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THE PEACE MOVEMENT AND THE SECURITY DEBATE IN CANADA

by

Kristen Ostling

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
January 1991
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(coercion) to induce others to act as the power wielders wish." (p. 12-13) Thus, in Kriesberg's framework of analysis for social conflicts, coercion is an important dynamic when parties in conflict seek to attain their respective interests. (p. 17) For Kriesberg, interests are defined as "objectives". Moreover, the concept of objectives is crucial to his definition of social conflict. According to Kriesberg: "A social conflict exists when two or more parties believe they have incompatible objectives." (p. 17)

Power is expressed at social, economic, political or ideological levels. In field or political economy, a social class' economic power will tend to determine its power at other levels. However, as Poulantzas (1976) stated in a very important debate: "Political or ideological power is not the simple expression of economic power" (p. 113). Rather, in Poulantzas' framework power relations are "... determined in the last instance by economic power." (p. 113) Poulantzas distinguished his definition of power from a whole tradition within the social sciences (including Lasswell, Mills, Weber and Parsons). According to Poulantzas, power can be defined as "... the capacity of a social class to realize its specific objective interests. (p. 113)

From a Canadian perspective, Cranford Pratt (1984) examines the conflict and power relations between a dominant class and a counter-consensus. According to Pratt's dominant class theory, there is significant state autonomy, but the state is "... heavily influenced by structural and class factors in ways that will favour capitalism in Canada and is especially attentive to the interests of the dominant class and its attitudes and values." (p. 100) The counter-consensus in Canada is represented by "... a substantial number of internationally minded public interest groups which are in serious opposition to many components of the present consensus which underlies Canadian foreign policy." (p. 100) According to Pratt, despite the fact that the discourse of the counter-consensus is not
The undersigned hereby recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research acceptance of this thesis, submitted by Kristen Ostling, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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Abstract

The thesis of this paper is that there is an emerging security debate in Canada and that this debate can be viewed as a conflict between social forces with divergent power, interests and discourses on security. In analyzing the nature of the debate and conflict, I will use the concepts of military-industrial complex and the peace movement as a social movement. The debate arising out of the government’s 1987 White Paper on Defence, Challenge and Commitment, will be used as a case study in chapters 3 and 5 of this thesis. Chapters 2 and 4 define two social forces in the debate, namely, Canada’s military-industrial complex and the peace movement.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the following people for their comments on this thesis at various stages of its development: Fen Hampson, John Sigler, Peter Bruck, Frances Cherry, David Langille, Peter Langille and Daiva Stasiulis.

I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of Vivian Cummins, resource coordinator of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs library.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for their support, patience and encouragement.

Of course, I take full responsibility for the final product.
Dedication

To Erik, Joe, Megan and Katherine.
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION

"The principal direct threat to Canada continues to be a nuclear attack on North America by the Soviet Union."
— Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada (1987)

"In today's world, our sovereignty is not threatened by military force or aggression. Our freedom and opportunity to realize our dreams for ourselves and our children rest on our response to the challenge of a more competitive world in the throes of economic change."
— Minister of Finance Michael Wilson, The Budget (February 20, 1990)

"To be honest, I can't find anyone who can write fast enough to keep up with the changes that are taking place in the world today."
—Defence Minister William McKnight, Globe and Mail, (February 16, 1990)

This thesis deals with an important point in history for the defence debate in Canada. In June 1987, the government of Canada released Challenge and Commitment, its first defence policy statement in 16 years. This 1987 White Paper offered an interpretation of threats to Canadian security within a Cold War environment and presented an ambitious program of military acquisitions. Since its release, a series of dramatic political changes in East/West relations has ushered in a new climate for world affairs.

The policies outlined in the 1987 White Paper immediately became the subject of conflict within many sectors of Canadian society. Some argued that the policies in the White Paper
did not go far enough in terms of military doctrine and spending. On the other hand, many Canadians were concerned that the policies presented were out of step with the dawning of a new era of détente between the superpowers; they were also concerned that increased defence spending would mean cutbacks in social programs. The Federal budgets of 1989 and 1990 gave way to worst case scenarios for both those seeking to ensure military spending as well as those in favour of maintaining social spending. Both defence and social spending cuts were introduced as part of an overall program of deficit-cutting measures.

Focusing particularly on the time period between 1987 and 1990, the purpose of this thesis is to develop an understanding of the basis of the conflict and debate on security in Canada. Yet, whether it is even possible to speak of a debate on security in Canada is a contested issue. For instance, writing in 1989, Kim Nossal stated that "... the lack of debate in Canada is neither puzzling nor discouraging: We have no debate because there is nothing to debate. On defence policy, Canadians are in unusual agreement and that is not such a bad thing." Nossal went on to argue "... what opposition there is to Canada's present security posture stems from symbolic, as opposed to concrete interests ..." (p. 4).

In contrast, the argument advanced in this thesis is that there is a security debate in Canada based on a conflict of power, interests and discourse. The exploration of this contention will be guided by the following group of questions:

(1) How can we conceptualize the debate? Who are the social forces\(^1\) involved? What conflicting interests, power bases and discourses on security are involved?

\(^1\)In *Naming the moment: political analysis for action* (1989), Deborah Barndt defines "forces" as "social groups or institutions which shape events and are shaped by them; these groups represent particular interests, dominant or oppressed." (p. 83)
(2) What factors explain the contradiction between an ambitious military program set out in the 1987 White Paper on defence and the subsequent defence spending cutbacks imposed in 1989 and 1990?

(3) How did the peace movement and the public react to the 1987 White Paper? To what extent did the peace movement play a role in the defence budget cuts? Does the peace movement offer an alternative or counter-hegemonic security project?

Some answers to these questions will be discussed in the chapters that follow. However, before proceeding some preliminary explanation and conceptual orientation are required.

*Debate and Discourse:*

There are many ways of conceptualizing a debate in society. Sometimes debate takes the shape of formal argument between opposing sides. However, in this case, I am not referring to a formal debate with two sides and an agreed upon set of rules. What is being referred to as a “debate” in this thesis is the interplay of different discourses on peace and security.

A discourse can be defined as a specific and distinctly structured way of thinking and speaking about reality. Within a society it is possible to locate different discourses. (Bruck, 1989; Walker, 1983-1984) For some it may be difficult to speak of conflicting discourses on security issues because a dominant discourse on security issues may overshadow other discourses and give the appearance of an overall consensus. However, it is usually possible to locate various other ways of speaking about security issues.

Peter Bruck (1989) distinguishes between five main discourses presented within the media: "(a) the discourse of the leaders of state, (b) bureaucratic-technical discourse, (c) the
scientific-technical discourse, (d) the discourse of victims, (e) the discourse of survival." (p. 119) The first three discourses can be viewed as part of the dominant discourse, the latter two as discourses of dissent, counter-consensus, or alternatives.

R.B.J. Walker (1983-1984) discusses the concept of a "discourse of dissent". Walker explains:

... societies cohere around deeply structured patterns of consensus and legitimacy. These patterns are expressed in hegemonic or dominant ideological forms and discourses which have become an increasingly important instrument of political power and social control. The prevailing structures of knowledge are simultaneously structures of power. As a consequence, attempts to articulate critical and emancipatory positions — a discourse of dissent — become co-opted, dejected or even made self-defeating. (p. 304)

The dominant discourse on security is spoken by sectors of the state, business and the military. (Bruck, 1989) There is evidence of the existence discourses outside of the dominant one, in the growing attention to peace and security issues within civil society: in the media, educational institutions, social groups and movements. In particular, the peace movement articulates an alternative way of speaking about peace and security. My analysis of the security debate in Canada focuses on the conflict between two social forces: the peace movement and the military industrial complex.

*Power and Interests*

Power is frequently viewed as the capacity of a social class to dominate over another through force or the threat of coercion. Louis Kriesberg (1982) uses the concept of power to refer to "... a person's or group's use (actual or threatened) of negative sanctions
(coercion) to induce others to act as the power wielders wish." (p. 12-13) Thus, in Kriesberg's framework of analysis for social conflicts, coercion is an important dynamic when parties in conflict seek to attain their respective interests. (p. 17) For Kriesberg, interests are defined as "objectives". Moreover, the concept of objectives is crucial to his definition of social conflict. According to Kriesberg: "A social conflict exists when two or more parties believe they have incompatible objectives." (p. 17)

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marginal to Canadian society, counter-consensus groups remain peripheral to the decision-making process because they are not part of the dominant class.

In this thesis, power is viewed from two angles. Social forces can exercise power as "power over" others. Power can also be expressed or in a more socially shared or participatory mode as "power with". These two views of power are not mutually exclusive. For example, a social class may operate on both levels. However, my analysis of the differences in power between the military-industrial complex and the peace movement in Canada will not focus on a concept of power as the ability of one social class achieve its interests through coercion or the threat of coercion. Instead, I will focus on the differences in the power bases of two social forces (both of which are comprised of more than one social class) from a structural and ideological point of view.²

_Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony_

In exploring the ideological elements of the conflict on security in Canada, I situate my analysis of the debate within the conceptual framework of hegemony. In using the concept of hegemony our attention is drawn to the power of ideas, consciousness and social relations in the reproduction, challenge and transformation of reality (Boggs, 1986, p. 242).

The concept of hegemony has been widely discussed in recent years. It has been applied to many levels of analysis within various disciplines. Within the field of international

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²Barndt (1989) defines a structural analysis as "an understanding of the underlying principal contradictions reflected in the more permanent structures of society, an analysis of domination/oppression." (p. 83) To Barndt's definition I would add that a structural analysis may also include an analysis of relationships of empowerment and liberation. A contradiction is defined as "opposing social and economic interests, whether these be principal and structural such as the contradiction between rich and poor, or secondary and temporary such as the contradiction between multinational business favouring free trade and small businesses which stand to lose from it." (Barndt, p. 83).
relations, hegemony is used in "neo-realist" discourse to describe the stabilization of the international system of relations through the presence of a hegemon (Keohane, 1981). Building on the Gramscian notion of hegemony, hegemony in the "realist" variant of critical theories has led some analysts to discussions of unending domination — a phenomenon which can be referred to as hegemonic closure.³

In this thesis, hegemony is used as a labrys — an analytic tool which cuts in at least two directions.⁴ It can be used to understand both how the status-quo is perpetuated as well as how reality can be transformed. Hegemony is never seamless — without contradictions or challenges. Thus, in discussing the Canadian security debate, I look at both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces. Both the peace movement and the military-industrial complex attempt to provide "leadership" in terms of the security debate. However, their respective modes of organization, discourse and interests diverge greatly.

*Militarism and the Military-Industrial Complex*

The structures and consequences of militarism have been well-documented.⁵ Militarism is a pervasive phenomenon. Dieter Senghaas views militarism as "...a tendency of all modern high-technology countries, capitalist or socialist." (quoted in Berghahn, 1981, p. 101) The militarization of the Third World has also been the subject of many analyses (see for example: Chomsky and Herman, 1979; Dos Santos, 1977).

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³Peter Bruck (1989) refers to this phenomenon as ideological closure (p. 126)
⁴A labrys is a double-sided axe. On the double-sidedness of language, see Mary Daly (1984)
⁵See, for example: E.P. Thompson et al. (1982); Mary Kaldor and Ashbørn Eide (1979); Mary Kaldor (1982); Dan Smith and Ron Smith (1983); Johan Galtung (1984); William Arkin and Richard Fieldhouse (1985); Saul Mendlovitz and R.B.J. Walker (1987); Ruth Leger Sivard (1989).
Like most "isms", the definition of militarism has been debated. A common dictionary
definition of military is: "of or relating to soldiers, arms or war", "of or characteristic of
war" and "experienced or inclined to war". One of the primary definitions of militarism in
the same dictionary is "a policy of aggressive military preparedness." (Webster's, 1979, p.
723). Michael Mann (1984) gives a typical definition: Militarism is ". . . an attitude and
set of institutions which regard war and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable
activity." (p. 25) War is much easier to define. McMurtry (1989) sums up the definition of
war as the "organized armed engagement that seeks by maximally efficient means to kill or
mutilate large numbers of other human beings." (p. 5).

In Volker Berghahn's (1981) Militarism: The History of an International Debate, 1861-
1979, militarism is examined within a number of paradigms over the past century.

Berghahn isolates two types of militarism historically:

The first type emerged in preindustrial and industrializing societies. It was
characterized by the self-exclusiveness of the military sphere, an emphasis
on an all-pervasive militaristic spirit to be generated by indoctrination and
through large-scale para-military organizations, and by means of an
austerity programme. The second type is to be found in industrialized high-
technology society. It is marked by a civil-military symbiosis, operating
within a predominantly civilian, mass-consumption society and relying on
the deterrent value of push-button nuclear armoury. (p. 116)

The term "military-industrial complex" refers to the political and economic structures which
promote contemporary militarism. The concept draws linkages among sectors of industry,
state bureaucracy and the military, which help to sustain the political, economic, social and
ideological bases for militarism in contemporary societies. The concept can be situated
within an area of political economy which undertakes a socio-economic critique of
militarism (Walker, 1983-84, p. 306). However, President Dwight Eisenhower is
generally attributed with popularizing the term "military-industrial complex". In his
farewell address (1961), Eisenhower referred to the development of a coalition of interests
in the post-war period working to further the process of militarization in the United States (see: Dyer, 1985, p. 216).

Today, the military-industrial complex can be viewed as a global phenomenon. Specific networks operate between military industries, state bureaucracies and military establishments — albeit the strength of the complex varies from country to country. What is being suggested here is not that there exists a global structural entity which could be referred to as a global military-industrial complex. Instead, what is being proposed is that it is possible to conceptualize military-industrial complexes operating through transnational military institutions (NATO, WTO, etc.), transnational military corporations and government agencies responsible for military production and policies.

Security: Conflicting definitions

Since the term is central to the conflict examined in this thesis, "security" must be defined. Security means different things in different contexts of discourse. Indeed, in a society two different sectors may claim that their goals or interests are to promote security, but their definitions of security may diverge greatly in orientation.

In the realm of military discourse, security is generally measured in terms of military capabilities: Security is viewed primarily from the perspective of defending against military attacks through military arrangements, both within the nation-state and collectively between nation-states belonging to the same military alliance. From the viewpoint of militarists, security is the domain of military experts and arms contractors. Security planning is usually a highly secretive and specialized process taking place primarily outside of the purview of civilians.
The peace movements which emerged throughout the world in the 1980s have begun to reclaim the concept of security and challenge the militarist definition of security. In contrast to the traditionally accepted militarist concept of security, peace movements are redefining security in terms of an ethic of justice: a 'positive peace' brought about through political, economic, social and even environmental security — a state of peace which is far more than an absence of war. For instance, Norwegian peace researcher Birgit Brock-Utne defines positive peace as

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\ldots \text{the absence of violence in any given society, both internal and external, direct and indirect. We further mean the nonviolent results of equality of rights, by which every member of that society, through nonviolent means, participates equally in decisional power which regulates it, and the distribution of the resources which sustain it. (1985, p. 2)}
\]

Thus, within the field of discourse articulated by peace movements the scope of the concept of security is considerably expanded to include the goals of equality, health, education, employment and participatory democracy. Although the concept of defence still comes into play, the way to achieve a secure global reality does not rest on military power. Rather, the cornerstone of security is inextricably linked to meeting the social, political, economic needs of people and their environment (Brundtland, 1987).

Moreover, the concept of security developed within peace movements increasingly rests on an understanding of security as interdependent and held in common (Palme, 1979). Common security means going beyond 'alliance security' arrangements and formulating security policies based on the assumption that security cannot be attained simply by attending to considerations of a particular nation-state or alliances of nation-states. The dangers and needs we face are global. Security considerations must also be confronted with reference to a common global reality. Finally, the peace movement's perspective on security differs from the secretive and exclusionary conception of military security. The peace movement calls for the democratization of security decision-making.
The Peace Movement: A Social Movement

I will situate my analysis of the contemporary peace movement in Canada within the theoretical orientation of social movements. In the 1980s a large body of literature emerged to deal with the phenomenon of social movements. The growth in the literature has paralleled the growth in the movements. Today, we can observe the work of a number of movements for social change which cross-cut class and sometimes overlap. Some theorists of social movements have chosen to affix the prefix "new" to the concept of social movements in order to distinguish the contemporary movements dealing with issues related to the environment, women, natives, and peace, from 'older' movements such as workers' or union movements, which are based on social class (Touraine, 1981; Boggs, 1986; Offe, 1985; Cohen, 1985). Social movements express social conflicts (Touraine, 1981). The peace movement, seen from this perspective, is a social actor in conflict with the goals of the military-industrial complex.

The definitions offered so far are preliminary. They will be elaborated further throughout this thesis. With the conceptual orientation in mind that I have outlined up to this point, I will now proceed to map-out the organization of chapters.

The organization of chapters

Chapter 2 will situate the power, interests and discourse of the military-industrial complex in Canada vis-a-vis theories of the military-industrial complex. Chapter 3 will review the policy prescriptions and policy formation process of, as well as the effects of fiscal restraint on the 1987 White Paper. Chapter 4 will examine the power, interests and discourse of the
peace movement vis-a-vis theories of social movements. Chapter 5 will present an analysis of the peace movement's intervention in the debate on the 1987 White Paper. Chapter 6 will conclude by summing up the nature of the security debate examined herein and with some reflections on the future of the security debate in Canada.
CHAPTER 2:
THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX:
CONCEPT AND PRACTICE

How can we describe a pattern of interaction among government, business and the military which fosters militarization? Peace researchers have provided many critical analyses of how a complex of political, economic, social and ideological structures operates to reproduce global militarism. This chapter presents a conceptual orientation vis-à-vis the notion of a military-industrial complex. I will also discuss specific interests and "practices" of this complex in Canada.6

1. Conceptual orientation

The particular entity which I refer to as a military-industrial complex (MIC) has been designated as such by several Canadian authors (Regehr, 1987; Langille, 1990; Richardson, 1990). The military-industrial complex has also been referred to as a Military-Bureaucratic-Corporate-Intelligentsia Complex (MBCI) (Galtung, 1984), World Military Order (Kaldor and Eide, 1979) and Nuclear Infrastructure (Arkin and Fieldhouse, 1985).

Some differences exist between these concepts with regard to the emphasis placed on different components of the complex. For instance, Arkin and Fieldhouse (1985) present a notion of a global nuclear infrastructure that emphasizes the nuclear dimension of global military arrangements. Galtung's (1984) weighty term "Military-Bureaucratic-Corporate-Intelligentsia Complex" stresses the incorporation of elements of the bureaucracy and

6Practice can be defined as: '... social and political activity, how we act upon our beliefs and work toward our goals.' (Barndt, 1989 p. 83)
intelligentsia into the complex of interests which foster militarism. Kaldor and Eide (1979) suggest the existence of a "World Military Order", a concept which highlights the global coherence of the defence sector (armed forces/military strategists) and military industry. All of the above conceptual orientations share an emphasis on global, interlocking networks of economic and political interests which seek to promote militarism. Canada is situated within this global system and is thus affected by the political economy of militarism.

The concept of a military-industrial complex offers a way of looking at structural relationships which contribute to militarization through a pairing of interests among the military, industry and state (Smith and Smith, 1983). In Canada, the dominant discourse describes these relationships by applying the concepts of the defence industrial base, defence industrial preparedness and defence-industrial lobby groups (Cannizzo, 1989; Slack, 1989; Haglund, 1988; Canada, Challenge and Commitment, 1987).7

My use of the term military-industrial complex does not deny the existence of a defence-industrial base, defence lobby groups or the interests of this sector in fostering defence-industrial preparedness. On the contrary, by using the concept of a military-industrial complex we are taking into account the economic and political basis from which defence industrial lobby groups emerge. The concept of a military-industrial complex helps to orient our understanding toward the political and economic linkages which promote militarism.

Some analysts have expressed the viewpoint that the articulation of military, government, and business interests in a military-industrial complex represents a form of collusion or

7 In June 1989, Canadian Defence Quarterly devoted an issue to developing an understanding of these concepts. A defence industrial base is made of corporations working on research and development and production for military purposes. Defence-industrial preparedness is reflected in the ability of the defence industrial base to provide the machinery for defence and sustain military efforts during times of crisis. Defence industrial lobby groups defend and promote the interests of the armed forces and defence industries.
The fact that there is often secrecy and cover-ups in the operation of a military-industrial complex seems to have led to the conspiracy theory perspective. In my application of the concept of a military-industrial complex, I am acknowledging the existence of cooperation between government, business and the military. However, as Dan and Ron Smith (1983) point out:

The military-industrial complex, in general, functions not on the basis of conspiracy (though that happens) nor on the basis of bribery (though that also happens, especially if one recognizes that not all bribery is legally corrupt). Rather, it functions on the basis of a structural pairing that inevitably develops into mutual interests. (p. 74)

In a similar vein, Joseph Nye (1989) states: "To be sure there are corruption and waste in all areas of public life, but that is not the heart of the matter. It is the politics and decision-making devices of defense that we should be concentrating on." (p. vii-viii)

Military-industrial complexes operate differently according to their particular geo-political and economic situation. Thus, when speaking of the existence of a military-industrial complex in Canada, the entity which is being referred to does not possess identical power and structural characteristics as the military-industrial complex of the United States.

That the defence lobby groups or the defence-industrial base of a given nation-state are not particularly robust (i.e. not at a high level of defence industrial preparedness), does not mean that a military-industrial complex does not exist. It may simply indicate that the linkages of the military-industrial complex are not as strong as in other nation-states. That is, the complex is not as evolved. The relative weakness of the military-industrial complex, in Canada, may affect the latitude of its operation and ability to ensure that policies in its interest are developed and carried through.

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8See Regeur's (1987) critique of Melman.
There are many ways in which the Canadian version of the military-industrial complex differs from the U.S. version. First, the Canadian defence industry is largely a branch-plant of the U.S. defence industry. Second, in Canada, the military-industrial complex is not as powerful, permanent or organized as it is in the United States. Third, the military-industrial complex in Canada operates in a different domestic decision-making environment.\(^9\)

In order to understand how the military-industrial complex operates in Canada, I will look at the roles played by the government, business and the military. The major criterion for locating the existence of a military-industrial complex is that it is possible to observe a pairing of interests among sectors of government, the military and industry which seek to promote militarism.

II. The Operation of Canada's Military-Industrial Complex

*The government and the military-industrial complex:*

Government\(^10\) plays an important role and becomes a link in the military-industrial complex in Canada through its economic, political, administrative and ideological support.

The Canadian government's role in the military-industrial complex is primarily, though not exclusively, a subsidiary and supportive one. Canada contributes to global arms

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\(^10\)The military is part of the government or state. The state is a broader concept than government. In Gramscian terms, repressive state apparatuses include: the government, the administration, the army, the police, the courts, the prisons — all of which ultimately function by violence. The ideological state apparatuses include: the churches, the educational system, the family, trade unions, the media, the political and legal state apparatuses. The latter two also belong to the system of repressive state apparatus. For a discussion of various theories of the state, see: Martin Carnoy, (1984).
production by providing subsidies to defence industries, producing components of weapons systems, and testing delivery systems. The government plays an important function in the legitimation of militarism. Canadian participation in military programs, arms expenditures and involvement in the global arms trade is legitimated on the basis of assuring national security and sovereignty, commitments to military alliances, and economic development through the promotion of a defence industrial base.\textsuperscript{11}

In addition to the legitimation of defence decisions, many governments generally promote and market the defence industry. For instance, in Canada, the Defence Program Bureau (DPB) of External Affairs publishes the \textit{Canadian Defence Product Guide}. This guide has been described as the "Eaton's catalogue of the Canadian arms business." (Regehr, 1987, p. 97). The financial and marketing support the government gives military industries is crucial for sustaining the industry. As Regehr puts it: "Military production has, by definition, a single market: governments." (Regehr, 1987, p. 97).

The Canadian government's administrative facilitation of militarism takes place through its management of various inter-governmental arrangements on defence production. In particular, the Defence Production Sharing Arrangements (DPSA) played a role in the integration of Canadian and U.S. military production. The DPSA, established between Canada and the United States in 1959, gives Canadian defence industry access to U.S. defence contracts. The DPSA created a partial free trade in military commodities between Canada and the U.S.. According to Regehr:

\begin{quote}
The result is a high level of Canadian vulnerability to U.S. pressure. The rough balance and specialization features of the DPSA mean that Canada has developed substantial military production facilities, within the aerospace and
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{The government's discourse of legitimation of defence policies will be discussed further in Chapter 3.}
electromics industries in particular, that depend upon a single market—the Pentagon. 12

Michael Slack (1989) notes that the DPSA has helped to condition a distorted and dependent defence industry in Canada:

The DPSA has helped to produce a truncated and highly-specialized defence industry with comparatively little ability to indigenously design and produce complete weapons systems. Dependent to a significant extent on American contracts, components, machine tools, and research and development, the Canadian defence-industrial base can meet only a modest percentage of Canada's own defence equipment requirements. (p. 52)

In the same year as the DPSA, the Defence Industrial Productivity (DIP) program was set up as "... the main vehicle through which the Canadian government subsidizes research and development..." (Regehr, 1987, p. 108) in the defence industry. The DIP helps to make Canadian defence industry more competitive. Under the Defence Development Sharing Program (DDSA), established in 1963, Canadian defence industry can obtain complete funding for research and development projects: the United States can supply up to fifty percent and Canada the remaining fifty percent (Regehr, 1987, p. 107).

Government subsidies to the defence sector have developed in tandem with the growth of the Canadian defence industry. Through the DIP, the government contributed $52.2 million to the defence industry in 1978-79. By 1982-83, this figure had increased to $181.2 million. In 1989, DIP "... gave out $248.6 million, and increase of 6.8% over the previous year's total of $232.8 million." (Ploughshares Monitor, June 1990, p. 14). Annual DIP totals increased in the 1980s over two and half times. However, as Peter Langille (1988, November) points out, it is

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...very difficult to gauge the amount of government funding that is directed to the defence industry. Frequently programs of the Department of Defence; Industry, Trade and Commerce; Science and Technology, and Regional Economic Expansion, etc., overlap, and corporations producing military products receive funds through more than one specific government program. (p. 211)

Various sectors within the government bureaucracy are involved in facilitating funding and administration for military research, development, production and exports. At least five from a total of twelve government departments and agencies have programs directly or indirectly promote Canada/U.S. collaboration in defence initiatives, the Canadian defence industry and higher defence expenditures (Peter Langille, June 1988, p. 9). The various participating departments and agencies include: External Affairs, Department of Supply and Services, Department of Regional Industrial Expansion, the Minister of State for Science and Technology, the Canadian Commercial Corporation and, of course, the Department of National Defence.

Many of these government departments are involved in developing an integrated North American Defence Industrial Base (NADIB). The enhancement of continental defence industrial cooperation was agreed to by Prime Minister Mulroney and President Ronald Reagan in 1985 at their Shamrock Summit in March 1985. The two leaders pledged "...to work toward reducing barriers that existed in the North American defence market, improve the North American Defence Industrial Base (NADIB), and focus on industrial preparedness planning." (Purver, 1989, p. 132).

A Defence Industrial Preparedness Task Force (DIPTF) was established in May of 1985 by the Department of National Defence. The purpose of the DIPTF was to evaluate and make recommendations on the state of Canadian and U.S. defence industry. The report issued
by the Task Force recommended that defence industrial preparedness be defined as "... an integrated defence industrial planning with the United States Department of Defense..."\textsuperscript{13}

As a result of this task force, a charter was signed in March of 1987 between Canada and the U.S. formally established a North American Defence Industrial Base Organization (NADIBO). NADIBO's purpose is to

"... define ways to more effectively ensure complementary industrial support for North American security requirements. Much of its focus is to carry out peacetime industrial planning to ensure an adequate supply of equipment for the armed forces and sustenance of supply in times of war and crisis." (Purver, 1989, p. 132)\textsuperscript{14}

As in the U.S., the military-industrial complex in Canada brings together military industries, armed forces, military lobbies and sectors of government involved in various aspects of militarization. Many studies of the U.S. military-industrial complex have shown that "... a symbiotic relationship has developed among industry, the Department of Defense and the White House to manage and sustain military economic demand." (Regehr, 1987, p. 69) When speaking of the existence of a military-industrial complex in Canada, Regehr (1987) refers to a phenomenon that "... operates on a somewhat different scale, but the principles are the same."

The defence decision-making environment in Canada is conditioned by external factors such as influences of U.S. and European (NATO and NORAD) defence requirements and decisions. It is also affected by particular influences within the government. For instance,


budgetary restraint and Canada's post-war tradition of constructive internationalism\textsuperscript{15} have
had an ongoing constraining affect on the development of a Canadian military-industrial
complex. In the domestic decision-making environment, the government responds to
pressures for and against militarism. Defence policies can be affected by public pressures
through public opinion, the media, and citizen groups composed of both those seeking
further militarization and those seeking to give credence to the earlier internationalist role of
Canada as a peacemaker and peacekeeper.

The government's role in the military-industrial complex is defined by several factors.
Government intervenes economically in military production (military Keynesianism taking
the form of regional development through military programmes, subsidies, tax breaks for
military industries and increased taxation to pay for military programs).\textsuperscript{16} At the political
level the government helps to legitimate military policies by promoting them to the public.\textsuperscript{17}
The government also facilitates the administration of military policies through its liaison
function with other nation-states and by helping to manage the armed forces.

Although there is a pairing of interests in Canada among sectors of business, the military
and government, it is important to emphasize that the components of the military-industrial
complex operate with a relative degree of autonomy vis-à-vis each other.\textsuperscript{18} The relative
autonomy of the government vis-a-vis the military-industrial complex is manifested in
several ways:

(1) The interests of the military sector of the economy are not immediately translated into
government policy.

\textsuperscript{15}On the decline of constructive internationalism, see: Dewitt and Kirton (1983).
\textsuperscript{16}Military Keynesianism can be defined as a strategy to stimulate the economy through military spending.
\textsuperscript{17}For instance, the rational for cruise missile testing and low-level flight testing is that such testing was part of Canada's obligation to NATO.
\textsuperscript{18}On the concept of the relative autonomy of the state, see: Gregory Albo and Jane Jensen (1989, p. 180-211).
The pressure exerted by military organizations and defence industries does not assure that policy development will be along lines promoted by these organizations and industries. For instance, the defence budget cuts which occurred in April 1989 and February 1990, illustrate that even though the interests of a military-industrial complex may have been served through the policy development process (ie. the 1987 White Paper on defence), they were not carried through in the important game of the allocation of scarce resources. Not all sectors of the government or dominant social class have entrenched interests in militarization. Therefore, the interests of the military-industrial complex can be superceded by the efforts of other more dominant sectors of the economy and government.

(2) The government draws civil society into the military-industrial complex through its legitimation of defence policies, taxation, and by helping to promote production and employment in military industries. The non-democratic manner (the lack of public input, the secrecy and emphasis on expertism) through which security policies are developed is legitimated through the ideology of "national security".19 Parliament and the public are mostly excluded from debate and decisions on important security issues. The secrecy and mystification of the process of armament is predicated on military and economic motivations (keeping defence plans secret from enemies and stimulating the economy through military industrial mobilization). It also provides a mechanism whereby governments and military decision-makers can avoid public accountability.20

(3) Some sectors of the government permit concessions/overtures to the peace-oriented public and the peace movement. For instance, Prime Minister Trudeau's peace initiative;

20Global military spending is currently at about a trillion dollars per year with very little public input or accountability. See: Ruth Leger Sivard (1989).
the invitation of peace movement to participate in the government's hearings on security policy (eg., SCEAND and the Hockin-Simard Committee); the Canadian government's decision not to participate in SDI; the establishment of Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS); and the funding of peace groups through CIIPS and External Affairs all represent initiatives on the part of sectors of the government to accommodate the interests of a growing sector of the public concerned with militarization, including, the peace movement.

**Business and the military-industrial complex:**

The defining characteristic of Canadian military production is that it is geared to the development of a North American defence industrial base oriented primarily to the export of military components.

The anatomy of the Canadian defence industry is described in detail by Ernie Regehr (1987) in *Arms Canada* (p. 73-98). Canada's military production is primarily for export and concentrated in two industries, aerospace and communications, which are concentrated in the provinces of Quebec and Ontario. These two industries account for 75 percent of Canadian military exports. As previously mentioned, because of the DPSA, Canadian companies produce mostly parts of weapons systems. Some of the more well-known companies such as Litton, Boeing, CAE Electronics, the Canadian Commercial Corporation, Canadair, Canadian Marconi and Vickers have been producing components of nuclear weapons systems or nuclear-capable components since 1982. (Regehr, 1987, p. 241) These companies are also among the top fifteen recipients of DIP payments. (Regehr, 1987, p. 109)
In the 1980s, the defence industry became one of the leading growth sectors of the Canadian economy. Since the beginning of the 1980s, military spending has increased by over 43 percent (Robinson, 1990, p. 12). Economic gains have been made by high-tech, industrial and manufacturing sectors through military-related capital intensive production, government grants, tax breaks and access to U.S. markets through Canada/U.S. agreements (including the Defence Production Sharing Agreements and now Free Trade).\textsuperscript{21}

In Regehr's 1987 study, he found that "... Canada currently produces about $3 billion worth of military commodities annually (about two-thirds for export)...", (p. 67) Moreover, "Canadian military exports are the equivalent of almost 5 percent of world annual trade of about $50 billion." (p.17) Although Canada is not a leader in defence exports it is certainly a growing concern. Canadian defence exports nearly doubled between 1980 and 1981 from $481.7 million to $826.6 million. By 1985 Canadian defence exports increased to $1,902.7 million. In 1986 the defence industry in Canada was netting five billion dollars and projected military exports for 1988 indicated a forty three percent increase (Peter Langille, 1990, p. 91). The major recipient of Canadian defence and defence related products is the U.S. (Krause, 1988, pp. 7-8). Between 1959 and 1987, Canadian defence exports amounted to $13.490 billion. During this same period, Canadian defence imports from the U.S. totalled almost $16.5 billion (Purver, 1989, p. 131).

In 1986, "... eighteen of Canada's top twenty-five military contractors were branch plants of foreign-based multinationals" primarily originating from the U.S (Peter Langille, 1990,  

Over seventy-five per cent of Canadian military industry is foreign owned (Regehr, 1987). It is in this sense that the Canadian version of the military-industrial complex can be characterized as a branch-plant of the U.S. military-industrial complex. Under Free Trade, military production will become a more certain opportunity. It is important to keep in mind that both indigenous and foreign-based (primarily U.S.) corporations benefit from military production in Canada. There is a fairly substantial supportive relationship between the Canadian and U.S. military industries. Canada and the U.S. have over two hundred defence and research and development arrangements (Purver, 1989, p. 131).

Barlow (1989) and Coop (1988) argue that the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) may help to stem the protectionist moves within U.S. Senate and House of Representatives and encourage military industrial development in Canada. Under the Free Trade Agreement, military industry is one of the few sectors of the economy in which subsidization is possible. Article 2003 of the Free Trade Agreement permits subsidies to each country's security interests "relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition, and implements of war."

A study on the effects of the Free Trade Agreement on the economy by Jack Coop (1988), with Lawyers for Social Responsibility, shows how Free Trade can contribute to an accelerated militarization of the Canadian economy. According to Coop, the infrastructure for this development will be a

... system of Canadian subsidies to Canadian military industry and a bi-national framework of Canada/U.S. treaties in existence since 1959. The catalyst is the FTA's practical effect of eliminating all non-military subsidies traditionally relied upon by Canada for regional development and research and development (R&D). (p. 1)

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22 Peter Langille (1990) shows how Canadian decisions on security policy are integrally linked with decisions and processes taking place in the United States. Emrie Regehr's *Arms Canada* (1987) also documents the relationship as well as its economic and strategic consequences.
Moreover, Coop (1988) states that: "With the implementation of the FTA, Canada will increasingly be forced to rely on military spending as the only legal means of furthering its regional and R&D needs." (p. 1) Coop's assertion, of course, rests on whether the government will be able to legitimate this kind of expenditure in the context of a period of East-West détente.

Much along the same lines as Coop, Maude Barlow (1989), of the Council of Canadians, has argued that "... the FTA is the means by which the White Paper on Defence and the other reports, public and secret, are implemented." (p. 6) The "other reports" to which Barlow refers include a suppressed document composed by senior officials from the Departments of National Defence, External Affairs and International Trade. The document recommended that:

1) Canada and the U.S. create a "common defence economic market";
2) the two countries should "eliminate national boundaries" in the area of defence;
3) there should be a continental integration of defence production and;
4) the existing cooperative foundation must be expanded to make joint industrial planning by national defence and the Pentagon an integral part of continental defence." (quoted in Barlow, 1989, p. 5)

Barlow predicts that, because the only two areas permitted subsidization under Free Trade are energy and defence, 1) "There will be massive transfusion of private capital and public funds into the militarization of a continental North American system."(p. 6) and 2) "We must supply a proportion of our energy in perpetuity to the Americans, much of which will supply their defence industrial base."(p. 5)

Concerns have been expressed by industry and government regarding the inadequacies of defence industrial preparedness and the defence industrial base in Canada. It should not be surprising that Canada's defence industry is not seen to meet the particular needs of its
country's defence requirements. The Canadian defence industry's purpose is to supply primarily U.S. defence requirements and to service NATO security interests on the European front. In addition, Canadian industry sells components of military products, which are assembled in countries like the U.S., Britain and Switzerland, and are then sold to governments in the Third World, often repressive military regimes which are human rights violators (Regehr, 1987, pp. 137-158).23

In the 1980s, the business sector's promotion of militarism became more organized. One of the foremost advocates of a NADIB and increased military expenditures is the powerful Business Council on National Issues (BCNI). The BCNI is composed of chief executives officers of major corporations operating in Canada — most of which are multinational corporations. In 1987, the BCNI's Peter Cameron, became co-chair with the Defence Minister, Perrin Beatty, of the government's Defence Industry Advisory Committee. Since its foundation in 1976, the BCNI has which has been described by many observers as 'the voice of business' in Canada.

The BCNI's association with defence affairs coincided with the recognition of the financial opportunities arising from heightened Cold War tensions and the American arms buildup. In 1981, it launched its own Task Force on Foreign Policy and Defence. Through its extensive contacts within government and with several Ministers of Defence, the BCNI received high-level briefings at NATO and NORAD headquarters. Since the inception of the task force, it has been active with publications and presentations emphasizing the Soviet threat and the need for a Canadian military buildup. (Peter Langille, April/May, 1988, p. 19).

Despite the growth of Canada's defence industrial base, some defence analysts have declared it to be unimportant. John Treddenick (1988), for instance, has stated that "... by comparison to total economic activity in Canada, the defence industrial base must be judged as insignificant." (p. 42).

The defence industry in Canada is not the dominant sector of the economy. The dominant sector of Canada's economy is comprised of resource and financial capital. Indeed, Canadian manufacturing and high tech sectors are underdeveloped and have always played a secondary role in the economy. Canada has historically followed a staples-biased economic growth pattern.

In recent years there has been an increased tendency in government and industry to view military Keynesianism as an appropriate strategy for industrial development. Military spending in Canada (as in most countries) has both defence and economic objectives. Economic benefits are now often cited as an integral part of the objectives of the military spending and programming (Langille, 1990, p. 98; Canada, Challenge and Commitment, 1987).

In 1984, the Minister for Science and Technology issued a report stating that:

We do not advocate the creation of a Canadian military-industrial complex as a means of stimulating technology development. But we do advocate the equivalent: a policy that would effectively utilize the federal government's immense purchasing power to promote private sector innovation." (Canada, Ministry of State for Science and Technology, July 1984, p.13-14)

The Aerospace Industries Association of Canada expressed a similar viewpoint in their testimony before the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and Defence (SCEAND) in October of 1985. It stated that military research and development are "essential to our ability to continue to be world competitive" and that "there is no doubt that high technology defence requirements are a major driving force" behind successful

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industrial development. (Quoted in Regehr, 1987, p. 67) As Regehr, puts it: "The arms industry in Canada is ( . . .) not so much a 'defence industry' concerned with Canadian military needs as it is a military industry with economic objectives." (1987, p. 68)

The Canadian arms industry is not focused on the specific requirements for Canadian defence. Rather, decisions on defence spending and programming are often framed within the context of the importance of sustaining and developing a Canadian defence industrial base which is integrated into the larger framework of the North American defence industrial base. The objective of "defence industrial preparedness" in Canada is tied into satisfying the needs of the North American defence industrial base.

No doubt, concerns regarding the lack of robustness of the defence industry in Canada have also been generated by the fact that the government has often had to come to the rescue of industries with a large interest in defence contracting. For instance, the government has, over the years, made some companies such as DeHavilland and Canadair, crown corporations and then sold them back to the public sphere. According to Regehr (1987), the government subsidized the two companies by $2.5 billion dollars ( p. 111).

The fact that Canadian industry does not meet the needs of defence requirements is underscored by the high level of Canadian military imports — primarily from the U.S. Despite the growth in Canadian military exports, Canada continues to import more military products than it exports (Cannizzo, 1989).

Moreover, Canada's lag behind other NATO nations in terms of military spending has been of concern to both business and the armed forces. According to Pierre Touchette (1987) of The Library of Parliament's Research Branch (Economics Division),
One of the reasons Canada lags behind other countries in terms of military spending is that the country lacks the large military industrial complex which makes for big business in those countries which are large armament exporters. Countries with large armament industries can afford to spend staggering amounts on military procurement since most of the procurement is domestically sourced. (p. 2)

The military establishment and the military-industrial complex:

As a result of a more military-industrial approach to defence in the latter half of the 1980s, the institutionalized interests of militarism in Canada stood to regain some of the status they lost during the seventies due to the thaw in the Cold War, the prevalence of the assumption of a short-war policy, and the decrease of defence spending.\textsuperscript{25}

In addition to the business lobby concerned with military production, there is also a growing group of lobbies within the military sector which have been arguing for increased military production and spending. These groups include: the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA), the Federation of United Military Services, the Canadian Defence Preparedness Association, the NATO Industrial Advisory Group, the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (Peter Langille, 1990, p. 110-118).

The Conference of Defence Associations brings together representatives of the Canadian Armed Forces, government and business to study defence problems and promote efficiency within the different branches of the armed forces. The CDA is unique in that it is a lobby group which is directly dependent on the Department of National Defence for organizational and financial support.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{25} In Chapter 3, the shift from the short-war policy to the long-war policy will be defined in greater detail in relation to the 1987 white paper on defence. See: Langille (1990), p. 82-83.

\textsuperscript{26} William Yost, former Brigadier General in the Canadian armed forces, and Director General of CDA, has emphasized the importance of defence industrial preparedness through industrial mobilization and the strengthening of the North American defence industrial base. See: Peter Langille, (June 1988) p. 16.
The structural pairing between business, government and military is also apparent in the policy proposals and organization of the Canadian Defence Preparedness Association (formally the Canadian Chapter of the American Defence Preparedness Association). The Canadian president of the organization, Rear Admiral Dudley Allen (ret.) has stated that: "This association is about communication; between government and industry executives, and between military users and the industry that must support them." (Canadian Chapter American Defence Preparedness Association, 1987, March/April, p. 1).

As a consequence of the particular form of structural pairing between military industries, government and the military establishment that has taken place in Canada, Canadian defence policies have become attuned to the needs of the armament sector of business in North America and to the political needs of U.S. and NATO defence strategies. In order to continue cooperation and solidarity with U.S. military industry, Canada must also demonstrate cooperation and solidarity with U.S. military initiatives. (Project Ploughshares, no date, p. 50). Although Canada has commitments to the defence of its European allies, there is a growing tendency to emphasize the defence of North America (Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 1989, p. 54).

Canada's armed forces cooperate with the U.S. in alliance security arrangements. Canada is linked to U.S. warfighting strategies militarily and politically through NATO and NORAD. Economically, Canada is linked to warfighting strategies through its production of components of U.S. weapons systems. The push towards military production also increasingly means Canadian contribution to Third World conflicts. In the search for new markets, Canada is contributing to the erosion of security in the Third World by helping to prolong and make more deadly Third World conflicts through its supply of military components.
Alliances have developed to serve the interests of various components involved in militarism. For instance, many military industries have formed consortia in order to produce complete weapons systems (Peter Langille, 1990, p. 95). Business and defence lobbies cooperate and overlap in their promotion of policy. The role of the armed forces, military strategists and defence lobbies is to provide the rationale for militarization in terms of economic as well as military security. The institutionalized interests of militarism encourage the defence industry both ideologically and by facilitating business opportunities.

Canada's integration with the U.S. military-industrial complex has had a negative impact on its ability to develop more constructive foreign and defence policies. Middlemiss and Sokolsky accord a large degree of Canadian autonomy and flexibility vis-a-vis U.S. security policy. However, we have seen that there are various economic, political and defence agreements between the U.S. and Canada which condition the directions of Canadian security policy.

Although the military-industrial complex in Canada is not as entrenched as it is in the United States, the concept is still applicable in Canada. Defence industries, defence lobby groups and a defence-industrial base exist and appear to have gained strength over the past decade. The military sector of Canada's economy is not dominant. However, it does play an important role in Canada's economy. The very nature of military production and markets necessitate government involvement. The Canadian government intervenes to a significant extent in military production due to its potential to develop Canada's truncated high-technology and manufacturing sectors. There is definitely a confluence of power and interests between the government, defence business and the military establishment in Canada. Boyce Richardson has recently summed up the situation as follows:
Around this growing arms business has clustered a formidable lobby of 300 defence firms, the armed forces, and twelve departments and agencies of the federal government, allied in what can justifiably be called our own military-industrial complex that has been working unceasingly for the rearment, militarization, and continentalization of Canada.” (1990, p. 215)
CHAPTER 3:

THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE 1987 WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE

In this chapter I discuss the politics surrounding the making of *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada* (1987). The 1987 White Paper on defence will be analyzed in terms of policy prescriptions and the consequences of fiscal restraint for Canada's defence policy.

The directions of the Canadian security policy, as set out in the Department of National Defence's 1987 White Paper on defence, can be understood in the context of the second Cold War environment and the development of the military-industrial complex in Canada. *Challenge and Commitment* affirmed Canada's participation in warfighting doctrines and accompanying strategies of military industrial development. The structural pairing and momentum of military-industrial interests in the 1980s led to what is the most militarist expression of defence policy in recent Canadian history. However, there is an obvious contradiction between Canada's most recent statement of defence policy and the defence budget cutbacks of 1989 and 1990.

*Challenge and Commitment: Policy Prescriptions*

(1) *Threat Assessment*

The historical backdrop to *Challenge and Commitment* was nearly a decade of intense Cold War tensions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The fact that this environment heavily
influenced the policy prescriptions of *Challenge and Commitment* is reflected in the White Paper's assessment of a strategic environment which focuses on the threat posed to Canada by the East/West conflict.

Canada's previous 1971 White Paper claimed that the biggest threat to Canada was the possibility of a nuclear exchange between the superpowers. A new nuance in the threat assessment was introduced in the 1987 White Paper. *Challenge and Commitment* stated that: "the most serious direct threat to Canada is a Soviet nuclear attack on North America." (p. 17).

Thus, between the 1971 and 1987 White Papers the threat assessment changed. In 1971, the major threat to Canada was based on the possibility of a nuclear exchange for which both the Soviet Union and the United States would share responsibility. In 1987, the threat assessment was based on a situation in which the Soviet Union alone would bear responsibility for initiating an attack on North America.

The Cold War orientation of the 1987 White Paper quickly became outdated. The authors of the White Paper did not anticipate the relaxation in Cold War tensions, the INF treaty and a new wave of détente between the superpowers. Some analysts of the White Paper have been critical of the Cold War posturing in the document and the exaggeration of the Soviet threat.  

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27 For the peace movement's critique see Chapter 5.
28 In its *Defence Update 1988*, DND was forced to acknowledge the importance of the INF treaty and softened and some of its Cold War posturing. A *Defence Update 1988* was never released. It was scheduled for the Fall of 1989 and would have had to explain how DND would proceed without the acquisitions proposed in the 1987 white paper. A completely new policy statement is apparently in the wings.
Military spending and acquisitions

The analysis of the structure of a military-industrial complex in Chapter 2 of this paper revealed that such a complex involves a coalition of interests dependent upon economic support of the state. After the 1987 White Paper on defence military spending in Canada was "... rising faster than any other area of government expenditure, except for interest on the national debt." (quoted in Peter Langille, 1990) Between fiscal years 1984/85 to 1988/1989 annual defence funding grew about 6 percent annually (8.8 billion to 11.1 billion). This growth took place in the context of fiscal restraint "when total government spending (excluding defence) was increasing at about 3.3 percent annually." (Canada, "Budget Papers", p. 23).

Although Challenge and Commitment made a commitment to spend $183 billion on defence over the next fifteen years, the cost of the total package was estimated by many sources to be much higher. Some defence industry sources optimistically predicted that "the scope of expenditures the Canadian government has in mind will require annual after-inflation increases in the defence budget of up to 6.5% — which would almost double military spending over the next fifteen years." (The Wednesday Report, September 23, 1987).

On one level, the decision of the 1987 White Paper on defence to significantly increase military spending can be viewed in light of the eagerness on the part of defence industries to profit from the arms race and military contracts. According to David Langille (1988), some defence industries...

... believed that military spending would prime the pump of the domestic economy without inflating labour costs, as more traditional Keynesian policies threatened to do. Military spending offered a high-tech industrial strategy that subsidized research and development and guaranteed profits." (p. 201)
As stated in the 1987 White Paper, significant increases in military spending were needed to finance the ambitious procurement programs. The rationale for new acquisitions was based on an assessment that: "After decades of neglect, there is indeed a significant 'commitment-capability gap'." (p. 43) The problem of "rust-out" and obsolescence in Canadian military equipment led to a situation in which the Armed Forces were over-committed in relation to their military capabilities. Thus, the challenge set out in Challenge and Commitment was to address the "commitment-credibility gap" problem through increased military expenditures and acquisitions.

The most publicized aspect of the 1987 White Paper was its proposal to substantially increase military spending in order to accomplish an ambitious procurement program. The acquisition which gained the most attention was the proposed purchase of a fleet of 10 to 12 nuclear-powered submarines. In addition to submarines, the 1987 White Paper acquisitions program included the following:

- an additional six frigates (beyond the six under construction)
- installation of a fixed under-ice surveillance system in the Arctic
- development of new sonar for surface ships
- new shipborne ASW helicopters
- an additional six maritime long-range patrol aircraft and modernization of existing medium-range aircraft
- mine countermeasures vessels
- CF-18 replacement
- new tanks for Canada's European forces
- the purchase of 820 all-terrain vehicles
- increases in the number of military personnel (a tripling of Canada's reserve force) (Challenge and Commitment, 1987).

Military strategy and doctrine

According to the 1987 White Paper, within the framework of collective security (participation in NATO and NORAD), Canada's new defence policy was designed to contribute to:
- maintenance of strategic deterrence,
- credible conventional defence,
- protection of Canadian sovereignty,
- peaceful settlement of international disputes, and
- effective arms control. (Challenge and Commitment, 1987, p. 49)

Although, DND's policy emphasizes deterrence, alliance security arrangements have been based primarily on warfighting doctrines. In terms of strategic orientation, the White Paper supported both nuclear warfighting and conventional long-war warfighting capabilities (Challenge and Commitment, p. 55-57). In June of 1987, Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty stressed that: "All of this machinery must be bought not simply for its utility in peace but for its utility in war." (Hansard, June 18, 1987). Moreover, in order to reaffirm Canada's role in conventional warfighting, Beatty stated that "... a protracted non-nuclear conflict would be possible without escalation to a nuclear exchange."  

The 1987 White Paper did not explicitly acknowledge the shift from deterrence to extended deterrence and nuclear warfighting strategies, which took place in U.S. defence policy after Canada released its 1971 White Paper. However, it did accept the legitimacy of the concept of nuclear warfighting. The 1987 White Paper stated that "the only effective counter" to the threat of a nuclear attack on North America "is a strategy of deterrence based on the maintenance of diversified nuclear forces." (p. 17). The document goes on to describe the basic nuclear warfighting scenario which it argues makes deterrence 'stable':

29The term "warfighting" is used in official U.S. policy statements. However, the 1987 White Paper shied away from using the term. Retired Canadian Major-General, Leonard Johnson, explains the evolution of nuclear warfighting strategies. (See: Leonard Johnson, 1988, pp. 16-34.) Johnson specifies four periods in the evolution of nuclear warfighting doctrines: First, between 1949 and 1961 the doctrine of "massive retaliation" was in effect. This nuclear strategy "threatened an all-out nuclear response to any Soviet use of nuclear weapons." (p. 21) Second, between 1961 and 1965, John F. Kennedy and Robert McNamara developed the doctrine of "flexible response". The strategy of flexible response gave military and political leaders the choice between nuclear and conventional options "to respond to any contingency from sub-conventional insurgency in the U.S. economic domain to general nuclear war." (p. 23) Third, the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) came into use between 1965-1974. Under MAD, the strategy was that nuclear war would be deterred due to the massive destructiveness for both sides if a nuclear war were to occur. Finally, at the beginning of 1974, the second term of the Nixon Administration, the era of "Selective Options and Nuclear Warfighting" came into effect.
forces must be capable of surviving an attack and retaliating in a manner so devastating as to convince any potential aggressor that the penalty he risks incurring far outweighs any gain he might hope to achieve. Each superpower now has the capacity to obliterate the other, even after having absorbed a nuclear strike. For that reason, the structure of mutual deterrence today is effective and stable. The Government believes that it must remain so. (p. 17)

In the 1987 White Paper, acceptance of nuclear warfighting is based on two assumptions: "(1) war can be limited to conventional means; but (2) if limitation fails, nuclear war is winnable at acceptable cost."31

The White Paper, of course, also reaffirmed its support for "strategic deterrence" (as described above) through participation in the military alliances of NATO and NORAD. It also introduced support for a new U.S. warfighting strategy. A one line statement in the White Paper refers to Canadian participation in the U.S. Air Defence Initiative (ADI).32

Although Canada's commitment to ADI research is mentioned in the 1987 White Paper in the context of military surveillance (p. 55-59.), participation in ADI would expand Canada's role in nuclear warfighting.33 The ADI program is being designed to survive a nuclear attack and contribute to continued nuclear confrontation. With regard to ADI, the U.S. Air Force has noted:

A more survivable capability is needed to satisfy additional air defense objectives for surveillance during periods of continuing nuclear conflict. These objectives include warning of bomber and cruise missile attacks upon the surviving force and inhibiting post-attack reconnaissance. . . . We want to develop sensors that are survivable with a mobile capacity. The air

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31 These assumptions are discussed in a paper by the Veterans Against Nuclear Arms (1988), p. 5.
32 The line is: "We also plan to participate in research on future air defence systems in conjunction with the United States Air Defence Initiative." Challenge and Commitment, p. 56, 57.
33 Other examples of Canada's participation in warfighting strategies include cruise missile testing and dual (nuclear and conventional) capability low-level flight training.
platforms will get off the ground and recover to keep fighting. (Defense Weekly, 1986, June 23.)

ADI is part of SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative) and both are subsumed under the Strategic Defence Architecture (SDA) program. Thus, DND's participation in ADI potentially draws Canada further into SDI.

The shift from short-war to long-war policy was an important new feature of Canadian defence strategy introduced in the 1987 White Paper (see: Peter Langille 1988, 1989, 1990). In Canada's 1971 White Paper on defence it was assumed that conventional war would quickly escalate to a nuclear exchange. Thus, Canada pursued a conventional short-war capability.

The long-war policy introduced in the 1987 White Paper necessitates a higher degree of defence industrial preparedness, which can be defined as "... the preparation of both the forces and a defence industrial base capable of sustaining protracted conventional war-fighting." (Peter Langille, 1988, November, p. 50).

In the 1987 White Paper, defence industrial preparedness is seen as the ability of "our industrial base (. . .) to respond to the need of our armed forces and those of our allies, both for initial readiness and for follow-on sustainment." (Challenge and Commitment, p. 74.) The long-war policy helps to provide the rationale for defence industrial preparedness and the mobilization of the defence industrial base. According to the head of the Conference of Defence Associations: "The short-war policy hurt the Armed Forces and the defence industry." (Quoted in Peter Langille, 1988, November p. 142).

Within the context of the 1987 White Paper, the long-war policy can be seen as vehicle through which defence industry and the armed forces were to be provided legitimation, enhanced relevance, and elevated status.

"Defence industrial preparedness", described in the 1987 White Paper as one the foundations of defence, is secured though the stimulation of a "defence industrial base". The White Paper states: "On a continuing basis and as determined by extensive study, industrial preparedness measures will be pursued by the Government to enhance the responsiveness of the defence industrial base." (p. 75). According to the 1987 White Paper, one of the primary means through which the Canadian defence industrial base will be expanded is through increased Canadian participation in the North American Defence Industrial Base (NADIB) (p. 75).

_The Making of the 1987 Defence White Paper_

_The Intra-governmental dimension of policy-making_

What was the policy-making process for the 1987 White Paper? Defence policy is developed within the context of a complex web of bureaucratic decision-making. The current structure for defence policy-making is characterized by the practice of scientific management, attempting "...to exhibit a flow of rationality from goals and objectives through planning, programming, budgeting to operations." (Bland, 1987, p. 11). The overriding and ongoing problem for defence policy-makers has been the question of matching financing with military needs (Bland, 1987, p. 216). Indeed, this problem was a

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35 On the making and administration of defence policy in Canada, see: Douglas Bland (1987).
36 Bland describes the current period of defence administration as the "Management Era." Over the period between 1960 and 1972, the "Management Era" of defence policy administration was born.
major factor in the conflicts involved in the 1987 White Paper policy-making process and in
the aftermath of the release of the document.

The 1987 White Paper was only the third issued since 1964. Bland (1988) reviews how
"... each paper was prepared in unique ways" (p. 1). What was particularly distinctive
about the policy development of the 1987 White Paper was that it was generated almost
completely "in house" (Bland, 1988, p. 16). Bland goes on to explain:

... the appreciation of the world situation was developed by defence
officials using for the most part information drawn from Canadian, NATO,
American, and other Allied sources. Not surprisingly this assessment
supports the "realist" preferences of the defence establishment: the Soviet
Union plays a leading role in the world's security problems; power in terms
of military assets, is the currency of security; and the military defence of
Canada is the aim of national defence policy. (p. 16)

As with previous White Papers, the Minister of National Defence played a key role in the
policy development process. Perrin Beattie's preoccupation was with presenting a White
Paper to Cabinet which would have the full support of the defence establishment (Bland,
1988, p. 21). Thus, in the preparation of the 1987 White Paper, Beattie's major activity
was developing a consensus within the defence establishment on policy orientation.
Government White Papers will typically go through several drafts. In the consensus-
building process for the 1987 White Paper, the document went through approximately
twenty drafts (Bland, 1988, p. 21).

Ultimately, a White Paper must be approved by Cabinet. Some of the proposals put
forward in the 1987 document immediately became the subject of conflict within Cabinet.
For instance, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark was concerned about the overall
directions of the document, and especially about the proposed acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines.37

The strongest challenge to the proposed defence program came from the Minister of Finance, Michael Wilson. Wilson was not opposed to the assessment of the military requirements set out in the 1987 White Paper. His apprehension was primarily about "the ability of the government to meet the fiscal demands of the program" (Bland, 1988 p. 20). Again, the submarine acquisition programme was at the centre of the conflict. The proposed military expenditure of eight billion dollars for nuclear-powered submarines, was difficult for Finance Minister Wilson to accept in the context of his plans for a belt-tightening budget aimed at lowering the deficit. Despite such conflicts within Cabinet, the 1987 White Paper was finally accepted "in principle" and tabled in Parliament on June 5, 1987.

The extra-governmental input in security policy-making

Although many analysts38 of the policy development process have emphasized the role of DND in the 1987 White Paper policy development process, there was also some input from non-governmental organizations.

In the formulation of the 1987 White Paper on defence, a consultation process took place in which government-selected lobby groups representing the interests of the military-industrial

38 For example, see: Bland (1988) and Defence Quarterly (1989, June).
complex and members of the peace community were invited to submit their opinions. But the final outcome was heavily conditioned by the proposals put forward by the military and business establishments. Public opinion and the growing peace movement in Canada were not influential in the making of the 1987 White Paper on defence.

Defence issues have always been sheltered from public input and scrutiny through the principle of military secrecy. Even the tiny inroads towards public input that the Canadian peace movement has helped to gain have resulted from an extremely long and uphill struggle. The fact that elements of the peace movement were involved even to a minimal extent in the formative stages of the White Paper on defence is an indication that the government is beginning to acknowledge the growing public concern for security issues.

However, there was no open public or parliamentary debate in the formulation of DND’s White Paper. The process which led to Canada’s current defence policy is an example of how little public input goes into major security decisions. The peace movement, and the public in general, remain marginalized from the process of security policy-making.

The lack of large scale debate and democratization in the development of security policy is an indication of the extent to which the ideological, political and economic apparatus of the

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39 Approximately 185 organizations submitted written proposals. Peace groups who submitted their opinions include: Voice of Women, Project Ploughshares, Veteran’s Against Nuclear Armament, the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament.

40 The Hockin-Simard Report stated that: “The combination of global awareness, interdependence, and participation are transforming the very nature of foreign policy and nowhere faster than in Canada. Our hearings made us aware of just how much international relations has ceased to be the preserve of government.” Independence and Internationalism. Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada’s International Relations, (1986, June). p. 5.

military-industrial complex have been able to effectively legitimate minimal public input in
the defence policy-making process.

Peter Langille's work (1988, 1989, 1990) documents how organizations such as the
Business Council on National Issues (BCNI), the Conference of Defence Associations, the
Federation of United Military Services, the NATO Industrial Advisory Group, the
Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, the Aerospace Industries Association of Canada,
and the Canadian Defence Preparedness Association presented briefs containing policy
recommendations which were largely adopted by the government.

According to David Langille (1988), the BCNI (composed of 150 chief executive officers
for corporations who control more than $700 billion in assets and employ more than 1.5
million Canadians) is "... the strongest force pushing for increased military spending and
greater economic integration with the United States..." (p. 202). The release of BCNI's
own policy document on defence was delayed at the request of the government. The
similarities of the BCNI's policies and the policy paper the government was about to
release were apparently too obvious.

After the 1987 White Paper was released it was predicted that "... profits of the military
industry will likely soar as a result of opportunities arising from 1987 Defence White
Paper..." (See: Peter Langille, 1988, June, p. 5). However, the relative autonomy of the
government from the military-industrial complex is illustrated by the fact that many groups
within the military-industrial complex lamented that their goal of even higher military
expenditures was not adopted in the defence policy adopted by the government.\footnote{See for example: "Aerospace Industry Dow `s Defence Dollars Adequate" \textit{Globe and Mail} (1987,
September 23), p. B1. A conflict has also emerged between factions of the U.S. and Canadian military
establishments. Some U.S. defence officials were particularly concerned about the \textit{submarine programme}. Capt. Bob Hofford, U.S. naval attaché, speaking at a defence industry conference, commented that Canada's...}
There were conflicts between the government and business sectors regarding the White Paper. Although the Business Council on National Issues praised the government on many aspects of the White Paper, it also criticized the government for not making commitments to establish a military space agency, for not getting more involved in SDI and for underestimating the costs of the submarine program (Ottawa Citizen, October 14, 1987).

Moreover, the defence spending cuts and delays brought about through the 1989 and 1990 budgets again illustrate the principle of relative autonomy of the government (in this case, the Department of Finance) from the military-industrial complex. Canada's version of the military-industrial complex did not have sufficient hegemonic leverage to make certain that defence spending increases were carried out in the Federal government budget. (The consequences of the 1989 and 1990 budgets for Canadian defence policy will be discussed in more detail in the final section of this chapter.)

The Gap between External Affairs and the Department of External Affairs

The defence and industrial establishments had a greater influence on the formulation of Canada's new security policy than the Department of External Affairs. The gap between Canada's foreign and defence policies has been an ongoing concern of analysts of Canadian security policy. However, the differences became even more pronounced both in terms of policy prescriptions and policy development.

In May of 1985 the government released a discussion paper, Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canadian International Relations, which was reviewed by a special joint

real intention with the submarines was not to monitor Soviet but U.S. submarines in the Arctic. See: The Ottawa Citizen "American View: Damn our torpedoes" (1987, November 21) p. B2.
committee of the Senate and the House of Commons. The Committee was also to consider the question of free trade and the possibility of Canadian participation in the U.S.'s SDI research program. The Committee held cross-Canada hearings specifically on these two issues. The interim Hockin-Simmard report to the government favoured free trade but did not make any specific recommendations regarding SDI, citing a lack of information.

In December 1986, the Department of External Affairs issued Canada's International Relations, a detailed response to the Committee's final report Independence and Internationalism substituted a White Paper and became the Conservative government's formal policy statement of its foreign policy.43

The threat assessment, perception of the role of deterrence and effectiveness of arms control and disarmament are now sources of a major gap between the policy statements of DND and External Affairs.44 In DND's formulation of Challenge and Commitment, the consultation process was by invitation only. The External Affairs policy development process involved a broader spectrum of the Canadian public and the consultation process was more open and publicized in comparison with the Department of National Defence's decision-making process.

In late 1984, the Department of National Defence initiated a policy review with the goal of producing a discussion paper. The intention was to follow a process along the lines of the Department of External Affairs. However, the goal was not realized. A discussion paper on defence issues did not emerge, probably as a result of a combination of factors including conflicts within DND, the rapid turnover of Ministers of National Defence during

43Middlemiss and Sokolsky (1989) discuss and compare the policy development process for External Affairs' Canada's International Relations and the Department of National Defence's Challenge and Commitment, p. 102-104.
44Chapter 5 will review the widening gap between public opinion and government policy on security issues.
this period, and the sensitization of the Canadian government to the public's views through the public hearings on the Department of External Affairs' paper. It would appear that when Perrin Beatty was made Minister of National Defence in 1986, he decided that he would bypass the green paper stage and proceed straight to a White Paper policy document.

In terms of policy statements, DND and External Affairs differ with regard to the questions of the threats to Canadian security, arms control and disarmament, the role of deterrence and how to deal with the issue of Arctic sovereignty. The perception that the threat of nuclear war between the superpowers as the greatest threat to the Canada, was shared by the External Affairs' 1985 green paper, the 1986 Hockin-Simmard report, and the External Affairs response to Hockin-Simmard. The December 1986 External Affairs report stated:

Reinforcing Canada's security means working towards reducing East-West tensions, pursuing a progressively safer and more stable strategic balance through a vigorous disarmament and arms control policy, strengthening the multilateral instruments that help to settle regional conflicts peacefully, and participating in peacekeeping. (Canada's International Relations, 1986, p. 11)

In contrast, the 1987 White Paper on defence was quite pessimistic about the prospects for arms control and disarmament. The 1987 White Paper stated that, while the optimism for arms control negotiations of Canada's previous defence policy issued in 1971 may have been justified because it was formulated in a period of détente, the developments "during the late 1970's and the 1980's have shown that the early promise of détente was exaggerated." Thus, according to the Canada's 1987 defence policy statement: "The realities of the present, however, call for a more sober approach to international relations and the needs of security policy" (Challenge and Commitment, 1987 p. 2)

In terms of sovereignty protection, especially Arctic sovereignty, there are notable differences between the approaches of External Affairs and DND. While DND's policy orientation for assuring sovereignty protection involves mainly military preparedness and
acquisitions, External Affairs advocates protecting sovereignty and independence "... through the strengthening of the national economy, through the pursuit of a responsible and effective foreign policy, and through the vigorous projection of Canada's bilingual and multicultural identity onto the world stage." (Canada's International Relations, 1986). In terms of sovereignty protection in the Arctic, the Hockin-Simmard Report recommended Canadian involvement in the demilitarization of the Arctic, cooperation among Arctic states, and cautioned specifically against both nuclear and diesel-powered submarines.

To a certain extent, the differences between the policy orientation of DND and External Affairs can be attributed to bureaucratic politics. DND is primarily responsible for defence. External Affairs is not. The difference in the policy orientation between the two departments has often been attributed to the greater influence of the more liberal or "red" Tories in the foreign affairs decision-making process. However, we must keep in mind that the Liberal government had began to increase military spending before the Conservatives came into power, "... just as the Carter Administration presaged Reagan's spending spree on the military." (David Langille, 1988, p. 202).

The differences between the External Affairs policy with regard to defence issues and the Department of National Defence's White Paper, illustrate the relative autonomy of sectors of the government (such as External Affairs) from the hegemonic interests of the military-industrial complex. The policy formation process for External Affairs in 1986 was more in tune with an earlier Canadian tradition of constructive internationalism and led to policy proposals which involved more constraints on the interests of those seeking to further the militarization of Canada.\textsuperscript{45} On the other hand, the policy formation process for the

Department National Defence was geared more to sustaining the interests of the military-industrial complex.

In sum, the configuration of forces behind the policy to increase the militarization of Canada includes the defence industries and lobby groups, sectors of the government bureaucracy and military establishments. The military industry, the armed forces, military strategists and military interests inscribed within the state, were allied to put forward increased defence expenditures, an ambitious acquisitions program, pursuit of defence industrial preparedness, the development of a North American defence industrial base, and support for a long-war warfighting strategy.

The directions of Canadian security policy, as set out in the Department of National Defence's 1987 White Paper on Defence, can be understood in the context of the second Cold War environment and the development of the military-industrial complex in Canada. The structural pairing and momentum of military-industrial interests in the 1980's led to what is the most militarist expression of defence policy in recent Canadian history. However, in the 1989 and 1990 budgets, the economic imperative of reducing the deficit overrode the specific interests of the defence-industrial sector of the economy.

1989 and 1990 Defence Spending Cuts: Analysis of the Implications

Two years after the release of the 1987 White Paper many of the acquisitions outlined in the document became victims of fiscal restraint. The cancellation of the submarines and the cancellation or delays in other military acquisitions as a consequence of the 1989 budget is a measure of the Canadian military-industrial complex's inability to assure that decisions
are carried out. Although the military-industrial complex is part of the dominant class, it
did not have sufficient leverage to ensure that the policy would be backed financially.

According to a report by David Cox (1989):

The 1989 budget announced by Michael Wilson in late April has overturned or delayed all the main proposals of the White Paper. The 1989-1990 defence estimates provide for an increase of $95.6 million, or 0.9 percent over the 1988 forecast expenditures. This represents a reduction of $575 million from the anticipated 1989-1990 budget, which following the White Paper, was intended to provide a 3.3 percent increase to compensate for inflation. The Government has stated that $2.74 billion will be stripped from defence expenditures over the next five years, but claims that in 1993-1994, at the end of the deficit-reduction period, the base of defence spending will be restored to the level that would have been achieved under the White Paper formula of two percent real growth per year. (p 17).

Acquisition cutbacks taking place through the 1989 federal budget included:

- the cancellation of the nuclear-powered submarines
- the replacement CF-18 (lost through accidents) as well as additional long-range maritime patrol aircraft were cancelled
- the reduction of the new tanks for Canada’s European Forces by half
- the main battle tank project has been put on hold
- all terrain vehicles for militia were reduced by half
- unmanned airborne surveillance and target acquisition system were cancelled
- northern terrain vehicles equipment equipment outfit, electronic countermeasures, landforce radios, and CF-5 avionics were reduced
- 14 military bases will be closed or reduced in size
- military personnel will be reduced by 2,500.46

In 1990 another major defence spending cutback was introduced: The scrapping of the
Polar 8 ice-breaker. The Polar 8 was to be an important vehicle for the assertion of
Canadian sovereignty in the North, in particular the Northwest Passage. Finance Minister
Michael Wilson cited “changes in the international environment” as the reason for

46This list is based on: (1) a review presented by Kenneth Calder, Director for Policy Planning, Department of National Defence in “The Federal Budget: Defence and Foreign Policy”, Peace and Security (Volume 4, Number 2, Summer 1989), p. 6. (2) A section of David Cox’s “Defence Notes” titled “Canada — Deficit Disarmament” in the same issue of Peace and Security noted above p. 17.

Many anticipated much greater defence cutbacks in 1990 — more along the lines of the 1989 budget. However, according to Hugh Windsor (1990) of The Globe and Mail: "... by massaging the electorate while he manipulates the cuts, Mr. Wilson hopes to build up a reservoir of trust to be used in the continuing battle to enact the goods and service tax." (p. A10).

The 1989 defence budget cuts of $2.74 billion over the next five years took place alongside major cuts in social spending. Mulroney’s election promise was that Canada’s social programs were a "sacred trust" which would not be affected by Free Trade. Yet the 1989 Budget introduced the following cuts:

- $3-billion cut to UI over between 1989-1991
- a "clawback" on Old Age Security and Family Allowance
- cancellation of the Child Care Act, eliminating $195 million scheduled for 1990-1991
- Established Program Funding was cut by 200 million in 1990-1991, including cuts to development aid cuts to Unemployment Insurance.
  (Department of Finance, "Budget Papers", 1989, April 27, p. 9-15)

The Federal surtax on personal income increased in the 1989 budget from 3% to 5% (Budget Papers, 1989, p. 36). The Good and Sales Tax was introduced in 1989 and estimated to cost the an average Canadian family an extra $1,000.

The 1989 budget also cut regional development programs such as Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency and the Western Diversification Fund. Farmers received cuts of $274-million over the next two years. All of the programs cut are included in Annex 705.4 (Subsidies) of the Free Trade Agreement (Pro-Canada Network, 1989, April 27, p. 3-4 ). The regions were also affected by cuts to Via of $125-million between 1989-1991.
Development aid was cut by $1.8-billion, representing a 13% cut in absolute dollars and a 17% cut in value.

The 1990 defence spending cut of $84-million is minor compared to the budget restraint program affecting social programs under provincial jurisdiction: health, education and social assistance. The 1990 social spending cuts include:

- a freeze on transfer payments to the provinces for medicare and post-secondary education for two years: $870-million in 1990-1991, a total of $7.4 billion over the next 5 years. Approximately half of the reduction in spending comes from this area.
- The Canadian Pension Plan spending will be reduced over the next two years by $155-million to the three richest provinces: Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia.
- Social Housing Programs were cut by $51 million between 1990-1992.
- Secretary of State and Health and Welfare Programs were cut by $23-million and $12.3-million respectively.

Moreover, with the 1990 budget the government adopted a "... more businesslike approach to assistance to business" through a policy that "... will with limited exceptions, eliminate grants to business" (Minister of Finance, 1990, "The Budget", p. 82). This policy moves Canada more in line with the Free Trade Agreement's provision of limiting subsidization.

One of the "limited exceptions" will be grants to defence industries. The major cuts to social spending and regional development in the 1989 and 1990 budgets also indicate alignments towards the Free Trade Agreement. In response to the comparatively minor defence cuts in the 1990 budget a senior DND official stated flatly: "We gave last year."

(Quoted in: Terrance Wills, 1990, p. B6.)

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48 This list is compiled from: Pro-Canada Network (1990, February 21) p. 1-2. For a complete list, see: Canada, "The Budget, The Expenditure Control Plan" (1990, February 20) p. 61-82.

- 53 -
As previously discussed, the central focus of the 1987 White Paper was its ambitious acquisitions program justified on the basis of a Cold War threat to Canadian security. With many of the central acquisitions delayed or cut, begs the question: what's left?

The acquisitions were the instruments through the policy could be implemented. Policies such as developing a long-war capability and the development of Canada's defence industrial base will certainly be constrained. The question is to what extent? How seriously will the cuts hold back the realization of goals of revitalizing the forces and developing the Canadian sector of the North American Defence Industrial Base?

In terms of military programmes, a senior DND official offers the following list of items which will remain:

- The North American air defence modernization programme
- The two phases of the frigate replacement programme
- The modernization of the Tribal class destroyers
- New helicopters and mine-sweepers for the Navy
- Canadian forces in Europe will be maintained at current levels
- The 1987 White Paper proposal to withdraw Canada's commitment to provide an infantry battalion in Norway will not take affect.
- The reserves will be expanded but will fall short of the White Paper's target of 65,000.49

Many analysts have commented that Canadian defence policy has been "gutted". John Marteinson, editor of Canadian Defence Quarterly, stated in June 1989 that the 1987 White Paper was "in tatters": "Its substance has been gutted, ostensibly because the need for drastic steps to reduce the national deficit has taken precedence over matters of principle." (p. 5).

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From the perspective of the military establishment, the White Paper's initiatives of a Three Ocean Policy and sovereignty protection were severely shaken by the cancellation of the nuclear powered submarines, long-range patrol aircraft, the replacement CF-18s, the KC-130 tanker aircraft and the Tracker fleet. Moreover, the equipment cancellations and delays for soldiers on the Central Front (such as the main battle tank, armoured personnel carriers, self-propelled howitzers and air defence systems) amount to a "...fudging of our Alliance commitments" (Marteinson, 1989). For the Canadian Armed Forces, the bottom-line implication of the budget cuts is that the "... government has dashed all hope of rebuilding and revitalizing the Canadian Forces, and in the process has done immeasurable damage to the moral of its members." (Marteinson, 1989 p. 6.)

The 1989 "Budget Papers" emphasized that "... the basic parameters of the White Paper remain the defence policy of the Government although in the current fiscal context, that policy will need to be implemented more slowly." (p. 24). However, there is an obvious contradiction between Canada's stated policies and its capabilities to pursue these policies. The policy statement remains without the acquisitions which would permit effective realization of the policy.

Yet it is important to stress that despite 1989 defence budget cuts of $2.74 billion of the next five years, Canada's current Minister of Defence has assured that "defence spending will experience a real growth of 4.4% a year over the next five years." (Globe and Mail, 1989, October 17) Moreover, David Langille (1989) has pointed out that Wilson "... could just as honestly boast that military spending will increase by over $3 billion." (p. 3). The $2.74-billion figure represents only a cutback in the rate of increase in defence spending.

Military spending will continue to be the fastest growing area of government expenses next to debt carrying charges. Although there was a $39 million cut to science and technology
spending in the 1990 budget, the Defence Industry Productivity Programme received a five per cent increase (Howard, 1990, p. A10). According to David Langille (1989): "As far as the closing of the bases, the Department had wanted to close some of them for years. Now it can use fiscal restraint as an excuse." (p. 2). The closing of the bases will free up money for capital purchases which will benefit the arms industry. There was an overall 5 per cent increase in defence spending in 1990-1991.

Budget cuts will mean delays and a slower rate of growth for defence spending. Moreover, as a consequence of the defence spending cuts brought about through the budgetary restraint in 1989 and 1990, the military-industrial complex in Canada has incurred a loss of status as well as potential profits. Defence industries face further uncertainties due to the change in international political climate. With the easing of Cold War tensions, defence industries have acknowledged an end to the era of "ballooning defence budgets" (Hogarth, 1990, p. A9). In January 1990 many defence stocks traded at or near 52 week lows. Stockmarket analysts see the decline in defence stocks as "a definite reflection of peace in the world." (Marteinson, 1989, p. 6)

In 1989, the government suffered a loss of credibility vis-a-vis the defence industries and the military establishment by not living up to the stated financial commitments of its defence policy. Wilson did not pursue any major cuts in 1990 as a response to the thaw in Europe. According to one commentator additional spending cutbacks were not pursued in 1990 because: "Defence spending took a big hit last time, and you can only cut so far before you hit bone." (Hogarth, 1990 p. A9). Indeed, the 1989 cuts left even the defence establishment's analysts calling for "... an honest statement of its defence policy." (Marteinson, 1989, June p. 6).
How can the defence spending cutbacks be explained? In particular, four factors appear to have played a role: 1) A deficit reduction strategy based on fiscal restraint; 2) the military-industrial complex in Canada is not hegemonic; 2) the reduction in Cold War tensions; 4) the development of legitimation problems.

Fiscal restraint, the debt and the deficit: A major reason offered by the government for the defence spending cutbacks and spending cutback in general for fiscal restraint in light of Canada's debt and ensuing deficit problems. In 1990 Canada had a $350-billion public debt and accompanying yearly deficit of $39.4-billion.

Interest payments on the debt are the largest single government outlay. They will rise from $39.4-billion in 1990 to $41.2 billion in 1991. The federal government is now spending "...35 cents out of every dollar it collects to pay interest on the public debt." (Drohan, 1990, p. B6) Due to a high interest rate policy, the debt grows almost exponentially. The net public debt reaches $351.4-billion this fiscal year, increasing to $370.0-billion in 1990-91 and $406.8-billion in 1991-92. "On a per capita basis, that's about $15,100 worth of debt for every man, woman and child in Canada this fiscal year, rising to $16,300 by 1991-92" (Drohan, 1990, p. B6). Due to continual annual deficits, debt per household increased from $12,300 in 1981-82 to $34,200 in 1988-89 (Canada, 1989,"Budget 89: The Fiscal Plan", p. 12).

In his 1989 budget Wilson introduced an "Expenditure Restraint Plan" which is intended to reduce the deficit and debt by cutting back on government spending. The government's strategy is to lower the deficit through fiscal restraint affecting primarily social and regional spending.
The 1989 and 1990 budgets were presented as "tough budgets". But they were primarily tough on unemployed, sick, women, regional development, advocacy groups, natives, students and workers.

Beyond a doubt, Canada's debt problem needs to be addressed. However, according to some economists Wilson's monetarist strategy for reducing the deficit through fiscal restraint (cutting back primarily on social spending) in an economy with high interest rates, high unemployment, growing taxation will only serve to exacerbate the debt problem (see: Jackson, 1990; Chorney, 1989, Canadian Labour Congress, 1990; Cameron, 1990).

Critics of the government's strategy for reducing the debt through fiscal restraint, maintain that large deficits are not the cause of high interest rates. The relationship is the inverse: high interest rates increase the growth rate of the deficit and debt. Now that the deficit is falling in real terms the "... growth of the debt and thus the cost of the debt are largely a function of the level of interest rates." (Jackson, 1990, p. 2).

The Canadian Labour Congress' analysis of the 1990 budget claims that: "If the budget had attacked the real source of the problem—high interest rates—spending cuts would have been unnecessary. A 2 per cent cut in rates would have saved 3.4 billion. And that is before taking into account the stimulative effect on the economy of lower interest rates." (p. 11).

Harold Chorney (1989) goes so far as to equate the government's strategy of cutting back on the public sector with the medieval notion of "bleeding the patient". (p. 11) Because the public sector is an integral part of the economy, fiscal restraint in this area merely reinforces "... a tendency toward economic stagnation in the economy." (Chorney, 1989 p. 71).
Some members of the defence establishment have criticized that defence spending cutbacks will really not serve to reduce the deficit. Instead, they have been viewed as a political gesture in view of the unpopularity of the 1987 White Paper and defence spending in general in Canada. On the other hand, some economists have argued that defence spending has actually been a significant contributor to the indebtedness phenomenon internationally.

Studies of indebtedness in U.S., Britain and Canada show that the growth of debt tends to reflect military and economic events. The rate of debt increases primarily in periods of 1) wartime efforts; and 2) economic downturn and high unemployment. The aggravation of debt problems in the 1980s can be viewed in the context of the combination of these factors (Chorney, 1989, p. 37). The decade of the 1980s was both a period of increased military spending and economic stagnation. One of the reasons for a high deficit in the United States is high military spending. Military spending becomes a deadweight on the economy because it involves production of goods and services "... that are ultimately destroyed or rarely have peace-time application." (Watkins, Hargrove, Wainwright and Colterman, 1985, p. 1)

Many studies have shown that the more a country spends on arms the less productive its civilian economy. Japan and Germany are often given as examples as economic leaders which have been successful because they have concentrated on civilian production.

Canada seems like an anomaly among OECD countries because it ranks second lowest in terms of military spending and at the same time it has the third lowest productivity rate. However, Canada ranks eleventh in the world in its total military expenditure and sixth in NATO (Robinson, 1990, June, p. 6). In the first half of the 1980s military spending in
Canada followed international trends, stimulated by increased Cold War tensions, increasing at a rate between 15 and 20 per cent per year.

Mel Watkins (et al., 1985) explains that Canada gets even fewer benefits from military spending than the U.S. because "... the arms industry like Canadian industry in general is of an inefficient branch-plant variety, while we share the economic costs of being tied overall to an inefficient and waning U.S. economy." (p. 5)

Whether or not Wilson's restraint program will actually alleviate the debt and deficit problems, the deficit was very much a part of the discourse of the government in the rationalization of the cuts. The 1989 and 1990 budgets were framed around the issue of reducing the deficit.

The strongest voice for deficit reduction through cutbacks to social programs are Canada's major corporations. Following the 1988 election the Business Council on National Issues (BCNI), the Canadian Manufacturers Association and the Chamber of Commerce pursued an aggressive lobbying campaign aimed at getting Finance Minister Wilson to begin major deficit reductions by cutting social programs. According to the Pro-Canada Network:

The corporate lobby groups advocating deficit reduction represent the same corporations that are responsible for much of the deficit through their refusal to pay their fair share of taxes, in some cases no taxes at all. Many of these corporations have been actively lobbying for a major increase in military spending." (1989, April 17, p. 3)50

Canada's military-industrial complex is not hegemonic: The military-industrial complex brings together fractions51 of the dominant class, but it is not hegemonic. In the process

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50 In its 1990 budget analysis, the Pro-Canada Network pointed out that "one-third of all companies have some $27 billion in profits and yet pay no taxes." (1990, February 21) p. 2.
51 On the concept of class fractions, see: Poulantzas (1978), Mahon (1977).
leading to the making of the White Paper, the military-industrial complex had a consensus on the policy objectives. There was a fit between power, ideas and institutions in the making of the White Paper. But the military-industrial complex was not hegemonic or all powerful in the process of resource allocation. In the Federal Budget of 1989 the interests of a more dominant sector of the economy (finance capitalists and other big business interests) won out.

The monetarist policy of deficit reduction benefits the dominant fraction of the dominant class. Although the Conservative government's strategy for lowering the deficit through fiscal restraint affects defence programs, it has a far greater negative impact on social programs and regional development. By avoiding the option of lowering interest rates the government served the interests of the wealth owning or rentier class who benefit from debt instrument investments.

**Timing: The Reduction in Cold War Tensions:** DND's White Paper for increased military spending based on a Cold War assessment came at exactly the wrong time.

The beginning of the Gorbachev era in 1985 marked the beginning in a new era of the superpower relations. The White Paper was released in June of 1987 and by December the United States and the Soviet Union had signed the first arms control treaty since SALT I. The series of changes in Eastern European countries in 1989 have led some NATO officials into a state of confusion. (Gray, 1990) There is now an increasing perception amongst NATO leaders that the Soviet Union is not likely to invade Western Europe.

Despite the commitment-credibility gap of the Canadian Armed Forces that the White Paper emphasized, the Cold War discourse of the White Paper now even seems out of step with reality to the defence establishment. During his summit in Moscow with Gorbachev in
November 1989, Prime Minister Mulroney finally had to admit that the 1987 White Paper was outdated.

**Legitimation Problems:** The White Paper's Cold War policy orientation was faced with serious legitimation problems due to the combination of the Conservative government's strategy to reduce the deficit through fiscal restraint and the alleviation in Cold War tensions.

From the moment it was released, the White Paper's spending proposals became the subject of controversy. (In Chapter 5 I will deal with the peace movement and the public reaction to the White Paper.) There is now a widespread call for new defence policy for Canada.

In the context of a deficit-cutting budget and a new climate of détente between the superpowers, the Mulroney government likely knew it could experience difficulties in legitimating increased armament expenditures. As previously mentioned, despite the cuts in defence spending in Canada will continue to rise.52 The military-industrial complex was able to assert ideological hegemony to the extent that the policies outlined in the White Paper were introduced. However, in the final analysis it did not have sufficient control to assure that government funding would follow within the desired time framework.

By pursuing defence budget cuts, especially the widely unpopular nuclear-powered submarines, the government moved more in line with public opinion. As a result of the

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52 Between 1984 and 1989 defence spending rose from $8.8 billion to $11.1 billion. Wilson's 1989 budget will mean a 1.2% increase for 1989-1990. From the perspective of some in the peace community, "... by shifting its spending commitments to a future government ...", the government "has undermined its own credibility. (...) Why not just say we can cut defence spending, as the Americans and Russians have done?" (Quoted in Ottawa Disarmament Coalition, 1989, Spring) p. 1. In 1988 the U.S. announced that it would cut defence spending by 10 billion, representing .9% decrease.
1989 budget cuts, the peace movement claimed the cancellation of the submarines as a victory.
CHAPTER 4:

THEORIES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
AND THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN CANADA

In the 1980s a new body of literature emerged dealing with the theory and practice of contemporary social movements. A growing concern with understanding social movements is found not only within the discipline which would most obviously be drawn to this study, namely, sociology. The study of social movements has also been taken up within the disciplines of history, political science, linguistics, and international political economy. Social movements have become an interdisciplinary subject of analysis. The reason the study of social movements has become so popular is undoubtedly related to the fact that their presence globally is now impossible to ignore (Walker, 1988, p. 29). Carl Boggs (1986) states that: "... the immense diffusion of popular struggles over the past two decades attests to the vitality of an insurgent collective consciousness within civil society." (p. 243).

There is no single theoretical framework for the analysis of social movements because of the diversity of movements and of disciplines in which the concept has been articulated. Different theorists explore various levels of analysis and focus on particular movements. However, the new social movement literature contains many recurrent themes and a general theoretical orientation. In this chapter, I will discuss how the peace movement in Canada fits into this theoretical orientation focusing on the concepts of power, interests and

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discourse. The guiding questions in this chapter are: 1) How do theorists of social
movements theorize about the questions of power, interests and discourse vis-à-vis
contemporary social movements? 2) How does the peace movement in Canada fit into this
perspective?

I. Power, Interests and Discourse in Theories of Social
Movements

i) Power

What is the basis of social and political power of social movements?

First, theorists of contemporary social movements such as Alain Touraine (1981, 1985),
observed that the social composition of social movements is heterogeneous. The people
involved in social movements cross-cut the categories of class, gender, race and
nationality. The social movements referred to most frequently in the new social movement
literature include: the peace movement, the women's movement, the environment
movement, the human rights movement, the development movement, student and youth
activism.

In order to distinguish contemporary movements from 'older' movements based primarily
on class such as labour or socialist movements, many social movement theorists refer
'new' or 'contemporary' social movements. According to Claus Offe (1985):

... the new social movements' pattern of social and political conflict is the
polar opposite of the class-conflict model. First, the conflict is staged not

54 Touraine, Offe and Boggs refer to new social movements. Jean Cohen refers to contemporary social
movements. R.B.J. Walker speaks of critical social movements.
by one class but by a social alliance of that consists in varying proportions, of different elements from different classes and 'nonclasses'. Second, it is not a conflict between principal economic agents of the mode of production, but an alliance that includes virtually every element except these agents. Third, the demands are not class-specific, but rather strongly universalistic or highly particularistic, and thus either more or less categorical than class issues. (p. 878)

A second feature of new social movements is that they tend to operate primarily within civil society. For theorists of social movements, the distinction between political activity within the state and civil society is crucial. Older, more traditional social movements attempt to influence politics by working primarily through the conventional channels of state power. In contrast, the new social movements are rooted in civil society. Carl Boggs (1986) summed up this tendency as follows:

They [social movements] represent a potential break with the bureaucratic state apparatus insofar as they bypass the normal corridors of power (parties, elections, legislative bodies) or at least they do not establish their centre of gravity there. Historically, they point to a recovery of civil society that has been crushed under the weight of statism and capitalist rationalization. (p. 47)

Although social movements interact with and attempt to influence government policies, there is commonly an awareness that the changes they seek cannot be brought about solely through government channels. In their interaction with the state, social movements often appear to behave and take on the characteristics of interest groups. However, it is important to emphasize that social movements are not merely aggregates of pressure or interest groups. Their agendas and action-orientation are much broader in scope than those of interest groups. Interest groups are normally limited to influencing particular aspects of government policy. On the other hand, social movements attempt to develop new political ideas and practices within civil society.55

55 Offe (1985) has commented that the new social movements "... seek to politicize civil society in ways that are not constrained by representative-bureaucratic political institutions and thereby to reconstitute a civil society independent from increasing control and intervention." (p. 865).
A third feature of new social movements is that they tend to make connections between various issues and problems. For instance, human rights movements in Latin America confront the problems of "... national debt, economic penetration, and disputes over territorial boundaries between states." (Walker, 1988, p. 74). In the women's movement violence against women is frequently connected to the inequality between men and women in society, politics and the economy. In making connections, new social movements create alliances and overlap with other movements for social change (Walker, 1988; Touraine, 1985, p. 773). Thus, social movements make connections on at least two levels: 1) They make connections between different problems; and 2) They make connections with other social movements. According to Walker (1988):

The way some movements respond to certain kinds of connections is important not least because many of these connections undermine our most powerful guides as to how political life should be conducted. Critical social movements both evade classification in terms of and challenge the very principles that give rise to our prevailing images of political power. (p. 76)

A fourth feature of new social movements is that the types of organization they pursue tend to be characterized by networking and decentralized modes of communication and action. In building these alternative structures of communication and action new social movements are redefining politics. A major component of this redefinition of politics is an obsession with grassroots forms of democracy.

A fifth feature of social movement is the cultural dimension of their work. Because social movements attempt to transform politics, society and the economy from outside of the traditional arena of state power, the impact of their work is often felt within the realm of

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56 For an analysis of the contemporary women's movement in Canada, see: Nancy Adamson, Linda Briskin, Margaret McPhail (1988).
57 Touraine's (1985) definition of social movements revolves around the power of cultural transformation: "Social movements, in a strict sense, represent conflicting efforts to control cultural patterns (knowledge, investment, ethics) in a given societal type." (p. 776.)
culture. For instance, the women's movement has played a role in changing the gender-biases of language and has drawn attention to the way women are sex-stereotyped in film, literature and the media.

Finally, a major theme in the social movement literature is the attempt by the new movements to develop alternatives. They are not only resisting forms of domination or struggling against problems of contemporary life; they increasingly propose alternatives. It is in this sense that social movements present a challenge to dominant or hegemonic ways. There is an attempt to build a counterhegemony within civil society. According to Carl Boggs (1986) "... counterhegemonic struggles can have a powerful impact outside of formal organizations, as agencies for transforming political culture within civil society." (p. 243-44).

In sum, social movements are not geared toward changes through traditional channels of power. The concept of power is not one of "power over", but "power with". That is, the concern is not with dominating or reproducing the status quo. It is with challenging and changing the status quo through a popular participation.

**ii) Interests**

Touraine frames the question of the conflict of interests in terms of "stakes". What are the stakes for social movements?

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58 Within the feminist movement, Joanna Rogers Macy sees a "radical" transition in the concept of power. The transition "... involves seeing power not as a property we own, not as something we exert over others, but as a verb, a process we participate in. This is a huge evolutionary step." Quoted in Charlene Elridge Wheeler and Peggy Chinn, (1984).

59 The stakes in the conflict between the technocrats and the new social movements according to Touraine are the "... social control of the main cultural patterns. These cultural patterns are of three types: a model of knowledge, a type of investment and ethical principles." Touraine (1985, p. 775). Jean Cohen (1985) also refers to the importance of assessing the general political stakes in analyzing social movements. In Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1979) a stake is defined as "... a: something that is staked for gain
Social movements address various crises or problems of contemporary life. The emergence of new social movements is frequently viewed in relation to consequences or crises of an advanced or postindustrial phase of capitalism. For Touraine (1985), the crises in advanced capitalism are generated by postindustrialism and the emergence of programmed societies run by technocrats (p. 780-81). Both Jean Cohen and Alain Touraine view power, investment and domination as "... located at the level of cultural production itself." (Cohen, 1985, p. 701-702).  

The historical context in which the new movements have emerged is characterized by growing fiscal crisis of the state; the erosion of the welfare state; widespread poverty, hunger, unemployment and illiteracy; permanent war economies; ecological crises; alienation from traditional modes of political interaction and oppression on the basis of race, class and gender (Boggs, 1986, p. 26, 31, 34). The new social movements are interested in dealing with global problems which have reached crisis proportions. They have a stake in changing the course of history.  

**iii) Discourse**

R.B.J. Walker (1983-84) refers to the discourse of social movements as a discourse of dissent in which critical and emancipatory positions are articulated (p. 304). He explains that

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or loss b: the prize in a contest c: an interest or a share in an undertaking (as a commercial venture)." p. 1123.  
60See also: Boggs (1986) p. 222.  
62Touraine defines historicity as "... the capacity to produce an historical experience through cultural patterns." see: Touraine (1985), p. 778.
societies cohere around deeply structured patterns of consensus and legitimacy. These patterns are expressed in hegemonic of dominant ideological forms and discourses which have become increasingly important instruments of knowledge and social control. The prevailing structures of knowledge are simultaneously structures of power. (p. 304)

The politics of the new social movements are to open up space in civil society for alternative discourses to the dominant ones spoken by technocrats, state managers and corporate elites.63

A major part of the work of the new social movements involves democratization — sometimes this is referred to as the democratization of the structures of everyday life. According to Jean Cohen (1985), social movements "... target the social domain of civil society rather than the economy or state raising issues concerned with the democratization of everyday life and focusing on forms of communication and collective identity." (p. 667). The new social movements apply the concept of democracy not only to the traditional political structures. For the new social movements democracy means grassroots forms of political participation.

Social movements reach out to diverse components of society. Lobbying governments is only a small fraction of the work of the new social movements. Much of the work attempts to involve the general public in various educational fora: public discussions, citizen-sponsored referenda, cultural events and involvement in community-based groups.

Frequently the tactics take more dramatic forms: demonstrations, concerts, street theatre, sit-ins and civil-disobedience are used to politicize issues. These are often the forms taken by the debate (or interplay of discourses).

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63 On the concept of "free spaces", see: Evans and Boyte (1986).
In the study of social movements, one uncovers the existence of a "multiplicity of social forces and modes of discourse." (Boggs, 1986). Taken as a whole, the discourses of the new social movements offer a critique of multiple and overlapping problems in society. However, social movements offer more than a critique. New social movements also increasingly speak of alternatives.

II. THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN CANADA: POWER, INTERESTS AND DISCOURSE

In this section, I will examine some of the connections between the theory of new social movements and the Canadian peace movement.

i) Diversity and Decentralization

David Langille (1988) argues that the peace movement in Canada cannot be understood as a new social movement because of its long history. He writes that: "Many Canadians had been active in the peace movement long before there was any threat of cruise missiles." (p. 204).

However, the concept of new social movements is not meant to deny the longer historical tradition in which these movements can be situated. The prefix new in the conceptualization of contemporary social movements is meant to signal some of the qualitative changes these movements have undergone. For instance, the divergence with the past is underscored by the more recent convergence of different social movements within the peace movement.

The diversity of the peace movement in Canada parallels Johan Galtung’s concept of "peace forces". According to Galtung (1984), the early history of Western peace movements is characterized by the participation of two major groups: pacifist and often sectarian
Christian groups and pro-Soviet peace groups. In the 1980s new groups began to figure prominently in the picture. These new groups make up the new peace forces: women, youth, the green movement, local community groups, trade unions, social democrats, churches, professions, generals/admirals for peace and peace researchers. (Galtung, 1984, p. 19-25.)

While there is a fairly long tradition of peace movement activity in Canada (Socknat, 1987), it is possible to observe a similar process in Canada to the one Galtung refers above. The peace movement in Canada can trace its roots to the religious communities concerned with peace, such as the Mennonites, the Doukhobours and the Quakers, of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. According to some observers the pro-Soviet tradition in the Canadian peace movement has played a marginal role (Roussopoulos, 1986, p. 125). Others have tended to exaggerate its influence (Tugwell, 1988, p. 57-64). One of the oldest peace groups in Canada is the Canadian Peace Congress which is affiliated with the Moscow-based World Peace Congress. However, the "pro-Soviet" tradition in the Canadian peace movement was never as strong as it was in Europe. What can be said with a degree of certainty is that, especially over the course of the past decade, the peace movement has become a force embracing a much broader spectrum of Canadian society than the sectors to which it can trace its historical roots.

The fact that Canadians are concerned about peace issues can be seen in the phenomenal growth in the movement starting in the 1980s. The beginning of the decade saw a tremendous expansion in the number of peace groups, their activities, and the scope of the movement's membership in different in community sectors. In virtually every sector of Canadian society, peace groups have formed and begun to address the problems of
militarization in Canada and internationally. Today, there are over 2,000 peace groups in Canada.64

Two sources, both produced by the peace movement in the 1980s, have helped to document the diversity of the peace movement in Canada.

In June 1987, Christine Peringer published How We Work for Peace with the Peace Research Institute in Dundas Ontario. Peringer sent out over 800 questionnaires asking peace groups to describe their activities in terms of what works and what doesn't. One hundred and eighty four groups responded representing a wide cross-section of the Canadian peace movement. The author's study and personal experience in the peace movement lead her to the following statement:

The Canadian peace movement is an amazing phenomenon. What other movement or cause can you think of that has more than 2,000 active groups across Canada that started, for the most part independently, out of a concern for an international problem? While there are several dozen national peace organizations, most groups are community based and set their own mandate and goals. The strengths of such a movement are that it contains people from all regions, all walks of life and all stripes of the political spectrum. (Peringer, 1987, p. 7)

The Canadian Peace Directory, published for the first time in 1988 by the Canadian Peace Alliance is a guide to over 500 peace organizations in Canada. The questionnaire used by the Canadian Peace Alliance asked peace and related groups to describe their organizational nature, purpose and main activities. The Directory is indexed by issue (including: alternative defence, Canadian defence policy, conflict and conflict resolution, development and disarmament, economic conversion, environment and peace, feminism and peace). It

64 It is difficult to gauge the exact percentage of growth in peace groups during the 1980's. However, the number of peace groups was estimated to be about 800 in 1984 by Operation Dismantle. An estimated number of over 2,000 was offered by the Canadian Peace Alliance in 1988.
is indexed by organizational type (branches, coalitions, networks, community peace groups, labour union, national peace groups, professional association, religious groups, research body, student-youth group and women's organization). The directory is also indexed geographically (by province from east to west).

In the preparation of Tables 1 and 2, I have drawn extensively from these two sources.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance for Non-Violent Action 1980</td>
<td>Coalition of groups</td>
<td>• non-violence, citizen-community initiatives, social change</td>
<td>• non-violent direct action, civil disobedience, demonstrations, education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament 1983</td>
<td>6000 associates</td>
<td>• arms control, disarmament, Canadian defence policy.</td>
<td>• research, public education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Peace Alliance 1985</td>
<td>400 groups</td>
<td>• NWFZ, disarmament, economic conversion</td>
<td>• networking, facilitating campaigns, public education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Peace Congress 1948</td>
<td>10,000 individuals councils</td>
<td>• NWFZ, withdrawal from NATO and NORAD, strengthening the U.N., détente, disarmament, national independence, democracy, justice</td>
<td>• campaigns, lobbying education, networking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Peace Educators Network 1985</td>
<td>network of 200 groups and 1,200 individuals</td>
<td>• peace education, peace and security</td>
<td>• networking, peace education, newsletter and directory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (CPPNW) 1980</td>
<td>6,100 individuals branches</td>
<td>• medical consequences of nuclear war, alternative defence, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, international relations, social justice and peace</td>
<td>• research, education, public inquiries, symposia, publishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>Activities</td>
<td></td>
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<td>------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenpeace</td>
<td>90,000 individuals</td>
<td>• Canadian defence policy, cruise missile, NWFZ, Disarmament</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1971</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>• direct action, lobbying, networking, education, door to door canvassing, publishing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group of '78</td>
<td>750 individuals</td>
<td>• alternative defence, development and disarmament, nuclear disarmament, International Relations, World government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1981</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>• memberships conferences, public discussions, education, publications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Dismantle</td>
<td>9,000 individuals</td>
<td>• nuclear disarmament, democracy (World Referendum), NWFZ, World Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1977 (1989)</strong></td>
<td>21 branches</td>
<td>• media, education, campaigns, cruise court case</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Ploughshares</td>
<td>7,500 individuals</td>
<td>• alternative defence, arms exports, militarism, disarmament and development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1976</strong></td>
<td>branches</td>
<td>• research, education, advocacy, networking</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice of Women</td>
<td>1,000 individuals</td>
<td>• alternative defence, Canadian defence policy, feminism and peace, war toys and violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1960</strong></td>
<td>local chapters</td>
<td>• networking, campaigns, UN NGO state publishing, campaigns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's International League</td>
<td>3 groups</td>
<td>• Development, Peace and Disarmament, Nuclear power and nuclear weapons, social justice, world government, social economic and political equality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for Peace and Freedom</td>
<td></td>
<td>• international campaigns, NGS status at U.N., international conferences, projects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1930 (in Canada)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Federalists of Canada</td>
<td>1,940 individuals</td>
<td>• alternative defence, development and disarmament, international peace and World government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1948</strong></td>
<td>branches</td>
<td>• Nuclear Weapons Legal Action Campaign, publishing, education, mondialization and twinning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: Canadian Peace Alliance (1988); Peringer, (1988),

** The dates indicate the founding year of the organization. A second date indicates the year the organization ceased to operate.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance pour la paix du Québec 1985</td>
<td>40 groups 150 individuals</td>
<td>• alternative defence, Canadian defence policy, NWFZ, cruise missile testing</td>
<td>• coordinating campaigns, public education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calgary Disarmament Coalition 1982</td>
<td>coalition of groups and individuals</td>
<td>• cruise missile testing, nuclear disarmament, peace and disarmament</td>
<td>• networking, education, organizing joint activities, campaigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End the Arms Race (Vancouver) 1982</td>
<td>225 groups individuals</td>
<td>• peace and disarmament</td>
<td>• coordinating activities for groups across B.C., annual peace walk, campaigns, public education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Island Peace Committee (PEI) 1982</td>
<td>network of groups and 50 individuals</td>
<td>• Canadian defence policy, militarism, underdevelopment, social injustice</td>
<td>• public debate, education, resource for groups and media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland and Labrador Peace Network</td>
<td>network of groups and individuals</td>
<td>• peace and disarmament</td>
<td>• networking, campaigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Number of Groups</td>
<td>Number of Individuals</td>
<td>Focus Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Free North</td>
<td>25 groups</td>
<td>100 individuals</td>
<td>Canadian defence policy, cruise missile testing, NWFZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa Disarmament Coalition</td>
<td>25 groups</td>
<td>100 individuals</td>
<td>global disarmament, uranium mining, cruise missile testing, NWFZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regina Coalition for Peace and Disarmament</td>
<td>network of groups</td>
<td>100 individuals</td>
<td>Canadian defence policy, war, international law, disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thunder Bay Coalition for Peace and Disarmament</td>
<td>network of groups</td>
<td>100 individuals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toronto Disarmament Network</td>
<td>85 groups</td>
<td>5,500 individuals</td>
<td>cruise missile testing, NWFZ, Porting, SDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winnipeg Coordinating Committee for Disarmament</td>
<td>network of groups</td>
<td>100 individuals</td>
<td>Disarmament, NWFZ, cruise missile testing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yukon Disarmament Coalition</td>
<td>3 groups</td>
<td>60 individuals</td>
<td>conflict and conflict resolution, non-violence, peace and disarmament</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


** The dates indicate the founding year of the organization.
It is impossible to give a completely accurate picture of the peace movement because it is so diverse and always changing. The tables introduce some of the major actors and situate them in terms of time, location, major issues of concern and activities.

ii) Cross-Canada networking and coalition-building

Despite its historical roots in peace-related activity in the early nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Canadian peace movement is still at an emergent stage of development.

The cross-Canada organization of the peace movement has been discontinuous. The fate of the Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CCND) is an example of this discontinuity. The CCND campaigned to prevent the deployment of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil, when for the first time in Canadian history nuclear weapons became a central election issue. Liberal leader Lester Pearson, without consulting his party, proclaimed that, if elected, his government would allow nuclear weapons to be stationed on Canadian territory. Although the Liberals won by only a narrow margin, the CCND did not survive the defeat. Within a few years, the CCND was no longer in existence. Dimitrios Roussopoulos (1986) explains: "It was very much a single issue organization and thus did not develop a broader policy to deal with Canada's policy on international relations." (p. 128)

Historically, the peace movement's efforts to advance an alternative security project have been weakened by its diverse and fragmentary nature.\(^{65}\) Efforts at building a Canada-wide

\(^{65}\)Denis Howlett (1989) makes a similar observation for social movements in general in Canada: "The sectoral fragmentation of social movements in Canada have seriously limited both the effectiveness as well as the political orientation of social movements." (p. 41).
coalition have been marked by conflicts of leadership, ideology, concepts about organizing and security. An attempt in the late seventies to bring about a formal national alliance or coalition of peace groups ended with some representatives walking out of an initial organizational meeting to explore the possibility of creating such a coalition.

The peace movement's most recent efforts to form coalitions, networks and alliances working across Canada to promote peace, disarmament and security issues can be traced to the early 1980s.

Babin, Shragge and Vaillancourt (1986) identify two major organizational tendencies existing within the peace movement:

The first tendency favours developing a more strictly political movement and looks to trade unions and left wing political parties for support. The second tendency, with a wider conception of the movement, seeks to come together with progressive social forces to put forward a socio-political critique and to work out an alternative to today's militarist, productivist society. (p. 177)

The point made by Babin (et al.) underlines a real tension within the movement between a conscious new social movement orientation and one which leans more towards a traditional social movement approach. There is an ongoing debate within the movement regarding how the movement can best be organized to influence society and government policy directions. Although there is a consensus on the importance of cross-Canada networking, there are differences in opinion in terms of formal coalition-ouilding. Because the movement attempts to operate on the basis of consensus decision-making, the organizational formula of networking has prevailed. The debate has often been characterized by reference to decentralized versus centralized decision-making structures.
In terms of the formation of national organizational structures, some sectors have advocated loose networks and decentralized decision-making. On the other hand, others have pressed for a stronger national coalition able to undertake national campaigns.

The Peace Petition Caravan Campaign (PPCC), the peace movement's major cross-Canada 1984 election campaign, was instrumental in forming the basis of communication for the foundation of the Canadian Peace Alliance in 1985.

The PPCC succeeded in gathering 430,000 signatures on a petition circulated across Canada which demanded an end to cruise testing, making Canada a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, converting wasteful military spending to meet human needs, and an open public and Parliamentary debate on these issues. Moreover, the campaign helped to develop communication across the country and encourage the formation of new peace groups. Many national and local groups as well Canadian Labour Congress backed the campaign donating money, volunteer and staff time.

At a final evaluation meeting of Peace Petition campaign, participants from across the country, a proposal was put forward by the Toronto Disarmament Network to form a national coalition of peace groups. After extensive meetings and pre-convention discussions through the mail, the Canadian Peace Alliance (CPA) was formed a year later at a founding convention in Toronto.

The formation of the CPA was a product of compromise among the various elements of the peace movement. The functions of the CPA are: 
"a) Networking among groups concerned with peace. b) Information sharing among groups concerned with peace. c) Discussion of ideas and issues in a national forum. d) Facilitating opportunities for action
between groups concerned with peace." (Canadian Peace Alliance, "Structure Document", adopted November 10, 1985)

The CPA's "Statement of Unity" is based on a wide range of interrelated peace and security issues. The "Statement" declares that the objective of the CPA "is to build Canadian public and government support" for the following seven goals:

1. The involvement and participation of the Canadian public in the worldwide movement towards disarmament and a truly secure and economically just world for all people.

2. A negotiated and verifiable freeze and reversal of the arms race, ending the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear and other weapons on earth and in space.

3. The establishment of Canada as a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ), thereby ending all funding research, transport, testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and their components in Canada and also ending the export of nuclear technology and radioactive fuels that may be used for the production of nuclear weapons.

4. The redirection of funds from wasteful military spending to the funding of human needs through a program of conversion and retraining, promoting the development of a peace oriented economy.

5. The creation and strengthening of world institutions and mechanisms for the prevention of aggression, the peaceful resolution of international conflict, and the promotion of friendship among peoples.

6. The dissolution of all military blocs.


The CPA brings together over 400 peace and related groups representing a total of approximately 2,000 groups in Canada. Its membership includes a broad spectrum of local, regional and national groups. Its composition cross-cuts many social movements.
including women, labour, professionals, churches, development, environment and native groups.

The CPA's major function is networking among its member groups. It can facilitate campaigns if there is enough (80 per cent) consensus. So guarded is the autonomy of member groups, the CPA cannot conduct campaigns in its own name.

As Babin (et al.) put it, the key question is "... how the various regional and social components (inside the movement) will continue to work together, and how the movement will succeed in becoming a more efficient political voice." (1986, p. 178).

One way in which the diverse regional and social components of the peace movement have been able to work together is by acknowledging and respecting the plurality within the movement. David Langille (1988) has suggested that after "... an initial phase of mass mobilization and consciousness-raising an implicit division of labour was established ... " within the Canadian peace movement.

Some sections of the movement continued to promote mass mobilization, civil disobedience, and other more radical means of protests that would capture the attention of the media and the politicians; some worked through institutional channels, sponsoring research and educational programs, intervening in elections, and lobbying parliamentarians; and some concentrated on changing personal values and attitudes. (p. 204)

iii) The stakes

What are the stakes for this diverse loosely networked movement?

In the 1980s Western peace movements experienced a resurgence as the Euromissile issue came onto the scene. The movement spread across Europe and North America (Young,
Western peace movements emerged in the context of international public concern regarding the failure of arms control, vitriolic Cold War posturing between the superpowers, increasing military expenditures, environmental degradation and massive global unmet human needs.

The consequences of militarization on the world economy, in particular, in terms of human costs have been the subject of Ruth Leger Sivard's annual survey, *World Military and Social Expenditures*. According to Sivard's 1989 report, global military spending has reached $1.9 million per minute. Since 1960, global military expenditures have consumed over 17 trillion dollars. Today military spending is two and a half times higher than in 1960. It currently exceeds the total income of almost half the world's population. Global military spending has reached one trillion dollars annually (Sivard, 1989, p. 5, 7).

This kind of spending has bought a vast array of weapons with a massive potential for destruction. There are now over 50,000 nuclear weapons in the world: enough destructive power to destroy the world's population many times over. This is what is called "overkill". Even with this high level of "overkill", in 1987 the nuclear bomb inventories of the superpowers increased at a rate of 16 per week (Sivard, 1988, p. 6). Although the signing of the INF Treaty is a sign of progress by eliminating a class of weapon, ninety-five percent of the world’s stockpile is left in place.

An examination of war in the nuclear age indicates that the global level of violence has escalated significantly. According to Sivard's 1989 statistics, there have been "...127 wars since World War II, compared with 88 in the 40 years before it." (p. 11). Today wars are being fought almost exclusively in the Third World. Four-fifths of the victims in these wars are civilian. The proportion of civilian casualties of war is on the increase. In the 1950s the proportion was 50 percent. By the 1980s, three-quarters of the victims of
war were civilians. Thus, war has become a growing problem for the world's civilian population (Sivard, 1989, p. 23).

The militarization of the Third World has taken place with a flow of weaponry and advice originating from industrialized countries — primarily the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Between 1975 and 1983 "... over two-thirds of all arms exports to the Third World went to repressive military régimes." (Sivard, 1985). Over $400 billion of foreign debt to industrialized countries was racked up by developing nations between 1960 and 1987 (Sivard, 1989, p. 21). There has been an increasing number of military-controlled governments in the Third World. In 1989, 64 Third World governments, over half of the developing countries in Sivard's report, were "... judged to be under military control." This was the largest number in a decade." (Sivard, 1989, p. 21)

The impact of militarism on the environment became a major issue in the 1960s when there was widespread public concern over nuclear testing, waste and production. In the late 1970s, the findings of scientists such as Carl Sagan regarding the phenomenon of "nuclear winter" as a consequence of nuclear war served to create an awareness of the omnipotential of nuclear weapons. In the 1980s, the peace movement increasingly intersected with the environmental movement by connecting the environmental threat of the arms race with threats to environmental and public health and safety.

In the production of nuclear weapons a huge waste problem has emerged:

Radioactive wastes, for example, contaminate water and soil; the explosive gases that they generate while in storage have the potential for a Chernobyl disaster. ... Deteriorating production facilities silently threaten the health.

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67 Sivard's criteria for classification of government under military-control is as follows: "Key political leadership by military officers; existence of a state of martial law; extra-judicial authority exercised by security forces; lack of central political control over armed forces; occupation by foreign military forces." (p. 20.)
and lives of workers and residents in surrounding areas. The health effects of radioactive emissions through the weapons production cycle, including risks of cancer, leukemia, and genetic damage, are now amply documented, as are the sky-high clean-up costs required to reduce the danger (at least $150 billion alone.) (Sivard, 1989, p. 10) 68

The production of conventional weapons also creates waste "...in the form of contaminated sludge, acids and heavy metals." In the U.S. the production of conventional weapons generates approximately 400,000 tons of waste per year (Sivard, 1989, p. 11).

In socio-economic terms, military programs compete with social programs in budget allocations. Military expenditures have a negative effect on job opportunities. Studies have shown that military expenditures create only half of the number of jobs as the equivalent funds spent of civilian needs such as housing, education, health care. In OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries more than 8 percent of the workforce is unemployed. In Third World countries the situation is even more serious: only three in five people are fully employed. Military expenditures divert investment from civilian sectors and gear training to skills which are often not applicable in the civilian sector but dependent upon public funding (Sivard, 1988, p. 22).

Although expenditures on health have increased faster than military spending since 1975, there are still huge unmet health needs. In developing countries budgetary outlays for health "... average $10.50 per capita, one-fourth of their military budgets." (Sivard, 1988, p. 24). The richest as well as the poorest countries have growing sectors of their populations which suffer from unmet human needs. Globally:

100,000,000 people have no shelter whatsoever.
770,000,000 do not get enough food for an active working life.
500,000,000 suffer from iron-deficiency anemia.
1,300,000,000 do not have safe water to drink.
800,000,000 live in "absolute poverty", unable to meet minimal needs.
880,000,000 adults cannot read or write.

68See also: Rosalie Bertell (1985).
10,000,000 babies are born malnourished every year. 14,000,000 children die of hunger-related causes every year. (Sivard, 1988, p. 25)

As Sivard (1988) puts it: "... social neglect on the present scale constitutes a growing threat to global security." The connection between militarization and the deterioration of social conditions is primarily a question of priorities. By emphasizing military security, human and environmental security are negatively affected.

Sivard's statistics reveal the consequences of militarism in global terms, in particular, for Third World countries. Canada is part of a world order in which militarism has a significant impact upon economic, political and social life. The peace movement in Canada can be viewed as a reaction to the global worsening of material conditions and erosion of security. Canada's role in global militarism may not be as important as the United States' or the Soviet Union's. The impact of militarism is felt less dramatically in Canada than in Third World countries. However, the resurgence of Canadian peace movement in the 1980s corresponds to a growing perception among civilians of an international security crisis and Canada's particular contribution to international security problems.

The stakes for the peace movement in Canada and peace movements everywhere can be viewed in relation to ethical concerns, modes of investment and knowledge (Cohen, 1985; Touraine, 1985). The ethical concerns have frequently been framed as survival issues such as prioritizing civilian security and addressing human and environmental needs. The economic stakes for peace movements involve economic conversion from military production to investment geared to developing a strong and just civilian economy. The stakes in terms of knowledge require changing the predominant cultural pattern of

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expertism and secrecy to one which includes civilian participation in the discussion of and
decision-making on security. Peace movements have a stake in opening up a broader space
in civil society for knowledge and action on security issues.

iv) Ways of speaking: critical and emancipatory discourses

The critical discourse of the peace movement addresses various aspects of militarism from a
variety of perspectives reflecting the diversity of the movement. For instance, physicians
have pointed to the human health consequences of nuclear war and of militarism in general.
Women speak about how war and military spending affect women and children and the
connection of these problems to more general problems of violence in patriarchal societies.
Ecologists have been critical the environmental problems generated by militarism.

The Canadian peace movement is a broad-based movement of people working to promote
peace and disarmament in their communities through research, education, and participation
in local, provincial and national campaigns. The movement brings together many
different sectors of society, including church groups, professionals, women, students,
artists, labour groups\textsuperscript{70}, development groups and environmentalists.

The peace movement in Canada makes connections between the problems of militarization
and the socio-economic and environmental effects of military spending and military
policies. For example, recently the issue of low-level flight testing has made connections
between the environment, native issues and militarism. Connections have also been made
with feminist concerns through the movement’s attention to gender-parity and consensus

\textsuperscript{70}Although by definition new social movements are distinguished from traditional political groups such as
parties and unions, parties and unions do participate within the peace movement. For instance, at the
local level, riding associations and labour councils frequently participate in the work of the peace
movement.
decision-making. The peace movement has drawn from the women's movement practice of consensus which emphasizes the importance of the participation of all those affected in decision-making process.\textsuperscript{71}

Sometimes the consensus process can lead to a lowest common denominator approach. Peace movement politics have often been criticized on the basis of being dominated by single-issue campaigns (Nigel Young, 1987). Indeed, in Canada the most prominent campaigns have been directed against particular government policies such as the cruise missile testing, potential government participation in SDI, NORAD renewal, porting of nuclear powered and nuclear-weapons capable ships in Canadian harbours, and most recently the 1987 White Paper's proposal to purchase nuclear submarines.

Intermingled with these single issue campaigns there have been alternative-oriented campaigns such as the Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) campaigns in many municipalities, provinces and territories. In the 1980s, over 200 Canadian municipalities declared themselves NWFZs. There have also been a number of conversion campaigns.

For instance, the Nanoose conversion campaign has sought to convert the Canadian Forces Maritime Experimental Test Range (CRMETR) in the Georgia Strait and Jervis Inlet to an "... economically sound, environmentally safe and peaceful activity." (Canadian Peace Alliance, 1988, p. 43). The Québec campaign, "Un F-18 pour la paix" (An F-18 for Peace), also focused on conversion.\textsuperscript{72} Moreover, within these single-issue oriented campaigns there has been an accompanying discourse often putting these problems within a

\textsuperscript{71}In order to come to a decision most groups require a general consensus amongst the membership. This kind of participatory democracy is often difficult for participants who have affiliations with traditional organizations such as labour and political parties who adhere to the 50\% plus one formula for most decisions to pass.

\textsuperscript{72}The labour movement has undertaken many studies of the implication of conversion of Canadian military industries for civilian-use. For example, see: CUPE, The Facts, Special Peace Issue, (1984), p. 13-16.
wider context of global unmet human needs. Slogans of the 1980s such as "End the Arms Race, Feed the World", "End the Arms Race, Fund Human Needs" and "Think Globally, Act Locally" reflect this tendency.

The tactics of the Canadian peace movement have involved primarily campaigning within civil society to promote peace issues. There are peace groups which view the government as the major vehicle through which militarism can be addressed. Out of this tendency emerge strategies geared to reforms through elections and parliament. Other groups rely primarily on a strategic orientation which is extra-institutional—the primary goal is to transform consciousness, political structures and discourse outside the government.

For many observers of the peace movement, its most obvious work is in appeals to government and its media-oriented events. However, it is perhaps the educational and information distribution activities of the peace movement which are having the most long-term effects. The integration of peace studies into high school and university curricula, public talks, the distribution of information on security issues, door-to-door canvassing, conferences and education of the media through press conferences all can have a long term impact upon the government and civil society.

Demonstrations were a major vehicle of protest in the early 1980s and centred on the cruise missile testing issue. Although demonstrations have continued to play a part in the movement's activities, in the latter half of the 1980s much more attention has been devoted to public education through debates, conferences, workshops and media work.

There are some groups who confront the problem of militarism as a whole. These groups tend to see their work in terms of a long-term project for social change. In contrast, some groups view the threat of nuclear war as the greatest priority. Consequently, their
campaigns are usually focus upon a single issue and stress the problem of nuclear weapons.

Most peace groups seem to be aware that changes in civil society can have an impact upon the government. In representations to government through petitions, lobbying and election campaigns the politics of the movement are oriented towards broader participation in security issues. The universal call is to open both public and parliamentary debate, though some groups may focus on one over the other.

The goal of democratization of security issues is a coherent element of the peace movement's discourse. The movement calls for popular participation in the decision-making of security issues and thereby calls into question the legitimacy of security policy-making which excludes the vast majority of citizens. As Hegedus (1987) writes:

\[ \ldots \text{the movement has challenged the largely nondemocratic process that has surrounded discussions of security, a discussion that has remained the monopoly of states, governments, politicians and military experts — and thus escaped any collective democratic control. (p. 197)} \]

In conclusion, there are many points of intersection between theories of social movements and the Canadian peace movement. First, the peace movement is a broadly based movement working through decentralized networks. The movement's power is not derived from being part of the dominant class. Rather, its potential lies in tapping its diversity and democratizing security issues within civil society.

The interests or stakes for the Canadian peace movement have been to address the problems of the arms race and global insecurity. In the 1980s, the movement dealt with issues related to the Cold War arms build-up and Canada's particular contribution to the build-up. As new social movement theory would suggest (Boggs, 1986), the peace movement
focused on problems reaching crisis proportions in the 1980s. Indeed, from the perspective of the peace movement, the stakes are survival.

The discourse advanced by the Canadian peace movement contains both critical and emancipatory elements. It has been a discourse of bringing security issues into the public realm. Taken as a whole, the discourse of various sectors of the peace movement offers a comprehensive critique of contemporary security issues. The emancipatory discourse of the Canadian peace movement can be framed as a discourse of democratization. There is a widespread call within the peace movement for public participation in the making of security policy.

In the 1980s, the Canadian peace movement began to exhibit another important element of new social movement discourse—the discourse of alternatives. As the debate on security issues has evolved, the Canadian peace movement has begun to articulate not only a critique, but also alternative policy options. The next chapter will review the Canadian peace movement's critique and discourse of alternatives in the context of the debate which emerged around the 1987 White Paper on Defence.
CHAPTER 5:

THE PEACE MOVEMENT'S INTERVENTION IN THE DEBATE ON THE 1987 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER

With the release of the 1987 White Paper on Defence, the Canadian peace movement was faced with what was perceived as a major effort on the part of the government to intensify the militarization of Canada. In response to this challenge, many sectors of the movement launched campaigns and produced documents which were critical of the directions of Canada's defence policy. This chapter looks at the peace movement's intervention in the debate which emerged around the 1987 White Paper on Defence.

I. The evolution of the nuclear-submarine single-issue strategy

In response to the 1987 White Paper, the peace movement pursued primarily a single-issue strategy focusing on the nuclear submarines component of Canada's new defence policy. Some groups did this consciously as a way of drawing people into the larger debate.73 Peace groups across the country pursued activities to counter the government's decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. These activities include protest rallies (public demonstrations against the submarines were held in 1988 by groups in Victoria, Vancouver, Regina, Winnipeg, Toronto and Montreal), petition campaigns, press conferences, public opinion polling and newspaper ads.

During the November 1988 election period, the Canadian Peace Alliance (CPA) facilitated the Peace Pledge Campaign which included the submarine issue, but it also attempted to go beyond it. The tactic diverged from the traditional single-issue campaign style. It involved asking voters to

73This was, for example, Operation Dismantle's strategy.
pledge themselves to vote for "peace candidates" (candidates who had taken a pledge to work for peace). The voters' pledge read as follows:

I pledge - to vote for candidates who will actively work for a new peace policy, which will end Canada's support for the arms race, make Canada a nuclear weapons free zone, and make Canada an international voice for peace. (Canadian Peace Pledge Campaign, campaign materials, 1987).

There was some apprehension expressed within the movement regarding various aspects of the campaign, including the viability of the tactic and the lack of specificity in the content of the campaign's message. However, the campaign went ahead. According to Peace Pledge Campaign organizer, Sheena Lambert, an estimated 10 million people were reached through the media attention to Helen Caldicott's tour during the pre-election period. Across Canada, a total of 13,000 people attended lectures by Helen Caldicott. Through newspaper ads ran during the election campaign, it was estimated that 600,000 people were reached. About 50,000 people were contacted directly through repeated canvassing and mailings (Peace Pledge Campaign, 1989). The campaign cost the CPA approximately $100,000. About the same number of voter pledges were collected. Out of 1,200 candidates 338 were surveyed in 151 out of 292 ridings.

Many groups seem to have participated in the Peace Pledge Campaign 'in the spirit of consensus'. However, at the same time many groups (including Greenpeace, Operation Dismantle, Project Ploughshares and local groups such as the Ottawa Disarmament Coalition) ran self-initiated campaigns during the election, and many activists spent their time on issues related to free trade and militarism.74

Greenpeace launched a postcard campaign against the nuclear submarines which were sent to Ottawa MPs and the Prime Minister. Characteristically, Greenpeace also undertook high-profile actions such as hanging its banner with the slogan "Nuclear Submarines—Deep Trouble" at

74 For instance, the Toronto Disarmament Coalition's 1988 Walk for Peace connected the themes of Free Trade and militarism. Also see: Dennis Howlett (1989)
Conservative rallies during the election period and outside the Department of National Defence headquarters in Ottawa.

Operation Dismantle conducted a campaign which involved gathering signatures from the general public and persuading municipalities to pass resolutions against the submarines. The resolution was passed by over 60 municipalities, including St. John's, Toronto and Victoria. It called upon the government to divert the funds to be used for the submarines for municipal infrastructural needs such as housing and roads. Campaign organizers saw it as a measure of their success when, after their press conference launching the campaign, an organization called the Committee for Responsible Canadian Defence began its own campaign to promote the submarines.

In Ottawa, the Ottawa Disarmament Coalition ran a postcard campaign which involved door-to-door canvassing and a newspaper ad in the Ottawa Citizen.

In the end, the Peace Pledge Campaign became a "sleeper" during a pre-election period in which the free trade issue overshadowed everything else. Moreover, for many peace activists the submarine acquisition became the "issue of the day" on the peace movement's agenda. Consequently, the "Stop the Subs Action Plan" aspect of the Peace Pledge Campaign did attract a significant number of peace groups (over 255). Towards the end of the Peace Pledge Campaign, the focus of the campaign increasingly became the submarine issue. The Action Plan involved a "Subs or Social Services Day", a full-page ad in the Globe and Mail, a public opinion poll on the subs commissioned by the CPA, and the production of various educational materials.

The purchase of nuclear submarines also attracted major public attention and became the subject of numerous polls. From the beginning, there was not a high degree of public support for the

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75This expression was used by an executive member of a major national peace organization to describe the CPA Peace Pledge Campaign.
submarines. After the acquisition was officially announced, the decision became increasingly unpopular. Prior to the release of the White Paper, Goldfarb conducted a poll for the *Toronto Star* which found that 55% of Canadians felt that "...the federal government should not buy nuclear-powered submarines to protect Arctic sovereignty." (Alan Christie, 1987, p. A8). Similarly, an Environics poll conducted for the *Globe and Mail* released shortly after the White Paper was tabled found that 50% of Canadians supported the nuclear submarines. In 1987 and 1988, DND polls conducted by Decima found respectively 45% and 42% agreeing that in response to U.S. and U.S.S.R. submarine incursions into Canadian waters, Canada should build its own submarine force (Decima, 1987, p. 16; Decima, 1988, p. 17).

However, in 1988 public attitudes towards the nuclear submarines became increasingly unfavourable. In a May 1988 poll conducted by Environics for the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 59% responded that they somewhat or strongly disapproved of the submarine purchase when the $8 billion price tag was mentioned in the question (Koring, 1988, May).

In May 1988, an Angus Reid poll conducted on behalf of the Canadian Peace Alliance, asked the following question:

> The federal government has recently announced a policy calling for an increase in defence spending of approximately $185 billion over the next twenty years. Some people think this money is necessary for Canada to expand our military capabilities and improve our security. Other people think that it would be better to spend the money on improving social services in areas like health care and education. What do you think? (Angus Reid, 1988, p. 1)

Thirty one percent of the respondents believed that the money was needed for the military. Sixty percent would rather spend it on social services. Nine percent were unsure.

In contrast to the Angus Reid poll, in June and July of 1988, a survey conducted for CIIPS asked: "The Canadian government recently announced its intention to purchase ten to twelve nuclear-
powered submarines, to enable the armed forces to patrol Canada's three oceans. Do you approve or disapprove of the plan?" (Driedger and Mutton, 1988, p. 108). With the emphasis on the "three oceans" role instead of the price tag of the subs, 55% of Canadians approved or strongly approved of the purchase.

According to Donna Dasco of Environics, who tracked the submarine issue from the start, the balance of public opinion on the issue shifted in late 1988 and by 1989 there was very little support. During the 1988 Federal election campaign, a survey conducted by CBC found 71 percent of respondents were opposed to the submarine acquisition (Paul Koring, 1988, November 24, p. A3). The submarine program was well behind schedule and peace activists believed that it would been seen as a liability to a new Conservative government.

In January 1989, the submarine program was still in trouble in the polls. A poll conducted by the Toronto Star found 69% of respondents were opposed to the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines (Winnipeg Free Press, 1989, January 22, p. 8). In February, Angus Reid conducted a poll for Greenpeace which showed 71% were opposed to the submarines, with 50% of the respondents saying that the $8 billion should go towards the environment, and another 35% said it should be used to reduce the deficit (Nunes, 1989, February 6, p. A4).

After the 1989 budget announced the cancellation of the submarine program, Environics conducted poll which found that approximately 70% of the respondents agreed with the government's decision to cancel the submarines (Interview with Donna Dasco, vice-president, Environics, 1989, August 8).

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76 Interview with Donna Dasco, vice-president of Environics, August 8, 1989. Environics tracks public opinion of a wide variety of issues. It offers its clients a quarterly report for an annual subscription fee of $18,000. Clients of Environics' quarterly report are bound not to disclose the findings. However, Environics does grant interviews to the public and the media and will reveal the nature of the trends it finds, but the specifics of questions and figures remain confidential.
A number of factors appear to have affected the variance in the findings and the shift in the balance on the submarine question. Opposition to the submarines was greatest when the price tag of $8 billion dollars was included in polling questions. Agreement with the purchase was highest when questions included the 'three oceans', modernization and sovereignty protection rationales. However, the balance of opinion definitely shifted over time towards increasing unpopularity of the decision. A public debate emerged on the issue in the context of an international climate characterized by a new détente between the superpowers and a domestic mood of concern regarding the growing signs of economic crisis, free trade, and the environment (NSI, 1987, p. 2). Moreover, the shift in public opinion vis-a-vis the nuclear-powered submarines was paralleled by a shift in public perception of the severity of the Soviet threat to Canadian security (Mutton, 1988; Windsor, 1988; Purver, 1989).

The nuclear-powered submarines became the centrepiece of the media attention on the White Paper. They also became the central focus of the peace movement’s critique of the policy. The government’s decision to purchase nuclear submarines was the most widely unpopular aspect of the White Paper. Eventually most Canadians, including the government, found it difficult to rationalize the extravagant and dangerous idea of a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines.\textsuperscript{77}

In the context of increasing moves towards détente between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and the growing unpopularity of the nuclear submarines acquisition, the peace movement perceived the cancellation of the submarine procurement program as a winnable objective. Many peace activists claimed the scuttling of the submarines as a victory for the peace movement. Michael Vickers of Operation Dismantle, stated that the peace movement could definitely "take much of the credit" for the decision. According to Vickers: "Our efforts and those of other groups created a highly unfavourable attitude to this horrendous expenditure." (Canadian Peace Alliance, 1989, p. 5).

\textsuperscript{77}Marjorie Nichols, writing in the Ottawa Citizen, said that every school child knows that what is needed for Arctic surveillance is underwater sonar.
Freda Knott of the Greater Victoria Disarmament Group, agreed that the cancellation of the submarines "...did happen because the peace movement protested." (Canadian Peace Alliance, 1989, p. 5).

The government's change of heart, in terms of the submarines and the more general issue of making military spending a fiscal priority was also attributed to peace movement efforts by military lobbyists. At ARMX 1989 in Ottawa, top military lobbyist and former Naval commander Keith Davies, called for a new industry-wide lobby to counter the "lack of support for military spending."

Davies blamed the decline in public support on the peace movement, especially the Canadian Peace Alliance. From his perspective, because of the lack of an effective voice in Canada for military spending, the arguments put forward by the peace movement were emphasized and swayed the public. Davies' effort was taken on behalf of PIR Communications, the official public relations firm of ARMX. In his letter to delegates to ARMX 1989 weapons Davies writes:

In the absence of effective voices to the contrary, the Canadian Peace Alliance has weakened public support ... The main message of [the CPA] ... is to prioritize social program spending over defence because this group does not see any present threat to peace and security." (Canadian Peace Alliance, 1989, p. 6)

Of course, the Canadian peace movement does see threats to security, but these threats are framed within a different mode of discourse than the military-industrial base. Critics of the nuclear submarines within the peace movement saw the acquisition as posing a risk to Canadian security by drawing Canada further into nuclear warfighting scenarios. Moreover, the peace movement's single-issue focus on the nuclear-powered submarines made connections with broader security issues. For instance, the alternatives to the submarines presented by the peace movement were

78 The basis for this concern will be discussed in the next section.
often framed as funding human needs: food, housing, education, employment, municipal infrastructure, etc.

The single-issue approach has its advantages and disadvantages. For a movement with scarce resources, such as the peace movement, a single issue approach offers a way of approaching issues of concern in manageable parts. It provides a way of presenting the peace movement's message in a concise way. This is especially the case with the electronic media. Television clips are usually only 8 to 15 seconds. The single issue approach also offers a way of facilitating consensus among diverse sectors. The peace movement's campaigns against the submarines involved a wide net of community and labour groups. By focusing on a single issue which was very much in the public eye, the peace movement hoped to help to advance the debate.

Despite the fact that there wasn't an organized effort on the part of the peace movement to make a common critique of the White Paper on defence, there are many similarities and parallels in the documents produced in response to Challenge and Commitment.

My survey of the peace movement's written discourse in reaction to Canada's 1987 White Paper shows that there exists a much broader consensus on the problems of and alternatives to Canadian defence policy than the movement has articulated.

I now turn to an exploration some of the major points of agreement I found within the Canadian peace movement's broader discussion of the 1987 White Paper. First, I will look at the peace movement's critique. Second, I will discuss the alternatives proposed to the 1987 White Paper.

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80The responses reviewed in this study were drawn from major coalitions across Canada, national peace organizations, and local groups. The diversity of the social components of the peace movement is reflected in the sample drawn from. The various organizations referred to include: Veterans Against Nuclear Arms (VANA), End the Arms Race (EAR, Vancouver), Greater Victoria Disarmament Group (GVDG), Winnipeg Coordinating Committee for Disarmament (WCCD), Ottawa Disarmament Coalition (ODC), Coalition Québécois pour la paix (CQDP), Groupe désarmement et paix (GDP, Moacton, New Brunswick), Voice of
II. Critical discourse

Assessment of threats to Canadian and global security: The peace movement's response to White Paper pointed out that Canada’s current security policy is inaccurate in terms of its assessment of the threat to Canada. In Challenge and Commitment, the greatest threat to Canada was seen as the Soviet Union, rather than a superpower conflict. As Project Ploughshares put it, the White Paper

... adopted an alarmist, Reaganesque-style of Cold War rhetoric... The White Paper invites Canadians to look at "threats to security" in exclusively East-West, rather than North-South, terms. In the former, the emphasis is on superpower rivalry and spheres of interest. In the latter, the emphasis is on the threats to common security of people (not superpower blocs) throughout the world ...

(Project Ploughshares, 1987, July 10, p. 1.)

The threats to common security go beyond the threat of nuclear war to include worldwide threats to human survival such as the lack of food and health care, violations of human rights and the degradation of the environment.

Most groups commented on the exaggeration of the Soviet threat. Bill Robinson (1987) of Ploughshares showed that "... the White Paper's statistics on the Soviet threat tend to even overstate Pentagon/NATO threat assessments by a factor of 1.5 to 2 times." (p. 2.) Many groups also pointed out that the White Paper did not acknowledge the recent progress in East-West
relations (Voice of Women, 1987; Veterans Against Nuclear Armament, 1988; Greater Victoria Disarmament Group, 1987; Winnipeg Coordinating Committee for Disarmament, 1987).

The fact that the White Paper did not acknowledge the shift from Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) to nuclear warfighting which took place in the late 1970’s was of grave concern to many peace groups.

The peace movement’s critique of the decision to purchase a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines pointed to the fact that: "Canadian subs would inevitably be drawn into a continental defence strategy composed of the U.S. Maritime Strategy, the Strategic Defence Initiative, and the Air Defence Initiative, all of them based on the premise that nuclear war is acceptable as a rational choice and winnable at acceptable cost." (Veterans Against Nuclear Armament, 1988, p. 19).

There was resounding agreement within the peace movement that nuclear-powered submarines were not needed either for assuring Canadian sovereignty or the defence of our territory. Many groups saw the nuclear-powered submarine decision as a political gesture on the part of the government.\(^3\) Other objections to the nuclear-powered submarines included:

a) Submarines are useless in the sovereignty role or for peacekeeping - they travel unseen.

b) Arctic surveillance could be done more cost effectively with under-ice acoustic systems.

c) The government’s quote of the costs of the submarines was underestimated.

d) Nuclear submarines require reactors fuelled with weapons-grade enriched uranium, the acquisition of which violate the Canada-Euratom Agreement and the Non Proliferation Treaty. (The French firm bidding on the contract argued that Canada should pick their subs because they are fueled with "civilian" grade uranium.)

e) Nuclear submarines are a security risk for the environment. (VANA, p. 19, 20).

\(^3\) For example, see: VANA (1988); Project Ploughshares (1987). Defence analyst Gwynn Dyer speculated that the subs may have been part of the free trade deal. "In exchange for an Arctic sovereignty deal and free trade, Canada would become involved in a joint U.S.-Canadian defence command over coast waters.... " This arrangement would be the maritime equivalent of NORAD. (Dyer, February 10, 1988).
In response to the criticisms against the nuclear-powered submarines, former Minister of Defence Beatty emphasized in his justification of the decision, that the purpose of the submarines was not defence but warfighting. Thus, even though the White Paper did not acknowledge the shift from Mutual Assured Destruction to nuclear warfighting, the doctrine did seem to have gained acceptance within the military establishment.

In contrast to the peace movement's concern about the shift to nuclear warfighting strategy in NATO and the importance of the INF treaty, the lack of acknowledgement of these factors amounted to a denial on the part of the makers of our security policy that there is a new strategic context in which security questions must be examined. On the one hand, the nuclear warfighting doctrine increases the threats to security. On the other, there is some progress being made in arms control.

Inconsistencies within the Government's Policies and Policy-Making Process: The peace movement's critique of the lack of coherence between the policies of External Affairs and DND is significant because it points to a key contradiction within the formulation of security policy. Foreign policy is currently subordinate to and conflicts with defence policy. From the point of many peace groups, defence policy should be developed within the context of domestic and foreign policy objectives.

Some of the peace movement's criticism with regard to the lack of consultation process in the making of Challenge and Commitment can be understood in relation to the movement's experience with the policy formation process which took place in the making of External Affairs policies. The peace movement's involvement in representations to the Hockin and Simmard Committee led peace groups to accept a certain amount of the responsibility for some of the more positive elements of

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External Affairs' policy and to anticipate more invitations from the government. Peace groups seem to have expected that the foreign policy directions set out in *Independence and Internationalism* and in the government's response to this document, would be taken into account in the formulation of the government's policies on defence. However, as the Winnipeg Coordinating Committee for Disarmament stated: "Both in specifics and in spirit the White Paper contradicts the will of the Canadian public as expressed and refined in the External Affairs *Independence and Internationalism*." (1987, p. 3).

Many groups were critical of the process whereby the White Paper was arrived at. VOW, one of the few peace groups selected to make representations to DND, stated that only military solutions to international security problems were considered in the White Paper. "No alternative views which were presented at the Department of National Defence 'consultations' were even acknowledged." (1987, p. 2) WCCD pointed out: "In his preface to the White Paper, Perrin Beatty, the Minister of National Defence, mentions only one of groups he consulted during its production: the Canadian military." (1987, p. 4).

**Economic Implications of the White Paper: The Insecurity of Military Production.** The White Paper stated that the defence budget would rise 2% each year above inflation over the next 15 years. Peace groups estimated that the base military budget for over the next fifteen years would be well over 200 billion dollars. This figure did not include some major equipment purchases such as the submarines or the space-based defence system (WCCD, 1987, p. 21) and the figure would also be higher with inflation taken into account.  

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85 The participation of the peace movement in the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND) hearings on NORAD in 1986 renewal also further sensitized the peace movement to the security policy-making process in Canada.

86 At the press conference launching the 1987 White Paper, Beatty did not deny that defence expenditures would in fact rise to well over $200 billion over the next fifteen years. In fact, he laughed.
WCCD put the figures for defence spending in the context of costs per capita: "Given that there are 25 million men, women and children in Canada, the cost per person will be $8,000 over the next fifteen years, or $533.33 per year. For a family of four, the annual average cost would be $2133.33." (1987, p. 22).

In particular, the cost estimates on the nuclear submarines received much attention. Researchers within the peace community emphasized the gross underestimates in the government figures. Whereas the government estimated the cost of the submarines at eight billion, they were estimated by sources within the peace movement to cost between ten and twenty billion dollars.87

Another related area of concern was the White Paper's objective of enhancing Canada's defence industrial base. The White Paper suggested that Canadian industry could be enhanced through the development of military technology and production. This kind of industrial base could not be sustained by the purchases of Canadian DND. Instead it would require a sustained export market to Third World countries, which as Project Ploughshares has pointed out, would likely involve selling to human rights violators in order to sustain the conditions for the reproduction of a Canadian economy increasingly dependent upon a military industry (Regehr, 1987, p. 1). In the critical discourse of the Canadian peace movement, through the policy directions set out in the 1987 White Paper, Canada's industrial base would be set on a course of developing a growing stake in military production.

87 According to Ish Theilheimer, president of Operation Dismantle, a modest estimate would be $14 billion for construction and infrastructure (1989, p. 3). The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament suggested a figure of $10 billion for a 1,100 ton nuclear powered submarine (1987, November 16, p. 2.) In Arms Control Communiqué, No. 46, Dan Hayward suggests an estimate of between $12.5 and $14.8 billion for the submarine program (1988, February 24), p. 1. In a press conference on their "Sink the Subs" campaign, Groupe désarmement et paix state that estimates of $20 billion are given "...by those who remember the successive increases in costs for nuclear power stations in the 70s, the cost for the F-18s and the frigates in the 80's and who also have in mind the breadth of the chronic frauds in the military industry." "Sink the Subs", Press Release, (1988, June 20), p. 2.
The treatment of economic benefits of defence expenditures in the White Paper was inaccurate and alarming to the peace movement. There was no comparison with job creation and economic benefits with the same level of spending in the civilian economy. In its critique, EAR's paper (1987) emphasized that there "... are no positive economic benefits derived from military spending to be found in the development of a large scale arms industry." (p. 28).

From the point of view of the peace movement, increased militarization of the Canadian economy would lead to growing economic insecurity for the vast majority of Canadian citizens. The large-scale military industrial mobilization that the 1987 White Paper encouraged would lead to further economic crises, increases in taxes, cutbacks in social programs, environmental decay, unemployment problems, and the aggravation of regional disparities (see: VOW, 1987; VANA, 1988; Ernie Regehr, Ploughshares, 1987).

III. Discourse of alternatives

An Alternative Vision of Security: Common Security: The overarching concept which can be used to describe the alternatives suggested by the peace movement is common security. The term was not always explicitly used, but nonetheless common security seems to be always present as an alternative philosophy informing security policy prescriptions.

The concept of common security emerged in the eighties with the Palme Commission Report. The principles of common security as developed by the Palme Commission are as follows:

1. All nations have a legitimate right to security.
2. Military force is not a legitimate instrument for resolving disputes between nations.
3. Restraint is necessary in expressions of national policy.
4. Reductions and qualitative limitations of armaments are necessary for common security.
5. "Linkage" between arms negotiations and political events should be avoided. (Palme, 1982, p. 8-10)
The World Federalists (1987) emphasized common security in their response to the White Paper. They stated that

"... the route to long term security in the nuclear age lies within the overall concept of common security, an approach that emphasizes the interdependence of all nations. Since nuclear war would bring global devastation, all nations have a common interest, and a stake in its prevention. Common security obliges nations to minimize the resort to arms by creating or strengthening international institutions for the settlement of international disputes." (p. 2)

While the Palme Commission pioneered the concept of common security, the term has recently been given a broader definition and wider currency. Common security in some sectors of the peace movement means justice — social, political, economic, and even environmental justice. The word 'security' is being reclaimed by peace activists to help convey an ethic of positive peace. From the peace movement's perspective, security must not only take into account questions of defence, but also the general well-being of global society in terms of health, employment, the economy, education, democracy and the environment.

The Canadian peace movement's reclaiming of the word 'security' and development of the concept of common security illustrates that, at least in terms of policy prescriptions, the movement is not stuck in the nation-statist mold that some researchers have attributed to peace movements internationally (Young, 1987). The adoption of common security as a Canadian policy is viewed by the peace movement as a way of enhancing Canadian security and sovereignty and helping to build confidence globally that a world without war is possible.

Common security may seem utopian. However, given the growing unreality of the militarist conception of security in the nuclear age, common security does appear to be as a more realistic security policy if we are thinking in terms of the long term survival of life on Earth. Militarism is an impractical scheme for economic development when we take into account its serious social, political, environmental and economic consequences.

As an alternative to the nuclear submarines, underwater sensors were offered as a feasible, non-provocative solution which would be less costly than submarines. (The White Paper did advocate sensors, but they were also cut along with the subs in the 1989 budget.) In addition, expenditures on coast-guard vessels, such as ice breakers, are seen as a more constructive way of assuring the presence and expressing the sovereignty of Canada in the Arctic.

Most groups draw attention to the Arctic question. As an additional alternative to the submarines, the peace movement appears to be united in its call for a demilitarized Arctic. The idea is to form non-military alliances with Arctic countries and declare the Arctic a demilitarized zone through multilateral negotiations. As a way of enhancing security and sovereignty in the Arctic, this type of initiative was also favoured by the External Affairs' 1986 Hockin-Simmard Report.

Support for developing a global system for seismic monitoring of nuclear explosions, through the development of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA), is a consistent element throughout the peace movement's response to the White Paper. VOW suggests establishing international data and communication centres which would make information from global collection devices available to all countries. By upgrading the Yellowknife seismic array and other similar installations Canada could contribute to international monitoring of nuclear testing and enforcing an eventual Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (VOW, 1987, p. 3).

Many peace groups were critical of the underemphasis of a peacekeeping role for the Canadian military. Project Ploughshares, for instance, stated that although the White Paper "...refers to and supports peacekeeping, it treats it as a kind of military footnote." In Ploughshares' discourse
of alternatives to the 1987 White Paper, it was suggested that: "Peacekeeping should be a centerpiece of Canadian defence policy — for it is through the peaceful settlement of disputes that the world will develop and maintain a stable world order, on which Canadian security ultimately rests." (Regehr, Project Ploughshares, p. 9; VOW, 1989; VANA, 1988).

In its proposals for underwater sensors, improving the coast guard, monitoring of military activity, demilitarizing the Arctic, and peacekeeping activity, the peace movement has shown an awareness that in the present context the question of defence cannot be ignored. But what is needed is an alternative approach to defence which is non-provocative.

Alternative Economic Policy: Economic Conversion: There is a growing concern within the peace movement regarding the development of the military-industrial complex. Instead of fostering the growth of a defence industrial base in Canada, many groups put forward the suggestion that Canada needs to begin efforts to convert our economy from one increasingly dependent on militarism to one geared to civilian needs.

The Canadian Labour Congress' perspective on economic conversion, is set out in their "International Affairs Policy Paper: Preparing for Peace—Labour's vision" (1988). The CLC promotes:

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\ldots \text{with the full participation and consultation of the trade unions involved, a major infusion of funds allocated by governments for conversion research, followed by implementation of orderly conversion of unnecessary military production into civilian industries, ensuring that adequate measures are taken to provide retraining and employment protection for those affected (\ldots )}\n\]

\[
\ldots \text{a dedication of resources saved by arms reduction and conversion programmes, to national and international development goals, noting that the resources released for international development should be coordinated through the U.N.} \ldots \text{ (p. 2)}^{88}\n\]

\[88\text{VOW suggests that Canada should develop "...high-tech civilian and commercial economy without reliance on a military-industrial base."}, \text{p. 3.}\]
Groupe désarmement et paix, in Moncton, New Brunswick, emphasized that research has shown that more jobs are created in the civilian sector of the economy, with the same amount of investment, than in the military sector. From their perspective, conversion would involve "... responding to our real and essential needs such as education and research, health, daycares, upgrading municipal infrastructures, environmental protection, regional development... " (1988, p. 2)

Alternative Politics of Security: The Democratization of Security Issues: There is a strong consensus within the peace movement that there needs to be informed public and parliamentary debate and decision-making on security issues.

The Voice of Women stated that: "In this nuclear age, society must recognize the participation of civilians in defence decisions, since we, not the military, are on the 'front line'." They went on to say that defence policy must be "... developed within the larger framework of this country's domestic and foreign policy. DND must follow these directives, not set or develop them." (1987, p. 2)

A resolution passed by Québec members of the Canadian Peace Alliance urged the Government of Canada:

- to withdraw its White Paper on Defence, and, in consultation with the people of Canada,
- to draft a new document based on the premise that the principle threat to Canadian and world security is not any particular nation state, but the very existence of nuclear weapons, the continuation of the conventional and nuclear arms races, and the problems of underdevelopment and unmet social needs at home and abroad.89

89 In Montreal on October 26, 1987, peace groups attending a conference from across Quebec passed this resolution. The resolution was circulated at the CPA Convention in Ottawa, June 1988. A press release issued by the Québec groups on October 26, 1987, states that: "The delegates to the conference agreed that Canada could play a very constructive role by fostering non-military approaches to conflict resolution, by working to ease tensions between the superpowers, and by encouraging international cooperation on such matters as environmental protection and third world development. These would cost far less, achieve far
Ernie Regehr of Project Ploughshares has said that the submarines were cancelled because of the "... government's utter failure to provide a convincing security rationale to keep them afloat."

Ploughshares' call for a new discussion paper on defence emphasized the need to take into account non-military elements of security such as the economy and the environment (Canadian Peace Alliance, 1989, p. 6).

The peace movement's call for the withdrawal of the White Paper can be seen, together with its proposals for a shift in defence and external policies towards common security and the involvement of civilians in the debate and decision-making on security as part of global effort of peace movements to civilize international relations.

IV.

Despite the existence of an underlying broad consensus among peace groups across Canada indicated by my research on the peace movement's response to the 1987 defence White Paper, the peace movement did not attempt to mount a national campaign to challenge overall security directions.

My review of the Canadian peace movement's critique and alternatives is meant to illustrate the potential for a broader alternative consensus. In the process of analyzing and constructing policy statements in response to the White Paper as a whole, the peace movement developed a more comprehensive critique, as well as, a set of alternatives to current directions of Canadian security policy. The peace movement appears to be moving beyond being primarily a reactive movement, to one which is formulating alternatives.
Part of the failure of the movement seems to lie in its inability to articulate the consensus which exists. However, it is obvious that the peace movement's critique of the White Paper is grounded in the perception that the concrete security interests of Canadian's would be negatively affected by Canada's defence policy proposals of 1987.

Whatever the peace movement's impact on the subsequent alterations to the 1987 White Paper, it must be seen in combination with the momentum of other factors at work. In addition to taking into account the budgetary imperatives of deficit-cutting, intra-governmental conflicts on the White Paper in terms of policy prescriptions and funding requirements, it is also necessary to consider the shifting of public opinion as the debate on the White Paper became more publicly pronounced.

Public opinion polls played a visible role in the debate surrounding Canada's most recent security policy. The Conservatives have been somewhat 'poll-happy' in their past two terms in power. In 1987, the Montreal Gazette obtained reports that showed that the government had paid $5 million for 61 of the 799 public opinion polls it had commissioned since 1983. The documents show that prior to virtually all major legislation in 1987, federal departments hired polling firms to track public opinion (Diebal, 1987, p. A1 and A8). Public opinion polling has also become a tactic within many community sector groups. For example, Greenpeace, Canadian Peace Alliance and the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament sponsored polls on the nuclear submarine issue.

The Conservative Government's concerns regarding public opinion on defence issues were well-founded. In the late 1980's, there was a shift in public opinion on several key security issues. This shift is paralleled by a growing gap between public opinion and government security policy. Public attitudes regarding the Soviet threat, military spending, Canadian involvement in cruise
testing and SDI, as well as certain defence acquisitions such as the nuclear-powered submarines were all marked by shifts (Mutton, 1988-1989, 1987-1988).

A North-South Institute (NSI) poll conducted in 1987 found a growing gap between government policy and public opinion on security issues. According to the survey:

The Canadian public seems to be on a different wavelength from the government in what it sees as the main threats to Canadian security and what should be done about them. . .

In 1987 the government allowed a Defence White Paper to be seen to speak for Canadian security policy, and the Department of National Defence to be seen to shape Canada's views on peace and war. In the year that ended with Mr. Gorbachev in Washington and the INF (Inter {sic } Nuclear Forces) Treaty, NSI's survey shows most Canadians implicitly rejecting both the Cold War diagnoses and prescriptions of the Defence White Paper ( . . .)

Canadians themselves have a different and much wider agenda for enhancing international security, including environmental, health, developmental and ethical/political goals. In the maintenance of peace, they seem more likely to see Canada's best contribution in more arms control and disarmament efforts, international cooperation, conflict resolution and peacekeeping, rather than a build-up of arms. Even among various international purposes—quite apart from needs at home—most Canadians resoundly reject increased defence spending as a priority . . . (p. 1)

When asked to rank issues facing Canada, respondents in the NSI polls ranked pollution and the environment as the most important issue (98%). Next respondents ranked as their most important preoccupations major world diseases (94%), poverty and hunger (93%), respect for international organizations such as the U.N. (89%), apartheid and human rights issues (87%), and the danger of accidental nuclear war (83%). Among the 13 concerns listed, the danger of Soviet aggression was ranked lowest (61%) (NSI, 1987, p. 3).

The peace movement played a role in the budgetary changes affecting DND's policy to the extent that it can be viewed as part of public opinion. Public attitude surveys on peace and security issues have shown that there are many parallels between the peace movement and the public at large. The peace movement is not on the fringes of national debate, but instead, tends to echo the
concerns of the general public. Through the course of the development of public discussion on security issues stemming from the release of the 1987 White Paper, the public became more attuned to the conflicting perspectives of the military-industrial complex and sectors of society concerned with a more peace-oriented security policy for Canada.

It appears that the relative ideological and political weakness of the military-industrial complex, created a vacuum for the peace movement to fill, particularly within the media and public opinion. In reviewing the peace movement's general response to the White Paper we have seen that the movement does see threats to Canadian peace and security. However, the peace movement diverges from the military-industrial complex's discourse on security problems and how to manage them. The peace movement is now closer to public opinion than the military-industrial complex. This represents an expansion of the potential for conflict between the movement and the complex.

The critique and alternatives proposed by the peace movement conflict directly with dominant ideological perspectives. Even if the movement had been able to express the untapped consensus, it would have faced enormous language and power barriers. However, because of the movement's broad-based existence within society and growing popular support for some of its ideas, it does present a challenge to the interests of the military-industrial complex. The potential of the peace movement lies in its ability to find creative ways to develop support for its alternative proposals within civil society and the state. Yet, the power differential between the peace movement and the military-industrial complex in terms of economic and political resources foretells of the enormous effort that the movement will have to undertake in order to develop a counter-hegemony on security issues in Canada.

The Canadian peace movement's intervention in the debate around the 1987 White Paper on defence reflected elements of a new social movement orientation.
The peace movement operated in a decentralized, networking mode to communicate its opposition to the nuclear submarines. Although during the 1988 pre-election period the movement addressed the Canadian Government directly, its overall focus was on communicating its message within civil society through public debates, street theatre, demonstrations and educational activities. Its power base rests primarily within an heterogeneous network of community and labour sector groups.

The stakes for the Canadian peace movement in its intervention were mostly framed around a single issue imperative of stopping the widely unpopular nuclear-submarine acquisition. This interest was articulated in the context of unmet social needs in Canada and globally. The unstated stakes for the Canadian peace movement in its intervention in the debate around the 1987 White Paper were advancing a discussion about alternative concepts of security.

There were both critical and emancipatory elements in the peace movement's discourse on the nuclear submarines, as well as in the broader discourse I have reviewed of the movement's written discussions of the 1987 White Paper.

There appears to be a counter-hegemony developing on security issues in Canada — an alternative way of thinking and speaking about peace and security issues. The peace movement is a movement seeking to democratize security issues. In so doing it is involved in a process of redefining the rules of discourse and power vis-a-vis security decision-making.
CHAPTER 6:

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I will examine the questions\(^90\) posed at the outset of this thesis in light of my research. Finally, I will discuss the direction of next phase of the security debate in Canada.

1.

(1) I have argued in this thesis that the security debate in Canada is based on a conflict of power, interests and discourse. I have focused on two social forces in this debate: the peace movement and the military-industrial complex.

The conflicting power bases of the peace movement and the military-industrial complex can be viewed as follows: The peace movement's power is founded on a broad-base of social actors organized in a loose network. In contrast, the military-industrial complex has a much narrower class base organized hierarchically within the state and business sectors. The military-industrial complex played the predominant role in the formulation of the 1987 White Paper on Defence. The agenda for the security debate around the 1987 White Paper was set by a power bloc of interests within the state, the military and business. The direction taken by the military-industrial complex was conditioned by external influences of the military-industrial complex in the United States and the Cold War climate of the 1980s.

\(^{90}\)See: page 3 of this thesis.
Although Canadian defence industry is not the dominant sector of the economy, the military-industrial complex is made up of elements of the dominant class (sectors of business, the state and the military) which have a greater influence on security policymaking than the peace movement.

The interests of the peace movement are in basic opposition to the interests of the military-industrial complex. The interests of the military-industrial complex are 1) to develop military capabilities and doctrines (articulated by the complex as 'defence-industrial preparedness' through a profitable defence industrial base); and 2) to assure the state's administration of the economic and political requirements of militarization. In contrast, the stakes for the peace movement are to 1) transform the orientation of security from a military to a civilian definition of security; 2) to transform the power basis upon which security policy is constructed through democratization allowing for broad-based civilian input into the decision-making process.

The discourses articulated by the peace movement and the military-industrial complex are in sharp opposition. The conflict in the discourse of military-industrial complex and the peace movement is rooted in different definitions of security. On the one hand, the military-industrial complex speaks of a security based on weapons, defence-industrial preparedness, national security and economic prioritization of military needs. On the other hand, security in the peace movement's discourse is a social and ethical imperative spoken of in terms of 'positive peace', social justice, democracy and civilizing international relations.

The growth of the peace movement in Canada and globally can be viewed as a reaction to worsening social and economic conditions and growing insecurity. There was massive
global outcry against the nuclear build-up in the Cold War of the 1980s—including public demonstrations on an unprecedented scale, intensive public education, and coalition-building within the peace movement.

The impact of militarism is felt less dramatically in Canada than in Third World countries. Canada's role in global militarism is not as important as the United States' or the Soviet Union's. But there are conflicting interests in Canada between social forces promoting a military definition of security and social forces seeking to promote an alternative vision of security. The growth of peace movement and the growth of general public's concern regarding security issues can be viewed as a reaction to the consequences of the military-industrial complex on a global scale.

(2) Several factors explain the contradiction between the ambitious policy put forward in the 1987 White Paper and the subsequent defence spending cutbacks which took place in 1989 and 1990.

First, the deficit reduction strategy of the Mulroney government entails a programme of fiscal restraint. In the context of general fiscal restraint policy, the major defence spending increases demanded by the acquisition programme of the 1987 White Paper could not be legitimated. The military-industrial complex's interests were superceded by those of more dominant sectors of the economy pushing for fiscal restraint and high interest rates. In the end, the interests of finance capital and big business won out in the game of resource allocation.

Second, a new détente process in East/West relations moved quickly in the late 1980s. In 1987 we began to see friendlier relations and a series of summits between the Soviet Union and the United States. The new era of détente involved a shift away from extreme forms
of Cold war rhetoric which had included the Reagan administration's outright references to
the possibility of nuclear warfighting. After a decade in which arms control seemed like
a hopeless proposition, the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 1987
signaled a major breakthrough — an historical moment in the development of a new period
of détente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. After a decade in which the Cold War
between the superpowers reached new peaks, Gorbachev and Bush declared in their
December 1989 summit in Malta that the Cold War is now over.91

The 1987 White Paper's Cold War orientation was out of sync with reality as soon as it
was released. In the context of a major thaw in the Cold War and fiscal restraint the
government could not justify the White Paper's warfighting strategies and major military
capital outlays.

Finally, the White Paper's policy directions became substantially out of step with public
attitudes. The discourse of the White Paper conflicted with the shift in public mood on
issues of international security. The ideology of military-industrial complex was not
hegemonic.

(3) The peace movement's response to the 1987 White Paper was to launch campaigns
which involved demonstrations, public education, signature gathering, commissioning
opinion polls. Although it is difficult to gauge the peace movement's impact on
government policy or the discourse on security within civil society, through its educational
and political work, the Canadian peace movement may have contributed to creating an

91 During the Gorbachev era, we have seen the development of new thinking and reforms in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe such as perestroika, glasnost, democratization and recently the historic
dismantling of the Berlin Wall. In addition to East Germany, major political upheavals and moves
towards democratization occurred in communist countries such as Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania.
In the U.S., after a decade of unparalleled increases in military expenditure, political and economic pressures
finally led to a decrease in defence expenditures — 9 percent in 1989 and a further 2 percent in 1990.
unfavourable environment for the nuclear submarines acquisition and increased military expenditures.

The peace movement's major focus was on the White Paper's proposal to purchase nuclear-powered submarines. However, in my research I found that the peace movement's critique went beyond a single issue approach. Through the debate around the 1987 White Paper on Defence the peace movement's discourse integrated both a critique and alternatives to current security policy directions. The peace movement's critique and alternatives are summarized below:

A. The Peace Movement's Critique of the White Paper

- The White Paper's assessment of the strategic environment and the threat to Canadian security is inaccurate.

- Nuclear-powered submarines are not needed for assuring Canadian sovereignty or defence.

- The support for the Air Defence Initiative, Strategic Defence Initiative and the Forward Based Maritime Strategy within the 1987 White Paper draws Canada into a nuclear warfighting strategy and undermines Canadian arms control objectives.

- There are contradictions between Canada's foreign and defence policies.

- The costs of the White Paper are underestimated and unjustified in terms of the defence of Canada.

- The treatment of economic benefits of defence expenditures in the White Paper is inaccurate.

- The White Paper encourages further militarization of the Canadian economy.

B. The Peace Movement's Alternative Security Proposals

- Common security, as opposed military security, is the overarching concept which can be used to describe the alternatives suggested by the peace movement.

- Canada could enhance common security internationally by undertaking a more comprehensive role in military surveillance.
• Underwater sensors are viewed as a non-provocative alternative to nuclear-powered subs.

• Monitoring of military activity should also involve seismic monitoring of nuclear explosions, establishing international data and communications centres which would make information available to all countries, and support for the International Satellite Monitoring Agency.

• International peacekeeping under the auspices of the UN would be a positive role for Canadian armed forces.

• Canada should work towards the demilitarization of the Arctic.

• Canada needs to begin serious efforts to convert our economy from one increasingly dependent on militarism to one geared to civilian needs.

• There needs to be informed public and parliamentary debate and decision-making on security issues.

II.

The easing of Cold War tensions is a sign of progress undoubtedly welcome by the majority of the world’s population. However, there is still enormous momentum behind global militarization. The INF treaty leaves ninety five percent of the world’s stockpile of nuclear weapons still in place. Arms industries are far from approaching the path to conversion from military to civilian purposes. The institutional basis for militarism is far from being dismantled — East or West.

In Canada, the peace movement has begun to discuss the question of a the peace dividend. According to Bill Robinson (1990) of Project Ploughshares, capital spending on defence “... has declined more than 10 percent since 1988-89, from $3.2 billion to $2.8 (all figures in 1990 dollars) — more than twice the size of the decline in the military budget as a whole.” (p. 13) DND will spend $12.362 billion in 1990-91. Despite the cutbacks, this figure amounts the same amount as military spending in 1988-89 after adjusting for inflation. Thus, it is difficult to really speak of a peace dividend in 1990 when
"...Canada's military spending remains about 43 percent higher in real terms than it was at the beginning of the 1980s." (Robinson, 1990, p. 12)

Writing in 1988, Ruth Leger Sivard sums up the current juncture as follows: "While there are now a few reassuring signs that the public's determination for peace is beginning to reassert control over the military steamroller, the corrective process is unlikely to be easy or quick. (Sivard, 1988, p. 6)

Peace movements globally must now ask: "Where do we go from here?"

If the untapped consensus I have found in my research on the peace movement's written response to the 1987 White Paper on Defence is any indication, the next phase of the security debate in Canada will be oriented towards popularizing common security as an alternative to current security arrangements. Indeed, there are some indications that this is the direction that the peace movement is taking. Metta Spencer, editor of the Canadian peace movement's most widely circulated journal, Peace Magazine, has stated that:

Peace activists must develop sane systems of security to replace the militarism of the Cold War. We refer to "common security" as our chosen model for reform—though without always understanding the concept. It's time to think the notion through. (1990, August, p. 4)

The September issue is a special one devoted to stimulating the debate on common security. Ted Olson's article in the same issue reviews the various submissions and he comments: "The articles published here constitute a beginning; but they are scarcely more than that."

(1990, p. 20)

The peace movement can build on these initial discussions of common security. There are some signs that the next phase of a broader debate on security issues is approaching.
Preparations are now underway for launching a cross-Canada Citizen's Inquiry into Peace and Security.

The Canadian Peace Alliance in cooperation with many other community sector groups is organizing public hearings in 25 communities across Canada. Six commissioners (including Iona Campagnola, Douglas Roche and Johanna den Hertog) will take into consideration the views of Canadians about what "security" means in the post-Cold War era (Citizen's Inquiry into Peace and Security, 1990, "Changing Canada's defence and security policies for the 1990's"). The inquiry will pose the question: "What makes Canada secure?". Based on the findings of the inquiry, the commissioners will propose "... a new and creative policy to make Canada a leader in developing a secure, just and peaceful world."

(Citizen's Inquiry into Peace and Security, no date, "Changing Canada's defence and security policies in the 1990's"). A background document for the inquiry has just been released and indicates that the notion of common security will figure prominently in the peace movements submissions to the inquiry. The document offers a critique of Canadian security policy, an exploration of the concept of common security and some proposals for an alternative Canadian security policy (See: Citizen's Inquiry into Peace and Security, 1990, "What Makes Canada Secure?").

The concept of common security is relevant to the peace movement not only from the point of view of policy orientation. It can also be used as an important linking principle between the peace movement and other progressive social movements in Canada. Through a commitment to common security, the peace movement can further develop its alliances with the environmentalist, feminist, youth, labour, anti-racist, development movements.

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92 Given the current war in the Persian Gulf, many submissions will undoubtedly refer to Canada's role in this conflict.
Carl Boggs (1986) suggests that economic and social conversion can best serve as the linking principle for the new social movements. However, common security is an overarching principle into which economic and social conversion can be articulated.

What is being suggested in this proposition is not that the various movements neglect their established agendas in favour of adopting a new priority: common security. Rather, it is possible for these movements to converge by coming to realize and act upon their implicit connection in a more explicit fashion. That is, by beginning to develop a more holistic and shared concept of what they are striving for: A common economic, political and social security based on a transformation of systems of domination. A world in which social, economic and political relations are democratic, preserve and enhance our future and well-being. What the new wave of peace movements globally is fundamentally about is the development of new security systems based on human security.

The success of the Citizen’s Inquiry into Peace and Security in promoting a common security agenda as an alternative security project for Canada, and the success of the peace movement as a social movement in general will depend on many factors. As Carl Boggs (1986) has written with reference to social movements:

... a viable counterhegemonic politics will depend, in the final analysis, upon essentially subjective factors: intellectual resources, strategic choice, the capacity of disparate groups to unite in a common outlook, and the success of activists in making concrete—making alive—issues that can attract the vast majority of people in the ideal of a democratic, egalitarian, nonviolent world. (p. 249)
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