French Canada could best be achieved within the context of a strong federal government.

By the mid-fifties, neo-nationalism made its appearance. One of the main exponents of neo-nationalism was the historian, Michel Brunet. Brunet, unlike the traditional nationalists, did not oppose modernism and industrialization; rather, he was opposed to the traditional nationalists because they subordinated industrialization and modernization to a more important value namely religion. 15 Brunet did not disagree with the tenets of the 1930s. He shared their suspicions of the central government:

Brunet's pessimism was based on what he perceived to be an inevitable fact - the incapacity of total social development for French Canada because it lacked statehood. He viewed the federal government as a political structure ethnically appropriated by English Canadians and as a tool of English-Canadians in national interests and aspirations... Co-operation necessarily meant being shortchanged, and in such a setup French Canada could only be perceived as a burden by the rest of Canada. French Canada, because of ethnic appropriation by the central state, was doomed to a condition of arrested development. The only solution lay in relying exclusively on the government of Quebec to transform its province into a national state and to use the full powers of its limited scope to achieve partial development. 16

The neo-nationalists by rejecting traditional nationalism and the beliefs in agriculturism, messianism and anti-statism, instead accepted the tenets of modernism thereby giving legitimacy to social planning. As Guindon notes: "Industrialization helped finance the development of urban bureaucracies, but the new middle class was formed within the context of traditional


16 Ibid., p. 50.
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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RECUE
A CASE STUDY OF IDEOLOGY IN QUEBEC'S PUBLIC SECTOR:

1900-1975

by

Gerard Kreeft, B.A.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Political Science

Carleton University

OTTAWA, Ontario

November 1977
The undersigned recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies acceptance of the thesis:

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1900-1975

submitted by Gerard Kreeft, B.A., in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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Carleton University

April 1980
This thesis traces Quebec's industrial development from the turn of the century to the post-World War II period. It examines the circumstances that led to the establishment and expansion of Quebec's public sector. The expansion of health, social services and public education in the post-war period required a more centralized state. Yet the anti-statism perfected during the Duplessis era for the most part diluted the state's ability to carry out any reforms. The implementation of hospitalization and medicare insurance, and public education gave the state more legitimacy. It is maintained that the centralization that took place in the health, social services and educational fields also required that the public sector unions - the CSN, and the CEO - become more centralized.

It is further argued that the Common Front formed after the 1968 negotiations must be seen as a logical sequence to the centralized bargaining initiated after the implementation of the Labour Code (1964) and the Civil Service Act (1965). While it is true that the public sector unions were given collective bargaining rights in the mid-1960s it is also true that the provincial government continued to exercise wide powers to prevent labour unrest. Finally, it is argued that labour unions and therefore collective bargaining is an integral part of liberal-democracy.
DEDICATION

To Constance: who has waited so patiently
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to give a special thanks to my thesis advisor Professor Kenneth D. McKae, who patiently read the manuscript throughout its development. Also a special thanks to Professor Leo Panitch, who gave many helpful suggestions and comments. I would like to thank Miss Marjorie Robertson, librarian from the federal Department of Labour, and Mr. Robert Lange, librarian from the Progressive Conservative Research Office for their help in obtaining certain key documents. The Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN), the Centrale de l'Enseignement du Québec (CEQ) and the Syndicat des Fonctionnaires Provinciaux du Québec (SFPQ) deserve special thanks for their help. Finally, I would like to give a special word of appreciation to my friend and colleague Garth McNaughton, who read the thesis and gave many helpful criticisms and suggestions.
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CHAPTER ONE

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND INTRODUCTION
Since the Quiet Revolution in Quebec much has been written about Quebec's social and political transformation. With increased industrialization in the 1950s there was a shift of population to the urban centres. Although the sociological framework of the Quiet Revolution has been examined by various authors, it will be useful to trace briefly the key historical trends that helped mould the ideological milieu of Quebec.

Michel Brunet, for example, has maintained that traditional French-Canadian was built on three myths: agriculturalism, anti-statism, and messianism. In a similar manner the traditional nationalism has also been aptly described by P.E. Trudeau, Horace Miner, Everett C. Hughes, and

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3 Brunet defines anti-statism as..."l'Etat devrait jouer un role extremement limite dans l'organisation de la societe. Sur ce point, ils sont les heritiers spirituels de l'ecole liberale classique. Sauf dans le domaine agricole, ils preconisent la politique du laissez faire". Ibid., p. 76.

4 Messianism, according to Brunet was an attempt to create..."une haute civilisation francaise et catholique en terre d'Amérique". Ibid., p. 105.


6 Horace Miner, "Changes in French-Canadian Rural Culture", in French-Canadian Society, ed. (s), Marcel Rioux and Yves Martin, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart
Herbert F. Quinn. In the 1940s men such as Esdras Minville and François Albert Angers served as the key spokesmen for Quebec's conservative nationalism. Although these conservative nationalists dominated the 1940s and early 1950s, nationalism after World War II did not enjoy the popularity it had received one decade earlier. Men such as P.E. Trudeau and Maurice Lamontagne condemned the traditional elites' support of encouraging back-to-the-land movements as a negative reaction against industrialization. Trudeau, for example, in his celebrated The Asbestos Strike states the 1949 asbestos strike was the first province-wide protest against the traditional nationalism and he further maintains the strike was the first organized attempt to bring change in the name of modernization and democracy. Lamontagne in his Le Fédéralisme Canadien attempted to show how the modernization of


9 See for example Labour Legislation and Social Services in the Province of Quebec. A study prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Appendix ).


French Canada could best be achieved within the context of a strong federal government.

By the mid-fifties, neo-nationalism made its appearance. One of the main exponents of neo-nationalism was the historian, Michel Brunet. Brunet, unlike the traditional nationalists, did not oppose modernism and industrialization; rather, he was opposed to the traditional nationalists because they subordinated industrialization and modernization to a more important value namely religion.\(^{15}\) Brunet did not disagree with the tenets of the 1930s. He shared their suspicions of the central government:

Brunet's pessimism was based on what he perceived to be an inevitable fact - the incapacity of total social development for French Canada because it lacked statehood. He viewed the federal government as a political structure ethnically appropriated by English Canadians and as a tool of English-Canadians in national interests and aspirations... Co-operation necessarily meant being shortchanged, and in such a setup French Canada could only be perceived as a burden by the rest of Canada. French Canada, because of ethnic appropriation by the central state, was doomed to a condition of arrested development. The only solution lay in relying exclusively on the government of Quebec to transform its province into a national state and to use the full powers of its limited scope to achieve partial development.\(^{16}\)

The neo-nationalists by rejecting traditional nationalism and the beliefs in agriculturism, messianism and anti-statism, instead accepted the tenets of modernism thereby giving legitimacy to social planning. As Guindon notes: "Industrialization helped finance the development of urban bureaucracies, but the new middle class was formed within the context of traditional

\(^{15}\)Hubert Guindon, "Two Cultures: An essay on nationalism, class, and ethnic tension", in Contemporary Canada, ed., R. Leach (Duke University Press, 1967), p. 50.

\(^{16}\)Ibid., p. 50.
institutions headed by the traditional power elite, but undergoing fundamental changes to meet the demographic need of the urban masses." 17

It is true that Guindon does not formally define "the new middle class"; however, he does point out that "the new middle class equated its social role with progress and the growth of its institutions with modernization. Its cohesion was thus first achieved under the banner of modernization, not nationalism. This value of modernization was a product of the training and education of the new middle class. In the process of developing urban social bureaucracies, the need for functional specialization and training brought the new generation in contact with the various specialized, social, human, biological, and economic sciences of industrialized societies. This new training was the basis of the internal status of that class within the developing hierarchies." 18

Guindon's explanation serves as a useful departing point from which the trade union movement can be examined—namely the Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN), the Centrale de l'Enseignement du Québec (CEQ) and the Fédération des Travailleurs (FTQ). How did the growth of Quebec's public sector affect both the public sector unions and the government? What structures and institutions did the government and the trade union movement develop to distinguish their respective ideologies?

Although Guindon has provided us with a plausible framework by which the Quiet Revolution can be examined, no attempt is made to distinguish

17 Ibid., p. 44.
18 Ibid., p. 45. While the class formation in Quebec is an important aspect in understanding labour relations in that province it should be noted that this is beyond the scope of our study.
between the ideology that was established by the government and the trade union movement. Even Gilles Bourque and Nicole Laurin-Frenette, who state that the trade union leadership in Quebec is a kind of "business unionism," fail to examine the evolution of the trade union movement in the public sector. Does this suggest that the trade union movement has never been in opposition to the traditional nationalism? More important, however, is the fact that this leaves unexplained the role of the trade unions prior to and during the Quiet Revolution. The absence of such explanations would tend to confirm the conclusions of P.E. Trudeau and Maurice Pinard, who have maintained that the monolithic character of Quebec's elites, including the trade union elite, has prevented the working class from voting for more radical alternatives.

Although it is true various students of both political science and industrial relations have analyzed the structure and ideology of the CSD, the CEC, and the FTQ, each study has been confined to the parameters of the particular union that was studied. Again, although the development of

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24 Michel Brossard, L'Ideologie économique de la Fédération des travailleurs du Québec, Thèse de Maîtrise, Université de Montréal, 1969.
these three labour centralis have been thoroughly discussed, their evolution has never been analyzed in terms of their contribution towards the growth of Quebec's public sector, which was greatly expanded during the 1960-1975 era.

In our study we will discuss the implications of Quebec's expanded public sector, particularly in the health, social services and education fields. How did the centralization of these fields affect the role of the state? How did this centralization affect or alter the public sector unions? Did the introduction of public sector collective bargaining give these unions the legitimacy they sought and did collective bargaining help solidify the legitimacy of the state? Did the formation of the Common Front between 1968-1975 threaten the state's legitimacy or did the Common Front demonstrate that its own legitimacy was limited?

In order to gain a better perspective of how industrial relations in Quebec's public sector developed we will discuss at some length the role of the state (both at the provincial and federal levels) in Quebec's industrialization.

Our study is divided into six chapters. In the second chapter we will examine briefly Quebec's industrial growth between 1900 and 1945 and the role of the state in the development of the province's economy. We will also discuss how the Catholic Church reacted to industrialization resulting in the birth of la Confédération des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada (CTCC). Finally, we will examine the growth of the international unions in Quebec.
In the third chapter, we will discuss the development of federal-provincial relations - in particular, the important ramifications of the various tax-sharing agreements and other cost-sharing programs between the provinces and the federal government. The joint cost-sharing programs also provided an important thrust for improved educational and health care in Quebec, moves which were instrumental in broadening the public sector.

In the fourth chapter, we will examine the evolution and ideology of the CSN, and the CEQ - particularly during the critical period of the mid-sixties. We will also discuss the expansion of the Syndicat des fonctionnaires provinciaux du Québec, the introduction of the provincial labour code, and of course, the founding of the public service.

The fifth chapter is devoted to the public sector bargaining that began in 1968, and eventually led to the formation of the Common Front.

In the concluding chapter we will discuss the significance of collective bargaining in the light of Quebec's recent past.

It should be noted that although the Fédération des Travailleurs du Québec (FTQ) is a member of the Common Front, our study is primarily centered around the CSN and the CEQ. It is true that the FTQ with about 350,000 members is the largest labour body in Quebec, but the FTQ is first and foremost a labour federation. Unlike the CSN and CEQ, who carry out wage negotiations for their respective unions, the FTQ in most instances does not participate in any contract talks. Instead, salary negotiations are conducted by such unions as the United Steelworkers of America and the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE). As a result the allegiance of workers to the FTQ is at best a secondary one.
CHAPTER II

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND UNION GROWTH
At the turn of the twentieth century Quebec as well as the rest of Canada was predominantly a rural society. With the advent of industrialization in the 1920s a more urban work force became established, a change resisted by the Catholic clergy, who preached the virtues of an agrarian and rural society. Nevertheless, the establishment of the Catholic trade union movement was the Church's response to industrialization.

In this chapter we will briefly discuss some of the highlights in Quebec's development as an industrialized province. In the first part of the chapter we will examine the role of the state in the development of the province's economy. We will also discuss how the Catholic Church reacted to industrialization, resulting in the birth of la Confédération des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada (1921).

In the second part of the chapter we will outline briefly the labour legislation that was passed from 1900 through the post World War II period.

In the third part of the chapter we will discuss the growth of the international unions in Quebec. Coupled with the actions of the federal and provincial governments, a new era of labour-management relations was established.
I. Early Industrialization and the Growth of Organized Labour

Quebec's rural and agrarian society\(^1\) during most of the latter half of the nineteenth century was dominated by the Conservative Party. The strength of the Conservative Party was largely due to the co-operation between Sir John A. Macdonald, and George-Étienne Cartier, his Quebec lieutenant. Furthermore, the Conservatives had received the support of the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy, while the Liberals had to contend with their anti-clerical image.\(^2\) The Liberal victory in 1897 was attributed to two factors: 1) the resentment against the federal Conservatives for their handling of the Northwest Rebellion that resulted in the hanging of Louis Riel; 2) the leadership of Wilfrid Laurier, who successfully battled the Church in his defence of liberalism.

Herbert Quinn maintains that all successive Liberal administrations from 1897 to 1936 believed the well-being of Quebec was dependent on the exploitation of the province's resources of timber, minerals, hydroelectric power, and the rapid development of manufacturing industries.


The development of the province's economy, however, was the task of private enterprise instead of the public sector:

The preference for private enterprise on the part of the Quebec Liberals was not too surprising. The party had discarded the anti-clerical aspects of nineteenth century liberalism but retained the economic principles of that particular philosophy. The most important of these principles was the belief that government ownership of industry or any kind of intervention in 'the smooth functioning of the economic order' was harmful and could be disastrous.³

A similar attitude was reflected in 1881 when the provincial government passed une loi des manufactures de Québec. The new act applied to all industrial establishments, except small family businesses. Under the act it was made illegal for girls under fourteen and boys under twelve to work in industrial establishments. Inspectors were employed by the provincial government to enforce the new law. Fines of 50 to 200 dollars, and imprisonment of three months to one year was called for if the fine was not paid.⁴ The passage of the law in some quarters was seen as a contradiction to liberalism. The state, so the argument went, had no business tampering with private industry: "c'était une dangereuse aberration de compter sur la contrainte légale pour réagir d'une manière efficace contre certaines défaillances, et que la protection due à l'enfant et à la femme, dans une société bien réglée, devait trouver son fondement dans la seule loi naturelle garantie par l'humanité des patrons et l'amour des parents. Les premiers


inspecteurs du travail chez nous auront vite fait d’examiner sur place les beaux fruits de 'l'humanité' de certains patrons et de l'amour de certains parents."

In one key paragraph, P.E. Trudeau has captured the essence of the matter: "If there was any constant factor in Quebec policies from Honoré Mercier to Maurice Duplessis, it was the state's passive attitude toward capital investment. From mines to forests, from hydro-electric resources to urban property, there was scarcely a resource that could not be exploited by private investment without political difficulty. This was also true in the fields of manufacturing and services. True, the state could be bothersome at times, and partisan politics were not above imposing taxes on money-lenders. But on the whole, the main characteristic in Quebec's economic history over the past hundred years has been the absence of any coherent policy on private investment, and the same could almost be said of public investment as well."

The establishment of hydro-electric power, which helped secondary industry develop, provides us with some insight regarding how industrial development took place in Quebec. Prior to 1907, Quebec disposed of its water power by outright sales, either through private contract or public auction. After 1907, leases were signed for periods of 50, 75, or 99 years. The Quebec government could have controlled power development in

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5 Chartier, Ibid., p. 46.


three ways: 1) the companies could have been brought to terms at the resource level, when the power rights were first granted; 2) the companies might have been regulated by a public utility board, a system favored in the United States; or 3) the private companies could have been subject to competition by publicly owned enterprises. 8

A public utilities commission was set up in 1909. It exercised a general supervision over electrical as well as other utilities until 1934. As a result of public discontent, a provincial royal commission headed by Ernest Lapointe was appointed in 1934 to study the electrical industry. In Quebec City an acrimonious dispute over electricity rates between the municipal authorities and the Shawinigan Water and Power Company spread to other centres including Montreal. On February 3, 1933, a delegation from the Confederation of National Catholic Labour Unions of Canada petitioned the Liberal government to create a provincial hydro-electric system. This was rejected outright. 9

The sole consequence of the royal commission was the establishment of the Quebec Electricity Commission on December, 1935. It had wide powers of inquiry and regulation. The Quebec Electricity Commission of 1935 was replaced by the Provincial Electricity Board in 1937, which in

8 Ibid., p. 30.

9 See footnote 23, Ibid., p. 284. The Catholic unions saw the publicly owned Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario as one example the Quebec government could follow. H.V. Nelles points out that the publicly owned Hydro-Electric Power Commission was not done out of a spirit of altruism. Various municipalities banded together as early as 1902, urging the provincial government to take control of Niagara Falls so that the municipalities could provide cheap power to prospective industries. The municipalities also feared that the Toronto based Electrical Development Company, chartered to develop hydro-electric power from Niagara Falls would prevent the municipalities from having access to this cheap power. (H.V. Nelles, The Politics of Development. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1974) pp. 215-255.
turn was taken over by a refurbished general utilities commission under the name of the Public Service Board in 1940. The irony of these utility boards, as J.H. Lales noted, is best suggested by the first annual report of the commission: "The head office of the commission was set up in the Transportation Building in Montreal, near the head offices of the power companies, and in order...to be properly situated to deal directly with the members of the Legislature whose duties frequently require their presence at the seat of the Government, a branch office was also provided in Quebec City, facing the Parliament Building on Grande Allée".\(^\text{10}\)

It is true that when water power rights were sold by the province at the turn of the century, the development of the hydro-electric industry was seen as a financial gamble. However, the early promoters of the Shawinigan Water and Power Company realized that if inexpensive water-power could be provided to industries, hydro-electric development could prove to be a profitable venture. In the case of Shawinigan Water and Power Company, the company not only prospered, but proved to be the nucleus around which secondary industries developed. By 1925 the pulp and paper industry provided 38.4 per cent of gross revenues from power sales; by 1929, this had risen to 49.3 per cent.\(^\text{11}\)

Other power companies such as the Gatineau Power Company (1926) and the Saguenay Power Company (1924) were established not primarily as speculative financial ventures, but were developed to provide cheap power for industrial development. The International Paper Company built the Gatineau Power Company to provide power for the pulp and paper industry; and the Saguenay

\(^{10}\) Ibid., p. 32.

\(^{11}\) Ibid., pp. 66-100.
Power Company was developed to provide electrical energy for the aluminum industry. 12

Between 1920 and 1930 the developed water power in Ontario and Quebec rose from 2.0 million horsepower to 4.8 horsepower. Nearly 30 per cent of this power was utilized by the pulp and paper industry. 13 While industrialization grew at a rapid rate, Quebec continued to lag behind Ontario. In terms of the listed manufacturers for 1929, 51 per cent of all manufacturing took place in Ontario, compared to 33 per cent in Quebec. 14 With the exception of pulp and paper, and the railway rolling stock, Ontario controlled the prestigious and important industries needed for industrial growth. However, it is timely for us to understand certain historical developments in Quebec that explain why industrialization lagged behind Ontario.

Had industrialization always been the responsibility of the private sector? Certainly, when Quebec was still a colony of New France, the dominant influence did not come from the fur traders, the chartered trading companies, nor from the colonies, which Champlain helped establish. The thrust came rather from the French Royal Court. In 1663, France transferred New France from the Company of New France to direct royal control. Under Louis XIV, with his minister Colbert, absolutism by the 1660s in France had reached its peak:

12 Ibid., pp. 145-155.
14 See Appendix I.
Absolutism was a progressive force, a unifying force, a successful and powerful instrument of a dynamic state. Its universal popularity lay in the fact that, to all appearances, it had made France by far the greatest nation in the world. The effects of absolutism were felt in every branch of public policy. In the economic sphere a vigorous mercantilist policy was the counterpart to political centralization. The army was reorganized and reshaped into a highly efficient instrument of state policy. 15

In reality the role of the state in New France was ubiquitous. The task which the French monarchy defined for itself was not simply to act as the political authority of the colony; the state also organized and regulated the daily life of the colony. Immigration, trade, and mineral rights were policy matters that were carried out by the state.

With the British entry into Canada in 1760 this policy was updated. Lord Durham's report, which envisioned a legislative union of Upper and Lower Canada was aimed at bringing about a more centralized administration capable of helping British mercantilism. In unusual candor, Durham states that under a central government it would be much easier to support the public debt of the canal system, as well as the completion of other public works:

The union of the two Provinces would secure to Upper Canada the present great objects of its desire. All disputes as to the division or amount of the revenue would cease. The surplus revenue of Lower Canada would supply the deficiency of that part of the Upper Province; and the Province thus placed beyond the possibility of locally jobbing the surplus revenue, which it cannot reduce, would I think, gain as much by the arrangement as the Province, which would thus find a means of paying the interest of its debt. Indeed it would be by no means unjust to place this burden on Lower Canada, inasmuch as the great public works for which the debt was contracted, are as much the concern

of one Province as of the other... The completion of the projected and necessary line of public works would be promoted by such a union. The access to the sea would be secure to Upper Canada. The saving of Public money, which would be ensured by the union of various establishments in the two Provinces, would supply the means of conducting the general Government on a more efficient scale than it has yet been carried on. 16

It is important to understand the profound effect of Durham's pleas for a more central economy. Durham's pleas were coming at a time when agricultural settlement and the timber industry demanded a structural change, namely "a change from a sea-coast economy of surface exploration to an integrated continental economy". 17

During the first period of canal construction, 1827-1837, it was the state (the British Crown and the government of the Canadian provinces) that provided the bulk of the capital for the construction of the Lachine Canal, the Cornwall Canal, and the Rideau Canal. A similar pattern developed during the first railway era, 1850-1859. The state provided the bulk of the funds for capital development. The manner in which canals and railways were financed is outlined by Pentland:

Canals were built by governments; railroads by profit corporations with the aid of government grants and guarantees. This pattern should not be thought in any way unusual. Arrangements were almost identical in the United States and elsewhere; only in Great Britain could private capital tackle giants like canals and railroads... In the canal era, wealthy men were not wealthy enough to build canals themselves.


Moreover, they doubted whether they could pay. Hence, they influenced the state to build them. But canal spending allowed rich men to become much richer. In the first railroad age, these men still could not finance whole railroads. But they could go a good part of the way; and since they expected railroads to be enormously profitable, they prevailed upon the state to create and assist private railroad corporations. These facilitated still more rapid stratification of wealth, and a new scale of business organization. If a time differential of ten or fifteen years is allowed, this is a pretty accurate description of Canadian events. 18

In short, the government proved to be the centre around which capital was organized, and hence chiefly responsible for any fiscal losses that might occur. As Pentland notes, the British and American experiences taught that the real money came not from owning and operating the railroads, but from building them, provided the matter was handled properly. 19 Usually, the system required that the contractor and his friend collect sufficient funds to take control of a projected railway, though it was customary to dispose of the stocks when the contracts were finished. The financing of the Grand Trunk Railway provides us a good example. In 1853, the Canadian Legislature granted a charter to the Grand Trunk Railway and guaranteed the capital backing for it. In assuming the financing of the proposed railway, the Canadian government had considered it essential that the British government guarantee the necessary loan. When the British government refused, the support of the Canadian government for the Grand Trunk Railway proved indispensable.

During the following decade hardly a year passed without some relaxation of the terms of the agreement between the company and the Canadian

18 Ibid., p. 466.
19 Ibid., p. 467.
government. By 1867, the total debt of the Grand Trunk Railway to the Canadian government was estimated at over $26 million. Easterbrook and Aitken point out it was "...a debt in name only, in effect it was an outright gift."20

Yet it was the central government, not the provinces, which was involved in the development and planning of Canada's canals and railways. This should come as no surprise in light of Lord Durham's own desire for a central government. The provinces had their legislative rights protected in Section 91 of the BNA Act, but the federal government had the power of disallowance, to turn aside provincial laws, and more important, the "Peace, Order, and Good Government" clause by which the Fathers of Confederation had anticipated that the general granting of authority in Section 91 would put the largest part of the responsibility in the hands of the central parliament.21

At the time of Confederation the primary government functions were placed in the hands of the federal parliament, along with the burden of the provincial debts. Jurisdiction over education, public welfare, and local transportation was left to the provinces; the costs of which were very modest in 1867. Because the federal government assumed a greater importance, and took over existing provincial debts, the major sources of revenue were turned

over to the Dominion government. The Fathers of Confederation had anticipated that the provinces' revenues from timberlands, and licencing fees would adequately cover provincial costs. Any deficit which might occur would be met by federal subsidies. The area of direct taxation was seen... "as a sort of residual source of provincial revenue, which it was not intended should be used extensively."  

Because of the power and influence of the federal government the power of the provincial Quebec government was by and large negligible during most of the nineteenth century. Yet the provinces proved to be more than token opposition to the central government. Already in 1867 the provinces met to examine the relationship of the provinces with the Dominion government. The interprovincial conference was chiefly organized by Honoré Mercier, the Quebec premier. Together, five provincial premiers adopted resolutions that challenged and rejected the centralist policies of Macdonald's government. The federal government, however, ignored and rejected the provinces' challenge.  

It is not surprising Quebec led the battle for provincial rights. Provincial premiers from Mercier through Duplessis consistently argued that the federal government had no legislative power beyond those conferred on it by the provinces and which were recognized in Section 91 of the BNA Act. Many authors have referred to this as the Compact Theory of Confederation. This theory asserts that the federal government is the child of the province, and therefore subordinate to the provincial governments.

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22 Ibid., p. 194.


Within Quebec, provincial autonomy was not only equated with the survival of French Canada, but also the survival of its way of life, its institutions, its social structures, and above all its value system and goals. The 1953 Tremblay Commission succinctly summed up Quebec's claim: if in fact "the province of Quebec as a territorial and economic unit is a province like the others, it is neither assimilable to any other, by reason of its origins, religion, culture or the history of the great majority of its population, nor, consequently, by most of its juridical and social institutions." 25 French Canada was depicted as rural and agrarian, unchanging, a society where the conservative elite, including the Catholic clergy, preached a message of other worldliness—a message which ignored the reality of industrialization, and instead concentrated on the virtues of the rural life, and le retour à la terre. 26

Trudeau points out how the Quebec clergy borrowed from papal encyclicals..."only formulas which might dignify our collective prejudices with a borrowed prestige." 27 Trudeau continues: "In other countries, the social doctrine of the Church did much to prepare the way for the democratization of peoples, the emancipation of workers, and the progress of society. In French Canada, it was evoked in support of authoritarianism and xenophobia. What is more serious still, our doctrine made it impossible for us to solve our problems. On the negative side, it rejected any solutions which might succeed among our 'enemies': the English, Protestants, materialists, etc.

25 Ibid., p. 6.
27 Ibid., p. 13.
On the positive side, it was content to set conceptual systems bearing no objective relation to reality; the application of these systems was frequently impossible."28

Was Quebec an agrarian society? Did it not experience urban growth like Ontario? And what about the work force? Was Quebec a province of habitants who refused to accept the reality of an industrialized society? During the 100 year period from 1871-1971 urban proportion of the population in the province of Quebec was consistently higher than the national average.29 At the same time urban growth in Quebec kept pace with Ontario.30 Between 1891 and 1921 it increased the most rapidly from 27 per cent to 56 per cent; in Ontario, however, the pace of urban growth was more consistent rising from 22 per cent in 1871 to 80 per cent in 1971.

Between 1901 and 1951 the Quebec farming population maintained a surprisingly stability. In 1901, there were 140,110 farms and in 1951 there were 134,336 farms, a level maintained with surprising consistency.31 Only in the 1930s and the 1940s in the midst of the Great Depression was there a sizeable increase in the number of farms. During this same period the agricultural work force (male) increased from 218,094 in 1931 to 246,467 in 1941, the only period when agricultural workers increased.32

29 See Appendices II and III.
30 See Appendix IV.
31 See Appendix V.
32 See Appendix VI.
activity in agriculture can be attributed to the revival of the back-to-the-land-movement, encouraged by the provincial Liberals in an attempt to fight the great depression years. 33

In Ontario, the number of farms stayed virtually the same between 1901-1931, and decreased sharply after 1931. Unlike Quebec, the 1930s and 1940s did not see an increase in the number of farms. The agricultural labour force during the 1930s and 1940s also continued to decrease. Nathan Keyfitz has stated that both Ontario and Quebec arrived at the same point, but by processes of evolution which varied considerably. 34

The Church's response to industrialization stemmed from Pope Leo XIII's historical encyclical Rerum Novarum, proclaimed on May 15, 1891. This remarkable document not only gave the Church's support to workers' associations, but provided for the first time an extensive social commentary on the responsibilities of the Church and the state toward the working class in a society becoming more industrialized. Rerum Novarum, nevertheless, was Thomistic in tone:

(32) Now a state chiefly prospers and thrives for religion and justice, the moderation and fair imposing of public taxes, the progression of the arts and of trades, the abundant yield of the land...hereby then, it lies in the power of a ruler to benefit every class in the state, and amongst the rest to promote to the utmost the interests of the poor.

(33) As regards the state, the interests of all, whether high or low are equal. The members of the working classes are citizens by nature and by the same right as the rich; they


are the real parts, living the life which makes up, through the family, the body of the commonwealth...

(45) Let the working man and the employer make free agreements, and in particular let them agree freely as to the wages; nevertheless, there underlies a dictate of natural justice more imperious and ancient than any bargain between man and man, namely, that wages ought not to be insufficient to support a frugal and well-behaved wage-earner.

(49) The most important of all are working men’s unions for these virtually include all the rest. History attests what excellent results were brought about by the artificers’ guilds of olden times. Such unions should be suited to the requirements of this our age— an age of wider education, of different habits, and of far more numerous requirements in daily life. 35

Although Leo XIII had proclaimed *Rerum Novarum* in 1891, no specific action was taken until twelve years later. In 1903, Father (later Monseigneur) Eugène Lapointe began the arduous task of creating a confessional Catholic union, the Fédération Ouvrière Mutuelle du Nord in the frontier region of Saguenay. Due to the workers’ lack of commitment to industrial life, and the problems of dual unionism, the confessional union withered away. 36

In 1907, Lapointe organized the Fédération Ouvrière de Chicoutimi, and again the union lacked support. This time, however, other embryonic Catholic unions began to appear in the same year. In Montreal, the Fédération Nationale Saint-Jean-Baptiste organized three clubs of female workers, who worked in manufacturing, retailing, and office jobs. The federation also provided social activities, and operated a placement office. 37


37 Ibid., pp. 44-47.
By 1912, Msgr. Lapointe re-organized the Fédération Ouvrière Mutuelle du Nord, and by August 31, 1913, it had 1,500 members.

Five years later various Catholic unions held a series of conventions in order to lay the groundwork for the founding of the Confédération des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada (CTCC). These conventions were held in Quebec City (1918), Trois-Rivières (1919), and Chicoutimi (1920).

In Trois-Rivières, le Révérend Père Archambault welcomed the delegates with these words:

"Membres des Unions Ouvrières Catholiques, l'Eglise vous salue ce matin avec joie, elle salue en vous sa floraison magnifique de ses idées sociales; elle salue en vous, la force grandissante du travail organisé suivant les directions de Rome; elle salue en vous, l'un des éléments vitaux de cette organisation professionnelle qu'elle préconise et dont la réalisation, dissipant la discorde et la haine des classes, assurerait la bonne entente et la paix au sein des sociétés."

The Church's encouragement of the formation of a confessional-based union did not mean it had now accepted the reality of industrialization; it meant, rather, that the Church wanted to maintain an influence on its Catholic workers. The only logical step to take was to extend the social doctrine of the Church to include confessional unions:

1) "Contrary to 'liberalism' which considers private property an absolute, and to socialism which has gone so far as to call property 'theft' and would control or even suppress it, Catholic trade unionism sees in private property, a natural right entailing obligations of justice and charity."

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2) "Catholic trade unionism attaches extreme importance to the labour agreement. To be valid, this agreement must be just and assented to with a full knowledge of the facts; it must be free or it involves no moral responsibilities." 40

In 1937, Pope Pius XI's encyclical Divini Redemptoris, further elaborated the message of social harmony: "Now it is of the very essence of social justice to demand from each individual all that is necessary for the common good. But just as in the living organism it is impossible to provide for the good of the whole unless each single part and each individual member is given what it needs for the exercise of its proper functions, so it is impossible to care for the social organism and the good of society as a unit unless each single part and each individual member ... is supplied with all that is necessary for the exercise of his social functions." 41

Gilbert R. Horne, commenting on Pius XI's statement, warned that the building of a corporate order was to be distinguished from fascism:

"A sound prosperity is to be restored according to the true principles of a sane corporative system which respects the proper hierarchic structure of society... The aim of this type of 'corporatism' is not the welfare of the state, as in fascism and nazism, but the common good of society. Man by nature has certain inalienable rights, such as the right of private property. These rights carry with them obligations or duties to society." 42

40 Ibid., p. 22.


Writing on the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the CTCC, Jean Marchand (President of the CTCC/CSN, 1961-1965) acknowledged the strong influence of corporatism: "La CTCC à ses débuts, était nettement nationaliste, confessionnelle, pro-corporatiste et les surnomiers y jouaient un rôle prédominant. Souvent l'action catholique prenait le pas sur l'action professionnelle et proprement syndicale. L'industrialisation était tenue en suspicion et nous relevons même des résolutions, lors des premiers congrès contre l'exode rural et pour le retour à la terre."  

II. Labour Legislation in Quebec

To gain a better perspective of how social harmony and justice were administered in Quebec it will be helpful to examine briefly labour legislation dating back to the 1890s.

In 1901 the Quebec government passed the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, which established for the first time a voluntary procedure for arbitration and conciliation. The Quebec law was modelled after the New Zealand statute; however, the Quebec government rejected binding arbitration, choosing instead voluntary conciliation, which the federal government had implemented in its Conciliation Act of 1900. The passage of the law was also heavily influenced by a strike in 1900, after 22 shoe factories locked out 3,850 employees. The strike was started after one factory went on strike in support of a dismissed worker. The three month strike was only stopped after Mgr. L. Nazaire Bégin, archbishop of Quebec, acted as an arbitrator for both sides. In his decision Mgr. Bégin noted: "Le droit de

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se constituer en association de métiers, de professions, d'emplois quelconques est un droit naturel; il a toujours existé et il existera toujours. Mais de ce que ce droit ne peut être méconnu, il ne s'ensuit pas que toutes les associations soient légitimes. Pour qu'elles aient droit à l'existence et puissent faire du bien, il faut qu'elles se proposent d'atteindre une fin honnête et juste et qu'elles n'emploient, pour y arriver, que des moyens conformes à la morale, à l'honnêteté et à la justice..."44"

This was the first time a Catholic archbishop had intervened in any labour dispute in Canada. More important was the tone of his message: the right of association was "un droit naturel". Because it was seen as a natural right it meant that conciliation or arbitration too were voluntary - a point the government could not take lightly.

The same understanding of trying to implement a sense of social justice was seen in the 1907 loi des Accidents du Travail. Hailed as the first law of its kind in Canada, compensation was granted to workers for lost work days. If a person was off the job for seven days he/she received the minimum compensation of fifty per cent of the daily salary. If a person was permanently disabled he/she could receive compensation for the equivalent of fifty per cent of the last two months salary. The maximum amount which could be collected, however, was only $3,000.45

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45 This law did not apply to salaries exceeding $1,000. Roger Chartier, "Les indemnités pour accidents du travail, les bureaux de placement gratuits et la première guerre mondiale (1908-1918)", Relations Industrielles, 17:3, (Juillet, 1962), pp. 287-289.
Not until the 1921 municipal strike in Montreal did the provincial government distinguish between "une profession au sens ordinaire et celle où domine l'idée de service du bien commun". La loi des grèves et contre-grèves municipales maintained that municipal workers (firemen, police, and sanitary workers) could not strike before the case was brought to conciliation or arbitration. Either party could contact the Minister, and the matter would be acted upon within five days. Each side would name an arbitrator, and there would be no recourse to appeal.

Jean van Loon maintains that in the 1930s and 1940s the leadership of the CTCC were committed to establishing a corporate order. Van Loon notes how in 1931, the CTCC began to pressure the Quebec government for a statute which would permit collective agreements to be made legally binding over the whole industry. In 1934, such an act was passed and hailed as "a first step toward a corporatist order". While the 1934 law may have appeared to have been an attempt at establishing corporatism, Alfred Charpentier (CTCC President 1937-1946) points out that the early 1930s was a period of extremely high unemployment, depleted salaries, and the CTCC was itself on the verge of bankruptcy. For the workers in the smaller industries

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49 Statuts de Québec, 24 George V, 1934, C. 56.

collective agreements were non-existent and often replaced by a gentleman's agreement. For CTCC workers it was advantageous to have a collective agreement binding on the entire industry. Charpentier states: "Nos adversaires internationaux habitués aux conventions collectives particulières à chaque entreprise craignaient que l'extension juridique nuise au progrès des organisations ouvrières; tandis que nous qui étions soucieux de remédier à la misère des ouvriers voyions dans cette mesure un moyen efficace de protection mutuelle entre tous les employeurs et tous les salariés d'une même industrie, dans une région donnée. Le but de législation était d'empêcher la course aux salaires de rabais chez les travailleurs et d'établir des conditions de loyale concurrence entre les employeurs." 51

No doubt the CTCC elite was influenced by corporatism. Gérard Dion quotes Maxime Fortin, one of the early founders of the CTCC: "Au début des syndicats catholiques, nous avions tout le monde contre nous: les unions internationales, évidemment, qui nous combattaient; les employeurs qui se sentaient menacés; les gouvernements que nous dérangeons; les évêques et les prêtres que nous apeurions; et même les travailleurs." 52

Whatever corporalist thought may have dominated the CTCC elite, the direction of the CTCC was also tempered by the needs of its members. In 1937, ten thousand textile workers in Montreal, Valleyfield, Sherbrooke, Magog, Drummondville, and Saint-Grégoire de Montmorency went on strike from August 2nd until a settlement on August 27th. 53 Dion notes that the militancy

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52 Ibid., p. XI.

53 For a discussion of the textile strike see Charpentier. Ibid., pp. 196-248.
displayed during the textile strike illustrated that militancy among CTCC members was first evident not during the 1949 asbestos strike, but already in 1937.\(^{54}\)

Yet the militancy which surfaced in the CTCC during the latter 1930s was manifest on a much larger scale within the international unions. The strikes in the tobacco, shoe, shipbuilding, and pulp and paper industries in 1942 and 1943 involving the craft unions of the American Federation of Labour (AFL) and the industrial unions of the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL) and the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) served as examples of the militancy displayed during this period.\(^{55}\)

III. The Industrial Boom and The Role of International Unions (1933–45)

In 1855, the National Typographical Union, the first American union to enter Canada, organized an affiliate in Toronto. In 1861, the Iron Moulders' Union of America established a local in Montreal, the first incursion of American unions into Quebec. Others followed: the International Cigar Makers' Union in 1865; the Ship Labourers in 1862; The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers in 1867; and the Brotherhood of Railway Conductors in 1868.\(^{56}\) The first international union to gain prominence in Quebec was the Knights of Labor. The Knights came to Quebec in 1882, and by 1887 had 16,000 members, roughly one third of the total union membership in the province.\(^{57}\)

Cardinal E.A. Taschereau of Quebec City was the strongest critic of the Knights of Labor, who argued that while the present leaders were well disposed.

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\(^{54}\) Ibid., p. XII.


\(^{57}\) Ibid., p. 24.
it was no guarantee that their successors could continue to restrain "the disorders, strikes, seditions, conflagrations, and other troubles which the experiences of the recent years shows as the first fruit of this association." 58 Cardinal Taschereau further described the Knights as a "socialist fraternity" which refused to work for capitalists who had non-union help, and which struck to protect workers who had been discharged for good reasons. 59

One of the chief reasons why international unions were established in Canada was the need of American unions to protect their own labour markets. Between 1904 and 1914 the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), out of fear of low non-union coal imports being sent to the United States from Canada, spent over two million dollars on strike pay in Canada. 60 Similarly, both the Pulp and Sulphite Workers, and the International Brotherhood of Paper Workers felt they had to unionize their Canadian counterparts in order to protect their own labour markets. As forest resources in New England became more scarce, the industry tended to move into Quebec and Ontario. Crispo notes:

The general view that it was a common product market in North America that induced the international unions to enter Canada can easily be disputed... a more appropriate explanation is that international union links were merely following the international corporate links which were later to become more prevalent between the two countries. There is no doubt that the steady and increasing penetration into Canada of American branch plants became an added reason for international unions to move north of the border. Likewise when major international specialty contractors became more common in the construction industry, this re-inforced the desire of the building trade unions to maintain and build their operations in Canada. 61

58 Ibid., p. 27.
59 Ibid., p. 27.
61 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
International unions came to Ontario and Quebec in two stages: the craft unions, which enjoyed their greatest growth during the 1910-1920 period; and the industrial unions, which enjoyed their greatest growth during the 1940s. The craft unions - who were to a large extent affiliated with the American Federation of Labour - enjoyed their greatest growth during the 1917-1924 period and declined in membership during the late 1920s and 1930s. 62 Similarly, the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC), an early forerunner of the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), experienced a surge of growth in the 1919-1921 period and experienced a sharp decline for the rest of the decade. 63

From the selected five year intervals examined, 64 beginning in 1915, it is evident the craft unions shared in the growth of the union movement. The United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (AFL) in 1915, 1920, 1925, and 1930 was among the ten largest unions on the continent. By 1935, however, this union was reduced to 2,539 Canadian members, compared to 13,900 in 1930. 65

The founding of the more radical labour unions such as the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and the One Big Union (OBU), was

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62 See Appendix VII.

63 See Appendix VIII.


65 See Footnote 63.
grew out of the dissension at the 1918 TLC convention in Quebec City was one of the chief reasons why the growth of the craft unions stagnated during the later 1920s. The founding of the IWW was in direct opposition to the American Federation of Labour. It declared itself to be the advocate of what it termed "revolutionary industrial unionism", and had as its objective the abolition of the wage system. In 1930, the IWW had 3,741 members in Canada.

The OBU was founded in 1914, following the failure of the 1918 TLC convention to call for a general strike if more Asiatic labourers were brought into the mines; the failure to condemn conscription; and the passage of the Executive Committee's Report which commented on the favorable attitude of Robert Borden's Union Government toward labour. The OBU received its strongest support in Winnipeg where it was reported by the Trades and Labour Council that 51 unions had voted in favour to withdraw from the international unions. In spite of TLC pressure, the OBU in 1925 had 17,256 members, and in 1930 it claimed 23,724 members in Canada.

66 Labour Organizations in Canada, 1925, (Department of Labour, 1926), p. 175.
68 Ibid., p. 191.
69 Labour Organizations in Canada, 1925, (Department of Labour, 1926), pp. 216-217.
The surge of growth by the industrial unions in the 1930s and 1940s severely tested the strength of the craft unions. After 1940 as the industrial unions surged forward, and in spite of an increase in membership, unions like the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners continued their relative decline. The industrial unions such as the United Mine Workers of America, the United Steel Workers, and the United Auto Workers were all united in the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL). Within Quebec, the TLC was represented by la Fédération provinciale du travail (FPT) and the CCL was represented by la Fédération des unions industrielles du Québec (FUI).

In spite of their differences the craft and industrial unions were united in their opposition to the CTCC, frequently resulting in membership raids. In 1935, the CTCC with its 38,000 members represented almost 75 per cent of the total union membership in Quebec; by 1943, the CTCC grew to 53,384 members, but this represented less than one third of all unionized members in the province. Even as late as 1951, CTCC membership continued to climb, but continued to control only one third of the province's union membership.

Whereas in 1931 only 10.7 per cent of the 550,032 industrialized workers were unionized, by 1941 the number of unionized industrialized workers nearly doubled to 19.7 per cent, while the number of industrial wage earners only increased to 616,998.

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71 The CCL was formed in 1940 by the merging of the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) and the All-Canadian Congress of Labour.


73 Appendix IX.

74 Quinn, Op. cit., p. 204, Table VI.
The large growth of the industrial unions, the passage of the 1935 National Labour Relations Act in the United States, and the federal government's 1940 Order-in-Council (PC 2685) endorsing the right of workers to join unions, were instrumental in the provincial government's decision to introduce a provincial labour code in 1940. La loi de la convention collective made it compulsory for employers to bargain with their respective labour unions. The spirit of the bill was emphatic in the need for maintaining "social justice and harmony". The preamble stated in part:

Considérant que la justice sociale impose la réglementation du travail lorsque la situation économique entraîne pour le salarié des conditions contraires à l'équité;...

Considérant qu'il est opportun d'adopter, d'étendre et de rendre obligatoires les conditions de travail consignées dans les conventions collectives, tant pour prévenir la concurrence déloyale faite aux signataires que pour établir le juste salaire et satisfaire à l'équité; 76

The penalty for not complying with the law for the employer was a maximum $25 fine for a first offence, and any subsequent offence not less than $25 and not exceeding $50.

By 1940, the federal government's presence in the war-time economy resulted in a series of events which drastically changed labour-management relations in the entire Dominion. On February 17, 1944, the federal government using its war-time powers granted under the War Measures Act passed PC 1003, making it compulsory for employers to negotiate with

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75 The passage of the National Labour Relations Act in the United States was seen as a cornerstone in legitimizing labour unions. Included in the bill was a provision making it compulsory for employers to bargain with the various labour unions. See Stuart Jamieson, Industrial Relations in Canada, (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1973), p. 23.

76 Statuts de Québec, 4 George VI, 1940, c. 38.
labor unions. FC 1003 also established an industrial relations council with an equal number of representatives of labour and management, and authorized the federal minister of Labour to designate a conciliation board in the event of a strike.

The Quebec government reacted accordingly. On February 3, 1944, la loi concernant l'arbitrage des différents entre les services publics et les salariés à leur emploi introduced a system of binding arbitration for all public employees: office workers, unskilled laborers, and all employees of the provincial government. Both lockouts and strikes were forbidden. The repressive nature of the bill was revealed in the penalties imposed for conducting an illegal strike: a fine not exceeding $100 for the first offence, and a fine not exceeding $1,000 for any subsequent offence. Compared to the 1940 loi de la convention collective, which imposed a maximum $25 fine for a first offence, and a fine not exceeding $50 for any subsequent offence by employers who refused to bargain with the respective unions, the contrast was startling.

The same year the provincial government passed la loi instituant une commission de relations ouvrières, which re-inforced the 1940 loi de la convention collective, making it compulsory for employers to bargain with labour unions. A strike could not take place until fourteen days after the Minister had received a conciliation or arbitration report from the commissioners appointed to investigate the labour dispute.

77 Statuts de Québec, 8 George VI, 1944, c. 31.
78 Statuts de Québec, 8 George VI, 1944, c. 30.
The series of measures taken by the federal and provincial
governments inaugurated a new era of labour-management relations in the
1940s and early 1950s. More important, however, were the changes that in-
dustrialization brought with it. Industrialization had introduced conflicting
ideologies for the Church, the government, and especially the CTCC. When in-
dustrialization started under the provincial Liberals, the traditional anti-
statism was no hindrance for the provincial Liberals, who maintained that
the prosperity of the province depended on the exploitation of the province's
minerals, timber, and hydro-electric power by the private sector. The
Church's own anti-statism coincided with the laissez-faire ideology of the
Liberal government. The Church, however, was highly suspicious of the in-
dustrialization that the Liberal government proclaimed. For the Church,
industrialization diametrically opposed their vision of a rural agrarian
society. The birth of the CTCC, moreover, was an attempt by the Church to
reluctantly accept industrialization and at the same time maintain its in-
fluence over the Catholic workers.

Certainly the early leaders of the CTCC were theoretically
committed to corporatism, which they adapted from Pope Leo XIII's encyclical
Rerum Novarum. The CTCC was also pragmatic enough to realize the needs of
their membership. The raiding of CTCC membership by the international
unions, and the 1937 province-wide textile strike proved to be strong
medicine for the CTCC leadership. The end result was a quasi-corporatism,
which sufficiently tempered the CTCC. True, the CTCC continued to view
society as an organic whole, of which the CTCC was a part; however, the
measures passed by the federal and provincial governments and the presence
of the international unions forced the CTCC to change its stance during the
late 1940s and 1950s.
Within the next decade changes in Quebec proved to be more dramatic. The unfolding of the 1949 asbestos strike, and the quest for a more centralized economy - the foundation of the Quiet Revolution - will be the focal point of the next chapter.
CHAPTER III

CENTRALIZATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Ralph Miliband has maintained that a state consists of five elements: the government, bureaucracy, military, judiciary, and "the various units of sub-central government". Miliband’s explanation, however, down-plays and ignores provincial (state) power, which he includes under the various units of sub-central government. It is true, he notes, sub-central government does not merely carry out the functions of the central government; indeed, in some instances these units of government remain independent from the central government. The state system of Canadian federalism, however is best understood in the context of three related phenomena: the-state-at-the-provincial-level, the-state-at-the-central-level, and the relationship between the two.  

This is particularly relevant for the 1960s when the provinces expanded their provincial administrations. In 1955, federal expenditures on goods and services were 8.5 per cent of GNP, while combined provincial and local expenditures were 6.0 per cent. In 1965, this had drastically changed, the corresponding proportions were 5.1 per cent and 7.9 per cent. Other Canadian provinces experienced a considerable growth in their public sectors during the post-war period. Yet Quebec's public sector growth besides an expansion of the province's educational, health, and social services also was a period when the government greatly increased its own authority. The anti-statism perfected during the Duplessis era for the most part diluted the state's ability to establish province-wide hospitalization and medicare insurance as well as a public education system. Local municipalities

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and the Church shared the burden of public welfare and education. Not surprisingly, the municipalities, not the province, used income and sales tax power for raising additional revenues, a move which strengthened the financial base of the municipalities.

Within Quebec, however, men such as P.E. Trudeau and Maurice Lamontagne argued that Quebec’s problem was not federal government encroachment upon provincial autonomy as much as Quebec not having used its full constitutional options. They maintained that Quebec did not require more autonomy; rather, Quebec needed a more centralized state, which of course implied that the provincial government would have to coordinate its activities more carefully with the federal government.

When the Lesage government came to power in 1960, the implications became more obvious. Hospitalization insurance, already accepted by other provincial governments was now accepted by the new Quebec government. Although the Lesage government credited itself with the passage of these measures we must not underestimate the influence of the federal government, which had originally initiated hospitalization and medicare insurance.

In spite of the Lesage government opting out of unemployment assistance, disability and blindness allowance, hospitalization insurance, hospital construction, and grants for public health, it is nevertheless true the Quiet Revolution established firmer bilateral relations between the Quebec government and the federal government than had existed under the Duplessis regime. By opting out of these programs, Quebec was merely exercising

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4Book of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial-Relations Canada: 1867-1939, Book 1, p. 227.
her constitutional prerogative. The centripetal action of the federal government, moreover, helped provide the necessary thrust for the Lesage government to initiate educational and social reforms.

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Although provincial premiers from Mercier through Duplessis consistently argued that the federal government had no legislative powers beyond those granted it by the provinces and which were recognized in Section 91 of the BNA Act, provincial autonomy after World War II became more focused on fiscal relations. In the 1948 election campaign Duplessis opened his campaign with these words: "Ne prenez plus de chance, il est temps de retrouver notre autonomie fiscale par la rétrocession de l'impôt sur les corporations et de l'impôt sur les successions et de reconquérir notre autonomie sociale par la rétrocession de pouvoirs provinciaux relatifs à la législation ouvrière et à la réglementation du commerce". 5

Duplessis' remarks were of course directed against the federal government's tax-sharing agreements, first implemented in 1941, and subsequently re-negotiated every five years. Although it was only in 1941 that the federal government implemented its first tax-sharing agreement, the appointment of the Rowell-Sirois Commission in 1937 to investigate the distribution of functions and revenues between the provinces and the federal government was

the first indication the federal government wanted to re-evaluate its approach to economic planning. It is true the federal government did not implement many of the recommendations of the Rowell-Sirois Commission, yet the Commission's report was an indication that the federal government wanted to take a more comprehensive focus on national and social policies.

Prior to the Rowell-Sirois Commission the federal and provincial governments were using essentially the same taxing and fiscal structures first implemented by the Fathers of Confederation. At the time of Confederation the federal government upon taking over the debts of the provinces was given access to the customs and excise duties. The four provinces Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick - were given tax sources, which in total produced less than one-fifth of their revenue in 1866.6

Direct taxation was so unpopular that it was given to the provinces so it would not be used extensively. Since the federal government now occupied the main revenue fields, the central government worked out a subsidy program to help the provinces. The subsidy proved to represent 80 to 90 per cent of the revenue for Nova Scotia and New Brunswick; and in Ontario and Quebec the subsidy provided one-half to two-thirds of the provincial revenues.

During the 1860s and 1870s the federal government constantly extended and revised its subsidy program, giving grants to Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and British Columbia.

The 80 cents per capita subsidy did not change until 1907, when the federal government and the provinces removed the 400,000 population limit, and introduced a more flexible formula based on total population.

At the close of the 1920s the provinces and municipalities were spending almost twice as much as the federal government, a state of affairs hardly foreseeable in 1867. The new emphasis on capital expenditures and welfare programs led the federal government to establish conditional grants, that is, where the federal government would participate in a joint cost-sharing program with the provinces. Conditional grants, first used in a 1913 agricultural program, at first proved less than ideal. After World War I, however, the federal government and the provinces participated in cost-sharing programs involving vocational education, highway construction, employment offices, and in 1926 the old age pension plan. 7

What were some of the proposals of the Rowell-Sirois Commission? The Commission was of the opinion that social welfare programs should remain under provincial jurisdiction and be financed from the provincial treasury. The Commission opposed joint jurisdiction, criticizing the shared-cost grant mechanism. In most cases the Commission's emphasis was to establish a clear-cut delineation of the respective responsibilities of the federal and

7Ibid., pp. 7-8.
provincial governments, and unified control of particular programs by either one or the other government. The Rowell-Sirois Commission proposed a system of National Adjustment Grants, unconditional grants paid to the poorer provinces to provide a level of social service equal the Canadian average. The recommendations of the Royal Commission were presented to the 1941 Dominion-Provincial conference and were rejected by Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia, three provinces not eligible for the National Adjustment grants. The failure of the conference to adopt any policy led to the early passage of the 1941 Wartime Tax Agreement Act. By virtue of the wartime measure the provinces ceased to levy personal income taxes, and corporate income taxes. In return for the lost revenue, the federal government paid each of the provinces a tax rental payment.

Although the 1941 Dominion-Provincial conference had failed to adopt any policy on how the post-war re-construction should take place, the Green Book proposals presented to the provinces at the 1943 Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction indicated that the federal government was anxious to play a major role in the post-war re-construction. The federal government's recommendations included:

8 D.V. Smiley, "The Rowell-Sirois Report, Provincial Autonomy and Post-War Canadian Federalism", in Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality, ed., J. Peter Massie, (Toronto: Methuen, 1971), p. 70. Smiley notes, however, the Commission did give qualified support for the use of conditional grants in cases when the amounts of money were small and where the programs could be either routine, or subject to scientific standards of performance.


10 Ibid., p. 18.
health grants to the provinces, wider responsibilities for social security including old age pension to all residents over 70, half the costs of provincial social assistance plans to persons between 65 and 69 and an extension of the coverage of the existing unemployment insurance scheme.  

The federal proposals were strongly opposed by both Ontario and Quebec who believed that the federal government wanted to maintain a strong central control over the postwar economy. Although the federal proposals were dropped the Reconstruction Conference was an indication of things to come. Smiley notes that by 1946, the time of the last plenary sessions, the federal government was pledged to four goals: a) a high and stable level of income and employment; b) exclusive access to the fields of individual and corporate income tax so that the government could implement its fiscal policy more effectively; c) the federal government and the provinces would cooperate in building a developed welfare state in Canada; and d) in collaboration with other nations Canada would work towards the reconstruction of the international economic order on liberal lines.

The postwar tax rental agreements negotiated between the federal government and the provinces until the mid-sixties continued to reflect, with minor exception, the 1941 Wartime Tax Agreement.

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11 Ibid., p. 22.
13 Ibid., p. 119.
14 Ibid., p. 119.
15 Ibid., p. 119.
At the 1947 Dominion-Provincial conference all the provinces, except Ontario and Quebec, agreed to participate in a new five year agreement. The provinces were guaranteed $206.5 million, almost double what they received under the 1941 Wartime Tax Agreement. The provinces would not levy income taxes and succession taxes, and corporate taxes were restricted to a five per cent on net income.

In 1951, the basis for calculating tax rental payments was updated by substituting data of the year immediately preceding the year of payment, in place of the three year average which had prevailed. This meant a substantial increase in adjusted payments and brought Ontario into the agreement. Quebec remained the sole province outside the agreement, and found itself receiving considerable less than if it had participated in the rental agreement.

By refusing to agree to the tax rental agreement for the 1952-1957 period, Quebec received far less in abatements than an agreement would have offered. Quebec instead imposed personal income tax at roughly 15 per cent of the federal rate. To offset this action, the federal government raised its personal income tax credit to 10 per cent. The actions of the Duplessis government dramatized a major defect of the tax rental scheme: non-agreeing provinces received no compensation even if they refrained from imposing any or all of the designated taxes.

17 Ibid., pp. 45-46.
18 Ibid., p. 46.
At the October 1955 federal-provincial conference all the provinces except Quebec agreed to a new tax-sharing agreement for the 1957-1962 period. Again, the participating provinces refrained from imposing personal income tax, corporate taxes and succession duties, with the exception of Ontario which continued to levy its own succession duties.

Although the Duplessis government throughout the 1950s refused to participate in any tax rental agreements, authors such as Maurice Lamontagne and P.E. Trudeau maintained that Quebec's quest for improved economic and social conditions was dependent on greater centralization by the federal government. Lamontagne argued that only the federal government could successively control fiscal and monetary policies in order to maintain a prosperous economy: "Il faut reconnaître que la politique de stabilité économique doit dépendre d'abord du gouvernement fédéral. Tout semble désigner celui-ci à cette fonction: le caractère national et international des fluctuations cycliques, le fait que la politique de défense l'amène parfois à susciter lui-même les pressions inflationnaires, la juridiction presque exclusive qu'il détient dans le domaine du commerce international et surtout dans celui de la politique monétaire et enfin, en temps normal, le caractère assez compréhensible de ses dépenses. Le gouvernement fédéral peut successivement accroître ou diminuer ses dépenses et réaliser des surplus ou des déficits budgétaires importants. Il peut aussi imposer un système efficace de contrôles directs lorsque les fluctuations économiques deviennent dangereuses. En somme, lui seul peut pratiquer vraiment la nouvelle politique fiscale qui demeure notre principal instrument de lutte contre l'instabilité économique." 19

In a later essay, P.E. Trudeau, states a similar proposition, but carries the argument one step further, maintaining Quebec's economy must be more integrated with the rest of the country: "The important question is not whether Quebec will become a sovereign state, remain integrated with Canada, or be annexed to the United States, although these options are not unrelated to the kind of political means used to attain economic goals. In the last resort, what really matters is that the per-capita income be increased as quickly as possible. To achieve this, the economy of Quebec must become extremely efficient, technologically advanced, quite specialized and capable of offering the best products at the best prices in all the markets of the world.

In practice this means that the economy of Quebec must not be isolated, but open to the whole world, for then it will find new markets as well as the competition it has to expect." 20

Duplessis, moreover, not only refused to participate in any tax-sharing agreement, but also refused to accept federal aid for post-secondary education in Quebec. 21 Quoting Esdras Minville, Trudeau points out... "the province of Quebec received less because it asked for less... Quebec had a kind of instinctive fear of excessive expenditures... The other provinces,

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21 On the particular problem of federal post-secondary aid Trudeau sided with Duplessis. Trudeau maintained that the federal government could use any tax provided it is destined to increase the Consolidated Revenue Fund; Trudeau however, maintained that the position of the federal government became ultra vires when it disposes... "of these funds through legislation that encroaches upon provincial jurisdiction". See ibid., p. 86.
which do not have the same traditional attitude towards expenditures, seem on the contrary to have wanted to profit as much as possible from federal handouts: public works, etc.". 22 Trudeau maintained that Quebec within the parameter of the existing BNA Act already had the constitutional prerogatives to ensure its autonomy:

The federal system obliges Quebec's political culture to stand the test of competition at the federal level, while allowing Quebec to choose the form of government best suited to its needs at the provincial level. Under our present constitution, Quebec may modify its own constitution (except in those sections relating to the function of the Lieutenant-Governor) and create the political institutions its people desire. It is true that in the past the people did not really desire very much: witness the survival of the legislative Council! But this was due to the people, themselves, not to any lack of freedom.

Consequently, there is no need to evoke the notion of a national state to turn Quebec into a province 'different from the others'. In a great number of vital areas, and notably those that concern the development of particular cultural values, Quebec has full and complete sovereignty under the Canadian constitution. 23

Yet with the election of the Lesage government in 1960 the provincial government began a wide series of negotiations with the federal government. Unlike the Duplessis regime which had categorically opposed all post-war tax-sharing and other joint federal-provincial cost-sharing programs, the Lesage government's electoral pledges promised extensive co-operation with the federal government. The new government had promised hospitalization insurance, already in effect in other Canadian provinces; the most telling proposal was the promise to establish a permanent federal-provincial


secretariat, proving how much conventional wisdom had changed in the course of a decade. 24

It was indeed difficult for the provincial Liberals not to participate in the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act, which Parliament had passed in 1957. Originally five provinces - Newfoundland, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia, and Manitoba agreed to participate in the plan. Later Ontario and Nova Scotia entered the plan on January 1, 1959; New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island entered on July 1st and October 1st, respectively of the same year, and Quebec was the last to join on January 1, 1961.

The federal share was 25 per cent of the national average per capita cost, plus 25 per cent of the per capita cost of services provided in the province in question, less any direct charges to patients for services. 25

The Medical Care Act received royal assent on December 21, 1966, but did not come into force until July 1, 1968. The Act establishes a grant-in-aid program whereby the federal government is empowered to make a financial contribution to those provinces operating medical care insurance plans meeting certain minimum criteria. These criteria are related to comprehensiveness of insured service, universality of coverage, portability of benefits and public administration.

Already, in 1958-1959 the first year of payments to the provinces for hospital insurance, the cost was 22.0 per cent of total conditional grants. The next year, the cost almost doubled to 39.3 per cent, and throughout the mid-sixties, these costs hovered around the 45 per cent level. With the addition of medicare payments in 1968-1969, these costs climbed past the 50.0 per cent mark, up to the present 62.4 per cent level for 1974-1975.

The spiralling costs of hospitalization insurance, various social security schemes, vocational training allowance, and health grants, and a fear of being tied to programs initiated by the federal government were primarily why Quebec opted out of these shared-cost programs in 1964. The Lesage government also received invaluable support from the federal Liberals, who promised in 1963 to re-negotiate the 1962-1967 Federal-Provincial Fiscal Act:

A new Liberal government will make equalization payments which will bring the other provinces up to the level of the richest, in revenue per head from shared taxes.

If some provinces wish, they should be able to withdraw, without financial loss, from joint programs which involve regular expenditures by the federal government and which are well established. In such cases, Ottawa will compensate provinces for the federal share of the cost, by lowering its own direct taxes and increasing equalization payments. This will be done also if some provinces do not want to take part in the new joint programs.

26 See Appendix X.


28 Ibid., p. 80.
By opting out of these joint-shared programs the Lesage government was essentially giving the dictum of P.E. Trudeau a new twist: if a province had the constitutional prerogative to demand federal government funding to which it was entitled, the provincial government could also opt out of a program in favour of financial compensation. Quebec's insistence on its optimum share of federal compensation in place of continued participation in joint federal-provincial cost-sharing programs was a means rather than an end. The provincial Liberal party was the party of modernity, the party which could successfully increase social services, implement hospitalization insurance, and expand the public sector, all of which required a more centralized state. For the experiment to be successful the provincial government required federal funds.

Already in the 1952 election campaign the modest social reforms promised by the provincial Liberals were the first visible sign that the party was capable of improving the province's social services and education system. The Liberals promised a new labour code, health insurance, benefits for invalids and expectant mothers, free secondary schooling, and the subsidizing of secondary and university education. 29

In the 1956 election campaign the Liberals basically kept their 1952 program intact, but added several new proposals: the creation of a ministry of natural resources; the re-organization of the Labour Relations Board in order to make it politically independent; decertifying all company unions; re-establishing the independence of the Civil Service Commission to end patronage; and increasing civil service salaries. 30


30 Ibid., pp. 363-372.
In 1960, the year the Liberals were elected to office, electoral
promises of past years had been re-polished and given new appeal. The
government was pledged to free primary and secondary education; hospitalization
insurance; the establishment of an economic and planning council, which would
plan the economic policies of the government; extensive supplementary pension
plans for invalids, the blind, and the elderly; and the creation of an in-
dependent public service commission. 31

During the late 1940s and early 1950s the Confédération des Tra-
vaillleurs Catholiques du Canada (CTCC) did not prove indifferent to the
changing social climate in Quebec. Already in 1946, the CTCC convention
approved a resolution calling for the implementation of hospitalization and
medical insurance. 32 In 1954, these demands were repeated both before the
Tremblay Commission 33 and before the federal government. 34 At the 1954
hearing before the Tremblay Commission, the CTCC also maintained it was
difficult for the working class to have access to any educational facilities. 35

The introduction of hospitalization and medicare insurance, par-
ticularly the former, carried with it sweeping changes for Quebec. After the
Lesage government took office, one of its first priorities was to begin

31 Ibid., pp. 373-388
32 Procès-Verbal, Vingt-cinquième session du Congrès de la CTCC, Québec,
1946, pp. 220-221.
33 Procès-Verbal, Trente-troisième session du Congrès de la CTCC, Montréal,
1954, p. 81.
34 Nous, Les Comités D’Action Santé, Les Comités D’Action Sociale et La Loi
65, Cahier No. 3, Fédération nationale des services, CSN, p. 30.
negotiations with the federal government to establish province-wide hospitalization insurance. Formerly hospitals came under the provisions of the Loi de l’assistance publique de Québec, a statute which required that hospitals throughout the province provide health care for the general public. There were, however, no provisions for regulating the hospitals on a province-wide level, and as a result they were de-centralized, controlling their own budgets and administrative policies. Hospitalization insurance changed all this. The Loi de l’assurance-hospitalisation which spelled out the agreement with the federal government, placed the hospitals in the province under the direct regulation of the government. Hospitals, if they were to receive funds from the government, had to provide the ministry of Health a monthly financial report and an annual budget.

Although the Lesage government had made hospitalization insurance one of its chief election planks, it downplayed any implications of centralization, justifying its policy instead with the social doctrine of the Church: "La protection de la santé est un élément essentiel de cette sécurité légitime qu’approuve la doctrine de l’Église. Les bienfaits de la médecine moderne, rendus accessibles à ceux qui en ont besoin, s’inscrivent dans le cadre de la sécurité sociale, elle-même une formule de 'solidarité qui vise à faire disparaître les inégalités trop criantes entre les individus et les peuples".  

In order for the Lesage government to establish a provincial department of education, the government first had to consolidate its own power.

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36 Statuts Refondus de la Province de Québec, 1941, c. 187.
37 Statuts de Québec, 9 Elisabeth II, 1960/61, c. 7-8.
Formerly, the provincial Superintendent, acting on the advice of the Council of Education dispensed educational grants to the various school boards. In 1961, this responsibility was turned over to the provincial Ministry of Youth, the government ministry responsible for education. The new measure also required school boards to have their annual budgets approved by the Youth ministry. Other measures were also introduced: the establishment of a loans and grant program for post-secondary education; free textbooks and free secondary education.

Formerly education in the province was administered under the Loi de l'instruction publique. There was no minister of education, the administrative head of the department was rather a superintendent. The real power of the department lay in the two Roman Catholic and Protestant Committees, which together made up the Council of Education. Section 23 of the statute stated: "Les questions scolaires dans lesquelles les intérêts des catholiques romains ou des protestants sont exclusivement concernés sont décidées par celui des deux comités qui représentent la croyance religieuse que professe la partie concernée".

The creation of the Ministry of Education in 1964 changed all this. The Council of Education was reduced to an advisory body, and the decision-making power was turned over to the provincial government. The tone of the Parent Commission, the Royal Commission charged to investigate

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39 La loi modifiant la Loi de l'instruction publique, Statuts de Québec, 9 Elizabeth II, 1960, c. 31.
41 Statuts de Québec, 9–10 Elizabeth II, 1960–61, c. 29.
42 Statuts Réfondus de la Province de Québec, 1941, c. 59.
the status of education in the province, was symbolic of the new quest for modernity, efficacy, and rationalization of the decentralized educational system:

(115) In modern societies the educational system has a threefold goal: to afford everyone the opportunity to learn; to make available to each the type of education best suited to his aptitudes and interests; to prepare the individual for life in society.

(117) Modern society demands that every person should have access to the level of education suited to his capacities.

(118) The modern concept of education aims at preparing every citizen to earn his living through useful work and to fulfill his social responsibilities intelligently. 43

L’Action Nationale in a series of articles condemned the proposed ministry, accusing the Parent Commission of trying to make French-Canadian culture a poor reflection of the American Way of Life: "Nous y insisterons: les structures une fois établies auront nécessairement un effet contrai-

gnant et directeur sur l’évolution de notre système d’enseignement... Notre pensée tendra à se mouler dans ces structures et celles-ci produiront un effet déformateur qui transformera le Canada français en un vassal de la culture américaine."

Although L’Action Nationale fought a determined rear-
guard action against the bill, the legislation received the active backing of the CTCC and Cité Libre. 45

In evaluating the period of the Quiet Revolution, Daniel Latouche maintains that the growth of the public sector gave the state a greater fiscal

43 The Structure of the Educational System at the Provincial Level, Report of the Royal Commission, Volume 1, pp. 75-76.


capacity and was thus able to intensify its ability to intervene in the private sector. Total government spending in current dollars between 1945 and 1970 increased from 91.1 million to 3,148.3 million, an annual increase of 15.8 per cent. In constant dollars, however, this increase was 1,449 per cent or an average increase of 11.4 per cent.

For the period 1954–1959, the average increase in government spending was 11.9 per cent (current dollars) and for the 1960–1965 period spending was 20.9 per cent. In constant dollars the average increase for the two periods was 10.3 per cent and 16.4 per cent. From 1960 to 1965 the Quebec government's portion of Gross National Expenditures rose to 12.5 per cent from 7.5 per cent, an increase of 67 per cent compared to 24 per cent during the previous five year period (1954–1959).

Latouche to illustrate which period from 1945–1970 determined the budget priorities for the provincial government correlated by category (administrative and legislative; protection of persons and property; transportation and communication; health; social welfare; recreational and cultural services; education; natural resources and primary industries; trade and industrial development; and debt) the six five years periods between 1945–1970. Not surprisingly, the weakest correlation was between the years 1945 and 1970. Only 20 per cent of the 1970 expenditures could be explained by the 1945 figures. Latouche also shows that the 1960–1965 period showed a shift in budget priorities. Whereas the 1950–1955, 1955–1960 and 1965–1970

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47 Ibid., p. 530.
48 Ibid., p. 533.
eras showed similar correlations, the 1960–1965 period showed a much lower correlation. Yet the fact that the 1945–1950 correlation is weaker than the 1960–1965 correlation indicates that the post-war period was the era which determined the direction of government spending.49 He states:

"La période de l'après-guerre aurait donc été déterminante pour l'évolution du système politique québécois. C'est durant ces années d'expansion économique rapide qu'auraient été prises les décisions politiques qui viendront jeter les bases du Québec moderne. La Révolution tranquille n'aurait donc rien modifié à ces orientations mais les aurait tout simplement accentuées et accélérées".50

Although Latouche maintains that the post-war period determined the direction of the Quiet Revolution, the accelerated growth of the province's public sector was more than a reflection of the public sector's growth. The thrust of the government's actions in the fields of health and education also gave the state the legitimacy it lacked in the Duplessis era. Although the Lasage government centralized political power in the province, the expansion of Quebec public's sector could not have been achieved without the thrust of the federal government. The federal government with its medicare and hospitalization plans helped provide the necessary legitimacy for the social reforms of the early 1960s.

49 Ibid., p. 534.
50 Ibid., pp. 534–535.
CHAPTER IV

IDEOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS
This chapter is divided into four parts: 1) the evolution and ideology of the CSN during the post-war period; 2) the evolution and ideology of the CEQ during the post-war period; 3) the founding of the Syndicat des fonctionnaires provinciaux du Québec; and 4) the Labour Code and the expansion of the public service.

Although this chapter discusses the evolution of the CSN, the CEQ, and the SFPQ, each section is not intended to be comprehensive. Rather, my purpose is to outline the structure and ideology of each labour central and to examine their development in the public sector. It will be argued that the granting of collective bargaining rights as well as giving public employees the right to strike, also provided the government with a mechanism which would ensure greater labour harmony. Finally, we will maintain that the centralization within the CSN, the CEQ and the FTQ reflected the earlier centripetal action in the health and education fields thereby, granting these public sector unions their needed legitimacy.
I. Evolution and Ideology of the CSN

The asbestos miners' revolt [1949 asbestos strike] against an authoritarian company and government, at the very moment when the traditional reflexes should have resulted in obedience and submission to these acknowledged symbols of authority, seemed to be a matter which concerned everybody who believed that his hopes for the future should be grounded in liberty. The struggle in the asbestos industry arrived on the scene like a sliver of crystal in a supersaturated liquid: the province of Quebec emerged from it clothed in new structures.

Clearly, and by definition, the long-term effects appeared only little by little. For this reason, we had to go back somewhat in time to realize just how far the upheaval of 1949 went beyond the social context in which it had risen, and how, by overstepping the bounds of the institutions of the day, it forced them to readjust themselves to it. This explains why many men came to adjure their commitment of '49: they only realized later on just where the logic of their gesture was leading them.

Union militants, for example, who had felt it a matter of urgent necessity to assert the equality of working people within a conventional social framework, became worried as soon as they saw that the impetus for emancipation begun in '49 had to a great extent passed beyond the horizons of the known world. They lacked the courage to go forward with their membership towards an unexplored future... .


Although the asbestos strike had given the CTCC a new impetus, the CTCC faced a bleak future. It is true the CTCC received the active backing of the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC) and the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) during the four and a half month strike. The CTCC, nevertheless, realized that the growth of the international unions during the late 1930s and 1940s had been at its expense. So much so that in 1951, the CTCC represented only one third of the entire organized work force in Quebec, a considerable drop from the mid-thirties when the CTCC represented 60 per cent of all unionized workers.  

1See Appendix IX, chapter 2.
Since these international unions dominated the private sector, the CTCC of necessity embarked on a campaign to organize the public sector - greatly expanded during the early 1960s as a result of public education, expanded health care and improved social services.

The province-wide organization of the CTCC, moreover, gave it a distinct advantage to organize the public sector. While it is true that the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) organized Hydro-Quebec, and other unions such as the United Steelworkers of America and the Office and Professional Employees' International Union were partially successful in organizing segments of the public sector, the CTCC captured the lion's share. Unlike other unions which had only regional offices in Quebec, the CTCC's entire organization was based in Quebec.

The fundamental unit within the CTCC was, of course, the union local or syndicat. Each syndicat was organized according to occupation. The various syndicats in turn were grouped into federations:

The federation was to be a structure similar to that of the national (international) unions of the American Federation of Labor. It was to group 'the whole of the workers' syndicates following the same profession, the same trade in commerce and industry or belonging to the same type of industry'. It would undertake the organization of syndicates within a jurisdiction, coordinate the efforts of its affiliated unions to advance their occupational interests (this included approving and aiding any strike action) and undertake some self-help activities. It would establish trade qualifications and apprenticeship programmes and seek to have its qualifications made compulsory for anyone who wanted to practice the trade it represented. 2

The Catholic Federation of Pulp and Paper and Factory workers was first established in 1923 and by 1930 there were four more. 3

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3 Ibid., p. 43.
In each locality the various syndicats were organized in a regional union or regional council (in the case of smaller centres) or a central council (in the larger urban centres). The central or regional councils were delegated bodies with representatives from each syndicat in the locality. They would provide arbitration, advise in the industrial disputes of their affiliated syndicats, and make representations before municipal or educational authorities. In 1921 there were seven regional offices and by 1950 all but one of the eight central councils had a permanent office.  

The authority of the CTCC was, of course the convention, and between conventions, the confederal bureau consisting of a president, vice-president, secretary-general, and a treasurer, carried out the policies of the CTCC.

Beginning in the late 1940s the CTCC made several key changes in order to strengthen its internal organization. At the 1949 convention, for example, the CTCC established a political action committee: "Cette action aurait pour but immédiat de suivre de plus près les actes posés par tous groupes politiques, économiques et sociaux, sans engager le mouvement syndical."  

The CTCC also strengthened the powers of the confederal bureau, in order to shift power away from the federations. At the 1950 convention the CTCC was given the right to collect directly the per capita dues, which had formerly been paid to the federations.

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4 Ibid., pp. 42-43.
5 Procès-Verbal, Vingt-huitième session du Congrès de la CTCC, Montréal, 1949, p. 167.
In 1954 the convention changed the process of submitting resolutions to the convention. Formerly, resolutions submitted by the syndicats went first to the federation or central council; this was changed so that resolutions could be submitted directly to the confederal bureau. 7

In conformity with its strengthened internal organization, the CTCC also became more militant, especially after the 1949 asbestos strike. Louis-Marie Tremblay has described the CTCC as follows: "La CTCC défend alors avec aggressivité et autorité les intérêts économico-professionnels de ses membres. Aux questions de salaires, vacances, conditions de travail ... elle ajoute très tôt des préoccupations du sujet du chômage et de l'automatisation. Une nouvelle conception idéologique apparaît; la permanence de la revendication. La CTCC considère que les travailleurs ont un droit strict au partage des bénéfices dus à l'accroissement de la productivité. Comme celle-ci progresse de façon constante la CSN se croit justifiée d'avoir une attitude de revendication permanente. Cette attitude est rationalisée par la dignité de l'homme au travail plutôt que par des motifs spirituels." 8

The CTCC maintained that Canada's dependence on primary products contributed heavily towards unemployment, a matter which the CTCC did not take lightly. At the 1948 convention, for example, the CTCC urged the federal and provincial governments to nationalize the major resource industries. 9 Already in 1947, delegates passed a resolution calling on the CTCC leadership

7 Ibid., p. 72.


9 Ibid., p. 105.
to prepare a study that would give workers more decision-making power in various industries: "Que demande soit faite à la CTCC pour qu'elle étudie et prépare un programme pour assurer aux travailleurs une participation efficace à la gestion des entreprises et un partage bien équilibré des bénéfices réalisés; et que la CTCC, les Fédérations et les Conseils centraux préparent l'opinion publique sur cette question."\(^{(10)}\)

Other CTCC actions included: urging the federal government to establish a data centre for monitoring the cost of living,\(^{(11)}\) increasing the minimum wage,\(^{(12)}\) implementation of hospitalization insurance,\(^{(13)}\) and better educational facilities for workers' children.\(^{(14)}\)

The CTCC's post-war militancy and increased secularization is best illustrated in its statement of principles adopted at the 1960 convention:

The state should promote the common good. The CNTU believes that it should, by its laws and their proper

\(^{(10)}\) Proces-Verbal, Vingt-sixième session du Congrès de la CTCC, St-Byacinthe, 1947, p. 226.


\(^{(12)}\) Ibid., pp. 146-150.


application, safeguard the civil rights and liberties of everyone and foster the development of autonomous intermediate groups whose active contribution is necessary for the maintenance of social peace.

The state should concern itself above all with directing and orienting the economy and the distribution of wealth and with establishing conditions that ensure full employment and social security. 15

The conciliatory note of the CSN in 1960 is further proof of its liberal-democratic nature:

Nous sommes donc heureux de noter que plusieurs des objectifs inscrits au programme du gouvernement actuel concordent parfaitement avec certaines réclamations que le mouvement ouvrier en général et la CTCC plus particulièrement, n'ont cessé de formuler depuis quinze ans. L'abolition du patronage, la réforme de la Police provinciale, l'octroi des contrats sur soumissions, une administration équitable des lois ouvrières par les commissions responsables, voilà autant de points qui nous tiennent à cœur et pour la réalisation desquels il peut compter sur notre appui loyal, constant et désintéressé. 16

Precisely because the CSN expounded the virtues of liberal-democracy, and provided the needed legitimacy for the Lesage government, the CSN became the natural recipient of these new public employees. After all, public education, hospitalization, and medicare insurance, and improved social services were the promises which carried the Liberals to victory.

16 Procès-Verbal, Trente-neuvième session du Congrès de la CTCC, Montreal, 1960, p. 23.
In 1959, only 23.2 per cent of total CSN membership (including municipal school employees and hospital employees) worked in the public sector; by 1966, over half of the CSN membership worked in the public sector. The greatest growth between 1959 and 1966 occurred in the Services Fédération, representing hospital workers and the Services Publics Fédération, representing municipal and school employees. The phenomenal growth of the CSN was also helped by the unionization of the civil servants represented by the Syndicat des Fonctionnaires Provinciaux du Québec (SFPQ), affiliated with the CSN until their withdrawal in 1972.

In 1961, hospital workers only constituted 10.6 per cent of total CSN membership; in 1963, this climbed to 15.4 per cent; and by 1965, hospital workers represented 18.7 per cent of total CSN membership. Municipal and school employees showed a similar increase: in 1961 the Services Publics Fédération constituted 4.9 per cent of total CSN membership; in 1963 this climbed to 9.0 per cent; and by 1965 membership climbed to 13.3 per cent.

The introduction of hospitalization insurance had the greatest effect on the hospital workers predominantly organized within the Services Fédération, and to a lesser extent, the hospital workers organized in the Union Internationale des Employés de Services d'Edifices, Local 298 (FTQ) and the National Union of Operating Engineers of Canada, Local 14850, district 50 (United Mine Workers of America).

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17 See Appendix XI.


19 Ibid., pp. 133-134, Table VI.
The introduction of hospitalization insurance not only made bargaining more centralized, but dramatically increased the number of hospitals that became unionized. In 1960 less than one third of Quebec's 283 hospitals were organized; by 1965, almost one-half of Quebec's 289 hospitals were organized. Union growth was of course reflected as the number of organized hospitals increased. In 1961 there were only 11,844 unionized hospital workers, predominantly belonging to the CSN, and by 1965 this had increased to 35,115.

Hospital associations show a similar pattern of growth. The first hospital association established in 1944, L'Association Patronale des Services Hospitaliers (APSH) was only started at the urging of various union leaders and the Church.

By 1946 the APSH included 73 members and 3,700 employees. The APSH continued to operate independently until 1962 when it merged with l'Association des Hôpitaux Catholiques de la province de Québec (AHCQ). Despite their merger and despite the fact that the AHCQ established an employer-employee committee, the APSH continued to carry on its own negotiations.

Another group, Le Conseil des hôpitaux de Montréal (1931), helped form the provincial L'Association des Hôpitaux du Québec in 1956. Later, (no specific date is given), Le Conseil des Hôpitaux de Montréal withdrew

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20 See Appendix XII.
21 See Appendix XII.
23 Ibid., p. 25.
from the province-wide organization and became the first bargaining agent for Montreal area hospitals. 25 A third hospital association, the Comité des Relations Ouvrières des Hôpitaux de Langue Francaise de la Région de Montréal, founded in 1961, bargained for fifteen hospitals. 26

Only with the introduction of hospitalization insurance in 1961, did these various hospital associations begin to associate with each other, though they did not merge on a province-wide level until 1966.

Hospitalization insurance as well as guaranteeing a minimum health standard throughout the province, also provided the hospitals with a stable cash flow guaranteed to meet their operating expenses. 27 Yet the hospitals realized that if the government was going to provide the lion's share of the hospitals' costs the government would also determine their budget priorities including that of contract settlements:

Pour l'Etat la négociation d'un contrat de travail unique est une question d'efficacité administrative. N'ayant pas le personnel voulu pour constituer une ou plusieurs équipes de négociateurs qui auraient à négocier avec les hôpitaux, il lui fallait absolument négocier une seule convention collective. Les relations patronales-ouvrières dans ces institutions, constituent un point important dans leur administration. De plus, la somme des salaires versés au personnel syndiqué des hôpitaux est un item majeur dans le budget des hôpitaux. Pour ces raisons, le gouvernement se devait de contrôler cet aspect de l'administration hospitalière et par conséquent de centraliser ce contrôle. 28

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26 Ibid., p. 43.
27 Ibid., pp. 32-35
28 Ibid., p. 128.
The unions - the CSN, le Syndicat Canadien de la Fonction Publique, and le Syndicat des Employés de Services d'Édifices, Local 298 - demanded that since the government was indirectly bearing the cost of health care, negotiations should be carried on between the government and the unions. Both le Syndicat Canadien de la Fonction Publique and le Syndicat des Employés de Services d'Édifices (Local 298) favoured a single bargaining table, a matter to which the CSN objected. Since the Labour Code stipulated that each bargaining unit could meet separately with the employer, the CSN chose this latter route.

Although the 1966 hospital negotiations did not create a common bargaining table between le Syndicat Canadien de la Fonction Publique, le Syndicat des Employés de Services d'Édifices and the CSN, the drive towards more centralized bargaining had changed dramatically in the course of five years. And though l'Association des Hôpitaux de la Province de Québec were part of the employers' bargaining committee, the AHPQ was content to play an advisory role, leaving the real bargaining to the government.

II. Evolution and Ideology of the CEO

The first province-wide teachers' union was founded in 1937 at Malbaie under the leadership of Laure Caudrault, who had already in previous years, organized teachers' associations in Jonquière, Chicoutimi and Alma. The purpose of the newly founded Fédération Catholique des Institutrices

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29 Ibid., p. 130.

Rurales (FCIR) was...de promouvoir et de sauvegarder les intérêts professionnels de ses membres, non seulement au point de vue économique, mais aussi sous le plan religieux, moral, intellectuel et social. C'est également un organisme ouvertement et franchement catholique qui subordonne tous ses actes aux intérêts supérieurs des âmes, de la société et de la religion."31

Local associations of FCIR were organized on the basis of school districts, but local associations also existed on the local parish level, which reported to that particular association.32 FCIR's chief concern in its early years was the poor salaries of its teachers. For example, in 1924-1925, half of the province's 7,262 teachers were receiving less than $360 per annum, ranking them well below the salaries of other provinces.33 FCIR signed its first collective agreement with the school of Jonquière in 1939 and by the 1940-1941 school year, the teachers were earning a minimum salary of $400 per annum.34

Although FCIR was the first province-wide teachers' union, two other unions were also established. They were: the Fédération Provinciale des Instituteurs Ruraux (1939) and the Fédération des Instituteurs et Institutrices des Cités et Villas (1942). In September 1945 the three federations, after considerable discussion, formed la Corporation Générale des Instituteurs

31 Ibid., p. 82.
32 Ibid., pp. 73-75.
33 Ibid., pp. 51-52.
34 Ibid., pp. 98-99.
et Institutrices Catholiques de la Province de Québec (CIC). The governing body of the new CIC was the 32-member General Council made up of 16 PFCV representatives (eight men and eight women), eight FCIR representatives, and eight FPFR representatives.

Although the merger gave the CIC a combined membership of over 11,000, each federation continued to exercise the power it had prior to the merger. Indeed, until the mid-sixties, the CIC made no attempt to centralize its internal structure, resulting in considerable autonomy for the local associations. Local associations, for example, did their own collective bargaining with their respective school district. As a result, the early actions of the CIC were timid and routine. In 1946 the CIC established its own placement bureau, and in 1947 it established a newspaper called L'Enseignement. 35

The CIC timidity, however, was not without warrant. As a result of a six-day strike by L'Alliance des Professeurs Catholiques de Montréal, one of the largest groups within the CIC, the Montreal teachers' union was decertified, a considerable loss to the CIC. 36

In 1959 the Sauvé government passed legislation which made it mandatory that all Catholic secondary and primary school teachers in the public sector become members of the CIC. 37 This nearly doubled CIC membership to 28,483 in 1960-1961 from 16,200 members a year earlier. 38 With the

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36 Ibid., p. 139.
37 Ibid., p. 145.
38 See Appendix XIII.
increased membership came new reforms: a pedagogical department in 1962\textsuperscript{39} and several regional offices throughout the province in 1963.\textsuperscript{40}

The establishment of a provincial department of education in 1964 proved to be a blessing in disguise for the CIC. With the creation of a provincial department of education new centralized commissions scolaires were established compelling the CIC to re-organize its own internal structures. In 1944 there had been 80 local associations, but by 1964 this increased to 220. The task of streamlining the local associations to coincide with the commissions scolaires was in itself a delicate problem, since each association was responsible for carrying out the negotiations with their respective school board.

Already in the Parent Commission's Report, it was evident that the trend towards more centralized bargaining was inevitable: "(132) We recommend that in the near future the negotiations of salaries for teachers in the public and semi-public schools be conducted at the provincial level within a joint committee made up of representatives of the Ministry of Education, representatives of the teachers and representatives of the regional school commission and of the councils of school development."\textsuperscript{41}

As early as 1964 when the Department of Education was being formed the Minister of Education, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, had invited CIC representatives to participate in discussions with the hope of establishing province-wide negotiations, a matter rejected by the CIC.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., p. 146.
\textsuperscript{42}J.S. Tremblay, "La crise scolaire", Cité Libre (15 juin, 1967), p. 47.
Although the introduction of the 1964 Labour Code extended coverage to virtually all workers in the province, the teachers continued to be governed by la Loi concernant des corporations municipales et scolaires et leurs employés, which prohibited strikes and made it compulsory for teachers to submit disputes to arbitration. In 1965 teachers were given the right to conciliation, and to go on strike in the event of a stalemate. 43

The 1965 amendments to the Labour Code also reflected the trend towards more centralized bargaining. School boards could now authorize an association of school corporations to bargain on its behalf. In such cases, the teachers would be obligated to bargain with the larger unit, except that they would not be required to negotiate an agreement applicable to an area greater than that of a regional school board. 44

During the 1966–1967 school year all negotiations between local commissions scolaires and the teachers broke down. On October 14, 1966, the Department of Education forwarded a "confidential" document to the various commissions scolaires defining the maximum salaries the government would provide to the school boards to settle the stalled wage negotiations. Raymond Laliberté, the CEQ president, accused the government of interfering in the contract talks, a matter he felt was the sole jurisdiction of the CEQ and the commissions scolaires. As Jacques Tremblay notes: "La CIC ne demandait pas au gouvernement de revoir ses directives, elle ne demandait pas de participer à cette révision, elle ne faisait pas de contre-proposition.

44 Ibid., p. 1178.
45 In 1966 the CIC changed its name to Corporation des Enseignants du Québec.
La CIC, organisme provincial, ne demandait pas de discuter avec l'État provincial; elle lançait un ultimatum à l'État: "Que l'État se retire de toutes les négociations, car les négociations, légalement doivent se faire entre une Commission scolaire et un syndicat local". 46

The government's response to the CEQ's demands was Bill 25, presented to an emergency sitting of the National Assembly in March, 1967. La loi assurant le droit de l'enfant à l'éducation et instituant un nouveau régime de convention collective dans le secteur scolaire ordered that teachers would have to be back in their classrooms within 48 hours of the passage of the bill. 47 The bill also imposed a salary scale upon the teachers and province-wide salary negotiations. 48

La politique du pire manée par M. Laliberté a eu pour effet de forcer le gouvernement à imposer aux professeurs la négociation provinciale. On en venait enfin à cette solution que M. Laliberté avait promis personnellement, mais que la CIC avait jusque là refusée. Ce que M. Laliberté avait désiré personnellement était imposé d'autorité, et M. Laliberté-président-de-la CIC devait l'accepter. 49

In effect, the centralization that was so badly needed by the CEQ, and which it was unable to apply was finally imposed by the provincial government:

"The policy of confrontation waged by M. Laliberté at this time left him with two things; firstly, the 'global' provincial negotiations that he and other CIC leaders had thought to be inevitable anyway; and secondly, an

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48 Ibid., sections 5, 6, 13, 14.
organization that was more centralized in structure and unified around a single issue than it had ever been before." 50

Provincial negotiations not only included representatives of the CEQ, but also the Provincial Association of Protestant Teachers (PAPT), and the Provincial Association of Catholic Teachers (PACT). The teachers' bargaining committee was made up of six CEQ members, and two members from both PAPT and PACT. On June 30, 1968, the provincial government and the teachers ratified a three year agreement.

III. The Founding of The Syndicat des Fonctionnaires Provinciaux du Québec

Already at the 1958 convention the CSN presented a study on white collar unionism to its delegates. The study underlined the care that was necessary to organize white collar workers:

Civil service groups show great psychological permeability to union activity, but there are legal obstacles to unionization on the provincial and federal levels: union action must respect the value of the class concerned: respect for the hierarchical set-up of public office, loyalty to the public office, prestige of professional positions, etc....

White-collar workers in economic concerns are less permeable to union activity than civil servants, but their sociological conditions favour such action, which must, however, spring from the deep-seated aspirations of their class; economic promotion through advancement in the concern, maintenance of the dignity of office work; ...

All union activity in middle class circles must be clearly identified with the underlying interests of the group, must

50 Joan Berg, The Radicalization of the Quebec Teachers' Corporation, (Institute of Canadian Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa, 1973), M.A. Thesis, p. 82.
espouse its cause and must enlarge and improve on that which forms the essence of labour, in its actual provisions. 51

It was not until the 1962 convention that the CSN established a special white collar branch especially devoted to "the integration of all the middle class wage-earners in the system of union institutions, and the merger, without distinction of caste or class, between wage-earning groups, whether labourers or not." 52

In 1961 the CSN in response to public employees working in the Department of Revenue in Montreal began organizing various government ministries. On March 21, 1961, the CSN helped to found in Montreal the Syndicat National des Fonctionnaires Provinciaux du Québec. On June 25, 1961, a local was founded in Quebec City, and in early November, a local was formed in Trois-Rivières. 53

On two occasions in 1961 and in 1962 the CSN urged the Lesage government to give provincial employees collective bargaining rights. 54 It was not until October 1963 when provincial employees working at the Régie des Alcools petitioned the Quebec Labour Relations Board, that provincial employees were given collective bargaining rights. The Commission, however, distinguished between workers and civil servants: ..."d'abord les ouvriers, qui ont tous les droits des autres salariés et ensuite les fonctionnaires qui, en plus d'avoir des droits limités, ne peuvent faire partie d'un syndicat

The purpose of restricting civil servants to their own bargaining unit was simple enough: the government feared that the CSN would have a virtual monopoly over all public sector union members and the government wanted to isolate the civil servants from any outside militancy.

On June 10, 1964, Premier Lesage announced that a vote would be held between le Conseil Général des Employés Civils and le Syndicat des Fonctionnaires. Not surprisingly, the SFPQ won the majority support.

After the founding of the SFPQ as an independent union in 1965 it signed an entente with the CSN giving it the equivalent of federation status within the CSN. The CSN would pay the salaries and expenses of the SFPQ staff members and provide them office space, technical services, including the negotiations of collective agreements. The CSN also collected the SFPQ union dues set at $2.00 per member per month, later changed it to $1.50 per member per month.

At the founding convention of the SFPQ, CSN president Jean Marchand insisted that the SFPQ was not compelled to join the ranks of the CSN: "Il est certain que la CSN a contribué à mettre debout votre syndicat: nous

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55 Procès-Verbal de la Quarante-et-unième session du Congrès de la CSN, p. 69.

56 Le Conseil général des Employés civils according to the CSN has as its primary goal, the organizing of various social events: fishing, tennis, etc. "Chez les fonctionnaires, on répète que si le Conseil est un syndicat, il est fortement 'domestique', s'il n'est pas carrément un syndicat maison ou un syndicat de boutique." Ibid., p. 71.


59 Ibid., pp. 174-178.
l'avons fait non pas pour en retirer des profits mais pour vous aider à vous libérer une fois pour toutes. Cependant, si vous décidez de vous affilier un jour à la CSN, vous le ferez librement et pour des raisons positives."

At the 1967 convention a committee which had studied whether the SFPQ should become fully affiliated with the CSN brought down its report. Although the committee and the convention agreed to extend their affiliation with the CSN, the committee by its own admission was ambivalent in its recommendations: "Le SFPQ s'est affilié à la CSN sans savoir exactement en quoi consistaient tous les avantages offerts par cette centrale."  

In 1971 the SFPQ held a referendum, and by a 2-1 margin decided to continue their affiliation with the CSN. Yet in 1972 the SFPQ executive withdrew their membership from the CSN. 

Although the SFPQ's status vis-à-vis the CSN proved to be a source of ambiguous debate, the CSN nevertheless conducted the SFPQ's negotiations. In August 1965 with the passage of the Civil Service Act, granting the SFPQ the right to bargain, the CSN began its negotiations in earnest with the government. Wage negotiations dragged on well into 1966 when the SFPQ threatened a strike for March 25, 1966. Three days later both sides signed a two-year agreement.

60 Ibid., p. 8.
63 Sixième session... Ibid., p. 131. No reason is given why the SFPQ overturned a decision by their membership to remain affiliated with the CSN.
IV. The Labour Code and the Expansion of the Public Service

The Lasage government introduced a first draft of the Labour
Code before the National Assembly in June 1963. The CSN regarded the new
code as less than adequate: "Le Bill 54, première version, nous a paru
rétrograde, non adapté à la réalité industrielle présente. Pour une part,
il condensait dans une même loi, un certain nombre de dispositions contes-
tuelles dans plusieurs statuts distincts." 65

The CSN approved of the automatic check-off of union dues by
the employer, and unions right of access to logging camps. The CSN,
however, voiced its disapproval of establishing a permanent court of arbi-
tration composed of district judges to decide disputes involving public
employees. 66

The second draft of the bill, introduced in January 1964 brought
additional changes. It made it illegal for an employer to discharge an
employee for engaging in a legal strike. The proposed bill also contained
one controversial provision: collective agreements were to be subject to
interpretation by the courts. 67 As a result of the strong union protests,
including a threatened general strike by the FTO, the government dropped
this controversial proposal.

The third and final draft of the labour code came into force on
September 1, 1964. Under the new code, the term "employee" was defined to

include any person who works for an employer for remuneration. With few exceptions virtually all workers in the province, including professional employees and domestic servants now were given the right to organize.

Municipal and school employees, and hospital workers formerly under the la Loi concernant l'arbitrage des différents entre les services publics et les salariés à leur emploi, were now given the right to strike.

The Code provides that if conciliation fails, the parties are now free to engage in a strike or lockout 60 days after they have notified the Minister that negotiations were unsuccessful (90 days in the case of a first agreement).

The Code also stipulates that before public employees could engage in strike action, the Minister must have been given at least eight days written notice. If, in the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council, a threatened strike endangers the public health or safety, a board of inquiry is then appointed and must report back within 60 days. In extremely serious public disputes the Attorney-General could grant an injunction to prevent or terminate a strike, if he finds that the strike imperils the public health or safety.

In 1965 the government also adopted its long awaited Civil Service Act (la Loi de la fonction publique). Bill 55 essentially reflected what the Quebec Labour Relations Board had already established in 1963. The Civil Service Act stipulated that the Syndicat des Fonctionnaires Provinciaux du

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68 Lawyers, doctors, druggists, dentists, civil engineers, architects, forestry engineers, optometrists, opticians, and chartered accountants were allowed to unionize, but could only form associations from members of the same profession.

69 Statuts Refondus du Québec, 1964, Labour Code, c. 141, s. 46.

70 Ibid., s. 99.

71 Ibid., s. 99.
Québec was to be the sole bargaining agent for the province's civil servants. The Civil Service Act divided civil servants into "fonctionnaires" and "ouvriers", following the 1963 example of the Quebec Labour Relations Board.

On January 31, 1966, the Civil Service Act gave civil servants other than peace officers the right to strike, provided there was prior agreement with the government regarding the maintenance of essential services.

Yet the most important portion of the Civil Service Act was not granting the province's employees the right to strike, nor was it the recognition of the SFPQ as the sole bargaining agent for the province's civil servants. The most important aspect of the bill was the creation of the public service commission. The bill provided for the creation of a three-man public service commission whose responsibilities included job appointments, promotions, transfers, and job training. Section 16 of the Act left no doubt that the government had the unilateral right to determine the manner in which the public service was organized and maintained:

La Commission peut faire des règlements pour sa régie interne et pour l'exécution de la présente loi. Ces règlements sont subordonnés à l'approbation du lieutenant-gouverneur en conseil et doivent être publiés dans la Gazette officielle de Québec.

The CSN maintained that because there was no provision for a merit system within the proposed bill, patronage and nepotism would continue.

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72 Statuts de Québec, 13-14 Elizabeth II, Vol. I, c. 14, s. 69.
73 Statuts de Québec, 13-14 Elizabeth II, Vol. I, c. 14, s. 70
74 C. 14, Ibid., s. 75.
75 C. 14, Ibid., s. 16.
76 Procès-Verbal de la Quarante-deuxième session du Congrès de la CSN, Montréal, 1966, p. 67.
The CSN further maintained:

La Commission de la fonction publique représente l'Employeur, soit le Gouvernement ou l'État. Elle a le pouvoir de poser des gestes qui engagent l'activité professionnelle des fonctionnaires et ouvriers. Dans un cas de congrédiment, c'est à elle que revient le pouvoir de faire enquête et de prendre une décision. Il est inacceptable que la Commission ait un droit exclusif et que les employés du Gouvernement ne puissent en appeler de cette décision à un organisme extérieur (arbitrage) suivant les règles édictées par la convention collective. Ce droit d'appel d'une décision semblable n'est exclusif à l'employeur dans aucune convention collective. Les employés du Gouvernement ont droit à la même mesure de justice et de sécurité. 77

The CSN correctly saw that the government’s dual role as governor and employer inevitably meant that the government would maintain dominant control of its public employees; however, the CSN was naive at best to assume that this would be resolved through an independent body. The government did not establish its public service commission in order to act as an independent body; rather the commission was established so that the government could maintain control of its public employees. The CSN, instead, could have demanded that union representatives have dominant or equal representation on both the public service commission, and on a further board to establish job classification, methods of hiring, and seniority. This same reluctance to give up political power is further reflected in the ambiguous manner in which essential services are defined both in Section 99 of the Labour Code and Section 75 of the Civil Service Act.

Moreover, would it not have been simpler to place Quebec's public servants under the Labour Code? This would have been easier to administer, but it would have meant that the SFPQ would have had to become a federation within the CSN, a matter which the Lesage government did not want to encourage.

77 Ibid., p. 66.
This is why the Quebec government distinguished between "fonctionnaires" and "ouvriers". Since SFPQ members were predominantly in the former category, the government could ensure that these civil servants were isolated from any outside union militancy. It is true that the CSN for the most part helped organize the SFPQ. Although the SFPQ continued to have federation status within the CSN, it remained virtually autonomous, content to use the technical services of the CSN until the SFPQ executive completely withdrew from the CSN in 1972.

Even the introduction of the provincial Labour Code was not a spontaneous gesture by the Lesage government to liberalize collective bargaining. In the face of the rapid growth of the CEQ after 1965, and the further growth of the CSN's Services Publics and Services Federations in the early 1960s, the Lesage government was under a tremendous pressure to grant these workers the right to organize, as well as the right to strike. The granting of collective bargaining rights in the public sector as well as giving the province's employees the right to strike and organize also provided the provincial government with a mechanism which would ensure greater labour harmony. Although collective bargaining in the public sector institutionalized labour conflict, the ultimate purpose of collective bargaining was to seek industrial peace between the government and the public sector unions. In particular, the pressure of the CSN upon the Lesage government in the early 1960s demanding collective bargaining rights for its public sector workers was both out of a belief in liberal democracy, and because the CSN desired the needed legitimacy to conduct its organizational campaign in the public sector. Although the evolution of the CSN was not as dramatic as that of the CEQ, the 1950s and early 1960s was a period of
important change for the CSN. The CSN shed all vestiges of its corporatist ideology, its own internal structure became more centralized, and it made many public representations before the Duplesis government. With the election of the Lassage government and the introduction of provincial health insurance, medicare, extended social welfare programmes, public education, a new labour code, and the creation of a public service, the CSN saw many of its earlier objectives realized.

The development of the CEQ into a public sector union required more radical action. The provincial government in 1967, against the wishes of the CEQ, imposed order on the CEQ by introducing for the first time province-wide negotiations. It is true that by so doing the provincial government was more able to control the salary levels of the province's teachers; but, it is also true that this government action was a major step in unifying the CEQ into a highly disciplined union, a radical change from its former state as little more than a loose coalition of the three unions which had merged in 1945.

Just as the centripetal thrust of the federal government actions in the health and educational fields granted the provincial government a greater legitimacy in the early sixties so the development of centralized bargaining by the CSN, the CEQ, and the FTQ gave these unions the needed legitimacy in the mid-sixties.
CHAPTER V

PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING 1964-1975
This chapter is divided into three parts: 1) Public Sector Bargaining 1964-1972; 2) The Common Front 1972-1975; and 3) The Consequences and Implications of the Common Front. Traditionally the 1964-1972 period is discussed as two distinct eras: 1 1964-1968 and 1968-1972. Since we have already discussed the implementation of the Labour Code, The Civil Service Act, and the negotiations between the government and the CSN, the CEQ and the SFPQ, we will concentrate on the negotiations that took place between 1968-1975. In the concluding section we will argue that the CEQ, the CSN and the FTQ by forming into a Common Front granted the public sector unions the needed legitimacy and centralization to bargain with the provincial government.

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I. Public Sector Bargaining: 1964-1971

The passage of the Labour Code (1964) and the Civil Service Act (1965) did grant collective bargaining rights to the majority of Quebec's public sector employees. Yet it was not until 1966 and 1967, when various public sector unions went on strike, that the government's attitude became more defined.

Although Section 99 of the Labour Code did allow the government to issue an injunction against striking public employees if a strike endangered the public health or safety, there was no provision for penalizing workers who refused to return to their jobs. The government on a number of occasions had to issue not only injunctions but also special legislation to order public employees back to their jobs: in March 1966, le Syndicat des Professeurs de l'Etat du Quebec (SPEQ), refused to obey an injunction, resulting in the imprisonment of thirteen union leaders; in April 1966 a number of Hydro-Quebec engineers went on strike for three months; in the summer of 1966 the government's professional employees went on an 11 week work stoppage; in 1967 the government passed Bill 25 to order striking teachers back to work; and also in September 1967 the provincial government passed Bill 1 ordering Montreal's striking transportation workers back to their jobs.

Jean Boivin maintains that three conclusions can be established from the 1964-1968 period:

D'abord, même si le gouvernement se disait en faveur de la revalorisation de la fonction publique et du secteur public, il n'avait pas de politiques précises visant à mettre en application ses déclarations de principe. Ainsi les relations patronales-syndicales étaient généralement établies sur la base de l'improvisation.
En second lieu, le raidissement du gouvernement à partir du milieu de 1966 pourrait s’expliquer de la façon suivante: il devint évident à un moment donné qu’une certaine uniformisation des traitements devrait être réalisée dans le secteur public. La question était de savoir comment elle se ferait et qui, du gouvernement ou des syndicats, en prendrait l’initiative. Comme les syndiqués manifestaient beaucoup de militantisme et que les méthodes de surncroches portaient fruit, le gouvernement craignait que l’uniformisation ne se fit à un niveau trop élevé et il décida de freiner l’élan des organisations syndicales en intervenant directement dans certains conflits...

La troisième conclusion que nous pouvons tirer de cette première ronde de négociation est qu’un embryon de rationalité est introduit tant dans la gestion du personnel que dans les mécanismes de négociation. 2

In 1968 most of the public sector contracts for teachers, hospital workers, and civil servants expired between March and June. The government’s strategy was rather simple: "Officiellement, le gouvernement s’était fixé comme objectif d’augmenter la masse salariale du secteur public de 15% sur une période de trois ans. Pour réaliser ce but, la stratégie face aux syndicats consistait à trouver un premier groupe qui accepterait les offres gouvernementales et à appliquer le précédent aux autres tables de négociation." 3

Not surprisingly, the SFPQ was the first union to come to terms with the government. With a wage pattern now set, the government skillfully applied this formula to the other bargaining units. Employees from the Régie des Alcools, in spite of a five month strike, had to settle for the basic settlement given to the SFPQ. 4

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3 Ibid., p. 687.
Although the chief demand of the CEQ was not wages, but teacher/student classroom ratios, the CEQ realized its own position was highly tenuous. The CEQ on the one hand was faced with a government whose own bargaining position was inflexible, and on the other hand the CEQ realized that public opinion would not support another teachers' walkout as had been the case in 1967. In spite of conducting rotating strikes, and massive resignations, the CEQ could not budge the government.

In spite of the fact that CEQ negotiations were now conducted on a province-wide level, the union membership refused to give either their executive or their bargaining committee a free hand. At the 1968 convention the CEQ passed a resolution rejecting a permanent negotiation team. Although the CEQ convention passed a resolution which required the Provincial Council to consult the various locals, the convention also passed a resolution requiring that all CEQ members ratify any collective agreement.

The CSN hospital workers experienced similar difficulties. Although they gained additional job security and higher salaries in certain job categories by June, 1971, the expiry date of their contract, approximately 60 per cent of their members were earning less than $100 per week.

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7 Ibid., p. 13.
8 Ibid., p. 18.
II. The Common Front (1972-1975)

Although the government's divide and conquer strategy succeeded in the 1968-1971 negotiations, the government in anticipation of the 1972 negotiations established in 1969 le Ministère de la Fonction Publique. Formerly la Direction générale des relations du travail (DGRT) attached to the Treasury Board conducted the salary negotiations for the government. Judging from the responsibilities assigned to the new ministry, there is little doubt the government wanted to establish a more permanent and centralized bargaining structure. The new public service department's responsibilities included:

- "proposer au gouvernement des mesures visant à accroître l'efficacité du personnel de la fonction publique;"

- conseiller le gouvernement sur les conditions de travail du personnel du secteur public;

- négocier les conventions collectives auxquelles le gouvernement est partie et en surveiller l'application..."  

Already at the 1968 CSN convention there was evidence that combined inter-union negotiations were not far away. In an eloquent appeal to CSN delegates, CSN President Marcel Pépin stated: "Il faut transformer des milliers et des milliers de victimes silencieuses en milliers et en milliers de volontés agissantes. Il ne faut pas laisser les choses comme elles sont et nous contenter d'en parler. Il faut mobiliser la misère pour combattre la misère, la pauvreté pour combattre la pauvreté, les endettés pour combattre l'endettement, les trahis pour éliminer la trahison, les exploités pour vaincre l'exploitation. Et il nous faut d'abord nous mobiliser nous-mêmes. Si nous

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10 Ministère de la Fonction Publique _1er Rapport Annuel_, 1960/70, p. 10.
refusons de faire cela, rappelez-vous, mes amis, que nous aurons, nous aussi, trahi et exploité nos gens à notre tour et à notre manière." 12

The convention in support of Pépin passed a resolution which gave the CSN a mandate to make overtures to the other labour centrals:

"Attendu qu'il est essentiel pour les syndiqués du Québec de présenter un front uni à l'employeur;

Attendu que les négociations entre les deux principales centrales syndicales semblent à un point mort;

Attendu que les luttes intersyndicales se font impunément sur le dos de travailleurs;

En conséquence, il est proposé de demander au congrès de la CSN de former un comité chargé de réaliser l'unité syndicale." 13

The Resolutions Committee in support of the resolution pointed out that the Comité Central d'Action Politique (CCAP) established in principle in 1962, was the logical vehicle to launch such action. At the 1966 convention CCAP's mandate had been defined as follows:

"Le Comité d'action politique de la CSN aurait principale-
ment pour tâche de faire connaître, auprès des syndiqués et la population en général, les objectifs des travailleurs af-
fillés à la CSN en matière sociale et économique. Les conseils centralx sont encouragés à participer aux activités des conseils municipaux et des commissions scolaires et même à se faire repré-
senter au sein de ces organismes." 14

At the January, 1970 meeting of the CSN's confederal council, it was evident CCAP could not fill the required mandate. What was proposed

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12 _Procès-Verbal de la Quarante-troisième session du Congrès de la CSN, Quebec, 1968_, p. 49.

13 The Resolutions Committee pointed out such a committee was already in existence and should continue its work. _Ibid._, p. 49.

14 _Ibid._, p. 291.
instead was the Comité de Coordination des négociations dans le secteur public:

Attendu que le Front Commun est pour les secteurs publics et para-publics vital;

Attendu qu'il est impossible que ce front commun fonctionne sans que tous les secteurs concernés y adhèrent pleinement et en toute connaissance de cause;

Attendu que seuls les représentants des syndicats impliqués sont à même d'évaluer leurs besoins respectifs, ainsi que leurs intérêts communs;

Il est proposé par le confrère Jean-Paul Breuleux appuyé par le confrère Norbert Rodrigue, que le président de la CSN convoque, dans un délai de 15 jours, une réunion des représentants des fédérations et des syndicats, et que l'engagement de personnes proposées dans le rapport du Bureau Confédéral des 26 et 27 janvier 1970 ne se fasse qu'après cette réunion.  

At the first meeting both the Services Fédération, representing hospital workers and the Services Publics Fédération, representing municipal employees, and the Syndicat des Fonctionnaires Provinciaux du Québec (SFPQ) were in attendance. It was subsequently decided to invite both the FTQ and the CEQ. The CEQ certainly was not indifferent to the formation of a Common Front. At its 1969 convention, the CEQ affirmed: "Qu'un front commun inter-syndical CEQ-CSN-FTQ soit formé et amené à participer à l'élaboration des grands principes généraux de la politique économique gouvernementale."  

Yet the participation of the CEQ in the Common Front was only one of a series of actions taken between 1969 and 1972. For example, in 1970-1971,

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16 Ibid., pp. 18-20.
17 Procès-Verbal des Assemblées du XIXe Congrès, CEQ, 1969, p. 41.
the CEQ created un Comité d'Action Sociale (CAS) so that the CEQ could..."

accentuer ses prises de position sur les questions sociales, politiques et économiques du Québec."\textsuperscript{18}

The CEQ at the 1970 convention passed the report of its Commission d'étude sur la gestion et l'implantation des structures (CEGIS), transforming the CEQ to a labour central, thus ending the duality of whether the CEQ was a "centrale syndicale" or a "corporation professionnelles".\textsuperscript{19} Although after 1969 the CEQ had become more militant, the transformation of the CEQ into a labour central gave it a greater legitimacy as a labour union and enabled the CEQ to speak out on socio-political issues with greater authority.

In 1971, for example, the CEQ passed the following resolutions:

Quë la CEQ, par ses organismes habilités et en collaboration avec ses organismes affiliés, prévoie et fournit aux militants syndicaux et aux membres en général, les moyens nécessaires à une formation syndicale et politique avancée.\textsuperscript{20}

Quë la CEQ prévoie du personnel et des moyens afin d'assister techniquement et idéologiquement les groupes qui se formeront selon ses ressources et les priorités établies par le Congrès.\textsuperscript{21}

Quë la CEQ, comme centrale syndicale ait une représentation égale à celle des autres centrales, soit deux membres, au conseil consultatif du travail et de la main-d'œuvre (CCTMO).\textsuperscript{22}

Quë les salariés du secteur public et para-public soient considérés de la même manière que ceux du secteur privé, et qu'à cet effet, toute loi ou réglementation régissant leurs relations de travail soit soumise à la consultation du CCTMO avant adoption.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 15.


\textsuperscript{20} Procès-Verbal des assemblées du XXI\textsuperscript{e} Congrès, pp. 47-48.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 52.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 64.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 64.
The Common Front's strategy consisted of two elements: une politique salariale and a centralized bargaining table. By September 1970 the Common Front announced that their politique salariale consisted of the following demands: "1) obtention d'un salaire de base minimum de $100 par semaine; 2) harmonisation des fonctions à l'intérieur de la fonction publique; 3) harmonisation des fonctions à l'extérieur pour les fonctions où le gouvernement est employeur monopolistique (Énergie-Québec, Agents de la Paix); 4) obtention d'un pourcentage d'augmentation tenant compte de l'augmentation du coût de la vie et de la productivité, pourcentage fixé à 8 pour cent." \(^{24}\)

On November 26 the three presidents of the labour centralis Messrs. Pépin (CSN), Charbonneau (CEQ), and Laberge (FTQ), met with Premier Bourassa to request one central bargaining table. The request was rejected. On January 13, 1971, the three presidents again met with the government for preliminary discussions; and again a central bargaining table was rejected. It was not until March 30, 1975, the first official meeting between the Common Front and the government, that the government announced its 4.8 percent annual increase, an offer which the Common Front promptly rejected.

Between June and August 1971 the Common Front and the government met three more times: the Common Front demanding one central bargaining table and the negotiation of une politique salariale, both of which the government refused to grant. \(^{25}\) The government's response was Bill 46, la Loi du régime de négociations collectives dans les secteurs de l'éducation et des hôpitaux, passed on June 30, 1971. \(^{26}\) The statute prohibited the Common Front

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\(^{25}\) La Négociation 1975, deuxième édition, Centrale de l'enseignement du Québec, p. 4.

\(^{26}\) Lois du Québec, 1971, c. 12.
from signing a common collective agreement. Bill 46 instead required that all negotiations between the teachers and the government could only include the Centrale de l'Enseignement du Québec (CEQ), the Provincial Association of Protestant Teachers of Quebec (PAPT) and the Provincial Association of Catholic Teachers of Quebec (FACT); all negotiations for employees of a commission scolaire would have to be done by the CSN; employees of a CEGEP or university could only be represented by the FTQ and the CSN; and finally, all hospital workers' contracts had to be negotiated with either the CSN or the FTQ. 27

Although the Common Front opposed Bill 46 in principle, 28 the bill had little practical effect. The Common Front, it is true, had its own internal structure, but the various collective agreements were still signed by the respective labour centrals.

During the fall and winter of 1971-72, sectoral bargaining continued between the government and the various unions of the Common Front. By the end of February 1972 all sectoral bargaining stopped. On March 9, 1972, the Common Front by a vote of over 70 per cent rejected the government offer, thus setting the stage for a general strike. 29

27 Ibid., c. 12.

28 At the 1974 convention for example, the CEQ delegates were asked to vote upon the following recommendations: "La CEQ de concert avec les autres centrales, étude d'une façon immédiate la possibilité d'éliminer ou de modifier la Loi 46." La Négociation 1975, Op. cit., p. 18.

29 Of the 82.2 per cent CSN members participating in a strike vote, 74.0 per cent rejected the government offer; of the 93.5 per cent CEQ members participating in a strike vote 71 per cent rejected the government offer; and of the 80.3 per cent FTQ members participating in a strike vote 68.5 per cent rejected the government offer. Ethier, Op. cit., p. 78.
On March 13, 1973, Jean-Paul L'Allier, minister of the public service, announced at a meeting with the Common Front that a central bargaining table would be accepted by the government. The revised government wage offer again only included a 4.8 per cent per annum for three years, but now included a revised pension plan. The government wage package, not including fringe benefits, was costed at $246 million, while the Common Front's wage package would have cost the provincial treasury $800 million. 30

Following a one-day strike on March 28, 1972, the Common Front reduced their demands to 7 per cent per year, and demanded the $100 minimum per week be applied only to the third year of the contract, reducing the total cost of the wage package to $408 million. 31 The government, in turn increased its wage package by an additional $11 million, which was rejected by the Common Front. In response to the government wage offer, the Common Front on April 11, again went out on strike, this time for an indefinite period. The strike lasted until April 21, when the government introduced Bill 19, thereby legislatively ending the strike. The bill provided for individual fines varying from $50 to $250 for each day of a continued strike; unions were liable of fines varying from $5,000 to $50,000. 32 Finally, la Loi assurant la reprise des services dans le secteur public required that if no settlement was reached by June 1, 1972, the government would unilaterally impose a three-year settlement no later than June 30, 1972.

32 Lois du Québec, 1972, c. 7.
Although negotiations resumed, no progress had been made by the
decreed deadline. On June 30, the government passed Bill 53, extending
the deadline to September 15; this deadline was again extended to October
15, when the CEQ came to only a partial agreement with the government.
The final agreements were signed in early December, 1972. The final settlement
cost the government $100 million more than the last offer prior to Bill 19.
The settlement provided for a 4.8 per cent increase in 1971-72; a 5.3 per
cent increase in 1972-73; 6.0 per cent increase in 1973-74, and 6.0 per cent
increase in 1974-75. The contract also provided a universal pension plan
replacing one that already covered teachers and civil servants. The costing
of the pension plan, which came into effect on July 1, 1973, was based on a
progressive scale. The Common Front also received an innovative sickness
insurance plan, which was to complement the existing sick leave. The plan
was primarily designed to cover workers' salaries in the event that accumulated
sick leave had expired.

Finally, for the first time, the Common Front also obtained a
Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA). The COLA clause did not benefit all the
unions involved in the Common Front. CEQ members and the 2,500 employees of
la Société des Alcools were exempted from the October 15, 1972 government
deadline to continue negotiations. Although the CEQ members and the employees
of la Société des Alcools did receive the basic salary settlements of the
Common Front, their exemption from the COLA clause cost each CEQ teacher
$400-$500 for the duration of the contract.

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34 Ibid., p. 92.
Yet the achievements of the Common Front did not come without difficulty. Following the passage of Bill 19, three executive officers of the CSN, vice-president Paul E. Dalpé, treasurer Jacques Dion, and director-general of services Amédée Daigle, maintained that the CSN could not financially be responsible if union members disobeyed Bill 19. The CSN's confederal bureau in a unanimous decision demanded the resignation of the three men. In a counter move the 3Ds (as they were called) announced their resignations from the CSN and promptly asked all CSN dissenters to follow. Approximately 30,000 members drawn from the Pulp and Paper, Metallurgy, and Wood Workers' Federations followed. A month later in Quebec City, the CSN dissenters founded the Centrale des Syndicats Démocratiques. At the founding convention the three De's outlined their dissatisfaction with the CSN:

...Ce n'est donc pas la combativité de la CSN qui l'a conduite à cette impasse, mais plutôt le type de luttes qu'elle a mené, de même que la confusion idéologique qui a entourée ces luttes. Ces luttes devenaient de plus en plus politiques et idéologiques dans le secteur privé et à plus forte raison dans le secteur public... 38

The Common Front also faced other defections. During the strike in April, Hydro-Québec employees (Canadian Union of Public Employees) refused to disobey an injunction ordering them back to work resulting in their withdrawal from the Common Front. 39 In mid-August, the SFPQ also withdrew from the Common Front. Although the SFPQ had signed a statement of agreement with the

36 This is an estimation made at the time of the 1975 budget presentation. (Procès-Verbal du Deuxième Congrès de la Centrale des Syndicats Démocratiques, p. 56).


38 Centrale des Syndicats Démocratiques, Procès-Verbal du Congrès de Fondation, p. 76.

Common Front leadership felt that the Common Front was of little benefit to them. It is true that the Common Front negotiated a COLA clause for their membership, but the SFPQ had already in their previous contract (1968-1971) obtained a cost of living adjustment which was compounded on their salary levels, rather than attached to the basic wage as was the case of the Common Front. 40

Although the negotiations were carried on by a central bargaining committee the CSN, the CEQ, and the PTC failed to coordinate their own internal activities. For example, the CEQ on more than one occasion pressed for a more centralized and better organized internal structure. In November 1971 the CEQ publicly attacked the Common Front organizational strategy. 41 Diane Ethier has noted:

Selon la CEQ les méthodes d'organisation des autres centrales seraient donc plus conservatrices et traditionnelles que les siennes. Or lorsque la CEQ critique, elle le fait d'un point de vue corporatiste et technocratique. Ce qu'elle reproche à la PTC et à la CSN, c'est de ne pas avoir été assez efficaces dans l'encadrement de leurs troupes; c'est d'avoir risqué d'être débordées; c'est d'avoir affaibli leur mobilisation par un manque de formation des 'structures techniques' 42

In reflecting upon the Common Front, Yvon Charbonneau, President of the CEQ, stated: "On peut dire, après coup, que le Front commun constitué pour soutenir la négociation du secteur a été une gigantesque improvisation, qu'il a manqué de stratégie, d'idéologie ou d'objectifs clairs." 43 The CEQ

40 Convention Collective De Travail 1968-1971, entre le Gouvernement du Québec et le SFPQ, c. 7705.


feared that any ad hoc strategy would severely curtail province-wide participation in the Common Front, and to a certain extent the CEQ proved to be correct. In their evaluation of the 1972 Common Front various CEQ representatives reported the reactions of their teachers: Deux-Montagnes' teachers prior to the April general strike received little information from the CEQ, resulting in contradictory and confusing positions. Teachers, although sympathetic to the proposals of "travail égal-salaire égal", reduction of wage gaps between the high and lower salaried employees, and the $100 minimum per week, nevertheless, saw themselves having a special status vis-à-vis the Common Front.  

In Youville, it was feared that only a minority of the CEQ teachers supported the $100 minimum wage demand. Again, it was felt the CEQ had given its teachers little information, resulting in apathy, and an absence of any organizational committees at the local level. Similar complaints were also heard from other centres around the province including the Montreal teachers.

Although the reluctance of teachers to participate in the Common Front in some instances can be attributed to the CEQ, it is not surprising that apathy existed. Unlike the hydro-electric workers of the FTQ, the 30,000 members who quit the CSN, and the SFPQ, the CEQ did not lose any of its members.


Ibid., p. 3.

Ibid., pp. 1-3.
III. The Consequences and Implications of the Common Front

Did the formation of the Common Front between 1968-1975 change the bargaining tactics of the CSN, the CEQ, and the FTQ? Was the concept of a Common Front a threat to liberal-democracy or did the Common Front merely reflect the centralization that had already taken place in the health, and educational fields? How must we view the discussion within the Common Front of the need for a workers' party?

To better understand the strength of the Common Front we need only examine the union growth in Quebec in the 1960s. After all Quebec's extensive union growth in the 1960s was predominantly in the public and para-public sectors. Between 1962 and 1971 union membership in Quebec increased from 350,384 to 728,263. This was an increase of 106 per cent, the greatest of all the Canadian provinces for the same time period. During this same era in Ontario union membership increased by only 38.6 per cent. This does not mean that Ontario suffered a stagnation in union growth; indications are rather, that any real upsurge in the growth of Ontario unions had taken place prior to 1962. This is further revealed if we examine union membership in both provinces for 1962. Quebec had 350,384 union members, while Ontario had 640,098, nearly twice as many. Throughout the decade, however, union growth in Ontario continued at a moderate pace.

In Quebec union growth was unprecedented. At the beginning of the decade Quebec had only 350,084 members compared to 640,098 union members in Ontario. By 1971, this gap had dramatically changed. Quebec now had 728,263 members, while Ontario had 897,455.

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47 See Appendix XIV.
In Ontario total union membership as a percentage of the total work force has shown a more consistent growth than in Quebec. In 1926, 32 per cent, a third of Ontario's total work force, was unionized; in 1946, this figure climbed to 37 per cent; and by 1966 this had only climbed to 39 per cent. 49

In Quebec total union membership as a percentage of the total work force in 1926 was 26 per cent; in 1946, this climbed to only 27 per cent; and by 1966, this increased to 31 per cent. 50 By 1968, however, total unionized members had increased to 39.1 per cent, just surpassing Ontario. 51

The influence and dominance of the growth of the public sector is further revealed by examining the union growth in the following sectors: primary products, manufacturing, construction, and the tertiary sector, which includes education, health services, recreation and public administration, all of which figure prominently in the public sector.

Between 1961 and 1968, union membership as a percentage of total unionized members dropped in the primary products, manufacturing, and construction sectors. Although union membership for the primary products sector increased to 8.6 per cent in 1965, from 7.3 per cent in 1961, it again dropped to 4.0 per cent in 1968. Manufacturing dropped from 49.1 per cent to 40.8 per cent in 1965, and finally to 34.8 in 1968. The percentage of unionized workers in construction faced a similar decline: from 9.2 per cent in 1961, decreasing to 8.8 per cent in 1965, and again dropping


50 Ibid., p. 13.

51 Ibid., p. 13.
to 6.7 per cent in 1968. Only the tertiary sector showed a steady growth from 34.3 per cent of total unionized members to 41.7 per cent in 1965, and increasing to 54.5 per cent in 1968.

TABLE I: Union Membership in Various Sectors (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary Products</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Tertiary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Union mem.</td>
<td>Total Union mem.</td>
<td>Total Union mem.</td>
<td>Total Union mem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>25,772</td>
<td>173,345</td>
<td>32,480</td>
<td>121,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>44,116</td>
<td>209,296</td>
<td>45,142</td>
<td>213,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>28,098</td>
<td>244,717</td>
<td>46,857</td>
<td>382,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Taux du Syndicalisme au Québec, Ministère du Travail et de la Main-d’œuvre, 1968, p. 6.*

Although the largest percentage of all organized workers are employed in the tertiary sector, it has the lowest rate of unionized workers when compared to the primary products, manufacturing, and construction sector. In 1968 only 35.3 per cent of workers in the tertiary sector were organized as compared to 56.9 per cent in the construction sector, 47.0 per cent in the manufacturing sector, and 44.0 per cent in the primary sector.
TABLE II: Rate of Unionized Workers in the Various Sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Rate of Unionized Workers</th>
<th>% of Total Union Members</th>
<th>% of all Employees of all Sectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Products</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Taux du Syndicalisme au Québec, Ministère du Travail et de la Main-d'œuvre, 1968, p. 22.*

The strength of the CSN, the CEQ and the FTQ can be better understood if we briefly examine the strikes that have occurred since 1965 when public employees were given the right to strike. Since 1965 public service employees have accounted for the majority of workers who have gone on strike.\(^52\) Beginning in 1965, no less than 41.2 per cent of all workers who went on strike were public employees; in 1966, this figure doubled to 81.1 per cent.\(^53\) Between 1967 and 1969 this figure did not drop below 60.0 per cent. Only in 1970, when there were no major negotiations with the government did this figure drop to 20.4 per cent. By 1971, the percentage of employees on strike who were in the public sector went up to 78.8 per cent, climaxing with the general strike in 1972.

\(^52\) See Appendix XV.

\(^53\) See Appendix XV.
The bargaining tactics of the Common Front in 1972 which led to the general strike gave rise to some serious questioning about the nature and direction of the public sector unions. To what extent did the Common Front have legitimacy both in the eyes of the public as well as their own members? The refusal of the SFPO to join the 1972 Common Front, the further refusal of Hydro-Québec employees to disobey an injunction thus leading to their withdrawal from the Common Front, and the founding of the 30,000 member Centrale des Syndicats Démocratiques are indications that the Common Front's support was by no means overwhelming. Nor can we forget the somewhat tenuous support that certain CEQ teachers gave to the Common Front, thereby reducing the legitimacy claimed by the Common Front.

Jean Boivin, on the other hand, goes so far as to claim that if the Common Front had explained their goals and objectives to the general public, the Common Front's legitimacy would have been short lived. It can be argued that public sector unions having been given the right to organize in 1964 were beginning to have a certain legitimacy in the public's mind. If the CEQ, the CSN, and the FTQ had bargained separately with the Bourassa government there is little doubt their legitimacy would have been questioned. Even the formation of the Common Front, which must be viewed as a logical sequence to the centralized bargaining initiated after the implementation of the Labour Code and the Civil Service Act, was not a step that brought the legitimacy of the Common Front into question. As long as the Common Front continued its wage negotiations with the Bourassa government the Common Front's legitimacy was not questioned. It was only with the April 1972 general strike and the

---

imprisonment of the three union presidents Messrs. Pépin, Charbonneau, and Laberge that the legitimacy of both the Common Front and the provincial government came to a head. The fact that the three union leaders were imprisoned dramatized the limited legitimacy of the Common Front. Yet in the final analysis the government was anxious to preserve the legitimacy of the Common Front. After the striking Common Front unions were ordered back to work the government on two occasions postponed the final contract deadline so that a settlement could be reached.

A further question that has helped undermine the legitimacy of these public sector unions is whether or not the Common Front should restrict their activities to the bargaining table or organize itself as a political party. The Hydro-Québec workers, and the 30,000 dissenting CSN members, who formed the CSN left the Common Front precisely because it was becoming too political. In other words, the Common Front's legitimacy existed as long as its activities were restricted to wage negotiations. Yet it is the restrictive nature of the trade union movement that prompted the CEQ to react so strongly against public sector unions becoming involved in any political action. At the 1976 CEQ convention delegates passed a resolution which stated in part:

... le syndicalisme de classe est conscient des limites des luttes syndicales: celles-ci, en effet, ne visent pas la prise du pouvoir politique qui seule rendra possible l'abolition du système capitaliste d'exploitation. Cette lutte pour le pouvoir politique ne sera possible que sous la direction d'un authentique parti des travailleurs et non sous celle des syndicats. Le syndicalisme de classe cherche toutefois à développer, à travers les luttes économiques, la solidarité de la classe ouvrière, solidarité qui pourra être canalisée par
l'organisation politique des travailleurs. Il transforme ainsi ces luttes à court terme en un tremplin, en une école pour la mobilisation politique à long terme. 55

Already prior to the passage of this resolution the CEQ had published *École et Luttes de classes au Québec*, which analyzed the ideology of the textbooks used in the classrooms, and the famous *Manuel Du ler mai*, a self-styled teaching manual illustrating the exploitation of Quebec’s working class. Yet there is no doubt that the election of a PQ government has dampened any discussion of a workers’ party in CEQ circles. Although the CEQ denounced the PQ as early as 1973, 56 the PQ victory in November 1976 was greeted with cautious optimism by the CEQ. Yvon Charbonneau, president of the CEQ, publicly stated that since the PQ government contained 15 teachers associated with the CEQ, education would be given a higher priority than under the Bourassa government. 57

The election of the PQ has also dampened the call for a workers’ party in CSN circles. A resolution calling for the establishment of a workers’ party was passed in June 1975. 58 The resolution was not passed by the CSN convention, but by the more radical Conseil Central de Montréal (CSN). While the resolution was passed by only a slim majority over half of the delegates abstained from voting.


57 *La Presse*, 16 novembre, 1976, p. 2.

58 *Le Devoir*, 2 juin, 1975, p. 3.
Yet both because the PQ has been recently elected to office and because the CEQ and the CSN have realized the limited support of a workers' party, it is probable that the Common Front will try and stabilize its present legitimacy. The need for the Common Front to re-examine its own solidarity came to the floor in the 1976 negotiations. Although the Common Front in its 1976 contract talks negotiated as one central bargaining unit, a split soon developed. The CSN's hospital and social workers accepted a four year contract in June leaving the CEQ teachers in virtual abandonment. The CEQ teachers did not come to terms with the Bourassa government until September when both sides signed a four-year pact.

60 Le Devoir, 1er septembre, 1976, p. 1.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION
In our study we have suggested that the state has played an important role in the historical development of Quebec. As a colony of France the role of the state in Quebec was ubiquitous. The French monarchy was the political authority of the colony controlling immigration, trade, and mineral rights. With the British entry into Canada in 1760 the role of the government expanded. The central government, often in collaboration with private entrepreneurs, financed and helped build canals and railroads. Because of the power and influence of the federal government during most of the nineteenth century the provincial government's power was extremely limited. Even with the advent of industrialization at the turn of the century the provincial government believed that the province's economy could best be developed by the private sector.

Although successive provincial Liberal governments encouraged industrialization, a matter which the Catholic Church opposed, the government's own laissez-faire ideology, nevertheless, coincided with the Church's traditional anti-statism. Yet the Church's strongest expression against industrialization came with the founding of the Confédération des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada (CTCC) between 1918–1920. It is true that during the 1920s and throughout the 1930s the Church's social doctrine as expressed in Pope Leo XIII's historical encyclical *Rerum Novarum* had a dominant influence on the CTCC elite. Yet as the 1937 province-wide textile strike demonstrated, whatever corporatist thought may have dominated the CTCC elite, the direction of the CTCC was also tempered by the needs of its members. With the expansion of the industrial unions in Quebec during the late 1930s and the war economy of the early 1940s, the CTCC became more secularized. This period also marked a significant shift in the attitude of the provincial government. While at the turn of the century the provincial government had
initiated various measures to prevent child labour, and provided for compensation of worker's loss of salary, the provincial government by the 1940s was passing labour legislation that was harsh by any standard. The 1940 provincial labour code rather than giving legitimacy to labour unions, instead was designed to prevent labour unrest. The minimal fine the code called for if an employer refused to bargain with a particular union failed miserably to protect the unions's bargaining rights. The subsequent la Loi concernant l'arbitrage des différents entre les services publics et les salariés à leur emploi, implemented in 1944, imposed a system of binding arbitration for all public employees. Both strikes and lockouts were forbidden.

The postwar period brought about a considerable expansion of the public sector: public administration, health and social services demanded a more centralized economy. Yet the anti-statism perfected during the Duplessis era for the most part diluted the state's ability to carry out any reforms. Before being able to implement its planned reforms such as hospitalization and medicare insurance, and public education the Lesage government first had to give the state more legitimacy. Prior to the establishment of hospitalization insurance hospitals were decentralized, controlling their own budgets. The enactment of hospitalization insurance changed all this. Hospitals, if they wanted to receive government funds, were placed under strict supervision, thus giving the provincial government direct jurisdiction over them. In a similar fashion the Lesage government implemented its promised educational reforms. Prior to 1964 the province's education system was jointly controlled by a Catholic-Protestant Council of Education. In 1964 a provincial department of education was formed reducing the Council of Education to an advisory body.
The centralization that took place in the health, social services and educational fields required that the public sector unions - the CSN (formerly the CTCC) and the CEQ (formerly the CIC) - also become more centralized. In the case of the CSN this was not a difficult task since it was already established on a province-wide basis and by the late 1950s committed to liberalism. The CEQ, on the other hand was highly decentralized and up to 1963 was little more than a loose coalition of the three unions which had merged in 1945. When the provincial government imposed province-wide negotiations on the CEQ it in effect brought more order to the CEQ than it had experienced in its 22 years. Yet the provincial government's action was not out of sympathy for the CEQ. The government realized that if the CEQ was more centralized it could exercise proper budget control over the province's teachers.

It is true that the passage of the 1964 provincial Labour Code and the 1965 Civil Service Act granted collective bargaining rights to Quebec's public employees. Yet it was the lobbying and pressure of the CSN in the early 1960s which were instrumental in obtaining these new bargaining rights for Quebec's public sector unions. Certainly on the matter of collective bargaining the difference between the provincial Liberals and the CSN and the CEQ was more of degree than of substance. Both in the case of the Labour Code and the Civil Service Act the government continued to exercise wide powers to prevent labour unrest. In the latter instance the government had the unilateral right to determine job appointments, promotions, transfers, and job training, thus assuring virtual control over the public service. Moreover, it is important to realize that the Labour Code and the Civil Service Act also
gave the government the authority to intervene in the public sector in
the event of labour unrest.

The formation of the Common Front after the 1968 negotiations
must be seen as a logical sequel to the centralized bargaining initiated after
the implementation of the Labour Code and the Civil Service Act. Moreover,
the Common Front by establishing a common bargaining table during the 1972-
1973 negotiations was able, despite defections, to withstand the govern-
ment's divide and conquer tactics, as successfully applied in the 1968-1971
negotiations. As long as the Common Front continued its wage negotiations
with the provincial government its legitimacy was assured by its rank and
file members. In the eyes of the provincial government its own legitimacy
was threatened unless it moved quickly and decisively to defuse the general
strike. Yet the fact that Messrs. Pépin, Charbonneau, and Laberge were im-
prisoned demonstrated the Common Front's own lack of legitimacy. In the
final analysis the Common Front could do little but follow the collective
bargaining route in order to arrive at a negotiated settlement with the
bourassa government.

It is important to recognize that despite the imprisonment of
the three union presidents, within the Common Front there is a recognition
that unions and therefore collective bargaining is an integral part of
liberal democracy. As Perry Anderson has noted:

...trade unions are dialectically both an opposition to
capitalism and a component of it. For they both resist the
given unequal distribution of income within the society by
their wage demands, and ratify the principle of an unequal
distribution by their existence, which implies as its
complementary opposite that of management.  

Collective bargaining, moreover, can also be cited as an example of where capitalism is a "system in which production is carried on without authoritatively allocation of work or rewards, but by contractual relations between free individuals (each possessing some resource be it only his own labour-power) who calculate their most profitable courses of action and employ their resources as that calculation dictates." Such a system, notes MacPherson, permits a great deal of state interference without its essential nature being altered. Thus assuming that the Common Front, despite its difficulties, continues to work within the parameters of the collective bargaining process it will continue to have a contractual relationship with the state.

Yet there is reason to believe that the PQ government will deal more harshly with the Common Front that did the previous Bourassa regime. Commenting on the attitude of the Bourassa government with the Common Front, Jacques Patizeau has stated:

"Aucun truc, aucune loi, ne pourra remplacer l'aptitude d'un gouvernement à être raisonnable et à gérer les affaires publiques au nom des intérêts de la société et non pas pour certains groupes contre d'autres. Il faut qu'il sache être dur quand c'est nécessaire, ouvert quand il le faut. Aucun 'machin' juridique ne peut finalement se substituer à la responsabilité de l'État." 3

There is the example of the newspaper Le Jour. Although the PQ only owned 5 per cent of the shares, Le Jour, nevertheless, became the

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3 Le Jour, 9 avril, 1976, p. 28.
unofficial voice of the PQ. On May 29, 1976, at the urging of PQ leader René Lévesque, the party's executive committee passed a resolution calling for a shift of editorial control of the paper from the Société des Rédacteurs - the working reporters - back to the paper's management. On June 10, the PQ announced it would no longer support Le Jour. Although the journalists' dissension stemmed from editorial control of the newspaper, the death of Le Jour also revealed an ideological dispute between the paper's owners and journalists. When, for example, the CSN asked Le Jour's staff union to walk out in support of a planned general strike, the newspaper's staff union decided not to participate, which would have cost Le Jour money. Instead, and much to the embarrassment of the PQ, which did not support the strike, Le Jour published a message of support on its front page. Although the Le Jour incident has been forgotten in the wake of the PQ victory, it is indicative of their political toleration. Nor can it be forgotten that the PQ has not supported the Common Front in the past.
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APPENDICES
### APPENDIX I

Percentages of the Net Value of Manufactures in Ontario and Quebec to the Canadian Totals, 1910-1929

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Ontario and Quebec 1910</th>
<th>Ontario 1929</th>
<th>Quebec 1929</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Textiles</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton Textiles</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool Textiles</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Iron &amp; Steel Products</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Iron &amp; Steel</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Implements</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway Rolling Stock</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Apparatus &amp; Supplies</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals &amp; Chemical Products</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber Products</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boots and Shoes</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass Products</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulp and Paper</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour Mills</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saw Mills</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-ferrous Metal - Smelting &amp; Refining</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit and Vegetable - Canning</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat Products</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquors</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum Refining</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Electric Stations</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total of Listed Manufactures: 80 84 51 33

All Manufactures: 80 82 51 31

Source: Table 38 from Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations—Canada: 1867-1939, p. 124.
APPENDIX II

Urban-Rural Population of Canada 1871-1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>3,689,000</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>2,967,000</td>
<td>81.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>4,325,000</td>
<td>1,170,000</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>3,215,000</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>4,833,000</td>
<td>1,537,000</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>3,296,000</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>5,371,000</td>
<td>2,014,000</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>3,363,000</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>7,807,000</td>
<td>3,273,000</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>3,934,000</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>8,788,000</td>
<td>4,353,000</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>4,436,000</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>10,377,000</td>
<td>5,572,000</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>4,805,000</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>11,507,000</td>
<td>6,252,000</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>5,255,000</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>14,010,000</td>
<td>8,628,000</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>5,381,000</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>18,238,000</td>
<td>11,069,000</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>7,169,000</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>20,015,000</td>
<td>14,727,000</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>5,238,000</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## APPENDIX III

**Urban-Rural Population of Quebec**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>1,192,000</td>
<td>272,000</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>920,000</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>1,359,000</td>
<td>379,000</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>981,000</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>1,488,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>989,000</td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>1,649,000</td>
<td>654,000</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>995,000</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>2,006,000</td>
<td>967,000</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>1,039,000</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>2,361,000</td>
<td>1,323,000</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>1,038,000</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>2,875,000</td>
<td>1,814,000</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>1,061,000</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>3,332,000</td>
<td>2,110,000</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>1,222,000</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>4,056,000</td>
<td>2,697,000</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>1,358,000</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>5,259,000</td>
<td>3,906,000</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>1,353,000</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>5,781,000</td>
<td>4,525,000</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>1,256,000</td>
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</table>

Source: See Appendix II
APPENDIX IV

Urban-Rural Population of Ontario

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Source: See Appendix II
## Appendix V

Total Number of Farms in Ontario and Quebec 1901-1971

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<th>Quebec</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1971</th>
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<td>140,110</td>
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<td>137,619</td>
<td>135,957</td>
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<td>1931</td>
<td>154,669</td>
<td>134,336</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941</td>
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<td>61,257</td>
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Source: Census of Canada, 1961, Agriculture-Ontario, Table 2, Dominion Bureau of Statistics
Census of Canada, 1971, Agriculture-Ontario TableII. Statistics Canada.
Census of Canada, 1961, Agriculture-Quebec, Table 2, Dominion Bureau of Statistics.
Census of Canada, 1971, Agriculture-Quebec, Table II, Statistics Canada.

Note: In the 1961 census a farm is defined as an agricultural holding of one acre or more with sale of the agricultural products during the past 12 months of $50 or more. In the 1951 census a farm was defined as a holding on which agricultural operations were carried out which was: a) 3 acres or more in size; b) from one to three acres in size with agricultural production during the previous year valued at $250 or more.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1911 Number</th>
<th>1921 %</th>
<th>1931 Number</th>
<th>1941 %</th>
<th>1951 Number</th>
<th>1961 %</th>
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<td>36.7</td>
<td>209,351</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>218,094</td>
<td>26.8</td>
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<td>286,585</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>290,256</td>
<td>27.1</td>
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<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mechanical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>77,743</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>74,734</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>103,120</td>
<td>12.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>128,443</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>131,029</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>170,104</td>
<td>15.6</td>
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<td>Labourers</td>
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<td>16.4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>14.4</td>
<td>116,109</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>145,343</td>
<td>13.3</td>
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</table>


Note: All persons are classified according to the nature of their work regardless of the kind of establishment in which it is carried on or their status in the establishment. Labourers include workers in unskilled occupations except for those engaged in petroleum and gas well operations. Also excludes specified groups such as Longshoremen, Freight Handlers, Seamen, and Trackmen. This residual group of labourers is subdivided by industry groups as are the residual groups of "owners and managers", and "foremen".
Appendix VII

Union Membership in Canada, 1911-55

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>With international affiliation Membership</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Without international affiliation Membership</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Total membership</th>
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<td>13,717</td>
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<tr>
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<td>85.1</td>
<td>26,222</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>175,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>146,482</td>
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<td>25,681</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>172,163</td>
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<td>20.0</td>
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<td>47,455</td>
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<td>283,096 (a)</td>
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<td>280,648 (a)</td>
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<td>147,977 (a)</td>
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<td>322,746 (a)</td>
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<td>66.2</td>
<td>240,070</td>
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<td>258,439</td>
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<td>291,607</td>
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<td>302,550</td>
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<td>70.0</td>
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<td>29.5</td>
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(*) Revised to exclude certain organizations not regarded as trade unions.

APPENDIX VIII

Trades and Labour Congress Membership: 1914-1944

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Membership</th>
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<td>1914</td>
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<td>126,638</td>
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<td>71,419</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>138,881</td>
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<td>1916</td>
<td>66,573</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>141,137</td>
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<td>81,687</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>122,129</td>
</tr>
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<td>1918</td>
<td>117,498</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>105,546</td>
</tr>
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<td>1919</td>
<td>160,605</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>103,424</td>
</tr>
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<td>173,463</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>105,998</td>
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<td>173,778</td>
<td>1936</td>
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<td>1937</td>
<td>131,105</td>
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<td>1939</td>
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<td>1942</td>
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</tr>
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<td>119,243</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>190,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>246,791</td>
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</table>

Source: Labour Organizations in Canada (1945). Published by the Department of Labour, 1946, p. 22.
APPENDIX IX

Total Trade Union Membership in Quebec and Membership of the Confédération des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada, for the Years 1932 to 1951 Inclusive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Trade Union Membership</th>
<th>C.T.C.C. Membership</th>
<th>C.T.C.C. Membership as a Percentage of Total Membership</th>
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<td>1932</td>
<td>42,680</td>
<td>25,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>41,309</td>
<td>26,894</td>
<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>53,798</td>
<td>30,346</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>51,240</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>74.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>74,572</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>108,566</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>114,856</td>
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<td>1939</td>
<td>104,876</td>
<td>49,401</td>
<td>47.1</td>
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<td>114,707</td>
<td>46,341</td>
<td>40.4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>121,280</td>
<td>46,032</td>
<td>38.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>151,605</td>
<td>46,447</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>188,714</td>
<td>53,384</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>175,993</td>
<td>65,249</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>171,203</td>
<td>61,723</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>208,546</td>
<td>62,960</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>210,260</td>
<td>70,176</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>229,621</td>
<td>82,218</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>236,399</td>
<td>83,272</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>239,800</td>
<td>83,112</td>
<td>34.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>259,950</td>
<td>88,081</td>
<td>33.9</td>
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</table>

Source: Table VII from The Union Nationale by Herbert F. Quinn, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), p. 205.
## APPENDIX X

Federal Conditional Grant Payments for Hospitalization and Medicare Insurance

(In thousands of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Conditional Grant</th>
<th>Hospitalization Insurance Amount</th>
<th>Medicare Total</th>
<th>Hospitalization &amp; Medicare % of Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958-59</td>
<td>248,356</td>
<td>54,708</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>382,754</td>
<td>150,593</td>
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<td>435,523</td>
<td>188,938</td>
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<td>49.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>606,453</td>
<td>283,209</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>846,202</td>
<td>335,839</td>
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<td>39.7</td>
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<td>860,795</td>
<td>391,297</td>
<td></td>
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<td>935,603</td>
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<td>1,117,717</td>
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<td>1,384,295</td>
<td>569,893</td>
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<td>1967-68</td>
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<td>1968-69</td>
<td>1,626,328</td>
<td>798,125</td>
<td>32,966</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>1,895,951</td>
<td>919,019</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>2,539,904</td>
<td>1,037,994</td>
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<td>1,216,443</td>
<td>575,547</td>
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<td>1972-73</td>
<td>3,044,102</td>
<td>1,355,451</td>
<td>629,250</td>
<td>65.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>3,318,578</td>
<td>1,492,110</td>
<td>676,173</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>4,200,187</td>
<td>1,863,925</td>
<td>760,756</td>
<td>62.4</td>
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</table>

Source: Summary of Federal contributions to the province in certain payments to institutions in the province, Federal Dept. of Finance.
# APPENDIX XI

**Public Sector Union Members of CSN Federations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Services Publics Fédération</th>
<th>Services Fédération</th>
<th>Fonctionnaires Provinciaux</th>
<th>Enseignants</th>
<th>% of Total CSN Membership</th>
<th>Total CSN Membership</th>
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<td>1947</td>
<td>3,805</td>
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<td>70,176</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>1949</td>
<td>4,059</td>
<td>3,379</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>4,034</td>
<td>3,428</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>4,167</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>5,118</td>
<td>4,674</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>85,369</td>
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<td>1953</td>
<td>5,149</td>
<td>5,339</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>94,751</td>
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<td>5,540</td>
<td>6,073</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.0</td>
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<td>5,397</td>
<td>6,479</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>6,511</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6,003</td>
<td>6,761</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>99,957</td>
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<td>6,219</td>
<td>6,943</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>98,038</td>
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<td>7,847</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>95,212</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4,520</td>
<td>9,104</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28.4</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>7,876</td>
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<td>113,885</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>24.3</td>
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<td>18,382</td>
<td>2,644</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>167,917</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>18,818</td>
<td>40,120</td>
<td>25,842</td>
<td>3,181</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>191,392</td>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>20,455</td>
<td>42,237</td>
<td>29,428</td>
<td>3,930</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>199,102</td>
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<td>1969</td>
<td>22,524</td>
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<td>28,563</td>
<td>3,916</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>199,215</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>24,315</td>
<td>50,738</td>
<td>30,434</td>
<td>3,243</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>202,970</td>
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<tr>
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<td>27,086</td>
<td>55,896</td>
<td>29,121</td>
<td>3,718</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>221,629</td>
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<td>1972</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>28,144</td>
<td>60,559</td>
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APPENDIX XII

Hospital Statistics for the Province of Quebec, 1960-1965

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<td>Hos Mem</td>
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<td>Hos Mem</td>
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<td>4a 4b 5a 5b</td>
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<td>7a 7b 8a 8b</td>
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<tr>
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<td>283</td>
<td>27 693</td>
<td>16 531 66 9232</td>
<td>5 868</td>
<td>6 61 5 459</td>
<td>79 11884</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>29 627</td>
<td>18 701 80 12202</td>
<td>7 1239</td>
<td>7 70 5 633</td>
<td>91 15472</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>30 916</td>
<td>22 1100 98 15852</td>
<td>8 1740</td>
<td>9 89 5 660</td>
<td>105 20357</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>31 1258</td>
<td>23 1392 113 18244</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1940 13 94 5 1035</td>
<td>124 23962</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>31 1937</td>
<td>33 2059 129 22885</td>
<td>14 2081</td>
<td>20 115 7 1139</td>
<td>140 30216</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>35 2105</td>
<td>37 2645 132 26680</td>
<td>14 2244</td>
<td>71 196 7 1270</td>
<td>142 35115</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Syndicat Professionnels d'Infirmières Catholiques founded in 1928.*
APPENDIX XIII

CEQ Membership for Selected Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959-1960</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1961</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1962</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-1963</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-1964</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1965</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1966</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1967</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1968</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-1969</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54,258</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65,334</td>
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<td>70,000</td>
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</table>

## APPENDIX XIV

**ALL REPORTING LABOUR ORGANIZATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quebec Membership</th>
<th>% Increase Over Previous Year</th>
<th>Ontario Membership</th>
<th>% Increase Over Previous Year</th>
<th>Total Canadian Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>350,384</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>640,098</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>369,022</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>667,768</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1,563,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>411,055</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>690,969</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1,650,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>445,531</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>727,595</td>
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<td>510,122</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>766,200</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>629,822</td>
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<td>786,976</td>
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<td>662,874</td>
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<td>827,037</td>
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**SOURCE:** Corporations and Labour Unions Returns Act 1962-71. Table 14A. Distribution of membership and local Union Branch of all reporting Labour organizations.

**Note:** After 1971, Corporations and Labour Unions Returns Act, has failed to report total members organized.
APPENDIX XV

Strikes in the Various Sectors of Quebec: 1965-1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>All Sectors</th>
<th></th>
<th>Public Sector</th>
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<th>Public Sector</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Workers on Strike</td>
<td>Days Lost</td>
<td>Number of Workers on Strike</td>
<td>Days Lost</td>
<td>Workers on Strike % of all Sectors</td>
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<td>1972*</td>
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<td>2,351,809</td>
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* First five months of 1972 only.