Towards "new St.-Malo:"
The Europeanization of Polish Security Policy

by

Rafal Domisiewicz

A thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario

© 2012

Rafal Domisiewicz
NOTICE:
The author has granted a non-exclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distribute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or non-commercial purposes, in microform, paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright ownership and moral rights in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author’s permission.

In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis.

While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis.

AVIS:
L’auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par télécommunication ou par l’Internet, prêter, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou autres formats.

L’auteur conserve la propriété du droit d’auteur et des droits moraux qui protege cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privée, quelques formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de cette thèse.

Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans la pagination, il n’y aura aucun contenu manquant.
In this dissertation I utilise the conceptual framework of Europeanization to interrogate the influence of the EU – through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and other European fora - on the security and defence policy of Poland. Within the empirical case studies of the armed forces reform, defence-industrial policy and civilian crisis management to determine triggers of change, modes of transmission and nature and scope of the outputs. The analytical timeframe encompasses 1999-2009, commencing with the establishment of the CSDP and Poland’s accession negotiations, covering five years of Poland’s EU membership until the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.

Europeanization is a process in which the EU member states’ policies, institutions and ideas (dependent variable) are affected by new practices, norms, rules and procedures generated above the nation-state level within the EU security governance (independent variable). Europeanization diffuses through several mechanisms, which evince the tensions between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences. The extent and direction of Europe’s impact is mediated by two intervening variables. European cognitive constructions are the more likely to have an impact the more they resonate with ideas embedded in national security identity. The traction varies with respect to state capacity, which encapsulates the possession of expertise and resources as well as the level of policy autonomy.

The CSDP is anchored within the Euro-Atlantic security network, alongside NATO, which has strong causal properties of its own. Therefore, I employ a triangulated methodology - literature analysis, interviews and participant-observation, as well as tools
like process tracing and temporal sequencing, to help distinguish *EU-ization* from *NATO-ization*. Poland’s responsiveness to either one or the other stimuli has depended on the balance of costs and rewards, thickness of the rules in respective policy subdomains, as well as the country’s position in relation to decision-making within each organization.

Europeanization is shown to be uneven and differentiated across policy areas. While the armed forces reform, facilitated by complementary influence of NATO and the EU, exemplifies transformation, defence-industrial policy continues to adapt in response mainly to European triggers, while civilian crisis management lags behind the other two policy dimensions.
To my parents

Marian (□) and Genowefa Domisiewicz
Acknowledgements

Several individuals have helped me complete this dissertation. I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. David Long for his counsel and support, which enabled me to travel the full distance of this intellectual journey. I am grateful also to my committee members. Dr. Joan DeBardeleben has provided invaluable constructive critique and advice. I am indebted to Dr. Piotr Dutkiewicz, particularly for his unfailing assistance and encouragement. I appreciate also the mentorship of Dr. Alexander Moens, who has greatly stimulated my interest in the affairs of European security.

I have benefitted from professional experience or analytical insights shared by individuals who kindly agreed to be interviewed. I have also been lucky to have bosses who allowed me to pursue this academic venture while working. The views expressed here are my own and in no way reflect those of my employer.

I would not have been able to complete this work were it not for the support of my family. I would like to thank Sylwia, my dearest wife, for standing by me and always keeping me on track. For a number of years she has patiently put up with rooms filled with books and papers and my countless hours spent at the computer. Emilia, our precious daughter, who was born shortly after I began doctoral studies, has provided me with welcome distraction and boosted my motivation. My mom has helped busy parents share the burdens of daily responsibilities at times when juggling professional, academic and family commitments proved too daunting. And I know that my sister Agnieszka has been with me all this time in thoughts and prayer.

I thank all of you from the bottom of my heart.
# Table of Contents

Abstract ii  
Acknowledgements v  
Table of Contents vi  
List of Tables viii  
List of Figures ix  
List of Abbreviations x  

Introduction 1  
1. The Research Puzzle 1  
2. The Analytical Framework 6  
3. The Empirical Content 16  
   3.1. The armed forces reform 16  
   3.2. Defence-industrial policy 22  
   3.3. Civilian crisis management 27  
4. Methodology 32  

Chapter I: The Conceptual Framework 36  
I.1. Independent variable 36  
I.2. Dependent variable 42  
I.3. NATO-ization, networks, globalization and domestic reforms: 49  
   Unravelling the causal relationships  
I.4. Diffusion mechanisms 63  
I.5. Taxonomy of changes 75  
I.6. Intervening variables 79  
   I.6.a. Security identity 80  
   I.6.b. State capacity 85  

Chapter II: The Armed Forces Reform 89  
II.1. Europeanization and reform of the Polish armed forces 89  
II.2. NATO-ization, 91  
II.3. European Headline Goal 2003 100  
II.4. Brusselization and organizational changes 108  
II.5. Education and training 116  
II.6. The multinationality paradigm 125  
   II.6.a. Multinationalization and specialization: Constabulary forces 134  
II.7. Impact of the EU Battlegroups and the NATO Response Force 137  

vi
II.8. The expeditionary paradigm 153
II.9. Transition to an all-volunteer force 169
II.10. The Chobielin Initiative – The New St.Malo 177
II.11. Conclusion 182

Chapter III: Defence-Industrial Policy 194

III.1. Europeanization and defence-industrial policy 194
III.2. Capability Development Mechanism and the European Capabilities Action Plan 198
III.3. Defence procurement 208
III.4. Offset Policy 233
III.5. Restructuring the defence industry 243
III.6. Defence R&D 250
III.7. Conclusion 262

Chapter IV: Civilian Crisis Management 271

IV.1. Europe’s forte? 271
IV.2. Ideational resonance, doctrinal impact and experiential learning 281
IV.3. Institutional framework for Brusselization 293
IV.4. Legal-institutional framework at the national level 297
IV.5. Civilian Headline Goal, Personnel Recruitment and Training 311
IV.6. Missions 326
IV.7. Conclusion 339

Conclusion 346

1. Towards a Europeanized security and defence policy? 346
2. The causes of change 352
3. How Europe hits home 357
4. The filters of Europeanization 360

Bibliography 365
List of Tables

Table 1 Polish security and defence policy in 1999 and 2009 43
Table 2 Mechanisms of diffusion 65
Table 3 A typology of domestic change 75
Table 4 Polish security policy elites (1999-2009) 86
Table 5 Polish defence budget 92
Table 6 The size of the Polish armed forces 93
Table 7 Training locations of Polish officers 119
Table 8 The Polish armed forces in multinational military units in Europe 128
Table 9 EU BG Roster 138
Table 10 EU BG and NRF in comparison 147
Table 11 Poland in EU and NATO military operations 159
Table 12 Participation of Poland in ECAP project groups 203
Table 13 Unclassified deliveries or contracts of Polish defence and law enforcement equipment (1990-2009) 217
Table 14 Notices published in the Electronic Bulletin Board per subscribing member state from 1 July 2006 to 24 September 2007 226
Table 15 Poland’s major military purchases (2000-2008) 230
Table 16 The offset agreements in Poland as of 30th December 2008 236
Table 17 Poland in EDA R&D programs 253
Table 18 EU civilian crisis management quantitative targets and member state commitments 312
Table 19 Poland in EU civilian crisis management operations 333
## List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>Europeanisation as an ongoing and mutually constitutive process of change linking European and national levels</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>Research design</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>EU member states’ CHG commitments and actual deployments in 2009</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>Proportion of the EU’s total civilian deployments, By member state</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>NATO Allied Command Transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARP</td>
<td>Agency of Industrial Development (in Poland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVF</td>
<td>All-Volunteer Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>NATO Comprehensive Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARDS</td>
<td>Community assistance for reconstruction, development and stabilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Civilian Crisis Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDM</td>
<td>Capability Development Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPOL</td>
<td>European Police College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHG</td>
<td>Civilian Headline Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>communication and information systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>EU Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civ-Mil Cell</td>
<td>EU Civilian-Military Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CivOpsCdr</td>
<td>EU Civilian Operations Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMCO</td>
<td>EU Civil-Military Co-ordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMPD</td>
<td>EU Crisis Management and Planning Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNAD</td>
<td>NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoC</td>
<td>EDA Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>EU Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRT</td>
<td>Civilian Response Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP/ESDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy/European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>civil society organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Defence Capabilities Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG E</td>
<td>Directorate General for External Relations and POLITICO-Military Affairs in the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPQ</td>
<td>NATO Defence Planning Questionnaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EADS</td>
<td>European Aeronautic, Defence and Space Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAPC</td>
<td>NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EATF</td>
<td>European Air Transport Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBAO</td>
<td>Effects Based Approach to Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBB</td>
<td>EDA Electronic Bulletin Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Eurocorps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECAP</td>
<td>European Capability Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECFR</td>
<td>European Council on Foreign Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDEM</td>
<td>European Defence Equipment Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDTIB</td>
<td>European Defence Technological and Industrial Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGF</td>
<td>European Gendarmerie Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoE</td>
<td>(Polish, unless otherwise indicated) Ministry of Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP CoE</td>
<td>Military Police Centre of Excellence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUSIS</td>
<td>Multinational Space-based Imaging System for Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACC</td>
<td>NATO North Atlantic Cooperation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAD</td>
<td>National Armament Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIAG</td>
<td>NATO Industrial Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORDPOLBDE</td>
<td>Nordic-Polish Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPBG</td>
<td>Nordic-Polish Battlegroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSIP</td>
<td>NATO Security Investment Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NURSC</td>
<td>NATO Undersea Research Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCCAR</td>
<td>Organisme Conjoint de Coopération en matière d’Armement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHQ</td>
<td>operational headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMC</td>
<td>Open Method of Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>NATO Prague Capability Commitments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PermRep</td>
<td>Permanent Representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLUKRBAT</td>
<td>Polish-Ukrainian Peacekeeping Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team (in Afghanistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOPS</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REACT</td>
<td>Rapid Expert Assistance Cooperation Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELEX</td>
<td>Directorate-General for External Relations in the European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMA</td>
<td>Revolution in Military Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTA</td>
<td>Research &amp; Technology Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>Research &amp; Technology Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Airlift Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALIS</td>
<td>NATO Strategic Airlift Interim Solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SatCen</td>
<td>EU Satellite Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG/HR</td>
<td>Secretary General/High Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Standby Forces High-Readiness Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SitCen</td>
<td>Situation Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMEs</td>
<td>Small and Medium-sized Enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNE</td>
<td>Seconded National Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANAG</td>
<td>NATO Standardization Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty of the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>NATO Target Force Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKIE</td>
<td>Office of the Committee for European Integration in Poland (Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGCI</td>
<td>UN Guards Contingent in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIPTF</td>
<td>UN International Police Task Force (in Bosnia-Hercegovina)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>UN Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOT</td>
<td>UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>UN Observer Mission in Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>UN Standby Arrangement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAES</td>
<td>UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEAG</td>
<td>Western European Armaments Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEAO</td>
<td>Western European Armaments Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WT</td>
<td>Weimar Triangle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŻW</td>
<td>Polish Military Gendarmerie (Zandarmeria Wojskowa)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

1. The research puzzle

The policy environment of the European Union, an entity *sui generis*, leaves an imprint on policy making and outputs in the EU member states. An investigation of the process of penetration of domestic policymaking by the EU, called Europeanization, is a relatively new research project. It straddles academic boundaries of comparative politics and international relations. In 1978 Peter Gourevitch appealed to IR scholars to treat national outcomes as to some extent a product of international policies and institutions (1978). Europeanization is said to have provided the study of European integration with such a “second image reversed” (Vink, 2003). Accordingly, it takes European policy as an independent variable and its reverberations on domestic policy as a dependent variable (Radaelli, 1997).

Europeanization is a bourgeoning field of research. At the beginning of the 1990s there were fewer than ten publications a year on Europeanization in academic journals. By 2000 and 2001 the number increased up to respectively 24 and 22 publications (Sittermann, 2006). Until recently scholars have focused on domestic implementation in areas of Community competence, such as internal market policies. Other popular subjects have been environmental policy, social policy, labour law, gender equality and transport policy (Treib, 2006). Lately, the scope of Europeanization research has broadened to matters of “high politics,” long regarded as immune from European integration, above all security and defence policy (Reynolds, 2006; Ojanen, 2006; Sheppard, 2006; Vink, 2003). The pioneers of this inquiry were Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon. In their 1997 study, they concluded that since the EU lacks competence in defence matters it has
exercised little or no direct impact over shifts in national defence policy (Howorth and Menon, 1997:156). Their research had been completed, however, just before the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was born\(^1\). A year later, at St.-Malo the French and British agreed that the EU should develop autonomous defence capabilities. This agreement formed the basis for an EU decision to inaugurate CSDP at the Cologne European Council in 1999 leading to its growth as a distinct EU policy area.

The progress in the development of the CSDP has invigorated research on how the EU through this policy affects national security and defence policies. Researchers have started to examine the CSDP’s impact on security and defence policies in general (Dover, 2007; Hellmann et al., 2005; Kalburov, 2008; Lee-Ohlsson, 2008; Rieker, 2006), or focused on specific sub-policies, variables and outcomes, including: defence reform (Gross, 2007; Irondelle, 2003; Jacoby and Jones, 2008; Kalata, 2009; Terpan 2008), institutional adaptation (Vanhoonacker and Jacobs, 2008; Aktipis, 2007), civil protection (Britz, 2007), arms export policy (Bromley, 2007) and security identity (Rieker, 2003; Rieker, 2006).

All but one of these studies focus on the EU-15. Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, the first to apply Europeanization to Central and Eastern Europe, note that “the process of Europeanization in the CEECs and its outcomes have rarely been subjected to a systematic, theory-oriented and comparative analysis” (2005:2). Others have also remarked that opportunities have not been exploited to test hypotheses about Europeanization of the candidate states and new EU members from East Central Europe.

\(^1\) For the sake of consistency I will use the post-Lisbon Treaty nomenclature — CSDP as opposed to its earlier variants — Common European Security and Defence Policy (from 1999 to about 2003) and European Security and Defence Policy (2003-2009).
saddled with the experience of over four decades of circumscribed sovereignty, communist central planning and membership in the Warsaw Pact - outside the socio-political milieu of Western Europe (Bromley, 2007; Grabbe, 2003).

The time is therefore ripe to study the experience of the new EU member states. As the largest and strongest militarily of the ten countries admitted in the 2004 Eastern enlargement, Poland is a suitable object. A comprehensive study of the impact of norms, ideas and institutional and policy models, originating within the European Union, on the security and defence policy of Poland has been lacking. A number of monographs on contemporary Polish foreign policy have appeared, but they are mainly empirical and written in Polish, which limits their accessibility to the academic community-at-large (Grudziński, 2008; Rotfeld, 2006; Kuźniar, 2008; Kuźniar, 2009). Kuźniar edited a magisterial survey of post-1989 Polish security policy, but its analytical scope ends around Poland's entry to NATO (2001). The same pertains to Zaborowski's application of normative Europeanization to Polish-German defence cooperation, and likewise his and Dunn's earlier overview of Poland's role in transatlantic security (2004; Zaborowski and Dunn, 2003). In a later publication, Zaborowski and Longhurst mapped out the sources of Polish security preferences, without, however, gauging the impact of the EU on the Polish security policy (2007). A few journal articles and working papers have focused on EU-induced changes in Polish foreign policy, though not on the security policy proper (Kaminska, 2007; Pomorska, 2007). A recent volume edited by Bielen covers the effects of NATO and the EU on Polish foreign policy, yet security policy receives a cursory treatment (2010). Therefore, by interrogating if, how and to what

---

2 I will call it alternatively the Polish security and defence policy, the Polish security/defence policy, or, since defence is a subset of the security policy, just the Polish security policy.
extent Polish security and defence policy has become Europeanized, this research takes Europeanization to an area that has not yet received much academic attention (Dover, 2007).

Looking at policy change through the prism of Europeanization should bring added value to this research project and the political science discipline. Claudio Radaelli points out: “we still know too little about the processes of Europeanization and its effects” (2000:1). Scholars have not reached agreement on its definition, understanding how Europeanization takes place or measuring its outcomes (Britz, 2007; Flockhart, 2006; Major and Pomorska, 2005). Empirical analysis should, therefore, contribute to the knowledge of the nature of external constraints upon domestic policy, how external actors induce policy change and in what manner it manifests itself. Since the EU interacts in Europe with other security actors, primarily NATO and the OSCE, as well as multinational frameworks, such as the Eurocorps, this study should fertilize research in broader and still novel areas of multi-level/security governance. In short, this dissertation fills a lacuna in knowledge.

The analytical timeframe spans a period from 1999 until 2009. It commences with the collective decision to launch CSDP taken by the European Council in Cologne on 3-4 June 1999 coming on the heels of the St.-Malo Declaration, Poland’s accession to NATO (a year after Poland began official negotiations on EU membership), and closes with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. By encapsulating a five-year pre-EU accession period and five years of Polish membership in the EU, the focus on this decade allows to discern a possibly differential impact of the EU on an EU candidate versus an EU member state. Empirical research has confirmed that the EU pressure may
induce policy changes in candidate states (Epstein and Sedelmeier, 2008; Scherpereel, 2006). The starting point coincides with Poland’s accession to NATO, the effects of which I will employ as an alternative hypothesis to explain changes. A temporally-sequenced analysis of Europeanization is instructive. It should shed light on the scope conditions and diffusion mechanisms at the various stages of Poland’s involvement in the CSDP.

Changes in the Polish security and defence policy have taken place during that decade, some very advanced, others inconsiderable, depending on the sub-policy area. I have chosen to investigate three empirical policy realms: armed forces reform, defence-industrial policy and civilian crisis management. For reasons of space and conceptual parsimony, I have thus limited my inquiry mainly to the externally-oriented dimension of security policy, as appropriate to CSDP, conceptualized in a narrow classical sense around the use of force. Hence, I focus mainly on gearing up for and the deployment of military and civilian capabilities in crisis management operations (armed forces reform and civilian crisis management) and the means of raising them (defence-industrial policy). By focusing on these three case studies within a national security policy I illuminate the European effects “on the ground” and draw intersectoral comparisons. My research strategy follows the “logic of parsing,” recommended by Anderson, that is disassembling national policy into its articulated components or spheres of activity in order to search rigorously for the presence or absence of Europeanization (Anderson, 2003). The choice of the case studies reflects a desire to find more or less measurable policy outputs. It follows an assumption that European security governance would induce strongest adaptation pressures in these three tangible, operational subdomains or sub-
policies of the security policy. I am aware that the insertion of counter-terrorism to the CSDP and cross-pillarization, bourgeoning particularly after 9/11 - the so-called internal-external security continuum - have led to the securitization of many policy spheres in the EU. However, extending my inquiry into, for instance, energy security policy, critical infrastructure protection, emergency response, or the area of justice, freedom and security, would not accord with my traditional conception of security policy. Neither would it be applicable to my research framework, which takes up the CSDP as the assumed key trigger for change within the European security governance. Broadening the foci of inquiry would also risk exposure to many confounding variables and, at any rate, not be manageable time-wise.

The organization of the dissertation is as follows. It starts off with an introduction, proceeds to the conceptual chapter defining the concepts and laying out the analytical apparatus. The empirical analysis is then laid out in three chapters corresponding to the Europeanization case studies in the armed forces reform, defence-industrial policy, and civilian crisis management. The research findings are finally summarized in the conclusion that feeds into the conceptual framework.

2. The analytical framework

As a novel foray in Europeanization research, applying this conceptual framework to security/defence policy is fraught with challenges. First, as Ojanen noted, because European integration in this area has caught both scholars of the EU and IR by surprise, it remains under-theorized (2006). Neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists long maintained that, representing "high politics," this policy field would be immune from the
integration process. In turn, subscribing to neo-realist precepts, the strategic studies school of IR, populated by defence analysts, has also cast doubt on the prospect of Europeanizing security policy. Assuming state-centricity, the self-reproducing nature of the international system and primacy of high politics, neo-realists have had a difficult time explaining the development of CSDP (Sheppard, 2006; for a dissenting voice see Siedschlag, 2006). Defence policy has also received scant attention in public policy literature (Sheppard, 2006).

Second, because defence policy remains outside the communautaire ambit of the EU, this begs the question whether Europeanization, hitherto applied mainly to pillar I, could be addressed in relation to pillar II. I concur with scholars who argue that since CSDP may be conceived as a “sub-set of CFSP” or a policy “officially subordinated” to the latter, one may draw on a burgeoning research on the EU’s impact on the member state foreign policies (Sheppard, 2006; Gourlay, 2004; Howorth, 2007). Although the EU members retain ultimate political control over the CSDP process, many of the issues it deals with actually straddle the intergovernmental-communautaire divide. For instance, generating defence capabilities touches upon industrial policy. Augmenting the work of the European Defence Agency, the European Commission has influenced the development of defence-industrial policy. The Commission moreover shares competencies with the Council in civilian crisis management.

To define Europeanization of security/defence policy, I have adopted and modified Olsen’s conception of it as a process at the domestic level in which member states’ policies, institutions and ideas are affected by new practices, norms, rules and procedures generated within the EU security governance (Irondelle, 2003). Incorporating
the focus on governance into a definition encapsulates the polycentric nature of the defence field in contemporary Europe. According to Webber and associates “security governance” comprises several features: a heterarchy, that is multiple, overlapping policy-making structure not necessarily organized hierarchically; an interaction of a number of actors whose relationships are ideational in character, structured by norms and understandings as by formal regulations; a multiple level of decision-making; and a collective purpose (Webber et al., 2004). Security governance is an inclusive concept allowing me to account not only for the downloading from the EU-level, but also transnational cooperation that facilitates emulation and norms transfer. Ideas are shared and cooperation experience garnered not only in Brussels, but also through the participation of the EU members in defence-industrial projects, missions (learning), or bilateral/multilateral cooperation. Transnational interactions are worth looking at because they are in Europe, and therefore contained as compared to all possible transnational influences.

In order to distinguish the causes from the effects, and best reflect the empirical record, I have chosen to concentrate on the vertical and horizontal dimensions of Europeanization. Wong posits that Europeanization may be conceptualized as a top-down process of national adaptation and policy convergence (“downloading,” also conceived as “EU-ization” or “Brusselization”), a bottom-up process involving the export of national preferences (“uploading” or “national projection”) and a horizontal identity reconstruction (“crossloading”), which results from mutually-constitutive vertical
processes (Wong, 2007). Europeanization in this view is a circular process depicted in Fig. 1 (Major, 2005):

From an analytical point of view such a feedback loop risks blurring cause and effect, and, for this reason, it lacks an explanatory clarity (Howell, 2004; Radaelli, 2004). Bache and Jordan argue that "the task of isolating particular causal factors when there are mutual interacting flows and multiple pressures emanating from different EU (and non-EU) sources is difficult" (Bache and Jordan, 2006). Olsen adds that "no coherent empirical research programme is possible if everything is seen as endogenous and in flux" (2002:942). Attempting to address this conceptual quandary Major and Pomorska suggest helpfully defining as the main idea of Europeanization the aim of retracing the effects of the European integration process at the national level. Thus, we may be able to

3 Miskimmon breaks down uploading into: agenda setting, example setting, ideational export and institution building (Miskimmon, 2007:15fn.). Major and Pomorska redefine crossloading as "modifications coming from other countries, policy areas or institutions beyond CFSP" (Major and Pomorska, 2005:3). This is the conceptualization of horizontal Europeanization I will apply to my analysis.
distinguish analytically between process and results (Major, 2005:177; Major and Pomorska, 2005).

In view of Poland’s position in relation to the CSDP in 1999-2009, Wong’s conceptualization of Europeanization is hardly applicable to my case study. For the purpose of evaluating an impact of the CSDP on Polish security policy I consider it to be a facet of the European integration initiated and further developed without Poland having played a substantive part in the agenda-setting in this period. The CSDP agenda has been determined primarily by the French, British and Germans. Only these states possess relevant capabilities to negotiate with as well as the political pull to ensure commitment to collective defence goals (Kempin and Mawdsley, 2009). Jørgensen has conceptualized these countries’ policy lead as a unique form of EU governance he calls “minilateralism,” or the “creation of core groups and the multilateralisation of their agreements” (cited in Keukeleire and Justaert, 2008:8). The relatively low level of Poland’s network capital in the Council, defined as “the quantity and quality (in terms of power) of cooperation partners of member states,” as assessed in 2007, has handicapped its policy initiatives in the EU (Naurin, 2007:1). Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier concluded in mid-2000s that “Europeanization West [Europeanization of West European member states of the EU] is a two-way street when it comes to shaping EU policy measures, whereas Europeanization East, at this stage, seems to be more of a one-way street” (2005:207). Goetz concurs:

---

4 Rather than having one core, composed of the Big-3, as is the perception with regards to the EU Council, Naurin, who has assessed cooperation patterns in the Council, has found that the core revolves around a North (the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK) and a South (France, Italy, Spain) triangle, connected by Germany in the centre (Naurin, 2007). Though bonds of cooperation connect Poland to Germany, in the analytical period Poland found itself relatively peripheralized from the decision-making mainstream.

5 A sub-field of Europeanization research called the candidate country Europeanization, or Europeanization East sparked debate concerning whether or not there are qualitative differences between Europeanization process in East-Central Europe and one taking place in Western Europe. Goetz, Grabbe, Héritier,
"'Top-down' – as opposed to 'bottom-up' – dynamics are often seen to play a more prominent role in shaping Europeanisation in the recent accession states when compared to long-standing members" (2005). For these reasons, I will concentrate on the vertical and horizontal dynamics of Europeanization.

I argue that the national-level node of Europeanization has been affected by new practices, norms, rules and procedures resulting from the developments within the EU security governance, my independent variable. The choice of EU security governance in statu nascendi as my independent variable addresses three limitations of the Europeanization research.

First, I have heeded the call by Héritier and Knill, to account for the relative importance of Europeanization qua EU-ization alongside other variables (2001:290). Major has argued that "domestic change might not only be generated at the EU level but might come indirectly through transfer of ideas, norms and ways of doing things that are exchanged from and within European neighbours, domestic entities or policy areas" (2005:186). Europeanization is not only due to Europe, and not only due to the EU, but also within Europe and it is influenced by European transnational frameworks acting as transmission belts (Ibid.).

Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier argue that there are fundamental differences between Europeanization West and Europeanization East, in terms of inter alia: a passive role of the Commission versus an intrusive one, strong societal veto players versus weak societal veto players and an involvement in the creation of EU rules versus a wholesale adoption of ready-made EU rules (Scherpereel, 2006; Goetz, 2005; Héritier, 2005). Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon disagree. The fact that in both CEECs and the EU-15 the impact of European integration has been mediated by domestic factors, in their view, speaks against differentiating the process into Europeanization East and West (2004). For this reason, the strong conditionality hypothesis in Europeanization East is rather a myth (Scherpereel, 2006). Grabbe has approached the debate from a different angle by highlighting power relations at the root of asymmetrical interdependence between accession states and EU-15. This asymmetrical interdependence allows the EU to set rules of the game (Grabbe, 2003).
As the core political project in Europe, the European Union has successfully institutionalized a governance system that since 1999 encompasses the security and defence policy (Olsen, 2002: 927). In this perspective, the EU through its Common Security and Defence Policy acts as an agent of change with regards to the national policies of both – albeit in varying degrees - the EU candidate states and members. The norms it projects are instantiated in the multilateral initiatives pursued by the EU member states, such as the Eurocorps or the European Gendarmerie Force. These *sensu stricto* non-EU initiatives are vehicles for the projection of norms associated with Europe, often as strong and influential as the CSDP itself. Thus, while the CSDP is my central focus within the EU security governance perspective, the concept of governance incorporates the totality of the intra-EU defence cooperation initiatives.

Second, security in Europe continues be defined to a great extent by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In half-a-century of its existence, the Alliance has transmogrified into a thickly institutionalized politico-military apparatus. For these reasons, it is very adept at socializing agents and inducing policy change (Gheciu, 2005). The impact of NATO, or *NATO-ization*, has therefore been incorporated into the research design as an alternative explanan. In this manner, I have addressed a propensity often encountered in Europeanization research to attribute outcomes to the EU alone, as if it functioned in an institutional/policy vacuum. I have tried to overcome the challenge of distinguishing the impact of EU-ization from NATO-ization mainly through process tracing, and other methods I will describe below (Cortell and Davis, 1996).

Third, related to the previous point, the focus on governance introduces a dynamic, multi-level relationship, in which policy developments at the European and national
levels intersect. Instead of conceiving these levels in dichotomous terms, I regard them as parallel, interlinked processes (Hériritier, 2001). In particular, drawing on Hériritier and Knill, I hypothesize that European policy inputs have a greater chance to stimulate changes if there are already similar impulses, or parallel reform trajectories, at work in the domestic context (Hériritier and Knill, 2001). It ties in with the idea of ideational resonance I will mention next. Although such an approach raises difficulty of ascertaining the causal weight of external influence as opposed to domestic factors, process tracing and temporal sequencing should help distinguish the power of these respective triggers.

The explanandum, or the dependent variable, consists of two levels of domestic changes. The first level includes cognitive or ideational frameworks, exemplified in policy discourse and strategic doctrines. The second consists of policy objectives, the implementation fora within which policy is anchored, instruments and decision-making processes.

In my view the impact of the EU security governance is mediated by two intervening variables: security identity and state capacity. Unpacking the realist concept of “national interests” I argue that rather than being reducible to interests, ideas filter the perception of interests (Hériritier, 2001:13). CSDP is a construction zone of “social representations” - shared images and concepts organizing the perception of the world - articulated by national elites, the gatekeepers of national security identity, about the desirability of and the shape of European defence (Mérand, 2006). Since national actors are said to “perceive the world through a lens consisting of their pre-existing beliefs” it follows that European imports will be filtered through these deeply rooted and institutionally
embedded “belief systems” or “mental maps” constituting the security identity (Surel, 2000:501; Héritier, 2001:12). I will verify empirically Checkel’s hypothesis that diffusion will be more rapid when a norm promoted at the European level resonates with historically constructed domestic norms (1999:87). The power of ideas to make a difference depends too on the strength of those holding them and on the overall adaptation of the state to the exigencies of EU membership. I will therefore see whether there has been a fairly consistent narrative on the constituents of Poland’s security identity, or whether the elites have instrumentalized the identity narrative for political ends. I will also take note of possible differences on the adaptation of national security policy to the EU as reflected in party debates and agendas.

State capacity, elsewhere in literature referred as the “reform capacity” (Héritier, 2001) or “action capacity” (Börzel, 2005) has been shown to influence the pattern and the degree of Europeanization. While it is obvious that every state faces finite resources, a post-communist country, like Poland, grapples with a twofold mélange of constraints: (1) severe resource shortages – funding for security policy commitments has had to be reconciled with restructuring the economy and reforming the polity; and (2) relatively weak policy capabilities – policymakers have difficulty coordinating domestic policy and influencing European policy agenda (a paucity of expertise and of the network capital in the EU). A strong security identity pull has occasionally (vide “Iraqi Freedom”), however, prompted Poland to punch above weight. In other words, a security identity is a stronger force for policy change than state capacity. Therefore, I have expected to find that if there were a strong identity match with policy paradigms promoted at the European level the national elites would try to find ways to address capacity constraints.
Absent such congruence corresponds with a lack of will to bring about suitable adjustments to resources and a policy tool-kit.

Furthermore, in contradistinction to intergovernmentalism I have unpacked the notion of the state as a rational, unitary actor (Cortell and Davis, 1996). Thus, in addition to the two aforementioned state capacity constraints – resources and expertise - I have also employed this concept to denote “the organization of decision-making authority.” How that organization works will bear upon adoption of European inputs (Ibid., 1996:454). I posit that a high level of policymaking autonomy within a specific policy area at home will enable leadership to pursue innovations on behalf of a convergence with European imperatives (Dyson, 2008). The Polish polity, being a statist structure, features a high level of executive autonomy in relation to societal pressures. There are few veto points, defined as “actors whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo,” least of all a strong civil society, in which Poland is lacking. Yet, even in such strong state competence as the security/defence policy, the level of policymaking autonomy varies across policy subdomains (Checkel, 1999). The MoD enjoys relatively uncontested leadership and a permissive public consensus with regards to the armed forces reform. However, adjustments in defence-industrial policy have been constrained because several governmental, social and industrial veto players are involved in the policy process that straddles across a number of other policies\(^6\). A similar dispersion of

\(^6\) There are two possible counterarguments: the interventions of the ministry of finance and a co-habitation between the prime minister and the president, both sharing prerogatives over defence policy. As to the former, for the greater part of the period under study (2001-2008) the MoD enjoyed a stable budget, therefore financial uncertainty was not of a big concern. In terms of the latter, the presidential-prime ministerial interactions remained fairly non-contentious save for the 2007-2009 period marked by adversarial relations between the presidency and the government. However, the divergences of views concerned primarily the timing of professionalizing the military and its downsizing.
authority takes place in civilian crisis management. The empirical research confirms an uneven progress of Europeanization across the three policy sectors as a result.

Fig. 2 presents the research design.

**Fig. 2 Research design**

| EU (CSDP) security governance [INDEPENDENT VARIABLE] |
| (alternative explanation: NATO-ization) |
| ↓↔️ |
| diffusion |
| security identity [INTERVENING VARIABLE No. 1] |
| state capacity [INTERVENING VARIABLE No. 2] |
| ↓ |
| : [DEPENDENT VARIABLE] |
| changes, if any, in Polish security and defence policy, 1999-2009, in the following 3 empirical case studies |
| 1. armed forces reform; |
| 2. defence-industrial policy; |
| 3. civilian crisis management |

3. The empirical content

3.1. The armed forces reform

Since the end of the Cold War, the EU and NATO member states have been busy reforming their militaries. Cashing in on the “peace dividend,” they have slashed military spending, trimmed both manpower and the size of military establishments. In response to changes in the strategic environment and domestic conditions, a reorientation of the military posture has followed. The European (and North American) militaries have
moved away from static, armour-centric concept of national defence, taking on mainly an external crisis management role (Chisholm, 2002). King notes two main trends: concentration and transnationalization (2005). The former relates to prioritizing well-trained, professional, joint, highly manoeuvrable and deployable rapid-reaction units for expeditionary warfare. The latter refers to the organizational shift towards, if not multinational formations then interoperable, interdependent military units backed up by integrated command structures. The change in the organization and the missions of the military has resulted in “the decline of the mass army,” epitomized in movement towards all-volunteer forces (cited in Booth, Kestnbaum and Segal, 2001).

Scholars in the field of military sociology argue that the armed forces have become postmodern (Ibid.). In this view, the end of the Cold War has heralded a shift of paradigm from the modern military to the postmodern military. Born in the nineteenth-century, the modern military had been inextricably intertwined with the nation-state, defending against threats to national security as well as the citizen-soldier model. Today, however, having gone fully professional and having engaged in operations authorized or legitimated by entities other than the nation state, the military has loosened the ties with the nation-state. It has become preoccupied greatly with responding to external intra-national as opposed to inter-national threats. The postmodern military then is said to encompass the following five organizational characteristics: 1) the interpenetration of civilian and military spheres – exemplified in the demand for civilian crisis management; 2) an increasing jointness of the services; 3) a change in mission, from war fighting to lower-intensity humanitarian and/or constabulary missions (hence as great a demand for soldiers-warriors as for soldiers-constables and soldiers-scholars; 4) the tendency for
missions to be carried out in a multilateral rather than unilateral context, through a force coalition acting under international authority; and 5) the internationalization of the military forces themselves (Ibid., 321). Postmodernity among the militaries does not necessarily portend a supranational telos, or an evolution towards a European army. In this view, the raison d'ètre of the military, the "rationalized embodiment of the state’s claim to the monopoly over force within its territory," still holds (Booth et al., 2001:330; King, 2005). Political scientists too note that a shift from the Cold War-era "modern" onus on statist and spatial aspects of security toward "post-modern" concept of safeguarding human security has provided a strategic backdrop for reforms (Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, 2008:299).

What accounts for these changes? There are no monocausal explanations. King attributes them to two factors: budgetary pressures and strategic constraints (2005). Mérand considers that a plethora of common activities, like academic exchanges, secondments, exercises, joint procurement programs, policy conferences, language training, technical working groups, and the preparation for and conduct of military operations have given rise to a "transgovernmental security and defence arena" sui generis in Europe (2008:6). In this arena, socialization dynamics induce changes and help diffuse new paradigms of military organization. Similarly, Barbé and Johansson-Nogués maintain that EU and NATO member states have been socialized in the dominant discourse on threat perceptions and the need to address these asymmetric threats through crisis management. They emphasize nonetheless that the current asymmetric threats drive reforms of the military forces (2008:3003). Grant argues that both EU and NATO, as
norms entrepreneurs and facilitators of emulation, have encouraged convergence across the member states (2004).

The key practical ‘conveyor belts’ for reforms have been the NATO Response Force and the EU Battlegroups (Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, 2008; King, 2005: Grant, 2004). This view is shared by Everts, Engelhardt, Farrell and Terriff, who put more weight on the former (Everts, 2004; Engelhardt, 2004; Farrell and Terriff, 2010). Lee-Ohlsson credits CSDP, called a “transformator,” with effecting Swedish defence reforms, the “biggest in the history of the SAF for the last 500 years” (2008). Other scholars note that the armed forces reform, often treated synonymously as a transformation, has been primarily a US-led process. It has diffused to the allies either through various NATO capabilities initiatives, or horizontally via an emulation of the US military template (Farrell and Terriff, 2010; Sloan, 2002; Boyer, 2004). Cohen points to the hegemonic position of the US as well as the spread and application of advanced information technologies in defence, known as the Revolution in Military Affairs, as main triggers of military transformation (2004).

Even though today’s militaries resemble each other, the diffusion of norms of concentration, transnationalization, expeditionary crisis management and professionalization has not engendered homogeneity in the armed forces. There must be factors mediating the absorption of these norms at the national level. Farrell and Terriff argue that “a complex and contingent mix of international and local drivers is operating to push forward military transformation in each country” (2010:2). Scholars have argued that institutionalized ideas containing causal and principled beliefs affect changes in defence policy (Møller and Bjereld, 2010). If innovation is to succeed, it cannot
contravene "the core identity" of the military organization (Farrell and Terriff, 2010:8). Because the armed forces reflect the societies, in which they are rooted, change is thus likely to be mediated by security identity (Cohen, 2004). As "Janus-faced organizations" the armed forces respond to the changing strategic context by building effective organizations. At the same time, the militaries are well-attuned to the domestic social context in which they are embedded (Dandeker, 1994:639). Thus, reforming the armed forces may appear like a tug-of-war between demands from abroad and domestic political constraints. Barbé and Johansson-Nogués contend that discordant collective (global expeditionary forces) and particularistic (defensive) identity constructions in the EU and NATO member states have hampered force structure transformation (2008).

Another contingent variable is state capacity. As defined earlier, it relates primarily to the ability of the state to provide resources for innovation, including expertise, and the degree of policy autonomy. Because in the case of armed forces reform the policy delivery rests with the MoD, and defence has traditionally enjoyed bipartisan support in Poland, I assume that, provided the military gets sufficient funding, it should not encounter major hurdles.

I will assess the armed forces reform in Poland in terms of the responsiveness of the Polish defence establishment to four key norms underpinning military transformation in the EU and, for the most part, in the Euro-Atlantic area: concentration, transnationalization, which I call multinationality, expeditionary warfare and the transition to an all-volunteer force. The outcomes will be analysed in terms of the institutional adaptation, changes in the mission of the armed forces, organizational structures, operational role and the policy salience of the CSDP.
As far as the mechanisms of diffusion, or norm transfer, are concerned I will focus on several possible conduits. First, by exploring in-depth defence cooperation within the Weimar Triangle and to a lesser extent the Eurocorps as well as bilateral ties linking the Polish armed forces with other militaries, I will assess the strength of horizontal diffusion and emulation. Second, in order to gauge the import of socialization, I will analyze the secondments and training of Polish military and civilian staff in the EU and NATO institutions, as well as those of the respective member states. Finally, I will interrogate the role of learning from operational activities.

In order to judge the strength and the efficacy of norms diffusion, the mode of governance at the European level must be taken into account. Since defence policy remains a national responsibility, both EU and NATO efforts to trigger transformation (ex. European Headline Goals, NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative, Prague Capability Commitments) have followed the Open Method of Coordination. Because it favours voluntary adjustments, I anticipate difficulties in translating European initiatives at the member state level, especially given the influence of the intervening variables.

Having reviewed the empirical record I rate the impact of Europeanization upon the reform of Polish armed forces and Polish defence policy in general as a transformation. Such outcomes as, on the one hand, Poland’s shift to an all-volunteer force and a strong record of expeditionary crisis management; and on the other hand, the country’s support for a strong CSDP, including an operational EU headquarters, once a heretical notion, and a permanent structured cooperation, substantiate such a conclusion. Differentiating the impact of the CSDP from NATO, I note however a stronger impact of the Alliance (NATO-ization) on the reform than the CSDP (EU-ization). A temporal
sequencing of the reforms indicates the strongest NATO impact right after Poland’s entry to the Alliance, and an incremental Europeanization since Poland’s accession to the EU. This coincided also with an accelerated tempo of CSDP deployments, which enhanced the policy’s credibility, and, hence increased its appeal in Warsaw. Because both the CSDP initiatives have consistently reinforced NATO’s transformative influence, and Poland has emulated change happening in the other European militaries, an awareness of the CSDP’s supportive role in relation to NATO does not disprove my contention that Europeanization has left a relatively strong imprint in this field.

3.2. Defence-Industrial Policy

The Europeanization of defence-industrial policy has been an understudied phenomenon. The only two academic publications to apply the Europeanization framework are Britz’s investigation of the Europeanization of Swedish defence industry from 1989 to 2001, and Dover’s study of the Europeanization of British defence policy from 1997 to 2005 (Britz, 2008; Dover, 2007). Britz associates Europeanization with a transnational consolidation of defence industry, in particular the privatization and sale of Swedish defence producers to foreign European corporations. This process has been mediated via a trend of “marketisation” within the state administration (Britz, 2008). Dover argues that the “extraordinarily influential” marriage of the Commission, advancing complementary European security R&D and EDEM agendas, and the manufacturers, eager to cash in on the promises of these agendas, have eaten away at state sovereignty. At the same time, the increasingly coordinating role of EDA, designed and operationalized as a “state-private” network of manufacturer interests and national
and supranational officials, has dovetailed with the arms export interest of leading defence makers in the EU. He therefore finds strong evidence of Europeanization in this field (2007). There are also two studies of how the EU has influenced the development of arms export policies, one looking at the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, and, another one focusing on Belgium, Germany and Italy (Bromley, 2007; Holm 2006). Because military exports are not essentially a means of defence, and, for reasons of paucity of open-source materials, I have eschewed looking at arms export controls.

The defence industry has long occupied a special place in the history of European integration. The premise of the Schuman Plan of 9 May 1950, which lay behind the European Coal and Steel Community, was that a joint control of the coal and steel industry would prevent one country from controlling the raw materials for the production of arms. This would ensure peace on the continent. Having created a common market, by virtue of Article 296 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome (European Treaty), however, the member states were allowed to protect production or trade in arms (Britz, 2010; Hartley, 2008).

Since the end of the Cold War, attempts have been made to address the issues of procurement, R&D and production of weapons as matters of EU policy. This shift has had its sources in the interactions between the response of the defence industry to the key trends in the post-Cold War defence markets (supply), as well as national and EU-level policy initiatives (demand) (Meijer, 2010). The four triggers of changes in the supply side have been: reduced defence budgets, spiralling costs of modern weapons systems, technological developments - especially the Revolution in Military Affairs, and the competition from US arms makers (Ibid., 64-65). The response of European defence
producers has been two-fold: concentration and internationalization (Ibid., 66; Caruso and Locatelli, 2010; Kopač, 2006). Through concentration, via mergers, acquisitions and other collaboration strategies, companies have sought to pool resources for R&D and benefit from the economies of scale. Prompted by shrinking domestic demand, they have also looked to expand their activities abroad. The rise in 2000 of the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), Europe’s first transnational defence company, best exemplifies the process of internationalization.

Changes in the supply side have been complemented by policy initiatives related to demand. The six EU member states which by the end of the 1990s accounted for 90% of arms production in Europe - France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom – succumbed to pressures to change their practices (Britz, 2010). On the one hand dwindling defence expenditures limited procurement, and on the other hand politicians felt compelled to save jobs, stimulate industrial growth and in some cases regional development. These governments therefore encouraged the restructuring of their national defence industrial base. The starting point and the trajectory of change for each country have been different. In general, France and the United Kingdom represented two different models: the United Kingdom as a more market-oriented model and France a more state-oriented model. It was not at all certain which way the restructuring would go (Ibid., 1982).

By 2000, the British “trust in market forces” appeared to have won out as a new “mantra” for defence-industrial policy (Sweeney, 2008). A normative consensus emerged that the defence industry should be privatized to as large extent as possible, or otherwise kept at arm’s length from the state, and that it should seek out partnerships or other forms
of collaboration with other European defence industrial entities. Britz calls the idea that the market should be a guiding principle for the relationship between the state and defence industry, defence marketization. Influenced by British reforms of the 1980s, the market-oriented model for defence-industrial policy has diffused horizontally to other countries. And so, Sweden, for example, let ownership of most of its armaments assets pass to transnationals (Britz, 2010). France shed large parts of state capital involvement in defence industry. At the same time, however, continuing a dirigiste tradition, to strengthen the competitive position of its industry it backed the so-called national champions. Italy has done likewise (Caruso and Locatelli, 2010). Other examples of changing practices include the increased use of laws of public procurement in arms purchasing in place of opaque practices, such as automatically contracting with a national supplier (Hartley, 2008). What the British, Swedish, French and Italian cases show, nevertheless, is that, although there has emerged a market model to adhere to, the norms on what the interaction between the state and the industry, in procurement, production and sales, and the structure of defence industry in Europe should look like have not taken strong root (Ibid., 181). Because thinking in terms of state interests predominates, national specificities remain (Sweeney, 2008). Therefore, I assume that Europeanization is not likely to make as strong an impact in defence-industrial policy as in the armed forces reform.

The restructuring of defence industry has been encouraged by developments at the EU level. In the past, there had been many attempts to stimulate European armaments cooperation, including the Eurogroup and the Independent European Program Group (IEPG), both within NATO during the Cold War, and henceforth the Western European
The St. Malo initiative added a powerful political logic to the market logic of defence industrial integration. The member states agreed that to support the European Rapid Reaction Force, envisaged at the Helsinki Council as the CSDP flagship (later superseded by the Battlegroups), they had to harmonise requirements, procure arms and equipment collectively, and strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). This awareness grew after the Kosovo conflict, which revealed interoperability gaps between the US and its European allies. The policy solutions were the European Capabilities Action Plan, designed to stimulate joint capability development, and the European Defence Agency (EDA). The latter has spawned a number of common projects, including the European Regime for Defence Procurement as well as research and development endeavours (R&D).

Complementing the work of intergovernmental EDA, the Commission has also pushed to rationalize the European defence-industrial market. It has framed policy in terms of single market deregulation aiming to set up a European Defence Equipment Market and, if possible, to do away with offset. The post-9/11 security environment highlighted the internal-external security nexus and prioritized the fight against terrorism. This set the stage for the European Commission decision to unveil the European Security Research Programme, benefiting the defence industry. The steps taken by both EDA and the European Commission have had the markings of an embryonic EU defence industrial policy (Hartley, 2008).
The new market norms entwined with the political logic behind CSDP have been diffused by a number of agents, including the member states, EDA and the Commission, as the main rules-setters, stimulating changes in the Polish defence industrial policy. I will look for evidence in five empirical realms: joint capabilities development through the European Capabilities Action Plan, procurement practices, the offset policy, the policy framework for reforming defence industry, as well as research and development. I will show that changes in Polish defence industrial policy have been triggered by an intermingling of internal and external factors. The defence-industrial reform has been patterned upon the European model of concentration and internationalization. Its underlying objective has been to modernize Polish defence industry and link it with West European collaboration. The latter, as well as a desire to act “like a good European,” have motivated Poland’s support for EDA and Commission-sponsored procurement regimes and R&D regimes. As would be expected in an area in which European norms have not been strongly entrenched, however, Europeanization has been uneven and held back by pressures for the state to keep defence industrial policy in tight grip and support the national champion. I find that NATO has had a very limited influence in this policy space.

3.3. Civilian Crisis Management

The 2003 European Security Strategy noted that the EU is “particularly well equipped” for multi-faceted crisis and post-crisis situations necessitating a broad array of capabilities, including civilian expertise (EU Council, Dec. 2003). Ever since the EU agreed to develop the CSDP, civilian crisis management (CCM) has become its integral
part. It expresses a reconciliation of an early conception of Europe as a "civilian power" with the "militarisation" of the EU (Kirchner, 2006, Lee-Ohlsson, 2008; Smith, 2005). The EU member states adopted specific targets – called headline goals - to attain their CSDP objectives, in both military and civilian dimensions. In practice, by 2009, all but six CSDP operations have been either civilian or mixed civilian-military (Menon, 2009).

At the EU level of analysis I will map the "lead" institutions co-ordinating and managing civilian crisis management (CCM). I will also assess whether there is coherence between the respective actors and a cohesive body of concepts, norms and practices that would let the member states know what CCM entails at the national policy level. Rynning argues that the ability to carry out new policy approaches hinges on policy coherence, which he defines as the ability to articulate policy goals and align resources to obtain them (2011). A coherence of the Brussels-based design of CCM would be conducive to disseminating this paradigm to the member states and non-members (Kirchner, 2006).

CCM structures are spread over pillars I and II. 7 The players include the PSC, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), as well as other relevant Council bodies, including geographical working groups. In addition, specialized institutions within the GSC have over time handled the management of CCM, including the Civil-Military Cell (Civ/Mil Cell), Directorate-General for External Relations and Politico-Military Affairs (DGE), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC, since 2007) and the planned Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD, as of

7 The first pillar incorporates policies within the Community competence, in which the European Commission plays the lead role. Common Foreign and Security Policy forms the second pillar, in which member state governments make decisions through intergovernmental agreements. The pillared structure was introduced with the 1993 Maastricht Treaty and abandoned with the entry into force of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty.
1 Feb. 2010). The Directorate-General for External Relations, other DGs and agencies of the Commission have also pitched in. They control the largest share of Community resources, and, because of the wide remit of what is considered civilian crisis management, they have engaged in many of its niche areas (Khol, 2010).

One would normally consider the density of institutions in a certain policy field as conductive to Europeanization. In this instance, since all of these entities more often than not work at cross purposes in the struggle to control their own policy turf, bench-marking and diffusion suffer. Moreover, this state of affairs does little to clarify the lingering conceptual ambiguities about the demands the CCM exacts from the EU member states. Radek Khol, GSC official handling CCM, admits that a “coherence and an overall EU approach is still fairly difficult to achieve across pillar boundaries” (2010:7). Korski and Gowan, authors of a European Council on Foreign Relations report on CCM, have also laid bare the inefficacy of CCM à la EU (2009).

I will investigate how much influence actors other than the EU have had in disseminating civilian crisis management norms and practices. Khol too advises us to look beyond Europe for inspiration. He says that on the international scene, only the UN is capable of planning and launching civilian crisis management operations (2010:4). In recent years NATO has also gained appreciation for civilian capacities which is reflected in the launch of its “comprehensive approach.” It will therefore be necessary to isolate the impact of the EU on Polish developments from the UN and NATO respectively.

In addition to assessing the bearing that Brussels-based web of institutions has on domestic policy, I will look also at possibilities of horizontal diffusion and lessons learning from operational deployments. In November 2008, in connection with the
“Ministerial Commitments As Regards the Development of Civilian Capabilities,” the EU diplomatic chiefs agreed inter alia to develop national strategies to facilitate the deployment of mission personnel and encourage exchange of good practices between Member States,” (EU Council, 10-11 Nov. 2008). Is Poland drawing on the implementation of CCM in other countries? Has it drafted a proposed strategy? If there were progress along these two tracks, this would corroborate Europeanization.

Summing up, domestic outcomes will be appraised in terms of progress or lack thereof in four areas of action identified by the Council in its CSDP conclusions of November 2009 - namely national regulatory measures, national budgetary measures, national rosters and training – designed to enhance the availability of civilian personnel (EU Council, 17 Nov. 2009). I will show that even though prior to 1999 Poland had acquired some experience in sending police as well as civilian personnel to crisis management missions led by the UN, OSCE and the WEU, this did not translate into significant organizational or doctrinal changes. It did however lead to the creation of the basic outlines of a training and recruitment system for the police. Once in the EU, Poland tried to take advantage of CCM to enhance its political standing. It made the sixth largest contribution after Italy, Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom to the EU pool of civilian capabilities. The Poles have taken part in many EU civilian crisis management missions. The participation has been strongest in Eastern Europe – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – which corresponds with its geographical priorities. Poland has done well in deploying police units, yet poorly when it comes to sending individual, non-uniformed civilian experts. Participation has been curtailed inter alia by exiguous domestic incentives and an absence of common funding (Polish EU mission interview, 2009).
While Poland’s operational record would appear to show that the CCM paradigm has been internalized, in reality no major legislative and administrative steps have been taken to establish a systemic framework for civilian capacity building. The limited adjustments on the capacity-building side of CCM may be explained by a novelty of the concept and, consequently, its relatively weak conceptualization and institutional entrenchment both in Brussels and the member states. It has hardly made a dent in Poland because it does not resonate with the “military-first” Polish security identity and because the state capacity in policy coordination is weak.

As an EU member Poland has invested more in the military dimension of CSDP rather than its civilian corollary. There is a dissonance between the Polish security identity, which places premium on hard security, and the EU security culture, which considers mixed civil-military culture its strength. Because NATO has only just begun to enrich its “toolbox” with military means, it has only to a limited extent served as an alternative platform for learning. The Poles did, however, learn the practicalities of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) from the Americans in Iraq. These experiences, in synergy with an emphasis on CIMIC in NATO Strategic Concept, the effects-based operations and a comprehensive approach, have fed into doctrinal developments (Rybak, 2007). Because of discrepancies in the level of attainment of the EU standards in CCM by the member states, horizontal diffusion in the EU has had a limited impact.

The process of operationalizing the civilian dimension of security policy runs headlong into Poland’s compartmentalized and inefficient central bureaucracy. As a result, policy coordination necessary to bring about new regulations facilitating civilian deployment has been a perennial quandary. A great deal of effort put in to establishing a
domestic crisis management system shows how difficult it has been for Polish security institutions to operate as one. Due to a shortage of instructors the Poles have not been able to take part in the European Group of Training – an NGO initiative funded by the European Commission to train civilian experts. Poland has made no concerted effort to put its nationals in units of the EU Council tasked with civilian crisis management and planning (EU Council interview, 2009). In short, because Polish and EU identities in relation to civilian crisis management are incongruous, the Poles have lacked the will to push through solutions that are costly, require a whole-of-government approach and, at any rate, have not been implemented en masse across the EU. Thus, Europeanization here may be considered the weakest among the three case studies, effecting but policy "patches" and adjustments here and there.

4. Methodology

This dissertation relies on three qualitative case studies of the Polish security and defence policy subjected to the processes of Europeanization: armed forces reform, defence-industrial policy and civilian crisis management. A case study is on the one hand a flexible tool that allows drawing up new hypotheses, on the other hand due to its restricted comparative scope it limits generalizeability. While detailing correlational developments in the EU and in Poland, I will rely a great deal on process tracing to isolate changes induced by the EU as opposed to NATO or other sources of influence. This method denotes "attempts to uncover what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual behaviour that then occurs; the effect of various institutional arrangements on attention, processing, and
behaviour; and the effect of other variables of interest on attention, processing, and behaviour” (Falletti 2006). It is particularly useful in gauging the CSDP effect within the framework of the EU security governance, isolating it from the potential impact of NATO.

I will also undertake documentary content analysis of primary sources, including open-source Polish and EU official documents, speeches as well as printed interviews. A use will be made of articles and commentaries that appeared in opinion-forming papers, including the dailies - liberal Gazeta Wyborcza and right-leaning Rzeczpospolita, a centre-left weekly Polityka, as well as specialist publications – Polska Zbrojna – a weekly associated with the defence ministry and an independent defence monthly Raport. I will also examine the Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, an authoritative review of developments in this domain, and the Strategic Yearbook, both of which feature articles penned by bureaucrats. The dissertation builds on a large body of secondary materials, particularly academic literature on Europeanization, as well as empirical studies informed by this concept.

Another method employed is interviewing. In the summer of 2009, I conducted semi-structured face-to-face interviews (lasting 45 to 90 minutes) with officials in institutions relevant to the CSDP and NATO in Warsaw and Brussels. In Poland I interviewed officials from the MFA (2), Office of the Committee for European Integration (1), MoD (3), the General Staff (2), an ex-staffer of the National Security Bureau, analysts from the Polish Institute of International Affairs (2), and a defence affairs journalist. The interviewees in Brussels included fonctionnaires from the General Secretariat (2), members of the Polish Permanent Representation to the EU and NATO.
(4) as well as staff of the European Defence Agency (1). The interviewees were asked questions drawn upon the Europeanization framework, general enough to permit interviewees to reflect on their work.

This triangulated methodology helps cross-check my own insights, observations and experiences as a participant-observer. Since 2001, I have worked for the Polish state administration initially as a security policy expert at the presidential National Security Bureau and subsequently at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ramifications of one’s involvement as a practitioner in the policy world on the academic work are a matter of debate. Classical realists, including Morgenthau, held that IR scholars should conduct studies over the shoulder of the practitioners. Steeped in behaviouralism, neo-realists have eschewed this view. From the perspective of logical-positivist philosophy of science, this situation impinges on a dispassionate analysis grounded in objectivity. A valid knowledge results from distancing of the scholar from the subject of study.

Theories which entered the IR discipline at the end of the 1980s, as part of the so-called “third debate” or “postpositivism,” have challenged this methodological stance (Tickner, 2006). Critical theories have acknowledged the subjective element which impregnates all social science research. Feminism in fact advocates “a participatory research strategy that emphasizes the dialectic between the researcher and the researched” (Tickner, 2006:27). It allows a better understanding of context and behaviour producing a “thicker description.”

I advocate neither polar position. I recall the contentiousness of the debate on epistemological commitments simply to underscore self-awareness of the tensions inhering in my position as scholar and practitioner. To guard against bias, I have invested
in a rigorous, multiple-sourced methodology. But my “insider status” has given me at least three strengths. For one, were it not for my great interest in this topic as well as my involvement in it, albeit mainly on the analytical side, I would not have chosen it. And second, given the need to balance tightly professional and academic commitments, I was confident I could complete it. And third, I have had a very good grasp of the sources of information required for research. A note about information is warranted. Bound by information security constraints in the professional world I have obviously worked only with open, accessible sources.
Chapter I. The Conceptual Framework

I.1. Independent variable

The purpose of this research is to assess changes, if any, in Polish security and defence policy in 1999-2009, and determine whether Europeanization accounts for these developments, and, if so, to what extent and in what ways it has had an impact. In order to assess empirical findings properly, we must first define key concepts and formulate a rigorous research design, within which to operationalize them. Ergo, in this chapter I will lay out my research apparatus. I will define operational variables – independent, dependent and intervening variables, as well as specify taxonomies. I will also advance main working hypotheses underpinning the conceptual apparatus.

The independent variable are the “new practices, norms, rules and procedures generated within the EU security governance.” As explained in the introduction, the incorporation of governance into the analysis offers “a more fine-grained toolbox to trace processes and outcomes of domestic change as a consequence of European integration and EU policy making” (Sittermann, 2006:8). What pathways Europeanization will take and how effective it will be depends on patterns of governance in particular EU policy areas (Britz, 2007).

The Common Security and Defence Policy has become the focal point for defence cooperation within the EU security governance. The CSDP’s development has been conceptualized as “the institutionalization of a system of governance with ever more constraining rules of behaviour over a large number of actors” (Mérand et al., 2011:122). However, bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation among the EU member states
have also contributed to CSDP objectives as well as fostered congruent norms. The practices of European states-contributors to crisis management have propelled European policy forward (Koivula, 2009). Bulmer and Radaelli point out that “bilateral relationships, notably between France and Germany, have served to generate policy models or ideas that have then been adopted at EU level” (2005). For these reasons, my definition of EU security governance encapsulates also these “non-Brussels” intra-EU (as a community of the EU member states) triggers. Constituting a “massive transfer platform” for the borrowing of policies the EU is thought to facilitate Europe-wide policy transfer (Radaelli, 2000, 2003). The CSDP performs such a function in the military realm in the EU. A broader conceptualization of Europeanization thus captures the essence of defence integration in Europe, understood as a “decentralized process in the sense that it is not guided by a single political or military plan, or organized within a single institutional framework” (Koivula, 2009:174).

It is worth appraising the policy weight of the CSDP. Experts who size it up fall between two extremes. Hyperoptimists laud it as “one of the great political revolutions of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries” (Webber, Croft, Howorth, Terriff and Krahmann, 2004:19). Some succumb to licencia poética portraying it in anthropomorphist terms as a “grown up” in relation to other, longstanding EU policies (Angelet and Vrailas, 2008; Howorth, 200). Others claim that CSDP does not amount to a policy, being rather a tool for crisis management, and of low-intensity at that (Kempin and Mawdsley, 2009). Sceptics dismiss it downright as a “policy without substance,” of “substantial marginality in the international affairs,” even a “pipe-dream, or simply a “failure” (Lindley-French, 2002; Moravcsik, 2003; Striuli, 2009; Sweeney, 2008).
A fundamental difficulty with assessing just what the CSDP adds up to is that it is a fluid construction site of ideas about the policy’s ends argued out among the EU member states and the institutional stakeholders in Brussels. Although the script of other EU policies may be open-ended, a particular indeterminacy of the CSDP owes to the lack of consensus on the finalité politique of European integration. Is the CSDP a political ploy to displace NATO in European security? Is it a project for the creation of a “European Army,” or merely a tool to assist the EU in playing its part in crisis management? Because of its elusive identity, the CSDP has been called a “work in progress,” a “policy in flux,” “sludgy amalgam” and “a fudge factor” (Howorth, 2007; Mérand, 2006; Moens, 2001).

The CSDP in statu nascendi encapsulates the different security identity inputs of the EU’s member states (Howorth, 2007). Wary of ceding sovereignty to Brussels, the British have treated the CSDP primarily as a means of raising capabilities so that the EU is able to do crisis management, and ipso facto rebalance the transatlantic burden-sharing. Until Sarkozy’s rapprochement with the Alliance, the statements and actions of the French elites lent credence to the suspicion that France aimed to construct l’Europe de la défense as a global pole counterbalancing the United States. In turn, for the Germans, at least until in the late 2000s they tired of being in the driver seat of European integration, supporting European defence potential has been about nurturing European integration, especially the federalist project. Fearing the CSDP would develop a militaristic identity, the Scandinavian states in turn have sought to perpetuate within it the EU’s civilian identity. Moens has characterized this hybrid construction thus:

CSDP is a ‘big tent’ under which various visions of a European role in military affairs can co-exist for the time being. CSDP means different things to different
member states. To some it means a stronger voice, even an emerging ‘geopolitical’ entity for Europe... To others it means a rationale for restructuring and modernizing a European defence capability inside a slimmer, more robust NATO... Still others see it as an opportunity to transform from cold war neutrality to international participation. Almost all of these versions overlap, allowing the CSDP to grow, though for now on a somewhat thin layer of shared objectives (Moens, 2001).

I lay out a processual view of CSDP – as a policy, founded in support of the CFSP, that is continuously shaped by the member states, and, which, as institutional theories posit, has carved out its own distinct, evolving position as a norms entrepreneur. CSDP has not settled in a stable equilibrium and so European triggers and likewise national responses may be variegated in substance within the policy subdomains along a temporal dimension (Olsen, 2002).

For the purpose of this research I take the CSDP for what it is declared to be checked against with what it has accomplished in practical terms. As an implementer of the defence aspects of CFSP, it has fostered “common” EU member state approaches to such issues as the tasks and structures of the armed forces; defence-industrial R&D, production and procurement; as well as civilian crisis management. Since St.-Malo, the CSDP has built up an institutionalized centre of gravity in Brussels. At its core is the main decision-making body, the Political and Security Committee (PSC or COPS), assisted by the Politico-Military Working Group (WG), comprising MFA and MoD officials dealing with operational planning, and the Nicolaidis WG, whose members help prepare the PSC agenda. On the military side there are the EU Military Committee (EUMC), composed of the chiefs of defence, and the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the planning body. The EU member state representatives in the PSC, and the EU High Representative, rely also on the Committee of Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
(CIVCOM), the Policy Unit and the Joint Situation Centre at the EU Council General Secretariat (CGS) (Gourlay, 2004). The European Defence Agency (EDA) has since 2004 contributed to bringing about a policy convergence in defence-industrial policy.

The CSDP institutions are said to be strong conduits for policy diffusion and socialization, and thus, excellent incubators of Europeanization. They facilitate the integrative dynamics of Brusselization and "Commonization" in CSDP. Brusselization pertains to "the growth of the influence of Brussels-based actors within the CFSP and ESDP network, as opposed to [...] input guided from national capitals." "Commonization" is a similar process of the establishment and growth in importance of "central common actors that define, defence, promote and represent common EU interests, and that develop and implement policies from this European perspective" (Koops, 2011:300). According to Duke, the CSDP institutions have "'Europeanized' the political-military dialogue which, to various degrees among member states, has been a national preserve" (2005:29). Institutions may have developed their own dynamics conducive to norms diffusion (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006).

Among the CSDP institutions, scholars have paid most attention to the Political Security Committee. It is the locus of daily deliberations, decision-making, and working out defence policy routines in the EU at the level of ambassadors and representatives of the Commission and the Council Secretariat. Howorth argues that the close, iterative cooperation within PSC has engendered a new hybrid form of governance sui generis a supranational intergovernmentalism. Though it sounds like a contradiction in terms, in his view, a "trans-European strategic culture" has grown out of an intergovernmental process. This has been expedited through normative socialization informing the work of
PSC. National representatives in the PSC adjust their positions, from those instructed by national capitals, "in the greater cause of forging EU policy" (Howorth, 2007). Meyer, who like Duke and Howorth, has looked at the PSC in detail, concludes that it has brokered "compromises even in areas where national strategic norms would initially indicate incompatibility" (Ibid.). Through a constant "European learning process," socialisation, peer pressure and informal group conformity mechanisms, explored in social psychology, it has fostered norms/policy convergence. Meyer thus considers the PSC as "one of the most important ideational transmission belts of a gradual Europeanisation of national foreign, security and defence policies" (cited by Howorth, 2007:26).

In the field of practice, since the CSDP was declared operational at the Laeken Summit in 2001, the EU has conducted 23 military and civilian missions – a few with NATO’s assistance through the Berlin Plus arrangement (Kempin and Mawdsley, 2009). Operational lessons learning has stimulated Europeanization (Koops, 2011). In 2003 the EU member states drew up a first-of-its-kind European security strategy – *A Secure Europe in a Better World* (Toje, 2005). It has become a sort of doctrinal benchmark for the EU member states. Capabilities generation processes have been initiated. These include the 2003 European Headline Goal, designed to raise the European Rapid Reaction Forces; its successor the 2010 Headline Goal, with the Battlegroup concept as its centrepiece; as well as the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 for civilian crisis management. The EU has also promoted armaments collaboration through EDA to address, *inter alia*, capability shortfalls. Towards this end, the Agency has formulated the *Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs* and
spearheaded work on the Defence Equipment Market, the Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement as well as joint Research & Technology programs. The innovations of the Lisbon Treaty herald a further deepening of the CSDP. These include: an appointment of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, an establishment of the European External Action Service, provisions for the Permanent Structured Cooperation, mutual assistance in the case of armed aggression and the solidarity clause (Angelet and Vrailas, 2008).

The CSDP has become institutionalized, embedded in the treaties; its decision-making procedures have facilitated the launch of activities in support of CFSP on three continents. It has had concrete outputs. It is a policy in progress, but by no means a lightweight in the EU policy menu. The developments and processes within the EU security governance should leave a footprint upon the EU member states’ policies.

1.2. Dependent variable

Looking at the dependent variable, we observe that over the past decade, Polish security and defence policy has undergone changes. Most policy domains, or sub-policies, have to various degrees registered it, although civilian capability-building appears to be in stasis. Table 1 highlights the key findings.
Table 1  Polish security and defence policy in 1999 and 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(t_1) (1999)</th>
<th>(t_2) (2009)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>security policy anchored in NATO</td>
<td>security policy anchored in NATO and the EU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>limited expeditionary civilian and military deployments</td>
<td>extensive expeditionary civilian and military deployments*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support for European defence capability within NATO (ESDI)</td>
<td>support for autonomous CSDP, though in complementarity with NATO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participation in 4 multinational military units</td>
<td>participation in 15 multinational military units*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conscript force</td>
<td>all volunteer force**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unreformed defence-industrial sector with limited ties to western markets and producers</td>
<td>restructured defence-industry with links to western markets and producers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mainly domestic procurement</td>
<td>a substantial foreign content in procurement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>limited civilian crisis management capacity</td>
<td>limited civilian crisis management capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author;  
* in the 1999-2009 period  
** full professionalization due to start as of 1 Jan. 2010

An oft-noted problem in Europeanization studies, as in related but distinct concepts of policy convergence/diffusion/transfer, is inadequate precision with regard to aspects of policy being investigated (Heichel et al., 2005). Policy transfer is defined generically as a “process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and so forth in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). Dolowitz and Marsh propose to narrow the focus to one of seven objects of policy transfer: policy goals, structure and content; policy instruments or administrative techniques; institutions; ideology; ideas, attitudes and concepts; and negative lessons (Ibid.: 349-350). While I will put the ideas underpinning policy under a magnifying lens, my main interest lies in policy content and
implementation through decision-making procedures and instruments. The relative weight I give to policy implementation and policy outputs, in other words how policy moves from policy formation to actual practice, stems from my desire to examine concrete examples of policy change and, further, to distinguish *behavioural* from *formal* change. While Polish security policy content has been subject of several studies, less attention has been paid to the way it has been designed and executed through national institutions. I therefore aim to fill a lacuna in knowledge.

I will measure the impact of Europeanization within three domains: *armed forces reform*, *defence-industrial policy* and *civilian crisis management*. I have chosen these case studies for two reasons. First, I have sought to discern the tangible imprint of the EU and the means by which it disseminates ideas, promotes institutional designs and policy practices. Second, the choice of these practical spheres of activity should allow me to appraise Poland’s propensity to download from the EU level or to draw inspirations from other EU member states (“cross-loading”).

I have conceptualized security policy in a “traditional” sense focalized around the use of force. This explains my interest in raising (defence-industrial policy) and deploying capabilities (armed forces reform) for crisis management. I treat crisis management as the raison d’être of the CSDP, an operational arm of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Conceptualizing security in such a narrow sense enables me to trace the impact of CSDP on Poland’s “national security.” I refer to externally-oriented security policy, because I aim to explore also how Europeanization has affected the job of the Polish ministries of: foreign affairs, in charge of formulating security policy; defence,
in so far as it implements decisions laid out at the foreign ministry level; and, where it is relevant to civilian crisis management, also the ministry of internal affairs.

What does a Europeanized national security and defence policy entail in practical terms? As Reynolds noted, "a central justification for the development of the European Security and Defence Policy" has been "the need to incite a process of military capability reform across the European Union" (2006). The Joint Declaration of the 1998 British-French summit at St.-Malo, acknowledged as a blueprint for the CSDP, spelled out what were to be the key thrust of reforms:

2... the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.... 3... the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework). 4. Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology (Rutten, 2001)

Based on this declaration, other EU documents (for example the European Security Strategy) and studies of changes that have occurred in the West European militaries we can sketch out the benchmarks for an ideal-type Europeanized security and defence policy, and the changes necessary to bring it about.

Four developments, or indicators, would evince a Europeanizing security/defence policy. The first indicator would be reframing policy – putting less stress on a territorially-bounded sensu stricto national defence, and redefining policy in (increasingly) European terms. To what extent has the salience of the EU agenda increased in Polish security policy? Back in 1999, Poland thought that if, as it declared in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the EU really wanted to operationalize a common defence
policy, NATO’s attempt to carve out a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance offered the best opportunity. Thus Poland’s preferred scenario was to enable the Western European Union, as the EU’s executive agent, to avail of NATO capabilities by way of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) instrument, or, once the WEU closed shop, give the EU a direct access through the Berlin Plus arrangement. Ten years later, while NATO, alongside a concomitant direct relationship with the US, remains the lynchpin of Poland’s defence policy, the CSDP is held up as a complementary platform in which to realize Poland’s defence interests. Most importantly, though it insists on synergies with NATO, Poland has grown comfortable with the idea of the CSDP being built up within the EU with a relatively high degree of autonomy. A significant piece of evidence for the shift in the frame of reference has been Poland’s volte-face on the issue of establishing an operational headquarters for the EU.

The second indicator would be the reform of the armed forces, particularly to ensure they are able to take part in multilateral cooperation and crisis management operations under the EU aegis. In terms of the force structure and the mandate the militaries of the EU member states have had to part with a singular fixation on the defence of national territory, and gear up to handle crises on the fringes of Europe and beyond (“respond to international crises”). Thus, I will seek out an evidence for domestic-level changes in four respects: (1) the participation of the Polish military units in multinational formations (“multinational European means” as spelled out in the St-Malo Declaration); (2) the rate of and the depth of contribution of the Polish military to expeditionary deployments; (3) a possible shift from a conscript force to an all-volunteer army that would attest to an advanced process of professionalization (“credible military forces” “that can react
rapidly”); (4) and in the adaptation of the institutions at home to service the CSDP (in St. Malo Declaration - “the means to decide to use…. the “military forces”). By institutional adaptation, I mean a reorganization at the executive level, resulting from functional pressures to liaise with relevant EU structures - Political and Security Committee, Military Committee and Military Staff – and respond to EU policymaking rather than a deliberate attempt by the EU to refashion national institutions (Aktipis, 2007; Sedelmeier, 2006). I will follow a broad definition of institutions to determine also changes in the procedures regulating ways the foreign and defence ministries as well as the general staff “do business,” including staffing, training and secondment of officials to Brussels.

Since NATO is known to stimulate policy changes, the impact of this organization must be accounted for as well. Epstein has argued that thanks to denationalizing defence planning, the Alliance has successfully pushed Polish elites to abandon territorial defence (2008). I will check also for other potential triggers, especially major contingencies like Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as stimuli within the EU security governance, including the Weimar Triangle, the Eurocorps and the EU Battlegroups (EU BG). Jacoby concluded that EU BGs may affect reforms if they map onto national reform trajectories (2008). Since Polish MoD experts claim that the BGs provide a transformative and developmental impulse for Polish armed forces, it is worth investigating whether rhetoric meets reality (Kawałowski, 2007). Recalling Mérand’s contention that the CSDP has benefited from the international defence field cultivated by NATO and the attribution of the transformative import to the NATO Response Force, I will assess the causal power of the Alliance in this regard as well (2008).
The third indicator of defence policy Europeanization would be opening up the national defence industry to pan-European collaboration in research and development and procurement as well as liberalizing the procurement policy to enable weapons purchases from other EU member states. The St.-Malo Declaration calls for "a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology" to support "strengthened armed forces." There is a lack of agreement on what a Europeanized defence-industrial policy actually entails. Many studies focus on the empiria leaving it up to us to infer the outcome of Europeanization (for example Kenny, 2006; Mölling, 2008). Referring to a draft resolution of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee in 2002, "calling for a greater synergy between national and multi-national defence projects in Europe," an EurActiv news service spoke of the EP’s support for "a greater Europeanisation of defence industries," (Euractiv, 2002). That resolution did not spell out the meaning of Europeanization. A reading of the text reveals that it is understood as the "restructuring" and "rationalising" defence industries in the member states aimed at their "integration." The preferred outputs are therefore: the establishment of transnational companies; pooling and coordinating research; introducing an effective procurement policy to support the fulfillment of the CSDP capabilities requirements; "defence standardisation," another term for harmonizing military requirements; and exposing the defence industries to the discipline of the single market (European Parliament, 2002). Scholars take up these outputs as a corroboration of Europeanization (Mawdsley, 2002; Moravcsik, 1990; Morth, 2000; Schmitt, 2001).

An ideal-type European defence-industrial policy, therefore, entails primarily removing barriers to intra-EU collaboration. Freeing up the economies of scale would
strengthen the European Defence-Industrial and Technological Base (EDITB) and buttress a competitive European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM). I will examine Poland’s record in liberalizing military procurement, revising policies on industrial compensation, called offset, and connecting its defence industry and R&D outfits with European networks. Should Poland model its defence-industrial restructuring upon the European patterns, this would attest to a horizontal diffusion of Europeanization.

The fourth indicator of Europeanization would be how seriously civilian crisis management is taken in Poland. Although there is no reference in the Franco-British declaration to civilian capacity-building and civilian crisis management, the EU soon after decided to endow the CSPD with both military and civilian dimensions. After ten years of CSDP, it turns out most of the EU operations have been civilian rather than military. One would expect the civilian dimension to have had a considerable impact on national approaches to crisis management (Menon 2009). It is worthwhile comparing and contrasting the creation of civilian and military capacities since they are likely to put different kinds of demands on the state institutions (Britz, 2007). I will interrogate those aspects of Poland’s security policy that are most relevant to civilian crisis management, namely: training, recruitment, operational participation as well as doctrinal and legislative changes.

1.3. NATO-ization, networks, globalization and domestic reforms:

Unravelling the causal relationships

Europeanization researchers in general are predisposed to attribute changes found to the EU, and only gloss over other stimuli (Haverland, 2005). They tend to treat their topic
under investigation as a closed system impervious to external influences other than the EU (Bromley, 2007). However, through the concept of the "institutional environment" sociological institutionalism reminds that "all organizations must interact with other organizations" (Jacoby, 2004). Nowhere is this truer than in the field of defence.

NATO has played a critical role in European security, a fact which, though it should not, tends to be overlooked in research on Europeanization of security policy (Radaelli, 2000). The Alliance has been called "a key agent in building security governance in Europe" (Webber, 2004:14). Mérand considers CSDP as simply a merger of NATO-based military internationalization and the CFSP (2008). NATO has got what it takes to influence national defence policies. For a start, it has had a fifty-year head-start on CSDP (Howorth, 2009). As the historical institutionalist concept of path dependency predicts, "the weight of the shadow of the past," or past policy choices and traditions, have locked in policy of a type and in a trajectory preferred by the organization (Jacoby, 2004; Reiter, 1994). The Alliance is highly institutionalized. It has a single operational and planning HQ structure – composed of the civilian International Staff in Brussels and the military Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, as well as many institutions and agencies. The Allied Command Transformation is solely dedicated to engendering force transformation. Around 4 thousand people work at NATO HQ, including national representatives, and 1,200 civilian members of the International Staff, while 5,500 civilians fill positions at NATO agencies and commands. There are 13,100 military posts across NATO commands. If one takes into account thousands of officers who have served tours of duty at NATO commands, this makes for an environment far
more conducive to socialization than the EU. NATO Parliamentary Assembly has also been claimed to have a strong socialising impact on national security elites (Flockhart, 2004). There has been a plethora of large-scale exercises organized under NATO watch, as well as many operations led by it, that have facilitated policy transfer and lessons learning.

NATO’s unparalleled strength lies also in an integrated defence planning. Policy convergence is written explicitly into the aim of the planning process which is “to provide a framework within which national and Alliance defence planning activities can be harmonized to meet agreed targets in the most effective way” (NATO ACT, 2010). A single jointly agreed Political Guidance sets the direction for national defence planning, while comprehensive requirements and the setting of NATO Target Force Goals have the potential influence changes in the national militaries, for example by prescribing multinational cooperation. Through the Planning and Review Process written into the Partnership for Peace Programs, NATO may influence defence planning of the candidate and partner states as well.

The literature on the transformation of civil military relations in East-Central Europe, which, Donnelly conceptualizes more broadly as defence reform, also attributes causal powers to NATO (1997; Dutkiewicz, 2004; Herspring, 2002; Latawski, 2002). Kempin and Mawdsley claim that “NATO enlargement conditions have had a strong impact on

\[C^A\]

Comparatively a lot fewer personnel work for EU institutions dealing with the CSDP. The total number of staff working with CFSP and ESDP at the General Secretariat of the Council is 322 out of 3461 (in 2007), out of which 200 are employed at the EU military staff, 94 in the CFSP and ESDP policy units at external relations directorate and 28 at the HR/CFSP’s private office. The European Commission’s DG Relex, consisting of 12 directorates, has a staff of 657 people out of 23,211 (in 2007), the staff in Directorate A (dealing with CFSP and ESDP-related issues) is about 60 (Rieker, 2007). The EU Military Committee is said to have “a very small staff” (Vanhoonacker, Dijkstra and Maurer, 2010). This means that fewer than 500 people out of a total of 26,672 EU staff, or less than 2%, work on ESDP-related issues in the EU bureaucracy, as compared to tens of thousands of people at NATO.
the newer EU and NATO members" (2009). To the extent that conditionality accompanying NATO accession may have influenced redesigning national policy, it deserves scrutiny.

For Wallace, in particular, Europeanization has clearly been buttressed by NATO through norms of out-of-area crisis management and multilateral cooperation it projects (2000). The Alliance should thus be looked at as a source of norms in defence policy, which Europeanization scholars have regarded as if they were innately European. Both NATO and the EU have gradually oriented themselves on similar concepts of force, like deployability, high projection, global approach, and a spectrum of missions covering prevention, peace operations and those in response to a crisis (Striuli, 2009). Since NATO has a strong potential for norms diffusion, substantiated in concrete results, we should not fall into the trap of failing to systematically account for alternative sources of domestic policy change (Epstein, 2008; Flockhart, 2004; Gheciu, 2005). For this reason, I consider the influence of NATO on national security policy, NATO-ization, as an alternative, to the effects of the CSDP, explanation for Europeanization, (Hofmann, 2009). Incorporating NATO-ization into the analytical design should help distinguish real from rhetorical causes of change. It will provide a corrective to assumptions locking Europeanization to the EU (Wallace, 2000). We thereby heed Major’s advice not to close off Europeanization from the international level of analysis (2005).

Distinguishing conceptually and methodologically the respective influences of the CSDP (EU-ization) from NATO (NATO-ization) is bound, however, to prove challenging. The available empirical and – however little of it - conceptual work related to this subject provides little guidance. None of the Europeanization research to-date
interrogating the defence policy sector has taken pains to scrutinize the impact of the CSDP versus NATO’s. Zooming in solely on the EU effects has been a method of choice. In other words, researchers have studied national defence policy changes in discrete ways, focusing on pieces – either the impact of the EU or NATO – bracketing the larger context (Alter and Meunier, 2006).

Further, there has been “an almost lack of attention to inter-organizational relations by theory-driven IR scholars” (Biermann, 2008). Some attempts have been made to conceptualize inter-institutional effects in general and NATO-EU relationship in particular. Scholars have employed the concepts of “regime complexity” (Alter and Meunier, 2009); “networking” (Biermann, 2008); “security communities” (Deutsch, 1968; Adler, 1992); “institutional overlap” (Hofmann, 2009; 2011); “nested and overlapping regimes” (Alter and Meunier, 2006); or “normative overlap,” in terms of NATO’s strategic culture being a subculture of the EU (Zyla, 2011). These approaches, however, are piecemeal and “still in their infancy.” None have elaborated causal relationships or developed cumulative theoretical insights (Hofmann, 2011).

I will follow an eclectic conceptual approach, albeit informed foremost by Biermann’s concept of networking, which he applies to the network of Euro-Atlantic security institutions, a “novel form and quality of security governance in Europe” (2008). Networks are fluid, complex mutually interactive and constitutive configurations of institutions (nodes), featuring a high density of links, reciprocal causal effects and a common socially constructed perception of boundaries. Although the Euro-Atlantic security network includes NATO, EU, WEU, OSCE, the Council of Europe and the UN, I shall concentrate chiefly on the dyadic relations between NATO and the EU. I will pay
attention to the WEU insofar as it has played a (limited) role in socializing the Polish EU military and police in the culture of European defence cooperation, and as it has - through WEAG/WEAO - contributed (marginally) to defence-industrial cooperation. Since it was decided in 2000 to transfer the functions of the WEU into the European Union, this organization has ceased to have any relevance. Because the Council of Europe has carved out a niche as a normative body in soft power, primarily human rights-related issues, it bears no importance to the analysis. The OSCE has been pushed into the periphery in the network, its mandate reduced mainly to preventive diplomacy, and its budget reduced to a mere €168.2 million (2007) (Biermann, 2008). Where appropriate, however, I have referred to the OSCE, as it has provided a platform for learning for the Polish police, and for the EU itself. The EU’s acquisition of civil crisis management capacities demonstrates that it has been progressively “OSCE-ified” (Biermann, 2008). I will pay attention to the UN insofar as it has influenced the Polish defence establishment.

The EU and NATO form a “strategic alliance,” which makes up “the backbone of the whole [Euro-Atlantic security] network.” Strategic alliances are dyads comprised of two organizations, which, through their high visibility in the network, disposal of most resources and maximum influence have established “commanding central positions in a network” (Biermann, 2008). Inter-organizational relations presuppose domain similarity and common interests. Domain similarity is defined as a “shared issue-area with significant, though not total overlap of competences for meaningful cooperation” (Ibid.: 9 The total budget of the OSCE shows a downward trend. By comparison the EU’s budget is €126.5 billion (2007), of which in one year alone €306 million (from the CFSP budget of €1.981 billion for 2007-2013) was spent only on the civilian CSDP operations (2011). Non-civilian operations are paid out of the member state contributions and around 10% of their common expenses are covered under the Athena mechanism (€45 million in 2006). NATO’s total annual budget of €3.1 billion dwarfs both the OSCE and the CSDP funding (2011) (Biermann, 2008; EU Council, June 2006; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008; Liska, 2011; MFA, 2011).
NATO and the EU obviously concern themselves with the security of Europe and managing crises out-of-area. As the doctrinal documents (NATO strategic concepts, European Security Strategy) of the two organizations indicate, both NATO and the EU share common interests. It could not be otherwise since twenty-one countries share membership in the EU of 27 and NATO of 28.

The CSDP, a “tightly coupled security community,” has been nested since birth within the Euro-Atlantic security network (Rieker, 2003). In the 1950s Deutsch already perceived the then European Communities as a “subarea of integration” within the North Atlantic area, which “could [...] prosper in the eventuality that NATO might for some reason decline as a binding force in the North Atlantic area” (1968:190, 202). Hofmann argues that the architects of CSDP were not only aware that they were creating an institution that would overlap with NATO, but they chose to design it upon the NATO template because it was the most credible defence organization in town (2011).

There is plenty of evidence of NATO-EU “mirror-imaging” (Grazioso, 2007; Wallace, 2000). This is a phenomenon, whereby NATO templates are copied within the CSDP and their respective policy initiatives reveal mutual interdependence (Kempin and Mawdsley, 2009). As soon as Javier Solana left his post of NATO Secretary General (1995-1999) the EU member states appointed him the first EU High Representative for CFSP. As the primary architect of CSDP, he brought the best NATO practices (Biermann, 2008). Hence, the PSC has been modelled on the North Atlantic Council; the EU Military Committee on the NATO Military Committee; and SitCen bears

---

10 “Nesting” pertains to a situation where regional or issue-specific international institutions are themselves part of multilateral frameworks that involve multiple states or issues (akin to Matryoshka dolls) (Alter and Meunier, 2006).

11 “Overlapping regimes” are found where multiple institutions have authority over an issue, but agreements are not mutually exclusive or subsidiary to another (Alter and Meunier, 2009).
resemblance to the erstwhile NATO Special Committee. In a process of "knowledge transfer," many officers in the EU Military Staff brought their NATO experience into the new organization (Ibid.). The 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal revealed similarities with the NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative, adopted in the same year. Two years later, as proof of cross-fertilization, the follow-up EHG 2010 and NATO's 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitments spawned the Battlegroups and the NATO Response Force (Hofmann, 2009). Influenced by the comprehensive security approach, in which the EU enjoys a comparative advantage, NATO has moved to augment its military arsenal with civilian capabilities. While the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) is said to reflect the premium placed by the EU on a full spectrum of capabilities, NATO has also recognized the need for police support in crisis management. Thus, the Alliance set up the Multinational Military Police Battalion. The feedback effects engendered by the NATO-EU relationship extend to standardization. The European Defence Agency, in its Initial Long-Term Vision called for the EU defence capability efforts, particularly those related to network-enabled warfare, to be "nested within NATO conceptual frameworks and standards" (EDA, 2006). NATO and EU have developed operational linkages through, inter alia, the "Berlin Plus agreement," the establishment of the EU cell at SHAPE and NATO's liaison at the EU Military Staff.

Though much has been made of the emergence of the so-called European strategic culture, there may well be indications of a converging identities of NATO and the EU. The respective evolutions of the EU and NATO casts doubt on the conventional wisdom about a seemingly impassable divergence between the Atlanticist (European defence capability anchored in NATO) and Europeanist (European defence capability anchored in
the EU) conceptions of European security. The EU places emphasis on a holistic approach to security, encompassing conflict prevention, military and/or civilian approach to crisis management, and it seeks UN legitimacy for its activities. Influenced by its key principal, the US, NATO attaches great importance to high-intensity warfare, kinetic operations and a military dimension of security in general. Through article V, the Alliance remains at heart a collective defence organization. However, the incorporation of the mutual security clause and the solidarity clause in the Lisbon Treaty may presage the transformation of the EU into a collective defence organization in its own right. Hofmann argues that an institutional overlap has engendered feedback effects. Specifically, "The prior existence of NATO shaped the conceptualization and organization of CSDP at its creation, and the existence of two alternative security institutions continues to influence how the institutions evolve – how each institution defines security interests and how states adjust the mandate of each institution to address changes in the security environment" (Hofmann, 2009).

While factoring in the NATO-CSDP dynamics, we must be careful not to credit external triggers for reforms that had endogenous roots. A wholesale defence transformation is an aspect which differentiates "defence Europeanization East" from "defence Europeanization West." While the post-Cold War peace dividend triggered adaptation of defence policy in Western Europe, its scope cannot compare to the transformation East-Central European states underwent post-1989. Chris Donnelly, former Special Adviser for Central and East European Affairs of NATO SG, argued that defence reform in these countries entailed:

a total reassessment of their national security requirements, developing new mechanisms and procedures for elaborating national security policy and for crisis
management, a major restructuring and downsizing of the military system, a reorientation of the officer corps and of the military philosophy generally, and a far-reaching reform of the military industrial procurement and production system” (Donnelly, 1997).

As a long-term process, transition did not stop once East-Central Europeans entered the Alliance. The reform of defence industry, for example, would have been a domestic imperative of the first order, related to saving jobs and maintaining industrial capacity rather than being primarily or only a response to external triggers.

Finally, globalization appears to be a contender for Europeanization in inducing domestic changes. The two concepts tend to be conflated or used interchangeably. Disentangling empirically the ‘net effect’ of Europe from sources of domestic change at the global level appears problematic (Börzel, 2005). For Wallace, since the EU develops policies that make the globalization pressures more palatable to the EU member states, Europeanization may be conceptualized as a ‘filter’ for globalization (Wallace, 2000). In this sense, the EU is external to globalization. Alternatively, the EU may act as an agent of globalization fostering the norms, of, for instance, democratic governance, that are then disseminated globally through transnational networks. Europeanization and globalization would therefore be regarded as interwoven processes.

Cowles and Risse advise us to look at Europeanization as a reference point through which globalization (and domestic) processes are channelled. Europeanization may reinforce, take advantage of, or fend against globalization forces (Cowles and Risse, 2001). Such a conceptualization is helpful in discussing, in particular, the advent of an embryonic EU defence-industrial policy. Globalization, in this case pressures from a consolidating US arms industry and a post-Cold War reductions in defence spending, prodded the EU member states to reform the industry. Through patterns of ‘clustered
convergence’, those EU member states eager to pursue enhanced collaboration did so, while at the same time they encouraged both positive (building regulatory frameworks) and negative integration (liberalization) through the EU. Since the advent of CSDP, defence-industrial consolidation in Europe has taken the form of strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. Europeanization has therefore evolved its own integrative dynamic (regionalism), independent of globalization, albeit couched in terms of Europeanization as “a bastion against globalization” (competition from the US) (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2005).

Causal complexity, associated with overlapping institutions within European (not just EU) security governance, obfuscates cause and effect relations (Alter and Meunier, 2009). Students of EU-NATO relations have observed a “process of convergence among the Euro-Atlantic security institutions in recent years” (Biermann, 2008); a growing strategic coherence between NATO and the EU (Dyson, 2008); or a tight CSDP-NATO complementarity (Striuli, 2009). This process has not been unproblematic. It features a constant rivalry for a central position in the network, a concept known as positioning. A central position brings more political power, resources, making the organization more attractive to political actors, including aspirants for membership (Biermann, 2008). The stronger the gravitational pull of an organization, the more effective its norms diffusion is likely to be. Scholars have drawn different conclusion with regards to the impact of the dynamic EU-NATO dyad on the European states. For Striuli, an alignment of the EU and NATO military conceptions means that for these states their belonging to one international organization or to another “does not make a great difference for their international military policies” (2009). Domínguez believes however that NATO “has
acted as a powerful incentive for new members to transform their institutions, while the latter has had a limited impact" (2009). Webber thinks that both the EU and NATO have exerted a “telling effect” upon aspirant states by means of accession conditions (2004).

If the member states are subject to similar commitments by overlapping organizations, how do we conceptualize their receptiveness to the influence of either NATO and/or the EU? Navigating through a theoretical terra incognita, we are aided by insights that allow us to put forward four propositions.

First, as rationalist perspective suggests, states comply with external demands when the benefits outweigh the costs. The state must be certain that they will receive the promised rewards after meeting what is expected of them (Sedelmeier, 2011). In other words, the promise of rewards must be credible. In the late 1990s and early 2000s NATO, backed up by the US and dangling a prized carrot - Article V, would have appeared a far more credible norms entrepreneur for Poland (and appealing in view of resonance of Poland’s security identity) than the EU. This might have changed once CSDP institutions consolidated, the policy started to deliver results in the field and, since the 2002-2003 Convention on the Future of Europe, the EU looked into adopting a mutual security and solidarity clauses. The shifting temporal context matters.

Second, the determinacy of the conditions enhances the likelihood of rule adoption. The clearer the behavioural implications of a rule, the higher its determinacy (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005). But regime complexity by design contributes to rule ambiguity. Since the underlying preferences of the architects of St-Malo turned out to be different – the British desire to push NATO to the central position in the network versus the French desire that the CSDP be centre-stage – the CSDP and EU-
NATO relations rest upon a strategic ambiguity (Alter and Meunier, 2009). Reflecting disagreements, each milestone in the development of CSDP creation has been accompanied by the following caveat: “the development of the common European policy on security and defence will take place without prejudice to the commitments under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.... Nor shall the development of the common European policy on security and defence prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.” A country confronting two sets of commitments, of which one or both are ambiguous, would be uncertain how to respond. Europeanization scholarship teaches that uncertainty prods a state to heed successful policy models (Börzel, 2005). Again, NATO would have an edge in this regard. However, a country might play the game strategically by “forum-shopping,” selecting an international venue that both suits its interests and promises to maximize utilities (Alter and Meunier, 2009). Facing non-binding commitments states may select which rules to follow. The nested context provides opportunities for political actors to shift “framings” of the issue depending on the forum in use with attendant repercussions regarding the salience of a particular policy agenda (Alter and Meunier, 2006). A state that is only member of one institution may politicize the resources and mandate dimensions of overlap to make its voice heard, and thus improve its own relative position in the network (Hofmann, 2011).

Third, rule adoption will depend on the size of governmental adoption costs. Since “the existence of multiple institutions in one policy field increases the relative scarcity of resources,” an EU-NATO dyadic network will exact high implementation costs (Ibid.; Hofmann, 2011:104). As Haas had noted "formerly centrally planned economies have
greater difficulties in complying with international obligations than industrialized
countries owing to less developed administrative systems and fewer monitoring and
financial resources which can be devoted to enforcement” (cited by Versluis, 2005:9).
Such a state, particularly as only a member of one organization, will be fair game to calls
for “non-duplication” being wary of stretching scarce resources across two overlapping
organizations. Once a modus vivendi has been worked out on the coordination of
capabilities or a change in candidate or membership status occurs, a recalibration of an
approach follows.

Fourth, a policy promoted by an organization will be complied with when the affected
parties have been involved in developing the arrangement (Olsen, 2002). Giving its even
weakest members a say in decisions endows a system with a high degree of legitimacy
(Wendt, 1994). A country as an “outsider” to policy-creation will be disinclined to abide
by the norms of their sponsoring organization which excludes it from decision-making. A
shift from an “outsider” (policy taker) to an “insider” (policy shaper) will have an impact
on the propensity to download.

Aware of the difficulties involved in disentangling causal connections between
domestic, inter-organizational and global processes, I will turn to several methodological
tools to help chart the pathways of change. They include: process-tracing (process
analysis), temporal sequencing, comparisons, and interviews with individuals in the
policy community. A multi-sourced methodological approach allows accumulating a
large amount of overtime data. Process tracing may thus be employed with greater
confidence we will be able to connect the dots between inputs with outputs, and confirm
observed association as causation. Studying sequences of events over time allows us to
infer causation. Processes at the level of EU security governance help explain why a certain domestic policy change took place when it did. Alternative explanations, like globalization, may not account for the timing of changes (Cowles and Risse, 2001). There may be marked changes between the period of accession candidacy and then of membership in the susceptibility of the state to import foreign templates. Longevity of the CSDP versus NATO certainly bears relevance to the gravitational pull of Europeanist versus Atlanticist ideas. The temporal context allows an identification of ‘critical junctures’ (for example the war in Iraq and the intra-EU split it engendered) that would be cathartic to departing from established policy trajectories. As a process transcending EU member state boundaries the study of Europeanization may necessitate a reliance on cross-national comparisons supplementing cross-case comparisons. A recourse to several methodological approaches helps minimize the risk of inferring a spurious relationship.

I.4. **Diffusion mechanisms**

Europeanization scholars have drawn on social sciences, including public policy, organizational theory and social psychology to shed light on a broad array of mechanisms that facilitate the spread of norms, policy models and practices state-to-state or of/and by international organizations. These include: voluntary learning or lessons-drawing from others, by doing, from success or failure, as well as social learning or socialization (Major, 2005; Major and Pomorska, 2005; Hartstein, 2009; Juncos and Pomorska, 2006; Jacquot and Woll, 2003); normative persuasion (Finnemore, 1996); policy transfer, mimicry, mimetism and isomorphism, copying, combination and inspiration (Dolowitz
Europeanization literature integrates these various concepts with similar causal mechanisms (Börzel and Risse, 2009). While isolated mechanisms have been operationalized in empirical research, in real-life several causal mechanisms likely push Europeanization forward. As Börzel and Risse point out: “Ideas diffuse in such a complex process that several mechanisms should be assumed at work simultaneously in a given empirical situation” (2009: 19fn.). As an example, Dyson notes that the experience of joint operations with the British in the Gulf and Bosnia convinced President Chirac that the British military should be the “model against which the French would measure themselves.” Here we have mechanisms of lessons learning and emulation at work. Unfortunately, in Europeanization literature these mechanisms are treated as alternative or even competing explanations (Ibid.). That is perhaps because we have not devised a conceptual apparatus able to capture multiple dynamics at play (Holzinger and Knill, 2005).

Informed by different theories several typologies of mechanisms conveying Europeanization have been put forth. Inspired by organizational theory, which focuses on increasing similarity of institutional designs and cultures, Knill and Radaelli point out three varieties of isomorphism, or “the tendency to become alike:” coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism and normative isomorphism (Knill, 2005; Radaelli, 2000). Dolowitz and Marsh draw upon policy transfer literature to highlight three types of policy transfer: voluntary policy transfer, direct coercive policy transfer and indirect coercive policy transfer (1996:344). Börzel and Risse propose their own typology of the
mechanisms of diffusion, defined as “the “socially mediated spread of policies across and within political systems” (cited by Knill, 2005: 766) (see Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social mechanism and underlying theory of social action</th>
<th>Promoter of Ideas (Sender)</th>
<th>Recipient of Ideas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coercion (legal and physical imposition)</td>
<td>coercive authority, legal or physical force</td>
<td>Obedience, submission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulation of Utility Calculations (instrumental rationality; logic of consequences)</td>
<td>(positive) and (negative) incentives</td>
<td>reward (reap benefits); punishment (avoid costs); adaptive learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialization (normative rationality; logic of appropriateness)</td>
<td>promote ideas through providing an authoritative model (normative pressure)</td>
<td>internalization of ideas; a change in actor’s behaviour to gain social acceptance (type I socialization); identity change, leading to a change in interests (type II socialization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuasion (communicative rationality)</td>
<td>Promote ideas as legitimate or true through reason-giving</td>
<td>reasoned consensus (acceptance of idea as legitimate or true); complex learning; identity change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emulation (indirect influence)</td>
<td>(Promote comparison and competition - strictly speaking this mechanism does not require the active promotion of ideas)</td>
<td>a) performance (adopt effective and efficient policy solution) b) imitation (become more like the relevant peers)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Börzel and Risse 2009 and author’s own alterations

For the sake of parsimony, I will assume isomorphism, policy transfer and diffusion to be similar processes. Börzel and Risse subsume five mechanisms of coercion, manipulation of utility calculations, socialization, persuasion and emulation within three major logics of social action: instrumental rationality, also known as rational choice, or the logic of consequence; normative rationality, or the logic of appropriateness; and communicative
rationality based on the logic of arguing (2009). Because it ties in the interrelationship between the promoter of ideas and the recipient, accounts for the respective motivations of each, and not only parallels but expands on the insights of Knill, Radaelli, Dolowitz and Marsh, this conceptualization captures well the means through which the impact of Europe is brought home.

The first mechanism – coercion, akin to coercive isomorphism in Radaelli’s typology or direct coercive transfer in Dolowitz and Marsh, is the imposition of ideas either by force or through the authority of the European Court of Justice. While forcing countries to adopt ideas by the threat of physical force is no longer accepted in Europe, the resort to the force of law is a powerful mechanism of internal diffusion. The Commission directives impose upon the EU member states an obligation to harmonize legislation. The national authorities have to comply, or else they are brought before the European Court of Justice. Coercion appears similar to Knill and Lehmkuhl’s concept of positive integration, whereby the EU promotes concrete institutional requirements, or an institutional model for member-states to comply with. This is akin to a “regulatory state” model of EU governance (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999). For Dolowitz and Marsh, a direct coercive transfer may also be affected by transnational corporations. A pressure put on the government to adopt certain policies, backed by a threat of disinvestment, is none other than coercion (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996).

Because it applies to diffusion through the case law of the European Court, coercion does not generally apply to CSDP. However, in view of increased regulatory role of the European Commission (pillar I) in defence-industrial policy, it may well begin to make its mark in this policy sector. Its and the European Defence Agency’s role may,
however, be better conceptualized as *negative integration*, whereby the EU resorts to liberalization or deregulation, to alter domestic opportunity structures (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999). As I will show, an intervention by both the European Commission and EDA to open up the defence industry market to competition has influenced Polish defence-industrial policy.

Drawing on micro-economics, the second mechanism – *manipulation of utility calculations* refers to “carrots and sticks,” or the external incentives model. It is expressed *inter alia* by conditionality. In this view, a “government adopts EU rules if the benefits of EU rewards exceed the domestic adoption costs” (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005). For example, in shaping defence-industrial policy, the Polish government would be assumed to take into account not only EU expectations, but also the reaction of domestic constituents, especially the defence-industrial lobby, especially how these expectations impinge upon re-election prospects. Conditionality in its institutionalized form as part of accession negotiations did not play a large part in the adaptation to CSDP of Poland as a candidate state. The negotiations of the CFSP chapter obligated it to introduce a few institutional changes as well as to support the EU positions on external relations. For example, the offices of the Political Director, the European Correspondent and of a representative to the CSDP structures were created in Poland in the early 2000s. Negotiations on the CFSP/CSDP chapter also envisaged setting up a training program for civilian staff bound for deployments in EU crisis operations. Having ticked off these few conditions, once it entered the EU, Poland’s receptiveness to the CSDP became voluntary. Poland has had to comply as well with basic NATO membership requirements, especially in the area of democratic civil-military relations.
and interoperability. However, as I mentioned, for the most part “soft conditionality” accompanied Poland’s accession to NATO. The cost-benefit calculus remains an integral aspect of national decision-making. The recipient’s compliance with the EU, of lack thereof, is guided by the “logic of consequences.”

 Defined as “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community,” socialization, or normative isomorphism, works through normative rationality, or the “logic of appropriateness” (Checkel, 2005). States do “the right thing” rather than optimize utilities. Constructivist scholars have unpacked socialization in two ways—depending on the depth of the process. Central European states may adopt practices of the IOs they wish to join, not necessarily because they are persuaded, but because they want to be part of the club. Once they are in, for reasons of social acceptance or policy uncertainty, they may prefer to conform to the majority (Jacoby, 2004). So, an EU novice would learn the ropes, play by the EU rules, and master such norms as, for instance, le réflexe européen. Checkel calls this relatively shallow socialization, a conscious role playing - Type I socialization. Type II socialization envisages “complex learning,” independent of any material incentives. In this deeper socialization, the “logic of appropriateness” takes root, conscious calculation has been replaced by a taken for grantedness, inducing an identity change or a redefinition of interests to match those of the community. Such an ideal-type is a theoretical construct, yet to be corroborated empirically. An analysis of state behaviour suggests that the two logics may not be mutually exclusive. Actions taken by EU members are likely to involve a combination of the two logics, as I will show when explaining Poland’s motivations for playing part in EU military operations in Africa (Breuer, 2010:7fn.)
In Radaelli’s view, *normative isomorphism* may be induced by the process of professionalizing the military. Through recruitment, education, training and joint participation in military operations, the military profession fosters “a common cognitive base and a shared legitimization of occupational autonomy which make organization structures similar one to another” (Radaelli, 2000:28). As a powerful network, penetrating deep into the defence establishments of its member states, NATO has been portrayed as an able facilitator of convergence. As Mérand points out: “while there is still a great deal of diversity among European armed forces, there has also been a convergence of military representations around the “culturally interoperable professional” *habitus* promoted by NATO” (2008:60). In this view national elite representatives linked in professional networks, based on “professional tribalism” assumed to be as strong as “national ethnocentrism,” are socialized into adopting best practices. Bennett has termed this process convergence through elite-networking (1991).

Knill and Lehmkuhl speak of socialization in terms of a cognitive logic of *framing integration*. The EU, not without reason called a “normative power,” affects change more indirectly by altering the beliefs and expectations of domestic actors (Irondelle, 2003; Kalburov, 2008). A change in the elite cognitive frames may affect strategies and preferences of domestic actors, “potentially” leading to institutional adaptation. Knill and Lehmkuhl specify that the “emergence of such policies of framing integration is particularly likely when the European decision-making context allows for the adoption of only vague and more or less symbolic policies, given the underlying conflicts of interests between the member states” (1999:4). Considered strictly speaking as an intergovernmental governance framework, CSDP is such a decision-making
context. Assessed as the weakest of Europeanization mechanisms, the cognitive mechanisms are nonetheless brought up as a prominent conduit for diffusing CFSP/CSDP. Europeanization, in this perspective, “appears as a learning process about good policy practice for elites for which the EU sets the scene, offering a ‘forum for discussion and a platform for policy transfer’” (Major and Pomorska, 2005:3; Major, 2005).

Building on Habermasian communicative action which grants speech the power to create new social facts that change how states view the world and shape policy, scholars argue that actors may be persuaded of norms legitimacy by their sponsoring IOs (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001). In institutionalized patterns of political dialogue and cooperation, actors, such as international organizations or transnational nongovernmental organizations, persuade each other about the validity claims inherent in any normative statement. By championing, for instance, a mixed civilian-military approach to crisis management as the best way to ensure security, the EU holds up a normative standard that inherently constitutes a causal belief (Börzel and Risse, 2009). Actors may be persuaded of the legitimacy of the norm either through an appeal to the “logic of appropriateness” and/or, through invoking rational choice, by pointing out that certain norms translate into more effective policies. Interrogating NATO-ization, Gheciu, Jacoby and Epstein have noted a tutor-pupil relationship between NATO and East Central European states. Through “teaching” and persuasion, the Alliance inducted Central and East European states into liberal-democratic norms of (security) governance (Epstein, 2008; Gheciu, 2005; Jacoby, 2001; 2004). In this connection, Börzel and Risse again pose a question to what extent the EU diffuses distinctively European ideas. The
readjustment of national security policies to address international security exigencies has been an idea promoted by NATO (Börzel and Risse, 2009).

The last set of mechanisms subsumed under *emulation*, or a voluntary transfer, also conceptualized as *mimicry*, does not require a purposive engagement of a policy entrepreneur. Instead, it attributes a voluntary, learning capacity to states, which may incorporate external ideas or institutional designs either to improve policy – lessons-drawing, or to gain respectability through imitating others – mimicry. Emulation may be underlain either by the logic of instrumental rationality, or the logic of normative rationality. Drawing on organizational theories to explain the modus operandi of the process of homogenization, for example, Radaelli notes that copying organizational structures is a process driven not only by efficiency considerations - improving policy. It is also a way of securing legitimization (2000). An adoption of models deemed more successful or legitimate is called *mimetism*. One of the factors deemed to facilitate it is uncertainty. DiMaggio and Powell explain: “[W]hen goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty, organizations may model themselves on other organizations” (cited by Radaelli, 2000:28).

Dolowitz and Marsh suggest three other sources of indirect policy transfer. The first is externalities from interdependence. The EU member states may be pushed to work together to address the common good of “security.” The second driver may be a perception shared by domestic political actors that their country is falling behind its neighbours or competitors: “The cumulative effect of action elsewhere may translate into a feeling of insecurity about being the odd-man-out” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996:349). Seeing the majority of NATO and EU members, including East Central Europeans, turn
to all-voluntary forces, the Polish elites might have chosen to professionalize the military, because being left behind would have been judged too risky. Finally, technology as well as international consensus may further policy transfer. The Revolution in Military Affairs, the coalescence of the European elites around the expeditionary paradigm and a focus the war on terror all propelled policy convergence.

An example of an internal diffusion through managed policy emulation, also termed 'facilitated coordination', is the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), one of the newer modes of EU governance (Börzel and Risse, 2009). A methodology like the OMC had been employed to oversee the realisation of the European Monetary Union. However, this method was specified and adopted formally by the 2000 European Council to achieve the Lisbon Agenda in economic affairs. The Council conclusions state as follows:

Implementation of the strategic goal will be facilitated by applying a new open method of coordination as the means of spreading best practice and achieving greater convergence towards the main EU goals. This method, which is designed to help Member States to progressively develop their own policies, involves:

- fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for achieving the goals which they set in the short, medium and long terms;
- establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks against the best in the world and tailored to the needs of different Member States and sectors as a means of comparing best practice;
- translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and regional differences;
- periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual learning processes (European Council, Doc/00/8).

The OMC is therefore a decentralised process encompassing socializing practices such as benchmarking, peer review, evaluation, periodic monitoring and sharing of best practices
(voluntarism) to coordinate and move policy forward, while leaving its actual implementation to the member states (the principle of subsidiarity). Because it is non-compulsory, the OMC has been likened to soft governance or a “soft law”.

The CSDP has been developed through a resort to the OMC. Reynolds argues that the implementation of the Headline Goals has been based on this method (2006). Likewise Peterson and Shackleton assert that the CSDP has followed this methodology (2011). The OMC is used in areas, “where previous attempts to develop stronger forms of co-ordination failed during the past decades owing to strong national political sensitivities” (Borrás and Jacobsson, 2004:191). It reconciles the interests of those who wish to move forward in a certain policy area, and thus settle for the OMC as a possible stepping stone towards hard governance, with those of the opponents, who like this method because it is non-binding and therefore likely to turn out fruitless (Idema and Kelemen, 2006). The soft governance behind CSDP may institutionalize the diffusion of solutions, though how effective it is, as compared to the hard governance of the Community method is a matter of debate (Ibid.; Bomberg and Peterson, 2000; Peterson and Shackleton, 2011).

The development of CSDP and the European Monetary Union reveal similar methodologies. The European Monetary Union involved a transfer of a successful policy model (German monetary policy) and a policy entrepreneurship (led by bankers) (Radaelli, 1997; 2003). One would think there was no policy model to draw on when CSDP was being formulated. However, according to Reynolds, the Headline Goal was a brainchild of Richard Hatfield, a senior official of the British Defence Ministry. By the time of St.-Malò, the UK was in the thick of defence reforms, whose direction and
content had been set by its own Strategic Defence Review. It advocated rapid deployability and power projection, the very thrust of transformation that the EU has encouraged. A heavy emphasis on improving defence in the Franco-British declaration thus attests to a strong imprint therein by Britain, eager to promote its own model of defence reform (Reynolds, 2006). The EMU convergence criteria inspired French Defence Minister Alain Richard to propose that defence spending “convergence criteria” of 2% of GDP be adopted (Menon, 2009). The Lisbon Treaty’s idea for permanent structured cooperation (PeSCo) envisages an inner core of states able and willing to integrate faster in defence matters, just as the EU is differentiated into those member states inside the Eurozone and those outside. Finally, the EU is not lacking in potential CSDP entrepreneurs. Sheppard, for one, has argued that EDA may be fit to play that role in defence-industrial policy (2006). By pursuing negative integration in this field, the European Commission has already emerged as a nascent policy entrepreneur here.

Bomberg and Peterson suggest that there is a considerable overlap between intensive transgovernmentalism and the OMC (2000). According to Mérand, that is just what the CSDP has become – a “strongly institutionalized transgovernmental field” (2008:42). A progressive institutionalization of the CSDP accompanied by an expansion of an epistemic community, as exemplified in the burgeoning number of think tanks concerned with European security, suggest an evolving new complex policy environment - an intensive transgovernmentalism in the making. Wallace, who put forth this conceptualization, thinks intensive intergovernmentalism has “the capacity on occasion [emphasis added] to deliver substantive joint policy” (2005:87fn). In short, the CSDP
may have evolved from an intergovernmental *stricto sensu* policy arena into a hybrid type of governance, conducive to Europeanization.

### 1.5. Taxonomy of changes

There is no agreement on how to measure outputs and outcomes in the dependent variable, or change induced by Europeanization (Britz, 2007; Flockhart, 2006). It remains an "inexact science" (Bromley, 2007). One of the most widely used taxonomies, devised by Radaelli, encompasses inertia, retrenchment, absorption and transformation (see Table 3; 2000). I will rely on it, and, where it does not capture precisely the nature of change, supplement it with Hériritier, Knill and Smith’ categories, which I will elaborate on below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Level of domestic change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inertia</td>
<td>Small: states resist change (but this often increases adaptive pressure and leads to change in the long term)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrenchment</td>
<td>Negative: states actively resist adaptive pressure by stressing their unique features (&quot;nationalization&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absorption/Adaptation</td>
<td>Small-medium: states incorporate/accommodate EU requirements without substantially modifying national policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformation</td>
<td>High: domestication fails; states forced to substantially alter or replaced existing policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: modified from Bache and Jordan 2006*

In Radaelli’s view, *inertia*, a lack of change, may occur particularly if there is a substantial degree of misfit between the EU policy and domestic practice. A country may lag in the implementation of EU prescriptions, or resist EU-induced change. Radaelli argues, however, that in the long run inertia can not be sustainable. In an analogy with
Kuhn's notion of accumulated anomalies, or "outcomes that do not fit the expectations induced by the existing paradigm" – the pressures from the build-up of discrepancies that cannot be handled within the old model may eventually force a breakthrough (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001). This is particularly likely to occur at "critical junctures," meaning tangible stressors, such as a serious economic crisis or a military conflict. They may provide a "window of opportunity" for decision-makers to depart from the established institutional or policy continuity (Hall and Taylor, 1996).

Retrenchment, or policy re-nationalization, is a consequence of national policy becoming less "European" than it had been before EU pressure started to be felt. This is not as rare an outcome as one might think. Héritier recalls an instance when EU pressure resulted in rolling back liberal road haulage policies in France (2003).

Absorption, or adaptation, denotes "non-fundamental" changes, whereby accommodation of policy requirements takes place without, however, affecting an institutional "core" or changing the "logic of" behaviour. This is a result of a mixture of flexibility and resilience of domestic structures and policy legacy. Börzel calls this type of effect accommodation. A country adapts to Europeanization pressure superficially, so the degree of domestic change is modest (Kalata, 2009).

Transformation is a fundamental change in policy logic. A useful way of conceptualizing changes is by following Hall's tripartite classification of paradigm shifts. Transformation mirrors Hall's "third-order" paradigm change, or a change in the core policy content, as opposed to minor alterations in policy ("first-order") or modifications in policy settings or instruments ("second-order") (Hall, 1993).
Adrienne Héritier has come up with additional categories to measure outputs. In addition to absorption, which she conceives of along the same lines as Radaelli, she suggests also: substitution (complete replacement of a policy or structure by a new one); enlargement (adding new tasks); innovation (substantial reform); and patching up (quick fixes to gaps in institutional or policy designs) (2004). Patching up is a useful category. Jacoby notes that when Poland, along with three Central European states entered NATO, the legislation they pushed through to meet NATO Target Force Goals amounted to “patches” (2004).

The end-results of Europeanization have also been conceptualized in terms of convergence (Heichel, Pape and Sommerer, 2005; Holzinger and Knill, 2005; Knill, 2005; Lee-Ohlsson, 2008; Radaelli, 2003). Since the dynamics of an Open Method of Coordination, underlying the governance of CSDP, facilitate convergence towards the EU goals, it is worth looking at what convergence brings about. Knill defines it as “any increase in the similarity between one or more characteristics of a certain policy (for example policy objectives, policy instruments, policy settings) across a given set of political jurisdictions (supranational institutions, states, regions, local authorities) over a given period of time” (2003:768). Radaelli distinguishes between convergence in debate, convergence in decisions, convergence in actual practice and convergence in results (2003). Domestic implementation and results may lag behind convergence in “talk” and EU-level decisions. Thus, ideational convergence at the EU level does not necessarily produce national policy change.

Radaelli’s and others’ taxonomies are ideal types. Applying them to security policy, which is does not easily lend itself to measurability, poses problems. Authors of the
studies in this area, and regarding foreign policy, moderate their ambition and, tend to resort to descriptive, qualitative assessments. Analyzing the EU-induced adaptation of UK foreign policy, for example, scholars have referred to “a quiet revolution in Whitehall” or “fine-tuning” in the FCO (Bache and Jordan, 2006, 274). It has been a question of determining, for instance, whether Europeanization has occurred at all, and if its impact has been “limited” or “negligible,” “deep” or “shallow” (Goetz, 2005; Miskimmon, 2007). Considering the scope conditions of the transition of East-Central-European EU member states, Héritier predicted that Europeanization will initially remain at the level of transposition or legal/institutional adjustment, unlikely to proceed to the level of policy outcomes, policy impacts or behaviour change (2005:205). Hill and Wong operationalized seven qualitative categories of responses to Europeanization in foreign policy: (1) significantly Europeanized; (2) willing to Europeanize, but still a partial or slow process; (3) erratic in the degree of Europeanization; (4) consistently instrumental in the approach to Europeanization; (5) resistant to Europeanization; (6) de-Europeanizing; and (7) never significantly Europeanized (2011). Since there is no consensus then on how to measure the outcomes of Europeanization, Radaelli has cautioned against the risks of “conceptual stretching” or “degreeism.” He asks: “If everything is Europeanized to a certain degree, what is not Europeanized?” (2000).

Seeking to introduce a greater rigour in CFSP domains, Smith has advised to look at four possible effects of Europeanization. These are: 1) élite socialization; 2) bureaucratic reorganization; 3) constitutional change; and 4) the increase in public support for European political co-operation (2000). Cognitive socialization would be evidenced by familiarity with each other’s positions regarding foreign policy, and a new-
gained appreciation for political co-operation as a way to enhance national foreign policy capabilities. This is a category found in earlier examined taxonomies. Reorganization, or “adaptive processes of organizations to a changed or changing environment,” affects the “organizational logic” of policy-making (Radaelli, 2004:3). Change is substantiated by the establishment of new offices, the expansion of administrative services and the development of new competences. I will look at these two outcomes in my research. For example, in evaluating the EU’s impact in civilian crisis management, I will see whether new coordination mechanisms have been created (Vanhoonacker and Jacobs, 2008). Constitutional change might see adjustments to the norm of military interventionism. Such a change would be visible particularly in Germany or the neutral countries. Finally, opinion polls might gauge an increase in public support for EU-level cooperation. I will also keep an eye for fluctuations in the salience of CSDP. Gross suggests looking at the “degree of salience of the European agenda; the adherence to common objectives; and the relaxation of national policy positions in order to accommodate the progress of EU policy and institutions” (2007:505).

I.6. Intervening variables

Europeanization scholars underscore a key role certain contextually dependent factors play in affecting dissimilar patterns of EU policy “domestication” (Wallace, 2000). A range of mediating conditions – also termed “domestic opportunity structures” - condition the way the EU influence filters in (Ibid.). The intervening variables may include country-specific macro-institutional patterns, legal systems, as well as state, market, and civil traditions (Major, 2005). For example, how intrusive Europeanization
will be in defence-industrial policy might depend on the tradition of state-industry relations. Some scholars explore the “goodness of fit” between the European and domestic level in terms of how it facilitates or arrests Europeanization (Bromley, 2007; Irondelle, 2003).

As I have discussed, the CSDP is as much about ideas as it is about effective policy management. Because it remains de jure intergovernmental, whether an EU member plays by the rules is pretty much up to it. Therefore, relative success or failure of Europeanization would hinge on the extent that the dominant ideas promoted within the EU security governance find their match in domestic ideas on security policy. At the same time, because CSDP is a policy that is institutionalized, inscribed in procedures and depends on active involvement of state actors, it follows that its domestic response should vary according to the means and the organization of the national security apparatus, including policy-making and instrumentarium. Thus, the key intervening variables affecting how “Europe hits home” I consider in my research are national security identity and state capacity.

I.6.a. Security identity

I argue that the extent and nature of the impact of Europeanization is mediated through national security identity. I call this mediating effect resonance. It shares affinity with such concepts as “cultural match,” “salience” or “a goodness of fit.” They are rooted in studies of international norm transfer, which draws on sociological institutionalism and constructivism (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005). A congruence of norms promoted by IOs with local ones facilitates institutional diffusion (Jacoby, 2004).
Inspired by Risse’s work on identity reconstruction (2001), I put forward the following hypothesis contextualizing the effectiveness of the EU agency in relation to the scope condition of a security identity:

*The external cognitive constructions and policy designs are the more likely to impact upon Polish security and defence policy the more they resonate with ideas embedded in national security identity* (Hypothesis no. 1)

Following Rieker, I situate security identity within a *dominant security discourse*, "the general understanding of security shared by the majority of the political elites at a given point in time" (2006). A security identity is a cognitive framework suffusing and institutionalising strategic culture, which I take to be "the socially transmitted, identity-derived norms, ideas and patterns of behaviour that are shared among a broad majority of actors and social groups within a given security community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community’s pursuit of security and defence goals" (Meyer, 2005:528). The beliefs prescribing action for organizational members have been differentiated into *constitutive* norms which “express actor identities” and *regulatory* norms that “define standards of appropriate behaviour” (Farrell, 1998:410).

A security identity is a thicker conceptualization than a neorealist conception of national interests. Interests may be situated within a political or strategic culture which links individual and collective identities (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996; Risse, 2001). In contrast to realism which holds culture to be epiphenomenal and does not problematize interests, constructivism highlights the “ideational dimension” of politics. This dimension encapsulates two activities: making sense of reality and value judgments (Radaelli, 2003:525). Political actors make sense of “reality” through cognition, or causal beliefs
that provide them with mental maps allowing them to see what “is,” as well as to judge between “good,” or legitimate, and “bad,” or illegitimate, policy options (Ibid.). A security identity engenders a certain role conception, “a ‘road map’ or a “toolkit of action,” that foreign policy-makers rely on to simplify and facilitate an understanding of a complex political reality” (Aggestam, 1999; Banchoff, 1997; Dyson, 2008; Luif, 2006). An identity refines the perception of national interests. In short, security identity integrates the beliefs held by its gatekeepers, the political-military elite, pertaining to the collective identity of a nation and the means of safeguarding it, including the use of force, thus constituting a coherent belief system guiding security policy.

Such a belief system has many sources. However, I argue after Copsey, Haughton and Wagner that historical memory, or the “formative” experiences of a state, has played the strongest part in shaping “consistent patterns of perceptions about a country’s role in international politics and in the use of military force,” thence framing Polish security identity (Copsey and Haughton, 2009; Neumann and Heikka, 2005; Wagner, 2003). Historical memory has been shown empirically to constitute a Weltanschauung of other European countries with wartime traumas as strong as Poland’s. For instance, Germany’s self-limiting foreign and security policy has been linked to the effects of historical memory (Banchoff, 1997; Berger, 1997; Kalata, 2009). Because the once-mighty Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was dismembered in late 18th and occupied for the more than one-hundred years, acquis historique weighs heavily on the consciousness of the Polish élite. Additional trauma - of the Second World War, which caused extremely heavy biological losses, and the subsequent half-century of Soviet domination, have also cast a shadow on the Polish threat assessment and an appraisal of security policy alternatives.
The historically-informed national security identity is institutionalised in various ways within the political system of the state (Berger, 1997). Because the armed forces have traditionally operated in national environments, national historical experience moulds the organizational culture of the military, including its shape, size and the way it constructs norms (Donnelly, 1997; Farrell, 1998).

Scholars have examined Polish security policy through the prism of strategic culture as well as identity per se. Drawing on this body of work, as well as élite interviews and foreign policy exposés, I assume the following to be core features of the Polish security identity:
- an existential interest in security maximisation, including a willingness to use force, adherence to allied solidarity, and a maintenance of the Atlantic and European options for defence collaboration and guaranteeing security;
- a self-perception as a European power with a special vocation for stabilization of Eastern Europe;
- a determination to be the subject of European politics and never again its object, as well as a concomitant valuation of sovereignty (Chappell, 2006; Dębski and Jaskulowski, 2005; Longhurst, 2008; Longhurst and Zaborowski, 2007).

Thus, Poland will be more inclined to adopt external ideas and policy designs if it anticipates such tangible rewards as strengthening its real position in EU policy-making commensurate with its self-perception as a middle-sized/regional power and a role conception of a key player in managing security, particularly in Eastern Europe.

Security identity is thought to be a highly resilient construct (Smith, 1992). Though security discourse as a whole may be reinterpreted or instrumentalized across
party lines giving off impression of multiple identities, the deeply embedded “core
content” of security identity stays intact (Dyson, 2008). Only an experience of exogenous
shocks, called “formative moments” or “critical junctures,” like wars, may destabilize
security discourse and alter identity (Longhurst, 2004; Meyer, 2005). Such momentous
events empower new actors championing new ideas in place of those thought to have failed.

Recent scholarship has, however, argued that identities, like strategic cultures,
might be susceptible to Europeanization through inter alia an internalization of EU norms
(Checkel, 2001; Marcussen et al., 1999; Meyer, 2005; Risse, 2001). It is argued that
ideational structures evolve, because through social interaction the meaning embedded in
ideas creates intersubjective knowledge which reconstitutes identities (cited in Kalburov,
2008). Though I will keep an eye for indications of a possible transmutation of Polish
security identity, I doubt that enough time has elapsed since Poland’s entry to the EU for
its “hard core” of security policy to be seriously disturbed. As Britain’s case illustrates,
temporality alone may not suffice to bring about identity change. The critical juncture in
Poland’s recent history has been the systemic change in 1989. It set Poland on the pro-
western reorientation of its foreign and security relations and a concomitant trajectory of
reforms. The “return to Europe,” regarded synonymously as an “integration with the
Euro-Atlantic structures,” has conditioned Poland’ inclination to heed advice from
external organizations-sponsors of norms. The wars in Iraq and Georgia in the previous
decade have had some impact in catalyzing change, but rather through learning from
policy failure and policy learning in general than by triggering identity change.
An increased salience of CSDP in the security policy of Poland in the run-up to its chairmanship of the EU Council in 2011 may be explained by Poland's identity-driven desire to affirm its credentials as one of the big players in European politics. The CSDP provides a multiplier effect which furthers this objective. There are other examples of policy changes underpinned similar motivations. Following its own democratic transition, Spain embraced European Political Cooperation (EPC) and CFSP to enhance its foreign policy capacity (Torreblanca, 2001). Even though conventional thinking holds that Poland would be wary of ceding sovereignty to the EU, identity and capacity considerations explain its treatment of CSDP as a “power multiplier” and of the European Commission as an ally. For the same reasons, Poland has put much capital in the European Defence Agency which, as a new institution, might enable it to upload its preferences, again moving Poland from the periphery to the core of EU policymaking. There remains, nonetheless, a resource asymmetry between Poland, until recently a transition economy, and the EU-15. Notwithstanding Poland's identity-rooted Euro-Atlantic tilt, a concern about multiple commitments and resource overstretch provides supplementary explanation for Warsaw's longtime nervousness about initiatives implying duplication of NATO and EU capabilities.

1.6. b. State capacity

The second key intervening variable is state capacity. I employ it in a twofold sense. First, in a narrow sense, whether European inputs turn into domestic outputs depends very much on administrative, or management capacity of the state. There must be, first of all, adequate, accumulative level of expertise to “translate” the CSDP into
domestic context. Good human resource management is therefore important for the success of Europeanization. The high-turnover of Polish governments in the analytical period, through the attendant politicization of the administrative cadres, has destabilized personnel policy (see Table 4).

Table 4 Polish security policy elites (1999-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Minister of Foreign Affairs</th>
<th>Minister of National Defence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: author's notes. Note: AWS (Solidarity Electoral Action) - centre-right; PiS (Law and Justice) - right wing; PO (Civic Platform) - centre-right; SLD (Democratic Left Alliance) - left-wing; UW (Freedom Union) - liberal; n/p - not affiliated with a party.

Poland created an apolitical civil service in 1996. In the next 12 years the law, which brought it about, went through three changes or amendments, with each successive government seeking to influence staffing. In 2006, the Law and Justice Party took advantage of introducing new law on the civil service to conduct an ideologically-motivated purge within bureaucratic ranks. The problems in achieving a stable, professionalized administrative core has impaired the development of the executive’s coordinating capacity and administrative reform (Goetz, 2001; Zubek, 2006). As I will
show, Poland has not been able to build institutional capacity to support effectively Polish candidates for posts in the EU and NATO. Neither has it facilitated a reintegration of experts with EU/NATO experience resuming their careers in Warsaw.

A second aspect of policy management is policy coordination, horizontal and vertical, as well as policy planning. The later is considered one of the key factors determining policy coherence and effective participation in the EU policy process (World Bank, 2006). According to the World Bank, Poland compares poorly not only to EU-15, but also EU-8 (East Central European EU member states), failing “in virtually all of the benchmarks for good strategic planning” (Ibid.). Unsurprisingly, very few of the several armed forces reform plans or strategies for defence-industrial reform, divorced from the fiscal realities in the late 1990s and early 2000s, made it from the drawing board to the implementation stage. As far as policy coordination is concerned, Poland also scores “well below the levels that would be considered effective for domestic policy formulation” (Ibid.). Poland’s own ministry of regional government corroborates these findings (Ministry of Regional Development, 2008). As I will show, the lack of a strong coordination capacity has been one of the main hindrances to Poland’s capacity-building for civilian crisis management, as well as impairment for defence-industrial policy.

Apart from policy management, in a broader sense, state capacity refers also to the ability of the state to extract resources, tangible and non-tangible, and have its way in the political process. Hence, the variable denotes also the opportunity structure of policy-making authority. I hypothesize that

*the higher the policy-making autonomy in whatever domain of national security policy, the greater the ability to implement policy* (Hypothesis no. 2)
In other words, Europeanization stands a greater chance of making inroads at home if the policy subdomain in question does not feature excessive number of veto points/players. As the veto players theory postulates, "the difficulty for a significant change of the status quo... increases in general with the number of veto players and with their [ideological] distances" (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005:16). As I will show, whereas defence ministry has had considerable latitude in reforming the armed forces, a plethora of actors in civilian crisis management, and interest groups in defence-industrial policy have acted as a stumbling block to Europeanization in those two subdomains.

The scope conditions, constituted by state capacity and identity, intertwine. Poland may well be inclined to punch above weight and address capacity constraints only if there is resonance, i.e. if external ideas match security identity. Absent such resonance, the willpower to augment capacity will be lacking. It is not the other way round. Grabbe has argued that Europeanization is likely to have a stronger impact on the East Central European states because of gaps in the institutional frameworks and the need to create new policy mechanisms, rather than adapt existing ones (2003:216). However, as I will show, Poland has not felt hard-pressed to create new civilian crisis management policy mechanisms, because civilian approach to crisis management is relatively low on the list of policy preferences. Its low prioritization is a result of this approach being regarded as alien to Poland's security identity. A different situation is found with respect to the security R&D subdomain of defence-industrial policy. A strong desire to bridge technological distance between Poland and Western Europe, and thereby raise Poland's standing in the EU, has motivated policymakers to invest resources into this policy void.
II.1. Europeanization and reform of the Polish armed forces

The Joint Declaration from the 1998 Anglo-French summit at St.-Malo, which lays out the vision for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), focused squarely on developing military capabilities. It stated that to address "rapidly" "international crises" and "new risks" as well as to enable the EU "to play its full role on the international stage," it needs to have "credible" and "strengthened" military forces (cited by Rutten, 2001). It asserted that "the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework)" (Ibid.). While, the Joint Declaration did not spell out in detail what these "suitable" and "strengthened" military forces are supposed to look like, the key message was that they be rapidly deployable and able to react to new risks wherever these may arise. It presented an option that the European forces may be drawn either from the NATO pool, or outside of it. The notion that the Franco-British initiative contributes to "the vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance" underscores an envisaged complementarity of future CSDP with NATO.

Four years later, the EU set the direction, in which the armed forces should reform. In the European Security Strategy, the member states agreed that if they are to address the capabilities-expectations, they should "transform" their militaries "into more flexible, mobile forces." These forces should have access to "pooled and shared assets," NATO capabilities (through the Berlin Plus arrangements) as well as civilian resources (EU
Council, 12 Dec. 2003). The EU therefore establishes an obligation upon its members to transform their militaries into more flexible, rapidly-deployable, and if possible multinational forces. How, by what means, and to what effect the EU diffuses this norm is the question pursued in this case study.

I have chosen to uncover the impact of Europeanization by focusing on armed forces reform, believing, like King, that the military is critical to the delivery of a European defence policy and that its transformation may illuminate underlying processes of policy transformation in contemporary Europe (2006:258; 2005). I seek out the outcomes of Europeanization mainly in the following four areas of Polish defence policy: (1) institutional adaptation; the adjustment to the paradigms of (2) multinational cooperation and (3) expeditionary deployments; as well as (4) the transition to an all-volunteer force. These organizational, operational and procedural changes reveal a process of new norms impinging on the state’s military doctrine. This is defined as “a set of prescriptions (....) (about) how military forces should be structured and employed to respond to recognized threats and opportunities” (cited in Venesson et al., 2009). Therefore, where relevant, I will background the discussion with a look at changes in doctrine in terms of strategic-level documents.

The structure of the chapter is as follows. I will examine each of the transformation areas in turn: institutional adaptation – through organizational innovations as well as staff secondments, education and training; the multinationality paradigm – focusing on defence collaboration, in particular the impact of the EU Battlegroups juxtaposed against the impact of the NATO Response Force; the expeditionary paradigm
- a look at the lessons learned from the deployments of the Polish armed forces; and, last, the transition to an all-volunteer force of the Polish military.

The analysis will be contextualized temporally. I will start off with an appraisal of the Polish defence policy context in 1999, the high-point of NATO-ization. I will then compare NATO’s impact to the reverberations on the Polish defence policy caused by the launch of the European Headline Goal and earlier proto-European forms of defence collaboration, in which Poland had been involved. I will terminate my analysis in 2009, a period of incremental Europeanization informed by the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the preparation for Poland’s Presidency of the EU. In the conclusion I will sum up the analysis tying it back to the conceptual framework.

II.2. NATO-ization

The post-Cold War “peace dividend” compelled the EU member states to transform their military structures (King, 2005). At the same time, Poland has faced major challenges common to former members of the Warsaw Pact. First, for several years after the 1989-1990 shock market reforms, defence expenditures dwindled, decreasing by as much as one percent of GDP (see Table 5).
Table 5  Polish defence budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>U.S. ($) bn</th>
<th>Percentage of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1.708</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2.165</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2.333</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2.516</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2.333</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2.399</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3.013</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2.994</td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>4.621</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5.536</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>6.130</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7.833</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>10.169 (est.)</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Simon 2004, 81; Polish MoD; NATO

No other West European military experienced such drastic cuts. Second, the transition from communism to democracy required working out a new framework of civil-military relations in a country which has had a strong tradition of military interventionism in politics. Civil-democratic control of the armed forces fell into place as late as 1997 thanks to NATO’s input to reshaping the culture of Polish civil-military relations. If it were not for the influence of the Alliance, the domestic battles fought over civilian control in the 1990s would have sapped all the energy away from the urgent task of reforming the military (Latawski, 2002; Michta, 2002). Elsewhere in the EU-15, the basic institutional defence policy set-up was long in place. As Goetz notes the transformations in the economy, polity and policy unfolded contemporaneously and had a mutual influence on each other (2005). As a result, transformation in Poland has had a much deeper, resource-intensive and all-encompassing character than in Western Europe.
(Donnelly, 1997). What the Polish armed forces had had to go through was nothing short of a revolution.

In practice, Poland had not moved forward with military transformation until finally pressured to fulfill NATO entry requirements. Olaf Osica enumerates the reasons for this delay: "enormous inertia of structures of the broadly defined defence establishment, the lack of determination in carrying out plans as well as a weakness of the political leadership (virtually every minister of defence, and there were ten of them in 1990-1999, had his own vision of the armed forces)" (2009). The first half of the 1990s saw mainly substantial reductions in the size of the bloated armed forces (Table 6) prompted by deep cuts in defence spending. This was accompanied by alterations in the structure of the armed forces: reducing the ratio of officers to non-commissioned officers, shortening the term of military service, as well as a transferring some of the military infrastructure from western Poland towards its eastern borders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Number (length of service, months)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>412,000 (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>314,000 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>213,500 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>205,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>197,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>165,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003... /2008</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Simon 2004, 89. In 2005 the term of service was shortened to 9 months.*
With seven foreign ministers and six ministers of defence in office from 1999 to 2009, the governance of Polish defence policy in that period hardly improved. However, the process leading up to Poland’s accession to NATO in 1999 did mark the onset of the gradual transformation of the armed forces. If we consider the St.-Malo initiative as an impulse for reforming European militaries to handle external crisis management, then NATO, seeking to engender the same effect, may too be regarded as an agent of Europeanization. Although the biggest trigger for change was the need for Poland to meet the basic NATO entry criteria, through institutionalized cooperation or bilateral Allied relations, in the half-decade before 1999, the Polish armed forces had felt the pressure to reform. NATO started inducting Poland into the Allied cooperation through the creation in 1991 of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Because at the time expanding NATO was off the agenda both in Washington and in Warsaw, the NACC, a merely consultative body, had no influence on defence reform of the participating states.

The next milestone in Polish-NATO relations was the establishment in 1994 of the Partnership for Peace. With Poland, now eager to join the Alliance, on board, it proved a little more effective in stimulating reforms. When in the mid-90s the Clinton administration decided to expand NATO to East-Central Europe, the PfP, hitherto suspected to be possibly a substitute for a membership in NATO, gained credibility. And so did its influence and determinacy, particularly through the introduction in 1995 of the Planning and Review Process as well as the Individual Partnership Programs. These reinforced instruments empowered the reformers and mobilized the decision-makers to pursue reforms ahead of the expected accession. Once the formal invitation came in 1997 the pace of adaptation quickened. Yet, as already mentioned, the reform was by no means
wholesale. It was incremental, touching upon initially the rudimentary tasks and capabilities expected of a future NATO member.

The quest for interoperability - defined as the procedural and material means to enable cooperation with other military structures - ahead of Poland's entry to NATO drove early Polish military reforms. After filling in and submitting to NATO the Defence Planning Questionnaire in 1997, Poland drew a lot closer to NATO defence planning. This opened up tremendous socialisation opportunities. Providing thorough information about Poland's defence establishment to NATO set the stage for drawing up the so-called NATO Target Force Goals (TFGs). Epstein attributes NATO's causal impact particularly to the implementation of these basic goals a member has to meet to ensure both an effective NATO teamwork as well as the collective defence potential. She calls it "the process whereby new members essentially redesign their force structures and develop new capabilities" (2008). During the first round of biannual defence planning in 1998 an ambitious Poland promised to meet 65 goals (Simon, 2004). Details cannot be divulged as the TFGs are classified, however, they pertained generally to the following six main interoperability priorities: NATO common doctrine; command, control and communication (C3); integration of the Polish air defence with NATO's; host nation support (HNS); logistics and modernisation of the weapon systems and other equipment (Onyszkiewicz, 1998).

Although Poland did not turn out an exemplary reformer, counting on the politics of the enlargement process more so than doing homework, it was by and large responsive to NATO demands. Polish politicians sought to anchor Poland in the Alliance, which they considered credible and successful on account of Art. V commitments, the integrated
military command and the transatlantic connection. This geostrategic orientation conformed to the Polish security identity. Poland’s activities in the Partnership for Peace helped break an introverted mindset of the military, still focused on territorial defence.

In 1998, the Polish Council of Ministers adopted the Program for Integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Modernization of the Polish Armed Forces 1998-2012 (Army 2012). Polish officials said that it was devised expressly to meet the requirements brought by the NATO target force goals (Onyszkiewicz, 1998). The program amended the 1997 reform plan called Tenets for the Programme of the Armed Forces Modernisation, 1998-2012 (Dutkiewicz, 2004; Latawski, 2002; Wolosz, 2004). It was the first blueprint for transforming the armed forces into a smaller, better-equipped expeditionary force, premised on the membership in NATO (Jacoby, 2005; Simon, 2004). Emulation from western countries was by then in full swing. Drawing on a model of the U.S. Joint Staff, a new command structure was established in 1996. A separate land forces command was set up, while the general staff was stripped of command functions and entrusted with strategic planning, as is the practice in NATO member states (Epstein, 2008). Polish army divisions were reorganized from the Warsaw Pact regiment-based structure to the brigade-based system preferred by NATO (Michta, 2002). Younger officers, beneficiaries of the EAPC/Individual PfP and bilateral NATO member state training programs, began to fill the senior ranks of the military occupied hitherto by graduates of Soviet academies. “A generational shift” was speeded up in concomitant with the reorganization of the defense ministry. In 2002 reform, for instance, 700 senior officers were offered early retirement (Ibid.). Laws on the deployment of foreign troops on Polish territory (SOFA – Status of Forces Agreements) were fast-tracked through the
Parliament to “meet NATO requirements” (Ibid.). In 2000, the Polish government shifted to a six-year planning system as used in NATO (Simon, 2004). In sum, NATO’s institutions and practices – the integrated command, 1,300 standardization agreements (STANAGS) and multinational defence planning, including the Defence Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) – all have played an important role in transmitting NATO norms, standards and procedures to effect military transformation (Jacoby, 2004; National Defence Academy interview 2009).

NATO jumpstarted the reform process, but it did not affect a wholesale change. Because the Army 2012 plan was too ambitious and not correlated with defence funding, as soon as it left the drawing board it became a dead letter (Wolosz, 2004). In view of Poland’s turbulent history, territorial defence could not simply be scrapped. At the end of the 1990s, a number of conservative politicians, among them future Polish defence and foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski, mounted a rearguard action to build up territorial defence forces as an auxiliary branch of the armed forces. This effort was discredited by the Allies, deemed incompatible with NATO’s norms and standards. Domestic critics also saw it as a drain on scarce resources (Polish defence journalist interview 2009). According to insiders’ accounts, the US Embassy in Warsaw simply called up the exponents of this idea and communicated its displeasure directly. Facing this coercive form of norms diffusion, the right-wing politicians of the then ruling Solidarity Electoral Action coalition backed down (Epstein, 2008:178-180).

On the training side, while the English language training was stepped up, Poland found it very difficult to fill positions allocated to it in NATO. This problem persisted five years into its membership in the Alliance (Simon, 2004). Meeting Poland’s target
force goals (TFG) likewise proved difficult. Of the 65 TFGs it promised to comply with, only twenty-three were completed fully. Institutional rigidity and financial constraints inhibited thoroughgoing defence reforms (Simon, 2004). In response to a dual pressure by NATO commitments and funding shortages, Poland put money into units first in line to attain NATO interoperability standards and participate in allied operations. As Bronisław Komorowski, then parliamentary defence committee chairman noted, this resulted “in part of the army being degraded” (Simon, 2004). Nonetheless the practice of cannibalizing parts of the military as a way of squaring reform needs with limited funds has continued well into mid-2000s (Sikorski, 2005). Jacoby argues that the new entrants to NATO responded to the TFGs by creating legislative and institutional “patches,” that is fixing areas in dire need of upgrade to fulfill NATO conditions instead of pursuing deep reform (2004). Polish politicians felt that “there’s no hurry [to reform], since we’re already secure (Kuzniar, 2005).

Continued western pressure was therefore crucial to maintain the momentum of reforms. On his trip to Poland in January 2001 NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Joseph W. Ralston, said that to be an effective member of NATO, “Poland must modernise its equipment; today though its budget share earmarked for modernisation is too small” (Simon, 2004). This criticism reflected dissatisfaction of the United States at the lack of progress in meeting the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), adopted at the Washington summit in 1999.

A week after SACEUR’s visit, the Polish government rushed through a new defence reform program - the Programme of Restructuring and Technical Modernisation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland for 2001–2006. It restored money to the
defence budget it wanted to allocate elsewhere (Domisiewicz, 2003; Simon, 2004). The Programme aimed to restructure the military in line with wider "European trends" towards smaller, but better-equipped forces (Latawski, 2002). The US pressure, backed by an appeal to NATO norms, was therefore instrumental in pushing the Polish government to continue the European trend of concentration. As I will elaborate in the chapter on defence-industrial policy, because the Program was accompanied by a law that set a threshold of 1.95% for defence spending, it stood a better chance of being implemented than any of its short-lived predecessors (Domisiewicz, 2003). It marked the beginning of Poland’s spending spree on modern capabilities.

The six-year plan was drafted in cooperation with NATO allies, including the western military advisers seconded at the time to the Polish defence ministry. The posting of NATO member state liaison officers to the MoDs of the candidate states was a feature common to Central Europe. In Hungary, for instance, American and British advisers were working with the Hungarian military on rewriting its doctrine “along Western models” and harmonizing its plans and strategy with those of NATO (Congressional Budget Office, 2000). The Polish deputy defence minister at the time admitted that the British liaison staff at the MoD advised him to focus on specific reform objectives and better allocate resources to future programs (Simon, 2004). The armed forces reform then was an agenda shared across the militaries of the EU and NATO member states, which owed a great deal to the influence by NATO and horizontal diffusion (emulation).
II.3. European Headline Goal 2003

Meeting in Helsinki in December 1999, the EU members states agreed to establish by 2003 a rapid reaction force for crisis management missions, as specified in the Amsterdam Treaty's Petersberg Tasks. It would consist of up to 60,000 troops, backed up by navy and air capabilities, to be deployed within 60 days and sustained in theatre for up to a year. At the time the European Council set this target – European Headline Goal 2003 (EHG 2003) Poland had had its share of European cooperation experience, though in a non-EU sensu stricto framework. One would have expected it then to welcome this development. However, for the Polish elites, who had just achieved a dreamed membership in NATO, and had yet to enter the EU in an uncertain future, the creation of what seemed an alternative western framework felt like a rug being pulled from under their feet.

An early transmission belt for the norms of European defence cooperation was Poland's participation in the Weimar Triangle (WT). In 1991 Germany persuaded France to found together with Poland an informal platform for trilateral cooperation, known as the Weimar Triangle. The rationale was to create an institutional anteroom that would help bring Poland closer to the European mainstream of decision-making, before it could enter the EU. Even though the Triangle was not equilateral – the French and the Germans would often agree their positions before meetings, and though it did not prevent the rupture over Iraq, it is thought it has more or less served its purpose (Centre for International Relations, 2009; Łukaszewicz, 2006; Świtalski, 2008). The Triangle has helped to supplement Poland's transatlantic ties with the European option and to draw Warsaw closer to the Franco-German special relationship (Baas, 2000).
One of the biggest attractions of the Weimar Triangle was that it promised to strengthen an already growing Polish-German defence relationship. If we apply Jacoby’s analogy of “tutors and pupils” to Poland’s integration with western security institutions, then Germany was the second most important “tutor” after the United States (2001). The first foreign minister of the Polish (post-1989) Third Republic, Krzysztof Skubiszewski cultivated the “community of interests” between Poland and Germany. As Zaborowski showed, this relationship furthered the Europeanization of Poland, conceptualized here as the transplantation of the norms of consultations and collective decision-making in security matters (2004).

Defence policy has been an evolving as a dimension of cooperation within the Weimar Triangle. It was initiated at a meeting of the three defence ministers in 1994 (Łukaszewicz, 2006; Kuźniar, 2008). Three years later, the Joint Military Coordination Group was set up to oversee the trilateral defence relations. The cooperation has encompassed annual meetings at the level of defence ministers, political directors and MoD/General Staff experts, as well as defence policy seminars and joint military exercise (Wróbel, 2009). Since 1999 it has extended to staff exchanges and training as well as the development of defence capabilities (Łukaszewicz, 2006). The WT cooperation has paved way for two achievements: the decisions to establish the Weimar EU Battlegroup and to bring Poland into the Eurocorps.

---

12 Poland took advantage of this forum to convince France and Germany in 1993 that they put before the WEU ministerial council a proposal to grant Poland an associate partner status in this organization (Gryz, 1997). As mainly a discussion forum, with but a few low-scale operations to its credit, the WEU has had little tangible impact on defence reform. As I will note in the study of civilian crisis management, however, it afforded the Polish police some experience in non-military crisis management.
Poland has viewed the WT as a conduit for trilateral defence cooperation, hoping its potential would grow like the Franco-German relationship based on the Élysée Treaty (Przegląd Środkowoeuropejski, 1998). Signed in 1963, the Treaty provided for inter alia exchanges between the armed forces staff and a doctrinal alignment between France and Germany (WEU A/2041). However, a number of reasons have prevented this ambition from being realized. The asymmetry of political potential is an obvious impediment. Poland needs Germany much more than Germany needs Poland. In comparison to the Franco-German relationship, which had been solidified in the context of European integration right after the Second World War, the period of socialization in the Weimar Triangle has been a lot shorter. Finally, divergent interests in relation to the US and Russia, deepened in the latter period of Schröder’s chancellorship (1998-2005), and the rocky Polish-German relationship under the Law and Justice government in Poland (2005-2007) have not helped to deepen the political relationship.

The Weimar Triangle and - to a far lesser extent - the Western European Union have facilitated a horizontal and vertical diffusion of norms of European defence cooperation. However, this limited accumulation of political capital proved insufficient to offset a mutual miscommunication and friction between Poland and the EU in the early period of CSDP development when Poland was still outside the EU. The construction of CSDP got mired with a spat over the voting weights in the EU Council in the run-up to the European Council at Nice, touching off sensitivities at the core of Polish security identity. These were: a sense of exclusion from European decision-making in high-politics, concerns about jeopardizing transatlantic ties and about building structures alternative to NATO. Warsaw worried that it would have to meet new obligations when it
had a difficult time making do on its NATO promises. Poland was quite happy with the allied European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) concept, which would see NATO assets being put in the service of the WEU/EU through the Combined Joint Task Forces. Such a solution would put Europeanist ambitions to rest.

Sometime after St.-Malo, it started to become clear that the CSDP would be a far cry from the NATO-based ESDI concept, Poland preferred. Even though the St.-Malo initiative was co-sponsored by Atlanticist Britain, the CSDP became viewed by Polish elites as an expression of the Gaullist predilection to balance the United States (Osica, 2001). The architecture of the CSDP – building institutions squarely within the EU and responsible solely to it – seemed to augur a drift from NATO. The unwillingness of Paris and Berlin to engage in a dialogue on CSDP with an EU member-to-be clashed with the Polish elites’ role conception of their country being one of the upcoming shapers of European policy alongside the “big six” EU member states (Lang, 2002). What compounded the difficulties in communication, as Knowles acknowledged, was its similarity to France’s role conception – minus, of course, the divergent outlook on transatlantic relations (2002).

A power asymmetry between the EU and Poland made constructive dialogue problematic. Poland could not articulate its genuine position on the CSDP lest it affect the EU accession negotiations. As a matter of fact, Poland’s official position on the CSDP was presented publicly in a Polish foreign minister’s speech only late in May 2001, almost three years after the St.-Malo initiative! Until then, instead of considering how to contribute to the 2003 Headline Goal Polish diplomacy focused on improving the terms of institutional and crisis-management cooperation between the EU and non-EU
NATO members. The June 1999 Cologne council appeared to favour a de facto exclusion of the latter, and indeed of NATO as a whole, from the process of achieving the EHG. It took the intervention of the UK, and behind-the-scenes pressure by the US, for the “15+6” terms to be defined more inclusively at the Feira Council in June 2000 (Longhurst, 2008). However, the general provisions for EU-NATO consultations still appeared fuzzy. When Paris and Berlin continued to keep Poland in the anteroom of the EU policy chambers, Warsaw tried to counterbalance this West European directoire through an alignment with the US.

Europeanization, or in practical terms persuading Poland to the need for an autonomous EU defence policy, would have to wait for “lessons learning” from the Iraq conflict and Poland’s entry to the EU. The high point of Poland’s balancing strategy was its participation alongside the US and Britain in the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Ibid.). Although Poland’s military performance surprised European observers in a positive sense, this did not translate into political points. What is worse, Warsaw faced a creeping entente cordiale between France, Germany and Russia. To avoid further fractures in the EU both sides eventually came around to a more accommodating stance. Osica argues that Iraq was actually the “crossroads” of Polish Atlanticism. It forced Poland to re-evaluate its hitherto lukewarm reaction to the CSDP (2002). The lessons learning from Iraq was not only an experience of Poland, but, as Sweeney points out, also of the EU-15. Eager to bridge the Old Europe/New Europe divisions they redoubled efforts inside the EU towards building a policy able to deliver. An evidence for this, he cites the sharp increase in CSDP missions after Iraq, to which, one might also add an acceleration of work on the European Security Strategy (Sweeney, 2008)
Europeanization did not at first affect Polish security policy content also because the Poles interpreted the lessons from the Balkan crises differently than the rest of the EU. The majority of Europeans realized they had to improve their defence capabilities to address security concerns on their own – at least in the EU’s backyard. In contrast, the pivotal role played by NATO and the US in extinguishing the Balkan fires confirmed for the Poles that the American-led Alliance remained essential for European security. Hence, one should not tinker with it. This different reading of the “Balkan lessons” also lay behind Poland’s initially ambivalent attitude towards CSDP (Osica, 2002).

Poland’s NATO accession, sponsored by the US, brought a knee-jerk response à la neophyte to the rise of what appeared to be a competing defence organization. Hence, Poland for a long time echoed the US position on “no duplication” of capabilities. NATO-ization by then had made great strides in socializing Polish political and military elites. Washington’s at first alarmist appraisals of CSDP, impressed upon Warsaw, influenced its recalcitrance toward the CSDP, especially when it became clear – for some of the elites as late as 2001 - that it was going to be different from their preferred ESDI conception (Zięba, 2001). In other words, the EU defence capability would not be built inside NATO or through a middleman - the Western European Union, as the ESDI had envisaged, but it would be anchored in the EU. In short, the combination of Poland’s EU outsider status and its concerns about duplicating trusted and credible NATO arrangements undercut the ideational impact of the 2003 European Headline Goal.

There is another important reason why the impact of the 2003 EHG had been limited. It has to do with a mode of governance underlying the attainment of the 2003 European Headline Goal - the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) (Reynolds, 2006).
To meet this target, the Feira Council of June 2000 put in place a new capability generation process. It may be summarized as follows. The EU tasked 30 military officers of the Headline Goal Task Force (HGTF) to determine the military requirements for the Headline Goal. These requirements were listed in the Helsinki Headline Catalogue (HHC), approved by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) in October 2000. The following month, the first Capability Commitment Conference took place, at which the member states and third parties declared their force contributions. As a third party, Poland offered a so-called framework brigade, an air search-and-rescue group, a transport aircraft, two minesweepers, a salvage vessel and a unit of the military gendarmerie. It did not specify what units would form the brigade. It turns out it wanted to form it jointly with Ukraine. Because Ukraine’s non-EU/NATO member status would have complicated its operationalization under the CSDP, the plan was eventually shelved. The 15+6 contributions formed the basis of the new Helsinki Force Catalogue (HFC). By comparing the overall contributions (HFC) with the requirements (HHC), the EU member states were able to identify the shortfalls. These were then listed in the rather misnamed Helsinki Progress Catalogue (HPC). In turn, to address the shortfalls it was necessary to hold the Capability Improvement Conference in November 2001 (Kaczk, 2003). And so it went.

The force generation process sounded good in theory. In practice, by relying primarily on the will of the member states to turn words into deeds it had little impact on the reform of the EU members’ militaries. Thus, the declaration made at the Laeken summit in December 2001 that the CSDP has become operational turned out to be premature. The EU member states failed to reach the Helsinki target because the target
itself was too ambitious to be attainable. Starting from a clean slate, the member states were expected to build in a fairly short time a multinational corps size force of 60,000, which, if we include rotating replacements, would actually have to be 180,000-strong. The EU member states toned down the level of ambition and readjusted focus in 2004 when the EHG 2003 was superseded by the more incremental, better time-framed and lower-scaled EHG 2010 envisaging the formation of battlegroups.

Neither was the process underlying EHG 2003 conducive to reaching this goal. No convergence criteria, applied in the EMU, were set. There was neither leadership nor a strong institutional back-up: COPS, MC and MS were then still embryonic (Reynolds, 2006). Since they had mainly a functional role to assist the member states, they were not the “commitment institutions” that would provide monitoring and assist in enforcing compliance with the rules of cooperation (Laursen, 2010). The European Defence Agency, viewed by some scholars as potentially able to fill a leadership role in the Open Method of Coordination such as the Commission plays in the Community method, would not come into being until 2004 (Reynolds, 2006; Sheppard, 2006). There were then but faint outlines of today’s EU security governance which Mérand characterizes aptly as a “strongly institutionalized transgovernmental field” (2008:42). Not until the EU launched its first peace support operations in 2003 did Poland, then moving from an outsider to an insider status in the EU, began to see the value-added of the CSDP. The combination of Poland’s entry to the EU, the CSDP’s “baptism” in the field, and an awareness of the need to patch up the differences over Iraq set in motion Warsaw’s rapprochement with the CSDP.
II.4. Brusselization and organizational changes

At an institutional level Poland’s adaptation to CSDP has featured a limited expansion of posts in the state bureaucracy, a small-scale secondment of staff to the European institutions and trickle by trickle “mainstreaming” of the CSDP agenda into the mandate of the relevant MFA and MoD departments. As of 2009 the staff dealing with the CSDP at the Polish Permanent Representation to the EU numbered six experts, of whom three came from the MFA, two from the Ministry of Defence and one from the Ministry of Interior. As its ambassador to the PSC, Poland had appointed a mid-career diplomat, former deputy director of the MFA security policy department and ex-deputy permanent representative to the UN. Compared to other EU permanent representations, Poland thus maintained an average-size staff to handle the CSDP\(^\text{13}\).

The same developments have characterised Poland’s representation to the EU Military Committee. When it was set up in 1998, the Polish Military Representation to NATO (MILREP) had a staff of 15 officers and the head of mission. Eleven years later, it had 31 civilian MoD and military personnel and its mandate had been broadened to include servicing the EU Military Committee. Only five officers handled EU files. In practice, they have had to take care of NATO business as well. Sweden, France and Italy had more Brussels-based military personnel dedicated to CSDP (Polish NATO mission interview, 2009).

Working in different locations in Brussels the respective heads of Polish missions meet once or twice a week to confer on CSDP matters. With a view towards the Polish

\(^{13}\) Because of rotation and reorganization which goes on at the diplomatic missions hard data is difficult to get. Based on website-based information, Vanhoonacker, Dijkstra and Maurer mention a range from 6 civil servants in the Permanent Representation of Malta to 23 in the Permanent Representation of France (2010). However, it is not clear whether their data includes the combined size of CFSP and CSDP sections. In 2009, the CFSP section alone at the Polish Permanent Representation had more than 20 staffers.
2011 EU Presidency, in 2008 the MFA purchased a building closer to the EU Council and the Commission, to house the Permanent Representation. From mid-2011 the respective diplomatic and military staff servicing CSDP will be working under the same roof. It is hoped that is this will *inter alia* facilitate the transplantation of the EU civilian-military culture to the work of Polish diplomatic and military representations in Brussels. This process would concomitantly trickle down to domestic institutions (Polish EU mission interview, 2009). The fact that the military was initially resistant to move out of its NATO HQ office suggests that such an acculturation has yet to take place. The joint immersion of the diplomats and the MoD/General Staff should contribute to it (MoD interview, 2009).

An embryonic socialization has been evidenced in the way policy perceptions have been reshaped by the national representatives in Brussels. They have had to assimilate the culture of Brussels, learning to balance the logic of consequences (carrying out instructions sent from the capital) with the logic of appropriateness (fitting into consensual decision-making in line with an *esprit de corps* of the Council working groups) (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006). Interviews with diplomats at the Representation to the EU confirm that the instructions sent from the capital are sometimes “creatively interpreted” to suit the prevailing mood in Brussels which the officials in Warsaw are not necessarily able to read correctly (Polish EU mission interview, 2009). This fits with studies of the PSC dynamics, indicating that the EU member state ambassadors perform “a didactic function” with regards to their national capitals, communicating the sense of and a direction of flow of a collective policy mainstream and suggesting ways of
modifying national positions to facilitate consensus. In this perspective, they act as "two-way ambassadors" (Howorth, 2007).

The CSDP has not had a deeply intrusive impact on the state bureaucracy. A budding culture of inter-departmental consultation and cooperation on CSDP has influenced the internal workings of the MFA and the civilian MoD. Fostered in part by the participation of several ministries in periodic EU crisis management exercises, however, this culture has not extended much beyond the two ministries. From 1999 until 2009 the MFA unit responsible for CSDP did not increase substantially in size, especially in relation to the personnel handling NATO (MFA interview, 2009). Consisting of 1-2 experts at the beginning of the previous decade it increased to 4 by 2009, including the head of unit, classified as a junior managerial post. Conservative and NATO-centric the General Staff has lagged in the adjustment to the CSDP relative to the civilian MoD. It may be due to the latter having had greater interaction with the EU CSDP institutions than the General Staff, which is far more involved in the work of numerous NATO institutions and commands (Polish NATO mission interview, 2009). A senior MOD official said in an interview that the cooperation on the CSDP between the civilian and military (General Staff) parts of the MoD "could be improved," a sentiment also corroborated in interviews in Brussels (MoD and Polish NATO mission interviews, 2009).

Organizational adaptation has also been evidenced. In 1996 the MoD created a Department for Cooperation with NATO and the Western European Union staffed by experts holding joint portfolios (Herspring 2000). By 2009 the CSDP was being handled within the Department of International Security staffed by 35 experts. They worked in
two divisions: NATO and EU policy (10 personnel), the latter having a 5-member section dedicated solely to CSDP, as well as NATO and EU defence capabilities (10). Such an overlap between NATO and EU responsibilities, in the Polish MoD, has also been observed in defence ministries of other EU MS. The studies of administrative adaptation to CSDP in the UK and Belgium show that the CSDP tasks have been added on to the MoD planning teams responsible for coordinating the capabilities development process within NATO and its military operations. This is meant to ensure a full coordination and integration between the national efforts across both organizations (Aktipis, 2007; Vanhoonacker and Jacobs, 2008). The same conclusion drawn about Belgium, a strong advocate of the CSDP, to the effect that “the processes of administrative adaptation as a result of the new EU role as a crisis manager remained limited,” may be drawn also with respect to Poland (Vanhoonacker and Jacobs, 2008: 26).

The ability to “upload” national preferences at the EU level depends to some degree on how effective a member state is in promoting the placement of its citizens in the relevant Brussels institutions and how it utilises at home the competence acquired by its representatives. The Polish record is mixed at best and at worst reveals a persistent deficit of representation at senior levels in the EU institutions (UKIE, 2008). In 2009, 15 MoD and civilian staff were seconded to EU institutions dealing with CSDP (EU Council, EDA. According to data from 2008, 22 Polish citizens were employed in the 677-strong DG-RELEX of the European Commission, which works with the Council on “soft dimensions” of CSDP (three percent). If we take into account Poland’s population in relation to the population of the EU an equitable proportion would have been 8 percent, or 54 posts. By comparison, Spain, with somewhat larger population than Poland, had
been represented roughly equitably (56), while Belgium grossly overrepresented (EU Commission, Apr. 2008). Only 11 Polish nationals worked in the EU external representations totalling 1000 staff (PAP, 19 Feb. 2009). In 2009, the proportion of Poles in the General Secretariat of the Council was two percent, none in senior CSDP posts (Sadowska, 2009). Poles occasionally broke through the glass ceiling in Brussels. From 2007 to 2009 a Polish parliamentarian – former head of the Office of the Committee for European Integration\(^\text{14}\) - chaired the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament. A success came in 2009 with the election of former Polish premier Jerzy Buzek as President of the European Parliament.

In fairness to Poland’s administrative capacity, even if it had developed a strategy of personnel promotion, which interviews in Brussels and Warsaw confirm it has not, the under-representation of Poles in the EU managerial positions could not possibly be addressed in just five years of Polish EU membership (EU Military staff interview, 2009; MoD interview, 2009). This was not just Poland’s problem. The obstinacy of - in the words of Polish deputy foreign minister – the “diktat of the quartet,” or the preponderant influence of the old EU members, the EU-15, over top personnel appointments, meant that those countries that entered the EU in 2004 and 2007, the EU-12, handicapped by limited “network capital,” faced what appeared to be a glass ceiling (Naurin, 2007; Senate, 2009)\(^\text{15}\). In 2009, the opaque way of selecting the new NATO Secretary General

\(^{14}\) A ministry-level institution set up in 1996 to coordinate EU policy - as of 1 January 2010 merged with the MFA. I will refer to it in chapter 4.

\(^{15}\) Peterson, who studied this issue, notes inter alia that the EU-12 Commissioners were given relatively minor portfolios and they faced greater recalcitrance from their DGs than those from the EU-15. Only 12 per cent of Commission officials were EU-12 nationals and most held relatively junior posts. At the élite level of Directors-General and their Deputies, only 9 of 75 officials hailed from the new states (all were Deputies) by mid-October 2007. Furthermore, the Kinnock reforms to the Commission, bringing new Staff Regulations, which expanded the range of administrative grades and cut the pay per promotion, slowed the
as well as the European Council President and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy were additional tough lessons for the Poles so sensitive to the perception of exclusion.

The Polish administration appears to have only recently started figuring out how to increase the representation of Poles in EU institutions. Under a barrage of media critique, in 2008 the head of the Office of the Committee for European Integration stated publicly he would address this issue with top EU officials (PAP, 8 May 2008). The MFA responded by appointing an official within its human resources office to address this problem. Whether simply adding up HR posts at home would make a difference to the problem of Poland’s longtime exclusion from the CSDP networks in the EU Commission and the Council, dominated by the EU-15, is an open question.

The same problem of under-representation concerns NATO posts. Though between 1999 and 2009 the number of Polish officers in NATO commands increased from 65 to 300, this figure pales in comparison to the number of staff other smaller Allies have at NATO (Gągor, 2009). For example, in 2009, there were 35 Polish officers in the key - from the point of view of armed forces reform - Allied Command Transformation (ACT) structures, including 6 in its headquarters (HQ SACT) in Norfolk. By comparison, 45 Dutch officers worked in the 750-strong ACT headquarters alone. Taking representation by population into account, Poland, the 7th biggest NATO member and its 8th largest military, would have been adequately represented by 25 officers at HQ SACT (Ojrzanowski, 2009). While in 1999 there was one Polish civilian employed in the International Staff at NATO HQ, a decade later the number increased to just 13 Polish
nationals out of 1,200 staff, a rate of increase of roughly one new hire per year (Senate, 2009). Looking at NATO structures as a whole, in 2004-2007 Poland managed to fill just 8 percent of the quota to which it was entitled, a rather weak performance (Supreme Control Chamber, NIK, 2008). The division of NATO posts is based on a formula which takes into account the percent share in the alliance’s common budget, the forces deployed to NATO operations and the NRF, as well as the current number of posts filled. The fact that Poland had more troops deployed as part of the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq and Afghanistan than under the aegis of NATO at the time of the 2005 round of negotiations on the NATO command quotas has had repercussions (Bilski, 2005). A lack of sufficient number of highly-qualified candidates, especially those with excellent English skills (a “deficit”), able to compete with experienced candidates from the West may have also accounted for a generally low level of representation.\footnote{The Supreme Control Chamber, Poland’s top administrative watchdog, revealed that in 2004-2007 the Polish armed forces did not meet the NATO Target Force Goal with respect to the acquisition of requisite levels of English language proficiency by deployable forces. It concluded that this “was a barrier to nominating soldiers for study abroad” (NIK, 2008).}

Another issue comes into play as well: an experience as a secondee or a contract employee either in NATO or the EU may actually be of little value for career advancement at home. In fact, both the MFA and the MoD/General Staff either do not have requisite policies (MFA) or do not make an effort to harness the CSDP or NATO experience of those returning to the capital (Polish EU mission interview, 2009; General Staff interview, 2009)\footnote{There are few exceptions. The head of the MFA security policy department in 2009 was eventually reappointed to this position after having held in 2003-2007 the post of Assistant NATO Secretary General for Operations, the highest office ever held by a Polish national in NATO’s civilian bureaucracy.}. According to Poland’s Supreme Control Chamber, of 361 professional military personnel coming back from duty in NATO structures in 2004-2007 as many as 248, or 69% were not offered higher positions in their service, to which they
were entitled under the MoD's HR policy (NIK, 2008). Of 11,765 military personnel who served in 12 NATO, EU, OSCE and UN operations, in which Poland took part in 2004-2007 only 38% jumped up the professional ladder after coming back to Poland. 9% of those who returned, among them much-needed NCOs with specialized skills, quit the military service due to a "lack of mechanisms motivating them to continue professional service" (Ibid.).

The weakness of state capacity, manifested as a lack of stable personnel career paths within the MFA and MoD, financial constraints, and the absence of a strategic approach to the promotion of nationals in the EU, has limited the Europeanization potential. Since the higher the number of personnel strategically placed in the EU institutions the better the chance of Poland's voice getting heard in Brussels, these recruitment limitations have circumscribed Poland's ability to "upload" preferences. Likewise, there has not been as much of an infusion of national institutions with experience and cultural imports likely to be brought back by civil servants and military officers returning home from their secondments in the EU institutions (Simon, 2004). Thus, the "institutional spill over" effect, or the transmission of the EU norms through experts and secondees, could not be realized (Breuer, 2010). Because the same problem concerned filling NATO posts, one cannot say that NATO-ization has been fostered through this means. Handicaps in the personnel management policies, particularly shortfalls in long-term planning, may be viewed as a corollary of the systemic transformation. It speaks also to the specificity of a political culture of a country in transition, in which political parties put their stamp on the staffing of senior ministerial posts, a practice that trickles down the chain of command. I will say more about these shortcomings in the context of civilian crisis management.
II.5. Education and training

Lt-Gen. Manfred Engelhardt, one of the most senior officers of the Bundeswehr, said that “the most important part” of any transformation is changing mindsets (Engelhardt, 2004). The change of mindsets has likewise been recognized by Polish experts as a *sine qua non* for the success of Polish military transformation. Former deputy defence minister, Andrzej Karkoszka, once intimately involved in the process of Poland’s integration into NATO, admitted that the most difficult aspects of NATO integration have been questions involving what he calls “awareness”. They included “apprehensions concerning the credibility of the policy pursued by the West” and an “unwillingness” to adapt to new requirements (Karkoszka, 2001:531). For Dyson, elite socialization within EU and NATO institutional forums and policy-learning processes consequent upon interaction through joint military operations facilitate normative convergence (2008).

The European militaries have traditionally been geared towards national defence. This focus has been reflected in the training of forces, which provides an opportunity to inculcate doctrine in the minds of the recruits. Shifts towards an expeditionary paradigm as well as making the EU level of security governance a point of reference in the daily practices and decision-making would therefore have to be part and parcel of the training programs. In addition to the participation in multinational crisis response missions and joint exercises foreign training, exchanges and secondments should contribute towards this mental shift. It would be impossible to measure and assess changes in the realm of awareness or the mindset of Polish ministry of defence civilian personnel and officers without polling or other means of quizzing the individuals. Instead, I will assess the
education and training the military and civilian security sector officials have received in the analytical period. This picture will allow me to form tentative views with regards to the possible impact of the European military cultural milieu as opposed to the US or the NATO environment.

Without a doubt NATO has provided the bulk of training opportunities for Polish civilian and military personnel. It has done so through the six decades-old NATO Defence College in Rome, NATO School (SHAPE) in Oberammergau, the US-German George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) and defence colleges of its member states. Their doors became open to the Polish nationals since Poland joined the PfP in 1994. From 1991 to 1997, over 1200 members of the armed forces completed courses abroad, including 33 at high-level foreign staff colleges (Latawski, 2002). In the same period, 150 Polish nationals trained in French military colleges, including 20 in the Inter-Services Defence College in Paris (Parzymies, 2001). A senior expert in the Polish MIAA department of crisis management and defence affairs, who attended the “Leaders Program for Advanced Security Studies” at GCMC, conceded that “the twelve weeks spent together with representatives of more than a dozen countries, various institutions, civil and military, helped build bonds of friendship.” He stressed that it makes the performance of tasks in an international environment smoother and more effective (Mach, 2007).

NATO socialization deepened after Poland became a member of the Alliance. From 1998 to 2008 2.5 thousand Polish officers received training abroad (Gogor, 2009). Thanks to generously funded US programs, such as the U.S. Security Assistance and

---

18 It is unclear what proportion of this was English language training, or how many of the graduates stayed in the army later on.
International Military Education and Training (IMET), the largest number went to NATO and US military institutions, followed by defence academies in the UK, another Atlanticist member state, and Germany (Gryz, 2000; Senate, 2009). Table 7 shows the distribution by destination in 2004-2006. From 2004 until the first half of 2007, 34.6% Polish military personnel trained in NATO schools, 45.6% in schools of NATO member states, including in the US – 28.5%, UK – 6.4% and Germany 3.7% (Supreme Control Chamber, 2008). Up to 15% of all Polish officers have attended courses abroad. In fact, a promotion to senior military command posts has become contingent on acquiring a part of the officer’s education at any of the NATO schools or member state military academies (Senate, 2009). Some fifty-percent of civilian employees of the MoD Department of International Security have also attended courses at NATO schools (MoD interview, 2009). One might surmise that Polish officers trained at the French German, or for that matter British defence colleges would have seen that these states’ support for CSDP does not presume lessening commitment to NATO.
### Table 7 Training locations of Polish officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Bosnia-Hercegovina</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>727</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Supreme Control Chamber (May 2008)*

The NATO military environment has afforded the Poles acculturation and networking opportunities. Polish officers have held senior managerial positions at NATO schools. The commandant of Warsaw’s National Defence College takes part in the activities of the Conference of Commandants coordinated by the NATO Defence College. Through this
network NATO wields influence over the content of the curricula of the member state defence academies, which contributes to standardizing military education.

The multinational exercises organized by NATO, as well as individual NATO/EU member states have enhanced not only technical, but also doctrinal interoperability. Until the end of 2008 Polish troops participated in 70 major Allied and multinational exercises (Gagor, 2009). Poland is deepening cooperation on training within NATO. It has, for instance, joined a nine-NATO member initiative – HIP Helicopter Task Force (HHTF) – launched in 2009, to provide operational pre-deployment training for the crews of Mi-type helicopters. It plans to lead jointly with the US a working group on operations and training within this initiative. The aim is to establish a NATO centre of excellence for common training. This would boost capabilities generation, and reduce the cost of separate national training.

Although the EU, as a newcomer to defence policy, has been eager to catch up with NATO in the field of training, it cannot hope to match any time soon the strength of the Alliance. The European Council meetings at Feira in June 2000 and Göteborg in June 2001 recognized the importance of training, yet the focus then was limited to training for civilian aspects of crisis management. Late in 2002 the Greek presidency started to conceptualize EU common training encompassing both civilian and military aspects (Council 14176/2/03). At the same time, the Commission began to implement the EC Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis management, while the EU Military Committee was also developing an EU Common Military Training Concept. The member states realized they needed to coordinate the two streams. At the November 2003 Thessaloniki Council they endorsed the EU Training Policy in CSDP (Council
14176/2/03). It called for *inter alia* implementing a proposal to set up a European Security and Defence College (ESDC). A clear socializing motif underlay the CSDP Training Policy. Its key objective at the strategic planning level was to "develop throughout the Union a common CSDP culture," as well as enhance interoperability at the operational level. This was to be achieved through courses, seminars, simulation exercises, workshops, lectures and distance learning (Council 14176/2/03). The EU Training Concept for CSDP, approved in September 2004, defined the principles for the establishment of a European Security and Defence College (ESDC). Organized as a network of national institutes, colleges, academies and institutions dealing with security policy the ESDC came into being in July 2005 by means of a Joint Action of the Council (Council Joint Action 2005/575/CFSP). Its genesis, however, lay in a French-German proposal for the "development of the WEU Institute into a European Security and Defence Academy", which was incorporated into the Maastricht Treaty (WEU A/2041).

The ESDC was a creature of compromise. Britain questioned its value-added, while other countries lacked an appetite for spending additional money. The French, however, pushed it strongly. As a French senator's report on ESDC indicates, the intertwining of civilian and military aspects of CSDP would be a tangible value-added "contrary to the NATO Defence College... which made such a contribution to forging a distinctive "NATO culture"" (WEU A/2041, 10). This reads like an attempt to forge a distinct EU culture in contradistinction to NATO. During their EU presidency in November 2008 the French launched a complementary project for the training and exchange of European officers inspired by the Erasmus university program in civilian education (Council 9820/09). The then French deputy defence minister Jean-Marie Bockel's maintained that
through the exchanges the young officers "will develop a real awareness of common European defence – I might even say a genuine ‘common defence culture’ that they will carry with them throughout their careers" (WEU, 2009). Inspired by the Élysée Treaty, the aforementioned French senator envisaged “military Erasmus” contributing to a European identity.

As a beneficiary of numerous, often US-sponsored NATO training opportunities, it took a while to convince Poland to the efficacy of EU training programs. First, the new projects appeared to be competitively driven in relation to NATO programs. Warsaw saw little need to fix something that was not broken. In other words, it approached personnel training through the prism of effectiveness rather than a political doctrine, least of all one that envisaged projects “contrary” to NATO. And second, because the new EU programs, ESDC in particular, were based on the “costs lie where they fall” principle, they necessitated additional national spending (Lieb and Ondarza, 2008; Jacob, 2011). Because little common funding had been provided, the cost of realizing this initiative would have to be fielded by a participating state. Unlike other bigger EU member states which, fearing the ESDC might compete with their well-established national institutions, have hampered its development, Poland’s reserve owed most to resource constraints (Jacob, 2011).

Given the short gestation of the EU initiatives, their limited scope and an embryonic state of “military Erasmus,” their socializing impact on the Polish officers and civilians has not been strong (Polish Institute of International Affairs interview, 2009). Even the French backers of ESDC and “Military Erasmus” admit that the ESDC innovative format has not yet been securely established, while the outlines of “military Erasmus” are still
“fuzzy” (WEU A/2041). ESDC oversees only 10 weeks of training per year, which takes place in different European locations by turns and is designed around different modules. Though the small secretariat within the GS of the Council has from 2005 to 2009 increased from 3 to 11 staff the EU cannot be said to have built up an institutional core in the field of training.

As a participant in ESDC Poland has a potential influence on further developing EU training. The Executive Academic Board of ESDC includes a Polish representative, a navy captain employed as researcher at the National Defence Academy. As such, he also has input into the Implementation Group (IG) for the “military Erasmus.” In contrast to the Czechs and Slovenians who had taken an early lead in organizing ESDC high level courses (HLC) Poland planned to do so in the 2010-2011 academic year. This suggests both a modest level of commitment and reluctance to bear the lion’s share of organizational costs at a time when Poland has been going through a costly restructuring of its military education system. The Polish National Defence Academy, however, co-organized two high level courses – together with Spain in February 2007 and with Finland (jointly with the MFA-funded Polish Institute for International Affairs) in Helsinki in June 2009. The latter was attended by 60 individuals, a mix of civilian and military experts. Data from 2005-2007 shows that there were 16 Polish attendees at ESDC courses, which is an average rate of participation by EU MS representatives, and hardly ripe for significant socialization (ESDC SC/2007/010).

The Poles have also taken part in bilateral military exchanges. The September 2008 stocktaking of existing military exchanges, done by the EU Council, shows that Poland at the time had 5 military student exchange relationships within the EU: with the Czech
Republic (1 Polish officer on an exchange/training program), France (11), Italy, Latvia (1) and Portugal, as well as a military instructor exchange with the Czech Republic (2) (Council 12843/08). By comparison, Germany and the UK each had 11 such relationships while France topped the list with 17 intra-EU exchange programs. In contrast to 13 military students Poland sent to other EU academies in 2008, the three mentioned states sent 197, 145 and 219 students respectively. More officer training exchanges between Poland and France are expected as envisaged in the declaration of the Franco-Polish Summit on Security and Defence of 5 November 2009 (UKIE, 2009). The current level of exchanges with France and the promise of more to follow may be a prognostic of Europeanization.

The data confirms that the Polish military education system has not yet opened up extensively to intra-EU exchanges. It may be argued that a one-way street has predominated, in which Polish officers have studied and trained abroad without reciprocity. An insufficient offer of English-language courses in non-English speaking countries is but one explanation for this state of affairs. The resource crunch is another one.

The fledgling EU efforts to enhance common training are bound to have a limited impact unless countries integrate such a learning experience into their national curricula and reward beneficiaries of exchanges. The Polish graduates do not have a strong incentive to study abroad. The Supreme Control Chamber revealed that in 2004-2007 of 152 Polish graduates of foreign schools and courses preparing students to take up higher posts in the military hierarchy, only 38% assumed such posts, while 46.7% did not and 14.5% were actually moved to the military human resource reserve pool (NIK, 2008). It
appears furthermore that the majority of EU members, Poland in particular, neither desire to supplant an extensive NATO educational network nor allow an EU intrusion into the national autonomy in military education. The slow progress stems also from the “costs lie where they fall” formula in financing EU military education. For cash-strapped Poland capacity constraints – limited resources, lack of carrots for graduates, rather than a lack of political will, pose obstacles to availing to a greater degree of the training opportunities in other EU or NATO member states. The Polish MoD after all sticks to its declaration that its own military system of training “should be closely integrated with the European and NATO systems of military education” (Senate, 2009). It is unclear though what the Poles mean by a European system of military education. Apart from bilateral projects, the dearth of EU-level programs to promote a specifically EU hybrid civilian-military culture of defence as compared to the rich menu of NATO training opportunities suggests that the room for EU-ization in training is very circumscribed Thus far, NATO training programs are the carriers of Europeanization, introducing new ideas and norms related to multinational cooperation and an expeditionary mode of operation. Their frame of reference though is the North Atlantic Alliance.

II.6. The multinationality paradigm

Mérand’s holds a view that CSDP has come about thanks to, on the one hand, 50 years of internationalization of armed forces around NATO and, on the other hand, 50 years of foreign policy cooperation around the EU (2008:143). With regards to military internationalization, or what King calls the transnationalization in Europe, he notes:

Thanks to the integrated structures of the Atlantic Alliance and the growth of multinational interventions since the end of the Cold War, West European armed
forces increasingly look like multinational corporations: they operate on a global theatre; their manpower is international in outlook; and their governing structures are increasingly similar. *Mutatis mutandis*, they have moved towards small all-volunteer forces (or an all-volunteer core), covering a wide spectrum of tasks, and usually intervening in a multinational context in missions that are only loosely related to "national" defence (2008:14; King, 2005).

The push in the direction of multinational cooperation and out-of-area crisis management operations has spurred efforts to enhance interoperability. The quest for interoperability has meant that "today very few defence policies are unaffected by European (not necessarily *EU* [emphasis added]) developments" (Mérand, 2008:6). Thus, Europeanization of defence policies, evidenced by a burgeoning of multinational units, owes to the catalytic impact of both NATO and the EU.

Mérand traces NATO’s push towards multinationality to Germany’s uploading of its preferences in the Alliance. Berlin insisted on including in the *Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance* a statement the Alliance “will rely increasingly on multinational corps made up of national units”. This was endorsed at the NAC meeting in London on 6 July 1990 (London Declaration, 1990). Binding Germany in multinational cooperation was Berlin’s way of assuaging concerns about its reunification as well as a continuation of a voluntary policy of entangling German armed forces in European frameworks of defence cooperation. The precursor of the latter was the Franco-German brigade, an offspring of decades-long Franco-German cooperation. The brigade has become a symbol of reconciliation and a will to further military cooperation (Heisbourg, 2004). A Polish military expert described it as an historic model for others to follow (Kaćki, 2003). The brigade became the nucleus for the multinational Eurocorps subordinated under the double-hatting formula to both EU/CSDP and the NATO Response Force (King, 2006).
Since then both NATO, through the NRF and the EU, through the battlegroup concept, have encouraged multinationality. Whereas NATO’s key motivation has been to enhance interoperability for crisis management operations, the logic of political integration has played a big part in the EU’s case (Mérand, 2003). The budgetary economy of scale calculus has also underpinned the promotion of the multinationality paradigm (King, 2005). The 2010 European Headline Goal spells out “an emphasis on the multinationality principle” (Council 6309/6/04). In December 2008 the EU members adopted a Declaration on strengthening capabilities, in which they agreed to pool multinational critical capabilities as well as strengthening mutual interdependence between themselves (Council 16840/08). In effect, they have reaffirmed the directions of defence transformation already set in the St.-Malo Declaration.

In 1998, just before Poland’s formal entry to NATO, then Polish defence minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz said that the Poles “strongly support the Alliance concept of creating multinational units” (1998). The 1992 Security Policy and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland expressed this policy as follows: “We regard as worth developing the idea of creating multinational armed forces and the participation therein of Poland. We consider it possible to establish mixed military units with our neighbours” (Security Policy, 1992). Polish MoD experts have stated that the Franco-German brigade was an inspiration behind this move (MoD interview, 2009). By 1999 Poland had engaged in four such projects, since then until 2009 it has participated in eight additional endeavours and planned further three beyond the 2010 horizon. Therefore, as Polish role in NATO and the EU has grown, such activities have picked up in the last decade (see Table 8).
Table 8 The participation of the Polish military in multinational units in Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Poland’s Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polish-Ukrainian Peacekeeping Battalion (POLUKRBT)</td>
<td>1998-present</td>
<td>Co-founder since 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech-Polish-Slovak Multinational Brigade</td>
<td>2002-2005</td>
<td>Initiator / one of the founders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic-Polish Brigade (NORDPOLBDE) / Nordic Polish Battlegroup (NPBG)</td>
<td>1996-2002</td>
<td>Poland joined Nordic Brigade (NORDBDE), formed by Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, under US-led Multinational Division North (MND-N) in IFOR/SFOR. In 2000, NORDPOLBDE was reduced and restructured into NPBG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational Battlegroup (MNBG)</td>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>After the dissolution of NPBG Poland jointly with Portugal and Slovenia formed the MNBG under US-led Multinational Brigade North (MNB N) in SFOR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational Corps North East (MNC NE)</td>
<td>1999-present</td>
<td>One of the founders alongside Denmark and Germany. MNC NE has since expanded membership to 11, including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (2004), Slovakia and Czech Republic (2005), the US (2006), Romania (2008) and Slovenia (2009).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Multinational Military Police Battalion (NATO MNMPBAT)</td>
<td>2007-</td>
<td>Initiator and co-founder alongside Croatia, Czech Republic and Slovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Battalion (MNCBRNBN)</td>
<td>2003-</td>
<td>One of the founders along with 12 NATO MS: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, an initiator, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, UK and US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational Manoeuvre Battalion</td>
<td>2004-present</td>
<td>One of contributors of an infantry company with Austria, Portugal and Turkey and since 2007 also Hungary. Subordinated to 13-nation Multinational Task Force North (MNTF N) in Op ALTHEA in Bosnia-Hercegovina.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech-German-Latvian-Lithuanian Polish EU Battlegroup</td>
<td>on standby in 2010</td>
<td>Initiator and co-founder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weimar EU Battlegroup</td>
<td>operational by 2013</td>
<td>One of the founders alongside Germany, an initiator, and France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visegrad EU Battlegroup</td>
<td>&quot;beyond 2015&quot;</td>
<td>Poland has in principle agreed to form it together with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurocorps (EC)</td>
<td>2002-</td>
<td>One of 5 sending nations (SN) alongside Austria, Greece, Italy and Turkey, in 2010 it will upgrade its status to become the 6th framework nation next to Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Gendarmerie Force (EGF)</td>
<td>2007-present</td>
<td>Partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG)</td>
<td>&quot;operational by 2011&quot;</td>
<td>Poland has co-initiated it in 2009.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kaccki 2003 and author’s own data
The precedent-setters were battalions for peacekeeping duty which Poland formed with neighbouring countries (LITPOLBAT and POLUKRBAT) and with West European states for duty in NATO-led IFOR/SFOR mission in the Balkans (NORDPOLBDE, NPBG and MNBG). The peacekeeping battalion with Ukraine (POLUKRBAT) and Lithuania (LITPOLBAT) fostered reconciliation and good neighbourly relations. After Poland’s entry to NATO in 1999, both units took part in the KFOR mission in Kosovo. These units were also transmission belts diffusing NATO standards and experiences both to Lithuania, which Poland wanted to bring swiftly to NATO, and to Ukraine, which Poland supported as well. With Lithuania in NATO and a neighbourly relationship ensconced by a common membership in the EU the two countries dissolved the LITPOLBAT in 2007. However, Lithuanians and Poles agreed to continue cooperation in a trilateral format, with Ukraine, in a new Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian battalion, upgraded to brigade level in 2008 (Rochowicz, 2009). On the occasion of signing an MOU by the three countries in 2009 Polish deputy defence minister made clear that Poland thus aims to “tie Ukraine closer to Western structures, including military ones” (Reuters, 2009). For similar reasons - buttressing Slovakia’s bid for membership in NATO, from 2002 to 2005, the Polish forces also co-formed the Czech-Polish-Slovak Multinational Brigade.

\[^{19}\] A Polish MoD expert noted that the idea of creating a joint Polish-Ukrainian unit is not new, because... such a proposal had already been put forward in 1920! (Kacki, 2003:130fn). This curious reference reinforces my contention that an historical memory, a constitutive ingredient of Polish security identity, casts light on present-day policy choices.
Poland’s first foray into creating durable multinational structures with Western NATO allies was the Danish-German-Polish Multinational Corps North East (MNC NE) set up in 1999. The Corps was designed by Germany to immerse Poland in European multinational cooperation. The establishment of MNC NE had been facilitated by Danish-German-Polish defence cooperation. It has encompassed meetings of defence ministers as well as military manoeuvres and joint exercises which grew in intensity since Poland’s accession to the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. When signing in 2001 the MoU on Czech-Polish-Slovak MNBG then Polish defence minister Komorowski called the MNC NE a “good incubator” helping orient Polish officers in NATO structures and speeding up defence reforms as well as adaptation to NATO standards. Poland used this model to spread the multinational cooperation framework to the East. This policy has served its interests just as it served the interests of Germany and Denmark to tie Poland, on the fringes of NATO, into the MNC NE (Simon, 2004).

While the MNC NE was a German project for European military cooperation, it became at the same time a part of NATO military cooperation. These two trajectories have been mutually compatible. This parallelism between NATO cooperation and European cooperation is underscored by Simon’s appraisal of the establishment of MNC NE as “a milestone in European integration” (Koszel, 2007; Simon, 2004). Each division of the Corps’ HQ, located in Poland, has been staffed by mixed teams of Danish-German-Polish officers, a unique set-up even by European standards (MoD “Korpus”). The MNC NE has since expanded to include 11 members. Its “baptism of fire” took place in Afghanistan where it provided ISAF command elements. By enhancing interoperability
and strengthening the multinationality paradigm, the Corps thus proved conducive to Polish defence reform.

Poland has also entered the Eurocorps. Unlike the EU BG, which is subordinated to CSDP, the multinational European force - Eurocorps has been formally independent of the EU. Theoretically if asked, it may undertake missions on the EU's behalf as it has done on behalf of NATO. In practice, neither the EU BG nor the EC, though high mobility and high readiness forces, has been deployed in an EU operation. Both the EC and the EUBG follow NATO procedures for training and other aspects of functioning.

Due to its symbolism as the first European multinational force set up for an expressly political purpose – to entrench the Franco-German rapprochement, a cornerstone for European integration, Poland's relations with the Eurocorps may be viewed as a litmus test of Europeanization. Poland established relations the Eurocorps in the 1990s to strengthen ties with the WEU. At the time, the relationship amounted to no more than posting liaison officers. In 2006 the Weimar Triangle defence ministers agreed that Poland should raise its profile within the Eurocorps by increasing its personnel at the headquarters (EC HQ) from 3 officers as of 2008 to 15 officers. A Polish brigadier-general was to assume the position of EC deputy chief of staff for support (Kawalowski, 2009). In 2008 the MoD announced that Poland would upgrade its status from the so-called sending-nation to a framework nation, thus becoming a full member of today's five-nation Eurocorps. This means that in 2010 at the earliest Poland would have about 120 officers and NCOs at the EC HQ and it would make available to the EC a brigade-strength – about 3,000 personnel - force contribution.
Subregional cooperation in the form of a multinational military corps furthers Europeanization rather than detracts from it. The Eurocorps symbolizes a commitment to EU member states’ reconciliation and joint service in the spirit of European unity. These very values inform the CSDP. The Eurocorps is therefore a useful exemplar of EU security governance, a sort practical and normative laboratory for CSDP, as well as a carrier of Europeanization. In Osica’s words Poland’s decision to accede to the Eurocorps “shows an enormous change in the thinking about this [CSDP] project” (2008). It could not have come about without the experience of close Polish-French cooperation in the EU/CSDP operations in Africa. It comes alongside the cooperation with Germany on setting up a battlegroup jointly with other East-Central European countries and with the Weimar Triangle on the Weimar EU BG. These actions have reinforced trust, a culture of European military cooperation, and boosted Poland’s confidence in its ability to rise up to both operational challenges and the expectations others have of this biggest of the EU’s newcomers.

Poland’s decision to integrate with the Eurocorps also substantiates its volte-face on a concept of an EU defence avant-garde (permanent structured cooperation) and an autonomous planning (Pitarch, 2008). The EC commander assessed the Eurocorps as “the multinational headquarters that is the nearest to the principle of permanent structured cooperation, as it had been imagined in the Lisbon Treaty” and opined that it might fulfill the EU’s planning needs (Ibid.). Early as a candidate state Poland was very concerned about the permanent structured cooperation concept, thinking it could be exclusionary, and that it might not be able to afford the “entry fee.” During the work of the Convention on the Future of Europe Poland formally removed any objection to it. Thanks to
successful experience in demanding operations in Iraq and central Africa, and the recognition it received from allies, Poland gained enough confidence to regard itself as one of the potential co-shapers of CSDP.

A political evolution of the Eurocorps has boosted Poland's confidence that Europeanist ambitions may be reconciled with Atlanticist leanings, endearing it over the years to the CSDP. Having provided the FHQ for NATO's KFOR and ISAF missions as well as the land component for the NRF, the Eurocorps has proven NATO credentials (Osica, 2008). It is no longer perceived as manifesting Franco-German autonomist inclinations. A symbolic mark of the EC's hybrid Euro-Atlanticist nature is the fact that in 2002, it has dropped French and German in favour of English as its common language. Pragmatism on all sides of the debate about CSDP and its relationship with NATO has been helped by Sarkozy's rapprochement with NATO. Through military integration with the Eurocorps, and, as I will show, also through cooperation within the battlegroups, Poland has in fact tried to broaden the Franco-German tandem steering CSDP.

In sum, whether realized through NATO, the Eurocorps or other multinational formation, multinational military cooperation has been both a manifestation of and a vehicle for the Europeanization of Polish defence policy. It has had a doctrinal impact. A document prepared in May 2008 by the MoD Department of Transformation – The Vision of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland – 2030 envisaged that the Polish armed forces will in future be an integral part of what it calls the "Euroarmy" (MoD Wizja, 2008). Although this document has been dismissed by one of my interviewees outside government as "an exercise in futurology," the fact that such a scenario was taken seriously by MoD department responsible for charting the future of Polish military
transformation illustrates a sea-change in official attitudes towards CSDP (Polish Institute of International Affairs interview, 2009).

II.6.a. Multinationalization and specialization: Constabulary forces

One of the new trends in the armed forces reform in Europe has been the creation of special constabulary formations based on the military police/gendarmeries and their multinationalization. The use of the military police responds to contemporary crisis management requirements. This type of force plays a stabilizing role in a transitional period just after a military intervention has taken place, but before new security structures have been set up (Górka-Winter, 2006). The lawlessness which followed the US-led coalition operations in Iraq showed a glaring need for this type of force (Domisiewicz, 2005). Performing such duties as search and rescue, maintenance of law and order and criminal intelligence military gendarmeries are well-suited for security sector reform (SSR) missions that have become the main fare of the increasingly mixed civilian-military CSDP operations (Pacek, 2007) 20.

Poland has responded to these demands. In 2004-5 three Specialized Units of the Polish Military Gendarmerie (ŻW), well-trained, well-equipped, fully professional and rapidly deployable rapid response elements totalling 2,000 personnel, were established. This facet of military transformation has been prompted by the new security challenges as well as Polish experiences as part of the UN International Police Task Force operating in the Balkans, and thanks to an inspiration - political and doctrinal - of NATO and the EU members. Even though a mixed crisis management toolbox is considered an EU

---

20 Out of 14 CSDP operations in progress in October 2009 10 of 12 were SSR-type non-military missions (Gya and Thomsen, 2009).
speciality, the EU influence has in fact been one of several triggers for this type of reform.

NATO has acted as a catalyst for change. At the 2002 NATO summit in Prague, the Polish defence minister declared that as part of the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) Poland would become a “lead nation” in the future NATO Multinational Military Police Battalion. Launched five years later, NATO MNMPBAT builds on one of those ZW Specialized Units on the basis of the NATO Military Police Doctrine and Procedures APP-12 (Ibid.). Through this initiative, Poland has responded to NATO’s expressed call for “multinational efforts” and “role specialisation” (Prague Declaration, 2002). Poland also proposed to the NATO Allied Command Transformation that it would set up a Military Police Centre of Excellence (MP CoE), an international institution designed for joint military police training, analysis of operational lessons learned, doctrinal development and information-sharing. If Poland carries it through by 2011, as envisaged in the MoD’s Program of the development of Polish Armed Forces in 2008-2018, it would become one of 17 NATO member states that already have or are building CoEs to support various types of military capabilities (Kowalczyk, 2009).

In parallel with NATO, the EU has embarked upon the creation of constabulary units. In a case of emulation and lessons learning, at an informal meeting of EU defence ministers in 2003 the French defence minister proposed setting up the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF/EUROGENDFOR). It came into being three years later, though formally outside of the EU structures. As a rationale for setting up the EGF, Michèle Alliot-Marie actually cited NATO experience in Balkan stabilization missions (Górka-Winter, 2006). The French recognized the potential the Polish armed forces were
developing in this area. In 2004, they invited ŻW to hold bilateral consultations with the French Gendarmerie to assess the possibility of joining the EGF. The Polish MoD had been interested in this venture expecting it to be subsumed under CSDP (Pacek, 2007). At the operational level, the Polish Military Gendarmerie played prominent part in the 2006 EUFOR DR Congo and the 2008-9 EUFOR Chad missions. The experience the ŻW gained in Africa reinforced the reputation of Poland as a niche contributor to military police capabilities, winning Poland the French support for its bid to join in the EGF (Jankowski, 2008). In 2007 Poland was granted a transitional partner status in the EGF. In turn, the African experience gathered by the gendarmerie has given Polish officials confidence to push CSDP initiatives related to this force. In 2008, for example, the Polish foreign minister suggested that the EGF be deployed to Afghanistan, before this proposal was formally tabled by the French the following year (MFA, 2008).

The EGF and NATO MNMPBAT initiatives illustrate a trend within the European armed forces towards the development of specialized military capabilities and their multinationalization. A part of the impetus has come from the post-9/11 security environment. The fight against terrorism has put a premium on a wide spectrum of capabilities short of, though not excluding, military force. Budgetary constraints have also played a role. As defence funding shrinks, rationalization of the military follows. The setting up of the Specialized Units of the ŻW has been reinforced both by the North Atlantic Alliance and the EU, as well as an endogenous process of experiential learning. In this circumstance and as, I will show below, also in the case of the battle group formation, the EU has not been the main agent of Europeanization. It has shared the pride of place alongside NATO.
II.7. Impact of the EU Battlegroups and the NATO Response Force

In 2003 France and Britain launched a new capability initiative known as the EU Battlegroups (BGs). Inspired by the *Artemis* mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and eager to push CSDP forward, the French and the British agreed at the Le Touquet and London summits in February and November 2003 respectively to develop new battle-group sized force packages. Composed of approximately 1,500 troops each, set up by individual states or several nations, they could be deployed within 15 days in response to a crisis (Franco-British summit declarations, 2003). It was implicit that the intended area of deployment would be Africa where former colonial powers, particularly France, have long intervened. This project was in large measure designed to breathe life into the moribund European Headline Goal 2003, which, in spite of declarations to the contrary, failed to generate the 60,000-strong rapid reaction capacity (Lindley-French, 2005). Winning over Germany, the three states presented their ideas in a *food-for-thought* paper in February 2004. The battlegroup concept was further refined at the EU Military Staff and uploaded as the centrepiece of the 2010 Headline Goal endorsed by the European Council of 17-18 June 2004. The BGs have been declared operational in January 2007. Eventually 25 out of 27 EU member states got involved in the construction of some 15 battlegroups (Banasik, 2007). A predefined timetable envisages “at least” two battlegroups on a six-month standby rotation (Menon, 2009). Table 9 shows the BG standby schedules from 2007 to 2010.
The battlegroups are thought to have a potential as catalysts for force transformation. Boyer, among others, has called the BGs “a significant test case of the resolve of EU Member States to transform their military forces as well as an extremely useful tool to develop interoperability among EU military apparatus and establish a common military culture between Europeans” (2007). The capabilities generation approach specified in the 2010 Headline Goal has an explicitly transformative intent. It “requires Member States to voluntarily transform their forces by progressively developing a high degree of interoperability,” particularly in terms of equipment compatibility, procedures, concepts, command arrangements, defence planning as well as an emphasis on the multinationality principle (Council 6309/6/04). Major and Mölling point out that the BGs have been designed to prod EU member states to get their armed forces ready and deployable for crisis management. For Germany, in particular it was a “political project” designed to strengthen multinational cooperation and stimulate force transformation (Major and Mölling, 2011). The small size of the package, while questionable from a strategic perspective, thanks to stronger peer pressure might have a
greater chance of succeeding in inciting defence reform than the 2003 Headline Goal (Reynolds, 2006).

In practice, the BG process has had varied effects on the EU member states. Without naming countries in question, Angelet and Vrailas argue that “In some Member States, the Battlegroup has engendered significant capability development and a reappraisal of military thinking and policy” (2008). This has been corroborated in Sweden, where defence reform focused on the creation of the Nordic Battlegroup that has since been held up as an example for other EU members (Jacoby and Jones, 2009). Other battlegroups, however, are merely paper formations, argues Nick Whitney, a former head of the European Defence Agency (2008). Whitney has pointed a finger at his own country’s BG, which, as Menon learned from interviews in Brussels, was in 2008 on standby in name only as the British troops were resting between Iraqi and Afghan deployments (2009). Major and Mölling are more ambivalent about the national imprint of the BGs. They argue that the “broad” transformation of national structures and capabilities has “largely” failed to materialise. Nonetheless, the BGs have forced adjustments in decision-making, military planning and command procedures, as well as a development of joint solutions in transport and logistics, to better meet the demands of EU crisis management (Major and Mölling, 2011).

In their comparative study of the effects of the BGs on defence reform in Sweden and Czech Republic, Jacoby and Jones make three assumptions. First, those effects would be most pronounced on small armies, especially those without deep traditions of active military role. There is a risk, however, that some countries like the Czech Republic might focus on a few “showcase” units featuring niche capabilities, for example, CBRA
defence, in which the Czechs are strong, while neglecting broader armed forces transformation (Major and Mölling, 2011; Jacoby and Jones, 2009). Fielding a large military, Poland does not fit this description. Second, their influence would be considerable if they latch on to national reform trajectories, especially if there is high salience between the ideas underpinning the 2010 Headline Goal and those held by national decision-makers. For instance, the objectives of the Battlegroups correspond with German security interests, aimed at intensifying defence cooperation, embedding the German security and defence policy in the EU, and enhancing the deployability of the German armed forces for multilateral crisis management (Major and Mölling, 2011). One might see a congruence of the BGs with the progressive expeditionary and multinational cooperation trend in Polish defence policy. And third, the actual deployment of the BG would be even more transformative than the generation process. However, since none of the BGs have been deployed, such a supposition cannot be validated.

The notion that the BGs are catalysts for the transformation of armed forces pervades official discourse in Poland. This has been articulated by Polish defence ministry officials as well as those of other security institutions (Kawałowski, 2007a; 2007b; Konarzewska, 2007). In a 2007 Senate hearing the Polish deputy defence minister said that “as in NATO, Poland regards its participation in such ambitious [EU] initiatives as the battlegroups as means of enhancing the modernization of our armed forces and supporting the process of transforming these forces” (Senate, 2007). He also added that the creation of the battlegroups is the most important CSDP project from the point of view of Polish defence ministry. The interoperability and potential expeditionary
demands posed by the BGs have been cited as one of the arguments for a shift to an all-volunteer force (Wierciński, 2009).

Analysing Poland’s decisions since 2004 with regard to the BG formation one may distinguish two factors conditioning Europeanization. The first one is a role conception rooted in its security identity – the imperative that Poland gets a seat at the CSDP decision-making table. And the second factor has been a politically as well as capacity-driven determination to ensure complementarity between the battlegroups and the NATO Response Force (NRF). Even though the BG concept had been developed without a substantive input by Poland, it saw the 2010 Headline Goal as an opportunity to patch up differences with France and Germany over Iraq as well as to make a strong mark in CSDP. One could see it therefore as Europeanization in a negative sense – entering into cooperation for the sake of political damage-limitation. The project was launched at an opportune moment just as Poland was about to enter the EU. There was, as then MFA security policy department head admits, a “certain hesitation and discussion about the degree of commitment” to the BG concept (Kupiecki, 2005). Poland at the time faced major force commitments. It assumed command of the multinational division centre-south in Iraq and faced a costly adaptation to the new-born NRF (Frank, 2008). There was just like in other EU member states some apprehension within the MFA about the emphasis on Africa as a preferred area of deployment\(^2\). Very soon, however, as former General Staff expert involved in the BG negotiations noted, Poland recognized that its involvement in this project would be a “litmus test” of its will to develop EU defence capabilities (Wierciński, 2009).

\(^2\) Menon, for instance, cites German suspicions that their troops were to be used as a ‘cover’ by other countries to legitimize interventions in their former colonies (2009).
The MFA and the MoD together with the General Staff debated what kind of battlegroups Poland would be engaged in. As MoD staffer notes, Poland had three choices (Kawalowski, 2007). First, it could set up its own BG just like France and Britain. Although this would tally with Poland’s ambitions it would entail heavy responsibility and onerous expenses. Second, it could act as the so-called framework nation availing of existing neighbourly or regional defence cooperation. The “EU Framework Nation Concept,” developed in 2002, defines the framework nation (FN) as “a member State… that has volunteered to, and that the Council has agreed, should have specific responsibilities in an operation over which EU exercises political control. A FN provides the OHQ/FHQ and the core of the military chain of command, together with the Staff support, the CIS and the logistic framework, and contributes with a significant amount of assets and capabilities to the operation” (Council, 8641/11). While less expensive, an option of taking charge of and forming a constituent part of a BG would still raise the country’s profile. The third approach - to join a unit already being formed would bring none of those desired political benefits. While it might appear a good demonstration of Europeanization, it would put Poland again in a position of a perpetual “joiner” of defence initiatives rather than a leader.

In the end, Poland chose to act as a BG framework nation. It was a compromise squaring political ambitions with a capacity potential (Wierciński, 2009). Polish decision-makers thus parted with – what then MFA security policy director called - “a certain conservatism” in the Polish approach to the armed forces’ presence in multinational structures: “away from planning in terms of limited resources (with the corresponding niche role for the country as a partner that only complements another’s efforts) towards a
more daring definition of its position as an organiser of other countries’ actions” (Kupiecki, 2005:60). The determination to score political points is reflected in then deputy defence minister’s remark that “it is better to be a visible leader in one group than to break the potential among several ones” (Kaleta and Wróbel, 2004). Usually the framework nations are countries with more experience and a wider range of capabilities (Major and Mölling, 2011). Poland’s choice would therefore affirm its status as a constructive big-league player not a niche contributor in CSDP. Thus, already in April 2004 at an informal meeting of the EU defence ministers, the Polish defence minister declared his country’s intention to form a multinational battlegroup.

The selection of the Polish units earmarked for a BG attests to the impact of NATO, an accumulated operational experience as well as a strategic fusion of Poland’s commitment to the 2010 EHG with the modernisation and development of its armed forces (Kupiecki, 2005). In accordance with its obligations under NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitments, Poland planned to create two light infantry battalions that were to be mobile, deployable and able to handle a broad spectrum of tasks. These battalions were being established within the 12th and 17th Mechanized Brigades (Wierciński, 2009). As Poland’s contribution to the Multinational Corps Northeast and the main component of the multinational division centre-south in Iraq, the 12th brigade was used to operating within multinational force structures (Ulriksen, 2006). The 17th likewise had Iraqi experience. In line with a domestic modernization program these units were the first in line to be equipped with brand-new ROSOMAK AMV vehicles, thus guaranteeing high manoeuvrability and force protection – essential qualities for the BGs. The BG concept therefore latched on to NATO’s transformation initiative which, as the
Polish MoD underlined in an internal document, has helped steer the development of the Polish armed forces (MoD).

Poland’s choice of partners has followed in the footsteps of its defence collaboration with close neighbours. Arguably this may entrench the patterns of subregional cooperation detracting from broader Europeanization. Elsewhere in Europe, the BG formation has also reflected pre-existing configurations. A case in point is the British-Dutch BG for standby in 2010, which “latched on” to the over 30 years’ old UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force (Major and Mölling, 2011). Mindful of the experience of the Nordic-Polish battalion in the Balkans, the Polish MoD in cooperation with the MFA put out feelers to Sweden whether it would be interested in a partnership. The two sides did not see eye to eye on a contribution by Polish forces. As the Polish general involved in these negotiations remarked, a “marginal role” for Polish forces envisaged by Sweden proved unacceptable (Kaleta and Wróbel, 2004). Poland then turned to another tested partner – Germany. The two reached an agreement on a formation of a joint battlegroup. On 22 November 2004 at the Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels Poland and Germany, joined by Slovakia, with whom Poland had had extensive cooperation, signed a declaration of intent on establishing by 2010 an EU BG with Poland as a framework nation. Lithuania and Latvia, also tried partners, invited by Polish MoD, joined the effort. All five states signed MoU on 13 November 2006, which set the stage for expert-level negotiations on the shape of the battlegroup, logistics, national contributions and the terms of standby (Wierciński, 2009).

The formation of the BG could be read as a test-case of Poland’s leadership in European defence cooperation. Whereas Poland received substantial support from the
United States and NATO when setting up the MND CS in Iraq, this time it seized an opportunity to hone its own skills in multilateral military diplomacy and enhance the efficiency of its military governance structures. On 20 June 2007 the minister of defence set up a special team, involving high-level representatives of 22 MoD institutions, headed by deputy chief of general staff, to lead the BG formation process (MoD, 2007). Poland hosted successive rounds of negotiations, prepared technical documents for negotiations, as well as held manoeuvres and exercises. The BG was supposed to be up and running by 1 January 2010. Out of the Group’s total roll-call of 1,800 personnel Poland was to fill half the force, Germany 30%, including logistic-support and medical units, and the remainder were to come from Slovakia, mainly engineers, Lithuania and Latvia. Because multinationalizing one of its own commands would tax the financial and manpower capacities of the MoD, it was decided that the operational headquarters (OHQ) for the BG would be in Potsdam, where one of five OHQs made available the EU is located (General Staff interview, 2009; Terlikowski, 2010).

The successful organization of the German-Latvian-Lithuanian-Polish-Slovak BG enhanced Poland’s confidence as a contributor to CSDP and fed ambitions to set up additional BGs to match the multiple commitments also made by the big EU members. The selection of future partners has as previously been based on a tradition of defence collaboration. Mindful of the Weimar Triangle cooperation, the MoD decided to set up a BG with France and Germany. Two motivations undergirded this step. First, such an endeavour would breathe life into the Weimar Triangle cooperation, and, as considered in the case of the Polish-led BG with the participation of Germany, it would strengthen the Warsaw-Berlin relationship. Secondly, the MoD saw that its military would benefit from
lessons gathered by the French forces in Africa (Wierciński, 2009). Originally tabled by Germany at a seminar organized in Poland in 2005, the proposal was further developed at the Weimar defence policy directors meeting in Warsaw in July 2006 and formally announced by the three defence ministers later that month (Ibid.). The EU Weimar BG is planned to become operational by 2013. Three observations are in order. First, this decision could be interpreted as Europeanization horizontally diffused through the Weimar Triangle bearing fruit. Second, taking place against the backdrop of friction between a right-wing government then in power in Warsaw and the German government, the establishment of the Weimar BG shows that political differences do not necessarily stand in the way of CSDP commitments. Third, though initially France declared a willingness to assume the role of framework nation, this responsibility was handed over to Poland. This is a gesture ripe with political symbolism implying both a high appraisal of Poland’s competence and a “graduation” of Poland as a mature EU/CSDP player.

Poland is also slated to be involved in setting up the Visegrad BG. This proposal was first aired, probably at Slovakia’s behest, at a meeting of the Visegrad chiefs of defence staff in January 2007. Four months later, the Visegrad defence ministers mentioned that this BG would probably be formed after 2015 (Ministers of Defence, 2007). As with the other two BGs, the proposal builds on the Visegrad cooperation experience, including the short-lived Polish-Czech-Slovak brigade. The chiefs of staff also considered that given its Euro-Atlantic aspirations and the strategic lift capabilities Ukraine might also be invited to join this endeavour. Because the potential inclusion of Ukraine would satisfy the Polish security identity-rooted postulate of promoting Kiev’s
integration with the EU and NATO, such a BG design enjoys Polish support (Wierciński, 2009).

By strengthening multinational cooperation and planning for expeditionary deployments, the BGs have reinforced defence reform dynamics. However, the impact of these force packages could not possibly be assessed in isolation from NATO’s own transformation initiative announced at the 2002 Prague Summit: the NATO Response Force. The preamble to the German-Latvian-Lithuanian-Polish-Slovak BG acknowledges “that the EU Battlegroups concept is complementary and mutually reinforcing with the NATO Response Force concept” (MoU, 2006). The two share the objective of transforming member states’ militaries (Major and Mölling, 2011). Like the EUBG, the NRF has been designed to “catalyze force transformation,” acting “as an agent of change whereby all the member nations of NATO will be able to bring new technology, capabilities, and concepts of operations into their national forces” (Bialos and Koehl, 2005). The Alliance has been referring to the NRF as a means of “Alliance transformation” to foster expeditionary capabilities (King, 2005). Table 10 compares the two force packages.

Table 10  EU BG and NRF in comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Number of participating nations</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Type of operations</th>
<th>Additional goals</th>
<th>Time frame</th>
<th>Composition of forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European battlegroups (BGs)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Expanded Petersberg tasks (incl. ESS and TEU)</td>
<td>Develop European military capabilities independent of NATO</td>
<td>Six-month standby rotations; training and coordination vary</td>
<td>Ground forces only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Response Force (NRF)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>Entire operational spectrum (crisis response collective defence)</td>
<td>Force transformation</td>
<td>Six-month training period, followed by a six-month standby rotation</td>
<td>Air, sea, and ground forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kaitera and Ben-Ari 2008, with author's own alterations
The NRF and the BGs are similar in so far as these forces are deployable, interoperable and sustainable rapid response capabilities on six-month standbys. Their differences relate to size, force composition and the range of tasks. With a full operational capacity of 25,000 troops from all armed force branches, an ability to handle both high-end out-of-area crisis management and Article 5 collective defence operations, the NRF is bigger, more robust, rapidly deployable and more ambitious (Dyson, 2008). In contrast to the EUBG, the NRF has been deployed four times: in 2004 – to provide preventive anti-terrorist security during the Olympic Games in Athens and the Afghan presidential elections; and in 2005 – to respond to natural disasters after the Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and an earthquake in Pakistan (Barbé and Nogués, 2008). While these were by no means armed conflicts, for which the NRF has been designed, at least, in NATO’s own words, the deployments have facilitated “learning by doing,” which the EU has found lacking. However hard the Swedes, during their 2009 presidency, tried to make the BG concept more flexible, for reasons of disagreements on the utility of the BGs and a lack of political will, the EU member states have not yet agreed to deploy the BGs.

The EU and NATO member states have tried to coordinate development plans of both the BG and NRF (Major Mölling, 2011). NATO has influenced the BG design. The BG concept was launched after NATO had unveiled the NRF and is informed by the latter’s standards, interoperability criteria and certification procedures (Ibid.). This interrelationship, and the fact that American troops make up but a small proportion of the
NRF personnel, has led King to assert that the “NRF signifies the Europeanization of NATO” (2005:331).

Eager to prove its credibility as a security provider rather than a free-rider and to strengthen NATO, Poland has contributed to the NATO Response Force. Although Polish MoD calls its input of “average” size relative to others, it was rather small at the beginning, though increasing incrementally in recent years (MoD). From October 2003 to January 2004, while busy in Iraq, Poland supplied an Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) unit with 20 personnel for the prototype 9,500-strong NRF1 (Bialos and Koehl, 2005). It was thus at the bottom of the list of contributions by 15 nations. In comparison, Spain provided 2,200 troops and the Czech Republic 80 personnel. In 2005 Poland’s contribution increased to 140 engineers who participated in the NRF5 operation “Swift Relief.” Three years later it supplied 220 personnel. In the 12th NRF rotation of January-June 2009 the contribution reached the highest level yet of 950. However, that was because at the time Poland assumed the lead in the 13-nation strong NATO Multinational Chemical, Biological Radiological and Nuclear Defence Battalion (MNCBRNBN) which is a component of the NRF.

The NRF and EUBGs have suffered from essentially the same weaknesses: different national interpretations of the rules of engagement set in the broader context of disagreements on the international role of NATO and the EU; the shortage of critical enablers such as strategic transport jeopardizing force projection; the “costs-lie-where-they-fall” approach to financing operations, which makes many EU countries, though especially cash-strapped Poland, wary of shouldering the burden for foreign ventures; and the long chain of decision-making, involving in addition to Brussels-based bodies also
national executives and parliaments in approving deployments. Notwithstanding these handicaps the two initiatives have had complementary effects upon national defence reform. Defence cooperation among troop contributors has been strengthened and both the multinationality model and – to some extent - the expeditionary mind-set reinforced (Mölling, 2007; Ringsmose, 2010). The multinational exercises in preparation for BG standby honed the skills of the Polish troops later sent to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan (Polska Zbrojna, 2009). This is an investment in enhancing force deployability for the good of both the EU and NATO.

The impact of either the EUBGs or the NRF on national defence transformation has had limitations however. Poland’s insistence on a congruent process of NATO and EU capabilities generation owes to financial and manpower constraints that bedevil its dual commitments (Madej, 2006; Mölling, 2007; Osica, 2004). The fact that those units designated for the NRF and BGs are the same as those that have taken part in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan reflects the dual-tiered nature the Polish armed forces have evolved as reform progresses. The best-equipped showpiece units are carved out of the armed forces and earmarked for multinational cooperation and expeditionary deployments. They come back from foreign missions enriched by these experiences while the rest of the military toils away in the barracks performing homeland duty. Yet, Poland’s approach has not been all that different from other EU member states. As King points out, in France, Germany and the UK the same units likely to be assigned to the CSDP under the battlegroup concept and the NRF are those specialist units that have emerged as a result of what he calls “concentration of the armed forces,” that is building up strength in core rapid reaction elements (2005).
Interestingly Poland has taken the lead in BG formation while assigning only niche capabilities to the NRF. As already explained, capacity constraints have played a role. Another explanation is that Poland’s responsiveness to NATO precepts has ceased to be affected by conditionality. However, a strategic policy factor may cast additional light. Since 9/11, in particular, driven by security identity imperatives, Poland has sought to reinforce its security through cultivating a “strategic relationship” with NATO’s primus inter pares, the US, a policy orientation adjunct to the Polish membership in the Alliance and the EU. By raising the spectre of Russian military expansionism, the Russian-Georgian war has boosted credibility of this policy course. Though the NRF is designed also to address Article 5-type operations, it has in practice focused on expeditionary deployments. To assuage the security concerns of Central Europeans reawakened by the war, the UK, at a meeting of NATO defence ministers in February 2009, proposed setting up a so-called Allied Solidarity Force (ASF) in charge of the defence of NATO territory. The announcement made in Poland was music to the Poles’ ears. Berlin and Paris were not enthused, so the initiative turned out a non-starter. Poland has therefore reinvigorated its efforts to bolster - through the installation of parts of the missile defence architecture and of the US Patriot batteries on Polish soil - direct ties with Washington. Other EU member states maintain latent concerns about territorial defence. Looking at Europeanization of French defence policy, Terpan concluded that this process has been limited to crisis management and does not include territorial defence (Terpan, 2008).

The “policy loyalty” on Iraq and missile defence has been viewed as Warsaw’s compensation for its symbolic commitment to the NRF and an important measure of
strengthening Poland's security (Jacoby, 2005). Warsaw, therefore, did not feel hard-
pressed to Europeanize by contributing forces to the NRF, conceptualized as the
European spearhead force, for which, at any rate, the US had intended to provide only a
token contribution of its own. A litmus test of Poland's Europeanization, its support for
the smaller and less demanding EU battlegroups, would pay higher political dividends
while incurring smaller cost. In other words, the NRF case shows in the Polish case that
Europeanization has not hit home by this means. Other European NATO member states,
one might add, have also not put their fair share into the NRF, as a result of which this
initiative has been scaled-down several times (Ringsmose, 2010).

Poland has in turn seized on the BGs - a flagship of CSDP - to raise its political
profile in the European Union. The ability of Poland to position itself closer to Berlin and
Paris as one of the chief CSDP decision-makers through the BGs will inform its future
engagement in European defence cooperation. The more Poland is able to upload in
CSDP the greater will be its propensity to augment the EU level of security governance.
A conceivable outcome of Poland's participation in the BGs may be a more convergent
political alignment with Paris and Berlin.

In the heels of heightened security concerns after the war in Georgia, Poland's
commitment to the BGs, however, may be more than a matter of political symbolism and
status. Because of the importance Poland attaches to real as opposed to the notional use
of force, enhancing the operability of the BGs is set to become an important item on the
agenda of Polish 2011 EU Presidency, with CSDP slated as one of its central foci. In
2009, General Wolfgang Schneiderhan, then Inspector General of the Bundeswehr told
the Polish MoD that for the EU to have a real crisis management capability the BG
concept should be supplemented with air and maritime elements. Since this position corresponds with Warsaw’s, provided that the economic crisis does not put more pressure on defence spending, augmenting the BG with additional military and civilian elements and, possibly extending the BG tour of duty from half-a-year to one year, will likely become the Polish postulates for strengthening CSDP (MoD interview, 2009; Polska Zbrojna, 2009). This will give the BGs stronger teeth and might make the EU member states more inclined to deploy them, a position favoured by Poland.

II.8. The expeditionary paradigm

Both NATO’s push for out-of-area operations and the extroverted orientation of CSDP, in line with an ambitious CFSP, have since the late 1990s influenced the transformation of the Polish armed forces. The process of change may be illustrated as a movement between two ideal types. From being focused almost exclusively on traditionally conceived “national defence” – what Latawski calls “a Territorial Defence type” - the military has moved into an expeditionary mode of action – “a Power Projection type” (2002). The participation of Polish troops in crisis management operations in Europe and beyond attests to this change. As mentioned already, an investment in expeditionary capabilities has however been selective - benefiting certain units more than others. Though deployments have stimulated modernization, with limited MoD money tied up to finance external deployments, modernization has been difficult to achieve across-the-board. As a result, a two-tiered structure of the military has been perpetuated.
An involvement in NATO, EU, and also in the US-led coalition of the willing-type operations has stimulated conceptual or institutional innovations. This development has brought Poland closer to what is generally thought of as a “European way of warfare,” but which is in fact mirrored in NATO’s recent “comprehensive approach.” The building blocs of the two include: a civil-military cooperation (CIMIC); the “multinationality principle,” i.e. a greater reliance on constabulary forces; a multi-phased approach to crisis response, from prevention to post-conflict reconstruction; the deployment of both military and civilian capabilities in crisis management; and an approach to crisis reaction less as an MoD responsibility alone and more as a responsibility of the state as a whole. A corollary of such an understanding of operations includes an unstated assumption that modern crisis management tasks are best performed by professional forces backed by critical enablers that ensure deployability, mobility and sustainability in distant theatres of operation.

The new Polish approach to crisis management reflects conceptual and doctrinal convergence around force projection, which, as Heisbourg observed, characterizes developments in the French, British, German and other European militaries (2004). There has been increasing convergence in the objectives of the militaries of the big EU member states around low-medium intensity expeditionary crisis-management as well as post-conflict reconstruction operations (Dyson, 2008). Emulation accounts to a large degree for this convergence. Copying successful policy models from others is the stuff of horizontal Europeanization. And Poland has been copying such institutional and tactical innovations as joint commands, special forces commands or CIMIC, from its EU and NATO allies.
The EU member states' have had different motivations to participate in EU-led operations. For France, at least before Sarkozy, European autonomy has traditionally been related to a desire to balance the US pole. France has also preferred to deploy EU capabilities in Africa in order to legitimize its interventionism in the former colonies where its forces are permanently installed (Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Chad and Djibouti) (Osica, 2009; Terpan, 2008). Being entangled in CSDP has satisfied a German quest to strengthen intra-European alliances and buttress the federalist thrust of the EU project. The British view EU crisis management through the prism of a more equitable transatlantic burden (Ibid.). Poland's motivations have not been uniform. A logic of appropriateness, especially a desire to be seen as a “good European” has featured in the elite calculations. However, for the most, the elites have tended to leverage Poland’s position in the EU and through the manifestation of solidarity get West Europeans to support Polish positions in the EU.

A brief historical background is in order. Before 1989, fielding the second-largest army in the Warsaw Pact, Poland stood out in the Soviet bloc for its active UN peacekeeping role. It began in 1953 with the secondment of observers to the international commission monitoring a ceasefire in the Korean Peninsula. Two decades later, Poland sent a contingent of troops to the first-ever UN multinational peacekeeping mission – the UN Emergency Force II in the Suez. Thanks to the UN peacekeeping experience Polish troops were the only Warsaw Pact soldiers to have had working relations with NATO counterparts. Because the units deployed were small, the Poles specialized in the logistical niche and the missions as a whole were not demanding, these experiences did not translate into defence reform. Any changes would have anyway required Moscow’s
imprimatur. As befits the Warsaw Pact military requirements Poland’s priority was to invest in heavy armoured divisions with which to push towards Jutland either as part of the U.S.S.R.-led invasion force or to repel a feared NATO aggression, neither of which materialized.

The UN experience remains nonetheless a source of pride for the Poles. It was brought up during Poland’s bid to enter NATO as an evidence of Poland’s propensity to act as a peacekeeper. A Polish defence minister’s remark in the late 1990s is illustrative: “we have cut our teeth on UN peacekeeping missions” (Onyszkiewicz, 1999). This experience has to some, unmeasurable, degree helped conduce the doctrinal and cognitive reorientation that has taken place in the last decade.

The shift in Poland towards expeditionary deployments of higher-intensity than the classical Cold War-era UN operations has had endogenous and external sources. Endogenously, prompted by the integration with NATO and the EU and motivated by the security identity-rooted principle of allied solidarity, the elites endeavoured to use the military as a sort of a trump card to obtain political rewards. An expert considers that “over the last ten years, Poland has sought to advance its status and influence in international affairs through active engagement in crisis management and peacekeeping operations” (Krakiewicz, 2008). The military has been utilised as a conduit for power maximization within NATO and the EU. As Polish foreign minister Radosław Sikorski said: “The Polish Army is an important instrument in our foreign policy. Poland is not a financial power. We do not have any major natural resources. But in the game of global interests you need to have a few tokens” (cited by Jankowski, 2008:3-4). The army is such a bargaining chip.
Poland’s choice of a platform for a military role – NATO, the EU or a coalition with the US - has reflected a mix of considerations. Ambivalent about the value-added of CSDP, not yet in the EU, Poland bandwagoned with the US in Iraq not only out of the solidarity reflex, but also to strengthen its position in the EU. When the EU membership loomed and the Iraqi balance sheet did not appear as rosy as the elites had expected, Poland turned to strengthening its role in CSDP. It realized that the EU has had much to offer it on issues of such vital importance as stabilising the Eastern neighbourhood or the energy security. While NATO remains a linchpin of collective defence and a paramount organization in the European security governance, the Poles, as a Civic Platform politician expressed it, have recognized that there is “greater space to develop the politico-military agency of Poland in the EU than NATO” (Saryusz-Wolski, 2007). They have also learned that the stronger the position of Poland in the EU will be the stronger will be its political currency in Washington. Not only, and perhaps not necessarily, the other way round.

Exogenously, the push in the expeditionary direction has reflected the rise of new security threats and challenges in the post-Cold War security environment. All the key security organizations - the UN, NATO, EU, CSCE/OSCE, and the erstwhile WEU - have been taxed with the intensity of peacekeeping demands. The Balkan wars showed a need for a new type of missions - peace enforcement. The British were the first to invest heavily in power projection and manoeuvrability emulating, in turn, the US model of expeditionary power projection (Dyson, 2008). The lessons from NATO and EU expeditionary deployments then pushed the laggards to adjust their doctrine and transform their military establishments accordingly.
Table 11 shows that between 1999 and 2009 the Polish armed forces have taken part in 4 out of 6 military operations undertaken by the EU, and in 11 missions under NATO command. Even if we exclude ISAF from the count, substantially more troops have acquired NATO operational experience than in CSDP missions. The two EU missions to which Poles did not commit troops are the ARTEMIS in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 and the EUNAVFOR Somalia, the anti-piracy operation Atalanta off the coast of Somalia, launched in 2008. The absence in the former had very much to do with Polish forces being busy in Iraq, while the shortage of naval assets, reflecting the sorry state of the Polish navy, and an absence of immediate interests accounts for non-participation in the latter.
## Table 11 Poland in EU and NATO military operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>Concordia</strong></td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>31 March 2003 - 15 Dec. 2003</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>Althea</strong></td>
<td>Bosnia-Hercegovina</td>
<td>2 Dec. 2004 – currently</td>
<td>170-265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><strong>EUFOR DR Congo</strong></td>
<td>Democratic Rep. of Congo</td>
<td>30 July 2006 - 30 Nov. 2006</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td><strong>EUFOR Chad/RCA</strong></td>
<td>Chad and the Central African Republic</td>
<td>15 March 2008 – 18 May 2009</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>NATO</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>SFOR</strong></td>
<td>Bosnia-Hercegovina</td>
<td>1995 – 2004</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>AFOR</strong></td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>May – Oct. 1999</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><strong>KFOR</strong></td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1999 – currently</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td><strong>Active Endeavour</strong></td>
<td>Mediterranean Sea</td>
<td>2001 – currently</td>
<td>27 (submarine crew)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td><strong>Amber Fox / Allied Harmony</strong></td>
<td>FYR Macedonia</td>
<td>2001 – 2003</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td><strong>Distinguished Games</strong></td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td><strong>Air Policing</strong></td>
<td>Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania</td>
<td>2004 – currently</td>
<td>90 (4 fighter jets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td><strong>ISAF</strong></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2004 – currently</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td><strong>Swift Relief</strong></td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Oct. - Nov. 2005</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td><strong>NTM-I</strong></td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2006 – currently</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td><strong>Peaceful Summit</strong></td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: EU Council; Jankowski 2008; Kawałowski 2009; Lindstrom 2006; NATO; Ozerski 2008*

The year 1999 began with Poland’s entrance to NATO followed right after by the allied intervention in Kosovo. Although Poland did not participate in combat operations it deployed forces to KFOR. Lacking in transport capabilities, it relied on rail to move its troops. This mode of transport, slow and requiring permission of transit states, reminded the policymakers of the dire need for a strategic lift. In contrast to many of the EU member states Poland did not see the lack of an explicit UN authorization for the NATO mission as problematic (Zaborowski and Longhurst, 2003). The attitude that vital security
imperatives overrode international law may be traced to the paramountcy of security in the Polish identity. The first EU operations Concordia and ALTHEA also took place in the Balkans, a region considered important from Poland’s national security perspective. These operations relied on the Berlin Plus arrangements and followed upon NATO operations Allied Harmony and SFOR. The Polish troops essentially took off their NATO hat and put on the EU’s. The recourse to the Berlin Plus concurred with Poland’s preference for enhancing the NATO-EU relationship.

What Table 11 does not show is the participation of Poland as part of the coalition of the willing in operations “Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan and “Iraqi Freedom.” In 2003-2008 a total of 14,500 Polish troops, some 10% of the Polish army, were deployed as part of the US-led “coalition of the willing” in a “stabilization” mission, and then also the NATO Training Mission, in Iraq. These dwarf NATO and EU commitments. A 2,500-strong Polish contingent commanded the initially 25-nation Multinational Division Central-South (MND CS), responsible for 5 Iraqi provinces, one-quarter the size of Poland and a population of 5 million.

There is a broad agreement in the policy and analytic communities that the Iraq mission has been a critical catalyst for the transformation of the armed forces (Gagor, 2008; Interview with former senior MoD official, 2009; Osica, 2009). In the words of the Chief of General Staff General Gagor “not since the end of the Second World War have our armed forces had so many soldiers with combat experience” (2009). The formal subordination of the 1,400 strong Spanish contingent to the Polish command in Iraq

---

22 The participation of Poland in the actual invasion of Iraq was minuscule. It provided 180 special forces operators as compared to 2,000 British troops and the 47,000 US troops which made up the bulk of the invading force (Balcerowicz, 2009).
boosted the confidence of Poles. The command experience, and the "reality check" it has provided to the Polish military, has legitimised changes in the Polish defence doctrine. As Freedman writes: "Countries like Germany and Spain are going through a useful military reform process, but their national doctrines remain limited compared to those of Britain and France, because they have less experience of commanding larger units of troops" (Freedman, 2004). Iraq has helped augment the Poles' deficit of major international command experience without which NATO and EU-induced reform would not have possibly borne fruit.

Leaving aside strained political relations, the European countries gained an appreciation for the abilities of the Polish military. Whenever the topic of a future EU military avant-garde would come up in a political or analytical discourse Poland would since then be one of those core countries mentioned (Konarzewska, 2008). Poland also gained a lot of self-assurance. An evidence of this was premier Kaczyński's short-lived proposal to set up a European army put forward on a visit to Berlin in November 2006. Kaczyński's stipulation that this "Euro-army" be put under NATO command, however, made the proposal unacceptable to other EU member states.

Apart from boosting Poland's status and confidence, the Iraqi mission led to new insights and innovations. It revealed that the tactics of the Polish military are closer to the British tactics than the American. These include: a capacity-borne reliance on ground forces, less effort put into force protection, more fraternisation with locals and a greater reluctance to unleash fire-power out of concern for collateral damage (Everts and Keohane, 2004:11). Everts and Keohane argue that these experiences on the ground may foster doctrinal convergence among the big EU member states (Ibid.).
New military institutions have been established inspired by the Iraqi experiences. Cells within the Training Directorate – P7, and the Materiel Planning Directorate - P8 of the General Staff have been created to collect and disseminate lessons-learned from military missions. A new Joint Operations Command was established at the General Staff in 2003, effectively since 2005, to oversee expeditionary deployments involving more than one branch of the armed forces. In addition to the Iraqi experience, the decision to set it up had been influenced by the practical need for coordination after the terrorist strike on the US in 2001 and through an emulation of US developments. The Pentagon had long been a proponent of jointness – an integration of naval, air, and land power. From the US, it has found its way into the doctrine and organizational changes in the EU members as well (Dyson, 2008; Simon, 2004).

In 2007 the MoD also established the Special Forces Command in order to strengthen the specialization of the Polish armed forces in special ops, which proved their worth in Afghanistan and Iraq. In a mixed case of lessons learning and mimicry Poland thus followed in the footsteps of France, which founded Commandment des Operations Speciales in 1991, Germany, which established Kommando Führung Operationen von Spezialkräften in 2005, and the UK - the Directorate of Special Forces, set up in 1987 at the same time as the US Special Operations Command came into being (King, 2005). As it touches on various vested interests in the defence establishment, strengthening the position of the special forces in the Polish military has not been an easy process.23

23 This discussion does not concern the creation of the special forces. Poland created its vanguard special operations unit “Grom” on its own initiative in the early 1990s. Since that time, “Grom” operators developed extensive cooperation with the US in training, materiel support, and operational activities (for example providing personnel protection for US officials during the intervention in Haiti). The imprint of the US has long been very strong in this area (Rybak, 2005).
Another lesson the military picked up from Iraq is the importance of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) (Domisiewicz, 2005). While a novelty for the Polish military, it has been a key ingredient of a European – especially the EU’s as well as NATO’s - approach to crisis response. The Poles also learned that the success of operations depended on the provision of humanitarian and development aid, security sector reform (SSR) and new methods of warfare, such as psychological operations (PSYOPS), all of which require civilian back-up (Konarzewska, 2008). In other words, they learned that modern crisis management, particularly the comprehensive approach adopted by the EU and now NATO, entails not only the involvement of the MoD, but other government ministries and state agencies. It is the responsibility of the state as a whole. This lesson has been incorporated into the military doctrine in the Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland and the Strategy of the Participation of the Republic of Poland in International Operations, both adopted in 2009. However, due to capacity constraints, mainly sluggish bureaucracy, it has yet to be turned into deep legislative and organizational changes.

The reformist jolt Poland experienced during and following from its engagement in Iraq may appear to invalidate the Europeanization thesis. I would caution against such a logical jump for at least two reasons. First, it is commonplace knowledge that for any military a combat experience serves as a key test for doctrine, organizational structures and equipment. It is no surprise that the Iraqi experience would either legitimize or discredit one method of warfare and military organization over another. The urgencies of operational engagement required immediate “patching up” in areas in which the Polish

---

24 PSYOPS is an area, to which the Polish armed forces turned their attention relatively recently. In 2001, the General Staff founded the Central Group of Psychological Actions (CGDP). It was inspired mainly by learning from US and British counterparts. Its personnel served in Iraq, cooperating with British PSYOPS specialists, and Afghanistan (Rybak, 2005).
military had been deficient. Second, the reforms instituted in Poland – emphasizing deployability, jointness, special forces and CIMIC – had been advocated by the US and NATO long before the Iraq operation. These innovations had also been implemented by the European militaries, which the Poles, if they so willed, could have picked up prior to the deployment.

The Iraqi experience, most importantly, strengthened the hand of the reformist “advocacy coalition” within the military and the security policy apparatus. Many officers and civilian experts had long advocated internally or in public debates changes that the Polish military required to catch up with the US (insofar as it could or should) and the European militaries to perform effectively in the context of a new threat matrix. Iraq produced a new crop of battlefield-tested officers, many promoted to the rank of general - two would later become Commanders of the Land Forces. These senior officers became convinced, for instance, that if Poland were to participate in high-intensity kinetic operations in future it would have to rely on professional troops. The conscription thus had to go (Górska and Zadworny, 2009). The advance of the new military brass, officers who had served in Iraq, moved the military institutions out of lethargy onto the reform trajectory. Without this jolt the decision-makers would neither have treated those changes as a priority nor invested resources into them.

Europeanization should not be underestimated also because the Polish participation in the EUFOR mission in Chad in 2008-9 brought another considerable inducement to innovations. While Iraq proved a useful training ground for the Polish armed forces, the mission and the diplomatic negotiations preceding it – especially “the Letter of the Eight” - strained political relations in Europe. Poland thus endeavoured to
bridge the divide. The French push for expeditionary activity in Africa provided such an opportunity. The Polish participation in these missions, wrapped in the EU flag, has helped to affirm Poland’s credentials in the EU and raise its standing in the CSDP alongside France, the key policy driver. The Polish officials’ rationalizations for Poland’s role in these operations reveals a mix of the logic of appropriateness ("it is the right thing to do") and the logic of consequences ("it pays off"). Polish defence minister Bogdan Klich drummed up the logic of appropriateness declaring that “we are drawn to Africa neither by sentiments, nor strategic interests. Our participation comes out of concern for the success of the EU (cited by Kawalowski, 2009:228). At the same time, the EU missions in Africa have been viewed as an investment in Poland’s ability to realize its strategic interest of pulling Eastern Europe to the EU. Klich’s deputy Komorowski shed light on this calculation, saying that Polish decision to participate in the EUFOR Chad/RCA “is a proof of solidarity with other member states that have serious interests in Africa. Taking this decision gives us a moral right to advocate a greater engagement of the European Union in the promotion of security, stability and the rule of law in countries east of our border, which is where our interests lie” (cited by Konarzewska, 2008). Alyson Bailes has argued that some of the new EU member states “may be willing to take risks abroad to be seen as good EU citizens (and/or earn favours from more interventionist powers)” (2009). Such a disposition lies behind Poland’s decision to participate in the EU operations in Africa.

Already in 2006, Poland deployed its troops in the EUFOR DR Congo mission. However the real test case of Poland’s commitment to CSDP came in the EUFOR Chad/RCA in 2008-9. The deployment of the second largest contingent, next to France,
in that operation brought valuable experiences for the Polish military. It learned to work in an environment extremely demanding logistically and climatically, in which it has never before operated (Kawałowski, 2009). Senior Polish officers, many of them veterans of the EUFOR Congo, assumed important command posts in EUFOR Chad/RCA, including deputy commander of the operation. This general would go on to lead the Polish Military Police, which has been moving closer to the French-led EGF project.

Poles honed their skills in European cooperation through such joint formations as the Multinational Army Aviation Battalion created specifically for the mission (Walczak, 2008).

Both EUFOR missions strengthened political relations with France. Poland’s “policy loyalty” - this time around to France - is thought to have won French support for the Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership initiative in a discrete trade-off for the Polish support for the French Mediterranean Union project (Bendiek, 2008). It is also reported that the Franco-Polish rapprochement was also reflected in the negotiations on the Reform Treaty. At the time France together with other EU member states agreed to the Ioannina compromise, which was the sine qua non for Poland’s consent to the Treaty (Sienkiewicz, 2008). The Franco-Polish “comradeship-in-arms,” finally, paved way for their joint declaration on security and defence in November 2009, which I will describe in detail later.

Although an advisor to Polish defence minister justified the Chad mission in terms of it being “an investment in the EU capabilities, its international credibility, cohesion and an ability to make a difference in external relations,” such logic of appropriateness failed to sway public opinion and parts of the elite (Kuźniar, 2009;
Former National Security Bureau staffer interview, 2009). Criticized for an indiscriminate engagement in foreign missions, the government felt compelled to justify it. Towards this end, it drafted the *Strategy of the Participation of the Republic of Poland in International Operations*, approved on 13 January 2009, by the Council of Ministers. For the first time the Polish government specified the priorities, the level of ambition and the conditions under which missions were to be conducted. The document stipulates that NATO and EU missions come first in the Polish hierarchy of priorities, followed by the UN, OSCE and - it is worth noting - “coalitions of the willing” last. The participation in NATO and EU operations would allow Poland to have an influence on the decision-making process of these organizations, enhancing its “prestige” and an international position. Although the strategy does not dismiss engaging in ad hoc “coalitions of the willing,” the last position of such a scenario indicates a newfound predilection for cooperation within the main institutions of the Euro-Atlantic security network. When implemented, it would herald a departure from the hitherto close alignment with the US in foreign operations.

The strategy spells out that there should be 3,200-3,800 troops deployed in missions at any one time - down from over 5,000 at the height of Iraqi engagement (Gołowski, 2009). Poland’s participation should fulfill three conditions: efficacy (conformity with the “national interest”), freedom of action (the Polish contingent should have the greatest possible influence on the conduct of the mission) and an economy of force (an optimal use of means in relation to objectives) (MON, *Strategia 2009*). Poland also aims to ensure a large share of its troops in relation to the total contribution and their geographical concentration, as to meet the criterion of “visibility.” Having had its forces
spread thin in the EUFOR DR Congo and likewise early on in Afghanistan, Poland would prioritise “waving its flag” (visibility). In practice, it has concentrated its troops in EUFOR Chad and in 2008 chose to assume control for the province of Ghazni in Afghanistan as opposed to, for instance, reinforcing another NATO ally in control of an Afghan province (Kawałowski, 2009). This last ambition does not square with a government promise of greater restraint in expenditures on missions at a time of an economic crisis\textsuperscript{25}.

Poland has done well in developing expeditionary forces, though as with anything there is room for improvement. With 4,450 troops deployed abroad in 2008 it ranked sixth in the EU in terms of the average number of troops deployed behind the UK (18,557), France (12,008), Italy (8,562), Germany (7,725) and Spain (5,177). ISAF and EUFOR Chad accounted for 23.6% increase in Polish deployments since 2007. Considering that Poland has the sixth largest EU military, behind France, Germany, UK, Italy and Spain, its deployability count does not deviate from the average. However, as a share of the total military personnel, with 19% deployable land forces (a 2% increase from 2007) Poland occupies middle position behind such countries as the Netherlands (41%), UK (40%), Czech Republic (35%), Italy (32%), Spain (32%), Luxembourg (28%), Slovenia (28%), Sweden (26%), and Estonia (21%)\textsuperscript{26}. The EU average is 26% (EDA 2009).

\textsuperscript{25} The lion’s share of the costs for Poland’s mission in Iraq was underwritten by the US, while France provided Poland with extensive logistical support in EUFOR Chad (Jacoby, 2005; Kawałowski, 2009).

\textsuperscript{26} Due to the size of some of the militaries (ex. Estonia), the number of troops actually deployed by some of the countries ahead of Poland in this ranking may be very small indeed. The data might thus give a misleading impression (Kawałowska, 2009).
II.9. The transition to an all-volunteer force

Analysts note a European trend away from the mass army model towards the all-volunteer forces (AVF). This model dates back to the 23 August 1793 decision by revolutionary France to call up the *levée en masse* (Haltiner, 1998; Hoegger, 2008; Jehn and Selden, 2001). Britain has had a volunteer force since 1963. In 1992 Belgium became the first European country to drop conscription after the Cold War, followed by the Netherlands (1996), France (2001), Spain (2002), Portugal (2004) and Italy (2005). Sweden plans to follow suit in 2010. Among the new EU members from East-Central Europe Slovenia paved way in 2003, followed by Czech Republic and Hungary in 2004, Romania and Slovakia in 2006, and one year later Bulgaria and Latvia. In the late 2000s Lithuania also started going professional (Górka-Winter and Madej, 2010). Only a few of the EU-15 maintain the draft – Austria, Denmark, Germany and Finland. This issue has, however, been subject of intense debate recently in some of these countries, particularly in Germany and Denmark raising expectations of changes in the near future (Kalata, 2009).

There are a variety of explanations behind the move to the AVF: changes in the threat environment, the diffusion of advanced technology, new dynamics in society-military relations, the negative correlation between socioeconomic advancement and compulsion, domestic politics, membership in a defence alliance and participation in military missions. Haltiner who examined the switch to the AVF in the 1990s concluded that: “the combination of being a member of a defence alliance and being far from a direct national military threat and participating frequently in international missions facilitates the abolition of conscription and the change of army format into a force with
no or a low degree of compulsory military personnel" (1998:33). His conclusion is supported by Jehn and Selden who found that the main reasons to end the draft cited in France, Spain, Portugal and Italy were the adverse effects of conscription on military effectiveness (2001:16). Analysts have also noted that a debate on conscription in one country spills over into neighbours engendering emulation (Haltiner, 1998). The Czech programme of defence reforms, unveiled in 2001, which included the plan to end conscription by 2007, is said to have raised expectations of change in Poland (Zaborowski and Longhurst, 2003).

There is no NATO policy on the draft. While the Alliance has not insisted upon AVF, it has exacted pressure on its member states to build technologically-advanced, highly capable expeditionary military forces (Jacoby, 2004). Because of their shorter term of service, conscripts are unable to master the technologies that drive today’s complex military operations. For this reason alone, they are considered less capable than professional troops. That is why the AVF model has gained favour in NATO quarters, and a pronounced shift in this direction has picked up pace in the last decade.

The development of the CSDP has complemented NATO’s own expeditionary, multinational trend, thus indirectly influencing the shift to AVF. The degree of the EU’s impact in this area, however, is debated. Analyzing the “1996 revolution” in French military policy, which included the decision to end conscription, Irondelle has attributed it to the causal (ideational) power of European integration and the expectations of a common European defence policy (2003). Others examining the French case point to lessons learning. During the Gulf War the French authorities found not only that they could deploy just 15,000 troops out of an active duty force of 250,000, but as well they
had to move 5,000 professional soldiers from other units in order to create a makeshift division capable of deployment (Jehn and Selden, 2001). King too argues that the shock this poor performance caused the French authorities spurred them into military reforms, including professionalization (Bratton, 2002; King, 2005). The references of Polish decision-makers to this French example indicate that the Poles also took this particular French lesson into account (Onyszkievicz, 1999).

Poland’s decision to move toward AVF has certainly been made possible by NATO’s guarantees, but, taking place when it did, the shift was triggered by lessons learning from Iraq. The high tempo of operational deployments, also in the service of CSDP, which has fostered the expeditionary paradigm, combined with national military modernization programme reinforced a move away from conscription. Although ultimately it came to a political decision, Polish military’s experiences and the tasks it faced convinced even conservative sceptics among the political elite that professionalization was a sound policy choice. By promoting multinational cooperation, expeditionary deployments and the generation of power-projection capabilities the EU therefore reinforced the conditions that may not have made the switch to AVF inevitable, but at least provided a major rationale for it.

The goal of professionalizing the military has featured in national modernization programs. The *Program for the technical restructuring and modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces 2001-2006* envisaged downsizing the army from 220,000 to 150,000, of whom 50% were to be professional by 2006, as well as reducing conscription from 12 to 9 months by 2004 (Millen, 2002). When the Polish Parliament passed a law in May 2001 to guarantee stable financing for the program, the MoD justified the professionalization
by references to NATO “standards” and the aim of ensuring that 1/3 of the Polish armed forces would be interoperable with NATO (Law of 25 May 2001). Since NATO has had no uniform policy on conscription, critics questioned the resort to “NATO standards.” In the same year, the Polish chief of general staff affirmed that the driver for the professionalization process were the NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and the Target Force Goals, one of which was the aforementioned proportion of professional personnel (Piątas, 2001). Like the European Headline Goals the DCI emphasized interoperability, mobility, deployment, effective engagement as well as sustainability. Because meeting these goals demands well-trained, duty-bound soldiers at a high readiness to deploy conscripts do not meet these criteria (NATO, 1999; Haltiner, 1998). Then NATO SG Robertson drummed up this point in interviews published in Polish military press in 2002, saying “I don’t see any future for conscript armies” and that the conscript armies are “anachronistic products of the Cold War” (Otwinowski, 2008). Bailes confirms that NATO planners had been hard at work to wean Alliance members off conscription (2009).

The dispatch within three months of a 2,500-strong contingent to Iraq revealed weaknesses of a conscript army. Though the defence ministry called the deployment exemplary, analysts described it as a “successful improvisation” (Szmajdziński, 2003; Wagrowska, 2003). A crucial lesson from the campaign recognized by Polish military commanders and politicians alike was the need to professionalize the armed forces (Klich, 2008; Szmajdziński, 2003). Drawing on the Iraqi experience, the left-wing government at a time expressed this aim in its new Program for the development of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland in 2003-2008. It called for a 60% professional
staffing of the military by 2008 and the creation of well-trained high-readiness professional brigades deployable for allied operations and sustainable for six months (Szmajdziński, 2003). The new corps of soldiers – professional privates, staffed by those who went through compulsory period of training and then signed up for longer service, was created27. Between 2000 and 2007 the level of professionalization increased from 47.6% (officers, NCOs) to 64% of armed forces personnel. However, the percentage differed between the branches: from 100% in the Special Forces, which is unsurprising to the “lowest” level, unspecified by the MoD, in the Land Forces (MoD, 2008). Poland was therefore emulating the experience of Germany, which has few highly trained units, composed of a lot of professionals, while conscripts play less demanding roles in the majority of others (Miller, 2001). The first Polish units to be substantially professionalized were those mobile and deployable forces earmarked for NATO, EU and “coalition of the willing” operations.

The decision to go 100% professional became mired in politics. An accelerated transition to AVF was one of the recommendations put forth in the Strategic Defence Review, initiated in 2004 by a left-wing government, but completed in 2006 under its right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) successor. Due to either partisanship or a perceived radical nature of its recommendations or both, the report was shelved by PiS. Nonetheless, according to MoD officials it influenced defence reforms, including the switch to AVF which enjoyed strong support from then reformist defence minister Radoslaw Sikorski (Goławski, 2007; 2009; Sikorski, 2007). While the PiS government announced plans to phase out draft by 2012, the opposition centrist Civic Platform (PO)

27 The contract service itself was introduced on a small-scale in the mid-1990s to create a pool of soldiers who signed up for 1-4 years after basic training (Herspring, 2000).
promised to speed up the transition (Krakiewicz, 2008; Stasiak, 2008). Though conscription was not a major campaign issue in the 2007 election it appealed to young voters, 92% of whom supported ending the draft. The young overwhelmingly voted for PO, which won the biggest share of the vote and assumed power (Ćwieluch and Henzler, 2008; Pankowski, 2009; Kulish, 2008). A similar situation took place in 1997 in the Spanish elections when the Partido Popular won after seizing on conscription as a last-minute campaign promise (Jehn and Selden, 2001). The PO minister of defence incorporated AVF as one of the central elements of the new Program of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland 2007-2012 and detailed the plans in the Program of the Professionalization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland in 2008-2010, adopted by the Polish government in August 2008.

The Polish military is slated to become an all-volunteer force by 1 January 2010. As in some EU states, conscription would not be phased out completely, but suspended. Notwithstanding this question of semantics, the Polish chief of general staff hailed the move as a "revolutionary and epochal change" in the armed forces (Gągor, 2009). NATO’s guarantees of Poland’s territorial integrity have relaxed elite attitudes about conscription, while the allied shift to an expeditionary crisis management paradigm, paralleled by EU commitments as well as experiential learning, particularly in Iraq, accelerated the movement to AVF. The learning from the experiences of the allies has also played part in this policy shift. The minister of defence, for example, cited British studies indicating that volunteers are 3-4 times more effective than conscripts. Noting that the majority of NATO member states opted for an AVF he affirmed that full professionalization is the only chance to catch up with allies (Klich, 2008; MoD, 2008).
In view of on-going modernization of the Polish military, the increasing degree of complexity of the arms systems, diffused by the Revolution in Military Affairs, have also played a role in Poland’s as well as other European countries’ decisions to end conscription (Miller, 2001). Draftees cannot be expected to man sophisticated weaponry. The Polish minister of defence noted that “as a country still catching up economically [with the rest of the EU] Poland may not afford to waste money on nine-month-long conscript training” (Przeciszewski, 2008).

Critics have charged that the Polish government is ignorant of the time it takes to move to AVF and the cost of it. Especially since the switch has also involved cutting down the forces to 120,000, increasing the proportion of deployable units in relation to support elements, reforming the system of military education, and creating a new reserve force. It took more affluent France and Spain half a decade to make the jump to AVF. With the MoD hard-pressed during an economic crisis and bogged down in Afghanistan, experts worry that the switch to AVF may come at the expense of force modernization (Koziej, 2008). The minister of defence has rebutted these charges noting that Poland has taken into account the experiences of NATO members in transitioning to AVF (Klich, 2008). Poland is also said to be looking at the experiences of allies in building up a new system of mobilization and reserve forces (Beauchamp, 2008).

The transition to AVF is a proof of a “paradigm change” in Polish defence policy. This “revolutionary” decision brought closure to ninety years of military service tradition which had been an ingrained part of the national narrative of devotion and sacrifice for the nation-state (Kulish, 2008). The opposition right-wing PiS and the President criticized the ruling PO for setting the army threshold of “up to” 120,000, as opposed to 150,000
they prefer. Yet, even President Kaczynski, an ardent proponent of strong national
defence and a champion of patriotic education campaign, ran by his National Security
Bureau, came around. This highlights two developments.

First, Polish defence policy autarchy is being supplanted by a model of
multinational cooperation. Even though Polish concerns vis-à-vis Russia have not abated,
the decision-makers have realized that the country’s security derives not from a large
standing army, but from strengthening NATO and the EU that have bound it closely to
the rest of Europe, and brought strong allied relations, particularly with the US and
Germany (Kulish, 2008). Compared with Greece and Finland which, in light of threat
assessment or past historical experience, have kept mass conscript armies this is an
unprecedented change.

Second, the social contract that underpinned the commitment of Polish citizens to
the defence of the state may be eroding, as is the case in Western Europe, and politicians
have finally become aware of this. Valuing individualism and consumption Polish society
resembles more and more Western Europe. The military brass has felt the impact of what
might be called societal Europeanization as the pool of draftees kept shrinking in recent
years. When asked whether the end of conscription has weakened Poland’s security the
majority of those polled disagreed (Pankowski, 2009). These societal changes will in the
future make it difficult for nationalist politicians to drum up support for renationalizing
defence policy.
II.10. The Chobielin Initiative – The New St.Malo

In the last ten years Polish defence policy underwent a significant change. From an “America’s protégé” and a “critical observer” of the CSDP – until its accession to the EU, Poland has evolved into a “constructive European” and a “prudent participant” in the CSDP (Longhurst and Zaborowski, 2007; Zaborowski, 2007). In 2009, in anticipation of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and its 2011 EU Presidency Poland launched an initiative that illustrates a sea-change in its attitude to the CSDP. At the Munich Security Conference that year, the Polish prime minister Donald Tusk noted that his security policy “agenda includes almost identical tenets” to those expressed by German Chancellor and that his country as well as Germany and France speak “with one voice” (2009). Even if it had been motivated by Tusk’s desire to distinguish his government from its eurosceptical predecessor, the Law and Justice Party, such a declaration of a convergent security policy coming from a Polish prime minister was unprecedented.

Two weeks later, in July 2009, at an informal meeting at his country estate in Chobielin, Polish foreign minister Sikorski handed his French counterpart Kouchner a non-paper listing dozens of proposals to strengthen CSDP (Wojciechowski, 2009). It contained progressive ideas regarding CSDP, namely appointing a deputy to the High Representative for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy, who would be responsible for CSDP; the creation of an integrated civil and military EU headquarters; setting up ‘European stabilisation forces’ (civil-military forces that would be made up of elements of armed forces, national police and border guards); temporary exchanges of units in EU operations; more common exercises; and launching new European defence-industrial projects (Liberti, 2011).
Negotiations followed on a text of a declaration on the CSDP that was adopted at the Franco-Polish summit on security and defence on November 4th in Paris. Sticking to Atlanticist Europeanism, the Polish MFA and MoD amended the original French draft, by inserting more references to NATO (MoD interview, 2009). Poland also pushed for a reference to the EU mission in Georgia by way of stressing that the CSDP should not be focused only on Africa, but also Eastern Europe. It likewise stuck a reference to “increasing financial solidarity” among EU MS, a codeword for more Community funding for military operations, Poland’s idée fixe28. In their bilateral declaration, France and Poland declared support for “strengthening the EU capability to plan and conduct civilian and military operations” (UKIE Deklaracja, 2009). This support for the EU’s command structure, albeit ambiguously-worded, marks a volte-face in the Polish position on this issue. Until then, Poland had been reluctant to consider an autonomous EU planning capability unless it was tied integrally to NATO (Longhurst and Zaborowski, 2007). The Declaration concludes with France and Poland expressing willingness to be in an “avant-garde shaping new ideas and solutions for the good of Europe” (UKIE Deklaracja, 2009).

The Franco-Polish initiative (known in Poland as the Chobielin Initiative) shows a new, increased salience of CSDP agenda in Polish security policy. A reframing of the security policy agenda is a marker of the progress in Poland’s Europeanization, as well as

---

28 The current Athena instrument is unsatisfactory from Poland’s point of view because it does not cover inter alia the cost of transport, which takes up a large share of the mission costs (Polish EU mission interview, 2009). The French presidency took up the cause, proposing to obligate all the member states to contribute (around 10% of common expenses are financed by all the states, with the remainder borne by the states taking part in the operation). It ran into strong opposition, not least from Germany, unwilling to contribute further to CSDP. The resultant changes to the Athena mechanisms turned out to be cosmetic. While the scope of expenses financed jointly was broadened, it amounted to sanctioning the existing practice (Gros-Verheyde, 2009).
“the best example” of the change in attitude towards CSDP of Central and Eastern European states (Liberti, 2011). The foreign minister and his deputy called it intentionally “the second St.-Malo” (Bielecki, 2009). These references reveal Poland’s ambition to position itself as France’s new partner in invigorating CSDP at a time when eurosceptical conservatives were expected to win the upcoming British elections (Pawlicki, 2009). France expressed willingness to reciprocate Poland’s shift. President Sarkozy said: “An involvement of Poland in the European defence policy, hand in hand with France, is a brilliant affair” (cited by Bielecki, 2009). Though the repercussions of the economic crisis could actually scuttle Poland’s ambitions, Warsaw remains determined to make strengthening of CSDP one of the priorities of its 2011 EU Presidency. This desire to pass a test of Poland’s leadership and its agenda-setting role may actually be considered another factor behind the initiative.

The Franco-Polish initiative would never see the light of day if it were not for three factors that have facilitated the Europeanization of Polish defence policy: the re-integration of France with NATO, the new US administration’s policy shifts, and the Polish experience in EU crisis management missions. Since the French decision in 2008 to return to NATO’s integrated military command “the theological debate on this issue, CSDP versus NATO, is over” (cited by Kordošová, 2008). The French re-integration has been premised on the Europeanization of the Alliance. In the words of the French European Affairs Minister, Jean-Pierre Jouyet at the time of the 2008 French EU presidency, “Strengthening European defence is part of a renewed political vision, based on the complementarities of European and NATO defence. This principle of complementarity is shared by the Europeans and our US partners, who recognise the need
to improve EU-NATO relations" (www.ue2008.fr). The French policy shift has put to rest concerns by Polish elites about a subordination of CSDP to the Gaullist agenda. The Declaration, abounding in references to both the EU and NATO, shows France’s new pragmatic approach.

The threat of the de-coupling of the transatlantic security community has abated, so have Polish anxieties about NATO-EU relations. It is no coincidence that the Chobielin initiative followed in the heels of another pragmatic shift – of the US administration. Since 2008, Victoria Nuland, the US ambassador to NATO, has signalled the US administration’s desire to see the EU play a major role in defence (Liberti, 2011). The green light from Washington has helped Poland warm up to CSDP.

At the same time the change in the US administration, from George W. Bush, who cultivated US-Polish relations, to Barrack Obama, who is not an instinctive Atlanticist, raised Warsaw’s concerns about US-Polish relations. Poland, which had always overestimated its own “strategic importance” to Washington, feared the bilateral relationship might drop beneath America’s radar. When US vice-president Joe Biden first spoke at the February 2009 Munich Security Conference about a “reset” in US-Russia relations, and then in March, Secretary Clinton handed her Russian counterpart a symbolic reset button, Poland was not impressed (Reuters, Mach 2009). Old fears were rekindled when Russia taught Georgia - trying to exit the Russian orbit of influence - a lesson, and met little opposition in the act either from NATO or the US, rekindled old fears. Then, the Obama administration decided to pull out of the Bush-era missile defence deal, communicating this decision to Poland on September 17th, the anniversary of the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland. Polish commentators seized on this diplomatic gaffe to
invoke Poland's history and its perennial insecurity, calling the US *volte-face* "a betrayal" or "an appeasement" (Madej, 2009). Poland pinned hopes for upgrading its security through the privileged relationship with the US. Towards this end, in August 2008, it signed a politically binding *Declaration on Polish-American Strategic Cooperation* with the outgoing Bush administration. With Obama's pull-out, the credibility of this *Declaration* hung in a balance.

Poland's daily *Dziennik Gazeta Prawna* wrote that "the agreements reached in the Elysée Palace are supposed to be a kind of an insurance policy in the case of a deepening crisis in Polish-American military cooperation" (Bielecki, 2009). Although Polish defence ministry officials denied a connection between this deal and Obama's MD decision, analysts could not believe the timing of Poland's overture to France, less than two months after September 17th, was anything but coincidental (Schwarzgruber and Pielach, 2010). Analysts wondered whether Poland's search for alternatives would mark the end of the "U.S.-Polish security romance" (Madej, 2009). Warsaw, it seems, was playing the old game of hedging bets and diversifying its security investments portfolio in the Euro-Atlantic security network. If so, the 'New St.-Malo' would appear to be an opportunistic rather than a strategic shift in Polish security policy.

The Polish experience in EU crisis management demonstrated to the French, as much to the Poles themselves, that Poland is capable of conducting demanding operations (as in Tchad), willing to contribute to CSDP and, therefore, it is a credible partner for defence cooperation. Poland has not ceased to treat NATO as the central node of

---

29 In the fall of 2009 France engaged in discussions on the sale of its Mistral amphibious assault ship to Russia. The deal provoked protests in the Baltic states and prompted Republican efforts in the US Congress to press the Obama administration to urge France not to sell major offensive weapons systems to Russia (Rogin, 2009). Given Poland's serious concerns, it remains to be seen whether the Polish-French new "security romance" will not turn out to be short-lived.
European security governance, but it has learned to approach CSDP as a valued complement and in recent years an increasingly valuable partner in the management of security. The speedy deployment of an over-staffed CSDP observer mission to Georgia, under the French Presidency’s watch, showed Poland that the EU is able to tread in the murky waters of the post-Soviet space where NATO would not be welcome. These developments have come at a time when the Lisbon Treaty’s innovations, in particular the mutual defence clause and the solidarity clause promise to deepen solidarity between the EU member states in defence policy (Falkner, 2008).

II.10. Conclusion

In 1999-2009, changes in the organization, goals and institutional fora of activities of the Polish military have taken place alongside ideational shifts. The armed forces have moved from: (1) “a Territorial Defence Type” to a “Power Projection type;” and (2) a conscript army to an all-volunteer force (Latawski, 2002). In the realm of ideas, an exclusively NATO-centric perspective has given way to recognition that both NATO and the EU are essential for providing security. Recalling Hall’s tripartite classification of paradigm shifts, a third-order change has occurred (1993). A significant downsizing of the military could be regarded as a first-order change. The mimicry of the US approaches - fostered particularly by way of NATO and bilateral ties - such as jointness, force modernization, post-9/11 emphasis on the special forces, or CIMIC are second-order changes. The end of conscription, however, brought about by horizontal Europeanization and lessons learning from EU, NATO and “coalition of the willing” missions, exemplifies a third-order change. Europeanization, though not exclusively EU-ization,
has made substantial inroads in this sub-policy (Miskimmon and Paterson, 2003). On Radaelli’s measurement scale, the reform of the Polish armed forces may be classified as *transformation* (2000).

Following Epstein, for whom “Western institutions, including NATO, had defined over decades what it meant to be “European” (2008:167) I argue that both NATO and the EU have fostered Europeanization. On the one hand, judged by the intersection of the so-called European strategic culture or the “EU conception of armed forces” (Kojvula, 2009) with NATO’s own transformative initiatives, it appears that NATO has become much more of a European alliance than it used to be. On the other hand, Poland’s own Atlanticism has evolved. Although Poland’s security policy remains “Atlanticist in essence,” its *réflexe atlantique*, at its highest point during the Iraq war, has been supplemented by *réflexe européen*.

I have pointed out that both the EU and NATO have since the 1990s pursued a comprehensive approach to crisis management. The EU has not had an exclusive monopoly on catalyzing the development of specialized – and softer - capabilities, such as the constabulary forces. NATO’s promotion of multinational gendarmeries in fact spilled-over to the EU capitals influencing the European Gendarmerie Force initiative. The idea, brought up by some scholars, that the EU has developed a distinct (from NATO) strategic culture has also been overstated (Cornish and Edwards, 2001; Howorth, 2007; Meyer, 2004; 2005). The 2003 *European Security Strategy* called for “a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention” (EU Council, Dec. 2003). At the end of the day, the EU has built a defence capability that is neither rapid nor robust. Today’s CSDP “quite confusingly emphasizes robustness but... does
not enable enforcement” (Kojvula, 2009). By this definition, though, NATO has embraced such a strategic culture fully. It has built up an arsenal of instruments to facilitate a robust military enforcement. Leaving aside the actual practice, NATO and EU strategic cultures thus do not appear antithetical (Council, 2003; Heugen, 2005).

EU-NATO rapprochement has been exemplified by the re-integration of France into NATO. Delivering on his promise that “the more France takes its place in NATO, the more European NATO becomes,” the pro-US French President Sarkozy has put to rest the tendency to dichotomize the EU versus NATO (cited by Moga, 2010). The appointment in July 2009 of French general Stéphane Abrial as Supreme Allied Commander Transformation means that France has assumed the leadership of NATO’s key transformational vehicle, established as part of the PCC in 2003, to induce change in the member state militaries. Although the alignment of French CSDP and NATO policies will not end the “turf battles” between the EU and the Alliance, it promises to strengthen the complementarity of efforts by the EU and NATO in military reforms.

Poland’s evolving Atlanticism has also facilitated Europeanization. The “1989 revolution” marked a rupture with the Moscow-framed defence policy. Soon after, a drastic reduction of defence funding, a preoccupation with economic reforms and political squabbles over building the basic blocs of a civilian-democratic control of the military inhibited armed forces reform. NATO accession moved defence reform out of stasis. By the time Poland entered the EU it had undergone ten years of NATO socialization. NATO had locked Polish defence policy in path dependence. While some politicians in the right-wing AWS government (1997-2001), particularly then deputy

---

30 Poland hosts the Joint Force Training Centre, a NATO HQ subordinated to the ACT on its territory. It promotes interoperability through the conduct of joint tactical training, particularly in support of the NRF.
defence minister Romuald Szeremietiew, favoured setting up territorial defence, NATO’s precepts reinforced by direct pressure of the US, holding up the supposed “NATO standards,” undermined these efforts. The identity imperative to anchor Poland in a transatlantic security community, abetted by post-9/11 réflexe atlantique, incentivized isomorphism. Poland thus concentrated on second-order changes emphasizing jointness, multinational cooperation and increasing deployability.

When the EU launched CSDP, Poland’s Atlanticist elites feared the worst: the potential, repeatedly underscored by Washington, for decoupling the transatlantic defence community and a risk that Poland would be sidelined in the decision-making. Warsaw was concerned that it would be forced to invest in new structures and capabilities while it had yet to catch up with the EU-15 economically (Borneman and Fowler, 1997). The uncertainty of building a new and hence untried European defence organization seemed to render Poland’s hard-won NATO-based insurance policy vulnerable. As a newly-groomed NATO member state, since the early 1990s socialized in the NATO mode of cooperation and, at the time an ‘outsider’ in relation to the EU, Poland until 2003-2004 Poland thus acted like a neophyte. Its réflexe atlantique, a sense of indebtedness to the United States for extending the Article V insurance policy to Poland, enhanced its receptiveness to NATO norms and influenced its critical attitude towards CSDP. At the same time mimetic processes of modeling Polish armed forces upon successful NATO member states’ militaries continued (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Lodge, 2000). However, while resource constraints did not inhibit military procurement, a few years after Poland’s entry to NATO, a lack of funding for military reorganization proper and an absence of incentives slowed down reforms. As NATO accession conditionality, never
very “hard” in the first place, waned it proved unable to sustain reforms. By the time of the intervention in Iraq, an organizational dualism set in. The military invested in showpiece professional, well-trained and well-equipped units designed for expeditionary deployments at the cost of letting the unreformed conscript army atrophy.

The intervention in Iraq turned out to be a “critical juncture” for the reform of the armed forces and reframing defence policy. The experience garnered by thousands of Polish officers in Iraq generated a momentum for deep reforms affecting the core content of defence policy. A new batch of officers, who had served in Iraq, gained a voice within the conservative General Staff. They pushed through an agenda for professionalization and adaptation of the armed forces to external crisis management, long preached by NATO and the EU. This process illustrates an instrumentally rational desire to improve policy solutions (Börzel and Risse, 2009). Pressed to make a choice between the US and the European allies, the elites also drew hard political lessons from the bifurcation of the transatlantic community. They set out to prevent such a rift from ever happening again by way of strengthening European integration in external and defence policy and by ensuring that it disposes of tangible capabilities to alleviate the burden borne by the United States.

Four conditions enabled these changes. First, having joined the European Union Poland no longer faced an outsider’s dilemma. Second, having assumed command of a multinational division in Iraq, the defence policy makers felt reassured in the ability of the Polish armed forces to perform in multinational, expeditionary contexts. Paradoxically, while Poland faced a political backlash for backing the US in Iraq, the

---

Iordonelle attributes the push for professionalizing the French armed forces to a similar reform advocacy role played by the “young Turks” among the French officers brass in the 1990s (Iordonelle, 2003).
performance of the Polish military there strengthened Poland’s credibility within the EU as a serious contender for a meaningful role in CSDP. Third, CFSP was increasingly perceived as a forum, in which Poland could stake out a pace setting role in areas vital from the point of view of the security identity, above all drawing East European neighbours to the EU orbit. The Polish elites therefore recognized that in the absence of economic trump cards, if Poland wanted to have greater influence in the EU, it would have to play an active role in CSDP. Fourth, five years after its establishment CSDP was taking root. Its institutionalization combined with a proliferating crisis management role strengthened the policy’s credibility in Warsaw.

Adjustments in Polish defence policy in this period included an active engagement in the EU operations and in implementing the Battlegroup concept. This process latched on to domestic restructuring of the armed forces, already spurred by the NATO Response Force. Staffed overwhelmingly by European NATO allies, the NRF reflects the Europeanization of NATO. New positions within the MFA and MoD and politico-military representations in Brussels were also being set up. A closer involvement in CSDP “unavoidably” placed further demands on “the restructuring of the national armed forces” (Bajwa and Postnikow, 2006:51).

However soft-eurosceptical, the Law and Justice (PiS) coalition governments of 2005-2007 maintained Poland’s active role in the CSDP as a means of advancing to the CFSP avant-garde. If personalities matter in politics, much credit for this goes to the leadership of a modernization-minded defence minister Radosław Sikorski. At the end of the day, however, by amplifying the sovereignty aspect of Polish security identity, playing hardball in the EU constitutional reform negotiations, as well as hardening the
policy line in relations with Berlin, Poland undercut its room for diplomatic manoeuvre. It sought compensation through strengthening direct ties with the Bush administration. This move stemmed also from the insecurity dilemmas articulated by right wing politicians, some of whom, including then deputy foreign minister, went as far as to express public doubts about the efficacy of NATO guarantees. However, while foreign minister at the time Anna Fotyga, Kaczynskis’ loyalist, wavered on key policy decisions, Sikorski, kept a steady course of reform, moving to slash conscription and maintaining close defence cooperation in the EU.

The fall of the PiS government in 2007 brought to power centre-right Civic Platform (PO) in coalition with the Polish Agrarian Party (PSL). Eager to distance itself from the rhetoric and methods of its predecessor, the new coalition government positioned itself as an Europeanist advocacy coalition. It set out to reframe security policy in European terms. It sent the second-largest contingent to the French-led EUFOR mission to Chad and announced Poland would join the Eurocorps. It completed the transition to an all-volunteer force. Poland also secured the support of France for an initiative to reinvigorate CSDP, dubbed by Polish European affairs minister “the new St.-Malo”. This initiative marks Poland’s grand entry onto the European stage as an initiator of EU policy rather than a merely downloader. It is a symbolic mark of graduation from a new EU member state to a mature, responsible member. As much as it neatly encapsulates the long road Poland traversed from being labeled a “Trojan horse” of the US to a potential co-shaper of CSDP, one must not forget that Poland threw a strong weight behind CSDP after the French rapprochement with NATO and in anticipation of the Polish EU presidency envisaging CSDP as one of its top priorities. The fact that the
appeals to CSDP in the policy discourse and doctrine have been “ring fenced” by references to NATO has had much to do with the repercussions of the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008.

If the Iraq war was a critical juncture for policy change towards CFSP and a boost for force transformation, the Russo-Georgian conflict sparked a renewed Polish interest in close collaboration with the US. The Poles drew two lessons from this war: (1) the pendulum has swung too far towards expeditionary crisis management to the detriment of national defence; (2) the threat from the East has not abated. This experience prompted Polish leaders to hedge their bets by closing a deal on missile defence with the United States which the PiS government had longed to achieve. It was accompanied by a bilateral strategic cooperation agreement, envisaging, among other things, a rotation of American anti-missile Patriot battery in Poland. In the course of working out NATO’s new strategic concept, Poland called for the Alliance to “come home” and, to this end, it advocated rebalancing article V and out-of-area commitments. This position put it on a collision course with the US and the EU defence heavyweights Britain and France. The fact that the Europeanist advocacy PO-PSL coalition could continue the alignment with the US, pursued by PiS, and at the same time launch together with France new initiatives to reinvigorate the CSDP does not appear contradictory. It marks a continuous thread in Polish security identity: keeping the US in Europe while strengthening Europe’s defence capability. Europeanization has not changed the core of Polish security identity, but the half-decade of EU membership has strengthened considerably the réflexe européen.

It would appear that the Europeanization paradigm is incapable of accounting for an exogenous trigger for defence transformation – lessons learning from Iraq. I present
three arguments to justify my contention that this stimulus does not contradict the causal effect of Europeanization. First of all, for any military, live operational engagement, besides being its essential raison d’être, is the most important test of capabilities and thus a strong spur to further development. Second, by demonstrating the need to address shortcomings, and in particular highlighting the anachronism and inefficacy of conscription, *Iraqi Freedom* simply reinforced the position of the reformers in the military establishment and policy circles, who had long argued that radical change was necessary. The EU and NATO had been pushing Poland in the direction of developing expeditionary capabilities. Taking into account policy antecedents, the US-led Iraqi mission simply jolted the elites out of complacency and reinforced reformist trajectories. A similar influence could be traced to the “Operation Freedom” and ISAF missions, but since the latter is run by NATO in this case the lessons-drawing may be linked to NATO-ization. And third, the split within the EU on Iraq, accompanied by an ominous alignment of France and Germany with Russia, prompted the Polish elites, once Poland entered the EU, to quickly repair the damage done to European unity. They realized that they overplayed their US card. The Iraqi debacle, especially a dawning realization that Poland did not gain much from this adventure, except a boosted ego, prompted the Poles to invest in the CSDP. In other words, it took a shock to instigate the transformation, but the shape it took and the relationships forged have been influenced by Europeanization.

This research has shown that Europeanization in defence policy has been diffused by different mechanisms than in pillar I. Because this policy remains outside the *communautaire* remit, Europeanization in this field cannot be conceptualized as standardization promoted by Brussels. Instead, it is “the diffusion and consolidation of
ideas and practices in the European governance network," which includes various forms of multilateral cooperation (Zilmer-Johns and Pilegaard, 2004:187). In matters of community competence the European Commission and the European Court of Justice are able to bring direct legal or financial pressure to bear on non-performing states. In defence policy, where the member states have a choice whether to commit to CSDP, Europeanization is fostered to a large extent by emulation (horizontal diffusion), lessons learning and socialization.

Apart from framing and lessons-drawing, socialization and mimicry have also fostered Europeanization. The Weimar Triangle experience was a useful laboratory for the CSDP. So have been Poland’s bilateral relations, especially with Germany. The augmentation of the Polish diplomatic and military representations in Brussels has exposed more and more personnel to socialization processes. An immersion of Polish officials in the institutional webs of activity in Brussels and in the interaction between Warsaw and the EU capitals has facilitated Type I learning, that is socialization brought about by the logic of consequences. As evidence of the primacy of the logic of consequences, when engaging in out-of-area operational deployments, the Polish elites time and again justified such actions in terms of the allied solidarity, an investment in Polish security “insurance policy.” In other words, such interventionism would pay dividends for Polish interests, rather than (necessarily or in the first instance) benefit the EU as a whole.

Socialization has hit home unevenly. While the MFA under reformist leadership of Sikorski, particularly after the 2010 merger with the Office of the Committee for European Affairs, and the civilian part of the MoD are increasingly enmeshed in and
sympathetic to CSDP, the General Staff, the military arm of the MoD, remains NATO-centric and instinctively Atlanticist. The acculturation of foreign ministry in the EU environment and the defence ministry in the NATO milieu is a familiar, and in view of longer socialization and denser institutional linkages, understandable pattern pretty much across the EU members of NATO.

Faced with the triple challenge of reforming the state and its economy, fulfilling NATO membership obligations along with satisfying the political demands of the EU, Poland took in those external ideas and policy designs which resonated with its security identity as well as measured up to or enhanced state capacity. The creation of three EU battlegroups, in two of which Poland acts as a “framework nation,” shows the consistency of the diffusion of Europeanization with Poland’s “role conception” as one of the “big six” European players (alongside France, Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain) (Aggestam, 1999). This corroborates the findings that the heterogeneous outcomes in Europeanization of defence reform in individual EU member states owes to lingering differences in strategic cultures (Vennesson et al., 2009). The perception of the EU as a power multiplier has over time endeared the CSDP to the Polish elites. The launch of the Eastern Partnership initiative proved that Poland is capable of “uploading” its interests which raised appetites for ambitious projects such as the Franco-Polish initiative on security and defence. Five years after Poland’s entry to the EU, the CSDP has become an increasingly important thread in the Polish security policy.

The switch from a conscript army to an all-volunteer force, justified \textit{inter alia} in terms of making it compatible with the structure of the EU and NATO rapid reaction forces marks the extent of the paradigm change observed in Poland (Ironge, 2003;
Mérand, 2006). It drew on lessons learned from a "coalition of the willing" deployment in Iraq and EU crisis management operations, in which Poland has taken part, capacity considerations as well as isomorphic pressures due to the transition of other EU member states’ militaries to the AVF model. The Polish elites realized that professional soldiers are best able to manage increasingly complex tasks expected of them in a modern, hi-tech fighting force and that a professional army would be a financially sound investment in the long term.

Poland’s commitment to CSDP activities in the realm of armed forces reform has been based primarily on logic of consequences. It has been motivated by a desire to benefit from other EU member states’ support for Polish initiatives at the EU, or to affirm Poland’s European credentials when the policy pendulum swung too far towards alignment with the United States. The predominance of the logic of instrumental rationality corroborates Goetz’s observation that Europeanization in the new EU members may be regarded as "shallow". In his view: “Under conditions of shallow institutionalisation, fluidity and uncertainty..., strategic interest-based ‘rational’ behaviour by domestic actors is more likely than action according to a ‘logic of appropriateness’” (2005). As a civil servant in Warsaw expressed it: “the closer to our EU Presidency [the latter half of 2011] the more we become European” (Office of the Committee for European Integration interview, 2009). Although the Lisbon Treaty has reduced the Presidency to a supporting role in relation to the President of the European Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy, it seems, however, a strong boost for Europeanization especially for ambitious states like Poland eager to make its mark in European politics.
Chapter III: Defence-Industrial Policy

III.1. Europeanization and defence-industrial policy

The Europeanization of defence-industrial policy\textsuperscript{32}, that is a policy regulating the production, sale and procurement of defence capabilities, has been one of the aims of the Common Security and Defence Policy (Rutten, 2001). The Franco-British initiative reiterated the EU’s ambition to pursue armaments co-operation, which has long been expressed in treaties. In the Declaration on Western European Union attached to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the WEU member states had agreed to “examine” the proposal for an “enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency” (The Maastricht Treaty, 1992). Five years later, the Treaty of Amsterdam said this: “The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as member states consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments” (The Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997). The French and British leaders also responded to developments in the supply side of defence industrial policy. Backed by governments, the industry spearheaded a process of concentration and transnationalization of defence companies. It reached new heights in 2000 with the formation of the first truly European corporation, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS).

Within the CSDP, the initial efforts have focused on generating defence capabilities through the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM) and the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) to support the European Headline Goal 2003 (EHG2003). ECAP’s work was subsumed in 2004 by the European Defence Agency (EDA). Its establishment

\textsuperscript{32} I will refer to defence industrial policy and armaments policy interchangeably.
marked a turning point in the EU member states’ efforts to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). The activities of EDA have been complemented by the European Commission. Through market framing of defence industrial policy, including procurement, it has sought to bring about the European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM). The ten-year analytical period, from 1999 to 2009, concluded with the adoption of two Commission directives - on intra-EU transfers of defence products and on the coordination of procedures for the award of defence contracts - heralding further progress in integrating the defence market.

An introduction to this case study sheds light on its complexity. I have mentioned already the paucity of literature on Europeanization and defence-industrial policy, as well as contested definitions. Now I would like to mention two other problems: the multiplicity of actors; and a wide array of stimuli, not limited to the EU, affecting the defence industrial policy.

As a cross-pillar issue, defence industrial policy straddles three policy fields - national defence, CSDP and market/industry policy. In the first pillar, the key actors are mainly the European Commission, and within it several DGs, sometimes acting at cross purposes. The second pillar includes the Council, the European Defence Agency, and non-EU actors, such as NATO, policy advocacy groups and industrial lobbies. There are also national governments further disaggregated, as in the Polish case, into domestic actors, that is ministries of defence, foreign affairs, economy and treasury as well as defence companies, research and development (R&D) institutes, and trade unions. Mapping the interaction of these different entities in an Europeanization process is challenging.
The third difficulty - isolating causal factors emanating from the EU security governance as opposed to globalization, has been particularly salient for the study of defence industrial policy. While this is an issue of relevance for Europeanization research in general, the close links between defence industries in Europe and the United States, make it especially pertinent here. The presence of the US as a security and defence ally of the EU, the biggest defence market and often a major business partner for European companies as well as a key investor for certain EU states, the UK and Poland in particular, has been an elephant in Brussels’ negotiating chambers and in the member state capitals. As Sweeney argues, a strong interest of the British and other Europeans in the US market is indicative of the global nature of the defence sector, not simply an evidence of a lack of interest in consolidating European interests (2008). Another point related to globalization and the preponderance of the US industrial-military power, is the diffusion of technology, particularly the US-derived information technology revolution applied to defence capabilities, known as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Kluth has attempted to differentiate the causes of cross-border defence industry consolidation between Europeanization and globalization (2009). In turn, in his analysis of the adaptability of the French armaments industry to globalization Serfaty sees the same forces behind globalization affecting changes attributed to Europeanization (2001). In his view, global conditions such as the post-Cold War geopolitical changes, budgetary cuts to defence procurement as well as the pace of technological change set by the USA have encouraged the French elite perspective that the key to preserving France’s potential in armaments lies in European cooperation. Lungu, who traced the impact of the RMA on
the French defence industrial sector during the 1990s – that is before the emergence of full-fledged CSDP – reached a similar conclusion (2004).

In this case study, I will seek out evidence for Europeanization in Polish defence industrial policy in terms of these two manifestations:

- the degree of reliance on European frameworks for cooperation in the process of generating defence capabilities and conducting defence-related research and development – specifically looking at the influence of CDM/ECAP, EDA and European R&D networks;
- the nature and the extent of the restructuring of Polish defence industry, opening up the defence market and changes in military procurement practices under the impact of EDA and European Commission’s efforts to establish the European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM), as a means of strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), essential to the CSDP, as well as due to emulation of West European practices.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, I will assess the impact of the European Capabilities Action Plan, an early collaborative program under the CSDP, on the Polish approach to generating defence capabilities. In the second part I will track changes, if any, in the Polish defence industrial policy induced by the European Defence Agency, particularly through the adoption in 2005 of the Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement. I will also look at the activities in this area of the European Commission, which, in tandem with the manufacturers, Dover argues has accelerated Europeanization (2007). I will then explore changes, if any, in the national offset policy in response to
European norms, examining particularly its role as an inducement or a handicap to EU-wide collaboration. In the final section I will look in detail at the extent of transnational defence R&D activities in which Polish companies and institutes are involved. I will conclude with a summary of the empirical findings related back to the conceptual framework.

III.2. Capability Development Mechanism and the European Capabilities Action Plan

The European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), adopted officially at the Laeken European Council in December 2001, was the first major EU capabilities generation program in support of the European Headline Goal 2003 (EHG 2003). It was also the first joint EU endeavour of this type in which Poland had participated, from 2003 until 2004 as a candidate state and since 2004 until December 2007, when the last three ECAP project groups outside the European Defence Agency (EDA) were terminated, as EU member. As defined by defence ministers at the Capability Improvement Conference in Brussels on 19 November 2001, ECAP reinforced the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM), which took shape in the course of the European Council deliberations at Nice in December 2000, Göteborg and Laeken in 2001, to be concretized at the GAERC meeting in Brussels in February 2003 (EU Council, 2001; EU Council 6805/03). The CDM was a governance model put in place to ensure that member state commitments to the EHG2003 were translated into tangible outcomes (Reynolds, 2006). The CDM had three aims: to enable the EU to monitor and facilitate progress in EHG 2003, to evaluate and review the capability goals against the requirements defined in the
Petersberg tasks, and to help achieve consistency between the pledges undertaken in the EU and the NATO planning and review process (EU Council 6805/03).

The CDM involved organizing annual capability commitment/improvement conferences and drafting requirements, force and progress catalogues on the basis of the assessed needs, identification of shortfalls and member state declarations regarding their intended contributions to fill the gaps. Designed as such the CDM proved unable to induce changes in the individual national approaches to generating capabilities. Several reasons account for this. First, comparable in many respects to the Open Method of Coordination, because of its intergovernmental character, it lacked a central EU lead. Instead, the member states endowed the then embryonic and poorly-staffed Military Committee with the coordinating role. They were essentially left in a position of monitoring themselves and setting targets at will. Second, as a purely voluntary process, it lacked coercive means to ensure compliance. And, third, the possibilities for benchmarking and peer pressure – including naming and shaming – were undermined by the fact that, notwithstanding appeals for transparency, the process was opaque and national contributions in most cases remained anonymous. For all these reasons, CDM is judged to have been ineffective (Reynolds, 2006).

In spite of EU declarations of its will to cooperate with NATO, the early attempts to bring out jointly qualitative and quantitative improvements to the implementation of EHG2003 were thwarted in large degree due to autonomist ambitions of the EU. At the European Council at Feira in June 2000, the EU members agreed to set up an ad hoc EU-NATO working group to make sure that the EHG2003 and NATO’s own Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) were “mutually reinforcing” (European Council, 2000).
EU-NATO Capability Group was therefore established at the Nice Council “to ensure the consistent development of EU and NATO capabilities where they overlap (in particular, those arising under the overall EU goal and NATO DCI)” (EU Council 6805/03).

Launched at the same time as the EHG2003, the DCI was NATO’s attempt to address capability shortfalls, especially in the critical area of force projection (Buckley, 2002). Even though there was at least a strong leadership provided by the United States, for similar reasons to the pre-ECAP CDM, the Alliance proved ineffectual in delivering results (Kawałowski, 2009). DCI focused on a wide range of shortfalls (around 58), no specific goals were allocated to individual member states and there was no pressure to meet particular deadlines (Buckley, 2002). According to a Polish MoD specialist, riding on a wave of Atlanticism following its entry to NATO, Poland pinned hopes on the work of the EU-NATO Capability Group. But they were not met (Kawałowski, 2009). The working group for the most part limited its activities to exchanges of information about initiatives in which each organization was involved.

Proposed originally by the Netherlands, the European Capabilities Action Plan was an attempt to give teeth to the Capability Development Mechanism (Ibid.). The ECAP was launched at the same time as CSDP was declared “operational” at Laeken. While making that bold – albeit premature - assertion the member states, however, recognized that the EU would not be able to carry out “progressively more demanding operations” if it did not develop assets and capabilities (European Council, 2001). UK secretary of defence Geoffrey Hoon revealed that the EU faced 40 capability shortfalls, of which half were regarded as significant, including transport aircraft, attack and support
helicopters, precision-guided munitions and headquarters (UK House of Commons, 2002).

The ECAP was to be based on an improved methodology compared to the one employed for 2003 European Headline Goal described in chapter 2. The EU members zeroed in on the priorities, creating, since February 2002, a total of 19 panels of national experts whose job was to analyze the shortfalls and propose feasible solutions based on national, bilateral or multinational projects. The lack of leadership was addressed by designating certain member states as “lead nations” in each of the panels. They in turn responded to the Headline Goal Task Force (HTF), a coordinating body of military experts, established at Feira, backed by the EU Military Committee accountable to the Political and Security Committee. Although these modifications, based on learning-by-doing, strove to overcome weaknesses of the CDM, the ECAP continued to be hampered by relying on “bottom-up” voluntary national contributions and an absence of any enforcement and sanctions mechanisms, for instance naming/shaming rule-breaching countries (Reynolds, 2006).

Poland was not involved in the establishment of either the CDM or the ECAP. It did not participate in the ECAP panels, but it was able to take part in the second phase of the ECAP - the work of the ECAP project groups. When the results of the ECAP panels were reported to the GAERC in March 2003 it became clear that major progress still eluded the EU. Yet, rather than revise the method, the EU members resorted to yet another cosmetic adjustment. The ECAP panels were rechristened Project Groups (PGs), since March 2003 fifteen of these would eventually be formed, again under lead-nation supervision. There was one innovation, proposed by Greece and agreed by the member
states, which promised to give political impetus to the implementation of the options proposed by military experts. An Informal Advisory Group (IAG), composed of representatives of ministers of defence, was established. It was thought that the involvement of an official closer to the ministers’ ear would help smooth the process.

As a NATO neophyte facing serious resource constraints, Poland was initially wary of potential duplication of the ECAP with the Allied DCI and then Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC). However, Poland’s experience in the successive rounds of capabilities commitment conferences, the EU assurances that its efforts were to be harmonized with those of NATO, as well as the impending entry to the EU made joining the ECAP worthwhile. A selection of the project groups to join was influenced by the modernization priorities outlined in the Program of the Development of the Polish Armed Forces in 2003-2008, adopted by the defence ministry in 2001. It took into account national needs, the PCC as well as overall NATO’s expectations. Fixing the level of defence funding at 1.95% of GDP, which was guaranteed in the 2001 Law on the rebuilding and technical modernization as well as funding the Armed Forces, ensured that the MoD would have the resources for procuring capabilities. In the end, Poland chose to participate in eight ECAP project groups (see Table 12).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Group</th>
<th>Lead State</th>
<th>Termination of work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Air refuelling</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>October 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Strategic airlift</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>January 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Strategic sealift</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>January 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Special forces</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>December 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Combat search-and-rescue</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>November 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Medical support</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>January 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Operational HQ</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>January 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 WMD protection</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>January 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kawałowski 2009

It is difficult to assess the Polish experience in the ECAP because the open-source materials on this topic are few and far between. I will rely primarily on an internal MoD document *The Evaluation of the Process of EU Defence Capabilities Development*, cited by Kawałowski, which was prepared in 2007 by an MoD task force in charge of Poland’s participation in this process (2009). Of the eight ECAP groups in which Poland took part, only two – strategic airlift and strategic sealift – could be said to have produced either directly or indirectly tangible outcomes. The need for heavy airlift as a critical enabler for the EU rapid reaction force/Battlegroups has dogged the development of EHG2003/EHG2010. The ECAP was the forum which in 2003 stimulated the conceptualization of the *Global Approach on Deployability* initiative aiming to make effective use of all available means for transport co-ordination (EU Council, 2004). At the same time, the discussion within the strategic airlift Project Group facilitated an
agreement of 18 EU and NATO states to pool resources to charter 6 Russian and Ukrainian Antonov aircraft for a minimum of 2000 flying hours per year to be shared by the participating states in a consortium. The Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS), as it became known, entered into force in 2008 filling both the EU’s (ECAP) and NATO’s (PCC) shortfalls pending deliveries of Airbus A400M (NATO 2006). Poland committed to 50 hours annually, in comparison France – 550, Germany - 750, Czech Republic – 60 (SALIS MOU). The work within the strategic sealift PG facilitated the establishment of the Athens Multinational Sealift Coordination Centre and the European Airlift Coordination Cell/European Airlift Centre, which in 2007 merged into the Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE). Poland joined it a year later. The other ECAP PGs made some headway in doctrinal alignment and harmonization of procedures (for example, the special forces and combat search-and-rescue PGs). Others got mired in disagreements, particularly over the respective ECAP and PCC competencies, a fate which met for example the PG dealing with important albeit costly in terms of potential solutions air refuelling.

In the final assessment, except for the SALIS initiative, which owes its birth to EU-NATO cooperation in critical strategic airlift, the ECAP did not move the process of capabilities development along. It has had a limited impact on inducting Poland to a European approach towards acquisition of defence capabilities. The reasons have to do with the methodology followed by the ECAP panels/project groups, Poland’s defence policy specifics, as well as objective considerations related to the time it takes to translate

33 In addition, in 2008, Poland also joined another multinational consortium of 12 NATO and EU member states – the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) – to acquire, manage, support and operate jointly three Boeing C-17 strategic transport aircraft (NATO, 2009).
procurement decisions into deliverables and the levels of defence spending. First, because of both insufficient political will and political guidance, the expert proposals that came out of the ECAP work, even if they reached the Council through the EUMC, failed to carry weight at the top decision-making levels in the national MoDs. Second, notwithstanding the ECAP governance model, addressing shortfalls involves procurement decisions that tend to be very costly and take a long time to produce results. A case in point is the A400M program. The EU countries that signed on in 2003 will not see the aircraft until 2010 or, as current troubles presage, until 2012 at the earliest (BBC, 12 Jan. 2010). Even though the EU SG/HR Javier Solana appealed to defence ministers to become more actively involved in political guidance, to spend if not more then better and to ensure more effective mechanisms of monitoring progress in ECAP as well as realistic calendars, the member states by and large did not heed his advice (EU Council S0216/02). As a result of its own reviews, in 2004-2005 the EU decided to “migrate” a majority of the ECAP PGs to the “more integrated structures in the framework of EDA,” a process completed in 2006, while terminating others that either met their goals (only one!) or were judged of little promise (applicable to three PGs) (Kawałowski, 2009; EP, 2006). Experts generally agree that prior to its migration to EDA the ECAP “has not had much success” (EP, 2006; Keohane, 2004; Kawałowski, 2009).

As to the reasons for a limited impact of the ECAP owing to aspects of Poland’s defence policy, three issues stand out: Poland’s accession status vis-à-vis the EU, its then security-identity rooted strong predilection for the Euroatlanticist as opposed to the Europeanist logic of cooperation in generating capabilities as well as capacity constraints having mainly to do with a sluggish organizational adjustment within the Polish MoD.
During the “heyday” of the ECAP (2001-2004) Poland was an EU candidate state. Therefore, as Kawalowski reminds, its participation was restricted by EU regulations regarding cooperation with non-member states. Because it did not have influence over the direction of work and decisions, a country as status-conscious as Poland, that had only in 2001 secured long-term state funding for military procurement and, on top of that, a short time earlier entered NATO, could not have been expected to engage fully in the ECAP (Kawalowski, 2009). Pressed by NATO to meet ambitious Target Force Goals (TFGs) and concomitantly contribute to the PCC, which largely overlapped with the ECAP, Polish officials were wary of overstretching commitments.

The decision of the Polish government, in December 2002, to buy 48 US F-16 fighter aircraft also showed a strong Euroatlanticist logic, that is a preference for cooperation between NATO/the United States and the EU as opposed to an autonomist EU approach to the acquisition of capabilities. As I will show later the Atlanticist orthodoxy has evolved since the early 2000s. While in the PCC and the ECAP, Poland advocated NATO-EU cooperation through the EU-NATO Capability Group (EP, 2006). NATO decisions to appoint the same lead nations to also head the corresponding NATO capability bodies suited Poland’s preference for non-duplication. Because NATO documents related to PCC remain classified, it is impossible to evaluate competently the progress of this initiative. However, secondary sources indicate that neither the PCC nor the ECAP by themselves proved successful (European Parliament, 2008). When working out solutions jointly, however, the two organizations were able to make achievements as the case of the strategic lift demonstrates.
Organizationally the Polish MoD was unprepared to facilitate the transfer of any lessons learned from the ECAP into procurement decisions. It was only in July 2005, a year after Poland’s accession to the EU that MoD internal regulations, dating to 2002, were revised to take into account the EU membership conditions. The responsibility for the ECAP was then formally added to the ministerial tasks. The ECAP became an additional responsibility of the Department of Defence Policy, already entrusted with NATO Defence Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) process, TFGs, and the PCC. It was also added on to NATO-related tasks carried out by the Directorate-General for Logistics within the General Staff (MoD, 2005). However, the real, albeit belated impulse to Poland’s participation in ECAP came in March 2007 when the MoD established a Task Force in charge of MoD Participation in the Process of Developing EU Defence Capabilities. It was chaired by a staffer directly responsible to the coordinator of that process in the rank of deputy defence minister (MoD, 2007). That ministerial decision sorted out overdue issues concerning the institutional arrangements, responsibilities, and funding related to Poland’s participation in the EU capabilities generation process. If such a task force with a well-defined political and institutional anchoring and mandate had been formed earlier, it might have helped involve the MoD more intensely in the activities in ECAP. Though coming late, it was a welcome organizational change, stimulated by the EU/CSDP that would henceforth facilitate Poland’s engagement in EDA.

The Polish experience in the CDM/ECAP, then, even if it did not bring about a transformation at the policy output level, helped influence organizational changes within the MoD. A participation in the ECAP proved a valuable socialization environment and a
learning experience, familiarizing the MoD officials both at the decision-making and expert levels with the CDM procedures, EU institutional culture as well as ideas and norms making headway within the European expert community. These included the norms of defence-industrial collaboration, and ideas concerning pooling resources, enhancing EU planning, or setting up an armaments agency. All of these ideas were gradually implemented.

III.3. Defence procurement

EDA was born as a creature of a compromise between the French desire for a well-funded armaments organization à la dirigisme, in the business of engineering defence-industrial policy, and the British preference for merely a small-staffed and funded coordinator of capabilities generation (Sweeney, 2008). These tensions are reflected in EDA’s mandate which includes multifarious responsibilities, for: armaments cooperation, strengthening European defence technological and industrial base and research and technology (Heuninckx, 2009). The birth of the European Defence Agency on 12 July 2004 was therefore greeted with a mixture of scepticism and hope.

In the past Europeans’ faith in institutional frameworks for defence industrial cooperation turned out largely misplaced. The old angst of burden-sharing within NATO on the one hand and, on the other hand, a desire to reduce Europe’s dependence on the US had spawned many efforts to foster European armaments cooperation. The oldest, but little known agent of Europeanization, focusing on the army systems, is the FINABEL Committee. It was created in 1953 by the army chiefs of staff of France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Its membership has since expanded to 18 countries’ chiefs of staff and it aspires to include all the EU member states. This initiative
is worth mentioning because the chief of staff of the Polish armed forces joined it in 2006 (Stepek and Marcinkowski, 2007). Though it focused initially on the armaments cooperation, the FINABEL turned its attention to harmonizing the land doctrines, as it realized that this was a sine qua non for joint equipment programs (FINABEL website). Seeking to promote interoperability and doctrinal harmonization, it is an agent - albeit non-EU - of Europeanization. Because FINABEL has failed to build an institutional centre of gravity – it has but a tiny secretariat in Brussels, and because of its status outside of the EU it remains a niche actor. It is but a clearing house for reports drawn up by experts sitting on its several working group and a forum for meetings of chiefs of defence staff. Still, its socialization potential for the upper echelon of the land forces, however limited, should not be underestimated.

Other agents of Europeanization have been the Eurogroup, set up in 1968 within NATO, and the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), established in 1976 with the participation of France, and in 1992 subsumed by the Western European Union (Kirby, 1979). Even if they produced meagre outcomes, by keeping up pressure for policy convergence these fora kept up the participating member states’ will to pursue collaboration. Since Maastricht, the WEU spawned the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) and the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO), which it intended to convert into a full-fledged European Armaments Agency. However, progress turned out to be slow and the WEAO did not evolve much beyond a research cell (Mawdsley, 2008). Its plan to metamorphose into a European Armaments Agency was dropped in 2002 by the WEU member states, which chose to move forward in the EU instead.
Given the poor historical record of defence-industrial collaboration, it does not surprise that the rise of EDA had been met with scepticism. Scholars have been guarded in their appraisal of EDA’s potential. Mölling points out that as an intergovernmental institution, operating under article 296 of the EC Treaty which by and large excludes the armaments sector from Community initiatives, EDA has a limited room for manoeuvre. It depends first and foremost on the political will of the national governments (2008). The EDA would also have to generate progress on a tiny budget of €22 million in 2006 and a staff of just 90 people, more than half of them, however, appointed by the Agency itself rather than seconded from member states (Reynolds, 2006).

On the other hand, EDA has also generated hopes in its ability to succeed where other attempts failed. At the policy level, high expectations may be surmised from the laudatory vision of EDA’s added-value. The Council declarations in 2004 and 2005 stated *inter alia* that: “The establishment of the EDA offers opportunities to reinvigorate the ECAP process,” “The EDA will act as a “conscience” and a “catalyst,” it will offer a “new, more integrated,” “more systematic and analytical approach,” EDA “can stimulate military co-operation by promoting and co-ordinating the harmonisation of military requirements and proposing multinational solutions to remedy identified shortfalls,” it will play a role of a “catalyst” in the capabilities generation process;” and the “comprehensive” and “broad scope of the EDA,” involving “Armaments, Research and Technology, and Industry and Market... will result in new projects and initiatives to improve military capabilities” (EU Council, 2004; EU Council CL05-132).

---

It states: “Any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding the products which are not intended for specifically military purposes” (*EU Treaty*).
Although EDA is organized along intergovernmental lines, with the state representatives playing the first fiddle, some scholars argue it has potential to become a policy entrepreneur in its own right. They point out that capabilities cannot be generated in vacuo, but must involve the translation of politico-military requirements into deliverables, which requires an institutional framework (Sheppard, 2006). EDA is an institution in its own right. It has a nearly EU-wide membership which eliminates issues of inclusion/exclusion that could have impaired previous attempts. Its oversight by the High Representative, as well as the attendance of the Commission representative (with non-voting rights), at meetings give it a close and direct link to EU policy (Reynolds, 2006). Bátora argues that by facilitating the sharing of best practices and benchmarking EDA enables mutual learning and socialization among participating national defence officials. By setting standards and influencing the strategic thrust of capabilities generation as well as agenda, it may foster normative isomorphism. By gathering detailed information about the member state progress, it may be able to contribute to mimetic isomorphism as countries are better able to compare each other (Bátora, 2009). EDA has therefore been considered “particularly apt at promoting the ‘models’ and ‘norms’ defined in the Headline Goal and other documentation” (Sheppard, 2006: 17).

Looking at the first five years of the Agency, one is able to see that it has channeled the creative energies of its experts and the national officials into producing documents that have the hallmarks of a strategic framework for a multi-faceted defence-industrial policy. EDA put together A Strategy for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, on 14 May 2007, followed by a European Defence Research & Technology Strategy on 19 November 2007. It mapped out the EU capability
requirements in An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs, endorsed on 3 October 2006, forming the basis for the Capability Development Plan presented on 8 July 2008. Finally, on 15 October 2009 it unveiled A European Armaments Co-operation Strategy. Because of the Agency’s focus on devising a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), I evaluate its impact on the Polish defence-industrial policy through an analysis of one of its key projects – the creation of the Intergovernmental Regime to Encourage Competition in the European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM). Here, I assess what influence, if any, and through what means EDA has brought to bear on Polish policy. And later, in another section of this chapter, I will interrogate whether the agency has helped catalyze and moor Polish defence research and development establishment in European R&D networks.

Before describing the effect of EDA on the Polish procurement it is important to consider official attitudes towards the agency in the project stage as well as assess the capacity of the Polish armaments sector at the 1999 analytical baseline. Poland supported the French and German proposal put forth in the Working Group VIII-Defence of the European Convention on the Future of Europe to establish a European Armaments and Strategic Research Agency (European Convention 461/02). Poland’s position was in line with its 2003 National Security Strategy, envisaging Polish contribution to the development of EU military capabilities, and recognizing the need for a “gradual harmonization of procurement and of the European armaments market in a manner ensuring that all [emphasis added] the member states’ specific capabilities and experiences are put to use” (National Security Strategy, 2003). Aspiring to play an active role in CSDP, in congruence with its security identity, Poland sought to contribute to the European process
of developing capabilities. Paradoxically, Polish decision-makers took this process more seriously once Poland jumped into the "Iraqi Freedom." On the one hand, thanks to this experience, Poland realized it had some serious gaps in capabilities in need of filling. On the other hand, it realized that, just as it was about to enter the EU, it had to "wave the EU flag" for political reasons.

The stress put in the National Security Strategy on an inclusion of all the EU member states has to be interpreted both as a wish for and recognition that a membership in a brand-new institution might help assuage a longstanding concern that Poland not be excluded from European defence-industrial co-operation. A decision by the WEU to close down WEAG/WEAO only two years after Poland managed to enter it made it feel like the rug had just been pulled from under its feet. The care for inclusiveness is a deep-rooted motif in the Polish security identity, but in the armaments case it has been enhanced by a desire to address capacity issues. Warsaw felt cold shouldered by the EU's refusal – said, it was rumoured, to be in response to its position on Iraq - to include its representative, a former deputy defence minister, in the Agency Establishment Team. Despite this initial setback, the Polish officials did not lose hope in the potential of the new institution to help it enter the hitherto elitist domain of European defence-industrial cooperation, and, through it, attenuate capacity constraints (PAP, 2004).

Poland wanted to improve its relative position in the EU in defence-industrial and technological capacity terms by way of institutionalized co-operation, in which it would have an equal voice. Mawdsley suggests that this attitude is synonymous with small states which insist on equality of membership in armaments cooperation structures and

---

35 By March 2006 EDA had taken over most of the WEAO portfolio of about 60 ad hoc projects, whilst WEAG closed shop.
demand compensation (in the form of offset). For Poland, this insistence on equality would be easier to press upon the EDA, because being a new organization it lacks stable relationships as well as bases of influence (Bátor, 2009). Large states, those with a strong defence-industrial capacity, she argues, tend to find institutional structures constraining, and as a result may prefer ad hoc forms of collaboration (Mawdsley, 2008).

The experience of OCCAR is illustrative. Frustrated with WEAG, in November 1996, France, Germany, Italy and the UK struck a deal to establish the Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Armement (OCCAR). It aimed to employ best practices in multinational defence procurement and rely on competition in the production of defence equipment (Mawdsley, 2008). Enlarged to include Belgium and Spain it has supervised the production of big-ticket procurement items. Two years later France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK signed the Letter of Intent (LoI) paving way for the 2000 Framework Agreement Concerning Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring and Operation of the European Defence Industry. These countries endeavoured to spearhead the consolidation of European defence industry through joint efforts to harmonize military requirements, export procedures and enhance research and technology (Konarzewska, 2008; Mawdsley, 2008). In tandem with the industry these governments have been able to make some progress in consolidating the European defence industry.

---

36 These include: the Milan missile (Italy, Germany, France); the Roland missile (France, Germany); the Hot missile (France, Germany); the PAAMS anti-air missile system (Britain, Germany, Italy); the Tiger helicopter (Germany, France, Spain); the Cobra radar (Britain, Germany, France); the Boxer multi-role armoured vehicle (Germany, Netherlands — though not a formal OCCAR member); the FREMM multipurpose frigate (France, Italy); A400M strategic aircraft (Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Turkey, and non-members — Luxembourg and Turkey); and ESSOR European secure software-defined radio (France, Italy, Spain and non-members — Finland, Poland and Sweden) (Moens and Domisiewicz, 2001; OCCAR website).
market, now dominated by a few big companies (BAE Systems, EADS, THALES) linked by cross-ownerships (Mörth and Britz, 2004).

While in the EU politics generally Poland with Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain may be regarded as one of the large member states, in the defence-industrial policy, “Poland is frequently relegated to the second tier” (Mawdsley, 2008). In Mawdsley’s view, the mark of a big state is the possession of “a degree of independent capacity in major weapons systems production, meaningful defence research capabilities and the resulting power to have a major impact on any decisions on armaments cooperation in the EU” (Ibid.). Despite its biggest defence production and sales market in East-Central Europe as well as the fourth largest defence-sector workforce in the EU after France, UK and Germany, judged on the basis of these criteria Poland is not the first-tier player (ECORYS, 2010).

The troubling state of the Polish defence industry dates back to the transformation in the early 1990s amounting to a series of simultaneous revolutions: an accelerated democratization, shock therapy market reforms and a geostrategic tilt to the West. Even though the end of the Cold War and an associated drop in defence spending affected all the EU member states, the combination of the peace dividend, an inability to keep up with technological changes, and a transition to new politico-economic governance resulted in deeper defence cuts in the former Warsaw Pact states than in the West (Mawdsley, 2008). The result was what Polish experts called a deep crisis or simply a catastrophe for the Polish defence industry (Piątkowski, 2003; Wieczorek, 2001). In 1990-1997, the MoD orders in the national defence industry fell by half, or more than the 43.4% drop in total defence spending in that period (Ibid.). The workforce – admittedly
bloated in the first place - shrank from a communist-era 158,000 in 1989 to 57,100 in 1999 and 34,700 in 2001 (Ibid.). It has stayed at that level since. The number of armament producers fell from 112 in 1988 to 36 companies in 199937. The defence share of the industrial production declined from 1.21% in 1989 to 0.79% in 1999 (Wieczorek, 2001). The freefalling defence budget and the relatively small national market pushed R&D and production costs. These could have been restrained had the slump in domestic demand been offset by exports (Mawdsley, 2008). However, while in the 1980s Poland was one of top 10 arms exporters in the world and even as late as 1990 exports accounted for 38% of total deliveries, by 1999 well over 90% of production was sold only on the domestic market (Wieczorek, 2001; Solidarity, 2009). The dramatic decrease in exports, hitting rock bottom in 2000, illustrated another vulnerability of the Polish defence industry: the offer of relatively low-tech Soviet-licensed products by Polish companies. Many of them are uncompetitive, and a majority depend on export markets in developing countries (Behr and Siwiecki, 2004). While exports to the West are a new development facilitated by the offset agreements, that I will turn to later, the traditional export destinations in the developing world in the period of 1990-2009 are illustrated in Table 13.

37 In addition to these armament producers, the so-called industrial defence potential of Poland consisted also of 12 state enterprises in the business of overhauling and upgrading of equipment, subordinated to the MoD, 17 R&D institutes, of which 7 were under MoD control, as well as 3 arms trade companies (Wieczorek, 2000:490-1). Other companies also produced armaments equipment, but they were not classified under Polish law as defence industry enterprises.
After a decade of stagnation and neglect, upon entering NATO, the Polish government felt compelled to modernize the armed forces. So, in 1999, it brought out the
Strategy for the Restructuring of the Defence Industry (Ibid.). Due in no small part to the resistance of the trade unions, which had an influence over the coalition conservative-syndicalist government at the time, and financial vicissitudes, the strategy did not arrest decline in defence industry. In 2002, the Council of Ministers adopted the new Strategy of Structural Transformation of the Defence Industry Potential in the Years 2002-2005. It faced better odds of succeeding, because on 25 May 2001 the Polish Parliament passed the Law on the Rebuilding and the Technical Modernization as well as Financing of the Armed Forces, committing the government to spend no less than 1.95% of the GDP on defence, and to increase the capital/equipment share of defence expenditure – from 16.2% in 2004 to 20% in 2006. This legislation arrested a freefall in defence spending in the 1990s creating a predictible financial climate, which allowed the MoD, defence industry and research institutes to plan, invest and otherwise make long-term commitments (Domisiewicz, 2003).

The 2002 Strategy led to the creation of two holding groups (or “capital groups”) concentrated around the “national champion” Bumar, in the business of land armaments, and Agency of Industrial Development (ARP), focusing on aeronautics and electronics, while the remaining 13 companies were to be privatised (Behr and Siwiecki, 2004). Thanks to increased government involvement in defence industry, assured financing, investments in modernizing the armed forces, as well as new sales in Asia, the first half of the 2000s saw the defence industry pick up from the slump of the 1990s. These were the structural conditions at the inception of Poland’s membership in the European Defence Agency. It is no wonder that these conditions influenced Poland’s perception of EDA as a “policy solution.”
In November 2004, the EDA Steering Board, a decision-making body composed of defence ministers, tasked EDA to prepare proposals for a regime that would stimulate competitiveness and inject transparency into the European defence market hitherto shielded from market pressures by way of article 296 (Kawalowski, 2009). EDA experts together with national representatives, including Poland's MOD specialists, completed the job. They produced a voluntary, non-binding Intergovernmental Regime to Encourage Competition in the European Defence Equipment Market, which Polish and other EU defence ministers agreed to at the Steering Board meeting on 21 November 2005. It formally entered into force on 1 July 2006. In addition to the cornerstone document *The Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement*, the regime also comprises:

- *The Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain* (adopted on 15 May 2006);
- *Framework Arrangement for Supply Between Subscribing Member States in Circumstance of Urgency* (20 Sept. 2006);
- the *Security of Information* agreement (20 Sept. 2006);
- as well as the *Code of Conduct on Offsets* (24 Oct. 2008).

Out of 24 EDA member states (all EU members at the time, except Denmark) 22 joined the regime while initially Hungary and Spain stayed out. By decision of the Polish Council of Ministers, on 16 May 2006, Poland entered the regime. The Ministry of Defence justified accession to the *Code of Conduct* as follows: it “… demonstrated our commitment to increasing transparency in the European Defence market, broadening business opportunities for defence companies and strengthening global competitiveness of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base” (MoD, 25 Oct. 2006).

---

38 These two countries committed to the regime in 2007.
As a crucial part of the regime an Electronic Bulleting Board was established on the EDA website to inform arms producers about contracting opportunities valued at over €1 million in a €30 billion EU market. Goods and services related to ABC weaponry as well as cryptographic equipment were understandably excluded. Procurement without competition was also allowed in case of “pressing operational urgency, follow-on work or supplementary goods and services and for extraordinary reasons of national security” (EDA, 2005). In place of opacity and political considerations that tend to be the norm in the procurement practices of European states the regime encouraged economics to be the sole criteria for the selection of contractors. There would be no “European preference” in the bidding process. EDA member states agreed to disagree on the issue of third-party access – understood to mean US defence contractors. As to the compliance with the regime, there would be no sanctions. Instead EDA would monitor and report on how the regime gets implemented, thus encouraging peer pressure. Concerned about the viability of small and medium-sized enterprises, EDA came up with a second Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB2) to allow industrial contractors advertise subcontracting opportunities. EDA has also addressed the security of supply. This is an important issue for Poles, who remembers to this day the difficulties their country faced in obtaining British and French supplies during the 1920 Polish-Russian war (Polish EU mission interview, 2009).

In the period after the Code had been signed by the Polish defence minister and before the Polish government decided formally to enter the Code, a domestic debate ensued. It led ultimately to changes in the national defence-industrial policy. Like

---

39 At the time of the Bolshevik invasion of Poland, inspired by communist propaganda and Soviet agentura, the British workers refused to load supply and ammunition to ships heading for Polish ports, the Germans refused to unload them or provide transit from France, while the Czechs delayed transit of military goods destined for the Polish troops.
everywhere else in Europe, the defence ministry had few qualms about purchasing arms and equipment abroad. As Radoslaw Sikorski, Polish defence minister in 2005-2007, put it: “Poland just wanted to buy the best” (Security & Defence, 2006). The industry and trade unions had a different view. They resisted entry to the Code raising the spectre of the collapse of this sector if it were exposed suddenly to competition from West European companies (Rzycki, 2006; Europe Economics, 2009). On the surface, this would seem like a strategy being played out all over Europe. Companies want domestic purchasing to shore up their position. But, whereas many large West European companies make up for reduced domestic sales by high-volume and high-value exports, Polish companies do not have that luxury. In 2008, the export share of revenue by Bumar was just 13,8%; it dropped to 12,5% the next year (Altair, 2010). Ranked in terms of volume of exports, from 1998-2004, Poland ranked 12\textsuperscript{th} in the EU, behind Slovakia, with the UK and France outpacing the pack, and Germany coming a distant third (EDA, 2007).

Polish trade union and business leaders demanded that the government put more money into the consolidation of this sector before signing the Code. The government felt, however, that this was an infant industry argument, and a delay of Poland’s entry to the regime might turn out to be of long duration jeopardizing Poland’s standing in EDA and CSDP more generally. This would be embarrassing since Poland had taken part in shaping the Code. In the end a compromise was reached. In order to address the concerns of the industry and trade unions, the government committed to negotiating “adaptation measures.” These were designed to limit the potentially negative ramifications of accession in the short-term and to facilitate long-term systemic conditions that would stimulate the competitiveness of Polish defence industry.
The two sides sat down to negotiate. The broad composition of the government team, involving representatives of several ministries, revealed a fragmented management of defence-industrial policy. No single ministry claims responsibility for this sector. The main stakeholders are the ministries of: defence, as a key customer for defence equipment and an owner of some of the military repair facilities; economy, as a regulator of defence industrial policy; and treasury, as either an owner of defence companies or, in the wake of privatisations, through representation on the boards of directors, their supervisor. There was also input from the ministries of foreign affairs, finance, science and higher education as well as the presidential National Security Bureau. The Council of Ministers tasked the MoD with coordinating the negotiation process. The key role was played by deputy defence minister for armaments policy, director of MoD armaments policy department, brig. gen. Adam Sowa, and national research and technology director. After a few months of negotiations, on 11 August 2006, the government representatives signed an agreement with representatives of three trade unions, the Polish Chamber of Defence Manufacturers as well as two main defence corporations – Bumar and ARP (MoD, Aug. 2006). It featured an adaptation timetable and envisaged: adopting a strategy for the consolidation of the defence industry in 2006-2010; establishing R&D program; drawing up a catalogue of equipment to be excluded from the EU Code of Conduct for “reasons of an important national security interest”; as well as developing a long-term plan for MoD purchases (MoD, May 2006).

By opening up negotiating space among domestic stakeholders, EDA thus contributed to inducing the government - compelled to address the demands of domestic interest groups, empowered indirectly by EDA - to create a comprehensive defence
industrial policy framework. The government delivered on its main promises. After some delay, in August 2007, the Council of Ministers adopted the *Strategy for the Consolidation and Support of the Development of Polish Defence Industry in 2007-2012*, developed by the Ministry of Economy in cooperation with other state institutions (MoE, Aug. 2007). In the same year the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, in cooperation with the ministries of national defence and economy, developed the *Program of Scientific Research and Development in Support of the Defence Industrial Potential* (MS&HE, 2007). In the internal MoD decision of 26 July 2006, the minister of defence also revised procurement procedures to take into account the need to post tenders on EDA Electronic Bulletin Board as well as drafted a list of arms and equipment exempted for reasons of operational urgency (MoD, 26 July 2006).

The minister of defence at the time, Oxford-educated, Radoslaw Sikorski, signed the Code hoping it would help make military procedures more transparent, fair, and less weighed down by bureaucracy, an issue that was dear to him. Seeking to remove suspicions of corruption, or a manipulation of tenders in favour of certain companies, charges that a few years earlier resulted in a dismissal of a deputy defence minister, he appointed a special plenipotentiary for transparency within the MoD. In the view of one legal expert, signing of the Code aimed to “ensure that this legacy of increased transparency will survive the future changes of government and that the legal system will also be changed.” Hence the entry to the regime could be characterized as a “catalyst for change” (Rzycki, 2006).

---

40 It concerns the so-called “Szeremietiew affair” of 2001, featuring charges of bribery and facilitating unlawful access to classified papers levelled at the then deputy defence minister responsible for military procurement Romuald Szeremietiew. In 2008, the courts cleared him of all the charges.
It was high time to reform the domestic procurement system since both government officials and experts regarded it as inefficient. In the simplest terms, it worked more or less as follows. Through a dense bureaucracy within the General Staff the armed forces communicated the capability requirements to the MoD. They were then processed by two MoD departments with somewhat overlapping portfolios - the armaments policy department, of a more strategic policy nature, and the armed forces procurement department, which was more operational, taking care of spending issues (Bączyk, 2008). On top of that since 2005 the minister of defence has had to take into account the advice of essentially his own MoD subordinates represented in an advisory body called the Armaments Council. This byzantine system as well as already-mentioned opaque, complicated legal procedures delayed procurement, contributed to cost overruns or otherwise not necessarily lead to the purchase of the best item on the market. When the forces on a mission required urgently a certain weapons system, which in the case of an "operational need" would be fast-tracked outside of an offset requirement, it would take a long time before such a system could be deployed in the field (MoD interview, 2010).

The MoD procurement regime was reformed in 2006-2009. The legal changes included reducing the ability of the state bodies to exclude bidders on formal grounds, such as missing a document, setting deadlines for the submission of documents, and, also, limiting the ability of losing bidders to exploit the protest process for years thereafter, which paralyzed procurement (Ibid.). In 2008, the Polish MoD announced it would set up a domestic armaments agency. It would take over responsibility for procurement currently split between the MoD, and two departments within it, as well as the General Staff, and assume the tasks of the Military Property Agency managing MoD property.
The motivation of government officials – to create a more “effective,” “centralized” and “professional” system of procurement able to function properly in “the market realities of the European Union,” shows an influence of European ideas (Sejm, 2009). In the words of a former MoD decision-maker “we are a part of a broader [European] system, and we want to adjust to it the best we can” (MoD interview, 2010). Not all reforms succeeded. By 2009 the fate of the draft law on the armaments agency, sent to parliament, seemed uncertain, because the economic crisis soured appetites for reforms. As a stop-gap measure, in August 2008, the MoD established a Weapons Market Analysis Office, designed to inform decision-makers about global weapons markets as well as help streamline procurement.

Thanks to the entry to the Code a Polish national secured a position of EDA deputy chief executive. Sikorski recalled that at one of the conferences Solana told him: “I would like to repay you for the manner in which you managed this issue. Poland will get a post of deputy chief of European Defence Agency.” Sikorski commented that this means that general Sowa, who led the process of negotiations with domestic stakeholders, would have influence over multi-billion contracts in the European defence industry (2007:163). Though, strictly speaking, a deputy EDA head owes loyalty to this organization, Poland has been rewarded for its downloading capacity by a potential to upload its preferences at one of the key sources of EU defence-industrial policy creation. That important post boosted the strength of the Polish representation at 113-strong EDA. Still, it numbered just 4 Polish nationals, mostly MoD secondees, none of whom, with the exception of the head of media and communication, occupied senior positions in that organization.
EDA hoped its Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB) would help inject transparency into procurement. Poland shared this goal, considering it useful in assisting its companies to expand their markets and operations in Western Europe. In the first year of its operation, from July 2006 to September 2007, Poland came second after France in terms of the number of contract opportunities it published on EDA’s Electronic Bulletin Board (Table 14).

Table 14  Notices published in the Electronic Bulletin Board per subscribing member state from 1 July 2006 to 24 September 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>Published Notices</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal, Lithuania, Slovakia</td>
<td>2 each</td>
<td>0.8% each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Luxemburg, Malta, Spain</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.0% each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>250</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Heuninckx 2008*

However, each contract awarded went to a Polish company (Heuninckx, 2008). From October 2007 to the end of 2009 the proportions did not change much. While this time Poland posted 32 contract opportunities as opposed to 45 in the previous period, which could be attributed to the economic crisis, 92% of contracts went to domestic companies.
Most of these Polish contractors subcontracted with local enterprises, while only few companies published notices for subcontractors on the EBB2 (Europe Economics, 2009). The situation was similar in other countries. National companies won 100% of contracts in Greece, Italy and Slovakia, 94% in the Czech Republic, while in France 77%, the UK 60%, Sweden 43% or the Netherlands which has a small industry 30%.

The cross-border industry bidding and awarding contracts to suppliers in another European country remains limited, but appears to be picking up. Until 2007 there were only two cases in which the tenders went to foreign producers (Bátora, 2009). By 2008, there were 26 cross-border contracts, though that is still a far cry when one considers that more than 320 contract opportunities had been published. Bulgaria, Estonia, Luxembourg, Latvia and Malta have not published any tenders on the EBB. Polish companies have not made as much use of the EBB as they could. The reasons have to do with an insufficient knowledge about EDA, inadequate English language skills of the managers as well as introverted attitudes of many of them (MoE interview, 2009). This introversion, looking up mainly to the MoD and the domestic market, has been evidenced by little interest of national defence producers in the opportunities afforded by EDA/EBB. For example, when the Polish economy ministry organized a seminar on EDA for defence industry representatives, few of them bothered to show up (MoE interview, 2010).

EDA’s efforts have been complemented at the same time by the Commission’s aimed at liberalizing the European defence market. In conjunction with other actors, such as the POLARM Council Working Group on a European Armaments Policy, and under
influence from business associations, like the Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (since 2007 the European Organisation for Security), the Commission has been hard at work to address the implications of the Janus-faced nature of the defence industry. It is both a market and a cornerstone of sovereignty in national defence matters. The Commission has aimed to restrict the interpretation of Article 296 TEU exempting armaments from the community competence. Since releasing in September 2004 its *Green Paper on Defence Procurement*, the Commission has framed this issue in the context of single market deregulation, or a negative integration. In December 2007, the Commission adopted the “defence package,” which included the *communication with recommendations for fostering the competitiveness of the sector*, a *proposal for a new directive on the coordination of procedures on defence procurement* and a *new directive simplifying terms and conditions of intra-EU transfers of defence products* (Konarzewska, 2008). After two years of negotiation, in July 2009 the Council adopted these directives in the hope this would strengthen the European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM). By summer 2011, Poland along with other EU member states will have transposed the new directives into national laws.

The crafting of Poland’s position on the Commission proposal provoked heated debates inside the government. In the end, the Polish government acquiesced to the proposals. First, Warsaw felt satisfied that the Commission outlined the future legislative framework for the defence industry in advance, because this allowed it to respond at home ahead of time (Konarzewska, 2008). Second, it was pleased that the procurement directive did not address relations with third parties. Entangled in the webs of defence-industrial deals with the United States, Warsaw was wary of any Commission attempts to
push for a *Buy European* regime. Third, as I will later discuss, the directives did not tackle the contentious issue of offset policy. This suited Poland as offset is seen, particularly by the economy ministry, as an important mechanism for modernization and Euro-Atlantic integration. And fourth, Poland felt assured by the attention the Commission paid to the role of small and medium enterprises, just as EDA had done (Ibid.). The government realized that its defence industrial policy needed to be adjusted in view of what was being designed in Brussels. Therefore, the changes had been made in the context of European policy developments at two levels: voluntary pillar II-level initiatives and reinforcing binding pillar I initiatives with regards to EDEM. Without the policy reinforcement from the Commission, it is doubtful whether an intergovernmental EDA’s pressure alone would have sufficed to bring about domestic changes.

The creation of the EDA/Commission-managed European defence procurement regime addresses the methodology of intra-European procurement, but it does not affect the choice of suppliers. In particular, it does not presume restricting EU member states’ purchases of US arms and military equipment. Such a move would have been resisted by Poland. As Table 15 shows, in the early 2000s, it purchased a lot of American products, just as the UK and to a lesser extent other EU member states have done. These importers have therefore resisted creating policies based on the “fortress Europe” concept.
### Table 15  Poland's major military purchases (2000-2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Type / Quantity</th>
<th>Supplier</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Date of decision / awarding of contract</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>RBS - 15 SF anti-ship missile / 24</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>10 million US$</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>navy frigates / 5</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Donation</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>MSTAR ground surveillance radar / 22</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>approx. 10 million US$</td>
<td>2000 / 2nd order – 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Leopard 2A4 main battle tanks / 128</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Donation</td>
<td>July 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>EADS-CASA C-295 tactical military transport aircraft / 12</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>212 million US$</td>
<td>28 Aug. 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>RAT-315/L air surveillance radar / 3</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>90 million US$</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>SH-2G Super Seasprite helicopter</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Donation</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>TACTICOS naval combat systems</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>76 million €</td>
<td>1 Aug. 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Light torpedoes</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>26 million €</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Koben class submarines / 4</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Donation</td>
<td>Feb. 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Rosomak armoured modular / fighting vehicles / 690</td>
<td>Finland (licenser)</td>
<td>1,25 billion US$</td>
<td>Dec. 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>MiG-29 (fighter jets from the former East Germany) / 23</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Donation</td>
<td>Spring 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Hercules C-130E/5</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Donation</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Hitfist turrets for AMVs / 313</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>231 million US$</td>
<td>July 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Spike anti-tank guided missile / 2,675</td>
<td>Israel (licenser)</td>
<td>397 million US$</td>
<td>29 Dec. 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Orbiter mini-UAV / 6</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>3 million US$</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Schmitt 2004 and author’s data

The transatlantic trade in military goods and armaments cooperation in general is a sensitive issue. The West European arms producers are not happy with US export control and protectionist measures, exemplified by the "Buy American" provision in the *American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009*. Outside the context of the economic crisis, the US regulatory framework can have a strong impact on the EU defence-industrial policy. If European defence equipment includes US manufactured components and technology, it is subject to the US International Trade in Arms regulations (ITAR), which may act as a stranglehold on European technology transfers and exports (ECORYS, 2010). *A Strategy for the European Defence Technological and Industrial*
Base, drafted in 2007 by EDA and member states, including Poland, affirms that: “We do not envision this EDTIB of the future as a “fortress Europe”, excluding imports from, or cooperation with, overseas defence industries. But we recognise that the problem of accessing the US defence market, and of establishing balanced technology exchange across the Atlantic, make it natural and necessary for Europeans to cooperate more closely to ensure the future of their own DTIB” (EDA, 14 May 2007:2). The authors concur that “Over time, reduced dependence on non-EU sources for key technologies will help” (Ibid., 5).

Eager to strengthen Poland’s European credentials and at the same time keep the transatlantic avenue open, the Polish officials reject European-only procurement. If procurement is indeed “intimately connected with alliance patterns,” as Neumann and Heikka suggest, then Poland’s large-scale purchases from the US accord with its identity-rooted balancing of the Atlanticist and European options in security policy (2005:17). Following accession to NATO, Poland actively sought defence investments and advanced technology transfers from the United States. First, in 2002, the Polish government decided to buy the F-16 multi-purpose fighter jet as the basic aircraft of the Polish Air Force to meet NATO Target Force Goals. This “contract of the century,” interpreted as a testimony to Poland’s Atlanticist orientation, was criticized in Europe. Undeterred the government hoped the implementation of the accompanying offset would radically transform the Polish defence industry (Domisiewicz, 2003). In view of tight US controls over technology transfers, such hopes turned out to be largely unfounded. Six years later, Warsaw expressed the same hopes in connection with the missile defence (MD)
agreement, accompanied by a declaration on strategic cooperation, *inter alia* in defence-industrial and technology areas, it signed with the outgoing Bush administration.

Polish experts argue that the expectations with regards to the defence-industrial cooperation with the US have not borne fruit (Former senior MoD official interview, 2009). Many officials have recognized that transatlantic asymmetry stands in the way of partner-cooperation. They argue that the US policy, through Foreign Military Financing and other programs assisting Poland to acquire US military hardware, have actually fostered dependence on Washington (Ibid.; EDA interview, 2009). Poland felt unnerved by the Obama administration's decision to drop the Bush-era MD design, and the timing when it was communicated to Warsaw - on the day of the anniversary of the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland. It seemed at the time to dash hopes of deriving benefits for Polish defence industry from the installation of missile interceptors. This would add to another lack of success – Poland's inability to draw substantial benefits from F-16 offsets. Part of the reason has had to do with a stringent approach of Lockheed Martin to technology sharing and another with a weakness of state capacity. In the view of the Supreme Control Chamber – a top Polish bureaucracy watchdog – the "less than fully satisfactory level of results from offset on account of a deal with Lockheed Martin is a consequence of mistakes made by the Polish side in 2003-2006 at the stage of negotiating the terms of the offset agreement and especially an erroneous selection of commitments that came with it initially" (MoE interview, 2009). Representatives of the Polish defence industry also drew lessons from this experience. In their 2007 submission to the government they stated that: "due to both the scale as well as legal restrictions in the US, a more natural partner in these endeavours [an international cooperation] is European industry." Only as

232
a part of cooperative European ventures could Polish companies attempt to pursue transatlantic cooperation (Polish Industrial Lobby, 2007). In other words, while Poland has not lost hope of benefiting from cooperation with the US, learning-by-doing has taught it to reduce expectations, improve state capacity and look for opportunities closer to home. Poland could at the same time leverage this EU cooperation to get a better deal in relations with the US.

III.4. Offset Policy

A comparison of the approach to offset policy in the EU, fostered both by EDA and the European Commission, with Poland’s illustrates the limitations of Europeanization in the face of critical capacity constraints. Offset is a compensation demanded by weapons-purchasing states as a condition for the sale to take place. It comes usually in two varieties – direct and indirect. The former is a demand for the exporter of equipment to integrate weaponry parts, assembly or other production or supply arrangements involving the importer’s defence industry, to the value it demands. Indirect offset goes beyond compensatory investments in defence industry itself, to include also those in civilian industrial sectors of the economy. Offset is expressed in terms of a percentage value of the purchase price.

The offset was originally devised by Canada for military purchases from the United States, thence spread to other countries. When the end of the Cold War brought large defence spending to a halt, markets became glutted with weapons surpluses, leaving the purchasing states in an excellent position to dictate the terms of trade. In effect, offset became prevalent. Moreover, instead of compensatory investments being limited to the weapons produced and defence industry, the interpretation of offset widened, and this led
to weapons sellers being pressured to invest in altogether unrelated areas of the economy (MoE interview, 2009). Although the individual EU member states approaches to offset differ, they consider Article 296 as giving them a free rein in this regard. Because of its market-distorting power, however, in recent years a tendency within the EU has emerged to curb the resort to offset. The preference of the European Commission, which has challenged the legality of such an interpretation of Article 296, has been to phase it out entirely, but if it were not politically feasible, then to establish more uniform, transparent rules with regards to its application. The latter course of action has been favoured by the European Defence Agency. Their push has been backed by France and Britain, Europe’s biggest defence exporters.

Due to the protectionist benefits afforded by offset, Poland has seized on it. It is an approach associated strongly with second-tier players in armaments policy. Mawdsley sees offset requirements as a policy of choice of “small states” eager to strengthen their own defence-industrial potential and/or to limit balance of payments deficit from the purchase of weapons from foreign suppliers (2008:382-3, fn. 10). The Polish government, however, has not been of a single mind on offset. The Ministry of Economy has advocated maintaining it, while the Ministry of Defence, as a customer of defence equipment, has argued the opposite. Both institutions have reached a modus vivendi. It was reflected in Poland’s pro-offset position during EDA negotiations on the Code of Conduct on Offsets. Polish offset policy is nonetheless being gradually adapted, but it owes more to domestic efforts to ensure policy effectiveness in the face of EU-level modifications than normative isomorphism.
One of the key ends, to which Poland has used offset policy has been to foster an integration of Polish defence industry with western armaments producers, an important aspect of the restructuring of the Polish defence industry. Although the word "offset" first appeared in Polish industrial quarters in the early 1980s, it was only at the end of the 1980s that the first deals, involving civilian aircraft purchases from French-Italian ATR and American Boeing, were accompanied by compensating deliveries negotiated under both industry and government pressure. In the early 1990s the government put additional pressure put on Boeing to support the Polish aviation industry, in the doldrums following the cessation of deliveries to the USSR.

It was not until close to the middle of the 1990s that offsets began to be treated as a matter of policy rather than a tactical device to address politico-economic exigencies (Czerwiński 1998). It was formally given legal basis in 1999 in The Act on certain compensation agreements concluded in connection with supply contracts for deliveries for the purposes of defence and security of the state (MoE website). The law stipulates that an offset agreement must accompany a contract for the delivery of armaments or military equipment valued more than €5 m by one foreign supplier over a period of three years. The total value of the offset agreement must not be lower than the value of the supply contract, and the value of direct offset must not be lower than half the value of the total offset agreement (Europe Economics, 2009). The offset package constitutes 10% of the criteria on which an offer is assessed. When the MoD receives a bid it sends details of the offset package to the Ministry of Economy for evaluation. The scorecard includes the

---

41 The overview of Polish offset policy draws largely upon an interview in 2009 with a Ministry of Economy official who shared an insider's perspectives on the negotiations of both the EU directive as well as EDA's Code of Conduct on Offsets, cross-referenced by insights from MoD officials.
degree of involvement of Polish defence industry in production, supply chain or assembly as well as the attractiveness from the view of national needs of the intended – if any – technology transfer. A direct offset carries the biggest multipliers.

Virtually all large weapons purchases in 1999-2008 involved offsets. As Table 16 shows in 2008 the value of all offset projects underway in Poland reached $9 billion.

**Table 16 The offset agreements in Poland as of 30th December 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Foreign supplier</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Signed</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>EADS Construcciones Aeronauticas, Spain</td>
<td>connected with the delivery of C295M transport aircrafts for the Polish Air Force</td>
<td>28 Aug. 2001</td>
<td>385.06 million $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>GEIE Eurotorp, France</td>
<td>the delivery of light torpedoes for the Polish Navy</td>
<td>13 Dec. 2001</td>
<td>26.99 million €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>THALES Nederland B.V., Netherlands</td>
<td>the delivery of systems for ORKAN class ships for the Polish Navy</td>
<td>21 Dec. 2001</td>
<td>76.28 million €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lockheed Martin Corporation, USA</td>
<td>the delivery of F-16 fighters for the Polish Air Force</td>
<td>18 Apr. 2003</td>
<td>6,028 billion $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Patria Vehicles Oy, Finland</td>
<td>the delivery of Armoured Wheeled Vehicles (AMV) for the Polish Armed Forces</td>
<td>1 July 2003</td>
<td>482 million €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Oto Melara S.p.A, Italy</td>
<td>the delivery of Armoured Wheeled Vehicles (AMV) for the Polish Armed Forces</td>
<td>1 July 2003</td>
<td>308.71 million €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Rafael Armament Development Authority Ltd., Israel</td>
<td>the delivery of Anti-Tank Guided Missiles for the Polish Armed Forces</td>
<td>17 Feb. 2004</td>
<td>440 million $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Harris Corporation, USA</td>
<td>the delivery of digital manpack and vehicle radio stations, communication systems components and spare parts for the Polish Armed Forces</td>
<td>28 Sept. 2006</td>
<td>25.77 million $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Nammo Raufoss AS, Norway</td>
<td>the delivery of ammunition caliber 12.7 mm and 30 mm for the Polish Armed Forces</td>
<td>3 Oct. 2006</td>
<td>70.96 million €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Saab Bofors Dynamics AB, Sweden</td>
<td>the delivery of RBS 15 Mk3 missile for the Polish Navy</td>
<td>6 Oct. 2006</td>
<td>127.3 million €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Avio S.p.A, Italy</td>
<td>the delivery of gas turbine for corvette project 621</td>
<td>15 Feb. 2007</td>
<td>9.76 million €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Satlynx, Luxembourg</td>
<td>the delivery of satellite terminals for the Polish Armed Forces</td>
<td>22 Oct. 2008</td>
<td>17.29 million €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Pratt&amp;Whitney, Canada</td>
<td>the delivery of engines for M28 Bryza aircraft</td>
<td>10 Dec. 2008</td>
<td>25.50 mln $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Terma, Denmark</td>
<td>the delivery of passive defense system for M28 Bryza aircraft</td>
<td>10 Dec. 2008</td>
<td>15.70 mln $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Rockwell Collins, USA</td>
<td>the delivery of M28 Bryza aircraft avionics</td>
<td>10 Dec. 2008</td>
<td>31.97 mln $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Kongsberg, Norway</td>
<td>the delivery of the naval strike missile (NSM) system for the Polish Navy</td>
<td>30 Dec. 2008</td>
<td>345 mln PLN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Polish Ministry of Economy 2009
One evidence of the degree to which offset has been considered a means of boosting defence industry is that, averaging 167.7%, Poland’s offset requirement as a percentage of the underlying contract value was the highest of all the EU importers of US defence products (Europe Economics, 2009). Thanks to offsets the Polish aviation sector has become a manufacturer of components for a global aerospace supply chain, producing inter alia engines and other components for the F-16 and F-18 fighter jets as well as civil aircraft built by Airbus, Boeing, Bombardier and Gulfstream (Ibid.; TNO, 2009:21). These products count towards Polish defence exports to the West (as shown in Table 13).

As already noted, there are differences on this issue between the ministries of economy and defence. Ever since former defence minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz enunciated in late 1990s that he is “a minister of defence, not a minister of the defence industry,” his successors have stuck to this view. Thinking as befits customers, defence ministers have repeatedly said they are interested in procuring the best equipment – regardless of its origin or the offset sweeteners. In MoD’s view, offset procedures delay transactions by an average of three months and inevitably increase costs. For this reason offset should be gradually phased out (MoE interview, 2009; Polish EU mission interview, 2009; EDA interview, 2009).

As the guardian of a well-being of the economy, the economy ministry thinks offset is necessary to benefit the defence industry from arms procurement. In its view, offset should be considered an “invitation” for foreign producers to cooperate with Polish companies. Instead of treating Poland as merely a market, they should look carefully at what the Poles have to offer and establish durable business relationships (Ibid). For

---

42 The only departure seems minister Bogdan Klich’s overtures to the defence industry in 2008-2009.
Poland with a post-transition economy but still liberalizing and catching up with the EU-15, offset contributes to economic growth and job creation. While textbook economics suggests offset may distort the Polish market by benefiting inefficient producers, since a lot of Polish arms makers have few comparative advantages, it may have a positive spin-off for the economy overall. As a report commissioned by the European Commission stated: when (thanks to offset) Polish firms become subcontractors they enter western supply chains which they otherwise would not have had a chance to penetrate (TNO, 2009).

It is difficult to speak of an emergent strong EU norm with regards to offset since there are intra-EU differences on this question. While big defence producers and exporters, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, would gladly do away with offset, many other West European states regard it as an indispensable part of their defence-industrial policy. Belgium, partly for economic and partly political reasons, abandoned it in 2001. Three years later, it reversed policy under domestic pressure when an estimated 4,500 defence jobs were lost as a result of offset not being enforced (Mawdsley, 2008). For some EU members offset remains “an essential fact of life.” For the European Commission officials, particularly in DG Market and DG Enterprise and Industry, it is viewed only as a detriment to competition. In contrast, DG Relex staff has a more politically informed and thus less doctrinaire view of offset (Security & Defence Agenda, 2007:6-7 fn. 2). France does not have a formal policy on offsets, and Germany does not accept offset as a matter of policy, although it has resorted to offsets, both on the import and export side (TNO, 2009; Mawdsley and Brzoska, 2004). Other EU members lacking in regulations on offset are: Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands and the
The remainder have legally binding offset policies, though each country has distinct preferences for either direct or indirect military offset, or indirect civil offsets. Poland and Finland, for example, because they have ambitions to develop their defence technological and industrial base, prefer direct military offset even though it incurs major additional purchasing costs. In turn, smaller countries are happy with indirect civil offsets (Europe Economics Chancery House, 2009).

Because armaments are a buyer’s not a seller’s market, there has not been bidding down of offsets within the EU. A race to the bottom takes place only insofar as export standards are concerned. It is the defence companies that try to outbid each other in crafting the most enticing offset package to potential customers (New York Times, 2003).

The issue of offset raised controversy during EDA’s work on the 2007 Strategy for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. The member states agreed to disagree on this issue, stating: “This issue requires further study and analysis and will need careful consideration over time” (EDA, 2007). EDA pressed on. It ordered a study to investigate the impact of offset on the market, which was produced that same year. It revealed that, between 2000 and 2006 offsets applied to 50% of the EU imports of military equipments averaging as much as 135%. Of these 40% were direct, 35% indirect military and 25% were non-defence offsets (EDA, 2007). It found that on the whole offset was an impediment to the market, but, like the EDTIB Strategy it found that there may be conditions where such arrangements could help member states develop their defence-industry skills and linkages. Still, it recommended that steps be taken to mitigate the impact of offset on competition and the EDTIB.
To bring about convergence in offset regulations, and minimize their market distorting power, both the Commission and EDA endeavoured to bring about EU-level change in this policy. This effort had been spearheaded at EDA by its first head, Nick Whitney, an official from the UK, a major arms exporter. During negotiations on the Code of Conduct on Offsets Polish representatives in the offset working group, backed by colleagues from Greece and Portugal, also big importers, advocated that the document be non-specific and non-binding. France and Germany, on the other hand, wanted it to be detailed, defining direct versus indirect offset as well as its application (MoE interview, 2009).

In a compromise outcome, agreed in October 2008, the parties adopted only a 3 page-long non-binding, fairly general document which reconciles divergent interests. The Code of Conduct acknowledges that offsets are a global phenomenon. However, it calls for “closer convergence of offset policies” to increase “transparency and mutual confidence” (EDA, 24 Oct. 2008). While EDA member states were said to be “working towards the creation of market conditions and a European industry in which offsets may no longer be needed,” they committed to mitigating in the short-term the adverse impact of offsets on cross-border competition (Ibid.). The Code stipulates that foreign suppliers should not be required to provide offset at more than 100% of the contract value. Arguing they needed time to adjust national policies to this provision, national armaments directors agreed to defer the application of this ceiling until 15 October 2010 (Ibid.). Because Polish law allows for total offset obligations of greater value, this provision has stimulated adjustments in the national offset regime. The Code allows offset to remain
one of the criteria for the assessment of the sale offer, though it must not be a decisive one.

The Polish ministry of economy advised the Polish Council of Ministers to ratify the *Code of Conduct* for political reasons. Because it was part of the package of rules on a new procurement regime, it did not want Poland to lose face in the EU. However, the economy ministry insisted that Polish arguments be taken into account in the phase of its implementation or any future work in this sphere. Because EDA remains an intergovernmental organization, and thus there is always a possibility to exercise veto power, Polish politicians have been reassured that their country’s interests remain protected.

In turn, the European Commission’s determination to rationalise offset policies, and, if it had its way, eliminate them altogether appeared more problematic to the Poles. First, because of Poland’s low level of network capital as well as a dearth of Polish nationals at the Commission, influencing the policy process in the Commission is more challenging than at EDA. Second, unlike the EDA which does not have legal powers to sanction non-compliance, the Commission possesses legal instruments to demand transposition of its directives into national law (WEU, Dec. 2009). Because the passage of the EDA *Code* reflected the member states’ lowest-common-denominator agreement, de facto pre-empting action by the Commission, the latter’s resolute move to address this issue irrespective of what EDA had done provoked fresh debate. In December 2005, the European Commission came up with, among other things, proposals to issue an interpretive communication on Article 296, aimed at limiting its scope, as well as to submit two directives, one of which dealt with defence procurement (Ibid.).
A working group on procurement was later set up in Brussels to tackle this issue. Poland sent an official from the Office of Public Procurement to represent it, later joined by a representative of the economy ministry at the latter's insistence. At the same time, a coordinating working group, composed of staff from the Office of Public Procurement as well as ministries of economy, national defence and foreign affairs and police was set up in Warsaw to monitor the process in the Commission and shape Poland’s policy position. The instructions worked out in the course of interdepartmental consultations were communicated to Poland’s negotiator in the EU working group. Though the ministry of defence was not keen on offset, the economy ministry’s view, set in a broader context of domestic politico-economic considerations, prevailed. Thus, Poland was adamant not to lose offset as a crucial instrument for stimulating defence-industrial development. Although Poland insisted on offset being acceptable as one of criteria for assessing defence contracts, its view was backed only by Portugal (MoE interview, 2009).

In its final shape the Commission directive did not address offset. This could be interpreted as de facto, but not de jure rejection of offset. However, without a clear judgment or legal interpretation the issue remains, as Polish economy ministry official put it, a “grey zone” (MoE interview, 2009). The directive, however, will make it much harder for member states to apply article 296 to defence procurement unless there is a persuasive justification that national interests are at stake. This will prevent member states from shielding market-distorting practices, like offset, behind it.

Poland found itself isolated on offset, because, even though a majority of EU countries maintain offset requirements, the thinking about offset is slowly changing in the European Union. Yet, even though there is supranational agency involved, the policy
shaping role by the European Commission, does not suffice to bring all the EU member states into line. In the absence of a strong enough convergence of political will in sensitive realms of defence policy, a supranational agency alone cannot strongly influence Europeanization. The gradual change of approach towards offset that there is, though, begins to make its mark on Polish defence-industrial policy. A ministry of economy official told me that should there be an EU pressure to get rid of offset Poland would have no choice but to comply. However, it is a situation it would not like to face. Inspired by EU-level developments the offset department at the economy ministry has started drafting a new conceptual document, entitled tentatively “The Strategic Directions of Offset Policy,” to be adopted in the first quarter of 2010. It should, as I was told, “translate what is happening in the EU into national regulations” (MoE interview, 2009).

III.5. Restructuring the defence industry

Polish decision-makers began to tackle defence-industrial reform at the end of the 1990s. There was a desire to address a deep performance crisis linked to the modernization of the armed forces after Poland entered NATO. The successive government strategies have reflected the concerns of Polish elites that the European market might split into producers and buyers – with Poland relegated to the latter category (Domisiewicz, 2005). The politicians wanted to raise the competitiveness of the Polish defence industry and enhance the high-tech end of its output, which would make it an attractive partner for international collaboration. A voluntary emulation has been evidenced in the attempts to address serious capacity constraints.

Admittedly, individual EU member states have taken different approaches with regards to defence industrial restructuring. As far as the ownership structure is concerned
the Swedes have been happy to sell the majority of their companies to foreign buyers. In contrast, the French government, in line with a *dirigiste* tradition, has kept “golden shares” in the companies that went on the stock market (Markowski & Wylie, 2007). The support for “national champions” has been a common thread in defence-industrial policies of many EU members, particularly in the 1990s. As regards to international collaboration the United Kingdom has felt comfortable deepening links with the United States, while France – at least in rhetoric - has been pushing for greater European autonomy. Each EU member state has also had different traditions of government-industry relations. In ideal-type terms, France has cultivated the cosiest relationship. Its influential Directorate General of Armaments (DGA) has combined three missions of a *customer*, a *policy* architect, and a *technological and industrial* generator (Serfaty, 2001).

At the opposite end of the spectrum, Britain and Sweden have pursued generally a *laissez-faire* approach towards the industry.

In Poland, the collapse of communism brought an end to a system of direct interface between the armed forces and the defence industry (RUSI, 2008). Only in recent years as part of the adaptation of the defence-industrial policy to EDA, have steps been taken to bridge the gap between the MoD and defence industry. In 2005, the Polish defence minister formed an advisory National Armaments Council. It includes a subordinated body Scientific-Industrial Group, staffed by industry representatives, providing the defence minister with advice on procurement or R&D issues (MoD, March 2005). Three years later, then deputy defence minister tried to strengthen the interface between the MoD and the industry by creating the Department for Cooperation with Industry at the MoD. However, the proposal got nowhere as it was tied to broader reforms, including
setting up the national armaments agency, which also got stalled (MFA interview, 2010). These attempts at reconfiguring government-industry relations, a part and parcel of defence-industrial reforms, may be attributable to Europeanization.

Notwithstanding individual differences among EU members, the general trend has been towards first national consolidation of the defence industry, then privatization or otherwise reducing state control as the first step before European consolidation. The EU member states have been influencing one another as much as they have been influenced by what has been happening elsewhere – mostly on the other side of the Atlantic. Although, as Kluth notes, national consolidation has been an ongoing process in the European defence industry since the fifties, it accelerated in the 1990s. The trigger was the state-orchestrated consolidation in the United States, which left six large corporations in an excellent position vis-à-vis their European competitors (2009). The fear of acquisitions by Americans drove both European governments and firms they supported to draw strength from a “critical mass”. The pressures for consolidation have been also domestic though arising from a strategic environment, namely the post-Cold War shrinking of defence budgets. Through access to private capital, greater corporate flexibility and more efficient management, privatization became the means of raising competitiveness of the industry as well as facilitating cross-border mergers. The final stage of restructuring has involved the rise of European collaborative procurement, R&D and production ventures.

There have been bottom-up and top-down developments. On the one hand, companies have sought to find both outlets for excess capacities and research funding outside of national borders. This has driven the process of defence industrial integration through
joint ventures or transnational consortia, such as the creation of BAE Systems in the UK and the first pan-European defence multinational EADS in 2000. On the other hand, eager to spread the cost of procurement of ever more advanced, RMA-driven and thus expensive equipment, and keen to underpin CSDP with an EDTIB, the EU governments have also supported collaboration. In a case of minilateralism, in July 2000, the six largest European arms makers France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom signed a Framework Agreement about the restructuring of the European defence industry. For some advocates of EDTIB, the notion of a "European defence identity" was a convenient smokescreen behind which lay a desire to improve competitive terms vis-à-vis the United States. The Europeanization of the civilian industry sectors rendered isolated pockets of the defence industry anachronistic, especially, in the context of the single market agenda. This provided another boost for European consolidation. Other stimuli included the Commission’s efforts to liberalize the defence market and shape R&D policies in support of European technological networks as well as policies on dual-use technologies and export controls (Kluth, 2009).

The Europeanization through negative integration, or removing obstacles to competition to facilitate the single market, championed by the Commission and reinforced by other drivers of change has not, however, brought a significant convergence in national armaments policies. The norm of marketization and consolidation is not strongly anchored. Kluth argues that divergent identities of the EU member states have stood in the way. In his opinion, "notions of the character and desirable direction of European integration, rooted in domestic foreign policy identities, differ tremendously and affect the extent to which major Western European powers embrace changing
perceptions of sovereignty prompting them to maintain national control of defence industrial and technological assets" (Kluth, 2009:22). At the end of the day, joint military purchases accounted for only 18% of $35 billion EU member states spend on defence procurement (Polskie Lobby Przemysłowe, 2007).

Between 1990 and 2007 successive Polish governments adopted 6 defence industry restructuring strategies. All those developed prior to 2002 had been half-baked concepts, none of which had been fully implemented (Solidarity, 2009). The first strategy tying together privatization and offset, as well as declaring cooperation of Polish companies with NATO and EU member states an important policy objective, was adopted in 1999. It had a limited impact. One of the reasons was that the lawmakers, representing a conservative syndicalist coalition government, set very restrictive conditions for privatizing companies. As a result, only two were sold, going off to foreign buyers – one was acquired by EADS/CASA and another by Pratt&Whitney Canada, a subsidiary of an American United Technologies Corporation. However, because the two companies had been leading players in the Polish aviation sector, this defence industrial sector has now become controlled to a large extent by foreign entities, and, in turn integrated with a European aviation sector. Though it has had mixed success, the choice of privatization as a policy option was an important breakthrough in Poland, where the defence industry had been perceived as an integral element of national defence and state sovereignty.

A new program, adopted this time by a left-wing coalition in 2002, the Strategy of Structural Transformation of the Defence Industrial Potential in 2002-2005 moved away from privatization towards strengthening industry through consolidation. This consolidation model, with two holding groups (or “capital groups”) - the national
champion Bumar and Industrial Development Agency (ARP), has predominated (Behr and Siwiecki, 2004). The strategy still envisaged privatizing 13 companies outside either of these holding groups, but not before they underwent restructuring, a process in which their share of military manufacturing capacities would be transferred to Bumar. This means that as a result of the strategy the state would remain an owner of the majority of the Polish defence industry (Ibid.). By supporting domestic mergers and acquisitions benefiting the “national champion,” the Polish government was attempting to catch up with the consolidation trends that had been a feature of the West European defence industry. This was evidenced also in increasing government funding for the industry, either directly or through tax relief schemes and credit or long-term procurement guarantees, after years of undercapitalization. The scale of that support though, has obviously been much smaller than the benefits enjoyed for decades by Western European companies.

The most recent defence industrial restructuring program adopted by Poland was produced under domestic pressure to adapt the defence industry to the emerging European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM). *The Strategy of the Consolidation and Support for the Development of Polish Defence Industry in 2007-2012*, agreed to by the Polish Council of Ministers on 31 August 2007, states that the directions and dynamics of changes in Poland’s international environment must be taken into account in the government strategy for the defence sector (Strategia, 2007). It focuses again on strengthening the “national champion,” Bumar, so that it would be able to compete successfully for contracts at home and in the European markets (MoD, Aug. 2006). As a result of government actions the industry today remains concentrated around Bumar,
though there are some thriving small private enterprises (Europe Economics, 2009). The Bumar Group plans to float its shares on the stock market in 2012 (Kogan, 2008).

Ten years since 1999, the Polish defence industry was smaller, consolidated, better connected with Western Europe, enjoyed greater support from the government and had better export earnings. The government has created the national champion Bumar in the hopes that giving it greater critical mass would improve the odds of it making it in the European defence-industrial co-operation. Though the emulation process has been driven by domestic interests, Europe has increasingly provided the point of reference for national policy. In practice, the integration of Polish companies in European networks has been spurred for the most part by offset agreements accompanying major armaments projects of the last decade (especially US F-16 fighter jets, Spanish medium-ailift EADS CASA 295M aircraft, Finnish Rosomak armoured personnel carrier and Israeli Spike anti-armour missiles). This integration has progressed farthest in the aerospace sector, the most privatized branch of defence industry, mirroring the same development elsewhere in Europe, while the land systems market, for the most part in state hands, has lagged behind just as in Western Europe. As I will describe in the next section, EU-led defence research and development initiatives is growing up to be another trigger for an increased enmeshment of Polish companies and R&D institutes in European networks. Thanks to defence-industrial restructuring, windfalls from Iraq, new Asian contracts as well as government support, after a near collapse in arms exports in the early 1990s, in 2007 Polish arms producers enjoyed $135m in export earnings, returning to the top 10 (in 9th position) ranking of European exporters (TNO, 2009).
III.6. Defence R&D

In the 1990s Polish research and development institutes shared the fate of the defence industry. They were starved of funds and lacked opportunities to bring their innovations to industrial production. The entry to NATO at the end of that decade was therefore perceived as a blessing that would contribute to revitalizing R&D at home and developing cooperative links with EU-15 and North America. In 1999 the Polish government and R&D sector representatives gained seats in such NATO agencies as the Research & Technology Organization (RTO), Research & Technology Agency (RTA), NATO Undersea Research Centre (NURSC), NATO C3A Agency, NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) and the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD).

Joining the majority of other EU NATO members, Poland assumed participation in many NATO projects to generate defence capabilities. It has been involved in inter alia Missile Defence, Airborne Early Warning & Control (NAEW&C), Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC), Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI), Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) and Defence Against Terrorism (DAT) programs (MoD 28 May 2009). Polish officials who have taken part in Allied R&D ventures admit that the expectations concerning NATO’s ability to revitalize Polish R&D and the defence industry have not borne fruit (EDA interview, 2009). Defence-industrial co-operation has not been the purpose of the Alliance. However hard NATO tried to promote convergence in those aspects of defence industrial policy impacting upon interoperability, it could not enforce member state commitments. Moreover, West European countries have suspected that whether it is the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) or other NATO programs, one of their main intents has been to push American sales. Poland had yet to acquire that perspective that comes with experience as NATO member (EDA interview, 2009). Polish
companies have admittedly benefited from the implementation of 115 NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) projects on Polish territory. Until 2007 about €418 million were invested in these projects under a co-financing scheme, in which the NATO share of the costs was about €189 million (Senate, May 2008). However, an overwhelming majority of these projects address the modernization of infrastructure as opposed to defence R&T.

In this context of failed expectations, EDA provided an alternative “policy solution” to address domestic capacity constraints. Poland thought that its R&D institutes would benefit from participating in brand-new European projects in a more level-playing field, which EDA, as a new organization, was thought to guarantee. In order to enhance domestic capacity and at the same time raise its standing in CSDP just after it entered the EU, Poland seized opportunities to benefit from EDA-facilitated R&D collaboration. The aim of this collaboration has been to supply the member states’ armed forces with scarce albeit necessary capabilities they would otherwise have difficulty developing on their own, or might find the cost of going alone prohibitive.

The Poles have therefore participated in the work supervised by EDA Capabilities Directorate, which picked up where ECAP left off. The Directorate supervises six Integrated Development Teams (IDT) addressing capability deficits in the areas of: command and control (IDT Command); information-sharing and intelligence (IDT Inform); force deployment (IDT Deploy); engagement (IDT Engage); force protection (IDT Protect); and force sustainability (DT Sustain). The Poles participate in all of these IDTs through meetings of national experts responsible for the development of specific capabilities. Once a consensus is reached at the conceptualization stage to develop a
project, the Project Teams are set up. They then come up with concrete suggestions whether to proceed into R&D, supervised by EDA Research and Technology Directorate, or turn a concept into actual armaments production overseen by EDA Armaments Directorate. By 2009 Poland had representatives in all Project Teams. In addition, EDA supervises the so-called CapTech groups that are essentially networks of experts dealing with technology questions that are ripe for military application through collaborative projects. Poland had representatives from MoD and the MoD-subordinated Military Institute of Technology in 9 of 12 CapTechs in 3 groups reflecting three major capability domains: knowledge – Information Acquisition and Processing (IAP); engagement – Guidance, Energy and Materials (GEM) and manoeuvre – Environment, Systems and Modeling (ESM) (MoD, Oct. 2009; EDA website).

When in 2006 EDA launched its first R&D program – the Joint Investment Programme Force Protection (JIP FP) – Poland contributed as much as €10 m towards the budget of €54 m. Poland made this contribution, equal to France’s and Germany’s each, intending to thus underline its commitment to European cooperation. The Polish MoD said it supported increasing investment in defence R&T generally and specifically in European efforts, “critical for helping the EU to develop the capabilities required for future operations” (MoD, Oct. 2006). In 2007, Poland signed on to four other programs, contributing €13.1 million. By 2009, it was participating in 16 EDA programs and

43 These are: satellite communication (PT SATCOM); command and communication (PT CIS); program-defined radio (PT SDR); information operations (PT OPINT); strategic transport (PT ST); 21st century soldier (PT 21stCSS); identification and monitoring of CBRN contamination (PT CBRNDIM); protection against CBRN explosives (PT CBRNEOD); maritime surveillance (PT MARSUR); military medicine (PT MEDICAL); the establishment of a European strategic transport fleet (PT EATF); as well as base protection (PT CAMP PROTECTION) (Wiercinski, 2009).
projects at a contribution of some €22 million. The biggest six programs for which data is available, are listed in Table 17.

Table 17  Poland in EDA R&D programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Total Budget (€)</th>
<th>Polish Contribution (€)</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Lead Polish Agencies/Companies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Category A Programs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Investment Programme on Force Protection (JIP FP)</td>
<td>55 mln</td>
<td>10 mln</td>
<td>2007-2009</td>
<td>Military University of Technology (WAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Investment Programme on Innovative Concepts and Emerging Technologies (ICET)</td>
<td>15.5 mln</td>
<td>720,000</td>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>Warsaw University of Technology (PW), University of Science and Technology (AGH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Category B Programs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Secure Software Defined Radio (ESSOR)</td>
<td>118 mln</td>
<td>10 mln</td>
<td>2008-2011</td>
<td>RADMOR S.A.,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmanned Ground Tactical Vehicle (UGTV)</td>
<td>1.3 mln</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>Industrial Research Institute for Automation and Measurements (PIAP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Protection System Study for Armoured Fighting Vehicles (APSS)</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>Military Institute of Armament Technology (WITU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Establishment and Management of a Common Database of B-agents</td>
<td>6.6 mln</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>2008-2010</td>
<td>Military Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology (WIHiE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL COMMITMENTS</strong></td>
<td>197.2 mln</td>
<td>21.72 mln</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Wierciński 2009a, Wierciński 2009b with author's slight alterations

The “A” category programs, like JIP FP, are those that are initiated by a majority of EDA members or EDA executive director and having a budget, to which in principle all EDA member states contribute. “B” category programs are run by several countries that

"Other projects, in which Poland has been involved, include: European Network Enabled Armoured Fighting Vehicle (ENEA); Fluorescence Applied to BIOLogical Agents Detection – FABIOLA; Biological Equipment Development and Enhancement Programme – BIO EDEP; Stand-off Detection of IED – FaaSap X; Passive Protection Against IED; Future Unmanned Aerial System – FUAS; and Maritime Mine Counter-Measure – MMCM (MoD, May 2009).
put forward an idea and contribute towards a common budget. The biggest B program, with Poland on board, is the six-country European Secure Software Defined Radio (ESSOR) development. In a step indicating synergies between multilateral armaments initiatives EDA has entrusted its management to OCCAR.

As Poland's contribution to the JIP FP program shows, the pursuit of European R&D collaboration has been politically motivated. The choice of programs to enter corresponds to national requirements. The decision-making proceeds through several steps. First, the General Staff/MoD determines capabilities shortages in the order of priority. Second, Polish R&D institutes are assessed for their ability to make a tangible contribution to a European program, while the MoD appraises the value of its potential material commitment. In the final step, the Armaments Council makes a recommendation, which the defence ministers signs into a formal a decision, thence opening the door for Poland to sign an EDA project agreement (MoD, Oct. 2009).

In the Polish MoD's view the participation in EDA R&D brings political, military, financial, scientific, economic and social benefits. First, it demonstrates Poland's will to contribute to capabilities development in support of CSDP. Second, the armed forces gain access to modern arms and equipments, which assists modernization and interoperability with other European militaries. Third, thanks to Poland's financial contribution and spreading the costs among several members, it is able to procure technologies, the cost of which exceeds a participating country's share of the budget. Fourth, national institutes are able to enter European R&D collaboration, gain new insights and experiences, which would have been very difficult to achieve without EDA coordination. Fifth, Polish armaments producers have a chance to win contracts and, through cooperation with
advanced West European partners, raise competitiveness. Finally, the MoD argues that a participation in EDA activities contributes to job creation at home (MoD, Sept. 2009).

In practice the domestic spin-off from Poland’s participation in EDA programs has so far been limited. When one looks at the amount of money EU member states have spent on R&D through EDA the expectations of substantive output appear unwarranted. EDA expenditure of €200 million on defence research and technology is a small fraction of the total EU member states’ €12 billion spent in this area. Moreover, only 13% of that amount goes to international R&D programs (Batora, 2009). Poland is no exception, spending hundreds of millions of dollars on big national armaments projects. Its involvement in EDA has, nonetheless, brought many of the 14 or so major Polish R&D institutes into close contact and cooperation with colleagues from Western Europe. This has facilitated both socialization and augmentation of domestic capacities through access to EDA co-funding. This is good news for Polish R&D community, which Polish deputy defence minister in 2006 diagnosed as being “in deep crisis” as a result of years of neglect, mainly due to underfunding (Altair, 2006). Polish experts who have taken part in EDA projects point out that previous experience, some upfront investment for business meetings, travel to Brussels as well as knowledge of West European legal system, not to mention an excellent command of English are required to successfully enter international consortia (Hołubowicz and Samp, 2009; Jabłkowski, 2009; Łopatka, 2009). By contributing indirectly to mastering these requirements, EDA thus enhances the competitiveness of Polish institutes. Again, the logic of consequences prevails.

Although there is evidence of elite socialization facilitating cognitive changes, one observes at the same time countervailing tendencies. Former head of EDA Nick Whitney
noted that “national chiefs of defence staff have been wary of the Agency, seeing it as a threat to the EU Military Committee where they hold sway” (Whitney, 2008). My interviews as well as participant observation have confirmed this. The Polish General Staff officers display a more cautious attitude towards EDA-coordinated defence R&D than civilian MoD staffers. The latter no doubt has had more exposure to the EU than their uniformed colleagues (Whitney, 2008; EDA interview, 2009; Polish EU mission interview, 2009). In one Polish military officer’s view EDA’s role has been reduced to a think tank (EU Council interview, 2009). Some military officials are critical of the capabilities-based proto-planning at EDA as they favour threat or scenario-based planning (Natolin European Centre interview, 2009). Doubts have been raised in military quarters about the wisdom of backing EDA investments in niche capabilities, at a time when Poland faces, for example, the need to revamp its whole air defence. Independent Polish experts likewise consider EDA projects narrowly dedicated (Polish defence journalist interview, 2009).

Such criticism may be exaggerated. On the heels of EDA’s *European Armaments Co-operation Strategy*, adopted in October 2008, member states have let EDA coordinate progressively bigger capabilities initiatives. One is an effort to increase the availability of helicopters, put into the Agency’s Capability Development Plan for 2009-2010. Poland has expressed interest in this project which one expert described as “the first real undertaking of the European armaments co-operation strategy in support of [CSDP]” (Guhl, 2009). Poland also joined 13 other EU member states signing on 17 Nov. 2009 a Letter of Intent regarding the European Air Transport Fleet. Coordinated by EDA, it aims to devise the most cost effective means of making military transport aircraft available for
both EU and NATO needs. Poland has also joined EDA projects related to maritime mine counter-measures capabilities in littoral sea areas (also with Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Sweden) and the development of an unmanned aerial system, able to take off and land on a ship’s deck (with Finland, France, Germany, Portugal and Spain) (Kawałowski, 2009; EDA website).

At the same time, the Polish defence policy community has not been of a single mind on whether European collaboration is in fact a better option than going it alone. Satellite reconnaissance is a good example of these inconsistencies. In March 2009, leading operators of satellites, France, Germany and Italy, together with Belgium, Greece and Spain, brought the Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS) project to EDA. It aims to augment the EU’s space-based imagery intelligence (IMINT) in synergy with the civilian Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) programme (Weiss, 2009). This move has been prompted by the EU’s venture into space policy, with the European Space Agency acting as a trailblazer (Sweeney, 2008). While Poland formally expressed interest in this project, its MoD has put funds into a project to launch by 2012 Poland’s first ever artificial satellite Mazovia (Newsweek Polska, 2008). Polish defence officials at EDA have tried to convince their colleagues in Warsaw that a European collaboration would be more suitable. However, advocates of Poland’s own satellite program argue it would not only be a matter of national prestige, but it would be more reliable and bring long-term benefits to domestic R&D community (Ibid.; EDA interview, 2009). Declaring adherence to pan-European collaboration, the EU-15 have nonetheless pursued national programs as well. No matter how redundant it may be, the aforementioned EU member states all have developed independent satellite
communication services available for security use (Sweeney, 2008). In other words, the EU-15 have not been credible teachers, from whom Poland could learn.

Poland’s participation in EDA has influenced organizational and procedural changes at the MoD and other parts of the Polish government. A Department of Science and Higher Education has been set up within the MoD to supervise the procurement of modern technologies in response to demands of the armed forces (MoD, Aug. 2008). After a time-lag, in a decision of 29 March 2007 on the participation of the ministry of national defence in the process of developing EU defence capabilities and a decision of 25 May 2007 on the participation of the ministry of national defence in the work of EDA, the defence minister formally established arrangements for Poland’s work in EDA (MoD, 2007). Both decisions sorted out responsibilities of MoD officials in this regard. The deputy defence minister for armaments policy has decision-making powers in defence procurement and in the R&D process. At a lower level, the head of the Strategic Planning Directorate (P5) at the General Staff oversees military capabilities development, while the director of MoD’s Science and Higher Education Department supervises research and technology side of the EDA. Depending on the activity in question the three officials represent Poland at EDA Steering Board meetings (Wiercinski, 2009).

In parallel with the EDA, the European Commission has also reinforced the Europeanization of R&D. Prompted by increased interest in homeland security after 9/11 the European Commission launched the European Security Research Programme and the 7th Framework Program, allocating €1.4 billion towards security research (Annegret, 2006). Polish institutes have taken cue from these EU initiatives, including also the Commission’s 2003 agenda for technology platforms outlined in *Investing in Research:*
An Action Plan for Europe and A European Initiative for Growth: Investing in Networks and Knowledge for Growth and Jobs. These institutes have also taken advantage of EDA’s support for R&T networks of excellence expressed in A European Defence Research and Technology Strategy of 10 November 2008 (Mejssner, 2009). A Polish representative was one of nine EU member state experts in EDA working group drafting this strategy. This actually shows the level of interest Poland devotes to this area (Kawalowski, 2009). In February 2005 33 Polish R&D institutions and companies led by the Warsaw-based Military University of Technology (WAT) established a consortium called the Polish Technology Platform of Security Systems. One of its members, the Industrial Research Institute for Automation and Measurements (PIAP), has secured €13 mln in funding from EU’s 7th Framework Program to coordinate €20 million-worth R&D project “TALOS” to devise a robotic patrol system for land border surveillance. It is the largest EU R&D project coordinated by a Polish company involving also 14 partners from 10 countries. Other Polish companies, not necessarily in the security and defence field per se, have also taken advantage of security-related projects funded by the 7th Framework Program.

In line with EDA’s 2007 European Defence Research and Technology Strategy, the Polish government has developed a well-funded domestic defence R&D program (EDA, Nov. 2008). In 2006-2007 the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, in cooperation

---

45 PIAP also participates in such multilateral projects co-funded by EDA as MUSAS (Multi sensor anti-sniper system), AHEAD (Advanced helmet and devices for individual protection), UGTV, CARDINAL (Capability study to investigate the man-machine relationship for improved decision making in urban military operations), ICAR (Intelligent control of adversary radio communications). Their cumulative budget totals €16,613,728.66, of which PIAP share is €2,268,669, or 14% of total costs (PIAP website).

46 For example, a civilian company, Institute of Communication and Information Technology (ITTI), has taken part in such projects as TALOS, SECRICOM (Seamless Communication for Crisis Management), SICMA (Simulation of Crisis Management Activities) and INSPIRE (Increasing Security and Protection through Infrastructure Resilience) (Hołubowicz and Samp, 2009).
with ministries of defence and economy as well as R&D institutes and defence industry representatives, developed a *Program of Scientific Research and Development in Support of the Defence Industrial Potential*. It offers funding of €609 mln for defence companies and R&D institutes conducting research in six advanced technology areas of priority interest to the Polish armed forces (MS&HE, 2007). These areas overlap by and large with those outlined in EDA’s *Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs* of October 2006 (EDA, Oct. 2006). Such a convergence shows potential for future harmonization of requirements. It may not be surprising, given that Polish experts had been involved in drafting this EDA document more or less at the same time as work was being done on outlining the priorities of the national R&D program. However, it must be reminded that this initiative was expressly part of the adaptation of the defence-industrial policy in connection with Poland’s entry to EDA’s *Code of Conduct on Procurement*.

The empirical evidence suggests that the EU has facilitated a shared set of policy understandings on the need to first of all prioritize defence R&D and invest in it at home, and secondly to carry out work within European networks. One issue deserves a comment – that is the relative weight of European versus transatlantic vectors of cooperation in R&D. Despite some rhetoric to the contrary, the majority of the EU member states do not find R&D cooperation with the US, be it desired or in-progress, at odds with the R&D Europeanization agenda. Eager to complement the European track with a transatlantic one, Poland has not been an exception. In August 2008, in a run-up to what observers hoped would be the signing of a missile defence deal with the outgoing Bush administration, the Polish government negotiated with Washington a Polish-US
Declaration on Strategic Cooperation. The two sides declared their intention to “explore joint investments in the field of industrial security and defense technology,” “develop, negotiate, and conclude international agreements to support industrial and research and technology armaments cooperation,” and “to explore opportunities for cooperative research, development, testing, and evaluation, including industry-to-industry cooperation, related to ballistic missile defence systems” (MFA, Aug. 2008). Some of the statements on defence R&D from the Polish-US declaration mirror word for word the phrasing of the UK/US Declaration of principles for defence equipment and industrial cooperation, from 2000. That document included more unequivocal aims to “harmonize research and development programs” and to “avoid unnecessary duplication of effort” (Schmitt, 2003). At the time the US had signed such DOPs also with Spain and the Netherlands. Others were pending signature with Sweden and Italy, while discussions were under way with Germany and France.

Poland’s record of compliance with the norms of pan-European cooperation in R&D set against the backdrop of the country’s efforts to hedge its bets between the EU, NATO and the US suggests that it has been shallow Europeanization. It would appear it has only been a superficial change “in the margins” rather than a conversion to the good of an EU-based collaboration approach. But such a conclusion would grossly simplify the picture. Just like in military procurement, the gulf between the professed commitment of the EU member states to a European R&D, and the actual practice, in which these countries concentrate on national programs and at the same time court cooperation with the US shows the weakness of European norms in this area. It may well be that European cooperation in defence R&D does not a priori preclude transatlantic R&D collaboration.
Poland's multi-vector approach has been informed by its serious capacity constraints. Just like other EU member states Poland wants the best for its defence R&D potential, and its economy. However, unlike the British, who, thanks to their R&D power, investment potential and industrial strength, have been able to capitalize on R&D agreements with the US, Poland has found it difficult to turn transatlantic agreements in this sphere to tangible benefits. For various reasons, not least geography and co-participation in policy development, is easier for the Poles to access partners and funding in the EU than on the other side of the Atlantic. Over time, the incentive for Poland to cooperate at European level will grow even stronger. So, whereas Goetz's concept of shallow Europeanization would suggest an instrumental compliance with EU norms, eager to strengthen capacity Poland has in fact expressed much will and commitment to European integration in defence R&D.

III.7. Conclusion

In the 1990s, a consensus started to emerge across the EU about a desirability of joint production and procurement of arms and defence equipment. It would help meet the collective commitment to set up a European Rapid Reaction Force, and consolidate the European Defence, Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), upon which CSDP was anchored. At the root of this convergence lay two stimuli. The first was the need to address the challenges of globalization, particularly a shrinking demand for arms at the Cold War's end, and a rapid pace of defence-industrial and technological transformation in the United States, which strengthened its competitive position. And second, as neo-functionalism would explain, it reflected the dissatisfaction of norms setters such as the
European Commission with art. 296 of the EU Treaty which had circumscribed the application of the single market in defence industry (Sheppard, 2006).

Already before the CSDP entered the stage, leading European states took steps to strengthen cooperation through championing cross-border mergers and transnational projects, like the OCCAR. These efforts had been presaged by domestic reforms proceeding roughly along the stages of domestic consolidation, the creation of national champions and – in many cases – privatization. Liberalization opened up possibilities for international mergers.

The CSDP context brought forth such innovations as the European Capabilities Action Plan as well as the European Defence Agency. Unlike earlier half-hearted attempts, like the Western European Armaments Organization, that were kept at arm’s length from the EU, the Agency would become a part of CSDP architecture, intergovernmental by design, yet supervised by the EU High Representative. EDA was expected to come up with new ideas, stimulate policy convergence and therefore energize both capability development and defence-industrial collaboration. EDA devised the European Regime for Defence Procurement, drew up several strategies and launched a number of joint initiatives. Its efforts have been complemented by the European Commission.

At first glance, EU policy inputs would appear to have a strong potential to Europeanize member states’ armaments policies. However, three aspects of the policy design and the mode of policy governance have circumscribed diffusion.
First, ECAP followed the Open Method of Coordination. Since defence capabilities touch upon the core of national sovereignty, it was a tall order to expect quick progress through benchmarking, "peer pressure" and other soft mechanisms.

Second, as an intergovernmental agency based on unanimity in decision-making progress through EDA is contingent upon political will of the member states. If the will is in short supply, the agency is likely to churn outputs based on the lowest common denominator. The dispute over the mandate of the Agency, pitting France and Britain at its birth, has cast a shadow over its functioning. While Poland, with most to gain from EU defence-industrial collaboration, has welcomed a broad mandate for the Agency, other EU member states, including London, have looked askance.

Finally, while the initiatives of EDA, the European Commission and of the big arms makers among EU member states have furnished various strands of what might pass for a European defence-industrial policy, no coherent policy as such exists. Given the heterogeneity of domestic regulations and policy preferences, a ‘European defence-industrial policy’ resembles a "patchwork," linking loosely different approaches and regimes, EDA-based, Commission-run or minilateral (Börzel, 2001). In the absence of a policy template at the European level (determinacy), facing uncertainty with regards to the nature of expected adaptation, states have treaded cautiously. As a result, Europeanization has been limited.

In terms of state capacity, the presence of many veto players has refracted Europeanization (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2001:16). As elsewhere in Europe, Polish armaments policy lies at the intersection of a plethora of policies: industrial, national defence, arms exports, regional development, market and competition as well as
labour policies. The management and implementation of this policy has been split between at least three ministries – defence, economy and treasury (and an office for public procurement). It features a number of veto players outside the government, including combative trade unions and by and large unreformed managerial cadres in public enterprises. In contrast to armed forces reform, the autonomy of the executive has therefore been much more constrained here similar to the sphere of civilian crisis management. Facing NATO’s pressure to modernize its military, in 2001 Poland adopted legislation that provided for a stable annual level of defence funding. Since the government and industry could henceforth operate with long-term planning and budgeting horizons, this facilitated capability-generation.

In identity terms, Poland wanted to become an insider in the decision-making networks. The birth of a brand-new central institution, the EDA, promised a level-playing field for the EU member states, which until then had been clustered around privileged networks, like the LoI or OCCAR. Accordingly, Poland jumped at this opportunity to sit as equal, at least in a formal sense, at the EDA. For this reasons, it wanted it to play an influential role in defence-industrial policy.

All in all, in the span of ten years the development of Polish defence-industrial policy showed changes affected by three sets of interweaving variables – socialization fostered by the European Capabilities Action Plan, horizontal mimetic isomorphism based on emulating West European approaches to defence-industrial restructuring, and normative isomorphism promoted by the European Defence Agency.

Immersed since 1999 in addressing military capability shortfalls within NATO, and until 2004 an outsider to the EU, Poland had neither the will to pursue ECAP, nor the
legal possibility for a full participation. The overwhelmingly NATO-centric elites had not yet to frame defence policy in European terms. They feared the EU would shift resources away from modernizing the armed forces, and undermine NATO's own capability development initiatives, such as the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), adopted earlier than ECAP, which the latter had borrowed from, and the later Prague Capability Commitments (PCC). On the downloading side the soft governance paradigm underlying ECAP lacked effective transmission channels to influence decision makers. If it failed to exact compliance from the EU members, ECAP could not fare better in relation to non-members.

The ECAP experience, nonetheless, helped socialize Polish officials in the CSDP and promoted learning. By working out a means of coordinating ECAP with NATO's own defence capability platforms, instead of duplicating efforts, the Plan contributed to forging EU-NATO interoperability. The concerns of the Polish elites were thus assuaged. By the time Poland entered ECAP project groups as full member this initiative was on the wane. However, without an immersion in ECAP the subsequent Polish support for EDA and European capabilities efforts in general might not have been as strong as it turned out to be. The ECAP experience contributed to organizational adaptation within the MoD.

Absent from Western defence-industrial initiatives, such as OCCAR and the Letter of Intent (LoI), Poland, a second-tier state in defence-industrial strength, has embraced EDA as a "policy solution." It promised opportunities to enhance domestic capacity, integrate Polish industry with Western Europe's and strengthen Poland's voice in the European defence-industrial field. The parallel assault by EDA and the Commission on protectionism in defence industry and in military procurement had a
potential to induce strong pressure upon EU member states. Poland actually had a fairly liberal policy approach in this regard. The Polish political class, in general, felt that communism discredited industrial interventionism. The critics of Polish defence-industrial policy even charged that the state abdicated responsibility for managing this sector in the name of neo-liberal orthodoxy, or that it buckled under US pressure. Unlike in France, there was no preferential treatment of domestic producers in the MoD procurement practices. Thus, Polish elites could have invoked external pressure to strengthen a liberal course in armaments policy. In other words, the government could have made use of the EU - a pressure from EDA and the European Commission – to alter the domestic opportunity structure to strengthen its hand (Padgett, 2003). However, due to circumscribed executive policy autonomy, Europeanization turned out to have the opposite effect – it empowered the veto players.

Coming on the heels of intra-EU squabbles over Iraq, the Polish defence minister’s consent to EDA’s plan for the European code of conduct for procurement was a calculated political move to affirm Poland’s support for CSDP. Secondarily, it reflected the laissez-faire approach of the military brass towards domestic defence industry. Through backing European policy solutions, the defence minister, who staked out his position as a reformer, tried to win external support for steps he was taking to modernize domestic procurement practices. An attempt to position Poland in CSDP vanguard fit with the security identity imperative of ensuring a place in Europe’s decision-making.

In the end, the government had its way, but at a price of succumbing to the trade unions as well as defence industrial enterprises dependent on state support. It agreed to a hodge-podge of measures. They included, on the one hand, a commitment to develop a
new strategic plan for transforming the defence industry and to set up a well-endowed
defence R&D program, both congruent with Europeanization, and, on the other hand
measures out of sync with Europeanization, such as drawing up a list of equipment to be
exempted from the new liberal rules on procurement and a long-term MoD plan for
domestic procurement. Since the previous governments have to all intents and purposes
deregulated this policy sector, the acquiescence of policymakers to protectionist demands
by the unions and the industry, amounted to reregulation. The EU has the power to alter
the existing “opportunity structure” for domestic actors (Héririer, 2003:10). In the Polish
case, the policy outputs reflected a mixture of adaptation, for instance phasing in an R&D
program, which amounted to filling a policy void, and also of apparent retrenchment. The
latter is exemplified by the promise of drawing up a list of equipment to be excluded
from the new rules as well as the MoD’s rhetoric about “Polonizing” defence
procurement, stepped up since 2008.

The EU did little to sway Poland’s position on offsets. Warsaw sided with the
PIGS47 in resisting liberalization. Despite problems with the F-16 offset, this policy has
been judged an effective tool to help Polish defence companies penetrate European and
transatlantic armament networks. However, the Polish government has been split on this
issue. As customer, the defence ministry does not support offset since it raises the price
of military goods and prolongs procurement process. Looking after the defence-industrial
sector and the economy at large, the ministry of economy has seen no reason to tamper
with it. In the end, domestic politico-economic/capacity considerations prevailed and
Poland’s negotiating position reflected largely the view of the economy ministry. Even

47 A term denoting Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain - associated with either resisting European reforms or
lagging in their implementation.
though, different national practices in the EU member states prevented a consensus on phasing out offset, EDA enforced non-binding agreement to limit its value and application. In response, the Polish economy ministry has endeavored to adjust national regulations to these norms and work out a new offset strategy. This has been the only extent of domestic changes. The core policy content stays intact.

Both Europeanization, diffused horizontally, and globalization have affected the general thrust of defence-industrial restructuring in Poland. As in the armed forces reform, Europeanization, conceptualized as a “nested phenomenon,” has been both a response to and a driver of globalization. Europeanization transmitted by way of mimetic isomorphism latched on to and spurred domestic reforms. Since 1999, successive Polish governments have endeavored to facilitate the participation of Polish defence companies in transnational collaboration. They have supported the consolidation of industry around a single national champion rather than let the industry sink or swim in the market. This contrasts with the marketization approach by Sweden, but it is similar to Italy’s national-champion policy. Poland’s ambitions to integrate into European networks have been met partly. While the largely privatized aerospace sector has been integrated, the ownership of the land systems, still shielded behind protective barriers, stays mainly in domestic hands. This uneven pattern has been replicated across Europe. The contradictions it reveals put into question the credibility of European norms.

Acting upon utilitarian and identity-rooted impulses, Poland has also consistently, though with mixed results, sought to strengthen links with the US industry. Since the overwhelming majority of the EU member states also pursue this course, a Janus-faced policy trend indicates that the Europeanization does not entail the creation of a fortress
Europe. Poland’s long-time involvement in the US Foreign Military Financing (FMF) scheme helped tie the elites into the transatlantic framework of arms collaboration. It turned out to be a one-way street predicated upon Polish purchases of US military hardware. This experience as well as poor results of attempts to plug Polish institutes into US-run R&D collaboration provoked dissatisfaction with a lopsided relationship. The lessons-learning has also fuelled a quest for European solutions. Because of its limited competence in defence-industrial policy, NATO itself has had little domestic influence.

The establishment of a new Polish defence R&D framework corroborates a distinct impact of Europeanization. The government has set up and committed funds into a brand new R&D program as well as EDA activities. Were it not for the EDA’s influence, complemented by the Commission’s, domestic pressure alone might not have been sufficient to fill this policy void. EDA, in particular, has contributed to shared policy understandings about the need for investments in military R&D and joint European programs. EDA and the Commission have also provided Polish research institutes with opportunities to network and collaborate. However, because money spent on collaborative R&D programs in the EU is still a fraction of the resources devoted to national endeavours, Europeanization has not broken the state-centered mindset.
Chapter IV: Civilian Crisis Management

IV.1. Europe's *forte*?

An analysis of change in Polish security and defence policy under the impact of European security governance would be incomplete without examining Poland's approach to civilian crisis management, both in terms of participation in missions and capacity building. The civilian dimension of crisis management forms an integral part of Common Security and Defence Policy alongside the military one. It is beyond the scope of this paper to trace the *fons et origo* of the incorporation of civilian capabilities into the EU's inventory of crisis response instruments. Suffice to recall lessons learning from the Balkan wars in the 1990s. Multinational stabilization efforts in the wake of conflicts in places such as Bosnia and Kosovo encountered problems in filling the so-called security gap, meaning the need to use specialized capabilities that can fill the gap between the point where military operations leave off and the governance of the security sector reverts to local ownership (Armitage and Moisan, 2005). Recognizing that "In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos," the European Security Strategy recommended "greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations" (2003).

Back in 1994, the member states of the Western European Union (WEU) agreed to include humanitarian and rescue missions as well as peacekeeping in the so-called Petersberg Tasks, which the Swedes and Finns then pushed successfully to integrate into the Amsterdam Treaty in 1996 (Lee-Ohlsson, 2008). At the time however, augmenting civilian crisis management (CCM) capabilities took second place to equipping the EU
with military means to make sure that it would be able to address another Bosnia-type conflict (Kaldor, Martin and Selchow, 2007).

The experience of Kosovo, where law and order broke down after the military deployment of KFOR in June 1999, was again used by these two Nordic states to upload policy preference for civilian crisis management at the Helsinki summit, and by Denmark and the Netherlands to push their case for a rapid-reaction police force capability (Jakobsen, 2008). Thus, the 2000 Feira Council laid out priorities and preliminary numerical targets in four areas of non-military crisis management: police, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection (European Council, 2000). Mechanisms for generating capabilities, modelled upon those used to raise military capabilities, have been brought in, including setting quantitative targets, holding capabilities commitment conferences and developing concept papers on civilian operations within the Council working groups (Gourlay, 2004). In December 2004 the European Council approved the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG 2008). It added two new priority areas of monitoring and support for the EU Special Representatives, as well as initiated the so-called Civilian Response Teams (CRT), packages of rapidly deployable civilian experts, modeled upon the EUBG concept (Lee-Ohlsson, 2008). It was succeeded in January 2008 by the new Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (CHG 2010) with the EU member states renewing pledges of rapidly deployable civilian personnel.

The CCM policy and operational machinery has been institutionalized in Brussels and includes responsibilities scattered across pillars. It is therefore spread across such institutions as the Committee for Civilian Crisis Management (CIVCOM), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), the Civil-Military Cell (Civ/Mil cell), and the
Directorate-General for External Relations and Politico-Military Affairs (DG E) within the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC), as well as the Directorate-General for External Relations (RELEX) and other DGs and agencies of the Commission. CCM has been operationally tested. By 2009, under CSDP, the EU had launched 6 military missions and 16 civilian missions in the area of police, border assistance, planning, rule-of-law, monitoring and security sector reform missions (Menon, 2009). In effect, one could make the case that civilian crisis management has emerged as the predominant type of activity in CSDP. Scholarship has not caught up with the expansion of the EU’s activities in CCM. A lot more has been published about the military dimension of CSDP than its civilian corollary (Jakobsen, 2006; Chivvis, 2010). What tends to be forgotten is that the EU has been neither the only nor the first organization to use non-military means to respond to crises however. In the 1990s, in line with its human security dimension, and in particular the emphasis on early warning and conflict prevention the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) strengthened CCM activities. It sent monitors and special rapporteurs to trouble spots in Eastern Europe, in 2002 undertook police training in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as well as established the Rapid Expert Assistance Cooperation Teams (REACT), a pool of rapidly deployable experts in CCM. Writing in 2002, before the EU tested its civilian capabilities in the field, one expert even judged the OSCE to be at the operational forefront of CCM (Lindborg, 2002: 7). However, once CSDP missions got off the ground, the OSCE, whose progress in CCM never gained as much recognition as the EU and whose human security efforts in the former Soviet countries have been curtailed by the Russian Federation, soon found itself eclipsed by the European Union (Ibid.).
Grappling with the proliferation of peace operations after the end of the Cold War, the United Nations was the first international organization to launch a comprehensive review of the capacity to plan and conduct such missions. It recognized that once fighting had subsided, the international community required civilian expertise for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), which often accompanied the implementation of peace accords, as well as specialists in governance. In March 2000, then UN Secretary General (SG) Kofi Annan invited a high-level Panel on UN Peace Operations to suggest ways of improving crisis response, including through the use of civilian capabilities. In August 2000, the Panel, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, submitted its report to the SG (Behrendt and Nutt, 2009). It made a number of recommendations to help overcome the same problems in generating civilian capacities that beset also the EU and its member states, inter alia: “lack of standby systems to respond to unexpected or high-volume surge demands,” “difficulties in attracting and retaining the best external recruits,” “penalizing field deployment,” and “lack of a comprehensive staffing strategy for peace operations” (UN, 2000: 21-25). As continuing difficulties in meeting demands for deployable civilian personnel show, neither the UN nor the EU have succeeded in implementing Brahimi Report’s recommendations.

Learning from operational experience, particularly in Afghanistan, NATO has become the latest convert to a greater reliance on civilian capabilities. Although the 1999 Strategic Concept already underlined that: “The interaction between Alliance forces and the civil environment (both governmental and nongovernmental) in which they operate is crucial to the success of operations,” the civil-military interdependence had for a long time been conceptualized tactically in terms of the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)
(NATO, Apr. 1999). In NATO’s CIMIC doctrine this is defined as “The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and nongovernmental organizations and agencies” (NATO/EAPC, 2003). CIMIC is therefore primarily concerned with the engagement of local authorities and civilians to assist in achieving military objectives (Khol, 2006). NATO CIMIC thus differs from the EU’s approach. The latter sees civilian and military aspects of operations as being on the same level (Chapman, 2008).

In 2002 the EU Military Committee (EUMC) adopted the EU’s own concept much broader than CIMIC – the Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO). Through an Action Plan for further strengthening of CMCO in EU crisis management, it has sought to integrate all the relevant civilian and military actors across the EU pillars into planning and implementation of crisis management at political-strategic level (Ibid.; Jankowska, 2007). The implementation of the CMCO has suffered from heterogeneity of cultures of civilian-military coordination among EU member states as well as a lack of truly joint civil-military structures in Brussels (Jankowska, 2007).

The ISAF experience in Afghanistan, particularly the demands of security sector reform (SSR), such as police training, as well as the staffing and functioning of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), fuelled NATO’s efforts to improve military-civilian interface across all aspects of crisis management. As in the case of uploading in the EU, the idea to utilise not only military instruments, but also political and civilian in crisis management, called the Comprehensive Approach (CA), was put forth by a Nordic state, Denmark (Smith-Windsor, 2008). It was endorsed at the NATO Riga Summit in
2006 in a Comprehensive Political Guidance, which reiterated that: "While NATO has no requirement to develop capabilities strictly for civilian capabilities, it needs to improve its practical cooperation, taking into account existing arrangements, with partners, relevant international organizations and, as appropriate, nongovernmental organizations in order to collaborate more effectively in planning and conducting operations" (NATO, 2006). NATO heads of state and government affirmed their commitment to the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, agreeing to draw up an Action Plan of "pragmatic proposals" to integrate the Comprehensive Approach into NATO's crisis management from the strategic to tactical levels (Smith-Windsor, 2008). According to one NATO analyst the classified Action Plan is said to explore improvements in information and joint training between the Alliance and international organizations such as the UN and the European Union (Ibid.). NATO's newfound appreciation for civilian capabilities and an interest in potential cooperation with the EU has generated an idea about the EU possibly making its civilian crisis-management capabilities available to the Alliance in some form of "Brussels Plus" or an "inverse Berlin Plus" agreement. Due to the uneasy EU-NATO relationship, strained over the Cyprus dispute, this idea has not yet moved outside of think tanks (WEU, 2009; Biscop, 2005).

Although work on a Comprehensive Approach continues, there are doubts as to its efficacy. It comes at a time of budgetary squeeze with NATO member states unwilling to make new investments. Furthermore, the declaratory consensus on CA glosses over differences in interests among member states. France, backed by Belgium and Luxembourg stands on guard of the value-added of the EU CCM. So does Poland and
new East-Central European members, though for a different reason. These countries want NATO to remain focused on “hard power.” On top of that, Turkey, for political reasons, continues to block NATO-EU cooperation. It could have possibly allowed NATO to have recourse to EU civilian assets in a sort of “reverse Berlin+” deal (Smith-Windsor, 2008). NATO’s willingness to explore cooperation with the EU illustrates the extent to which the EU has acted as a model in the area of CCM for other international organization, while at the same time, as the UN reform efforts indicate, picking up ideas diffused by other organizations.

The above review of capacities of major international organizations shows that the EU has moved to the forefront in the concept of civilian crisis response. We should then expect it to be able to facilitate the diffusion of this civilian model. The EU’s weight in this regard stems not only from the institutional build-up and experience, but ties in to the longstanding “civilian power Europe” discourse. Although one could trace its genealogy to the medieval concept of the republica Christiana or the Kantian foedus pacificum, this discourse proper dates to an essay written in 1972 by François Duchêne. Duchêne prognosticated that a maintenance of a nuclear and superpower stalemate in Europe would lead to devaluation of military power and open up space for “civilian forms of influence and action” (Whitman, 2002; Lesaffer, 2001). Later Maull defined civilian power as encompassing three features: the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives, the concentration on non-military means to secure national goals with military power left as a residual instrument, and a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management (cited by Smith, 2005: 2). In 1982, Hedley Bull critiqued the idée force of
the European Community, which he saw as being conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which it did not control but should acquire if it were to become a credible international actor. The notion of civilian power has since spawned a debate on whether the normative ends of the EU and its resort primarily to civilian means have become a trademark of the EU’s nascent international identity (Bull, 1982; Manners, 2002; Manners, 2006; Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2007; Hyde-Price, 2006). The build-up of EU military capabilities at the beginning of previous decade sparked another round of soul-searching. While Zielonka claimed that the militarization of the EU weakened “its distinct profile” as a civilian international identity, Whitman, in turn, maintained that recourse to military means does not invalidate the notion of civilian power Europe per se (2002; Treacher, 2004). A via media has been taken by Karen Smith, for whom the EU has become a hybrid entity found somewhere between the civilian and military power ideal-types (2005). In my view, the leitmotif of civilian power Europe provides an ideational underpinning for the development of CCM. It has been invoked *express verbis* by senior EU officials, including the former President of the European Commission Romano Prodi (Treacher, 2004).

Having provided a synopsis of the development of EU’s CCM, compared it to other international organizations’ efforts in this area, and contextualized civilian crisis response within a specific ideational discourse I have shown how the EU has been perceived as an exemplar in this policy domain. Now, I turn to examining how much it has influenced Polish security and defence policy. I will separate the rhetoric from the substance of what the EU has actually managed to achieve in CCM and capability-generation. In the process I will concentrate on two critical aspects of CCM: capacity-building and operations. First,
I will explore whether there has been a security identity congruence between the EU’s conceptualization of CCM and its member states’, including Poland’s. Second I will explore in-depth the areas of institutionalization and doctrinal/legislative change, CHG governance methodology, planning, recruitment and training. I will seek to determine whether the EU has developed a CCM institutional gravity and mechanisms strong enough to exert pressure upon the member states. I will then look for outputs indicative of Europeanization in Poland compared to changes across member states, to see whether there has been any adjustment, adaptation or transformation in cognitive, legal and institutional frameworks. In the second part of this chapter I will test Poland’s capability commitments against the actual deployments in civilian operations, looking in particular at the nature and extent of participation, geographic priorities, and experiential learning. I will conclude this empirical case-study by gauging the overall depth and extent of Europeanization.

One caveat is in order. I will not examine in depth the policy subfield of civil protection, defined as the “protection in the event of natural, technological, radiological and environmental emergencies, including accidental marine pollution, occurring both inside and outside the European Union” (EU Council, 2001/792/EC). Although it has been one of the four priority areas for civilian crisis management, as stipulated in the European Councils of Cologne, Helsinki, Feira, Nice and Göteborg, and given ambitious targets for operationalization, it started to take concrete shape following the 2001 Council decision to establish a Community mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions (Dwan, 2006; UK House of Lords, 2003). The Community civilian protection mechanism has since encompassed tools to coordinate
member state cooperation, including mechanisms for information-sharing, monitoring, rapid response, training and funding, that are overseen within pillar I by DG Environment, DG ECHO and DG Environment within pillar I. Although the Council had envisaged that “Such a Community mechanism could, under conditions to be determined, also be a tool for facilitating and supporting crisis management referred to in Title V of the Treaty on European Union” it has never been used under CSDP (EU Council, 2001/792/EC). The main reasons mentioned in the literature on this subject are said to be political conflicts, pitting on the one hand the Commission against the Council, and, on the other, the member states and the EU. On the one hand, the Commission has successfully defended its competencies in civil protection, which it had started to develop before CSDP entered the fray (Dwan, 2006). On the other hand, out of concerns about a circumscription of sovereign powers in emergency management and doubts about the value-added in financial and efficacy terms of placing national civil protection capabilities on a permanent standby for the EU, a lot of member states, including Poland and Britain, have resisted incremental communitarization of civil protection (UK House of Lords, 2003). Poland’s recalcitrance has also stemmed from its strong socialization within NATO’s civil emergency institutions (MIIA interview, 2009). Because the civil protection mechanism has never been employed under CSDP, and since it deals with emergencies unrelated to the use of force or its effects, I have chosen to eschew an interrogation of it.
IV.2. Ideational resonance, doctrinal impact, and experiential learning

The development of CSDP has from the outset been associated with providing the EU with military capabilities, which it needed to make Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) credible, meet crisis response exigencies and, especially for France, reduce dependence on the United States. As mentioned this "hard security" bias is reflected in literature on CSDP, which focuses to a large degree on the creation of military capabilities. In fact, back in 1999 it was not at all clear that the military component would be matched by the civilian dimension. The initial drafts of the EU Cologne Summit did not mention non-military crisis management (Jakobsen, 2009). It was thanks to the agenda-setting efforts of the Nordic states that CCM was adopted as a corollary of the military dimension. This policy uploading was in line with the Nordic policies of military non-alignment (with the exception of Denmark). It also fitted with their broader understanding of security, was matched with their experience, as well as appealed to "civilian power" Europe discourse.

We are not surprised to find Denmark, Sweden and Finland ranked as "the professionals" in a recent in-depth review of Europe's civilian capacities by the European Council on Foreign Relations, a finding also corroborated in other empirical studies (Korski and Gowan, 2009; Jakobsen, 2009; Behrendt and Nutt, 2009; see Annex 1). The Nordic states have well-developed mechanisms for civilian capability generation and meet their CHG commitments. Given its role conception as a civilian power Germany is also included among the "professionals" (Frank, 2008). The fifth top performer is the United Kingdom. This finding may be attributed to its experience or bureaucratic efficiency more than an ideational congruence. In Korski and Gowan's four-part typology

281
— "the professionals," "the strivers," "the agnostics" and "the indifferent" - Poland is classified as an "agnostic", a classification which one Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs intimately involved with this process has even called "far too generous" (MIAA Interview, 2009). It means that Poland is unconvinced about the value of civilian deployments. To complete the picture, Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy and Romania are included in "the strivers" category, or countries eager to build civilian capacities but which have not yet made major investments towards this end. Poland is joined by the Czech Republic, Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain in the "agnostics" category; and in "the indifferent" group one finds Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Malta (Korski and Gowan, 2009).

What the European Council on Foreign Relations' stock-taking suggests is that while there has been a convergence in rhetoric within the EU around the need to build civilian capacity for crisis management, this novel concept remains out of sync with the national security identities of many EU member states, whether old or new. In a majority of cases, it is also unmatched by domestic capacities for generating civilian capabilities. Because CCM has been uploaded, though not as a complete package, by the Nordic states one should not assume the EU itself is capable of diffusing it. Quite the contrary, the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) points out that the "fact that CCM potentially comprises multiple stages and multiple actors and that there is no agreement on its definition has resulted in some confusion over the definition of CCM at the EU level." Ultimately "CCM means different things to different people." (Nowak, 2006:16). By 2009, no common definition of what encompasses "civilian" had been developed (Gya, 2009). Notwithstanding some of the conceptual and institutional progress the Nordics had
made towards CCM since neither these countries nor any other EU member state had the type of integrated, multifunctional civilian rapid reaction capacities that the EU is trying to establish, concepts, doctrines and standards have had to be developed from scratch (Jakobsen, 2006). Europeanization in this area is perhaps more likely to be diffused horizontally than vertically. Given its novelty and taking into account the results of the ECFR study demonstrating that there are heterogeneous approaches to CCM across member states, I will argue that the ideational framework underpinning it has not become ingrained in Poland’s elite policy community, which remains fixated on “hard security”.

The normative congruence between “civilian power Europe” discourse and the Nordics’ comprehensive approach to security stems from these countries’ support for the norms associated with the EU, including strong support for the UN, human rights, development, peacekeeping and peaceful conflict resolution. These have been central themes in their foreign policies since the Second World War (Jakobsen, 2009). The active role played by Sweden in the nascent CSDP agenda-setting in 1999 and then in the face of opposition from France also during its 2001 EU presidency, has been read as a nexus of Nordic internationalism and Europe as a normative power (Ibid.). Even though they have military forces, Smith argues that Finland and Sweden as well as Europe’s other neutrals come closest to “pure civilian power” (Smith, 2005). Admittedly Swedish agenda-setting had also been motivated by a desire to appease domestic constituencies who saw creeping militarization of the EU as a threat to their security policy values. But, even Rieker, who employs the conventional view of Europeanization as a mechanism of EU-induced change points out the Swedish foreign policy elites had already in the 1990s
developed a comprehensive external security approach notwithstanding the domestic political calculus (Rieker, 2003).

At the institutional level the Nordics were among the first to establish protogenic civilian rapid reaction mechanisms – a non-EU member Norway paved way by setting up the Standby Arrangements of Professionals in 1991, followed by Denmark with its International Humanitarian Service in 1995 and Sweden which established civilian rosters prior to 1999. Rieker noted a feed back from the EU into the national security discourse in the Nordic states catalyzing further development of civilian capacities (Ibid.). In short, there has been a normative congruence between the “civilian power Europe” discourse underpinning EU’s CCM and the security identities of the Nordic states, which proved conducive to ideational cross-fertilization driving further changes at the domestic level.

During the Cold War, the Polish People’s Republic took part in 39 peacekeeping operations in 29 countries worldwide (Gagor and Paszkowski, 1998). It was the biggest player in peacekeeping among the Eastern Bloc countries. Poland made its debut in international crisis management in 1953 when it sent civilian and military representatives to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea. Hundreds of civilian and military personnel worked shoulder-to-shoulder there until 1995, as well as in the International Commission in Indochina (1973-5) and in the International Observer Team in Nigeria (1968-1970). In the 1990s Poland ranked among the top 10 contributors to UN operations. It was the top peacekeeper in terms of number of troops deployed among 76 peacekeeping countries in 1998 (Ibid.). Therefore, before joining the EU, Poland acquired experience in crisis management, and as the participation in the international
commissions for supervision and control attests, it was exposed to civilian-military interaction.

Notwithstanding this impressive record, by admission of representatives of the Polish defence policy community, until the end of the 1990s the participation in international peacekeeping operations did not constitute a durable, integrated element of Polish security and defence policy (Ibid.:10). Since the military occupied primarily a logistical niche in foreign peacekeeping contingents, all the other parts of the armed forces remained unaffected by lessons learning. UN peacekeeping was a distinct element, additional and discretionary compared to the main business of territorial defence. It was only in the 1990s that the new security and defence doctrines of the independent Polish state inscribed peacekeeping into the core mandate of the armed forces. Likewise, the limited civilian-military experience failed to make an impact on the forces’ doctrine. The first strategic documents adopted after the end of communism - the 1992 Assumptions of Polish Security Policy and the Security Policy and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland lacked references to civilian crisis response.

The first significant experience in civilian missions came in 1992 with the deployment of Polish police personnel to the UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) mission in the former Yugoslavia. The police officers performed tasks that have become a standard fare of CCM: observation and inspection of local police and justice systems, police training, public safety, security advice and leading courses on combating organized crime (Policja.pl). After the UNPROFOR wrapped up, and prior to Poland’s participation in EU civilian operations, Polish police were deployed as part UNGCI (UN Guards Contingent in Iraq) in 1995-6, then UNTAES (UN Transitional Administration in

Polish civilians had important assignments as part of the OSCE’s crisis management activities. In 1992, Prof. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, the future Polish foreign minister, was appointed personal representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office responsible for proposing a resolution to the conflict in Transdniestria. Three years after, a Polish ambassador was appointed special representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office for the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (Zięba, 2001). The Polish MFA also sent large contingents of civilians to OSCE election monitoring missions. In 1991 Warsaw became the location of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.

Informed by a gradual accumulation of experience in UN, OSCE and WEU operations, involving cooperation of uniformed and civilian personnel, including the police, in 1998-2000 Poland began warming up to the idea of civilian crisis management. Polish diplomats in New York participated in discussions related to the Panel on UN Peace Operations, and when its report came out they supported its conclusions. In his presentation before the General Assembly the Polish ambassador at the UN backed the EU position favourable to the Brahimi Report and in his additional remarks reiterated

---

48 The author was part of such a contingent in the OSCE election monitoring mission deployed in Kosovo in 2002.
support for strengthening the UN capacity for rapid deployment particularly through the
UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS). Poland had a good reason to support the
UNSAS as it had, since 1993, been involved in its elaboration. Back then it declared that
it would consider the possibility of providing UNSAS with military troops. By 2000, it
was one of 88 countries willing to take part in this initiative. This meant though that
Poland focused squarely on the military aspects of the UN crisis management. Poland
participated in the creation of a multinational Standby Forces High-Readiness Brigade
(SHIRBRIG) designed to rapidly deploy troops at the UN’s calling (Popiuk-Rysińska,
2001).

There is scant evidence of a cognitive evolution. The Security Strategy of the
Republic of Poland, adopted in January 2000, did express a commitment that
“in connection with an increase in the importance of civilian component of peace
operations, including the police, Poland will appropriately adjust its potential to the
participation in peace operations of a new type.” This indicates that the UN experience
lent credibility to new ideas about the role of civilians in peace operations (Council of
Ministers, 2000). At the same time, however, institutional changes remained few and far
between.

The gulf between the rhetoric and action on civilian capacity building could also be
observed at the OSCE. In 1998, Polish foreign minister in the capacity of the OSCE
Chairman-in-Office expressed “a continued commitment to develop the so-called “civil
component” of conflict prevention.” Later, he declared that “the OSCE ‘speciality,’ a
comprehensive approach to security, requires continues development” (Zięba, 2001:332-

---

49 Officially due to an overstretch of commitments by its participating member states the initiative
foundered and SHIRBRIG closed shop in 2009.
In the same vein, addressing the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999, Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski talked about boosting what he called “humanitarian security” (Ibid.:346). In practice, affected by NATO socialization, Poland pursued a delicate balancing act trying to enhance the OSCE’s role, particularly in the “human security” dimension, but not to the extent it might jeopardize the position of the Alliance. The only discernible reflection of this rhetoric at the domestic administrative level was creation at the MFA of some kind of pool of civilian experts “in principle” available to the OSCE (NATO PA, 2000). There is, however, no documentary trace of its existence.

The effects of both NATO socialization and an EU “outsider’ status, were evident in Poland’s initial reaction to the development of CCM within CSDP. In a November 2000 speech then deputy Polish foreign minister Andrzej Ananicz declared that “Poland has supported the development of the Feira concept of civilian crisis management since its inception” (Ibid.). He said that due to a commitment overload no detailed targets had yet been developed, but Poland had already started a process of internal consultations about its possible contribution. He pointed out that the police would be an obvious choice. Poland might also share the pool of Polish civilians available for OSCE missions, and, for civil protection, offer the experienced Polish International Search and Rescue Group and the Water and Chemical Resource Group. Both of those had been involved in the activities of the UN Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs and NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Co-ordination Centre (Ibid.). Two themes resonated in that speech. One was an outsider’s - *express verbis* - quest to be part of the process of developing CCM and *ipso facto* the CSDP. Another was the appeal for complementarity between the EU’s and NATO’s efforts particularly in the civil protection then conceptualized as an element.
of CCM/CSDP. The speech revealed a sense of frustration of the Polish officialdom in that “the rule of the closed club has prevailed over logic” and Poland had been denied the ability to contribute to the extent that it desired (Ibid.). Given this sentiment, it would be difficult for the EU to pressure Poland to adapt to CCM, which lay outside acquis communautaire, and was de facto not conditional upon accession. Polish officials stressed in no uncertain terms that if Poland was to adapt administratively and procedurally to CCM it should be “immediately” involved in the work of the EU’s Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and that the topic should become subject of consultations with the EU Political and Security Committee. Warsaw was not sure at the time whether the 15+6 formula for EU consultations with non-EU NATO members on military aspects of crisis management would be extended to civilian aspects.

The Polish deputy foreign minister’s appeal to the EU not to ignore NATO’s acquis in civil emergency planning and civil-military relations betrayed NATO socialization (Ibid.). Ananicz’s entreaty, however, proved in vain. The Swedish idea of creating an ad hoc NATO-EU working group on the civilian aspects of crisis management, which Poland supported, met with a lukewarm reaction from other EU members. Instead of learning from SCEPC or NATO’s CIMIC doctrine, the EU went its own way duplicating NATO’s pioneering civil protection and drafting its own CMCO doctrine that broadened the CIMIC concept.

To sum up, notwithstanding a candidate state’s understandable resort to official expressions of support, Poland’s early perception of CCM was a corollary of its political

---

50 By then, NATO’s Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Co-ordination Centre had been up and running.
position regarding CSDP. A proud Poland found itself torn between a mistrustful US administration on the one hand, and, on the other hand, an autonomist EU policy, steered by the French. Because, as Ananicz observed, prior to the launch in 2004 of CHG 2008 there were no concrete targets or guideposts to follow, at this point the EU had few tangible means to get the member states to comply in CCM.

At the time of Feira the Poles were just mastering the practical facets of CCM, including CIMIC. Even though the 2000 Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland described CIMIC as “an essential condition for the whole state defence system to work effectively” it was still treated from the point of view of national defence rather than external crisis management (Council of Ministers, 2000). The learning curve in CIMIC has speeded up since 2003 when the Poles got involved in Iraq. Within the Multinational-Division Central-South (MND CS) commanded by Poles were CIMIC units, which included the so-called Governorate Support Teams (GST), composed of experts who mentored Iraqi provincial authorities. CIMIC units also ran Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Centres. According to senior Polish officers CIMIC was a brand new venture for the Polish military (MoD Interview, 2009). Veterans of the Iraqi mission noted that the enormous challenges facing CIMIC took the Polish military by surprise (Domisiewicz, 2005). CIMIC operators honed their skills under US coaching and benefitted from financial resources, crucial to winning the “hearts and minds,” provided by the American military. Poles thus learned CIMIC by doing it.

Experts note a correlation between levels of development assistance and the willingness to participate in CCM (European Centre Natolin interview, 2009). One of the

51 The defence strategy of 2000, however stated that CIMIC applied also to “the performance of tasks [unspecified – R.D.] outside the borders of Poland” (MoD 2000).
policy strengths of the Nordic states and a few others at the frontline of CCM have been extensive development aid programs. Because Poland had begun a development assistance program around the time of EU entry, this issue could not have fed an interest in CCM. At the inception of CSDP Poland was making baby steps toward establishing a well-oiled program of official development aid (ODA). A long time beneficiary of foreign assistance Poland started its foreign aid activities in 1998 with a modest contribution of $18,68 mln. This foray was in no small part inspired as much by the EU norms as those of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which Poland had joined two years earlier (Popiuk-Rysińska, 2001). Only in 2003 did the government adopt the first development co-operation strategy. It was drafted by the MFA in anticipation of EU accession and in response to the UN’s Millennium Development Goals. It took another two years to set up within the MFA’s UN department a division in charge of planning and coordinating the delivery of humanitarian aid (MFA, 2005). By 2004, the level of Polish ODA rose to $124 m, 61% of which went to the EU development budget (Ibid.). Shortly after, a development co-operation department in its own right was established within the foreign ministry. As Poland’s development assistance picks up so may its propensity to get involved in civilian conflict response.

Other factors conducive to a strong national activism in CCM may be the advocacy work by NGOs, and, as is the case for some EU members, colonial ties. NGOs are often outsourced by both governments and the European Commission to provide training and to fulfill CCM-related mandates in theatre. NGOs tend to rely on volunteers to work well.

---

52 The level of Polish ODA has been increasing - from $205 m in 2005 to $363 m in 2007. Of the 9 priority countries for foreign assistance – 4 are in Eastern Europe (Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova), which ties into Polish security identity, and two others in areas where Polish military has been involved (Afghanistan and Iraq).
Unfortunately, far fewer Poles volunteer than their West Europeans. According to surveys, in 2001, 10% of Poles reported volunteering, that proportion increased to 18% around Poland’s entry to the EU, only to drop to 13% in 2008 (GHK, 2011). By comparison, 54% of Swedes and 49% of Dutch volunteer (Voicu, 2004). Polish NGOs list the lack of volunteers as their second biggest problem after concerns about funding (Klon/Jawor, 2004).

There are not many NGOs in Poland involved in development aid and humanitarian missions relative to EU-15 states of comparative size. Because of the traditionally opaque system of policy-making in Poland, even if there were many such NGOs, it is doubtful whether they would have been able to influence the MFA like their counterparts, say in Britain (Dvořák, 2009). “Overly bureaucratic public administration” and “unclear rules of cooperation between the organisations and the public administration” are mentioned as the 3rd and 5th respectively biggest problems faced by Polish NGOs (Klon/Jawor, 2004). At the end of 2005, the year-old Polish association of NGDOs (nongovernmental development organizations) Za Granica, joined CONCORD – European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development (zagranica.org.pl). A participation in this transnational network linking 1,600 NGOs across the EU could over time help spread the norms related to crisis management.

For Belgium, the UK, Netherlands, France, Portugal and Spain, a colonial legacy has been a strong factor prompting engagement in CCM. The choice of a Dutch diplomat to head the EU monitoring mission in Aceh (2005-2006), a former Dutch colony, is no coincidence. By admission of its own officials, Poland has not taken part in proliferating
civilian missions in Africa and Asia, because it lacks the post-colonial interventionist reflex of those EU members (Polish EU mission interview, 2009).

In contrast to Western Europe, then, absent a strong pressure from civil society, extensive development assistance programs, and a colonial heritage, Poland has had neither the same awareness of urgency and importance of civilian operations nor the resources to support CCM as some of its EU-15 counterparts. These three factors cannot be considered alternatives to Europeanization as explanation of EU members' engagement in CCM. They are simply conditions that facilitate the resonance of the elite cognitive and organizational frameworks at the national level with the EU’s.

IV.3. Institutional framework for Brusselization

The EU has not built up an institutional core integrating civil-military coordination effectively that would facilitate diffusion of the norms and procedures related to CCM, and, thus, foster convergence of the disparate member state cultures in this area. Europeanization scholars have observed that norm entrepreneurs play a crucial role in this internalization of new norms. The entrepreneurs mobilize at the domestic level to persuade actors to redefine their interests in light of the new norms and rules in the process of social learning (Börzel, 2005:54-5). For example, central bankers and national technocrats linked in an epistemic community, defined as a “network of actors with an authoritative claim to knowledge and a normative agenda,” promoted the European Monetary Union (Ibid.). The European Commission acted on many occasions as an “ideational entrepreneur” socializing domestic actors into new practices of cooperative governance (Ibid.). The construction of the institutional infrastructure for CCM has been
an on-going process of trial-by-error, inhibited by a scattering of relevant organizations across the intergovernmental and community pillars as well as clashing administrative cultures (Gourlay, 2006). The weakness of an institutional set-up speaks to the absence of a generic model to draw upon in terms of planning and coordination of civilian crisis management (Gebhard, 2009).

Within the second pillar alone at least five institutions have been involved in planning, coordination, supervision and evaluation of CCM. In May 2000, as envisaged at the Helsinki Council, the Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) was established within the Council to advise the Political and Security Committee (PSC) on civilian crisis management and to help *inter alia* disseminate common standards and best practices (EU Council, 10898/08). Poland has been represented at CIVCOM by an interior ministry expert seconded to the Polish permanent representation to the EU. Staffed by Brussels-based national representatives, in most cases junior diplomats with no experience in this area, assisted if need be by their colleagues from the national capitals, and joined by officials from the Commission and Council Secretariat, CIVCOM has had very limited impact. According to insiders, particularly the early days of CIVCOM featured “day-to-day fire fighting,” “improvised measures for internal emergencies,” and well-meant but more than courageous “trial-failing” (cited by Gebhard, 2009:10).

While CIVCOM has remained an advisory body, the key role in preparing and implementing decisions related to civilian missions has been assumed in practice by directorate IX (Civilian Crisis Management) of Directorate General E (External and Political-Military Affairs) in the Council. Under the 2001 Swedish presidency, a Police
Unit was created within DG E IX to help out in planning and conducting EU police missions (Gebhard, 2009). With the launch of the EU CSDP missions in October 2003 DG E IX acquired a civilian mission support section. It has grown from an initial staff of 10 to 32 by late 2005 and 40 by 2006 (Ibid.). While CSDP missions have multiplied, the CCM-dedicated staff has remained small relative to the personnel servicing the military end of CSDP. Moreover, although the EU claimed to have interwoven the civilian and military streams, it actually did not do a good job. To address these shortcomings, at the so-called “chocolate summit” in April 2003 France proposed setting up an EU command and control HQ independent of NATO. Because the British opposed duplication, as a compromise a Civil-Military Cell (Civ-Mil Cell) was created within the EU Military Staff (EUMS). Staffed by civilian (mostly police) and military planners as well as 1-2 Commission officials, it was designed to bridge both the gap between civilian and military cultures as well as intra- and inter-pillar organizations and instruments (Gebhard, 2009; Korski and Gowan, 2009). In reality, whatever comparative advantages had been expected of the Civ-Mil Cell, they were not met as the civilian strength became submerged within a dominant military culture of the EUMS. Thus, a rather dysfunctional entity came into being mired from birth in competition with DG E IX of the Council Secretariat, which retained the upper hand in the planning process for a majority of missions (Ibid.).

To improve on this half-baked solution, in June 2007 the EU member states decided to create within the GSC a full-fledged operational HQ for CCM in the form of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). It started work in May 2008. A Dutch diplomat Kees Klompenhouwer was appointed the first Civ-Mil Cell director and
Civilian Operations Commander (CivOpsCdr) reporting directly to the SG/HR and after Lisbon Treaty came into force – the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This has given the EU a unified and clear chain of command in CCM. Klompenhouwer oversees a directorate of initially 60 and by 2009 65 staff – 50% Council officials, and 50% seconded national experts, among them police officers, judges, diplomats and political advisors (2008). As might have been predicted, the rise of CPCC sparked fratricidal in-fighting within the Council with DG IX resisting encroachment on what it saw as its turf. In December 2008, in anticipation of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council agreed to yet another institutional reform – the creation of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). It would merge DG E directorates IX and VIII (defence aspects) - the latter, it turns out, had been involved in planning the mission in Georgia - and bring together personnel from GSC, SitCen, SatCen, EUMS, including its Civ-Mil Cell, and the relevant Commission bodies (Ibid.).

The picture of a labyrinthine institutional set up in the second pillar gets muddier as one takes into account also the many Community structures that fund CCM and deploy staff as part of civilian crisis response. These include several Commission DGs, most prominently DG RELEX and DG Development, as well as DG Environment (for civil protection), the EuropeAid Cooperation Office and the European Community Humanitarian Office (DG ECHO) (Gourlay, 2006). Thus far the interaction between pillar I and II institutions has been ad hoc and more often than not conflictual. The tussle over influence between the Commission, which holds the purse strings for “soft security”
expenses, and the Council, which decides on CSDP has not helped matters (EU Council interview, 2009).

It is thought that the Lisbon Treaty innovations, such as merging the pillars, unifying CSDP authority under the HR, and subsuming CMPD within the European External Action Service (EEAS) overseen by the HR will remove hindrances to the institutionalization of CCM at the EU level. Until this happens, the many EU actors in this policy area and their suboptimal relations will inhibit inter-pillar co-ordination, as well as effective diffusion of norms and practices to the member states. At present, a single, coherent policy and normative entrepreneur at the EU level is missing.

IV.4. Legal-institutional framework at the national level

Just as the EU has found it difficult to set up an institutional framework able to tie in all the actors needed to ensure a multi-faceted civil-military coordination, so have a majority of the EU member states. Scholars emphasize that a broad-encompassing civilian crisis management is a novel concept “particular to the EU” and having “no equivalent parallels in the lexicons of UN, OSCE or non-European regional organisations” (Kaldor et al., 2007). As a result, in contrast to military crisis management, the EU member states have had to develop concepts and doctrines ad novum (Wtorek, 2008; Jakobsen, 2006). Aside from the conceptual quandaries, the development of a national institutional framework for CCM support and capacity building requires not only a congruent security identity, but also a strong administrative capacity, which in turn require effective domestic governance. While military missions call upon only or chiefly defence ministries/general staffs to handle planning, execution
and funding, civilian missions require tight-knit interministerial cooperation as well as a single coordination (Wtorek, 2008). Working out concepts, planning, recruitment, and training of civilian expertise requires the participation of state ministries and institutions, including ministries of foreign affairs, defence, interior, justice, finance and where appropriate development, as well as agencies such as customs, border guards, correctional and intelligence services. Some of these institutions do not have experience in sending personnel, sometimes at short notice and for long duration, on crisis response missions abroad. Therefore, a whole-of-government approach is required to make it work.

Experts have discovered that in most EU member states other parts of the national administrations have had difficulties in keeping pace with the high standards and “the lofty political goals” set for CCM by foreign ministries (Angelet and Vrailas, 2008). Sweden, Germany and Finland have devised national strategies for civilian crisis management rooted in a whole-of-government approach. In 2000, the German government produced a *Comprehensive Concept on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building*, followed by an Action Plan (German Federal Government, 2004). It tasked the Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention, chaired by MFA official in the rank of ambassador, with coordinating civilian peacebuilding policy, created an Advisory Board for Civilian Crisis Prevention to involve civil society organizations as well as committed to improving EU capabilities. In 2008, the Finnish government adopted the *National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management*. It was drawn up by an intergovernmental working group, composed of representatives of several state institutions, and co-chaired by MFA and interior ministry officials. The Finnish strategy addresses CCM decision-making, inter-institutional
division of competencies, capacity building, planning and budgeting (Finnish Ministry of Interior, 2008:4). The foreign ministry is responsible for political coordination and decision-making with regards to participation in missions, and the interior ministry oversees capacity building through a brand new Crisis Management Centre (Behrendt and Nutt, 2009).

The Council Secretariat and the European Parliament have recommended that other EU members adopt similar strategies (European Parliament, 2009). The GSC organized a seminar on national strategies out of which came a paper on facilitating the deployment of civilian personnel, disseminated to EU member states. It points out that a national strategy should address the following 4 dimensions of civilian crisis management: legal regulations, financing, rosters, and training (Górski, 2009). Italy and Ireland are said to be interested in producing a strategy (Miranda, 2009; Korski and Gowan, 2009). In this connection Italian officials have found it necessary to stress the need for a "smoother and more effective coordination" among relevant state and non-state actors, which may speaks to weaker administrative capacity compared to Finland's (Miranda, 2009). As we will see, Poland is also exploring such a possibility. This strategy-building exercise shows the success a few EU member states committed to CCM, particularly Finland, have had in stimulating the exchange of best practices and uploading their model of integrated management of civilian capacity to the EU level. In this example, horizontal and vertical dimensions of Europeanization intertwine and mutually reinforce each other.

A post-transition polity, with national administration still under reform and affected by politicization pressures, the Polish state has found mobilizing across-the-board institutional resources for CCM more difficult than the long-established West European
bureaucracies. In fact, the need for a comprehensive approach to crisis management has only recently been articulated in Polish strategic documents. In the national strategies of 2000 and 2003, drafted by the foreign ministry, and the strategy of 2007, drafted by the presidential national security bureau, Poland’s support for the EU’s military and civilian capacities merits only brief references. The ministry of defence in the 2008 *Vision of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland–2030* and the 2009 *Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland* has included paragraph-length statement recognizing that the complex nature of contemporary and future crises and threats require a comprehensive approach. Drawing upon NATO’s Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) and Comprehensive Approach concepts, the first of these documents envisages that in order to attain desired political, social and economic objectives the future military operations would have to be integrated and synchronized with the activities of other government and nongovernmental organizations. Therefore, future planning process has to incorporate military and civilian synergies (MoD, 2008; Smith-Windsor, 2008). The defence strategy reiterates this point. It states that “planning and waging of international operations, including the preparation of an adequate civil-military component is the responsibility of the entire state [emphasis added – RD] and requires the cooperation of many entities” (MoD, 2009). The whole-of-government approach is necessary. Although these documents appear path-breaking in terms of their cross-sectoral conceptualization of crisis management, an analysis of the concepts employed – “comprehensive approach,” “effects-based operations,” and oft-repeated “civil-military cooperation,” suggests a narrower, NATO-influenced rather than EU’s understanding of civilian crisis management.
Adopted by the Council of Ministers in January 2009, the Strategy of the Republic of Poland’s Armed Forces’ participation in international operations, drafted by defence ministry in cooperation with the foreign ministry, is the first document of its kind to express a state commitment to generating civilian capabilities. Although it comes in a single paragraph in the 6-page document its wording is as unprecedented as it is unequivocal:

The engagement of Poland in international operations is a national effort. Hence, there is a need to develop, in addition to already functioning procedures for the preparation and deployment of the armed forces of the Republic of Poland abroad, also procedures regulating the participation of state administration institutions other than the ministry of national defence in international operations. Therefore, appropriate legal, organizational and financial arrangements will be adopted in order to ensure a broad participation of civilian specialists (inter alia from the ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of internal affairs and administration, nongovernmental organizations) in international operations. This concerns both the phase of state preparation for participating in an operation, the period of an engagement within an area of its responsibility in a given mission, as well as the phases of rebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction (MoD, 2009).

Why has it taken five years after its EU accession for Poland to commit to working out a “legal, organizational and financial” framework in support of civilian capabilities? The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration (MIAA) officials admit that it has had to do with a “weakness of administration,” a finding corroborated in scholarly analysis. They also opine that the recent rekindling of interest in addressing this deficit owes to the choice of CSDP as one of the priorities of Poland’s 2011 EU presidency, as well as lessons from the ISAF mission (MIAA Interview, 2009; Kaminska, 2010; Goetz, 2001; Zubek, 2006). There is a correlation between the adaptation of public administration and the will to influence (upload) EU policy. Kaminska argues that the more the EU member state is determined to make an impact on EU policy the greater is its will to strengthen administrative capacity (2010). While Poland could not become an
exemplar in CCM, the thinking among officialdom is that at least it can get its civilian crisis management capabilities up to speed with the better performers in the EU. This would enhance its credibility as an aspiring CSDP policy setter.

Polish experts agree that the establishment of an effective system for generating civilian capabilities requires a major legislative and administrative overhaul (Polish Institute of International Affairs interview, 2009; European Centre Natolin interview, 2009). Failure to adapt would leave Poland as a relatively weak and not a wholly credible player, not only in CCM, but in CSDP generally (Polish EU mission interview, 2009). Notwithstanding this awareness, by the end of 2009 Poland has not developed a legal-institutional framework to support this task. According to an MIA expert, after the 1999 summit in Helsinki the EU department in the ministry of interior submitted a concept paper on developing Polish civilian capabilities. However, there was no reaction at the top of the ministerial hierarchy and the document was simply moved to the analytical department for further studies (MIAA interview, 2009). The senior interior ministry officials probably took comfort in the fact that the 1990 Police Act provided for the secondment of police officers to police contingents for deployment in peacekeeping missions abroad, anti-terrorist actions, search and rescue and humanitarian missions as well as training and exercises (Journal of Laws, 1990). However, the fact that it took more than a decade from the passage of the Police Act for the Council of Ministers to adopt executive directives – the Regulation of 5 November 2002 regarding the financial compensation for police officers seconded to serve in police contingents abroad as well as the Regulation of 25 June 2003 regarding the employment of staff in police contingents and their remuneration, illustrates just how slowly the wheels bureaucracy
have been moving (Journal of Laws, 2003). In view of the growing tendency to employ non-uniformed civilians for logistical support to the Polish police, the latter allowed hiring civilians outside the force with special skills. It turned out that the system of financial incentives was not attractive enough to motivate sufficient number of civilian specialists, particularly IT specialists but also doctors and nurses, to sign up for duty in police contingents. Hence, in late 2009 the ministry of internal affairs began working on amendments to the Regulation of 25 June 2003 to create a financial package competitive enough in comparison to the private sector (MIAA, 2010).

A major impulse to start examining legal and procedural questions related to deployment of civilians in operations had been triggered by Poland's socialization in NATO, and in particular its exposure to the CIMIC concept. In 2001 the Polish Land Forces Command undertook to translate and inscribe CIMIC into Polish law. The Command looked particularly at the role and place of the so-called functional specialists in the Dutch CIMIC staff concept. Renowned in NATO for its strengths in CIMIC, the Dutch military is able to call upon functional specialists, in most cases but not exclusively reservists, who have expertise in typically civilian areas, such as law or civil administration – and assign them in support of a military mission, for instance in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2007).

The Polish Land Forces Command did not move forward in laying out a legal framework for the CIMIC concept. Hence, in 2004, this job was handed over to the Office of the Civil Service. This Office was created by virtue of the 1996 Civil Service Act to supervise a professional civil service. It therefore has an overarching scope over the entire bureaucracy, which, in theory, should help it mainstream CCM. The Civil
Service Office attempted to address this problem through a new law, such as the Finnish Act on the Participation of Civilian Personnel, or legislative patches (Majcherkiewicz, 2009).

The work on drafting a law or otherwise administrative procedures on the deployment of civilians ended up in the foreign ministry, in its security policy department. The department had already in 2003 started to conceptualize a law on delegating civilian officials, but in six years it has not left the drafting board. The security policy department assumed a role of a coordinator of CCM among Polish institutions in an uneasy relationship with the interior ministry which has the requisite proto-capacities for generating capabilities. Compared to the Finnish MFA, which has an entire administrative unit dedicated to civilian crisis management, only one person within the CSDP section of 4 staff in the Polish foreign ministry is responsible for it. In 2008 the EU and international cooperation department of the interior ministry again appealed to its leadership to start adapting to the CCM concept, but to no avail (MIAA interview, 2009).

The one major development, coming on the heels of the declaration in the *Strategy of the Republic of Poland's Armed Forces' participation in international operations*, was a study visit to Helsinki in late fall 2009 of a joint delegation of foreign and interior ministry experts. They went there to learn lessons and possibly emulate Finland’s work on a strategy for capacity building (MIAA interview, 2009). Two other post-communist countries succeeded in drafting legal rules to support CCM. In 2006, the Czech Republic adopted legislation for the secondment of civilians. A year later, Lithuania followed suit (Khol, 2008; Korski and Gowan, 2009). Both countries, however, have not moved far in institutional adaptation.
Europeanization scholars note that misfitting European policies inflict high implementation costs since national policy-making structures have to be built from scratch. This has been a perennial problem of the southern European member states (Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Spain, Portugal, Italy), which due to weaker action capacity (i.e. budgetary resources, staff power, expertise, administrative coordination) tend to be policy takers or downloaders in Europeanization. In comparison, the northern European states (Denmark, Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Austria) are generally policy makers or up-loaders, apt to shape European policies according to their interests (Börzel, 2005). Not surprisingly then, the ECFR survey puts the majority of northerners in “the professionals” and “the strivers” categories, whereas the majority of southerners make up the “the agnostics” and “the indifferent” groups. The participants in a 2009 workshop on Italy’s participation in EU civilian missions, co-organized by the Italian foreign ministry, mentioned the lack of both a coordination mechanism among national actors and of planning capability, insufficient incentives for seconded public service employees and suboptimal legal frameworks as obstacles to effective Italian role in CCM (Miranda, 2009). The same handicaps have also been found in Greece. The CCM has challenged parts of the Greek government unconditioned to the ways of the EU, posed new demands for the resource-starved bureaucracy and required interdepartmental cooperation on a scale never before encountered and in a situation where government agencies lacked procedures for working together (Demiri and Vlioras, 2004).

In light of its relatively weak action capacity, Poland may be relegated to the southern European tier in matters of CCM. Willing to punch above weight, Polish elites could, if they wanted, use EU pressure to induce changes. Yet, the elites have taken a
compartmentalized view of CSDP, investing in the military dimension to a far greater extent than its civilian counterpart. A political push to enhance capacity in the civilian policy domain has long been absent. A portent of a breakthrough, the *Strategy of the Republic of Poland's Armed Forces' participation in international operations* coincides with preparations for the Polish EU presidency. Clearly, the responsibility that comes with chairing the Council of the EU acts as a stimulus to converging with EU norms.

Compared to the southern European member states, however, Polish administrative capacity has been saddled with problems related to post-communist transition. The overlap of systemic transformation and EU-induced pressures to adapt to CCM has put a tremendous strain on already unwieldy bureaucratic structures. Students of administrative reform in East Central Europe have catalogued the ills of its bureaucracy, reflecting a burdensome heritage of the *ancien régime*. These include: a structural conservatism; an authoritarian tradition resulting in micro-management and decision-making at the top levels as opposed to where they matter (an antithesis of subsidiarity); chronic shortages of financial and personnel resources inhibiting effective reform; frequent changeover in political personnel, as a result of which those in charge of pushing reform legislation are rarely in office long enough to oversee implementation; a high level of politicization especially at the upper management levels; limited success in the creation of a professional civil service; fragmentation at the central level of government; inadequate information-sharing and coordination procedures between different ministries and even units within ministries; and a preoccupation of policymakers with more immediate political problems, in consequence of which solutions
requiring administrative reform are pushed aside as files of less priority (Goetz, 2001; Kaminska, 2010; Zubek, 2006; Itrich-Drabarek and Nowak-Far, 2008).

In communist times, Polish ministers and their departments were geared toward implementing policies agreed within the party apparatus rather than supporting policy-formulation processes (Zubek, 2006: 90). With the communist party gone, the centre has struggled to enhance coordinating capacity. Aiming to improve the situation, in 1996, the government set up the Committee for European Integration, a collective supreme authority with competence to coordinate Polish EU policy, modelled on the French SGCI (Secrétariat Général du Comité Interministériel pour les questions de Coopération Economique Européenne) (Ibid.). The establishment of the Office of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE) was inspired by a need to adapt to the future membership in the EU. The new institution was supposed to help usher in habits of cooperation and coordination between government actors.

Interacting closely with the European Commission, UKIE has contributed to fostering a culture of coordination. Nevertheless, its impact has not been uniform across policy areas. The foreign ministry CSDP staff have resisted encroachment by UKIE experts, even for consultation or opinion-making. They have done so by upholding a strict division of competencies and invoking rules on the protection of classified information to prevent third-party access to documentation (UKIE interview, 2009). This tendency to hide behind information security was cited in 2008 by a deputy minister of interior as a major handicap to progress in policies requiring interagency cooperation (Sejm, 2008).
UKIE itself did not prove immune to dysfunctions of post-communist administration. In the thirteen years of its existence it has had 12 bosses, a turnover on average of one every thirteen months. The political bargaining among coalition partners resulted in such paradoxes as appointing as one of its bosses a soft-Eurosceptical politician. There was also considerable friction between UKIE and the Foreign Ministry. After Poland’s entry to the EU, left-wing coalition governments (2001-2005), attempted to fuse the two institutions. As a stop-gap measure, in 2004 another collegial body the European Committee of the Council of Ministers was created to inter alia approve instructions for GAERC as well as the candidacies of national experts for secondments to EU institutions.

It took five more years before the merger of UKIE and the Foreign Ministry could be completed (Rzeczkowski, 2009). This was achieved by a centre-right coalition government on the basis of the Act of 27 August 2009 on the Committee for European Affairs slated to enter into force on 1 January 2010 (Journal of Laws, 2009). Granting extensive power of coordination to the foreign minister and the establishment of a Committee of Foreign Affairs at deputy ministers’ level promises to remove corrosive institutional dualism and, in effect, strengthen the coordination of Poland’s European policy at the executive level. It may help alleviate the “strong sectorization” at the centre which has handicapped the execution of complex projects such as civilian capabilities generation which require a broader perspective than a single ministry’s own turf. These institutional innovations envisage explicitly a “fundamental reform” of Polish administration, which one senior MFA official as late as 2009 called “parochial,” underinvested and due to staffing limitations not able to produce enough experts able to
go on foreign missions (MFA interview, 2009). The UKIE-MFA merger has been interpreted as an accelerated Europeanization, which is taking place in preparation for the Polish chairmanship of the Council (Kaminska, 2010). It is a manifestation of a broader trend of Europeanization of Polish public administration said to progress as the country gains more experience as EU member (Itrich-Drabarek and Nowak-Far, 2008). It remains to be seen, however, whether the aims of reform will be reached. It has been noted that there are time lags between formal organizational change and deeper institutional transformation influencing informal rules, norms and values (Goetz, 2001). A mere tinkering with organizational design is unlikely to affect “cultural adjustment,” an issue in Poland, which like France has one of the strongest “military-first” bureaucratic cultures in the EU (Jakobsen, 2006; Korski and Gowan, 2009).

The difficulties of replacing the culture of “sectoral Poland” with a joint or whole-of-government approach may be illustrated by the travails in creating a domestic integrated system of crisis management. It took nearly two decades after 1989 until a pan-sector crisis management authority could be established in Poland (Soloch, 2006). By means of the Crisis Management Act, adopted in 2007, it took the form of the Government Security Centre. It acts as a national centre of crisis management coordinating preparation of threat analyses, conducting 24/7 threat monitoring and advising the prime minister, to whom the director of the centre responds, and the interdepartmental Government Task Force on Crisis Management, chaired by the premier (Journal of Laws, 2007a). The need to set up a pan-sector authority had been repeatedly highlighted in the evaluation of international and national crisis management exercises, and called for by experts from ministries of defence, foreign and internal affairs. The interior ministry describes the
Government Security Centre as a “new development in the Polish administrative system” and expects it to improve “the quality of cooperation” with NATO and the EU in civilian crisis management, civilian planning and critical infrastructure protection (MIA, 2008).

The expectations with regards to the Government Security Centre have not been met. Experts note that that the Act on Crisis Management focuses only on non-military, internal crises and in that sense does not provide for a truly integrated crisis management system, one that is able to tie both military and non-military strands. It does nothing to address the internal-external crisis management divide, which is considered anachronistic. When officials of the Eurosceptical government at the time started drafting the Act on Crisis Management, the issue of external crisis management missions came up, but was ultimately not addressed since it proved “a nut too tough to crack” (MIAA interview, 2009). Whereas the Government Security Centre was supposed to improve cooperation with NATO and the EU, in practice it has privileged relations only with the former. Its work program for international activities concentrates on NATO and the visits by its officials to Brussels have been only to NATO institutions dealing with civil protection (RCB website). In a year-and-half of its existence, from August 2008 until the end of December 2009, the Centre has had two changes at the director level. The respected Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza speculated that the dismissal of the second head of the Centre, in the capacity of acting director, had to do with his personality- and experience-driven desire to exercise his full powers which rubbed other bureaucrats the wrong way (2009). In other words, coordination prerogatives remain on paper.

The turnover of the managerial personnel in the public administration has affected adversely institutional and policy reform. In the last ten years the Ministry of Interior, in
the premises of which, the Centre had been located and wherefrom it drew a lot of staff, has been particularly hit by frequent rotation of high-level officials. This fate has also befallen the foreign ministry. The government of the conservative Law and Justice Party (PiS) in 2005-2007 (in 2006-2007 in coalition with the eurosceptical League of Polish Families (LPR) and the populist, isolationist Self-Defence party) conducted a purge of senior MFA staff (Kaminska, 2010). In an environment of political uncertainty at home, one would have hardly expected decision-makers to heed calls from lower-level experts to take on a complex task of addressing shortfalls in civilian capabilities for EU crisis response.

In short, having had a difficult time establishing an internal integrated civilian crisis management system, Polish officials, still beset by problems left-over from post-communist transition, had no stomach to develop such a system oriented externally. Since many other EU member states and - as the saga of never-ending institutional reform in Brussels illustrates - also the EU itself, have not met this challenge, it would have been a tall order to expect Poland to accomplish such a feat.

IV.5. Civilian Headline Goal, Personnel Recruitment and Training

The EU methodology employed to raise civilian capabilities bears part of the blame for poor policy outcomes at the national level. The Civilian Headline Goals are modelled upon the Open Method of Coordination used to generate military capacity. It encapsulates the establishment of precise, quantitative targets in specific priority areas to be met first by 2003 and then 2008 and 2010 (headline goals), followed by commitment conferences or questionnaires in which the member states voluntarily pledge a specific
quantity of resources, holding conferences identifying shortfalls on the basis of the commitment-target gap, and formulating action plans to address deficits, for instance in the area of police (Dwan, 2006). In terms of commitments, the capabilities declared by the member states have actually exceeded the numerical objectives. Table 18 summarizes the commitments EU member states had made up until 2006 in response to successive targets.

Table 18   EU civilian crisis management quantitative targets and member state commitments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Headline Goal</th>
<th>Member State Commitments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>5,000 police, of whom 1000 should be deployable within 30 days, for any type of police operation, from advisory, assistance and training to substituting local police forces</td>
<td>5,761 police of which 1,400 are deployable within 30 days, 13 rapidly deployable, integrated police units (ranging from 60 to 110 officers each) and four police HQ, two of which are available for rapid deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>200 rule of law experts (prosecutors, judges and penitentiary officers) deployable in 30 days</td>
<td>631 experts, including 72 judges, 48 prosecutors, 38 administrative services, 72 penitentiary system officials and 34 others, of which 60 officials area available for rapid deployment within 60 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Civilian administration</td>
<td>A “pool” of rapidly deployable experts to set up or support civilian administration in the mission area</td>
<td>565 officials able to take on assignments of, among other functions, civil registration, local administration and custom services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Civil protection</td>
<td>2-3 assessment teams consisting of 10 experts available for deployment at 3-7 hours notice. These experts should be on 24 hour call from a group of up to 100 specially selected experts; intervention teams of up to 2000 personnel available for deployment at short notice (civilian protection teams).</td>
<td>579 civil protection experts and 4,445 staff for intervention teams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>Identified in 2004 as one of the priority areas, monitoring contributes to &quot;prevention/deterrence by presence&quot; and enhances EU visibility on the ground</td>
<td>505 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Support to EU SR</td>
<td>Also added in 2004, it deems to strengthen the offices of EU Special Representatives.</td>
<td>444 officials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jakobsen, 2006; EU Council civ/03.
To introduce methodical rigour a new Civilian Capability Management Tool powered by a software called Goalkeeper was developed, lists of non-human resources, such as equipment, compiled and since 2008 National Action Plans have been brought in to help the member states meet CHG commitments (Korski and Gowan, 2009; Grevi and Keohane, 2009). At the end of the day, however, a significant gap remains between commitments on paper and concrete contributions to the EU CCM activities (Angelet and Vrailas, 2008). Korski and Gowan estimate the shortfalls to be at least 1,500 across all 12 ongoing CSDP mission (2009:44). Figure 3 illustrates the discrepancy between the pledges and the delivery.

**Figure 3** EU member states’ CHG commitments and actual deployments in 2009

![Graph showing the discrepancy between pledges and delivery]  
*Source: Korski and Gowan 2009*

It is debatable whether the methodology of capabilities generation, patterned upon the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), delivers results. In the absence of coercive
mechanisms voluntary mimetic and normative processes may not be bring about national change (Borrás and Jacobsson, 2004: 195; Korski and Gowan, 2009; Dwan, 2006). It is thought that, for instance, “naming and shaming” rule-breaching governments could spur them to stay true to their word, particularly if the media, “the fourth branch of government” gets involved (Schmidt, 2010). Given the traditional opacity of policy-making in Poland, it is doubtful whether the media or the civil society, already assessed as weak, could put pressure on the government. Wessels and Bopp suggest that in future the High Representative could play the role of a “moral conscience” in trying to enforce discipline among the member states (Wessels and Bopp, 2008). However, since Solana has not attempted to exercise such powers, the suggestion may be a moot point.

Dwan points out two other problems of the methodology. First, the four CCM priority areas have been conceptualized and negotiated separately rather than having been addressed as part of a continuum of interdependent tasks. And second, resources committed on paper do not reflect the reality of what civilian capabilities the EU can actually bring to bear in a crisis response operation. Neither do they help identify specific civilian expertise (Dwan, 2006: 9-10). Korski and Gowan have noted cynical attitudes expressed by diplomats, quoting one as saying that the CHG remains a “number exercise,” and another, from a new EU member state, describing it as nothing but a “declaration” (2009:44). Overbidding does nothing to address the mismatch between standard means and complex missions.

Whereas the military, thanks to long experience of institutionalization, standardization, training and cooperation under NATO tutelage, has become “internationalized,” civilian personnel, such as judges and lawyers, correctional officers
or civilian administrators, are rooted in domestic contexts of training and employment. The demand for the services of the former, who are pre-trained, pre-equipped and pre-formed, is abroad, whereas for the latter - who, when deployed, would be an assortment of experts with little or none prior training or integration as a team - it is at home (Dwan, 2006; Jakobsen, 2006; Khol, 2010). Civilians must be provided with sufficient incentives to leave their domestic duties and go on a foreign mission (Gourlay, 2004). Regulations are necessary to ensure that civilians retain their jobs at home while on deployment, remain eligible for promotion and/or pay raise, are not penalized in terms of vacation and (un-)paid leave of absence, and have otherwise sufficient financial incentives to volunteer in the first place. This set of issues has not been taken into account in the legislation on the civil service or such sectoral services as the correctional service or the prosecutor’s office – save for the police. After all the efforts put into CCM governance by the EU, in 2008, the Swedish foreign minister, Carl Bildt, admitted:

Although the military missions are often seen as the most demanding, it is often the deployment of the more political and civilian ones that are the most challenging. While we have standing military units ready to go notably the two EU Battle Groups ready to deploy within 10 days – we don’t have policemen, judges, lawyers or different instructors ready in the same way (cited by Gya, 2009).

Poland, like other EU member states, has not been frugal in making commitments. However, the rhetoric has not been matched by the development of a national system of civilian capabilities generation. As soon as it entered the EU in 2004, Poland pledged 345 experts towards the CHG 2008. It was the sixth largest contribution after Italy, Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom. At the time Poland also spearheaded discussion within the EU on how to unify the regulations and principles underlying the training and deployment of civilians in crisis management operations (Kupiecki, 2005; MFA
interview, 2009). In 2004, it organized a seminar in Warsaw towards this end. Poland’s generous commitment and its initial spur of activity had been motivated by a desire to make “the first impression” as an ambitious new EU member state eager to contribute to CSDP. The creation of coordination mechanisms for participation and training of Polish representatives in the EU’s CCM had actually been mandated during the accession negotiations on the CFSP chapter and recognized as one of the priority tasks in the National Programme of Preparation for Membership in the European Union, approved in June 2001 by the Polish Council of Ministers (Council of Ministers, 2001). Because CSDP is an intergovernmental domain the EU could not, however, enforce compliance, so this promise of establishing coordination mechanisms has, it would seem, not been kept by the Polish government.

There is evidence of incremental changes. The Regulation of the [Polish] Council of Ministers of 19 June 2006 on the service of officers of the Border Guard in the Border Guard contingent addresses the issue of foreign deployments for border guard officers. The new Act of 27 August 2009 on the Customs Service also contains procedures related to the secondment of personnel to the EU (Journal of Laws, 2009a). The draft law on the correctional service sent in May 2009 to parliament elaborates at greater length regulations on the secondment of correctional service officers to international organizations, though still not addressing directly operational duties. It would be ideal to address civilian deployment as part of a comprehensive, horizontal legislation applicable to the bureaucracy-at-large rather than apply patches in vertical legislation or sectoral regulations here and there. But, as mentioned, such an attempt has proved a non-starter. As one Polish expert put it, it is easier for the decision-makers to tick off the deployment
of military police as a contribution to civilian missions than undertake the complex work of adapting the state institutions to the demands of multi-purpose CCM (European Centre Natolin interview, 2009).

Apart from legislative and procedural issues, challenges also concern recruitment. The EU does not promote a generic model in this regard. Norms in this area have been diffused by means of such documents as the EU Council's 2006 Draft recommendations and guidelines on the raising of personnel for EU civilian crisis management and the encouragement of vertical and horizontal sharing of information on the recruitment, exchanges of know-how, best practices and lessons learned (EU Council, 16696/06). The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability itself does not have a central roster of civilian experts. Instead, it seeks out national experts through Calls for Contributions to the member states (Behrendt and Nutt, 2009). It is the same case, by the way, in the military capabilities side of CSDP.

Unwilling to transfer personnel decisions to the European level, the member states maintain responsibility for recruitment (Lieb, 2010). In terms of personnel selection process, 19 EU member states have either integrated rosters, which include the police officers and other civilian personnel, or police databases; 3 are in the process of developing rosters; and 5 have no institutionalized system at all (Korski and Gowan, 2009). Finland, through its Crisis Management Centre, Germany, a quasi-governmental Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF) and the United Kingdom, through the Stabilization Unit, have pioneered the development of rosters of civilian capability, running into hundreds of names of experts from both the government and outside (Behrendt and Nutt, 2009; Korski and Gowan, 2009; Gourlay, 2006). The British model
has inspired the Netherlands and Denmark to set up similar outfits (Behrendt and Nutt, 2009; Gourlay, 2006). Belgium has also established a database of civilian personnel for CSDP operations (Korski and Gowan, 2009).

In Poland ad hoc-ism in recruitment prevails. Only the police is said to maintain an embryonic database of police staff, for EU and also UN and OSCE missions, which it is considering expanding into a fully-fledged roster to include also experienced police officers, retired staff, veterans of police deployments. Polish experts admit that police bosses are wary of standardizing recruitment procedures and centralizing rosters, because this would take away their discretionary power to use the prospect of foreign deployment as a carrot in personnel management. Other EU member states to have only police rosters are Austria, Cyprus, Portugal and Slovakia (Ibid.). The Polish police have also developed some planning and recruitment mechanisms for staff to be deployed in police contingents. This is a responsibility of a division in charge of police contingents and liaison officers within the international police cooperation bureau at the National Police Headquarters (NP HQ). This division is also in charge of strategy and planning of police deployments in peace operations, a task in which it cooperates with the interior ministry, that oversees the police, and the foreign ministry.53

The procedure for deploying police officers is generally as follows. The foreign ministry, through its representative in the PSC, makes a political decision with regards to the participation of the Polish police in an EU operation, formalized in a resolution of the Polish Council of Ministers. When the EU through CIVCOM specifies the requirements,

53 In cooperation with the foreign ministry, for example, the police has organized internships for its staff at the Polish permanent representation to the EU. Such an experience would likely facilitate exposure to and enhance appreciation for the CSDP (Policja.pl 2007).
such as professional background and skills necessary for the position, the bureau sends out a call for volunteers to all the police units in the country. Normally police officers over 25 years old, with a minimum of 5 years of service, in good health, and for commanding officers able to communicate in English are accepted. The bureau screens and interviews the candidates. Once accepted, they go through a one-month specialist training at the Police School in Słupsk or the Police Training Centre in Legionowo, experienced in preparing the police for UN missions. The goal of the training is to shape a unified team out of individual police officers hailing from various parts of the country. It emphasizes readiness and coordination. The trainers are police officers with experience in international deployments. Once the officers are deployed, they may or may not receive EU induction training on-site.

The EU has urged “Member states to consider, in accordance with their national legislation, expertise from the NGO and CSO [civil society organizations] sector, when establishing or developing rosters for deployment in civilian crisis management missions” (EU Council, 15741/06). Poland has not fared well in this regard. Polish nongovernmental experts criticize the inability of the foreign ministry to utilize the strengths of those Polish NGOs that are active abroad, which, for instance, managed to send quickly a very large contingent of election observers to Ukraine during the Orange Revolution (European Centre Natolin interview, 2009). The unwillingness to seek expertise outside of the public administration is a feature of the bureaucratic culture in Poland. It appears all the more surprising in this context since the foreign ministry has in the past outsourced the recruitment of personnel for OSCE observation missions to NGOs, namely the Warsaw-based Batory Foundation, active in Eastern Europe. The
MFA has therefore gathered an experience, which it could have put to use in developing public-private partnerships in the same way as, for example, the UK has done. The declaration in the 2009 *Strategy of the Republic of Poland’s Armed Forces’ participation in international operations* to engage civilians from NGOs in CCM would mark a departure from current practice. Knowing how sticky bureaucratic culture may be it remains to be seen whether it is not merely a rhetorical convergence with the EU precepts.

The potential for socialization of Polish officials in the CCM culture in the EU is limited. Poland has not invested in the secondment of its personnel to EU institutions handling CCM. As of 2009, there were two seconded Polish experts in the Civilian-Military Cell: a diplomat in the Civil Strategic Planning section, and a military officer in the Military Assessment and Planning section (EUMS interview, 2009). In addition, within DG E there were a former MoD civilian staffer, now GSC employee, as well as a seconded national expert, both of whom however dealt mainly with the military dimension of CSDP. The two individuals working in the Civ-Mil Cell responded to calls for seconded national experts and worked their way to Brussels on their own rather than through any institutionalized means of nomination or support (Ibid.). Aside from the capacity limitations – member states cover the cost for the secondment of their national experts and Poland has not developed an institutionalised process of supporting its nationals to EU posts – the lack of attention betrays low priority attached to CCM.

Training remains an Achilles’ heel. The EU has committed to developing “common standards and modules for training” in the priority areas of civilian crisis management (EU Council, 14176/2/03). Although an evolutionary trend towards collective efforts in
the provision of training may be detected in CSDP, EU civilian training policy still “remains in its infancy” – just like its military corollary, one might add (Jakobsen, 2006).

It is mainly up to the member states to provide training.

Since 2001 the EU has run policing courses in cooperation with the UN and developed several guidelines and training curricula for police training (EU Council, 14176/2/03). A year later, it began holding crisis management exercises involving civilian institutions. In follow-up to the European Councils in Feira and Göteborg, in October 2001 the Commission launched a pilot project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management initially in the areas of civil administration and the rule of law. It outsourced the coordination of this project to the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR), an NGO with an experience in mission preparation training for the OSCE (Conigli, 2006). This program, which has become known as the European Group on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (EGT) has since 2005 expanded to embrace: human rights; democratization and good governance; press and public information; conflict transformation; and mission management, administration and support. In line with CIVCOM recommendations to enhance co-operation with NGOs and CSOs, training is organized and provided by the EGT, a network of 13 training institutes and NGO training providers from as many member states with a rotating chairmanship and a direct link to CIVCOM (Jakobsen, 2006; Lieb, 2010). It is funded out of the Instrument for Stability (IfS), overseen by DG RELEX. In 2002-2009, the EGT offered 68 courses for a total of 1,399 participants, including judges, prosecutors, human rights observers, local administrators, infrastructure experts and other civilian personnel. However, because the member states have resisted any move to link EU training with
deployment, few of these graduates have been deployed (Gourlay, 2004). Since its funding contract was set to expire in October 2009, the future of the EGT looked uncertain (Lieb, 2010).

Two institutional innovations, also based on the network architecture, promise to strengthen European training. In 2005, the EU Council set up the European Police College (CEPOL) tasking it with among other things developing and providing training to prepare police forces of the EU MS for participation in non-military crisis management (EU Council, 2005/681/JHA). Three years later, as an outcome of an EU Training Policy in the field of CSDP, the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) was born. Its mandate encompasses training in CSDP at the strategic level to develop and promote a common understanding of the policy among civilian and military personnel, and to identify and disseminate, through its training activities, best practices (EU Council, 2005/575/CFSP, 2008/550/CFSP). Although the ESDC has launched a number of courses relevant to CCM, including Security Sector Reform (SSR) Training Course and “CSDP Mission Planning Process Course,” it has devoted most of its attention to the military dimension of CSDP (Lieb, 2010). Besides, the ESDC remains a virtual entity with a small secretariat located at the Council, and as such is unable to facilitate an institutionalized basis for cooperation. So far, cooperation between the EGT and ESDC has been limited. There has been more of competition, course overlaps in SSR, and fear on the part of the former that training for civilian crisis management could be “taken over” by the “military ESDC” (Lieb, 2010).

Only a handful EU member states have training institutions, whether they be NGO or government-run that, on the one hand, take active part in the European Group of
Training, and, on the other hand, offer high-quality training for national civilian personnel. The institutions that stand out are the Crisis Management Center in Finland, Centre for International Peace Operations in Germany and the Folke Bernadotte Academy in Sweden. In addition to training they are also involved in recruitment as well as follow-up evaluation and lessons learned (Khol, 2008). The majority of the EU member states however, lack systemized training for civilians.

Poland has stayed on the sidelines of the fledgling EU training policy for CCM, and made no serious effort to set up appropriate domestic arrangements. A typical reason cited for Poland’s non-participation in the European Group of Training is a paucity of its own training institutions, a debatable argument in view of the strength some of the Polish police schools have been building up in recent years (Polish EU Mission interview, 2009). Although several Polish interior ministry staffers have attended EGT courses none of them has been deployed abroad (MIIA interview, 2009). The impact of the European Security and Defence College in Poland has been negligible. The “costs lie where they fall” principle underlying the ESDC’s funding for training has discouraged deeper involvement (MFA interview, 2009).

Aside from the military, only the police has good training infrastructure. However, its origin bears no direct relation to EU expectations, and it only offers training to national personnel from within its ranks. As mentioned, pre-deployment training is provided at the Police School in Słupsk and the Police Training Centre in Legionowo near Warsaw. Some of the Polish police schools, above all the Higher Police School in Szczytno, have developed cooperation with CEPOL, an institution rooted in pillar III of the EU; bilateral links, including student and teacher exchanges and joint research projects, with partner
schools, especially in Germany; regional connections through a co-membership in the Central European Police Academy (Mitteleuropaische Polizeiakademie); as well as multilateral ties through participation in the Association of European Police Colleges.

An extension of European integration processes to police training bodes well for harmonizing of training (Bogdalski, 2008). The Higher Police School in Szczytno, a premier education and research institution of Polish police, has had its legal mandate changed expressly to respond to the extension of the Bologne process – envisaging the creation of a European Higher Education Area – to police education. The Law of 2005 on Higher Education has given it a broad mandate to pursue international cooperation which it has put to good use (Ibid.). In 2009, the European Commission awarded the School the Erasmus Mundus Charter to facilitate an expansion of international collaboration. In 2005-2007, the School participated in eight international projects, under the CARDS programme (Community assistance for reconstruction, development and stabilisation) helping build police capacities in the countries of South-Eastern Europe, and offered training in criminal investigation for Iraqi justice sector and internal affairs officials (Ibid.). CEPOL, in which Poland participates actively, has sought develop a common curricula for police training regarding civilian crisis management. In 2008, 3 police officers from Poland took part in the first EU Police Forces Exercise based on a crisis management scenario. It was organized by the Centre National de Formation de Gendarmerie in France, a prominent training centre which the Commission has contracted to train police in CCM (Wright and Auvinen, 2009). The Polish police committed to participating in similar exercises in the future (Policja.pl, 24 June 2008).
The strength of police capabilities in training as opposed to others is a situation mirrored in a majority of EU member states (Khol, 2008). It reflects the fact that the lion’s share, or 7 out of 16 civilian missions launched thus far by the EU have been police missions (in Bosnia, FYROM, two in the DRC, Palestine, FYROM and Afghanistan). This owes to the historically preponderant focus on stabilizing the Balkans and generally on the emphasis on the promotion of the rule of law and norms in democratic security sector governance within the mission mandate (Chivvis, 2010; Menon, 2009). It is difficult to ascertain whether the availability of the police and the relative ease of deploying it abroad, as opposed to, say, experts in civilian administration, encourages availing of police expertise so extensively, or whether there is in fact an overwhelming need for it in the first place. The reality on the ground seems to suggest a comparable influence of “demand” and “supply.”

Experts argue that “improving the civilian contribution to multi-dimensional operations is best achieved through training together with military partners” (Blair, 2010). The Polish military has its own procedures with regards to the recruitment and training of CIMIC staff. As a result of a decision in 2009 to establish 20,000 strong National Reserve Forces within the 120,000-strong Polish military, the MoD will theoretically have access to a sizeable pool of deployable civilian specialists. It already supervises the Military Gendarmerie which has taken part in both military and civilian capacity in several EU operations. The MoD also runs the Training Centre for Peace Support Operations in Kielce for the uniformed and civilian employees of the armed forces. The Centre belongs to two international networks – since 1996 to the International Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) and from 2000 to the NATO PfP Training
Centres. In spite of the expert advice and the EU attempts to foster a model of civil-military cooperation, little thought has been given to utilising this or many of the other standard MoD training facilities to foster civil-military synergy. By comparison, Slovenia uses its MoD training centre to prepare civilians about to deploy on peace support operations (Korski and Gowan, 2009).

Along with other EU member states Poland has regularly participated in standard EU-wide crisis management exercises, both as a candidate state and as EU member. These exercises have involved the chancellery of the prime minister, ministries of national defence, foreign affairs, internal affairs and administration, finance (overseeing inter alia the customs service) and justice, counterintelligence and intelligence agencies as well as Poland’s permanent representation to the EU in Brussels. As a result, deficiencies in coordination have been identified (Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland, 2004). As we have seen, these findings contributed to the decision to set up the Government Security Centre, a half-baked attempt to improve national crisis management.

IV.6. Missions

Of the 22 EU CSDP operations launched by the end of 2009, only six have been military (Concordia in FYR of Macedonia, Artemis and EUFOR in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Althea in Bosnia, EUFOR in Tchad/Republic of Central Africa, and EUNAVFOR in Somalia), while 16 have been civilian or civil-military (Menon, 2009; EU Council, civ/03). The civilian missions have been carried out in 13 countries on

three continents, involving an increasing number of staff, from 715 in 2003 to nearly 2,800 in January 2009 when 12 CSDP missions, 10 of them civilian, were in progress (Chivvis, 2010:9).

The operational record looks impressive and each time around EU officials call it a success. However, independent experts and retired EU officials say the real picture is far from rosy. The most scathing evaluation has come from Korski and Gowan, in whose view “most EU missions are small, lacking in ambition and often strategically irrelevant” (Korski and Gowan, 2009:22). Nick Whitney, a former EDA chief, echoes their sentiment: “many of the civilian operations... have been so small as to be little more than political gestures” (2008: 41). The small scope and limited mandate of these operations resulting in modest outcomes has been noted by the International Crisis Group and RAND Corporation (Chivvis, 2010; Menon, 2009). Such criticism must not belie undisputed added-value the EU has brought to post-conflict rehabilitation. The rapid deployment of for the first time over-staffed monitoring mission to Georgia, meeting a precondition for the withdrawal of the Russian forces (though not from South Ossetia and Abkhazia), is a case in point (Wright and Auvinen, 2009). Polish experts note that the value of civilian capabilities lies in their low level of politicization. The police may be sent off to areas where deploying military capabilities would not have been politically feasible (Jankowska, 2007)

The CSDP missions in general have been fraught with at least five weaknesses pointed out by Whitney. First, notwithstanding the provision of general principles in the

European Security Strategy, EU interventionism has proceeded in a strategic vacuum and in the absence of a coherent plan. It appears that the hopes put into the Strategic Planning Branch, one of the central units of the Civ-Mil Cell have not borne fruit (Ibid.). Notwithstanding the pride EU expresses in its elaborate conflict prevention, early warning and country risk assessment machinery, decisions to launch an operation are mired in politics and depend not only on the strength of persuasion, but also the strength of the persuader. Whitney asks (rhetorically) why five out of 22 CSDP operations have been in Congo (2008). Germans, in particular, have suspected that the French use the EU as a “cover” to legitimize interventions in their former colonies, a perception likewise shared by the Poles (Menon, 2009; Polish EU mission interview, 2009). Under pressure from the sponsoring states, the EU launched a monitoring mission in Aceh irrespective of the fact that there were other international organizations on the ground already assisting the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration process. Until its deployment of police trainers to the hostile environment in Afghanistan, the EU has tended to insert personnel into relatively benign theatres, benefiting from the supporting presence of bigger entities on the ground, NATO in the case of the Balkans, and the UN in Africa or Asia. Furthermore, until the launch of EULEX Kosovo in 2009, none of the civilian missions have had executive powers. While the risk of conflicts between the mission staff and the local population has thereby been reduced, limiting the EU’s direct impact on law enforcement in situations that call for it has cost it credibility and efficacy (Wright and Auvinen, 2009).

Second, civilian operations have been difficult to launch due to a lack of capabilities. Quite simply, the member states have not delivered on their promises. Two
months after the EU’s police mission to Macedonia deployed in December 2003, for example, it still faced a personnel shortfall of 30% (Korski and Gowan, 2009). At the end of 2009, the police mission in Afghanistan remained severely understaffed.

Third, the “costs lie where they fall” principle of financing participation in crisis management has been a disincentive for those member states which, although willing to flex the muscle, face resource constraints. According to the EU Treaty non-military operational expenditures are funded out of the Community CFSP budget. However, this budget covers only “common costs,” inter alia mission support - logistics and telecommunications, security, procurement, administration and finances, while salaries of personnel, individual equipment, or for the most part transport to the operational theatre, are borne by the member states (Gourlay, 2006). Polish diplomats in Brussels admit that Warsaw’s participation in civilian missions might have been more extensive had a larger share of the operational costs been funded out of the Community budget (Polish EU mission interview, 2009). Finland has expressed support for “sufficient and sustainable joint funding” for CCM (Finland, MoI, 2008). The European Parliament has also backed this call.

However, increasing common funding is a challenge. The EU member states wrangled long and hard over what constitutes common costs when setting up the ATHENA instrument for to fund military crisis management. An attempt by the French presidency in 2009 to radically overhaul this scheme brought meagre results (Gros-Verheyde, 2009). It would be hard to get the net payers to agree to cede control over the length and mandate of the mission which the communautarization of funding would
entail. Howorth predicts that the EU member states will not be willing to concede sovereignty over defence spending (cited by Sweeney, 2008).

Common funding would also require a substantial increase in the CFSP/CSDP budget. While the number of EU missions has gone up through the roof, the CFSP budget has not increased commensurately. As the economic crisis got underway after 2008, such a move looked even more unlikely. In effect, those EU member states, keen to share the burden, will continue to foot the bill. As far as mission funding is concerned, it will be difficult to avoid the impression of ad-hocism. In one of the more “spectacularly amateurish improvisations,” the advance party in the monitoring mission sent to Aceh (AMM) had to finance their operation on their personal credit cards along with a loan from the entertainment allowance of the British ambassador in Jakarta (Whitney, 2008:8, 46). In order to launch the EUPM mission in Bosnia-Hercegovina, “the Union had to struggle hard, scratch around for leftovers from different budgetary chapters, and even devise bureaucratic stratagems to put together a mere $14 million” (Gourlay, 2006: 109).

The inflexibility in funding affects also the procurement of matériel. There have been many delays in the provision of essential equipment as the Commission, responsible for it, has not been able to cope with demands and the tempo of procurement in support of burgeoning missions. For example, the staff of the 12-month long EUJUST THEMIS mission in Georgia had to wait 3 months for the arrival of computers (Gourlay, 2006). The Commission has only recently started to explore ways of getting supplies in quickly during the critical mission start-up phase (Wright and Auvinen, 2009).

Fourth, mission efficiency has suffered due to the already discussed fragmentation in planning, command and control, insufficient civil-military integration and the broader
challenge of the inter-pillar disconnect. The lack of a joint EU planning and command
centre accounts in large part for this problem. Even though the participants at the 2003
“chocolate summit” backed the establishment of such an HQ, and the European
Parliament and the think-tanks have jumped onboard, many member states, above all the
UK, have been lukewarm about this idea. As already said, Poland has moved from being
a staunch critique to a recent convert to this idea.

Finally, and this relates to the previous point, not enough attention has been paid
to lessons learning and follow-up to prevent mistakes and organizational glitches. The
shortage of civilian experts in the EU Council, for instance, has meant that the energies of
available personnel have been drained on supporting missions on the ground rather than
assessment and follow-up. In short, in view of the limited size and scope of EU civilian
operations one should have modest expectations that the operational experience would
bring about significant national cognitive or institutional policy changes.

Poland has been an active participant in civilian EU crisis management. This
finding appears somewhat surprising given the dearth of systemic approaches to civilian
force generation. As illustrated in Figure 4, it has been the fifth biggest provider of the
civilian staff after France, Germany, Italy and Romania (“a striver” in ECFR’s report),
ahead of the Nordic members of the EU.
It has taken part in nine out of 16 EU civilian crisis management missions, contributing a total of 180 personnel, 90% civilian (or military) police officers, out of the CHG 2008 commitment of 345 (see Table 19). Poland has also made contributions of equipment to civilian missions. For instance, it declared 2 An-2 aircraft without crew, offered to train 4 pilots to fly it, as well as committed 4 electricity generators to the EU Support to AMIS operation in Sudan (Polish Council of Minister, July 2005).
Table 19  Poland in EU civilian crisis management operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total International Personnel</th>
<th>Polish Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>EUPM</td>
<td>Bosnia-Hercegovina</td>
<td>1 Jan. 2003 - 31 Dec. 2011</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>122 (as of Apr. 2010), down from 500 at the outset</td>
<td>12 police officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>EUJUST Themis</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>16 July 2004 - 14 July 2005</td>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1 senior rule of law expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>EU Support to AMIS</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>18 July 2005-31 Dec. 2007</td>
<td>Civilian/polic e-military</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1 police officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>EUJUST LEX</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1 July 2005 - 30 June 2012</td>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>53 coordination and liaison staff</td>
<td>Experts holding a seminar for 40 Iraqi officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>EUBAM</td>
<td>Moldova and Ukraine</td>
<td>30 Nov. 2008 - 30 Nov. 2008</td>
<td>Border assistance/ Monitoring</td>
<td>119 experts from 22 EU member states as well as CIS representatives</td>
<td>17 Border Guard and Customs Service personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>EUPOL Afghanistan</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>15 June 2007 - 31 May 2013</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>265 (as of 6 June 2010)</td>
<td>3 police officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>EULEX</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>16 Feb. 2008 - 14 June 2010</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>117 police officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>EUUMM</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1 Oct. 2008 - 14 Sept. 2010</td>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>330, of whom 250 are monitors</td>
<td>10 police officers and 16 MP officers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jankowski, 2008; Ozerski, 2008; EU Council; MFA; Korski and Gowan, 2009; Chivvis, 2010.

The preponderance of police officers among the civilians mirrors a disproportionate EU demand for police capabilities. Nonetheless, the EU-15 have been able to deploy more civil administration and judicial affairs and other officials as part of their civilian contribution than Poland. Notwithstanding this, by deploying 52% of total civilian personnel declared to CHG 2008 Poland occupied the first spot among the EU members in terms of meeting this commitment, followed by Czech Republic at 45% deployed,

By comparison with the military dimension of the CSDP, Poland participated in 4 of 6 EU military operations, contributing 817 personnel. When one takes this data into account and compares Poland’s CCM tally to Finland’s and Sweden’s record of having participated in all EU civilian operations, Poland has taken part in a greater number of military than civilian EU operations – this despite the fact that the Union has conducted more civilian than military missions (Ojanen, 2007; Herolf, 2007). One must bear in mind the limited effect of the small civilian contributions on domestic policy. One-hundred eighty civilians deployed, 90% of them police officers, will fail to induce a strong socializing effect upon the rest of the staff of the 379,278-strong Polish public administration. The institutional interaction is likely to be small as well.

Wright and Auvinen argue that the decision to second staff depends on the resources available to the member states, cooperation of key ministries such as interior and justice ministries and interest in a particular political issue or geographic region (Wright and Auvinen, 2009:120). We now know enough about capacity shortfalls and problems with inter-ministerial coordination and how these stand in the way of Poland’s effective participation in CCM. As to the political issues and geographical regions of interest, Poland’s priorities are clearly evident. Six out of nine civilian missions to which Poland has contributed, have been in Eastern Europe, reflecting the strategic nature of this region in Poland’s national security policy (and identity). Because Poland has long been interested in bringing CSDP to bear on this part of Europe, by matching rhetoric

---

55 Korski and Gowan actually give a 44% figure for Poland, which is likely based on incomplete data that I have revised upon cross-checking multiple Polish sources.
with tangible input Poland has sought to prod the EU to expand its missions in that direction. It has sent a national expert to the first ever EU rule of law EUJUST THEMIS mission in Georgia; fielded the largest number of civilian personnel among the participating states to the EU border assistance mission in Moldova and Ukraine; the fourth largest contingent, after Germany, France and Sweden, to the monitoring mission in Georgia; and by seconding two national experts reinforced the staff of the EU Special Representative for South Caucasus. Poland sees its support for CSDP operations in Eastern Europe as a reinforcement of its advocacy of the Eastern Partnership. Warsaw wants to be seen as an active player in the region and it seeks to build a niche within the EU as a specialist in its eastern relations. This is particularly pertinent in the run-up to the 2011 Polish presidency of the EU.

Poland also perceives CCM as added value to its military commitments in other parts of the world. To help bridge the transatlantic divide over Iraq and support Iraqi security sector reform, at a time when Polish troops were in that country, Poland advocated launching EUJUST LEX rule-of-law mission. It felt that the EU input, also coming on the heels of the NATO Training Mission, would be a good political sell in Washington. For similar reasons, to strengthen the European contribution to ISAF and assist its own troops in Afghanistan, Poland backed the EU training of the Afghan police.

A lack of motivation by the sending institutions to release an employee, needed at home, and pay him or her per diem for participating in a mission that has no direct relevance to the tasks he or she are asked to perform in a domestic post remains a serious issue. Polish diplomats criticize the tendency by the EU to appoint officials from countries that have very good recruitment and training systems as well as extensive CCM
experience, to top positions in the EU missions. Experts fear that a vicious circle could be in the making: the Council Secretariat chooses only experienced individuals to fill the vacancies in missions, but one can gather mission experience by getting deployed (Meijer and Matveeva, 2006). Thus, the 100% CCM participation record of Finland and Sweden owes in large degree to their experienced, high-quality human resources.

Poland is slowly accumulating a pool of experienced police officers. By 2008, when the EU launched its biggest ever civilian mission EULEX in Kosovo, over 1800 Polish police officers had since 2000 served in 16 rotations of the 115-strong Polish police contingent supporting the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) (Policja.pl, Feb. 2008, May 2006). Ten officers also advised the Kosovar ministry of internal affairs. This experience helped make the transition of the Polish officers from the UN-led operation to the EU’s seamless. Poland was also familiar with the conditions of the security sector in Georgia as it had maintained 2 police officers in the UNPOL mission in that country since 2003. The 3 police officers Poland sent to EUPOL Afghanistan had participated in mission in the Balkans and (one) in the US-funded training program of Iraqi police officers hosted by the Jordan International Police Training Centre in Amman. The duty in Kosovo actually inspired one of those officers to learn Arabic (Policja.pl, Feb. 2008). So far, however, only a handful of Polish police officers have occupied senior EU posts. One was a senior advisor to the head of the police mission in the EU Support to AMIS operation, others though have held lower-level posts as crime advisor team leaders, chiefs of logistics, training advisors, and the like (Policja.pl, 2006). While a Hungarian was appointed head of mission of EUBAM, there
has not been any Polish national acting in that capacity within civilian CSDP missions, nor as EU special representatives (Khol, 2008).

Poland's fairly good rate of participation in the EU civilian operations has not translated into progress towards drafting a long-sought law on deployment, but it did lead to the application of patches in police legislation and a few other sectoral laws. The accumulated experience, after five years in being an EU member, has helped bring about an apparent volte-face in rhetorical convergence on civilian capacity building, as reflected in the declaration in the Strategy of the Republic of Poland's Armed Forces' participation in international operations. Since the Strategy prioritizes EU and NATO operations, thus downgrading UN and OSCE missions in the scale of importance, a greater willingness to take part in EU civilian crisis management may be expected.

There has not been any indication of the civilian and military cultures merging in line with the civil-military integration encouraged (albeit, not realized in practice) by the EU. The top Polish military brass does not feel comfortable about it. Focusing overwhelmingly on "hard security" the NATO environment is said to be far more amenable to Polish officers than the EU's mixed civilian-military culture (General Staff interview, 2009). Such a situation is also found also in Germany where the MoD is said to have an Atlanticist tilt, while the MFA is anchored deeply in the EU (Dyson, 2008). This Janus-faced relationship may likely be found in other EU member states that also belong to NATO. There has been one tangible organizational change in the MoD structures related to CCM. As described in chapter 2, in 2004-5 the MoD set up the so-called Specialized Units within the Polish Military Gendarmerie, a 2,000-strong well-trained and equipped fully professional deployable rapid response capability. However,
the *fons et origo* may not be traced back directly to experiential learning within the EU. Documentary analysis cross-checked by interviews shows that it reflected lessons learned from UNMIK duty, an EU and NATO emphasis on the development of anti-terrorist capabilities, and it responded to NATO’s efforts to engender military police capability. As part of the 2002 Prague Capability Commitment, NATO has endeavoured to establish the Multinational Military Police Battalion (MNMPBAT) with Poland as a framework nation.

One could, nonetheless, interpret the formation of the Specialized Units as evidence of adaptation to the comprehensive approach subscribed to by the main actors constituting the European security governance – the EU and NATO. The accession in 2007 of the Polish Military Gendarmerie, in possession of new rapidly deployable capabilities, as a partner to the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), created in 2006 inter alia to back up the EU in crisis management, has been expressly motivated by a desire to contribute to the EU’s crisis management capabilities. A Polish Council of Ministers document revealed that the government consented to the Military Gendarmerie joining the EGF expecting that in near future it would evolve from being a merely multilateral European initiative to become a joint EU program. The government stated that: “Our involvement in the initiative of a ‘pioneering’ group of member states would facilitate the preparation of our forces to carry out specific tasks in EU civilian and civil-military operations whose role has in recent times grown significantly. It will also have an important political dimension” (Polish Council of Ministers, 2005:72). By contributing police capabilities to the EGF Poland becomes one of few EU member states that have gendarmerie-type police forces, armed and able to cooperate with military forces.
(Jankowska, 2007). The operation in Tchad, described in chapter 2, was a field test of the military police being tasked with traditional combat roles.

An analyst with the MFA-affiliated Polish Institute of International Affairs called the establishment of the EGF, deployable within 30 days of a political decision, "an important step in the process of shaping civilian crisis management instruments" (Górka-Winter, 2006). Poland's strengthened and reformed military gendarmerie has been successfully deployed in two EU military operations, EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Tchad/RCA, as well as a civilian EUMM in Georgia. The quality and extent of experience the Polish Military Gendarmerie has accumulated led to NATO Allied Command Transformation's proposition that Poland sets up the Military Police Centre of Excellence (Kowalczyk, 2009). This reveals an interconnectedness of the EU and NATO capability developments in this area.

IV.7. Conclusion

Due to weaknesses in the 'supply side' of CCM and the refracting impact of national security identity and state capacity, Europeanization has had the least impact on the civilian dimension of crisis management in Poland. This domain of Polish security policy has been Europeanized in patches. The level of participation of Polish civilians in EU missions has far surpassed domestic policy and institutional adaptation, but this has been mainly limited to police deployments. One observes a "shallow Europeanization" of Polish security policy in this domain. The policy outcome may be conceptualized at best as adjustments, or at worst as inertia.
The case study of civilian crisis management shows the centre of EU policy gravity remains weak and fragmented across pillars. Since it is a new and rather nebulous concept, entailing multiple stages of intervention, CCM is not an off-the-shelf policy model ready for dissemination downwards (Nowak, 2006). CCM requires effective interdepartmental cooperation to enact changes in the legislative framework, appropriate modalities for decision-making as well as allocation of budgetary resources, provision of training and recruitment procedures – in short a whole-of-government mobilization. Lacking in conceptual clarity, albeit extremely ambitious in its policy implications, CCM may be simply too difficult to implement.

There has been a cross-institutional diffusion of norms across the Euro-Atlantic security network. Before the EU launched Civilian Headline Goal, the OSCE had been deploying police missions and other civilian resources for conflict prevention and mediation. At the same time the UN had also been busy building civilian strength. However, the promise of reforms in the Brahimi Report proved short-lived and the UN largely failed to fill the gaps. Due to a paucity of political will, Russian obstructionism as well as EU and NATO quest for a central position in the network, the development of OSCE capacities stalled. Building on the civil-military relations doctrine (CIMIC), emulating EU’s efforts and drawing lessons from operations, especially ISAF, NATO has been interested in augmenting its military arsenal with civilian means. To this end, it has developed the comprehensive approach (CA). In NATO’s view, military-civilian synergies are essential to address contemporary security threats and challenges of a hybrid nature. Its efforts have been thwarted by on the one hand those European allies, like France, that jealously guard the EU’s civilian strength, and on the other hand, other
allies, like Poland, that are not keen to see a ‘softening’ of the Alliance. Officially then, NATO does not aspire to attain the level of civilian capacity developed by the EU. Besides the EU, each of these players, OSCE, UN and NATO, has inducted Poland into CCM.

Due to its level of ambition, experience and reputation, the EU would appear to have the greatest potential for norms entrepreneurship in CCM. Two conditions have nonetheless undercut this potential: a fractured institutional core in Brussels and its conceptual indeterminacy as well as the mode of governance underpinning capability-generation (Civilian Headline Goal).

First, the multiplicity of EU actors has neither added to internal institutional coherence, nor helped formulate a single, consistent message with regards to the core policy content and to what is expected of the member states. The Brussels world of CCM consists of more than a dozen institutions and agencies spread across pillars I and II. The CCM budget has been splintered in more ways than one, so have other functional aspects. A high density of players might be considered an asset for Europeanization, but, in this case the cacophony of agendas and turf warfare sparked by fragmentation, have had a similar effect on outputs as a high number of veto players at the domestic level.

Second, soft governance has not helped. Prior to the 2004 adoption of the Civilian Headline Goal (CHG), the EU member states had few if any concrete targets to fulfill. Only later did the EU start to offer more guidance, though it left such important areas as training and recruitment up to the member states. A notorious mismatch between member state commitments and contributions ensued.
Heterogeneity ('patchwork') in national CCM architectures reflects complex demands put on state administrations and different degrees of congruence of member state security identities. Only a few countries, especially those with colonial legacies, or traditions of neutrality, or internationalism, or with strong development assistance programs, have made strides in implementing the kind of multi-faceted CCM paradigm envisaged in the EU doctrinal documents. Only Finland can be said to have made the greatest strides. It drafted a national CCM strategy, set up a government agency dedicated to CCM and a dedicated legal framework. As a result of divergent national approaches, horizontal diffusion has not helped to optimize outputs.

While the "supply" side of CCM policy models has been weak, Europeanization has also been curtailed on Poland's "demand" side. This is due to two factors: a dissonance between the norm of engaging civilians in a broad spectrum of crisis management activities and the military-first Polish security identity as well as capacity constraints. Before joining the EU, Poland had deployed its police officers in UN, OSCE and WEU missions. This learning experience helped make the police the only civilian capability in Poland to have adapted reasonably well to CCM. Because of this extensive police experience, Polish officials have been content to let the police do the job of CCM, while neglecting to invest in the non-uniformed civilian capabilities.

There is little evidence that CCM norms have been internalized. The Polish security identity remains fixated on hard security. Unlike Belgium, France, Britain, Italy or Portugal, Poland has no ex-colonies in the developing world that might sustain interventionist impulses; its civil society is fairly weak and its development assistance program is relatively new and modestly endowed. The past exposure to UN, OSCE and
WEU activities in civilian crisis management made little dent to Poland’s hard security orientation.

A promise of a breakthrough in Europeanization came in early 2009. In the new MoD strategy on the participation of Polish armed forces in international operations the government declared an intention to build civilian capacities for crisis management. The fons et origo of this potential shift is threefold. First, an interest in CCM reflects the MoD’s growing appreciation for the role of civilians in post-conflict reconstruction, which is a corollary of Iraqi and Afghan experiences. As such, it reflects an influence of NATO’s CIMIC, CA, and EBAO concepts, rather than the EU’s per se. Second, this declaration speaks to a higher level of priority attached to CSDP in advance of Poland’s 2011 EU presidency. CSDP is said to be a key feature of the Polish presidency agenda. It remains to be seen whether this desire to make an impact in European affairs will help overcome Poland’s compartmentalized approach to CSDP. And third, such an interest may speak to Poland’s appreciation of the speediness with which the EU dispatched police observers to Georgia. This experience showed that non-military tools might sometimes be the only politically acceptable means to address conflicts in sensitive spots such as the former Soviet Union.

In the run-up to the 2011 Polish EU presidency, then, an ambition has grown to close the gap between the military and civilian tracks of Polish role in CSDP. However, state capacity issues could thwart such designs. While, admittedly, a whole-of-government approach is difficult to implement in any country, the five decades of communist governance have left the Polish state saddled with a generally weaker capacity than the capacity of the EU-15. It includes inter alia a weak executive, sectoral
fragmentation and legislative gaps. Leaving aside the question of a political will, in the absence of effective mechanisms for policy coordination - not to mention resources - constructing a legal-institutional framework for civilian capacity-building may be problematic. The 2010 merger of the Office of the Committee for European Integration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could help strengthen the coordination of CHG implementation. However, because “cultural adjustment” usually lags behind in any reorganization, the results are not expected to bear fruit any time soon.

The Europeanization paradigm assumes that misfitting European policies inflict high implementation costs. Polish elites have not shown much willingness to pay the price for internalizing CCM norms. A few legislative changes enacted to date have been vertical rather than horizontal, even though the latter is more suitable for cross-sectoral CCM. They have also been confined mostly to the police. Many other EU member states have also put more resources into police rather than other civilian capabilities. Apart from the police, the recruitment of civilians has been ad hoc. The officialdom has not expressed a desire to strengthen the Polish expertise in the CCM institutions in Brussels. Due to an opaque bureaucratic culture, the state administration has had little inclination to seek outside expertise. This contrasts with well-developed public-private cooperation in some of the EU-15 states. Outside the police, few opportunities exist to train civilians eager to take part in CCM missions.

Poland’s domestic-capacity building lags behind its operational activities. Poland has taken advantage of participation in EU civilian missions to enhance its standing in the EU. It has provided substantial numbers of personnel, though mainly civilian and/or military police. In relative terms, though, Poland has taken part in greater number of
military missions than civilian. The majority of the missions, to which it contributed, happened to take place in Eastern Europe, an area of strategic interest for Poland, others in Afghanistan and Iraq, major theatres of operation for Polish troops. These choices suggest that Poland's approach to an operational dimension of CCM has been driven by instrumental rationality.

Unlike in the military operations, Poland's paradoxically strong record of contributing to EU's civilian operations has not spilled over into policy-institutional changes at home. This may perhaps reflect the fact that EU missions have been limited in scope, often following in the heels of NATO operations, and motivated more by political ('waving the EU flag') rather than strategic considerations. A credibility of this policy may have suffered as a result. Or, it may have to do with the fact, that whenever the EU requested contributions, the Poles would send police officers rather than volunteer non-uniformed civilians. Apart from sectoral and legislative patches here and there, only the police capacities have been strengthened. The establishment of the so-called special units of the military gendarmeries speaks to the interest of both the EU and NATO in developing forces incorporating military and civilian competencies.
Conclusion

1. Towards a Europeanized security and defence policy?

This research has shown that the norms and policy inputs generated at the above-state level of the EU security governance may be able to influence the nature, pace and direction of changes in national security/defence policies. The effects of Europeanization tend to be uneven temporally and output-wise (Buller and Gamble, 2002:13; Harmsen, 2000; Héritier, 2001; Ladrech 1994). Change may affect the core policy content or policy instruments or policy fora. This differentiated pressure has to do with the ‘rule density’ (determinacy, ‘thickness’ of rules) within particular domains of security policy, espoused by the central players in the Euro-Atlantic security network –NATO and the EU, as well as the particular mode of governance which underlies policy diffusion. Europeanization may be facilitated, refracted or resisted due to the mediating role of national security identity and “the domestic structural context” (state/administrative capacity, ‘reform capacity,’ ‘opportunity structures’) within which decision-making takes place (Börzel, 1999; Cortell and Davis, 1996; Dandeker, 1994; Harmsen, 2000; Iassandra, 2003; Ladrech, 1994; Padgett, 2003). Exogenous conditions have a bearing on national security policy, though the degree and the ultimate shape of resultant is a function of domestic ideational and structural constraints. The temporal context matters, in particular through (a) the recipient country’s position with regards to the international norms entrepreneurs (pre-accession period versus post-accession period); and (b) the stage of development of the external policy models (CSDP); (c) the possible critical junctures, or ‘focusing
events’ that draw attention to policy problems and facilitate a path-departure (Natali, 2004).

I have demonstrated that Europeanization has had a transformative effect on the Polish armed forces reform. It forced adaptations in defence-industrial policy, and effected, at best, adjustments to civilian crisis management, or, at worst, did not make any difference. Variegated results of Europeanization have been mirrored, to various degrees, in other EU member states (Irondelle, 2003; Kalburov, 2008). Although the defence establishments across the EU member states have converged around a ‘crisis management core,’ differences in organizational frames and role conceptions still remain (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2002). It is not surprising to discover, in one country, resistance to innovation, stymied by security identity considerations (for example a German debate on professionalizing the Bundeswehr), and elsewhere support for new organizational developments, driven by the cost calculus (such as the British turn to multinational force structures) (Longhurst, 2003; Dandeker, 1994).

It would be unrealistic to expect an ideal-type Europeanization across all security policy sectors. New EU member states, in particular, may be tempted to cut corners when conforming to Europe. Rather than go through costly behavioural adaptation or a sweeping reorganization, they may take a short-cut by way of ‘Potemkin Europeanization,’ or ‘Europeanization à la carte’. Select inputs may be imitated or translated into “EU conform laws” that are a hollow façade for external use with little impact on domestic outcomes, or internalization (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005; Meloni, 2008). Those administrators of security and defence policy (MFA, MIA, MoD), interacting on daily basis with Brussels may be socialized into European practices,
while others, further removed, may be little affected (akin to the 'Matryoshka dolls'). As a result, 'islands of excellence' might be established within the policy establishment facilitating the rise of an 'archipelago of 'islands of Europeanization' within a sea of traditional institutions and practices' (Andreou, 2010).

A 'patchwork Europeanization' does not necessarily attest to a willful strategy, but it may be an outcome induced by resource constraints. While as a matter of doctrine Poland has embraced the concepts of force deployability, multinationality, expeditionary engagements and professionalization, the reforms have left it with a two-tiered military. It has "islands of excellence," showpiece rapid reaction units, while the rest of the military remains underreformed. The double impact of NATO commitments and a relatively high-rate of expeditionary deployments have also contributed their share. This is in a sense paradoxical, as expeditionary activities are in general a positive impulse to armed forces reform.

A discord between the political will (high) and state capacity (low) has been at play in the domain of the defence-industrial policy. An acceleration of developments in the Polish defence-industrial policy, since 1999, coincidental with modernization of the armed forces following NATO accession, an investment in capabilities, especially R&D, and the efforts to reconfigure state-industry relations suggest that Europeanization has involved not so much adaptation, but rather ab novo creation of new institutions and policies (Goetz, 2005). While modification of national offset policy has taken place, it has been driven mainly by a desire to improve policy effectiveness and adjustments to what transpired in Brussels rather than changes in belief systems. Poland has looked for
European “policy solutions” mainly to address an underperformance of its defence industry.

In contrast, the patches in civilian crisis management show that as a matter of its identity, Poland has been disinclined to invest in soft capabilities. It has been content to stovepipe its CCM commitments by focusing mainly on the police. As pointed out “different countries are pursuing a variety of options in developing stronger civilian capabilities, depending on their size, legislative and institutional framework and crisis management culture” (Cross, 2010). Although there is evidence of an exchange of best practices, in the absence of concrete policy models peer pressure does not suffice to homogenize recruitment, training, policy planning and coordination. A majority of EU member states lag in the development of civilian capabilities. This may indicate that the threshold set by the EU might be too high.

The temporal sequencing matters, especially in relation to the post-communist states of East-Central Europe. There, systemic transformation has encompassed reforms to the polity (democratization) and the economy (marketization), in parallel with a reform process triggered by the need to meet simultaneously NATO and EU membership criteria. These grand transformations unfolded in parallel and engendered feedback effects and interdependencies (Goetz, 2005). Disentangling on the one hand EU-ization from NATO-ization, and, on the other hand, the causal import of domestic policy initiatives, requires greater analytical scrutiny than in relation to the EU-15, where

---

56 No other EU-15 state has faced a similar set of constraints. The reunification of Germany did strain Germany polity and its economy. However, as Dyson and Goetz point out, Berlin retained “considerable resources of power at its disposal to shape the integration process on terms that are favourable to its interests” (2003:4; Lungu, 2004).
national policy has settled into a more stable equilibrium (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2002; Cortell and Davis, 1996).

Sedelmeier asked whether the post-accession dynamics of Europeanization confirm the findings of the pre-accession phase (2006). Because defence policy remains a remit of high politics, and, thus, subject to intergovernmental procedures, the EU does not appear to have a strong leverage to induce changes in the candidate states. An outsider is reluctant to abide by the EU policy solutions in a domain so central to sovereignty without a corresponding stake in the development of CSDP. There may be a space for policy transfer, or a horizontal Europeanization. A country’s prior engagement in the prescribed practices, for example deploying forces in UN, WEU and OSCE missions facilitates its receptiveness to EU norms.

A country’s entry to the EU, on the other hand, relaxes those reservations. Acquiring a full stake in the success of CSDP, the new entrant gains an incentive to upload its preferences and is subject to peer pressure (socialization). This finding bears implications for the EU’s ability to induce change in the security policy of the candidate and partner states. The closer Poland has moved to EU membership and, once in, the longer has been its practicum within the EU, the greater will be the impact of CSDP on both policy and practice.

I have discovered that in the first half of the 2000s, Europeanization qua EU-ization has not been as strong a trigger for change as NATO-ization. As NATO’s own influence waned, the operational experience boosted reforms. The out-of-area missions with the participation of the Polish military - as part of the US-led “coalitions of the willing” (“Iraqi Freedom” and “Enduring Freedom”), under NATO (particularly ISAF) or
the EU command (especially EUFOR Chad) - reinforced transformative processes. These trajectories had been encouraged albeit with mixed success, by both NATO and the EU.

After Poland’s accession, EU-ization took off. Whereas Poland declared a relatively small contribution to the European Headline Goal 2003, and played a marginal role in the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), it spared no effort to demonstrate its commitment to the successor EHG 2010. It sent sizeable troop contingents to Africa, an area traditionally off Poland’s radar screen, expanded much energy into building up the potential of EDA and of the EU Battlegroups. The Chobielin Initiative shows clearly the increased salience of the EU agenda. Temporality thus relates not only to the position of the state in relation to a norm sponsoring international organization, but also the level of maturity of the norm. Through its increased expeditionary role, a codification of norms in the European Security Strategy, and the innovations promised in the Lisbon Treaty, CSDP gained credibility and gradually inched its way towards the central position in the Euro-Atlantic security network, long occupied by NATO. Its attractiveness as a complementary policy forum increased.

A pre- and post-accession discontinuum has been clearly evidenced, but how pronounced it is remains to be confirmed in future research set within a longer periodization. It would be worth examining whether the logic of consequences, typical of states at a pre-socialization stage, continues to dominate over the logic of appropriateness as longer-term immersion in the EU has taken place. It remains to be seen too whether the effects of Europeanization have been locked in to make changes in defence-industrial policy irreversible. The onset of a global economic crisis at the end of 2008 portends possible retrenchment. Officially adhering to the EU and NATO precepts on the need to
invest in military modernization, Poland has considered reducing defence expenditure. Two scenarios could be envisaged. Either the Polish government opts for protectionism in defence-industrial policy, or as Poland’s capacity to acquire capabilities on its own further erodes, the will to get more involved in EU projects will increase (Bosacki 2009). In the first scenario, Poland may reduce contributions to EU programs and instead back domestic ventures and procurement. In late 2008 the MoD leadership started voicing support for “Polonizing” armaments policy. If protectionist tendencies gained ground across the EU member states, instead of holding Poland to unreasonably high standards, we would conclude that Europeanization of defence-industrial policy has a long way to go in general. The appeals to “Polonization” could be read, however, as a rhetorical move, employed by then politically embattled defence minister to appease industrial and labour constituencies. Only future developments will tell.

2. The causes of change

In the post-Cold War environment of “risk uncertainty” states have found it difficult to settle on the right set of policy outputs: for instance, what appropriate mix of military and non-military instruments to develop, or how to restructure defence industry to keep it competitive and able to provide the tools for its soldiers. This is where international organizations come in. They act as filters and norms setters helping to interpret the global context, mitigate uncertainty and zooming in on the appropriate policy solutions (Dandeker, 1994:639-640; Irondelle, 2003). As an example, EDA and the European Commission have “framed” responses to globalization by drafting EU rules in the defence technological and industrial sector.
The EU today is considered be “the major institutional push behind Europeanization.” (Borneman and Fowler, 1997). By alleviating – in tandem with NATO - the insecurity dilemma that once plagued Europe and, *ipso facto*, facilitating interdependence, the EU has enabled opportunities for multinational defence cooperation (Ibid.). Once considered a sphere of “high politics,” and thus outside the scope of the European integration, CSDP has planted institutional roots and showed it can deliver, albeit on the lower end of the crisis management spectrum.

Through a shared space and a central position, contested with the EU, within the Euro-Atlantic security network, NATO still continues to exert a significant influence on security and defence policies of its member states, including allies that also belong to the EU. The Alliance has been a critical enabler for armed forces reform, a recent convert to civilian capabilities, but a dwarf in defence-industrial collaboration. Therefore, Europeanization (the impact of the EU security governance) in the defence field could be conceptualized as a “nested phenomenon,” taking place within a broader and interactive process of an “internationalization of the armed forces” (Anderson, 2002; 2003). This internationalization has been facilitated by decades-long institutionalized military cooperation under the aegis of NATO (Mérand, 2008). The notion of CSDP “nestedness” in the Euro-Atlantic security network acknowledge that “the EU is not the only factor, nor is it always the most significant, when it is compared with other transnational regimes that affect the making of Europe” (Borneman and Fowler, 1997: 496).
If the EU security governance, the independent variable, is a substratum within the EU-NATO dyadic relationship, distinguishing the respective EU and NATO influences was bound to be conceptually and methodologically difficult. However, the admittedly limited theorizing about interorganizational relations has given us an invaluable analytical concept to help distinguish the respective impulses - ‘forum shopping’. Forum shopping brings an actor-driven perspective to the structure-cantered Europeanization. It suggests that states choose to upgrade or downgrade their efforts in different organizations, depending on which venue is most amenable to its preferences. Since security maximization, the quest for a ‘voice opportunity’ and Atlanticism are the main driving forces of Polish foreign policy, I assumed it would devote its resources and be conformable to organizations that satisfy those objectives. Alterations in the allocation of resources will reflect a mix of factors: the external policy developments (determinacy), triggering events, lessons learning or socialization, a possible identity shift, or the changes in Poland’s position within either the EU or NATO (temporality).

Since NATO brought the East-Central Europeans to its institutionalized fold earlier than the EU, as path dependence predicts, Poland framed defence policy in Atlanticist terms and downloaded NATO templates. When NATO’s influence waned, the US stepped in to keep up the pressure on the reforms of the armed forces. Poland did not welcome CSDP, because it feared it was driven by the French agenda to emancipate Europe from the US tutelage, which for Poland was an indispensable security umbrella. French President Jacques Chirac’s outburst in the run-up to Iraq about Poland having missed the opportunity to “stay silent” solidified the Atlanticist orientation of Polish security policy. Iraq turned out to have been a traumatic experience for the Poles. While
bandwagoning with the US enhanced the favourable assessment of Polish military capacity, the Polish elites felt both unrewarded by Washington and misled by the WMD *casus belli*. This issue weakened CFSP, and brought about a dangerous alignment of Gaullist France, Russia-friendly Germany and Putin’s Russia on Poland’s doorstep. Learning from this catastrophe, just prior to its 2004 accession to the EU, Poland set out to patch up differences with its EU allies and, thus, prevent it from becoming marginalized in EU decision-making. It used the African missions, EDA, and the Battlegroups as platforms to corroborate its Europeanist credentials. This investment in EU capabilities spurred further emulation and socialization.

If Iraq was cathartic for jumpstarting Poland’s Europeanization, then the confluence of the Russo-Georgian war, a change in the US administration, as well as the run-up to the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and Poland’s preparations for the 2011 EU Presidency opened another ‘window of opportunity’ for reforms. Just four days after the hostilities in the Caucasus ceased, on 20th August 2008, Poland and the outgoing Bush administration signed an agreement on the placement in Poland of anti-ballistic defensive missile interceptors and an accompanying bilateral declaration on strategic cooperation. Poland thus took out a third – in addition to NATO and the EU - security insurance policy based on the “strategic relationship” with the US. When a year later, Barrack Obama withdrew from the Bush-era missile defence, Poland felt it needed to balance the US vector in its security policy by strengthening the EU defence capability. Poland hoped that its CSDP initiative with France would pay dividends in the run-up to both the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and of Poland’s 2011 EU Presidency. Even
though the Treaty circumscribed the role of the rotational presidency, Polish politicians expressed high expectations.

Poland’s rapprochement with France and CSDP would not have seen the light of day without the reintegration of France into NATO. The French volte-face promised to close a chapter on EU-NATO acrimony as well as to make NATO an ever more European alliance, a direction in which it has been evolving. The Alliance’s defence capability initiatives (DCI, PCC, NRF) are after all designed to spur the reforms in the militaries of the European NATO member states rather than the standard-setting US military. Interoperability would allow the European allies to keep plugging into the US military, the transformation of which has been driven by the Revolution in Military Affairs to a degree unmatched in Europe. The United States has chosen to act increasingly through the “coalitions of the willing,” leaving the European allies to conduct the daily business of the Alliance. The deconflicting of NATO-CSDP relations appealed to the Poles. They would not want to make a choice between “mommy” and “daddy”, as Polish politicians, in a rather infantile way, characterize Europe and the United States (Kuźniar, 2005).

To sum up, the salience of CSDP agenda has increased substantially in Polish security policy. However, at no time has the EU frame supplanted the NATO frame. Poland has opportunistically maneuvered between the US, NATO and the EU to maximize security and voice opportunity. Europeanization thus correlates with, on the one hand, the ebbs and flows of Poland’s approach to the NATO-EU dyad, and on the other hand, the internal dynamics within this dyad.
3. How Europe hits home

As a policy impinging on the core of sovereignty, and is therefore liable to contested ideational constructions, CSDP has been managed through “soft” forms of governance (Dyson and Goetz, 2003). The Open Method of Coordination takes place of the Community method common to the first pillar\(^{57}\). Another mechanism reflecting the domestication of European inputs is “framing,” the softest form of adaptational pressure (Buller and Gamble, 2002:13). Europeanization takes place as the salience of the EU agenda increases and the EU member states recalibrate goals in relation to the European référential (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2002). As “a policy process geared to the bargained accommodation of diverse member state preferences and norms,” CSDP does not have the wherewithal to mediate the wholesale transfer of policy models (Padgett, 2003). Instead of downloading policy templates vertically, the EU acts like a “supranational idea hopper,” a mediator of ideas as much as a policy entrepreneur (Padgett, 2003). By encapsulating EU security governance in my definition of Europeanization I have shown that subnational political structures, like the Weimar Triangle, EGF, Finabel, or the Eurocorps, complement CSDP through cross-national learning.

Since CSDP falls within a remit of the EU member states, Europeanization has not been fostered through conditionality (coercive isomorphism). It was a non-contentious issue during Poland’s accession negotiations. The effect of conditionality on the process of admitting new members to NATO is a matter of debate. The 1999 enlargement of NATO had been driven in a large degree by political considerations. There were few hard conditions, except the basic Target Force Goals. Were it not for

\(^{57}\) An exception is the European Commission rule-setting role with respect to aspects of defence-industrial policy. Procurement policy shows, however, that it too has its limitations.
stimuli associated with troop deployments on out-of-area missions, the combined NATO and EU pressures would have been insufficient to sustain Polish military transformation.

Problems of soft coordination, rule density and the EU policy gravity have impaired Europeanization. For instance, a constant institutional house-cleaning in Brussels has left civilian crisis management a permanent construction zone. Civilian crisis management is fragmented across the EU pillars and at various levels within the EU security governance. One might think that the multiplicity of actors would augment the agency of Europeanization. But the reverse has been true. Acting often at cross-purposes, the relevant players in the GSC and the Commission have contributed little to policy coherence and determinacy. Since the EU has not developed integrated civilian-military structures, it would be naïve to expect that a bureaucratic compartmentalization could be overcome at the national level. It is hoped that either the creation of a joint civilian-military strategic HQ or the establishment of a civilian counterpart to the European Defence Agency might give the EU increased clout (ICG, 2005). Meanwhile, the modalities of CCM governance, based on the Open Method of Coordination, have proven insufficient to bring about policy convergence.

The EU’s arguably one tangible policy template - the Battlegroup concept has had a limited impact on armed forces reform. Because different member states have their own ideas on the usability and deployability of the Battlegroups, a real-life test of these force packages in the field has yet to take place. A deployment in theatre would have catalyzed deep changes. The EHG 2010 has, nonetheless, enhanced armed forces reform, especially when domestic policy change in favour of smaller, more flexible force packages had already begun, or since complementary pressure from NATO Response Force boosted
changes. This project proved helpful to the Polish armed forces reform. Poland has invested in the EU Battlegroups for reasons of leadership aspirations (a framework nation) and an increased appreciation of CSDP’s added-value. Because of a disconnect of the European Capabilities Action Plan from national decision-making as well as its soft governance, this capabilities-generation project has not been able to induce substantive changes. Yet, it made some headway in socializing Polish MOD officials and triggered a number of organizational adjustments in the defence ministry.

Since CSDP is a novel policy framework, it is unlikely, at least in the short to medium-term, to expect it would supplant the social networks built up under the heavily institutionalized NATO. The Alliance retains an upper hand in training and exercises, which have helped perpetuate the Atlanticist perspectives among the beneficiaries of these programs. The European Security and Defence College and the Erasmus military programs are newcomers to this field. R&D networks in the technological-defence-industrial field have shown potential to tie Polish networks into EU collaboration. Poland’s weaknesses in state capacity, including few successes in securing influential posts in the EU institutions for its nationals, have limited the potential for socialization.

Changes in national security policy are being driven through mimetic isomorphism. Lesson drawing from operational experiences has indirectly fostered Europeanization. The expeditionary deployments, in which Polish armed forces have taken part, stimulated lessons learning and emboldened advocacy coalition pushing for reforms advocated by both NATO and the EU. Were it not for these tests in the field, their calls might have gone unheeded.
Unique among the three case studies, Europeanization has been making inroads in defence-industry through the mechanism of negative integration – the removal of barriers to free market. Art. 296, exempting defence industry from the single market, has long been an eyesore for norms entrepreneurs in the Commission. However, path dependence – a tradition of state interventionism and protectionism, the cross-cutting nature of this sector featuring multiple veto players have not pushed Europeanization a great distance forward. A case in point is the retention in the Lisbon Treaty of the infamous exemption (art. 296).

4. The filters of Europeanization

My research has confirmed a hypothesis that EU member state takes on those external ideas and policy designs that both resonate with national security identity and may be squared with capacity constraints (Padgett, 2003). The mediating impact of the two variables entwines. If security identity considerations so warrant, a state may choose at one point or another to ‘punch above weight’. Inversely, even if mobilization of resources were possible, a policy-identity misfit rules out ‘deep Europeanization’ (Börzel, 1999).

Facing similar external pressures the EU member states manifest divergent outcomes of Europeanization. This is in large degree due to the intervening role of the “normative grids specific to each country,” encapsulated in a security identity (Surel, 2000). These cognitive understandings shared by national elites narrow down the range of legitimate policy choices. European cognitive constructions are likely to latch on to these deeply-rooted national “mental maps” if there is enough corresponding traction or
resonance (Ibid.). In pillar I, if there is a large degree of misfit between the EU and national policies, ‘hard Europeanization’ (Europeanization in policy areas that are not governed by hard law), may actually facilitate path-departure. However, in the high politics area of security, ‘soft Europeanization’ will work best if the misfit is low.

External ideas and policy designs related to defence policy have filtered through the Polish national security identity, which remains wedded to “hard security,” a determination for Poland to assume an influential place at the EU decision-making table, and ensuring the US remains a “European power”. CSDP has been utilized as a vehicle for the projection of Polish interests in Eastern Europe, legitimating Poland’s aspirations for a place in the CFSP/CSDP directoire and an expression of a European burden-sharing in the Euro-Atlantic security network.

Like an elephant in the room, the US has been present in the EU defence policy debates. Notwithstanding French rhetoric about the need for Europe to cut the umbilical cord, none of the EU initiatives I examined restrict in a formal sense the EU member states’ ability to collaborate with the United States. Europeanization has not been a zero-sum game in relation to transatlantic relations. For instance, the absence of a “Fortress Europe” assumption to European defence-industrial cooperation has endeared it to Poland, one of the biggest EU member state buyers of US arms.

The transatlantic orientation of Polish security policy shows signs of evolution. Thanks to learning, in particular mixed results from or failed expectations regarding bilateral cooperation, military (Iraq) or defence-industrial (F-16 offset), Polish decision-makers have thrown increased support behind European cooperation. Although motivated in the first instance by utility-maximization, this support has also revealed an increased
influence of the logic of normativeness. Further research should investigate whether security identity, as an intervening variable, is itself prone to change, which might justify its treatment as a dependent variable in its own right.

The availability of domestic expertise bears on the success of reforms. The greater the number of experts dealing with CSDP, especially in senior positions in home institutions and seconded to relevant places in the Brussels bureaucracy, the greater the socialization potential. As part and parcel of Brusselization, socialization processes foster “knowledge accumulation,” an expansion of epistemic networks, and a diffusion of Europeanization back to the capitals (Bennett and Howlett, 1992).

A paucity of resources inhibits both an access to CSDP networks as well as domestic reforms (Börzel, 1999). European imports are filtered differentially due to different degrees of domestic policy autonomy. The higher the number of veto players and the greater the gulf between their preferences in a given policy dimension, the more difficult it is to induce substantive change from outside (Radaelli, 2000). Notwithstanding problems of presidential-prime ministerial co-habitation, it may be easier for the executive authorities to force through changes to the tasks and organization of the armed forces than to modify armaments policy, which lies at the intersection of several policies. As the travails of aligning Polish procurement policy with the EDA regime showed, Europeanization may contribute to changing domestic opportunity structures. Pushed to the corner, the Polish government, which staked its prestige upon accession to this regime, was forced to negotiate with an empowered defence industrial representatives. The Polish experience confirms that if the state’s overall coordination capacity is weak
bringing disparate domestic actors into line for the sake of developing civilian capabilities is a major challenge.

Raising defence capabilities requires a long-term sustained commitment, which is incompatible with election-bounded time horizons of national executives (Héritier and Knill, 2001:292). I have pointed out that the frequent changes in Polish governments in 1999-2009 inhibited policy continuity and personnel policies. The decision-makers have been too happy to unveil a succession of plans to reform the armed forces and defence industry, which, failing to match expectations to resources, turned out unrealistic before the ink on the official signatures had tried. I have not addressed, however, the broader issue of whether Europeanization has been contingent on the shifts in Polish politics. This is not an omission. As Roman Kuźniar notes: “security policy (including the NATO membership strategy) has enjoyed a considerable autonomy in relation to domestic politics, or current Polish politics in general” (2005:343). Longhurst and Zaborowski suggest that the right-wing Law and Justice Party (PiS), in power from 2005 to 2007, attempted to redefine the terms of Polish security identity (2007). I agree that the PiS elite picked out an aspect of Poland’s security identity – the valuation of national sovereignty – to justify their lukewarm attitude to European integration. However, as these authors themselves show, this rhetorical divergence in security policy was not matched in practice. The defence minister at the time, Radosław Sikorski and his deputy, Bogusław Winid, both ardent proponents of close military ties with the United States and of the NATO’s role in Polish security policy, understood well the importance of the European defence project, and the benefits that Poland could derive from its participation therein (Kuźniar, 2008). Sikorski would stay the Europeanist course as foreign minister in the
centre-right Civic Platform-Polish Peasant Alliance coalition, which assumed power in 2007. The differences between PiS and the Civic Platform with regards to professionalization did not pertain to the policy principle, but rather the timing of the shift from AVF to a professional army.

Finally, a word is in order about the generalizability of these findings. This has been a study of only one country, very specific in terms of its evolving position in relation to the EU and its own post-communist restructuring. It would be worthwhile to test the assumption that Europeanization may induce similar effects on other countries with Atlanticist security identities, like the Czech Republic. Hopefully, this research may spur comparative analyses across and within EU member states, which could corroborate the role these contingent factors play in Europeanization, or perhaps identify new ones unique to other members. The EU policy environment since 2009 lends itself as a suitable caesura to compare the pre- and post-Lisbon variance in the independent variable and the reverberations of these changes on the reconfiguration of national security policies.
Bibliography

Primary sources:


- Defining the EU Capability Development Mechanism (CDM), 6805/03, 26 Feb. 2003.
- Development of European Military Capabilities, July 2009.
- Draft declaration on strengthening capabilities 16840/08, 5 Dec. 2008.
- Draft EU Training Policy in CSDP 14176/2/03

- European initiative on exchanges of young officers inspired by Erasmus: SG/HR report on the state of affairs 9820/09

- European security and defence policy: the civilian aspects of crisis management, GSC website, 2009, civ/03.


- Joint Action 2005/575/CFSP of July 2005 establishing a European Security and Defence College (ESDC)

- Joint Action 2008/550/CFSP of 23 June 2008 establishing a European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and repealing Joint Action 2005/575/CFSP


- Recommendations for Enhancing Co-operation with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the Framework of EU Civilian Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention. Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, 15741/06.


- Stocktaking of existing exchanges and exchange programmes of national military officers during their initial education and training 12843/08.

- Summary of the intervention of Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, SO216/02, 19 Nov. 2002.


EDA. *Defence Data of EDA participating Member States in 2008*, Brussels.


MFA (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Declaration on Strategic Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Poland, 20 August 2008.


MoD. *DECYZJA Nr 56/MON MINISTRA OBRONY NARODOWEJ z dnia 9 marca 2005 r. w sprawie powołania przy Ministrze Obrony Narodowej Rady Uzbrojenia*. Warsaw.

MoD. *DECYZJA Nr 279/MON MINISTRA OBRONY NARODOWEJ z dnia 20 czerwca 2007 r. w sprawie powołania Zespołu do spraw koordynacji zaangażowania Sił Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Grupy Bojowe Unii Europejskiej*. Warsaw.


MoD, Department of Administration. Zarządzenie Nr 15/MON Ministra Obrony Narodowej z dnia 22 lipca 2005 r. zmieniające zarządzenie w sprawie regulaminu organizacyjnego Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej.


MoD, Department of Armaments Policy. Decyzja Nr 231/MON Ministra Obrony Narodowej z dnia 25 maja 2007 r. w sprawie udziału resortu obrony narodowej w pracach Europejskiej Agencji Obrony (European Defence Agency, EDA). Warsaw.

MoD, Department of Armed Forces Procurement. Decyzja Nr 291/MON Ministra Obrony Narodowej z dnia 26 lipca 2006 r. w sprawie zasad i trybu zawierania w resorcie obrony narodowej umów, których przedmiotem jest uzbrojenie lub sprzęt wojskowy. Warsaw.

MoD, Department of Science and Military Education, Marek Kalbarczyk, National RTO Coordinator. NATO Research & Technology Organization (RTO), ppt presentation, Warsaw.

MoD, Department of Science and Military Education, Michał Wierciński. Udział Polski w Projektach i Programach Naukowo-Badawczych Europejskiej Agencji Obrony, briefing material, Warsaw, 4 Sept. 2009.


MoD, Department of International Security Policy. Decyzja Nr 156/MON Ministra Obrony Narodowej z dnia 29 marca 2007 r. w sprawie uczestnictwa resortu obrony narodowej w „Procesie Rozwoju Uniwnych Zdolności Obronnych.”


MoE. Hubert Królikowski, Director of Offset Programs Department. *Offset na forum Unii Europejskiej i EDA (Europejska Agencja Obrony)*. Ppt presentation at a seminar „Doświadczenia i wnioski z monitorowania umów offsetowych i ich wpływ na strategię dla polskiego offsetu,” 2 July 2008.


NATO. *Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council ("The London Declaration"),* London, 6 July 1990.
NATO. *Prague Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague, Czech Republic*, 21 Nov. 2002.

NATO. *Strategic airlift agreement enters into force*, NATO News, 23 March 2006.

NATO. *Strategic Airlift Capability*, last updated 4 Nov. 2009.


- "Zagraniczne misje pokojowe."


Senate of the Republic of Poland. *Transcript no. 621 of the joint meeting of the Committees of National Defence (32nd) and Foreign Affairs (36th)* on 20 February 2007.
Senate of the Republic of Poland. Transcript no. 490 of the 25th meeting of the National Defence Committee on 29 November 2006.

Senate of the Republic of Poland. Transcript no. 643 of the 30th meeting of the National Defence Committee on 13 January 2009.

Senate of the Republic of Poland. Transcript no. 842 of the joint meeting of the Committees of National Defence (39th) and Foreign Affairs (62nd) on 20 April 2000.


Senate of the Republic of Poland. Transcript no. 761 of the 35th meeting of the Committee of National Defence on 12 March 2009.


Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) MOU. Istanbul, 28 June 2004.


http://www.ukie.gov.pl/WWW/serwispr.nsf/0/d2078f246ddf8370c12576650033895a/11125_Deklaracja%20Francusko-Polskiego%20Sczytu%20w%20sprawie%20bezpieczenstwa%20i

UKIE. *4 Year's of Poland's Membership in the EU.* Warsaw: UKIE Department of Analyses and Strategies, 2008.


WEU. *European young officers exchange scheme ("Military Erasmus"),* Assembly Fact Sheet No. 11, Dec. 2009.


**Interviews**

- EDA interview, 2009;
- EU Council, 2009;
- EUMS, 2009;
- European Centre Natolin, 2009;
- Former National Security Bureau staffer, 2009;
- General Staff, 2009;
- MFA, 2009a;
- MFA, 2009b;
- MFA, 2010;
Secondary sources:


BBC. Airbus chief says he 'may cancel A400M' military plane, 12 Jan. 2010.


Börzel, Tanja A. *Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting. Member State Responses to Europeanization*. Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation No. 4/2001,


Chappell, Laura and Petar Petrov. “The European Defence Agency and Permanent Structured Cooperation: Are we heading towards another missed opportunity?”
http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-porto/virtualpaperroom/053.pdf


Chivvis, Christopher. EU Civilian Crisis Management: The Record So Far. Santa Monica: RAND, 2010.


383


Falkner, Gerda, Miriam Hartlapp and Oliver Treib. Worlds of compliance: Why leading approaches to the implementation of EU legislation are only ‘sometimes-true theories’.” EUI Working Papers RSCAS No. 2006/22, 1-15.


Featherstone, Kevin. The Limits to Europeanization. LSE, 2003. pened2003.pspa.uoa.gr/The_Limits_to_Europeanization_Athens_1_1_%5B1%5D.07.ppt


Gazeta Podatnika. „Offset ma wspierać rozwój przemysłu zbrojeniowego,” 3 July 2008.


Harasimowicz Andrzej and Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski, „Costs and Benefits of Poland’s Accession to the EU in the Area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy,” in *Costs and Benefits of Poland’s Membership in the European Union* (Warsaw: European Centre Natolin, 2003), 204-217.


Herspring, Dale R. "Civil-military relations in post-communist Poland; problems in the transition to a democratic polity." Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 33, 2000, 71-100.


Heusgen, Christoph. "Is there such a thing as a European Strategic Culture?" Oxford Journal on Good Governance, 2:1, 2005, 29-32.


Holsti, Ole R. "The belief system and national images: a case study," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6:3, 1962, 244-252.


2006, European Integration Online Papers.or.at/European Integration Online Papers/index.php/European Integration Online Papers/article/download/2006_011a/33.

Kaczmarek, Wiesław. “Polski przemysł zbrojeniowy: Nie żywią nie bronią,”


Karkoszka, Andrzej. *Combating Terrorism and Its Implications for the Polish Armed Forces (Draft).* Conference Paper, Geneva: DCAF.


400


Krzeminski Adam, “First Kant, Now Habermas: A Polish Perspective on ‘Core Europe’” in Daniel Levy, Max Pensky and John Torpey, eds., Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations After the Iraq War (London: Verso, 2005), 146-152.


Lentowicz, Zbigniew. “Ostroźnie z bronią, czyli jak dobrze wydać miliardy na bezpieczeństwo, Rzeczpospolita, 6 Nov. 2009.


Osica, Olaf. *From Strategic Partnership to Velvet Divorce? New Challenges in the U.S.-Poland Agenda,* Central Europe Digest, 15 June 2009.


Osica, Olaf. *Poland,* Flexible Integration in the Area of CFSP/CSDP: Questionnaire, Austrian Academy of Sciences, ICED-Research Unit for Institutional Change and European Integration & Department for History and Political Science, Paris London University of Salzburg (PLUS), March 2004, 100-113.


Osica, Olaf. *Wspólna europejska polityka bezpieczeństwa i obrony (CCSDP) w perspektywie Polski,* Center for International Relations, Warsaw, Raporty i Analizy 5/01, 1-45.


Padgett, Stephen. „Between synthesis and emulation: EU policy transfer in the power sector,” Journal of European Public Policy, 10:2, Apr. 2003, 227-245.


PAP. Komitet Europejski o polsko-francuskim programie obronności w UE, 22 Sept. 2009.


PAP. Osica: 10 lat w NATO – zmiany w wojsku, zmarnowane szanse polityczne, 6 March 2009.


PAP. Po pięciu latach koniec misji w Iraku, 22 Dec. 2007.


PAP. Polska wraz z Europą buduje system logistyki militarnej, 22 March 2008.

PAP. Sikorski: unijni szefowie dyplomacji o Białorusi i Afganistanie. 27 March 2009.

PAP UE. Polacy w dziewięciu gabinetach KE i u Van Rompuya. 19 Feb. 2009.


Polska Zbrojna. „Europejskie grupy bojowe,” 6, 8 Feb. 2009.


Radaelli, Claudio M. *Europeanization: Solution or problem?* European Integration Online Papers, 8:16, 2004, 1-23.


Rhodes, Matthew. „Central Europe and Iraq: Balance, Bandwagon, or Bridge?” *Orbis,* 48:3, Summer 2004, 423-436.


Rzycki, Władek. „Polish Public Procurement and the MoD,” *FDE Finance Director Europe,* online, 14 July 2006.


Security & Defence Agenda. Challenges for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, Report from a high-level evening debate organised by the Finnish EU


Striuli, Lorenzo. “NATO and EU between regrets and revivals of an often (needlessly) conflicting relationship,” *Military Center for Strategic Studies CeMiSS Quarterly*, 2, Summer 2009, 39-44.


Sweeney, Simon. *Industrial incapacity – the lack of an integrated defence industry is a barrier to an effective ESDP*. Paper presented at the Political Studies Association Conference, University of Swansea, 1 Apr. 2008.


Walczak, Janusz, "Zaangażowanie i zadania," *RAPORT*, 8, 2008, 12-21


Zyla, Benjamin. „Overlap or Opposition? EU and NATO’s Strategic (Sub-Culture),” Contemporary Security Policy, 32:3, 667-687.