Peaceful, Tolerant, and Orderly:
Post-Cold War Foreign Policy and ‘Canadian’ Subjectivity

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the requirements for the degree
Master of Arts

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by
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Ottawa, Ontario

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Abstract

This thesis argues that post-cold war Canadian foreign policy is implicated not only in the governance of others, but also in the subjectification and governance of ‘Canadians.’ While Canadian foreign policy analysis has largely been understood as an ‘outward’ practice, it is possible instead to consider its relation to ‘Canadian’ subjectivity. This thesis thus traces the ways in which ‘foreign’ subjects have been targeted by post-cold war Canadian foreign policy, and peacebuilding in particular, as unable to fully self-govern due to their ‘underdevelopment’ and their lack of liberal values and behaviours of tolerance, peacefulness and orderliness. In contrast, ‘Canadians’ have been idealized within foreign policy as having just those values that are deemed to be lacking among ‘foreign’ subjects, including tolerance, humanitarianism, orderliness, and peacefulness. Thus, post-cold war foreign policy enjoins ‘Canadians’ to understand and conduct themselves as good liberal subjects, and to govern themselves as such. The thesis concludes with a consideration of resistances to this truth regime, and a discussion of the importance of critique.
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Introduction

The relation between the subjectification and governance of ‘Canadians’ and Canadian foreign policy is a topic that has, as yet, not been considered. This thesis aims to provide just such a study, through a consideration of post-cold war Canadian foreign policy. I argue that the particular ways in which ‘foreign’ subjects have become ‘problems’ for post-cold war Canadian foreign policy is implicated in ‘Canadian’ subjectivity, and the governance of ‘Canadians.’ Such an assertion counters studies located in traditional Canadian foreign policy analysis, which have largely conceptualized foreign policy as an ‘outward’ practice. Yet it is possible instead to consider how foreign policy is implicated in the formation of national identities or subjectivities. Such analysis borrows from scholars working in the area of post-structuralist international relations, who have theorized that foreign policy contributes to the formation of national identities which underpin the legitimacy of state sovereignty and the exercise of sovereign power. This thesis departs from such analysis, however, by considering the ways in which the formation of national subjectivities does not solely provide legitimacy for the exercise of sovereign power, but is also implicated in the exercise of governmental power. Here, studies of governmentality are instructive in elucidating how governmental power can be understood as power that encourages certain forms of life and conduct, whereas sovereign power is deductive or repressive, and is associated with the power of the state. In this sense, post-cold war Canadian foreign policy - broadly conceived to involve not just the state, but also non-governmental organizations, academics, think-tanks, and business, among others - is implicated in the
exercise of governmental power in that it enjoins ‘Canadians’ to live certain forms of life: to self-govern as liberal autonomous subjects. ‘Canadians’ are enjoined through foreign policy to understand and conduct themselves differently from ‘foreign’ subjects through the problematization of ‘foreign’ subjects and an idealization of ‘Canada’ and the values of ‘Canadians.’ As such, ‘foreign’ subjects have been problematized or targeted as engaging in intrastate wars due to their violence, intolerance, poverty, lack of development and a culture of peace, while ‘Canadian values’ have been stated inversely as peaceful, tolerant, multicultural, humanitarian, and orderly. In sum, while ‘foreign’ subjects are understood as unable to autonomously self-govern, and therefore to require the aid of ‘Canada’ and ‘Canadians’ to manage their own violent values, attitudes, and behaviours, particularly though programs such as peacebuilding, ‘Canadians’ are enjoined to understand and conduct themselves as capable, autonomous liberal subjects, able to self-govern. This governance of Canadians cannot be considered fully successful, of course, as some ‘Canadians’ fail at the task of self-governance, and therefore also require intervention. In addition, there are resistances to narratives that idealize ‘Canada’ and ‘Canadian values.’ This project is also intended as critique, which takes the form of questioning the truth regime that characterizes ‘Canadian’ subjects inversely to ‘foreign’ subjects, not in order to reveal this characterization as ‘true’ or ‘false,’ but to understand it as contingent and therefore changeable.
Scholarly Contributions

This thesis aims to make scholarly contributions to several academic literatures. These include Canadian foreign policy analysis, post-structuralist international relations theory, and studies of governmentality. The following provides some notes on the contributions of this thesis to these areas of study.

Canadian foreign policy analysis is marked by an absence of studies using a governmentality approach, which is not surprising considering that studies of government have also been silent of the issue of foreign policy, and have only recently turned to more international or global studies. This thesis thus contributes a new way of theorizing foreign policy as a technology of government. Moreover, post-cold war Canadian foreign policy is implicated not only in the governance of ‘foreign’ subjects, but also of ‘Canadians.’ By theorizing a relation between foreign policy and the governance of ‘Canadians,’ this thesis also breaks with traditional foreign policy analysis, which has understood foreign policy as an ‘outward’ practice. This work could thus be placed as a new contribution to critical Canadian foreign policy analysis, which has, until now, largely been concerned with neo-Gramscian approaches.

This project also aims to contribute to critical post-structuralist international relations theory, including foreign policy analysis emerging out of this scholarly work. Such theorists have largely considered national identities or subjectivities to be important insofar as they legitimate state sovereignty and the exercise of sovereign power. Studies of foreign policy in this body of literature have been similarly concerned with how foreign policy is implicated in the formation of national identities, and how these
identities provide legitimacy to state sovereignty. This thesis suggests that it is important to consider the formation of national or domestic identities or subjectivities not only as they relate to state sovereignty, but also in terms of the exercise of governmental power, which fosters certain forms of life or conduct. As such, the relation between post-cold war Canadian foreign policy, and the subjectification and governance of ‘Canadians’ is explored throughout the thesis.

Finally, this thesis aims to contribute to the approach that is generally termed governmentality. As mentioned above, studies of government have rarely considered foreign policy, and only recently have studies of government been concerned with the international or global sphere. Instead, this body of work has largely been concerned with national or sub-national ‘populations’ and ‘communities.’ This thesis uses concepts that have been invented for the analysis of national governance, and applies them to a national policy, which is practised in an international arena, and also focuses both on the governance of ‘foreign’ subjects and of ‘Canadian’ subjects. It can thus be understood as a contribution to an emerging field of studies of governmentality in the international sphere. Additionally, this project draws on work emerging out of governmentality that push at its limits or challenge the ways in which it is commonly undertaken. The most notable instances of this include the consideration of the relation between the governance of others and the subjectivity of ‘Canadians,’ following from recent work on the authoritarian dimensions of liberal rule by Mitchell Dean, as well as the discussions of

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1 I would like to thank Lorna Weir for drawing my attention to this aspect of my work, and for urging me to claim it as novel.
resistance and critique, which follow largely from the work of O’Malley, Weir, and Shearing. In this sense, it is also a reclamation of genealogical work as a form of critique, which is explored in the following section on methodology.

**Methodology**

In any discussion of methodology, it is important to consider the relations between methods, methodology and epistemology. Methods of ‘data collection’ (or, how we know) are informed by methodology (ways of knowing) which are underpinned by epistemology (our theories of knowledge). This is a dynamic relationship, however, as epistemological (or meta-theoretical) location also informs our methodology and choice of methods. All of this is to say that how we know directly affects what we know, and the methods that we choose are not just ‘practical’ matters, but are rooted in what we consider to be important or worth knowing. The methodology of this thesis thus follows from the idea that knowledge is invented, not discovered.

This project also follows from the methods and methodologies advanced by Michel Foucault. Foucault advocated archaeological methods, which “treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say and do as so many historical events.” The aim of this project is to study how Canadian foreign policy is implicated in the subjectification and governance of ‘Canadians.’ Discourses and practices of Canadian foreign policy are thus the objects of knowledge in this thesis. The methods relevant to

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this study have primarily been documentary research and textual analysis. Given that foreign policy is conceptualised broadly within this thesis as a practise that involves several actors, including parts of the Canadian state, think tanks and academics, the United Nations, and non-governmental organisations, among others, documents from a variety of such sources have been included. At times, certain academic articles are treated as ‘primary documents’ that parallel documents produced by other actors involved in Canadian foreign policy. This is based on the idea that academics, as much as other actors, are a locus of thought in the representational practices of foreign policy. For example, in examining the discourses of an increase in ‘ethnic’ conflict in the post-cold war era, academic articles that assert such an increase are included as examples of these discourses. Again, this method of textual analysis is consistent with the aims of this project: to create knowledge on the relation between discourses and practises of Canadian foreign policy that govern ‘foreign’ subjects, and the subjectification and governance of ‘Canadians.’ These methods are thus archaeological, as outlined by Foucault, in that discourses of foreign policy are treated as historical events articulating a ‘reality’ to which foreign policy claims to respond to. The methodology of this project is also consistent with those advanced by Foucault.

Foucault advocated a genealogical methodology. A genealogy separates out “the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think” through an examination of the historical contingency that has made us what we are.\(^5\) This thesis, in providing an account of the post-cold war history of Canadian foreign policy, examines

\(^{5}\) Ibid. 315.
the role that foreign policy has played in how ‘Canadians’ understand and conduct themselves -‘Canadian’ ways of being, doing, and thinking – as both historically changing and as contingent. In this sense, this thesis is not only genealogical in its methodology, but is also intended to provide a critique of these contingencies.

For Foucault, critique means asking “in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent and the product of arbitrary constraints?”⁶ O’Malley, Weir & Shearing have further advocated a position in which genealogy stands as a position of critique. They assert that studies of governmentality have too often eschewed critique as a Marxian unveiling of the ‘truth’ behind ‘ideology’ to the expense of approaches aimed at providing criticism.⁷ Yet, according to these authors such a stance is neither necessary nor desirable. Instead, they advocate a position in which critique is not the revelation of truth behind ideology, but of the “a troubling of truth regimes.”⁸ In examining the historical contingency of discursive representations of ‘foreign’ subjects, and also of idealized ‘Canadians’ enacted by Canadian foreign policy, this thesis contributes to the possibility of understanding such representations not so much as ‘true’ or ‘false,’ but as contingent and changeable. This methodology then aims at critiquing the truths that foreign policy creates (e.g. violent ‘foreign’ subjects) and then claims as its external objects. Its intent is to open ways in which foreign policy could be about governing ‘foreign’ subjects and ‘Canadian’ subjects

⁶ Ibid.
⁸ Ibid., 507.
differently, or "of not being governed quite so much"9 through an examination of the historical contingency of the ways in which this has occurred since the end of the cold war. In this sense, it is intended as "a practical, historical critique of our present selves that makes thinkable and assists the creation of other possible ways of living."10

The thesis critically examines truth claims not only about ‘foreign’ subjects, but also truth claims of what it is to be ‘Canadian,’ to have ‘Canadian values’ and claims as to what marks ‘Canada’ as a ‘nation’ worthy of emulation. As such, it moves the object of study away from ‘foreign’ subjects, towards a troubling of ‘Canadian’ subjectivity. In this sense, this project is intended to be in keeping with recent shifts in what might broadly be called equity studies. Thus this thesis is intended to parallel the shifts of some feminist scholarship to the study of masculinity, of critical race studies to the study of whiteness, of queer studies to studying heterosexuality, and of disability studies to ability. This means directing my academic gaze not towards others, but towards problematizing ‘Canadian’ subjectivity and notions of ‘Canada.’ This shift is not aimed solely at producing critical knowledges on that which is normalized (the masculine, whiteness, heterosexuality, the able-bodied or able-minded) to the exclusion of knowledges of and for the ‘marginalized,’ but of adding to such scholarship. This means that while my academic gaze is directed at truth claims about ‘Canada’ and ‘Canadians,’ it is also directed at the governance of ‘foreign’ subjects. As such, Chapter Four includes an examination of how Canadian foreign policy is implicated in a limited form of liberal government at a distance of the ‘foreign’ subjects it makes up as its targeted populations.

Yet, in keeping with this shift in equity studies, this thesis is intended primarily as a challenge to truth claims about ‘Canadian’ subjectivity and the ‘Canadian’ ‘nation.’

**Histories of the West**

This thesis, in line with a postcolonial ethic(s), also aims to contribute to a corpus of work that challenges the bracketing of histories of the ‘West.’ The work of Robert Young is particularly instructive here. Young challenges the “white mythologies” that have informed the writing of histories of the West, and the ways in which such history writing provides accounts of the West that either subsume or ignore how the Third World is implicated in these histories.\(^{11}\) In similar terms, Ann Laura Stoler questions how “both students of European and colonial histories treated bourgeois ‘civilizing missions’ in metropole and colony as though they were independent projects.”\(^{12}\) With this in mind, this thesis examines how the current liberal ‘civilising missions’ of Canadian foreign policy are related to ‘Canadian subjectivity’ and the liberal government of ‘Canadians.’ In this sense, this thesis is in keeping with Stoler’s call to “cut across the dichotomies of colonizer and colonized, colony and core” to “reconnect a range of domains that have been treated discretely.”\(^{13}\) Yet, this thesis is distinct from studies such as Stoler’s in that it addresses the history of the present, where the present is marked not by bourgeois, but by *liberal* civilising missions. The relation between Canadian foreign policy and its targeted populations since the end of the cold war and especially since the mid-1990s, is

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10 Ibid.
one marked increasingly less by imperialism and more often by liberalism, which enjoins both ‘foreign’ and ‘Canadian’ subjects to self-govern. This shift is not necessarily a ‘good’ one: it can instead be understood as a different form of governing those targeted by foreign policies. Both imperialism and liberalism are rationalities harnessed in the service of governing, as illustrated in the third and fourth chapters of this thesis.

This discussion also warrants an explanation of the term ‘targeted populations’ employed in this project. Those targeted by post-cold war Canadian foreign policies such as peacebuilding, correspond generally to those areas that have come to be understood as the Third World. There has been some controversy over the use of this term. I am sympathetic to Robert Young’s defence of the term Third World unapologetically and without scare quotes in an effort to retrieve “the lost positive sense” of the term set forth at the 1955 Bandung Conference as “a radical alternative to the hegemonic capitalist-socialist power blocks.” Yet the concept of the Third World – whether understood as a ‘fact’ or a construct, negatively or positively – is not particularly useful in a discussion of post-cold war Canadian foreign policy, and of peacebuilding in particular. Throughout this thesis I refer instead to ‘targeted populations’ to refer to those ‘populations’ targeted by peacebuilding, one of the central policies of post-cold war Canadian foreign policy. The term ‘targeted population’ is borrowed from Mitchell Dean, who points to a division between those who are governed as “active citizens (capable of managing their own risk) and targeted populations (disadvantaged groups, the ‘at risk’, the high risk)” on a

\[\text{\textsuperscript{13}}\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{14}}\text{Young: 11.}\]
national or ‘community’ level.\textsuperscript{15} It is possible to think of active citizens and targeted populations as constituted on a global scale as well, although I do so with caution as these ‘populations’ are also ‘domestically’ differentiated as ‘active’ or ‘targeted.’ One of the aims of this thesis is to understand the ways in which targeted populations are problematized or targeted in order to relate this process to ‘Canadian’ subjectivity and the governance of ‘Canadians.’ This focus on targeting as a process means understanding such ‘populations’ not as pre-existing, but as ‘made up’ and represented in particular ways through foreign policy. This understanding of ‘population’ is explored in more detail in Chapter Two. Furthermore, the Third World is not an appropriate term in the case of peacebuilding. While the vast majority of peacebuilding activities are carried out in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, as of 1998, seven percent of peacebuilding activities were carried out in Eastern Europe (once known as the ‘Second World’).\textsuperscript{16} In this sense, those made up as targeted populations by peacebuilding do not fully correspond to those understood as within the Third World. Moreover, the term Third World does not allow for an account of the problematization of others that is fluid and changes over time. As Dean points out, the threshold between active citizens and targeted populations is fluid. This concept of a division between active citizens and targeted populations is further nuanced in Chapter Four, through a consideration of how subjects are further divided according to their perceived capacity to autonomously self-govern. For now, however, the term ‘targeted populations’ is employed to denote those subjects targeted by post-cold war Canadian foreign policy.

Chapter Outline

This thesis is comprised of four chapters. The first chapter provides a review of existing Canadian foreign policy analysis. The chapter illustrates the ways in which foreign policy has traditionally been understood solely as an ‘outward’ practice, and has not been conceptualized as implicated in the subjectification and governance of ‘Canadians.’ The chapter thus traces how the ‘nation’ and the ‘domestic’ have been understood in the two main streams of Canadian foreign policy analysis that consider first, Canada’s position in international affairs, and secondly, the domestic inputs into foreign policy. Here it is argued that by placing the ‘nation’ and the ‘domestic’ conceptually anterior to foreign policy, such theories are unable to critically examine how foreign policy may be and ‘inward’ process, implicated in the constitution of the ‘domestic’ sphere, or ‘national’ subjectivities. The chapter concludes by considering how critical approaches to foreign policy have, at times, both differed from, and been consistent with, more traditional approaches to Canadian foreign policy analysis.

The second chapter of the thesis explores theoretical approaches that can contribute to understanding foreign policy as not only an ‘outward’ practice, but also as implicated in the subjectification and governance of ‘Canadians.’ The first section of the chapter involves a consideration of the contribution of critical international relations theory. Authors located in this approach have considered how national identities or subjectivities legitimate state sovereignty. Some located in this approach, most notably

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David Campbell, have also argued that foreign policy, in its representation and 
problematization of others, is directly implicated the formation of national identities 
which legitimate state sovereignty. As important as this contribution is, I argue that it is 
important to consider not only how the formation of national or domestic subjectivities is 
implicated in legitimating state sovereignty or the exercise of sovereign power, but also at 
the exercise of governmental power. Using the theory that is generally termed 
governmentality, and particularly the work of Foucault, this section contrasts sovereign 
power, which is deductive, to governmental power, which fosters certain forms of life or 
conduct. Yet the governmentality approach is not a ‘ready-made’ theory that can be 
easily applied to foreign policy. Thus, the chapter also examines some of the ways in 
which governmentality, which has generally been concerned with programs of rule within 
national settings, can also be applied to foreign policy and to an international context. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the temporal limiting of this project to the 
post-cold war era, and a discussion of issues of periodization.

The third chapter of the thesis provides a historical account of some of the central 
ways in which post-cold war Canadian foreign policy has problematized ‘foreign’ 
subjects, especially since the mid-1990s. The chapter contains three sections. The first 
section of the chapter provides an account of the discourses of the rise of civil conflict or 
intrastate wars, of the ‘root causes’ of such conflict being ‘ethnic strife and 
‘underdevelopment,’ and the discourse of such conflict as a ‘security risk’ for Canada. 
The section ends with a brief consideration of, in Mark Duffield’s terms, the merging of 
development and security. The second section of the chapter focuses on peacebuilding as
a purported response to the new ‘problems’ of intrastate conflict, and provides a historical account of the rise of Canadian peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is theorized as an assemblage, first, in that its rise cannot be attributed solely to the Canadian state, and, moreover, in that it both relies on and reproduces certain ideas about how targeted populations are ‘problems.’ The third and final section of the chapter provides an examination of the particular ways in which ‘foreign’ subjects have been problematized as violent, intolerant, poor, ‘underdeveloped,’ and lacking in a culture of peace and the values, attitudes, and behaviours therein. In summary, this chapter provides an account of the ways in which ‘foreign’ subjects are problematized by post-cold war foreign policy, and peacebuilding in particular, in order to turn to an analysis of how this targeting of others is implicated in the subjectification and governance of ‘Canadians.’

This analysis of the subjectification and governance of ‘Canadians’ through the discourses and practices of foreign policy, forms the content of the fourth and final chapter of this thesis. I argue, however, that it is important to consider not only the governance of ‘Canadians,’ but also of the ‘foreign’ subjects targeted by foreign policy. As such, the first section of this chapter explores the ways in which Canadian foreign policy, and peacebuilding in particular, are technologies of government in the governance of ‘foreign’ subjects. The governance of others is marked by a limited form of a liberal mentality of rule, which governs at a distance. In this sense, the ‘foreign’ subjects of targeted populations are governed as though they are not yet, but have the potential to be, autonomous liberal self-governing subjects. The following section of the chapter moves to a theoretical exploration of how subjects are categorized according to their perceived
capacity for autonomous self-governance, and how those considered autonomous self-governing subjects are knowable only in relation to those who are perceived as incapable, or not yet capable, of such autonomy. This section relies heavily on the recent work of Mitchell Dean. The next section of the chapter provides an account of the discourses of ‘Canadian values and culture’ in Canadian foreign policy, and of the striking way in which such discourses characterize ‘Canadians’ inversely to those ‘foreign’ subjects problematized in foreign policy. In just those areas where ‘foreign’ subjects are deemed to be problematic, ‘Canadians’ are represented in an idealized manner as unproblematic. Thus, the following section of the chapter illustrates the ways in which ‘Canadians’ are enjoined to understand and conduct themselves in particular ways through foreign policy. This section connects the problematization of others to ‘Canadian’ subjectivity and governance, yet also pays attention to the ways in which ‘Canadians’ are categorized ‘internally’ within the nation. The final section of the chapter explores resistances to the idealization of ‘Canadian’ subjectivity in foreign policy, and relates this account of resistance to the wider project of critique. The project ends with a brief chapter providing a conclusion to the thesis.
Chapter One

The Nation in Canadian Foreign Policy Analysis

This chapter explores the ways in which Canadian foreign policy analysis has largely theorized foreign policy as an ‘outward’ practice in that it has generally conceptualized the ‘nation’ and the ‘domestic’ as anterior to foreign policy. In this sense, the ‘domestic’ and the ‘national’ are understood to effect foreign policy, yet an inverse relation is rarely theorized. In order to explore this, the chapter begins with a brief overview of the theories of Canadian foreign policy, and the ways in which this thesis might be placed in relation to such theories. The chapter then proceeds by looking first at traditional approaches to understanding the ‘position’ debates in Canadian foreign policy analysis, and the conception of the relation between foreign policy and the ‘nation’ in this area of debate. Secondly, the ‘process’ or ‘domestic determinants’ debate in Canadian foreign policy analysis, as well as the conceptions of the ‘domestic’ therein, are examined. The third section of the chapter considers how critical Canadian foreign policy analysis – including neo-Gramscian, feminist, and post-colonial approaches – have both departed from, and converged with, traditional analyses. Through such a consideration of both traditional and critical approaches, it is possible to identify areas of Canadian foreign policy analysis that could be further developed in ways that would consider foreign policy not only as an ‘outward’ practice, but as also implicated in the constitution of ‘Canada’ and of ‘Canadians.’ The chapter concludes with a set of
questions concerning the role of foreign policy in the subjectification and governance of ‘Canadians’ that form points of departure for the following chapters of the thesis.

This chapter argues that traditional foreign policy analysis problematize neither the ‘nation’ nor the ‘domestic,’ and thus conceptualize foreign policy solely as an ‘outward’ process. In traditional foreign policy analysis, the nation is conceptualised as anterior to foreign policy, leaving no theoretical space for theorizing how foreign policy might affect or be constitutive of the ‘nation’ or of the ‘domestic’. By looking at the ways in which foreign policy is not merely an ‘outward’ activity, we can also consider how foreign policy is involved in the formation of ‘Canadian’ subjectivity. Critical foreign policy analysis, especially that inspired by neo-Gramscian theory, has challenged the traditional assumption that the ‘nation’ and the ‘domestic’ are not affected by foreign policy. This challenge, however, is mainly limited to class analysis, and does not seek to understand how foreign policy might be implicated in the subjectification and governance of ‘Canadians.’

Theoretical Approaches to Canadian Foreign Policy

Canadian foreign policy analysis has traditionally been concerned with two central questions, the first concerning position, and the second concerning process.\(^1\) The literature on position is characterised by attempting to understand Canada’s place in the world: its status, position, influence, and power.\(^2\) The second set of theories constitutes

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1 Maureen Appel Molot, “Where Do We, Should We, or Can We Sit? A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy Literature,” *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, vol.1, no. 2 (Spring-Fall 1990): 78.

2 Molot, “Where Do We...” 77.
“rival theoretical answers to a common question: ‘How can one best conceptualize theoretically the interaction of government and society in the making of Canadian foreign policy?’”

It thus seeks to assess the domestic inputs into the formulation of Canadian foreign policy. Maureen Appel Molot has claimed that “…concern with Canada’s status within the global system has produced a Canadian foreign policy tradition diverse in philosophical perspective yet rather narrow in the range of issues it has examined.”

This assertion of diversity in philosophical perspective should not, however, foreclose the possibility of proposing new perspectives that challenge existing ones.

It is in this spirit that the following chapter traces both the traditional and more recent critical frameworks that constitute Canadian foreign policy analysis, with attention to the ways in which otherwise divergent theories share commonalities that deserve reconsideration. The central commonality at issue here is the ways in which approaches based both in traditional and critical Canadian foreign policy analysis have seldom problematized the ‘nation’ or the ‘domestic’ and have thus understood foreign policy solely as an ‘outward’ practice. By problematizing these ideas, it is possible to look at foreign policy not merely as an ‘outward’ practice, but also as an ‘inward’ one that plays a role in the formation of ‘Canadian’ subjectivity and in the governance of ‘Canadians.’ This will be further explored in the second chapter of the thesis.

I proceed in outlining these theories and their commonalities with trepidation about re-asserting theoretical categories, since they often serve to discipline knowledge,

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4 Molot, “Where Do We…” 86.
resulting more often in closure than open debate. As such, the following takes a critical stance towards these frameworks, which should not be considered the extent of the possible, but an overview of how the boundaries of the possible have produced a body of literature limited to two, three, four, or more perspectives. The purpose of this project is not merely to add a fifth (or whichever number), but to destabilise the field upon which these disciplinary boundaries are enforced and practised. This happens by not by answering the same questions differently, but by reassessing the very questions posed and the assumptions - especially those about the ‘nation,’ the ‘domestic,’ and ‘Canadian’ subjectivity - that led to the posing of these questions. That said, it is important to outline the history of the debates in Canadian foreign policy in order to provide a critique of them.

The ‘Position’ Debates

Andrew F. Cooper identifies three contending analytical frameworks for understanding Canadian foreign policy in relation to Canada’s position within the international realm: Canada as a principal power, as satellite/dependent, and as a middle-power. While these frameworks have traditionally been understood to be in contention with each other, Cooper identifies some commonalities between them. One commonality that he identifies is “the salience each of the contending frameworks gives to the notion of national interest and national identity... each assumes a collective vision of how the

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5 A rare instance of such debate on Canadian foreign policy analysis can be found in the “Round Table on Canadian Foreign Policy,” moderated by Maxwell Cameron, with the participation of Kim Richard Nossal, Andrew F. Cooper, Mark Neufeld, Heather A. Smith, and David R. Black, Canadian Foreign Policy, vol. 6, no. 3 (Spring 1999).
nation sees itself and acts in the international arena. Whether explicitly or implicitly, this vision is interconnected with a deeply ingrained depiction of Canadian society and its values.\(^6\) Cooper, however, leaves the implications of this commonality, and the possibility of breaking with it, unexplored. The following constitutes an exploration of this commonality, while the remaining chapters of this thesis are intended to break with this commonality by providing a critical examination of narratives of ‘Canadian society’ and especially of ‘Canadian values.’

Since the Second World War, liberal internationalism has been the predominant theoretical approach to Canadian foreign policy analysis.\(^7\) This approach is closely associated with an understanding of Canada as a middle power that acts primarily in multilateral fora. John Holmes, perhaps the most prominent figure espousing the middle power perspective, has stated that “the concept of middle power… is a term of convenience with no standing in international agreements or organizations. It is subject to a confusing ambiguity, its significance is in a play of words…”\(^8\) Indeed, middlepowermanship is an ambiguous term, but is most often conceptualised as necessitating a role for Canada as ‘helpful fixer’ acting altruistically in the international realm. Canada is thus understood as internationalist, instead of nationalist.\(^9\) Yet Lyon and Tomlin have pointed out that middle-power internationalism “recognizes no conflict between Canada’s idealistic internationalism and the national interest.”\(^10\) They continue

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\(^7\) Maureen Appel Molot, “Where Do We…” 80.


by asserting that “Canada’s most vital interest, a secure peace, is unattainable save through world order. Canada’s ‘internationalist’ vocation, moreover has helped to define a distinctive national identity…” The authors, however, leave the implications of the formation of a ‘Canadian’ national identity through foreign policy completely unexplored.

Similarly, John W. Holmes, writing from the internationalist perspective, asserted that Canadian foreign policy:

...combines the moral uplift, respect for authority, prideful independence, belief in the virtue of toil, and conviction of responsibility towards the less blessed which are at the same time the silliest and noblest of Canadian characteristics. It is easy to laugh at these qualities, but one should not laugh them off. In a nasty world, of which Canada is a somewhat less nasty and a great deal luckier part than most, Canadians need a chivalrous theme for their international relations – something to live and labour by until peace and prosperity, or something more like it than the present state of affairs, emerges.12

Moreover, for Holmes, Canada’s role “must be wrapped in an acceptable formula, oversimplified of course but honest, to give Canadians some kind of guide and an idea of which they can be proud.”13 Thus, the practice of internationalism that is conceived of as the proper middle power role, is not only compatible with the construction of a ‘secure world order,’ but also with instilling pride in the nation. This instilling of pride in the nation can be theorized as implicated in the formation of ‘Canadian’ national identity or subjectivity. Of course, this understanding of foreign policy is not advanced within this perspective. The formation of national or ‘Canadian’ identity is instead stated as a fact, and as desirable, but is not critically examined.

11 Ibid.
12 Holmes, The Better Part of Valour: 16. (my emphasis)
In contrast to the liberal middle power framework, James Eayrs contended that Canada could be considered a “foremost nation,” a formulation followed by Hillmer and Stevenson in their 1977 edited volume on Canadian foreign policy, as well as Lyon and Tomlin. This formulation of Canada’s position took prominence, however, with Dewitt and Kirton’s ‘complex neo-realist’ understanding of Canada as a principal power. This theory “begins with the premise that America’s decline and the consequent diffusion of power in the international system have propelled Canada into the position of a principal power in the globe. Principal powers, like the great powers of old, stand on the top tier of the global hierarchy of power and act autonomously in pursuit of their own interests, rather than as mediators among others or agents for them.” This understanding of Canada’s position informs their belief that Canadian foreign policy “consists primarily of an expanding effort to advance Canada’s distinctive national interests and values through external initiatives and the promotion of a world order directly supportive of Canadian purposes.” These interests and values are understood by Dewitt and Kirton to derive from military, economic, social and cultural spheres. Dewitt and Kirton thus view the ‘nation’ unproblematically as a pre-existing, undifferentiated, and stable unit that has certain clear and knowable interests and values.

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13 Ibid. 27.
17 David B. Dewitt and John Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations, Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1983: 4.
18 Ibid. 4.
19 Ibid. 39.
that are represented and advanced by the state through foreign policy, in keeping with neo-realist theory. More recently, D’Aquino and Stewart-Patterson argue in a similar vein that Canada can ‘Walk Tall Among Nations’ because Canada has a ‘Northern Edge.’²⁰ For these authors, the way that Canada can ‘walk tall’ as a nation in the international realm, is through ‘domestic’ economic policy and innovation. As with the ‘principal power’ theorists outlined above, D’Aquino and Stewart-Paterson assume an objectively knowable and singular national interest. So, although they are more ‘cynical’ than the liberalist tradition, which espouses Canada’s internationalism and altruism, theorists positing Canada as a principal power nonetheless hold in common with the liberalist middle power theorists an understanding of the nation as conceptually anterior to Canadian foreign policy, leaving no room for a critical examination of the ways in which Canadian foreign policy could also be understood as an ‘inward’ process.

Distinct from both the middle power and principal power frameworks, theories of economic nationalism have gained importance, particularly since the 1960s. This theory focuses on Canada’s position in relation to the United States as economically subordinate and dependent. In Michael Hawes words: “...this view holds that the economic control associated with foreign [American] ownership has led to the popular Canadian self image of a ‘penetrated society,’ one whose economic and political destiny is disproportionately influenced by foreigners.”²¹ Otherwise opposing political actors and theoretical perspectives were often united in asking the same questions: “both Marxists and liberal

intellectuals are engaged in a debate not over whether but rather to what extent international economic interdependence undermines the power of nation-states.” 22

Proponents of this perspective shared a belief that economic ‘penetration’ constituted a threat to the nation, and that the state could (or should) play a role in mitigating this threat. The divergence in perspectives was reflected in popular organising around the issue as two central actors emerged: “the Waffle Group (a radical wing of the social democratic New Democrat Party promoted the belief that nationalism was the only means with which to regain control of the Canadian economy. In the 1970s a less radical group, the Committee for an Independent Canada [later to become the Council of Canadians] was formed.” 23 In this view the ‘national interest’ can be located in the realm of economics. Since the ‘nation’ is understood here as a pre-existing object requiring protection in the form of certain foreign policies, the ‘nation’ is once again understood as prior to foreign policy. In this analysis, as with the other theoretical approaches in the position debates, there is no examination of how foreign policy itself may be constitutive of the ‘nation.’

The theoretical approaches of statism/neo-realism, liberalism, and political economy 24 that have traditionally been dominant in Canadian foreign policy analysis, have differed greatly in their analyses of Canada’s position within the international (dis)order. Still, it is possible to draw out certain commonalities in these approaches.

23 Hawes: 21.
24 Beyond these three approaches that have traditionally been dominant in Canadian foreign policy analysis, critical perspectives, especially neo-gramscian ones, have addressed questions related to Canada’s position in the world order. The most significant is Mark Neufeld’s article, “Hegemony and Foreign Policy
The commonality examined above illustrates how each theoretical approach treats the nation as conceptually anterior to foreign policy. As such, these theories are not able to critically address the role of foreign policy in the formation of national or ‘Canadian’ identities or subjectivities, nor in the governance of ‘Canadians.’

The ‘Domestic’ in Canadian Foreign Policy Analysis

David R. Black and Heather A. Smith state that in Canadian foreign policy analysis “for far too long domestic processes have been assessed independently from international structure and processes.”25 More recently there has been more analysis that brings together the international and the domestic. However, this analysis has proceeded primarily in one direction: from the domestic to the international. As such, there has been a debate on the domestic inputs into the Canadian foreign policy-making process. There have, however, been exceptions to this literature: these will be discussed at the end of this section. First, it is important to discuss the major contributions to the ‘domestic’ debate. The most notable include work by Donald Barry, Denis Stairs, and Cranford Pratt, as well as the work included in a special issue of International Journal, published in the Winter 1984 issue, and the 1995 edition of Canada Among Nations.

Donald Barry, using the case of the Nigerian civil war, highlighted “the important role which interest groups can play in bringing a subject to the attention of the public.

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thereby creating a major political issue.”

In this article the ‘domestic’ is considered important insofar as public opinion, which can be stirred mainly by interest groups, the media, and parliamentary debate, affects policy. The ‘domestic’ is thus understood able to affect foreign policy, while no reverse relation is considered.

Denis Stairs, another key figure in early work on the domestic sources of foreign policy, argued that while Canadian foreign policy-makers had traditionally been understood as ‘architects,’ acting without constraints, this notion needed to be reconsidered given “recent changes in the character of their domestic environment.”

Stairs pointed out that while in the 1950s there was little public dissent on foreign policy issues, “since the early 1960s the Canadian foreign-policy-making community has been confronted not merely by an increase in the scale and intensity of domestic demands, but also by a proliferation of the channels through which these demands are expressed.”

However, the fact that policy-makers had not succumbed to these pressures was a measure of the failure of domestic groups to apply significant pressure. Moreover, “the contemporary foreign policy community in Canada is nothing if not a castle under siege. But to be under siege is not necessarily to be without weapons.” Stairs then lists several possible ‘strategies of denial’ available to foreign policy-makers, yet he does not problematize why the Canadian state, or foreign policy-makers in particular, might want to use these ‘weapons’ against the Canadian public. Thus, the public/domestic is

28 Ibid. 223.
29 Ibid. 224.
30 Ibid. 225.
conceptualised as oppositional to, and a burden on, policy-makers, but a burden that can be overcome.

Stairs subsequently argued that as international issues became increasingly important to the Canadian public, there had been a parallel increase in domestic public opinion on foreign policy: a phenomenon he called “the domestication of Canadian foreign policy.” For Stairs, this domestication could “give a measure of comfort to supporters of the liberal democratic state… yet the growing importance is not entirely without costs,” costs such as policy that is undesirable or disadvantageous to policy-makers. Again, the public/domestic is conceptualised as important yet burdensome to policy-makers. It is interesting to note that Stairs makes brief reference to the idea that the relationship of the public to policy-makers is a “two-way street. If public opinions influence those who make policy, those who make policy also influence public opinions” – yet for simplifying purposes Stairs decides to explore this relation only in one direction and accounts only for the influence of the ‘domestic’ on policy-making. This has continued to be the project of analysts of Canadian foreign policy with few exceptions. How foreign policy might affect or constitute the ‘domestic’ has been left largely unexplored.

Stairs, in his Presidential Address to the Canadian Political Science Association (CPSA) in 1982, also argued that Canada’s ‘political culture’ was evident in its foreign policy:

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32 Ibid, 149.
33 Ibid. 129 (my emphasis).
...the conduct of foreign policy can sometimes be viewed not merely as the expression abroad of perceived interests of the state, but as the *manifestation of national political character...* some principles and practices of Canadian politics at home may also be evident in our behaviour abroad."34

Stairs continues by suggesting that Canada’s political culture is marked by liberalism, a distrust of “dogma” (read communism), “respect for diversity,” compromise, order and pragmatism.35 This culture is learned by bureaucrats “from the practice of politics in the domestic environment” and applied to foreign policy. The domestic ‘culture’ is thus understood to be at the root of Canadian foreign policy, while it is assumed that no reverse relation may exist. Additionally, this perspective ahistorically theorizes ‘Canadian culture’ as essentialized, singular, and coherent. Such ideas about ‘Canadian culture’ are problematized in Chapter Four of this project.

Cranford Pratt departed from previous analysis in accounting for class relations in the policy-making process. Like Stairs and Barry, Pratt notes the increase in public engagement with foreign policy since the early sixties due to the “increasing importance of economic matters in foreign policy” and the “widening acknowledgement of a human obligation to act internationally.”36 This second element was a result of “an upsurge in our societies of cosmopolitan values, that is values which entail obligations which extend beyond our borders, and are in part, at least moral in character.”37 Pratt argues that public-interest groups had much less access to policy-makers than business groups due to domestic class structures and the role of the state in maintaining these structures. Pratt

35 Ibid. 685.
differs from Stairs’ analysis in that he treats government strategies aimed at managing public interest groups as problematic, and attributes this problem to domestic class structures. Both authors, however, treat the ‘domestic’ only insofar as it is a pre-existing and coherent entity that influences foreign policy. While these authors come to different conclusions, they both seek to answer the question ‘what are the domestic influences on Canadian foreign policy-making?’ As such, they do not explore the ways in which Canadian foreign policy might also be considered an ‘inward’ process, or constitutive of this very ‘inside,’ whether understood as a ‘nation’ or as a ‘domestic’ realm.

Pratt continued this line of argumentation in his article for the Winter 1984 special issue of International Journal on the domestic sources of Canadian foreign policy. The issue served to highlight an emergent debate between liberal, statist (realist), and dominant class theories of domestic influences on foreign policy-making. The Winter 1983-84 issue of International Journal was dedicated to the theme “Domestic Sources of Canada’s Foreign Policy,” and followed a conference held by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA) on Domestic Groups and Foreign Policy. The debate over the domestic sources of foreign policy was a shift from traditional realist analyses that considered power and capability (i.e. ‘external’ constraints) to be the only elements affecting Canadian foreign policy. In his article in the special edition, Pratt critiques statist theory for the assumption that bureaucracies produce policies that represent the national interest.\textsuperscript{38} Pratt does not deconstruct the notion of pre-existing, coherent

\textsuperscript{36} Cranford Pratt, “Canadian Foreign Policy: Bias to Business,” International Perspectives, November/December 1982: 3.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, 3.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid, 115.
‘Canadian values’ but critiques statist theory for assuming that bureaucracies will reflect a pre-existing set of "societal values."³⁹ Pratt does accept some limitations to his dominant class theory, as it cannot “easily translate into class terms such internal determinants of real importance to foreign policy as ethnicity and nationalism.”⁴₀ Additionally, this work remains concerned solely with how domestic groups or the public affect foreign policy.

In the same issue, Kim Richard Nossal takes a statist or realist perspective by asserting that domestic groups have little influence over foreign policy decision-making: "the state does not seek guidance or direction from groups within society; rather, it seeks to use domestic sources for the pursuit of its own interests."⁴¹ In a subsequent article, Nossal applies this theory to aid policy, and contends that development assistance is "designed primary to benefit the interests of Canadian foreign policy-makers."⁴² The object of study here remains the influence of domestic groups, although Nossal assigns them little importance. Also writing in the 'Domestic Determinants' issue of International Journal, John Kirton and Blair Dimock use statist theory to assert that foreign policy-making is the preserve of the state. This, according to the authors, is evidenced by the fact that the state controls which groups have access to the state⁴³ and also controls those who do gain access through the construction and operation of

³⁹ Ibid. 113.
⁴⁰ Ibid. 115.
decision-making processes. While operating from a statist perspective, these arguments do not differ from Pratt in the questions they pose, but in the answers they provide. They both seek to understand how the 'domestic' affects foreign policy, to the excelsior of a critical examination of the idea of the 'domestic.'

Also in this volume, in an article by Annette Baker Fox and William T.R. Fox, the 'domestic' is conceived of only as a set of capabilities (labour, etc.) or assets (water, resources, etc.). The deployment of these assets for Canada's national interest is constrained only minimally by public opinion. These constraints lie primarily in Canada's diversity: "a special difficulty for Canada is that the tapestry of Canadian's interests is of such complex design that it may be harder for Canadians to identify what is in the whole nation's interest." Thus domestic difference leads to difference of opinion, which is understood to be faulty in that it is not in the nation's interest - an interest that is understood by the authors to be singular, coherent, and knowable. Dissent domestically is also considered an impediment: "preoccupation with domestic problems... consumes assets that might have been used to promote foreign policy interests." The authors minimize the importance of the role of domestic groups or interests in determining foreign policy, and suggest that internal difference and dissent is a constraint or impediment to the seeking of power of the Canadian state in the international sphere through its foreign policy. Again, in this formulation, the 'domestic' is conceptually anterior to foreign policy, in that it pre-exists (and is a problem for) foreign policy. This

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44 Ibid, 70.
article is thus in keeping with the others in the special issue in that it does not consider how foreign policy could also be understood as an ‘inward’ practice.

Another significant volume on the relation between the ‘domestic’ and Canadian foreign policy was the 1995 issue of *Canada Among Nations*.\(^4^8\) Democratization is the theme of the issue, both in terms of the democratization of the foreign policy-making process and in terms of democracy as a theme within foreign policy initiatives. This theme reflected the initiatives of the Chrétien government, elected in 1993, to democratize the foreign policy process.\(^4^9\) In their introduction to the book, Maxwell Cameron and Maureen Appel Molot argue that “democracies make foreign policies differently.”\(^5^0\) For Cameron and Molot, the character of the domestic realm (i.e. ‘democratic’) leads to a particular form of foreign policy. No reverse relation is postulated by these authors: they do not consider the role of foreign policy in constituting a ‘domestic realm.’ Many of the articles in the collection assume an objectively knowable ‘Canadian’ subject that that exists prior to foreign policy. Kim Richard Nossal states, for example, that “when Canadians speak of democratization as a goal of foreign policy... they know, to put it bluntly, what they want to see: they know how they want others in the international community to organize their political communities (i.e. just as

\(^4^7\) Ibid, 25.
Canadians organize their polity).\footnote{Nossal, “The Democratization of Foreign Policy”: 30.} Nossal assumes that there are knowable, fixed, and moreover, undifferentiated ‘Canadian’ (domestic or national) subjects, all sharing a singular opinion in common. Sandra Whitworth’s article is also of particular note, and will be discussed in the following section on critical approaches to Canadian foreign policy analysis.

The one article in this volume that includes analysis of how foreign policy might affect the ‘domestic’ is that written by Tim DRAIN and Betty Plewes. These authors, in fact, advocate that the foreign policy process, in order to be ‘truly’ democratic, should include more public education, such the ‘domestic public’ can “move from a vague opinion to ‘public judgement’” of foreign policy.\footnote{Tim DRAIN and Betty Plewes, “Civil Society and the Democratization of Foreign Policy,” Canada Among Nations 1995: Democracy and Foreign Policy, Maxwell A. Cameron and Maureen Appel Molot, (eds.), Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995: 64.} The authors further argue that the democratization of foreign policy and ‘educating’ the public will “promote social cohesion” and is “an important building block in the construction of broad social consensus.” The authors thus do not problematize the building of a coherent and cohesive domestic ‘Canadian’ body. This very process is the subject of critical examination in this thesis, as will be explored in the following chapters.

Debates on domestic inputs into Canadian foreign policy took shape particularly around the issues of aid and development programmes. In Nossal’s application of statist theory to aid policy, he contends that development assistance is “designed primary to benefit the interests of Canadian foreign policy-makers”\footnote{Alain Noël and Jean-Philippe Thérrien, working from a liberal perspective, argue for the use of comparative analysis to}
assert a causal relationship between welfare institutions and foreign aid by giving
importance to the "power of values and principles in international politics.”54 For Noël
and Thérien, "a state that is generous toward its own citizens would naturally tend to be
generous toward developing countries."55 Here, 'Canadian values' are understood to be
unproblematically philanthropic. These principles are then institutionalised within the
state, which extends these values into foreign policy. Pratt, on the other hand,
emphasizes that economic interests dominate in foreign policies related to North-South
issues, with the exception of development assistance, which was guided by the principle
of humane internationalism.56 For Pratt, humane internationalism is grounded in the
"dominant public philosophy in Canada."57 Again, Canadians are understood as
undifferentiated, and as having 'good' values that guide foreign policy, while foreign
policy is not understood to inform or construct 'Canada' or 'Canadian values.' Real
Lavergne, in his work on the determinants of Canadian Aid, incorporates all three of
these perspectives, and asserts that aid is determined by ideology and social values.
political determinants, economic determinants, as well as international factors.58 This
debate on the determinants of aid reflects the wider debate of the domestic determinants
of foreign policy from the theoretical perspectives of statism (or realism), liberalism, and

53 Nossal, “Mixed Motives”; 38.
54 Alain Noël and Jean-Philippe Thérien, “From Domestic to International Justice: the Welfare State and
55 Alain Noël and Jean-Philippe Thérien, "Welfare Institutions and Foreign Aid: Domestic Foundations of
56 Cranford Pratt, “Canada: An Eroding and Limited Internationalism,” Internationalism Under Strain: The
North-South Policies of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, Cranford Pratt (ed.), Toronto:
57 Ibid. 26.
58 Real Lavergne, “Determinants of Canadian Aid Policy,” Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty:
The Determinants of the Aid Policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, Olav
dominant class theory (or Marxism). Each of these approaches inquires into, and finds
different answers to, the same question that seeks to understand the domestic
determinants of foreign policy. Thus, in each of these approaches the 'domestic' is
deemed to be a more or less coherent body, sometimes marked with inequality, but
always marked with a coherent and knowable set of values and principles that act upon,
but are not conceived to be shaped by, foreign policy. The fourth and final chapter of this
thesis contains a more in-depth discussion of the idea of 'Canadian values' in foreign
policy and its relation to 'Canadian' subjectivity. So, while traditional approaches to
Canadian foreign policy analysis have understood the 'national' and the 'domestic' as a
coherent body marked by a knowable culture and set of values, critical approaches to
foreign policy analysis both depart from and converge with many of these conceptions.

Critical Perspectives in Canadian Foreign Policy Analysis

One of the most notable developments in Canadian foreign policy analysis in the
1990s has been the introduction of critical approaches, including neo-Gramscian,
feminist, and post-colonial perspectives. Mark Neufeld's 1995 article, "Hegemony and
Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of Canada as Middle Power" involves a critical
assessment of middlepowermanship, using both dominant class and neo-Gramscian
theory. Neufeld understands middlepowermanship as a 'regulative ideal' that guided
state action both internationally (in support of a capitalist global order), and domestically
(in reproducing domestic consent).\textsuperscript{59} Neufeld argues that "in representing Canada's

selfless activism in the international realm as the natural expression of Canadian society as a whole, middlepowermanship reinforced the notion that the social order within Canada’s borders was an essentially just one, and deserving of widespread public support.⁶⁰ Thus, foreign policy is understood to shore up consent for domestic unequal relations through the ideology of Canada as just. State policy is thus understood to “serve some parts of the ‘nation’ better than others.”⁶¹ Neufeld also argues this point in the 1999 article “Democratization in/of Canadian Foreign Policy” where he states that the notion of middlepowermanship in Canadian foreign policy “reinforced the notion that the social order within Canada’s borders was an essentially just one, and deserving of widespread public support.”⁶² Neufeld’s analysis is innovative in that it theorizes the ‘domestic’ as effected by foreign policy, in that foreign policy shores up support domestically through the ideology of Canada as just. The strength of this work is that it conceptualizes Canadian foreign policy not merely as an ‘outward’ process, but looks at the domestic consequences of foreign policy. Yet these domestic consequences are mainly defined in terms of class. In this conception, (class) relations within the national/domestic realm are understood to be reproduced through foreign policy. Additionally, it is limited in that it attempts to ‘expose’ the falsity of the notions of Canada as just. Instead, such narratives can be understood as a regime of truth. The purpose of studying such narratives as regimes of truth is not so much to expose them as ‘true’ or as ‘false,’ but to look into their ‘effects.’ So, while Neufeld’s broader project consists of an exposing of the truth behind

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⁶⁰ Ibid. 17.
⁶¹ Ibid. 10.
the ideologies of foreign policy, it is possible instead to look at how narratives of ‘Canada as just’ figure into the subjectification and governance of ‘Canadians.’ This thesis departs from this type of neo-Gramscian analysis in that it theorizes a relation between such narratives and the subjectification and governance of ‘Canadians.’

David R. Black and Claire Turenne Sjolander have employed a similar analytical framework, drawing on neo-Gramscian international relations theory. In their article, “Multilateralism Re-constituted and the Discourse of Canadian Foreign Policy,” Black and Sjolander address state discourses of multilateralism. They contend that the discourse of multilateralism has “enabled the construction surrounding foreign policy action” while the “norms and principles associated with this institutional form have been central to the construction and preservation of hegemony, at the levels of both world order and the Canadian social formation.” As with Neufeld, the ‘domestic’ realm is pre-given, and is conceived of as oppositional to the state, wherein the state is understood to act upon ‘society’ mainly in terms of class relations (or ‘social formation’ in their terms). The discourse of multilateralism is seen as a state tool in the maintenance of ideologies that (successfully) attempt to guarantee hegemony, characterised by unequal class relations.

Feminist analyses of Canadian foreign policy have entered the field relatively recently: “as slow as the field of international relations has been to incorporate discussions of gender, the sub-field of Canadian foreign policy has been slower still.”

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In her 1994-95 article, “Can the Silence be Broken? Gender and Canadian Foreign Policy,” Deborah Stienstra rightly identifies an absence of feminist analyses of Canadian foreign policy. Stienstra is wary of the liberal strategy of ‘adding women,’ and thus focuses on gender. Instead, “gender can be incorporated into the analysis of Canadian foreign policy only through a redirection of the analysis towards one which focuses on power relations,” a redirection she deems desirable, if unlikely.65 Indeed, this prediction has proven largely prescient, with a few exceptions. One such exception is Sandra Whitworth’s above-mentioned article, “Women, and Gender, in the Foreign Policy Review Process,” which uses a feminist and dominant class approach to understand the role of women and women’s groups in the foreign policy review process. In the article she concludes that women’s groups were consulted for the purpose of political management in an effort to manage a section of the attentive public.66 Another addition to feminist Canadian foreign policy analysis is Edna Keeble and Heather A. Smith’s (Re)Defining Traditions,67 which seeks to develop a feminist framework for analysing Canadian foreign policy. The framework provided, however, departs little from traditional analysis. Their conception of the nation also follows traditional analysis: in many instances they do not distinguish between the state and the nation, creating the impression of the collapse of the two. In this sense they attribute femininity to “Canada” and conceptualise the “Canadian” role and status in international politics as feminine, if

not in practice (where there are lapses into ‘masculine’ realism), then at least in
‘discourse.’

Another critical perspective in the literature on Canadian foreign policy analysis is
provided in Laura Macdonald’s “Unequal Partnerships.” In the article, Macdonald uses
postcolonial theory to argue that Canada’s privileged position within the hierarchy of the
British Empire, and subsequently the commonwealth, shaped Canada’s “discursive
practices toward the South before and after the period of decolonization, and that this
continues to influence how Canadians see the Third World.” Macdonald asserts that
Canada’s “imaginative geography” of what is now called the Third World... did play an
important role in the process of self-definition of the emerging Canadian nation.” This
imaginative geography underwent a shift in the postcolonial period to discourses of
‘development’ that are part of a continuum of “the ideological patterns established by the
experience of Empire”, wherein the ‘imaginative geography’ of the Third World may no
longer be prominent in the project of nation-building. Instead, this shift affects “how
Canadians ‘see’ the Third World and thus affect official policy.” So, for Macdonald,
while the ‘imaginative geography’ of the Third World in the era of Empire constituted an
aspect of Canadian nation-building, this ‘imaginative geography’ is presently understood
to affect policy – not as a continuing discursive practice in the construction of the
Canadian nation or of ‘Canadian’ identity or subjectivity. While this approach does not
consider the formation of ‘Canadian’ identity or, moreover, subjectivity in the present,

68 Ibid. 68.
70 Ibid. 112.
this perspective does open the possibility of understanding foreign policy in this way in the present. For, as will be explored in the following chapter, the nation, the domestic, and the state are never fully formed, but must be continually re-constituted or performed. Thus, Canadian foreign policy can be understood not only as the result of the discursive constructions of the Third World in the past, but also as implicated in these discursive constructions in the present, and thus as part of the formation of ‘Canadian’ subjectivity. The framework provided by Macdonald also stands in contrast to the majority of foreign policy analysis by privileging the contextualisation of Canadian foreign policy within histories of colonization, while the majority of foreign policy analysis assumes that 1931, the year that Canada attained an independent foreign policy, to be the relevant starting point for inquiry.

Conclusion

Traditional approaches to foreign policy, dealing both with debates on Canada’s position, and with the foreign policy process, treat the ‘nation’ and the ‘domestic’ (respectively) as conceptually anterior to foreign policy. In this sense, ‘the nation’ is understood ahistorically within the position debates as a coherent object that exists prior to, and is unchanged by, foreign policy. In the process debates the ‘domestic’ is similarly understood as a pre-existing and coherent object. Thus, traditional approaches conceptualise both the ‘nation’ and the ‘domestic’ as neither affected nor constituted by foreign policy. Not surprisingly, neither of the traditional approaches engaged in these

71 Ibid. 113.
72 Ibid., 113.
debates considers the relation between foreign policy and identity or subjectivity. As such, within the two strands of Canadian foreign policy analysis, traditional frameworks have understood the 'nation' and the 'domestic' as conceptually anterior to foreign policy. Critical approaches, particularly the neo-Gramscian approach, depart, to some extent, from traditional theoretical approaches to Canadian foreign policy analysis. While the neo-Gramscian approach holds more or less with traditional approaches in understanding the 'nation'/ 'domestic' as a coherent body, the 'nation'/ 'domestic' is also understood as differentiated, mainly along class lines. Where traditional approaches treat the 'nation'/ 'domestic' as static, critical approaches treat the 'nation'/ 'domestic' as affected by foreign policy, if only mainly in terms of class relations.

Yet traditional and critical approaches have some points in common. Both tend to naturalize the 'nation'/ 'domestic,' and do not ask how foreign policy is implicated in constituting either the 'nation' or the 'domestic.' Also in line with traditional approaches, critical approaches have not considered identity production, with the exception of Laura Macdonald's piece, and none have considered the relation between foreign policy and 'Canadian' subjectivity in the present. Instead, we might ask how foreign policy is implicated in the formation of 'Canadian' subjectivity. While traditional theoretical approaches have understood the 'nation' / 'domestic' as neither affected nor constituted by foreign policy, and critical approaches have sought to understand how the 'nation' / 'domestic' have been affected by foreign policy, we might want to contemplate how foreign policy is constitutive of 'Canada' and of 'Canadian' subjectivity. Another point of convergence between traditional and critical Canadian foreign policy analysis
centres on conceptions of the state. In terms of the process debate, both traditional and
critical theory conceptualise state and 'civil society' (or, the 'counter-consensus'), as
discrete bodies in opposition to each other. This conception is based on a certain
understanding of power as deductive and as possessed by one actor or another. Instead,
we might begin from a Foucauldian conception of power as running through the whole
social body, and as productive, as further elaborated in the following chapter. So,
whereas much neo-Gramscian foreign policy analysis has asserted that foreign policy
serves to re-enforce domestic class relations, we might ask how truth regimes concerning
the 'nation'/‘domestic’ are implicated in how ‘we’ are incited to conduct ourselves as
‘Canadians.’ These questions and issues form points of departure for the analysis that
follows in the next chapters. The following chapter seeks to provide a framework for
theorizing Canadian foreign policy in ways that address these points of contention, using
both critical international relations theory, as well as governmentality – a theory that has
not, as yet, been used in Canadian foreign policy analysis.
Chapter Two
Theorizing Foreign Policy: From Sovereignty to Governmentality

Although Canadian foreign policy analysis has not considered the role of foreign policy in the constitution of a ‘national’ or ‘domestic’ collectivity, nor its role in the formation of ‘Canadian’ subjectivity, as illustrated in the previous chapter, there are certainly perspectives beyond Canadian foreign policy analysis that can aid in such a project. The following is an exploration of just such alternative perspectives. First, work emerging out of critical international relations theory is considered. These perspectives are useful first in considering how identity and subjectivity relate to sovereignty, and how foreign policy is active in the formation of such identities or subjectivities. However, I argue that it is necessary to look beyond the ways in which subjectivity is related to the production of sovereignty, to a consideration of governmental power. This perspective can thus be pushed further, by examining not only sovereign power, but also governmental power, through the use of theories of governmentality. Such a shift allows for a consideration of how the formation of ‘national’ or ‘domestic’ subjectivities are important not only insofar as they legitimate state sovereignty, but also how such subjectivities are related to governance, and the exercise of governmental power. The next section of this chapter explores the relation between foreign policy and the state. The chapter ends with a brief consideration of periodization and the end of the cold war.
Sovereignty, Identity and Foreign Policy

While Canadian foreign policy analysis has largely conceptualised foreign policy as an ‘outward’ activity responding to objectively knowable and external ‘problems,’ some analysis of other foreign policy has challenged these notions. In particular, post-structuralist analysis has paid attention to the ways in which foreign policy may be constitutive of the ‘nation,’ the ‘domestic’ and state sovereignty. This work is situated with critical post-structuralist international relations theory, and seeks to deconstruct notions of fixed boundaries of ‘inside/outside’ or ‘domestic/foreign’ and the resultant naturalisation of state sovereignty.

Several authors working in the area of post-structuralist international relations theory have problematized state sovereignty. Richard Ashley, in his seminal piece, “Untying the Sovereign State,” asks how “actions are co-ordinated, energies concerted, resistances tamed, and boundaries of conduct imposed such that it becomes possible and sensible simply to represent a multiplicity of domestic societies, each understood as a coherent identity subordinate to the gaze of a single interpretive centre, a sovereign state.”¹ This ‘problem,’ he further argues, is one that is perpetually “in the process of solution,” but never can one say that the process is complete… and that states simply are.”² Thus, sovereign states are not foundational, ‘natural’ or pre-given, but can be considered to be constantly in the process of becoming through representational practices. This formulation also requires an understanding of ‘domestic society’ as “an effect of

² Ibid. 229
arbitrary practices of exclusion."^3 These practices of exclusion convert differences within the ‘domestic’ to difference between domestic societies and an external ‘anarchy.’ Yet, in this formulation Ashley subsumes the importance of the formation of the ‘domestic’ under sovereignty. He states, for example, that “‘domestic society’ may be inscribed and reinscribed as an identical ground which the state in turn may be claimed legitimately to represent and effectively to serve.”^4 Thus, the ‘domestic’ is conceptualized solely as an entity that legitimates the state. Moreover, this seems, for Ashley, to be the singular purpose of the ‘domestic’: “The primary problem of modern statecraft… is to stabilise the sovereign grounds of legitimate violence in modern politics by enframing and inscribing the domestic domain of ‘sovereign men’ which the state can be understood to represent.”^5 The ‘domestic,’ then, is a representation in aid of statecraft, and is not conceptualised as productive of anything other than sovereignty. It is thus beyond Ashley’s framework to conceptualise the ‘domestic’ beyond its role in producing state sovereignty. This point will be further explored below.

R.B.J. Walker similarly places state sovereignty centrally in his examination of the production of the arbitrary boundaries of ‘inside’ and ‘outside.’ Walker argues that that “knowing the other outside, it is possible to affirm identities inside.”^6 This knowledge of the inside, of the nation or of the domestic, is theorized as important for Walker insofar as it is productive of state sovereignty. As such, Walker questions how nations have come to be understood as constructed or as historical artefacts, while

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^3 Ibid, 257.
^5 Ibid, 256.
sovereign states are considered either as ahistorical and naturalized constants, or as able
to be “erased in favor of some kind of global polis.” Instead, Walker advocates a
position wherein state sovereignty, in “its fixing of unity and diversity, or inside and
outside, or space and time is not natural. Nor is it inevitable. It is a crucial part of the
practices of all modern states, but they are not natural or inevitable either.” Like Ashley,
Walker theorizes the role of identities, in fixing the boundaries of inside and outside, only
insofar as they are productive of state sovereignty.

In a similar fashion, Weber makes the argument that “sovereign nation-states are
not pre-given subjects but subjects in process and that all subjects in process (be they
individual or collective) are ontological effects of practices which are performatively
enacted.” In this performatve process, sovereignty is “fixed or stabilized historically via
practices of international relations theorists and practices of political intervention... [that]
stabilize the meaning of sovereignty, and, by default, write the state.” Weber also
considers ‘domestic communities’ to be constituted through the inscription of boundaries
of inclusion and exclusion, and moreover, the naturalisation of state sovereignty.
Weber states that “the sovereign voice of a supposed domestic community is assumed
when theorists refer to sovereign states... theorists as well as diplomats ‘solve’ the
problem of community constitution by positing a priori the existence of sovereign states

7 Ibid., 179.
8 Ibid.
10 Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention the State and Symbolic Exchange, New York:
11 Ibid. 25.
so that questions of community constitution are not asked." Yet, for Weber, the importance of the constitution of 'domestic communities' is, as with Ashley, relegated to a question of the constitution of states and of state sovereignty. Thus, she states, that

Thinking through the problem of the transference of authority from a domestic community to a state government within a logic of representation of semiotics, one might suggest that a domestic community is the signified to which a state government or signifier refers when pointing to the source of sovereign authority. The constitution of 'domestic communities' is posed as a 'problem' that relates solely to the constitution or legitimisation of the state and state sovereignty. In this sense, the constitution of a 'domestic community' is considered only insofar as it produces the (semiotic) grounds for legitimating the state and sovereign power: not as productive in any other manner.

A recent collection of essays, Sovereignty and Subjectivity, has also considered similar themes. While the essays collected tackle different subjects, "they demonstrate that the call to subjectivity within the social and political discourse of global life necessarily speaks about sovereignty." The collection is in keeping with prior formulations that theorize identity in relation to sovereignty. That is, as Edkins and Pin-Fat state: "[t]he inscription of particular forms of subjectivity produces and legitimizes the political arrangements of sovereignty." This is achieved through a 'social order' (such as the 'nation' or the 'domestic'). "The authority of the master signifier

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12 Ibid, 8.
13 Ibid, 7.
16 Ibid: 2.
[sovereignty] derives only from its position in the social order – which itself derives only from the subjection of the subjects that evoke it.”¹⁷ In other words, sovereignty is maintained through a social order (the ‘nation’ or the ‘domestic,’ for example) which is sustained through the subjection of subjects – the production of certain (national or domestic) subjectivities. So, in keeping with the theorists outlined above, subjectivity is primarily important insofar as it produces and legitimates state sovereignty.

This collection is particularly interesting, however, because of the its focus not just on identity, but also on subjectivity. This shift from theorizing identity to subjectivity is not an insignificant one. Jenny Edkins and Véronique Pin-Fat illustrate the importance of this shift by explicating the ways in which theories of identity assume a “preexisting (but ‘uncultured’ or pre-linguistic) subject [who] is socialized into particular cultural settings.”¹⁸ Instead, theories of subjectivity suggest that “the subject is always in the process of being constituted; there is no point at which, however briefly, the performance is finished.”¹⁹ We might also add that theories of subjectivity allow for theorizing not just how subjects understand themselves, but also how this process relates to the government of conduct. This will be explored further in the following section of this chapter on governmentality.

David Campbell, Michael Shapiro, and Cynthia Weber have considered how identity, subjectivity and state sovereignty relate to foreign policy. In his article, “Global Inscription: How Foreign Policy Constitutes the United States,” Campbell has argued that

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¹⁷ Ibid. 6.
¹⁹ Ibid.
U.S. foreign policy does not respond to a fixed external reality. Rather, it produces the boundaries of external and internal. For Campbell, foreign policy is “a boundary-producing practice central to the production and reproduction of the identity in whose name it operates” that requires a shift in concern to “the establishment of the boundaries that constitute, at one and the same time, the state and the international system...”  

The production of these boundaries is, for Campbell, productive of the state. Thus, in this article, Campbell argues that foreign policy produces the ‘domestic’ through the inscription of boundaries, and that the inscription of these boundaries is understood to be in aid of statecraft. Yet, it is possible to consider the production of boundaries of the ‘domestic’ that are performed by foreign policy, as not merely in aid of the legitimisation and constitution of the state and sovereign power.

In subsequent work, Campbell introduces the production of the nation (in addition to the ‘domestic’) through foreign policy as central to the legitimisation of the state. Like Ashley and Weber, Campbell understands states as “never finished entities... marked by an inherent tension.” But for Campbell this tension is resolved through the constitution of an ‘imagined political community’ or nation. So, instead of an approach that asks “how the United States foreign policy serves the national interest” - and to this we could add class/material interests - Campbell advocates an approach that examines how “through the inscription of foreignness, United States foreign policy helps produce

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21 Ibid, 279.
and reproduce the political identity of the doer supposedly behind the deed." Campbell uncomfortably situates nation and state together by referring throughout to the constitution of "(the United States of) America" through foreign policy practices. In so doing, he suggests that foreign policy is constitutive of both the nation and the state. Yet ultimately, he treats the nation as important only insofar as it is productive of the legitimacy of the state and of state sovereignty, in line with Weber and Ashley's conception of the 'domestic.' Such authors thus limit the importance of the formation of national or domestic identities or subjectivities to their role in the perpetuation of sovereign power, without considering the ways in which this process may be implicated in the exercise of governmental power. Additionally, the state is often understood to exercise this sovereign power in order to construct national identities. He argues, for example, that rather than understanding the nation as the natural essence of the state, "the state more often than not precedes the nation: that nationalism is a construct of the state in pursuit of its legitimacy."  

Foreign policy practices, through their inscriptions of the 'inside' - of the nation - thus serve to constitute the state. Again, we might ask whether the 'nation' - much like the 'domestic' - serves a purpose other than the production of dividing boundaries that legitimate the state and state sovereignty. If foreign policy is, in part, constitutive of the 'nation' and the 'domestic' and national (American) identity, then is this identity productive only of state legitimacy and thus sovereign power? While Campbell and others have conceptualised foreign policy not merely as an outward practice, the making

23 Ibid. x.
24 Ibid. 11.
of the state and a focus on sovereign power have played too centrally in their understandings of the constitution of the nation/domestic and national identities.

In *Violent Cartographies*, Michael Shapiro also considers the relation between identity and foreign policy, or warfare more specifically.\(^{25}\) Shapiro argues that "antagonistic Others serve as objects to perpetuate the identity of those who locate them as oppositional."\(^{26}\) Shapiro illustrates how warfare constitutes a process of Othering for the purpose of securing the identity of a national collectivity. He states that "an important impetus in modern warfare... is both the individual and national body's striving towards unity and coherence."\(^{27}\) The modern practice of warfare by nation-states is thus an important factor in the formation of national subjectivities and thus the coherence of such collectivities. Yet Shapiro, in a similar fashion to Campbell, asserts that "state-managed territories still hold sway over political subjectivity."\(^{28}\) While Shapiro goes beyond the authors discussed above in his examination of the importance of national or domestic subjectivities, he does not theorize this process as implicated in the exercise of governmental power.

In keeping with this theoretical position, Weber argues that foreign policy plays a role in making the 'domestic' for the state. For Weber, U.S. foreign policy pronouncements are performatve enactments of a state's sovereignty and "moments when states traumatically confront the impossibility of 'being' sovereign and thus insist

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\(^{25}\) Shapiro looks at warfare broadly, not only as a foreign policy.


\(^{27}\) Ibid. 45.

\(^{28}\) Ibid. 32.
upon their sovereign subjectivity all the more.”\textsuperscript{29} In this sense, “foreign policy is a response to a fundamental ‘trouble’ or crisis of representation, and sovereign states are discursive effects of ‘foreign policy trouble.’”\textsuperscript{30} Here, foreign policy is understood as a solution to the problem of performing the state and state sovereignty. So, foreign policy is, in part, constitutive of the state and of state sovereignty. Yet again, in this formulation, the making of the ‘domestic’ through foreign policy is important only insofar as it aids in the constitution of the sovereignty of the state.

These approaches outlined above are important in highlighting the ways in which state sovereignty must be continually (re)produced, or performed, through the naturalisation of boundaries of inclusion and exclusion and the production of certain identities or subjectivities. Based in this theoretical approach, foreign policy can be considered not only an ‘outward’ process. Rather, it can be understood as one practice in the production of the national identity that is required for the legitimacy of the state and state sovereignty, and thus the exercise of sovereign power. However, it is also important to think about how the production of a ‘nation’ or ‘domestic society’ and of ‘national’ or ‘domestic’ subjects are important beyond being productive of state legitimacy and sovereignty. Instead, we might think about how Canadian foreign policy is productive of ‘Canadians’ in ways that do not merely strengthen the state. I argue that foreign policy is, in part, constitutive of ‘Canadians’ through a process of identification or subjectification that is important beyond the production of the legitimacy of the state and state sovereignty. This assertion requires understanding the production of ‘Canadian’

\textsuperscript{29} Weber, “Performativity States,” 92.
\textsuperscript{30} Weber, “Performativity States,” 93.
subjectivity not only as productive of sovereignty and sovereign power, but also of governmental power. Governmentality is a theoretical approach that is useful for addressing how foreign policy is implicated in the production of ‘Canadian’ subjectivity in ways that do not simply bolster sovereignty and sovereign power.

From Sovereignty to Governmentality

The perspectives outlined above, emerging out of the field of critical international relations theory, are useful for understanding the ways in which identity and subjectivity underpin the legitimacy of state sovereignty and the exercise of sovereign power. However, it is also possible to ask how the formation of ‘national’ or ‘domestic’ identities or subjectivities are related to governmental power and the art of government.

Sovereign and governmental power can be understood as distinct. This distinction can be summed up by considering sovereign power as deductive, while governmental power is productive. As Mitchell Dean states, whereas sovereign power is “the exercise of authority over the subjects of the state,” governmental power “regards these subjects, and the forces and capacities of living individuals, as members of a population, as resources to be fostered, to be used and to be optimized.”31 Whereas “the exercise of sovereignty works fundamentally through a right ‘to kill and let live’” that “subtracts products, money, wealth, goods, services, labour and blood,” governmental power rules over things by seeking to foster them.32 While sovereign power rules through deduction, and, at the extreme, power over death, governmental power seeks to

31 Mitchell Dean, Governmentality, 20.
32 Ibid, 105.
foster certain forms of life, of subjectivity and thus conduct. This is not to say that it is not important to look at the production of sovereignty, particularly since sovereign and governmental powers can co-exist and are related in particular ways. This relation is further explored in the fourth chapter of this thesis, with particular attention to authoritarianism. For now, I will turn to a consideration of governmentality and subjectivity.

**Governmentality and Subjectivity**

The theoretical approach generally termed ‘governmentality’ arose out of the later works of Michel Foucault. Foucault identified a new pole of philosophizing characterized by the ever-changing question: “What are we today?”33 This question, moreover, is rooted in “the attitude of modernity” which is characterized by a valuing of the present and a will to transform it. This transformation of the present is achieved “not by destroying it but by grasping it in what it is.”34 Additionally, the attitude of modernity is marked not only by this relation to the present, but also by a particular relationship with oneself, wherein ‘man’ does not set out to discover himself, but to invent or produce himself. “This modernity does not ‘liberate man in his own being’; it compels him to face the task of producing himself.”35 These general philosophical questions and issues have provided the basis upon which questions of governance and the production of subjects and subjectivities have arisen.

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Foucault, writing about his own work under the pen name ‘Maurice Florence’, has espoused the study of “the constitution of the subject as its own object: the formation of the procedures by which the subject is led to observe itself, to analyze itself, to decipher itself, to recognize itself as a domain of possible knowledge.”36 In this sense there is no transhistorical or universal human subject – and the object of our study should not be directed at subjects, per se. Importantly, Foucault advocates “a return toward the study of the concrete practices by which the subject is constituted in the immanence of a domain of knowledge.”37 The following chapters thus explicate the ways in which foreign policy is a set of concrete practices, constitutive of subjects within a particular domain of knowledge or regime of truth of what it is to be ‘foreign’ or ‘Canadian,’ in ways that render them governable. It is important, however, to explore how humans are made into subjects.

The first observation we might make is that subjects are constituted or ‘made up’ through government, or ‘the conduct of conduct.’38 The ‘conduct of conduct’ has been defined by Mitchell Dean as “any more or less calculated means of the direction of how we behave and act.”39 Government in this sense refers to the shaping of human conduct in ways that are not necessarily characterized by domination. This is because “governmentality as the ‘conduct of conduct’ entails the idea that the one governed is, at

35 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”: 312.
37 Ibid, 317.
38 This term was coined by Foucault in “The Subject and Power” in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd edition, Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, (eds.), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982.
least in some rudimentary sense, an actor and therefore a locus of freedom... government
gives shape to freedom.\footnote{Ibid. 13.} As Nikolas Rose has put it, “to govern is to presuppose the
freedom of the governed.”\footnote{Rose, Powers of Freedom. 4.} This is not to say that liberal government gives rise to the
status of being ‘free’; rather, it involves the recognition that subjects are agents who are
enjoined to consider themselves responsible or capable of governing themselves to
different degrees. Indeed, “government works through practices of freedom \textit{and} states of
domination, forms of subjection \textit{and} forms of subjectification. It sometimes takes the
form of coercion, and at other times, seeks consent, without either coercion or consent
being its essential form.”\footnote{Dean, Governmentality, 34.} This recognition that the governed are a locus of action and
freedom also leaves open the possibility of thinking and acting differently, as discussed in
the introduction, as well as in Chapter Four.

The conception of the subject as constituted through government also brings
attention to identity, and moreover to the process of subjectification, of producing
oneself, or, in Foucault’s words, “the ascetic elaboration of the self.”\footnote{Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” 311.} While subjects
are considered agents, governmentality asks how certain subjects are formed and form
themselves as particular types of agents with certain capabilities and options, and inquires
into the process of subjectification. As stated by Michael Dillon, “subjectification
is...not an order of prohibitions productive of restrained wills and disempowered agents.
Rather, it is an order of knowledgeable practices, norms of conduct, and elaborate
protocols of behaviour." A primary question is thus, "how are certain individuals and populations made to identify with certain groups, to become virtuous and active citizens, and so on?" The process of subjectification, or "the way a human being turns him- or herself into a subject" is central to any analysis of government. It is my contention that 'Canadian' subjectivity is formed, in part, by foreign policy.

The ability of governmentality to theorize subjectivity, and, moreover, the relation between the formation of subjects and governance, is useful in understanding how Canadian foreign policy is implicated in the subjectification of 'Canadians.' However, much work in the area of governmentality has not paid sufficient attention to the production of 'nations' or of national or domestic subjectivities. For Foucault, 'civil society' – meaning a nation, domestic society or community – is not a pre-existing or naturally given reality, nor an ideological construct. Instead, it is "the correlate of a political technology of government." It is the body that is constituted by, and necessary for, the art of government. Foucault, in the words of Graham Burchell, also asks how, and "through the operation of what practices of government and by reference to what kind of political reasoning, have we been led to recognize our self-identity as members of a group?"

45 Dean, Governmentality, 32.
46 Ibid, 32.
47 Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power" 208.
of... entities we call community, society, nation or state? In other words, how are ‘national’ or ‘societal’ subjectivities formed, in ways that render ‘us’ governable? It is my assertion in this project that post-cold war Canadian foreign policy is implicated in the formation of ‘Canadian’ subjectivities. Still, these questions are not often given sustained attention in much of the governmentality literature. For the most part, instead of investigating the formation of ‘national’ or ‘domestic’ subjectivities and the constitution of such spaces, national or domestic spaces or ‘communities’ within them, are assumed to be the spaces within which government operates. Many (if not most) studies of governmentality are limited to particular national/domestic settings. Mitchell Dean, for example, has stated that “the existence of a sovereign authority exercised over a territory ‘forces open’ the spaces in which government can operate...” Michael Dillon similarly argues that “governmentality... seems to need its kings [i.e. the modern sovereign state] as much as kings and princes need governmentality...” First, we may note that the space of government is assumed to be national and sovereign. Moreover, however, it is important to think of the ways in which these territories are opened as spaces for the operation of government not merely through sovereign power (e.g. the existence of a state), but also through governmental power – such as the formation of

50 Ibid, 120.
52 There are several examples of this tendency. See for example, Mitchell Dean and Barry Hindess, (eds.). Governing Australia: Studies in Contemporary Rationalities of Government, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, among numerous other examples. This tendency is ironic, given the opposition to theories based on state power that is found in most governmentality work.
53 Dean, Governmentality, 203.
54 Dillon, “Sovereignty and Governmentality,” 328.
‘national’ or ‘domestic’ subjectivities. There are, however, some notable exceptions that consider the formation of such spaces.

One such exception in relation to ‘Canada’ is Bruce Curtis’ work on population. Curtis critiques the way in which Foucault, and others, have treated population naturalistically, as “an object on which power can act.” Curtis explores the ways in which the Census of Canada was instrumental in the ‘making up’ of a Canadian population and new subjectivities that become objects with an ‘essential nature’ (i.e. ‘Canadian,’ etc.) in particular governmental projects. Curtis’ work is helpful in moving beyond the ways in which ‘national’ or ‘domestic’ spaces are treated as natural within much of the governmentality literature.

The work of Barry Hindess is also important here, as it considers how the division of the world’s population into citizens of nation-states forms part of a “regime of population management.” Hindess argues that the study of citizenship “must consider not just its role in bringing together members of particular sub-populations and promoting some of their interests, but also the effects of rendering the global population governable by dividing it into sub-populations consisting of the citizens of... competing states.” Hindess thus considers the state system as a “supranational regime of government.” In this sense, Hindess argues that the establishment of national populations is implicated in the division and governance of the whole of humanity, and should be seen as an artefact.

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56 Ibid, 41.
58 Ibid, 57.
of government. He states that "the division of humanity into distinct national populations, many of them with their own national territories and states, operates as a dispersed regime of governance of the larger human population."\textsuperscript{60} Hindess also considers the role of the nation in this regime of government. However, he attributes the formation of nations or societies largely "to the efforts of states to nationalize the populations under their control."\textsuperscript{61} While Hindess may, in keeping with critical international relations theorists, assign too much authority to the state in the creation of nations or national subjectivities, this work is useful in understanding how the formation of nations, societies, and states, constitutes a division of humans into manageable populations. Here the exercise of governmental power is considered not just on a national level, but also on a supranational one.

However, the work of both Curtis and Hindess pays little sustained attention to the formation of ‘national’ or ‘domestic’ subjectivities. While both de-naturalize the national population or citizens of nations as pre-existing various programs of government, they do not consider how subjectivity is implicated in such dividing practices. These observations are in no way meant to suggest that studies of government should abandon the study of practices of government within ‘national’ or ‘domestic’ spaces. Instead, it is a call for the problematization of the formation of ‘national’ or ‘domestic’ subjectivities, and thus the constitution of such spaces for government, which is one of the aims of this project. Governmentality does provide the theoretical tools that

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid. 1494.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid. 1493.
can consider the formation of national/domestic subjectivity, and the ways in which foreign policy are implicated in the formation of such subjectivities. Yet foreign policy itself is not a self-evident term, as explored in the following section.

**Foreign Policy and the State**

Foreign policy has traditionally been understood to be solely the preserve of the state. The work of David Campbell is particularly instructive in broadening the concept of foreign policy. Campbell distinguishes between ‘foreign policy’ and Foreign Policy. For Campbell, ‘foreign policy’ refers to “all practices of differentiation or modes of exclusion (possibly figured as relationships of otherness) that constitute their objects as ‘foreign.’” In this formulation, Campbell separates ‘foreign policy’ from the state. As such, ‘foreign policy’ operates at all levels of social organization, from personal relationships to global orders. Moreover, ‘foreign policy’ provides the “discursive economy or conventional matrix of interpretations” necessary for the operation of Foreign Policy, that is, Foreign Policy as conventionally understood to be carried out by the state. For Campbell, the operation of Foreign Policy is dependent on ‘foreign policy.’ Additionally, “Foreign Policy serves to reproduce the constitution of identity made possible by ‘foreign policy’ and to contain challenges to the identity that results.”

While Campbell illustrates these points with examples only of cases of U.S. foreign policy, he generalises this distinction and relation between ‘foreign policy’ and Foreign Policy to all foreign policy, regardless of national location. In this sense, he puts

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63 Ibid, 69.
forth a universal conception of foreign policy. This conception, however, may not be equally applicable to all foreign policy, and to Canadian foreign policy in particular, since foreign policy is not solely the preserve of the state or of state actors. First, it is important to dismantle the notion of a monolithic and undifferentiated ‘state.’ Foreign policy, in the Canadian case, is carried out by many parts of the Canadian state, including the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Department of National Defence, the Canadian International Development Agency, and other government departments, as well as provincial governments, individual parliamentarians, among others. In addition to these state actors, it is also important to think of the involvement of non-state actors in foreign policy. As early as 1982, Cranford Pratt noted the increased involvement of both business and ‘public interest groups’ in foreign policy. In recent years there has been an increased involvement of voluntary or ‘non-governmental’ organizations both in terms of input into foreign policy and in terms of the actual practice of foreign policy. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, has stated that Canada had to “look beyond the bureaucracy and draw more effectively on the knowledge and expertise of NGOs, academics, business people, and citizens.” This involvement of non-state actors will be further explored in the following chapter in relation to the case of peacebuilding, and will be theorized as a facet of a liberal program.

64 Ibid. 69 (emphasis in original).
66 Here, I am thinking in particular of NDP member of parliament Svend Robinson’s trip to Palestine in April 2002.
of government. In any case, it is important to think of current Canadian foreign policy not merely as the preserve of the state. The relation between foreign policy and ‘Canadian’ subjectivity is not one that can be understood as an imposition by the state upon a (pre-existing) population or collectivity, not only because subjectivities are not imposed and further because the state is not the sole author of foreign policy. Chapter Three illustrates the ways in which peacebuilding - a key post-cold war foreign policy - can be understood as an assemblage of diverse actors. Yet this idea of a ‘post-cold war’ foreign policy is not self-evident, since the idea of discrete a ‘post-cold war era’ marked by rupture with the cold war is debatable, as discussed in the following section.

The ‘Post-Cold War’ and Temporal Limits

Before looking at the production of ‘Canadian’ subjectivity through foreign policy, it is necessary to explain the ways in which this analysis is consciously limited in (at least) two ways. The following is limited to an analysis of post-cold war foreign policy in the ‘Canadian’ setting. This analysis is not aimed at providing a transcendental metaphysics of foreign policy: a set of universally and ahistorically applicable rules or laws of the meaning of foreign policy. Instead, this analysis of foreign policy is temporally limited to the ‘post-cold war’ era.

This idea of a temporal limit, however, requires further exploration of issues of periodization. The idea of a discrete period of time that can be termed the ‘post-cold war era’ is not self-evident. David Campbell challenges the narrative of a sharp rupture that can be understood as the ‘end of the cold war.’ Instead, he advocates a conception of the
‘cold war’ and the ‘post-cold war’ as representational practices involved in the production of (American) identity. He states that “the popularly heralded belief that we are witnessing the end of the cold war embodies a misunderstanding: while the objects of established post-1945 strategies of otherness may no longer be plausible candidates for enmity, their transformation has not itself altered the entailments of identity that they satisfied.”

So, while the particular ways of othering or problematizing the ‘foreign’ have changed in the ‘post-cold war’ period, the very practices of othering involved in identity formation or subjectification remain central to foreign policy. Ann Laura Stoler’s discussion of periodization is also useful here. Stoler argues against understanding history as a series of clean breaks or ‘epistemic ruptures.’ Instead, what is at issue is “not rupture, but the tension between rupture and recuperation.”

Following from Campbell, we might say that the ‘end of the cold war’ is marked by a rupture in the particular ways of othering and of ‘domestic’ identity or subjectivity formation, along with a recuperation of the process of othering. So, the ‘end of the cold war’ should not be taken as a given: rather, we can study the ways in which others are problematized in foreign policy in relation to the narrative of the ‘end of the cold war.’ While the process of othering or problematizing the ‘foreign’ remains (recuperation), there has been a shift away from othering ‘communists’ (rupture), while the particular problematizations of the Third World have also changed. The ways in which ‘foreign’ subjects are problematized in post-cold war Canadian foreign policy is explored in the following chapter, in order to

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relate this problematization to the subjectification and governance of ‘Canadians’ in the fourth and final chapter of the thesis.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the ways in which post-structuralist international relations theory and theories of governmentality can contribute to the study of Canadian foreign policy. Critical international relations theory is instructive in understanding how foreign policy can be understood not solely as an ‘externally’ oriented practice, and can be understood to be implicated in the formation of national or domestic identities or subjectivities through the arbitrary exclusion of others. Studies emerging out of this body of work, however, have largely been limited to a consideration of how this formation of national subjectivities provides legitimacy to the state and the exercise of sovereign power. Theories of governmentality can contribute to furthering the study of the implications of the formation of national subjectivities beyond the exercise of sovereign power, to a consideration of the exercise of governmental power. By using theories of governmentality it is possible to understand the problematization of others and the formation of national subjectivities as implicated in the exercise of governmental power. In this sense, post-cold war Canadian foreign policy can be theorized as a technology in the subjectification and governance of ‘Canadians,’ as well as ‘foreign’ subjects. Here the post-cold war is not understood as a historical fact, but as a representational shift in the particular ways in which others are problematized or targeted in foreign policy. Thus, the purpose of Chapter Three is to explore the particular ways in which ‘foreign’ subjects
have been problematized in post-cold war Canadian foreign policy, in order to examine
the relation of this problematization of others to the subjectification and governance of
‘Canadians’ in the fourth and final chapter of this thesis.
Chapter Three
Problematising ‘Foreign’ Subjects: Narratives of Conflict

This chapter explores how post-cold war Canadian foreign policy problematizes those it targets for intervention as lacking in the proper liberal values and behaviours of tolerance, peacefulness, orderliness, and democracy, among others. This targeting of ‘foreign’ subjects as ‘problems’ for foreign policy will then be related to ‘Canadian’ subjectivity in the fourth and final chapter of this thesis. With this in mind, the chapter proceeds through three sections. The first section explores the changes that occurred in Canadian foreign policy beginning in the 1990s, with particular attention to peacebuilding as exemplary of these changes. This section also explores the discourses of the rise of post-cold war conflict, the ‘root causes’ of this conflict, and the ways in which such conflict has come to be understood as a threat to Canadian security. The second section of the chapter explores in more depth the making of Canadian peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is conceptualised as an assemblage\(^1\) in order to explore first, the ways in which the rise of peacebuilding cannot be attributed to the state, and secondly, in order to elucidate the relation between peacebuilding and the ideas that it both relies on and reproduces. One of these ideas relates to certain conceptions of foreign subjects. Thus, the third and final section of the chapter focuses on the particular ways in which the values, attitudes, behaviours, and sometimes even the psyches of ‘foreign’ subjects are problematized. Throughout the chapter, the representations of the ‘Third

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\(^1\) This concept is borrowed from Gilles Deleuze, and will be further discussed in the second section of this chapter.
World’ as a ‘problem’ for post-cold war foreign policy will be contrasted to the ways in which it was represented as a ‘problem’ in different ways in the cold war era.

**Discourses of Conflict**

The purpose of this section is to explore three related discourses concerning post-cold war Canadian foreign policy. The first is a discourse of the rise of civil conflict or intrastate wars, the second is that of the ‘root causes’ of such conflict being ‘ethnic strife and ‘underdevelopment,’ and the third is the discourse of such conflict as a ‘security risk’ for Canada. The section ends with a brief consideration of, in Mark Duffield’s terms, the merging of development and security.

There has been a broad consensus that the central post-cold war ‘problem’ for foreign policy, and international affairs in general, has been the rise in intrastate wars in what has come to be called the ‘Third World’ as well as in Eastern Europe. Then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, stated in 1997 that while the end of the cold war was hailed as “the beginning of an era of unparalleled peace and prosperity,” new ‘problems’ emerged in this period. These ‘problems’ included a widening gap between “industrialized and developing worlds,” often compounded by “internal conflict and state failure.” Much academic analysis also asserts the idea that ‘intra-state’ conflict or ‘complex political emergencies’ have arisen as the central ‘problem’ in the post-cold war era. Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme, for example, state that there has been a

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3 Ibid.
post-cold war shift "from wars between states to conflicts within states." In a similar fashion, Roland Paris opens his piece on liberal internationalism by stating that "[o]ne of the challenges facing the international community in the post-cold war era is the increasingly pervasive problem of civil conflict. Indeed, all of the thirty major armed conflicts fought in the world in 1995 were intrastate wars." Another oft-cited statistic states that "[b]etween 1989 and 1996, there were 101 armed conflicts; 95 took place within existing states (intra-state)." Examples of such statements asserting the changed nature of conflict and a rise in civil wars in the post-cold war era abound. Mark Duffield makes an invaluable point when he observes that the post-cold war regime of 'liberal peace' now condemns all violent conflict and the leaders of such conflict "regardless of whether they are guilty of war crimes, which many are, or defending themselves from dispossession or exploitation, which some may be." Thus, "liberal governance has all but abolished the idea of a just cause."Although the idea of a 'just cause' for any given conflict is no longer part of the discursive landscape of Canadian foreign policy, nor of international affairs in general, there have been increasingly pervasive discourses of the 'root causes' of intrastate conflict.

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8 Ibid, 183.
In response to this perception of civil war as a new ‘problem’ in the post-cold war era, several actions were taken on both a global level and in Canadian foreign policy. In the early 1990s, the number of peacekeeping missions increased dramatically. For instance, there were as many peacekeeping operations (13) between 1987 and 1992 as there were during all of the years between 1945 and 1987.9 Additionally, the character of post-cold war missions such as those in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Haiti changed, as they increasingly involved not only armed forces but also civilians. Whereas during the cold war these missions largely consisted of actions aimed solely at ceasing conflict, in the post-cold war era, these missions also began to concentrate their efforts on “election supervision and implementation, human rights monitoring, and, in the case of Cambodia, the virtual administration of a country.”10 Canadian foreign policy was no exception here, as Canadian forces and civilians were involved in many of these missions.

By the mid-1990s, however, peacekeeping fell somewhat out of favour on at least two counts. First, the missions were plagued by controversies related to ethical questions. These came to a head in Canada with the very public criticism of the mission in Rwanda by Romeo Dallaire, as well as the ‘Somalia affair:’ an inquiry into the torture and murder of a Somali prisoner, Shidane Arone, by soldiers in the Canadian Airborne Regiment during their duty as peacekeepers.11 Yet perhaps even more importantly, by the mid-1990s, there was an increasing discourse and rationale of preventing conflict

9 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 47.
before it ever happened. This discourse of conflict prevention is discussed in further
detail below. For now it is important to stress that it was within this context that
peacebuilding gained prominence as the preferred solution to conflict, while
peacekeeping became less favoured. In Canada, peacebuilding came to be defined by
DFAIT, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Canadian
Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC), an umbrella group of NGOs involved in
peacebuilding,\textsuperscript{12} as follows:

Peacebuilding is the effort to strengthen the prospects for internal
peace and decrease the likelihood of violent conflict. The overarching
goal of peacebuilding is to enhance the indigenous capacity of a
society to manage conflict without violence.\textsuperscript{13}

The activities now undertaken in the name of ‘peacebuilding,’ include “conflict
resolution,” “democratic development,” “economic” and “social reconstruction” as well
as “humanitarian relief” and “human rights,” among others\textsuperscript{14} These activities are largely
undertaken by Canadian non-governmental organizations, working mainly in the area of
international development, in ‘partnership’ with NGOs in the ‘South.’ These
arrangements of ‘partnership’ are critically examined in Chapter Four.

Throughout the 1990s, peacebuilding also became increasingly concerned not
only with post-conflict activities, but also with conflict prevention. So, whereas Boutros
Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 \textit{Agenda for Peace}, defined ‘peace-building’ as activity aimed

\textsuperscript{11} For an excellent critical account of the ‘Somalia affair’ see Sherene Razack, “From the ‘Clean Snows of
Petawawa’: The Violence of Canadian Peacekeepers in Somalia,” in \textit{Cultural Anthropology}, vol. 15, no. 1

\textsuperscript{12} The importance of this group is further elaborated on in the following section of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{13} Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Peacebuilding Activities Chart,” \textit{Canada and
Peacebuilding}, www.dfait-maect.gc.ca/peacebuilding/cpi_activities-e.asp
at securing peace after a conflict, through activities such as “rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war,”¹⁵ by the mid-1990s peacebuilding was increasingly touted as a measure for preventing conflict before it ever began, through activities that looked more and more like ‘development’ work. Yet in order to prevent conflict, there was an increasing concern with addressing the ‘root causes’ of conflict.

The ‘root causes’ of civil conflicts are usually attributed either to long-simmering ‘ethnic strife’ or, in a complementary fashion, to ‘underdevelopment,’ a lack of ‘good governance,’ and poverty. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his 1992 document, An Agenda for Peace, identified “fierce new assertions of nationalism” that emerged with the end of the cold war that threaten “the cohesion of States” through “brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife.”¹⁶ One of the central ‘problems’ of the post-cold war era identified by Boutros-Ghali was thus that “racial tensions are rising and finding expression in violence.”¹⁷ Statements such as these rely on the long history of the racialization of colonial and ‘Third World’ subjects, and thus predate the end of the cold war, yet they gained renewed vigour in the post-cold war era. Such assertions are also found in abundance in Canadian foreign policy. For example, Lloyd Axworthy has stated that the ‘dramatic increase’ in intrastate conflict is “rooted in religious or ethnic

¹⁶ Ibid.
¹⁷ Ibid.
discord.”¹⁸ One DFAIT publication, in similar terms, attributes conflict to “ethnic or religious divisions.”¹⁹ Often, this apparent rise in ‘ethnic’ tension is attributed directly to the end of the cold war. In Canada in the World, this view is reflected in the statement that “ethnic and religious divisions reflect, in some cases, tensions only temporarily suppressed by totalitarian states and the pressures of the cold war.”²⁰ This discourse of the post-cold war rise in ‘ethnic’ conflict is also present in academic sources, such as Goodhand and Hulme’s discussion of “ethno-nationalist conflict,” as discussed above.²¹ Duffield has argued that such discourses of the ‘uncorking’ of simmering ‘ethnic’ tension after the cold war are a type of “new barbarism” – a form of new racism. New barbarism sees difference as a source of inevitable conflict and tends to emphasise “the notion of a primordial, innate, and irrational cultural and ethnic identity” at the root of antagonisms.²² Such discourses also rely on histories of colonization, in which the Third World came to be understood as violent, barbarous and ‘uncivilized.’ Cristina Rojas has countered the related idea that civilization tames violence, and violence is understood as the unmaking of civilization, by looking at how civilization and violence intertwined and supported each other.²³ As discussed in the previous chapter, if we understand the ‘end of the cold war’ as a representational practice, in keeping with David Campbell’s work, it is possible to study the discourses of a rise in ‘ethnic strife’ in the Third World not in

²¹ Goodhand & Hulme, 15.
order to determine whether they are ‘true’ or ‘false,’ but in as representational practices
in the production of American identity, or, in this case, of Canadian subjectivity.
Narratives of a post-cold war rise in ‘ethnic’ conflict will be related to ‘Canadian’
subjectivity in Chapter Four. Yet the ‘root causes’ of conflict are not always attributed to
‘ethnic strife.’

More often, the cause of intrastate conflict or ‘complex political emergencies’ is
attributed to poverty and a lack of democracy and ‘development.’ For example, the
Conflict Prevention Working Group of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating
Committee (CPCC) states the need for “addressing the root causes of conflict such as:
insecurity between groups, social, religious and political institutions which fail to
promote social harmony, uneven social and economic development, and human rights
abuses.” Flora MacDonald, President of the World Federalists of Canada, a group
working in the area of peacebuilding in Canada, has stated that “the major cause of
conflict is poverty” and that transitions to democracy in African countries constitute “a
major breakthrough.” In a similar fashion, conflict is often associated with a lack of
‘good governance,’ which can be solved with democracy and ‘development.’ Susan
Brown, Chief of CIDA’s Peacebuilding Unit, has stated that:

the challenge is to solve the root causes of the problem... armed
conflict is evidence of the ultimate failure of governments of that
society. And surely we, who are in the development world, who do
good governance and democratic development, are now ready to
realize that unless we deal with the root causes of the failure of good

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23 Cristina Rojas, Civilisation and Violence: Regimes of Representation in Nineteenth-Century Columbia.
24 Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, “Conflict Prevention Working Group: Terms of
25 World Federalists, “Flora MacDonald: New WFC President an NGO Advocate,” in Mondial. April 2001:
4.
governance, then we are not doing sustainable development and we haven’t built sustainable peace.\textsuperscript{26}

It is interesting to note that while during the cold war poverty was seen as somewhat of a source of conflict in that it provided a breeding grounds for communism, in the post-cold war era poverty itself is seen as the ‘root cause’ of conflict, thus locating the problem more internally to the Third World itself, in a way that complements the idea that ‘ethnic strife’ - which is also located internally to the Third World – is the cause of conflict.

Assertions that poverty, a lack of ‘good governance’/democracy, and ‘underdevelopment’ are the ‘root causes’ of conflict, however, do not always counter those that see long-simmering ethnic identities as the source of violence. For instance, in the same article in which Lloyd Axworthy states that conflict is “rooted in religious or ethnic discord,” he also states that conflict is related to “economic forces” and a widening “income gap between the industrialized and developing worlds.”\textsuperscript{27} Similarly, in Canada in the World, alongside the attribution of conflict to ‘ethnic strife,’ it is stated that “economic disparities within and among countries, if left unchecked, will continue to be a source of political, security and humanitarian crises.”\textsuperscript{28}

In addition to the discourses of a post-cold war rise in civil conflict and of the ‘root causes’ of ‘ethnic strife’ and ‘underdevelopment,’ is a discourse of intrastate conflict elsewhere as a source of security threat to ‘us’ in ‘Canada.’ For example, DFAIT’s Canada in the World states that “the promotion of global peace as the key to

\textsuperscript{27} Lloyd Axworthy, “Canada and Human Security,” 183.
\textsuperscript{28} DFAIT. “Introduction” in Canada in the World, 2.
protecting our security remains a central element of our foreign policy.²⁹ In a similar fashion, CIDA states that “threats to individual security are not limited to situations of violent conflict” since they “potentially put all of us at risk.”³⁰ Such ideas draw on a history of the problematization of conflict elsewhere as a security threat to Canada, and of the need for international order in order for Canada to be secure. Yet these assertions are also based on the idea that “threats to security now are more complex than before [i.e. during the cold war]. A whole range of issues that transcend borders – including… underdevelopment – have peace and security implications.”³¹ Here it is important to note that in the post-cold war era ‘underdevelopment’ comes to be understood as a security threat. And, as Dillon and Reid point out, “development analysts have become as interested in conflict, war and security as security specialists have become interested in development economics, civil society, and conflict resolution.”³² Mark Duffield notes that although these discourses were present during the cold war, and became dominant during the 1980s, it was only with the end of the cold war that the association of development with conflict became a prevalent ‘problem’ among security networks, and thus that underdevelopment itself came to be considered dangerous.³³ Michael Dillon and Julian Reid similarly note that “novel security-development alliances of states, international organizations, international non-governmental organizations, and local nongovernmental organization have formed within the domain of liberal peace.”³⁴

³⁰ DFAIT, Freedom From Fear, 2.
³¹ Ibid.
³³ Duffield, Global Governance, 116.
³⁴ Dillon & Reid, 122.
Within this context, Canadian peacebuilding rose to prominence purportedly as a response to these new 'problems' of civil conflict.

The rise of peacebuilding in Canadian foreign policy, moreover, can be understood as an example of what Mark Duffield has termed the merging of development and security. Given that 'underdevelopment' (both in terms of 'ethnic strife' and in terms of 'poverty') has come to be understood as the 'root cause' of conflict, and that intrastate conflict elsewhere has come to be understood as a security threat to Canada, 'underdevelopment' is now considered dangerous to 'us.' The impetus for the prevention of conflict has thus become more urgent, and has meant that preventing conflict, or building peace, has become a task of development. In this sense, there has been a merging of development and security: promoting development abroad has become a way of ensuring 'our' security. While 'poverty' was understood as dangerous during the cold war because it was understood as the breeding grounds for 'communism,' 'underdevelopment' itself is now seen as a security risk. And, as Duffield has stated in relation to the merging of development and security in both global and European contexts: "representing underdevelopment as dangerous not only demands a remedial process of social transformation, it also creates an urgency and belief ensuring that this process is no longer trusted to chance." The rise of peacebuilding in Canadian foreign policy is just one way in which this transformation is no longer trusted to chance. Yet the rise of peacebuilding as a foreign policy activity should neither be attributed to the state, nor solely to state actors. Instead, peacebuilding can be understood as an assemblage, as explored in the following section.
Making Peace: Canadian Peacebuilding as Assemblage

Many have assumed that the state is the sole author of foreign policy, and have asserted that former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy was the primary author of the new approach to foreign policy, as exemplified by peacebuilding. Fen Osler Hampson and Dean F. Oliver, for example, have termed this approach the ‘Axworthy doctrine.’ The argument of these authors reflects the common assumption that foreign policy is state-directed, as explored in Chapter Two, and thus attribute this shift in foreign policy in the 1990s, which includes the making of peacebuilding, to Lloyd Axworthy’s tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Yet much of the shift in foreign policy pre-dates Lloyd Axworthy’s arrival in Foreign Affairs. It is possible to trace this shift in foreign policy to the early 1990s: a point in time that pre-dates both Lloyd Axworthy’s tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs, not to mention that of the federal Liberal government. Tom Keating and Nicholas Gammer, writing in 1993 in relation to the foreign policy directions of the Progressive Conservative Mulroney government, observed that there was a ‘new look’ in Canada’s foreign policy. This ‘new look’ was reflected in “an attempt to define a new foreign policy doctrine that would allow for, and indeed encourage, humanitarian intervention to protect victims of war and oppression.” Then-Prime Minister Brian Mulroney stated, for example, that there was a need to dispense with

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35 Duffield, Global Governance, 42.
38 Ibid. 721.
"debating the niceties of ‘this’ principle or ‘that concept’" associated with the cold war to get "on with the job of building peace and prosperity." In 1993 Barbara McDougall advocated an approach to foreign policy based on ‘co-operative security’ that would advance “respect for human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law.” This new direction was purportedly a reaction to external ‘problems’ that were arising with the end of the cold war: that of "civil conflict," including the events in Yugoslavia, Somalia, and the former Soviet Union, among others. The narrative of increased civil conflict and the need for a new foreign policy to respond to this ‘external’ condition thus predates Lloyd Axworthy and the Liberal government. Moreover, this shift originated neither solely with the Canadian state, nor at the behest of a single Minister of Foreign Affairs, but can be better understood to involve a complex number of actors, events, and ideas. This can be illustrated through a consideration of the making of peacebuilding as an assemblage.

Peacebuilding did not come about at the instruction of the Department of Foreign Affairs: its ‘cause’ cannot be attributed to the state. Moreover, in place of an analysis that seeks to identify the cause(s) of events or things, it is possible instead to trace a history of such occurrences without attributing their existence to any one particular cause or origin, such as the state. As such, peacebuilding and the ‘new look’ in foreign policy do not have to be attributed to Lloyd Axworthy, nor the ‘Axworthy doctrine,’ nor even the direction of DFAIT. Gilles Deleuze’s concept of assemblage is useful here. Deleuze identified in Foucault’s work the idea of assemblages, that is, sets of concrete practices or

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39 Quoted in Keating and Gamm, 721.
40 Quoted in Keating and Gamm, 727.
material 'technologies' that are both a result of abstract ideas, while also productive of them “within [their] very tissue.” Assemblages are thus not ‘caused’ by any one actor (state or otherwise). Instead, they are assembled through various strategies, and are both the result of, and reproductive of, particular ideas or thought. Peacebuilding can be understood as an assemblage “fashioned from diverse elements, put together in novel and specific ways, and rationalised in relation to specific governmental objectives and goals.” Such an analysis requires looking at the history of the making of Canadian peacebuilding, within an international context.

The term ‘peacebuilding’ first appeared in an article written by Johan Galtung in 1976. It then disappeared into obscurity for over fifteen years. Then, in 1992, it appeared in the UN publication An Agenda for Peace, proposed by then-UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict.” Soon after, NGOs in Canada involved mainly in international development and human rights work began to organize around ‘peacebuilding.’ In 1994, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Peacebuilding was formed through the actions of about 20 individuals working for different Canadian agencies involved in development work. This group was later to

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41 Ibid. 720.
42 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986: 37.
become the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC).\textsuperscript{46} The CPCC acts as the co-ordinating body and umbrella organization for NGOs involved in peacebuilding. In 1996, DFAIT launched the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative, followed soon after by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) Peacebuilding Fund. DFAIT thus began to shift some of its focus onto development work, and in so doing turned to CIDA, which had the project money needed to facilitate such a shift.

Beyond this early activity, several strategies were deployed in the making of peacebuilding. These include the conducting of the \textit{Peacebuilding Census}, annual consultations, a proliferation of programs within both DFAIT and CIDA, the CPCC, and more recently the CCHS (Canadian Consortium on Human Security), the Peacebuilding Fund and the \textit{Peacebuilding Activities Chart}. Before proceeding in tracing this history, however, it is important to provide some notes on the conceptualisation of the involvement of NGOs or ‘civil society’ that forms the basis of this chapter. Traditional theorists as well as political economists engaged in Canadian foreign policy analysis have most often understood a divide between NGO and state actors, and posit a great divide between state and civil society. When NGOs do become involved in foreign policy, they are often understood as relatively unimportant, as co-opted, politically managed, or as professionalized instruments of the state.\textsuperscript{47} It may be more useful, however, to begin

\textsuperscript{46} Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, “History of CPCC”, \textit{About the CPCC}, www.cpcc.ottawa.on.ca/about.htm.

\textsuperscript{47} For an example of the treatment of NGOs as unimportant in foreign policy, see the work of Kim Richard Nossal, especially the article “The Democratization of Canadian Foreign Policy: An Elusive Ideal,” in \textit{Canada Among Nations 1995: Democracy and Foreign Policy}. Maxwell A. Cameron and Maureen Appel Molot, (eds.), Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995. For examples of the argument that NGOs are politically managed, see the work of Cranford Pratt, especially “Dominant Class Theory and Canadian
from Foucault's assertion that "there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations." Further, Rose and Miller have asserted that the concept of a 'state/civil society' divide (among other concepts) "cannot provide the intellectual tools for analyzing the problematics of government." Instead, we can view the involvement of NGOs as a facet of liberal governance, in which the state seeks to "co-operate with, contract out or enter into partnership with the agencies, groups and bodies of civil society." A further characteristic of liberal government, according to Mitchell Dean, is the rationality that "government can secure democracy only by reproducing the values and expectations found in civil society within its own programmes and interventions."

Within peacebuilding a vital 'civil society' is understood to be fundamental to democracy 'abroad,' and is even named as a potential activity for peacebuilders. It then follows that the involvement of 'civil society' in peacebuilding itself is consistent with the liberal idea that the aims of peacebuilding (democracy through increased involvement of 'civil' society') should be reproduced within its own programme (the involvement of 'civil society'). Thus, the 'making up' of Canadian NGOs into peacebuilders should not be understood as an action carried out by the state in order to co-opt naive philanthropic groups. Instead, these groups, among other actors, are actively engaged in the making of

51 Ibid.: 43.
peacebuilding and the peacebuilding ‘community,’ and their involvement belies this liberal rationality.

One of the central problems in the making of peacebuilding was the need for existing Canadian NGOs involved mainly in ‘development’ work to come to understand their activities as peacebuilding. In 1997, the Peacebuilding Census was conducted by the CPCC, the International Development Research Centre, the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, and the Human Development Division of the Global Issues Bureau of DFAIT. As discussed in the second chapter of this thesis, Bruce Curtis has argued that ‘population’ is a theoretical, not empirical, entity that was ‘made up’ as an authoritative community through the Census of Canada.\textsuperscript{52} Similarly, although on a different scale, the Peacebuilding Census was productive in having Canadian NGOs, involved mainly in international development and human rights, constitute themselves as peacebuilders, and be constituted as an authoritative policy ‘community.’ This is reflected in the stated purpose of the Census:

The purpose of the exercise was to develop a peacebuilding capacity map and database in order that government and the non-governmental community could begin to work together... The partners wanted to determine, at a glance, what kinds of peacebuilding activities Canadians are involved with, the range of organizations involved in peacebuilding, in which countries and regions of the world this peacebuilding work is being done, what peacebuilding training is being offered and what training is required, and what policies and directions government and others should be pursuing with respect to peacebuilding.\textsuperscript{53}

Asking over 350 NGOs what peacebuilding activities they were involved in can be understood as an instance of producing peacebuilders, since only about 20 NGOs were fully involved with peacebuilding at this time. The Census thus served to both inform NGOs that their activities could be defined as peacebuilding, and moreover, to have the NGOs define themselves as peacebuilders. The Census states this plainly: “the NGO community and others are now just beginning to see their work in terms of peacebuilding and more in this community are starting to develop explicit peacebuilding programmes and projects.”54 In a section where respondents were asked to evaluate the census, one respondent commented “[it is] useful to have this information compiled. Most organizations don’t think of their work as peacebuilding so it has made people re-think the nature of their work. People will build new alliances as they see more commonality in their work.”55 Thus, the Census can be considered one strategy deployed in the making of peacebuilding.

The Peacebuilding Fund, established by CIDA in 1997, is another strategy in the making of peacebuilding. The fund is administered by CIDA in order to provide Canadian NGOs with ‘peacebuilding’ funds to be distributed to their NGO ‘partners’ in the South. A 32-page colour glossy booklet on the Fund states that “Peacebuilding is a relatively new concept for most people... The Fund can act as a catalyst to new and innovative approaches to peacebuilding.”56 This constitution of peacebuilding and the new funds allocated (in the context of declining government funding to international

54 Ibid, 3.
55 Ibid, 29.
development NGOs during the 1990s), was not viewed without caution by some. One respondent to the Census stated that "the funding-driven race to become involved in peacebuilding has led to a number of organizations improvising expertise, and insufficient quality control could lead to some embarrassing and costly disasters."57

Another stated that Canada’s peacebuilding role was “fragmented and inconsistent.” Such statements form part of an ongoing narrative of the need for more coherence, organisation, and effectiveness in peacebuilding.

Annual peacebuilding consultations have been carried out since 1997, organised by DfAIt and the CPCC, and, starting in 2002 the Canadian Consortium for Human Security (CCHS), an organisation designed to bring together academics working in peacebuilding. In 2001, the consultations drew 252 participants.58 The stated purpose of the consultations is to “come together to discuss current and emerging issues in the field of peacebuilding and human security with a view to increasing the coherence and effectiveness of Canada’s contribution to international peace and security.”59 Thus the consultations form part of the strategies deployed in the making up of peacebuilding.

There has also been a proliferation of actors involved in peacebuilding. One of the most prominent is the CPCC. The stated goal of the CPCC is “[t]o engender greater coherence and effectiveness in building peace through fostering collaboration and coordination among diverse groups and sectors in Canada, and their partners overseas.”60

The CCHS (Canadian Consortium on Human Security) was established in December

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57 Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, et. al., Peacebuilding Census. 28.
58 CPCC, List of Participants 2001 (author’s copy).
2001 as an organisation that “aspires to bring together academic communities, civil societies and governmental actors in order to advance policy research and development on the various issues of human security.” In order to develop expertise, the International Development Research Council (IDRC) set up a peacebuilding division in 1996. Both DFAIT and CIDA also set up peacebuilding-related divisions in 1997.

Perhaps one of the most interesting documents used in the making of peacebuilding is the Peacebuilding Activities Chart. The Chart fills in where the relatively vague definition of peacebuilding leaves off. But in defining peacebuilding, the Chart also enjoins pre-existing NGOs to define themselves as peacebuilders. The opening statement of the Chart states that:

Peacebuilding is a relatively recent term. Many organizations do not necessarily describe their activities as peacebuilding. The attached Peacebuilding Activities Chart is intended to list the range of activities that comprise a peacebuilding agenda, as the term is currently used by the Canadian government and non-governmental organizations.

The activities listed on the Chart such as ‘democratic development,’ ‘micro credit projects,’ ‘human rights’ and ‘humanitarian relief’ among others, were activities that were, of course, activities largely already being undertaken by Canadian NGOs in ‘partnership’ with NGOs located in targeted populations. Thus the Chart can be seen as one of many strategies – including the Census, the Fund, the consultations, and the

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60 Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, Goal and Objectives of CPCC. www.cpcottawa.on.ca/about.htm
62 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, et. al., Peacebuilding Activities Chart.
proliferation of organisations – that can be considered an assemblage constitutive of peacebuilding.

It should be stressed, however, that the process of making up peacebuilding was not without contestation. Many NGOs expressed ambivalence to peacebuilding in the Census: one NGOs representative commented that “there is no particular motivation to re-arrange existing programs and projects to develop new ones in a vague peacebuilding category. The ‘why’ is missing. How is it an advantage to switch to peacebuilding?” 64 Some NGOs may not have wanted to be made up as peacebuilders, while others questioned the motivation for the project, stating that it was “politically driven with undertones of sincerity.” 65 Such statements, along with the narrative of ‘incoherence’ discussed above, reflect some of the difficulties that arose in the making of peacebuilding.

It is not useful to think of the ‘new look’ in Canadian foreign policy, and peacebuilding in particular, as a state-directed policy, imposed upon NGOs or others. Instead, peacebuilding can be conceptualised as an assemblage existing in an international context, composed of various actors, including parts of the Canadian state (DFAIT, CIDA, DND, among others), think-tanks, NGOs, consultants, academics, and others. Let us return here to Deleuze’s concept of assemblage. Assemblages are sets of concrete practices or material technologies that are both a result of abstract ideas, while also (re)productive of these ideas “within the very tissue” 66 of such assemblages. Peacebuilding, then, is a result of certain ideas, while also being reproductive of them.

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64 Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, et al., Peacebuilding Census. 30.  
Peacebuilding relies on and reproduces the ideas reflected in discourses of increased post-cold war civil conflict in ways that problematize those targeted by peacebuilding. Peacebuilding, if considered as an assemblage, can be understood to ‘make up’ the ‘populations’ to which it purportedly responds, through particular problematizations of those ‘populations’ it claims to respond to. After all, a population, as discussed above, is not a pre-existing empirical ‘fact.’ The remaining section of this chapter explores the particular ways in which peacebuilding, and post-cold war Canadian foreign policy in general, problematize the subjects of targeted populations.

‘Foreign’ Subjects: Problematizing Others

The purpose of this section is to explore how foreign policy, and peacebuilding in particular, problematizes or targets the subjects of the populations that it ‘makes up’ through its activities. ‘Foreign’ subject, of course, should not be understood as external, pre-existing problems, but as ‘problems’ made up and represented by foreign policy in particular ways, especially as violent and prone to conflict. Additionally, peacebuilding does not merely identify those deemed to be engaged in conflict, but those subjects likely to engage in conflict. Here it is important to consider in more depth the discourse of conflict prevention.

As discussed above, the shift from a focus on peacekeeping in the early 1990s towards a combination of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the mid-1990s was a result not only of public controversies surrounding Canadian peacekeeping missions, but can

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also be placed within the context of an emerging discourse and rationale of *prevention*.

There are several examples of statements related to conflict prevention, the majority of which focus on the efficiency of prevention: the rationale being that what could be accomplished with ‘an ounce of prevention’ would otherwise cost ‘a pound of cure.’ One example that illustrates this point well is contained in CIDA’s publication *The Missing Peace*, in an article titled “*Weighing the Costs: Post Conflict Support versus Conflict Prevention.*” The article states that:

> It costs much less to invest in conflict prevention than it does in cleaning up after conflict escalates into violence. Armed conflicts do not occur without warning. They are usually preceded by a multitude of early warning signals. The international community is beginning to recognize that human and financial costs associated with ignoring these signals are extremely high. Within the international community there is increased thinking about creating preventive peacebuilding and development activities in areas where conflict could erupt...\(^{67}\)

Here it is the cost – both financial and human – that serves as the rationale for the prevention of conflict. The financial rationale for prevention alone is emphasized in an illustration accompanying the article, showing that post-conflict operations have cost $216 billion whereas conflict prevention has cost $35 billion in 9 cases in the 1990s.\(^{68}\)

No similar illustrations of the ‘human’ costs of conflict prevention are estimated or illustrated. Prevention, then, is preferred because it is deemed to be more (cost-)effective than post-conflict activities. This view is similarly reflected in many academic analyses of conflict. Ryan Grist, for example, advocates “the improved use of observation and monitoring missions into ongoing intra-state violent conflict” since it can “provide a

more cost-effective method to address violence” and is effective in “attempting to prevent and limit violence.”\(^6^9\) As peacebuilding began to be increasingly concerned with prevention and “pre-conflict situations,” peacebuilders began to take on monitoring activities. The *Peacebuilding Activities Chart*, for example, lists “Early Warning,” as one of the main activities of Canadian peacebuilding, including “intelligence and monitoring, data collection and analysis, and transmission and early action.”\(^7^0\) The question remains, what are they monitoring for? What indicates a propensity for violence and conflict? Here it is necessary to return to the earlier discussion of the ‘root causes’ of conflict.

As discussed above, the ‘root causes’ of conflict have generally been attributed either to ‘ethnic strife’ or to poverty, a lack of democracy and good governance, and ‘underdevelopment.’ Given the penchant for prevention, it then becomes important to prevent conflict in areas understood to be poor or ‘underdeveloped’ and among ‘populations’ understood to be lacking the proper liberal values associated with ethnic tolerance, democracy, and good governance. The subjects of targeted populations have thus generally come to be understood to be lacking in tolerance and in a culture of peace.

In the early- to mid-1990s, the subjects of targeted populations (i.e. those understood to engage in violent conflict) became a ‘problem’ in that they were deemed to be lacking in tolerance. The United Nations declared 1995 the Year for Tolerance, since “to practise tolerance is one of the principles to be applied to attain the ends pursued by

\(^{6^9}\) Ibid.

\(^{6^5}\) Ryan Grist, “More than Eunuchs at the Orgy: Observation and Monitoring Reconsidered,” in *International Peacekeeping*, vol.8, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 61

\(^{7^0}\) Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Peacebuilding Activities Chart.”
the United Nations of preventing war and maintaining peace.\textsuperscript{71} Given the discourse of ‘ethnic strife’ as the ‘root cause’ of conflict, tolerance became the solution to this ‘problem.’ In this context, tolerance became defined as

\begin{quote}
respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world’s cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human. It is fostered by knowledge, openness, communication and freedom of thought, conscience and belief. Tolerance is harmony in difference. It is not only a moral duty, it is also a political and legal requirement.\textsuperscript{72}
\end{quote}

Moreover, tolerance came to be understood as “an active attitude” and a “fundamental value”\textsuperscript{73} as well as a “behaviour.”\textsuperscript{74} Those that were deemed to be engaging in conflict have thus come to be understood to be displaying intolerance. These subjects are thus deemed to be lacking in the proper liberal attitudes, values, and behaviours. This point is further explored below. Tolerance also became understood as the basis for a culture of peace. As stated in one UNESCO declaration, “tolerance, the virtue that makes peace possible, contributes to the replacement of the culture of war by a culture of peace.”\textsuperscript{75}

This discourse of the need for ‘cultures of peace’ also came to prominence in the mid-1990s, and came to be defined in particular ways. The United Nations declared 2000 the International Year for the Culture of Peace, and 2001-2010 the decade for the Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for Children. Consistent with the goals of peacebuilding, the discourse of a culture of peace emphasizes the “link between peace and development and


\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{75} UNESCO, \textit{Declaration of Principles of Tolerance}. 
the need for a culture of peace that can lead… to sustainable human development.”\textsuperscript{76}

There has been a common assertion that

to save future generations from the scourge of war requires a transformation towards a culture of peace, which consists of values, attitudes and behaviours that reflect and inspire social interaction and sharing based on the principles of freedom, justice and democracy, all human rights, tolerance and solidarity…\textsuperscript{77}

Again, as with the discourse of tolerance, the ‘problem’ of conflict is located in the attitudes, values and behaviours of the individual subjects in targeted populations. Activities such as peacebuilding thus came to endeavour to seek “transition from the values, attitudes and behaviours of the past, which often led to war, violence and social injustice, to those values, attitudes and behaviours that can make possible a future characterized by peace.”\textsuperscript{78} This problematization of the values, attitudes and behaviours of ‘foreign’ subjects sometimes takes the form of a psychological problematization.

Psychological problematizations of targeted populations most often locate the source of violence in the psyche of others. There has been, for example, an emerging sub-field within psychology of ‘peace psychology,’ along with several journals related to the field, as well as organisations such as the Committee for the Psychological Study of Peace. A recent special issue of \textit{Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology}, focused on the contributions of psychology to building Cultures of Peace. Abelardo Brenes and Michael Wessells’ introduction to the issue argues for the contributions that psychology can make for building such cultures. The authors state, for example, that:

Democratization is a psychological as well as political task because it entails building attitudes, values and social psychological processes conducive to participatory, collective decision making and nonviolent transitions of elected leaders. Similarly, respect for human rights entails healing the wounds of past injustices, and psychologists have a wealth of expertise pertinent to healing.  

In the same issue, Daniel Mayton argues that "whether or not individuals behave in nonviolent ways... depends to some degree on their personal values, beliefs, cognitive make-ups, and other personal characteristics." According to this author, the "cognitive factors" that are predictors of violent behaviour "include stereotopic distortion, selective attention and memory, and compartmentalized thinking." Such assertions problematize 'foreign' subjects as psychologically impaired, and thus locate the 'problem' of violence "in the minds of men." This focus on the psyche of others is one extension of the problematization of the values, attitudes, and behaviour of the 'foreign' subjects targeted by peacebuilding.

Peacebuilding, and development in general in the 1990s and beyond, both responds to and reproduces such problematizations of the subjects of targeted populations. As Duffield has argued:

> In less than a generation, the whole meaning of development has altered significantly... Today, it is better described as an attempt, preferably through cooperative partnership arrangements, to change whole societies and the behaviour and attitudes of the people within them...

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81 Ibid, 148.
82 This phrasing comes from UNESCO's constitution, which states that "since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed." Quoted in United Nations, Culture of Peace: A Declaration on a Culture of Peace.
83 Duffield, Global Governance: 42.
There are several examples of this behavioural problematization of those targeted by Canadian peacebuilding, and peacebuilding similarly attempts to affect attitudes, such as the need to "rebuild democratic attitudes." Peacebuilding, and development in general "has increasingly come to resemble a series of projects and strategies to change indigenous values and modes of organisation and replace them with liberal ones." While these arrangements certainly draw on foreign policy practices before the end of the cold war, such practices and representations are novel in that the external object that is understood as the 'problem' of foreign policy is not so much an entire population or a set of national policies or economies (as in the case of Structural Adjustment Programs), but the individual 'foreign' subjects in targeted populations. With the end of the cold war, the objects requiring modernizing and liberal transformation are more often deemed to be individuals than national policies and economies, although these problematizations also certainly remain. Duffield has noted that with the end of the cold war, the transformation of 'foreign' subjects became an overt goal of development. He notes that:

> development has always has as its aim the modernization and transformation of the societies that it encounters... [yet] until the mid-1990s the transformational aim of official development policy was usually regarded as a natural outcome of development policy... the incorporation of conflict into mainstream development policy has significantly changed this order of priorities... effecting social transformation is now a direct and explicit policy aim.\(^{86}\)

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\(^{85}\) Duffield. Global Governance: 42.

\(^{86}\) Ibid. 39.
With the end of the cold war, programs such as peacebuilding came to prominence within Canadian foreign policy, and became directly and overtly aimed at effecting social transformation, and moreover, the transformation of the values, attitudes, behaviours, and even the psyches of individual ‘foreign’ subjects in targeted populations.

This attempt of peacebuilding to transform the values, attitudes and behaviours of ‘foreign’ subjects is both reliant upon and reproductive of certain problematizations of these individuals. Such problematizations locate the ‘problem’ of conflict in the disorderly and illiberal behaviour, attitudes, values, and psyches of those individuals it understands as violent. In this sense post-cold war Canadian foreign policy, and peacebuilding in particular, problematizes its foreign others - its targets - as subjects lacking in (liberal) values, attitudes, and behaviours.

**Conclusion**

The ‘end of the cold war’ has seen a rupture in the particular ways in which others are represented and dealt with as foreign policy ‘problems,’ yet these practices of othering remain. In Canadian foreign policy, several discourses related to the problematization of others as violent have emerged. These have included the discourses of a rise in civil conflict with the end of the cold war due to ‘ethnic strife,’ poverty, and ‘underdevelopment.’ Further, such conflicts have come to be deemed dangerous, and a security risk to ‘Canadians.’ Such ideas are relied upon and reproduced through the assemblage of peacebuilding, a novel post-cold war Canadian foreign policy. Additionally, the practices of foreign policy have come to locate the ‘problem’ of such
conflict in the values, attitudes, and behaviours of individual ‘foreign’ subjects. Canadian foreign policy has thus problematized the ‘illiberal’ values, attitudes, and behaviours of those ‘foreign’ subjects as intolerant, lacking a culture of peace, disorderly and prone to violence, undemocratic, and even, at times, psychologically impaired. This location of the ‘problem’ of violence abroad in individual ‘foreign’ subjects will be related to the subjectification of ‘Canadians’ in the following chapter by exploring the ways in which ‘Canadians’ are enjoined to understand and conduct themselves differently than these others: as good liberal subjects, able to self-govern due to their values and the ways in which they are understood as peaceful, orderly and tolerant.
Chapter Four

Governance and ‘Canadian’ Subjectivity

This chapter explores the ways in which post-cold war Canadian foreign policy is implicated in formation of ‘Canadian’ subjectivity, and in the governance of ‘Canadians.’ While the last chapter explored the ways in which ‘foreign’ subjects have become a ‘problem’ for Canadian foreign policy and peacebuilding in particular ways, this chapter will explore how the problematization of others relates to ‘Canadian’ subjectivity.

Foreign policy, however, should not be understood solely as a technology in the governance of ‘Canadians’ to the exclusion of conceptualizing Canadian foreign policy as a technology in the governance of ‘foreign’ subjects. As such, the first section of this chapter explores the ways in which ‘foreign’ subjects are governed at a distance in both spatial and constitutional senses. The following section of the chapter constitutes a theoretical argument concerning the ways in which the autonomous, self-governing individuals desired by liberal governance are defined in relation to others who are deemed incapable of self-governance to varying degrees. Next, the chapter turns to an examination of the discourses of ‘Canadian values and culture’ in foreign policy, which define idealized ‘Canadians’ and ‘Canada’ in largely inverse terms to the problematization of ‘foreign’ subjects. Thus, in all of the ways in which the values, attitudes and behaviours of ‘foreign’ subjects are deemed to be problematic, ‘Canada’ and ‘Canadians’ are understood as having those very values that ‘they’ are lacking. The following section considers how both the practices of post-cold war ‘Canadian’ foreign policy and the discourses of ‘Canadian values’ are implicated in the (attempted)
formation of ‘Canadian’ subjectivity, in order to enjoins ‘Canadians’ to understand and
conduct themselves as liberal, autonomous, and self-governing subjects. The final
section of the chapter turns to a consideration of instances of resistances to these
practices, and the ways in which paying attention to such resistances is integral to
critique.

‘Foreign’ Subjects and Limited Government at a Distance

It is important to consider not only the relation of foreign policy to ‘Canadian’
subjectivity and governance, but also to the governance of those that peacebuilding
targets. Although the purpose of this thesis is to dispute the idea that foreign policy is
solely an ‘outward’ practice through a consideration of ‘Canadian’ subjectivity, this does
not mean that foreign policy is not also implicated in the governance of ‘foreign’
subjects. Thus, this section explores the ways in which peacebuilding and foreign policy
are implicated in the governance of others at a distance, before moving on to an analysis
of ‘Canadian’ subjectivity.

Liberal rule, according to Nikolas Rose, is characterized by ‘government at a
distance’ in “both constitutional and spatial senses.”1 The spatial sense of government at
a distance, of course, means that programs of government operate at a physical distance.
The constitutional sense of government at a distance means that self-governance is
preferred to coercive measures. Liberal government, then, can be understood primarily
as the conduct of conduct, rather than rule by force, as explored in the second chapter of

1 Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999: 49.
this thesis. Peacebuilding, and foreign policy in general, can be understood as a form of limited government at a distance of the ‘foreign’ subjects of targeted populations.

Peacebuilding can certainly be understood as government at a distance in the spatial sense that Rose emphasizes. In terms of spatial distance, peacebuilding is a ‘national’ (foreign) policy aimed at the governance of others. According to the Peacebuilding Census, the vast majority of peacebuilding activities are carried out in Africa, Latin America, Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, i.e. not in Canada. Yet peacebuilding can also be understood as government at a distance in the constitutional sense.

Peacebuilding can also be considered a form of government at a distance in constitutional terms since those subjects targeted by peacebuilding are enjoined to self-govern, although it is a limited form of government at a distance since they are not fully trusted to do so. Additionally, it can be thought of as government at a distance in its focus on ‘partnership.’ As explored above, Canadian non-governmental organisations have become important and authoritative actors in peacebuilding. Yet it is not only Canadian non-governmental organisations, but also those ‘abroad’ that have become instrumental in peacebuilding through arrangements of ‘partnerships’ between such organizations. So, while in the past development projects had often been carried out by Canadian NGOs, in the present these same NGOs more often form ‘partnerships’ with NGOs in the ‘South.’ As such, there are increasing incidents wherein project funds are

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funnelled from CIDA to Canadian NGOs, and finally to NGOs abroad who carry out
‘development’ activities. The goal has thus increasingly become for ‘foreign’ subjects to
carry out their own ‘development’ activities. Such arrangements are rationalized in at
least two related ways: first, they are understood as more effective and efficient; and
secondly, they are part of a broader rationale of the need for those in targeted populations
to learn to be responsible for themselves – to become (liberal) autonomous subjects.

The first point, that ‘partnership’ is more efficient and effective than previous
development activities that were carried out by Canadian state agencies and NGOs, is
reflected in DFAIT’s Strategic Framework for peacebuilding. The Framework states
that “peacebuilding projects should aim, wherever possible, to support and strengthen
locally-generated peacebuilding initiatives so as to make them more effective and
sustainable.”4 In similar terms, CIDA states: “What we know: Imposing conditions
usually does not build sustainable peace... Imposing peace rarely works – local
ownership is critical.”5 Thus, the need for ‘partners’ among targeted populations is part
of a rationale of ‘effectiveness,’ because the ‘imposition’ of development activities
‘rarely works.’ Yet such assertions also form part of broader discourse related to the
need for targeted populations to become responsible for themselves. This is reflected in
DFAIT’s definition of peacebuilding, which states that “the overarching goal of
peacebuilding is to enhance the indigenous capacity of a society to manage conflict

4 Such ‘partnerships’ can be put into the context of the history of unequal North-South relations. See Laura
Macdonald, “Unequal Partnerships: The Politics of Canada’s Relations with the Third World,” in Studies in
Political Economy, no. 57 (Summer 1995): 111 - 141.
5 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, The Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative Strategic
without violence.”

It is also stated in similar terms in many other definitions of peacebuilding, including that of the CPCC. Various NGOs also use the language of a need for ‘foreign’ subjects to self-manage and become responsible (liberal) subjects. For example, the stated goal of the Canadian Catholic Organisation for Development and Peace (CCOPD) is “to encourage Canadians – individually and through government – to support initiatives by Third World peoples to take control of their lives.” Ultimately, such ‘societies’ are responsible for maintaining their own peace, through the transformation of their values, attitudes and behaviours. They are enjoined to self-govern - and peacebuilding aims merely to strengthen their ‘indigenous capacity’ to do so.

As Duffield has argued, “liberal global governance,” which would include much of Canadian foreign policy and peacebuilding in particular, “is not an imperial form of power. It is not based upon coercion but on the liberal principles of cooperation and partnership.” Indeed, foreign policy and peacebuilding are not (or, no longer) solely practiced as forms of sovereign or repressive power, but are more often marked by governmental power, which enjoins humans to live certain forms of lives, or, in the language of peacebuilding, to display certain values, attitudes and behaviours. They are further enjoined to conduct themselves in particular ways deemed consistent with self-governance. This is particularly visible given the focus of such programs on the values

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7 The CPCC’s definition states that “the overarching goal of peacebuilding is to strengthen the capacity of societies to manage conflict without violence...” in *The Peacebuilding Activities Chart*, www.cpcu.ottawa.on.ca/chart-e.htm.
and behaviours of ‘foreign’ subjects. Peacebuilding, as the conduct of conduct, can clearly be understood to be a form of (liberal) government at a distance in the constitutional terms set out by Rose above. Yet ‘foreign’ subjects are certainly not fully trusted to self-govern: this is a qualified government at a distance. Instead, ‘they’ are marked as not yet able to be autonomous self-governing subjects, yet they have the potential for such self-governance. Because they are not fully trusted to self-govern, they are thought to need education, monitoring, and, at times, authoritarian interventions, including the use of the military.

Given that ‘foreign’ subjects are not fully trusted to self-govern, education then becomes one of the central ways in which ‘foreign’ subjects can be moved towards self-governance, both in the sense of actual activities of education, and in the broader sense of the aim of transforming of such ‘societies.’ Education, of course, was central to colonial rule, and can thus be thought of as an imperial or authoritative aspect of governance.\(^\text{10}\) With a little education, the logic goes, ‘they’ may be able to move towards becoming autonomous and self-governing individuals. ‘They’ are thus understood to be in need of an education in peace: an education which can be provided by ‘Canadians.’ For instance, this has become an activity within peacebuilding: one of the activities listed under ‘Social Reconstruction’ on the Peacebuilding Activities Chart is ‘peace education.’\(^\text{11}\) There is also the broader sense of education as teaching ‘them’ how to change their values, attitudes, and behaviours, as discussed in the third chapter of this thesis. As Cristina

Rojas has observed, in the post-cold war era, aid has become “a relationship of tutorship between donor and recipient.” That Canadian foreign policy, and peacebuilding in particular, now aims at the transformation of values, attitudes, and behaviours of the subjects of targeted populations is exemplary of this broader meaning of tutelage. Furthermore, it is evidence of the limits to the trust in the capacity for targeted populations to self-govern.

There are also limits to the trust placed with targeted populations to know their own ‘problem.’ The belief in ‘their’ ability to self-govern is not extended as far as self-monitoring, since the activities of monitoring for the signs of conflict (as outlined in Chapter Three in the section on ‘prevention’) are not conceived to be effectively accomplished in ‘partnership.’ As such, ‘Early Warning’ including ‘intelligence and monitoring’ appear prominently as potential activities on the aforementioned Peacebuilding Activities Chart. While subjects of targeted populations are enjoined to self-govern and become self-sufficient through particular transformations of their values, attitudes, and behaviours, they are not trusted to self-surveillance.

Post-cold war ‘Canadian’ foreign policy that addresses the ‘problem’ of violent conflict abroad can also take on openly authoritarian aspects. One DFAIT document states, for example, that:

> There can be no doubt that preventive, non-coercive action is always the preferable approach to averting conflict. However, where

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13 See, for example, Ryan Grist’s article, “More than Eunuchs at the Orgy: Observation and Monitoring Reconsidered,” in International Peacekeeping, vol. 8, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 61.
14 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Peacebuilding Activities Chart.
humanitarian crises occur – or threaten to occur – they constitute profound threats to people and demand an effective international response... the ability of the international community to use all tools at its disposal – from political engagement to military action – is an integral, if controversial, element of human security.\(^{15}\)

The use of military power is one of the classic examples of the exercise of sovereign power (i.e. power over death). This quote clearly illustrates how aiding ‘foreign’ subjects in governing themselves through, for example, peacebuilding and other ‘preventive’ measures has its limits. When these limits are understood to be reached, military intervention – either in the form of peacekeeping or of NATO intervention, as in Kosovo – are deemed appropriate measures. This illustration of the ways in which authoritarian measures, which exercise sovereign power such as military actions, occur when ‘foreign’ subjects are deemed neither capable of self-governing, nor trusted to be aided in this self-governance.

In summary, while ‘foreign’ subjects are enjoined to become autonomous and self-governing, ‘they’ are also considered to be in need of assistance to achieve this ability for autonomous self-governance. These subjects are thus understood as not yet, but potentially autonomous self-governing individuals. As stated by Rojas, “unlike force which is directed toward a population which is perceived as unable to reform, aid is administered by the promise of transforming the recipient into a liberal subject.”\(^{16}\) As such, ‘foreign’ subjects are understood as potential liberal subjects, who have the capacity to learn to be autonomous through the practices of Canadian foreign policy.

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\(^{16}\) Rojas, “Aid and Global Governance,” 1.
Thus peacebuilding can be understood as a form of limited liberal government at a distance in the constitutional sense. As such, foreign policy and peacebuilding can be understood as ‘outward’ practices implicated in the governance of others. Yet, it is also important to relate the governance of ‘foreign’ subjects to ‘Canadian’ subjectivity and the governance of ‘Canadians.’

**Subjectivity and Others**

While those working within a governmentality approach have not paid sustained attention to the constitution of selves through others, Foucault’s earlier work focused on just these issues. For example, in *Madness and Civilisation*, Foucault studies how the constitution of the ‘insane’ also indirectly constitutes the ‘sane.’¹⁷ Nikolas Rose has observed that “in identifying with one’s proper name as a subject, one is simultaneously identifying oneself with a collectivized identity, and differentiating oneself from the kind of being one is not.”¹⁸ Still, such observations are rarely considered in depth within the broader governmentality literature. One notable exception is the very recent work of Mitchell Dean.

In the article “Liberal Government and Authoritarianism,” Dean takes as his departure point the relation between liberalism and authoritarianism, which has also been explored recently by Marianna Valverde and Barry Hindess. It must be stressed that ‘authoritarianism’ here does not refer to ‘authoritarian’ states, but to the facets of liberal governance that can be considered despotic. In “‘Despotism’ and Ethical Liberal

Governance” Valverde argues that liberal and illiberal modes of governance co-exist. She theorizes this co-existence at the individual level, by looking at how “the paradigmatic liberal subject often continues to govern his ‘passions’ through non-liberal means even as both he and his authorities seek to maximize self-governance.”\(^{19}\) For example, the liberal virtue of self-governance in the form of self-control over, say, ‘alcoholism’ or any ‘addiction,’ also involves the exercise of a certain repressive or despotic power over oneself. “Despotism over others is un-liberal, but despotism over oneself is part of the content of liberty” and the liberal governance of oneself.\(^{20}\) In a similar fashion, Barry Hindess has argued that the ‘liberal government of unfreedom’ is a necessary feature of the commitment to individual liberty in liberalism.\(^{21}\) In this sense, both of these authors argue that “the liberal governmental use of authoritarian measures is a necessary component of the liberal attempt to govern free individuals.”\(^{22}\)

Dean moves his analysis of the relation between liberal governance and authoritarianism to a different level by considering how “authoritarian measures follow not simply from the liberal government of free persons, but also from the liberal understanding of the sphere of government itself.”\(^{23}\) Spheres of government categorize individuals differently according to the capacity for autonomous self-governance that they are deemed to exhibit. Thus, Dean outlines how individuals are roughly separated into five groups according to their capacity for autonomy. These groupings can be

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19 Mariana Valverde, “‘Despotism’ and Ethical Liberal Governance,” in *Economy and Society*, vol. 25, no. 3 (August 1996): 357.
20 Ibid. 365.
understood as a theoretical nuancing of the division of subjects between 'targeted populations' (the at risk, the high risk, the marginal) and 'active citizens.' Moreover, they are fluid and can change over time. Dean presents the following typology:

**Group A:** "those who have attained capacities for autonomy, including the practice of exercising 'ethical despotism' upon themselves where necessary"

**Group B:** "those who need assistance to maintain capacities for autonomy" such as the unemployed who are "the 'job ready'"

**Group C:** "those who are potentially capable of exercising liberal autonomy but who are yet to be trained in the habits and capacities to do so."

**Group D:** "those who, having reached maturity of age, are for one reason or another not yet or no longer able to exercise their own autonomy or act in their own best interest"

**Group E:** "those who disrupt... those who are criminally delinquent or dedicated to the destruction of the state"\(^{24}\)

Again, these groups are defined by the capacity for autonomy that the individuals belonging to them are understood to exhibit, and to what degree they are thus enjoined to self-govern, or the require authoritarian intervention. Those in Group A, given their full capacity for autonomy, are considered self-governing even if this means exercising a certain despotism over themselves. The others are subjected to different degrees of self-governance and coercive measures. These might be, for example, training programs for the 'job ready' of Group B, philanthropy or workfare for those in Group C or D, right down to incarceration (in various forms of institutions: prisons, mental health facilities, etc.) for the delinquents and deviants of Group E. Contrary to most studies of government, for Dean these supposedly 'illiberal' coercive measures – not just those measures aimed at government at a distance and fostering self-governance - are a part of

\(^{23}\) Ibid.

\(^{24}\) Ibid. 48.
liberal rule. This is because these groups are defined in relation to each other. While those among Group A (and their capacity for autonomy) are considered the norm to which all those belonging to other groups are an exception, instead they are knowable only in relation to those other groups (and their relative incapacity for autonomy). So, while the autonomous individual of Group A is considered the norm to which others are aberrations, instead we can look at how these subjects are knowable and ‘made up’ only through these others: the norm is knowable only through its exceptions. As Dean states:

The liberal norm of the autonomous individual is a figure carved out of the substantive forms of life that are known only through these exceptions, e.g. insufficient education, poor character, welfare dependency, statelessness, underdeveloped human capital, absence of spirit of improvement, lack of social capital, etc. Moreover, this construction of the norm through the diagnosis and treatment of its exception is possible only on the basis of rationalities of government drawing upon the human sciences and associated practices of normalization. 25

So, those who are understood to be able to self-govern, to be autonomous, are knowable only through their relation to those deemed to be requiring intervention or authoritarian practices of government – and these are all a features of liberal government. As Dean states: “The specification of the autonomous subject of liberalism is only possible given a knowledge of [other] populations, personalities and forms of life…” 26 This separation of subjects according to their capacity for autonomy enacted through liberal governance can also be understood in terms of foreign policy, wherein the representation and governance of others is implicated in the process of the subjectification and governance of ‘Canadians.’

25 Ibid. 49.
26 Ibid. 56.
Dean makes some limited attempts to apply this framework to the international sphere. He places “the vast majority of those living in developing countries” within Group D: those who are deemed to be unable to exercise their own autonomy or act in their own best interests.\textsuperscript{27} Dean also analogizes coercive colonial governmentality, which placed those deemed incapable of spontaneous improvement under the dominion of colonialists, or ‘good despots’ in J.S. Mill’s words, to structural adjustment programs and developmentalism in general.\textsuperscript{28} Yet Dean’s analysis of the international sphere (and of the ‘domestic’ or ‘national’ sphere within this context) remains limited. It is possible, however, to consider how the practices of foreign policy are one way in which such groups are constituted on an international (as well as ‘national’) level. The following relates Dean’s account of the division of people according to their perceived capacity for autonomy within liberalism, to the separation of, and relation between different subjects in Canadian foreign policy. To this point, I have illustrated how ‘foreign’ subjects are represented and governed. The following section explores how ‘Canadians’ are idealized within Canadian foreign policy through discourses of ‘Canadian values’ and ‘Canadian culture’ in ways that enjoin them to understand and conduct themselves differently than ‘foreign’ subjects: as autonomous liberal subjects.

**Discourses of ‘Canadian Values’**

Discourses of ‘Canadian values,’ which became especially prevalent during the mid-1990s, enjoin ‘Canadians’ to understand and conduct themselves as autonomous

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid. 48.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
subjects capable of self-governance, or, as those within Dean’s Group A. Elsewhere, Dean has noted the importance of examining discourses of ‘values.’ Technologies and techniques of government, such as the instruments of foreign policy, should not be considered to be based in ‘values’ ‘rather than viewing regimes of practices [such as foreign policy] as expressions of values it is important to question how ‘values’ function in various governmental rationalities.’ Discourses of Canadian values are not limited to state-produced documents, and have appeared in academic analysis of Canadian foreign policy, as well as among non-governmental organisations. In 1995 and again in 1999 the Department of Foreign Affairs set forth three foreign policy objectives in the central document guiding state action in foreign policy, Canada in the World. These included “The promotion of prosperity and employment; The protection of our security, within a stable global framework; and The projection of Canadian values and culture abroad.”

It is interesting to note that discourses of ‘Canadian values’ are elastic and can include a range of statements. For instance, in Canada in the World, there is no coherent definition of ‘Canadian values’ or ‘Canadian culture.’ Instead there are several broad statements, such as:

Only Canadian culture can express the uniqueness of our country, which is bilingual, multicultural, and deeply influenced by its Aboriginal roots, the North, the oceans, and its own vastness.

More often these statements take the form of a list of ‘our’ positive attributes which are stated to be commonly shared by the whole of the ‘Canadian nation’:

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30 For an example from a non-governmental involved in foreign policy, see the Council of Canadians Website: www.canadians.org. Academic examples are addressed below.
Canadians are confident in their values... [which] are rooted in a commitment to tolerance, democracy, equity and human rights, to the peaceful resolution of differences and to sustainable development...  

Such statements generally centre on three themes. The first theme is that of tolerance for difference, diversity, and multiculturalism. Second, the theme of the values of altruism and humanitarianism are often articulated. Finally, the valuing of the rule of law and a respect for order are regularly deemed an essential ‘Canadian value.’ The value of peacefullness is also articulated with regularity. The articulation of these ‘values’ is present not only in official policy documents, but also in public pronouncements. In a 1995 speech on foreign policy, Jean Chrétien spoke on the theme of ‘Canadian values:’

Canadian values mean that we work to balance tolerance with order, diversity with unity, freedom with fair play. The people of Canada are very proud of our honourable tradition in international affairs. They know that this tradition is one of the things that defines us as a nation and a people. It is one of the things that makes us the best country in the world to live in. You don’t have to accept my word for it. Poll after poll shows that the vast majority of Canadians in every part of the country agree: Canada is the best!

Here, foreign policy is characterised as ‘ôurs.’ ‘We Canadians’ are understood to already have pride in ‘our’ foreign policy, while ‘we’ are simultaneously enjoined to take pride in the honour of ‘our’ conduct overseas. Moreover, this honourable tradition that ‘we’ are enjoined to take pride in stems from ‘our’ ‘Canadian values’ of tolerance/multiculturalism, humanitarianism, and order and the rule of law. To return to Dean’s point, “claims to be operating in the service of ‘values’ must be scrutinized as

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components of the rhetorical practice of government and as part of different forms of governmental and political reason.\textsuperscript{35} The practice of foreign policy – including the texts and statements above - can be understood to enjoin those constituted as ‘Canadians’ to understand themselves as ‘Canadians’ defined in part by an honourable tradition in international affairs, yet moreover for their capacity for tolerance, humanitarianism, orderliness, and peacefulness.

Such discourses are also (re)produced among Canadian foreign policy ‘experts’ and academics. First, it is important to note that in terms of foreign policy, the domains of the state and the academy are very much mixed. In a recent article published in \textit{International Journal}, written by Joe Clark, ‘Canadian values’ are stated to be twofold: “One is the notion of community, which implies difference and identity, and the other is the need for rules that reach across difference to allow common standards.”\textsuperscript{36} Here, Clark articulates a tension between two of the ‘Canadian values’ outlined above: tolerance for diversity and multiculturalism, on the one hand, and order and the rule of law on the other. Perhaps, for Clark, too much difference is a dangerous or disorderly thing.

Cranford Pratt has also argued that ‘Canadian ethical values’ that were rooted in strong domestic welfare programs led to a “Canadian public philosophy” in support of the varying levels of foreign aid.\textsuperscript{37} As discussed in Chapter One, several theorists working from a liberal internationalist perspective also speak of ‘Canadian values.’ For example, Alain Noël and Jean-Philippe Thérien assert a causal relationship between welfare

\textsuperscript{35} Dean, \textit{Governmentality}: 34.
institutions and foreign aid by giving importance to the "power of [domestic] values and principles." For Noël and Thérien, "a state that is generous toward its own citizens would naturally tend to be generous toward developing countries." Here, 'Canadian values' are understood to be unproblematically philanthropic. These are examples of the ways in which discourses of 'Canadian values' are taken up not only by DFAIT, but also by foreign policy experts and those in the academy. Similar statements as to the nature of 'Canadian values' are also found in The Northern Edge, written by Thomas D'Aquino and David Stewart-Paterson, two executives working for the Business Council on National Issues (BCNI). They claim "fairness, sharing, generosity, and tolerance" as "core Canadian values" and "winning attitudes" that must be fostered for 'our' success. They further assert that "Canadians reflect exemplary values" and that our actions abroad show that "we have been a force for peace in a world of conflict."

There are several ways in which such discourses are striking. First, there is a coherence attributed to 'Canada' and the values of 'Canadians.' Ironically, such utterances, while often emphasizing tolerance for difference and multiculturalism as 'Canadian values' make no allowance for the idea that there may be differences in the values of those it understands as 'Canadians.' So, while stressing diversity on the one

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41 Ibid.: 259.
hand, such discourses also attribute an essentialized sameness and coherence to the whole of the ‘Canadian’ nation.

What is perhaps most remarkable about these discourses of ‘Canadian’ values is the rather obvious relation that they share with the problematization of others. Just as the values, attitudes, and behaviours of certain ‘foreign’ subjects are problematized, the values of ‘Canadians’ are inversely stated and celebrated. As discussed in the previous chapter, post-cold war Canadian foreign policy, and peacebuilding in particular, targets ‘foreign’ subjects in specific ways. There are some central ways in which the values, attitudes, and behaviours of these others are problematized. First, ‘they’ are understood as prone to conflict or as violent. ‘Canadian values’ on the other hand, include orderliness and “the peaceful resolution of differences.”42 While ‘they’ are understood to be engaging in, or at risk of engaging in, conflict due to ‘ethnic strife’ and ethnic intolerance, ‘Canadians’ are marked by the values of tolerance, “multiculturalism and a respect for diversity.”43 While ‘they’ are marked by a need for ‘good governance’ and “democratic development,”44 ‘Canadian values’ are stated to include “democracy... order and the rule of law.”45 Even “sustainable development” has been stated as a ‘Canadian value,’ while others are problematized as requiring development.46 Finally, while ‘they’ are understood to require humanitarian and other intervention, ‘Canadian values’ apparently include “sharing” and “generosity”47 as well as “humanitarianism.”48 In

43 Ibid.
44 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, et. al., Peacebuilding Activities Chart.
46 Ibid.
47 D’Aquino and Stewart-Paterson: 22.
summary, in all of the ways in which the values, attitudes and behaviours of 'foreign' subjects are deemed to be problematic, 'Canadians' and 'Canada' are understood as having those very values that 'they' are lacking.

This understanding of 'foreign' subjects as lacking the values that 'Canadians' hold is important in at least two ways. First, it provides the rationale for promoting these values abroad. The third pillar of Canadian foreign policy is thus, as discussed above, "Projecting Canadian Values and Culture Abroad" in addition to security and prosperity. In *Canada in the World* it is stated that "Canadians hold deeply that we must pursue our values internationally. They want to promote them for their own sake, but they also understand that our values and rights will not be safeguarded if they are not enshrined throughout the international environment." The projection of these values, for example as in peacebuilding, is then understood to be in 'Canadian' security interests, in keeping with the merging of development and security, but is also understood as a moral duty, as a good unto itself, since the virtues of the 'values' that 'Canadians' purportedly hold are not questioned. This inverse relation between the problematization of the values, attitudes, and behaviours of 'foreign' subjects and discourses of 'Canadian values' is important in the subjectification and governance of 'Canadians.' This is further explored in the following section.

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49 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Projecting Canadian Values and Culture," in *Canada in the World* 1.
Defining ‘Canadian’ Selves

Through both the practices of foreign policy that problematize ‘foreign’ subjects as not yet capable of self-governance, and the discourses of ‘Canadian values’ that idealize ‘Canadian’ subjects, ‘Canadians’ are enjoined to understand themselves in particular ways such that they are enjoined to self-govern. These ways in which ‘Canadians’ are enjoined to identify are consistent with Dean’s Group A: as those who have attained capacities for autonomy. Yet autonomous and responsible subjects are knowable only through their exceptions: through those deemed incapable of autonomy to varying degrees. The ‘foreign’ subjects of foreign policy – those deemed incapable of managing their own risks of conflict without descending into violence due to their intolerance, poverty, ‘underdevelopment,’ etc., are just the ‘exceptions’ against which ‘Canadians’ are enjoined to define themselves in foreign policy.

The definition of ‘Western’ selves in relation to colonial others is, of course, not new. Ann Laura Stoller has argued that in the 19th century, colonial powers “defined their unique civilities through a language of difference that drew on images of racial purity and sexual virtue. That language of difference conjured up the supposed moral bankruptcy of culturally dissonant populations, distinguishing them from the interests of those who ruled.”50 Such studies, located in Foucauldian and post-colonial scholarship, have examined the relation between ‘Western’ identities and colonial others in terms of imperial relations. Yet it is also possible to understand these relations in the

contemporary era as marked not only by coercive or authoritarian relations, but in terms of a liberal governmental relation.

Those in Dean’s Group A, or ‘Canadians’ in this case, are deemed the ‘norm’ of self-governing subjects, and are defined against and in relation to each of the other groups of individuals who are deemed to be incapable of autonomy to various degrees. In an imperial relation, ‘foreign’ subjects would be defined in as those in Group D: “those who, having reached maturity of age, are for one reason or another not yet or no longer able to exercise their own autonomy or act in their own best interest” or those in Group E: “those who disrupt… those who are criminally delinquent or dedicated to the destruction of the state.”51 Such groups are thought to be incapable of self-governance, and therefore require the application of coercive or authoritarian government. Although Dean places “the vast majority of those living in developing countries”52 in Group D, it is important to recall the ways in which targeted populations, beginning in the post-cold war era, and especially in the mid-1990s, became defined as potentially self-governing. Such ‘populations’ are enjoined to transform themselves into autonomous liberal subjects, yet since they are deemed to lack the capacity to be fully autonomous and self-governing, ‘education’ aimed at transformation, monitoring, and, at times, coercive measures are applied through programs such as peacebuilding and peacekeeping. The new others of foreign policy might therefore more aptly be described as categorized as Group C: “those who are potentially capable of exercising liberal autonomy but who are yet to be trained

52 Ibid.
in the habits and capacities to do so."\(^{53}\) The point here is that ‘Canadian’ subjectification does not rely on imperial relations, but can also be thought of within liberal relations. In any case, foreign policy enjoins ‘Canadians’ to define themselves against ‘foreign’ others who are problematized as less capable of self-governance than ‘Canadians,’ while ‘Canadians’ are idealized as autonomous self-governing subjects managing their own risks of intolerance, conflict, and disorderliness.

The formation of ‘Canadian’ subjectivity, and of a coherent ‘national’ or ‘domestic’ ‘population’ through foreign policy is not solely in the interests of the sovereignty of the Canadian state or of the exercise of sovereign power. The subjectification of ‘Canadians’ is not merely an instance of creating a coherent ‘national’ or ‘domestic’ body for the purpose of reproducing the legitimacy of the state and state sovereignty. Instead, we can think of the subjectification of ‘Canadians’ through the problematization of ‘foreign’ others as a form of governmental power since it attempts to encourage certain forms of life: those deemed liberal, autonomous and self-governing. Foreign policy is a means to have ‘Canadians’ self-govern by enjoining them to understand and conduct themselves as idealized ‘Canadians’ as part of a noble ‘nation’ of liberal and autonomous subjects, unlike those ‘foreign’ subjects who are not yet capable of self-governance.

Yet not all ‘Canadians’ live up to the standards of ‘Canadian values’ as set forth by foreign policy. ‘Canadians’ too, are categorized according to whether they are thought to be able to self-govern. In other words, not all ‘Canadians’ are understood to be already living up to their potential to be liberal, autonomous, self-governing subjects.

\(^{53}\) Ibid.
while others are deemed to not even possess this potential. Rather, ‘Canadians’ are enjoined to live up to these expectations through the discourses and practices of foreign policy, among other technologies of government. Those ‘internal’ others in the ‘Canadian’ ‘nation’ who fail to self-govern (the unemployed, at risk youth, addicts, criminals, the welfare-dependent, the ‘insane,’ etc.), are failed ‘Canadian’ liberal autonomous subjects, and are thus deemed unable to self-govern. As such, they are subjected to varying degrees of coercive or authoritarian government. The subjectification of ‘Canadians’ through foreign policy is by no means a complete success, and these very failed ‘Canadian’ subjects point to the need for renewed efforts to enjoin ‘Canadians’ to understand and conduct themselves as liberal self-governing individuals through foreign policy, among other means. This lack of complete success is also evidenced in resistances to this process, especially through disruptions of the narratives of ‘Canada the good’ that are expressed in foreign policy.

Resistances and Critique

The idealized ‘Canadian’ subjectivity expressed in foreign policy is also met with resistance. As argued by Pat O’Malley, Lorna Weir, and Clifford Shearing, the governmentality approach has paid insufficient attention to contestation and resistance. They argue that governmentality tends to exteriorize resistance as “programmatic failure,” and because of this “the role accorded to contestation can only be a negative one of an obstacle to rule.”54 This lack of attention to resistance, and the resultant

conceptualisation of the practice of government as perfectly coherent is not, however, endemic to this approach. It is both possible and desirable to provide accounts of resistance.

Peacebuilding, and Canadian foreign policy in general, is neither univocal nor perfectly coherent, and there are examples of resistance relevant to the analysis provided above. Sandra Whitworth, for example, has provided an account of feminist resistance to the formulation of Canadian foreign policy.55 One example of resistance related to ‘Canadian’ subjectivity occurred at the World Conference on War-Affected Children, which took place in Winnipeg in September of 2000. The Conference was intended to focus on children in areas understood to be engaging in conflict (i.e. among targeted populations). Approximately 100 indigenous peoples, who had been defined as outside of the terms of the conference, gathered to protest the history of the on-going violence of Canadian institutions (including the state and churches) against Native peoples.56 This protest is an example of resistance that calls attention to the ways in which conflict and violence are currently defined in Canadian foreign policy, and creates ground for questioning the problematization of ‘others’ and the celebration of ‘Canada’ and ‘Canadianness.’ Such resistance disrupts celebratory narratives of ‘Canadian’ humanitarianism and a non-colonial history, such as that expressed by one NGO in the Peacebuilding Census that “Canada’s non-colonial past is an asset” in peacebuilding.57 This narrative was further disrupted when the NGO Peacemedia wrote a Special Report

titled “Canada’s War Against Indigenous Children,” which was distributed at the 2001 peacebuilding consultations. In the report, the authors draw attention to the ways in which narratives of ‘Canada the good’ ignore the on-going legacy of violence committed against Native peoples in Canada. Such forms of resistance are important in disrupting the problematization of others as violent and the idealization of ‘Canada’ and ‘Canadians’ as tolerant and peaceful that contributes to the formation of ‘Canadian’ subjectivity.

There is an important relation between theorizing resistance and providing an analysis that aims at critique. Paying attention to resistance sheds light on the contingency of truth regimes and forms of rule in the present, and opens possibilities for imagining other ways of being. Graham Burchell has stated that the study of government involves an understanding that:

what at any moment we are enjoined to think it is necessary to think, do and be, does not exhaust all the possibilities of existence or fix once and for all the limits of thought.\textsuperscript{58}

What are considered the limits of thought at any given moment, are contested by such resistances, and also through studies that focus on the contingency of any given regime of truth. Resistances contest these limits by suggesting alternatives in thought and thus in ways of being, and of being governed. Foucault defined critique in many ways at different times, one of which was in terms of a critical attitude, and as “the art of not


\textsuperscript{57} Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, et. al., Peacebuilding Census: 28.

being governed quite so much."\textsuperscript{59} It has been the aim of this project to critique the truth regime of post-cold war Canadian foreign policy and its relation to 'Canadian' subjectivity and the governance of others, in order to understand it as contingent. By thinking through these discourses and practices with a 'critical attitude,' it becomes possible to think through ways in which 'Canadian' and 'foreign' subjects might not be governed quite so much.

Conclusion

This thesis argues that Canadian foreign policy enjoins ‘Canadians’ to understand and conduct themselves as good liberal subjects: as peaceful, tolerant, orderly, and capable of autonomous self-governance. Post-cold war foreign policy has been theorized as productive of a regime of truth wherein ‘foreign’ subjects are ‘problems’ and ‘Canadians’ are ideal liberal subjects. The thesis thus traces the post-cold war history of discourses of a rise in violence and intrastate conflict, and practices of foreign policy that locate this ‘problem’ in the values, attitudes, behaviours, and even the psyches of ‘foreign’ subjects in targeted populations. Discourses of the virtues of ‘Canadian values and culture’ are also traced in order to illustrate the ways in which ‘Canadians’ are inversely idealized as peaceful, tolerant, orderly, and able to self-govern. Such discourses carve out ‘Canadian’ subjectivity from categorizations of others as unable to fully self-govern, and thus enjoin ‘Canadians’ to understand and conduct themselves as liberal, autonomous, and self-governing subjects. This thesis thus moves beyond understanding national subjectivities to be solely in the service of state sovereignty, and relates the governance of ‘foreign’ subjects to the governance of ‘Canadians’ in ways that move beyond locating programs of government exclusively in the ‘national’ sphere. Further, this thesis is aimed at providing a critique of this regime of truth in order to open up ways of thinking and being differently.

Chapter One of the thesis outlines the ways in which Canadian foreign policy analysis has largely understood foreign policy as an ‘outward’ practice responding to external problems, to the exclusion of critical analysis of the ways in which foreign
policy may be implicated the constitution of a ‘national’/‘domestic’ sphere and ‘national’/‘domestic’ identity or subjectivity. Many of the sources analyzed are also treated as incidents of discourse throughout the thesis, and particularly in the section outlining discourses of ‘Canadian values’ in Chapter Four.

The second chapter of the thesis explores theoretical perspectives that can aid in theorizing foreign policy not only as an ‘outward’ practice, but also as implicated in the subjectification and governance of ‘Canadians.’ Here, post-structuralist international relations theory, including analysis of (American) foreign policy, is examined in order to understand how foreign policy is implicated in the formation of ‘national’ identities or subjectivities through processes of othering. This thesis breaks with such approaches, however, by theorizing the importance of the formation of such subjectivities not only in terms of state sovereignty, but also in terms of the governance of these subjects. The chapter concludes with an examination of the ways in which foreign policy should not be considered solely the domain of the state, and consideration of the meaning of the ‘post-cold war.’

The third chapter of the thesis follows from the last one by exploring the particular ways in which targeted populations have been problematized in post-cold war Canadian foreign policy. The chapter pays particular attention to the rise of peacebuilding, which is theorized as an assemblage reliant upon, and reproductive of, specific ideas about targeted populations. These ideas center on problematizing others as violent, intolerant, and lacking in a culture of peace due to their ‘underdevelopment.’ In the post-cold war era, and particularly in the mid-1990s this ‘problem’ became
decreasingly located in ‘populations’ and national economies and societies, and increasingly located in the values, attitudes, and behaviours of individual ‘foreign’ subjects themselves. This categorization of others through foreign policy is related to ‘Canadian’ subjectivity in the fourth and final chapter of the thesis.

Yet the problematization of others through foreign policy should not be understood as implicated in the governance of ‘Canadians’ to the exclusion of theorizing the governance of ‘foreign’ subjects. Chapter Four thus begins with an examination of the ways in which ‘foreign’ subjects are not fully trusted to self-govern, and are therefore subjected to a limited form of government at a distance, and are thus surveilled, ‘educated,’ and, at times subjected to coercive measures such as military intervention. This chapter then explores the ways in which the problematization and governance of ‘foreign’ subjects is related to the subjectification and governance of ‘Canadians,’ in that ‘Canadians’ are enjoined to understand and conduct themselves as good liberal subjects, as peaceful, tolerant, and orderly, and, as such, capable of autonomous self-governance.

This thesis is intended to provide a contribution to various academic literatures. By theorizing foreign policy not merely as an ‘outward’ practice, this project moves beyond existing Canadian foreign policy analysis. This work also poses a challenge to post-structuralist international relations theorists, who have understood ‘national’ identities and subjectivities mainly in terms of sovereign statecraft, and not in terms of the exercise of governmental power. By theorizing the liberal government of ‘Canadians’ as a process involving not only ‘domestic’ practices, but also those of foreign policy that problematize and govern ‘foreign’ subjects, this project contributes to
emerging studies of governmentality in the international sphere. As such, the subjectification and governance of ‘Canadians’ should not be understood to exist in a vacuum, but can instead be related to those ‘foreign’ subjects and targeted populations that foreign policy ‘makes up’ and claims as its exterior ‘problems.’ Additionally, by looking at the relation between the governance of ‘foreign’ subjects, and the governance of ‘Canadians,’ this project challenges histories that bracket the West from its encounters with others. However, this thesis is not intended solely as a challenge to scholarly work, but is also intended as a critique of the truth regime of foreign policy.

The purpose of this project has been to study the regime of truth concerning what it is to be both ‘foreign’ and ‘Canadian’ subjects, and the ways in which this regime of truth is implicated in the governance of both ‘foreign’ and of ‘Canadian’ subjects. By aiming critique at a regime of truth, it is possible to think through the ways in which such truths are historically contingent and changeable. For, as advocated by Foucault, transforming the present is achieved not so much by destroying it, but “by grasping it in what it is.”¹ In exploring the historical contingency of the regime of truth that categorizes ‘foreign’ subjects and ‘Canadians’ inversely and governs them as such, this thesis is intended to open possibilities for thinking and being differently, and of not being governed quite so much.

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