Backtalk: Implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in the Canadian Armed Forces

Victoria Tait-Signal

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Abstract: This dissertation examines the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). It argues that the gender equality norms contained within UNSCR 1325 have been distorted by the discursive framework used to achieve buy-in within the masculinized culture of the CAF. Fearing backlash prompted by unpopular past gender integration initiatives, a discourse of operational efficacy was used to introduce UNSCR 1325 to the Canadian military. This discourse functionally separated UNSCR 1325 from past and present initiatives designed to challenge the dominance of militarized masculinity in the CAF. The problematic culture of the CAF was further emboldened by a conservative political opportunity structure under the government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, under whose governance the first Canadian National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 (2010-2016) was drafted. The Harper administration advanced a reimagined Canadian nationalism that emphasized NATO engagement in Afghanistan at the expense of Canada’s liberal internationalist past, further pulling Canadian public sentiment and resources away from the United Nations.
Acknowledgements

I want to thank the Academy…..no, seriously…

Rather predictably (for anyone that knows me) this is the section of my dissertation that I’ve been reflecting on the longest. It’s like a eulogy for that crappy part of your life where you were writing a PhD. For me, this season of life dragged on a little longer than I’d planned, so know that the folks in this list are REALLY in my corner, my “ride-or-dies” as the young people say.1 And by “in my corner” I don’t mean “I could always hit them up for a reference letter.” I mean, they parked their chairs in my corner of the ring and refused to let anyone knock me out, for any reason. Even myself. Ultimately, these are the people that turned this incredibly challenging season of life into a beautiful and rewarding experience, and I am eternally grateful for their support and friendship.

My supervisor Dr. Melissa Haussman has made immense sacrifices in her own personal time and energy to help me bring this project to fruition. I thought I was a pretty decent writer when I arrived at Carleton, having already completed two political science degrees at Queen’s.2 I was right, I was a decent writer – but Melissa gave me the tools to become an excellent writer. Melissa never let me rest on vague references to “the government” or allowed me to use complicated phrasing to obfuscate the fact that I wasn’t really sure what I was saying. She has gone to bat for me more times than I can count, she has refined this dissertation into something I can truly be proud of, and she always made time for me when I needed to just whine and eat nachos. She has been my sounding board, my no-BS editor and my most ardent supporter since the beginning of my PhD. Her patient and tireless instruction is something that I will have the privilege of carrying with me for the remainder of my writing career.

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1 See. Ian Plante-Signal and Erika Jackson (2021).
2 Insert obligatory Queen’s Mafia shout-out. We’re fancy.
shared a conversation on feminism and the military that spans over a decade. Al, how could I have done any of this without you? Seriously? Al has taken his given position as a “gatekeeper” of military expertise and authority in the CAF and turned himself into a door-kicker for feminist academics. He’s why I know that even “old white guys” can be feminists; indeed, he is one of the best. For a working-class girl from Oshawa, the “university” and the “military” can seem like incredibly intimidating institutions. Al showed me that the Great and Powerful Wizard of Oz was just some little dude behind a curtain, and that dude needed a talking to.

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## List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AWECF</td>
<td>Association for Womens Equity in the Canadian Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPA</td>
<td>Beijing Platform for Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Canadian Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Critical Frame Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHRT</td>
<td>Canadian Human Rights Tribunal</td>
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<tr>
<td>DWAO</td>
<td>Defence Women’s Advisory Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENAD</td>
<td>Gender Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFP</td>
<td>Gender Focal Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L1</td>
<td>Level One</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHARP</td>
<td>Sexual Harassment and Racism Prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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**Introduction**

**Gender, War and Discourse**

Canadian women’s record of military service is impressive; all legal barriers to women’s service in the Canadian military were removed in 1989, except for women’s submarine service, which was permitted as of 2001. This stands in stark contrast to the military regulations of Canada’s allies in the US and UK, both of which legally forbade women from serving in combat roles until 2016. Moreover, Canadian diplomats are credited with the invention and advancement of the human security agenda, the foundation of modern peacekeeping practice. Thus, when the Women, Peace and Security Agenda was initiated by the unanimous approval of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), many saw it as a diplomatic victory for the Canadian government. UNSCR 1325 advanced Canada’s foreign policy agenda by underscoring the importance of protecting civilians in conflict environments, and the resolution enshrined gender equality norms in a Security Council resolution by naming the Beijing Platform for Action (BPA 1995) and the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW 1979) in its preambulatory clauses. UNSCR 1325 therefore advances an expansive conception of gender equality, which emphasizes the right of all persons to participate in all governmental peace and security processes and institutions, free from assault and harassment. However, scholarly

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3 As a legally binding document for all UN member states, Resolution 1325 emphasized “prevention [of violence against women], protection [of women and girls] and participation [for women in international peace and security roles]” (Cohn 2003, 14).
consensus around the resolution has demonstrated that 21 years on, the goals contained in UNSCR 1325 have yet to be realized and progress has advanced unevenly across UN nation-states (Barrow 2009; Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011, Shepherd 2006, UN Secretary General’s Report 2005). 4

Canada was an ardent proponent of 1325 during its tenure on the Security Council (1999-2000). Canada should therefore have been well positioned to meet the demands of UNSCR 1325, chiefly its emphasis on the empowerment and protection of women, and yet it has struggled to realize the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda. UNSCR 1325, and the eight subsequent resolutions aimed at further refining the goals and scope of the original document, 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 and 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015), 2467 (2019) and 2493 (2019) (see Appendix A). Together, this body of resolutions, along with NATO Bi-Directive 40-1, informs the Canadian military’s approach to the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda. The core message contained within UNSCR 1325 is that gender equality amongst nations and their respective militaries and political structures is necessary to secure lasting peace. Despite the importance of this message – and its role in crafting the message itself, Canada’s initial implementation of UNSCR 1325 was desultory. Canada did not pass a national action plan to implement 1325 (CNAP) until 2010 and Canada’s subsequent progress reports on the CNAP were frequently submitted to parliament years late (WPSN-C 2015). Likewise, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has proven to be an inhospitable environment for many women despite their early integration in combat environments (Davis 1997; ERA 2015; Febbraro 2007). It is evident from these reports that the patriarchal structure and discourse of the CAF – though occasionally threatened –remains intact. With the dismissal of Chief of Defence Staff Johnathan Vance, sexual

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misconduct and gendered discrimination can now be traced to the highest levels of CAF leadership, and yet women remain significantly underrepresented in all operational branches of the Canadian military.\(^5\) The challenges faced by the CAF illustrate that although the institution has removed legal barriers to the equal employment of women, significant informal barriers remain (Winslow and Dunn 2002).

This dissertation explores the gap between Canada’s strong presence in framing and adopting 1325 in the UNSC and the domestic reality of the WPS agenda in the Canadian military. How have gender equality norms contained within UNSCR 1325 been amplified, attenuated, or renegotiated as they traveled from the United Nations Security Council to the individual Canadian soldier? I argue that the challenges Canada faced in implementing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda must be understood through the context of the political opportunity structure present at the time of its introduction (Chappell 2003, Tarrow 1998). To begin, Canadian foreign policy following the Security Council’s request that UN members develop national action plans for UNSCR 1325 in 2004 prevented coherent implementation of the resolution; first by the inaction of the Martin Liberals (December 2003-February 2006), then by the militarism of the Harper Conservatives (February 2006-November 2015). As a result, Canada’s first national action plan on 1325 (2010) offered no clear guidance or accountability structure, allowing the CAF significant discretion in its implementation in the military. Reports from Canadian civil society groups concerned with the Women Peace and Security agenda demonstrate that these political vagaries meant that the concept of gender equality embedded within 1325 was never fixed or standardized within the Canadian context (Lombardo et al 2009); therefore, gender equality norms remained

\(^5\) I say “operational branch” here because women are well represented in traditionally “feminized” military roles, like nursing and dentistry – which are nearly 52% women. To contrast, only 3-4% of “combat arms” personnel (those working within operational trades like infantry and artillery) are women. This is significant as UN peacekeepers would be drawn from the latter pool.
open to interpretation and distortion by those responsible for its implementation. Therefore, although Canada had a national action plan in 2010, the action plan did not provide an accountability structure for its implementation, nor did it define a standard of gender equality upon which to hold government organizations accountable.\(^6\) In the absence of clear direction from the federal government, and amidst the increasingly militarized nationalism of the Harper Conservatives, the CAF has enjoyed significant influence in the interpretation and framing of military policy on UNSCR 1325. As a result, policy leaders and trainers within the CAF crafted an approach that deferred to the existing masculinized culture of the Canadian military, rather than using UNSCR 1325 to challenge gender stereotypes and hierarchies within the gender culture of the CAF.\(^7\)

The process of implementing UNSCR 1325 in the CAF was complicated by the military’s history of failed gender integration policies. To date, the Canadian military has undertaken two programs intended to eliminate sexual misconduct and gendered harassment within the CAF, Operation MINERVA (1994) and Operation HONOUR (2015-2021); both failed to produce change in CAF culture (English 2021, 11). Operation MINERVA, a nine-point plan initiated in 1994 to increase the numerical representation of women in the CAF, was later paired with Sexual Assault and Harassment Prevention (SHARP) training in 1998. As will be discussed in chapter 3, Op MINERVA and related programming never formally ended, but faded into disuse as National Defence Headquarters continually devolved responsibility for monitoring the progress of gender

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\(^6\) Likewise, a clear standard of gender equality was not established within the UN, a necessary measure to ensure that the resolution was unanimously accepted by states with disparate (and occasionally contradictory) gender values. This will be discussed in greater detail in chapter two.

\(^7\) Institutional culture is defined in this dissertation as a shared organizational affinity for the history, discourse, policy, practice, and affective connections within the CAF. This culture empowers hegemonic masculinity through the legal and social submission of femininities. This concept is defined more extensively in chapter one.
integration, against the advice of the Minister’s Advisory Board on Gender Integration and Employment Equity (Park 1996, 3). Op HONOUR was initiated in 2015, in response to an External Review led by former Supreme Court Justice Marie Deschamps, which found that there was an “underlying sexualized culture, hostile to women and LGBTQ members, and conducive to more serious incidents of sexual harassment and assault” (ERA 2015, i). Like Op MINERVA, Op HONOUR (2015) was immediately met with resistance from military personnel, who saw the initiative as a “joke” and colloquially renamed it “Hop on Her” (Neustaeter 2021; Taber 2017). A year later, former Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Jonathan Vance issued a Directive on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the Canadian Armed Forces, which instructed all CAF personnel to take Gender Based Analysis Plus training, also known as GBA Plus (Canada 2016). As I will demonstrate in Chapter five, these multiple, overlapping policies generated significant confusion amongst CAF personnel, many of whom struggle to discern where one gender policy ends, and another begins.

Amidst the CAF’s complex, layered policy environment, and the civilian political pressures that underpin it, two discourses about gender integration emerged. The first is the liberal feminist discourse of gender equality and the second is an instrumentalist discourse of operational efficacy. The first discursive pathway is premised on civilian norms of gender equality drawn from the language of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women (1969) and the general parliamentary

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8 These personnel include recruits at the Royal Military College and personnel at Canadian Forces Headquarters in Ottawa (see Pugliese 2015).
9 This confusion worsened in 2021, when General Jonathan Vance was replaced as Chief of Defence Staff by Vice Admiral Art McDonald amidst allegations that Vance had committed sexual misconduct (Berthiaume 2021). Shortly after his appointment as CDS, McDonald was also accused of sexual harassment and voluntarily stepped aside; the position of Chief of Defence Staff is currently held by General Wayne Eyre. In 2021 Eyre has stated that Op HONOUR has “culminated, and thus we will close it out, harvest what has worked, learn from what hasn’t, and develop a deliberate plan to go forward” (Brewster 2021).
language of egalitarianism. This discourse traditionally dominates under a political opportunity structure headed by Liberal governments, which have enacted the political and legal mechanisms which women would later use to challenge gender discrimination in the CAF, including the Royal Commission, the Canadian Human Rights Act (1978) and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982). While this discourse is premised on the women’s right to participate in all Canadian institutions, it does not resonate within the fraternal gender culture of the CAF. Although the CAF claimed to adopt a stance of gender-neutrality from 1989 to 1999 – when the Human Rights Tribunal ruled that they had ten years to integrate women into nearly all occupations – women were expected to assimilate to the pre-existing male norms of the organization (Davis 2009). The assimilationist logic of this framing became increasingly difficult to maintain once the Employment Equity Act (1995) introduced a logic of gender difference to the CAF – and impossible to sustain as the CAF was required to engage with local populations in counterinsurgency operations during its combat mission in Afghanistan (2001-2011). In these operations, female military personnel were the only NATO troops permitted to liaise with women to gather intelligence, search women at checkpoints and influence Afghan communities to accept and assist NATO forces. As Ali (2016) illustrates, NATO’s reliance on female personnel rapidly led to the instrumentalist use of women, drawing “the notion of feminism… into the project of US militarism in Afghanistan and Iraq that elucidate how gender, equality, and difference can be deployed in service of warfare” (2). This cooptation of feminism in the Canadian context will be explored at length throughout the dissertation.

The second (discursive) channel is one premised on militarist norms of operational efficacy and can be traced to early attempts to deny women access to combat roles in 1986, when the CAF

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10 When speaking of the CAF, I refer to all enlisted military personnel, including soldiers, sailors and aviators. I am not referring to any personnel working with the CAF under corporate contract.
responded to the Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights (1985) with the assertion that women’s presence in previously all-male teams would hamper operational efficacy.\footnote{The relationship between mixed-gender teams and operational efficacy has never been established or defined with any scientific rigor. The 1979-1985 Canadian SWINTER Trials (Service Women in Non-Traditional Environments and Roles), designed to determine the effects of employing women in previously all-male units, failed to establish any standardized operational assessment metrics and therefore the findings were “largely unusable” (Park 1996, 8).} Operational efficacy refers to the CAF’s ability to successfully execute all military operations; including domestic operations, disaster assistance, combat operations or peacekeeping. Operational efficacy discourse was flipped in 1995, when the CAF began to encourage the recruitment of women shortly after it became subject to the Employment Equity Act (1995), which required that the military recruit and retain a minimum threshold of women. Once the Canadian military became subject to the Employment Equity Act, the CAF began emphasizing that women’s difference would lend strength to the organization. This discourse achieved dominance during the Conservative government of Stephen Harper from 2006-2015, which empowered militaristic discourse around foreign and domestic security policy (Swift and McKay 2012). While this discourse better resonated with military personnel, it has become divorced from the goal of pursuing gender equality in practice. This discursive pathway found external support from NATO, which has encouraged the exploitation of gender norms to enhance the efficacy of its counter-insurgency operations, having learned in Afghanistan that female personnel were necessary to liaise with conservative Muslim women (Lackenbauer and Langlais 2013). Within this discourse, gender integration is important because it allows the military to instrumentalize gender and benefit from the use-value of female soldiers, not as soldiers, but as women.

Therefore, when the Chief of Defence Staff Directive on 1325 was being drafted in 2016, its architects had two frameworks through which it could explain the importance of enhancing the
participation of women in the security sector: gender integration is necessary because Canadian women have a right to serve in the CAF (gender equality discourse), or gender integration is necessary because diversity increases the operational efficacy of the CAF (operational efficacy discourse). Since gender equality framing has a fraught history within the organization, the Canadian Armed Forces’ interpretation of Resolution 1325 was advanced through a discourse of operational efficacy, an interpretation in contention with the gender equality agenda of the original resolution.

Implementing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

Since its adoption in the Security Council in 2000, UNSCR 1325 has become the focal point for a vast body of feminist research across several political science subfields. Within international relations (IR) research, studies have traced the success of transnational networks of civil society organizations that introduced gendered perspectives to the Security Council (Etchart 2015; Klot 2015; Olsson and Gizelis 2013) while critical IR feminists have highlighted 1325’s shortcomings (Barrow 2009; Cockburn 2011; Gibbings 2011; Otto 2010; Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011; Shepherd 2016; Wright 2015, 2016; Young 2003). These studies highlight the growing transnational dynamic of social activism in which “the global and the local can no longer be neatly separated” (Orenstein and Schmitz 2006, 479; Della Porta and Tarrow 2005). IR research on 1325 is complemented by domestic case studies using comparative research, while regional specialists examine the implementation of resolution 1325 from a domestic perspective. Many studies have drawn attention to the shared failure of the UN and its member states to reach accepted benchmarks about women’s participation in peace and security processes and to end the culture of impunity for

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12 As will be examined in greater detail in chapter 1, the introduction of UNSCR 1325 represents the introduction of gendered perspectives to the members of the Security Council – however women have been involved in military campaigns dating back to antiquity.
sexual violence perpetrated by UN Member State militaries (Aharoni 2014; George and Shepherd 2016; Irvine 2013; Joachim and Schneiker 2013; 2017; 2019; Swaine 2009). The challenge of getting conservative UN member states to ratify resolutions about women’s rights is significant and extends to related issue areas like women’s reproductive rights and LGBT rights (Sanders 2018). Together, this body of research comprises the core component of feminist security studies (Sjoberg 2010; True 2012), a field of critical inquiry that brings feminist theory to bear on IR and security research. These studies demonstrate that despite activists’ enthusiasm for the women, peace, and security agenda in international organizations (IO), the implementation of the resolution has been extremely difficult.

Studies into the gender culture of domestic militaries suggest several avenues for understanding why implementing the WPS agenda in militaries has been so challenging. To begin, national armed forces are widely understood by feminist anti-militarist researchers to be the violent nationalistic force by which men and masculinity gain and maintain positions of power in the current international order (Enloe 1989; 2012; Cockburn 2013; Whitworth 2004). For these scholars, militarism exists to reinforce an inegalitarian gender order that justifies violent policy solutions to the very problems it creates – like warfare, social unrest, and poverty. In so doing, militarism legitimates the reallocation of public resources from social welfare programs to fund weapons procurement, while indoctrinating citizens to carry out violent tasks at the behest of the state. Similarly, many antimilitarist feminist organizations see military service historically as a vocation at odds with their larger agenda of dismantling patriarchal control of the state and eliminating militarized policies to create an egalitarian, non-violent social order (Cockburn 2011; Peach 1997). This is not to imply that feminists – or women for that matter – are unified in their pacifism. In North America, and indeed globally, opinions on military service vary widely. In some
instances, women’s service in the armed forces has also been framed as a civic virtue; for example, the National Organization for Women (NOW) filed a legal claim in 1981 that “compulsory, universal military service is central to the concept of citizenship in a democracy” (Elshtain 1987, 208). In this regard, the relationship between women and pacifism proves socio-historically contingent; that woman can be warriors has been obvious in other cultures and across other time periods (Toler 2019).

Nonetheless, Canada’s controversial engagements in Somalia, and later in Afghanistan, still draw the ire of many Canadian feminist scholars (Butler 2009; Howell 2005; Razack 2000; Whitworth 2005). Moreover, Canada’s military culture has proved to be hostile to women (Davis 1997, Statistics Canada 2018). Studies have demonstrated the prevalence of sexual violence by the armed forces within militaries, and against civilian populations – indeed, decrying the prevalence of these assaults forms a core pillar of 1325 (UN 2015). This is not to suggest that 1325 is a pantheon for the elimination of sexual misconduct amongst all military organizations, but the presence of these attacks undermines the legitimacy of the military as a credible peacebuilding force. These forms of sexualized violence have become entrenched in military culture, as processes of violent, sexualized subjugation have historically been part of the training protocol of many NATO forces, including the CAF (Whitworth 2004). To this effect, Whitworth (2004) quotes an internal CAF document from 1984 which states the “defining role of any military force is the management of violence by violence, so that individual aggressiveness is, or should be, a fundamental characteristic of occupational fitness in combat units” (3). While the debates within the feminist community about militarism will be explored in greater detail in chapter one, skepticism that the CAF can contribute to efforts to expand global gender equality in any sense are well founded.
Gender Mainstreaming in the CAF

Early gender integration initiatives in the CAF were resisted by military personnel at all levels of the institution. When the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (CHRT) decision ruled in 1989 that the CAF could not exclude women from combat –thereby opening nearly all military occupations to women— the institution reacted by consolidating its stance against women, and when that failed, it simply neglected to protect them from their peers (Davis 2013; O’Hara 1998). To the CAF, the 1989 decision was evidence of a progressive judiciary running roughshod over an institution that must have national defence as its primary purpose, thereby sacrificing operational efficacy at the altar of political correctness. Together, the CHRT decision (1989), along with the introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) and the Employment Equity Act (1995), placed pressure on CAF leadership to adhere to (and report to) a Liberal dominated parliament and a civilian judiciary. This solidified in the minds of military personnel that “gender integration” and “diversity” were tantamount to civilian encroachment into military affairs (Charter Task Force 1985, 2). Throughout the 1990s leadership in the CAF did little, if anything, to contest these views. Early training gender sensitivity initiatives, like Sexual Harassment and Rape Prevention (SHARP) training introduced in 1998, were treated with derision by both men and women throughout the CAF. Military personnel who received SHARP training were encouraged to “take it up with Ottawa” if they had a problem serving beside women.

13 The landmark CHRT case will be discussed in detail in chapter three. Women were still prohibited from serving aboard submarines until 2001.
14 This claim is further explored and supported in chapter 3 using testimony from Ministers Advisory Board on Gender Integration Reports (2000).
15 The Canadian Human Rights Act covers only equality rights under federal jurisdiction, while Charter cases can be brought against any level of Canadian government.
16 Members of the CAF operate under a separate judicial system established by the National Defence Act (1965). Areas of overlap between Canadian civilian and military justice systems are discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.
(MABGIEE 1999, 16). Amidst a culture of outright hostility towards the CHRT decision amongst most CAF members, feminist ideas about gender equality failed to gain traction in the cloistered politics of CAF culture.

Female CAF personnel throughout this period had little support from civilian women’s rights associations, many of which had explicit anti-militarist stances. Accordingly, the Association for Women’s Equity in the Canadian Forces (AWECF) was founded in 1985 by “Maude Barlow, the national Chairperson for the Council of Canadians and retired Canadian Forces officers Adelle Karmas, Shirley Robinson and Suzanne Simpson” (Davis 2013, 129). As Davis highlights in her 2013 dissertation, the “purpose of the AWECF was to address the concerns of military women, to challenge the CF policy through the equality clause in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and to ensure that ultimately service women would be afforded career opportunities equal to those enjoyed by Servicemen” (129). The AWECF was granted membership to the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) in 1986, however this partnership was short-lived. A vocal group of NAC members found engagement with the military – in any capacity— was misguided, and instead argued that NAC set out to lobby for the disbandment of the CAF (AWECF Report 1988, 5). After repeated verbal abuse during NAC meetings, the AWECF withdrew its membership from NAC in March of 1991 (Davis 2013, 154). Throughout the 1990s, the military’s corporate policy shifted into a period of gender-blind neglect, while at the unit level, female personnel continued to suffer from the de facto reality of hostile social exclusion and harassment (Ibid; O’Hara 1998). By the time UNSCR 1325 was passed in 2000, Canada had allowed female personnel into combat occupations for eleven years and had been grappling with gender integration in earnest for nearly thirty years.
Although gender integration remained a subject of significant controversy in the DND/CAF, the Government of Canada played a pivotal role in the creation of the international Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien in 2000. As part of a larger effort in advancing Canada’s human security agenda, Canadian delegates in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) helped to develop and defend UNSC 1325, which was the first Security Council resolution concerned with gendered disparities in conflict. Immediately after the adoption of 1325, Canada formed the group “Friends of 1325” which is an initiative to ensure UNSCR 1325 maintains the strength and expertise required to transform the gender culture of the UN and its member states (Tryggestad 2009, 540). Canada has produced two National Action Plans (NAPs) since the Security Council first requested member states develop NAPs in 2004. Canada’s first NAP was implemented in 2010 by the Conservative government of Stephen Harper, and expired in 2016, shortly after the election of Justin Trudeau. The first NAP, as will be discussed in detail in chapter two, lacked the depth and specificity to provide actionable guidance to federal governmental departments (Tiessen and Tuckey 2014). It did not provide a definition of gender equality, nor did it engage with “gender” conceptually. Instead, it emphasized the struggles of “women and girls” without providing any information on how to advance its actionable content and indicators (Ibid, 15). Nor were progress reports on the NAP of sufficient quality (or timeliness) to hold departments accountable for activities undertaken in service of the NAP (Ibid). In the absence of centrally defined standards for the achievement of gender equality, the first NAP essentially permitted the CAF to interpret and implement UNSCR 1325 through an approach that deferred to its pre-existing institutional culture.

Canada’s second NAP (2017-2022) was an improvement on its predecessor; it provides clearer objectives and acknowledges Canada’s failings in providing human security to Canadian
women. It also engages in the concept of gender, rather than the more antiquated framing of “women and children.” Nevertheless, the second NAP has been criticized for evoking gender essentialism, particularly its emphasis on the transformative role that women will ostensibly serve in peacekeeping operations (Jenkins 2018). However, there is little evidence that the content of Canada’s second NAP has reached the personnel of the CAF. The primary guiding document that the CAF has used to implement UNSCR 1325 in the Canadian military is the CDS Directive on UNSCR 1325, described above. The CDS Directive on 1325 was issued in January of 2016, while the second NAP (2017-2022) was not released until November of 2017. Therefore, the CDS Directive on implementing 1325 is based on Canada’s first National Action Plan (2010-2016). Although the DND/CAF finalized an implementation plan for the second NAP in 2019, the implementation plan still emphasizes that the CDS Directive on 1325 is a “keystone document” (Canada 2020). The Directive will be discussed in detail in chapter four, but to clarify, the DND/CAF remains heavily influenced by the original NAP and related shortcomings.

One of the most significant changes initiated by the CDS Directive on 1325 was that Gender Based Analysis (GBA) Plus training was officially mandated for all CAF personnel. GBA Plus training is administered by Women and Gender Equity Canada (formerly Status of Women Canada). GBA Plus is, “an analytical process that provides a rigorous method for the assessment of systemic inequalities, as well as a means to assess how diverse groups of women, men and gender diverse people may experience policies, programs and initiatives” (Canada 2021). Even though the CDS Directive mandated GBA Plus training, studies illustrate that military personnel have criticized the training both for its content and for the online delivery structure of the course (Johnstone and Momani 2019; Thomson and Filardo 2019).
A recent study by Johnstone and Momani (2019) revealed widespread confusion about the objectives of GBA Plus during focus group sessions amongst Canadian Gender Focal Points (GFPs), the military personnel entrusted with communicating gender-sensitive information back to CAF leadership. The study participants expressed concern that a lack of awareness will challenge their ability to serve as a GFP, while most anticipated “push back” to the message they were entrusted to deliver (Ibid: 514). Johnstone and Momani argue that in its present form, GBA Plus training is unlikely to overcome the challenges currently facing CAF’s gender culture. These findings suggest that CAF personnel struggle to understand gender as a concept because they have not been effectively trained to understand the concept, and/or because CAF’s existing gender culture discourages their robust engagement.

1325 and NATO

The Canadian military’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 has also been driven by its membership in NATO. Alongside resolution 1325, the CDS Directive also references NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Policy (EAPC) on 1325 (2007), followed by the first iteration of Bi-Strategic Directive 40-1 in 2009 (revised in 2012, 2017 and 2021), which sought to integrate 1325 into NATO’s military command structure (see Appendix B). These two documents are the cornerstone of NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 and emphasize that UNSCR 1325 is a tool which could “increase the operational effectiveness” of NATO’s military structure (Wright 2016, 356). Although the language of instrumentalizing gender perspectives has waned with each iteration of Bi-SC 40-1, it remained prominent within NATO during the period in which Canada released its first NAP (2010-2016). The 2009 iteration of Bi-SC 40-1 emphasized that “integrating gender perspectives in an operational environment is a force multiplier” (1-2). The view that women could be used to multiply the capability of NATO forces was further reinforced at the 2008
NATO Conference on Women in the Armed Forces, when Lt. Col. Kristin Lund, Chair of the Conference stated, “as NATO goes global, women are a critical asset for NATO’s new missions. Particularly in certain cultural contexts, like in Afghanistan, female troops and mixed-gender units are essential to carrying out such tasks as house searches, or establishing ties with the local population” (NATO 2008, 1). UNSCR 1325 can therefore be seen to serve two strategic purposes for NATO: it addresses NATO forces’ pre-existing struggle to recruit and retain servicewomen, and it enhances NATO’s capability to operate in counterinsurgency operations where military personnel are required to work closely with civilians (Ibid, 357). NATO therefore has a strong impetus to integrate UNSCR 1325 throughout member nations and within the structure of the organization itself.

NATO’s framing of UNSCR 1325 is particularly significant as the CDS Directive on UNSCR 1325 also committed the CAF to establishing Gender Advisors or “GENADs” at all operational and strategic levels of the CAF. GENADs are a NATO construct and serve as “specialist advisors for the Commanders responsible for the overall integration of gender perspectives into military planning execution and evaluation” (CDS Directive 2016, 6). GENADs therefore serve a central role in ensuring that UNSCR 1325 is properly implemented throughout the CAF. All “GENAD” training for Canadian Gender Advisors is provided at the NATO center of excellence for gender perspectives in operations: the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM) in Sweden—NATO’s center of excellence for gender perspectives in operations. However, as with GBA Plus training, GENAD training has been criticized by military personnel for being insufficient to prepare troops for the complex process of integrating gender perspectives into the CAF (see Thomson and Filardo 2019). In an internal DND/CAF study amongst Canadian GENADs, the GENADs interviewed reported that they had minimal training to
prepare for that role, emphasizing NATO training consists of a two-week in-person course, alongside a few online training modules (Thomson and Filardo 2019, 13). These personnel then return to Canada to serve as Canadian GENADs, bringing with them the knowledge, priorities and standards provided by the NATO-sanctioned gender training.

As this discussion illustrates, when Canada introduced its first National Action Plan (NAP) on 1325 in 2010, policymakers were confronted with several interpretations of the original resolution. While UNSCR 1325 remains the touchstone document for the Women Peace and Security Agenda, it is accompanied by nine ancillary resolutions and NATO Bi-Strategic Directive 40-1 and NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Action Plans. Tied only by a loose connection around the core goal of bringing gendered perspectives to the security sector, each interpretation varied widely around key issues of agenda-setting, epistemology, and problem definition. As will be illustrated in chapter four, the task of interpreting and implementing UNSCR 1325 was no easier for the military officers tasked with drafting the CDS Directive on 1325. Confusion emerged around whether UNSCR 1325 should be understood as an institutional or operational priority. Was this resolution something that should introduce gender perspectives to CAF missions, or was it something meant to change how the CAF itself treats servicewomen? Understanding how 1325 has been implemented in the CAF, therefore, is an exercise in understanding which interpretation gained pre-eminence in the organization and how this was achieved.

This preliminary overview of gender mainstreaming in the Canadian military illustrates the existence of two competing frameworks. The first is the operational efficacy framework, which finds strong support amongst military personnel and is bolstered internationally by Canada’s membership in NATO (see chapter two). The second is the gender equality framework, which is
often a target of derision in the CAF and can be traced back to the earliest days of gender mainstreaming in the Canadian military (see chapter three). I argue that the operational efficacy framing of 1325 has been pursued for fear that (as we will discuss in chapters four and five) framing 1325 as a “gender equality” initiative will encourage military personnel to equate the resolution with previous unpopular initiatives.

**Theory: Norm Translation and Feminist Discursive Institutionalism**

Tracing discourse from international organizations (UN and NATO) down to the Canadian military required that I combine two theories: feminist discursive institutionalism and norm translation. This approach was necessary as the research question brings together two units of analysis: international norm creation through UNSCR 1325 and the gendered institutional culture of the CAF. Feminist discursive institutionalism offers comparative frameworks for understanding institutional change and stagnation (Mahoney and Thelen 2010) as well as research on institutional gendered discourses and logics of appropriateness (Chappell 2006, Ferree 2009). Norm translation research examines how norms, like gender equality, “travel” across international and domestic borders; with a focus on how these norms are altered in their domestic implementation (Zwingel 2012). Although these are two separate subfields within political science, they are connected through a common epistemology through Critical Frame Analysis (CFA), an approach often attributed to the work of Irving Goffman (1974). CFA takes ideational constructs as its central analytical focus and examines the ways in which ideas are framed – both intentionally and unintentionally – by political processes and actors. Both norm translation research and feminist discursive institutionalism hold that the power relations operating within domestic and international institutions are unnatural and man-made. The framing processes that norm translation and feminist discursive institutionalism seek to identify are therefore exercises in power and
agenda setting; they will amplify elements of the policy seen to coincide with dominant institutional interests, while attenuating those elements that conflict with the institution’s existing gendered logic of appropriateness.

Framing analysis has become a popular approach within feminist discursive institutionalist research because of its ability to disentangle the complicated systems of power that have been surreptitiously embedded within government texts and directives (Bacchi 2009). CFA probes the connection between institutional culture, discourse, and policy to illustrate how a politicized issue has been framed. (Bacchi and Eveline 2004, Chappell 2006, Lombardo et al 2009). For example, Lombardo et al (2009) examine how the concept of “gender equality” has been shaped and renegotiated in response to policy framing as it was transposed from international and regional organizations, like the UN and EU, to the national context. Epistemologically, CFA rejects both objectivism and scientific neutrality by embracing the multitude of interpretations that can emerge from any one policy or policy challenge. CFA treats policy frames as narratives “that guide both analysis and action in practical situations…[these] frames are the generic story lines that underlie the particular problem-setting stories one finds in any particular policy controversy” (Rein & Schön 1996, 89). This framing effect, strategic or unintentional, defines the range of possible approaches to addressing a policy challenge through prioritizing carefully selected elements of the problem, while waylaying others.

Norm translation has also been used to explore the contested process of implementing new gender policy. Constructivist IR scholars have utilized the concept of vernacularization to reconcile the ambitious goals of international legislation with the specificities of domestic processes of implementation (Acharya 2004; Atalay 2016; Merry 2006; Levitt & Merry 2009; Rajaram & Zararia 2009; Zwingel 2012). Vernacularization emerged as a critique of trends in
norm translation, particularly its “tendency to assert some form of homogenization, creolization or hybridization without explaining why or how it happens [and for] paying too little attention to how circulation and translation evolve over time” (Levitt & Merry 2009, 443). Atalay (2009) extends Levitt & Merry’s critique in her examination of the “second wave” of norm translation scholarship. Norm translation, Atalay argues, “shifts the focus from the norm-makers’ diffusion strategies to the ways in which local entrepreneurs modify, hybridize, and adapt international norms to local [culture]” (396). This placed a renewed emphasis on the agency of norm-receiving communities and suggests they “do not simply displace or reject the external norm but assert their agency by actively reinterpreting and reconstructing it” (Ibid). This suggests that “talking back” may not be an overt rejection of a norm or idea but instead may involve creative reshaping and reinterpreting by both norm translators and the communities receiving the new norms.

Feminist expertise encounters a variety of challenges when confronted with a new institutional culture. Institutional cultures, like national cultures, are founded on a shared historical mythology and language, they create rules, they regulate actors and their behaviour, and most importantly, they identify and exclude outsiders. In this regard, one might consider the military as the paradigmatic example of a closed institutional culture. Krook & Mackay (2011) offer two related insights in this regard: “state institutions are not monolithic but can only be understood when broken down into a number of institutional arenas or spaces” and state institutions “are historically the products of the ‘mobilization of masculine bias’ and both produce and reproduce patriarchal power relations [but] they are historically variable in their composition and effects, and are theoretically open to change” (Krook & Mackay 2011, 3). Therefore, although institutions have

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17 Norm translation is a process that occurs at Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) third stage of norm diffusion; following the emergence and diffusion of a new international norm, norm translation occurs when states must adapt an international norm for domestic application.
histories of gendered hierarchy and exclusion, they can also present feminist activists with opportunities for redressing gendered inequality.

Like Krook & Mackay, Chappell (2006) highlights the fluid nature of institutions by emphasizing the conflicting opportunities and challenges they present to dismantling inequality. Chappell highlights Karen Beckwith’s division of gender as a category, and gendering as a process wherein “activist feminists…can work to instate practices and rules that recast the gendered nature of the political” (Chappell 2006, 224). This is emphasized by the emergence of femocrat projects in Australian governmental institutions, which promote internal advocacy for women within government institutions and throughout Australian society by internally driving feminist policy agendas (Chappell 2006, 227). The UK and Canadian ideals present an obstinate challenge for feminist actors, and those seeking to influence change within these institutions must work as subversives and opportunists rather than pushing for aggressive institutional change (see ex. Chappell 2006, 230). Ultimately Chappell’s analysis reveals mixed results for feminist activists within institutions; Australian femocrats have endured the downgrading of their institutional position following the election of a conservative federal government (Chappell 2006, 231). Similarly, UN led efforts to “introduce notions of gender equality and gender mainstreaming into the treaty bodies have been met with, at best, misunderstanding and a lack of support, and, at worst, outright hostility” (Chappell 2006, 232). This suggests that although institutions can create space to deconstruct patriarchal inequality in polyarchic societies, years of institutional memory tend to make reform an arduous process.

Katzenstein (2010) classifies anti-norm feminist behavior within institutional spaces, such as “most religious denominations, within prison management, the health sector, universities, armed forces” as protest, even though women within these organizations rarely resort to civil
disobedience and violence (Katzenstein 2010, 47). Katzenstein argues that these activities are not merely “resistance to the power of dominant elites; [they are] proactive, assertive, demand-making political activism” (Katzenstein 2010, 48). Nevertheless, institutional mobilization, rather than unobtrusive mobilization, is necessarily “[connected] to a parent organization” (Katzenstein 2010, 48). Therefore, associational feminist activists are connected to institutions administratively and/or financially and must negotiate a challenging terrain when trying to enact egalitarian change. Feminists within the military, for example, “face daily harassment from male peers in the form of comments, jeers, gossip, rumor—all amounting to accusations about their sexuality or their alleged incompetence at their job” (Katzenstein 2010, 49). Although other associational activist groups, including African Americans and immigrant organizations, have made important advances in advancing equality through institutional reform, many similar advances for women’s rights remain trapped (see. Katzenstein 2010, 52).

Feminist norm translators are therefore placed in a challenging position, they must introduce policies to transform the gender regime of an organization while ensuring that the goal of gender equality is communicated in a way that is both intelligible and agreeable to current members, who often have little-to-no gender expertise. Not unlike Krook and Childs’ (2008) “critical actors,”18 norm translators can be seen as those actors who carry out the work of reframing a norm in such a way that it resonates with the norm-receiving community. GENADs, for example, are tasked with adopting NATO’s version of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda to their peers, subordinates, and superiors in the Canadian military. Although vernacularization processes place norm translators in a position of power, they are not invulnerable. As Merry highlights, “new ideas and practices may be ignored, rejected or folded into pre-existing institutions… or they may be

18 Krook and Childs (2008) define critical actors as persons who “act individually or collectively to bring about women-friendly policy change” (127).
subverted: seized and transformed into something quite different from the transnational concept, out of the reach of the global legal system but nevertheless called by the same name” (Ibid, 40).

Therefore, translators must put “global human rights ideas into familiar symbolic terms and use stories of local indignities and violations to give life and power to global movements” (Ibid, 42).

Norm translation is necessary challenging; institutions and organizations are often resistant towards “new” ideas and are often protective of current social rules and norms (Towns 2012, 185). These sentiments are exacerbated when norm diffusion is understood to be homogenizing or seen as an imposition from an international hegemon (Ibid). In these instances, norms might be embraced only when they are presented in ways that shore up current beliefs and practices. If so, “what looks at first sight like norm acceptance might in fact only be an affirmation of the status quo...to placate global monitoring committees and international aid agencies” (Joachim & Schneiker 2012, 535). Accordingly, assessing the success of norm implementation requires a deep examination of institutional culture. As Vivien Schmidt (2008) notes, discourse “among policy actors” within an institution (coordinative discourse) may differ from the institution’s communicative discourse between “policy actors and the public” (303). Therefore, discursive institutionalist researchers cannot rely only on publicly available reports and documents like the CNAP and related Progress Reports, but must also examine internal memos and newsletters, as well as interview data with members of the institution itself.

My research findings on the militarization of UNSCR 1325 in the Canadian case amplify current theories on norm implementation and translation. Krook and True (2010) argue that discursive approaches to the analysis of norms reveal that actors can “resist or subvert these norms”

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19 Merry’s emphasis on translation also recognizes the power imbalances inherent in these processes which makes her research ideal for this study.

20 For more on the “logic of appropriateness” please refer to Chappell 2006.
ultimately producing an outcome quite different from the original norm in question (108). My dissertation explores how norm translators interpret and enact women’s rights and gender equality norms; whether they embrace, resist, or subvert these norms and under what conditions and in what contexts. My dissertation contributes, at its broadest, a case study on where the United Nations Women, Peace and Security Agenda risks running afoul of its original goal of improving gender equality in the peace and security processes. Having integrated women long before many of its NATO allies, the Canadian military Canada ought to have been an exemplar of the WPS movement, and yet it struggled to realize even the most basic of the resolution’s original norms. The Canadian case study highlights a process that Sanders (2018) has termed norm spoiling, wherein actors intent on “resisting normative change” actively contest and undermine incoming gender equality norms using a discourse of traditionalism or cultural relativity (272). While Canada’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 has not been a wholesale failure, reframing UNSCR 1325 to appeal to the operational priorities of the CAF has concomitantly weakened its emphasis on the gender equality norms contained within the resolution. While there may be hope for improvement amidst the new political opportunity structure created by the Trudeau administration, the challenges the CAF faced during its implementation of the resolution need to be noted as a warning for future feminist engagement with military actors. This has important implications for both IR and comparative research on militarization.

**Methods and Methodology: Critical Frame Analysis and Gendered Institutional Discourse**

The historical research for this dissertation was conducted through a literature search and archival research at the Library of Parliament in Ottawa, ON in the summer of 2016. To conduct this research, I first had to determine what documents would best indicate the gender culture of the CAF from 1989 until 2005; from approximately 2005 onward, many of the documents I use
have become available online. After determining what kinds of documents would be necessary for this research, I submitted a request to the library to draw a selection of memos and reports on the progress of gender integration following the 1989 human rights tribunal decision. Additional, declassified archival reports – including SWINTER (1979-85) and CREW (1987) trial data, as well as Karen Davis’s 1997 and 1998 reports on women’s attrition from the CAF – were graciously supplied by their authors, for which I am extremely grateful. This archival research forms the basis of my argument about the ways in which gender discourse and policy has been historically framed and reframed within the CAF.

I began processing archival research findings by using feminist institutionalist methods to define the policy terrain of the CAF. In so doing, I examined both the communicative discourse of the institution, meaning the public statements, parliamentary reporting, and press releases of the Canadian military, but also the CAF’s coordinative discourse (see Schmidt 2008). Coordinative discourse within the CAF includes memos between civilian and military personnel within the DND/CAF, internal reports that assessed the successes and failures of gender mainstreaming initiatives, and interview data with military personnel. I utilized qualitative research methods of archival research, process tracing and discursive analysis to identify and define the two discursive frameworks detailed above: operational efficacy and gender equality. These structures account for the interplay of military culture and civilian political processes in parliament and civil society by locating the institutional mechanisms and belief structures in which each of the two discursive framework is anchored. Further, I conducted an exhaustive literature review to determine that, like many of UNSCR 1325’s other signatories, Canada struggled during the implementation phase. Archival research of the communicative and coordinative discourse of the CAF revealed first, the
pre-existing institutional gendered logic of appropriateness within the CAF, and second, the policies and gender discourses that existed prior to the introduction of UNSCR 1325 in 2000.

The second, and more demanding, primary research source for this dissertation consisted of two sets of semi-structured interviews conducted from late 2017 until the winter of 2019. This process first required that I submit my dissertation proposal, research protocol, CV and letters of information and consent for review by both the Tri-Council Ethics Board of Canada and the Department of National Defense's Social Science Research Review Board of Canada. All research involving participants employed by the CAF or DND requires SSRRB review, in addition to ethical review by the host university’s board. In addition to the written submission, I also had to attain a supervisor at DND at what is called the “Level 1” or “L1” level. This required that I find someone who reported directly to either the Minster of National Defence or the Chief of Defence staff and had a professional interest in my research project. I was very fortunate to work with Dr. Gregory Smolyneec, who served as the Director General for Strategic Initiatives, and Sheila Ouellet, who was the Director of Gender Integration in the Strategic Joint Staff Command. I benefitted immensely from their support and insight, and they served as an invaluable resource for ensuring that my research met with the methodological rigor demanded of the department. I am currently working with Brigadier General Josee Robidoux, who replaced Sheila after her retirement, and we continue to engage in productive debate about the dynamics of gender in the CAF. I am grateful for their insight assistance, however any errors or omissions in this dissertation are my own.

Although I have enjoyed working with the DND/CAF to write this dissertation, the degree of effort involved in securing an L1 advisor at DND is likely the reason that my study is the only current study on the implementation of 1325 that engages with active-duty military personnel. I
should add that attaining L1 supervision is necessary before beginning your application to the SSRRB, so this hurdle may well serve as a gatekeeping function to slow or prevent external research. This is compounded by the reality that these persons are very difficult to locate; I only found an L1 willing to supervise my project after winning a scholarship from Women in Defence and Security (WiDS) in 2016, when Rear Admiral Jennifer Bennet kindly shared my project with Dr. Smoly nec after attending the ceremony. These difficulties notwithstanding, I have come to see the challenge of attaining SSRRB approval as an essential element of safeguarding the privacy and wellbeing of DND and CAF members. Many of Canada’s military personnel suffer from PTSD because of combat trauma, military sexual trauma, or trauma experienced during training exercises. As a result, it is necessary to carefully screen researchers to ensure that they have an appreciation of the community in which they wish to engage. However, researchers should carefully consider their time constraints and resources before deciding to engage with this interview population.

Before submitting my final portfolio for consideration to the ethics board at Carleton University and the SSRRB, I first had to design interview questions. Having defended my proposal, I knew I wanted to utilize vernacularization and discursive institutionalism to frame my project but trying to structure those questions in a way that would make sense to individual soldiers was a challenge. Ultimately this challenge was overcome by submitting my questions to my supervisor, Dr. Melissa Haussman – who ensured that they were academically sound, and Dr. Alan Okros at the Canadian Forces College – who reviewed the resultant questions to see if they would resonate with a military population. The result was approximately 30 interview questions, depending on the participants level of familiarity with the WPS agenda (see appendix c). These questions were divided into two preliminary sections on the participants’ deployment experiences
and professional experiences, followed by a small set of streaming questions. The streaming questions determined if the personnel being interviewed were familiar or unfamiliar with 1325, at which point I would determine if I could ask them further in-depth questions about the WPS agenda (stream A) or if I should first read them a preestablished description of the WPS agenda and then proceed with a series of questions that gathered their perspectives based only on the description I offered (stream B). This method worked well for generating an enjoyable and informative conversation that lasted approximately an hour in length. The intent of this interview series was to determine broad themes in military personnel’s responses to the WPS agenda, resistance or acceptance of incoming feminist norms, and experience with gender integration initiatives in the CAF.

Two series of semi-structured interviews were then conducted from late 2017 until 2019. The first set of 25 interviews were conducted with subject matter experts and elites to determine how they understood 1325 and what challenges they faced in implementing it within both the Federal Government and the CAF. These experts were variously: high ranking military personnel, Canadian diplomats, bureaucrats, and politicians. A second complementary series of interviews was conducted with 17 serving members of the CAF to determine how (and if) they understood UNSCR 1325, and when they were unfamiliar, I offered them a description of the resolution that utilized operational efficacy discourse (Appendix E, under Stream B, pg. 37).

This modest sample is not designed to be representative of the entire CAF population. Rather the goal with these interviews is to provide a snapshot of emerging trends and attitudes in CAF culture. This sample constitutes experienced soldiers (both in years of service and in deployment

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21 Subject matter experts were recruited directly, while CAF members were recruited using snowball methodology and a recruitment ad on the Facebook page of the Defence Women’s Advisory Organization.
history) and tends to favor officers and Army personnel, while over representing personnel that identify as female. Soldiers were not asked their sex in this study, but rather if they identify with a “masculine or feminine gender, either, both, or neither?” These semi-structured interviews lasted approximately 1 hour and focused on understanding how the gender norms contained in UNSCR 1325 has been framed and communicated to CAF personnel. These discussions also included opportunities to consider Op HONOUR and GBA Plus as complementary initiatives in the CAF’s suite of gender integration and anti-harassment policies. The interview population breakdown is as follows:

Table 2. Interview Participant Population. n = 17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender Identity</th>
<th>Male-identifying</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female-identifying</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender non-conforming</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component</td>
<td>Regular Forces</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reserve Forces</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Members</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment History</td>
<td>1 Plus Deployment on Expeditionary Mission</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 Deployment on Exp. Mission</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Operators</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Service (YOS)</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>19 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Median</td>
<td>17 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All soldier interviews were conducted anonymously; their names were omitted from any recording, they were assigned a reference number communicated to them verbally, and this reference list was written by hand and stored securely offline. Moreover, I removed any possibly identifying information from my typed transcription after the interview, and all recordings were
erased following transcription. During the transcription process, recordings were stored on a separate encrypted hard drive with no independent internet access. The recorder used during interviews has no independent internet connection, and it is password protected and thus could only be accessed by me. Copies of transcripts are stored on a password protected, encrypted hard drive that is kept in a secure location in my home – and will be destroyed following the successful completion of the dissertation. These considerations were also extended to subject matter experts (SME) who chose to remain anonymous, though they could elect to identify themselves during the interview or following the interview. Regardless of anonymity, all SME participants received letters of information and consent in advance of their interview, for which I received written or verbal consent. All participants had the option of having their interview deleted up to two months after participating, but no one elected to do this. There was no indication of upset or adverse experiences amongst any of my participants, and all claimed to find the process cathartic, and/or enjoyable.

The SME interview series utilized a different series of questions, as I was looking to gain more information about the actual political and bureaucratic machinations involved in the adoption and implementation of 1325. These experts were variously: high ranking military personnel, Canadian diplomats, bureaucrats and politicians. Though there was a standardized list of questions from which our conversation drew, these questions were often tailored to the interview participant. For example, it would not make sense to ask a CAF Gender Advisor if (s)he had ever worked with CAF personnel – it is in their job description. This allowed me to ask SME participants about their experience with Canada and the WPS agenda without unduly wasting their time, as many only had about 30 minutes to offer. Once again, these interviews progressed well and there was no indication of any adverse outcomes amongst participants. In total, I conducted 30 SME interviews, I was
permitted to record 25 of them, and those 25 were transcribed verbatim, resulting in approximately 250 pages of typed interview data.

While interviews with military personnel proved to be a useful way to gauge how experienced soldiers, sailors and aviators had interpreted the resolution, the SME interviews were designed to help fill in gaps that extant literature on 1325 and Canada had produced. Due to the nature of SME interviews, I cannot offer a population breakdown without compromising the privacy of my participants, but I will disclose their identity in the dissertation where I have been given permission to do so. During the literature review phase of my research, I noted that although many reviews argued that Canada was essential to the effort to get 1325 passed in the Security Council, and that we remained the Chairs of the Friends of 1325 group, there was very little information about the actual machinations that allowed the resolution to get passed. Moreover, I simply could not understand how the Liberal Party had failed to implement a National Action Plan once the UN requested it in 2004, and yet Canada’s first NAP was successfully passed during the Conservative administration of Stephen Harper; an administration well-known to dislike gender politics. In this regard, SME were an essential element of understanding how 1325 was understood at the Federal level of government, prior to departmental implementation. From there, SME interviews illustrated how key actors in DND and CAF framed 1325 in order to make the norms contained in the resolution palatable to CAF personnel. Finally, I have benefitted from SME suggestions for ATIP requests, further reading and generous offers to send along documents and directives where legally appropriate. As a result, I have compiled a selection of publicly unavailable, declassified documents, including training material utilized for sexual harassment courses (like Respect in the CAF and Bystander Intervention Training), the notes for the NATO 1325 preparatory course, theatre specific mission guides on 1325, and the directives on UNSCR
1325 for each one of the military’s L1 organizations. Although these documents are not classified, they are not available online or at the Library of Parliament.

Analysis of military personnel interviews began with incident-to-indecent coding, which means that I identified comments that responded to the core research questions I was exploring in my dissertation. For example, this dissertation examines how UNSCR 1325 has been explained CAF military personnel, so I flagged all incidents where participants recall their experiences with training on UNSCR 1325. Themes began to emerge from these incidents, and if a theme emerged in more than three of my interviews, I noted it and recorded it in the table 1., page 7. The “strength” of a theme was determined by how frequently it arose during interviews, e.g., if 7 interviewees brought up instrumentalist justifications for the inclusion of women, “instrumentalism” was classified as a strong theme. However, several of these themes are prompted by the interview questions. For example, I asked participants if there are “benefits to having women in the combat arms” and I used the example of Female Engagement Teams, which is explicitly an operational example. In this regard, the frequency with which “women in operations” recurs does not indicate the degree with which any governmental policy frame has permeated the CAF community, but rather it highlights my participants’ willingness to use that frame to explain and explore their experiences and perspectives. Likewise, theme prevalence does not reveal the time spent discussing a theme. For example, some participants discussed backlash against gender policies for 25% of the interview, while others only mentioned it briefly, comprising no more than 5% of our interview. Nevertheless, the prevalence of a given frame does illustrate which concepts resonated within the community, while the substantive content of these discussions provides insight into the norm-receiving community.
Using techniques influenced by Lombardo & Meier (2006), I generated fifteen theoretical categories, as illustrated in Table 2. The “strength” of a theoretical category refers to how many participants engaged meaningfully with the theme. For example, when I ask, “what do you think about women serving in the combat arms?” participants could invoke an operational justification e.g., “I think it’s necessary because we need female personnel to search Afghani women at NATO checkpoints.” The participant could also explain themselves using a rights-based justification, e.g., “women have a right to serve in the CAF, in accordance with Canadian law.” Rarely were participant responses so direct, and often multiple justifications were offered, in which case a participant response could be coded and counted under both thematic categories. Amidst this process, my goal was to situate my participants’ responses “in the historical, social, and situational conditions of [their] production” (Charmaz 2016, 299). I was less interested in the veracity of their response (unlike my subject matter expert interviews), and more interested in understanding where gender fit in their world view.

Chapter Outlines

Chapter one reviews current literature on UNSCR 1325 by delving into the challenges of gender mainstreaming in the armed forces, looking closely at processes in Canada and in the UN and NATO. This chapter illustrates the process through which UNSCR 1325 was crafted in the UN, and later adopted by NATO, and argues that the ambiguity of the resolution, though necessary for unanimous adoption, never fixed the ideal of gender equality within the resolution (on fixing, see Lombardo et al 2009). The process of drafting 1325 and getting it accepted by widely divergent states highlights the often-perilous challenge of feminist engagement with state actors, which we will later see replicated at the domestic level. While this tension can be negotiated through discursive framing processes to smooth over political contestation, these processes may ultimately
initiate or enhance frameworks that stand in contention with the core goal of gender equality. I then explore this challenge in greater detail through an analysis of the feminist movement’s cautious engagement with, or rejection of, militarism and civic republican tradition in the UN and NATO. My findings echo concerns of scholars like Cockburn (2011) and Enloe (2013), who feared that UNSCR 1325’s ambition of granting women a seat at the highest tables of military power would lend the legitimacy of the feminist movement to an increasingly militarized international system (see also Bastick 2018, Woodward and Duncanson 2016).

Chapter two explores UNSCR 1325, sketching its origins and shifting interpretation as it “travelled” from the international stage to the domestic. UNSCR 1325 began with the Beijing Platform for Action in 1995, which focused on eradicating gendered inequalities, and launched a global movement to empower women. Therefore, when UNSCR 1325 was introduced in October of 2000, it presented not just as a formalized attempt to integrate women into global peace and security architecture, but it also claimed to challenge the masculine basis on which the policy machinery of international security rests (Cohn 2003). Although these values were upheld by Canadian diplomats within the UNSC, a Canadian National Action Plan on the implementation of 1325 was not tabled for another decade (2010-2016) due to political vacillations in Canadian foreign policy. The interim period would prove crucial as other international organizations, like NATO, would provide alternate interpretations of the resolution that deviated significantly from its framers’ intents. Although these discourses utilize the language of the Women, Peace and Security movement, they fail to advance gender equality, and therefore do not maintain the substantive integrity of the original resolution. This chapter shows that shifting discourse around the interpretation of 1325 mean that the policy in place in Canada today is significantly different than which the framers at the UNSC intended.
Chapter two demonstrates that UNSCR 1325 emerged and travelled in conjunction with significant events at both the nation-state and international level. Vernacularization of the resolution therefore required norm translators to reshape UNSCR 1325 to suit the militarized, post 9/11 foreign policy of Canada. Thus, to create a complete picture of the development of this policy in Canada, it is necessary to highlight the relevant events. In this regard, 9/11 drove an intense re-securitization of nation-states; moreover, the Canadian government changed hands multiple times, with each administration bringing a new approach to issues of security and gender integration. With the election of a Conservative government in 2006, Canada shifted away from a nationalism of peacekeeping and human security, towards a “warrior” nation. This discursive shift was intensified by Canada’s growing military presence in Afghanistan and increasing reliance on NATO as our primary multilateral security partnership.

Chapter three details previous attempts to integrate women into the CAF. The CAF is often seen as a front-runner in gender integration as it legally into combat roles in 1989 after losing a Human Rights Tribunal case, this meant that its gender integration policies were formulated decades ahead of most of its NATO allies. Unfortunately, the legal obligation to integrate women did not result in their social integration. Although the CAF’s efforts to exclude women would ultimately fail, they produced policies and training programs that made women’s success difficult in the extreme, while protecting military members that expounded deleterious comments about women in combat. As a result, gender integration as a concept became discursively linked to a) unpopular judicial oversight of the military and, b) punitive measures taken by the military to eliminate sexual assault throughout the 1969-2000 period. Regardless of legal advances, gender-based harassment and sexual assault persist in the CAF today.
By shaping the historical memory and discourse of the institution, these pre-existing ideas about gender integration circumscribed the available rhetorical frames through which later norm entrepreneurs could achieve gender policy buy-in within the CAF. As subsequent chapters examine, UNSCR 1325 could not be introduced to the CAF as a resolution designed to eliminate military sexual trauma and increase female presence in the security sector, as this discourse would harken back to prior gender integration policies detested by those at the patriarchal core of the CAF.

Chapter four focuses on Canada’s first National Action Plan (NAP) to illustrate how domestic political institutions began to separate 1325 from the transformative gender agenda as intended by the civil society organizations that promoted it. The chapter details how UNSCR 1325 was introduced to the DND/CAF, with an emphasis on the discursive tools utilized to achieve policy buy-in amongst rank-and-file military personnel and amongst the DND/CAF’s elite. This chapter provides an opportunity to examine the perspectives and experiences of subject matter experts that work with the CAF, both civilians and military members. I use this discussion to expand on the theories of discursive bending and stretching presented by Lombardo and Verloo (2009).

Chapter five utilizes data from a series of one-on-one, anonymous interviews with CAF military personnel, which I undertook from 2017-2019 to provide contextualized accounts of how the current framing of 1325 and WPS are understood by military personnel. This secondary set of interviewees consists of a non-expert population willing to share their perspectives (and those of their peers) on both the Women, Peace and Security agenda, and gender mainstreaming in the CAF writ large. More specifically, these interviews illustrate the ways in which messaging about gender considerations have been interpreted by CAF members in practice.
Finally, my concluding chapter details my recommendations for ameliorating the issues remain in the CAF’s interpretation of 1325. I draw attention to areas that merit further research. Specifically, about how discourse around 1325 has promoted racist beliefs within the CAF. My findings suggest that many soldiers interpreted 1325 as something that was needed in the developing world, not among NATO forces. This supports research on military masculinities research by Razack (2004), and contributes to an ongoing debate led by Duncanson, Woodward and Bastick (2011-2019) on whether NATO forces can be “re-gendered.” I conclude with an overview of the theoretical debates discussed earlier and a brief discussion of what this case study suggests about norm translation and gender mainstreaming within military institutions.
Chapter 1

Mainstreaming in the Military - Gender Equality or Operational Efficacy?

The WPS agenda represents a multitude of benchmarks and values connected through the shared ideal of protecting and empowering women and children. The norms contained within the WPS agenda (which includes UNSCR 1325 and nine subsequent resolutions) are covered in the resolutions’ four pillars: protection of women and children; prevention of violence against women and children; enhanced participation of women at all levels of international peace and security architecture; and improved relief and recovery through the adoption of a gender-based lens. These four pillars rest on one core premise: enhancing the substantive and numeric representation of women in security processes will help to mitigate the atrocities of warfare, and when possible, yield a more peaceable international system. Despite the resolution’s clear focus on empowerment and protection, UNSCR 1325 has been subject to interpretations from international organizations like NATO and domestic institutions, like state militaries, that can be seen to distort the gender equality content of the resolution. For example, Cockburn (2011, 53) targets NATO, emphasizing, “NATO is not actually implementing 1325. The feminisation of soldiering is part of NATO’s thrust to modernize and professionalise contributing national armies. It has picked up the ball of gender equality by feminists and is running with it for its own objectives.” This underscores that frames of convenience, like the Canadian military’s use of operational efficacy framing, have very little to do with the actual content of the resolution. The goal of this chapter is therefore to contextualize UNSCR 1325 within the international discourses.

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22 UNSCR 1325 has been criticized by feminist scholars for being itself too weak to achieve these goals, see Gibbings 2011, Nikoghosyan 2017, Shepherd 2008. This critique is discussed in greater detail on page 44-45 and 53-55.
of gender and militarism that underpin competing interpretations of Women, Peace, and Security in Canada.

Embedded in UNSCR 1325 are several challenging contradictions that require unpacking before this dissertation can go further. First, UNSCR 1325 advocates for the integration of women into international and domestic systems of militarism. Integrating women into these systems requires pacifist feminist organizations like the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), to abandon, or at least waylay their rejection of militaries so that they can engage with the UN Member States. The cost and compromises necessary to enable feminist movements’ engagement with the state underscores a formative line of inquiry within feminist institutionalism. Second, scholars have highlighted that this framing of the women, peace and security agenda reinscribes linkages between women and pacifism, which obscures the variety of roles women have historically occupied in conflict environments. It will be no surprise to scholars of women’s movements that feminists have not mounted a unified response to these issues.

I begin the process of responding to these challenges in this chapter, and in so doing, I will highlight the criticisms offered by feminists critical of military engagement. To feminists critical of military engagement, like Voice of Women Canada, the legitimacy and esteem of feminism is coopted by military institutions to bolster - and occasionally disguise - the desire to pursue armed intervention for reasons that are unrelated or even detrimental to the advancement of women’s rights. On the opposite side of the pacifist debate, feminisms premised on civic republicanism have emphasized that military service is seen as a right of full citizenship and have used their service to advance women’s position vis-à-vis the state.23 This was the viewpoint of the Association for Civic Republicanism, as Snyder (1999) explains, produces, and legitimizes citizenship through the execution of civic duties, including military service. As such, soldiering is inextricably connected with virtuous citizenship, which is denied to women who are not permitted to serve in the armed forces.
Women’s Equity in the Canadian Forces (AWECF), which will be examined below. This is not to suggest that feminist debates on militarism exist in a binary; organizations within the women’s movement have negotiated a spectrum of responses to war, each socio-historically dependent on the political opportunity structures with which they were presented. These debates will be explored in detail as this chapter traces the discursive channels through which militarism has been emboldened at the domestic level by the masculine gender culture of UN member states. These debates also demonstrate that easy definitions for “militarism” or even “the military” are not forthcoming. Concepts like “militarism” are imbued with different systems of meaning for each feminist organization examined, and their relationship to the military as an institution varies widely. This discussion prepares the reader for an examination of how the Women, Peace and Security Agenda was implemented in Canada; an environment where one might expect a discourse of gender equality to thrive, but instead, a militarist discourse of operational efficacy has become dominant.

**Gender Mainstreaming: Coopting Feminism (Operational Efficacy) or Empowering Women (Gender Equality)?**

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the challenge of weighing compromise against cooptation is by no means unique to studies of gender mainstreaming within the armed forces. Feminist institutionalist research on gender mainstreaming has indicated that gender equality norms are often changed or distorted in their introduction to international and domestic institutions (Lombardo et al 2009). As such, there is a rich body of feminist research upon which to base our analysis. In examining discourse in the UN, NATO and Canada I am engaging in a form of Critical Frame Analysis (CFA), a field of study that bridges feminist discursive institutionalist approaches and IR research by examining how policy problems are framed.\(^{24}\) What follows is a brief

\(^{24}\) Ferree (2009) also highlights CFA as the basis for her research
discussion of how feminist scholars have refined gender mainstreaming using critical frame analysis (CFA) to illustrate how discourse shapes policy outcomes. These discursive opportunity structures, or frameworks, “actively give concepts meaning by embedding them in networks of other [widely] shared and practically relevant meanings” by linking “people, concepts, practices and resources” (Ferree 2009, 89). This section applies Judith Squires’ (2005) three-part typology on inclusion, reversal and displacement to describe gender mainstreaming processes, building on earlier models by Jahan (1995) and Rees (2002). This typology provides a framework through which we can begin to connect policy processes, intended policy outcomes and institutional culture within the CAF.

The first form of gender mainstreaming Squires describes is inclusion, which pursues “a strategy of inclusion [and] usually aspire[s] to objectivity, conceives[s] of people as autonomous, and espouse[s] an equality politics (and [is] often labeled as liberal feminist)” (Ibid, 368). In other words, this approach is integrationist, and describes a process where women are integrated into existing institutional arrangements. An inclusion-based approach describes well the integration of women into the Canadian Armed Forces during WWII, where space was created for women’s participation, but the core institution remained unchanged (see Pierson 1986). Unlike inclusion, strategies of reversal pursue an “interpretive methodology, talk of ‘woman’ or ‘women’ and espouse a difference politics (and are often labeled as radical feminist)” (ibid). The identification and exploitation of difference is evident in current policy about the “added value” of having women present in military operations, as Johnstone and Momani (2019) illustrate in the CAF’s application of NATO Gender Advisor (GENAD) training. Finally, Squires describes a strategy of displacement which “adopt a genealogical methodology, speak of … of gendering (as a verb) rather than a gender (as a noun), and espouse a diversity politics (and are often labeled as
postmodern)” (Ibid). While inclusion emphasizes gender-neutrality/equality, reversal emphasizes the importance of the female identity/difference, and displacement focuses instead on the deconstruction of “discursive regimes that engender the subject” (Ibid). In other words, displacement strategies aim to identify discourses and structures of power that impose unjust gender constraints on the individual. This form of gender mainstreaming is transformative, and seeks to dissolve gendered assumptions within the institution, thereby untethering actors within the institution from anachronistic (and inaccurate) connections made between gender and skill. It is an aspirational approach that situates gender as a process of *gendering* rather than simply a position one occupies, and closely aligns with the emancipatory goals of UNSCR 1325.

Squire’s (2005) typology, the three components of which I have illustrated above, has been widely adapted for use in the study of gender mainstreaming. In the security sector, it has most clearly been adapted in *Gender Expertise as Feminist Strategy* (Prugl 2013). Prugl examines 12 UN gender training manuals to determine how feminist expertise is employed in achieving gendered security sector reform. Like Squires, Prugl is concerned with mapping the narratives that gender experts use to achieve institutional buy-in to gender integration goals. In her analysis of these manuals Prugl (2013) identified three discursive groupings used to justify the inclusion of women in peace and security operations. Two of these discursive frameworks map directly onto my research findings: *gender equality framing* and *transforming security framing* (2013, 7). The first rationale that Prugl highlights is the goal of transforming security, which emphasizes women’s (purportedly) unique gendered differences, and ability to serve in an advantageous role in modern security practices (Ibid, 8). While this logic superficially employs gender difference, it also suggests that “validating women’s difference would [improve] existing practices and achieve an operational transformation; it implicitly advocates a cooptation of femininity into such practices”
This logic resembles NATO’s attempt to frame gender as a *force multiplier* in modern operations, or its claim that gender perspectives will enhance the military’s operational efficacy. The archival examination contained in chapters two and three of this dissertation suggests that mainstreaming models based on reversal or what Prugl (2013) calls transforming security, as discussed below (what I call operational efficacy) are being layered atop *inclusion*-based mainstreaming (gender equality).

I amend Prugl’s framing slightly, as her “transforming security” framework is more often referred to in terms of “operational efficacy” in CAF and NATO documents, policies and directives. Prugl’s second rationale the goal of achieving gender equality, which identifies peacemaking as “an opportunity to make advancements on women’s issues and rights” (Ibid, 14). This logic emphasizes the social construction of femininity, and by appealing to its artificiality, seeks to eliminate the gendered discrimination it produces (Ibid). Within the gender equality rationale, difference is no longer emphasized as validation for gender exclusion and instead progressive values of justice and equality are invoked to justify women’s inclusion (Ibid). These frameworks will be applied to Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) history in chapter 3.

Prugl’s rationales can also be usefully conceived of as *frames*; tools that utilize pre-existing values, histories, and discourse to introduce a controversial topic to an otherwise uninitiated audience. In gender mainstreaming, Walby (2005) emphasizes that there will always be “at least two different frames of reference: ‘gender equality’ and the ‘mainstream’ (322). In this instance, mainstream refers to values and beliefs of the (often masculinized) status-quo. Although there may be room for compromise between these agendas, encroaching feminist norms must always “fight their way into institutional thinking... because established goals may compete with the prioritization of gender equality even if they are not directly opposed” (Ibid). The challenge of
gender mainstreaming in this context involves reconciling feminism with the ‘mainstream’ of an institutional culture; in other words, it requires that gender experts normalize some version of feminism (Walby 2005; see also Benschop & Verloo).

This challenge of normalizing feminism is particularly pronounced for experts tasked with adopting the relatively esoteric concepts contained in UNSCR 1325 and translating them for implementation in domestic militaries (Ferguson 2015). In translating international norms, feminist experts must “navigate the constraints and frustrations of working within a technocratic framework” while trying to create meaningful change in often resistant masculinized organizations (Ferguson 2015, 383). In anticipation of pushback, for example, a Canadian military gender advisor might emphasize the “operational efficacy” frame by pointing to studies that show that the inclusion of women in combat teams enabled ISAF forces to gather intelligence about the Taliban from local women (Johnstone and Momani 2019). This frame is far more likely to resonate with the values and ideals of the advisor’s audience, but it is not likely to encourage military personnel to think critically about the gender norms contained within their organizational values. The tension between compromise and cooptation in framing UNSCR 1325 in the CAF will be explored comprehensively in the coming pages.

The Emergence of UNSCR 1325

Post-WWII movements against colonial governance sparked vicious internecine conflicts, many of which were further exacerbated by proxy wars backed by the United States and Soviet Union. By the close of 1949, both the US and USSR had developed nuclear weaponry, rendering the consequences of direct warfare between the two superpowers unthinkable. Accordingly, the global battle for economic and ideological supremacy would be waged in the developing world; Soviet leaders backed rebel groups that maintained the anti-imperial ideology of Marxism, while
the American government was content to back whichever group was anti-Soviet (see Kanet 2006, 331). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), instances of interstate warfare declined, while nation-building processes amongst former Soviet satellite states prompted an upsurge in violent civil wars, many of which ended in brutal genocides (Mann 2018). The UN became increasingly involved in intractable conflicts where civil wars stemmed both from colonialism and from US-Soviet proxy fighting in nations like Angola (1961-1974; 1975-2002) and the Congo (1960-1965; 1996-1997; 1998-2003). In countries where these conflicts became endemic, civil war broke out shortly after the cessation of colonial wars of independence, offering long-suffering civilians no respite from hostilities. The increase in civil war was met with widespread agreement amongst UN member states that if a state cannot protect its people from genocide, the international community has a responsibility to protect the people of the affected state, through military intervention if necessary (United Nations 2005). Modern humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping operations remain reliant on national armed forces to provide security, enforce peace mandates, and distribute goods and resources. These challenges created the demand for a human rights-based intervention into the machinations of international security.

Throughout these conflicts, women and children suffered violence and degradation in ways that were distinct from the experiences of men. While sexual violence has always been a feature of warfare, the United Nations was becoming increasingly aware that rape was being used as a tactical weapon of war (United Nations 2010, 7). Harrington (2011) quotes Kofi 2002 Annan’s commentary on these conflicts, “A disturbing characteristic of these conflicts is the practice of deliberately targeting civilian populations – the majority being women and children” (566).

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Note that several Marxist anti-state movements maintained a high percentage of women in their fighting ranks, including but not limited to FARC in Colombia, Sendero Luminoso in Peru and UNITA in Angola. Often women were drawn to the radical egalitarianism espoused (but not always practiced) by Marxist paramilitaries.
Instances of “rape, forced impregnation, forced abortion, trafficking, sexual slavery and the intentional spread of sexually transmitted infections” illustrated that the experience of warfare was, for many women, very different than it was for men (UN 2010, 7). While men served on the frontlines (by choice or by force), women were left as sole providers for the physical and economic wellbeing of their family; a challenge that was not often alleviated in the post-conflict era (Ibid). While rape would become recognized as war crime by the International Criminal Court in 1998, thanks to the diligent lobbying of Women’s organizations in the UN, there was a sense amongst Women’s NGOs that an audience with the Security Council was necessary (Pratt 2013, 774).

UNSCR 1325 was officially passed in 2000 and immediately ratified by Canada, however the transnational lobbying that produced the resolution began much earlier. The Beijing declaration was adopted at the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women and built on the ideas contained in 1979 the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Both documents represented decades of work on behalf of transnational women’s peace groups (NGOs) which institutionalized a position for women in matters of global peace and security (Reardon 2015, 92). CEDAW called for the elimination of discriminatory practices against women in public and private life and represented the most comprehensive women’s rights legislation to date (see Charlesworth 2013). The Beijing Platform for Action (BPA) advanced the legislative groundwork laid by CEDAW by recognizing sexual violence as a weapon of war, and by acknowledging the disparate impact that war has on women and children (BPA 1995). By acknowledging the gendered impacts of war, the BPA “designated [protection of women from gender-based violence] as a fundamental human right” (Reardon 2015, 95). From this organizational bedrock, women’s peace organizations recognized that to advance their agenda, they must first be permitted in the places and spaces where those decisions were being made,
chiefly, within the UN Security Council. As Felicity Hill notably proclaimed, “whatever the code words, let us in! Peacebuilder, decision-maker, whatever argument works, let us in!” (Hill, quoted in Klot 2015, 731). As Hill indicates, discourse at this stage was not designed to respond directly to militarism within the Council; instead, it was in response to the near-total exclusion of women in the Council, a topic which was itself quite avant-guard in its time.

The “us” in the context of Hill’s speech were the civil-society groups and non-governmental organizations that would eventually comprise the NGO Working Group on Women Peace and Security, which drove the unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1325 through tireless lobbying, education and activism inside and outside of the Council. During its 42nd session (1998) the Commission on the Status of Women’s (CSW) recognized that in order to address the issue of women in armed conflict, a stronger, more centralized approach to lobbying the UN would be necessary (UN 2010, 9). The NGO WG first convened in May of 2000 to “pursue two recommendations – to encourage women’s participation in peace agreements and to push for the convening of a special session of Security Council…. that would eventually lead to the adoption of UNSCR 1325” (NGO WG founders quoted in Shepherd 2008, 388). Although each of these NGOs I refer to in footnote 27 had differing relationships regarding women, militarism, and security, as will be discussed below, Shepherd (2008) argues that “peacebuilding and the protection of human rights” were heavily prioritized by each of the five founding members of the NGO WG (388).

26 The NGO Working Group on WPS was comprised of the following organizations: WILPF, Amnesty International (AI), International Alert (IA), The Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children (WCRWC), and The Hague Appeal for Peace (HAP). However, it has since expanded to include: The Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, Femmes Africa Solidarité, Global Justice Center, Human Rights Watch, International Rescue Committee, Madre, Open Society Foundations, Oxfam International, Refugees International, The Institute for Inclusive Security, and the Women’s Action for New Directions.
During the Arria format meeting that preceded the open debate in the Council, members of the Working Group pointed to article 26 of the UN charter, which calls for the “establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments to ensure that the world’s human and economic resources are not diverted towards armaments” and in doing so, emphasized that “the Council needs to fulfil this role, now more than ever, in order to address one of the primary root causes of war, which is militarism – the actual preparation for war” (Hill 2002, 28). Similarly, NGOs from war-torn nations detailed how the UN had failed to provide adequate consideration to the unique needs of women in conflict, detailing human rights abuses like the rape and sexual violence perpetrated by UN Peacekeepers in Somalia (Ibid).

UNSCR 1325 pushed states and international organizations to reconsider the role of gender in global security as the global notion of peace and security moved away from traditional geo-political issues and towards human security including protection from poverty and hunger. Issues of human security disproportionately affect women and children in both developing countries and in wealthy, industrialized democracies (see Buzan et al 1998; Robinson 2011). The merits of UNSCR 1325 are numerous. The importance of gendered perspectives in security was scarcely – if ever – discussed within the Security Council prior to the introduction of UNSCR 1325. The United Nations Security Council began as an entirely masculine environment when first created in 1945; a reflection of the militaries of the nation-states that comprised the organization (Cohn 2008). It was not until May of 2000 that the Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming: a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations recognized that “women have been denied their role in [peace support operations] both nationally and internationally, and the gender dimension in peace processes has not been adequately addressed” (Klot 2015, 727).
The Windhoek Declaration paved the way of UNSCR 1325 by organizing the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) to consider research that demonstrated “serious deficiencies as regards women and gender issues in a number of peace-keeping operations” (Cockburn 2013, 442). Using Windhoek as a launchpad, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM – now UN Women) drafted a research paper to illustrate the barriers that women faced in their attempts to participate in peace and security negotiations and processes (Ibid). The Windhoek Declaration, in collaboration with the UN General Assembly’s 5-year review on the Beijing Platform for Action, provided evidence that women remained underrepresented in “decision making processes in…. peacekeeping, peacebuilding, post-conflict reconciliation” (Otto 2006, 137). The Windhoek Declaration and the 5-year review illustrated that gender considerations must become a “standard component of all peace support missions” (Simic 2010, 188). Prior to the introduction of these perspectives, a thematic resolution on women had never been considered in the Security Council; if women were mentioned in Security Council resolutions at all, it [had] been in passing reference to women as victims or women as a vulnerable group” (Cohn 2004, cited in Shepherd 2008, 391). The Security Council before 1325 was therefore “tenaciously state-centered, militaristic, and male dominated (Otto 2004, cited in Shepherd 2009, 391).

Therefore, when UNSC Resolution 1325 was introduced in October of 2000, it presented not just a formalized attempt to integrate women into global peace and security architecture, but also claimed to challenge the masculine basis upon which the policy machinery of international security rested through the introduction of women’s perspectives (Ibid). Accordingly, the discourse around gender and security is far from being a product of the feminist movement’s cooptation into the militarist agenda. Rather, introducing gender as a topic for debate in one of the
most masculinized institutions in international security was a radical discursive challenge to the traditional agenda of the Security Council (Klot 2015, 729). Klot emphasizes that these concepts were articulated in an entirely new era of peacebuilding, where the concept of protecting civilians (articulated in UNSCR 1265) was only introduced a year prior to the passing of 1325 (Ibid).

The relationship between UNSCR 1265 and 1325 will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 2, however it is essential to recognize that introducing concepts like women and the protection of civilians into the Security Council’s agenda challenged its members’ preoccupation with state-centric priorities of sovereignty and geopolitical power (Ibid). This is not to suggest that that the resolution is faultless. Scholars have demonstrated that the discourses on women and children in the resolution reinscribe gender essentialism and masculinist logics of peacekeeping (Puechguirbal 2010). I do not disagree with these scholars, however variation in the content and quality of domestic and regional National Action Plans (NAPs) (see. Barrow 2016, Miller et al 2014, Swaine 2009) illustrates that the resolution itself can (and has) been interpreted in a myriad of ways. This variation demonstrates that the inherent weaknesses of the resolution can only offer a partial explanation for the deleterious outcomes at the domestic level; domestic institutions and culture matter too. Klot (2015) does not place the “failures” of 1325 in the discourse of the resolution, instead she sees these failures as a reflection of issues within the peacebuilding process itself (740). My research well supports Klot’s argument. It shows that Canada’s delegates at the UN emphasized the importance of including women in security and peacebuilding processes and the importance of protecting civilians from armed conflict. The interviews I conducted with Canada’s representatives at the UN during the debate on 1325 –discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2, and transcripts of their speeches during that debate, support this reading.
The primary goals that the WPS NGO Working Group injected into 1325 were to introduce gender balancing and mainstreaming into the legislative bodies of the United Nations and its member states, as well as the peacekeeping and security missions conducted therein (de Jonge Oudraat 2013). In this regard, 1325 was intended to respond not only to the NGO Working Group’s goal of increasing the representation of women, while underscoring “that better understanding of the gendered nature (that is, the socially constructed nature) of relations and roles of men and women in societies leads to better policies to further peace and security and hence contributes to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security” (Ibid, 614). Consequently 1325 responds, at least in writing, to both to the Beijing Declaration’s normative impetus to women at all levels of governmental decision-making, and it responds to militaristic concerns about operational efficacy in modern conflict. On paper, UNSCR 1325 obligated members of the Security Council to recognize their commitment to include women in significant policymaking decisions and to integrate these lessons into the norms of international peacekeeping and security. However, in practice, the outcomes of UNSCR 1325 have been subject to significant debate.

Otto (2010) highlights that UNSCR 1325 lacked accountability mechanisms, and thus additional resolutions were required both to refine the goals of 1325 and ensure that these goals were enforceable (100). In attempting to create a holistic document that captured the multitude of ways in which gender interacts with global warfare, 1325 proved to be too unwieldy to encourage specific measurable improvement (Ibid). In the face of odious sexual violence against women in conflicts following the adoption of UNSCR1325, and the continually dismal representation of women in peace processes, WPS advocates realized that the aspirations of 1325 could not be realized through a single resolution (Ban Ki-Moon 2015; Chowdhury 2011). Accordingly, more specific resolutions were created to respond to incidences of sexual and gender-based violence
(SGBV) perpetrated during warfare, to grant local female activists increased agency in negotiating peace processes and to better respond to women’s needs in “post-conflict recovery” (Coomaraswamy et al. 2015). Despite these additional resolutions, persistent obstacles to the realization of UNSCR 1325 remain.

UNSCR 1325 obligated members of the Security Council to recognize their commitment to include women in significant policymaking decisions and to integrate these lessons into the norms of international peacekeeping and security. As a legally binding document for all UN member states, Resolution 1325 emphasizes “prevention [of violence against women], protection [of women and girls] and participation [for women in international peace and security roles]” (Cohn 2013, 14). First, ratification of 1325 requires that both UNSC policy and the state level policies of national governments consider the impact of warfare on “women and girls” including but not limited to the use of rape and sexual violence as a tool of warfare (S/RES/1325). This element of the resolution requires that member states recognize their responsibility to protect women, and unsurprisingly it has become the most contentious element of the resolution. Shepherd (2011) argues that by emphasizing women as victims/vulnerable, the UN’s WPS policy discursively reaffirms stereotypes about the bellicosity of men and the peaceable and victimized status of women (see also Gibbings 2011, Ellerby 2013).

As critical feminist studies have illustrated, UNSCR 1325 is not without its faults. In the years since UNSCR 1325 was passed, it has been criticized for “movement to supplement the

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27 There is disagreement within the scholarly community regarding the binding nature of 1325. Although UNSCR 1325 was not adopted under article VII of the UN Charter (on threats to international peace), both the nature of customary law in the LOAC and subsequent International Court of Justice (ICJ) interpretations suggest that 1325 may be considered binding. For more on this debate, see Appiagyei-Atua 2011.

28 Although scholars and practitioners disagree on how best to measure the ratification of 1325, appendix B for a list of UN countries that have created NAPs for implementation of 1325.
[women’s] rights-based approach with one based on possible contributions” (Gibbings 2011, 532). These concerns echo feminist antimilitarist debate by expressing concern that in issues like military expenditure and cessation of the arms trade, the WG has made little progress. These issues have doubtless created opportunities to militarize the WPS agenda, however, I argue that blame also lays with the interpretation and implementation of the WPS agenda after the adoption of 1325, rather solely than in the resolution itself.

The importance of increasing the numerical and substantive representation female personnel is emphasized in both the preamble and operative clauses of 1325 and reaffirmed in many of its supporting resolutions. For example, operative clause four, “Further urges the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian policy, human rights and humanitarian personnel” (S/RES/1325). Likewise, the resolution urges the increased representation of women “at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict” (Ibid). Substantively, the resolution demands gender-based perspectives are integrated into all peacekeeping operations, and that funding and logistical support be made available to enable gender training for both civilian and military personnel (Ibid). The resolution further reaffirms the “important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, and stress[es] the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution” (Ibid). While there has been criticism of the progress made by Member States in achieving these goals, the resolution itself sets out a clear normative standard for enhancing women’s participation and empowerment.
As these examples illustrate, enabling women’s enhanced participation is present throughout the language of 1325 and subsequent resolutions within the WPS agenda. Although all core resolutions in the UNSC WPS collection reaffirm the importance of female military personnel in international peacekeeping missions, troop-contributing states have been unable to provide female soldiers in adequate numbers. Despite considerable UN effort, the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has struggled to communicate the importance of gender to UN peacekeeping personnel (Winslow 2009, 546). As a result of the “masculine culture of international militaries and police in peace operations…the code of silence concerning sexual misconduct, the view that ‘boys will be boys’ and the fear of recrimination for being a whistle-blower, all …make it difficult to introduce gender-sensitive policies” (Ibid). Similarly, since it remains the responsibility of troop-contributing states to prosecute soldiers guilty of sexual misconduct, these attitudes have contributed to a “culture of impunity” for UN military personnel (Ibid, 547; see also Whitworth 2004). It should be noted that the UN has no standing army, and all military personnel, e.g., soldiers that participate in a military observer mission, are provided by UN Member States. To that end, soldiers are deployed on UN missions through the national militaries that they serve.

Although it has been suggested that women’s involvement in peacekeeping missions has been shown to respond to both normative and practical concerns for all parties involved, their representation remains remarkably low (Bridges and Horsfall 2009). Currently, over 80,000 military and police peacekeepers are serving in UN missions, though only 8% of those personnel are women (Canada 2021). Examining just women in military contingents, this number drops to 4.8% (UN 2020). When the UN published a 10-year review on the status of UNSCR 1325, it found that
In only few countries has there been a significant increase in the proportion of women in national security institutions, despite several having adopted gender sensitive recruitment policies. The culture of most national security institutions remains unfriendly to women; discrimination and sexual harassment of female officers are widespread” (UNDPO 2010, 10).

These findings highlight that although considerable international resources have been levied in hopes of increasing the representation of women in UN peace and security operations, the local military culture of troop-contributing nations continues to frustrate efforts. Simply put, the inability of NATO and UN troop-supplying states to recruit and retain female soldiers in meaningful numbers significantly impeded their ability to advance the core pillars of the WPS agenda internally and on deployment. Thus, the culture embedded within UN and NATO forces prevents them from realizing their own objectives; one of the most significant obstacles to the realization of the WPS agenda rests at the domestic level of states and their militaries.

**NATO and the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda**

Amidst growing colonial wars of independence and Soviet aggression following the end of WWII, Western nations began to fear that the UN alone would be unable to quell rising Cold War tensions (Veterans Affairs Canada 2019). In response, Canada and 11 other founding members signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington D.C. in 1949, establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Duignan 2000). Accordingly, NATO exists as a perceived corrective to the inadequacy of the United Nations Security Council in issues of interstate warfare. NATO is a bipartite organization with functionally separate political and military branches (NATO 2021). Each NATO member-state contributes a Political Ambassador who sits in NATO’s

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29 The 11 other members were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States.

30 As in the Canadian CAF and DND, this the division of political and military arms is designed to ensure civilian control of the armed forces; it’s how democracies protect against a coup or the establishment of a praetorian guard (military loyalty to a specific government). See Appendix C for more details.
political headquarters in Brussels and military representatives, which are the Chiefs of Defence in each respective country (IMS) (Ibid). Canada’s current permanent ambassador to NATO is David Angell, (who will come up again, as his interview is featured in Chapter two), and Canada’s military representative is Vice Admiral Scott Bishop. When NATO adopted Bi-Strategic Directive 40-1 on Women, Peace, and Security (2007) the organization had grown to 28 members and the scope of modern military engagement had changed radically (NATO 2021). As of 2018, women represented 25% of NATO’s senior management (NATO 2018) and although deterrence remains a key concern, a new emphasis has been placed on counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, and therefore closer collaboration with local people in the nations where NATO and UN troops are stationed. Furthermore, all treaty members have now opened combat positions to female personnel (Duncanson 2015, 238).

NATO’s relationship with the WPS agenda has roughly kept pace with numerical advances in women’s representation in NATO forces. NATO’s formal institutional engagement with the feminist agenda began in 1976, with the creation of the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces (CWINF). This committee was organized, primarily to “advise NATO’s military leadership and member nations on critical issues and policies affecting service women in the NATO forces… [acting as a] consultative body which aims at promoting the most effective utilization of the capability of service women in the Armed Forces throughout the Alliance” (NATO 2004, 7). This committee was renamed the NATO Committee on Gendered Perspectives (NCGP) in 2009 and has provided an essential “gender machinery” for the advance of the WPS agenda in NATO (Wright 2016, 354). In 1997, the NCGP was granted an office, which became permanent in 2007, and thus the Office of Women in NATO Forces provided femocrats within the organization a permanent position within NATO’s military structure (Ibid, 354). Interestingly, female military
officers in NATO began ad hoc conferences on the status and wellbeing of women in military forces as early as 1961; resultanty, the military branch of NATO outpaced its civilian counterpart in the uptake of gendered perspectives (Wright et al. 2019, 2) A civilian/political counterpart to Office of Women in NATO Forces was only granted recently, with the creation of the “Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security” in 2012 (Ibid, 355). Interestingly, this position has most recently been filled by Claire Hutchinson (2018), who worked for over a decade as a Gender Advisor in the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations, making her the first UN employee to hold the role.

NATO committed to the United Nations WPS agenda with the formation of a NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) policy for integrating UNSCR 1325 mandates into NATO missions in 2007, which began NATO’s formal implementation of the WPS agenda as defined in UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions (Olsson et al 2015, 43). This commitment was realized in 2009 when the military branch of NATO issued Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 (also known as Bi-SC 40-1), the purpose of which claims to be the implementation “within NATO military organizations the policies contained within the UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security” (NATO 2009). The 2007 version of 40-1 emphasizes that the rationale behind implementing the WPS agenda in NATO is to “afford the Alliance and NATO-led missions the advantage of including female perspectives…specifically focusing on women and girls” (NATO 2009, 1-1). These documents have been revised several times since their inception, and currently the primary directives are Bi-SC 40-1 (2017), and the NATO/EAPC Women, Peace and Security Policy and Action Plan 2018 (NATO WPS Action Plan), in addition to recommendations from the annual meetings of the NATO Committee on Gender Perspective (NCGP).

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31 This is the civilian side of NATO’s structure.
Despite NATO’s progress in removing legal barriers to women’s full integration into NATO’s military and civilian staff, research suggests that NATO missions struggle with the same boundaries to implementation that plague UN missions. As of 2013, only 18% of NATO members had deployed gender advisors to NATO missions, suggesting that many ongoing NATO efforts continue without gendered perspectives (Figueroa & Palomo 2015, 5). Moreover, by 2017, women represented only 11.1% of active-duty military personnel in the armed forces of NATO member states (NATO 2017, 15). While several explanations are proffered for the disparity between women and men’s representation in NATO forces, such as a problematic work-life balance, the fact remains that of reported cases of sexual harassment and abuse in the armed forces of NATO member states, 82% of complainants are women (NATO 2017, 44). Notwithstanding that gendered harassment remains an issue in many (if not all) NATO member states, NATO’s official narrative around the organization’s implementation of 1325 continues to focus on the importance of gendered perspectives on operations.

In conversation with Swanee Hunt (2016) Douglas Lute emphasized that NATO used Gender Advisors “only in the field, and mainly to enhance the protection of women. But during NATO’s next major deployment after the Balkans, to Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001 attacks, our forces became more aware of the need to tap women’s potential contributions to security” (Hunt and Lute 2016, 12-13, emphasis added by V.Tait). Like Lute, Egnell (2016) states that because of “tactical level challenges” in the “field of operations – not least in Afghanistan and Iraq” NATO-forces have produced “organizational innovations such as… Female Engagement Teams and Gender Field Advisors to improve situational awareness and intelligence gathering by

32 Swanee Hunt founded the Washington based Institute for Inclusive Security, she is the former US Ambassador to Austria and currently teaches at the Harvard Kennedy School. Douglas Lute served as the US permanent representative to NATO during the Obama administration.
engaging local women…” (74).\textsuperscript{33} Loosely translated, this highlights that NATO forces have come to the realization that western men forcibly searching Muslim women living under NATO occupation belies the public image it seeks to portray; NATO needs women to complete these unsavory tasks. Egnell closes with the following statement:

In short, [women] have served as force multipliers within a context that often required their participation for maximized effectiveness. The jury is still out on the effectiveness and impact of these teams and advisors, but that should not distract us from the fact that they were not introduced as a politically correct nicety to please the women’s movement, but as a direct result of operational necessities… This is, in other words, the smart thing to do, and the fact that it is also the right thing to do in terms of promoting gender equality and women’s rights is useful but is not central to the argument. The core task of military organizations is to fight and win the nation’s wars and not to promote gender equality—and the organizational change process should therefore focus on these core tasks (74).\textsuperscript{34}

These excerpts underscore the core challenge feminist norm entrepreneurs face in working with NATO forces – the militarist agenda of NATO necessarily supersedes the egalitarian aspirations of the WPS agenda.

In her examination of NATO’s approach to adopting 1325, Cockburn (2011) has criticized NATO for using UNSCR 1325 to resolve image and personnel issues in the modern military, rather than as an instrument for increasing women’s agency in peace processes. Despite the strong anti-war roots of the organizations that lobbied for 1325, Cockburn argues, the resolution itself is easily coopted for military ends (Ibid, 6-7). Indeed, 1325 does not explicitly state that its aim is to prevent war, nor does it “contest the legitimacy of the systems that produce war” (Ibid). Although the resolution affirms the importance of finding peaceable conflict resolution, which

\textsuperscript{33} Situational awareness refers the familiarity that military personnel have with the social, political and environmental terrain in which they’re deployed.

\textsuperscript{34} Egnell is a senior fellow at the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security – I select his work both because of his position and because it provides a particularly unapologetic example of the operational efficacy discursive framework in practice.
fits within the larger purview of the UN, the body of documents that comprise the Women, Peace and Security agenda are by no means *anti-military*. Therefore, organizations like NATO and the CAF are free to interpret and adapt the relatively open-ended parameters of the resolution to fit the needs of NATO forces. This adaptation includes emphasizing the importance of assimilating women into national armed forces to enhance operational efficacy by using women to improve infiltration of civilian communities, particularly within the conservative Middle Eastern and Asian societies that NATO has been engaged with since the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Tait 2015). Finally, the increased integration of women within NATO-forces lends the legitimacy of the feminist movement to what was rapidly becoming a defunct Cold War-era alliance, thus improving the public image of NATO-forces embedded within increasingly diverse Western societies. This discussion highlights that NATO’s early engagement with the WPS agenda was shallow at best, and at worst, represents a cooptation of the agenda for militarist ends. These tensions loom large in our discussion of gender mainstreaming in the CAF; I now turn to the spectrum of responses that various women’s movements have maintained with the concept of militarism.

**Feminist Engagement with Militarism**

While introducing the concept of *gender* to the UNSC was a critical move towards uncovering the gendered logics that inform militarism, these concepts need to be examined in greater detail to capture the complex relationship between feminisms, international systems of militarism, and military service. The complexity of this relationship is highlighted by the original six members of the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security; only the Women’s international League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) was anti-militarist, anti-war and feminist, while the remaining members did not explicitly identify themselves as anti-war (Cohn 2008, 12
quoted in Nikoghosyan 2018, 10-11). Indeed, women’s movements have taken varied positions in their stance on warfare. From a systemic perspective, numerous feminist security scholars have argued that the discourse contained in 1325 represents a step towards the cooptation of the women’s movement; it has borrowed the legitimacy of the feminist movement to stabilize and legitimize militarism following the end of the Cold War (Cockburn 2011; Gibbings 2011; Shepherd 2008; Wright 2015; Young 2003). In so doing, 1325 can be seen to reify existing power structures by transposing women atop fundamentally unequal security institutions and processes. These scholars and activists see the issue of human rights abuses during warfare as systemic; these abuses are imbricated in the militarized international system itself (Cockburn 2011; Basu and Eichler 2016; Enloe 1989, 2000, Sjoberg and Via 2010, Sjoberg 2013, Whitworth 2004).

The human rights abuses that these scholars highlight have extended violent colonial narratives long after a colonial system of colonial governance has collapsed in former European colonies. In few other cases is this process more evident than in the Canadian “peacekeeping” intervention in Somalia, resulting in the torture and murder of 19-year-old Shidane Arone by Canadian soldiers (Razack 2001; Whitworth 2004). Razack emphasizes that the “Canadian troops saw themselves as colonizers, civilizing the natives and imposing order on the chaos of tribal warfare” (128). These beliefs were further reinforced by the regimental culture that the CAF maintained from the British tradition, which created space for a violent subculture of racism and aggression (Winslow 1997). From this perspective, war crimes – like sexual and gender-based violence – are rooted in the larger historical trajectory of colonial patriarchy; gender norms surrounding masculinity have been reinforced by the practices and discourse of militarism.

Within this view of the military, UNSCR 1325’s reliance on the armed forces to assist in the pursuit of a more egalitarian, peaceable international order may seem an injudicious approach.
As Wright (2015) emphasizes, although prevention of warfare is one of the core pillars of UNSCR 1325, this is often interpreted by member states as prevention of “sexual and gender-based violence in conflict” (504). Wright, commenting on her attendance at the Global UN Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict (2015b), expresses concern that the content of the resolutions themselves may actually confer “gender legitimacy to the same militarized approaches to international security that feminists have sought to disrupt… it was taken as given that having more female soldiers would make military units better able to respond to sexual violence, but the gendered nature of [modern] military institutions themselves was rarely mentioned” (505). Despite these critiques of militarized violence, feminists have not maintained a unified stance regarding pacifism, and debates around engagement with the military vary widely.

**Military Service: A Means to an End?**

From a historical perspective, women have always been essential actors in military campaigns – particularly if we expand our conception of participation to include both military service and women’s labour in support of men’s military service (Enloe 1989). If we expand our lens historically and geographically, there are many complex examples of women partaking in military service as a means by which to pursue liberation from both patriarchy and from colonial governance. These tales of individual heroism illustrate the complexity of feminists’ engagement with warfare. Harriet Tubman for example, was an ardent supporter of Union forces, becoming the first woman to command an armed military raid against Confederate plantation owners in 1863 (George 2020). Tubman’s story underscores the competing values that feminists are often forced to reconcile in engaging with armed services. By picking up arms against the Confederates, Tubman was able to advance the abolitionist cause at a systemic level, while she liberated 750

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35 Many women’s organizations have sought to disrupt militarized approaches, though a closer reading of the history of the women’s movement illustrates that this is not true of all women’s advocacy groups.
enslaved peoples during the 1963 raid alone (Ibid). As Tubman’s case illustrates, women’s engagement with war is often a necessary evil in their bid to gain citizenship in an existing – or emerging – state. In the Northern United States, abolitionist movements would become the prototype for transatlantic women’s peace networks as women from the United Kingdom and United States were banned from male-only institutions of the state (Etchart 2015, 703). In the years that followed, women’s suffrage became functionally linked to the abolitionist movement through their joint pursuit of rights as American citizens, however this relationship would dissolve following the passing of the 15th amendment, which gave Black men – and not women, the right to vote (Ibid).

In a statistical analysis of political opportunity structures at the outset of WWI, McCammon et al (2019) illustrate that American states were “significantly more likely to enact [state level] suffrage toward the end or just after World War I,” suggesting to the authors that women’s increased presence in the public sector throughout the War created a favorable political opportunity structure for their suffrage (64). The authors go on to emphasize that the “political opportunity provided by WWI was so intertwined with a gendered opportunity that we could not analyze them separately” (Ibid, 65). While American suffragists were not unanimous in their support for the war, many recognized that it presented them a unique opportunity to advance their claim to citizenship, a judgement that would prove prescient. Reversing his previous stance that suffrage should be left to the states; President Woodrow Wilson said of the 19th Amendment that, “its adoption is, in my judgment, [is] clearly necessary to the successful prosecution of the war and the successful realization of the objects for which the war is being fought” (Wilson 1918). Women’s participation in the American war effort exposed an untenable contradiction – how could

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36 For example, women (regardless of skin-color) were banned from participating in the 1840 Anti-Slavery Convention in London (Etchart 2015, 703).
the United States claim to fight for freedom when more than half of its population did not enjoy the right to vote?

Most international pacifist and suffrage movements remained closely linked at the end of the 19th century (Tickner and True 2018, 222). However, in the lead up to the First World War, major international suffrage organizations like the International Women’s Suffrage Alliance refused to participate in significant pacifist gatherings, like the International Congress of Women (ICW) held at the Hague in 1915 (Ibid). Their refusal to participate in the ICW was emblematic of the larger split emerging between women’s suffrage movement and the ideology of pacifism. The 1915 Hague conference would “reveal bitter divisions among essentialist, nationalist and internationalist feminists, and between pacifist and anti-imperialist feminists” (Etchart 2015, 706). These divisions notwithstanding, the conference created the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) with Jane Addams as its president; WILPF would become a key player within the United Nations NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security seventy-five years later, as discussed above.

In Canada, the outbreak of the first World War proved similarly divisive amongst first wave feminists (Bacchi 1977). As with the American case, there can be no singular narrative for Canadian women’s wartime experience, though in the broadest sense, total war also shifted the political opportunity structure for women’s voting rights. In 1917, the Wartime Elections Act extended suffrage to white women who either served as nurses overseas or were voting on behalf of their male relatives serving overseas (Janovicek and Thomas 2019). It should be noted that Canadian women’s political enfranchisement remained heavily curtailed until the 1929 Person’s

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37 The International Women’s Suffrage Alliance was founded by American Suffragist Carrie Chapman Catt and represented suffragists from 11 different countries and is now comprised of 41 different member organizations (see. womenalliance.org).
case, and Canadian Indigenous Women had to wait until revisions were made to the 1960 Indian Act allowed them to vote (Janovicek and Thomas 2019). This limited extension of voting rights amidst WWI created as many divisions in Canadian society as it resolved, splitting Canadian suffragist between patriotism and pacifism, and syphoning the resources of the women’s movement into the war effort (Bacchi 1977, 112). Support of WWI introduced lasting cleavages in the suffrage movement, “whose members held different views on the legitimacy of militarism, conscription, the Wartime Elections Act, and the decision to continue campaigning for suffrage during the war” (Glassfield and Brooks 2019, 154). Groups like the National Equal Franchise Union went as far as suggesting suffrage be dropped for the duration of the war (Bacchi 1977, 112). Wartime experience did not lead Canadian feminists to any consensus over the legitimacy of war, nor did it evenly grant them political enfranchisement. Instead, feminist organizations like the Canadian Suffrage Association remained pacifist and lobbied for diplomatic alternatives to continuing warfare in Europe (Roberts 1985, 2). These suggestions were an anathema to so-called “patriotic” women’s organizations like National Equal Franchise Association and the Women’s Patriotic League, both of which denounced pacifist feminist leaders like Jane Addams and Hester Maclean for functioning as an “unknown emissary to the Kaiser” (Ibid).

As early Canadian Women’s Movements soon discovered, tensions around warfare and patriotism introduced by the First World War remained well into the Second World War. Many members of the Canadian Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) branch were portrayed as traitors in print media to Canada and in March of 1920, militarists and extreme nationalists forced the “cancellation of WILPF International President Jane Addams’ invitation by the University of Toronto’s Department of Sociology to give a public lecture (Roberts 1989, 286).

38 Women in Quebec would not be able to vote provincially until 1949.
These tensions would carry through the 20s and 30s in the lead up to WWII (Ibid). In 1941 the Armed Forces expanded support roles, opening both the Canadian Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (CWAF) and the Canadian Women’s Army Corps (CWAC), with Women’s Royal Canadian Naval Service opening in 1942 (Pierson 1983, 5). Though the creation of these units meant that women were finally paid for their military service to Canada, the National Council for Women emphasized that profound inequalities within the Canadian military remained, particularly in pay and benefits (Ibid, 7; Davis 2013, 68). Likewise, a “whispering campaign” began over women who served in the Canadian military; their engagement in traditionally male roles led many to believe they may also adopt Canadian soldiers’ perceived promiscuity (Ibid). While Canadian feminists originally held out hope that their increased employment in the public sector would enhance their standing in Canadian society, their hopes would be dashed shortly after the war. Pierson (1983, 1986) demonstrates that whatever gains Canadian women made during the war, they were reversed after the war’s end and women were expected to return to domesticity.

As this brief history suggests, the relationship between various women’s movements and engagement with the military is fraught. Reasons of patriotism and nationalism have motivated women to serve in the Armed Forces, as has the rather shrewd recognition that it will help advance their position vis-à-vis the patriarchal state. Thus, when women in the Canadian Armed Forces began to challenge women’s exclusion from combat-facing trades, there was little hope that they would find allyship amongst the Canadian feminist community.\(^{39}\)\(^{40}\) Accordingly, the Association for Women’s Equity in the Canadian Forces (AWECF) was created during a meeting held by

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\(^{39}\) This is not to suggest that women in the CAF were unable to benefit from civilian legislation; as I will explain on pages 29-35, the *Canadian Human Rights Act* (1978) and the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1982) would prove instrumental in granting women the right to serve in non-traditional trades, like combat. These acts created a legal framework through which Canadian women soldiers could challenge the patriarchal leadership of the CAF by appealing directly to civilian authorities.

\(^{40}\) Note that in military parlance, trade refers to an occupation within the CAF, rather than a transaction.
“Maude Barlow, Adelle Karmas, Shirley Robinson, and Suzanne Simpson after presenting briefs to the Parliamentary Sub-Committee on Equality Rights” in 1985 (AWECF 1988). The AWECF represents the only Canadian Women’s organization exclusively dedicated to the cause of enhancing women’s equality in the CAF. During this informal meeting, the founding staff of AWECF determined that to further their cause, they should both seek membership in the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) and lobby members of parliament (Ibid). The AWECF proved instrumental in lobbying for the rights of Servicewomen, particularly in their involvement in the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal case (1989) that would ultimately force the CAF to permit women to serve in combat (Davis 1994, 19). While the AWECF was able to successfully lobby NAC for membership, the relationship would be short lived. After numerous protests from other feminist organizations within NAC, including NAC members verbally abusing and harassing AWECF members when they tried to “explain their position regarding the status of military women”, the AWECF withdrew its membership in 1991 (Davis 2013, 153). Canadian Servicewomen would continue to face the CAF in the absence of non-governmental feminist support from civilian organizations.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has parsed discourse around UNSCR 1325 in Canada, the UN and NATO, demonstrating that the resolutions that comprise the WPS agenda have been understood through militarist frameworks that are at odds with the original intent of its framers. Although many scholars place responsibility for inadequate implementations of 1325 within the discourse of the resolution itself, I argue this offers only a partial explanation of subsequent discursive distortion.

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41 However, other Women’s rights organizations, like the Women’s Legal Education and Advocacy Fund (LEAF), helped several members pursue individual claims with regards to maternity grievances and related issues.
during implementation. This explanation must be augmented by research within UN members’ militaries, both their domestic culture and its relationship to the state and competing international organizations – like NATO – in which it is embedded. Furthermore, it is essential that the relationship between feminism and militarism be understood through the historically contingent relationship that women have held with armed engagement. In the coming chapter, I will illustrate how Canadian foreign policy at the UN supported and bolstered the gender equality framework originally envisioned by the civil society organization that comprised the UN NGO on WPS. The chapter then goes on to demonstrate how Canada’s declining participation in UN missions aligned with increased engagement in NATO operations, while the Conservative administration of Stephen Harper capitalized on a discourse of militarism to discredit the internationalism of the previous Liberal government.
Framing 1325 in the Canadian Executive Branch: Compromise and Contradiction

When the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security introduced its agenda to the Security Council in 2000, it did so with the intent of both eradicating sex and gender-based violence as a weapon of war and enhancing women’s voices in the security sector. In this way, Resolution 1325 (2000) presented not just a formalized attempt to integrate women into the existing global peace and security architecture, it also sought to transform the masculine basis upon which the policy machinery of international security rested (Cohn 2003). The resolution was designed to amplify the representation and participation of women, while transforming the system from which they had been excluded. This was seen as a crucial step in the global movement for the empowerment of women. Unfortunately, the framing and implementation of the Resolution by other bodies, namely, NATO and nation-state militaries like the Canadian Armed Forces, would see the United Nations’ goals of empowering women and protecting civilians reframed and reinterpreted. Today, the Canadian Armed Forces’ interpretation of Resolution 1325 is dominated by an operational efficacy discourse, an interpretation in contention with the gender equality agenda of the UN Security Council.

In this chapter, I explore the exogenous factors shaping the Canadian Armed Forces interpretation of Resolution 1325. More specifically, I detail the role of the UN and NATO and their interactions with Canadian governments and diplomats over the last twenty years and how

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42 Recall that the NGO WG on WPS was originally comprised of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, Amnesty International, International Alert, the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, and the Hague Appeal for Peace. This working group was established in 1998 during the Fourth World Conference on Women, which focused on women and armed conflict (Hill et al 2003).
these interactions have shaped the Canadian military’s framing of Resolution 1325. Although Canada was a signatory, and the Security Council requested National Action Plans (NAPs) from all its signatories in 2004, it took politicians six years to develop and implement Canada’s 1325 action plan in 2010, when the Harper Conservative, minority government finally capitulated to pressure to develop a 1325 NAP. In the interim, other international organizations like NATO, which developed an Action Plan in 2007, filled the discursive vacuum with a militarized interpretation of the Resolution. Although this interpretation presented the Canadian Armed Forces a ready-made template for implementing 1325 within a military organization, NATO’s interpretation deviated significantly from the intent of the Security Council with its emphasis on the instrumental value of women in warfare rather than as a matter of democratic principle.43 The approach that the Canadian Armed Forces eventually adopted has much more in common with NATO’s interpretation than the intentions of the Women, Peace and Security NGO Working Group within the UN. However, the pathway that the CAF took to developing their approach was fraught and shaped in no small part by Harper’s (2006-2015) militarized Canadian nationalism and by international, humanitarian crises.

NATO’s influence on the Canadian Armed Forces offers only a partial explanation of why operational efficacy discourses triumphed over gender equality discourse in the implementation of Resolution 1325. NATO provided the language and framework to Canada, but its framework was only internalized because of two key domestic events: the election of a Conservative government (2006-2015) under Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan.

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43 The instrumental approach emphasizes that women share social and biological differences from male soldiers, and that these differences allow NATO forces to better complete missions. For example, female soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq were often better able to liaise with local women and children, and were the only personnel able to execute body searches of women without violating the Muslim community’s social mores.
beginning in 2001. The Harper administration shifted away from a nationalism focused on UN peacekeeping and human security towards a “warrior” nationalism, and increased cooperation with the American military. This served Harper’s purpose of discrediting the Liberal Government’s legacy of peacekeeping, while rebranding Canada and Canadians in the Conservative image of ‘moral traditionalists’ with a proud history of military service. This discursive shift was intensified by Canada’s growing military presence in Afghanistan and increasing reliance on NATO as our primary multilateral security partnership. Making matters worse, numerous Canadian women’s organizations – like the Gender and Peacebuilding Working Group (GPWG) discussed in the next section – had their operational funding decimated by the Harper government, making it extremely difficult to mount an organized response to the reorientation of the national narrative. Cumulatively, these international and domestic political dynamics enabled the CAF to frame the Women, Peace, and Security agenda in instrumentalist terms.


While the 1990s may be referred to as the “decade of darkness” by members of the Canadian military, this period represents a watershed in foreign policy (Desrosiers and Legasse 2009, 665).\(^\text{44}\) From 1999-2000, the majority Liberal government under Jean Chrétien had succeeded in securing an elected seat for Canada on the United Nations Security Council, its sixth term as a non-permanent member of the Security Council since the Council’s inception.\(^\text{45}\) During its tenure on the Council, Canadian representatives played a pivotal role in refocusing the Council’s agenda on

\(^{44}\) This period is called the decade of darkness in reference to sweeping budget cuts, a profound breakdown in military discipline during Somalia Affair, and again in Bakovici (Bosnia), and widespread reporting of sexual misconduct within the CAF. These events will be discussed in detail in the coming pages.

\(^{45}\) Henceforth the United Nations Security Council will be referred to as “the Council” for the sake of brevity. In four of these six terms, the governing party was Liberal, except for Prime Minister John Diefenbaker in 1958-59, and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in 1989-90.
human security, rather than national security, under the influence of former foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy’s human security agenda (Hill 2005, 16; Riddell-Dixon 2005, 1074).\textsuperscript{46} The “Axworthy Doctrine” emphasized coordinative action amongst “like-minded nations” and the use of soft power to ensure the security of individuals within society, rather than simply safeguarding state sovereignty (Bernard 2006).\textsuperscript{47} In Navigating a New World (2003, 75), Axworthy describes soft power as reliant on “the skill and talent of Canadians to negotiate, advise, organize and create, solve problems peaceably and look for practical solutions.” Soft-power approaches to Canadian foreign policy occupy a place of pride within Liberal Party tradition dating back to the leadership of Lester B. Pearson, whose deft use of non-coercive action during the Suez Canal crises in 1956 helped to enshrine peacekeeping as a cornerstone of Canadian nationalism (McCollough 2017). Human security for those affected by conflict animated Canadian foreign policy throughout Axworthy’s tenure.\textsuperscript{48}

The exchanges between domestic and international actors delineated in this chapter underscore the reality that Canada’s implementation of Resolution 1325 internalized a norm that it helped to create. First introduced by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994 in a publication entitled Human Development Report: New Dimensions of Human Security (Bosold and von Bredow 2006, 830), human security was quickly adopted into Liberal foreign policy, and appears in the 1995 statement Canada in the World (Smith and Ajadi 2020, 369). Lloyd Axworthy championed the concept of human security most fervently during his tenure as Canada’s Foreign

\textsuperscript{46} As will be discussed in chapter 3, the “decade of darkness” refers to the significant budget cuts that the department endured under successive liberal governments, as well as our failures in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda.

\textsuperscript{47} Axworthy’s “Like-Minded Nations Group” included Ireland, Switzerland and South Africa (Wallace 1998).

Affairs Minister from 1996-2000 (Ibid). Following the end of the Cold War, Axworthy saw that intrastate (i.e. civil) warfare would replace interstate warfare as the direst threat to international security and advocated for ways to protect civilians from warring parties within national borders (Chapnick 2011, 144). This is not to suggest that Conservative foreign policy is uniformly isolationist; Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was a supporter of the UN and of humanitarian intervention in places like the former Yugoslavia (Boutilier 2018). However, Prime Minister Mulroney’s government was forced to take a more restrained approach amidst numerous failures of the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia (Ibid).

As discussed in greater detail below, this human-centric focus was a significant point of departure for the United Nations Security Council (UNSCR) which traditionally focused on protecting the sovereignty of the state.

Axworthy’s conception of Human Security urged the Council to embrace new approaches to safeguarding vulnerable peoples in places of conflict, including the development of the International Criminal Court and revisiting the concept of state sovereignty when the state proved incapable of (or unwilling to) protect its citizens (Axworthy 2001, 1). In the words of the delegation to the Security Council from 1999-2000, this meant Canadian diplomats were trying to “put people at the centre of foreign policy and not nation states” (Paul Heinbecker, interview with V. Tait, May 6, 2019). Hence, Axworthy saw the international system as a place for state cooperation, where UN member-states could be:

…linked together by a web of international norms and standards that seek to ensure equal protection of individuals and constrain state leaders by holding them accountable for their actions with respect to protecting individuals (Bernard 2006, 235).

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49 Canadian peacekeepers lacked both the equipment and mandate to defend Bosnians during the UNPROFOR mission, making the protection of civilians nearly impossible (Boutilier 2018, 62). See also footnote 48.
Axworthy’s framing of the human security agenda succeeded in advancing the protection of individuals against state-sponsored violence; over his tenure as foreign minister, Axworthy was instrumental in the United Nations move to ban anti-personnel land mines, the establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) and in ensuring that the protection of civilians in armed conflict was at the core of the SC agenda (Ibid, 236).

Two resolutions anchored the protection of civilians as a cornerstone of the human security agenda in the Security Council and solidified Axworthy’s multilateral network of states committed to advancing humanitarianism within the Council: UNSCR 1265 (1999) and UNSCR 1296 (2000), both related to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.50 These resolutions opposed the intentional targeting of civilians as an explicit strategy of warfare that was on the rise in intrastate conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone and the former Yugoslavia (UNSC 1999; UNSC 2000). Increased targeting of civilians underscored the “erosion in respect for international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and principles during armed conflict” (UNSC 1999, 2). David Angell, the assistant secretary to the Cabinet, Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat in the Privy Council Office (PCO) held multiple UN postings during Canada’s 1999-2000 term on the Council under the Chretien majority Liberal government. He reflects that “one of our priorities on the council was to find a way of placing Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict on the council agenda through the introduction of UNSCR 1265” (Angell, Interview with V. Tait 2019).51 By bringing the protection of civilians to the fore of Council discussions on conflict, Canada’s involvement in the adoption of 1265 and 1296 laid the groundwork for the subsequent adoption of Resolution 1325.

50 Many of the states in this network would later form the “Friends of 1325” and includes Bangladesh, Namibia, Canada, Jamaica and the Netherlands.
51 Since interview, Angell has been promoted to NATO Permanent Representative for Canada.
The Council recognized that to maintain its legitimacy as a credible security provider, its approach to peacekeeping would need to be completely re-evaluated following its failure to protect civilians from genocide in Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995) (Curran 2016, 38).52 In the wake of these genocides, the Council commissioned the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (August 2000), known as the Brahimi Report, after its lead author Lakhdar Brahimi (Ibid). The review sought to improve the Council’s approach to peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction but “neglected any analysis of the gendered nature of conflict…[including] the impact of armed conflict on children, regarding the sexual exploitation and abuse of women and girls by peacekeeping personnel” (Klot 2015, 730). The Brahimi Report was particularly remiss in its omission of gendered analysis given reports of “strategic rape” in Bosnia and Rwanda, the two conflicts that inspired its production with of the (Swaine 2015, 758). Therefore, the Liberal government was able to further Canada’s foreign policy on human security during a period when the Council was particularly receptive to revitalized approaches to peacekeeping.

As Otto (2010) notes, gender mainstreaming arrived late to the Security Council. Despite that gender mainstreaming was “embraced as a global strategy” at the Beijing conference in 1995, it would not arrive in the Council until UNSCR 1325 was passed in 2000. By the time 1325 reached the floor of the Council, Canada had built a reputation as a UN leader in multilateral consensus-building regarding the protection of civilians during conflict. Gibbings emphasizes the key role

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52 Unlike traditional peacekeeping missions, The UN’s failures here stemmed from “second-generation missions” which involved “forceful interventions in ongoing conflict situations” where UN peacekeepers faced greater danger, and tasks that were completely unlike those associated with previous peacekeeping operations (Tessier and Fortmann 2002, 119). UN peacekeepers in second-generation peacekeeping missions could be tasked with responsibilities “ranging from humanitarian aid to disarmament and including election monitoring, the maintenance of public order, and the reconstruction of societies affected by war” (Ibid). Beyond these challenges, inaction in the Security Council – like the unwillingness of the American government to authorize enough troops to defend Srebrenica – made the prevention of these genocides impossible.
that Canada played in “humanizing” the Council during its term (Cohn et al 2004, 136). Outside the Security Council, prominent Canadians like Louise Arbour further bolstered Canada’s reputation in the UN by serving as the Chief Prosecutor in the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia in the Hague. Canadian delegations throughout this period leveraged the country’s “moral capital” in the field of human security to lend legitimacy to the WPS agenda (Cohn et al 2004). During this period the Liberal government of Canada advanced three interrelated goals: “[increasing] transparency in the Council’s work; applying elements of human security to Council debates and decisions; and increasing the accountability of the Council” (Ibid). Therefore, Canadian representatives introduced the concept of Human Security to the Council and the reforms it initiated facilitated “an institutional openness of the Security Council to the agenda of women, peace and security” (Cohn et al 2004, 136; Riddell-Dixon 2005, 1085). The combination of enhanced institutional openness and an increased focus on human security paved the way for the introduction and unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1325. Canada did not receive 1325 as an edict from the UN, therefore; on the contrary, Canada of the late 1990s framed the humanitarian norms to which subsequent Canadian administrations were held accountable. Understood in this way, UNSCR 1325 was not imposed on Canadian foreign policy, but was an extension of it.

Although Axworthy has been credited for advancing human security in the UN Security Council, the reality of this narrative is far more nuanced. In particular, the suggestion that Axworthy is somehow the “father” of human security belies the contentious relationship between the former Foreign Minister and the Canadian women’s movement, and obscures credit due to feminist activists for amplifying human security internationally. As examined in the previous chapter, human security has had conceptual resonance with many of the demands contained in
feminist peace doctrines predating the Hague Conference (1915) (see Tickner and True 2018). Therefore, suggesting a more robust conception of what security meant, and for whom, can by no means be credited to Axworthy, or any of his predecessors. Moreover, Canada’s advocacy for human security in its foreign policy has long struck an ambiguous chord amongst Canadian feminists. The Canadian record for advancing the rights of women internationally sits uneasily with its domestic treatment of women – even within the foreign service itself. Women were not allowed to write the foreign service exam until 1947, and “not until 1971 that married women were permitted to be foreign service officers, 16 years after the ban on married women in all other departments of the federal civil service was lifted” (Keeble and Smith 2001, 133).

The acrimonious relationship between the Canadian Women’s Movement and the Department of Foreign Affairs reached a boiling point in 1980, when Axworthy served as the Minister responsible for the Status of Women (Anderson and Gillies 2018, 163). In the lead-up to constitutional negotiations in 1980, NAC met with Axworthy to ensure that core women’s issues like pay equity and affordable care would be encompassed by the new Charter. Axworthy responded that women ought to “trust the Government” (Ibid, 161). Any doubt that the Canadian government was patronizing NAC and its President Doris Anderson, was eliminated when Co-Chair of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada stated to NAC and CACSW, “I’m just wondering why we don’t have a section in here

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53 Anderson’s memoirs detail her frustrations with Axworthy even prior to his appointment as Minister responsible for the Status of Women (Black and Carbert 2015, 84).
54 Women’s groups concern that their needs would not be met in the new Charter was well founded. Previously, the Bedard and Lavell cases brought before the Supreme Court demonstrated the woeful inadequacy of the Canadian Bill of Rights (1960), which was easily trumped by the Indian Act in court (Dobrowolsky 1996, 132). Later, the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Bliss case (1978) denied a pregnant woman unemployment benefits as “not all women become pregnant” and therefore, her employer was not being discriminatory (Ibid, 135).
55 The Charter also proved a point of significant contention in Quebec, which had already passed its own bill of rights in June of 1975.
about babies and children. All you girls will be out working and we’re not going to have anybody to look after them’’ (Ibid, 85). Anderson resigned in 1980 when the Vice-presidential Council of CACSW, along with Axworthy, cancelled a key conference on women and the constitution, explicitly violating Anderson’s orders (Ibid). There is therefore room for skepticism that Canada, even during the halcyon days of Liberal internationalism, is deserving of its reputation for humanitarianism. Smith (2005) highlights that Canada has failed to provide any measure of peace or security for Canadian indigenous women, values that Canada hypocritically extols on the world stage – a criticism she levied at the Liberal government of Paul Martin (11). The Canadian Feminist Alliance for International Action made similar observations in the period leading up to Canada “championing” UNSCR 1325 in the Council; from “1999-2000, grants to women’s organizations through the Women’s Program” dropped by 5 million dollars from 1989 and had not “kept up with inflation since 1995-1996” (Keeble and Smith 2001, 137). These accounts problematize Axworthy’s reputation as a benevolent proponent of women’s rights and illustrate the central role that the Women’s Movement has occupied in the advancement of Canadian human security both domestically and in foreign policy.

Canada and the Fight for 1325 in the United Nations Security Council

The Canadian delegation to the UNSC enjoyed a largely cooperative environment following the end of the Cold War in 1989. Paul Heinbecker, Canada’s permanent representative to the UN during the period in which 1325 was adopted, recalls that the resolution passed during an unusually cooperative period within the Council (Heinbecker, Interview with V. Tait, May 6 2018). The “Cold War was over and the disruptive period that began with the [2001] Iraq war hadn’t happened yet. So [Canadians] were in a good time frame to speak” (Ibid). Moreover, the resolution benefitted from the enthusiasm of the team staffing Canada’s UN mission at the time,
nearly three quarters of whom were women (Ibid). In this way, 1325 grew from a favourable environment for discussing the nexus between global security and gender. Advocates of Resolution 1325 managed to avoid the nationalistic obstinacy for which the Council has become notorious, and many of the key national delegations in the Security Council at the time were supportive of its content (Otto 2010, 100). The delegation from Namibia, the presidency that introduced 1325, was joined not only by Canada, but also by Bangladesh, the UK, Jamaica and the Netherlands, all member states who held highly positive attitudes towards expanding the Council’s agenda into the nascent field of human security (Ibid).

These delegations were represented by what Klot (2015) calls “door-openers”, many of whom were “well-placed and powerful male allies, who used their positions and access within the UN secretariat… to advance SCR 1325’s agenda” (724). Interviews that I conducted with the Canadian delegation present during the introduction and passing of UNSCR 1325, including Robert Fowler (Canada’s Representative to the United Nations Jan 1995 – Aug 2000), Paul Heinbecker (Canada’s Representative to the United Nations Sept 2000 – Jan 2004) and David Angell (Canada’s Permanent Representative to NATO), however, reveal that several strategies were necessary to realize the adoption of the human security agenda in the UNSC.

Despite the cooperative disposition of many of the Council’s members, several legal and discursive obstacles had to be negotiated prior to voting on Resolution 1325 in October of 2000. First, Canada had to reframe sovereignty in a way that made intervening in the domestic affairs of another state acceptable to the five permanent members of the Council (P5) – China, France, the US, the UK and Russia. Delegations friendly to the human security agenda needed to convince

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56 These discussions began in March of 2008. During Bangladesh’s presidency on the Security Council, Ambassador Anwarul Chowdhury of Bangladesh’s presidential statement emphasized links between women and peace, which the UN Commission on the Status of Women used as an entry point into the Security Council (Hill et al 2003, 1256).
states like Russia and China that foreign intervention into the affairs of a sovereign state-including theirs—could be warranted in the event of a humanitarian emergency while this was viewed as a potential violation of Article II (7) of the United Nations’ Charter, which entrenches the sovereignty of national actors. Second, delegations in support of 1325 had to convince the Secretary General of the UN to take on the additional responsibility of protecting civilians within conflict zones. These concessions would leave both member states and the UN open to criticism from international news media and watchdog agencies. Finally, supporters of Resolution 1325 had to overcome the disparate values that Council members held towards women and warfare. The following interviews, conducted during 2018-2019 with Canadian diplomats reveal the ways in which they sought to overcome these obstacles with the assistance of several key NGOs.

Resolution 1325 was introduced by the Namibian presidency of the Council; however, Canada’s earlier work in championing UNSCR 1265 emphasized the protection of subjects the Council had not previously considered, namely women and children (Ibid). Although these resolutions have since become enduring thematic foci of the Council, they touched on the rights of UN member states to intervene in the event of a humanitarian disaster, a taboo subject for several permanent members (Ibid, 124). Angell recalls that the human security agenda required,

“Delving deeper into issues of sovereignty than some Council members, historically have been comfortable with. And so, the resolutions were adopted unanimously…but we invested a huge amount of effort in working with…P5s who historically are reluctant to see the council engage on domestic issues” (Ibid).58

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57 Article 7 states “nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” Chapter VII resolutions include UNSCR 82 (Intervention in Korea), UNSCR 1267 (Intervention in Afghanistan) and more notoriously, UNSCR 872 (Intervention in Rwanda) and UNSCR 814 (Intervention in Somalia).

58 P5 refers to the permanent five members of the Security Council: China, Russia, the US, the UK and France.
In practice, this meant that the Canadian delegation was engaged in “painstaking discussion” leading to negotiators debating for “6, 7, 8 hours a day for days on end to get [human security resolutions] through” (Ibid). In a strategy to ensure that Resolution 1296 would get passed, for example, negotiators debated the clauses of the resolution backwards. By working through the draft resolution backwards, by the time that negotiators got to the more controversial clauses at the beginning of the resolution, they had already reached agreement on the less controversial two-thirds at the end of the document, therefore placing probable heel-draggers in a more amenable mindset then would otherwise have been the case (Ibid).

The challenge here is that taking the human security agenda seriously requires intervening in the affairs of a sovereign state. This principle first emerged in the UN Secretary General’s Millennium Address, which urged UN Member states to critically engage in the concept of state sovereignty in the wake of genocides in Rwanda (994) and Srebrenica (1995) (Simpson 2002). In response, Canada initiated an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in September 2000 (Canada 2002). The report produced by this commission argues that in instances where the state cannot protect civilians, it falls on the international community to intervene – militarily, if necessary. The report was titled Responsibility to Protect (also called R2P), and it provided an actionable guideline for UN intervention in states that had failed to protect civilians from the atrocities of warfare (Simpson 2002, 3). The report redefined norms of sovereignty by suggesting that state sovereignty must also include the responsibility to provide “respect for a minimal standard of human rights” for citizens (Ayoob 2002, 84). This approach would ultimately sanction the Council to place the needs of civilians above the recognition of state sovereignty; an anathema to P5 members like Russia and China, where human rights abuses are commonplace.
Council members’ reticence to revisit the question of sovereignty during debates on UNSCR 1325 were compounded by concerns amongst P5 members of the Security Council that Canada was seeking to turn the Council into an organization aimed at promoting social reform. Many UN delegates were concerned about the Council encroaching on the agendas of the General Assembly (GA) and the Economic and social Council (ECOSOC); UN organizations which were far better equipped to deal with humanitarian issues within their mandates (Klot 2015, 727). It was feared that by intervening in humanitarian affairs, the Council might be imposing “its norm-setting powers outside of its areas of responsibility” (Ibid, 728). This reflected both a resistance to deviating from UN organizations’ roles and responsibilities in accordance with the Charter, and a concern that the Council was ill-suited to advance humanitarian norms. Robert Fowler, Canada’s Permanent Representative to the UN from 1995-2000 recalls that “there was a lot of worry by the P5 that we [Canada] were seeking to turn the council into some kind of social organization. And they would insist that, “the UN has very specific venues for that...it has the Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC]...they said, you can’t turn the Security Council into the body that does everything” (Fowler 2019, Interview with V. Tait). These tensions further complicated the task of reaching consensus on the substantive content of UNSCR 1325.

Similarly, there was a prescient concern that building the duty to protect vulnerable civilians into the specific mandate of UN peacekeeping operations would, in essence, doom these missions to inevitable failure (ibid). Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the UN from 1997-2006, warned Fowler, “you Canadians! By insisting on including language in every resolution regarding peacekeeping to require that those peacekeeping operations protect civilians… you’ve given them essentially, a mission impossible!” Nevertheless, Fowler recalls that the Canadian mission saw the move towards human security as an unavoidable call to “recognize an ever more desperate reality
around the world” (Ibid). The horrors of Rwanda and Srebrenica revealed that the Council, and the UN Department of Peacekeeping in particular, needed to be capable of performing far more robust humanitarian operations than it had demonstrated in the recent past if they were to maintain their international legitimacy (Angell interview with Tait, 2019). In this regard, Resolution 1325 represented an opportunity to restore legitimacy to the Council while shoring up a key element of Canada’s foreign policy agenda.

Amidst these challenges, the framers of 1325, chiefly the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace, and Security, were forced to soften the language of the resolution to accommodate concerns about how WPS agenda may threaten state sovereignty or enable Security Council overreach. Thornier questions surrounding the capacity of the Council to meet emergent humanitarian demands were circumvented by the resolution’s open-ended demands on signatories; its vagueness was a strategy to achieve buy-in among socially conservative member states. Some member states, like Russia, emphasized essentialist understandings of the agenda, arguing that “[t]he words ‘women’, ‘peace’ and ‘security’ combine harmoniously, because this harmony is predetermined by nature” (UNSC 2000, 21). In contrast, Canada emphasized that “we must ensure that our focus is not restricted to issues of the victimization of women… [and]…the positive contribution that women…can and do make to conflict prevention and to post-conflict peacebuilding” (UNSC 2000, 24). The Egyptian delegation struck a nationalist chord by using 1325 to draw attention to “the deteriorating situation of Palestinian women under the yoke of occupation…” (UNSC 2000, 4). In each of these statements, the delegations used the vague

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59 Recall that the NGO WG on WPS was originally comprised of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, Amnesty International, International Alert, the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, and the Hague Appeal for Peace. This working group was established in 1998 during the Fourth World Conference on Women, which focused on women and armed conflict (Hill et al 2003).
language of the resolution to impose on it the meaning it wanted, neglecting the operating
principals of the NGOs that comprised the Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (Klot
2005). Nevertheless, it is evident that there was little agreement about what it means to be a
“woman” or a “vulnerable person,” and that no has consensus has been reached on the concept of
“conflict”.

By the time Resolution 1325 was passed in 2000, it represented a compromise between
many agendas. Canadian diplomats in the Council saw their humanitarian aspirations satisfied by
its emphasis on the protection of vulnerable civilians; likewise, the coalition of non-governmental
organizations that lobbied for the resolution (NGO-WPS 2019) believed it would finally grant
women access to the central arenas for the negotiation of international peace and security,
including command positions within national armed forces and during peace negotiations within
and outside of the Security Council and NATO. Non-governmental organizations opposed to the
resolution saw the victory as pyrrhic; how could feminists concerned with creating more enduring
peace accords trust an organization so reliant on militarized policy solutions (see Cockburn 2011;
Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011; Shepherd 2016)? Nevertheless, in the Canadian view, 1325 left
the Council as a written expression of the Canadian human security agenda, and our wider
commitment to aiding in the protection of vulnerable civilians. However, the way to accomplish
these laudable objectives began to shift once the resolution reached Ottawa.

Re-Militarizing the Canadian State: Leveraging Canadian Nationalism in Afghanistan (2001-
2012)

Although UNSCR 1325 was enacted by the UN in 2000, Canada did not implement its first
action plan until 2010 under the Conservative minority government of Stephen Harper. In the
intervening years, two significant events would emphasize the security part of UNSCR 1325’s
human security agenda during its implementation: Canada’s entrance into the Afghan war in 2001 and the election of a Conservative government in February 2006. Both events would contribute to a decline in Canada’s commitment to UN peacekeeping (both financially and in terms of troop contributions), thereby pushing Canada towards militarized interpretation of 1325 that closely coincided with Canadian military and NATO priorities.

As discussed in chapter one, the militarized interpretation of 1325 contains two key challenges to the implementation of the resolution. First, it suggests that women’s participation in peacebuilding efforts is justified by their ability to enhance the efficacy of military operations, not simply Peace Support Operations (PSO) initiated by the UN and NATO, but also military operations more commonly associated with combat and counter-insurgency campaigns. Second, the militarized framework suggests that 1325 applies only in conflict-affected countries, and it minimizes (or in some instances denies) the importance of applying the principles of 1325 in advanced democracies. My research demonstrates that this framework radically reduces the emancipatory feminist potential of the resolution for women in nation-state militaries and undermines the ability of the resolution to achieve its aims of increasing women’s representation and participation.

When Paul Martin took over leadership of the Liberal Party in 2003, he began to differentiate his government’s policies from those of the Chrétien administration, and Axworthy’s foreign policy. The split between Chretéin and Martin was in no small part due to the acrimonious relationship that developed between the two Liberal leadership aspirants in the previous decade.

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60 Suggesting that female-identifying military personnel contribute to operational efficacy is not necessarily problematic. In peace support operations, or disaster assistance operations, enhanced efficacy may align perfectly with the peaceable feminist goals contained in 1325. However, when enhanced operational efficacy refers to counter-insurgency campaigns, particularly in gathering information from vulnerable populations, the militarized framework distorts the goals of the resolution.
(Lagasse and Sokolsky 2011, 22). One way that Martin could distinguish himself from his predecessor was within the defence arena; through increasing the Canadian defense budget, re-establishing the primacy of defense issues within the federal agenda, and bringing Canada’s defence policy to align more closely with US priorities (McQuaig 2007). In so doing, the Liberal leader imported US military values into Canadian foreign policy while undercutting Canada’s ability to engage in traditional peacekeeping missions (see McQuaig 2007; Marten 2010). In focusing on revitalizing the CAF, Martin was able to seize on the popularity of militarized nationalism following the 9/11 attacks, while silencing critics of Canada’s previous soft-power approach (Ibid, 24; Marten 2010, 216).\(^{61}\) The most decisive change Martin would make during his brief tenure as Prime Minister would be the appointment of Rick Hillier to the position of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in February 2005.\(^{62}\) This appointment not only distinguished Martin’s defence and foreign policy from that of his predecessor, but it also “change[ed] Canada’s image abroad as a state that was well intentioned but overly idealistic” (Marten 2010, 218). With Hillier, the CAF gained a leader who had strong ties with the elite in the US Forces and had significant command experience in Kabul (Ibid). Though Hillier seemed a natural fit for Martin’s new Liberal defence agenda, the incoming Chief of Defence Staff would also push Canada further from its identity as a NATO peacekeeper.

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\(^{61}\) While public opinion data shows that support for ‘militarized nationalism ‘decreased during the Canadian combat mission in Afghanistan from 2001-2011 (Fitzsimmons 2014), many Canadians saw our early involvement in the war as “retribution” for 9/11 attacks. This coincides with the fact that Canada’s original decision to deploy forces to Afghanistan was that the 9/11 attacks triggered an Article 5 retaliatory NATO attack – an attack against one member of the organization is an attack against all. This narrative resurfaced when former Conservative Defence Minister Gordon O’Connor argued that Canadian presence in Afghanistan is “retribution” for 9/11 (Brewster 2008).

\(^{62}\) The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) is the most senior position within the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). The CDS is responsible to the Prime Minister, his Cabinet, and the Minister of National Defence. The position is analogous the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the US context.
Having once commanded Fort Hood’s prestigious III Corps “known for its heavy artillery and fighting skills” during his time training at the Texas military base, Hillier had little use for the “Pearsonian peacekeeping tradition” (McQuaig 2007, 72). Well-loved by many of his troops and often colloquially called “Uncle Rick,” Hillier gained notoriety in July of 2005 for saying “We’re not the public service of Canada, we’re not just another department. We are the Canadian Forces, and our job is to be able to kill people” (Hillier quoted in Leblanc 2005, V. Tait’s emphasis). This statement highlighted that with our joint combat engagement in Afghanistan (2001-2011), we were importing the worst of America’s militarized masculinity at the highest echelons of government. Moreover, Hillier seized on the long-held tradition of American exceptionalism; we are the Canadian Forces, and we are therefore exempt from the responsibilities of other Canadian departments. Implicit in this assertion is the dominance of Canadian military priorities and personnel, and the submission of Canada’s civilian foreign policy apparatus. Gender and development expert Sarah Tuckey found that this dynamic would frequently come into play throughout Canada’s mission in Afghanistan as funding for development projects would be consistently used to achieve security priorities (Tuckey 2018, Interview with V. Tait). Although civilian contingents desperately wanted to achieve “long term sustainable change on a gender level, it became virtually impossible within the structure of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team [KPRT]” (Ibid.)

With General Hillier at the helm, human security for Prime Minister Martin very quickly became about the exercise of hard power to achieve stable, enduring political institutions (Bernard 2011). Prime Minister Martin’s use of hard-power tactics, like sanctions and military force, alongside the discourse of development and diplomacy further deepened interconnections between humanitarian aid and militarization. Prime Minister Martin remarked at a NATO summit in 2005
“We used to think of military expenditure and development assistance as being poles apart. No longer. Security is an essential underpinning for successful investments” (Martin 2015 quoted in Bernard 2011, 254). Prime Minister Martin therefore unintentionally succeeded in closing a longstanding gap in Canadian foreign policy by reconciling humanitarian concerns with military strategy. In closing this gap, Prime Minister Martin further obscured the increasingly blurred boundary between humanitarian peacekeeping and military combat. The Economist, reflecting on General Hillier’s legacy, noted that his chief accomplishment as Canada’s top soldier was “not necessarily helping to secure more funding or administrating the Forces during a turbulent period, but for making "Canadians comfortable with fighting wars" (The Economist, July 26, 2008, p. 44 cited in Fremeth 2010, 8). Although the choices he made as Prime Minister drew the CF closer to the American warrior ideal, this was not Prime Minister Martin’s original intention. In offering the CDS position to General Hillier, Prime Minister Martin made it clear from the outset that DND-CAF engagement in Afghanistan was not meant to “preclude our capacity to deploy elsewhere [in Africa]” (Roi and Smoly nec 2010, 706). To Prime Minister Martin, engagement in Darfur was a top priority; it was in keeping with the humanitarian foreign policy his party was known for and the conflict allowed Canada to take a position of international leadership, unlike Afghanistan which remained dominated by US Forces (Ibid).\footnote{Hillier continued as CDS into the Harper administration, until replaced by General Walter Natynczyk. In appointing the obedient and scholarly General Natynczyk, Prime Minister Harper was able to restore civilian control of the defence agenda; a norm repeatedly violated by General Hillier (Lagasse 2009).} Prime Minister Martin conceded to the CDS’ demands for a greater presence in Afghanistan in exchange for the unequivocal promise that it would not prevent Canada from deploying the CAF to Darfur in the near future; however, the
Liberal government lost to the Harper Conservatives in February of 2006 before a mission to Darfur could be realized (Ibid).\textsuperscript{64}

The outcome of the rapid militarization of diplomacy and development following 9/11 is evident in the considerable decline of Canadian engagement in UN peacekeeping missions. Peacekeeping missions, once the backbone of Canadian nationalism, had become nearly non-existent by the end of the Martin administration. Afghanistan proved extremely costly and pulled significant resources from DND-CAF, as well as our civilian foreign affairs departments (Kirkey and Ostroy 2010). NATO missions, conversely, provided the CAF a multilateral partnership that more closely paralleled the culture of the Canadian military, one that aligned far better with the re-masculinized warrior ethos of the CAF and coincided with the American-led “War against Terror” (Spooner 2017). The decline in Canadian participation overlapped with a decline in peacekeeping operations within the UN itself. Following the UN’s widely publicized failure to pre-empt numerous high-profile genocides throughout the 90s, the “number of peacekeepers clearly declined while the organization attempted to grapple with the difficult lessons to be learned from the all too rapid surge of the early to mid-1990s” (Spooner 2017, 216). The result was a significant decline in the deployment of DND-CAF personnel to UN peacekeeping missions; by the time Martin left office in 2006, only 350 of the UN’s 70,000 peacekeepers were Canadian (Ibid 211-213; see also chart 1).\textsuperscript{65} Concomitant with Canada’s declining engagement in UN missions, CAF troops were being recommitted to NATO missions at a rapid pace, a trend that would increase dramatically with our deepening involvement in Afghanistan (Ibid 2016). Nevertheless, this was

\textsuperscript{64} It is unlikely in the extreme that the CAF could have engaged in Darfur while deployed in Afghanistan (Roi and Smoly nec 2011).

\textsuperscript{65} This decline steadily continued with the brief exception of the CAF’s deployment in Mali in 2018; the Canadian Airforce served a single rotation and declined the UN’s request to extend the Canadian mission until the Romanian Airforce was prepared to fill our position (Cox 2019). Except for our mission in Mali, Canada has had approximately 30-40 military personnel deployed on UN missions per year since 2014.
not a propitious environment for advancing feminist justifications for the importance of the resolution, nor was it possible during this period to pull significant governmental resources away from the war effort in Afghanistan.

Despite the widespread appeal of human security, the concept had become inextricably linked with the Liberal Party of Canada. While the concept of human security in foreign policy was previously owned by Prime Ministers Chretien and Martin, the Harper government put its own spin on the concept of humanitarian intervention. Under Prime Ministers Harper’s sweeping revision of Canadian foreign policy, however, the “human security policy division was renamed [to the Glynn Berry Program for Peace and Stability] the human security fellowship program was discontinued, and reports surfaced that foreign affairs Officials were ordered to avoid mentioning the term human security in their professional activities” (Chapnick 2011, 144; see also Smith and Ajadi 2020, 370). Much like their efforts to erase the concept of “gender equality” from Canadian foreign policy (see Tiessen 2015), Harper Conservatives sought to rebrand Canadian foreign policy by “expunging from government websites, publications and policies all mention of key Liberal policies concerning human security, international humanitarian law and Responsibility to Protect” (Gecelovsky 2020, 249). Eliminating the concept of “gender equality” allowed Harper to satisfy his socially conservative voting base (Haussman and Rankin 2009), but it had the additional consequence of delaying the development of the Canadian NAP. Canadian foreign affairs officials that participated in Tiessen and Carrier’s (2015) study on gender discourse argued that “the PCO deleted every reference to gender equality. The Action Plan was written in 2006-2007, and it didn’t come out until 2009 largely because of the dispute over language” (106). Repeatedly renegotiating the language around gender proved time consuming and slowed progress on the WPS agenda.
Despite the challenges posed by the Harper administration, Canadian feminists continued to work with International Organizations (IOs) like the UN and NATO to advance the WPS agenda. In 2001, the Canadian government established the Canadian Committee on Women, Peace and Security, a tripartite committee comprised of parliamentarians, government officials and civil society organizations led by Senator Mobina Jaffer (Anonymous. 2010. Interview with V. Tait, Feb 12). While the Committee was successful in developing peacekeeping training on Women, Peace and Security, the political reality of war in Afghanistan and Iraq proved divisive. With no funding and no core support, Committee parliamentarian and government members were divided over whether they could credibly claim to support WPS issues while Canada refused to condemn the US-led invasion of Iraq. Although the Committee drafted a first national plan of action in 2005, it was not adopted at the ministerial level and the committee disbanded shortly thereafter (GNWP 2011). Although there is no available information on why the NAP was rejected at the Ministerial level, Desrosiers and Legasse (2009) highlight that,

“Martin’s insistence on a unified set of international policies called DFAIT’s and DND/CAF’s distinct missions and roles into question. The demand for greater synergy implied a diminishing of their autonomy…. frustrated [by delays] in early 2005, Martin handed the direction of the defence policy review to his new Chief of the Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier. Within months, Hillier put DFAIT and DND/CF on the same track, and the Martin government was able to release the International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World” (699, Tait emphasis).

We may never know why the first NAP failed, but despite consistent pressure from civil society organizations from 2001-2005, it was made clear to civil society organizations that a NAP was not a priority for the Liberal government.

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66 Anonymous; 2004 reporting to the UNSC.
Conservative Foreign Policy and Harper’s Warrior Nationalism

One of the great untold puzzles of Canada’s ratification of UNSCR 1325 is how Canadian feminists managed to advance Canada’s first National Action Plan (NAP) (2010) during a Conservative administration. As Prime Minister, Harper radically altered Canada’s engagement in multilateral international organizations. In a bid to bring Canadian foreign policy more closely in line with his vision of Canadian nationalism, the Conservative Party under Harper was pro-American and “outspokenly pro-Western, and thus sympathetic towards key manifestations of the Western alliance such as NATO. In line with American conservative views, it was also skeptical of inclusive multilateral structures and processes – notably [the] UN…” (Black 2021, 373). Within this narrative, Harper was also an unabashed monarchist, emphasizing Canada’s “majestic past” with the British, and reinstated the title of “Royal” for both the Canadian Navy and Airforce (Frenette 2014, 55). Critiques of the Harper administration also emphasize the challenge that his government posed to the advancement of feminist agenda in Canada, and with good reason. While Conservative polices did not ignore women, both domestic and foreign policy under Harper treated
women as “walking wombs” (Tiessen 2015). Policy initiatives, like the 2010 Muskoka Initiative on Maternal and Child Health, were designed to protect women as child bearers and mothers, with intentional disregard for any other questions of their reproductive rights or broader gender equality (Tiessen 2015; Tiessen and Smith 2021, 122). Ultimately, Prime Minister Harper would draw the “bipartisan ire” of women even within the Conservative party when he failed to provide a state funeral for Canadian Conservative heroine Flora MacDonald, the first “female foreign minister in the developed world” (Kingston 2015, online). Making matters worse, Prime Minister Harper failed to show up for her funeral.

Prime Minister Harper’s budgetary cuts would prove disastrous for gender mainstreaming efforts undertaken by the government of Canada through Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA Plus). Beginning in 2006, the federal Conservative party of Canada closed 12 of 16 regional offices for the Status of Women in Canada (SWC) and eliminated their 1-million-dollar research fund (Dobbin, 2010). These funding cuts totaled a 5-million-dollar reduction in the department’s operating budget and because of concurrent change in its mandate, curtailed its ability to fund activism on behalf of women. Research suggests that these budgets severely weakened Canada’s ability to pursue gender-based analysis Plus (GBA Plus) from 2005-2015 both domestically and in its foreign policy. As the federal government’s interest in gender issues declined, “budgetary cuts and departmental reorganizations led to the disappearance of GM [gender mainstreaming] units and gender focal points in many departments” (Scala and Paterson 2018, 217; see also Rankin and Wilcox 2004). As a result, performing GBA Plus often fell to motivated individual bureaucrats willing to continue pressing the agenda despite limited institutional support, as GM “champions” at the senior management level all but disappeared (Ibid). Discussions with political staff in the PMO suggest that women’s groups were seen as “philosophically antithetical to conservative
values” because feminism was seen to emphasize equality of outcome rather than equality of opportunity; Harper believed in liberal individualism, wherein no special treatment would be granted to any “interest groups” (Anon 9, 2018 Interview with V. Tait. Feb 12). Two frequently cited challenges as it pertains to the WPS agenda are the discursive boundaries placed on public communiques from Canada’s foreign affairs departments, and Harper’s distaste for multilateral internationalism.

While GBA Plus programs within the government of Canada suffered for want of resources, the operational budgets of civil society organizations concerned with gender and diversity were decimated during the Harper administration. Although funding cuts began in 1984 with the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney, they were further deepened during the Chretien era; neither of Canada’s major parties can boast strong financial support for women’s civil society organizations at the end of the 20th century (O’Neil 2017, 444). As a result, feminist groups had to “focus singularly on providing services to women on the ground” a challenge that would intensify during the Harper administration (Ibid). Reflecting on how the Canadian women’s peace movement was able to respond to Harper’s “warrior nationalism” most organizations during this period were focused on simply meeting demand for service domestically on issues like violence against women, and had no resources or energy left to lobby the government on foreign policy issues (anonymous. 2022, Interview with V. Tait). The starkest example of the chill that Harper imposed on women’s civil society organizations was the decision to cut CIDA funding to the ecumenical human rights organization Kairos, after 35 years of Canadian governmental support. International Cooperation Minister Bev Oda reversed CIDA’s recommendation to provide over 7 million dollars of funding to the organization, which the Liberal opposition argued was a punitive measure designed to punish Kairos for its public support of the Palestinian cause (CBC
Following the government’s response to Kairos, civil society organizations across Canada refused to take activist stances that might draw the ire of the Harper government and therefore compromise what little funding they had left (Anonymous 26. 2022. Interview with V. Tait February 12). Also, during this period, the O’Neil (2017) identifies that anti-militarist sentiment has dropped amongst the youngest generation of Canadian Feminists (those who first identified as feminists in 2000-2008), compared to the two previous generations (1989 and earlier, and 1990-1999). The author attributes this trend to the decreased importance of the peace movement over time, and the decline of Voice of Women for Peace as a public player in the movement (Ibid).

The question of Harper’s restrictions on gender equality discourse in Canadian foreign policy first came to public attention through an article published in Embassy entitled “Gender Equality, Child Soldiers and Humanitarian Law Are Axed from Foreign Policy Language” (Collins 2009). The article details a Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) email that suggests that the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs had been clearly and consistently rejecting the language of “gender equality” in foreign affairs communiques, and instead insisted that DFAIT use the terminology “equality between men and women” (Collins 2009). Unlike “gender equality,” which recognizes that equality between the two binary sexes may still produce gender-discriminatory outcomes, “equality between women and men” denies that differential treatment may be necessary to ensure equality of access, while simultaneously rendering non-
gender-binary Canadians invisible (Ibid 96). The Embassy article prompted an extended parliamentary debate on the foreign policy discourse of the Harper government, particularly with regard to questions of gender and humanitarianism (Standing Committee on the Status of Women, 2010; 2010b). The debate suggested that there had been no formal policy change surrounding the language permitted in foreign affairs communiques; however, anecdotal evidence indicates that this language was carefully policed, albeit informally (Anonymous 11. 2019. Interview with V. Tait; Tiessen and Carrier 2015). Although this variation in language may seem purely semantic, the language of “gender equality” rather than “equality between men and women” carries significant practical and discursive implications. This discursive shift made the discussion of gender equality in international organizations like the UN exceedingly challenging (Ibid).

The challenge of framing appropriate language around Canada’s commitment to 1325 was compounded by Harper’s well-known distaste for the United Nations and what he viewed to be the “liberal internationalism” of previous governments (Paris 2014). Although Harper’s dislike of the United Nations was pronounced from the outset of his administration, it became particularly pointed following Canada’s loss in the bid for a non-permanent seat in the Council in 2010 (Ibid). Harper did not actively pursue a seat in the UNSC – the bid was initiated by the Chretien administration following its last position on the council from 1999-2000; Harper simply did not see a reason to withdraw Canada’s candidacy for the seat (Chapnick 2020). According to Chapnick (2020) Harper’s cabinet “did not fully commit to the bid until late 2008 and, even then, neither the Conservative caucus nor members of cabinet outside of the Foreign Affairs ministry took the election seriously” (2). The Harper administration used the loss on the Council as an “opportunity

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In keeping with social conservatism around gender and sexuality, Harper has also been publicly critical of LGBTQ2A rights throughout his political career, most notably in attempting to reopen the same-sex marriage debate in Parliament in 2006.
to differentiate themselves from previous governments”; arguing, rather acerbically, that “Canada’s goal was no longer to please every dictator with a vote at the United Nations” (Paris 2014, 281). In place of UN participation, Harper continued to emphasize that Canadian security interests would be better served by enhancing bilateral ties with the United States, particularly through military action in Afghanistan, where Canadian soldiers could “[help] rescue Afghanistan and its long-suffering people from violence and oppression” (Ibid). Addressing a group of departing Canadian troops in Kandahar in 2006, Harper argued

[The Kandahar effort is] also about demonstrating an international leadership role for our country. Not carping from the sidelines but taking a stand on the big issues that matter. You can’t lead from the bleachers. I want Canada to be a leader… (Harper quoted in McKay and Swift 2012, 298).

Shortly thereafter, the CAF began to advertise its new slogan during televised hockey games, “Fight! Fight Fear. Fight Distress. Fight Chaos. Fight with the Canadian Forces” (Ibid 330). These efforts would be augmented by the now infamous “red shirt days” and “support our troops” rallies (Lagasse 2009, 610). The message to Canadian civilians and military personnel was clear, the UN would no longer be the tool through which Canada achieved its foreign policy aims, and the resolutions produced by the Council were little more than hortatory pageantry.

Notwithstanding Harper’s oft described contempt for both the United Nations and feminist viewpoints, Scala and Paterson (2018, 225) highlight that it was possible within this climate to find “hooks...levers...and entry points” within Canadian bureaucracy to pursue gender mainstreaming goals. This is not to suggest that the Conservative government was ignorant of issues relating to women’s rights when they fit inside the conservative world view. For example, John Baird passionately argued against Early Enforced Marriage and demonstrated public support for the long suffering LGTBQ community in Uganda (Baird 2012). Rather it suggests that there were very clear discursive frameworks that feminist advocates had to work within to advance the
women’s rights agenda, and these frameworks could not challenge traditional gender roles. Due in no small part to resistance from the PMO, the work required to pass the first CNAP was largely done by bureaucrats in both the UN and Foreign Affairs and received little support at the executive level (Anonymous 9, Interview with V. Tait 2019). An anonymous participant points to a particularly significant gender mainstreaming lever: the Conservatives’ tenuous minority in parliament further pushed the PMO into grudging acceptance of the NAP. It was decided that continued resistance to tabling a CNAP on 1325 began to “hurt [Conservatives] more than simply OK-ing it” because it bolstered the image that the Conservatives were too ideologically conservative (Ibid). This participant’s reflection fits well within the Conservatives effort to “soften and humanize the Conservatives’ aloof and often confrontational brand under Stephen Harper’s leadership” through the instrumental use of foreign aid (Black 2021, 376; Tuckey 2017).

As part of the effort to soften the conservative image and gain a majority government in the upcoming 2011 election, the Prime Minister’s Office finally signed off on the Canadian National Action Plan (CNAP) on 1325 in 2010, six years from when the UN Secretary General first requested member-states draft action plans. The NAP’s release was announced in New York, not Ottawa, and was launched through a press release without advance warning to government officials or civil society. An anonymous participant recalls that civil society organizations choice to announce the NAP in New York was viewed by civil society organizations as a bid to shore up Canada’s Security Council bid, though this viewpoint contradicts that of the PMO insider cited earlier (Anonymous 26. Interview with V. Tait. February).

Although the loss of a seat on the Council may have meant little to Prime Minister Harper, it would have a profound impact on Canada’s ability to continue advancing the WPS agenda both domestically and internationally. Canada’s absence in the Council following 2010 did not just limit
our voice on the international stage, but it had a direct impact on the policy machinery within Ottawa. When serving on the Council, Canada had “more resources thrown into that space…it’s intensive, you need more staff…and there [is] a surge of capacity… [once you’re off the council] that dissipates” (Anon 4. 2018, Interview with V. Tait). Robert Fowler emphasizes this expert’s argument about importance of serving on the council, even in a non-permanent capacity,

That’s a very big deal, if you’re on the council, even if you’re not one of the five…. you can really make things happen.... you’re able to trade off interests with other players on the council, principally the P5, and therefore you’re able to push your agenda to an extent. And when you’re off the council you’re nobody. Of course, there are General Assembly resolutions, thousands and thousands of them because few pay much attention to them...because they have no effect of law. (Fowler 2019, Interview with V. Tait)

Institutionally speaking, Canada’s inability to influence the international debate on 1325 occurring in the UN, combined with the absence of designated domestic personnel working on the resolution, made ratification difficult in the extreme.

Canada’s first national action plan (CNAP) (2010-2016) has been widely criticized for the absence of clear indicators by which to measure governmental progress. The first NAP was “released without any fanfare…[and] it had no real direction for any of the departments that were meant to use that piece for a guide. So [the departments] ended up just doing what they’d always done and didn’t speak to each other properly” (Tuckey, Sarah. 2018, Interview with V. Tait). Lieutenant Colonel (ret’d) Kimberley Unterganschnigg, who served as the Defence Policy Desk officer for the UN (in the Department of National Defence) recalls,

…the original CNAP was written rather quickly and there wasn’t enough consultation within the departments. Both the RCMP and us [DND-CAF] felt that the metrics that had been highlighted were ineffective. They were not things that meant anything about how you were actually progressing. The way it was structured as well, because it was structured along pillars, it meant that you were repeating things, you answered the same question four or five times… some of the metrics were far more suitable for GAC than they were for [DND-CAF] or the RCMP (Unterganschnigg 2018, Interview with V. Tait).
Unterganschnigg’s observations about the 2010-2016 CNAP are well-supported in other studies examining the effectiveness of the plan. Senator Mobina Jaffer, Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights (2014) noted with concern that “the C-NAP data suggest that some progress has been achieved to date, but there is still a very long way to go toward full implementation” (SSCHR 2014, 1). Jaffer went further to highlight that the DND-CAF had not gone far enough to implement gender-sensitivity training, nor had it achieved sufficient female military personnel to meet the demands of the resolution, arguing “the inclusion of female military and civilian personnel is one of the most effective ways to mainstream gender perspectives in security operations” (Ibid, xii, 51). These concerns were echoed in an independent review from Inclusive Security, contracted by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) in 2014 to provide a mid-term review of Canada’s NAP. Inclusive Security shared the concerns mentioned above, and went on to reveal that,

“…one of the most widely cited (by civil society) challenges to demonstrating accountability on CNAP implementation was the delayed public release of the progress reports…the report(s) [are] too long and difficult to read…few interviewees use the report to inform decision-making, and several were unsure of the purpose of the report” (Inclusive Security 2014, 16).

Although Canada’s first NAP was released during a Conservative government, it lacked the institutional and budgetary support to appease monitoring committees.

**The WPS Agenda Hits a Wall: Toxic Culture in the Canadian Armed Forces**

The gravity of the CNAP’s considerable shortcomings would not be fully appreciated until a Maclean’s report once again forced the DND-CAF and the federal government to reappraise the gender culture of the military. In May of 2014, *Maclean’s* magazine published an incriminating report detailing numerous cases of rape and sexual assault in the CAF (Mercer & Castonguay 2014). In nearly all instances of sexual assault, victims were ignored or dismissed by their
commanding officers, and Mercer & Castonguay’s research into the gender sensitivity training of new recruits suggested that this problem was unlikely to be resolved within the military (ibid). These reports were completely incommensurable with the reality that the CAF had been espousing both internally and externally; a 2012 internal survey suggested that of 1705 survey respondents, only 56 “had indicated they had experienced an incident of sexual harassment in the preceding 12 months. Around the same time the Judge Advocate General (JAG) released its annual report, which stated that for the year 2011-12, only nine charges of sexual assault had been brought before the court” (Deschamps 2015, 3). However, the *Maclean’s* reports made the presence of a toxic sexualized culture in the CAF undeniable, and Chief of Defence (CDS) Thomas Lawson authorized an external review authority to examine the CAF’s “policies, procedures and programs with respect to sexual harassment and misconduct, as well as of their implementation” (Ibid).

During an interview with Peter Mansbridge, Lawson stated that military sexual harassment, …disturbs the great majority of everyone in uniform… it’s because we’re biologically wired in a certain way and there will be those who believe it is a reasonable thing to press themselves and their desires on others…there will be situations and have been situations where, largely, men will see themselves as able to press themselves onto our women members. (Lawson 2015)

Lawson’s now infamous “boys will be boys” justification would prove too distasteful for even the Conservatives; he was replaced by CDS Jonathan Vance shortly after the results of the ERA were published in March of 2015.70

The results that the External Review Authority (also known as the Deschamps report) presented the CAF were damning. The *Maclean’s* reports had detailed far more accurately the pervasiveness of sexual assault in the CAF than the military’s internal surveys, and the military

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70 Vance was forced to hand over command of the CDS position in January of 2021 following his engagement in sexual misconduct with a subordinate. His successor, Art McDonald, was also removed from the position of CDS for sexual misconduct only a month after he took the position in January of 2021, though McDonald still contests this decision. The current CDS is General Wayne Eyre.
chain of command had done very little to pre-empt these attacks through training or to prosecute those responsible (Deschamps 2015, 1-5). These findings shattered the heroic warrior narrative that had been constructed for the CAF since our initial foray into Afghanistan; Canadians now demanded fulsome parliamentary inquiry into the toxic gender culture of the CAF. In response, Vance introduced an institution wide program entitled Operation Honour, designed to make the eradication of sexual assault an *operational* objective within the military.\(^{71}\) By generating a formal Operation to eliminate sexual misconduct, Operation HONOUR frames the sexual assault as a “matter of operational effectiveness” which “grievously erodes the unit cohesion necessary for the successful completion of military duties” (Ibid).\(^{72}\) Renewed public scrutiny brought on by the Deschamps Report would create an opening for a significant shift in the gender culture of the CAF; Unterganschnigg would later seize on this opportunity to introduce General Vance to a resolution she felt passionately about, UNSCR 1325. Fortunately, that enthusiasm was shared by the new CDS and within the next year he would release the CAF’s first Directive on 1325 (2016), the keystone document for the Canadian military’s implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. We will return to this discussion in detail in chapter 4.

With the election of a decisive Liberal majority in 2015, there was renewed political interest through which to develop discursive opportunity structures for the implementation of 1325 within Canada. At a rally in Ottawa following his October 2015 election victory, Trudeau addressed the crowd, saying “Many of you have worried that Canada lost its compassionate and constructive voice in the world over the past 10 years. Well, I have a simple message for you: on behalf of 35 million Canadians, we’re back” (National Post 2015). In an effort to return Canada to

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\(^{71}\) Discouragingly, this operation was almost immediately renamed “HOP ON HER” by uniformed members – this is how “OP HONOUR” sounds when pronounced by Francophone members (Pugliese 2015; Taber 2017).
its status as a progressive, peacekeeping nation, Trudeau introduced a number of policy objectives that, on the surface, appear to advance a clear feminist agenda. Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland, for example, frequently touts Global Affairs Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy, introduced in 2017, which stands amongst the world’s growing list feminist foreign policy programs. Status of Women Canada transitioned from a struggling, underfunded agency under Harper into a full federal department, Women and Gender Equality Canada (WAGE) under the Trudeau administration. Within the security sector, Trudeau became the first Prime Minister to emphasize the importance of gender perspectives within Canadian defence policy with *Strong, Secure, Engaged* (2017). SSE highlights the importance of Resolution 1325 and the WPS Agenda to Canadian security, and vows to ensure its full implementation throughout DND-CAF. An even more unprecedented inclusion, Operation HONOUR is acknowledged at the outset of Canada’s current defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged (2017) and Canadians were promised that the Defence team will ensure the full implementation of all 10 of Deschamps recommendations (Ibid, 108). In comparison, Harper’s *Canada First Defence Policy* (2008) referred only to women in discussion of “men and women in uniform” and completely omitted any mention of gender equality or Gender Based Analysis (DND-CAF 2008).

**Conclusion: Exogenous Factors and Institutional Influence**

The period from when UNSCR 1325 was passed in October 2000 until the election of Justin Trudeau in November 2015 did not provide a hospitable environment for the implementation of Resolution 1325 within the Canadian federal government. The demands of the conflict in Afghanistan coupled with the transition to an anti-feminist conservative government, mean that proponents of the WPS agenda could strive only for piecemeal progress disconnected from any broader strategy from the Canadian executive branch. The NAP produced during this period lacked
clear direction and failed to provide unified guidance to federal departments looking to pursue GBA Plus generally, and the WPS agenda more specifically. Despite the multiple, competing domestic agendas within the Security Council when 1325 was passed, Canadian delegations and the NGO working group on women peace and security clearly articulated their stance on the content of the resolution; it is about protecting vulnerable peoples (particularly women and girls) and empowering women through both gender balancing and gender mainstreaming. These goals became obfuscated once introduced to the Canadian executive branch. Human security and gender equality, the core principles of UNSCR 1325, were intentionally stricken from Canadian foreign policy following Harper’s election while concerns about human security and soft-power multilateralism would take a backseat to militarized Canadian nationalism.

UNSCR 1325 now enjoys full, enthusiastic support from the Prime Minister’s Office, The Department of National Defence, and – at least on paper – the Canadian Armed Forces. Trudeau’s mandate to the Department of National Defence clearly states that the CAF is to enhance the recruitment and retention of women and eliminate sexual misconduct within the ranks, but the question remains: how can these new feminist policies compete with a decade of masculinized warrior discourse and an internal departmental environment characterized by a toxic gender culture? As the next chapter reveals, the internal discursive framing practices of the CAF prevent Resolution 1325 from achieving its full transformative potential. Circumscribed by the masculinized history of the CAF, and the inhospitable political environment into which 1325 entered, the WPS agenda has been interpreted through a militarized framework that compromises its ability to produce the feminist vision of peace it contains. This suggests that, although the Trudeau government has introduced what may seem like a transformative feminist agenda, these goals have been frustrated by the DND-CAF’s institutional legacy of toxic masculinity.
Chapter 3:

*Take it up with Ottawa: Gender Discourse in the CAF prior to UNSCR 1325 (2000)*

It is well-known within the feminist community that women suffered the consequences of conflict differently than men (Etchart 2015; El-Bushra 2007), but in the wake of targeted sexual violence against women in numerous failed peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, it became increasingly untenable for the international community to deny the gendered effects of conflict (Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2012). UNSCR 1325 began what is now known as the *Women, Peace and Security* (WPS) agenda, which has been adopted into National Action Plans in 86 UN member states as well as in international organizations (IO) like the UN and NATO (Davies and True 2018; Peacewomen 2020). UNSCR 1325 was the first Security Council resolution that acknowledged gender in any way, and it introduced Council members to the gendered dynamics of conflict and the importance of gendered perspectives in the provision of security. While the resolution broke new ground in the Security Council, gender mainstreaming was already underway in several NATO forces, including Canada’s. Prior to the adoption of UNSCR 1325, Canada had allowed female soldiers to serve in combat for eleven years and had been grappling with gender integration in earnest for nearly thirty years.

Gender integration into combat-facing occupations within the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF)\(^\text{73}\) began in 1969, and had already been defined, negotiated and legislated well in advance of the arrival of the international Women, Peace and Security agenda; however, this process has been received poorly by CAF military personnel (Davis 1997). In this chapter, I demonstrate the effects of the evolution of UNSCR 1325 on Canada, starting from its conception in the United

\(^{73}\) I will refer to the Canadian Armed Forces as the (CAF) throughout this chapter for continuity, however the reader will note that prior to force unification (1964), the CAF was called the Canadian Forces, and may appear as CF in historical texts from that period. Unification is discussed on pages 7-8.
Nations and ending with its internalization by Canadian soldiers. To do this effectively, however, it is first necessary to understand the institutional culture to which this resolution was exposed. While it might seem as though Canada’s long-term gender integration programme would make the CAF an ideal host for new norms about the roles of women in warfare, Canadian military culture had its own problems with masculinity that would affect the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in unique and unexpected ways. The dissertation focuses on the Canadian case to show how norm-receiving communities are far from passive recipients of international ideology. Instead, they act as norm translators that must “work at various levels to negotiate between local, regional, national and global systems of meaning” (Levitt & Merry 2009, 443).

In Chapter 1, I showed that institutional discursive frameworks like gender equality or operational efficacy, create “meaning by embedding them in networks of other more-or-less widely shared and practically relevant meanings” and by linking “people, concepts, practices and resources” (Ferree 2009, 89). Below, I divide the period from 1969-2000 by key legislative and judicial advances, from which gender equality (1969-2002) and operational efficacy (2002-2022) discursive framing emerged. The first period addresses the parliament’s first strike against military-sanctioned gender exclusion, brought about by the Royal Commission on the Status of Women (1969). The second period of gender integration was triggered by the Canadian Human Rights Act (1977), which created the judicial architecture for the CAF to be held accountable for its exclusionary gender policies. Third, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal decision on Canadian Armed Forces vs. Gauthier (1989) triggered the elimination of trade restrictions to Servicewomen. In each of the first three periods discussed (1969-1989), decisions made in civilian courts and parliament used gender equality discourse to justify the integration of women into the CAF, a justification that prompted backlash throughout the military. Finally, the fourth period overlaps
with the third – in 1986, in response to the 1985 *Charter Task Force*, the Chief of Defence Staff argued that integrating women into the CAF would impede operational efficacy, an argument which the CAF used to justify resistance to gender integration until the *CAF vs. Gauthier* (1989) decision pointed to the absence of evidence for this claim (*CAF vs. Gauthier* 1989). However, once the Employment Equity Act (1995) was passed, discourse around women and diversity enhancing operational efficacy, rather than hindering it, began to emerge. These discourses were reinforced by CAF experience in subsequent wars and peacekeeping missions – it became obvious that having female personnel would grant NATO forces an advantage in intelligence gathering and counterinsurgency operations. While justifying gender integration by suggesting that women enhance operational efficacy proved more compelling to a military audience, this discourse defers to the masculinized logic of the institution rather than encouraging egalitarian transformation of CAF culture.

In highlighting the genesis of these discursive frameworks, I illustrate that gender integration in the CAF has taken the internal path of “gradual incremental change with transformative results” (Streeck & Thelen 2005, 9). Accordingly, the two competing frameworks have been transposed atop one another in a process of layering, “where some elements of existing institutions are renegotiated but other elements remain” (Mackay et al 2010, 577). Gradual, incremental change produced a layered, gradualist approach to institutional change with two distinct discursive repertoires that inform the organization’s understanding of gender. This presents a unique challenge for the Canadian military; although it has permitted women in combat roles since 1989, gender mainstreaming efforts pursued by the CAF have historically been rejected by military personnel. As a result, UNSCR 1325, was carefully framed within the CAF to ensure that it would not coincide with unpopular gender equality discourse. As I demonstrate in chapters
four and five, the CAF’s choice to frame UNSCR 1325 to appeal to the masculinized operational core of the CAF violates the gender equality norms of empowerment and inclusion contained in the resolution itself.

The Genesis of Gender Integration Policy in the CAF 1969-2000: Layering Frames

I. The End of Exclusion (Royal Commission on the Status of Women 1969)

The catalyst for the eventual end to formal gender-based exclusion in the CAF was the 1969 Royal Commission on the Status of Women Canada (RCSW). Although I introduced the RCSW in chapter one, I will now provide greater detail about both how the RCSW initiated a transformation of CAF culture, and how this transformation wedded gender integration to civilian intervention in military affairs in the minds of CAF personnel. Canadian women were permitted to serve in the CAF following the end of WWII, however they were barred from combat trades and often relegated to administrative and support roles, which were not remunerated at the same rate as combat trades (Simpson et al 1979, 271).74 Although pay scales for male and female service members were the same, female soldiers served in positions within the lowest pay grade, with precious few opportunities for competitive pay, mirroring similar trends in gendered civilian employment (see table 1). Similarly, women did not occupy high ranking stations within the forces, due both to the positions in which they were permitted to serve and their high attrition rate (see table 2).75 The Royal Commission also pointed to the unreasonable standards placed on women who wanted to enlist. For example, a woman had to be at least eighteen years old with a grade ten education, while a man only needed to be seventeen years old with a grade eight

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74 Recall that in this context, trade refers to a skilled occupation (ie. to learn a trade) rather than a transactional arrangement.

75 As explored in greater detail below, these patterns have largely remained the same; women often occupy gendered positions and do not enjoy proportionate representation within the highest ranks of the military.
education. Likewise, married women were barred from enlisting because they would be “less free to move to new postings” (Ibid, 136). Much like the civilian laws that denied women property rights if they were to divorce or “desert” their husband, military wives that chose not to follow their husbands to a new posting risked legal repercussions if they resided in common-law provinces (Acorn 2021). If a woman were to marry while serving in the CAF, she could generally remain in military provided she did not have a child; there were no provisions for maternity leave.

As the examples above illustrate, recommendations made by the Commission were presented as a violation to women’s rights under the subsections of Education and Women in the Canadian Economy, drawn from statistical analysis through data provided by Canadian Forces Headquarters. This is significant because there is no available evidence from the briefings presented to the Royal Commission that any civil society organization presented on behalf of Canadian Servicewomen – this is evident both from my review of the RCSW briefings and from Karen Davis’ 2013 dissertation. Instead, civil society organizations like the Voice of Women Canada and the Congress of Canadian Women presented the RCSW with information about the dangers of continued militarism in politics (RCSW Submission 1969, Briefing 137, pg. 1565). Anti-militarist sentiment was echoed by individual contributor Jean Keller, who emphasized the impact of war on the position of women in Canadian society (RCSW Submission 1969, Briefing 59, pg. 442). The dearth of presentations on behalf of Servicewomen may be a result of CAF

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76 The RCSW Briefings at Library and Archives Canada total 17,471 microfilm pages. Within these pages, 17,054 have a “full text search” function (also known as optical character recognition). This means that 97.6% of this content is searchable by key word. I can confirm from correspondence with the Senior Manager at Heritage Services that those pages excluded from the search function are excluded because they are blank or illegible. I used the key terms “Canadian Forces” and “Military” to search these documents, resulting in the findings detailed above.

77 Servicewomen, however, did present to the Commission on behalf of Canadian mothers; an ex-Servicewomen’s organization from Scarborough Ontario called the “Tri-vettes” used their status as contributors to the Canadian war effort to legitimate the claims of working women (RCSW Submission, R.G. 33/89, vol. 12, pg. 1158).
policy, which prohibits military personnel from assuming any partisan political position while in uniform. Therefore, even though there were organized groups of Servicewomen during this period, like the Canadian Women’s Army Corps (CWAC), it is unlikely that they would have been permitted to submit a briefing to the Commission. However, Judy LaMarsh, the Minister of National Health and Welfare during the Pearson administration and a key figure in advocating for the creation of the Commission, was herself a member of CWAC prior to the advent of her political career (Pierson 1986, 218). Likewise, the Government of Canada’s current Elsie Initiative for Women in Peacekeeping Operations is named after aeronautical engineer Elsie MacGill, who led the production of Canadian fighter planes during WWII, and was also a Commissioner on the RCSW (Sissons 2007). Although there is no evidence of formal briefings offered in support of Canadian servicewomen, there is reason to believe that members of the Commission had personal experience with their plight of women in the armed forces.

Table 1. Distribution of Women by Trade in the Canadian Forces, 1969 (RCSW 1969)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Trades</th>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>Pay Field*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trades which women can enter</td>
<td>Dental Assistant</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after basic training</td>
<td>Nursing Assistant</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Administrative Clerk</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accounting and Finance Clerk</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supply Technician</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radar Plotter</td>
<td>4, 7**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teletype Operator</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trades which women can enter</td>
<td>Operating Room Assistant</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after satisfactory service in a</td>
<td>Communications Operator</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>basic trade</td>
<td>X-Ray Technician</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physical Education and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recreation Instructor</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trades for which women are no longer</td>
<td>Radar Operator (39)***</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recruited, but in which some are still</td>
<td>Meteorological Technician (7)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>serving</td>
<td>Safety Systems Technician (5)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Photo Technician (3)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avionics Technician (1)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refinishing Technician (1)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The trade determines the pay field. There are five pay fields, numbered 3 to 7, for non-officer ranks. Pay field 3 carries the lowest pay rate, and pay field 7 the highest.

**The numbers in the brackets represent the numbers of women remaining in the various trades.

Table 2. Distribution by Rank of Women and of the Forces as a Whole, Canada 1969 (RCSW 1969, 137)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number of Women</th>
<th>Total Number in the Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel and above</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>6,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total (Officers)</strong></td>
<td><strong>529</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,406</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer 1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer 3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>36,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,611</strong></td>
<td><strong>89,941</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Royal Commission reflected the larger movement towards liberalization in Canadian society. Protests about nuclear weapons proliferation and the Vietnam war spread domestically and transnationally and encouraged wide-spread anti-militarist sentiment amongst Canadians generally and feminist activists specifically (Cowen 2008, 155; Luxton 2001). The harsh realities of conscription, authoritarianism and warfare had no place in Canada’s new liberalism, and the legitimacy of the military as an institution began to decline across western democracies (Cowen 2008, 156). Despite preliminary moves towards liberalizing the military following the Royal Commission, Second Wave feminism in Canada remained distrustful of the military. These objections were not framed as a criticism of Servicewomen, but rather as an objection to the military-industrial-complex that continued to expand and deepen amid the rising tensions of the Cold War. The absence of a strong voice for servicewomen would later inspire the creation of the Association for Women’s Equity in the Canadian Forces (AWECF) in 1985, as discussed in chapter one (Davis 1994, 18).
Diplomatic attitudes found political voice in Prime Ministers Lester B. Pearson (1963-1968) and later P.E. Trudeau (1968-1979 & 1980-1984) during this period, both of whom sought to reorient Canadian nationalism around peacekeeping rather than warfighting (Ibid). While Nobel Peace Prize winning Pearson was known for his diplomatic internationalism, his support for militarist intervention began to wane as public support for the US’s Vietnam war deteriorated (Michaud 2006, 39). Like Pearson, P.E. Trudeau progressively pushed Canadian foreign policy from great power conflict and emphasized the importance of staunching the nuclear arms race (Granetstein and Bothwell 1991). Trudeau reduced the percentage of federal funding allocated to military spending, from 18% in 1967 to 13% in 1971, triggering a drastic reduction in Canadian Forces personnel (Ibid).\(^78\) Trudeau went so far as to consider abandoning NATO, and emphasized domestic stability and prosperity, often at the expense of a more robust foreign policy (Michaud 2008, 41). As Canada moved towards more peaceable foreign policy the domestic political environment was ideally suited for the expansion of individual rights and egalitarian reform, and the CAF found their influence in shaping Canadian foreign policy declining rapidly.

Canada in the late sixties and early seventies was moving towards a more peaceable foreign policy, however Trudeau’s reputation for peacekeeping is less deserved domestically. During the October Crises of 1970, the Francophone terrorist organization Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) perpetrated a string of bombings and riots, one of which killed a night watchman outside of a Canadian Forces recruiting centre in Montreal in April of 1963 (Clément 2008, 163). As a violent offshoot of Quebec’s Quiet Revolution, the FLQ represented the dark side of the rise in Canadian activism during the sixties and seventies (Ibid, 161). The strained relationship between Francophones and the Canadian military can be traced back to the use of conscription during WWI.

\(^78\) This reflects a decrease of 19,676 soldiers from 1962 to 1984.
With little remaining attachment to Europe, many French Canadians were unwilling to risk their lives in service of the British crown (Rioux 2004; Levi 1996). When rising fatalities overseas forced the Canadian government to enforce conscription in 1917, French Canadians responded through a series of violent riots in what is referred to as the ‘conscription crisis”, culminating in the deaths of 150 people during the 1918 Easter Riot, which was ultimately quashed by English military force (Auger 2008). This divide had profound consequences to already strained French-English relations in Canada; during the war as 60% of deserters were Francophone and it was believed that draft dodging was primarily a French practice (Levi 1996: 150). This distrustful relationship has persisted into the 20th century, and the Canadian Military was regarded as a predominantly English institution well into the 1950s (Canadian Military History 2011).

By October of 1969, rioting and ongoing bombings had overwhelmed Montreal police, and Trudeau deployed the Canadian Army to Montreal at the behest of the Quebec provincial government (Ibid, 164). These tensions culminated with the FLQ kidnapping and murder of French Francophone Deputy Premier of Quebec Pierre Laporte, resulting in the Federal government’s invocation of the War Measures Act for the first-time during peacetime, resulting in widespread human rights infractions throughout the country (Clément 2008, 161). Clément (2008) points to the suspension of habeas corpus in the arrests of FLQ leaders and members, the suppression of mainstream media throughout Canada, the expansion of federal police surveillance of Canadians and the enhancement of the CAF’s ability to deploy domestically (175-178). Blake and Whyte (2021) extend the criticism of Trudeau’s record on Canadian human rights to his mistreatment of Indigenous peoples and nationalisms; treaty rights were to be dissolved and indigenous peoples assimilated into broader “Canadian society” in his government’s failed 1969 White Paper (1-4). During Trudeau’s tenure, Indigenous peoples’ human security remained woefully under resourced
and housing and healthcare on reserves was then—as it is now—significantly below Canadian national standards (Ibid). Thus, Trudeau’s reputation for championing peacekeeping ought to be tempered with his record of using Canada’s military to quell domestic unrest.

While civilian politics were undergoing radical reform in the late sixties, the CAF was also undergoing aggressive policy changes in an effort to align the military with civilian defence priorities. The primary motivation for these changes was the findings of the Glassco Commission (1961), which sought to bring efficiency to what had become a costly and uncoordinated organization in which the three headquarters - the Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Army and Royal Canadian Airforce - operated separately, complete with separate bureaucracies, and were coordinated by some 200 inter-service committees and meetings of the Defence Council (Ibid 120; see also Gosselin 2015). The Glassco report also found that the roles available for civilians within National defence were so restricted that civilian control of the armed forces was questionable (Kasurak 1982, 119). Simply put, the existing military structure was too costly and not agile enough to respond to emerging strategic concepts and concerns in NATO, a reality compounded by NATO’s growing detachment from the liberal political environment of the 1960s.

In 1964, a Liberal White Paper on Defence and corresponding Bill C-90 (an Act to Amend the National Defence Act), proposed the integration of Canada’s three services. These changes culminated in the unification of the CAF in 1968, when Bill C-243 (the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act) eliminated the separate legal status of the services and unified all forces under “land, sea and air” elements of the CAF, under the centralized command of the Chief of Defence Staff (Critchley 1989, 119). Arguably the most significant outcome of force unification was its role in creating the perception amongst members that the CAF had become civilianized. The

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79 This is properly known as the Royal Commission on Government Organization, and the study concerned all government organizations, not just the CAF.
directive to unify the forces drastically changed the role of civilian management within the organization. Prior to unification, civilians were relegated to the Deputy Minister’s branch, where their influence was limited to “finance and material acquisition” and even then, civilian bureaucrats were subject to military oversight (Kasurak 1982, 120). With unification, the Deputy Minister’s branch was superimposed on the totality of NDHQ and allowed civilian managers into policy and planning fields that were previously restricted to military personnel (Ibid). Not only did unification threaten to undercut the unique service culture of each element, but it threatened the exceptionalism of the CAF by introducing civilian management at levels once held exclusively by the military elite. Although the proportion of civilians within National Defence had not changed significantly, civilians had penetrated the military’s executive branch and undermined the military’s claim to isolation from civilian oversight (Kasurak 1982, 117).

These stresses were exacerbated by the way in which unification was enacted haphazardly across the organization, as civilian and military personnel struggled to keep abreast with the rapidity of change (Critchley 1982). Moreover, unification coincided with “decreases in real terms, in the defence budget; decreases in authorized military personnel levels; and increases in the number and types of tasks set for the Canadian Forces” (Ibid, 130). The relative isolation from civilian intervention that the military once enjoyed during the early days of the Cold War was quickly being replaced by increased demands for transparency and accountability. Exclusionary personnel practices would become nearly impossible to maintain amidst the military’s growing convergence with civilian priorities.

Jumping ahead momentarily, we can determine servicemembers’ perceptions on Unification from the *National Task Force on Unification* (1980), which was commissioned by Conservative Minister of National Defence Allan A. McKinnon to determine the successes and failures of
unification. As part of the Task Force, nearly 1000 serving members of the CAF were interviewed (Kasurak 1982, 111). The Task Force found that a consensus had emerged amongst military personnel that they had “lost control of their own headquarters” and that “civilian standards and values are displacing their proven military counterparts and, in the process, are eroding the basic fiber of Canadian military society” (Ibid). Accordingly, many senior leaders within the CAF believed that the Liberal government had allowed an unknowing and ill-advised civilian take-over of the CAF, at the cost of *esprit de corps* and weaker civilian management techniques. Although this apparent weakness created an opening for the integration of civilian political priorities, the military would grow to resent its newfound status as a “laboratory” of social reform, a resentment that would only deepen in the coming decades. This history plays heavily into many soldiers’ attitudes towards both progressive civilian human rights legislation and liberalism more broadly. Although the CAF was forced to comply with the push for unification, the perceived civilianization of National Defence remains a sticking point to this day. This is not to suggest that the integration of women into the military occurred “too early” in Canada. Research demonstrates that male-dominated militaries have mounted resistance to women’s expanding presence in military roles even where integration occurred as late as 2016 (see Goldstein 2018 on the American armed forces). Instead, civilian drivers of gender integration, like the RCSW, simply provided a target for anti-feminist sentiment amongst military personnel.

While the Royal Commission represented a victory for Canadian Servicewomen, women did not enjoy an immediate change in their status within the CAF as it moved towards a piecemeal overhaul of its gender integration policy. The CAF responded to some of the changes recommended by the Royal Commission on the Status of Women immediately; they allowed the

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80 Kasurak is citing the Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces (1980) directly in these excerpts.
enrolment of married women and pregnant women were no longer forcibly released from service (Winslow & Dunn 2002, 654). The military also aimed to increase the recruitment of women from a fixed ceiling of fifteen hundred in 1965 (Davis 1994, 2), and by 1974 there “were 2373 women in the Canadian Forces, employed in 33 of 95 trades…. [representing] an increase from 1.8% of the total force in 1970 to approximately 3% of a total force of 81000” (Winslow & Dunn 2000, 37). Nonetheless women during this period had consistently higher attrition rates than male soldiers; by 1975 the rate of women’s attrition was 23% compared to only 13% of men (Davis 1994). Meanwhile, military colleges would not open their doors to women until 1980 and combat trades would remain closed to women until 1989 when subsequent Canadian legislation made these restrictions impossible to maintain (Winslow & Dunn 2002, 654).

Nevertheless, the RCSW forced the military to make the first step towards the integration of women in all trades; in 1967 only 19% of all military occupations were open to women, but by 1974 that number had increased to 67% (Hope, ND). Although progress following the Royal Commission was slow, it set a precedent for reprimanding the CAF’s exclusionary policies in the civilian political arena and laid the bedrock for future legislative changes that would eventually have the power to force the military’s hand to end gender-based exclusion. However, these events also marked the most profound expansion of civilian oversight into military affairs since the CAF’s inception; a move that was abhorred by uniformed personnel, and as I will demonstrate, one that would resurface in discourse around gender integration in subsequent decades.

II. Gender Equality Framing I - the Canadian Human Rights Act (1977)

The first authoritative text to introduce gender equality to the CAF as a discursive framework for the pursuance of gender integration was the Canadian Human Rights Act, passed in 1977. The CAF’s gender policy reform in the 1970s is characterized first by intense negotiation,
as the military attempted to resist the imposition of gender reforms, and ultimately, by the institutionalization of new legislation that would make resistance impossible. Despite mixed success in domestic human rights, this new legislation was an extension of Canadian foreign policy. As a founding member of the United Nations, Canada played a central role in drafting the United Nations’ *Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1947)*; Canadian law professor John Peters Humphrey helped to draft the original document (Carlson 2012). However, by the mid 1970s, the Trudeau administration was being pushed by both Status of Women Canada and the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women to formally pass the *Canadian Human Rights Act* which “established the principle of equal pay for equal work in the federal public service and created the Human Rights Commission [and the Human Rights Tribunal]” (Chappell 2002, 99). The *Canadian Human Rights Act* (1977) gave legal effect to the “principle that all individuals should have an opportunity equal with other individuals to make for themselves the lives that they are able and wish to have…. without being hindered in or prevented from doing so by discriminatory practices based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex” (*Canadian Human Rights Act* 1977, sect. 2). In practical terms, this meant that the discriminatory practices of the CAF identified in the Royal Commission on the Status of Women were now in contravention of Canadian law. The two bodies that the act established, the Human Rights Commission and the Human Rights Tribunal, are empowered to enforce the Canadian Human Rights Act and would become essential in forcing the CAF to remove gendered barriers to women’s service. The tribunal acts as a court and hears cases received from the Commission when the Commission has been unable to achieve reconciliation between parties, and ultimately
determines if a violation of the Canadian Human Rights Act has occurred and if restitution is warranted (Canadian Human Rights Commission 2013).\textsuperscript{81}

The Canadian Human Rights Act posed a new challenge to gendered discrimination in the CAF; excluding women from combat duty would only be permissible if the restriction was based on a bona fide occupational requirement. The only space this permitted for the CAF to maintain the status quo was under the condition that “a job could be refused to a person who could not perform it safely, efficiently and reliably” (Davis 1997, 180).\textsuperscript{82} Although the Canadian Human Rights Act provided space for federal organizations to exclude women from select occupations using the occupational requirement clause, it leaves the clause somewhat undefined (Simpson et al. 1979, 274). For example, the CAF is still exempt from employing Canadians with disabilities in occupations where physical disabilities would prevent the proper execution of tasks. In other words, the CAF might have been able to maintain combat exclusion if it was proven that gender integration would functionally impede the military. In practice, these questions were rarely posed as an issue of women’s physical capacity to serve. Some critics reasoned that women’s involvement in combat roles could impede the ability of the CAF to deter attacks; for example, opponents of women’s integration suggested that the Canadian military would seem “weaker” for including women, or that Canada’s NATO allies would react negatively to the inclusion of women

\textsuperscript{81} Note that there are areas of significant overlap between the intent of the Canadian Human Rights Act and section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, however the Charter is intended to apply to the relationship between the government and the public while the Canadian Human Rights Act applies to discriminatory practices within federal governmental departments (Holmes 1997, 3).

\textsuperscript{82} BFOR exceptions are only qualified if “(1) imposed honestly in good faith and in the sincerely held belief that such limitation is imposed in the interest of the adequate performance of the work involved with reasonable dispatch, safety and economy and not for ulterior or extraneous reasons aimed at objectives which could defeat the purpose of the code; and (2) the requirement is related in an objective sense to the performance of the employment concerned in that it is reasonably necessary to assure the efficient and economical performance of the job without endangering the employee, his fellow employees and the general public” (Zeigler and Gunderson 2005, 85).
Similarly, the military establishment was unsure about the sociological effect that gender integration would have on troop cohesion; what if male soldiers took unnecessary risks to save women injured on the battlefield? (Ibid). Little was known about how women would integrate into a modern Western military, and, amid the Cold War, the military reasoned that it could not integrate women without first attending to these trepidations.

In response to both these concerns and the Canadian Human Rights Act, the CAF initiated two large scale surveys. The first study was conducted internally and found that amongst 4000 CAF members and spouses, the majority were opposed to women serving in the combat roles and aboard submarines (Davis 2004, 2). Reasons provided included “women’s physical capabilities, marital conflict, the emotional suitability of women and the impact of women on operational effectiveness” (Ibid). The second survey was an opinion poll conducted between November of 1977 and May 1978 which sought to assess the opinion of Canadians outside the military towards the enlistment of women (Ibid). The survey found that although support for women in land combat units was weaker amongst participants than in support of women in Air Force positions, overall “responses indicated that more Canadians supported the service of women in all roles than were against the idea in any particular role” (Ibid). These opinion surveys illustrated to the CAF that opinions were mixed, amongst both soldiers and civilians, about the suitability for women in combat roles and perhaps more importantly, the suitability of all-male units to receive them. These studies were augmented by a review conducted by the Surgeon General of the Canadian Forces to determine if women should be excluded on physiological bases (Simpson et al 1979, 14). Although his study pointed to the need to set standards for the size and physical strength of soldiers, he found

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83 Survey respondents did not demonstrate negative attitudes towards women in all military occupations. Most were in favour of giving women an opportunity to serve as aircrew in the RCAF, serve aboard support ships, and serve in isolated postings (Davis 2004, 2).
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no reason why these standards should exclude women; they could apply equally regardless of sex (Ibid).

To further respond to the military’s concerns about the suitability of women in combat, the DND initiated the “Servicewomen in Non-Traditional Environments and Roles” trials, which ran from 1978-1985. The trials aimed to determine if the employment of servicewomen in previously all-male units (including combat units) would have an impact on “operational capability” (National Defence Instruction Deputy Chief of Defence Staff 1979, cited in Kovitz 1998). The trials could not justify women’s inclusion in combat; the DND-CAF could not make any inferences about the viability of mixed gender combat units since the 280 women involved were not assigned combat duties, only isolated posts and combat service support units (Kovitz 1998, 103). Furthermore, although the trials were intended to test the relationship between women and operational efficacy, operational efficacy was neither “operationally defined or precisely measured” in any of the trials (Ibid). When the trials ended in 1985, the leadership concluded that the negative attitudes of men toward the service of women could not be justified by sociological or operational motivations (Davis 2007, 75). Instead, senior military leadership would have to respond to more complicated cultural factors that shaped how women were trained, selected and tasked with duties within the military, as well as perceived problems with fraternization, beliefs that women were less aggressive than their male counterparts, and generalized myths about women’s emotionality and pregnancy (Ibid). Although the results of the trials did not have the immediate effect of assuring the DND-CAF that women could integrate seamlessly into combat positions, they exposed the complexities of the all-male environment into which female soldiers would be placed.

During the 1970s, it became increasingly clear that the military’s formal exclusionary policies would no longer be tolerated by civilian society and that the organization would have to
respond to emerging equality-based challenges under the *Canada Human Rights Act*. As Squires (2005) highlights, gender mainstreaming frameworks based on principles of inclusion are often based on liberal feminist objectives, like those enshrined in the *Canada Human Rights Act*. As discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, “a strategy of inclusion [and] usually aspire[s] to objectivity, conceives[s] of people as autonomous and espouse[s] an equality politics (and [is] often labeled as liberal feminist)” (Ibid, 368). These objectives emphasize women’s right to participate in all activities of the state by virtue of their status as citizens within a liberal democracy. The gender equality rationale therefore emphasized a logic of justice; gendered differences were an artifice of social construction and encouraged an unjust order that placed men at its apex.

At this historical juncture, gender integration within the CAF rested on arguments of men’s and women’s sameness if repeated physical and psychological testing showed that women could participate as well as men, then they merited their place in combat. Nevertheless, the gender equality rationale – which emphasizes the right of women to participate in the military by virtue of their status as citizens – found weak resonance with most male soldiers when surveyed. This rationale is seen to emanate from the unpopular civilian political elite, but difficult to reconcile with military ethos, particularly during the Cold-War fervor of the 1970s and 80s.

As the following section demonstrates, individual needs and rights claims are regularly subordinated to the needs of the military, legally reinforced by the National Defence Act. As Harrison and Laliberté (2008) argue, there is tension inherent in how military approaches affect operational efficacy and western democratic values. Exercising near total authority over its members by Royal decree, there is very little formal space for negotiating dissent amongst the ranks in the Canadian military. The *National Defence Act* (NDA) of Canada grants the Department of National Defence - Canadian Armed Forces (together known as the *Defence Team*) far more
control over members and members’ activities than any other Canadian governmental organization. This includes the unlimited liability\textsuperscript{84} of soldiers, and extends to judicial and labour regulations bodies that operate parallel to the civilian judicial system (\textit{National Defence Act}, NDA, 1985). Often principles like \textit{unlimited liability} and the \textit{universality of service} are allowed to override the rights enshrined in the \textit{Canadian Human Rights Act} under the premise that denial of these rights is essential to ensure the operational efficacy of the CAF (Ibid).\textsuperscript{85}

Despite the mixed results of the “Servicewomen in Non-Traditional Environments and Roles” trials, institutional resistance to gender integration at both the command level and in the ranks prompted the CAF to continue excluding female service members from combat.\textsuperscript{86} Two studies based on the results of the trials found that due to the poor selection and preparation of suitable female candidates, male soldier’s vocal discontent about the presence of women within their units, and mixed support amongst CAF leadership, women could not be successfully integrated into all military occupations (Trachy 2001, 67).\textsuperscript{87} Therefore, despite mounting pressure from civilian politicians, the CAF recommended against the integration of women in combat and combat support units.

\textbf{III. Gender Equality II – The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Decision (1989)}

\textsuperscript{84} Unlimited liability is defined in CAF military doctrine as the embrace of a “spirit of self-sacrifice and dedication to duty that requires them to carry out their lawfully assigned mission and tasks without regard to personal fear or danger. This may even mean loss of life” (\textit{Duty with Honour} 2003, 14). It is under the basis of this principle that commanding officers can command soldiers to perform any task required of them, even at risk of serious injury and death.

\textsuperscript{85} Unlimited liability is defined in footnote 80, while universality of service refers to the requirement for every member of the CAF to be fit for service, regardless of whether or not their trade requires physical labour. This regulation permits the exclusion of peoples with physical disabilities regardless of Canadian Human Rights legislation.

\textsuperscript{86} “The Ranks” refers to all non-commissioned members ranked at or below Sergeant.

\textsuperscript{87} The first study was intended to assess the social/behavioural (SBS – Social Behavioural Science) impact of the presence of women in combat support service units, and the second study was based on both the SBS report and the annual reports of the commanding officers in the two units involved in the study (Trachy 2001, 67). These “near combat” units were defined as those that “may become directly involved in combat but whose primary role is other than combat” and therefore serve as questionable models for women serving in a real combat environment (Dundas 2001, 115).
Despite the internal efforts of the CAF, attempts to bar women from service could not be sustained amidst the continued advancement of progressive human rights legislation, exemplified by the enactment of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* in 1982, which added individual rights protections to the Canadian constitution, including protections based on sex. In 1985, the Canadian Department of Justice published a paper highlighting five areas where the CAF was likely to contravene the *Charter*. Specifically, this included: “mandatory retirement ages; physical and medical employment standards, the recognition of common law relationships, the employment of women, and sexual orientation” (Pinch 1994, 13). Once again, the process of gender integration was bundled as part of a larger encroaching rights package that, in the eyes of many within the military, threatened to reduce the operational efficacy of the CAF. Nevertheless, it soon became clear that the CAF would have to come to terms with the integration of women into the Combat Arms. In anticipation of future challenges, the CAF established a *Charter* Task Force in 1986 to explore the ramifications of *Charter*-related legislation on CAF operations (Madsen 1999). The Task Force sought to provide recommendations to the military so that it might respond to growing demands for more inclusive policies emanating from both the *Charter* and the *Human Rights Act*, while ensuring that the organization would not sacrifice operational efficacy in the process.

The taskforce recommended 14 additional military occupation classifications (MOCs) be opened to women. In response, the Chief of Defence Staff issued Canadian Forces Administrative Order 49-15, which read:

> Empirical evidence gained throughout the history of warfare has proven that the operational effectiveness of an armed force is decisively affected by a combination of human factors. In particular, members of an armed force whose primary role is the engagement of the enemy in battle are faced with severe hardship, degrading living conditions, capture and death…. effectiveness in battle is vitally dependent on a strong bonding among the members, which is essential to units’ cohesion and morale. Empirical evidence has shown that human stresses are
compounded by the added complexities of mixed-gender groups. Concern that such additional stress would seriously jeopardize operational effectiveness has resulted in every major nation in the world maintaining limits on mixed-gender composition in their armed forces, particularly in units which are most likely to face an enemy directly in battle. Consequently, in order not to jeopardize the operational effectiveness dictated by the needs of national security, the composition of some units will remain single-gender male. As a result, a number of military occupations will be restricted to men, and in a number of others, there will be a minimum male component. (CFAO 49-15 cited in Brown V. CAF 1989, V. Tait’s emphasis). 88

As this excerpt reveals, the CAF was not ready to relinquish space to women soldiers. The “minimum male requirement” outlined by the Chief of Staff represented an attempt to protect the boundaries of all-male space in response to encroaching progressive policies. Administrative order 49-15 thus highlights that the military responded to these recommendations with varying degrees of acceptance (Tanner 1999, 6).

The text of the final report from the Charter Task Force emphasizes that although it is important to “enhance individual rights and freedoms” these changes must not cause “undue adverse impact on the operational effectiveness of the CF”89 (Charter Task Force 1985, 2). The Report further emphasized that resistance to gender integration was most acute in “occupations that have always been single-gender male” and “survey results confirmed that negative attitudes towards mixed-gender employment persist” (Ibid, 19). These challenges, amongst others, implied that pursuing a more egalitarian agenda would come at the cost of operational efficacy. Instances where women successfully served in combat roles in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Israel were declared “aberrations” (Ibid).

The progress made by the Charter Task Force was begrudgingly won; nevertheless, it was significant for a number of reasons. First, it was not mandated by civilian leadership but rather was

88 The minimum male requirement is not provided in the directive itself, which states that the “minimum male component will be specified from time to time in the CFSO’s [Canadian Forces Supplementary Orders] (CFAO 49-15 1988, C-1).
89 The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) were referred to as the Canadian Forces (CF) from approximately the late 1980s until 2013, so excerpts from this era read “CF” rather than “CAF.”
an internal initiative to get ahead of challenges to the gender culture of the organization. Second, it was far more intersectional than previous examinations of gender in the CAF, revealing important tensions not simply within the gender diversity mandate, but sexual orientation and racial cleavages as well (Okros 2017). The Task Force therefore represents one of the first (and few) substantive moments when an internal driver encouraged the military to pre-empt demands from civilian legislation.

Amidst increasing pressure from both the *Charter* and the *Canadian Human Rights Act*, a secondary set of trials, the Combat Related Employment of Women (CREW) trials, were set to begin in 1989 to “evaluate the impact of mixed-gender units on operational effectiveness” (Dundas 2001, 123). While the Air Force responded that no further trials would be necessary, and that it would commence with the integration of women, both the Army and the Navy allowed for a one-year integration period for servicewomen to become acclimatized to the conditions of combat, followed by a two-year evaluation period that compared mixed-gender units to all male units (Tanner 1999, 7). Ultimately, as a result of the *Canadian Armed Forces V. Gauthier* (1989) decision of the Canadian Human Rights Commission Tribunal, the Combat Related Employment of Women trials were to be considered an exercise in planning how the CAF was to integrate women, rather than a decisive trial to justify their inclusion or exclusion. From an international perspective, this represented a significant victory for Canadian Servicewomen, their sisters in key NATO allies like the US and UK would not be permitted into combat trades until nearly thirty years later.

In the 1989 *Gauthier* case, the defendants, Isabelle Gauthier, Joseph Holden, Marie-Claude Gauthier and Katherine McRae, argued to the Tribunal that sex-based discrimination in CAF
policy had prohibited them from advancing their careers (Gauthier V. CAF 1989). While the CAF did not deny that these policies were discriminatory, they argued that these discriminatory policies were necessitated by *bona fide* operational requirements; that is to say, full gender integration would undermine operational effectiveness (Davis 2007, 78). The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal found that the military offered insufficient evidence to suggest that gender integration would compromise the effectiveness of the military and found in favor of the complainants. CAF employment and training programs denied women the opportunities provided to men, and the military was therefore engaging in discriminatory practices in violation of the *Human Rights Act* (sections 5, 6 and 10) (Gauthier V. Canadian Armed Forces 1989). Accordingly, the military was to integrate women fully into all military occupations within 10 years, except for the submarine service, which would not be open to women until 2001 (Davis 2007, 78). This decision marks the formal entrance of women into the CAF combat arms, and therefore the elimination of legalized gender exclusion in the CAF.

While the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal decision ended legal gender exclusion in the CAF, the institution proved hesitant to displace exclusionary frameworks fully. At this stage, conflicting evidence from successive rounds of trials could not conclusively demonstrate that female soldiers would impede operational efficacy. This was partly because “operational efficacy” was (and remains) a vague concept nearly impossible to measure empirically, and partly because negative attitudes towards women within the military prevented female trial participants from ever being fairly evaluated. It mattered little; when the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal ruled that the military was in violation of the *Human Rights Act*, it permanently wed gender integration

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90 MacRae’s case was settled separately with the CAF as it was found that the “military occupation at issue was open to women at the time the complaint was made, and that refusal to consider the application of the complainant was due to administrative error” (Gauthier v. CAF 1989, 3).
initiatives with civilian intervention in military culture and ethos. Although essential for ensuring that women could legally serve in all roles in the CAF, the ruling embedded the gender equality rationale in the military’s institutional memory of gender integration initiatives. This was interpreted by many male soldiers as a sign that that women’s rights superseded the importance of operational efficacy of the military and that the gendered differences that male soldiers perceived in their female colleagues were immaterial (Kovitz 1998, 26).


The 1990s is colloquially referred to as the “decade of darkness” within the CAF. This era represents a period of defence policy that was characterized by failed peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Somalia, and the end of the Cold War; both pushed civilian political elite to reduce military spending to reduce the federal deficit (Gosslin 2015, 25). The 1994 Chrétien government’s Defence White Paper required the CAF to drastically reduce expenditures through centralization and personnel cutbacks while the operational tempo expanded rapidly to meet increasing demands for “peacekeepers” across the globe (Ibid). By the time that the Somalia inquiry concluded, it was evident that violence, sexual misconduct, and alcohol abuse plagued many CAF divisions (Hewson 1985 cited in Friedland 2012; Whitworth 2005). In response not just to new civilian human rights legislation, but also to the war crimes committed in Somalia, the CAF underwent radical reform to bring military culture in line with civilian standards of behaviour (Kasurak 2011, 111). These reforms were dedicated particularly to reforming the CAF Officer class, which one minister called “remarkably ill-educated…. surely one of the worst in the western world” (Ibid). Reports on the progress of gender integration throughout the decade reveal that, at the outset of the 1990s, the
CAF was under-educated, over-burdened and ill-prepared to react to the further spreading and entrenchment of progressive civilian legislation into formal military policy.

The challenges that the CAF faced during the 1990s illustrate that the fraught civil-military relations crises of the 1960s remain unresolved. To date, gender integration in the CAF had been driven largely by civilian political intervention; either through formal legislative initiatives, like the Employment Equity Act (1995), or in the *Maclean’s* 1998 and 2015 shaming campaigns which exposed the prevalence of sexual violence in the Canadian military – which continues to this day.

The relationship between civilian and military authorities in western democracies is necessarily a difficult, negotiated arrangement. After a brief overview of civil-military relations in the Canadian context, I will illustrate how antipathy towards civilian intervention prevented the success of the gender equality framework and required an alternative – the operational efficacy framework.

The first problem of civil-military relations, according to Bland (1999, 13) is the praetorian problem; that is, how to “curb the political power of the military” sufficiently while still encouraging a cooperative relationship between civilian and military spheres. A second and related challenge is ensuring that the military performs in accordance with civilian standards of behaviour and “behaves in ways that safeguard the state without bringing harm – through indiscipline, misadventure, or exaggeration of threats – to governments or citizens” (Ibid, 14). Third, the military must be subordinated to the state without the government of the day abusing that power through partisanship (Ibid). Finally, the relationship between the “expert and the minister” can present a problem when the political establishment is ignorant of military capabilities (Ibid).

Although the CAF and the Canadian government have succeeded, for the most part, in sidestepping the praetorian problem, and the military is held in high regard by the Canadian public (Earnscleff Group 2020, 4), the other two challenges have proven problematic. The CAF has
repeatedly struggled to perform in accordance with civilian behavioural standards, and tense relations between civilian and military political management have repeatedly emerged, particularly surrounding issues of diversity. These challenges further exacerbate military antipathy towards civilian intervention, which frustrates attempts to achieve gender mainstreaming goals.

The civil-military relationship in Canada highlights not only the military’s occasionally inimical relationship with civilian political leadership, but also its struggle against encroaching civilian norms. From the earliest days of the Charter, the CAF has lobbied to be exempted from civilian legislation: “the essential requirements of military effectiveness may similarly require an interpretation different from those which apply to society as a whole, insofar as reasonableness in the context of section 1 of the charter is concerned, in the consideration of other issues” (Charter Task Force 1986, 5). Although unification in the 1960s illustrated the depth of the civil-military challenge between the Federal government and the CAF, the Canadian Military’s struggle with progressive norms became publicly apparent with the Somalia Affair in 1993. The “Somalia Affair” refers to the gross breakdown of military discipline while Canadian Airborne Regiment was deployed to Somalia in December of 1992. The regiment’s “disobedience of unit rules, socially unacceptable behavior, and random criminal activity including excessive aggression, damaging property, the burning of the duty sergeant’s car, unauthorized pyrotechnic explosions and drunkenness” were known amongst leadership (Kasurak 2011, 109). This insubordination peaked with the baiting and subsequent rape and murder of a young Somali man (Shidane Arone) on a Canadian base (Ibid).  

\[91\] For a truly first-rate feminist examination of the relationship between Canadian nationalism and peacekeeping (and of the Somalia Affair) see Sandra Whitworth (2003).

\[92\] It’s alleged that the young men were attempting to “steal” food from the base, food which was ostensibly placed there to lure young thieves onto the camp where Canadian soldiers could justify the use of deadly force under the premise that these men were saboteurs.
A subsequent government inquiry (termed the Somalia Inquiry) was prematurely terminated by the government of Jean Chretien, because he feared he would be held responsible for his promotion of military personnel subsequently implicated in the Affair in the upcoming fall 1997 federal election (Ibid, 78). Although the public subsequently lost interest in the Affair, there were widespread allegations of a high-level military cover-up as senior military officials destroyed and/or falsified documents and denied information to commissioners during the inquiry (see Jenish & Fisher 1996). Bland (2000) argues that what was remarkable, and perhaps characteristic of civil-military relations in Canada at the time, was the attitude of officers called before the Inquiry. One after the other seemed outraged that they should be asked to account for their actions and decisions. The most spectacular instance involved the so-called acting chief of defense, Vice Admiral Murray, who so provoked the commissioners by his refusal to answer their questions and to follow their instructions that they threatened to hold him in contempt of the inquiry. Officers, according to one observer, had become so accustomed to acting without critical supervision that many apparently thought that they were not accountable at all. (75; see also Jenish & Fisher 1996) The Inquiry revealed the proliferation of violent sexualized and racist norms within, at very least, the Airborne Regiment, and more troublingly, the willingness of senior military leadership to cover-up these war crimes. It also shattered Canada’s post-Cold War reputation as a peacekeeping nation on the international stage; how could Canada justify its claim to be a nation of peacekeepers amidst these horrendous allegations (Whitworth 2003)?

The CAF was once again struck by reports of misconduct, this time in its treatment of female soldiers. In May of 1998 Maclean’s reporter Jane O’Hara interviewed 13 female CAF soldiers who had suffered sexual assault, revealing not only a systemic pattern of abuse, but also a near pathological mishandling of their cases by superior officers (O’Hara 1998). In the wake of these revelations, the CAF responded by establishing a sexual assault hotline and implored women affected by sexual abuse to report their rapes; very few survivors would ever find restitution.

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93 The Canadian Airborne Regiment was dismantled in 1995 following the findings of the inquiry.
(O’Hara 1998b). Subsequent reporting revealed that in many cases, survivors struggled to reopen old cases and reported bungled investigations (ibid). In one instance, a female soldier gave her statement to the francophone military police in English, only to find out that the French translation provided later left out key elements and “change[d] others so that it was unusable in pressing charges” (Ibid, 18). In response to these allegations, Chief of Defense Staff Art Eggleton appointed André Marin as the first military Ombudsman and re-established a “Minister’s Advisory Board on Gender Integration” headed by Sandra Perron, but as examined in greater detail below, neither program achieved success in eliminating sexual misconduct (Ibid). Marin reported that he faced serious resistance from military police during his office’s investigation into sexual misconduct, and although this resistance was couched in the language of “jurisdictional issues” and “legal impediments,” Marin had little doubt that the real reason was a rejection of the concept of an external Ombudsman (Marin 2001, 3). He reflects, “I get the impression that they would prefer to harken back to a day and age of a cloistered military operating out of reach of civilian oversight or, more precisely out of reach of the Ombudsman” (Ibid). Ultimately, the office of the Ombudsman possessed no legal or executive authority, and could only make recommendations to the organization, which could be rejected without consequence (Ibid). When Marin stepped down in 2005, he complained that military rejection of the civilian office of the Ombudsman was still common (Marin 2005).

Roi and Smoly nec (2010) argue that civil-military issues are compounded by the absence of strategic dialogue between defence experts and Canadian political leaders; policy aims advanced with very little understanding of what the CAF can reasonably achieve. Often, as has with Canada’s military engagement in Somalia (1992-1993) and Afghanistan (2001-2014), civilian politicians treat the CAF as an instrument to enhance Canada’s international image, a tool
of domestic and foreign policy craft, rather than an organization of last resort designed to respond where traditional diplomacy has failed (Ibid). This hints at a central challenge when it comes to crafting a more progressive military; the CAF, despite efforts to remain impartial, does not occupy a space of political neutrality. Instead, the military must respond to the whims and caprices of civilian political leaders concerned more with voting and international prestige, while attempting to convey strategic realities to often ill-informed civilian elite (Ibid). This political reality is not lost on soldiers and is an oft-lamented trope amongst military personnel.

The central challenge for any democratic military is whether it should seek to reflect and integrate with the society in which it is embedded or stand above the political pressures this implies. Although the CAF formally supports the belief that the military should reflect the diversity of Canadian society, this belief is not held consistently by all members (James 2006, 466). This challenge has been central to Canada’s struggle to professionalize military culture and becomes particularly pertinent to the historical struggle for women’s rights across civil-military boundaries. The complex historical relationship between civilian and military leadership further exacerbates antipathy towards a gender equality rationale; it is seen as representing an alien logic encroaching on military territory, rather than an internal military priority or initiative.

While the CAF struggled to keep up with the reforms required by the Canadian Human Rights Act, a parallel initiative sparked by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was underway within the Government of Canada. In 1983, Justice Rosalie Silberman Abella was appointed by the federal government to evaluate the employment practices of a selection of crown corporations and provide recommendations to ensure the equal treatment for four groups: women, native people, visible minorities, and persons with disabilities (Geller 1985, 20). The Royal Commission on Equality in Employment, often called the “Abella Commission”, would paint a damning picture
of the lack of progress in attaining equality and integration in the federal government; statistical analysis of the status of women’s employment, for example, suggested that little progress had been made since the RCSW in 1970 and had not “changed substantially from the situation that prevailed in the early 19th century” (Ibid). Abella’s recommendations would inform the Employment Equity Act (1986), which would be expanded in 1995 to include the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the CAF (Mentzer 2002, 43). The Employment Equity Act (1995) would prove to be a transformative text: which further drove the CAF to embrace gender integration and established “numerical goals for the hiring and promotion of persons in designated groups in order to increase their representation” (EEA 1995 s. 10 (1) cited in Mentzer 2002, 44). Although the Employment Equity Act would encourage the military to move towards a more equal treatment of service women, it had inadvertently instrumentalized the hiring and promotion of women, the first step the CAF would take towards a new discourse of operational efficacy.

As a result of new Employment Equity legislation, the Minister’s Advisory Board on Gender Integration in the Canadian Armed Forces evolved to become the Minister’s Advisory Board on Canadian Forces Gender Integration and Employment Equity in 1998 (Marin 200, 13). Although the military would not be brought under the Employment Equity Act until 2002, the Minister’s Advisory Board Reports held the military accountable for its treatment of designated minorities well into the late 1990s, as the deadline for gender integration approached. As the Tribunal deadline for full integration drew near, the CAF was no closer to resolving the inhospitable working environment for female soldiers. Throughout the 10-year period that followed the 1989 decision, the pace of change slowed dramatically at the halfway point and

94 The Minister’s Advisory Board on Gender Integration in the CF was an external monitoring committee intended to track the progress of gender integration during the 10-year transition period allowed by the Human Rights Tribunal and provide recommendations to the Minister of Defence.
progress towards gender integration remained sporadic, a reflection of a lack of a coordinated policy goals, standards or even an effective evaluation plan (Chief Review Services 1998, 3).\footnote{Op MINERVA was designed to increase the participation of women in the CAF, but due to a number of issues in design and implementation, limited action was taken in regard to the plan, and these actions were only taken at the tail end of the 10-year integration period (Chief Review Services 1998, 6).} By 1997, studies of the Combat Arms revealed that women still faced a non-supportive work and training environment characterized by harassment, ill-fitting kit and equipment, and were denied full access to facilities and accommodations like showers (Davis 1997). These issues were compounded by inadequate accommodations for family issues ranging from pregnancy to emergency leave (Ibid).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the representation of women in the CAF remained low throughout the 1990s. The average rate of female soldier attrition from the combat arms between 1989-1999 was double that of men in the Officer class (14.9%:6.1%), and three times higher than male non-commissioned members (30.4%:9.2%) (MABGIEE 2000, 23). Although the downsizing mentioned above actually improved women’s relative representation due to a proportionally larger number of men leaving the forces, there was only a modest 1% increase in women’s representation between 1989-1997 (Chief Review Services 1998, ii). The practical consequences of these failures would become undeniable when Maclean’s published its 1998 piece on the ubiquity of sexual assault in the CAF. One report revealed that women made 60% of formal harassment complaints while comprising only about 11% of the CAF (Perron, May 1997). Efforts at diversity training had also failed. A 2000 Ministers Advisory Board on Gender Integration and Employment Equity (MAGIBEE) Report revealed that the two primary programs through which soldiers were to receive diversity education during the 1990s, the Leadership in a Diverse Army (LDA) and Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention (SHARP) programs, actually had the unintended...
effect of encouraging distrust and scepticism (MABGIEE 2000, 19). Many felt that the courses were “something created in Ottawa with no relevance or practicality to the field units” (MABGIEE 1999, 16). In this context, most of the diversity training delivered by the military was ill-received. Many participants felt that military trainers did not “believe in the subjects being taught” and that participants “had difficulty coming to terms with the military accommodating the needs of visible minorities and Aboriginals” (MABGIEE Interim Report 1999, 16). One instructor went so far as to advise that the class, “…write to Ottawa if they disagreed with the policies regarding women in the combat arms” (Ibid). In nearly all instances, an emphasis was placed on the ways in which diversity could not be reconciled with the level of conformity demanded by the military. One soldier interviewed by the Ministers Advisory Board on Gender Integration argued that, “Group cohesion, imperative to operational effectiveness, comes from uniformity and conformity. We should all look the same, and that includes hair and headdress. That’s why we wear uniforms.” (MABIGEE Annual Report 1999, 10). Likewise, one Lieutenant complained that “Employment Equity is a political program designed in Ottawa in order to appease minorities and Aboriginals” (MABIGEE Annual Report 2000, 25). The consequences of dogmatic adherence to this level of conformity would resurface in the coming decade.

The most profound discursive “swing” in the 1990s occurred regarding the military’s concept of operational efficacy. During the period when gender equality rationale was dominant (1969-2002), senior leadership argued that operational efficacy in the CAF was threatened by the presence of women in combat forces. Operational efficacy was threatened by women’s rights claimants and hinged on female soldiers’ insistence that gender would not have any impact on their performance. With the introduction of the Employment Equity Act came the introduction of

96 Gender sensitivity at this point was being taught as part of a “Leadership in a Diverse Army” course package which examined diversity issues with visible minorities, aboriginals and women.
new operational efficacy rationale. Internal memos within the CAF began to show soldiers that women’s differences from men would not impede operational efficacy in the CAF; to the contrary, diversity might even enhance operational efficacy. Internal defence newsletters began to insist that women make a difference “not because they are simply women, but because they bring talents and skills to making this a more efficient organization” (MCCRT D2000 1997). One ship commander argued that the introduction of women to his ship led to a “different feel to the ship – a sense of family in a warship…the addition of women into the ship’s company had changed the dynamic” (Ibid). Others insisted that “women are more likely to see things in terms of the benefit to humanity…. men make the economic connection between what they choose to do and status and power (Ibid). The 2000 Minister’s advisory board report emphasized that CAF members with negative attitudes towards diversity initiatives “need to understand that equity is about leveraging differences to create a stronger team, thereby enhancing operational effectiveness” (MABGIE 2000, 25). These attitudes were by no means universal, and significant resistance to gender integration remained, nevertheless it demonstrates a reframing of the value of female soldiers. The concept of operational efficacy emerged as a powerful discursive shield against arguments that women would weaken the CAF, instead, these arguments suggested that their gendered differences may make the military stronger. These casual observations about difference and operational efficacy would find more formal voice in CAF policy in the coming decades.

Conclusion

This research is conducted with the understanding that the goal of mainstreaming gender within the security sector may develop a logic of its own because of negotiated processes of norm implementation. Gender-mainstreaming is necessarily an exercise in meaning-making, and the social frames constructed to effectively communicate progressive gender initiatives can proceed
along both intentional and unintentional paths (Caglar 2013, 340; see also Bacchi 2009). Although specific meanings-systems may be assigned to doctrine or legislation with the express goal of achieving norm acceptance, so too may unintentional compromises be struck, particularly in introducing new feminist norms to predominantly male institutions (Ibid). Therefore, the operational efficacy framework examined in this chapter, although intended to smooth the transition to a gender integrated military, may well have achieved the opposite effect by emphasizing a militarist agenda at the expense of gender equality. Similarly justifying gender integration through appeals to a logic of justice and egalitarianism had weak resonance with most CAF personnel and worse, became associated with already unpopular civilian intervention into military affairs. During the 90s, the CAF was able to bridge this divide using a rationale that suggested female combat personnel would not only help achieve Employment Equity Act goals, but further improve operational efficacy. Although this may be a more effective way of achieving buy-in amongst soldiers, it has instrumentalized the integration of women; it suggests they should be included in the CAF not because they are “rights bearing citizens” but because their inclusion could be useful to military engagement (Prugl 2013). Despite Canada’s early adoption of gender integration principles within the military, these pre-existing discursive frameworks are likely to prove challenging to those norm entrepreneurs looking to implement UNSCR 1325 for years to come.
This chapter examines the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the CAF at the departmental level. The examination illustrates that the CAF is not any closer to achieving gender equality because of being forced to permit women to participate in combat roles before its allies. Instead, decades of failed efforts at gender mainstreaming have uniquely circumscribed the arguments available for pursuing a new gender integration policy. This chapter concludes that the CAF continues to be characterized by a negative gender culture and is therefore incapable of fully implementing feminist gender-equality initiatives, like UNSCR 1325. In this chapter, I describe how anticipated backlash from the “warrior-culture” of the CAF discouraged the process of implementing UNSCR 1325 through use of a discourse of gender equality. Therefore, the department responsible for drafting the implementation plans for UNSCR 1325 emphasized that gender perspectives would be valuable as a tool for enhancing the military’s operational efficacy. I then illustrate how using the discourse of operational efficacy to implement 1325 in the CAF has distorted the gender equity norms in the resolution, particularly those around the empowerment and protection of women. This discourse suggested to military personnel that UNSCR 1325 was outwardly oriented; a resolution that called on the CAF to “save” conflict-affected nations, rather than an initiative to spark reform of the CAF.

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97 Karen Dunivin (1994) defines the “combat masculine warrior paradigm” or “CMW” paradigm as one founded first on the military’s core activity as combat, or the preparation for – and conduct of – war. The second pillar of the paradigm is the masculine-warrior image, which stems from the military being comprised almost exclusively of men. Karen Davis has applied Dunivin’s CMW paradigm to the CAF in several of her articles; my dissertation findings support her argument (see Davis 1998, Davis and McKee 2002, Davis 2009).

98 This department was the Strategic Joint Staff, or SJS. It will be discussed in greater detail below.
I argue that applying a discursive frame that defers to the “warrior culture” of the CAF undermined the transformative potential of the resolution and weakened support for policies, like Op HONOUR, to eliminate sexual misconduct in the Canadian military. Through its preoccupation with emphasizing that UNSCR 1325 will enhance the CAF’s operational efficacy during military missions, the CAF has implemented an interpretation of UNSCR 1325 that distorts the core gender equality messaging that the resolution contains. This argument is substantiated by interviews with subject matter expert conducted with military and civilian personnel throughout 2018-2019 (Appendix D). The discussion of these findings begins on page 141 after a brief review of the Conservative political environment in which the resolution entered the Canadian military. This establishes that the political environment external to the CAF enabled a militarized interpretation of the resolution. This chapter uses the comparative method of within-case process-tracing (Beach 2017) to track the interpretation and implementation of UNSCR 1325 within the CAF. This process causally linked the CAF’s flawed interpretation of the resolution to the discourse necessitated by the warrior culture of the CAF and the militarized political environment that facilitated this culture. The process of implementing UNSCR 1325 in the CAF began in 2016 with the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) Directive for Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions into CAF Planning and Operations, which was designed explicitly to appeal to combat-facing military personnel, also known colloquially as “operators.”

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99 Recall from chapter 3 that Op HONOUR was released by the CDS in 2015 as a response to a Maclean’s expose (2014) that revealed the ubiquity of sexual misconduct in the CAF and the subsequent Deschamps Report (2015) which confirmed the existence of a toxic, sexualized gender culture within the Canadian military. Refer to Appendix C for further details.

100 The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is the most senior officer in the Canadian Armed Forces, who answers only to the Minister of National Defence, and the Prime Minister. The CDS Directive on 1325 (2016) was therefore the authoritative document to which all personnel beneath him were required to obey. The CDS at the time was General Jonathan Vance (2015-2021). To save space, I will heretofore refer to the document as the Directive on 1325.
This chapter examines a limited time frame from 2016 when the CDS Directive on UNSCR 1325 was released, until 2020, which is when the most recently available reporting on DND/CAF gender and diversity programming was published. I begin with a brief review of the shortcomings of Canada’s first National Action Plan, and how those shortcomings would impact the CDS Directive (2016), which remains the only Directive for implementing UNSCR 1325 in the CAF. I then illustrate how UNSCR 1325 was translated into the CDS Directive at the executive level; the process through which the resolution was interpreted and reshaped into a formal military order. I demonstrate how reshaping the Directive to fit CAF culture required two separate lines of effort – one concerned with implementing UNSCR 1325 on operations, and a secondary line of effort designed to implement the resolution within the institution. As I demonstrate, the CAF readily accepted UNSCR 1325 as a tool for enhancing the military’s operational capabilities but rejected any meaningful reform to its gender culture. In training sessions, the CDS Directive on 1325 was further militarized using operational efficacy discourse and examples, while trainers functionally divorced it from gender equality initiatives. I then illustrate how the CAF’s training centers have met the challenge of teaching UNSCR 1325 to military personnel, many of whom also struggled with an unresponsive audience and the burden of prioritizing gender sensitivity training within the existing curriculum. Finally, I use Lombardo, Meier and Verloo’s (2009) framework of “bending, stretching, shrinking and fixing” gender equality norms to summarize how gender equality norms within UNSCR 1325 have been distorted during the process of implementation in the CAF.

Canada’s First National Action Plan and the CDS Directive on 1325

Resolution UNSCR 1325 was introduced to the Canadian Armed Forces in 2016, when Canada’s Chief of Defence Staff (Jonathan Vance) approved a CAF-wide directive about the resolution based on Canada’s first National Action Plan (2010-2016). General Vance did not
approve a Directive on 1325 before 2016 for several reasons (See page 10), however the primary reason was Prime Minister Harper’s weak support for the resolution. Canada’s first National Action Plan (NAP) introduced by the Conservative Harper government in 2010 has been criticized for multiple issues introduced in chapter two. They are of key import to this chapter, because the current CDS Directive on UNSCR 1325 (2016) is based on the first NAP (2010-2016), not the current NAP (2017-2022). The accountability structure of the first NAP proved confusing to those tasked with its implementation (Inclusive Security 2014, 15-17). Canadian bureaucrats criticized the progress reports as “too long and difficult to read” delaying their public release, often for years (IBID, 16). Consequently, very few people within the Canadian government were able to “use the report to inform decision-making, and several were unsure as to the purpose of the report” (IBID, 16). Accordingly, the first CNAP could not be used as a mandate or operational guide to inform Canada’s policy direction; instead, bureaucrats saw its purpose more as of a statement of Canadian “philosophy” than an actionable tool (IBID, 19). As Woroniuk and

101 As discussed in previous chapters, Harper cared little for the “special interest politics” of the WPS agenda. Therefore, the first CNAP was something his government accepted grudgingly.
102 The DND/CAF also released Implementation Plans for the second CNAP (2017-2022), however the keystone document cited in these plans is the 2016 CDS Directive on 1325. The Implementation Plans were made publicly available in 2020 and it is unlikely that my interviewees would have been introduced to the draft plans prior to our discussions.
103 The first NAP was subject to a midterm review, which the Government of Canada contracted to Inclusive Security. It reviewed background documents (including Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights testimonies, annual DFATD progress reports, CNAP progress reports) conducted approximately 25 interviews with these stakeholders: the Canadian Mission to Afghanistan, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, the Department of National Defense, the Parliament of Canada, the Permanent Mission of Canada to the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Public Safety Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Status of Women Canada; and the results from a workshop it conducted with Women, Peace and Security Network Canada.
104 Woroniuk and Minnings (2014) comment that 2011-2012 progress report was not tabled in Parliament until January of 2014, and the 2012-2013 report followed in March of 2014, which made it nearly impossible for Civil-Society Organizations like the WPSN-C to hold the government accountable.
Minnings (2014, 2) remark, this outcome was a far cry from the press release announcing the CNAP in 2010:

[The CNAP] will guide the way Canada develops policy, how we select, train, and deploy Canadian personnel, and how we ensure they have the right knowledge and guidance for implementing Canadian policies effectively in the field,” said Minister Cannon. “It will steer Canada’s interventions abroad, so they encourage the participation of women and girls, promote their rights, and advance their equal access to humanitarian and development assistance.

Prime Minister Harper’s Foreign Minister Cannon’s proclamation revealed that the first CNAP was designed to steer departmental policy towards a robust interpretation of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda. But it ultimately lacked the accountability mechanisms necessary to achieve this goal (Inclusive Security 2014, 16).

The gaps in Canada’s first NAP allowed for significant discretion in how federal departments and agencies interpreted and implemented the WPS agenda. This created space for the DND-CAF to pursue the implementation of 1325 with complete control over its guiding narrative. Other than guidance provided by NATO, there was no overarching strategy or direction for the CAF to follow; nor a clear accountability structure by which the military could measure their progress. Accordingly, the department pursued the implementation of 1325 with what Ferree (2003) calls a “resonant frame” (305); i.e., a discursive frame designed to appeal to the pre-existing culture of the organization into which a policy is being introduced. The benefit of a resonant frame is that it is “expedient for the purposes of influencing policy, gaining public support, and forestalling countermovement attacks” (IBID, 306). As I demonstrate below, the discourse selected for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 was chosen for its ability to fit into the warrior culture of the CAF, which resonated both with the ideas of military personnel, and with the Harper government’s hawkish approach to security and defence policy.
The Harper (2006-2015) government is well-known in Canadian policy circles for its limited acceptance of gender analysis, and its vocal disdain for human security programming (see Bae and Diaz 2018, Hankivski and Mussel 2018, Tiessen and Carrier 2015, Tiessen and Swan 2018). Programs once designed to advance the human security agenda were renamed and refocused to prioritize “issues of democracy [particularly in Afghanistan], the rule of law around the world, and conflict prevention” (Bae and Diaz 2018, 68). Programs like the Pearson Peacekeeping Center (Ottawa), a non-profit organization focused on training military personnel for UN peacekeeping missions (and a key node in the global system of UN peacekeeping training from its founding in 1994) was forced to close its doors in 2013 when the Conservative government pulled its funding (Copeland 2013).105 Defunding these programs was in keeping with the “courageous warrior” nationalism of the Harper government, which frequently deployed fear rhetoric to suggest that the left’s measured (or soft) approach would imperil Canadians and pull Canadian foreign policy into the realm of moral relativism (Staring 2015, 19). Accordingly, a framework for the WPS agenda that built on the discourse of unequivocal, aggressive action and minimized the recondite feminist principles of UNSCR 1325 was more likely to resonate with CAF personnel, and more likely to garner support within the Conservative political environment of the day.

**UNSCR 1325 becomes a Force Multiplier: WPS at the Executive Level of DND/CAF**

It was within this tense environment of political militarism that Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Jonathan Vance introduced UNSCR 1325 to the CAF. The agenda was first implemented by order of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in the **CDS Directive for Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions into CAF Planning and Operations (March 2016)**. This Directive

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105 During this period, the Harper government also made aggressive cuts to women’s centres, many of which were forced to close (Brodie 2008).
was designed to implement Canada’s first National Action Plan (2010-2016) in the CAF. In accordance with the National Defence Act, any orders given to the CAF must be issued through a CDS Directive, “to give effect to the decisions and to carry out the directions of the Government of Canada or the Minister [of National Defence]” (JAG 2008, 1-14). Directives like the CDS Directive on UNSCR 1325 comprise the internal rules that govern the administration of the CAF. The CDS Directive on UNSCR 1325 represents an authoritative document intended to substantively shift all CAF policy towards the resolution as the CDS and Strategic Joint Staff Command (SJS) understand it. Therefore, the creation of the CDS Directive on 1325 was the first step the CAF made towards internalizing the WPS agenda. It remains the only CDS Directive on UNSCR 1325. Although the CAF recently released the “Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces Implementation of Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security” (2020), the keystone document for these implementation plans is the 2016 CDS Directive on 1325. Accordingly, examining how the Directive frames UNSCR 1325 using discourses of operational efficacy and gender equality is essential to learning how the WPS agenda was translated into a militarist interpretation for CAF personnel.

For this dissertation, the CDS Directive serves two functions. First, it is a written record of how senior personnel (military and civilian) in the CAF and DND interpreted UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda. Therefore, the text serves as a formal CAF endorsement of which pre-existing policies, practices and values are to be amplified when implementing UNSCR 1325, and which

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106 SJS is the subsidiary organization within the CAF tasked with providing strategic military analysis and advice to the CDS. Recall that in the military context, “strategic” refers to the highest level of command where the political vision of the government is realized.

107 Similarly, General Jonathan Vance released a 2019 Aide de Memoire on Integrating Gender Perspectives in Operations, however as the title suggests, the handbook focuses exclusively on gender in operations, rather than on the CAF’s internal gender culture. Once again, the Aide de Memoire cites the CDS Directive on UNSCR 1325 as a guiding document.
are to be minimized, or eliminated. Second, it serves the more practical function of providing guidance on how their understanding of the WPS agenda was to be communicated to military personnel. The directive is publicly available, but I will briefly describe its content here before exploring in greater detail how 1325 was understood based on subject matter expert (SME) interviews. Figure 1. illustrates how the CDS Directive was to be implemented within each of the CAF’s Level one (L1) organizations. An L1 Organization is an organization that reports direction to either the CDS or the Deputy Minister of Defence.

**Figure 1. CDS Directive and Level 1 Organizations**

The CDS Directive on 1325 is a forty-page document with ten sections: references, situation, mission, execution, tasks, coordinating instructions, key timings, training requirements, support (finance), and command. A references section in a military directive lists the items in the body of the directive itself; it also illustrates the epistemic communities from which the knowledge in the directive was drawn. These communities heavily favour NATO, with NATO-sponsored research, NATO Directives, and NATO-affiliates, like the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations in Sweden. The directive itself lists nine documents and I have included the issuing agency/organization in bold for clarity:

1. **United Nations**: UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2122 and 2242,

3. **NATO**: NATO Bi-Strategic Command (Bi-SC) Directive 40-1, Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure, August 2012

4. **NATO**: Revised NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Policy for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and related resolutions 1 April 2014

5. **Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)**\(^{108}\): Implementing UNSCR 1325 in Capacity-Building Missions: a study of NTM-Afghanistan, EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mali


7. **Status of Women Canada**: Implementation of GBA Plus (GBA Plus)

8. **NATO**: NATO Joint Advanced Distributed Learning (JADL) e-Learning Programme Management System


10. **Canadian Armed Forces**: CDS Op Order – Op HONOUR dated 14 August 2015

In addition to UNSCR 1325 and Canada’s (2010-2016) NAP, references include NATO’s guiding documents on 1325 (Bi-SC 2012 and the 2014 EAPC policy), the NATO Centre of Excellence for Gender in Military Operations (overseen by the Swedish military), and references from the Canadian military (collective training guidance and Op HONOUR). The *situation* section describes the task to which the CAF has been asked to respond i.e., UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions. It outlines the four key pillars of the “WPS initiative” (prevention, participation, protection and relief and recovery) and describes the security landscape and domestic political environment that produced the demand for a gendered approach to security provision. The directive highlights the first CNAP and mandates all CAF personnel to take Women and Gender Equality (WAGE) Canada GBA Plus training. GBA Plus training is part of the Canadian Government’s effort to ratify the Beijing Platform for Action (BPA) by providing governmental employees access to intersectional gender equality training. The online GBA Plus course is

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\(^{108}\) The Swedish Defence Research Agency, and the Nordic Center for Gender in Military (NCGM) are both administered by the Swedish military. The NCGM provides training for Canada’s Gender Advisors (GENAD), Gender Focal Points (GFP) and works closely with NATO, the UN, the European Union and the African Union to deliver training.
intended to provide participants with general knowledge about intersectional, gender-based analysis and is not tailored to the needs of any specific governmental department. The content and impact of GBA Plus training in the CAF will be examined on page 18 below. Finally, the Directive provides insight from recent NATO studies on the importance of gender-based analysis to operational efficacy and describes how the directive is to be executed through detailing key tasks for each L1 organization in the CAF.

The CDS Directive on UNSCR 1325 was envisaged hierarchically; meaning that it was issued at the level of strategy and then was expected to cascade down through the sub-organizations of the CAF i.e., Level 1 (L1) organizations. But throughout the cascading process, the Directive underwent iterative rounds of reinterpretation in accordance with the culture of the L1 organization into which it was being introduced. As will be shown below, the framing of UNSCR 1325 as an operational priority began at the highest levels of the CAF as the Directive was intentionally introduced to the CDS through the discourse of operational efficacy. This discourse then amplified elements of the WPS agenda that coincided with the existing gender culture and priorities of the CAF. Simultaneously, the discourse of operational efficacy emphasizes an external orientation on conflict-affected countries, even though intent of the UNSCR 1325 is to transform domestic gender relations as well. This limited the degree to which UNSCR 1325 could be tied either to efforts to eliminate sexual misconduct in the CAF, or to pre-existing CAF Employment Equity Act programs. In the CAF’s interpretation, UNSCR 1325 is framed as something that the CAF can “do” during military operations, rather than a resolution that calls for an internal transformation of CAF culture. This interpretation may ultimately lead to the CAF coopting the legitimacy and resources of the WPS agenda in service of combat operations that

109 An L1 Organization is an organization that reports direction to either the CDS or the Deputy Minister of Defence.
conflict with the content of UNSCR 1325. In the next section, I will expand on this argument
drawing from interviews conducted with personnel within the DND-CAF from 2018-2020.

**Selling UNSCR 1325 to the Canadian Armed Forces**

My interviews began with LCol. (Ret’d) Kimberley Unterganschnigg, who advocated for
the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the CAF in 2015 when she led the Directorate of
Peacekeeping Policy in the DND-CAF. Unterganschnigg was the first person within DND-CAF
who clearly articulated the importance of the WPS agenda to the Chief of Defence Staff Jonathan
Vance. She told me that she, “took advantage of the renewed interest in gender culture, the
beginning of discussions with GAC on a new CNAP, and new work on UNSCR 1325 in NATO
to advise the CDS on the opportunities for the CAF to add to its operational effectiveness” (Tait
Interview with Unterganschnigg 2018). Unterganschnigg emphasized that the “gender culture” of
the military had recently been admonished by civilian political authorities in the External Review
Authority Report (also known as the Deschamps Report) in 2015, which emphasized the
“sexualized culture” of the CAF. (ERA 2015). Unterganschnigg used this opening to encourage
Vance to enact a Forces-wide order that would ensure the implementation of 1325. Unterganschnigg emphasized that although initiating a new CDS Directive was challenging, she
found she had the “tools, the resources, and much more important[ly], I had the top cover necessary
to get it done” (Ibid). By “top cover” Unterganschnigg means support from the CDS and within
highest levels of the CAF.

In addition to her resources, there were additional techniques that Unterganschnigg used to
ensure that 1325 would become a top priority in the CAF. First, she was able to achieve traction

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110 This Directorate operates under what is known as “ADM-Pol”, which is the Office of the Assistant
Deputy Minister, Policy. This Office reports to the Senior Associate Deputy Minister, and then to the
Minister of National Defence (Rather than under the CAF, and therefore, the CDS).
within the CAF by emphasizing Canada’s commitment to the resolution, through both the NAP and Canada’s obligation to uphold NATO’s gender mainstreaming efforts.111 As I illustrate in chapter 5, CAF personnel express a high degree of confidence in NATO as an organization. Thus, emphasizing that NATO is implementing the resolution can help to win over a military audience (Hardt and von Hlatky 2020). Moreover, Unterganschnigg noted that in 2016 there was a “new generation of senior people who had experienced Afghanistan; had experienced non-traditional activities. A lot of them had been through Bosnia, and Afghanistan and…. they’d seen a lot of gender violence” (IBID). Military personnel learned first-hand about the complexity of humanitarian catastrophes during deployment to peacekeeping and combat missions in the wars in Bosnia and Afghanistan. Further, female infantry soldiers were deployed to both Bosnia and Afghanistan, so there could be little doubt amongst CAF soldiers that women could effectively serve in combat-facing environments. Contrary to what many male soldiers had anticipated, female soldiers did not struggle with the inhospitable terrain of Afghanistan, nor did Afghanistan’s conservative religious norms prevent women from engaging with the local population (Tait 2015). To the contrary, women were able to thrive in a combat environment, and their presence allowed NATO forces to liaise with Afghan women and children, who were not permitted to speak with male NATO personnel (IBID).

For the 15th anniversary of UNSCR 1325, Unterganschnigg prepared a briefing note, calling attention to both the anniversary and Canada’s first NAP (2010-2016) (Anonymous 2. 2018. Interview with V. Tait).112 Unterganschnigg was successful, and Vance ordered the Strategic

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112 A briefing note is a short document that contains key information to enhance senior military leaders’ decision-making ability and to update or inform commanding officers about situational intelligence they otherwise would not have time to gather.
Joint Staff (SJS) to draft a CDS Directive on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 within the CAF. SJS is the subsidiary organization within the CAF tasked with providing strategic military analysis and advice to the CDS. Recall that in the military context, “strategic” refers to the highest level of command where the political vision of the government is realized. As illustrated above, the Directive on 1325 provided both direction and a timeline for the integration of gender-based perspectives in all CAF operations and plans (IBID). This directive would then be adapted to each of the Force Generating and Force Employing organizations that operated under the command of the CDS, also known as L1 organizations. The adaption meant that organizations like the Army, Airforce and Navy would each have to craft a specific plan for the implementation of the CDS Directive. Accordingly, SJS convened strategic operational planning groups, which bring together representatives from all Force Employers to inform them that a new directive was coming, its objective, and what new personnel positions would be created (Anonymous 2. Interview with V. Tait. 2018). Capt. (N) Matthew Bowen was the lead organizer and author of the CDS Directive; he generously provided an interview for this dissertation which addresses how and why the Directive was framed. Capt. (N) Bowen’s interview will be examined below.

The CDS Directive: Advancing Gender Equality or Operational Efficacy?

The CDS Directive was designed to advance gender equality within the CAF and to enhance operational efficacy on deployment, and as such, it contains both a rights-based discourse

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113 SJS is the subsidiary organization within the CAF tasked with providing strategic military analysis and advice to the CDS. Recall that in the military context, “strategic” refers to the highest level of command where the political vision of the government is realized.

114 see Appendix A pg. 46 of this chapter; note that SJS functions to advise the CDS rather than employ or generate soldiers, sailors and aviators.

115 Capt. (N) means the rank of Captain in the Navy, which is a higher rank than Captain in the Army and Airforce. A Captain in the Navy is the equivalent of a full Colonel in either the Army or the Navy and is therefore the most senior rank a sailor can attain before entering General/Flag Officer ranks. See Appendix C for more details on CAF rank structure.
of gender equality, and an instrumentalist discourse of operational efficacy. However, Capt. (N) Bowen did not believe that both goals would necessarily progress simultaneously. This section examines the creation of the CDS Directive with insights provided by Capt. (N) Bowen and Ms. Unterganschnigg and several high-level anonymous interviews. I also discuss the various L1 Directives generated by the organizations under the command of the CDS, and the challenges that my interview participants encountered when trying to draft these documents.

In its summary of the WPS Agenda, the Directive frames 1325 predominantly as an effort to address gendered inequalities in conflict, specifically the differential impact of conflict on “men, women, girls and boys” and is focused externally on “peace operations, fragile states and conflict-affected situations” (CDS 2-3). Therefore, the Directive begins by framing the WPS Agenda as an effort external to Canada and concentrated on conflict zones. The Directive makes a clear appeal to the logic of operational efficacy by stating that its purpose is first to “initially improve its ability to deliver operational effect” (IBID). However, it goes on to state that as the “initiative is introduced into wider CAF policy and procedures [it will] increase institutional excellence” (IBID, 12). The Directive also acknowledges the importance of enhancing women’s participation in “peace operations as soldiers, police and civilian representatives” (CDS, 2-3). It references the Beijing Platform for Action in its introduction to GBA Plus, which draws on a rights-based framework of gender equality. Ultimately, the scope of the Directive is defined under “concept of operations” which presents two “Lines of Effort” (LoEs) i.e. two channels for the implementation of UNSCR 1325:

a. LoE 1: Operational Effects. The incorporation of GBA Plus into military planning and operations, including related education and training. An essential element of this LoE is analysing, clarifying, and issuing legal and policy guidance related to
[sexual and gender-based violence] SGBV, [sexual exploitation and abuse] SEA, and protection of civilians to support future operations. Such guidance should also be incorporated into Theater and standing Rules of Engagement (RoE), as well as medical RoE considerations; and

b. LoE 2: Institutional Effects. The embedding of the requirements of UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions into the CAF approach to command and control, leadership, and management, including but not limited to education, training, policy, programs, materiel acquisition and infrastructure.

The first LoE is an operational channel, which required that persons responsible for mission planning and execution consider gender perspectives; this channel was prioritized by the Directive’s authors, as I demonstrate below. This means that when the CAF deploys on operations, for example, disaster assistance during flooding in Manitoba (domestic), or combat operations in Afghanistan (expeditionary), it must consider gender perspectives. The second LoE is the institutional channel, which emphasizes that UNSCR 1325 should also be implemented within the CAF to ensure gender perspectives are also considered for Canadian servicewomen. To help execute this goal, the Directive referenced Op HONOUR, the controversial CAF program to eliminate sexual misconduct within the Canadian military. Von Hlatky (2019) provides a chart to illustrate the difference between internal and external foci, to which I have added the Directive’s LoEs and Mackay’s (2004) numeric/substantive distinction on the representation of women for further clarification.
Table 3. Internal and External Dimensions of Military Culture (Von Hlatky 2019, 76).

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<td>Percentage of women deployed in military operations</td>
<td>Recruitment campaign aimed to increase the proportion of female service members</td>
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<td>Gender Mainstreaming [Symbolic]</td>
<td>Integration of the gender perspective in operations</td>
<td>Integration of gender-based analysis as part of personnel training</td>
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These examples do not square perfectly with the two forms of discourse that I examine in this dissertation. For example, a recruitment campaign aimed at women may not serve to advance gender equality; it may instead serve the needs of the organization at the expense of women targeted by the initiative. Nevertheless, this chart captures the internal/external dynamics of the LoEs in the CDS Directive.

When I questioned why Capt. (N) Bowen included an institutional LoE that included Op HONOUR, he responded that Op HONOUR was an important aspect of addressing sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). He further maintained that “we [in the Strategic Joint Staff] drew the linkage to Op HONOUR, which said this [sexual assault] is unacceptable, and it’s unacceptable in Canada, it’s unacceptable when you deploy, so start learning what the rules are here” (Bowen, Interview with V. Tait 2018). Therefore, he understood there to be a clear connection between the CAF’s institutional culture and its ability to implement gender perspectives on operations. I asked for further clarification, as several of my other participants had insisted that Op HONOUR has “nothing to do with 1325”, to which he responded:

My personal focus as I learned more about this topic and tried to draft this directive was to separate things – thus the two lines of effort in the directive – to separate out things like diversity, employment equity, gender balancing, things like that, from operational effects on deployments.
As this passage demonstrates, Capt. (N) Bowen recognized that UNSCR 1325 did indeed require the CAF transform its gender culture, however he also recognized that a gender equality framework would not resonate with CAF personnel. When he first began drafting the Directive, Capt. (N) Bowen recalled that,

> When I convened my first meeting about this directive, I sent it out to all the CAF L1s and I said, OK here’s the deal. We’re going to put together this directive to deal with UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions and tie it in with the NAP, to deal with the topic of WPS… Then I showed up at my meeting and every single person around the table except for me was female. And to me that was an immediate demonstration of how, when I sent this email out and it was read by whomever, male or female – there were a variety of recipients – it was immediately interpreted as a “oh well here we go, this is another gender relations thing, this is another “we need more women in the armed forces. OK so let’s get our equality or adversity advisor off to the meeting.” …

Capt. (N) Bowen emphasizes here that once he shared with the Directive with CAF personnel, he faced a challenge in getting military personnel to understand the concept he was trying to advance. Although the Directive is intended to pursue both an institutional and operational line of implementation, personnel saw “Women, Peace and Security” and assumed that it was just “another woman thing” and therefore “just” about the CAF’s internal gender equality programming. To correct for this misinterpretation, Capt. (N) Bowen rethought his approach to the Directive:

> I knew I couldn’t ignore the diversity, equality, and all those aspects, but what I wanted to do was at least separate them initially so that when this directive went out, when it went out to all the environments and those conducting operations, they understood that there was an immediate operational impact to this… And it was interesting, again in my opinion, I got a lot more buy-in when I linked it to operations and making the CAF better at operations. (Bowen, Matthew. 2018. Interview with V. Tait).

This explanation is significant because it illustrates that among CAF personnel at the command level of L1 organizations, a policy that concerned women was immediately seen through the lens of past initiatives on gender equality. Accordingly, they did not read the directive deeply enough to understand that Capt. (N) Bowen was also emphasizing the operational effects of UNSCR
However, once Capt. (N) Bowen emphasized the operational element of the resolution, he achieved far greater buy-in from other L1s. Although Capt. (N) Bowen recognized that there were institutional implications within 1325, he also realized that to achieve full buy-in from the CAF, he had to activate operational efficacy discourses and link in CAF personnel responsible for planning and operations.

While the emphasis that the CDS Directive placed on operations was in deference to the institutional norms of the CAF, Capt. (N) Bowen hoped that this Directive might still be a vehicle for meaningful change within the culture of the CAF. About pursuing an operational approach, Capt. (N) Bowen stated:

…this is how I wanted to point this out to operators, and if you can get the operators to accept that this is something that they need to incorporate into their thinking and incorporate into the doctrine and guidance for how the CAF writ large prepares for operations, over time, as these operators move up in rank and cease to become operators and then become planners – and then they even go further up to the strategic level – this all gets inculcated into the culture. (IBID).

As this demonstrates, to get CAF personnel to take the Directive on UNSCR 1325 seriously, Capt. (N) Bowen had to win over operators. An anonymous participant affirmed that the operational framing was indeed intended to “achieve institutional buy-in.” He anticipated that: “there might be some resistance to this directive, [SJS] didn’t necessarily have specific information that there would be resistance, but [SJS] anticipated there might be …so if you mainstream into ops and plans, you’re going to associate this initiative with the heart of the military….it was to achieve

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116 As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, CAF antipathy towards the gender equality discursive can be traced back to the Royal Commission on the Status of Women (1969) and the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal decision (1989), which ordered the CAF to integrate women into all occupations. Gender equality discourse was used to justify gender integration during this period (1969 – 1989) but waned significantly following the CHRT decision, as the CAF sought to eliminate the salience of gender identity in personnel decisions.

117 These staff positions are divided into NATO’s “J Structure” so they would be referred to the J3 (operational organization) and the J5 (planning organization).
institutional buy-in” (ANON2). Therefore, in relying on the operational efficacy discourses, planners in SJS intended to initiate a snowball effect. To their minds, the two Lines of Effort contained in the directive would be complementary; institutional change would be driven by the introduction of gendered perspectives in the operational planning process. However, by dividing UNSCR 1325 into separate operational and institutional LoEs, it became possible to bypass internal gender equality priorities entirely, and frame UNSCR 1325 as wholly operational project. As will be examined below, emphasis on the first LoE (Operational) could never have snowballed into the second LoE (Institutional) as the gender culture of the CAF forced GENADs to diminish—or eliminate—the second institutional LoE from their briefings. In other words, the second LoE was destined to fail.

Implementation: Professional Military Education and UNSCR 1325

In addition to the CDS Directive, CAF personnel are also expected to receive gender sensitivity training through their professional military education. While the CAF claims that military personnel receive regular training on the WPS agenda throughout their career, training efforts are far more piecemeal. It is very important to realize that there are no standardized curricula from which CAF trainers can draw, no centralized online repository where approved material is stored, and no bespoke Canadian course teaching a standardized interpretation of 1325 or related resolutions to the military’s Gender Advisors (GENADS). Consequently, as LCol (Ret’d) Reiffenstein in an interview with author (2018) maintained:

some very questionable people with some very questionable expertise [are] going out internationally and representing Canada and talking about Gender, Peace, and Security…. writing their own [material]. Reiffenstein continued: “you want people vetting that…that’s one of my big issues with how the education is being delivered: it’s ad hoc, it’s all over the place and it’s not conforming to any sort of national or organizational standard…”
Reiffenstein is correct; although there has been promise of a Canadian course on WPS, the CAF still relies on the Swedish Armed Force’s Nordic Center for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM) to train all its GENADs (Canada 2021). Other personnel receive WPS instruction only as part of pre-deployment training, and even then, only when it is deemed that their assigned task requires that they understand the WPS Agenda.\footnote{This is referred to as Theatre Specific Mission Training (TSMT).} Moreover, all training courses that the CDS Directive requires personnel to attend are provided by NATO, “until such a time as CAF-specific training can be developed and incorporated into military education processes” (CDS Directive 2016, 5). As of 2022, CAF-specific GENAD training has yet to be implemented, and the most recent DND/CAF Progress Report on the implementation of the CNAP highlights that “challenges do persist in terms of amount of GENADS/GFPs trained, due to the reliance of foreign training establishments providing these trainings…Due to limited number of national seats available at the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations, several of our forces deployed without the complete training package” (Canada 2021, 4). As the following discussion reveals, this piecemeal approach creates space for significant discretion in how 1325 is being interpreted and delivered to senior military officers: often it allows the priorities of the CAF to supersede those of the WPS agenda.

The challenges of implementing the current interpretation of WPS are evident within the Professional Military Education (PME) system in the CAF. The Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) leads is composed of the military staff colleges where senior leaders are trained in Canada i.e., the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC), Royal Military College Saint-Jean (RMC Saint-Jean), the Canadian Forces College (CFC), and the Chief Warrant Officer Robert Osside Profession of Arms Institute. This is the domestic system through which CAF personnel are taught
about issues related to WPS generally, and USNCR 1325 specifically. While there are numerous
courses that junior officers and NCMs are required to take to progress to higher ranks, several
important courses are offered at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. They prepare senior
officers to operate within the modern security environment through in-person and correspondence
training courses staffed both by civilian academics and select military personnel with graduate-
level education and a history of exemplary service. The courses teach Officers (and select public
servants as with the National Security Program), about trends in defence, policy interpretation,
operations planning and command of the CAF. While the curricula of these courses are designed
by the academic and military staff, they ultimately are approved by the Commander of the
Canadian Defence Academy. To understand how soldiers receive course material on 1325 I spoke
with several professors working at the Canadian Defence Academy.

Dr. Alan Okros is a significant figure in CAF training, particularly about gender and
diversity issues. Currently the Deputy Director of Research at the Dallaire Center of Excellence
for Peace and Security within the Canadian Defence Academy, he served as a Naval Officer from
1971 to 2004. Dr. Okros was appointed Officer of the Order of Military Merit in 1997 and led the
teams responsible for producing the CAF’s current doctrine manuals: Duty with Honour: The
Profession of Arms in Canada; and Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine, and Leadership
in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations. During this period, he worked at the Canadian
Forces College both as a Full Professor and as a college administrator. He is widely considered
one of Canada’s most authoritative sources on leadership and diversity in the CAF and frequently
testifies before Canadian Parliament. He offered several comments in 2018 that confirm that the
operational efficacy discursive opportunity structure has pushed the CAF’s interpretation of 1325
away from the original intent of the WPS agenda.
In his interview with the author (2018), Dr. Okros confirmed that within both NATO and the CAF, WPS remains under-theorized both intellectually and on the ground, and heavily slanted towards a militarist interpretation. Dr Okros contends that “one of the challenges that we’ve got with the NATO approach is that we’re using gender as a weapon of war” not as a variable of analysis. Regarding UN protocols, Okros (2018) emphasized that:

> If you’re going to go in and you’re going to use gender for intelligence gathering, COIN [Counter-Insurgency Operations], IA [Influence Activities], then you’re not involved at all in peace negotiations…. you can’t do that philosophically and I think even legally, but at least philosophically and morally. [But], I don’t see NATO as having differentiated it in that way…. because the minute you start collecting intelligence it’s very easy to be seen that you’re favoring one side or the other and you’re maneuvering the circumstances.

As Okros highlights, the WPS agenda currently being used to achieve militarist goals means that it deviates from the intent of the resolution, and in some instances, may violate UN peace agreements and accepted codes of conduct by engaging in intelligence gathering. Moreover, his commentary highlights Canada’s reliance on NATO training on WPS; which is overtly militarized and unconcerned with the UN’s acceptable peacekeeping practices.

LCol (Ret’d) Anne Reiffenstein, who also teaches and develops curricula at the CFC, shared similar conclusions during our interview in 2018, though with a different perspective on the utility of the NATO approach. One of the first three Canadian women to graduate as an artillery officer, she served for 28 years as an Army Officer (Reiffenstein, Anne. 2018. Interview with V. Tait, 2018). She comments that when developing course material, she works “quite extensively with the material from the Center of Excellence for Gender in Operations, … the NATO center of excellence [in Sweden] …. [which] speaks to the operational and tactical levels much better than policy does.” Reiffenstein (2018) also remarked:
NATO has a look and feel and shape to it that we are comfortable and familiar with, and that we understand as western nations, the UN peacekeeping operations don’t have that same look and feel. That’s not a judgement call in saying good, bad … it’s just a matter of saying they’re different and when you’re trying to draw materials, information, and examples you want to use the NATO examples because they’ll resonate more with people: they’ll say, ‘if NATO is doing it then we should buy into it.’ As opposed to ‘the UN is doing it’… that’s not as automatic a buy-in.

Therefore, in her considerable teaching and military experience, LCol (ret’d) Reiffenstein achieved greater buy in when she used NATO experiences and course materials. She summarized the core message of 1325 as “taking the gender perspective and understanding operational effects, the operational requirement, it makes us more effective” (IBID). In our discussion, the operational effects LCol. Reiffenstein (2018) referenced populations in vulnerable places like Afghanistan and Bosnia, which she emphasizes in this quote: “What this [WPS training] does, is reaffirm what we already know…. what we already saw.” She continues that: “We just didn’t classify it as a WPS agenda issue… we knew we wanted to engage with the population, and these are points where we could really engage with the population and make a difference.” Reiffenstein (2018) concludes that: “It changes the narrative on WPS from ‘we suck at this, we’ve been doing very badly, were not good at what we do – to – here’s something that will correct that. Although she was working within the accepted parameters of the WPS agenda, e.g., regarding the provision of specialized assistance to people in conflict zones, Reiffenstein’s approach still deferred to the existing knowledge and practices of the CAF. Despite that, she still faced resistance to her interpretation. I asked her if she got the sense that her “colleagues, superiors, and subordinates share [her] view”? She responded:
Military people are not comfortable singling out women as requiring something special, and I honestly believe that it is because we’ve fostered an idea of gender neutrality that is really taken us to a point now where with that gender neutrality, we don’t want to have anything that smacks of distinguishing men and women bringing different strengths and weaknesses to the table.... You have a whole bunch of women from my generation, and me as well, who have fought for that gender neutrality, and we view that as the big win. And so, to back off on that, to say **yah ok.... we can turn the lens on other populations but when we turn that same lens on ourselves it’s not a comfortable one.... The difficulty with 1325 is that it applies both internally and externally. Externally.... it’s the easier sell than internally. But the difficulty is, can you really do the external without the internal?**

Consequently, LCol. (Ret’d) Reiffenstein understood the demands of 1325 in a way that closely corresponded to the original intent of the resolution discussed in Chapter 1, but she struggled to achieve buy-in when teaching it as both an internal and external priority.

Several academic experts I interviewed within the Professional Military Education (PME) system had never received formal guidance on how – or even if – to teach WPS. Their knowledge about the resolution stemmed from their own interest in the topic. This reveals the limited reach of the CDS Directive and calls into question the existence of even the most minimal WPS training prior to deployment. I asked the Director of the Intermediate Learning Program at the Osside Profession of Arms Institute in St. Jean (Quebec) if her job required her to engage with UNSCR 1325. She responded,

> We don’t teach it... my staff don’t have any special training or knowledge on 1325 other than they’ve had to go out themselves and do the homework because it comes up organically in conversation. It is almost like it’s just a piece that we know that’s there. It’s one that we know is there for the protection of women and children, and then it’s just like *snap* 1325

In this case, the Director was eager to learn more about the agenda and had pursued WPS education in their free time but had no mandate to teach it in their classroom.

Professor Robert Lummack, also teaching at the Osside Institute, found minimal opportunity to teach the agenda, despite his own extensive research on Women, Peace, and
Security in Canada. He stated that UNSCR 1325 is “mentioned as one of the teaching points for two different courses…However, the curriculum is generally a lot wider and broader than what we can deliver. So, many of the teaching points remain dormant or not fully covered” (Lummack, Interview with V. Tait 2018). Within the program in which Lummack teaches, which is ten weeks of online learning and three weeks of in-person learning, he was able to devote approximately 45 minutes to teaching military personnel about the WPS agenda.

While Lummack (2018) attempted to provide his military students with an education on WPS, it was difficult to cover all relevant information in the short time provided. He also received implicit resistance while he was developing teaching material for 1325. He stated that, while trying to develop the course material, he found that: “there’s resistance, maybe not really to the content, but just like OK we already have a huge schedule that’s filled to the brim, where are you going to put this in? What are we taking out?” He continued: “there’s that resistance, but then also, you know there’s some apprehension as to how the candidates are going to receive this. It [WPS] is very controversial, and I had to have multiple conversations to explain why it’s important.” Nonetheless, he concludes that: “In the end I think that everyone has kind of come around to it…. when the CDS directive [on WPS] came out, it became a lot easier in the sense of convincing people because there’s this huge institutional, high-level effort going on.” This emphasizes that the CDS Directive did push military bureaucracy to embrace new course material, which demonstrates the importance of buy-in by senior leaders. However, it also illustrates that when the WPS agenda is forced to compete with the rest of the military agenda, it often becomes an afterthought rather than a priority. In this instance, Professor Lummack – like LCol (Ret’d) Reiffenstein – has a full understanding of the internal and external implications of UNSCR 1325,
and but faced difficulty in transferring that knowledge to his students due to the time constraints imposed by the military’s pre-existing agenda.

**GBA Plus and Op HONOUR: Gender Equality Policy as Contaminating UNSCR 1325**

Though the CDS Directive referenced both GBA Plus and Op HONOUR, these programs are controversial within the CAF. Accordingly, persons tasked with implementing UNSCR 1325 in the CAF chose to divide GBA Plus and Op HONOUR out of the Directive when communicating its content to military personnel. Amidst the rapid roll-out of all three programs within the same year, many CAF personnel viewed Op HONOUR, GBA Plus as synonymous with the CDS Directive. As will be argued below, the persons tasked with creating and implementing the CDS Directive saw a risk in “confusing” CAF personnel over what the CDS Directive was about, or worse contaminating the new directive through association with two unpopular gender integration initiatives. The following section illustrates how CAF personnel navigated the discursive minefield of introducing the CDS Directive amidst backlash to GBA Plus and Op HONOUR.

In drafting the Directive, Capt. (N) Bowen was assisted by Vaughn Charleton, then the manager of the GBA Plus unit at Status of Women Canada. In a 2018 interview, Charleton told me that she advised SJS personnel to take a “made in Canada” approach to the CDS Directive, i.e., to use the Government of Canada’s GBA Plus program to provide concrete processes and examples, rather than imprecise “gender mainstreaming” language, which she considered too vague to provide clear guidance to the CAF (Charleton, Interview with V. Tait, 2018). With Charleton’s assistance, Capt. (N) Bowen was able to write a Directive that resonated with the CAF’s prioritization of military planning and operations, but which introduced a potential driver for further institutional reform through existing GBA Plus programming. Although Cpt. (N) Bowen reported that he did not receive explicit rejection or push back against his inclusion of GBA
Plus and Op HONOUR, he did receive what Lombardo and Mergaert (2013) call *implicit resistance*. Some of his peers and subordinate staff during the meeting had claimed that the CAF “already does that” in reference to gender mainstreaming, or that it was “going to take forever” to apply GBA Plus to all their polices. The inclusion of GBA Plus in the CDS Directive on UNSCR 1325 was therefore not accepted outright; the agenda had to be shaped to speak directly to CAF operational priorities provide an incentive for the organization to take its content seriously.

The CDS Directive on 1325 mandated that all CAF personnel take online GBA Plus training. GBA Plus is a program administered by the Women and Gender Equality (WAGE) Department, formerly Status of Women Canada (SWC). It takes an intersectional approach to gender mainstreaming and was designed to encourage federal employees to avoid discriminatory policy outcomes. GBA Plus training has been mandated throughout the CAF since 2016 and is administered through an online course designed to take two hours (Johnstone and Momani 2019a, 3). In the news release announcing mandatory GBA Plus training, former CDS General Jonathan Vance stated:

> The CAF is constantly evolving, learning from past operations, and adapting to changes in the security environment. These efforts will enhance the way we operate. When you think about military operations—*tanks moving, aircraft flying, shooting at targets*—these operations may change in quality or characteristic when we formally account for gender perspectives and issues related to vulnerable populations at the outset. It’s an important part of real military planning that will help make the CAF a more effective institution” (Canada 2017, Online).

Note that in this excerpt, GBA Plus is framed as an analytical competency that can be added to the existing skill set of any CAF member to enhance operational efficacy. General Vance emphasized that this would allow those within the CAF to *excel at what they are already doing in operations*, which is a particularly acute distortion of gender equality when one looks at the operations he
references. Using gender perspectives to account for changes in “tanks moving, aircraft flying and shooting at targets” is not a faithful translation of UNSCR 1325.

Johnstone and Momani’s 2019 study on the implementation of GBA Plus within the CAF and DND emphasizes the challenges in implementing GBA Plus within a military environment. In October 2018, they conducted four focus groups composed of 28 civilian and military members of the DND/CAF. Participants reported that “culture change in DND/CAF is necessary for the successful implementation of GBA Plus, an approach which itself is attempting to institute such a change, but that such a change faces serious resistance because “leaders are not always on board and can just pay lip service to GBA Plus” (Johnstone and Momani, 2018, 512). A CAF participant noted that: “The GBA Plus course is fluffy. The way it is packaged is not applicable to the military. My troops think it’s about op-honour, transgender bathrooms, lady issues, breastfeeding rooms, that time of the month…” (Ibid). Other DND/CAF personnel described GBA Plus as: “too ‘esoteric’, ‘blurry’, and ‘overly focused on political correctness’” (Ibid). Alarmingly, all these participants were selected to be military Gender Focal Points, who are being trained to assist GENADs. It is unclear how GENADs will be able to rely on these personnel to provide regular updates on matters of importance to the WPS agenda given these flawed, and occasionally hostile perceptions of the merit of gender-based research and policymaking.

There is a danger in relying on GBA Plus as a metric by which to judge the general preparedness of CAF personnel to understand intersectionality. Both the discussions with expert participants outlined above, and my interviews with soldiers, sailors and aviators outlined in the following chapter, illustrate that GBA Plus is a subject of considerable skepticism amongst CAF personnel. These concerns are shared amongst feminist academics, for whom GBA Plus is an insufficient program for implementing intersectionality in policy. In an article examining GBA
Plus in Canada, Hankivsky and Mussell (2018) contend that the pre-existing “practices, structures and, and existing polices” of GBA prior to the addition of the “Plus” in 2017 have intersectionality difficult to achieve (304). In their analysis of Canada’s use of GBA Plus programming, they reveal that it is erroneously understood as an additive factor, which results in confusion about how GBA Plus ought to be “viewed, used and assessed” (304). The challenge of introducing gender and diversity into policymaking in the Canadian context is further complicated as recent internal DND/CAF reporting (DTMP 2020, vi) indicates that key stakeholders entrusted with functionally implementing GBA Plus stated that:

roles and responsibilities are not well defined or clearly communicated to them and to other organizations within the DND and the CAF. The lack of clarity with respect to roles and responsibilities has resulted in diluted accountabilities. Functional stakeholders indicated that they do not understand how other DND and CAF stakeholders’ mandates support or complement diversity and inclusion. As such, duplication of effort exists among functional stakeholders, including with other NDD and CAF organizations and stakeholders. In addition, key informants identified a lack of clarity in the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders and their relationships, and a lack of knowledge related to the objectives and outcomes for diversity and inclusion as well as around the activities and initiatives to further these objectives and outcomes.

As this excerpt illustrates, cultural rejection of GBA Plus is not the only challenge to the program. There are significant institutional, structural barriers to the implementation of GBA Plus, which further imperils the institutional LoE of the CDS Directive on 1325. The challenges that military experts faced in translating UNSCR 1325 into a military context continues to be felt in related initiatives like GBA Plus.

**Op HONOUR**

Although Capt. (N) Bowen decided to include Op HONOUR as a reference in the CDS Directive, the Directive did not provide any further guidance for how Op HONOUR would complement the CAF’s efforts to implement UNSCR 1325. His inclusion of Op HONOUR contradicted by the interpretation of UNSCR 1325 provided by other experts interviewed for this
dissertation, who suggested UNSCR applied only in conflict zones. When I asked Unterganschnigg if she had received any backlash concerning her interpretation of the resolution, she responded that she had no issues with her understanding of the resolution or its implementation in the CAF. The then-current CDS, General Jonathan Vance, accepted her new initiative and offered no resistance to her interpretation. I asked her if there were “ways in which [she] made it a little bit easier to achieve that buy in... [if there were] different rhetorical tools, or things ...[she]really liked to emphasize or deemphasize?” (IBID). She responded that she was:

...very clear to distinguish between our efforts to increase the number of women in the CAF, Op HONOUR and 1325. OK? I would say GBA Plus is a tool for increasing the number of women, because you’re looking at all your HR policies from a GBA Plus perspective, right? But GBA Plus is a tool. An analytical competency. Op HONOUR is about the culture stuff, and 1325 is about how we do our business. Externally. Right? And so, once you make those distinctions then people, people get off whatever defensiveness they were having. That was the first thing. The second thing is, the UN has lots of great training tools, and they had some concrete examples, so by using concrete examples either from the UN or from my experience… [these were both] tremendous for buy-in. (IBID).

As this illustrates, divorcing Op HONOUR from 1325 was a key step in achieving institutional acceptance of UNSCR 1325.

After its appearance in the reference section of the CDS Directive, Op HONOUR is not mentioned again in the 40-page directive and no explanation is offered for its inclusion. Although, the CDS Directive provided guidance for the implementation of GBA Plus training, it provided no guidance about the connection between Op HONOUR and the CAF’s implementation of 1325. Accordingly, the absence of Op HONOUR was evident in nearly all publicly available subsidiary Directives issued by the L1 organizations under the authority of the Chief of Defence Staff.

119 For a description of L1 organizations, and an organizational chart illustrating how they relate to each other, please refer to Appendix A.
120 These organizations are Military Personnel Command, Canadian Special Operations Command, Canadian Joint Operations Command and Canadian Forces Intelligence Command.
These L1s framed GBA Plus training variously; Special Operations Forces saw GBA Plus as a “means of improving operational effectiveness” (CANSOFCOM 2017), Intelligence Command also saw GBA Plus as a way to “enhance operational effectiveness” (CFINTCOM 2017). However, amidst these references, Op HONOUR was completely omitted from these texts.

The only L1 Directive that mentioned Op HONOUR was the Canadian Army (CA) Directive – *Integrating Human Rights Considerations into Operational Planning and Policy Development (2016)*. The Army Directive also included the *Canadian Human Rights Act (1985)* in its references, but not referenced in the original CDS Directive. Further inspection shows that the term “human rights” was used in place of “gender” or “women” in the Army Directive which suggests that this may have been a way to water-down the original gender objectives of the CDS Directive, rather than expand on them. In its opening paragraph, e.g., it states that “This document is the CA’s initial direction on how the Army will integrate all human rights considerations into operational planning, training and policy development” (Canadian Army 2016, 2) rather than detailing the four pillars of UNSCR 1325, as the CDS Directive did. The Army directive later repeats that: “ultimately the consideration of human rights must become second nature throughout the Army, which will augment our operational effectiveness and credibility.” Therefore, within this framing, “human rights” is used to dilute the CDS Directive’s emphasis on gender while simultaneously suggesting that human rights are important because they will augment operational efficacy. Like the CDS Directive, the Army Directive does not mention Op HONOUR again in the text or provide a reason for its (albeit silent) inclusion.

**GENADs, Op HONOUR and GBA Plus**

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121 The four pillars of the resolution are protection, prevention, participation, and relief and recovery.
Challenges in framing UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda are not limited to the strategic and operational levels of implementation; tactically, CAF personnel have found framing communications about the WPS agenda difficult in the extreme. The CDS Directive uses NATO’s framework to transmit gender considerations through the organization by using gender advisors, or GENADs at the several key positions: for the Chief of Defence Staff, for the Canadian Joint Operations Command and in Special Operations Command. The Directive calls on these GENADs to serve as “specialist advisors for the Commanders responsible for the overall integration of gender perspectives into military planning, execution and evaluation” (CDS Directive 2016, 6). These GENADS are to be supported by “Gender Focal Points” or GFPs within each strategic and operational headquarters or within tactical units where appropriate (IBID). These GFPs are to gather information of importance to the WPS agenda, and communicate it to the GENAD, who then advises their Commanding Officer. According to the most recent DND/CAF Progress Report on the CNAP, the DND/CAF has four GENADs in L1 headquarters and 18 senior GFPs appointed to other L1 organizations within the CAF (Canada 2021). The scope of this role is impractical for a single person; moreover, GENADs receive very little education prior to their posting in the GENAD position. Similarly, they are under-resourced and have very little staff support. Three previous GENADs shared their experiences with me, two at the operational level in the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and one at the Strategic level within Strategic Joint Staff (SJS). They maintained that despite their best efforts, lack of resources and insufficient training made progress on the WPS agenda difficult.

By relying on military GENAD positions to promote the integration of gender perspectives, the CAF teaches gender to military experts, rather than teaching gender experts about the military. Currently, the CAF offers no formal GENAD training, and CAF GENADs receive a two-week
course at the Nordic Center for Gender in Military Operations which is administered by the Swedish Defence Forces. All NATO GENADs are expected to attend this course prior to their posting, but very few CAF members are able to attend the courses: as of 2019, only four seats per year were available to Canadian military personnel. The DND and CAF’s Progress Report on Women, Peace, and Security (2019-20) highlights the challenges posed because of such limited training and admits that there remains “misunderstanding over roles and responsibilities of GENAD/GFPs that continues to challenge the advancement of operational integration of gender perspectives [and] challenges persist in terms of amount of GENADs/GFPs trained, due to the reliance of foreign training establishments” (Canada 2021, online). The Progress Report goes on to state that “due to limited number of national seats available at the [NCGM] several of our forces deployed without the complete training package” (IBID). Moreover, my discussions with several of Canada’s previous GENADs highlight that their insufficient training makes it difficult to confidently advocate for the WPS agenda.

A GENAD at the strategic level commented that it was difficult to serve on a commander’s advisory team in the absence of more robust training. The GENAD remarked that you’re sitting in a room with a legal advisor who probably has a post-graduate degree in law, this is their life’s work, their profession, they are licensed, you’re there with a public affairs advisor who again, probably 20 years of doing public affairs in the forces in a military capacity, the policy advisors, generally fairly switched on with a huge mechanism of reach-back and support, and then on the tactical sense you have your engineers advisor, your fires advisor, there are artillery or engineer officers with twenty years of…. And you’ve got your GENAD who’s been on the job for you know, four months” (GENAD 1, Interview with V. Tait, 2018-2021).

Although GENAD interview participants did not choose to remain fully anonymous, I have decided to reduce the number of identifying variables to protect their identity given the current political environment of the CAF. I can only disclose that these interviews occurred with GENADS within SJS, CJOOC or CANSOFCOM between 2018 and 2020. As there is only one GENAD at each level, providing the exact year would reveal their identity.
As a result of insufficient training, the GENAD cannot confidently intervene in the planning process on behalf of the WPS agenda. Similarly, another GENAD at the operational level commented that

I still have daily frustrations and feel woefully unprepared in two kinds of realms. Number one, like you said about being an advisor, these people have spent their whole careers learning how to advise and what to advise and I get from the commander, ‘what do you think?’ …. I don’t know yet how to apply what we’re learning and what we’re talking about to something that a commander would care about….and then my other reason is that yes, we have our CDS Directive from 2016 that says we will integrate gender perspectives in operations but basically then it’s like, over to you guys to figure it out yourselves. So, I must build the cart and the horse and I’m not particularly adept at either of those things.

Despite beliefs that military GENADs would have more credibility within the military community than civilian advisors, this quote seems to suggest that military GENADs have very little additional leverage by virtue of their military training. Within an organizational environment promoting efficacy and merit, a lack of experience and knowledge in gender and security obstructs meaningful engagement with commanding officers.

As highlighted above, because of minimal structured GENAD training, CAF GENADs are required to engage in much research on their own time. This grants GENADs significant discretion in how the WPS agenda ought to be interpreted. In framing the WPS agenda for personnel at the operational level, one GENAD stated, “Because I’m at the operational level, I try to make what I’m talking about pointy and army and sexy for military people. So military people don’t necessarily care about prevention and protection, they want to hear about pointy military things” (GENAD2, Interview with V. Tait, 2018-2021). This GENAD reveals that to persuade CAF personnel to care about 1325, it was necessary to reframe the resolution’s content using discourse that emphasized the “pointy” and “army” elements of UNSCR 1325. The use of “pointy” recalls Prime Minister Harper’s 2012 comment that his budget cuts to the CAF were necessary to give it
“more teeth and less tail” (Worthington 2012). This refers to enhancing the operational capability of the CAF (largely through weapons procurement) while reducing administrative expenses. Similarly, “tip of the spear” is a popular military analogy for “a person or group of people that is the first to do something considered difficult or dangerous, especially a group of soldiers, etc. who are the first to enter a battle area” (Cambridge Online).

Further detailing the difficulty of delivering information on 1325 within existing CAF culture, the GENAD went on to illustrate that it is nearly impossible to bridge unpopular institutional reform with the new CDS Directive on UNSCR 1325:

…I’m very hard lined - my side is that [1325] is all about operations and not about the internal part. I understand GBA Plus, but in my assessment, at the operational level, to have any kind of success or anything that we can kind of influence, it’s not really about the internal organizational stuff. That’s not for me to be able to influence really. I really try hard to divorce the two: internal and external. I really focus on the external piece ….to try to lump it all together, Op HONOUR with gender perspectives and operations, it’s bad… I think I’m a hard liner with my stance of ‘Nope! This isn’t about anything having to do with our own military’…I really separate the two” (Ibid).

Working at the operational level, this GENAD stated that to achieve buy-in, it was necessary to completely divorce the external operational component of 1325 from the internal impetus to enhance gender equality in the CAF.

These issues are also apparent in practice, as a recent review of the diversity and inclusion activities in the DND-CAF reveals (DTMP 2020). An internal review noted that “the overall governance and structures for diversity and inclusion, including roles, responsibilities and accountabilities are unclear. This lack of clarity has resulted in gaps and duplication of efforts with respect to diversity and inclusion initiatives across DND and the CAF” (IBID, vii). Within the DND and the CAF there “lacks a common understanding of the overall vision, objectives, outcomes and indicators of success for diversity and inclusion.” (17). The internal DND/CAF Report (2020) details that key Defence Advisory Groups tasked with providing advice on diversity
“are not implemented or used as intended” (H-1/2). Further, “stakeholders were not in agreement on the appropriateness of these committees to oversee the activities and initiatives to diversity and inclusion [leading to] further challenges associated with developing an integrated, coordinated and aligned Defence Team approach for diversity and inclusion” (14). This reporting illustrates that structural issues within the CAF are forestalling the full implementation of

Reshaping Gender Equality Norms in 1325: Freezing, Shrinking, Bending and Stretching

To illustrate how the gender equality content contained in UNSCR 1325 has been reshaped through its implementation in the CAF, I draw on Lombardo, Meier and Verloo (2009). As the authors note, the process of shaping gender equality concepts may “open up opportunities for feminist achievements, [but] it may also have unintended or intended negative consequences” (3). Each of the processes that the authors identify in the shaping of gender equality norms – freezing, shrinking, bending, and stretching – has been evident in the departmental implementation of UNSCR 1325. First, the CAF stretched its interpretation of UNSCR 1325 to include Canadian programming on GBA Plus in the CDS Directive (2016). However, the Directive (and subsequent interpretations therein) shrank the content of the resolution substantially regarding what would “count” as an act of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). According to the CDS Directive (2016), Sex and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) is “Conflict-related violence that is directed against a person on the basis of gender or sex. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty…” (Appendix-2/2, 2016). The directive even underlined “conflict-related”, presumably to emphasize that SGBV is a distinct form of trauma. This definition is at odds with both the UN definition of SGBV and that of the Government of Canada. The 2018-2019 Government of Canada Progress Report (Online) on the implementation of the CNAP defines SGBV as,
Sexual and gender-based violence (GBV) is violence perpetrated against someone based on their gender expression, gender identity or perceived gender. Specifically, GBV includes any act of violence or abuse that can result in physical, sexual, or psychological harm or suffering. It affects every society and every social class and occurs in both private and public life. Whether the context is the use of rape as a tool of war, sex trafficking, intimate partner violence, female genital mutilation, or other forms, GBV is a violation of human rights in all cases.

This definition, while acknowledging that SGBV can be used as a tool of war, goes on to emphasize that it is by no means limited to that application. Similarly, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees defines SGBV this way: “Gender-based violence can include sexual, physical, mental and economic harm inflicted in public or in private.” Further, “[i]t also includes threats of violence, coercion, and manipulation… in many forms such as intimate partner violence, sexual violence, child marriage, female genital mutilation and so-called ‘honour crimes’…” (UNHCR 2020, Online).

Like the Canadian Government’s 2018-2019 definition, the UN definition makes no mention of SGBV as an exclusively conflict-related offence. Shrinking the definition of sexual violence to exclude domestic acts of SGBV divorces the WPS agenda from any internal CAF efforts to eliminate sexual misconduct or effect culture change increasing the recruitment and retention of female soldiers. As a result, GBA Plus and 1325 became linked throughout subsequent military directives throughout 2016, and within the minds of GENADS, GFPs and military personnel receiving gender-awareness training. At the same time, Op HONOUR was framed as unrelated to UNSCR 1325, when, both CEDAW (1979) and the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action are cited in the opening clauses of the resolution; both of which condemn all forms of gender discrimination and gender-based violence.

Shrinking and freezing processes are directly connected to the implementation of 1325 within the DND/CAF. As Lombardo et al emphasize, freezing is “always the result of a discursive
struggle” meaning that “gender equality has been enshrined in legal or political documents and has become recognized as a no longer contested goal” (3). However, in the case of the CDS Directive on UNSCR 1325, it permits only a limited understanding of what the WPS agenda can mean within the CAF. In this instance, UNSCR 1325 is seen to apply only to gender-based analysis Plus and conflict-related SGBV during domestic and international obligations. It is not, as intended, meant to call attention to gender disparities within the security sector. Nor is it meant to name or shame the prevalence of military sexual trauma within mature democracies. In this frozen understanding of UNSCR 1325, the WPS agenda is something that Canada “does in other countries” rather than a tool for re-evaluating the domestic culture of the CAF. As a result of this fixed conception of UNSCR 1325, the gender equality discursive opportunity structure within the CAF is cut-off from operators and operational planning organizations, the so-called “heart of the military” (Bowen, Interview with V. Tait, 2018). Consequently, L1 organizations concerned with operations and planning have not used UNSCR 1325 to further legitimize Op HONOUR or emphasize the importance of recruiting and retaining female soldiers for future operations. As will be discussed in chapter five, the effects of this are clear amongst CAF military personnel with operational experience. Very few personnel I interviewed had heard of UNSCR 1325, and fewer still had an accurate understanding of meaning.

Most significantly, UNSCR 1325 has been substantively bent during its implementation in the DND/CAF. As Lombardo et al (2009) highlights, bending processes “shape meaning at the expense of the goal of gender equality… when the concept of gender equality is adjusted to make it fit some other goal than the achievement of gender equality itself” (5). In relying on an operational efficacy discourse, the CAF met its primary goal of being seen to adhere to civilian legislation without having to confront or transform the gender culture of the Canadian Military. In
anticipating backlash to gender equality policy and discourse, norm translators like CDA Professors, GENADs and GFPs have reinterpreted and reshaped the WPS agenda to fit within the existing culture of the CAF. This interpretation of the agenda is not only limited, but in emphasizing the value of gender-perspectives in combat operations, it is actively contradicting the goals of the agenda. In this regard, UNSCR 1325 is not being used to strengthen the discourse of gender equality, but instead is being used to enhance the discourse of operational efficacy. While gender-perspectives are undeniably essential to the proper execution of peacekeeping operations and assisting in humanitarian disasters, using gender perspectives to execute combat operations more effectively is the exact outcome that Cynthia Cockburn’s “NO to NATO” movement warned UN Women against in the earliest days of UNSCR 1325 (Cockburn 2011).

Ferree (2003) offers several findings that map well onto the findings of this research: first, that cultural resonance should not be interpreted as movement success (305). As this chapter has shown, the efforts made to reshape the WPS agenda to resonate with CAF personnel has led to ambiguous gains in the WPS movement’s agenda. Though awareness of gender-based analysis has improved in CAF operations, and UNSCR 1325 has the status granted by an official CDS Directive, progress towards gender equality has been achieved at a significant cost to the original content of the resolution. Accordingly, the “short-term strategic effectiveness” of the operational efficacy discourse may have undermined the likelihood of longer-term progress towards ensuring the empowerment and protection of women in the security sector (IBID). In this regard, the use of the gender equality discourse, or what Ferree would refer to as a “non-resonant frame” should be further explored to maintain the integrity of the original resolution. Finally, all discursive structures are “inherently selective, such that openings for ideas taking certain directions also are obstacles to other ways of thinking about a problem” (IBID, 306). Therefore, just as the operational efficacy
discourse limited the implementation of 1325 in such a way as to exclude internal critiques of CAF culture, the gender equality operational efficacy frame is often understood to limit the ability of the CAF to succeed on operations. Future use of both discourses should be permitted in so far as definitions around “operations” are more carefully tailored to include peacekeeping operations rather than combat operations.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has demonstrated that a militarized interpretation of UNSCR 1325 emerged from the institutional culture of the organization, which pursued gender equality goals instrumentally. This meant that UNSCR 1325 was framed as a resolution that would be valuable in the execution of CAF operations, without threatening the masculinized warrior-culture of the institution. The external political environment of the Harper administration further bolstered a militarist interpretation of the *Resolution*, while the incoming Trudeau administration publicly extolled the significance of the Resolution but did little to ensure its proper application within the military.

There are significant limitations to relying on an operational efficacy discourse in pursuing the implementation of UNSCR 1325. As interviewees revealed, this approach was not intentionally selected to limit the institutional effects of the *Resolution*. Instead, it was believed that by using an operational efficacy discourse, agents and organizations concerned with operations and planning would ultimately enhance the legitimacy of UNSCR 1325. While this may be partially true, as the next chapter will demonstrate, framing UNSCR 1325 as a matter of operational efficacy is extremely effective at securing buy-in – this approach came at great cost to the achievement of the substantive goals of the resolution. The DND/CAF failed in convincing personnel that the WPS demands transformative change of the gender culture of the organization, nor was UNSCR 1325
utilized to lend international legitimacy to CAF programming on internal gender culture reform. Moreover, operational efficacy discourse in policy and practice may have had the unintended consequence of syphoning support away from the gender equality programming. CAF personnel were repeatedly reassured that UNSCR 1325 has “nothing to do” with Op HONOUR and Employment Equity, and therefore, disparaged the value of internal efforts to reform CAF culture. It also denied resources that could have been allocated to gender equality training in relation to the WPS Agenda. Instead, UNSCR suggested an operational value for women; that they will enhance mission success even when that mission is not in line with the WPS agenda. The next chapter will examine how the CAF’s interpretation and subsequent implementation has influenced the perspectives of CAF personnel with deployment experience.
Trigger Warning: This chapter contains discussions of sexual violence. Please contact the author for a copy with these interview excerpts removed.

Chapter 5

Non-Expert Military Personnel: How is 1325 Received?

This chapter engages directly with a small group of 17 anonymous military personnel that have received training in one or more of the CAF’s gender integration programs. Unlike the subject matter experts in chapter four, none of these soldiers, sailors and aviators have specialized gender expertise. These interviews were conducted from January 2017 to December 2018. Until this point, I have conducted a largely top-down review of how UNSCR 1325 was implemented in the CAF. I have focused on the activities of the state and its agents at the federal level and have made scant mention of the perspectives of military personnel. In chapter two, I used elite level interviews to demonstrate how Canadian foreign policy shaped the domestic implementation of UNSCR 1325. Similarly, chapter four utilized subject matter expert (SME) interviews with civilian and military management in the Department of National Defence and the CAF. This illustrated that introducing 1325 to the CAF through the discourse of operational efficacy activated operationally driven institutional channels and personnel, yielding very real impacts on how 1325 was codified and taught. However, as Louise Chappell (2003) highlights, political opportunity structures do not exist in a vacuum, nor are they exclusively a top-down affair (27). Instead, feminist activists must respond to the “opportunities and constraints with which they are confronted” (Ibid). While decisions made at the executive level have had the most direct influence on the domestication of 1325 in Canada, this chapter will illustrate that those decisions were made with a mind towards how rank-and-file CAF military personnel would react to the introduction of a UN resolution premised on gender equality.
This chapter provides insight into the opportunities and constraints within the gender culture of the CAF. I have analyzed in-depth interviews with 17 experienced CAF officers to understand how frames like “gender” and “operational efficacy” coexist with military ethos in practice i.e., with the lived reality of its members, not the doctrine of its elite. This chapter illustrates the past and current shortcomings in how framing through which UNSCR 1325 was introduced to the CAF, which bent the gender-equality norms contained in the resolution. Without a coherent, gender-equality framework for implementing UNSCR 1325, military personnel were willing to adopt an instrumentalist justification for integrating women based under claims that it would enhance operational efficacy. The interviews reveal that backlash against equality-based programs like GBA Plus and Op HONOUR were and are a very real problem that threatens to undermine the transformative changes the framers of UNSCR 1325 envisioned.

The data used in chapter four did not require coding, as subject matter experts were asked how they developed and taught the CAF’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325. Chapter four gathered individual experiences and actions. However, the interviews I conducted for this chapter are different and serve a different purpose; to understand how the frames that experts developed in chapter four have been received by the norm-receiving community of CAF personnel, none of whom are experts. I begin this chapter with an overview of the method used to conduct non-expert interviews and describe how the data was coded. Prior to exploring qualitative data, I begin with quantitative summaries of my interviewees’ awareness of UNSCR 1325, and their attitudes towards the following gender-integration policies within the DND-CAF and the Canadian Government: Op HONOUR and GBA Plus. I also indicate that a little more than half of participants were familiar with UNSCR 1325, and most participants would prefer to deploy on a NATO mission, rather than a UN mission. As we will examine in the qualitative discussion, CAF
personnel express far more trust in NATO than in the UN. I then measure interviewee’s responses regarding women in combat by examining responses to these questions:

• Generally speaking, what do you think about women serving in the combat arms?
• Some studies have suggested that there are benefits to be gained from having women in the combat arms, for example as coalition forces found out with Female Engagement Teams (FET) in Afghanistan. What do you think based on your experiences?
• Some argue that the military should be completely gender neutral. These attitudes are popular amongst many in the CAF leadership. In your experience, is this desirable? Are there instances when gender comes into play in military operations?

These questions highlighted that the main question is no longer if women should serve in combat, but why women should be permitted to serve in combat. In other words, what rationales were provided to support a positive attitude towards women serving in the CAF. I move to qualitative analysis in the next section, where I identify fourteen thematic categories in Table 2. This table demonstrates which thematic categories were most prevalent amongst interviewees. These thematic categories are divided into those themes within the institution that support framing gender integration through operational efficacy, and what themes support a gender-equality based framework for integrating women. Finally, I conclude on a hopeful note that interviewees share perspectives that indicate the potential for improvement of gender culture in the CAF, and what these perspectives tell feminist insiders about how to proceed with the implementation of UNSCR 1325.

**Method**

The interviews that I discuss in this chapter were designed to determine a) if the CAF personnel I interviewed were familiar with the *Women, Peace and Security* (WPS) Agenda, and b) if so, how they responded to an operational framing of the WPS Agenda, and finally c) what pre-existing ideas did non-expert participants use to make sense of gender in the CAF. The methods applied in this chapter continue to build on feminist institutionalist research, particularly
Lombardo’s approach used to examine European gender mainstreaming, (Lombardo et al 2009; Lombardo and Meir 2006; Lombardo et al 2009; Lombardo and Mergaert 2013). Like Lombardo, I am interested in practical approaches to understanding challenges to gender mainstreaming within established ‘western’ institutions. While our cases differ significantly, we are both interested in how gender equality ‘travels’, and the chameleonic nature it must acquire to fit into different institutional cultures and contexts.

These interviews further support my argument that a discourse of operational utility was to ease the introduction of 1325 into the highly masculinized gender culture of the CAF. While initially promising, this discursive framing provided a shield against arguments that including women would undermine NATO’s operational efficacy, because many male soldiers had seen for themselves the importance of female operatives in Afghanistan and Iraq.\textsuperscript{123} While the discourse of operational efficacy was intentionally used in response to real backlash from CAF members and in anticipation of backlash given trainers’ previous experiences with CAF members, it is not a discourse of gender equality. The discourse of operational efficacy defers to the discursive repertoire, practice, and institutional culture of the CAF, and therefore won’t implement 1325 successfully. The operational efficacy framing of UNSCR 1325 distorts the gender equality messages contained within the resolution; either by subsuming them to military priorities and practices, or by eliminating them from the institutional interpretations of 1325.

The interviews conducted for this chapter reveal that the CAF’s approach to gender integration policy from 2016 onward has resulted in inexperienced military personnel being charged with the task of translating UNSCR 1325 into policy and practice. While chapter four

\textsuperscript{123} This is what Elgstrom (2000) calls a tipping point, when the utility of an incoming norm becomes undeniable.
captured this experience from the perspective of trainers, this chapter describes how trainees perceived the experience. Interviews also revealed that because those tasked with explaining gender equality policies know very little – if anything – about relations between gender equality and security, they explained it using their existing experiences and cognitive biases (Johnstone and Momani 2019). This is not just true regarding UNSCR 1325, but of other policies like GBA Plus and Operation HONOUR. It resulted in significant confusion around core concepts like gender, and the relationship between gender inequality and conflict.

Those interviewed were highly experienced soldiers (both in years of service and in deployment history) with Officers and Army personnel predominating, none of whom served as GENADS (Appendix G). A significant majority had been deployed outside of Canada on peacekeeping missions, disaster assistance response missions, combat missions, or some combination. Those with expeditionary service were intentionally recruited in the belief that they were more likely to have been exposed to the WPS Agenda through pre-deployment training, not offered during yearly training sessions. Furthermore, most interviewed identified as women, whereas women comprise only 14% of CAF personnel.

Interviews were semi-structured, and all participants were led through a pre-approved list of questions designed to stimulate discussion around key concepts like gender, women in operations, and CAF policy. The first 12 questions were identical, and then I asked participants four short questions to determine if they were familiar with UNSCR 1325. The remaining ten questions were divided into two sections: A (familiar) or B (unfamiliar) with UNSCR 1325. Interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim with the full consent of participants.

124 The list was preapproved by my L1 Sponsor at the Department of National Defence, through their Social Science Research Review Board.
Table 4. Theme Prevalence Amongst 17 Participants

Orange = Thematic categories that encourage instrumentalist/operational efficacy framing  
Blue = Thematic categories that encourage rights-based/gender equality framing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Strong Theme</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Prevalence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Backlash</td>
<td>Participant expresses anticipated, experienced, or felt antipathy towards gender integration policies</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Skill &lt; Gender</td>
<td>Participant claims an individual’s skill is more important than their gender</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Women and Operations</td>
<td>Participant argues that women should be integrated into the CAF because they are an operational advantage/necessity</td>
<td>10</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Strong Theme</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Prevalence</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. Instrumentalist</td>
<td>Participant uses instrumentalist terms to discuss the value of women in uniform</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Gender only necessary in some theatres</td>
<td>Gender perspectives aren’t always important in operations; their value depends on the country in which you’re deployed</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Politically Correct</td>
<td>Participant sees gender integration policy and training as an objectionable exercise in “political correctness”</td>
<td>6</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weak Theme</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Prevalence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7. Discomfort and Gendered Logic of Appropriateness</td>
<td>Participants have perceived a shift in the gender culture of the organization, and they find this shift confusing or otherwise difficult to navigate</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Gender Equality</td>
<td>Participant discusses gender using normative claim about how CAF members (and the civilians they serve) should be treated</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Civilizing</td>
<td>Having women in a military unit will “civilize” male soldiers by discouraging the use of coarse language and “locker room banter”</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. UN/Rwanda</td>
<td>Participant uses CAF experience in Rwanda as a cognitive shortcut for problems with UN</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Embarrassment and Op HONOUR</td>
<td>Participant recognizes that Op HONOUR is necessary, and this fact embarrasses them</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Essentialism</td>
<td>Participants discuss women using essentialist terms</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Neutrality is best</td>
<td>Participant expresses preference for identity blindness, rather than accepting diversity perspectives</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Mission First</td>
<td>The success of the mission must come before any other consideration about personnel</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As table 2. indicates, thematic categories that encouraged an instrumentalist justification for gender integration were far more prevalent. While several participants also invoked a rights-based logic of gender equality, these responses were not as frequent. This is, in part, a function of
how the questions were posed to interview participants. The interview questions (appendix A) contain several questions that explicitly ask participants to reflect on the role of women in operations. However, coding identifies only those instances where participants responded to that framing positively. These thematic categories indicate two significant processes which Lombardo and Mergaert (2013) identify as signs of individual and institutional resistance (301), either implicit or explicit. Regarding institutional resistance we can identify several categories where the meaning of gender equality is being ‘bent’ by the participant or their superiors to accommodate an instrumentalist justification for the integration of women (ex. categories 2 and 3). In individual resistance, participants also share perspectives and experiences that range from being forced to endure sexual assault without any viable means of redress (most extreme) to variations on the common sentiment that, “I don’t care if you’re male, female chicken, duck, whatever. If you can do your job, good. Then get it done and go home (ex. categories 1 and 7). As will be discussed in greater detail below, these forms of resistance trivialize gender and undermine the diverse, inclusive gender culture that militaries are required to pursue to implement UNSCR 1325. It might also point to participants’ failure (or unwillingness) to recognized institutionalized – or systemic – inequality.

**Quantitative Summary 1: GBA Plus, Op HONOUR and UNSCR 1325**

**Familiarity with 1325**

Familiarity with the Women, Peace and Security Agenda was higher amongst my participants than was likely amongst the CAF population generally. Similarly, though the experts interviewed in chapter 4 tried to inject WPS lessons and examples into pre-existing courses, e.g., during the Joint Command and Staff Program (JCSP), such efforts are often frustrated by the sheer

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125 Table summarizing quantitative responses in Appendix H.
volume of course material they are expected to deliver within a limited time frame. However, between these resources, and the online gender training required for all NATO deployments, 11 of my participants were familiar with 1325, and six were not. Those familiar with UNSCR 1325 were placed in stream A and asked questions designed to encourage reflection on the forms of training they received, and if they resonated with their values and experiences. Those who were unfamiliar with WPS were placed in stream B and asked to comment on a summary of UNSCR 1325 that emphasized an externally oriented, operational interpretation (Appendix D). Participants were asked to reflect on their thoughts and experiences in the military and asked if this guidance was of value to the CAF.

UN or NATO?

Most interviewees had experience on deployments organized through the UN and NATO. Even without personal experience, UN and NATO engagement is an important element of the CAF’s historical repertoire and identity. As discussed in chapter two, CAF engagement with these organizations often falls along the partisan lines of Canadian foreign policy. While peacekeeping is a proud legacy of the Liberal party, the Conservative government of Stephen Harper criticized the UN, and recommitted CAF resources to NATO operations. None of my 17 participants stated that they would rather work with the UN, while nine stated explicitly that they would rather work with NATO. Five participants stated no preference. The remaining three participants felt that they had insufficient experience to confidently choose one or the other.

The legacy of the failed Rwanda mission (UNAMIR 1993-1996) influenced these responses. Four participants explicitly justified their trepidation about involvement with the UN

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126 This also suggests that attempts to recruit participants with expeditionary deployment experience is an effective way to target members of the CAF population that have some exposure to the WPS agenda.
cited the example of Rwanda. Similarly, several participants emphasized that they feel more comfortable deploying through a NATO-led enterprise because they considered it would be “significantly more of a military organization” while they considered the UN “bureaucratic” (Anonymous 11-03-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. November 3) and “cumbersome” (Anonymous 03-07-17. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. March 7). Moreover, many participants felt more comfortable working with NATO because NATO engagement was their only reference point, since very few had any deployment experience with the UN. One participant commented that “since I’ve been alive, Canada has been in coalitions that are more NATO focused, [provide] NATO training opportunities, I can go to Europe and do NATO things…. I’ve always thought of them positively in the military sense (Anonymous 10-03-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. October 3). These responses indicate that the impact of redirecting CAF resources towards NATO did not just have a political impact, but also reoriented CAF personnel to NATO engagement and practice, at the expense of the UN.

**GBA Plus Training**

GBA Plus training received mixed reviews from those interviewed, many of whom struggled to understand how to integrate gender mainstreaming into the daily practice of service in the CAF. While this challenge is explored more below, note that Canada’s technocratic approach to gender mainstreaming has been criticized by several feminist political scientists (Hankivsky and Mussel 2018; Paterson 2010; Paterson and Scala 2018; Vida 2021). Mostly they criticize how gender knowledge is organized, and in some cases monopolized by the central state (Haussman and Sauer 2007; Paterson 2010). While this ostensibly entrenched the concept of gender into the highest levels of the Canadian political opportunity structure, its outcomes are often problematic. As Hankivsky (2005) notes, the core goal of gender mainstreaming –i.e advancing
gender equality – can become muddled “and even distorted” when reframed in the state’s technocratic language (984). These criticisms are particularly applicable to the Canadian military, where personnel have criticized the GBA Plus program as an exercise in “political correctness” divorced from military culture and practice (Johnstone and Momani 2019).

Johnstone and Momani (2019, 513) conducted four focus groups made up of civilian and military personnel responsible for implementing GBA Plus programming and reporting. The most prevalent response to the question, “what challenges do you foresee in acting as a GFP?” was “lack of awareness of GBA Plus among other members of the DND/CAF” (Johnstone and Momani 513). Similarly, many respondents “noted that they anticipated push back and that people would continue to view GBA Plus as a check in the box exercise, regardless of their actions” (514). The responses from my participants are similar - only 7 found the GBA Plus online training program useful. However, critiques were evident even amongst those who found the training useful. One participant found the training ‘super obvious’ (Anonymous 10-03-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. October 3). Moreover, a common response was that the course was not carefully tailored to military application. Indeed, GBA Plus is a standardized course for all public servants and is intended to provide federal government employees with a conceptual toolkit for understanding gender, not job specific. Most of my participants, considered this course was an exercise in being “politically correct” rather than a tool intended to make meaningful change in the gender culture of the CAF (Anonymous 12-04-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. December 4).

**Operation HONOUR Training**

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127 A Gender Focal Point can be either a civilian or military member within the DND-CAF, who is responsible for implementing GBA Plus programming and communicating results to superiors.

128 Responses organized into a chart in Appendix B.
Like GBA Plus, Op HONOUR was one of the few Canadian initiatives referenced in the CDS Directive on UNSCR 1325. Perhaps due to the widely publicized, controversial nature of Op HONOUR, few participants elected to identify whether they found Op HONOUR training useful. Op HONOUR was by many feminist onlookers, doomed from the get-go. As Nancy Taber (2017) notes, the program was quickly renamed “Hop on Her” at Royal Military Colleges and at National Defence Headquarters and was panned by rank-and-file soldiers (17). Therefore, it was not surprising that this operation to eliminate sexual misconduct in the CAF failed and the new Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) Wayne Eyre ended the program in March of 2021. This followed the dismissal of its chief architect, former CDS Johnathan Vance. Vance who had been the CAF CDS and an ardent proponent of gender-culture reform, was himself disgraced in April 2021 when Maj. Kellie Brennan publicly accused him of sexual misconduct (Connolly 2021). My interviewees concluded that, although the program was needed, its execution within the CAF had been dismal. A female participant commented that “[people] in lower ranks tend to make fun of it more,” and recalled that when she attended the briefing session on Op HONOUR, the officer charged with delivering the information said, “oh I know it’s painful, but we have to go through this….Nobody wants to go through this twice”  (Anonymous 15-06-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. June 15). As Taber observed (2017), Op HONOUR was not taken seriously amongst CAF personnel. Taber’s observations are supported by one of my participants, who stated, “the first week it came out the French guys were all like ‘Oh! Hop on Her!’ and they were the Officers…when you release a report saying, ‘oh my god, women are getting raped, and all the men are bad!’ that’s how the guys took it, so they went on the offence” (Anonymous 16-06-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. June 16). Accordingly, four people found the program useful, five did not find it useful, and nine participants did not to comment.
Quantitative Summary II: Parsing Positivity

Amidst the pressure to reform CAF culture following the release of the 2015 Deschamps Report, it was not surprising when all participants in this study espoused a positive view of women in combat. But this support was not unconditional, nor often expressed through a rights-based rationale. Many qualified an affirmative answer with conditions like, “as long as she can do her job” or “gender doesn’t matter, as long as you can do the job.” In other words, women should be permitted in combat-facing positions provided they don’t impede the operational efficacy of the CAF. Likewise, several respondents stated that both men and women fail in the infantry, the problem with combat is not exclusive to women. Two participants emphasized the instrumental value of having women in the infantry, either because the military struggles to meet recruitment targets in those trades, or because the presence of women enhances operational efficacy. Only one participant offered a rights-based claim, stating that she was in support of women in the combat arms, if they were passionate about pursuing that career, and not being directed into that occupation by recruiters or their commanding officers. Only four participants provided unqualified, enthusiastic support for women in combat one of whom emphasized the importance of the career aspirations of women joining. These responses suggest that operational efficacy framing was not monolithic, and several participants emphasized gender equality rationale for the integration of women. The remaining 12 offered support for women in combat-facing positions but suggested that: gender has nothing to do with one’s ability to serve in the CAF (4 participants), justified their support of women using instrumentalist rationale (2 participants) or stipulated that that woman must be able to do their job properly if they are in combat-facing positions (6 participants).
The next question was intended to determine how participants responded to an instrumentalist justification for gender integration, premised on operational efficacy framing. Recall that the CDS Directive on UNSCR 1325 proceeded along two lines: implementing the resolution in all operational activity (during deployment) and implementing it in all institutional activity (personnel decisions made within the DND/CAF). Again, all participants responded positively, underscoring the importance of female military personnel as an essential component of modern combat. Those with experience in Afghanistan and Iraq were quick to refer to their experiences with female colleagues who could liaise with Muslim women during their deployment and aid by physically searching these women, when necessary, for example at military checkpoints. Three participants also suggested that women also can provide a “completely different perspective” from their male peers, or that they employ more “consensus-building leadership” (Anonymous 06-06-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. June 6 and Anonymous 08-08-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait August 8). It shouldn’t be inferred from these responses that participants only saw women’s service through an instrumentalist lens, since the prompt specifically asked if there are “benefits to be gained” from having women in the combat arms. However, it does suggest that this framing resonates well with the participants interviewed for this study.

Question five asked if participants saw value in gender-neutral approaches, or if, in their experience, gender comes into play in military operations. The question also mentioned that these approaches were popular with CAF leadership, highlighting the legacy of difference-denial discussed in chapter 3 (see also Eichler 2013; Lane 2017). Coming directly after the question on Female Engagement Teams, it presented a challenging intellectual prompt to participants, and encouraged far more varied responses than the previous question. Only one person responded with
an exclusively operations-based justification, arguing that the “perception of gender [also] comes into play. As a soldier myself, [I feel that] gender doesn’t really come into play. I don’t consider it, I consider the person” (Anonymous 06-06-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. June 6). Six participants expressed a preference for gender neutrality within the institution, meaning that while gender might be a useful variable on operations, gender should not be considered in the treatment of personnel and their career trajectories within the organization. Two participants stated that they were in favour of gender-neutral treatment in both institutional and operational affairs, while six people thought that the military should not be gender-neutral and emphasized the importance of diversity. One participant was hesitantly in favour of gender neutrality.\textsuperscript{129}

These responses show that participants viewed gender through multiple frameworks that were almost perfectly divided on what the gender culture of the CAF should look like. While some saw value in diversity, others believed that true equality came from gender neutrality. Why the latter is a problematic perception is explored in the qualitative discussion below. While this question wasn’t designed to be assessed quantitatively, the range of responses show the confusion participants expressed regarding normative questions about gender in the CAF. While all participants viewed women’s participation positively, there were significant discrepancies in the justifications they provided for that positive perspective.

\textit{Qualitative Discussion of Thematic Categories that Buoy Operational Efficacy Discourse}

\textbf{Gender Blindness and Meritocracy}

The misperception that diversity policies constitute preferential treatment for minorities has long frustrated efforts to mainstream diversity (Bacchi 2004; Young 1989). Bacchi (2004)

\textsuperscript{129} One participant’s answer diverged significantly from the original question and could not be coded either way.
maintains that within this narrative of diversity-blindness, any measures taken to create more egalitarian opportunities for marginalized groups are perceived by the dominant group as special attention. This tension is evident across interviews with my participants 10 of whom emphasized that success within the CAF is dependent on merit, and 13 of whom maintained that the importance of skill far surpasses the importance of gender. Participants, regardless of gender identity, emphasized that “people should get judged based on their strength and knowledge…. Gender really should not be a factor” (Anonymous 02-07-2017. 2017. Interview with V. Tait. February 7). Interestingly, these views also applied to male military personnel, as participants argued “I’ve seen some incredible female soldiers, I’ve seen some that are absolute shit. But I can make the exact same statement for males. There are plenty that do not deserve to be [in the military] in both cases, so it doesn’t really matter” (Anonymous 13-4-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. April 13). While participants view these arguments as gender-neutral, they fail to recognize that the parameters of “skill and professionalism” were dictated by the organization’s male leadership. As one female soldier remarked,

I know it’s a nice statement ‘I don’t see women or men, I see soldiers.’ Well, that’s actually kind of demeaning you’re taking away from my experience as a female then...because my experience as a female soldier is different from that of a male soldier. So, I think gender still needs to be recognized. While it shouldn’t have preference or there shouldn’t be preferential treatment based on gender, it still needs to be recognized (Anonymous 03-07-17. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. March 7).

This statement highlights the central tension in an understanding of equity as “special privilege.” While the soldier recognized that her unique experience as a woman in the military was different than that of her male colleagues, she quickly shied away from any suggestion that this should merit “preferential treatment.”

As these excerpts suggest, policy that deviates from the perceived norm of meritocracy within the CAF is immediately met with derision. While discussing the institutional and
operational approaches within the CDS Directive to implement 1325, a participant complained that, “the institutional piece seems more individual…. the minute that you, in a military environment, make this seem like it’s something not about equality, you’ve lost that audience” (Anonymous 17-12-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. December 17). In referring to institutional approaches within the Directive, the participant emphasizes that any accommodations made to enhance individual rights may be perceived as distorting equality. Equality, in this context, should not be confused with *equity*; instead, it is understood amongst participants as completely blind to differences of race, sexual orientation or gender. The participant continued: “if you want to get the troops on board with this, you need to put it in a context that resonates with them, and operations…[represent] the only way it will resonate with them” (Ibid). This was a common sentiment amongst participants; gender or sexual identity should be irrelevant, provided you can “do your job” within the CAF (Anonymous 17-12-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. December 17). However, this approach obscures the central role that gender, and sexual identity have played in shaping the ability of women to serve the CAF. Another participant commented:

...all of my female [subordinates]... which isn’t many, like four or five over the years, ...[as]gung-ho, ...hard women. They’re great workers, who’ve always excelled ...were always amazing. I’ve never had a bad female apprentice; they were kick ass and they belonged there. But we’re kind of at that point now where they’ve been in for a few years and half [left] because of the culture. My favourite was so fed up with [the culture] that she put in her release, “I can’t take it anymore” and she had the toughest skin, ...was sassy, ...mouthy. She ...[gave] it as much as she could ... and now she’s like, “I’m done.” (Anonymous 16-6-19. 2018. Interview with V. Tait, June 18).

Clearly, gender and sexual identity are key components of how one’s ability to “do their job” is perceived.

Despite strong emphasis on the importance of gender neutrality, several participants picked up on the tension between diversity in operations and the maintenance of gender neutrality within the institution. One participant commented: “If you’re only thinking in terms of opportunities for
advancement and flourishing in the job, I’d like those opportunities to be gender neutral. But for those opportunities to be [gender]equal you must consider the differences, otherwise you’re not giving [everyone] the same opportunities” (Anonymous 08-8-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. August 8). This suggests that gender-blind approaches to diversity are not monolithic within CAF culture. There are [those] within the CAF [who] recognize a robust form of egalitarianism that compensates for the inequalities inherent within the organization. Nevertheless, a common theme amongst male and female participants [was] to express discontent with any policy or program that introduced a different standard for women and men.

As discussed in Chapter three, the Abella Commission, and the subsequent Employment Equity Act (1995), introduced the politics of difference to the CAF, challenging the dominance of its gender-blind institutional culture. This contrasted with the Royal Commission, which emphasized that women ought to have the same rights and opportunities as men. By introducing a difference-based of equality, the Employment Equity Act injected a gendered logic of difference into the recruitment and retention policies of the Canadian military and attached an instrumental value to the presence of women in uniform. This may be an incidental effect of reversal strategies of gender mainstreaming, which emphasize the unique perspectives of women, and so froze “women’ as a valid analytical category (Squires 2005, 375). In so doing, the Employment Equity Act reified women as different than their male counterparts, and these differences merit alternative policy approaches to their employment in the CAF. Unfortunately, once these gender categories were identified by the EEA, it became easier for the military to coopt them to serve goals unrelated to substantive gender equality.

Instrumentalism and Operational Efficacy: Qualitative Discussion
In this research, I frequently have been reminded of Kelly Oliver’s *Women as Weapons of War* (2010). In detailing the atrocities committed at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, Oliver refers to stories of women being used to “soften up” noncompliant prisoners (22). In these stories, female security operatives used fake menstrual blood to disgust prisoners and the patriarchal conservative religious norms of their captives to weaken their resolve, actions far more grotesque than any story relayed by my participants. Nonetheless, their responses still beg Oliver’s question: ‘are women the secret weapon of modern warfare?’ Moreover, what can be done to separate 1325’s goal of establishing gender equality within security institutions, from the occasionally horrific practices these institutions perform? Holvikivi (2021, 178) presents a similar challenge: how does gender training of a peacekeeping force introduce a “concept with feminist lineage to martial institutions often described as institutions of hegemonic masculinity, in which femininity is denigrated and responsiveness to feminist analyses is low?” While my participants did not express a desire to instrumentalize, or *objectify* women in uniform, the difference between their discussion of women in war and Oliver’s was a matter of degree, not of kind.

As discussed above, all participants responded positively to women being in uniform. Indeed, several participants had used their gender identity as an operational advantage during deployment in Afghanistan or had witnessed a female soldier doing so. One soldier responded to Q3 on the benefit of women in operations: “I take issue with the use of the word *benefit*. I would call it an operational *necessity*” (2). He continued “in an operational context, I look at everything about everyone that works for and around me and use it to the best of our abilities… If it helps Canada” (Ibid). Another soldier stated that female soldiers are:

…not just useful, [they’re] vital, I think. We couldn’t get into compounds with our male patrols, but as soon as we put together a female patrol, they were able to access inside the compound…. [the absence of women would] significantly decreases our ability to achieve
operational and tactical objectives because we …wouldn’t have that information …nor be attuned to understanding its importance (32).

This interviewee further provided an instrumentalist justification for having women within the institution. He states, “if we’re not attracting 51% of the population, and we’re under strength, we got a problem here” (Ibid). Although these responses support an instrumentalist justification for gender integration in the CAF, they do not indicate misogyny nor justify sexist misconduct. Instead, they reflect a shrewd willingness to operationalize identity factors as required by the rigors of military service. However, these examples can quickly devolve into the problematic objectification of women as weapons of war.

Instrumentalist justifications for including women in the CAF also illustrated that these justifications fail to advance gender equality, also can impugn it. One participant, when questioned about the benefits of female soldiers in operations, stated that:

… women were, um, very good at engaging with some of those Afghan men who had never really seen a Western woman up close before, and they’re a lot different than Afghan women. Western women without a headscarf on or a different colour of skin and just smelling differently… just like the basic primal stuff [referring to sexuality].

This passage suggests that the female soldier he mentioned served more as bait than as an equal partner in arms. (Anonymous 5-6-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. May 6). Reflecting on her time in Afghanistan, another participant stated that:

…people were saying, oh well women shouldn’t really be going to Afghanistan, they don’t really accept women…. But me and my peers, [the other women] had to do all the screening of women, that wasn’t our real jobs, but we spent half of the time these other types of jobs because men couldn’t do them. (Anonymous 12-4-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. December 4).

Another participant commented on the value of having female personnel for screening Muslim women in Afghanistan that: ‘men wouldn’t let us speak to women, if you had to frisk somebody, and they were female, way easier to just go to our female comrade and say, hey, you do it. Show
a little respect, right?” (Anonymous 8-1-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. August 1). As these examples illustrate, female soldiers were used to stopgap security issues presented by the cultural environment of Afghanistan. While this may be a necessary element of service in Afghanistan, it does not serve to advance the gender equality goals contained in UNSCR 1325.

A key issue with instrumentalist justifications for gender integration is that focusing on individual examples of women’s use-value creates the illusion that there are instances where gender does not come into play in conflict. Afghanistan proved to many soldiers that female soldiers are an essential component in winning the “hearts and minds” of the Afghan population. In counter-insurgency missions, as in Afghanistan, it is crucial to have female personnel present to liaise with the female locals to sway public opinion against insurgents. However, counter-insurgency operations are just one of many ways in which CAF personnel may be deployed. In Operation REASSURANCE for example, CAF personnel are stationed in Latvia to communicate NATO’s commitment to its member states, by discouraging Russian interference in the Baltics. Despite the profoundly gendered nature of Russian disinformation campaigns in NATO member states (see Tait 2020), military personnel often fail to see the gender dimension of interstate warfare. As one participant commented,

Latvia is a first world society, where women can speak with men…they might not require women’s engagement teams. If Canada was going to go to Saudi Arabia where women are not even [considered] human beings, and need permission from their husbands to talk, I would say female engagement teams would be the answer. It’s culture-specific and each terrain brings its own challenge. (Anonymous 2-7-17. 2017. Interview with V. Tait. July 2). Some participants’ comments show they are unaware of the relationship between gender and security, particularly as gender relates to access to food and resources during conflict. They suggest

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130 This is not to suggest that female participants necessarily had a problem serving in this capacity. A female participant recalled of her service in Afghanistan as “the most satisfying mission I’ve been on” (146).
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a degree of homogeneity in accessing resources within developed nations, an unwarranted assumption given that almost half of on-Reserve Indigenous communities in Canada experience food insecurity (Batal 2021). Another participant maintained that:

…if you want to stop rape camps, you put boots on the ground and you kick down doors and you kill the people that are doing that. That’s the only way you’re going to stop the people that are doing that…. When you’re dealing with insurgencies within your own country, the last thing they need is someone telling them about gender politics, when they need peace and security. (Anonymous 5-6-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. May 6).

This response illustrates a fundamental misunderstanding about how the politics of gender inform the instigation and perpetuation of conflict and insecurity. These perspectives illustrate a lost opportunity to use gender-based perspectives to expand CAF personnel’s understanding of security and equality.

Participants also presented ways of framing of UNSCR 1325 divorced from related gender-equality initiatives in the CAF. As indicated in chapter four, Op HONOUR is an unpopular policy amongst CAF personnel. One of my more informed participants stated that, “we have to be very careful to keep Op HONOUR and [1325] separate…they both need to run their course [but] not necessarily jointly, only where they touch. (Anonymous 12-4-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. December 4).

While this participant acknowledged that she had argued that the two initiatives are linked, she was very careful to deconstruct that linkage through touchpoints, rather than emphasizing that the two initiatives are fundamentally connected through gender equality. Another participant stated that, while she believed in the importance of Op Honour, when speaking to soldiers she tends to:

‘focus more on harassment. I try not to say Op HONOUR as much because it has such a stigma with the guys. As soon as you say Op HONOUR a lot of guys shut down’. She continued, ‘so, I usually say “harassment and abusive behaviours”, “racism sexism and stuff”, and I stick to more those kinds of [terms] rather than putting a barrier between men and women’ (Anonymous 16-6-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. June 16). This participant was a proponent of Op HONOUR, however she recognized that using the policy’s name would likely lose the support of her audience.
This suggests that Op HONOUR generated such strong resistance from CAF personnel that linking UNSCR 1325 and Op HONOUR during training likely resulted in being rejected.

A Gendered Logic of (in)Appropriateness?: Qualitative Discussion

As argued throughout this dissertation, the gendered logic of appropriateness within the CAF is fractured. As a result of poor training, and the multiple competing frameworks used by elite to justify gender integration, CAF personnel described confusion over what gender language and norms are “appropriate” within the Canadian military. By appropriate, I refer to Louise Chappell (2006, 226) who describes institutional norms as those norms that, ‘prescribe (as well as proscribe) acceptable masculine and feminine forms of behavior, rules and values for men and women within institutions’ (Ibid 227). Chappell further argues that the gendered logic of appropriateness is particularly rigid within Westminster governments (like Canada) which maintain strong norms of bureaucratic neutrality. Canadian military personnel are not permitted to engage in partisan politics or political advocacy in uniform. Within this environment, there is a heightened expectation that any qualified professional will also approach their job with complete objectivity. Reflecting on her training experiences with GBA Plus, Op HONOUR and UNSCR 1325, one participant stated that: ‘When you’re teaching [gender] to a military audience [which is] already skeptical and looking for reasons not to buy into what you’re selling, you risk alienating them if they detect a personal agenda not just passing on information (Anonymous 17.12.2018. Interview with V. Tait. December 17). This puts both civilian and military feminist norm entrepreneurs at a distinct disadvantage when teaching about gender equality within the CAF because their identity as feminists undermines the perceived legitimacy of their views. The assumption that the masculinized culture of the CAF is “value-neutral” further buoys the rejection of egalitarian gender policy.
The introduction of formal diversity policies, like *GBA Plus*, within the CAF’s previous “neutral” gendered logic of appropriateness has also disoriented my participants’ understanding of what behavior is appropriate. One participant expressed frustration that “people don’t know how to refer to women anymore, so they just become uncomfortable, which I think is the complete opposite of [what] the whole process [is intended to do]” (Anonymous 2-7-2017. 2017. Interview with V. Tait. July 2). Another participant also expressed frustration after overhearing stories about a transgender CAF member who chastised his subordinate for misgendering him after the subordinate said “oh, go ahead Ma’am” in line at a CANEX store (Anonymous 15-6-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. June 15). Sharing this story quickly snowballed into a discussion of “what do we do in that situation? What’s right? Are you not supposed to be courteous anymore? How can you be courteous in a respectful manner?” (Ibid). Although the story may be apocryphal, it highlights that my participants feel ill-equipped to navigate sensitive issues pertaining to sex and gender.

While participants found the shifting gender culture of the CAF difficult to navigate, they did not characterize it as an entirely negative transformation. Five participants shared that woman had a “civilizing” effect on the men in the units in which women served. Jenkins (2017, 7) observed that female soldiers are often lauded for improving the behaviour of their male counterparts despite little evidence that the presence of female peacekeepers impact male peacekeepers’ attitudes and behaviours. These essentialist frameworks about women’s presence in peacekeeping operations operate on unfounded stereotypes about gender. Nevertheless, the presence of women encouraged several participants to reflect critically on the former gendered logic of appropriateness within the organization. One participant stated that “guys are less gross when girls are around. Just less disgusting….in the most utilitarian way, just one girl, just one girl
around. Give them a sense of shame” (Anonymous 1-7-17. 2017. Interview with V. Tait. July 1). Another participant commented that had “always been uncomfortable with the banter in the locker room. But whenever I’ve had to work with women, and women are part of the team I’m on, the conversation expands” (Anonymous 4-7-17. 2017. Interview with V. Tait. July 4). Although these observations rest on an objectionable premise, they nonetheless illustrate that a diversified gender culture can problematize previously crude masculine logics of appropriateness and encourage critical reflection on professional conduct.

**Comfort with NATO & Trepidation about the UN: Qualitative Discussion**

UN Peacekeeping has been an important cornerstone of Canadian national mythology since Lester B Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1956 for his role in creating the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and thereby diplomatically ending the Suez Canal crises, (Young 2019). But even in the halcyon days of Canada’s participation in peacekeeping, there was a sense that UN engagement somehow “softened” Canada’s power on the international stage. Conservative newspapers of the day chastised the UNEF, calling it the “1st Chairborne” Division for its deviation from the traditional warrior role of Canadian soldiers (McCullough 2017). Pearson’s actions also represented an important point of departure from the British colonial roots of the CAF: moreover, in rejecting British foreign policy towards Egypt, Canada also was seen as “turning its back on its mother country” (Ibid). The kind of affective tie to British colonial identity highlighted in these passages is still very much at play in how the CAF shaped its identity throughout the 20th century, particularly regarding UN engagement. As discussed in chapter three the Canadian Airborne Division – once one of the most distinguished regiments in the CAF – was disbanded following the Somalia affair, in which members of the division murdered Shidane Arone. Razack (2000, 129) maintains that the CAF’s engagement with the US-led UN mission in
Somalia contributed to the narrative that “whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization.” While my participants did not reveal attitudes as abhorrent as those demonstrated in the Somalia affair, strong affective ties to NATO, and deep trepidation about UN engagement were evident.

My participants, while not demonstrating significant antipathy towards the UN, approached the subject of UN engagement with caution. None would prefer being deployed on a UN mission over a NATO mission, though five said they didn’t have a strong preference either way. Several soldiers justified their hesitancy about deployment with the UN with the example of the failed Rwanda mission. One stated “I’ve never experienced working with the UN. I’ve only read about it through Dallaire and stuff…. What I know about the Dallaire mission, Rwanda, the UN, and the indecisiveness is completely antithetical to what I lived under NATO” (Anonymous 1-7-17. 2017. Interview with V. Tait. July 1). Another participant shared a similar perspective saying “As far as what I’ve seen the UN do, it’s pretty useless. And if you’ve read books like Shake Hands with the Devil, the UN left a very bad taste in a lot of soldier’s mouths” (Anonymous 7-3-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. July 3). Several other participants also expressed negative views about the UN informed by their experiences during their tours with the United Nations Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR 1992-1995), when Canadians experienced horrific human rights violations, including against women and children (Perron 2017). A soldier commented that, “I’ve heard stories of UNPROFOR days and what people witnessed and they couldn’t do anything about it…I don’t have a lot of respect for the UN” (Anonymous 7-3-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. July 3). Another stated, “I personally do not want to go to Mali, I do not want to see what’s going on there just because you’re almost guaranteed to come out with PTSD after that… in UN missions you’re usually dealing with genocide and all that kind of stuff, whereas
NATO missions are more to do with security” (Anonymous 11-3-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. November 3). As this indicates, military personnel are hesitant to trust their physical health and mental wellbeing to the UN.

While soldiers expressed concern about deploying with the UN, they did not express similar concerns about deploying on a NATO mission. Instead, soldiers used concepts like “comfort” to describe their relationship with NATO or stated that they preferred NATO engagement because it is “more military” or that NATO “has more teeth” than the UN. Recall Lt. Col Anne Reiffenstein’s discussion of NATO in chapter four

NATO has a look and feel and shape to it that [military personnel] are comfortable and familiar with, and that we understand as western nations - UN peacekeeping operations don’t have that same look and feel. That’s not a judgement call in saying good, bad or anything else, it’s just a matter of saying they’re different. When you’re trying to draw materials and, information, you want to use the NATO examples because they’ll resonate more with [military personnel], they’ll say if NATO is doing it then we should buy into it. As opposed to the UN is doing it -- ok well, that’s not as automatic a buy in

LCol Reiffenstein’s argument was well supported by my participants’ responses. Many interviewees expressed opinions that suggested a trust-based organization with NATO, which in their opinion, gave them more permissive rules of engagement (ROE) and better equipped them to complete their jobs. One participant commented that “NATO gives us a longer leash to do the jobs you need to do without all the scrutiny. It’s less restrictive in allowing us to complete our jobs better… NATO does command a lot more respect than the UN” (Anonymous 7-3-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. July 3). Familiarity also heightened

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131 Reiffenstein is a professor at the CFC, which is the military college through which senior officers are trained to assume command roles. It offers such key courses as the Joint Command and Staff Program (for military personnel at the rank of Major and higher) and the National Security Program (for military personnel at the rank of Colonel and higher).

132 ROEs refer to the conditions that must first be met when “engaging” with an enemy. These conditions are determined specifically for each mission, but in the infamous Rwanda mission, ROEs prevented Canadian soldiers from using their weapons for any other purpose than self-defence. Accordingly, Canadian soldiers could do little more than watch the genocide unfold (Canada 2020).
participants’ preference for NATO engagement, and several participants stated, “I haven’t worked directly with the UN, so my preference is tainted in that respect, but I definitely see more advantage to working within a NATO construct” (101). These comments highlight those participants do not regard either the UN or NATO as simple consensus-based bodies. Instead, historically entrenched webs of meaning have been developed around each organization. While no participant stated that they were less likely to support UNSCR 1325 because it was a UN resolution, these responses suggest that NATO-derived discourses resonate more with CAF personnel than those taken from the UN repertoire.

**Evidence of Norm Rejection: Backlash**

Although this chapter has focused on implicit resistance to gender mainstreaming and the reframing of gender equality in instrumentalist terms, interviews also revealed significant evidence of *explicit* rejection of gender mainstreaming that far exceeds the resistance detailed within Lombardo and Mergaert’s (2013) framework. With 11 participants expressing anticipated, experienced or antipathy towards gender integration and sexual misconduct policies, backlash was one of the most common themes amongst my interviewees. When a participant shared frustration that the CAF’s current gender policy regime was tantamount to “McCarthyism” and encouraged a “witch hunt” mentality within the organization, I asked if he felt his subordinates and peers held similar perspectives. He shared that, in his opinion, “99% of them don’t necessarily like all of these policies coming in” (Anonymous 5-6-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. June 5). Another participant, reflecting on CAF members’ experiences in theatres of warfare and genocide, stated that:

> It is very hard for me to sit and hear how some folks, you know some women in the CAF, think that this is such a horrible place for them to be and that it is not supportive, and yet we get to come to work every day and our lives are not threatened with rape and disfigurement. I think this happens with soldiers, particularly troops, NCMs who
have deployed a lot, they’ve seen a lot of really horrible shit and then it’s hard to come back and take these things seriously (Anonymous 17-12-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. December 17)

Aside from obscuring the reality that women in the CAF do face the threat of rape and disfigurement in the workplace (see The Hand Project, by It’s Just 700)\textsuperscript{133}, this perspective grants military personnel impunity under the premise that they have been traumatized by war. This excerpt presents a very clear example of backlash, however not all instances of policy rejection were premised on the actual content of the policies. Although he recognized the importance of Op HONOUR, this participant found the delivery of the program repetitive and tedious,

…..it’s part of our annual compulsory training… it isn’t the most effective because with all of that annual training bullshit, nobody fucking wants to listen to it….I don’t want to fucking hear it again. I get it, don’t touch people inappropriately, let’s fucking go, [let us do our] job[s], you know what I mean? (Anonymous 7-3-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. March 7).

These responses indicate that, although many of my participants expressed positive attitudes towards women in combat, backlash against the expansion of gender integration policies persists and is a significant obstacle in the achievement of the gender equality goals contained in UNSCR 1325.

Complaints about the substantive content of gender integration training and policies, rather the format or delivery of that training, were commonly framed as a rejection of “gender rhetoric” or “political correctness.” Within this framing, gender mainstreaming efforts were understood as a Liberal government project to advance a political agenda, regardless of its impact on the CAF and its personnel. While participants did not explicitly criticize the Trudeau government, their discontent was clearly regarding policies that “are moving way to the left…. …and what’s scary is that if it goes too far to the left it could probably swing all the way back to the right” (Anonymous

\textsuperscript{133} Please be advised that this website details the sexual assault of CAF members and may be triggering for survivors of sexual trauma.
5-6-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. May 6). Likewise, when I asked another participant if s/he was familiar with any UN Security council resolutions, s/he responded, “how do I say this nicely… soldiers don’t really take our government seriously, so anything to do with the UN and NATO and stuff, people just kind of got fed up and stopped paying attention because it’s sort of a joke now more than anything” (Anonymous 16-6-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. June 18). These sentiments illustrate that, far from being a vestige of CAF history, opposition towards government interference in military affairs remains a point of contention amongst military personnel, particularly when that “interference” originates from a Liberal administration. Indeed, these complaints are reminiscent of those levied against early efforts to eliminate discriminatory conduct in the CAF throughout the 1990s. We may recall from chapter three that these initiatives, like the *Leadership in a Diverse Army* (LDA) project and *Standards for Harassment and Racism Prevention* (SHARP) were lambasted by soldiers for being, “something created in Ottawa with no relevance or practicality to the field units” (MABGIEE 1999, 16). The CAF’s deeply entrenched resistance to government interference, particularly regarding gender and diversity policy, demonstrate that elite-driven gender mainstreaming is likely to encounter significant opposition from CAF personnel. This highlights the importance of customized gender mainstreaming training programs that are tailored to the practice of the CAF, while remaining anchored within a larger justificatory framework of gender equality.

**Qualitative Discussion: The Gender-Equality Frame**

Despite the significant challenge ahead for those looking to champion gender equality in the CAF, my interviews also provide a basis for optimism that such change is possible. Instrumentalist rationales were by no means the only way participants engaged with the concept of gender: several
participants engaged sincerely with the concept of gender integration. For example, one participant emphasized the importance of female comradery within the CAF, asserting that:

….it certainly makes other women more comfortable. The more of us there [are], the more comfortable[it] seems to be. It also supports the idea that everyone has a place in the military, it’s not just lip service, it’s follow-through. [More women in higher ranks] sets a good precedent not just for females coming in but again, it really supports the idea that women and men can have any role (Anonymous 3-7-17. 2017. Interviews with V. Tait. March 7)

Another participant argued that “it’s very important for all the people who are in the military, not just for women, for everyone to be able to be a little bit more who they are and bring their true gifts and talents to the organization and be comfortable (Anonymous 12-4-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. December 4). The concept of authenticity figures prominently in these discussions: for example, a participant affirmed that CAF members have a right to “feel included in the CAF” not just instrumentally but as your “true self” (Anonymous 15-6-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. June 16). In these discussions, several participants shared the moment of recognition when they were forced to confront discrimination in the CAF- particularly revelatory moments for male participants. One spoke of a military friend who was upset that he might be criticized for his sexual orientation, stating: “that whole stigma with [homosexuality], that’s how the culture needs to change, right? He should just feel comfortable. As should women, as should men, we should all just feel comfortable in our surroundings” (Anonymous 7-3-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. July 3). Another male participant reflected on his younger years in the CAF:

…there was a time when I made rape jokes and thought it was OK because I would never rape a person. But the third time you’re an officer in charge of supporting someone who has been sexually assaulted, and your fifth or sixth personal friend that you love has come to you to tell you that she’s been sexually assaulted by a colleague…no matter how hard you try, you will fail your soldiers in millions of ways—you could not have imagined. But of all the ways that you may or may not fail your soldiers despite throwing all of your energy into taking care of them, how would you feel if an off-hand remark that you made as a joke was the reason that they didn’t come to you for help when they desperately needed you? (Anonymous 1-7-17. 2017. Interview with V. Tait. January 7).
Assuming a command position significantly shifted this participant’s perspective on the potentially severe consequences of “locker room banter” by illustrating both the prevalence of sexual misconduct in the CAF, and the devastating repercussions for personnel in his care.

In addition to comments made about the importance of increasing gender representation and equality within the CAF, several participants emphasized their admiration for women who serve in combat. In addition to recognizing the incredible challenges that women faced in non-traditional military occupations, these participants illustrated that their “army sisters” form an indispensable component of their community. One participant described the make-shift latrine that he and his troops would make for the women in their unit, “if we knew we were going to be at leisure for a bit before starting off on combat operations we would set up like four steel pickets and wrap a tarp around it for the females – just to give them a little bit of privacy” (Anonymous 7-3-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. March 7). Likewise, another participant emphasized that the women in his unit were seen as family, emphasizing that it operated as a safe space for personnel going through personal challenges, stating “this is our crew, and you’re safe” (Anonymous 1-7-2017. 2017. Interview with V. Tait. January 7). Another participant, who was herself a survivor of sexual assault, refused to characterize sexual assault as an army-wide problem, arguing that “95% of people I’ve encountered, even …in combat units, were phenomenal to me…harassment [exists in] pockets, it never was the full army” (Anonymous 16-6-18. 2018. Interview with V. Tait. June 16). These comments illustrate the deeply nuanced reality of gender culture in the CAF; the institution has created space for discriminatory violence and misogyny, but it has also created opportunities for women to thrive in careers that they find immensely rewarding.

Conclusion
In “Re-gendering the Military” Duncanson and Woodward (2016, 13) emphasize that as militaries continue to shift towards a focus on security and stabilization rather than violence and invasion, feminists should seek “engagement and reform, rather than [the] eradication” of military institutions. The authors reject arguments that militaries will invariably remain dominated by the norms of aggressive masculinity, and instead emphasize that incremental change in military culture in personnel, or operational approaches, can ultimately transform… its gender culture. This highlights a core challenge for feminists working within military institutions: are national and coalition forces credible sources of security and, ultimately, peace? (Bastick and Duncanson 2018). While my interviews demonstrate that the CAF is not at present a suitable environment within which to pursue the gender equality goals in UNSCR 1325, the possibility remains that the CAF can become capable of pursuing this agenda in the future.

If the CAF is to alter its course to institute a faithful translation of the gender equality goals contained in UNSCR 1325, several crucial changes must first occur. While operational efficacy discourse once served as a useful shield against arguments that the integration of women would hamper the CAF’s operational efficacy, this discourse has become divorced from gender equality in practice and so should be discontinued. Furthermore, interviews reviewed in this chapter demonstrate that CAF personnel may still have a strong preference for a thin politics of equality based on the denial of difference between the sexes. If so, the introduction of gender discourse premised on difference and diversity will be rejected, unless those differences can be exploited to meet the instrumental needs of the military and its NATO allies. However, there is reason for optimism that these objectives are achievable. While participants espoused many problematic views regarding the role of gender in modern operations, these views did not include outright rejection of gender equality perspectives, but rather a misunderstanding of how gendered
inequality perpetuates instability and conflict. Rather than understanding the relationship between gender and security as a systemic process, many participants understood gender as positional. My participants’ confusion around the subject of equality highlights that the CAF must develop policies and training on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda designed specifically for application within military practice, and to communicate the goals of the agenda without divorcing them from its central goal of gender equality. This is a crucial challenge for the organization as without recognition of its masculine history, practice and norms of the institution, the CAF is unlikely to recruit and retain women to the degree required by its obligations under UNSCR 1325.
Conclusion

One of the most significant challenges to the realization of UNSCR 1325 has been the domestic culture of implementing nations. National Action Plans have therefore played a crucial role in ensuring the domestic adoption of the resolution, and the strong message of gender equality that it contains. This message, as former NATO Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security, Marriët Schuurman (2015, 1) writes, is about “empowering women to take their rightful, active, and meaningful role in preventing and resolving conflicts, restoring peace and security, and building resilient and prosperous societies.” Nevertheless, institutional norms are resistant to change, and in the absence of critical junctures, institutional transformation often occurs incrementally (Jenichen et al 2019). This is the challenge that the CAF presently faces in implementing UNSCR 1325; the history of male dominance within the Canadian military has proven remarkably resistant to change. In a historic apology to CAF members in December of 2021, Defence Minister Anita Anand acknowledged that sexual assault within the CAF is a “failure that our Canadian Armed Forces, our department, and the government will always carry with us” (Honderich 2021). This apology underscores that gendered misconduct within the CAF is not just a harm visited upon individual women, but a larger systemic challenge embedded within the institution itself. As this dissertation has shown, the institutional memory of the CAF remains haunted by the military’s previous failures to successfully integrate women.

This dissertation demonstrates that Minister Anand’s apology is far from symbolic; sexual misconduct could be traced to the highest levels of CAF leadership. In the past two years, 11 members of the top brass have been implicated in sexual misconduct, including two Chiefs of Defence Staff (Ibid). Prof Leah West, herself a survivor of military sexual trauma, recalls of her ten years in uniform that, “sexualized behaviour, laughing and mocking women and other
minities in the military…became so much of the culture, you couldn’t see out of it.” The consequences of this culture were evident in 2018, when Canada nearly lost a planned UN mission to Somalia because the CAF could not meet the UN’s 15% minimum threshold for female military members present in the force the CAF planned to send (Pierotti 2018, 20). How then, can the CAF implement UNSCR 1325, which enshrines international feminist ideals rooted in the principle of gender equality?

**Making the Military Speak Feminist, or Making Feminism Speak Military?**

Engaging with the military has presented both challenges and opportunities for the advancement of women’s rights. The politics of war and pacifism have served as a wedge in women’s organizations, splintering groups like those that comprised the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC). As chapter one demonstrates, the divisive politics of war do not simply divide women’s organizations into a polarized binary for-or-against militarism. Instead, the question of military engagement has fractured feminist opinions into spectrum of beliefs about patriotism and the responsibilities of citizenship. Critical feminists have pointed to the military’s tendency to coopt feminism. In this vein, Otto (2010, 98) warns that women’s activism within the Security Council may have unintentionally lent “gender legitimacy to the international institutions of which they are fundamentally critical.” This issue has been evident in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the CAF, where the use-value of the resolution is emphasized through a discourse of *operational efficacy*. Not only does this discourse detract from the rights-based discourse of gender equality contained within UNSCR 1325, but it has had the measurable effect of channeling UNSCR 1325 through operationally driven organizations within the CAF, hastening the cooptation of the resolution.
Further complicating the implementation of UNSCR 1325, the resolution was ratified in Canada during an intense period of bellicose nationalism. The first Canadian National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 (2010-2016) was released during the Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, which emboldened violent warrior discourse, intensified Canadian militarism by deepening Canada’s military engagement in Afghanistan, and rejected the concept of gender entirely. The rejection of gender and gender mainstreaming, in concert with Prime Minister Harper’s deft use of security discourse to maintain public support for the Conservative Party, meant that the political opportunity structure present during the first NAP was ill-suited to a resolution founded on gender equality. Instead, the demands of NATO engagement in Afghanistan drove demand for policy that would enable CAF personnel to achieve mission objectives and undercut the Liberal peacekeeper mythos of the Canadian military. Thus, not only was the Harper government unwilling to problematize the combat masculine warrior paradigm, to the contrary, it emboldened it.

The combat masculine warrior paradigm, or the belief that the military’s core goal is the preparation for, and conduct of war, remains embedded in the culture of the Canadian Armed Forces. Within this context, interference from civilian political authorities—particularly in service of gender equality goals—has been seen to threaten the operational efficacy of the CAF. Therefore, maintaining the substantive gender equality content of UNSCR 1325 in the CAF was extremely difficult as the institution has a legacy of failed gender equality policies. When Op HONOUR was initiated in 2015, in response to an External Review led by former Supreme Court Justice Marie Deschamps, it was immediately met with resistance from military personnel, who

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134 Karen Dunivin (1994) defines the “combat masculine warrior paradigm” or “CMW” paradigm as one founded first on the military’s core activity as combat, or the preparation for – and conduct of – war. The second pillar of the paradigm is the masculine-warrior image, which stems from the military being comprised almost exclusively of men.
quickly renamed the initiative “Hop on Her” (Taber 2017). Thus, when former Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Jonathan Vance issued a Directive on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the Canadian Armed Forces, there were very few discursive repertoires that norm entrepreneurs could draw on without sparking backlash from CAF personnel. Accordingly, gender equality discourse and policy reminiscent of Op MINERVA (1994) and Op HONOUR (2015-2021) were separated from UNSCR 1325 during its implementation.

The importance of divorcing UNSCR 1325 from existing gender equality policies in the CAF became even clearer once CAF Gender Advisors, or GENADs, began introducing the WPS Agenda to CAF personnel. A CAF GENAD interviewed in a DND/CAF sponsored study reflected that it is important to focus explicitly on military frameworks when offering gender-based perspectives to Commanders, because the “GBA Plus intersectionality flower… that one doesn’t gain any traction with military people” (Thomson and Filardo 2019, 7). This comment echoes several of the GENADs interviewed in my dissertation, who insisted that they had to make UNSCR 1325 “pointy” and “army” to achieve buy-in from military personnel. Problematically however, this distorts both the gender equality and conflict prevention messaging contained in the original resolution. UNSCR 1325 was never about “pointy” or “army” but rather it sought to ensure gender perspectives were considered in peacekeeping operations, and that women would have a chance to participate in the security decisions that directly impacted their wellbeing. Another GENAD participant in the Thomson & Filardo study (2019, 9) recalled one of her first interactions with a CAF commanding officer, “Oh, you’re the Gender Advisor? So, I’m supposed to drop my trousers and you’ll advise me what gender I am?” Clearly, Capt. (N) Bowen and Ms. Unterganschnigg can hardly be blamed for fearing that CAF members may not take the gender equality content of UNSCR 1325 seriously.
When I began my interviews with rank-and-file CAF personnel, covered in chapter five, I expected comments much like that provided by the CAF commanding officer above. Admittedly, I was pleasantly surprised when no such crass answers arose during my interviews. Sandra Whitworth (2004, 1) has remarked that this is a particularly inconvenient contradiction for feminist researchers; while violent militarism is detestable, I have almost universally found individual CAF soldiers to be “jovial, decent, and dedicated.” In large part, the women and men that voluntarily provided their insight to this dissertation were thoughtful and wanted to learn more about gender. These participants were also unanimously in favour of women in combat-facing occupations. However, the problematic discursive rationale provided for increasing the substantive and numeric representation of women in the CAF remained: women and gender perspectives enhance operational efficacy. Criticism of GBA Plus and Op HONOUR was generally framed as a criticism of program delivery, however most personnel interviewed had either seen or anticipated some form of backlash to gender-integration policy. The combat masculine warrior paradigm may have softened since Dunivin first documented it in 1994, but it has by no means been eliminated.

This dissertation has demonstrated that gender integration in the CAF has moved from a logic of equality towards a logic of efficacy (see. Pollock & Hafner Burton 2000). Historically, the gender culture of the CAF moved away from the exclusion of women and towards a discourse of gender equality (1969-2002). This discourse emphasized the integrationist principle of inclusion; servicewomen were functionally no different than male military personnel, and thus had a right to participate in the CAF as Canadian citizens. As such, servicewomen were to be integrated into existing institutional arrangements without challenging the underlying cultural norms of the CAF. However, underlying this principle, as Squires (2005) notes, is a tendency towards the emphasis of sameness. As a result, servicewomen were forced to acclimatize themselves to the pre-existing
culture of the institution rather than introducing it to the diversity of their lived experiences (Febbraro 2004). Gender integration in this period was seen as something that must be accomplished to adhere to civilian legislation, which the 2016 Diversity Plan terms a “compliance-based model” (2016). Within this compliance-based model, gender integration is seen to be forced on the military by a liberal civilian political apparatus that aims to treat the CAF as a social laboratory with little regard for operational efficacy or troop morale. The emphasis on sameness would change with the CAF became subject to the Employment Equity Act in 2002.

With the introduction of the EEA, military leaders now had an incentive to emphasize difference and diversity. Discourse at the executive level of the CAF slowly shifted away from gender-blind approaches that denied difference and towards an emphasis on what women in uniform could do for the Canadian military. However, change was slow, and ardent resistance to the politics of diversity contained within EEA remained until it became evident during the CAF’s engagement in Afghanistan that it was indeed useful for the military to deploy women in uniform. Building on “lessons learned” from deployment in conservative Afghan provinces like Kandahar, the CAF – and NATO – quickly recognized that they would be unable to achieve their mission objectives with an all-male combat force. NATO forces could not maintain the benevolent imagery they sought to portray to the public while violating conservative Islamic norms about the interaction of men and women. Simply put, if NATO forces wanted to be able to engage with Afghan women, either to search them or gather intelligence from them, it would need female soldiers. In this regard, UNSCR 1325 presents the perfect vehicle for advancing several the CAF’s agendas. First, it encourages the recruitment and retention of women in combat forces, something that has bedevilled the CAF since it first became subject to the EEA. Secondly, it allowed the CAF
to expand its spectrum of operations into counter-insurgency missions, in which winning the “hearts and minds” of local nationals is paramount.

**Contribution**

My research findings on the militarization of UNSCR 1325 in the Canadian Armed Forces illustrate the explanatory value of norm translation and feminist institutionalism, particularly when used together. Having integrated women into combat-facing occupations prior to most of its NATO allies, the Canadian military had gained an international reputation as a front-runner in gender integration. This status ought to have allowed it to be an exemplary case of the implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda, and yet it has failed to realize UNSCR 1325’s core tenets of participation and protection. Throughout the period in which UNSCR 1325 was supposed to have been adopted in the CAF (arguably from the resolutions ratification in 2000, until the present day), the CAF failed to provide a hospitable work environment for female military personnel on several fronts. Sexual and gender-based harassment has remains an obstinate problem for both women and men in the CAF; violent sexual subordination was once an element of CAF hazing rituals, and it remains present in CAF culture because of deliberate efforts by CAF leadership to shelter its perpetrators. These problems are compounded by the CAF’s stalwart belief in gender-blind meritocracy within the institution, which discourages engagement with gender-integration policy that may be seen to accord a special status or privilege to women. This research suggests that domestic institutional norms can subvert international women’s rights campaigns, both intentionally and unintentionally, through the framing practices they employ to achieve buy-in within the norm-receiving community.

My dissertation contributes, at its broadest, a case study that allows researchers to trace the emergence of women’s rights norms at the international level down through the individual
branches of the institutions that they were intended to transform. The Canadian case study highlights that norm-spoiling (Sanders 2018), can occur outside of the conservative religious countries that one might expect would resist the advancement of gender equality. Canada, as demonstrated in chapter two, is both an advanced western democracy, and it has an international reputation as a leader in human security. Yet, military and civilian actors can actively contest and undermine incoming gender equality norms given the right political opportunity structure (Ibid, 272). While Canada’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 has not been a wholesale failure, reframing UNSCR 1325 to appeal to the operational priorities of the CAF has weakened its emphasis on the gender equality norms contained within the resolution. While there may be hope for improvement amidst the burgeoning political opportunity structure created by the Trudeau administration’s commitment to feminism, the challenges the CAF faced during its implementation of the UNSCR 1325 remain unresolved.

Future Research

That the CAF has issues with sexual assault and the mistreatment of women is a well-documented problem, however the full scope of this issue has yet to be realized. The issue of sexual assault – indeed the violent sexual subordination of all genders – will not be ameliorated by identifying a “few bad apples” within the military (Bickerton 2015). Toxic masculine culture within the CAF needs to be defined outside the narrow scope of sexual assault and re-situated as an issue within the very structure of the institution; in its language and cultural repertoire, rooted in the exaltation of violent militarism as a symbol of virility and strength.

Whitworth (2004, 3) points out the core contradiction of militarized peacekeeping: “on the one hand, it depends on the individuals (mostly men) who have been constructed as soldiers, and on the other hand, it demands that they deny many of the traits they have come to understand being
a soldier entails.” Anecdotally, I have heard similar comments from soldiers who insist that the core responsibility of the CAF can be distilled as “shooting people” or waging “war.” Or as former CDS Rick Hillier once said, “We are the Canadian Forces, and our job is to be able to kill people” (Leblanc 2005). This is somewhat akin to a surgeon insisting that it is her job to cut people. Though the execution of violence may be necessary, the CAF’s job is the provision of security. Moving forward, a core element of creating a hospitable environment for women will be undermining this violent iteration of masculinity, and its exaltation within the CAF.

In a special issue of Atlantis (2020), I engaged with a question first prompted by Bastick and Duncanson (2018). Can NATO forces (like the CAF) be relied upon as credible sources of security, and ultimately, peace? To this I respond (somewhat tentatively) yes. What my dissertation revealed was that the militarization of UNSCR 1325 was consolidated throughout the political opportunity structure into which it was introduced. Militarized nationalism imposed by Canadian political leadership along with its indifference towards the WPS Agenda, allowed the DND/CAF to take the easy road. A resonant frame that guaranteed buy-in by deferring to the pre-existing institutional culture of the Canadian Military, which remains deeply committed to NATO, hesitant about the UN and beset by a historic attachment to toxic masculinity. What is needed, moving forward, is a frame that does not intuitively resonate with CAF military ethos. Instead, the CAF needs to explore the transformative potential of UNSCR 1325 as it was originally intended – to unseat the masculinized bellicosity of the current international order and recenter human rights as the core purpose of international security.

If the CAF is to be successful in recruiting and retaining women, and mirroring the values and diversity of Canadian society, it first must allocate far more resources to the achievement of UNSCR 1325. The easiest step, and perhaps the most influential, would be developing and
implementing bespoke Canadian training on UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives. Rather than teaching the resolution only when personnel are to deploy on a mission where gender perspectives are deemed necessary, this training should be offered to all CAF personnel. Similarly, GENAD training is offered only to those select few officers fortunate enough to be chosen to attend the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations in Sweden. This training should be offered not just to officers, but to the non-commissioned military personnel often tasked with implementing UNSCR 1325 on deployment. My interviews indicate that military personnel may be receptive to training on the relationship between gender and security, however the delivery of this training must change. Participants repeatedly emphasized that training needs to move beyond online courses, or else in-person training led by unqualified military members.

Relatedly, the CAF must realign UNSCR 1325 within the broader scope of gender integration policy currently being pursued by the DND/CAF. New initiatives designed to replace Op HONOUR, e.g., *The Path to Dignity and Respect*, should be linked directly to the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda, both in policy and in practice. Similarly, the CAF’s most recent implementation plans on the second Canadian National Action Plan on WPS (2017-2022) still reference the 2016 CDS Directive on UNSCR 1325 as the cornerstone document for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the CAF. As the Directive is based on Canada’s first NAP (2010-2016), which has been widely panned for being insufficient, a new Directive should be drafted to reflect current Canadian policy on UNSCR 1325. In so doing, the CAF can demonstrate its commitment to gender equality through tangible commitments to enhancing the architecture of its current gender policy.
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<tr>
<td>29 October 2019, S/Res/2493</td>
<td>Reaffirms previous commitments to WPS, while strengthening language around domestic implementation of 1325. This resolution notes the lack of women in peace, security and political organizations and calls on member states to increase efforts to ensure women in those positions are able to work safely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 April 2019, S/Res/2467</td>
<td>Calls on member states to enhance accountability for sexual assault and eliminate the culture of impunity around rape as a tool of war. This resolution introduced a survivor-centric approach in addressing conflict related sexual violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 October 2015, S/Res/2242</td>
<td>This resolution encourages greater interaction with civil society organizations and emphasizes the importance of gender sensitivity training within UN bodies. The resolution urges members to increase funding for gender specific training programs and to increase accountability for funds already being spent. It calls on the Secretary General to double the number of women peacekeepers in UN organizations. The resolution also acknowledges gender as a cross-cutting issue in countering terrorism and violent extremism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 October 2013, S/Res/2122</td>
<td>This resolution addressed the persistent gaps in the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda, as highlighted in the most recent Secretary-General’s report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 June 2013, S/RES/2106</td>
<td>This was a resolution focusing on accountability for perpetrators of sexual violence in conflict and stressing women’s political and economic empowerment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 December 2010, S/RES/1960</td>
<td>This resolution established a monitoring, analysis and reporting mechanism on conflict-related sexual violence in situations on the Council’s agenda, and also called upon parties to armed conflict to make specific, time-bound commitments to prohibit and punish sexual violence and asked the Secretary-General to monitor those commitments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 October 2009, S/RES/1889</td>
<td>This resolution urged member states, UN bodies, donors and civil society to ensure that women’s protection and empowerment is taken into account during post-conflict needs assessment and planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 September 2009, S/RES/1888</td>
<td>This resolution strengthened efforts to end sexual violence against women and children in armed conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 June 2008, S/RES/1820</td>
<td>This addressed sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations and asked the Secretary-General for a report by 30 June 2009 with information on the systematic use of sexual violence in conflict areas and proposals for strategies to minimize the prevalence of such acts with benchmarks for measuring progress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 May 2002, S/RES/1408</td>
<td>The Council encouraged civil society initiatives in the region, including those of the Mano River Union Women’s Peace Network, to continue their contribution towards regional peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 August 2001, S/RES/1366</td>
<td>This resolution addressed the issue of DDR in UN peacekeeping and peace building mandates and stated that preventing armed conflict was a major part of the Council’s work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 November 2000, S/RES/1327</td>
<td>This resolution emphasized the importance of the Secretary-General in conflict prevention and reaffirmed the role of women in conflict prevention and resolution and peace building. The Council also agreed to strengthen the system of consultations with TCCs through the holding of private meetings with them and stated a possibility to consider using the Military Staff Committee as one of the means of enhancing UN peacekeeping capacity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 October 2000, S/RES/1325</td>
<td>This was the resolution on women, peace and security, in particular expressing the Council’s willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping missions, calling on all parties to protect women and girls from gender-based violence and to put an end to impunity for such crimes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix B. NATO Command Structure

Appendix C: Institutional Structure of the Canadian Armed Forces

Unlike other Canadian governmental departments and agencies, the Canadian military is divided into two legally distinct entities: the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence. Though this structure introduces a considerable degree of complexity into the organizational structure of the Canadian military, checks and balances like these are commonplace within Western democracies to ensure the civilian control of the armed forces. As a result of this structure, the military is legally subservient to the political will of a democratically elected Canadian government, at least on paper. The DND and CAF is the largest federal department in Canada, employing approximately 68,000 Regular Force Members, 27,000 Reserve Force Members and 5,200 Ranger Patrol Group Members. Regular Force Members (sometimes referred to as Reg Force) are full-time soldiers, while Reserve Force Members (or Reservists) augment the Reg Force on a part-time basis. Both Reservists and Reg Force Members are subject to the National Defence Act, and both can be deployed domestically and abroad. Finally, the Reg Force and Reserves are divided into an Officers, who are tasked with leading the organization and its personnel, and Non-Commissioned Members (NCMs) who execute the taskings specified by Officers. There is a separate rank structure for Officers and NCMs:

137 For example, in the United States, the Secretary of Defence is equivalent to our Minister of Defence and must not have served in the military within seven years of his appointment to the position. Likewise, the position of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in Canada can be likened to the American Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is the highest-ranking uniformed member of the military.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranks</th>
<th>Royal Canadian Navy</th>
<th>Canadian Army/Royal Canadian Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General/Flag Officers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral (Adm.)</td>
<td>General (Gen.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Admiral (VAdm.)</td>
<td>Lieutenant-General (LGen.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear-Admiral (RAdm.)</td>
<td>Major-General (MGen.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodore (Cmdre.)</td>
<td>Brigadier-General (BGen.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Senior Officers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain (N) (Capt (N))</td>
<td>Colonel (Col)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander (Cdr)</td>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel (LCol)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Commander (LCmdr)</td>
<td>Major (Maj)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Junior Officers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant (N) (Lt (N))</td>
<td>Captain (Capt)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Lieutenant (SLt)</td>
<td>Lieutenant (Lt)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acting Sub-Lieutenant (A/SLt)</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant (2Lt)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subordinate Officer</strong></td>
<td>Navel Cadet (NCdt)</td>
<td>Officer Cadet (OCdt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Warrant Officers, Petty Officers and Senior Non-Commissioned Officer</strong></td>
<td>Chief Petty Officer 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; class (CPO 1)</td>
<td>Chief Warrant Officer (CWO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chief Petty Officer 2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; class (CPO 2)</td>
<td>Master Warrant Officer (MWO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Petty Officer 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; class (PO 1)</td>
<td>Warrant Officer (WO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Petty Officer 2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; class (PO 2)</td>
<td>Sergeant (Sgt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Junior Non-Commissioned Members</strong></td>
<td>Master Seaman (MS)</td>
<td>Master Corporal (MCpl)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leading Seaman (LS)</td>
<td>Corporal (Cpl)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Able Seaman (AB)</td>
<td>Private (Trained) (Pte (T))/Aviator (Trained) (Avr (T))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ordinary Seaman (OS)</td>
<td>Private (Basic) (Pte (B))/Aviator (Basic) (Avr B))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Structurally speaking, this dissertation focuses on the Level 1, or L1 organizations that fall under the exclusive purview of the Chief of Defence Staff (in green in organizational chart below). These are the CAF’s “military” organizations, rather than the Department of National Defence’s civilian organizations that support the military. L1 organizations are divided into “Force Generators” and “Force Employers.” Force Generators are those divisions of the CAF responsible for the “training, career progression and welfare” of soldiers, sailors and aviators – in other words, Force Generators create and maintain military personnel. The Force Generators in the CAF are the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), the Canadian Army (CA), the Royal Canadian Airforce (RCAF), Military Personnel Command (MILPERSCOM), and Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM). Now included in this list is the ADM Information Management ADM (IM) with...
respect to the CAF’s cyber capabilities. Force Employers take personnel from Force Generating organizations to execute specific tasks given by the Chief of Defence Staff and the Deputy Minister of National Defence. Force Employers are Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC), Canadian Special Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) and the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). The final organization of note, which is neither a Force Generator or Employer, is the Strategic Joint Staff Command (SJS), which works in an advisory role to provide the CDS with strategic level analysis and engage with key partners like other federal government departments, allies, and partner nations.
Appendix D: Subject Matter Expert Interview Questions

Name:
Position:
Length of time in Position:
Previous Positions of Note:

Please recall that you are not required to disclose any information or answer any question that in doing so would make you personally or professionally uncomfortable

1) Could you please describe how your job requires you to engage with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325)?

2) Is there any other Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) document (for example NATO BI-Directive 40-1, or the Canadian National Action Plan on 1325) that guides your work?

3) In your opinion, what are the key messages and goals contained within UNSCR 1325 in particular, and Women, Peace and Security in general?
   a. Do your colleagues share this view?
   b. Do your superiors share this view?
   c. Do your subordinates share this view?
   d. Have you noticed points of contention in how you understand, interpret or apply these plans?

4) In what forums are you empowered to share this information domestically and internationally?
   a. What are the key talking points that you emphasize to your audience?

5) Do you discuss UNSCR 1325 and WPS in a teaching or training capacity?

6) In your experience, have you been given the tools and resources you require to achieve the goals outlined in UNSCR 1325 and WP&S, as you understand them?
   a. If applicable, what tools and resources would have made it easier for you to implement UNSCR 1325 and WP&S

7) Have you had an opportunity to work directly with Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Personnel on WPS guidance?
   a. Do you recall what trade these soldiers served in? For example, were they in Armoured or Infantry trades?
   b. Could you please describe the nature of your work with CAF Personnel?
   c. To your knowledge, did the soldiers you work with have any experience with UNSCR 1325 or any related WPS doctrine?
   d. Did you have an opportunity to discuss this guidance with CAF Personnel?
      i. In your opinion, how was this information received?
8) Are there any other Canadian Federal Government Departments that you worked with on UNSCR 1325 or related WPS Guidance?
   a. Which department did you work with?
   b. Could you please describe the nature of your work with that department?
   c. To your knowledge, did the personnel of that department have any experience with UNSCR 1325 or any related WPS guidance?
   d. Did you have an opportunity to discuss this guidance with the personnel of that department?
      i. In your opinion, how was this information received?

9) Did your perception of attitudes towards 1325 and related WPS plans change following Canada’s election of a liberal majority government?
   a. To your recollection, did any of the aforementioned attitudes change in response to the federal government? For example:
      i. Jean Chretien 2000 (when UNSCR 1325 was passed)-2003
      ii. Paul Martin 2003-2006
      iv. Justin Trudeau 2015-present
Appendix E: Solder Interview Questions

Please recall that you are not required to disclose any information or answer any question that in doing so would make you personally or professionally uncomfortable

I. Deployment Experience

1) What is your current rank and occupation?

2) You are a member of the Reg F. or Res F? (Please circle one)

3) How long have you served in Reg F./Res F?

4) What deployments have you had to date? Could you include year of deployment(s), length of deployment(s) and your position during deployment(s):

5) Did you have any contact with NGOs during your deployment(s)?

II. Professional Experience

1) To the best of your knowledge, during your deployment, how many female soldiers did you work with on a day-to-day basis?

2) To the best of your knowledge, how many female soldiers do you work with on a day-to-day basis at home?

3) Generally speaking, what do you think about women serving in the combat arms?

4) Some studies have suggested that there are benefits to be gained from having women in the combat arms, for example as coalition forces found out with Female Engagement Teams (FET) in Afghanistan. What do you think based on your experiences?

5) Some argue that the military should be completely gender neutral. These attitudes are popular amongst many in the CAF leadership. In your experience, is this desirable? Are there instances when gender comes into play in military operations?

6) How does having women in your unit affect your ability to develop a sense of comradery amongst your peers?

7) May I ask you a few questions about how you understand gender rather than biological sex? For clarification, the United Nations defines gender as “the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes.”
a. Does this definition coincide with what you understand gender to mean?
b. Do you prefer to say man or woman instead of gender? Or something neutral, like *troops*? What (if anything) does the word *gender* mean to you?
c. Do you shape the way you discuss gender to fit the audience you’re addressing?
d. Do you identify strongly with a masculine or feminine gender? Either, both or neither?

### III. Awareness of Relevant Gender Protocol (*Streaming Questions*)

8) Are you familiar with any United Nations Security Council Resolutions? Is there one in particular you find interesting or important?


10) Have you heard of NATO’s Strategic Bi-Directive 40-1? *(Could you describe it?)*

11) Have you had a chance to read any Canadian legislation or Canadian directives on Canada’s commitment to UNSCR 1325? This could include the CDS directive on 1325, or our previous National Action Plan on 1325 *(Could you describe them?)*

12) Are you familiar with any other Canadian initiatives to integrate gender perspectives into the Canadian military? For example, Operation Honour or Status of Women Gender Based Analysis Plus training programs? *(Could you describe them?)*

### Stream A: Familiar with 1 Plus Key WPS Document

13) What gender awareness training have you received to date? Please specify which training was included as part of your pre-deployment training.

14) Have you taken advantage of any additional training available to you, provided by organizations like NATO or the Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF), for example?

15) Have you taken any university or college courses on gender or women’s studies?

16) Have you taken any gender training provided by partner forces with whom you’ve been deployed? For example, training provided by the American, Dutch or British military?

17) What were your general impressions of gender awareness training provided by the CAF? Anything new to you? Was it useful?

18) What were your general impressions of gender awareness training provided by organizations outside of the CAF (NATO, DCAF, Partner Forces)? Anything new to you? Was it useful?
19) Do you have any reflections or impressions about the person or persons that delivered this training? Where they effective? Impartial? Any methods or lessons that really stuck with you?

20) Aside from the fact that you are required to take this training, were you motivated to learn more about gender? Why?

21) Consider your deployment. Were you able to apply gender awareness training in any meaningful way? If you’re permitted, could you share that experience with me?

22) Consider your time in garrison. Have you been able to apply gender awareness training? If you’re permitted, could you share that experience with me?

23) Has any of this training changed the way you see gender in your unit, or in the CAF as a whole?

24) Has any of this training changed the way you see gender in your personal life?

Stream B: Not Familiar with any Key WPS documents

May I offer you a very brief summary?

Studies show that war and conflict can affect women and girls differently than men and boys, and the UN sought to find a way to mitigate for the differential impact of war that women and men might experience. For example, in some conflicts women are more likely to become victims of sexual violence or may be more likely to starve when food resources are scarce. The documents I just mentioned originate with UNSCR 1325, a UN resolution passed in 2000 that requires the military to consider these differences by ensuring gender perspectives are taken into consideration. Since 1325 has been passed, the requirement to incorporate these gender perspectives in operations has been incorporated in NATO doctrine. By way of example, this involves integrating gendered perspectives through mandatory gender awareness training and the appointment of Gender Advisors (GENADs) in all NATO operations. Similarly, the Government of Canada is committed to implementing UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions in our military and in our operations abroad. Currently the CAF has three GENADs in SJS, CJOC and SOFCOM. These advisors provide specialized gender expertise to commanding officers to ensure that the abovementioned differences are taken into consideration during CAF operations.

1) Bearing in mind that I’ve only given you a brief summary, does your experience in the military suggest that there is a need for this kind of guidance? Why or why not?

2) Do you expect that some nations will benefit more from this kind of guidance than others?
3) Do you think having special gender advisory staff is needed and of value to the organization?
   a. When Canada sends troops on a UN mission, should one or more of the authorized positions be reserved for GENADS – and do you think they should be women, men or either?

4) Do you believe that these rules and regulations allow you to better complete your job as a soldier? Why or why not?

5) What is your general impression of international organizations like the UN and NATO?
   a. Do you prefer either the UN or NATO in your professional or personal opinion? Why?

6) These initiatives began in the UN as international guidance, rather than in Canada. Does this impact your overall impression of the doctrine, or your likelihood of embracing its message?