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UMI
THE ROLE OF COGNITIVE, MOTIVATIONAL AND AFFECTIVE FACTORS IN INTERGROUP BEHAVIOUR: A STUDY OF OPPOSING BOSNIAN GROUPS

by

SANELA DURSUN, B.A.

A thesis submitted to
The Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
In partial fulfillment of
The requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Psychology

Carleton University,
Ottawa, Ontario
December 22
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Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
Acceptance of the thesis:

“The Role of Cognitive, Motivational and Affective Factors in Intergroup Behaviour: A Study of Opposing Bosnian Groups”

submitted by

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in Partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the degree of Master of Arts

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Carleton University
January, 1999
Abstract

The central premise of the present study concerned the motivational factors that mediate social identification with a nationalistic identity and the subsequent cognitive information processing biases, and expression of intergroup differentiation and discrimination. Consistent with past research, compared to outside "neutral" observers, partisan groups, Serbs and Muslims perceived the same newspaper articles describing the Bosnian conflict as biased in favor of the other group. Potential motivational factors for this were derived from Realistic Conflict Theory and Social Identity Theory. As predicted from Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory, regression analyses indicated that in-group identification was a consistent and powerful predictor of perceived bias, intergroup differentiation and discrimination. Furthermore, contrary to Realistic Conflict Theory, conflict proved to be only a very weak predictor of discrimination. The relationship among intergroup bias, differentiation and discrimination with collective self-esteem proved inconsistent suggesting that some modification may be required of the central role attributed to self-esteem in Social Identity Theory. Practical and theoretical implications for Social Identity Theory and intergroup processes were discussed.
Acknowledgements

I am grateful to my advisor Dr. Kim Matheson for her invaluable guidance and patience throughout this project, and for a very enriching and enjoyable learning experience.

I would also like to thank Dr. Lloyd Strickland for his support, ideas and contributions that added to this thesis. Many thanks to my committee members for their time, effort and suggestions.

Finally, all my love goes to Mirko Dursun and our happiness – Ana and Luka.
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Introduction

Working as a cultural interpreter and counsellor for the Catholic Immigration Centre and Pinecrest Community Centre, I have been exposed to a great number of personal stories and interpretations of the Bosnian war. Most of the stories conformed to a nationalist prototype; each nationality has a distinctive, stereotyped version of the war. After a while, just from knowing a person’s name as an indicator of nationality (Serb, Croat or Muslim), I could predict his/her version of the story. Each of these versions showed a tendency for each partisan group to negatively bias their interpretation of the other side’s words and acts, and to blame the other side exclusively for the conflict. Curiously, despite the clear biases, each group perceived their own version to be truthful.

In Bosnia the people are divided (willingly or unwillingly) into three national groups. The great paradox is that this division is religion based, although most of these people are not religious. These three nationalities in turn have become out-groups to each other. They lost the ability to see each other as individuals, but instead began to see one another as members of an out-group. Bosnian Serb, Croats, and Muslims emphasize the differences between themselves, even where there seems to be none. They further create distinctiveness through such cultural dimensions as language: Croats are trying to rediscover their national identity by using the language of their ancestors; Bosnian

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1 According to the 1990 Encyclopaedia Britannica: “Rates of religious practice are low throughout Yugoslavia. Only about ten percent of the population has an active commitment to religion.”
Muslims are using more Turkish words, while Serbs refuse to write in Latin alphabets. Before this war, the language for all three nationalities was Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serb. There are a few dialects, but Serbs, Croats, and Muslims who live in the same city speak the same dialect. Serbian was originally written in the Cyrillic alphabet and Croatian in the Latin, but many Serbs use predominantly the Latin alphabet. In Bosnia, by law, children were taught both alphabets and in the classroom they used Latin one week and Cyrillic the next. Since the war started, the Serbs claim that they speak Serbian, Croats insist on Croatian, and Muslims call their language Bosnian. The minorities of citizens who still call their language “Serbo-Croatian” are from mixed parentage or in mixed marriages. Language is but one dimension along which previous commonalities are now secondary to the reclaimed distinctive elements.

The war in Bosnia is over and no national group has benefited from this war. To the contrary, as individuals, people from all nationalities have suffered dreadful consequences. So why their involvement in the war? Stern (1995) notes how it is possible for such nationalism to overcome self-interest even when self-interest is a primordial condition while national identity is not. He proposed that nationalism gets its force by drawing on a primordial sociality - a tendency to identify with, learn from, and favour groups to which one has strong emotional ties. He claims that group (not national) identification is a primordial condition and that when influence agents for nationalism succeed, they do so by eliciting identification with the nation and linking it to emotions and norms associated with membership in primary groups (Stern, 1995).

Consistent with this, propaganda in the former Yugoslavia was one of the most
important weapons of war. It was used to make Croats believe that they were the last bastions of Western democratic values; it encouraged the Muslims to see themselves only as innocent victims of Serbs' (and sometimes Croats') aggression, and above all it influenced the Serbs to view themselves as the tragic, blameless scapegoats in an international conspiracy to destroy Serb people and their homeland (Shawson, 1994). Clearly such propaganda was designed to enhance people's emotional identification with their own group.

Also evident in the propaganda was the establishment of competitive identities, one could not believe in the "truth" of more than one of these depictions of a group's situation. However, the difficulty of distinguishing between truth and lie has been one characteristic of this war. One thing held in common by members of all three nationalities was the certainty that those of their own nationality were the ones who knew the truth and that the others had been brainwashed by the press and other media. From the moment the respective nationalists took over the press in the new republics, facts were distorted and invented in order to serve their own nationalistic interests. Completely different versions of what happened were presented, depending on which national paper was read. Even scholars, driven by nationalist ardour, began inventing theories, exaggerating historical claims as to who inhabited which territory at what time, who had the legitimate claim over it, who was responsible for forcible migrations, who were the heroes and who were the villains (Mojsez, 1994). Therefore, the common people were left to rely on the "truth" that had been presented in their own interest; to believe that "the enemies openly kill us, even if we kill them - we only kill because they wanted to kill us in the first
place.” The explicit understanding came to be that “if you are not one of us, then you are against us.” Referring to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Stern emphasised that even if that experience (discrimination) happens in national historical myths, propagated and/or perpetuated by the media, it will still result in a powerful sense of group identification.

Consistent with Stern’s logic, Tajfel (1978) pointed out that cognitive, behavioural and evaluative intergroup differentiation reflects individuals’ need to provide social meaning through social identity to an intergroup situation such as war. He also says that this need is fulfilled through the creation of intergroup differences (or distinctiveness) even when such differences do not in fact exist. The three Bosnian groups (Serbs, Croats and Muslims) see the situation in the same region differently. They attribute such differences in construal to the biasing effects of the propaganda on others. This theme has long been noted in research on in-group versus out-group attitudes (Griffin & Ross, 1991; Robinson, Keltner, Ward & Ross, 1995). This “naïve realism” refers to the individual’s certainty that he or she is somehow privy to an invariant, knowable, objective reality while others are apt to misperceive the extent to which they view the world because they view it through a prism of self-interest or ideological bias (Robinson et al., 1995). Studies concerned with intergroup conflict have emphasised some of the potential social consequences of this naivete, such as the tendency to misinterpret the other side’s words and deeds, and to blame the other side exclusively for conflict (Robinson et al., 1995).

The effect of group membership on perceptions of “who holds the truth” was examined by Duck, Hogg and Terry (1995) in their study of the third-person effect (a
tendency for people to assume that other people are more influenced than they are by mass media). They surveyed Australian University students who identified with one of two major political parties regarding their perceptions of media campaign impact on self and others (during the 1993 Australian federal election). Results indicated that group membership affected the magnitude of perceived self-other differences in media influence, with ingroup members being perceived as less influenced by media campaigns than outgroup members. They also found that people who identified strongly with their preferred political party perceived less campaign influence on themselves and on political ingroup members and differentiated more between the perceived level of impact on ingroup and outgroup members. As a theoretical explanation for these effects aspects of social identity theory and self-categorization theory were drawn from. In social identity theory’s positive distinctiveness and self-esteem hypotheses, evaluative bias in favor of ingroup identities can be viewed as a consequence of social identification and the need to enhance self-esteem at the group level. When others are judged as outgroup members, they would be contrasted to the perceivers’ identity, and evaluated negatively – as relatively vulnerable to media influence. By contrast, to the extent that comparison others are seen as ingroup members, they would be assimilated to the perceivers’ identity, evaluated positively, like the self, as relatively invulnerable to influence (Duck et al, 1995).

Despite group members’ belief that they are not affected by media presentations, another line of research indicates that, guided by group identification, group members come to see what they want to see and believe what they want to believe. For example,
Vallone, Ross and Lepper (1985) explored "biased perceptions of media bias" by presenting pro-Israeli and pro-Arab student partisans (and also some "neutral" students) with videotaped news coverage of the "Beirut massacre" of 1982. They proposed that members of each partisan group would view a presumably neutral program as biased against their own position. In addition, they sought to examine the extent to which partisans' potential contradictory charges of bias were a matter of differing evaluations of the information presented or were a matter of differing perceptions or recollections of the programs' content. The most knowledgeable "neutral" subjects rated these programs as relatively unbiased, while the partisans' evaluations were very different. On all measures of perceived bias there was no overlap in the evaluations offered by the two partisan groups: Pro-Arab and pro-Israeli viewers alike were convinced that the other side had been favoured by the media, that their own side had been treated unfairly, and that the particular program reflected the self-interests and ideologies of those responsible for the program.

These findings at first glance seem to contradict the finding of other research that shows a tendency for partisans to find support and self-confirmation in information that others find inconclusive or problematic (Griffin & Ross, 1991). Vallone et al. (1985)

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2 In 1982, a tragic series of events in the troubled Middle East (Israeli move to West Beirut), culminated in the massacre of civilians in the refugee camp at Sabra and Chatilla, Lebanon.

3 Participants completed questionnaire in which they rated their factual knowledge about Beirut massacre and its historical antecedents.

4 The six segments chosen for stimulus material were from major networks: NBC, ABC & CBS Networks.
suggest that perceptions and attributions of media hostility are at least partially a consequence of the same confirmatory bias that they seem to contradict. That is, both partisan groups will consider the discrepancy between their own view of how things “really are” and the more moderate, two-sided view presented in the effects of the third party, as evidence of that party’s bias (Griffin & Ross, 1991).

The results of this study also suggested that the two partisan groups seemed to disagree about the specific events they had actually seen. Pro-Israeli subjects claimed that a higher percentage of the specific facts and arguments presented were anti-Israeli than pro-Israeli, while pro-Arab viewers offered the opposite assessment. Both sides also believed that the overall tone, emphasis, and message of the program was such that it would lead neutral viewers to change their attitudes in a direction favourable to the other group and hostile to their own.

Gunther (1992) went further in his study of perceptions of media coverage of social groups by exploring the underlying bases of the perceptual biases. Using data from a national probability sample, he examined the effects of numerous independent variables such as involvement with issues and groups, media attributes, audience demographics, and sceptical disposition on respondent ratings of newspaper and television news coverage of social groups. Involvement was operationalized as social group membership for each subject. He found that highly involved people were more likely to demonstrate biased processing by taking consonant information as simply factual and embracing it, but judging counter-attitudinal information to be the product of a biased, misguided source, and rejecting it. He too concluded that group membership played a major role in
perceptions of the fairness or credibility of mass media (Gunther, 1992).

The main interest of the present study is to explore the role of group membership and identity on how the “same event” evokes such contrary interpretations by people of different nationalities. These differences in interpretation appear to be characterized by extreme in-group favouritism and outgroup devaluation. More specifically, when presented with media reports of their realities, ingroup members accept information consonant with their identity as factual, and reject dissonant information as biased propaganda that primarily drives the suggestible members of the outgroups. However, it is further expected that not all members of a national group will engage in such intergroup differentiation to the same degree. In order to examine such individual differences in the effects of group identity, the psychological bases for belonging to a group will be examined. Classical theories of prejudice and discrimination have paid little attention to the role of social identity in ethnic group relations. However, a “social identity approach”, specifically, Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Self-Categorization Theory (SCT), do deal explicitly with this relationship (Jaspars & Warnaen, 1982). The central principle of a social identity approach is that belonging to a group is largely a psychological state which is quite distinct from that of being a unique and separate individual and that the psychological processes associated with social identity are responsible for producing distinctly “groupy” behaviours (Hogg & Abrams, 1988).

Cognitive mechanism underlying social identity

It has long been recognized that membership in social groups has a profound impact on individuals’ identity. People’s concepts of who they are, and how they relate to others
is largely determined by the groups to which they feel they belong (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Self-categorization theory "... makes social identity the social-cognitive basis of group behavior, the mechanism that makes it possible" (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). Self-categorization theory addresses the cognitive processes by which people come to conceptualize themselves in terms of social categories.

SCT suggests that there are different levels of categorizing oneself. The social identity is at an intermediate level (membership in certain social groups apart from others) between a superordinate level of self as human being and a subordinate level of the personal self, distinct from all other individuals. These levels define one's social, 'human', and personal identity, respectively (Turner et al., 1987), with SCT emphasizing the social versus personal identity. According to this conceptualization, the distinction between one's social and personal identity is a function of the level of abstraction in the salience of perceptions of self versus other. When social identity becomes salient, self-perceptions tend to become depersonalized and individuals are said to act as group members. They will likely see themselves in terms of a group stereotype and conform to group norms, ignoring their personal identity (Hogg & Abrams, 1990), which refers to self-categories that define the individual as a unique person in terms of his/her individual differences from other (in-group) persons (Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty 1994). Therefore, social identity refers to the shared social categorical self. Turner uses the concept of depersonalization to understand major group phenomena such as group formation and cohesiveness, cooperation and competition, social influence, social stereotyping, and crowd behavior.
The cognitive process of categorization serves to arrange the potentially infinite variability in social stimuli into a more manageable number of distinct categories (Tajfel, 1978). It simplifies perception by accentuating similarities within the same category and differences between different categories. Basically, the categorization process produces stereotypic perceptions, that is, perceptions of all members of a social category or group as sharing some characteristic, which distinguishes them from some other social groups. This process of minimizing intracategory and maximizing intercategory differences is referred to as "self-stereotyping" (Turner et al., 1987). Self-categorization causes self-perceptions and self-definition to become more in terms of the individual's representation of the defining characteristics of the group, or the group prototype (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). This can be expressed operationally as a meta-contrast ratio that is defined as the ratio of the differences between members of one category and another to the differences among members within one category (Turner et al., 1987). The relevant in-group prototype is that position on the dimension that simultaneously maximizes intergroup differences and minimizes in-group differences. The most prototypical group member would be the one who is simultaneously most different from the out-group and least different to the in-group (Hogg & McGarty, 1990). A high meta-contrast ratio, or self-stereotyping is considered to occur on all dimensions subjectively believed to be correlated with the relevant intergroup categorization.

The propaganda used by nationalist leaders in former Yugoslavia to categorize people into national categories in effect, successfully enhanced the meta-contrast ratios for group members and thereby increased the salience of nationalistic (social identity). For two
years before the war, nationalist leaders promoted the differences between the three nationalities and accentuated the similarities within each one. As a result of this process, people perceived similarities between the self and ingroup members and differences between outgroup members. Thus their social (national) identities became extremely salient. This co-occurred with individuals becoming depersonalized, that is, cognitively absorbed by their social identities, and separated from their personal identities. Their perceptions and behaviours were greatly influenced by their group membership, and they lost their ability to see each other as individuals, instead defining one another as members of the in-group versus out-group.

Self-categorization theory has been criticized on various grounds. Of particular interest to this study is the fact that the theory does not consider individual variations in responses when a social identity is salient (Abrams, 1990). More specifically, not all group members will show the same level of social identity in the same context, and hence show differences in intergroup behaviours. It has therefore been suggested that the relevance of social categories and intergroup behaviours are influenced by motivational factors involved in self-conceptualization and identity construction (Hogg & Abrams, 1988).

Motivational processes associated with social identification.

Social identity theory (SIT) was originally developed as an extension to realistic group conflict theory (RCT) (Tajfel & Turner 1986). The central hypothesis of RCT that “the real conflict of group interests causes intergroup conflict is seen as deceptively simple by SIT theorists” (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). They argue that RCT failed to
recognize either the processes underlying the development and maintenance of group identity or the possibly autonomous effects upon the in-group and intergroup behavior on these "subjective" aspects of group membership. According to RCT, in-group identification is epiphenomenon of intergroup conflict.

However, institutionalization, explicitness and objectivity of an intergroup conflict are not necessary conditions for intergroup discrimination, although they will often prove to be sufficient conditions (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). One example is provided in the early experiments of Tajfel (1970, 1971) in which it was found that intergroup discrimination existed under conditions of minimal in-group affiliation, an absence of conflict of interest, and an absence of previous hostility between the groups. It was concluded that the mere perception of belonging to two distinct groups, that is, social categorization per se, was sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination favoring the in-group.

Therefore, by contrast, SIT focuses upon the processes underlying the development and maintenance of group identity. Social identity is defined as that "part of the individuals' self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1982). According to SIT individuals' membership in various social groups makes an important contribution to his/her self-concept by providing a source of social identity. SIT further purports that when some social category contributes to defining the self, the need for positive self-esteem should motivate a desire to evaluate that category positively. Thus, the motivational explanation for intergroup differentiation provided by SIT revolves around the individual's desire to promote self-esteem.
Tajfel and Turner (1986) described this as a need for a positive social identity and have made it the basis for an extensive theoretical analysis of intergroup relations, and predictions about intergroup behaviour. The need for positive social identity motivates a search for and enhancement of positive distinctiveness for one’s own group in comparison with other groups. To assess the value of their identity, individuals will engage in social comparison on relevant dimensions. This comparison is generally between the in-group and a relevant out-group. Favourable comparisons provide ingroup members with positive distinctiveness and thus positive social identity. When the outcome of this comparison is negative or is threatened, individuals may strive to leave their existing group and join some more positively distinct group. If that is impossible (e.g., we cannot change our ethnic group), several other strategies may be adopted to establish a more positively distinct identity, including social creativity strategies such as finding some new dimensions of intergroup comparison, changing the values attached to existing dimensions of comparison, or changing the out-group for comparison. Another strategy that group members may use to seek positive distinctiveness is through direct competition with an outgroup. Hence the establishment of real conflict.

The Bosnians’ national identities have undergone intensive change and development since the dissolution of Yugoslavia. For those who identified themselves as Yugoslav, this caused a crisis of national identity. Perhaps the easiest way to deal with this crisis was to delve into one’s family past and identify with one’s family religion as had been the historical basis for identity (even though most had little experience of how to practice religion). At that time this provided individuals with a distinct identity. This identification
process was greatly encouraged by the nationalist leaders who were insisting on great
distinctiveness among and a lack of integration between these three groups. The
propaganda also made it clear that as it currently stood, the respective nationalist
identities were at a disadvantage compared to other groups. Therefore, to achieve a
positive identity the nationalist parties encouraged engagement in a direct competition
over who should rule the country.

One can see that through the use of propaganda, national identities of people in
Bosnia became salient, and direct competition was the response to achieve a positive
identity. One could argue that for the people who lived there, this strategy resulted in a
real conflict between groups, that would further enhance and perpetuate the intergroup
situation and salience of the intergroup identity. Indeed, Bosnians out of Yugoslavia
would similarly develop strong group identities, not because of real conflicting group
interests, material conflict or competition between these groups, but rather, because of the
salience of the processes of group categorization and self-enhancement. The need to
preserve or achieve "positive group distinctiveness" in the face of the situation of their
home country and international awareness of events would result in intergroup behaviour
that would serve to protect, enhance or achieve a positive social identity.

**In-group identification and intergroup discrimination**

In February 1994, Canadian television aired that, during constant shelling of Sarajevo,
a bomb fell on the marketplace killing 68 civilians. Commenting later on this news item,
a young and educated woman of Serbian nationality told me "you see how far they (the
Muslims) will go, they are killing their own people to make the world believe that Serbs
are the aggressors.” Generally each member of a group sees its own nation as blameless, or at least less guilty, than others. The more biased the person is, the more he/she will discriminate against outgroups. However, the degree of their bias and discrimination against outgroups varies among members of the same group. What does affect the individuals’ tendency toward intergroup bias and discrimination?

One of the central predictions of SIT is that there will be a positive relation between the strength of identification with a group and the degree of intergroup discrimination. More specifically, this would suggest that the more an individual identifies with a group, the more central this identity will be as a basis for self-esteem. The more his or her self-esteem depends on a positive social identity deriving from that group membership, the greater the need to establish positive in-group distinctiveness. This may be achieved by means of ingroup bias or intergroup discrimination (Kelly, 1988). For example, Kelly’s (1988) study with British political parties provides strong support for the hypothesized relationship between in-group identification and intergroup discrimination.

However, numerous other studies suggest that group identification and in-group bias are not always positively associated (Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade & Williams, 1986; Brown & Williams, 1984; Oaker & Brown, 1986; Struch & Schwartz, 1989). Kelly’s study contrasts strongly with the majority of these investigations, which have examined this issue in occupational settings. Kelly (1988) suggested that perhaps the differences in research results were due to differences in the group processes most evident in the occupational versus political settings. Two main differences were suggested. The first difference relates to the nature of social identification in these different contexts. In an
occupational setting the most common dimension of workgroup relations is the extent to which the individual feels an attachment to other *individuals* in the group. Thus, these workgroups provide a source of friendship or a source of income, and may be more of a basis for individuals’ personal rather than social identity (Brown et al, 1986). By contrast, the quality of interpersonal relations is a less salient attribute of political group membership (Brown et al. 1986). Political affiliation depends entirely on the sense of subjective identification with the norms and characteristics of the group (Kelly, 1988).

The second difference concerns the framework for intergroup relations: the occupational context is relatively cooperative, while political context is mainly competitive. Previous research has suggested that predictions derived from SIT may be more appropriate for explaining competitive than cooperative contexts (Brown & Abrams, 1986). Consistent with RCT, and as noted earlier with respect to Bosnians, a drive for a positive and distinct social identity may lead to direct competition, but the competition in turn may enhance and perpetuate group membership as the basis for the individuals’ identity and behaviour.

The intergroup relations among three Bosnian groups are much more similar to those of the political groups than the work groups, in that they are brutally competitive. However, individuals from these groups will differ in the extent to which they are directly exposed to the conflict, and in the extent to which they identify with individuals within groups (e.g. friend, family) as opposed to the group itself. Such variability in strength of group identity is especially likely among refugees and immigrants. Some have been more directly affected by the war and intergroup conflict than others; those who perceive
themselves to be most affected are more likely to have strong group identities and to display large intergroup biases. On the other hand, individuals' basis for interacting with other group members maybe less constrained by the intergroup conflict than it would be in Yugoslavia; for some, the basis of interaction may be a reflection of individual connections, while for others it may be a matter of absorption with the group identity. To the extent that the latter is true, these individuals may be more likely to show intergroup bias.

**Self-esteem and intergroup discrimination**

Assuming that intergroup discrimination is motivated by individual's desire to achieve and maintain positive self-identity, SIT leads to two corollaries: that intergroup discrimination will enhance self-esteem and that low self-esteem should lead to discrimination. Most of the relevant data that attempt to assess the empirical status of the self-esteem hypothesis comes from minimal group studies.

Corollary one, that intergroup discrimination enhances self-esteem, has been supported by some studies (Lemyre & Smith, 1985; Oakes & Turner, 1980), but not others (Chin & McClintock, 1993, exp.1; Hogg & Sunderland, 1991; Hogg & Turner, 1985, 1987; Kelly, 1988).

The results have been similarly mixed with respect to the second corollary that low self-esteem leads to greater discrimination. Some studies report that lower self-esteem, mostly manipulated experimentally through relative status, power or numerosity, was associated with greater discrimination (Hogg & Sunderland, 1991; Hunter, Stringer & Coleman, 1993). However, other studies found that those with low or threatened self-
esteem did not manifest higher levels of bias (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987, 1991), whereas those with higher self-esteem did (Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman, 1987; Long, Spears & Manstead, 1994). Thus, the research overall does not provide consistent causal relationships between intergroup discrimination and self-esteem.

The inconsistencies in research findings have led some researchers to suggest that the role of self-esteem has been over-implicated in intergroup relations (Hogg & Abrams, 1990). However, others have emphasized many problems associated with the research on self-esteem in intergroup relations. More specifically, measures of self-esteem typically used in this research are individualistic in nature, so that they address personal self-esteem rather than social or collective self-esteem (esteem derived from the social groups to which one belongs) (Long et al. 1994). Long et al. (1994) rationalized that personal self-esteem is at the wrong level of abstraction to account for intergroup discrimination and that collective self-esteem should be considered. These researchers examined the role of the social self-esteem specific to the salient social identity, as well as the effect of personal self-esteem on out-group discrimination. They found that while high personal self-esteem led to greater discrimination, low social self-esteem had this same effect. Their findings imply that it is critically important to distinguish between personal and social self-esteem.

Even when a collective esteem scale has been used, such measures frequently tap into a global collective self-esteem as opposed to focussing on a specific social identity (Long et al., 1994). Hunter, Platow, Howard and Stringer (1996) also recognized the problem of using global measures of self-esteem and addressed this issue by assessing a specific
social self-esteem. They found that when members of real groups engage in evaluative intergroup bias, the esteem specifically relevant to the salient social self is enhanced. It was concluded that only the esteem in which the specific self-images are held and are relevant to social category membership should be affected by an act of intergroup discrimination or bias (Hunter et al., 1996).

Hogg and Abrams (1988, 1990) further emphasized the issue of the level of generality and endurability of self-esteem combined with transitory nature of the experimental situations of discrimination set up. They argued that discrimination stemming from a transitory identity such as that which is constructed in the minimal intergroup context would not be expected to significantly affect measures of more enduring self-esteem (Hogg & Sunderland, 1991). Overcoming such methodological and interpretative limitations, Hogg and Sunderland (1991) tested both corollaries by manipulating transitory self-esteem in the minimal group study. Lower self-esteem subjects who were explicitly categorized as a group discriminated significantly more than those who were uncategorized or had higher self-esteem (corollary 2). However, greater discrimination was not associated with an increase in transitory self-esteem (corollary 1).

Finally, the most emphasised criticism of research in this area is that most of the studies have used a variant of the minimal group paradigm. It has been argued that self-esteem and intergroup discrimination may only be related when the relations between groups are meaningful (Crocker et al., 1987; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Hunter et al., 1996). In other words, when membership in minimal groups is assigned arbitrarily, group membership may fail to activate concerns with self-enhancement. Some empirical support
for this is provided by Ruttenberg, Zea and Sigelman (1996). In their study with real
groups, Arabs and Jews, they examined the effect of social self-esteem and strength of in-
group identification on intergroup bias and discrimination. In line with predictions from
SIT, it was found that participants who discriminated most were strongly identified with
the in-group and had low social self-esteem (Ruttenberg et al., 1996).

Measures of personal self-esteem focus on individuals' self-evaluations based on their
personal attributes, whether in relation to private or interpersonal domains. As such, these
measures assess the level of positivity of individuals’ personal identity and fail to
consider the positivity of their social identity as conceptualized in social identity theory.
Thus, while personal self-esteem tends to affect the use of self-serving biases and more
individualized self-enhancement tactics, social self-esteem may be an important moderator
of in-group bias, and other group-level strategies discussed in social identity theory
(Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). In the present study, the role of social self-esteem specific
to the salient social identity for members of the Bosnian groups in intergroup bias was
examined. Consistent with the logic underlying the suggestion that membership in real
social groups activates concern with self-enhancement, it was hypothesized that the more
an individual identified with a group, the more his/her self-esteem would depend on a
positive social identity deriving from that membership. Thus, those people with low self-
esteeome who identify strongly with their respective national group were expected to show
the greatest intergroup bias. People with high self-esteem, even under conditions of
strong identification with the group would be less biased compared to those with low self-
esteeome because their self-esteem is not threatened by the group identity. Conversely, if
the individual does not identify strongly with the group (as in minimal group context), self-esteem would not motivate intergroup bias or discrimination.

**Affect and intergroup relations**

Studies concerned with social identity theory and intergroup relations have tended to concentrate on the cognitive processes and effects of categorization and social comparison (Skevington, 1989). In any study of intergroup relations it is questionable how far it is possible to fully appraise intergroup discrimination without evaluating affective connections such as gladness and pride or shame and distress to be a group member. Some argue that affect is a central component of intergroup conflict (Pettigrew, 1986). This is especially true for partisan groups, in that it may be the power of emotions that drives discriminatory behaviour (Skevington, 1989).

In pointing to the importance of social identity, Tajfel (1978) referred to the "emotional significance" attached to group membership. Yet SIT has neglected an analysis of the role of emotions in intergroup relations (Skevington, 1989), focussing instead, perhaps as an alternative, on outcomes of social comparison. Deaux (1992) pointed out that the nature of emotional involvement has not been elaborated on by SIT and that objective categorization criteria for group membership are typically considered sufficient to define an identity category. She suggested a more subjective approach to identity which considers: 1) the degree to which an individual claims an identity that might be assumed on the basis of objective criteria; and 2) what meanings are associated with a given identity category (Deaux, 1992). To put this in the context of Bosnian groups, it would be a mistake to assume that not only do all members of each nationality
equally claim a given “social identity”, but as well, that being a member of a given national group has the same personal meaning for all members. For example, a strong sense of belonging to a group may involve a sense of shame, embarrassment or guilt, or conversely a feeling of pride and compassion. Clearly, it seems that the nature of such affective meaning will affect an individuals’ response in an intergroup context.

As a result of lack of research regarding the effect of the nature of emotional significance of group membership on intergroup bias, the following predictions are exploratory. It is hypothesised that the more an individual experiences emotions associated with own group membership the stronger he/she will be identified with his/her respective national group. However, the valence of these emotions may differentially affect intergroup bias. It is expected that those people with intense positive emotions who identified strongly with their respective group will display intergroup bias, while those with negative emotions may not.

**Summary of the present study**

The present study was an investigation of the underlying bases of biased perception of opposing Bosnian groups. In particular, this study sought to investigate the role of cognitive (categorization), motivational (self-esteem) and affective factors in intergroup behavior. In summary, this study of Bosnian nationalities was designed to test the following hypotheses:

1) Members of each national group would generally rate the information that was neutral to outside observers as biased against their own group.

2) Participants’ level of in-group identification would be positively associated with
intergroup differentiation and perceived bias.

3) Participants who perceived themselves to be most affected by intergroup conflict would be more likely to have strong group identities and to display large intergroup bias.

4) Lower self-esteem among participants who strongly identified with their group would be associated with greater intergroup differentiation and bias, compared to those with higher self-esteem.

5) Participants with intense positive emotions who identified strongly with their respective group would display intergroup bias, while those with negative emotions may not.
Method

Participants

Participants were Muslims and Serbs$^5$ from Bosnia and Herzegovina that immigrated to Canada within the last six years. Past research with ethnic groups (e.g. Ruttenberg et al., 1996) indicate$^6$ that being born or raised in a new culture could interfere with the phenomena that we attempt to explain. Therefore, for the purpose of this study the most appropriate participants were adults who lived in Bosnia prior to the conflict (that started six years ago). A sample of 30 participants from each ethnic group was recruited employing a snowballing technique, starting with friends and acquaintances. Also, some participants responded to announcements for recruiting that were placed throughout the Campus and in the community (such as community and health centres and immigrant organisations). Ages ranged from 23 to 52 with 36 male and 24 female respondents. The majority of participants (87.7%; n=52) had partners of the same nationality, while 13.3% (n=8) respondents had partners of a different nationality.

Participants were contacted over the phone and asked to participate in a “study of the

$^5$ Croats were not included in the study because this community in the Ottawa area is so small that it would have been difficult to get an adequate sample size. Also, it was impossible to find stimulus articles where all three groups were involved. It was believed that the objectives of this study could be accomplished with two groups, Muslims and Serbs.

$^6$ Ruttenberg et al. found that social identity variables were largely unrelated to prejudice among the Jewish students, but the findings for Arab students were consistent with hypothesis that low collective self-esteem and high participation in ethnically relevant organization would engender prejudice. The fact that most of the Arab students were born in the Middle East and as such, may have been more personally involved with the Arab-Israeli conflict, in contrast to most of the Jewish students who were born in the USA, was used to account for the differences in findings (Ruttenberg et al., 1996).
media coverage of the conflict in Bosnia.”

Finally, a group of neutral participants (n=30) that did not have any personal connection with the former Yugoslavia was recruited from introductory psychology classes for “a study of the media coverage of the conflict in Bosnia” and were compensated with course credit. This group was somewhat younger (age range was 18 to 26), although it was comparable in terms of sex breakdown (n=12 women; n=18 men).

Procedure

Participants were run in groups of 3 to 6 that were homogeneous with the respect to ethnic group membership. Before reading the stimulus materials, partisan groups were asked to complete questionnaires of self-esteem (personal and collective), strength of ingroup identification, emotional significance of group membership, a social distance scale and group involvement. Following completion of these questionnaires, participants read two selected articles in random order and responded to questionnaires designed to assess perceived biases and intergroup differentiation. Participants had a choice regarding the language in which they preferred to conduct the study (English or Serbo-Croatian). All questionnaires and stimulus materials were double translated to Serbo-Croatian by registered translators. Neutral participants only read the stimulus materials and responded to the questionnaires about perceived biases.

Prior to completing questionnaires, participants were told that their responses were anonymous and confidential and were asked to read and sign the “informed consent form” in which they were informed about the nature of the study and the conditions of their participation. All participants were debriefed in writing.
Stimulus material.

Six newspaper articles reporting on the Bosnian war were selected from a sample of major Canadian newspapers' coverage of the war in Bosnia. These articles were chosen because they provided coverage of controversial events, and both sides (Muslim and Serbs) appeared to be blamed equally. As such, the articles could be viewed as neutral to uninvolved reader. These six articles, each approximately two pages in length, were published by The Gazette (Montreal) (2), The Ottawa Citizen (1), The Toronto Star (2) and The Vancouver Sun (1). They were pilot tested on the "neutral" group of university students to assess the levels of perceived bias (see Appendix A). The final stimulus materials consisted of two articles that were rated as relatively unbiased by "neutrals." Both articles were concerned with the 1994 bombing of Sarajevo's market place that killed 68 people. The primary focus of the articles was to convey that officials had been unable to determine who was responsible for the attack, the Serbs or the Muslims. The first article titled "UN can't prove that Muslims have attacked their own" cites UN officials arguing that the United Nations in Sarajevo was unable to pinpoint precisely the origin of Saturday's 120mm mortar shell. This article primarily relies on citing opposing opinions concerning the accusation that "Muslims staged atrocities against own people to gain international sympathy." The second article titled "UN team can't pin massacre on Serbs' artillery: Muslim-led Bosnian army accused of staging shelling that killed 68" covers the same incident, but provides more technical details regarding the UN investigation of the incident. Mostly, it cites UN officials who try to explain why they were unable to determine which side fired the mortar bomb.
Measures

In-group identification. The strength of group identification was assessed using a scale developed by Brown et al. (1986). The scale is made up of 10 statements (five positive and five negative) reflecting awareness of group membership, evaluation and affect (e.g. “It is important to me that I belong to this national group”). Responses to the statements are on a 5-point scale (from never (1) to very often (5)). Brown et al. (1986) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.71, indicating adequate inter-item reliability. Criterion validity was established in terms of its ability to distinguish between respondents whose spontaneous comments about their group had been classified as positive, with those whose comments were neutral/negative (Brown et al., 1986).

Ratings on some items were recoded so that high scores indicated strong identification with the respective national group. Inter-item reliability analysis indicated that one item negatively related to total scale, r = -.18 (i.e. “I feel that it puts me at disadvantage to belong to Serbs/Muslims group”), and substantially reduced scale reliability. This item was not included in the final scale score. Inter-item reliability for the final scale was good (Cronbach’s alpha = .83). The mean score across nine items was used as the overall scale score.

Two items revised from Gurin and Townsend (1986) were also included to assess sense of common fate, which they argue is an important dimension of group identity. Participants responded to two questions: ‘Do you think that what happens to Serbs/Muslims generally will have something to do with what happens in your life? And ‘Do you think that Serbs’/Muslims’ political program has affected you personally?’ Responses were in the form of ratings on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (to a great
degree. The two items were moderately correlated (r = .38). Therefore, the mean was taken as participants' score of perceived common fate, such that higher scores reflected greater perception of common fate.

*The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE).* This 10-item scale was created to measure global personal self-esteem. Participants responded to statements about themselves (e.g. “On the whole I am satisfied with myself”) using a four-point scale (from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree)). O’Brien (1985) conducted a factor analysis on the RSE and found a single factor, strongly supporting the unidimensionality of the scale. Further, the RSE correlated significantly with global subscales of the Eagly Feelings of Inadequacy Scale, additionally supporting the contention that the RSE measures global self-esteem (O’Brien, 1985). Shapurian, Hojat and Nayerahmadi (1987) found good test-retest reliability of the scale, as well as establishing concurrent validity with other criterion measures. Likewise, Brems and Lloyd (1995) found that the RSE correlates with other measures of self-esteem (e.g. the MMPI-2 Content scale and the Harter Adult Self-Perception Profile), indicating good concurrent validity. Westaway and Wolmarans (1992) report that its internal consistency is good, = 0.78. The Rosenberg scale has been used in previous studies of self-esteem and ingroup bias (Crocker & Schwartz, 1985; Crocker et al., 1987).

Some items were recoded so that on all items, high scores reflected a high degree of personal self-esteem. The mean rating across all ten items was used as the overall scale score (Cronbach alpha = .82).

*Collective self-esteem scale.* A 16-item adaptation of Luhtanen and Crocker's (1992) Collective Self-Esteem Scale was used to assess self-esteem derived from ethnic group
identification. The scale consists of four subscales: Membership Esteem ("judgements of how good or worthy they are as members of their social groups"), Private Collective Self-Esteem ("one's personal judgement of how good one's social groups are"), Public Collective Self-Esteem ("one's judgements of how other people evaluate one's social groups"), and Importance to Identity ("the importance of one's social group memberships to one's self concept") (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). Responses to all 16 items were on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The instructions in the present study were modified so as to direct the participants to focus on their social identity as it related to ethnic origin/nationality (see Crocker et al., 1994; Ethier & Deaux, 1990; and Ruttenberg et al., 1996, for evidence that such adaptations are appropriate). Crocker and Luhtanen (1990) reported that the four subscales reflect distinct factors, with alpha coefficients of .83 or higher. They also reported a test-retest reliability of .68 over a six-week interval. The results of validity studies (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) have indicated the CSE dimensions are moderately correlated with measures of individual self-esteem (correlation with Rosenberg self-esteem scale \( r = .34 \)) but unrelated to Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scores.

Ratings on some items were recoded so that high score indicated a high degree of collective self-esteem. Item analysis for each subscale was conducted and yielded Cronbach alphas as follows: membership esteem, \( \alpha = .81 \), private collective self-esteem, \( \alpha = .53 \), public collective self-esteem, \( \alpha = .67 \) and importance to identity, \( \alpha = .85 \). Due to low reliability, the private collective self-esteem subscale was dropped from further analysis. Considering only moderate intercorrelations (from \(-.36\) to \(.58\)), each of the
other three subscale was treated as a separate variable.

**Affective component of in-group identity.** This scale was designed for the purposes of this study to assess the nature of emotional significance of group membership. It was made up of 10 statements reflecting positive (five items) and negative (five items) emotions associated with membership in the respective national groups (e.g. "I feel proud that I am Serb/Muslim"; "Being a Serb/Muslim makes me feel guilty."). These 10 emotions were taken from Chambers (1997) list of discrete emotions. Responses to the statements were on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). Ratings on items reflecting negative emotions were recoded so that high scores indicated a high degree of denial of negative emotions. Principal component analysis revealed a two-factor solution based on eigenvalues greater than 1. These two factors explained 56.3 % of the variability in responses. Based on rotated factor loadings greater than .40 the first factor comprised of four positive emotions (pride, feel secure, compassion, likeness), while the second factor comprised of three negative emotions (frustration, shame, guilt). The remaining items did not load on a distinct factor. Item analysis of the first factor subscale yielded a Cronbach 's alpha of .90, and for the second factor subscale Cronbach’s alpha was .89. There was no significant correlation between these two factors (r = .09). For further analyses, means of items on the two subscales were taken as independent dimensions of emotional significance of group membership.

**Perceived conflict.** This scale was designed for the purposes of this study to assess the extent to which participants perceived themselves to be affected by the intergroup conflict. Two items of this scale addressed whether participants had lost family members
or friends in the war ("no" = 0, "yes" = 1). The sum of these two items was used as the participants’ overall score of how much they were affected by the intergroup conflict.

**Meta-contrast ratios.** To assess each individuals’ cognitive differentiation, partisan participants were asked to rate first the extent of similarity perceived among members of their nationality, and second between members of their own and the other nationality on the basis of 12 attributes modified from Gardner, MacIntyre and Lalonde (1995), and a revised selection of 14 values from Rokeach. A 7-point rating scale was used where a rating of ‘1’ corresponded to a low degree of similarity and a rating of ‘7’ corresponded to a high degree of similarity. The attributes used include traits that might be viewed as stereotypes of the ethnic groups, such as polite, industrious, religious etc. The values participants rated correspond to a set of value stereotypes such as social justice, family security, and spiritual life used by Rokeach. Other values (5) were added that may be regarded as relevant to the Bosnian groups, including - trustworthiness, respect for national history, personal hygiene, loyalty to the nation, and tolerance for others.

In order to compute the meta-contrast ratios for each item, scores on both measures of ingroup and intergroup variability were recoded\(^7\) such that higher scores reflected higher perceptions of ingroup and intergroup differences (Turner et al., 1987). From these scores, a meta-contrast ratio was computed for each item by dividing perceptions of intergroup differences by perceptions of ingroup differences. Finally, meta contrast ratios

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\(^7\)Meta contrast ratios are generally conceptualized in terms of differences between groups, but measured in terms of similarities (e.g., Haslam & Turner, 1992). Thus, in the present study similarity scores were recoded to reflect differences to remain consistent with the theoretical conceptualization.
for each participant were calculated by taking a mean of these ratios for each attributes and values, respectively. Mean scores ranged from .25 to 7.00 for attributes, and from .32 to 7.00 for values. Higher meta-contrast ratios correspond to greater differentiation between the ingroup and the outgroup than within the ingroup. The two scales (attributes and values) were highly correlated ($r = .87$, $p<.01$), and so were averaged to form a single meta contrast ratio.

*Social distance scale.* The social distance scale was based on Byrnes and Kiger’s (1988) social distance scale. Item analysis of the scale yielded an alpha coefficient of .90 (Byrnes & Kiger, 1988). The test-retest reliability coefficient was .94. The construct validity of the scale was assessed by its association with the validated Modern Racism Scale ($r = .48$) (Byrnes & Kiger, 1988). Participants rated how they would feel about having a Serb/Muslim in a number of social positions, using a scale ranging from 1 (not at all comfortable) to 9 (very comfortable). These social positions included neighbour, roommate, spiritual counsellor, close friend, employer, personal physician, and co-worker. A final score of social distance was derived by taking the mean of the ratings obtained on all seven social positions or items ($\alpha = .96$), such that high scores reflected less need for social distance.

*Perception of bias.* A revised version of the questionnaire developed by Vallone et al. (1985) was used to elicit perceptions of the fairness and objectivity of the material. In addition to the item dealing with overall bias (“Overall tone of this article”...), respondents answered several more specific items allowing them to elaborate their views about the strength and number of arguments presented, and the apparent personal views
of the authors of the articles (Vallone et al., 1985). Responses to these items were on a 7-point rating scale ranging from −3 (more in favour of Serbs) to +3 (more in favour of Muslims). The mean response for each article was taken as participants’ score of perceived bias in relation to the two ethnic groups. Item analysis of the perceived bias on the first article yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of .95 and on the second article of .96. The two scales were significantly but only somewhat correlated (r = .28, p< .001). Therefore, responses to the two articles were analyzed as separate criterion measures.

To further assess perceived bias, two items were added for the partisan groups. On a scale of −3 (more in favour of Serbs) to +3 (more in favour of Muslims) participants were asked: “In your opinion West media is…” Similarly, on a scale of −3 (Serbs for sure) to +3 (Muslims for sure) they were asked: “In your opinion who is responsible for the attack?” Due to their distinct conceptual meaning, these items were analyzed individually.
Results

Descriptive Statistics

On all measures relating to their social identities, Serbs and Muslims did not differ significantly. The means and standard deviations for both groups combined are reported in Table 1. Overall, groups indicated a fairly high identification with their in-groups, given that scores could only range from 1 to 5. However, on the measure of perceived common fate, respondents’ means were somewhat more moderate, scoring on average, just around the scale midpoint. With the respect to self-esteem, respondents reported fairly high levels of personal self-esteem (possible range was from 1 to 4). However, on the measures of collective self-esteem, average scores were around or at the midpoints for all three dimensions. Finally, in terms of emotional significance of their group identity, on average respondents scored just above the midpoint (possible range was from 1 to 7) on the positive emotional significance subscale. Nevertheless, on the negative subscale respondents on average scored almost at the maximum, indicating a high denial of any negative emotions associated with their group membership.

Intercorrelations among these measures were also examined (see Table 1). Of particular interest is the relationship of identity with the perceived conflict scale. As expected in hypothesis 3, a positive correlation was found, suggesting that participants who perceived themselves to be most affected by intergroup conflict tended to have stronger group identities. Also noteworthy was the high positive correlation between identity and the positive emotional significance expressed regarding group membership. Comparing items on these two scales, it became evident that the positive emotional
significance items overlapped with items reflecting affect within the identity scale. To
avoid problems of redundancy, the positive emotional significance scale was not
examined further as an independent dimension. In contrast, negative emotional
significance expressed regarding group membership was not significantly correlated with
identity, thus reflecting an independent measure of emotional significance. Furthermore,
in relation to collective esteem, identity was highly related to the importance to identity,
and membership esteem. These two dimensions of collective esteem assess the
importance of one’s social group membership to one’s self-concept and the individuals’
judgement of how good or worthy they are as members of their social group, respectively.
As such, these aspects of self-esteem were expected to be related to strength of group
identity.

With the respect to the relationship between personal self-esteem and collective
self-esteem dimensions, a positive correlation was found between the personal self-
esteeem and membership esteem subscale, but not with the other two subscales, public
collective self-esteem and importance to identity. Interestingly, the public self-esteem
subscale was significantly negatively correlated with the membership esteem and
importance to identity, suggesting that the more they perceived own group to be evaluated
negatively by others, the higher membership esteem and importance to identity were.

Examination of intercorrelations among dependent measures showed that most of
the measures were significantly correlated (Table 2). However, participants’ general
perception of the Western media did not seem to be associated with their perceptions of
bias in the articles. One possible explanation for this is that the distribution of Western
Media was highly negatively skewed, (skewness = -.84) indicating that the majority of the sample found the Western media to be biased against their ingroup (M=1.95; SD=1.24). Interestingly, only 26.7% of the participants said “do not know” as response to question of who they perceived to be responsible for the attack, while 73.3% claimed that the other group was responsible.

Table 1

Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for measures relating to social identities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Id scale</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>.76</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Common fate</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>.49**</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Personal self-esteem</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Membership esteem</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>.61**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Public collective self-esteem</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-.29**</td>
<td>-.37**</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.36**</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Importance to identity</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>.71**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.58**</td>
<td>-.38**</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Emotional significance -positive</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.83**</td>
<td>.51**</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.65**</td>
<td>-.30*</td>
<td>.73**</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Emotional significance -negative</td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.28*</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Perceived conflict</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.27*</td>
<td>.49**</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.32*</td>
<td>-.06</td>
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Table 2
Correlations for dependent measures

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social distance scale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Perception of bias (Article 1)</td>
<td>-.43**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Perception of bias (Article 2)</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.26*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC ratio</td>
<td>-.42**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.37*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of Western media</td>
<td>-.47**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other side responsible for the attack</td>
<td>-.46**</td>
<td>.39**</td>
<td>.31*</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>.41**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05
** p<.01
*** p<.001

Perception of bias

To assess whether membership in a partisan group (Serbs, Muslims vs. neutral) affected perceptions of bias, a one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted on the participants' responses regarding the perceived bias in the two articles. This analysis indicated a significant effect for group membership on perceptions of bias (Pillais=.43, F(4, 174)=11.74, p<.001, η²=.21). Examination of the results of the univariate level showed that, consistent with expectations, these three groups differed significantly on perceived bias of both articles (Article 1, F(2, 87)=5.18, p<.005, η²=.11; Article 2, F(2, 87)=27.85, p<.001, η²=.39).

Consistent with hypothesis 1, planned contrasts indicated that compared to neutral participants both Serbs (t(29)=2.25, p<.05) and Muslims (t(29)=5.04, p<.001) perceived Article 2 as biased in favor of the other side. However, on the Article 1 only Serbs were significantly different from neutrals, t(29)=2.12, p<.05, whereas the perceptions of the
Muslims compared to neutrals were similar, \( t(29) = -1.03, \text{ ns} \). This is likely because, despite the pilot testing that indicated that both articles should have been perceived as neutral by an outside observer, examination of the 95% confidence intervals showed that neutral participants perceived Article 1 as slightly biased in favour of Serbs (-.59 ± 0.25).

**Table 3**

**Perceived bias in articles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article 1</th>
<th>Serbs</th>
<th>.18</th>
<th>1.28</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>- .96</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrals</td>
<td>- .59</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 2</td>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>-1.20</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrals</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scale range is −3 (more in favour of Serbs) to +3 (more in favour of Muslims)

**Perceived bias, intergroup discrimination and intergroup differentiation**

To examine the effects of group identification, self-esteem and emotional significance of membership on perceived bias, intergroup differentiation and discrimination, series of hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted. To examine whether strength of identity, self-esteem and emotional significance of group membership explained variability over and above perceived conflict, conflict was entered
on the first step, measures of identity on the second, followed by self-esteem measures on the third step and finally, emotional significance on the last step.

Perceived bias. For the purpose of regression analyses the scale responses were recoded such that high scores for all respondents reflected a high degree of perceived bias against their own group. A hierarchical regression was conducted to assess the relationship between conflict, identity, self-esteem variables, emotional significance and perceived bias on Article 1. On the first step, perceived conflict by itself was not significantly related to perceived bias, $F<1$. When entered on the second step, identity and common fate explained 18.7% of total variability in perceived bias, $F(2, 56) = 6.50$, $p<.01$. While both variables significantly correlated with perceived bias, identity appeared to be redundant with common fate, so that only common fate uniquely predicted perceived bias ($\beta = .38$). Finally, neither the collective self-esteem variables, $F<1$ nor emotional significance, $F<1$ explained additional variability in perceived bias over and above the effects of common fate.
Table 4

Regression on the Article 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor variable</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>R²change</th>
<th>Total R² adj.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived conflict</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>.29*</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common fate</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal self-esteem</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership esteem</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public esteem</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance to identity</td>
<td>.25*</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional significance</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05  
** p<.01  
*** p<.001

A similar pattern was found when these predictors were regressed on the perceived bias in the Article 2. On the first step, perceived conflict by itself was not significantly related to perceived bias, F (1, 56) = 2.56, ns. However, when entered on the second step, the identity variables explained 11.7% of total variability in perceived bias, F (2, 56) = 3.87, p<.05, such that the more participants identified with their own group, the greater the perceived ingroup bias in Article 2. Finally, neither the self-esteem variables, F<1 nor emotional significance, F<1 explained additional variability in perceived bias over and above the effects of identity.
### Table 5

**Regression on the Article 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor variable</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>R² change</th>
<th>Total R² adj.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1 Perceived conflict</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td></td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2 Identity</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common fate</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3 Personal self-esteem</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership esteem</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public esteem</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance to identity</td>
<td>.22*</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 4 Emotional significance</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05  
** p<.01  
*** p<.001

**Intergroup differentiation.** To examine the extent to which the perceived conflict, identity, self-esteem and emotional significance variables predicted intergroup differentiation, a hierarchical regression was conducted. On the first step perceived conflict by itself was not significantly related to intergroup differentiation, F<1. When entered on the second step, identity and common fate explained 32.0% of the total variability in intergroup differentiation, F (2, 56) = 13.27 p<.0001, such that the stronger identification with their own group, the greater perceived intergroup differentiation. Finally, neither emotional significance, F(1, 51) = 3.36, ns, nor the self-esteem variables, F<1, contributed unique explained variability and therefore the variance due to these
variables were pooled into the error term. While membership esteem, importance to identity and emotional significance variables showed significant zero-order correlations with intergroup differentiation, they were redundant predictors once identity had been taken into consideration.

Table 6

Regression on the MC ratio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor variable</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>R² change</th>
<th>Total R² adj.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived conflict</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>.55***</td>
<td>.63***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common fate</td>
<td>.23*</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal self-esteem</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership esteem</td>
<td>.29*</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public esteem</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance to identity</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional significance</td>
<td>.27*</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05  
** p<.01  
*** p<.001

Social distance. To examine the extent to which perceived conflict, identity, self-esteem, and emotional significance variables predicted social distance, a hierarchical regression was conducted. On the first step perceived conflict by itself explained 14.4% of the total variability in social distance, F(1, 56) = 15.07, p<.005, such that the more
affected by intergroup conflict, the greater need for social distance from the other group ($\beta = -.40$). When entered on the second step, identity and common fate explained an additional 25.4% of the total variability in social distance over and above the effect of conflict, $F(2, 56) = 12.13, p<.0001$. While both variables were significantly correlated with social distance, common fate appeared to be redundant with identity, so that only identity uniquely predicted social distance. The stronger identification with their own group, the greater need for social distance from the other group ($\beta = -.44$). Finally, neither the self-esteem, $F<1$, nor the emotional significance variables, $F(1, 51) = 1.90$, ns, contributed unique explained variability and therefore the variance due to these variables was pooled into the error term. This was not surprising in that neither personal self-esteem nor emotional significance had significant zero-order correlations with social distance. While the collective self-esteem variables did show significant zero-order correlations with social distance, they were clearly redundant predictors once conflict and identity had been taken into consideration, given their strong correlation with these variables.
**Table 7**

Regression on social distance scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor variable</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>R² change</th>
<th>Total R² adj.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived conflict</td>
<td>-.40**</td>
<td>-.40**</td>
<td></td>
<td>.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>-.60***</td>
<td>-.44**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common fate</td>
<td>-.43**</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.25***</td>
<td>.38***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal self-esteem</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership esteem</td>
<td>.50***</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public esteem</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance to identity</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.36***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 4</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional significance</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.38***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05  
** p<.01  
*** p<.001

Perceived bias, intergroup discrimination and intergroup differentiation (interaction effects)

It was hypothesized that self-esteem and the emotional significance of the group membership would affect indicators of intergroup bias and discrimination. However, it was further hypothesized that these relationships would only hold if the individuals' identification with their group was high. To examine the effects of group identification, self-esteem and emotional significance of membership on perceived bias, intergroup differentiation and discrimination, series of hierarchical multiple regression analyses were
conducted. Measures of identity entered on the first step, the esteem or emotion 
measures on the second step and the two-way interactions between identity and the self-
esteeem or emotion measures were entered on the last step. Because the main effects were 
discussed in the previous section, only the interaction effects were discussed.

Perceived bias. A hierarchical regression was first conducted to determine whether 
the identity moderated the relationship between self-esteem and perceived bias on Article 
1. No significant variance was added by the interactions, $F<1$. A second regression was 
conducted to assess the interaction effect between emotional significance and identity on 
the perceived bias on Article 1. Likewise, these interactions, $F<1$ did not contribute 
unique explained variability.

The same pattern was found when these predictors were regressed on the perceived 
bias in the Article 2. No significant variance was added neither by the interactions 
amongst self-esteem measures and identity, $F<1$ nor by the interaction between emotional 
significance and identity, $F<1$.

Intergroup differentiation. To examine the interaction effect of identity and the 
self-esteem measures on intergroup differentiation (MC ratio), a hierarchical multiple 
regression was conducted. None of the interactions between identity and self-esteem, $F<1$ 
contributed unique explained variability in intergroup differentiation. A second 
hierarchical regression conducted to assess the interaction effect between emotional 
significance and identity on the intergroup differentiation, likewise, found that the 
interaction, $F<1$ did not contribute unique explained variability.

Social distance. To examine the interaction effect of identity and the self-esteem
measures on social distance, a hierarchical multiple regression was conducted. None of the interactions between identity and self-esteem, $F<1$ contributed unique explained variability in social distance. A second hierarchical regression conducted to assess the interaction effect between emotional significance and identity on the social distance, likewise, found that the interaction, $F<1$ did not contribute unique explained variability.
Discussion

The central premise of the present study concerned the motivational factors that mediate social identification with a nationalistic identity and the subsequent cognitive information processing biases, and expressions of intergroup differentiation and discrimination. The results of the present study provide a compelling demonstration of the tendency for partisan groups to view media coverage of a controversial event as unfairly biased and hostile to the group to which they belong. This finding is consistent with past research which suggested that partisans respond to mixed, ambiguous evidence not by moderating their judgements but by becoming more certain and extreme in their views. This increased polarisation through mechanisms of “biased assimilation” was first demonstrated in a classic study of Hastorf and Cantril (1954).\(^8\) Lord et al (1979) extended this examination of the consequences of “biased assimilation” showing that when partisans are faced with mixed evidence, they not only construe particular pieces of evidence, but they also judge the validity and relevance of that evidence. Vallone et al (1985) suggested that the same mechanisms that lead opposing partisans to find support for their respective positions in mixed or ambiguous evidence can lead them to perceive hostility or bias in any third party that attempts to present an even-handed assessment of

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\(^8\) In Hastorf and Cantril’s study, Darmouth and Princeton supporters viewing a film of a particularly rough struggle between their respective teams seemed to see two different games: The Princeton fans saw a continuing pattern of Darmouth atrocities and occasional Princeton retaliations, the Darmouth fans saw brutal Princeton provocations and occasional, measured, Darmouth responses.
issues. That is, partisan groups will deem the discrepancy between their own view of how things "really are" and the more moderate, two-sided view presented or implied in the effects of the third party, as evidence of that party's bias. The present study further explored factors associated with partisan group membership that would mediate these perceptions.

Studies concerned with perceptions of media coverage of social groups have emphasized that group membership plays a major role in perceptions of the fairness or credibility of mass media (Gunther, 1992). However, little research had been conducted regarding motivational factors that may moderate this relationship. The present study has suggested that social identity theory might provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of social groups and group members' perceptual biases. The social identity approach focuses on group behaviour as a product of self-categorization in terms of the relevant category. Because the categorization involves a simplification and clarification of perception, and because there is a motivation to positively value the self, differentiation between one's own and other category members is often extreme, and biased in favour of the in-group (Hogg & Abrams 1988). Thus, salient social categorization, coupled with in-group identification was proposed to be both necessary and sufficient for intergroup discrimination. As hypothesised, the findings of the present study indicate that in-group identification was a consistent and powerful predictor not only of perceived bias, but also of intergroup differentiation and discrimination.

Compared to outside observers, both Serbs and Muslims perceived the articles as
biased in favour of the other group; this perception was more extreme the more they
identified with their in-group. Thus, it appears that guided by group identification, group
members came to see what they wanted to see and believed what they wanted to believe.
Indeed, the majority of participants found Western media to be biased against their in-
group. The magnitude of in-group bias and out-group devaluation was most apparent in
response to questions of who participants perceived to be responsible for the attack. Only
26.7% of the participants said “do not know”, while 73.3% claimed that the other group
was the responsible. Not one person allowed for the possibility that their own group could
be blamed for the attack in question.

While the pattern of results was similar for the two articles, the effect was much
clearer with the second article. The perceptions of bias in the first article were similar for
Muslims compared to neutrals, in that they both perceived the article to be biased in
favour of Serbs. This was despite the results of the pilot study that indicated both articles
were perceived as unbiased by a neutral group. The possible explanation for this
discrepancy is that in the pilot study, these articles were evaluated in the context of a
larger selection of articles, and accordingly, relative to the other articles these two might
have been perceived as the least biased. In the actual study, neutral participants could
directly compare one article to another, consequently rating one as more biased.
Alternatively, one could argue that the Canadian public has been generally exposed to
media coverage that favours Muslims’ interests over those of its Serb antagonists. As a
result, even “neutrals” might perceive a more ‘balanced’ argument as biased in favour of
Serbs.\textsuperscript{9}

As hypothesised, the findings indicated that participants who perceived themselves to be most affected by intergroup conflict (i.e. they had lost someone in the war) were more likely to have strong group identities. However, contrary to RCT, conflict by itself was not a good predictor of intergroup differentiation and bias. Nevertheless, respondents who most perceived themselves to be affected by conflict did display more need for social distance from the out-group. What could account for these different results is that having lost someone close in the war might trigger open discrimination against the out-group (in this case one would assume that it is just normal to discriminate) but not the more subtle cognitive biases. However, this relationship between conflict and social distance was redundant with the relationship between identity and social distance. This suggests that the effect of conflict may be to enhance individuals’ identity. Identity in turn is associated with a greater need for social distance. This perhaps indicates that once highly identified with the in-group, conflict in and of itself no longer motivates discrimination. Thus, an important step for future research may be to further examine the causal links between conflict and strength of identity in relation to intergroup bias, discrimination, and differentiation.

There are some methodological limitations associated with the manner in which conflict was operationalized that may also have affected the results. Conflict was

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{9} It was beyond the scope of the present study to discuss the war in Bosnia in itself or Canadian media coverage of the conflict. However, it seems that Canadian public is accustomed to the coverage where Serbs are mainly held responsible for all wrongdoing in the region (regardless of being a truth or not).
\end{footnote}
measured as having lost family members or friends in the war. Probing the participants in further detail about the degree to which they were involved in conflict would have been too sensitive and inappropriate. However, the vagueness of this question does not allow consideration of the circumstances involved that may have qualified the effect on an individuals' group identity and consequently, intergroup behaviour. For example, family members may have been killed by members of one's own nationality, in which case one might become resentful toward one's own nationality. Some respondents might have been involved directly in conflict against the out-group (as warriors). Needless to say, there are many different variables that might have accounted for how one was affected by war that may have attenuated the relationship between conflict as it was operationalized in the present study, and the intergroup responses. Future research into such sensitive areas might consider an interview format that would allow a more sensitive approach to assessing how people experience the conflicts of war.

Indeed, to disregard the role of conflict in intergroup behaviour would be extremely naïve, particularly when we are dealing with groups that have a long history of conflict. The results of the present study indicated that conflict was associated with the strength of in-group identity, which in turn was consistently related to intergroup bias, differentiation, and discrimination. Once identified strongly with the group, group members may discriminate against the out-group even in the absence of real conflicting group interests. They will discriminate, as proposed by SIT, to achieve and maintain a positive social identity. As noted previously, SIT was not intended to replace the RCT, but rather to complement it (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Similar to Kelly's (1988)
proposition, the results of this study suggest that the principles from the two models of group relations, namely the goal-oriented approach of RCT and the social identity approach should be closely integrated, in order to arrive at a better understanding of their complementarity.

As noted, in-group identification was found to be a consistent and powerful predictor of intergroup differentiation, discrimination, and bias. This finding contrasts strongly with some previous investigations that were conducted in an occupational setting which have shown in-group identification to be only a weak predictor of intergroup differentiation (e.g. Brown et al., 1986). However, the results of this study are in line with Kelly's (1988) findings in a political context. It seems, as Kelly suggested, that the differences in research results may be due to differences in the group processes associated with an interpersonal versus an intergroup conflict setting. In an occupational setting interpersonal relations are more salient, while in ethnic (or political) contexts people are likely to see themselves in terms of a group stereotype and conform to group norms, ignoring their personal identity. As SCT purports, when a social (national) identity becomes salient, individuals become depersonalised that is, cognitively absorbed by their social identities and separated from their personal identities. Thus, the respondents in the present study who identified strongly with their group saw themselves in terms of a group stereotype, exaggerating intergroup differences and accentuating the similarities within the in-group (high meta-contrast ratio).

A second difference with research finding only a weak relationship between identity and group processes, concerns the framework for intergroup relations: the
occupational context is relatively cooperative, while the intergroup relations among Muslims and Serbs are completely antagonistic. As noted earlier, previous research has suggested that predictions derived from SIT may be more appropriate for explaining competitive rather than cooperative relations (Brown & Adams, 1986).

Finally, findings from this study relating to the role of self-esteem in intergroup behaviour were rather inconsistent. Using Rosenberg’s scale of personal self-esteem none of the relations with intergroup bias, differentiation and discrimination were significant. These findings are consistent with Long’s et al. (1994) argument that personal self-esteem is at the wrong level of abstraction to account for intergroup discrimination. Also, the correlational data for the relationships among the esteem dimensions confirm that collective self-esteem and personal self-esteem were indeed independent dimensions.

When collective self-esteem was considered in relation to perceived intergroup differentiation and perceived bias, the results contradicted the initial expectations. Participants with higher membership esteem and importance to identity perceived greater intergroup differentiation and bias. However, this relationship disappeared once identity was controlled for. This might suggest that these variables were only related to differentiation and bias because of the common variance shared with holding a strong identity. Indeed, comparing items of the membership and importance subscales to items on the identity scale, it became evident that the items in these scales overlapped substantially; the identity scale reflected both awareness of group membership and evaluation (e.g. “It is important to me that I support this group”). Therefore, it is not surprising that collective esteem and identity were highly related.
With the respect to the role of collective esteem in intergroup discrimination, the hypotheses were partially supported. All three dimensions of collective self-esteem, membership esteem, public esteem and importance to identity were related to social distance in that lower esteem was associated with greater need for social distance from outgroup. Thus, these results are in line with the SIT position, in that depressed or threatened self-esteem promotes intergroup discrimination.

However, when identity was taken into consideration, these collective self-esteem dimensions were redundant predictors of bias, intergroup differentiation and discrimination. This would suggest that once highly identified with the in-group, collective self-esteem in and of itself no longer motivates discrimination. SIT theorists have already suggested that motivational status of self-esteem in social identity theory is in need of some elaboration and clarification to specify its relationship to more specific goals and purposes (Hogg & Abrams 1988).

In relation to collective esteem dimensions, while identity was highly related to the importance to identity and membership esteem, it was not related to public esteem. Rubin and Hewstone (1998) have drawn attention to this issue, suggesting that a finer distinction is required between in-group identification and social self-esteem. It seems to be necessary to better separate operationalizations of in-group identification and social self-esteem. One possibility is to restrict measures of identification to issues of importance and measures of self-esteem to issues of group evaluation (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). The present results with respect to public self-esteem, which assessed the perception of other’s evaluation of the ingroup, support this idea. It appeared that the participants with
the more negative perception of others’ evaluation of their group displayed more bias, perceived greater intergroup differentiation and displayed more need for social distance from outgroup. It may be that only the public esteem subscale approaches the independent conceptualisation of social self-esteem implied by social identity theory. Low public esteem means that the public image of the participant, as a group member may have been particularly vulnerable in this competitive context. According to SIT, one will discriminate to restore a threatened social identity. In the context of the Bosnian war in which propaganda has been so central, what could be more threatening to one’s social identity than perceiving one’s own group to be evaluated negatively by others.

Strong positive intercorrelations among identity and collective self-esteem dimensions might explain why this study failed to find a significant interaction effect of identity and the self-esteem measures on bias, intergroup differentiation and discrimination. Similarly, the interaction effect of identity and public esteem did not contribute unique explain variability. The possible explanation might be that the effect of identity is much stronger relative to the effect of esteem, so it may have prevented the detection of a stronger interaction effect. Thus, an important step for future research may be to further consider the nature of the links between identity and collective self-esteem, and clarify the independent role of self-esteem in intergroup relations.

This study intended to enrich the examination of intergroup cognition and behaviour by considering the affective or emotional component of group identity. However, the scale developed to assess positive emotions associated with group membership had to be dropped from analysis due to strong redundancy with identity scale. Thus, it appears that
for the participants in this study, a strong sense of belonging to a group involved highly positive emotions (pride, security, likeness, compassion, and happiness). Therefore, the argument that SIT has neglected analyses of the role of emotions in intergroup relations might not be completely right. Past research might not have examined emotions separately from identity, but the measures of identity clearly include an emotional component (e.g. Brown, 1986).

A second problem encountered concerned the negative emotion subscale. Responses to this scale were highly negatively skewed, indicating a high denial of any negative emotions associated with their group membership. Interestingly, on average, participants scored just beyond the midpoint on the positive emotions subscale, while on negative subscale they scored almost at the maximum. Thus, it appears that the members of these two ethnic groups have, on average, moderately positive emotions associated with group membership that covary strongly with their sense of identity, whereas, they are extremely likely to deny the existence of any negative emotions. Also, there was no significant correlation between these two subscales where conceptually a significant negative correlation would be expected. Further research is needed to address the affective dimensions of national group membership to better understand the nature of these discrepancies.

When negative emotions were considered in relation to intergroup bias, and discrimination, no significant associations were found. Only a significant zero order correlation was found with intergroup differentiation, in that the higher denial of any negative emotions associated with own group membership, the greater perceived
differentiation between the in-group and the outgroup. However, this association disappeared once other variables relating to social identities were considered. As suggested, this skewness of negative emotion scale might explain the nonsignificant relationships with almost all of the dependent variables.

It should be noted that the correlational design of the present study precluded establishing possible causal links among conflict, identity and intergroup behaviour. Because most studies in this area, including the present one, have been correlational in nature, identification of causal links are still lacking. It was impossible to determine whether Serbs and Muslims, as a result of conflict, developed strong group identities which, in turn were accountable for engaging in intergroup discrimination in order to protect and enhance a positive social identity or whether conflict came as a result of strong group identities.

The sample used may also have restricted the generalizability of the findings. The results of this study may have been different if the participants had been living in Bosnia at the time of the study.\textsuperscript{10} Also, it should be noted that the educational level of the participants was higher compared to the general population. About 50\% of the sample had a college or university degree while the rest had a minimum of high school. This is a common problem in psychological research that depends on volunteers. Another issue that limits generalizibility of the findings is that the individuals whose parents were of a different nationality could not participate, as they had to belong to one nationality exclusively. Finally, the possible influence of a social desirability bias on the participants'\

\textsuperscript{10} In that case conflict might be the best predictor of intergroup behaviour.
responses cannot be ignored. However, some members of these two Bosnian groups refused to participate when they saw the questionnaires. The usual explanation was that the issues were too sensitive. Thus, it might be possible that this study could not reach out to the people that feel extremely strongly about their nationality. The effect of all of these has been to reduce variability and hence the ability to find relations among variables. Despite these limitations, the significant relationships found in this study demonstrated support for the fundamental tenets of Social Identity Theory, particularly the hypothesised link between in-group identification and intergroup bias, differentiation and discrimination.

National affiliation may provide a fruitful context for examining the impact of certain structural and ideological factors on social identity processes. Conversely, Tajfel’s simple but stunning insight that even the most trivial of category distinction can be the cue for the most extreme forms of discrimination could help us better understand the Bosnian conflict. Particularly, it may help to understand the paradox of an ethnoreligious war in a land where everyone shares the same Slavic blood and almost no one goes to church (or mosque). Even more clear is SIT’s usefulness in understanding how 5000 kilometres from the conflict where only a person’s name can be used to distinguish group membership – that “different” name is enough to trigger intergroup bias and discrimination.

Finally, the mechanisms that were applied to partisan evaluations and perceptions of the media reports of their realities, can be applied to partisan evaluations of a proposal for conflict resolution. If these partisan groups see media as biased against their group,
there is a great possibility that they see any proposal of peace negotiators as unfair and against their groups. This might be a part of the answer for why numerous humanitarians and policy-makers in Bosnia were seen as interfering rather than helping.
References


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Appendix A

The pilot study to select a stimulus material

The purpose of this pilot study was to investigate the perceived level of bias among Carleton undergraduates (Canadians) with respect to six newspaper articles. The aim was to select a “balanced” subset (that would be rated as relatively unbiased by “neutrals”) for the final stimulus material. These articles were to be used in the main study.

It is believed that group membership plays a major role in perceptions of the fairness or credibility of mass media. More specifically, when presented with media reports of their own situations, ingroup members accept information consonant with their identity as factual, and reject dissonant information as biased propaganda that primarily drives the suggestible members of the outgroup.

It was the goal of the present to study to examine responses of two opposing Bosnian groups (Muslims and Serbs) to a specific sample of media coverage to determine how their perceptions and evaluations of the articles differed, and how such differences relate to perceptions of media “bias”. It was expected that each partisan group would generally view assumingly neutral material as biased against their own position. Therefore, it was the goal of the pilot study to identify relevant articles that would be viewed as neutral by nonpartisan groups.
Method

Participants

Participants (n=10) were first year students that did not have any personal connection with former Yugoslavia. To ensure this, the recruitment notices explicitly indicated that participants should not have any personal connection with former Yugoslavia. Participants were compensated with course credit.

Materials

Six articles about the Bosnian war were selected from an almost exhaustive sample of major Canadian newspapers' coverage of the war in Bosnia. These articles were chosen because they offered the coverage of some controversial events where both sides (Muslim and Serbs) were blamed equally, and as such, could be viewed as neutral to an involved reader. These six articles, each approximately two pages in length published by The Gazette (Montreal) (2), The Ottawa Citizen (1), The Toronto Star (2) and The Vancouver Sun (1) constituted the stimulus material for this study.

Procedure

The participants were asked to participate in a “study of the media coverage of the conflict in Bosnia”. They were fully informed as to the purpose of this study before they agreed to participate. Participants read the articles one by one. After reading each one they responded to a questionnaire about perceived biases for the article. Six articles were given to participants in random order. Each questionnaire consisting of 5 items was
designed to elicit perceptions of the fairness and objectivity of the material. In addition to the item dealing with overall bias, respondents were asked to respond to several more specific items allowing them to elaborate their views about the strength and number of arguments presented, degree of attention focused on each groups’ role in the war, and the apparent personal views of the authors of the articles. Responses to these items were on a 7-point rating scale ranging from −3 (more in favour of Serbs) to +3 (more in favour of Muslims). The mean response for each article was taken as participants’ score of perceived bias in relation to two ethnic groups.

All participants were debriefed in writing. At the end, any questions the participants might have had were answered and they were provided in writing with the names of the people they could contact to discuss possible questions and ethical concerns about the study.

Results and Discussion

Following the conduct of the pilot study it was decided to not include Croats in the main study. As a result, one article was dropped from the analysis because it included the Croats’ role in the conflict. This seemed inappropriate for the final stimulus material.

The means and standard deviations for the remaining five articles are reported in Table A-1. Considering the length for the final experiment (time to read articles and respond to all questionnaires), it was decided that two articles should be used as the final stimulus material. Examination of the means allowed the identification of the two least biased articles. These two articles were concerned with the 1994 bombing of Sarajevo’s
market place that killed 68 people. The primary focus of the articles was to convey that officials had been unable to determine who was responsible for the attack, the Serbs or the Muslims. These two articles were chosen to be used as stimulus material in the final study.

Interestingly, all three of the other articles were rated as moderately biased in favour of the Muslim side. Given that these articles reflected the general nature of the Canadian press, this might suggest that the sample in this study were exposed to media that was "objectively" biased in favour of one group over the other, that is the Muslims over the Serbs.

### Table A-1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN can’t pin massacre….</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN can’t prove that Muslims…</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truth lost in Bosnia’s fog …</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian winter brings…</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The new Bosnia….</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B

Identification Scale

We would like you to consider your Serb nationality and respond to the following statements on the basis of how you feel about this group and your membership in it. Please read each statement carefully, and respond by using the following scale:

1 never 2 rarely 3 sometimes 4 often 5 very often

1. It is important to me that I belong to Serb nationality. __________
2. I identify with Serb nationality. __________
3. I feel strong ties with other people of the Serb nationality. __________
4. I feel critical of Serbs. __________
5. I am glad that I belong to the Serb national group. __________
6. I feel annoyed to say I'm a member of the Serb national group. __________
7. I see myself as belonging to the Serb national group. __________
8. I feel that it puts me at a disadvantage to belong to the Serb nationality. __________
9. I make excuses for belonging to the Serb nationality. __________
10. I try to hide that I am a Serb. __________
11. In my everyday life think about being a Serb. __________

12. Do you think that what happens to Serbs generally will have something to do with what happens in your life? Please circle a number that best reflects your opinion.

1 Not at all 2 3 4 5 To a great degree

13. Do you think that the Serbs' political program has affected you personally?

1 Not at all 2 3 4 5 To a great degree
We would like you to consider your Muslim nationality and respond to the following statements on the basis of how you feel about this group and your membership in it. Please read each statement carefully, and respond by using the following scale:

1    2    3    4    5
never rarely sometimes often very often

1. It is important to me that I belong to Muslim nationality.

2. I identify with Muslim nationality.

3. I feel strong ties with other people of the Muslim nationality.

4. I feel critical of Muslim.

5. I am glad that I belong to the Muslim national group.

6. I feel annoyed to say I'm a member of the Muslim national group.

7. I see myself as belonging to the Muslim national group.

8. I feel that it puts me at a disadvantage to belong to the Muslim nationality.

9. I make excuses for belonging to the Muslim nationality.

10. I try to hide that I am a Muslim.

11. In my everyday life think about being a Muslim.

12. Do you think that what happens to Muslims generally will have something to do with what happens in your life? Please circle a number that best reflects your opinion.

1    2    3    4    5
Not at all To a great degree

13. Do you think that the Muslims' political program has affected you personally?

1    2    3    4    5
Not at all To a great degree
Appendix C

**Measures of meta-contrast ratio**

Using the characteristics/issues below, please indicate the extent to which you think Serbs are similar to one another along each dimension. Place in the space corresponding to each attribute a number that best represents your opinion on how similar Serbs are.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>Extremely similar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polite</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rugged</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easy-going</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazy</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selfish</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courageous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Using the characteristics/issues below, please indicate the extent to which you think Muslims are similar to one another along each dimension. Place in the space corresponding to each attribute a number that best represents your opinion on how similar Muslims are.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polite</td>
<td>_______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>_______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrious</td>
<td>_______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rugged</td>
<td>_______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easy-going</td>
<td>_______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazy</td>
<td>_______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selfish</td>
<td>_______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>_______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional</td>
<td>_______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest</td>
<td>_______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td>_______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courageous</td>
<td>_______</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extremely similar

Not at all similar
Using the characteristics/issues below, indicate the extent to which you think Muslims and Serbs are similar to each other along each dimension. Place in the space corresponding to each attribute a number that best represents your opinion on how similar Muslims and Serbs are.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Muslims/Serbs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrious</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rugged</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Easy-going</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lazy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Selfish</td>
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<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Emotional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courageous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Using the characteristics/issues below, please indicate the extent to which you think Serbs are similar to one another along each dimension. Place in the space corresponding to each attribute a number that best represents your opinion on how similar Serbs are.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Serbs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exciting life</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social justice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-respect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meaning in life</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-discipline</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleasure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritual life</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty for nation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trustworthiness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal hygiene</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for national history</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance for others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Not at all

2 Similar

3

4

5

6

7 Extremely similar


Using the characteristics/issues below, please indicate the extent to which you think Muslims are similar to one another along each dimension. Place in the space corresponding to each attribute a number that best represents your opinion on how similar Muslims are.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exciting life</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social justice</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-respect</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meaning in life</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family security</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-discipline</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleasure</td>
<td></td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritual life</td>
<td></td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty for nation</td>
<td></td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trustworthiness</td>
<td></td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal hygiene</td>
<td></td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for national history</td>
<td></td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance for others</td>
<td></td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Using the characteristics/issues below, please indicate the extent to which you think Muslims and Serbs are similar to each other along each dimension. Place in the space corresponding to each attribute a number that best represents your opinion on how similar Muslims and Serbs are.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Muslims/Serbs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exciting life</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-respect</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meaning in life</td>
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<td>Family security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-discipline</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pleasure</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritual life</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Loyalty for nation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Trustworthiness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal hygiene</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for national history</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance for others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 = Not at all similar
5 = Moderately similar
7 = Extremely similar
Appendix D

Collective self-esteem scale

We would like you to consider your Serb nationality, and respond to the following statements on the basis of how you feel about this group and your membership in it. There are no right or wrong answers to any of these statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions. Please read each statement carefully, and respond by using the following scale:

-3  -2  -1  0  +1  +2  +3
strongly disagree          strongly agree

1. I am a worthy member of Serb national group.
   __________

2. I feel I don’t have much to offer to the Serb national group.
   __________

3. I am a cooperative participant in the Serb national group.
   __________

4. I often feel I’m a useless member of Serb national group.
   __________

5. I often regret that I belong to Serb national group.
   __________

6. In general, I’m glad to be a member Serb my national group.
   __________

7. Overall, I often feel that the Serb nationality to which I belong is not worthwhile.
   __________
-3  -2  -1  0  +1  +2  +3
strongly disagree  strongly agree

8. I feel good about the Serb nationality I belong to.

9. Overall, Serb national group is considered good by others.

10. Most people consider Serb national group, on the average, to be more ineffective than other national groups.

11. In general, others respect the Serb national group.

12. In general, others think that the Serb national group is unworthy.

13. Overall, my belonging to Serb nationality has very little to do with how I feel about myself.

14. The Serb national group is an important reflection of who I am.

15. In general, belonging to Serb national group is an important part of my self-image.

16. The Serb national group is unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am.
We would like you to consider your Muslim nationality, and respond to the following statements on the basis of how you feel about this group and your membership in it. There are no right or wrong answers to any of these statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions. Please read each statement carefully, and respond by using the following scale:

-3 strongly disagree  -2  -1  0  +1  +2  +3 strongly agree

1. I am a worthy member of Muslims' national group.

2. I feel I don’t have much to offer to the Muslim national group.

3. I am a cooperative participant in the Muslim national group.

4. I often feel I’m a useless member of Muslim national group.

5. I often regret that I belong to Muslim national group.

6. In, general, I’m glad to be a member Muslim my national group.

7. Overall, I often feel that the Muslim nationality to which I belong is not worthwhile.

8. I feel good about the Muslim nationality I belong to.

9. Overall, Muslim national group is considered good by others.

10. Most people consider Muslim national group, on the average, to be more ineffective than other national groups.
11. In general, others respect the Muslim national group.

12. In general, others think that the Muslim national group is unworthy.

13. Overall, my belonging to Muslim nationality has very little to do with how I feel about myself.

14. The Muslim national group is an important reflection of who I am.

15. In general, belonging to Muslim national group is an important part of my self-image.

16. The Muslim national group is unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am.
Appendix E

Rosenberg's Self Esteem Scale

Instructions: Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements by circling the appropriate option for each statement.

1 = strongly disagree
2 = disagree
3 = agree
4 = strongly agree

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. At times I think I am no good at all.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. I certainly feel useless at times.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>others.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10. I take a positive attitude toward myself.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix F

Emotional significance of membership scale

Please indicate the extent to which the following statements describe your emotions with respect to your Serb nationality.

1  2  3  4  5  6  7

Not at all  Extremely

1. I feel proud that I belong to Serb nationality.
2. Being a Serb is a source of frustration to me.
3. I am happy that I was born in a Serb family.
4. I am ashamed that I belong to a Serb nationality.
5. I regret that I was born in a Serb family.
6. Being a Serb makes me feel secure.
7. I am angry at my nationality.
8. Being a Serb makes me feel guilty.
9. I feel compassion with other people of my nationality.
10. I like to say that I belong to Serb nationality.
Please indicate the extent to which the following statements describe your emotions with respect to your Muslim nationality.

1. I feel proud that I belong to Muslim nationality. 
2. Being a Muslim is a source of frustration to me. 
3. I am happy that I was born in a Muslim family. 
4. I am ashamed that I belong to a Muslim nationality. 
5. I regret that I was born in a Muslim family. 
6. Being a Muslim makes me feel secure. 
7. I am angry at my nationality. 
8. Being a Muslim makes me feel guilty. 
9. I feel compassion with other people of my nationality. 
10. I like to say that I belong to Muslim nationality.
Appendix G

Measure of group involvement

1) Do you have any close family members left in former Yugoslavia? Yes No

2) If yes, how much contact do you have with them?

1 never 2 rarely 3 sometimes 4 often 5 very often

3) Have you lost any close family member in the war in Bosnia? Yes No

4) If yes, how often do you think about that?

1 never 2 rarely 3 sometimes 4 often 5 very often

5) Do you have any family members here? Yes No

6) Please indicate whether it is new family (spouse and children) or birth family or both?

7) If yes, how much contact do you have with them?

1 never 2 rarely 3 sometimes 4 often 5 very often

8) Do you have any friends left in former Yugoslavia? Yes No

9) If yes, how much contact do you have with them?

1 never 2 rarely 3 sometimes 4 often 5 very often

10) Have you lost any friends in the war in Bosnia? Yes No
11) If yes, how often do you think about that?

1 never 2 rarely 3 sometimes 4 often 5 very often

12) Do you participate in activities organised by your community here?

1 never 2 rarely 3 sometimes 4 often 5 very often

13) Are your friends here of the same nationality as you are?

1 None at all 2 A few 3 Some 4 Many 5 All of them

14) Does your partner or spouse belong to different nationality?

Yes (1) No (2)
Appendix H
Social distance scale

Using the scale below, please rate how comfortable you would feel to have a Serb/Muslim in the following social positions. Fill in the blanks with your ratings.

1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
Not at all comfortable  Very comfortable

AS
A neighbour
My roommate
My spiritual counsellor
A close friend
My employer
My personal physician
My co-worker
**Appendix I**

**Questionnaire on perceived bias**

The article you have read was taken from newspaper published in_________________________. Given the context and its specificity, we would like you to rate your perceptions of this article along each dimension.

1. **Overall tone of this article**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>-3</th>
<th>-2</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>+1</th>
<th>+2</th>
<th>+3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro Serbs</td>
<td>Favors neither</td>
<td>Pro Muslims</td>
<td></td>
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2. **Number of arguments presented**

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<th>-3</th>
<th>-2</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>+1</th>
<th>+2</th>
<th>+3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More in favor of Serbs</td>
<td>Equal number for both</td>
<td>More in favor of Muslims</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3. **Strength of arguments presented**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>-3</th>
<th>-2</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>+1</th>
<th>+2</th>
<th>+3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stronger in favor of Serbs</td>
<td>Equally strong for both</td>
<td>Stronger in favor of Muslims</td>
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</table>

4. **Who is portrayed as responsible for conducting the violence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>-3</th>
<th>-2</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>+1</th>
<th>+2</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbs more responsible</td>
<td>Equally responsible</td>
<td>Muslims more responsible</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

5. **After reading this article initially neutral viewers would become**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>-3</th>
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<th>-1</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>+1</th>
<th>+2</th>
<th>+3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>against Serbs</td>
<td></td>
<td>against Muslims</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
6. Personal views of editors of this article

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>More in favor</th>
<th>Favors Neither</th>
<th>More in favor of Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-3</td>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-1</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>+1</td>
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<td>+3</td>
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</table>

7. In your opinion Western media is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
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<th>Favors Neither</th>
<th>More in favor of Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-3</td>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-2</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-1</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>+3</td>
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</table>

8. In your opinion who is responsible for the attack?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>More</th>
<th>Favors</th>
<th>More of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-3</td>
<td>Serbs for sure</td>
<td>Muslims for sure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2</td>
<td>Most likely Serbs</td>
<td>Most likely Muslims</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>Probably Serbs</td>
<td>Probably Muslims</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix J

Stimulus Material (Article 1)

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The Ottawa Citizen – Final
News Tuesday February 08, 1994 A6

UN can’t prove that Muslims have attacked their own
Ian Traynor
The Guardian
VIENNA

VIENNA – Before Saturday’s massacre of innocents by a mortar in Sarajevo, one of the worst atrocities in the besieged city was the killing of more than 20 and wounding of more than 100 lined up for bread six weeks into the war.

Then, as now, the besieging Serbs denied blame for the carnage and accused the mainly Muslim Bosnian government of murdering its own citizens as a propaganda stunt aimed at provoking outside intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The United Nations in Sarajevo says it is unable to pinpoint precisely the origin of Saturday’s 120mm mortar shell. It never identified those guilty of the bread line attack on May 27, 1992.

But suspicions that the Muslims murdered their own in May 1992 have been revived.

UN and diplomatic sources in Zagreb, Geneva and New York, however, all intimately connected with operations in the area, unanimously maintain they know of no instance where Muslims have committed atrocities against their own.

“I am not aware that the UN has ever officially found that the Muslims attacked their own people, says a UN official. “It’s such a serious charge that it should not be bandied around callously.

Nothing found in reports

One of the most senior UN officials in former Yugoslavia, who has been there since the UN operation began in spring 1992, says he has combed the files for reports on who was responsible for the bread line mortar and found nothing.

“There is no conclusive evidence at all. Reports of classified documents are hogwash.
In August 1992, a British newspaper reported that senior UN officials in New York believed the Muslims were staging atrocities against Muslims to gain international sympathy. The report was said to be based on confidential documents and classified briefings, none of which were cited.

The Bosnian government rebutted the allegations as reminiscent of Nazi claims that Jews were burning their own synagogues during the Third Reich.

A well-placed source at the UN in New York says he is not aware of any UN cables on the 1992 attack. It is not even clear if the UN carried out an investigation.

Two UN sources say the story that the Muslims perpetrated the 1992 attack originated with Gen. Lewis MacKenzie of Canada, the first UN commander in Bosnia. He was in Belgrade the day of the Sarajevo attack.

In his book, Peacekeeper, MacKenzie says he told President Francois Mitterrand of France in Sarajevo a month after the bread line carnage that there were strong suspicions that the Muslims had carried out the attack.

"There is strong but circumstantial evidence that some really horrifying acts of cruelty attributed to the Serbs were actually orchestrated by the Muslims against their own people for the benefit of an international audience, he cites himself as telling Mitterrand.

"To my knowledge, a UN official working in Bosnia since mid-1992 said Monday, "there has not been a single incident like that. Such charges "are complete[y] fabricated and trumped up."
Article 2

UN team can’t pin massacre on Serbs’ artillery: Muslim-led Bosnian army accused of ‘staging’ shelling that killed 68
WASHINGTON POST
ZAGREB, Croatia

STORY TYPE: NEWS

ZAGREB, Croatia – A special UN team reported Wednesday that it was unable to determine who fired the 120-mm mortar round that killed 68 people in a Sarajevo marketplace on Feb. 5, touching off the current confrontation between NATO and the Bosnian Serbs.

This was the same conclusion that the initial United Nations investigation into the incident reached the day afterward. The second investigation was ordered at the insistence of the Bosnian Serbs, who have been widely blamed for the fatal shelling.

The Serbs claimed the Muslim-led Bosnian army “stage-managed” the whole incident to provoke NATO’s military intervention. They threatened to withdraw from the Geneva peace talks last week unless an impartial international investigation was undertaken.

In a bid to defuse the issue, the UN special representative to the former Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi, appointed a new team made up of military technical experts from Spain, Pakistan, Canada, Russia and France.

“‘There is insufficient physical evidence to prove that one party or the other fired the mortar bomb,’” said Col. Michel Gauthier of Canada, who led the five-man team. “‘The mortar bomb in question could have been fired by either side.

“‘Both parties are known to have 120-mm mortars and the bombs to go along with them. The team has no reason to believe that either party does not have access to this type of ammunition.”

Gauthier said in his report that “theoretically” the origin of the mortar round could have been determined with precision had it been possible to correlate a fully accurate analysis of the shell’s crater in the market with information about its estimated direction, angle of fire and range.

But in practical terms, he said, no such correlation was possible because there were no UN observers in the general area northeast of Sarajevo from which the round was fired. The Bosnian Serbs had denied the observers freedom of movement in that area since October.
In addition, Gauthier said, the information provided by the Bosnian army about its positions in this area had been "inconclusive."

UN observers on the southern side of the city had recorded the firing, he said, but only on the basis of its impact on the marketplace and not a sighting of the mortar’s position.

Furthermore, Gauthier reported, the general area from where the mortar round came overlapped the Serb-Bosnian army confrontation lines. "The distance of origin of fire clearly overlaps each side of the confrontation line by 2,000 metres," he said.

The team had been unable to sweep that area for traces of the mortar position.

In any case, he argued, there was little hope of finding it because of fresh snow and "the strong likelihood that any such evidence has long since vanished."

Under questioning, Gauthier disclosed that the mortar shell had reached the ground before exploding, rather than detonating at face level after crashing into a market stall as reported. He said the UN team made no attempt to analyse the metal of the shell’s remains or the chemical makeup of its explosive charge to establish whether it had been manufactured in a Bosnian army or Serb factory.

Such an analysis was beyond the scope of the team’s mandate, Gauthier said.
Bosnian winter brings
ROGER COHEN
NEW YORK TIMES
PALE, Bosnia-Herzegovina

STORY TYPE: ANALYSIS
SUBJECT: BOSNIA YUGOSLAVIA CIVIL WAR

PALE, Bosnia-Herzegovina - Nenad Tadic, a Bosnian Serb soldier, looked up yesterday at the snow falling heavily on the mountains surrounding Sarajevo and said, "The weather would achieve a four-month ceasefire, with or without the politicians."

He was right. With snow falling and the weather bitterly cold, the fighting season is largely over in Bosnia. The ceasefire announced by former U.S. president Jimmy Carter that is scheduled to start tomorrow is therefore relatively insignificant unless it can be developed into a real disengagement of forces.

Such a disengagement, buffered by United Nations forces, took place earlier this year in central Bosnia, where there had been brutal fighting between Muslims and Croats. But in that instance, the rival armies and politicians had decided to end, or at least bury, their differences.

That is far from the case in the war between the Muslim-led Bosnian government forces and the Bosnian Serbs, who are based in Pale, outside Sarajevo. Announcing Carter's agreement, Sarajevo Radio said on Tuesday that it was signed by the government "and the war criminals in Pale." Conciliation is not yet in the air.

At least not among the politicians of Bosnia. Among the populations on either side there is, however, an immense fatigue that would, if it could ever find political expression, open the door to peace at least a crack. But politics in the Balkans does not seem to work this way.

"The war has destroyed us psychologically," said Milja Gluhovic, a Bosnian Serb in Pale who lost both her husband and brother last May to a single Bosnian shell that landed in their trench in the mountains above Sarajevo. "Everyone wants peace, everyone," she said. "But the prospects are dim."
In Sarajevo, an accountant named Amra who declined to give her last name said: "It is very sad when, after two and a half years, you see there is nothing left. I hate this place. I hate these people. If I can ever get away, I will never come back."

Such weariness, disillusionment and disgust with political manoeuvring are now rampant throughout Bosnia. But the grim scheming that has already inflicted 32 months of war on Bosnia continues unabated.

The Bosnian government of President Alija Izetbegovic, outraged by the Serbs' campaign of terror against Muslims across much of Bosnia, wants to "liberate" the country from the Bosnia Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and the many Serbs who follow him.

If that remains the case, Izetbegovic will try to use an eventual four-month respite from fighting to continue rearming and building an army that has made immense strides over the past two years.

Despite the successful Serbian onslaught on the western Muslim enclave of Bihac, the Bosnian army continues to put the Serbs under new pressure elsewhere in other parts of the country.

A Bosnian military victory over Karadzic would almost certainly take years; moreover, there would still be many Serbs left in Bosnia who would not want to live under a Muslim-led government. And the toll of political and economic isolation that goes with Karadzic's ideas would ultimately prove crippling.

If the United States, Britain, France, Germany and Russia, - the Contact Group that has drawn up a peace plan for Bosnia - can convince the opposing sides of the futility of this essential stalemate, there might be some chance of a real cessation of hostilities that would outlast the effects of the winter. its annual ceasefire
TRUDY RUBIN

The new Bosnia: Serbs, West to blame for death of pluralism

TRUDY RUBIN
KNIGHT-RIDDER

STORY TYPE: COLUMN
SUBJECT: BOSNIA YUGOSLAVIA CIVIL WAR MUSLIMS

A fundamentalist Islamic state in the heart of Europe: that is what Bosnian Serbs claim to be trying to prevent by waging war against Bosnian Muslims.

Some European governments appear to believe this crude Serbian propaganda, which may be why they have failed to help the Bosnians.

But, in a self-fulfilling prophecy, it is the Serbs and the West who may succeed in transforming multi-ethnic Bosnia into a one-party Muslim state.

Three years of brutal war have eaten away at the ethnic tolerance that once characterized Bosnia's largest cities.

Back in 1992, when Bosnia declared independence, its government pledged to build a multi-ethnic society. That was an uphill struggle: predominantly Serbian regions wanted to link up with Serbia, and the biggest political parties in Bosnia formed along ethnic lines.

But in cosmopolitan cities such as Sarajevo and Tuzla, multi-ethnic parties did well. The prevailing sentiment among ordinary Muslims, who frequently intermarried, was to retain a multi-ethnic state. That was before Serbs gained 70 per cent of Bosnian territory by "ethnic cleansing" and war.

And it was before Western leaders refused to help the new government of Bosnia save the country from ethnic partition by the Serbs.

With no end to the fighting in sight, Sarajevo is becoming less multi-ethnic and more Islamic. The mostly Muslim Bosnian government has introduced Islamic religion classes into public schools.

Media lambasted
The Washington Post reports this week that all but one non-Muslim director of the country’s state-run firms have been dismissed. Bosnia’s Muslim education minister has lambasted the independent media for their secular ideals.

And there is an increasing exodus of Bosnian Croats and Serbs who had been committed to staying on in a multi-ethnic Bosnia. They can seek refuge and residence with their ethnic cousins in the new states of Croatia or Serbia. Bosnian Muslims, on the other hand, have no where else to go.

When I visited Bosnia this summer, diplomats told me that the increasingly Islamic climate was very much the product of war. The changes reflect the authoritarian political climate of communist Yugoslavia that would have been modified in a peaceful Bosnia.

But, in a country under military siege, the leading Bosnian political party, formed by ethnic Muslims and headed by President Alija Izetbegovic, is starting to exert the kind of control common to a one-party state. Although it rules in alliance with a Croatian party, Croats get less of the spoils, and Bosnian Serbs are left out in the cold.

Loyalty to the party is becoming the condition for patronage jobs. Thus, one Bosnian Serb surgeon I met in Sarajevo, who was engaged to a Muslim doctor, told me in despair that a poorly qualified Muslim doctor had been made the head of her department.

She had been told she had no future, although she had worked side by side with Muslims and Croats in bloody operating rooms under Serbian siege. She now plans to emigrate.

Another contributor to "Muslimization" of Bosnia is a huge population shift. More than 1 million Muslim refugees have been forced into a tiny percentage of Bosnian territory by Serbian ethnic cleansing. Many are rural people, more conservative and religious than their urban counterparts. Most have suffered horrors at the hands of Serbs.

This influx of Muslims has upset the old balance of Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims in the cities. In the city of Tuzla, whose voters opted for a multi-ethnic party in 1990 elections, thousands of Bosnian Serbs and Croats have chosen to leave recently.

Appeals to Muslim nationalism have become more popular with Muslim politicians, as Bosnia’s isolation has deepened. Young Bosnian Muslims, who once considered themselves European, now feel that Europe has rejected and abandoned them because of their religion.

Bosnian Muslims are also very aware that the only countries that have helped them with money and illegal shipments of weapons are Middle Eastern Muslim nations such as Libya and Iran.
In Sarajevo this summer, I spoke with Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Siladzjic about the danger that his country would become beholden to radical Mideast nations. He said, "We have to take aid from whoever will give it." He also denied that Bosnia got aid from Iran.

But Iranian arms shipments have been intercepted en route to Bosnia, and Iran is widely assumed to be funding Bosnian government arms purchases. I asked another Bosnian official why his prime minister would deny those facts.

Western indifference

"We don't like to speak about such things," the official told me sadly. "We don't want our young people to be grateful to Iran." He and others told me they feared that Western indifference would make some young Bosnians choose to identify with radical Islam.

And yet, even today, it is impossible to confuse Sarajevo with the capital of a fundamentalist country. Serb Orthodox churches stand untouched (unlike mosques burned down in Serbian-captured territory). The press is still free.

This fall, a group of Sarajevo intellectuals called Circle 99 has collected more than 150,000 signatures on a petition drive calling for a united and multi-ethnic Sarajevo.

The group has protested against the firing of non-party members from important positions in Sarajevo, and changes in the Bosnian military to downgrade non-Muslim commanders.

But the fight for a tolerant, multi-ethnic Bosnia may be a losing one. When 1 million Muslims are driven into a virtual reservation because of their religion, who can doubt that some will heed the call to revenge?

By expelling all Muslims from Bosnian areas of Serbia, the Serbs have succeeded in killing the pluralistic spirit of Bosnia.

And the West will have little cause to complain if the end result is a one-party Muslim state. After all, Western nations refused to stop the destruction of multi-ethnic Bosnia, so how can they complain at the most likely result?
Truth lost in Bosnia’s fog of war
Don Sellar Toronto Star

LENGTH: Medium (300 - 700)
SUBJECT: THE STAR’S OMBUDSMAN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

BY ANY yardstick, the mortar attack on civilians at the Markale market in Sarajevo three Saturdays ago was a barbaric act. The toll: 68 dead, and more than 200 wounded.

So who launched the 120-millimetre shell that caused the worst massacre in the 22-month siege of Sarajevo?

Like many questions hovering in the fog of war in Bosnia, it hasn’t been answered conclusively.

The possibility exists that for diplomatic if not technical reasons, responsibility may never be fixed unequivocally.

A United Nations report has concluded that investigators were unable to determine the origin of the shell.

(At the time, Serbian and Muslim-led Bosnian government forces both had weapons in the snowy hills northeast of the crowded market.)

So far, The Star has run no fewer than 15 stories or editorials mentioning the massacre.

All but one were careful not to affix blame, even though the mortar attack galvanized NATO allies, Canada included, into giving the Bosnian Serbs 10 days to withdraw their heavy guns from the Sarajevo hills, or face air strikes.

But on Feb. 10, a Page 1 story referred in passing to “last weekend’s bloody Serb mortar attack.”

It was a mistake, given the insufficient evidence.

To readers with Serb-tinted glasses, the slip-up was more than that: it was proof The Star would use the news columns to pin the blame on Serbs, regardless of the facts.

Some who called the Ombudsman to complain weren’t content with a verdict of Not Proven in the market shelling. They offered two contradictory explanations.
Version 1 was that the attack had not happened. This version, based on public statements by Bosnian Serb leaders half a world away, suggested the attack had been rigged and filmed using actors, plastic dummies and corpses of people killed earlier.

Version 2 was an equally perverse-sounding allegation that Muslims had killed their own people to win international condemnation of Serbians.

Without accepting the truth of either version, editors agreed the story went too far. They said The Star has been wrongly accused of favoring every faction in the Balkans.

"When all sides are mad at us," remarked one senior editor a trifle warily, "we must be doing something right."

The poisonous Balkan broth of centuries-old ethnic rivalries has the potential to spill into local stories, too.

On Monday, a story about a pro-Serbian vigil at the U.S. consulate the night before mentioned that "representatives of Toronto’s Greek and Jewish communities pledged their support by attending."

Asked if the statement was accurate, a vigil organizer said no Jewish organization had sent representatives.

Also, Manuel Prutschi, executive director of the Canadian Jewish Congress, Ontario region, said that although Jews and Serbs have an affinity "because of their common victimization during the Nazi period," the Jewish community sends clothing and pharmaceutical aid on a non-sectarian basis.

Indeed, hours after the market shelling, it supported the evacuation of 296 Croats, Jews, Muslims and Serbs from the war-weary city.

And, as Prutschi made a point of noting, that list is in alphabetical order. May those who write and edit news about the former Yugoslavia continue to exercise similar care.
Yugoslav wars a godsend for hired guns Inspired by patriotism, money or adventure, several thousand mercenaries and volunteers fight on all sides
Janusz Bugajski SPECIAL TO THE STAR
WASHINGTON

WASHINGTON - The Yugoslav wars have provided a happy hunting ground for several thousand veteran mercenaries and adventure-seeking volunteers from all corners of the globe.

Military units on all sides of the barricades have eagerly recruited foreign fighters since the outbreak of hostilities in June, 1991, although well-supplied Serbian combatants in Croatia have had little need for foreign mercenaries, and only a few dozen exiles have returned to offer their services.

Three distinct types of volunteers flocked to the besieged Croats during their six-month war with the Yugoslav army and Serbian guerrillas: emigre patriots, frustrated eastern Europeans and professional instructors from Western militaries.

During the summer of 1991, the disorganized and outgunned Croatian Defence Force welcomed all the foreign assistance it could muster: weapons, trainers and volunteers. Croatian communities in Canada, the U.S., Australia and Germany mobilized to defend their newly independent homeland. Several hundred young emigres signed up; some had served in foreign armies, but the majority were raw recruits.

For these fighters, a sense of duty and patriotism rather than easy money or job security were the prime motivators. Most entered the ranks of the official Croat units, while a handful enlisted in the paramilitary arm of the hyper-nationalist Party of Rights who are on a self-declared mission to hunt down Serbs.

Jobless eastern European teenagers also signed up to fight with the Croats, usually for an undisclosed fee. They were recruited either by shady war profiteers or by political organizations avidly endorsing Zagreb's independence bid.

Despite legal prohibitions, at least 150 Poles were enlisted by a Krakow-based outfit whose recruiting posters declared, "Young Poles, Croatia is waiting for you!" Fifteen volunteers were subsequently killed by Serbian forces during the destruction of Vukovar. Dozens more are believed to be fighting alongside Croat forces in Bosnia, together with Slovaks, Czechs, Hungarians and Bulgarians.
The Croatians also welcomed Western professionals to train its troops in anti-terrorism and counterinsurgency techniques.

When the Serbian-Croatian war subsided in January, 1992, many of these "advisers" continued their careers in Croatian Herzegovina. Two such British trainers were captured and tortured to death in Travnik, central Bosnia this February, supposedly by Serbian forces.

A number of young soldiers reportedly deserted from the British army to seek thrills on the Yugoslav battlefields. One adventurer was featured in interviews last September claiming that he had formed a "special operations" squad that engaged in hit-and-run sorties behind Serbian lines.

But he vehemently denied any involvement in atrocities: "We don't massacre civilians, pillage villages or rape women. I ban alcohol and drugs in the unit, and I've had to reject some volunteers who were psychopaths or Nazis."

The protracted three-sided guerrilla war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has proved a powerful magnet for international mercenaries. The number of mercenaries has been estimated at between 5,000 and 20,000, among a quarter-million total combatants.

The Croatian Defence Forces in western Herzegovina and central Bosnia receive volunteers from western Europe, the Croatian diaspora, and the Catholic countries of eastern Europe. Many eager young recruits see the war as a Christian crusade against both Serbian communism and Islamic extremism.

But there is little evidence that they have formed disciplined mercenary units akin to those operating in several African conflicts during the 1960s and 1970s. The majority are incorporated in official formations loyal to Bosnia's Croatian leader Mate Boban.

Several American soldiers-of-fortune have also turned up in Bosnia after enlisting in the Croatian army. Two young U.S. fighters, one of Croatian origin, were captured by Serb troops last August. After a spell in a military prison, they were handed over to the U.S. consular offices in Belgrade, an event which the local media exploited to create a Serbian propaganda coup.

The largest number of volunteers, estimated at around 4,000, have rallied around the beleaguered Muslims from a broad cross section of Islamic states, including Turkey, Algeria, Iran and Pakistan.

Others have been enlisted from among Albanian and Turkish guest workers in Germany, Australia and Switzerland. Even Afghan mujahideen have been active in the central Bosnian regions of Zenica and Travnik. One well-known commander, Sheikh Mahmud
Abdul Aziz, is reported to lead an International Islamic Brigade of some 400 devoted volunteers.

Belgrade naturally exaggerates the influence of radical Islamic mercenaries on Bosnian politics to depict the conflict as a global extremist conspiracy. In fact, arriving Muslims have experienced a profound culture shock in Bosnia due to the lax ritual standards of local Sunnis. But despite their alien religious ardor, many imported holy warriors are valued by Sarajevo for their courage, determination and discipline.

The increasingly stretched Serbian forces in Bosnia have also embraced foreign conscripts. Volunteers from Orthodox Christian countries, like Russia, Romania and Greece, have answered the call to defend the allegedly endangered Serbs from “Catholic fascists” and “Islamic militants.”

By far the largest number are Russians, enlisted by various nationalist, monarchist and Cossack organizations.

According to the Moscow News, roughly 500 Russian volunteers are currently stationed in Bosnia, mostly in battle zones along the Drina river border with Serbia. Many are on three-month contracts, receiving $25 a month, a salary more generous than the average Russian wage.

Their motives appear as much personal as they are ideological or financial. This was confirmed in a recent interview with a Russian mercenary in the newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets; the youth claimed that money had little to do with their presence, it was more “the need to be real men.”

Russian officials are also suspected of involvement in the mercenary business. London’s Observer newspaper reported in February that Russian soldiers and technicians had been dispatched to Serbian-held areas of Croatia to operate missile batteries sold to Belgrade in a secret $360 million sanctions-busting deal.

The authorities in Moscow are taking action to end such embarrassments. The Russian parliament approved a draft law on March 1, 1993, proposing a provision in the criminal code banning the recruitment, arming, financing and training of mercenaries.

But with no end to the conflict in sight, the remnants of Yugoslavia will continue to attract foreign adventurers in search of profit, patriotism and peril.

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Appendix K

Debriefing

It is believed that being a member of a group affects one's perception of the fairness or credibility of mass media. More specifically, when presented with media reports related to them, members of a group accept information that is agreeable with their opinions as accurate. Also they tend to reject information that is against their view as biased propaganda. The purpose of this study is to examine the underlying bases of this biased perception.

Our goal is to study the responses of two opposing Bosnian groups (Muslims and Serbs) to specific newspaper articles, to determine exactly how their perception and evaluations of these articles differ. We will try to understand how group members come to see what they want to see and believe what they want to believe. What we expect to find is that each group will generally find these articles as biased against their own group. It is also expected that a "neutral" group (Canadians that won't have any personal connection with former Yugoslavia) will rate the material as relatively unbiased.

However, not all members of a national group will find these articles to be biased to the same degree. Previous studies suggested that different factors (cognitive, emotional, and affective) account for variation in intergroup behavior. What we expect to find is that if being a Serb/Muslim is very important to you (or central to your identity), then you will find these articles to be biased against your respective national group and you will perceive your national group to be very different from the other group. We also expect to find this same reaction for the people with lower collective self-esteem, who are strongly
identified with the group. In addition, we believe that people who perceive themselves to be most affected by intergroup conflict (war in Bosnia) are more likely to have strong national identities. Finally, we expect to find that the more individual experiences emotions associated with own nationality the stronger he/she will be identified with his/her respective national group.

We appreciate the time you took to participate in the study and want to stress that all your answers are valuable. Although the articles that you read are from the Canadian newspapers, we understand that the reading about war may be upsetting for some people. Therefore, we stress that you contact myself or one of the agencies listed below if you have any concerns regarding this study or the issues referred to in this study. The list of contacts includes agencies within both university and the community that are available.

Due to the nature of this research, we ask you not to discuss the subject matter with potential participants until testing is complete (approximately August of 1998). If you wish to discuss any additional aspects of the research we are available for appointments. You may contact Sanela Dursun in room A304 Loeb (520-2600 ext.2683), or Dr. K. Matheson (Principle Investigator), 520-2600, ext. 2648. If you have any questions and/or ethical concerns regarding this experiment, you may also contact either of the following faculty members; Dr. M. Gick, 520-2600, ext.2664 (Chair of the Ethics Committee, Psychology Department); Dr. K. Matheson, 520-2600, ext. 2648 (Chair of the Psychology Department.)