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Ottawa, Canada
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THE CBC INTERNATIONAL SERVICE
AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL INSTRUMENT OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY
IN THE COLD WAR, 1948-1963

by

Bernard J. Hibbitts, B.A. (Dalhousie – King's)

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs

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RESUME

Cette thèse analyse l'expérience du Service International de Radio-Canada en tant qu'instrument psychologique de la politique canadienne étrangère lors de la "guerre froide". Par une approche historique, elle identifie et clarifie les problèmes de politiques, de liaison, et de contrôle auxquels le Département des Affaires Extérieures ainsi que l'administration du Service International ont eu à faire face. Plus spécifiquement, elle évalue l'influence que certains groupes ethniques est-européens, dont surtout les ukrainiens, ont eu sur le Service et de quelle façon ceux-ci ont pu en faire un instrument en quelque sorte "tronqué" de la diplomatie canadienne. Finalement, la recherche termine en présentant un aperçu général des problèmes substantiels et en apparence interminables qui ont menacé la survie même du Service lors des années 1948 à 1963.
ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the Cold War experience of the CBC International Service as a psychological instrument of Canadian foreign policy. Through an historical examination it identifies and illuminates the problems of policy-making, liaison, and control which External Affairs and IS management faced during this time in supervising broadcast operations. In particular, it assesses the degree of influence which East European ethnic groups in Canada - especially the Ukrainians - exercised over policy, and shows how, in the end, they made of IS a "twisted arm" of Canadian statecraft. The paper concludes with a general explanation of IS's survival through the substantial and seemingly interminable controversies that rocked it from 1948-1963.
Students of international affairs should be aware of how broadcasting can be used in furthering the aims of foreign policy, and of its potentialities and limitations in this field.

* Sir Ian Jacob, "The Place of Broadcasting in International Relations", International Journal 5 (1949-50), 32.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>PREFACE</strong></td>
<td>IX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>INTRODUCTION: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY, PROPAGANDA AND THE MEDIUM OF RADIO</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CHAPTER ONE: PROLOGUE: THE CBC INTERNATIONAL SERVICE, 1937-47</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CHAPTER TWO: &quot;A LITTLE MORE AGGRESSIVE THAN BEFORE&quot;: HARDENING THE POLICY LINE, 1948-51</strong></td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CHAPTER THREE: A POLITICAL MATTER: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CBC-IS UKRAINIAN SERVICE, 1952</strong></td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CHAPTER FOUR: &quot;THE LITTLE NAPOLEON&quot;: DESY AT THE HELM, 1952-53</strong></td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CHAPTER FIVE: THE DISENCHANTMENT: REVIEWS AND REVERSALS, 1954-56</strong></td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CHAPTER SIX: DENOUEMENT: THE IMPORTANCE OF &quot;RESTRAINT&quot;, 1956-63</strong></td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CHAPTER SEVEN: &quot;ALL TOGETHER NOW&quot;: CANADA AND INTERNATIONAL CO-ORDINATION OF BROADCASTS, 1948-63</strong></td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CONCLUSION</strong></td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>APPENDICES</strong></td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- CBC-IS Language Services, 1944-61</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- International Service Coverage, 1954........219
- CBC-IS Operating Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1944-63.................................220
- International Broadcasting: A Comparative Table........................................221
- CBC-IS Total Hours Broadcast to Western Europe, 1946-54............................223
- CBC-IS Total Hours Broadcast to Western Europe, 1955-63............................224
- CBC-IS Total Hours Broadcast to Eastern Europe, 1946-54...........................225
- CBC-IS Total Hours Broadcast to Eastern Europe, 1955-63............................226

BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................227
- Note on Sources..............................................................228
- Bibliography.................................................................232
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Program Analysis, March 1950 ..................... 49
Table 2: CBC-IS Hours of Broadcast, June 1951 ........... 60
Table 3: CBC-IS Old and New Broadcast Times (1954/1955) .................................. 134
Table 4: Comparative Distribution of Broadcast Hours by Areas, CBC-IS, VOA, BBC (May 1953) .................. 193
This thesis does not deal with the CBC International Service as a broadcasting organization \textit{per se}, but rather as a psychological instrument of Canadian foreign policy. The difference is important, as it has a profound effect on what, in fact, is being studied. The broadcast historian is equally interested in shortwave transmissions and transcriptions; he is as much concerned with broadcasts to Latin America as with broadcasts to the USSR. The student of foreign policy, on the other hand, must be far more sensitive to the explicitly political aspects of his subject - thus the concentration here on shortwave transmissions to European, and especially East European, targets. The approach does not, however, make the task of analysis any easier. In the extensive literature of international affairs, studies of international broadcasting are exceedingly rare. The significant books on the subject can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Substantial published histories of individual national radios, such as the Voice of America or the British Broadcasting Corporation's External Service, simply do not exist. Such projects have not been academically fashionable in the past fifteen to twenty years. Our attention has been elsewhere.

But the international climate is changing. East-West tension is increasing and, with it, the possibility of
renewed "Cold War". In an atmosphere of conflict, international broadcasting promises to take its place again as a recognized instrument of foreign policy. It thus becomes important to review the experience of the past in order to prepare ourselves for the inevitable questions of the future. This is as true for Canadians as for anyone. What is the potential of the instrument? What are its limitations? How may the pitfalls in the policy making and implementing processes be avoided? The present work does not specifically answer all these questions, but it aspires to record and analyze events so as to provide at least some basis for intelligent judgement. History forgotten will only be repeated.

This thesis is the product of two years' study and research in the field of Canadian international broadcasting policy. As such, it has benefitted by the contributions of many people. I would first like to acknowledge my debt to those numerous serving and retired employees of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the Department of External Affairs who gave of their valuable time in interviews and/or otherwise aided the research process. Special mention should be made here of Robert Reford (formerly of CBC-IS) who not only offered his reminiscences, but was good enough to read and comment upon the manuscript before final submission. For the documentation upon which so much of the paper is based I must similarly
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I owe an incalculable debt to Professor Denis Stairs of Dalhousie University in Halifax whose advice, interest, and encouragement sustained the work from its beginnings in 1979 as a term paper for his third-year seminar in Canadian foreign policy. Professor Don Munton, once "converted", became himself a source of enthusiasm and useful research suggestions. Professor Peyton Lyon of the School of International Affairs, Carleton University, brought the thesis to fruition in what was, of necessity, a very short time. To him I also owe my thanks.

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and Brenda Rice. Such genuine interest and support will not be forgotten.

OTTAWA, August 1981
INTRODUCTION

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY:

PROPAGANDA AND THE MEDIUM OF RADIO

Statecraft has traditionally employed three instruments of policy: the diplomatic, the economic, and the military. Each has been characterized by distinctive techniques and resources. Diplomacy has depended on continual contact and negotiation among representatives of different governments. International regulation of trade flows and general national manipulation of production and consumption patterns for international ends have distinguished the economic instrument. Military force has served foreign policy in the threatened or actual application of physical violence by one state against another.

The twentieth century has seen these three arms supplemented by a fourth, which for present purposes will be termed the "psychological" instrument. Psychological tactics are hardly unique to the past eighty years; over this time, however, two particular developments have raised them to the level of a major policy tool. The first has been the "communications revolution". Prior to the invention of such media of transnational information exchange as radio, cross-border communication was sporadic and limited to a very few individuals.
Yet as modern technology evolved and spread, governments found at their disposal the means to address, and thus potentially influence, other peoples as well as their governments. Concurrently, national societies were broadening their participatory bases. In the democratic states of the West, the franchise was gradually extended and, as increasing numbers of people took part in the political process, social classes and interest groups sought more power. Even totalitarian regimes, by their very attempt to control the masses in almost every dimension of their daily lives, recognized that public disfavour was the ultimate sanction on their authority.

The psychological instrument thus took its place alongside the other more commonly utilized tools of foreign policy. From the beginning, however, it suffered from a certain definitional "fuzziness" which continues to plague it. What, exactly, were the activities subsumed here? The range offered by analysts boggled the mind: one could speak of political warfare, psychological warfare, propagandizing, information provision, political communication, and so on. One scholar managed to compile eighteen such labels. The difficulty in expressing the conceptual essence of the instrument seemed to betray an uncertainty not only about the instrument itself, but also about its relationship to the others previously mentioned.
Clarification of the relationship calls for a return to basics. Foreign policy, it is widely agreed, requires at once an objective and a strategy. The notion of "objective" subsumes that of "expectation", i.e. the strategy is linked in the mind of the policy maker with an image of the "result". This takes the form of altered behaviour on the part of "target states" or, more properly, "target decision-makers" upon whom the policy is exercised. A proper strategy, however, requires the acting policy- or decision-maker to have some appreciation of the sources of political behaviour. Decision-making theory offers a relevant hypothesis: "what the decision-makers see is what they act upon". One thus confronts the central role of perception in policy-making and, inevitably, in policy-changing. Alter a target policy-maker's definition of a political situation, and one may change his policy action or reaction. It is a matter of tactics whether the policy-maker is chosen to be the "target of first instance" or merely the "ultimate target" reached via another more susceptible or readily accessible.

This approach suggests a differentiation of the psychological instrument from its fellows. Diplomacy, economic sanction, and military force require manipulation of material situations: negotiations are initiated or broken off, trade is restricted, armies and weapons are deployed. Use of the psychological instrument primarily involves image manipulation: it seeks to alter how material situations are viewed more than it alters the
way they are (although the desired result of the effort is almost always to encourage a material policy response).

Psychological operations conducted by state A may thus affect the behaviour of foreign state B in four ways (assuming a strictly bilateral relationship) depending on the external or internal orientation of the perception being manipulated, and on the nature of the target of first instance in state B:

1) by altering the perceptions of an external situation held by the population of B, or a portion thereof, in such a way that decision-makers in B are required to change their foreign policy in line with the wishes of their people and, implicitly, with the wishes of A;

2) by directly altering the perceptions of an external situation held by decision-makers in B so that they will pursue the foreign-policy option desired by A;

3) by altering the perception of a domestic situation held by the population of B, or a portion thereof, in such a way that the decision-makers in B are required to change their foreign policy in line with the wishes of their people and, implicitly, with the wishes of A;

4) by directly altering the perceptions of a domestic situation held by decision-makers in B so that they will pursue the foreign policy option desired by A.

Perceptions held by decision-makers and general populations in target states are themselves a product of a cultural,
educational, geographic, and occupational environment. Recognizing this, one is required in the process of altering perceptions to manipulate symbols and values associated therewith. The limit of manipulation is conditioned by what the target is mentally prepared to accept, regardless of whether the perception post facto is closer to or farther from the objective reality of a given situation.

Propaganda may be defined as a technique of perception change. Defining it more precisely, however, is difficult. It is clearly "loaded" - in common parlance it amounts to "persuasion I don't like". It might even be preferable to discard the word entirely, perhaps substituting for it "information provision" or "political communication". But to adopt this alternative is to risk ignoring the purpose of the propagandist, which is to sway a target to accept his views. The attempt to influence may be obvious or subtle; the tone of the effort may range from near-hysteria to a calculated calm. Yet realizing that "information", be it true or false, must be believed if it is to be of value in altering perceptions, all propagandists want to be persuasive. In this context a definition of propaganda such as that offered by Terence Qualter is particularly appealing:

Propaganda is...the deliberate attempt by some individual or group to form, control, or alter the attitudes of other
groups by the use of instruments of communication, with the intention that in any given situation the reaction of those influenced will be that desired by the propagandist. In the phrase "deliberate attempt" lies the key to the idea of propaganda.

Qualter here comes to grips with a number of central concepts: policy objective, strategy, and group target. If there is a deficiency in the definition it is the failure to disaggregate types of propaganda. A distinction might be drawn between direct and indirect indoctrination. In the first instance the "reaction...desired by the propagandist" is made explicit. In the second, it is left to individual inference — although the impact of the message may be equal. Of course, propaganda may not by itself attain all the specific ends of foreign policy, but it may facilitate their attainment by influencing the general international environment and sweeping away some of the obstacles that hinder diplomatic activity.

Given then that propaganda is a technique used in applying the psychological instrument of statecraft, one might enquire into the various media involved in that subtle or not-so-subtle art of persuasion. Indeed, the medium for propaganda may be highly significant in determining the impact of the message and the nature of the response to it. The printed word is lasting; it is an appeal to reason that may be considered at leisure over and over again. The visual media —
television and film - can produce a stunning personal effect and bring an immediacy to their messages that the more psychologically "distant" print medium cannot. Then, of course, there is the aural medium - radio - the technology of which permits the sound of the human voice to be transmitted over incredible distances and events to be reported as they happen with unparalleled rapidity. The skilled propagandist, allowed these three basic options, selects the medium or combination of media which promises to maximize the intended effect of his message.

The international propagandist, however, does not usually have this choice. He inevitably faces two obstacles: not just the obstacle of understanding, but also one of limited access. His message must not only be comprehensible, but it must reach its target. He is less likely, therefore, to determine his medium of communication than to have it determined for him by circumstance. Printed matter, he finds, is cumbersome, it is easily censored or confiscated, and its effect is limited to the literate populace in a target state. Television, while exceptionally appealing, is largely confined within national boundaries. But the international propagandist requires a medium that is relatively immune to cross-border restriction, which possesses the capacity to convey his message forcefully, and which is technologically capable of being received by an audience, "elite" or "mass", in a foreign
land. Put simply, he needs radio.

Although radio amateurs experimented with long-distance broadcasting before World War I, it was political - not scientific - motivation that ultimately accelerated the growth of international radio communication. Among the first national leaders to recognize the capacity of radio as a propaganda instrument was Lenin, who described the medium as a "newspaper without paper...and without boundaries". Under his direction the Soviets built what was then the most powerful longwave station in the world; they followed that achievement with the construction of the first official shortwave station anywhere. By 1930, the USSR was beaming programs to foreign listeners in more than fifty languages and dialects.

Lacking the same ideological incentive to international proselytization, other nations were slower in taking political advantage of evolving communications technology. Nonetheless gradual growth of "Western" international broadcasting capacity can be traced from the mid-twenties when private medium-wave stations in the US and UK began regular exchange and relay of each other's programs. More obvious political purposes became apparent in the years after 1929, when various European colonial powers inaugurated official shortwave transmissions to their overseas possessions. The Dutch were the first in the field, followed by the French in 1931.
The British Broadcasting Corporation began its "Empire Service" in 1932; a daily Belgian radio program to the Congo commenced in 1934. Audiences at first were very small. In 1935, for example, the Belgians could only claim about 850 listeners.\textsuperscript{13}

Soon other nations, such as Switzerland and Czechoslovakia, were setting up overseas radio organizations of their own. Neither of these two countries had colonial interests to protect, but both recognized the value of reaching expatriates. Swiss radio, which started broadcasting in French, German, and Italian to North America and Argentina in 1935, was indeed officially described as an instrument of cultural propaganda by which the ties of distant nationals to their motherland could be reinforced.\textsuperscript{14} It quickly became clear, however, that the future of international radio lay more in the direction of open psychological warfare conducted by the government of one state against other governments and populations. The German Nazis had joined the Russians in the area of political broadcasting in 1933. Two years later Fascist Italy led off with Arabic broadcasts to Africa and the Middle East. Militarist Japan subsequently initiated transmissions in Japanese and English to Hawaii and the North American west coast.
Such developments prompted hitherto hesitant authorities in the non-fascist states to step up their own efforts. Old services diversified: the BBC took a major initiative in inaugurating an Arabic section in 1938 for the specific purpose of countering the Italian propaganda drive. New services sprang up in droves: by the outbreak of war in 1939, more than twenty-five nations were anxiously beaming their messages into the ether.

The Second World War saw international radio assume an unprecedented political prominence. This was psychological warfare in the fullest sense of the word. Berlin's infamous "Lord Haw-Haw" and Japan's "Tokyo Rose" became names synonymous with deceit and subversive intent. Shortwave was unquestionably serious business in the Allied countries too. The operations of the BBC mushroomed. In the United States, the government expropriated private facilities to establish an official "Voice of America". Other nations did likewise. War's end found fifty-five states broadcasting over four thousand hours a week.

If the war had been the true making of international radio as a psychological medium, the peace nearly proved its undoing. In the euphoria of the post-hostilities period, administrations were loath to continue pumping considerable sums into a political weapon they now considered superfluous. The
BBC was subjected to budget cuts. In Washington, Congress was on the verge of voting VOA out of existence altogether. Many international services around the globe faced equally bleak prospects. Yet international conflict, the very condition that had spawned the radios in such numbers, ultimately saved them. As tension between the United States and the Soviet Union increased, a Cold War mentality descended on the world's capitals. Governments on both sides of the Iron Curtain looked to their external broadcasting services for the psychological weapons to fight the "battle for men's minds". Radio Moscow launched a "peace drive"; in 1950 President Harry S. Truman authorized VOA and the other elements of the American information arm to wage a "Campaign of Truth". New operations were established. American government and private enterprise co-operated to found Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation (later Radio Liberty), both of which attempted to ram their messages behind Communist borders with hundreds of thousands of watts of transmitting power. The airwaves burned with accusations and denials. Technical facilities were strained to their limits. Sixty nations were producing 6500 hours of programming as the decade of the 1950s began. This phenomenal expansion of output continued through the 1960s and early 1970s, despite a certain improvement in the political climate. By 1975 over 17,000 hours of monitorable material were being produced world-wide.
The Canadian government was hardly a casual observer in the international "war of words". It too displayed an interest in reaching an international audience potentially numbering into the hundreds of millions. The greater portion of the Canadian public, however, has little recognized the resultant effort. There have been essentially three reasons for this. First, there has (with the significant exception of a few ethnic groups) been no domestic audience for the Canadian programming. All international broadcasts from Canada have been aimed abroad; domestic reception, if any, has been accidental. Secondly, Canada has not historically been a "shortwave country". Save for the Canadian North (where domestic shortwave broadcasts have been directed via the CBC Northern Service for many years) the nation has never had to rely on shortwave as a normal medium of internal communication. Thirdly, Canadians, together with most North Americans, have been objects of ongoing "communications overkill". With innumerable information channels constantly and freely accessible to them, few have seen any utility or necessity in seeking alternative sources on the international shortwave bands. Research conducted in the early 1970s, indeed, indicated that, reflecting a lack of mass interest, only 8% of all the radios on the North American continent had shortwave capability as compared with up to 75% in other regions of the world.20
This lack of public awareness has been faithfully reflected in academe, which, since 1961, has largely ignored the contribution of international broadcasting to propaganda and foreign policy in the Canadian context. The consignment of the subject to such oblivion, however, is at once undeserved and unfortunate. First, it may be advanced that the Canadian international broadcasting service has directly touched more people around the globe more often than all the more commonly recognized tools of Canadian statecraft combined. Secondly, insofar as academic analyses have to this point failed substantially to acknowledge or document the existence of the psychological instrument of radio in Canadian foreign policy, such failures may have contributed to incomplete or even false generalizations about motivating factors in Canadian foreign policy decisions, methods of policy implementation, and the influence exercised by certain actors - especially domestic ethnic groups - in the policy-making process.

What follows is an analysis of the Canadian international broadcasting service (the CBC international Service) as a psychological instrument of Canadian foreign policy from 1948-1963. This writer has chosen to concentrate on Cold War history, it being most illustrative of the relationship between international broadcasting and Canadian foreign policy in general, and of the problems confronted in the policy-making process in particular.
The present exercise may be conceptually divided into a series of tasks. In this Introduction an attempt has already been made to define the so-called "psychological" instrument of foreign policy and differentiate it from other tools of statecraft. "Propaganda" has been defined and identified as a policy technique. Radio has been identified as a propaganda medium with specific advantages, and its international use as such has been outlined. As the investigation of the CBC International Service as a psychological instrument of Canadian foreign policy begins, however, questions necessarily become more particular. How was the CBC-IS linked with the Department of External Affairs from 1948-63? Did the linkage change over time? What policy consequences did the liaison have, and how were these reflected in CBC broadcast strategy and programming? To what extent did strict foreign policy considerations guide the operations of the Service? Did the broadcast effort accomplish its goals? Did the International Service seek to further its ends through co-ordination of its activities with those of BBC and VOA? Under what domestic constraints did IS function during the Cold War? Finally, was the CBC-IS a significant instrument of Canadian foreign policy during the period under examination, or was it basically a "twisted arm" at the mercy of domestic pressures and interests? If the latter, why was it allowed to survive?
The relatively disorganized state of the External Affairs files on which this paper is largely based makes sequential thematic treatment of these queries inadvisable over the whole period 1948-63. The text is therefore chronologically subdivided in order to allow separate study of each distinct phase of policy development. Chapter One, 1937-47, provides essential background in an examination of the circumstances leading up to the establishment of IS, and its wartime and early post-war experience. Chapter Two, 1948-51, analyses the development of IS broadcast policy and the External Affairs liaison in the years following the Czechoslovak Communist "coup". Chapter Three discusses in detail the behind-the-scenes political maneuvering which resulted in the 1952 creation of CBC-IS's highly controversial Ukrainian Section. Chapter Four, 1952-53, looks into the period of IS history when the Service was headed by Canadian diplomat Jean Désy, and studies the changes he made in Service policy and the institutional relationship with the Department. Chapter Five, 1953-56, follows the story of the interdepartmental and Cabinet reviews of CBC-IS and, in addition, dissects Operation LOBSTER FESTIVAL, the 1955 "psychological offensive" which stands as the "high-water mark" of sophistication in External's employment of IS as a psychological weapon in the Cold War. Chapter Six, 1956-63, concentrates on the Department's attempt to "rein in" the external radio while concurrently defending it against Trea-
sury Board efforts to restrict its operations drastically, and takes the account of CBC-IS to the 1963 cessation of Soviet "jamming". Chapter Seven examines the extent of coordination that existed from 1948-63 between the broadcast campaigns of CBC, BBC, and VOA. The Conclusion of this paper surveys the domestic constraints which so complicated the work of the Service over the period considered, and offers an explanation of the reasons for the institution's survival in the face of controversy and uncertain achievement.
NOTES


3. What follows in this paragraph is modelled, with revisions, on Holt, p.11.


7. See, for instance, Davison, p.9.


13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.


17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.


CHAPTER ONE

PROLOGUE:

THE CBC INTERNATIONAL SERVICE, 1937-47

By the late 1930s, as will be recalled from the introduction to this paper, international broadcasting was becoming a field of increasing significance. As early as 1936 Canada's newly-established domestic radio network, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, was itself investigating the possibilities and potential for an international service. The idea was first brought to the serious attention of the Government the following year, when Leonard Brockington, Chairman of the CBC Board of Governors, addressed a letter on that subject to Prime Minister Mackenzie King. Brockington's case relied on such general policy considerations as the advancement of national prestige, the fostering of international goodwill towards Canada, and the encouragement of greater international awareness of Canada's economic and cultural status.¹ King, ever the hard-nosed politician, saw little of obvious or immediate value in the proposition and let it rest. The CBC's suggestion was, however, soon taken up at another level. The 1938 final report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Radio Broadcasting noted that

Your Committee was impressed with the importance of the establishment, at an
early date, of a high-powered short-wave broadcasting station. Such a station, your Committee believes, would be a great utility in interpreting and advertising Canada abroad...Canada, your Committee was informed, is the only major trading nation without such facilities. 2

The recommendation was repeated in the Committee's 1939 submission, but all to no avail. 3 The Government was simply not prepared to assume the expense.

The coming of war in Europe in September 1939 rapidly put the proposal in a different light. The use of "information" - propaganda - as a wartime instrument of foreign policy had already been established in the 1914-18 conflict. As the Nazi blitz rolled over the Continent, London and Paris radio again filled the airwaves with appeals and exhortations. But Canada was silent.

Not so silent was the domestic press, which raised its voice in favour of a Canadian shortwave operation soon after the outbreak of hostilities. An article appearing in the Ottawa Citizen in late December 1939 pointed out that Canada was "lagging behind in short wave radio". An editorial in the Regina Star berated the federal authorities for having supposedly "shelved" the project in fear of arousing the wrath of American isolationists. A further item in the December 27 Winnipeg Tribune expressed concern over German and Soviet
broadcasts beamed to Canada, and argued that the time had come for Parliament to act.

Yet the first official call for government reconsideration of the shortwave issue came not from Canadian, but rather from British sources. At an October 10, 1940 meeting of the Cabinet War Committee, C.D. Howe, Minister of Munitions and Supply, submitted a request he had received from the High Commissioner at Earnscliffe for the construction in this country of what was termed

a reserve high power short wave radio station to provide a world-wide service in the event of it becoming impossible, as a result of enemy action, to continue efficient operation of United Kingdom stations.

The rationale was not hard to appreciate: by October 1940 Britain stood alone in Europe against the Germans, and if she fell Canada would inevitably become the seat of Churchill's Government-in-Exile. Some means of overseas radio communication would become necessary - hence the request. The Canadian Cabinet group was nonetheless unimpressed.

The British persisted. In late 1941 they seemed to gain an important convert in the person of Norman Robertson, the highly influential Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, who wrote on August 16 to J.G. Thorson, the
Minister of National War Services,

...this proposal deserves careful consideration...[T]he usefulness of short-wave transmissions from Canada should be judged both on the basis of the contribution which their broadcast would have during the present war, and also on the basis of our own interests in other parts of the Commonwealth and in the countries of the American hemisphere...

Thorson too was won over to the cause. The gradual line-up of Ministers and high officials behind the proposal was reinforced by yet another report of the Committee on Radio Broadcasting, which bluntly declared in mid-1942 that "the national interest requires that [a shortwave station] be set under way at once."

Internal opposition in the Government was finally overcome, and on September 18 Cabinet approved Order-in-Council 8168 authorizing the construction of two 50kw shortwave transmitters at Sackville, New Brunswick. The Privy Council Minute recording the Order contained several paragraphs reviewing the considerations behind the Government action, one of which ran as follows:

The war serves to emphasize the part which a Canadian shortwave station might play at this critical time. Canada's special position in the Americas would lend weight to the effective projection abroad of the major issues at stake in the present war. Such broadcasts would serve

(i) to establish close contact with Canadian
troops abroad;

(ii) to supply the United Kingdom, and other countries of the Commonwealth, and foreign countries with accurate and timely information about Canada and the national war effort;

(iii) to provide the essential means of self-defence and counter-attack against the continuous flow of German and Italian short wave propaganda directed against Canada, or transmitted to foreign countries in order to minimize the Canadian war effort;

(iv) to provide a second line of defence if the enemy were able to put the BBC stations out of operation; and

(v) to strengthen the resistance within the occupied countries of Europe.

Similarly contained in the Minute was a sentence which, in its ambiguity, would pose profound problems for the CBC International Service and the Government in the years to come:

In view of the fact that such short wave broadcasts...constitute a factor affecting Canada's relations with other countries of the Commonwealth, and with foreign countries, the work of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in this field should be carried out in consultation with the Department of External Affairs.

Having thus created the CBC-IS in principle, three tasks remained before the station could go "on air": 1) transmitters had to be procured, 2) administrative controls and
relationships had to be established, and 3) targets and program policy had to be set. For a while it seemed as if the first of these problems would stymie the project indefinitely. The 50kw devices specified by Cabinet could only be purchased in the US. In wartime circumstances, however, the CBC's order was forced to compete with priority demands for electronic equipment from the American and British governments and armed services. Canadian officials quickly scrambled to Washington in an attempt to expedite matters. The Assistant General Manager of the CBC, August Frigon, visited the Federal Communications Commission. Lester Pearson, already attached to the Canadian Legation, called personally on Elmer Davis, head of the US Office of War Information, impressing upon him the Canadian need and how fulfillment of that would be consistent with American as well as Canadian foreign policy interests. Davis subsequently exercised his influence upon the Wartime Production Board, and by March 1943 Frigon was able to report that "a definite indication, unofficial and off the record" had been given to the effect that Canada would get her transmitters. The problem of procurement was thus reduced to one of delivery.

No less serious was the problem of administrative control. By early 1943 Canada had two bodies dealing with information abroad: the Wartime Information Board (dealing in news and propaganda to outside countries in general) and the
Psychological Warfare Committee (a WIB - External Affairs
group charged specifically with the supervision of news and
propaganda to enemy and enemy-occupied countries). Yet nei-
ther of these groups seemed appropriate to guide the new CBC-
IS, with the result that in May the CBC's General Mana-
ger suggested the creation of a joint External Affairs - CBC
Shortwave Committee responsible for IS programming.15 This
idea was later expanded into a Government - CBC Shortwave
Committee composed of representatives from the Privy Council
Office, the WIB, the Psychological Warfare Committee, the
CBC, and External Affairs.16 Its projected functions were
threefold: 1) determining broadcast policies, 2) ensuring
that these policies were followed in the whole shortwave
broadcasting field, and 3) judging the suitability of the
personnel engaged in shortwave broadcasting.17

Examination of relevant documents makes it clear
that, in practice, the Department of External Affairs took
primary responsibility for guiding the young shortwave arm.18
The Department, in fact, had done spade work in the field
of target determination as early as 1942. An internal memo
from December of that year offered this target list: 1) United
Kingdom and countries of the Commonwealth, 2) Latin America,
3) France, 4) China and adjacent territories, 5) Russia and
Central Europe.19 The list was revised over and over again
as the war progressed. By March 8, 1944, Norman Robertson
was backing the following schedule: 1) UK; 2) France, Holland, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Germany; 3) Australia and New Zealand; 4) South Africa; 5) Mediterranean area (Spain, Italy, North Africa); 6) Caribbean and Latin America; 7) Far East, China, Japan. Technical considerations intervened at this point, with the result that the "final list", approved by the Government - CBC Shortwave Committee on March 21, 1944, included only the UK, France and Central Europe, the West Indies and Latin America.

Remembering the time it took to finalize broadcast targets, the lag in settling program policy cannot be surprising. Of greater note is the fact that, when that problem finally arose, it was treated in a somewhat lackadaisical manner. Of course "troop programming" for Canadians abroad (intended as the mainstay of the service at first) was not of real policy concern. Nonetheless External Affairs in particular felt that the "propaganda" services, especially the German section, could also more or less run themselves (following PWC directives or, in their absence, guidance from the British Political Warfare Executive or the American Office of War Information) without much other supervision from Ottawa. It was only gradually persuaded of the advisability of reviewing actual scripts before broadcasts, especially those destined for enemy territory.
After two months of test transmissions, the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation signed on officially from its studios in Montreal on February 25, 1945. Over 65% of the early programming (the total amounted to 50 hours per week) was, as planned, intended for Canadian troops in Europe. Other early services were German, Czech, and Dutch (experimental). The first of these was clearly the leading edge of the Canadian shortwave propaganda effort. Transmissions in German were divided into three sections: news, features, and "prisoner of war" broadcasts. Here was the real "punch". In March 1945 the CBC's Central European Supervisor reported to the Psychological Warfare Committee as follows:

The primary purpose of [our POW broadcasts] is the conduct of psychological warfare....The content is based upon the current directives of the Political Warfare Executive and may be summarized...

a) to encourage surrender and desertion by German soldiers by depicting the favourable conditions of camp life in Canada;

b) to discourage continued resistance by the German people and to counteract Goebbels' "Strength Through Fear" propaganda by citing humane treatment of prisoners in Canadian camps as evidence of the general principles which will guide Allied treatment of the German people after the war;

c) to weaken the German will to re-
sist and loyalty to Naziism through the statements of anti-Nazi prisoners concerning the futility of continued resistance, the terrible cost of prolonging the war, the guilt of the Nazi leadership, the advantage of immediate unconditional surrender, and the futility of Nazi propaganda concerning a new and worse Versailles. 25

That this was an accurate analysis could be seen from programs broadcast at the time:

Not long ago I saw a letter which Hans, a German prisoner of war wrote [to his parents] from the Canadian camp '40...

"I must say one can be very satisfied here. The treatment is good, and the food is on a grand scale. Mother there is good tea here, genuine bean coffee, always with milk, in addition there is always white bread and cakes even, proper English cakes with heaps of raisins. I am always quite astonished."

- January 10, 1945

We are really very well....Naturally we must work, but there is so much to eat, that we often do not know where to begin. Our accommodation and food is comparable to an Eldorado.

- January 24, 1945

The quicker the war ends, that much quicker can the guilty be meted out their just punishment....Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels and Goering [know that] there is no road back. In order to
save their own skins for a while yet, they allow the German people to go on dying for a while longer...We prisoners of war call on you, Germans in the Homeland...Stop fighting against this overwhelming might. Slay the national socialist, who otherwise will lead you to the slaughtering block. Save for our country and for our people what remains to be saved. You owe us, to the world and to yourself - the peace.

- January 27, 1945

There is no longer any need to warn you at home of impending defeat. For defeat - inexorable and complete - is already upon you...The homeland shares the responsibility for the destruction of the homeland. This guilt will have to be recognized and admitted by the German people, by all of us...

- mid-March, 1945

With the end of the war in Europe in May the political warfare role fulfilled by the CBC-IS as an instrument of Canadian foreign policy decreased in value. Broadcasts in German now concentrated exclusively on the re-education process, with programs such as "The Guilt of the Nazis", "The Responsibility of the German People", and "The Reconstruction of Germany Under Allied Occupation" being prepared and transmitted. Eventually, the flow of directives was reduced to a trickle. Those which continued to arrive from PWE in Great Britain were quickly becoming irrelevant, especially as they concentrated on reactions to events in the
British occupation zone of the former German Reich. In Can-
ada, External Affairs disengaged itself from IS. The Psy-
chological Warfare Committee having disbanded, responsibility
for direct IS liaison was left with the Department's new In-
formation Division. This section limited itself to the oc-
casional perusal of script summaries after broadcast.

In consequence the staff of IS groped. Their ap-
proach to matters of international significance became one
of considerable, if not excessive, caution. What were the
purposes of a Canadian shortwave arm in the post-war period?
As of December 1945 no one knew. External's responses to
the complaints of Peter Aylen, CBC-IS's first General Super-
visor, were strictly ad hoc. One letter from the Department
dated April 9, 1946 attempted to fill part of the gap by
suggesting that "post war German programs should have two
main objectives:

1) giving the Germans an idea of main
world developments as seen through
Canadian eyes and

2) to give them a picture of Canadian
developments in order to understand
how normal Western democracy works.

The CBC-IS, however, did not find such broad hints satisfac-
tory. A further problem was one of straight information.
Aylen elaborated:
...in the absence of detailed back-
ground about conditions in Germany,
we are not in a position to formulate
policies ourselves and in the absence
of authoritative guidance from those
who are well-informed, we feel it
would be surprising if in these cir-
cumstances our programs could be as
valuable as they should be...

Aylen's observations introduced two peacetime prob-
lems: one for the CBC and one for the Department of External
Affairs. The CBC's problem was maintaining autonomy - not
necessarily absolute autonomy, but enough to dispel suspicions
that it was muzzled or controlled by the Department. Taking
material from External Affairs would, however, involve risking
that autonomy in the manner of the material's treatment. CBC
officials recognized that IS could not, as the "Voice of Can-
ada", go too far astray in the political field without risking
the imposition of stiff obligatory supervision. The broad-
casters were thus left to walk a fine line. Similarly con-
troversial for the Department was the matter of security, or
the terms on which Department background information could be
distributed for broadcast reference. Essentially, could the
Department be sure that, in sending despatches or analyses
to IS, confidentiality of documents would be preserved? To
what level would the Department's trust extend - the Supervi-
sor only, his assistants, the language/section heads, or the
script writers? Indeed, if the material were excessively re-
stricted did not this defeat the very purpose it was supposed
to serve? The information would not filter far enough down the administrative line of command to be of much use. The dilemma offered no ready solution.

In the meantime, language services which had been planned during and just after the war kept coming "on line" without any clear conception of their responsibilities or particular functions: Spanish, Portuguese, and English to Latin America and the Caribbean (September 1945); Norwegian Swedish, and Danish to Scandinavia (July 1946); English to Australia and New Zealand (June 1947). As the divisions multiplied, so did the number of staff; by early 1947 IS employed 120 persons, almost four times its original complement. But growth hardly encouraged increased guidance. The new targets, after all, were former allies or, at worst, friendly states whose political outlooks were broadly compatible with Canada's own. If anything, it was implied, broadcast concerns here lay in promotion of trade and immigration, for which little steady guidance from the Government per se was needed.

And so the problems smoldered. Yet while External Affairs did nothing to assist IS in finding its niche as "an arm of Canadian foreign policy," in the post war world, the international situation was deteriorating so as to make political guidance more essential than ever. Strains in the Soviet-American relationship had been building for some time by the
end of 1947. US President Truman had declared the "Truman Doctrine"; the Soviet Union had rejected the Marshall Plan and had moved to consolidate its hold on some of the East European states. IS appealed for a policy; the Department refused to set down anything firm so long as the global political scene remained in a state of flux. At the same time it was unwilling to back any proliferation of controversial sections. A tentative decision to broadcast to the USSR was taken by the CBC, then quashed by External Affairs.\(^{34}\) Within months of this action, however, events in Europe brought matters to a head. In February 1948 Communist elements seized control of the Czechoslovak government. For the CBC International Service, the Cold War had begun.

The wartime and early post-war experience of the CBC-IS as a psychological instrument of Canadian foreign policy is of considerable interest to the analyst of the Service's Cold War history. Not only may he find it valuable background, but he may discover therein the roots of many problems which plagued the station and its utilization in later years. Already evident were the difficulties of policy control (whose policy - DEA's or CBC's? - administered by whom?), station autonomy (what were the limits of "guidance"?), and security (who was to see what?). Even in its earliest
incarnation IS was an organization apart - not the mere ward of the CBC, but part of it; not a part of DEA, but more or less, inevitably, its ward in the policy sense. The money for international broadcasting was voted as a separate parliamentary appropriation, but the Director of the Service was answerable to the CBC whose operations were financed on an entirely different basis. IS looked to the Department for guidance; the Department, by failing to set policy (and doubtless recognizing its lack of ultimate administrative control) refused to take responsibility for it. The domestic Corporation at the same time held its "propaganda section" at arm's length, perhaps in an attempt to limit actual or potential "political interference" in its own affairs. International Service was thus left to drift, buffeted by the winds of fortune and political circumstance. It embarked on a course that would see it stumble from crisis to crisis - always a victim, never in control. It would be accused of being too leftist, then too rightist, and then of simply being unmanageable. It would fall prey to budget cuts that would, in turn, make it more open to such attacks. What, in the end, it would accomplish for Canadian foreign policy few would be able to say. And yet it would miraculously survive. In 1948, however, all these things lay in the future. There was a long road ahead.
NOTES

DOCUMENTS CODE:

Most principal references to documents in this thesis are coded according to their Public Archives and External Affairs file numbers. For instance, "PAC RG25/G2/2203, DEA 9901-40" indicates that the document cited may be found in the Public Archives of Canada, Record Group 25 (G2 series), Volume 2203, and that it is part of External Affairs file 9901-40. Those references which have only the Departmental designation signify materials which have not yet been transferred for final deposit. A list of all files used, together with their full titles, may be found in the bibliography.


6. More impressed by the situation were various members of Parliament, among them D.G. Ross (St.Paul's):

   What would be the result if anything happened to the British Broadcasting Corporation?...It seems to me that as part of her war effort Canada might help Great Britain by erecting such a station as I have mentioned. This should be done quickly.

   Canada, House of Commons Debates, November 26, 1940, p.441.

8. Canada, House of Commons Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, July 7, 1942, p.IV.

9. King had become personally persuaded long before this. As early as September 27, 1941 he had written on a memo "I favour the shortwave station & [sic] intended to recommend its establishment at last meeting of War Committee had principal members been present". See James Bayrs, The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), p. 194. That nothing was done until a year later suggests internal Cabinet wrangling; C.D. Howe was accused on several occasions of being cool to the idea.


12. Mackenzie King even went so far as to draft a letter to US President Roosevelt on the matter, but was advised not to send it. See W.L.M. King - F.D. Roosevelt, January 9, 1943 (not sent), PAC RG25/G2/2203, DEA 28-G-40.

13. Part of Davis' letter to the WPB ran as follows:

   "I am sure that Canadian broadcasts would be useful to the advancement of American foreign policy, particularly in such countries as France, where the Canadians would be able to make a much more effective approach than we should.

E. Davis - F. MacIntosh (WPB), January 9, 1943, Ibid.


15. Davidson Dunton - Norman Robertson, "Short-wave Broadcasting", January 26, 1944, Ibid.


18. A 1946 report on External Affairs' wartime propaganda activity commented plainly that

The Department felt that psychological warfare policy was an extension of foreign policy and should be under its direction.


20. Norman Robertson - August Frigon, March 8, 1944, Ibid.

21. "Minutes of Shortwave Joint Committee", March 21, 1944, Ibid. The original 1944 membership of the Committee was distinguished by high rank. Among the most prominent were:

- August Frigon, Acting General Manager, CBC (Chairman)
- Norman Robertson, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
- Davidson Danton, General Manager, WIB
- E.L. Bushnell, General Program Supervisor, CBC
- Peter Aylen, General Supervisor, CBC-IS

22. These were not, however, the first Canadian programs to be beamed abroad. Canadian broadcasts in French had been relayed via the BBC in London and WRUL Boston as early as 1940. By 1943, French and German programs were being produced under the direction of the WIB and transmitted over the facilities of the BBC and the American OWI in New York. The last shipment of these was delivered on December 1, 1944. See Hall, pp.61 and 62, and Birney, "Canada Calling", Canadian Forum, May 1946, 53.


24. The overall breakdown of programming for early 1945 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Percentage directed to Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>67.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>67.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>23.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>7.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>2.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ibid.
26. Transcript of German-language broadcast, January 10, 1945, PAC RG25/G2/2223, DEA 28-G-6-40C.
27. Transcript of German-language broadcast, January 24, 1945, Ibid.
28. Transcript of German-language broadcast, January 27, 1945, Ibid.
29. Transcript of German-language broadcast, n.d. (March 1945?), Ibid.
31. T.W.L. MacDermot - Peter Aylen, April 9, 1946, Ibid.
32. Peter Aylen - F.H. Soward, August 13, 1946, Ibid.
35. Order-in-Council P.C. 156/8855, November 17, 1943, provided that the IS would be financed by the Government of Canada on these terms.
CHAPTER TWO

"A LITTLE MORE AGGRESSIVE THAN BEFORE":

HARDENING THE POLICY LINE, 1948-51

Please do not give us up. Tell everybody over there that we shall not betray our ideals. Your broadcasts will be a source of strength for us and we shall keep our fingers crossed for you at the CBC and for the success of your work....I believe that some day Canada will again be calling Free Czechoslovakia. They cannot nationalize our spirit, it is ours and will conquer in the end.

- Letter from Czechoslovakia, February 6, 1948

The events of February 1948 in Czechoslovakia sent tremors through the West. The only democratic government of its kind in Eastern Europe had been successfully subverted by domestic Communists. As the new rulers consolidated their hold, political parties were banned, and non-Communist political leaders jailed. The death of Czechoslovakia's Foreign Minister, Jan Masaryk, was especially tragic; Masaryk’s father, Thomas, had won for the Czechs their independence from Austria. Freedom, so recently regained, had been lost again.

The Communist "coup" had a profound effect on East-West relations, for behind it most in the West saw the guiding
hand of the Kremlin. In Europe and North America governments intensified their reviews of policy vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc. The developments were of special import to the international propaganda arms of the Western group as they promised to provide justification for activities which had previously been suspect in value. Radio in particular was treated with new reverence.

Within weeks of the takeover, senior officials at the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa were considering proposals for the revitalization of Canada's psychological warfare administration. One memo reaching Escott Reid in early March suggested that

it may be useful at this stage for some government committee...to prepare recommendations as to the organization which it would be desirable to set up for wartime propaganda purposes. 2

The perception of immediate danger gradually dissipated, but it was nonetheless clear that under circumstances of nascent "Cold War" the role of the information services was significant. Recognizing this, Lester Pearson, now risen to the position of Under-Secretary, called a meeting in mid-April to discuss "dissemination of information in countries dominated by Communist regimes". In attendance were himself, Reid, George Glazebrook of the Department, Davidson Dunton (Chair-
man of the CBC Board of Governors), and a number of more junior personnel.  

It was quickly determined that the only practical means of communicating with peoples behind the Iron Curtain was the CBC International Service. It was equally apparent, however, that if broadcasts were to be systematically directed to Communist countries, IS policy would have to be more closely co-ordinated with general Canadian foreign policy than it had previously been. Dunton, speaking for the Corporation, agreed on the desirability of strengthened liaison and suggested that this might best be achieved through the provision of Departmental guidance notes (thereby echoing the line which Aylen had been pushing in 1946). Departmental officials concurred.  

Pearson, although essentially satisfied with the results of the discussion, felt that there was a need for more thorough investigation of the principles and administrative structures that were to govern Canadian broadcasting to the Soviet sphere of influence; he urged the Government-CBC Shortwave Committee to set up a sub-committee of officials to study the matter. Their report, presented to full Committee on July 3, 1948, stands as the first post-war attempt to examine systematically liaison and policy options for the Service. The recommendations of the group obviously reflected the April deliberations in the Department.
In broadcasts [to Communist countries] it is of the greatest importance that CBC-IS shortwave programmes should be well informed...and directly related to the Canadian national interest and Government policy. Such a result can only be achieved by a recognition of the distinct roles of the CBC International Service on the one hand, and other Government agencies on the other.

In the last analysis the CBC International Service must assume full responsibility for the shortwave programmes. The Department of External Affairs is clearly not equipped to undertake the actual-drafting and editing of scripts. CBC personnel are specialists in their field and should have full authority in connection with all matters of programming.

At the same time it is recognized that international broadcasting is... an arm of diplomacy, and that it is clearly desirable that there should be closer liaison between the CBC International Service and the Department.... This...should take two forms:

a) The provision by the Department of full information concerning conditions in the countries concerned, and Canada's relations to those countries. The possession of adequate and authoritative information which the Department is in a position to supply is essential to the functioning of the International Service.

b) The provision by the Department of background notes on Government policy....

There should be mutual respect and confidence as between the International Service and the Department, which means that, on its side, the CBC must ensure that the utmost care shall be exercised in the use and safeguarding of information provided to it.
Here were the old concerns restated: information, independence, and security. The really new departure came in actual broadcast policy, where the sub-committee recommended three substantive principles:

a) The Sub-Committee supports the value in shortwave broadcasting of the positive approach to political issues, i.e. to show the values of life in active, free and civilized nations which possess the tradition of liberty and which are determined to preserve it. It was agreed that the negative approach involving direct condemnation of totalitarian regimes should be used with care in order not to jeopardize the International Service's reputation for integrity and reliability by creating the impression in the minds of its listeners that the service was an agency of propaganda.

b) Nothing should be said or done which would lead people in Communist controlled countries to believe that Canada approves of their Governments. At the same time, great care should be taken to avoid giving the Governments of those countries valid grounds for protests which would be embarrassing to the Canadian government.

c) Every opportunity should be given to encourage the democratic elements in these countries, and to leave with them the impression that their present totalitarian regimes are not necessarily permanent. At the same time, care should be taken to avoid raising false hopes.
In truth, changes in the CBC-IS European service had begun to take place even before the formal articulation of these precepts. The percentage of news content had been dramatically increased in the days following the February coup. With the submission of the sub-committee report, however, IS management took conscious steps towards making the IS Czech service in particular "firmer and more direct". Political commentaries increased. A series of talks on "The Liberal Experiment" was prepared for broadcast. Elections in Canada were played up as an example of "democracy at work". Notable dates in Czech history were remembered, and special presentations were produced illustrating how, during the past history of Czechoslovakia, the people and their leaders were devoted to political freedom. Tributes to former President Benes and Foreign Minister Masaryk were carried on the occasions of their birthdays and the anniversaries of their deaths.

Yet questions inevitably arose as to the optimal limits of the new "firmness". The sub-committee principles themselves oscillated between advocating out-and-out psychological warfare against Communist governments and a desire to create as few ripples as possible on the international scene. Such schizophrenic policy guidelines quickly proved troublesome. As early as August 1948 representations were made to the Department of External Affairs that the
Czech service was adopting "much too friendly a line towards the Communist regime". These criticisms came not so much from Czechoslovak listeners, but from the Czechoslovak émigré colony in Montreal which demanded a much harsher treatment of the existing authorities. As the criticisms persisted, it became obvious that some of the internal divisions and disagreements in the closely-knit ethnic community were simply being projected onto the International Service. Charles Ritchie commented on the situation:

It angers [the Montreal Czechs] to see a little group of Czech Jews, many of whom came out of Czechoslovakia before the Communist regime had been established, sitting in the Ford Hotel [IS headquarters] with nice fat jobs and sounding off as the Voice of Canada to Czechoslovakia. In particular, they dislike Dr. Schmolka [the head of the Section].

Personal animosities notwithstanding, the Department decided an investigation was warranted, and in April 1949 A.D.P. Heeney, by this point Pearson's successor as Under-Secretary, asked the Canadian chargé in Prague to monitor the broadcasts in question. This officer's report, submitted in late May, came to two principal - albeit somewhat contradictory - conclusions. In the first place he summarily dismissed the contentions of the Czech émigrés that the IS programming was giving comfort to the Communists. The criticisms, he submitted, amounted to "so much petulant horse-collar".
Such people would like to move in and take over, and are not likely to be satisfied with any shortwave service that does not lash out at the Czech government.  

On the other hand, the chargé felt that the Canadian transmissions could be less subtle and more vigourous. "There is no fight in the CBC programmes", he wrote, comparing them to similar broadcasts by VOA and even BBC. While the news was comprehensive and factual, the commentaries lacked punch and were inclined to take an undesirable on-the-one-hand, on-the-other-hand position. The chargé concluded that if Canada was to play its part in helping to fight the Cold War on the information front, the amount of straight "projection of Canada" material would have to be reduced in favour of more East European content and more frequent and forceful political commentaries.

The Prague study met with ready approval in Ottawa. R.A.D. Ford, an expert in East European affairs, noted that

we are...waging a mild form of psychological warfare with the Czech government, and therefore our principal aim should be to make as many Czechs dissatisfied with their government and Soviet domination of their country as possible.

The report's recommendations were subsequently forwarded to
Ira Dilworth, now the Director of IS,\textsuperscript{17} who quickly set about making adjustments. The news to Czechoslovakia was made more pointed, religious broadcasts were inaugurated, and a greater effort was made to spotlight the works of Czech writers, thinkers, and political leaders dealing with Czechoslovakia's free past.\textsuperscript{18} Beyond this point, however, there was little the International Service could do - either in the Czech section, or in the sensitive German service - without precise political guidance from the Department. External agreed with the necessity of this, but in attempting to provide it ran straight into the old problem of security.

Security checks had been resumed on persons employed in the International Service of the CBC as early as 1946, but it was not until 1948 that these became truly systematic.\textsuperscript{19} Preliminary investigations only confirmed the Department's fears: in April 1948 Martin Dudak, a producer-writer in the Czech section, was found to have Communist affiliations and was dismissed from his position.\textsuperscript{20} The RCMP were subsequently directed to examine the backgrounds of all IS employees having access to secret material in the course of their work, as well as those of senior personnel (supervisors and heads of sections) who were in a position to make policy and direct programmes. News and feature writers were subjected to a file check.\textsuperscript{21}
One by one, IS personnel were cleared.\textsuperscript{22} In the end, however, two were not - Stuart W. Griffiths, the Central European Supervisor, and Sally Solomon, the Policy Editor. In the Department it was felt that the simple presence of these individuals in their respective key positions frustrated any attempt to take a firmer hand with IS.\textsuperscript{23} External's concern was communicated to the highest level of the CBC. Davidson Dunton undertook to obtain evidence that would justify the Corporation in dismissing the two; he was, however, reluctant to act until a foolproof case had been built up.\textsuperscript{24} In the meantime, the problem festered. Draft guidance notes prepared in External Affairs were explicitly held back on account of the situation.\textsuperscript{25} Finally it was decided that a pointed official representation by the Under-Secretary had to be made in writing to August Frigon, now General Manager of the CBC, who had assumed practical responsibility for the matter.\textsuperscript{26} A personnel shuffle was ultimately arranged: Griffiths was to go to television in Toronto, and Solomon would be reduced to doing "routine work under direction".\textsuperscript{27}

With the departure of these persons from their previous positions, the way was open for the Department to give the leadership IS so desperately required. The first move in this course was made in February 1950 with the posting of a Foreign Service Officer, Jack McCordick, to IS to assist in policy guidance. McCordick rapidly took stock. He noted that
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Type</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>Czech</th>
<th>Dutch</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Italian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>News (as % section output)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
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<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Commentaries</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Talks</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>6.7</td>
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Source: Adapted from "Program Analysis - March 1950", PAC RG25/G2/2203, DEA 9901-40
**TABLE 1**

*Program Analysis, March 1950*

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Program Type</th>
<th>Danish</th>
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<th>Norwegian</th>
<th>Austrian</th>
<th>Spanish</th>
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<tr>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2.8</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
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*To Latin America*

Source: Adapted from "Program Analysis - March 1950", PAC RG25/G2/2203, DEA 9901-40
IS now had twelve operational divisions (see Table 1, Parts 1 and 2). Broadcast policy, he found, was based in practice on three aims. These could be defined as

a) to "put Canada on the map"

b) to build up an audience informed on and well-disposed towards Canada and

c) to help promote Canadian trade in those regions where trade, goodwill, and information are to some extent interlocked. 28

The principles were for the most part applied negatively, i.e. scripts were examined for inaccuracies by the IS policy department and, in a manner of speaking, were censored before transmission. This, however, was unsatisfactory, especially as it was difficult "to distinguish policy from the personal opinions of the...Policy Section". 29 A more positive approach was needed, and McCordick encouraged the Department to frame a basic statement which would not only service as a touchstone for his guidance, but would also articulate for the benefit of CBC officials the Department's view of the role the CBC International Service was to play in the Cold War.

After several months of intensive deliberations such a directive was finally composed in the form of a letter from the Under-Secretary to Frigon, the relevant sections of which follow:
I know that for some time the International Service has been anxious to receive from the Department more information on Canadian foreign policy in general and our policy to individual countries. We have already taken steps to increase the flow of such information. For the sake of convenience, the material is sent to Mr. McCordick of the Department whose services have been loaned to International Service....

I am aware also that you have frequently expressed a desire to receive an expression of the Department’s views on the basic objectives of the International Service; more specific guidance on the policies which the Department thinks should be followed by the International Service in its broadcasts to certain countries or areas; and advice that may be sought from day-to-day on treatment of specific situations....

So far as current policy objectives are concerned, the view of the Department — put very simply — is that CBC-IS should

I. project Canada by

i) explaining Canadian policies and principles and their background, and

ii) presenting a picture of Canadian life, people, industry, etc.

II. promote Western democratic unity, understanding and friendship and participate in any movement to these ends which may be organized, for example, within the framework of the Atlantic Pact

III. participate actively on behalf of Canada in the Cold War

IV. promote Canadian trade.

The simplest and most obvious grouping of target areas for IS pur-
poses is in 2 categories: 1) Soviet and satellite; and 2) the free countries of the world. Broadcasts to the Soviet and satellite areas would have I and III as their chief objectives, whereas the chief aims of other broadcasts could be covered by I, II, and IV....

In prosecuting the Cold War...the CBC-IS...should try to encourage the people on our side, win over the wavers in countries where the battle is more clearly joined, bring over to our side the neutrals, and get the better of our opponents. It can help to do this in its broadcasts by applying objective I above and by including in objective III the following tasks:

a) to give an adequate account of what is going on in the world through a news service which is comprehensive, true, and objective;

b) to strive constantly to identify communism as an instrument of Soviet imperialism;

c) to appeal to the national self-respect of subject peoples, without attempting to incite them to revolt;

d) to unmask the hypocrisy of communist "democracy" in elections, trade unions, labour camps, religion, etc. and the hypocrisy of Soviet peace propaganda and its inconsistency in view of Soviet aggressive foreign policy, rearmament, and concentration on heavy industry to the detriment of the Soviet standard of living;

e) to correct misrepresentations...where Canadian actions are grossly distorted by Communist propaganda;

f) continually to remind listeners living under Communist tyranny that, although we have our social problems of minorities, slums, and occasional injustice, we cope with them, as do other demo-
ocratic nations, by bringing about social change without violence, and that the lives of our common citizens are not dominated by police, arbitrary law decreed by a "Party elite", official kidnapping, "trials" without benefit of justice, and ubiquitous "security" organs who are a law unto themselves.

Broadcasts to countries with large communist parties like France and Italy should contain occasional injections of b), d) and f). The implications of a) should not be neglected, but adapted to show proud peoples what happens when native communists seize the reins of power and then immediately transfer them to the Kremlin's iron grasp...30

IS - with the assistance of the Department - attempted to apply the new principles by a) hardening the policy line in standing language sections and b) refining the policy supervision process within IS. External Affairs rapidly discovered, however, that the methods they employed in coordinating IS policy with Department guidance were very important in themselves. It did not pay to be blunt. As McCordick reported to Charles Ritchie in July of 1950, "the IS [is very sensitive] to any suggestion or suspicion that the Department wants to control it or give it orders about policy or program content".31 At the other extreme, the Department could not allow itself to appear uninterested in any sense:

In order to make effective use of the CBC-IS as an instrument of Canadian foreign policy, it is essential that the IS be provided with adequate infor-
mation and that its morale be main-
tained at the highest possible level. 32

A delicate balance was being sought; subsequent years would prove that when the Department disturbed the scales on ei-
ther side, trouble would follow.

One of the earliest attempts to apply the "Heeney principles" within a specific context was made in the Ger-
man section of IS in September 1950 on the occasion of the first East German elections. Arthur Pidgeon, IS Policy Co-
ordinator, contrived a scheme for a six week series of daily commentaries which were to "attack the elections [and] the plans of the SED [Sozialistische Einheits Demokratie] and the Soviets as they develop during the...campaign". 33 These commentaries stressed the anti-democratic nature of the ex-
ercise and the implications of the elections for the whole of Germany. At the same time they sought to demonstrate Canadian concern to the West Germans and suggest that "they should do some fighting and show alertness in combating the threats from the East and the Communist threat within their own ranks". 34

A greater challenge to IS policy planners, as well as their DEA "wardens", was the formulation of principles to govern the operation of the station's projected Russian
service. The very decision to broadcast to the Soviet Union was a significant political move; it had been resisted for precisely that reason in the uncertain days of 1947. By 1950, however, circumstances had changed considerably. It was nonetheless interesting that the decisive "push" to the idea was provided by the British and the Americans. A letter reaching Davidson Dunton from the office of the British High Commissioner in January 1950 declared that

The United States Government and the Foreign Office consider that it would be desirable to reinforce [their] battery operation of broadcasts to the USSR and it is thought that the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation might be willing to transmit shortwave broadcasts in Russian in a scheduled time to coincide with those of the Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Corporation. 35

The suggestion at first met with reservations, but the British kept up the pressure. Again, in 1950 as in 1941, they were successful. Yet Heeney's ultimate rationale in recommending the option to the Minister (Pearson) seems to have been based more on a desire to please Canadian allies than any conviction about the worth of such a service per se at that time. 36

The new section required a strategy. Working from the aforementioned "Heeney principles", External Affairs officers put together by late 1950 a paper entitled "Psychological
Warfare: CBC-IS Russian Service" which offered the Department's views on appropriate policy. This document expressed particular IS aims as extensions of general Canadian aims in the Cold War. These were described as follows:

I - to preserve peace, by

a) strengthening the morale, faith, and determination of our friends in the Soviet Union in their opposition to the Soviet system, regime, and policies;

b) undermining the morale, faith, and determination of the people of the Soviet Union who actively or passively support Soviet policies;

c) convincing the Russians...of our peaceful, unaggressive purpose;

d) demonstrating to the Soviet peoples that they cannot hope to win a new world war;

e) presenting the Soviet regime (and its attendant satellite regimes) as solely responsible for war should it come.

II - to win the war if it comes, towards which result the above peace-preservation formula would contribute (in the event of war, "cold war" P.W. aims would have to be emeshed or reconciled with wartime P.W. aims)

III - as a long-term project, to help prepare the ground for a future better life in the Soviet dominated area by

a) showing the good in our way of life and the evil in the Soviet way;
b) keeping alive and if possible increasing knowledge of and appreciation of democracy, that code of ethics which we and the Russians have derived from Christianity and Western civilization and thought;

c) seeking to maintain belief in eventual liberation from tyranny and slavery, bolstering the will of the individual to fight for his freedom and soul when the time comes, and checking trends towards fatalistic resignation.

The Notes to the directive were similarly interesting. Here were offered the ever-so-important refinements and explanations of the general precepts. In a conscious counterpoint to the Soviet propaganda campaign, "peace" was proposed as a staple term for Canadian broadcasts. It was felt that Canada had a special claim to pacifism as a consequence of her tradition, constitutional form, inclination, and conviction. Transmissions were to make it clear, however, that if war was forced upon the nation, Canada's industrial potential, the quality of the population, and the love of freedom would carry the day.

Possible pitfalls in the approach were also identified. Broadcasts to the USSR were no place for classic Anglo-Saxon understatement. On the other hand, it was not advisable to present the Western message in an excessive manner, either concentrating solely on material progress or being too abstract in the proselytizing of Western values. Neither
was Russian pride to be offended. Harping on Soviet shortcomings or advocating the dissolution of the country was therefore to be avoided at all costs.\textsuperscript{39}

A like paper was eventually produced for the satellite nations.\textsuperscript{40} In the meantime, however, further care was taken to ensure that the IS Russian section, once operational, would truly serve the purposes for which it was intended. An unprecedented rehearsal procedure was arranged in the winter of 1950-51 between the CBC and the Department of External Affairs. Davidson Dunton, appearing before a parliamentary committee some months later, described the sequence of events:

\begin{quote}
The general policy to be followed was very carefully worked out with the Department along general lines. Then for a month we worked on a closed circuit operation - that is, we were not actually on the air - and then the scripts were all gone over by Departmental officials to give us their opinion of it. Then, of course, when we went on the air we followed the general lines laid down by them. [For the broadcast pattern in effect after the creation of the Russian service, see Table 2.\textsuperscript{41}]
\end{quote}

Yet even as the Canadian shortwave arm was taking this significant step into the ideological fray, allegations were heard once more that the IS was being "neutral", "politically ineffective", and was employing persons of somehow
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>European beam</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech/Slovak</td>
<td>9:45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish</td>
<td>2:20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>5:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>8:45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finnish</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>6:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>3:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2:20</td>
</tr>
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<td>Russian</td>
<td>7:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2:35</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Latin American beam</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Australasian beam</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td>English</td>
<td>2:20</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

questionable loyalty. The ringleader of the attacks this time was Robert Keyserlingk, editor of a right-wing Montreal-based Roman Catholic weekly called The Ensign. Keyserlingk, himself an emigré from Soviet rule, had an extensive background as a journalist, and was able to put his ethnic connections to good use in castigating the CBC for being particularly lax in the tone and programming of its European section.42 In effect, many of the same charges that had been levelled at the Czech service in 1948-49 were trundled out again. The controversy had never really died; The Ensign had latched onto it in November 1949 and had run sporadic editorials in the year that followed. A combination of circumstances then brought matters to a head. On January 14, 1951 Keyserlingk delivered a talk over radio station CJAD in Montreal in which he charged the head of the Czech section, Walter Schmolka, with being "particularly anxious not to make bad friends, even among the communists" and accused the general IS management of arranging a visit to the CBC studios, against the advice of the former Czech ambassador, of the head of the Communist Bohemian radio.43 Overall, IS was said to engage in "kid glove handling of the Communist [Czech] regime" which was probably the result of "left-wingers and Marxists finding employment in foreign language broadcasts".44

The remarks might have been ignored had they not been reproduced and expanded upon in the French-language
journal Relations, and, via that channel, on the editorial page of the influential Montreal Gazette. Ira Dilworth doubtless watched in horror as his service was lambasted in one of Canada's leading dailies. Incensed, he wrote a lengthy reply to the allegations which appeared in the Gazette on March 22, 1951. "I have no wish", he wrote in part,

to enter into a discussion of personal opinions which may be held from a highly partisan point of view, or expressed obliquely and with a certain amount of innuendo. I feel I would be remiss in my duty, however, if I did not point out...certain statements which are misleading or false or both.45

Rebuttal after rebuttal followed as Dilworth systematically attempted to correct Keyserlingk's misrepresentations. Other figures rallied to the cause, such as McGill University's J.R. Mallory who, perhaps not incidentally, had prepared talks for IS on previous occasions. "To attack by name", Mallory declared

an official of the International Service [i.e. Dr. Schmolka] for policy decisions made in the Department of External Affairs is a monstrous violation of the principles of fair play, because it is an attack on a man, the very nature of whose job renders him incapable of defending himself. Common decency apart, such attacks betray a lack of knowledge of our political institutions so vast as to be almost incredible.
The Relations article quoted concludes in a tissue of irrelevancies in which the National Film Board, Mr. John Grierson, and the views of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover are all culled together to create the impression that all employees of the International Service are probably Communists, though neither proof nor argument is offered for so serious a charge. There is a phrase for this: it is "guilt by association".

Nonetheless, the critics of IS remained dissatisfied. One writer to the Gazette, apparently well-informed about the internal situation in the service, wrote that he found Dilworth's response "most unsatisfactory":

If the service was so satisfactory, why has the policy editor of the service [Miss Solomon] been removed? Why did External Affairs have to appoint Mr. McCordick to "study the situation"?

Another correspondent, who also happened to be the Canadian editor of the so-called "Free Czech Information Service", submitted that "Mr. Dilworth does not deny...that there are still in the Czech section persons who have relatives with the Czechoslovak Red Consulate in Montreal".

Dilworth chose not to make a further rebuttal, perhaps deciding that to do so would only give the controversy added publicity. The controversy, however, refused to go away. On May 14 George Drew, the leader of the Progressive Conserva-
tive Opposition, rose in the House of Commons:

...I...think we should have much more information concerning the specific allegations which have been made by responsible people for some time that [IS] broadcasts have been rather sympathetic to the Communist point of view, and that men with known communist affiliations still have something to do with these activities...49

Pearson quickly came to the Service's defence. In Parliament he insisted that IS was doing valuable work for Canada and was playing a useful part in what he termed "the psychological war against communism".50 He simultaneously attempted to quash the suspicions which Drew had voiced about the loyalty of IS personnel. His position in testimony before the Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs later in the month was much the same. In a prepared brief he explained some of the Government's propaganda lines and outlined their procedures of application within the CBC. Broadcasts to West Europe, he noted, were intended to develop, in NATO countries, "a spirit of community and the appreciation of our common heritage and destiny, and should contribute to the growth of confidence in our common cause".51 East European service goals were largely explained in terms of the Russian section directive of October 1950. Pearson took care to reject the arguments of those who preferred a more openly hostile tone for IS programming: "good results", he declared, "cannot be ob-
tained in the long run by abusive name-calling.\textsuperscript{52} Finally, he emphasized the effectiveness of the broadcasts, drawing the Committee's attention to IS audience mail as well as to the "negative indicators" of target press criticisms\textsuperscript{53} and "jamming" in those states of Eastern Europe (particularly Russia and Czechoslovakia) which were taking steps to minimize the political impact of Canadian transmissions.\textsuperscript{54}

It was a consummate performance, but the damage had already been done. Morale in IS was at an all-time low. One section head recalled the period:

\begin{quote}
We were hysterical. You didn't like to see your name [in the papers]. You were charged with all kinds of treasons....I think we were all branded as pinkos....It was like a sudden loss of innocence. We were in another world.\textsuperscript{55}
\end{quote}

And the attacks kept coming. After reading an October 13 editorial in The Ensign, Dilworth dashed off one last desperate letter to Ritchie in the Department:

\begin{quote}
I have no doubt you have seen the latest attack....I have no intention of being dragged into this controversy again at this point. I do not believe it would serve any useful purpose....

Mr. Keyserlingk is concerned with who is responsible for...programming in the International Ser-
vice. I have to accept that responsibility. If Mr. Keyserlingk would only come out and say plainly and not depend upon innuendo that I am a less good Christian or a less loyal Canadian or a less intelligent opponent of Communism than he is, I should be glad to deal with him directly, even physically. I have never been very successful at shadow-boxing - nor have I ever found myself interested in this sort of activity... 56

That the Director was suffering in this ongoing fight was quickly becoming clear to all. As Thom Benson, a close friend and IS's liaison officer in Ottawa, remembered some fifteen years later, "you could see Ira Dilworth 'shrink' and lose his vitality". 57 In the end it was too much. By November, Dilworth had resigned.

Ira Dilworth had had the personal misfortune of being in charge of the International Service of the CBC during the most traumatic period in its history. When he assumed office in late 1947, IS was still basking in post-war euphoria. When he left, Canada, with her shortwave radio organization, was entangled in an ideological struggle of unprecedented proportions. Ultimately, Dilworth was a man miscast. A sympathetic associate discussed the Director's reactions to the pressures of his position:
He tried to resist... as much as he could... but didn't understand... It was like a sudden thunderstorm. Everything went so well and suddenly this happened... He was a humanist... a professor... totally unequipped for a political job of this nature... The idea of right-wing, left-wing, McCarthyism, subversion, and treason - he knew nothing about these things.... He was totally unschooled... 58

Dilworth's forced departure immediately brought on the problem of a replacement. More than ever, circumstance demanded a firm hand at the IS rudder. The organization, now employing 217 personnel, was becoming unwieldy, and certainly had acquired a new political sensitivity. 59 The latter fact had been appreciated as early as July 1950 when Prime Minister St. Laurent, in the course of discussing the problems at IS with his then-Secretary, Jules Léger, had intimated that it might be necessary to appoint a senior officer of the Department to a senior policy position, and that perhaps such an appointment could be made when the position of Director became vacant. 60 By May 1951 External Affairs seemed to be thinking along the same lines:

If it is felt that, either to disarm public criticism or to attain a more positive implementation of our policies, we should assume responsibility within the organization for policy direction, this I think could only be done by supplanting Mr. Dilworth himself with an appointee of our own... Another alternative might be to put a
more active General Manager of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in to replace Frigon, with specific responsibility for CBC-IS. This might be one of our senior officers or one of our Ambassadors... 61

Removing Frigon seemed excessive, but Dilworth's resignation - which, notably, neither the CBC nor the Government did anything to resist - gave the Department the required opening. Finally, after a relatively short personnel search, a suitable candidate was selected: in Ritchie's words, "a forceful and experienced personality, well-acquainted with the objectives of our foreign policy". 62 His name was Jean Désy. 63
NOTES


4. Ibid.


6. Ibid.


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.


11. Charles Ritchie - Under-Secretary, May 29, 1951, PAC RG25/G2/2224, DEA 6033-40. This analysis would have been as trenchant in 1949 as it was in 1951.


14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.


17. Peter Aylen had resigned in late 1946 to take up a position with United Nations Radio. His successor, Arthur Phelps - essentially a "caretaker" - retired from the Corporation in late 1947; Dilworth was appointed General Supervisor CBC-IS in October of that year. See James L. Hall, "The History and Policies of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's International Service" (unpublished


21. George - Reid. The extent of the Department's concern over security matters perhaps reached its limit of paranoia in the following memo of March 1949 to IS:

   The Department has no objection to the CBC's arranging a pen-pal for Mr. Dimkoff [of Sophia, Bulgaria] providing the correspondent is carefully chosen and is instructed to report immediately if Mr. Dimkoff should attempt to use his correspondence as a medium of political propaganda or if he should ask for information of a technical character regarding Canada.


22. Perhaps the most interesting person among those "cleared" was a Danish producer called Sorenson whose name had arisen in 1946 during the investigations of the Gouzenko affair. See interview with Eric Koch, February 12, 1981 and Canada, Royal Commission to Investigate Disclosures of Secret and Confidential Information to Unauthorized Persons, Report of the Royal Commission (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946), pp.527-533.

23. A. Anderson - Under-Secretary, April 26, 1949, PAC RG25/G2/2224, DEA 6033-40.

24. Ibid.


27. August Frigon - A.D.P. Heeney, December 23, 1949, Ibid.


29. Ibid.


32. Ibid.


34. Ibid.

35. British High Commissioner - Davidson Dunton, January 16, 1950, Ibid. A similar approach was made to Radiodiffusion Francaise.


The Department generally approves the proposal to begin a Russian service, more in order to help the British Broadcasting Corporation and the Voice of America in their efforts to reach listeners in the Soviet Union than from the conviction that we have anything very new to say to the Russians.


38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. See "Information Policy Towards Titoism in Soviet Satellites", May 1, 1951, Ibid. This read, in part, "...we should give cautious encouragement to Titoism guided by the following considerations:

1. That we must never abandon or bargain with our principles, and that we disapprove of totalitarianism and police systems of government based on hate and fear, whether or not they are controlled by Moscow.

2. That we welcome any nation's attempt to shake off the Muscovite shackles which we consider the first step towards possible liberalization....
3. That, while we are absolutely opposed to totalitarian illegality, brutality, immorality, privilege, intellectual enslavement, etc., we recognize the need for social reform in many parts of Eastern and South Eastern Europe and do not support reactionary emigré circles who wish to re-establish the status quo of 1939.

41. Canada, House of Commons Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, December 7, 1951, p.425. Shortly after the Russian service went "on air" External Affairs and the CBC confronted the rather touchy question of political content in transcriptions, i.e. recorded programs shipped abroad for relay over local stations. One memo reaching McCordick in June 1951 treated the problem as follows:

Perhaps it would be better to answer the last question first...-whether or not it is desirable to include political material in these recorded broadcasts. Clearly the answer to this must be in the affirmative. The principle is now well-established in the case of our foreign language broadcasts that they are not primarily for the entertainment of the listeners but are rather a means to the political objective of conveying a picture of democracy and freedom as practised in Canada in a manner calculated to establish its superiority over competing ideologies. To achieve this objective the broadcasts must have some political content....

R. Campbell (European Division) - J. McCordick, June 19, 1951, PAC RG25/G2/2211, DEA 9901-840. Nonetheless, transcriptions remained, in practice, much less "politicized" than actual shortwave transmissions; as such, they stand very much at the margin of the present account.

42. One of the officials of the International Service offered McCordick his interpretation of Keyserlingk's motives in March 1951:

It was his view that Keyserlingk is not very concerned about the CBC operation; he knows that ultimately the control of policy rests with this Department and not
with the International Service. His real quarrel is with Mr. Pearson and Canada's foreign policy, but since he does not dare criticize Mr. Pearson openly, he has adopted the tactic of sniping at an organization whose shortcomings, he believes, may fairly be laid at Mr. Pearson's door.


44. Ibid. One External Affairs official would later write: "...I suspect that 'communist' in The Ensign's lexicon means almost anyone to the left of 'the Canadian Manufacturers' Association'." See L.A.D. Stephens - Under-Secretary, November 12, 1953, PAC RG25/G2/2203, DEA 9901-40.


50. Ibid., p.3003.


52. Ibid., p.87.

53. On August 4, 1948, a Czech daily had for example declared that "the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation carries nothing but big doses of anti-Soviet propaganda and slander against the people's democracies". Ibid.
54. Ibid. The Soviets began jamming Western transmissions on an experimental basis in 1948; the practice became general in 1949.

55. Koch interview.

56. Ira Dilworth - Charles Ritchie, October 18, 1951, PAC RG25/G2/2203, DEA 9901-40. Dilworth sent a similar missive to Dunton. The latter replied, in part:

If Keyserlingk's methods of attack on the CBC are Christian, then many of us have long misread the Bible. Perhaps some day Providence will provide an answer.


57. Quoted in "Transmission from Tantramar" (Recorded Program, CBC Radio), February 25, 1966.

58. Koch interview.


62. Ibid. Ritchie himself had recommended Désy in these terms.

63. The Prime Minister considered the appointment of sufficient import to announce it himself. See Canada, House of Commons Debates, July 4, 1952, p.4247.
CHAPTER THREE

A POLITICAL MATTER:
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CBC-IS UKRAINIAN SERVICE, 1952

The selection of appropriate languages of transmission is one of the most fundamental problems facing the international broadcaster. In his chosen tongues are subsumed his "targets"; in his targets are subsumed his political purposes. The formulation of a language schedule must therefore be accompanied by shrewdness and political sensitivity. From 1949 to 1952 none recognized these truths better than the Ukrainian-Canadian community. This chapter examines the circumstances and events which resulted in the success of its agitation for the establishment of a CBC-IS Ukrainian service, and explores the factors which led the Government to support the proposal.

As was seen in the preceding chapter, ethnic interest in the policies and programming of the CBC International Service had been demonstrated as early as 1948. That this existed was hardly surprising. Ethnic groups naturally took a special interest in the affairs of their former homelands, and could be expected to be particularly concerned with those channels of communication which linked their present and previous countries of residence. There was a certain psychological bond here; anything that performed the geo-
graphic linkage function also linked the national past and
the ethnic present. Such a bridge was not easily ignored.

Three things, however, distinguished the Ukrainian-
Canadian community, and the pressure group that it consti-
tuted, from its Czechoslovak counterpart which had been the
first to press for changes in Canadian international broad-
cast policy. First, the Ukrainians were far more numerous.
In the early post-war years they numbered 350,000 of the en-
tire Canadian population. This made them the fourth lar-
gest linguistic group in the country after the anglophones,
francophones, and Germans. Secondly, they were far better
organized. Nationally, their interests were aggregated in
the Ukrainian-Canadian Committee, and specifically represented
by many regional and functional sub-groups. Internationally,
they were affiliated with powerful associations in the United
States and United Kingdom. The resultant ostensible cohe-
siveness of their movement endowed them with a significant
measure of political clout and respect. Thirdly, the Ukrai-
nian "cause" was far more political than the Czechoslovak. At
issue was the "homeland" itself. There was no Ukrainian state.
Rather, the Ukraine was under the domination of the Soviet
Union. The notion of "liberation" from Soviet (or, more
correctly, Russian) oppression was therefore fundamental in
expatriate Ukrainian agitation, and promised to lend a nation-
alist - almost racist - fervor to any attempt at international
propagandizing using Ukrainian-Canadians. Controversy was ensured. Indeed, the years after the establishment of CBC-IS (Ukraine) in July 1952 would see that section cause the IS as a whole the greatest tumult in its Cold War history.

The Ukrainian-Canadian campaign to pressure the CBC into inaugurating Ukrainian language broadcasts was waged in a number of clearly definable phases. The first of these, involving representations from the Ukrainian-Canadian Committee directly to International Service, began on June 13, 1949, with a letter that played upon some of the political advantages of such a decision:

> In connection with your European broadcasts we wish to bring to your attention the fact that the value of these...would be greatly enhanced if you would include the Ukrainian language...[This] is used by 45,000,000 people; they constitute one of the largest political refugee group [sic] and they offer the most formidable resistance to Russian Communism on both sides of the Iron Curtain...  

Dilworth avoided any commitment, saying only that "the subject is being studied very intently at the present moment". The Ukrainians pressed this opening in August 1949 and again in a letter in early March 1950. By this time, however, the "study" Dilworth had referred to in June had been completed,
allowing the Director to state plainly that, for budgetary and technical reasons, "there is really no hope of our going through with...a plan [for Ukrainian broadcasts]."

The issue was not so easily settled. The October 1950 announcement that the CBC-IS was initiating daily broadcasts to the Soviet Union in Russian only served to give new stimulus to the demands of the Ukrainian-Canadian Committee. Again, letters were sent to the Director of IS. This time, however, Dilworth stood firm, arguing that the wishes of the group could only be met through re-allocation of already-utilized transmission time in other more important languages. This prompted the Committee to escalate their effort, redirecting their pressure from the bureaucratic to the political plane. A letter was despatched to Pearson restating the Ukrainian position. Concurrently, the services of John Decore, a Liberal Ukrainian Member of Parliament from the constituency of Vegreville, Alberta, were engaged to lobby the Government from within. This he began to do in December, writing not only to Pearson but also Robert Winters, then Minister of Resource and Development, on behalf of the Ukrainian community.

Pearson's attitude was encouraging. "The possibility of including the Ukrainian language in the program", he wrote Decore,
is being kept under review by the CBC-IS and will be given every consideration if financial and technical circumstances should permit an extension of the service in the future.

I should be interested to have a talk with you on this whole subject when the House meets again, as I think it is one which merits very serious consideration. 10

Not long after this the Department began to explore the problems and potential of Ukrainian broadcasts. The Foreign Office and the State Department were solicited for their opinions on the matter. The British replied that they felt the greatest caution had to be exercised in attempting to exploit Ukrainian nationalism, and that shortwave broadcasting in Ukrainian would likely do more harm than good to the Western cause in the Cold War. 11 The Americans were of a somewhat different mind; by 1951 VOA had already embarked on broadcasts in Ukrainian, Georgian, Azerbaijani, and a number of other minority languages of the Soviet Union, but the station was under strict orders not to dabble in nationalist rhetoric in any of its programmes. 12 External Affairs in Ottawa was nonetheless led to the following conclusion in June:

It [is]...our feeling...that the very existence of broadcasts in the Ukrainian language could be interpreted by Russians and Ukrainians alike as implying some support for Ukrainian separation...[S]uch implied support... might alienate the sympathies of large
numbers of Russians at present disposed to be friendly towards the West. Our thinking continues to lean towards the view that, for the present at least, appealing to the nationalism of Soviet minorities, particularly the Ukrainians, may well be too costly in terms of Russian goodwill.

It cannot be ascertained whether this Departmental verdict was leaked to the Ukrainian-Canadian community. Nonetheless it is interesting to note that within two weeks of the writing of the above-quoted despatch the Ukrainian pressure campaign escalated again. This time the press was mobilized in an effort to involve the public directly. The Toronto-based Ukrainian-language newspaper Homín Ubrainy (Ukrainian Echo) ran a front-page lead editorial calling upon "every Ukrainian man and woman without exception, without regard to age, social position, allegiance to political parties, or religion" to write a letter along the lines of a provided model setting out, once again, arguments for the establishment of CBC-IS (Ukraine). The paper asked that copies of this be sent to Messrs. Pearson, Dunton, and Dilworth, as well as to readers' local MPs.

Decore, seeking at the same time to give a political edge to the new mass initiative, returned to the charge. In a letter to the Minister of July 4 he asserted that Dilworth, in conversation, had agreed that Ukrainian broadcasts
of a few hours a week would indeed be possible. This revelation (Dilworth's apparent change of position had been hitherto unknown to the Department) combined with the declaration of the Homin Ukrainy appeal, caused a considerable stir in External Affairs, and officials there, anticipating events, hurriedly prepared a comprehensive review of the reasons advanced pro and con Ukrainian-language transmissions. The essential arguments in favour were cited as nine-fold:

1) As a result of intensive jamming CBC-IS broadcasts were not getting through to Moscow and the other large cities of Russia; penetration was more likely in the as-yet-un jammed Ukrainian area.

2) The Russian-speaking area of the USSR was already thoroughly blanketed by BBC and VOA.

3) Ukrainian was the language of forty [sic] million Europeans, and its broadcast use would thus permit access to a large potential audience.

4) Few Ukrainians could follow broadcasts in Russian completely.

5) Radios in the area were numerous, due to the relatively high standard of living.

6) There were 350,000 Ukrainians in Canada who wanted to have contact with their brothers in the homeland.

7) Canada's large Ukrainian community would provide good propaganda material.

8) One of the supposedly effective means of diminishing the expansionist force of Soviet imperialism was to appeal to those Soviet minorities who were
themselves opposed to it, above all the Ukrainians, who were already conducting underground resistance to Muscovite Russian rule.

9) One of the best ways of working for and securing peace would be to break up the Soviet Union into a large number of successor states; Ukrainian nationalism was deserving of support with this end in mind. 16

A number of counter-arguments were similarly offered, the principal of which was a restatement of the above-noted conclusion of June 1951. Additionally, R.A. MacKay, with the collaboration of McCordick (no longer assigned to IS, but still responsible for IS liaison in Ottawa), submitted that

1) Russian was perfectly understood by all educated Ukrainians; and

2) A CBC-IS Ukrainian program might be the target for constant criticism and interference by Ukrainian organizations in Canada. 17

McCordick himself, in a memo to Ritchie on July 17, noted a further point: "Yielding to pressure may mean that other groups...will start lobbying." 18

Such arguments, however, were significantly weakened by internal divisions within the Department. R.A.D. Ford, by this time the Canadian chargé in Moscow, held that Ukrainian broadcasts were advisable, and could be conducted without
giving support to Ukrainian nationalist aims. His opinion seemed to be shared by, among others, Heeney, the Under-Secretary. As a result a recommendation in support of the Ukrainian position was submitted to Pearson on August 8; the next day the Minister wrote to Decore that "I agree it would be a good idea to include Ukrainian broadcasts in the CBQ-IS programmes".

Pearson's proffered opinion was nonetheless considered insufficient in itself, and the pressure on the Government increased. Its letter-writing campaign having thusfar been of marginal consequence, Homin Ukrainy printed a further petition, addressed to the Minister, on September 1. Correspondence continued between members of the Department and interested Ukrainians. One letter reaching George Glazebrook on September 10 drove to the heart of the whole matter: "something should be done...before certain elements succeed in making of this...a political issue". The Secretary of the Ukrainian-Canadian Committee wrote to Pearson: Decore pressed his advantage. Finally, the Government gave way entirely, and, in a telephone conversation with Ira Dilworth, Charles Ritchie pointedly expressed the official wish of the Minister and the Department that "we begin [Ukrainian] broadcasts as soon as possible". Ironically, the "Sunday punch" of the entire pressure effort landed on the Minister's desk on October 23, just days after the IS Director had received his
instructions from Ottawa. In a large envelope was a petition based on the Homun Ukrainy letter of June 23 from the "Central Committee of the Canadian League for Ukraine's Liberation". Appended to it were 11,741 signatures.26

The Government's decision was officially announced in the House of Commons on October 26, 1951.27 Controversy over the Ukrainian section did not, however, end with the decision to establish. Indeed, it only began there. The same groups and individuals that had taken such an interest in the founding of the service now attempted to influence its internal structure. John Decore had told Pearson as early as July that he had a number of "admirable candidates" in mind for the position of section head.28 Pearson, for good or ill, had encouraged him in this area, and at a meeting of Department and IS officials on November 1, 1951, he was invited to submit a list of applicants.29 This, and the more general attempt similarly to involve the various Ukrainian-Canadian organizations in the hiring process, unfortunately paved the way for a free-for-all among these bodies, each of which either sponsored candidates of its own, or objected to those sponsored by other organizations. By the end of November 1951 representations had been received from the Ukrainian-Canadian Committee, the Ukrainian Catholic Council of Canada, the Ukrainian Association of Victims of Russian Communist Terror, the Ukrainian Catholic Council of Western Canada, and
the Ukrainian Catholic Council of Saskatchewan. As may be
deduced from the above list, the religious orientation of
the staff candidates turned out to be most controversial.
The Ukrainian Catholics, who claimed to constitute two-thirds
of the Ukrainian population in Canada, asked specifically
that "due regard" be paid to their wishes. The selection
process began to take on the atmosphere of a comic opera;
Departmental officials seemed to look upon the resulting
chaos and anarchy with dismay. In the end, they attempted
to compromise. Two Orthodox Ukrainians - among them Gordon
Panchuk, the new section chief - were picked strictly for
their qualifications. A third person of Catholic persuasion - although apparently qualified himself - seems to have
been conveniently chosen to satisfy the pressure groups.

No sooner was the matter of personnel thus "settled"
than a dispute erupted over program policy. External Affairs
had suspected from the very beginning that Ukrainian organ-
izations would attempt to turn IS Ukrainian broadcasts into
appeals to Ukrainian separatist sentiment; the principal
point of disagreement in the Department had been on whether
this could be averted by any number of methods, including a
studious linkage of the Ukrainian-language broadcasts to the
closely-supervised Russian transmissions. Unfortunately, the
close participation of Ukrainian-Canadian individuals and
groups in the original organization of the service made avoiding
the problem difficult. In at least one instance, a misunderstanding arose between IS management and representatives of the Ukrainian Catholic Council of Canada about whether the Council would be allowed to prepare all feature material for the programs, or whether, at the least, the programming would be developed in close collaboration with it. Both notions were rapidly quashed by IS - with Department support - but the Service could not now deny the presence in its ranks of Ukrainian broadcasters who, as former nominees of Ukrainian-Canadian associations with significant nationalist predilections, were bound to share some of their views. It was agreed there had to be some measure of control over these individuals. How that control would be exercised was more problematic. The consequences of losing control were well-appreciated, as can be seen from this excerpt from a Heeney - Pearson memo of December 1951:

"[M]odifications [of the policy line in accordance with Ukrainian nationalist demands]...would not only require considerable redrafting of the general policy for CBC-IS but would have important implications connected with Canadian foreign policy, since it would be very difficult to maintain that there is no support in the Government for plans to dismember the Soviet Union while the State-owned broadcasting service was espousing the cause of Ukrainian independence. This might lead to important divergencies between our policy and those of the United Kingdom and the United States."
The worst fears of the Department were realized early on— in fact, in the opening transmission of the Ukrainian service on July 1, 1952. Included in this were greetings to the Ukrainian people from Pearson, Decore, Mr. Michael Starr (a Conservative Ukrainian MP) and two Ukrainian-Canadian churchmen. A juxtaposition of the statements of Pearson and Starr graphically illustrates the emergent problem. First, Pearson:

One of the purposes of this program will be to tell you something about the people who came from the Ukraine and settled here in Canada and also, more generally, to interest you in our land, our history, our people, and our way of life. At the same time it will be our purpose to bring you truthful, unbiased information about world events, information which should help you see the world as it really is...34

Now, Starr:

We, Canadian Ukrainians, deplore that you, our brother Ukrainians in the Ukraine, do not have the right to a full political, national, and personal life such as we enjoy in Canada. But do not lose courage, brothers, for the free world has not forgotten you. The time will come when the spirit of freedom penetrates the Iron Curtain of oppression, the prison of nations crumbles, and the regime of terror disintegrates under the blows of the victorious forces of freedom and democracy. 35
In External Affairs, officials cringed. The Ukrainian section of CBC-IS was hardly an hour old, but already it was out of control. 36

The decision to inaugurate a CBC-IS Ukrainian service was a landmark in the history of the Canadian international broadcasting organization. Above all, it set a precedent for principles of language selection that ethnic group after ethnic group (the Poles, the Hungarians, the Albanians, even the Jews) would appeal to in subsequent years. 37 Clearly it was for reasons of domestic rather than foreign policy that the decision had been taken. To this extent the decision itself created an internal constituency for the broadcasts unlike any that had previously existed. This put the International Service of the CBC, and the Department of External Affairs with it, in the unenviable position of having to fight a "two-front war," i.e. having to satisfy the listening audience in the Ukraine (without grossly jeopardizing Canadian relations with the government of the USSR), while at the same time having to placate ethnic organizations which, if displeased, could affect the Government's electoral base. This was hardly an easy task. The establishment of the Ukrainian service, and the reorientation it represented, therefore introduced a fundamental complication to the operations
of Canada's international broadcasting arm.

The significance of the decision to the International Service makes one question the relative ease with which the Government gave in to the demands of the Ukrainian-Canadian community. Certainly agreement to inaugurate the Ukrainian section of IS was reached before the Ukrainian pressure groups had fully expended their persuasive resources. Nonetheless one may identify five factors behind the premature and ill-conceived Government action. First, top officials, i.e. those in a position to most influence the decision, were insufficiently aware of the likely consequences of their actions. It is significant that those closest to the International Service, such as Jack McCordick, were most adamant in their opposition. Heeney and Ford, however - the one being Under-Secretary and the other, the chargé in Moscow - were more isolated. Both, unlike McCordick, had other things to think about, and were therefore less likely fully to consider possible implications and problems. Second, Pearson seems to have felt that the Ukrainian-Canadians were in the right on principle in demanding a voice. Indeed, the stands taken by the Minister both in December 1950 and August 1951 suggested a relatively favourable attitude that was not shared by all of the officers in his Department. Thirdly - although this is related - political considerations were clearly involved, and neither Pearson nor any other Government Minister
wished to alienate the Ukrainian-Canadian population (or the Ukrainian-Canadian vote) by stonewalling on a point which was not considered essential. Fourth, External Affairs did not completely control IS. Neither did the CBC. This, as will be recalled from Chapters One and Two, was an old problem of the first order, but in this context it was precisely the administrative arrangement which allowed Dilworth to make his alleged "revelation" in July 1951. This of course provided Decore with an opening and, as Departmental officials later acknowledged, substantially weakened the position of the Department in resisting the ethnic demands. Fifth, IS and the Department were not dealing with the Ukrainian "problem" in a vacuum. Indeed, it must be remembered that throughout 1951, while most of the controversy was taking place, IS was under attack by The Ensign and the Czech emigrés. Dilworth was weary, and not desirous of incurring any more ethnic wrath than was absolutely necessary. That he - and External Affairs, which had itself been implicated in the Keyserlingk accusations - proved pliable in the Ukrainian case was therefore not surprising.

By the beginning of 1952, however, another factor was in play - the presence in IS of a new Director. It is perhaps noteworthy that most of the early disagreements about personnel and policy took place just when Dilworth's replacement, Jean Désy, was in the process of familiarizing
himself with International Service and its problems. The "firm hand" which might have been better able to ride out the storms unleashed upon IS by the Ukrainian pressure groups, especially during the formative period of the Ukrainian section, was thus not prepared to intervene for control at one of the most pivotal points in the history of the operation. When Désy was ready it was too late. He, and the man who would follow him, Charles Delafield, were left with the unhappy assignment of coping with a mistake. Both, equally, were prevented from correcting it via elimination. The interest of the Ukrainian pressure groups in the section which they had created hung like a sword of Damocles over the head of anyone who would take that victory away. There was no turning back.
NOTES


2. A. Zaharychuk - John Peach, June 13, 1949, Ibid.


4. Ukrainian Canadian Committee - Ira Dilworth, August 5, 1949, Ibid.

5. Ukrainian Canadian Committee - Ira Dilworth, March 13, 1950, Ibid.


7. See Ukrainian Canadian Committee - Ira Dilworth, October 28, 1950, Ibid.


10. L. Pearson - J. Decore, January 9, 1951, Ibid.

11. See Secretary of State for External Affairs - Chargé d'Affaires, Moscow, June 11, 1951 in Ibid.

12. Ibid. For a short discussion of VOA's experience with their Ukrainian section, see L.E. Dobriansky, "The Voice of America and Ukraine", Ukrainian Quarterly, 11 (1955), 35-45.


15. J. Decore - L. Pearson, July 4, 1951, Ibid.

16. Adapted from R.A. MacKay - Charles Ritchie, July 11, 1951, Ibid.

17. Included in Ibid.

18. J. McCordick - Charles Ritchie, July 17, 1951, Ibid.
19. See A.D.P. Heeney - Minister, August 8, 1951, Ibid.

20. See J.B. Watkins - Charles Ritchie, July 20, 1951 and
Heeney - Minister, Ibid.

21. Heeney - Minister, Ibid.

22. Petition to Pearson, Homin Ukrainy (Clipping), September 1, 1951,
Ibid.

23. L. Biberovich - George Glazebrook, September 10, 1951,
Ibid.

24. Ukrainian-Canadian Committee - L. Pearson, October 5,
1951, Ibid.

25. See Ira Dilworth - Charles Ritchie, October 23, 1951,
Ibid.

26. Central Committee of the Canadian League for Ukraine's
Liberation - L. Pearson, October 19, 1951, Ibid.

27. Canada, House of Commons Debates, October 26, 1951,
P.433.

28. See Decore - Pearson, July 4, 1951 in PAC RG25/G2/2216,
DEA 9901-V-40.

29. Charles Ritchie - Under-Secretary, November 2, 1951,
Ibid.

30. Ukrainian Catholic Council of Canada - L. Pearson,
November 16, 1951, Ibid.

31. This solution was hinted at in Under-Secretary - Cana-
dian Embassy, Moscow, January 9, 1952 and in Charles
Ritchie - Under-Secretary, January 17, 1952, both in
Ibid.

32. See J.B. Watkins - Charles Ritchie, March 5, 1952,
Ibid.

33. A.D.P. Heeney - Minister, December 14, 1951, Ibid.

34. "Text of a Broadcast by Mr. L.B. Pearson for the Inaugur-
ation of CBC-IS Ukrainian Service , July 1, 1952",
Ibid.

35. Quoted in "What is the Situation with Regard to the
'Voice of Canada'?, Homin Ukrainy (Translation), Feb-
uary 7, 1959, Ibid."
36. Dana Wilgress, then Canadian High Commissioner in London, had anticipated this in April:

    It is, of course, possible that the decision to embark on Ukrainian broadcasts may add fuel to the flames which are being so assiduously fed by the Ukrainian pressure groups. This is one of the reasons why the Foreign Office has not felt able to recommend to the United Kingdom Government that the BBC should start a Ukrainian service.

D. Wilgess - Secretary of State for External Affairs, April 24, 1952, Ibid.

37. In 1953 one Minister would complain that

    ...we simply cannot explain to any foreign language group in this country why it is not important to broadcast to his [sic] native country if we are doing it to others.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE "LITTLE NAPOLEON"

DESY AT THE HELM, 1952-53

The November 1951 appointment of Jean Désy to succeed Ira Dilworth as Director of the CBC International Service seemed at the time to be an inspired marriage of necessity and convenience. The circumstances of the necessity will be recalled from Chapter Two: IS was under attack in the press and in Parliament. The Department of External Affairs was obliged to regain control of the deteriorating situation in Canada's international broadcasting arm before it disintegrated irretrievably. And who better to do this than one of Canada's senior diplomats, a former Ambassador to Brazil and Italy whose ideological outlook and political connections promised to soothe the Service's more vociferous detractors? "He [i.e. Désy] has", commented one Departmental memo of the period,

good contacts in the Province of Quebec and he enjoys a favourable reputation among those circles (which find a voice in The Ensign among others) which have been particularly critical in the past."

In addition, Désy seemed to possess an interest of his own in psychological warfare and the Canadian application of that. This had become evident as early as 1947 when, in replying
to the famous Reid Memorandum, he had remarked:

Nearly all propaganda now comes from the United States, and emphasises their own particular views of the Western approach to world problems. This plays into the hands of Soviet propaganda, since the latter is able to suggest that America dominates the Western nations by imposing its own ideology...

Canada, as the third largest world power [sic] has the responsibility of demonstrating that individual nations, within the framework of our general policy, have maintained their own freedoms and their own cultures... Such propaganda would necessarily have to reflect the flavour of a distinct culture, economy, and political environment.

Yet the Désy appointment was as expedient as it was appropriate. The Ambassador's seniority and experience - most of it gained in overseas postings - made him totally unsuitable for any advanced administrative position in the Department upon his return to Ottawa in 1951. One of his colleagues, years later, commented on External's predicament:

They didn't know what...to do with [Désy]. He was so senior... He'd been abroad most of his career. When he came home he'd either have to be Under-Secretary or Deputy Under-Secretary, and they wouldn't trust him for a minute in a top job like that. He didn't know how the Department ran. So they sent him down to Montreal.
Regardless of the reasoning behind the assignment, Désy was determined to make the most of it. His mandate, as he saw it, was clear—to establish a closer relationship between the Department and the International Service, and to achieve a better co-ordination of policy ends and broadcast means. The challenge was considerable. In summing up his stewardship eighteen months after taking office, the Ambassador attempted to describe the situation he discovered when first posted. The main problem in IS, he found, was a "lack of purpose and direction throughout". Inter-section intrigue was rife. Political questions were treated haphazardly and little control was exercised over program content. Security was still a nagging concern. As a consequence of earlier, less restrictive, hiring practices, many politically unreliable persons had been engaged and tolerated for so long that it had become almost impossible to dismiss them without... courting adverse criticism.

Their presence, however, combined with the lax control measures, "allowed their leftist tendencies...to...surface in unchecked broadcasts destined for Iron Curtain countries". As for the rest of the staff, they were mostly foreign nationals and recently arrived immigrants who, to Désy's mind, wanted the "background, information, and interest necessary to interpret Canada to foreign lands". All in all,
the whole organization seemed to be coasting along on its own momentum, generally rendering poor service and sometimes doing disservice to Canadian interests... It was obvious to me that those who could have given direction had failed to do so.

Changes were quickly made. Pressure was brought to bear on a number of the more "questionable" employees, most of whom, in Désy's words, subsequently "thought it preferable to hand in their resignations". Others were apparently reassigned. Désy was administratively cautious—despite reports to the contrary, no one seems to have been explicitly fired, and no one was explicitly demoted. Nonetheless the effect was the same, leading such papers as The Ensign to applaud the action of the Director-General (Désy, while technically on secondment from the Department, had been fit to label his position in accordance with Department nomenclature). Even TIME magazine commented that "the pale pinko tone no longer infiltrates the voice of International Service".

But "housecleaning" was only the beginning. Désy now set about cultivating stronger links with the Department. These links were of two types—informal and formal. Prior to 1952, the informal methods of liaison had taken the form of occasional transmission of policy memoranda and relevant despatches from the Department to IS, infrequent requests from the CBC to the Department for guidance in specific in-
stances, personal conversations and meetings between IS and DEA officials both in Ottawa and Montreal, and daily policy meetings within IS in which an effort was made to apply Departmental guidelines to actual programming. Formally, IS was tied to the Government - and the Government in a broader sense - through the old Government-CBC Shortwave Committee, which by 1951 grouped officials from IS, External Affairs and the CBC, and through the Interdepartmental Committee on Information Abroad. The latter body, chaired by the head of External Affairs Information Division, included representatives from Trade and Commerce, the Exhibition Commission, Citizenship and Immigration, and the National Film Board. A CBC-IS officer attended meetings whenever agenda items were thought to have a bearing on shortwave operations.12

The informal linkages were changed first. A Departmental document reported in February 1952 that the Director-General "would like to receive copies of many more despatches, letters, and memoranda than have reached CBC-IS in the past".13 It was entirely appropriate for Désy to make the request. Being a serving Departmental officer he was entitled and permitted to "read all the secret memoranda, secret telegrams, secret documents coming in from all over the world, from our missions"14 where his predecessors had not. The information was important; its transmission, the Ambassador felt, was "necessary if the operations of the Inter-
national Service are to be kept in harmony with the policies of the Government. The Department complied with Désy's wishes: the Information officer charged with delivering the documents reported on his weekly runs to IS in early March.

I took 44 documents to CBC-IS on the first trip, 53 on the second, and 61 on the third. Mr. Désy seemed to be pleased with the quality and type of material...

Eventually a full-time liaison, in the person of Mr. Yvon Beaulne, was assigned to the Director-General. Similarly a CBC-IS permanent correspondent, Mr. Robert Reford, was posted in Ottawa and made responsible for communicating "prompt and exact data on Government and diplomatic activities." Formal changes were slower in coming, but nonetheless definite. Within IS itself important steps were taken to regain control of policy-related operations and reduce the potential impact of the "ethnic factor". In 1953 Désy recalled, I thought it best to create, without saying so, a sort of executive committee, composed of responsible Canadians and designed to co-operate with my successors in the direction of the service. At the same time... I decided to set up a corresponding unit which would be en-
trusted with co-ordinating political information, writing commentaries and translating scripts. There is now at management level a co-ordinating officer, assisted by a staff ad hoc. He is responsible for the transmission of directives and the distribution of news and basic commentaries to all language sections which have been deprived of all powers of decision and are reduced to the role of executive organs.18

Thus was founded the IS Policy Co-ordination Section. A counterpart body was created in the Department in March 1953 to replace, from a policy-setting perspective, the Government-CBC Shortwave Committee, which Charles Ritchie had allowed to fade away in mid-1951 (reportedly in an effort to give the Department more flexibility in dealing with IS).19 The mission of the "Political Co-ordination Section" was defined in the following terms:

The...Section will have responsibility for providing the guidance and for securing the necessary departmental approval before communicating it to the CBC. This will include guidance on long-term and short-term policy, lines to be followed on developments in the news, points to be avoided and points to be emphasized, in connection with forthcoming events...and, on occasion, the writing of statements to be used in broadcasts. An important part of the work should be the answering of queries from the CBC on questions of fact and questions of policy....[T]he Section will thus have the dual role of taking the initiative in programming policy guidance on the one hand, and on the other hand of commenting on proposals and queries from the CBC.20
The attempt to regain control nonetheless encountered a number of complications. First among these was the problem of physical separation between IS in Montreal and the Department in Ottawa. The resulting "isolation" of IS from the centre of policy-making had been identified as a significant obstacle to proper liaison as early as 1948.21 The presence of Désy at the IS helm muted the perception but did not dispel it; certainly it brought the Department no closer to resolving the geographical difficulty. The Honourable Gordon Graydon, a member of the House Standing Committee on External Affairs, argued in 1953 that the arrangement simply made no sense:

...why in the world...we separate the CBC International Service by putting Jean Désy in Montreal and then having a commuter service where a man travels back and forth once or twice a week to tell him what the Department of External Affairs wants beamed to other countries is beyond me. I think what we should have is a CBC International Service, right here in Ottawa and Jean Désy or whoever is responsible for the material that goes out should be right here in the spot where consultations can continually go on instead of having some kind of a remote control policy such as this where somebody takes a bag of stuff from Ottawa down by train or plane and then brings it back and that I think would be a great nuisance with regard to the whole set-up...22

Graydon's point was overcome when it was made clear to him that Montreal had been chosen for technical reasons and that it would be quite costly actually to move the Service.23 IS
was thus fated, unlike the BBC and, after 1953, VOA, to remain apart from the nexus of decision. The liaison process would continue to be somewhat ungainly.24

The standing administrative position of IS vis-à-vis both External Affairs and the CBC was a problem of an entirely different nature, at one presenting the Department with an advantage and a temptation. The advantage was the relative apathy with which the Corporation regarded its international broadcasting division and the ambiguity of the latter's link with External Affairs. These things, combined, allowed the foreign policy specialists in the East Block to take a much firmer hand in the management of the Service than would have been acceptable in other circumstances. In this, however, lay the temptation to take the Service over entirely. It is quite possible that the CBC would not have objected strongly to such a change; indeed, senior management of the Corporation might have been only too glad to see the departure of a rather troublesome section. But the problem was with the Department. It was actually put in the position of resisting the urgings of those who would have had it exercise total authority over IS. The question of ultimate responsibility indeed arose repeatedly in the Standing Committee on External Affairs in early 1953. During testimony by Pearson in February, Graydon observed that
the policy as far as outside places is concerned rests with the Department of External Affairs. Why should officials of the CBC, whether seconded or not [a reference to Désy], be the ones left with the responsibility for that? 25

Graydon returned to the point when questioning the Under-Secretary, Dana Wilgess, later in the month:

I think the division of the authority, the division of direction, and the division of approach with respect to these international broadcasts leaves very much to be desired, and I think the government ought to give consideration right away to making sure there is one boss and one final person who is responsible for international service broadcasts. 26

The Department, of course, had no intention of taking IS under its wing. There were two considerations here. The first, from a policy standpoint, was that the credibility of programs could be adversely affected if it were known that the Department was directly responsible for content and substance. It was felt that this would reduce IS to the level of a government mouthpiece when it was not purely such. Secondly, and perhaps more important, External Affairs evinced no greater desire to be charged with the IS "albatross" than did the CBC. Unfortunately, however, this appeared to leave IS in the position of, as Graydon put it, "serving two masters". In practice from 1952-53 this was not a problem: External Affairs "called the shots" on policy
matters, and its authority was unchallenged. At the level of accountability for operations, however, an obvious difficulty existed. Finally, Désy himself was summoned to clarify things. The statement he offered was quintessentially typical of the man:

I and the CBC staff are responsible in turn to the management of the CBC and to the Board of Governors who report to Parliament through the Minister of National Revenue. I am not serving two masters. Whereas the Minister of National Revenue may be compared to my Father Superior, as they say in clerical circles, the Secretary of State for External Affairs is more a "directeur de conscience", a spiritual director. I am at liberty to follow the advice of my spiritual director, but should I commit any sin I have to turn to my Father Superior, either for absolution or reprimand.

It was a subtle distinction which Graydon, in particular among the members of the Committee, found rather unsatisfactory. Yet, having pressed the Director-General of the Service to the limit, he thought it best to let the matter drop. In this way the Department—so long as Désy was at the helm in IS—was left in the favourable position of controlling broadcast strategy and policy without having to bear the burden of technical responsibility for the operation as a whole.

The third complication which Désy and the Department confronted in the course of tightening their grip on Interna-
tional Service took the form of occasional "excesses" in programming produced in some of the East European language divisions. These problems were particularly serious during the early days of Désy's tenure prior to the reorganization which provided the Director-General with new levers of influence. Some of the "excesses" were doubtless honest ones committed by broadcasters intent upon applying the new "hard-line" policies. The potential difficulty here had been tentatively identified by McCordick in July 1950. This, however, did not detract from the fact of the excesses when they appeared. Note, for instance, a Departmental criticism of Russian section broadcasts from February 1953:

There is... a tendency in some of the scripts to make too much use of such words as "barbarous", "lying", "usurpers" and "plunderers". Abuse, unless it is accompanied by material which amply explains and justifies it, merely brings us down to the level of Soviet propaganda.

Greatest concern was demonstrated over the transmissions of the Ukrainian section which, as will be recalled from the previous chapter, had posed problems of this type from its inception. On July 31, 1952, Charles Ritchie suggested in a memo to the Minister that broadcasts of the sort being then presented were "likely to arouse resentment rather than to make converts to the Western point of view". Six months later, R.A.D. Ford reported from Moscow that "I
must confess that I am rather worried about the tone of the Ukrainian broadcasts." He cited one offending example at length (of which he had received a script in French translation):

Notre terre ukrainienne s'est transformée aujourd'hui en un immense Golgotha; notre Église catholique en est devenu la croix; et sur cette croix vous êtes crucifiés mes chères frères et sœurs. Aujourd'hui, vous souffrez et vous mourrez avec le Christ sur la croix. Cependant, le jour de la glorieuse résurrection est proche. Aujourd'hui tout le monde connaît vos souffrances et parle de vous. Notre Saint Père le Pape...toute notre Sainte Église catholique et tous les peuples civilisés de l'univers attendent avec impatience cette minute de joie. Ils sont tous avec vous aujourd'hui. En particuliers nos Églises au Canada, en Amérique et dans toutes les parties du monde vous assistent et prient avec vous. Luttez frères et sœurs, Dieu est avec vous. Luttez frères et sœurs, Dieu est avec vous ainsi que son Saint Église et tous les hommes de bonne volonté. Luttez pour le Seigneur et le Seigneur vous donnera la victoire.

Criticism continued through 1953. On February 16 D. Stansfield in European Division noted that "the words 'liberation' and 'liberated' appear with great frequency". He continued: "There are still...examples of rather low-level abuse, e.g. 'the phenomenal ignoramus Stalin' in Script no.364".

It was precisely to control this sort of excess that IS had set up its Policy Co-ordination unit on the one hand,
and DEA its Political Co-ordination Section on the other. Not wishing to take chances, however, and desiring to specify section policy for guidance purposes, the Department drew up a note on CBC-IS Ukrainian broadcasts in May 1953. Its position was frank: "the CBC-IS is at all times the voice of Canada, no matter what individual may be at the microphone at what language he may be using". "It is", it declared, "not the policy of the Canadian government to promise liberation from without, or to encourage the overthrow of the Soviet regime from within". The view of the Department was pointedly brought to the attention of Panchuk, the Section Head; it would not be the last time.

International Service was forced to deal with a fourth problem just as it was attempting to cope with the third. Indeed, the two were fundamentally related. The establishment of the Ukrainian section, as McCordick had feared, opened the way for pressures to create a further East European language service, this time in Polish. John Decore, who had led the drive for CBC-IS (Ukraine) began to lobby Pearson for Polish transmissions even before his first victory had been consummated. The proposal aroused little enthusiasm on the part of External Affairs officers closely associated with IS. As one frustrated official scrawled on a copy of a Decore letter of July 17, 1952,
I think the time has come to draw the line - Decore, having got his Ukrainian service is now beginning the same pressure for a Polish one and should not be encouraged to think it will succeed. 38

Such views were, however, tantamount to "closing the door after the horse had bolted" and Decore and his associates seemed to know it. Undaunted, they persisted. Pearson received letters from a Toronto MP on the matter in August and October, both times he turned back the requests. 39

Then, in December, George Drew raised the question of a Polish service in the House. 40 J.J. McCann, the Minister of National Revenue, tried to persuade him of the inadvisability of such an addition to the IS schedule, but to no avail. 41

The intensity of the lobbying effort mounted. By January, St. Laurent's Minister of Citizenship and Immigration had defected to the Polish cause. 42 This forced the issue. Désy was consulted, and opined that "no useful purpose would be served by broadcasts to Poland". 43 Wilgress, the Under-Secretary in External Affairs, agreed. That he had learned from the experience with the Ukrainians was demonstrated by his comments in a memo to Pearson of January 22, 1953:

IF the broadcast to Poland is begun, we shall find ourselves under pressure to step up the tone of the broadcasts and make them continuously more bellicose and anti-Russian. We are also running the risk of getting into hot water with
the various Polish groups and groups of Polish origin in this country who would no doubt be very vocal in their demands that the broadcasts be shaped to meet their particular views. I think that...a good deal more interest would be taken in their texts by the ethnic groups concerned in Canada than by those to whom the broadcasts are directed. 44

The impact of these arguments, however, was soon negated by that of a political imperative. In its hearings in March 1953 the House Committee on External Affairs seemed itself to be leaning towards Polish broadcasts. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration wrote to Pearson:

I...suggest that it would not suit our purposes to have External Affairs Committee pass a resolution [favouring the broadcasts] and then act upon it, but rather that our position would be much better if we announced the inauguration of the service before Parliamentary pressure was brought to bear. 45

The die was cast. In External Affairs, Wilgress - recognizing his predicament - constructed an elaborate foreign policy rationalization for the decision-to-come and recommended it. 46

Ten days afterwards, on April 10, 1953, McCann rose in the House. Broadcasts in Polish began on July 11.
It should not, however, be assumed on the basis of the above-described attempts to restrict possible or actual political excess in IS programming that "approved content", especially that transmitted over the East European services, was in any way tame or markedly subtle. Standard fare could indeed be quite pointed, in keeping with Désy's avowed intent to make IS "frank and critical almost to the point of combative ness". Regular program titles clearly reflected this approach: "Experiences of a Czech Diplomat In Moscow", "The World of Free Thought", "Answering the Soviet Press", "Soviet Propaganda and Reality", "Civil Liberties", "Soviet Propaganda Terminology", "Those Who Chose Freedom". Scripts were equally oriented towards confrontation. Note, for example, this excerpt from a broadcast entitled "What the Soviet Political School is Taught About Democracy" (December 19, 1951):

...even this monopolistic and in many other respects privileged Bolshevik party of the Soviet Union within itself does not permit any substantial democratic freedom. The party bosses are not elected or, rather, elect and perpetuate themselves, whether the rank and file approves of them or not. Can anyone imagine, for instance, an annual party conference in Tadjikistan passing a vote of non-confidence to Comrade Stalin and demanding his dismissal?...Of course not. In the Soviet Union only party secretary Stalin may dispose of any of his Politburo lieutenants and only Premier Stalin can dismiss comrade Stalin from
his post. That has nothing in common with democracy, that is plain dictatorship, no matter by what name it is called.49

Another script for broadcast by the Russian section described in equally pointed fashion, albeit in a somewhat lighter vein, the experiences of a former Soviet citizen in a Canadian factory (February 19, 1953):

Entering the factory my first thought was that I came to the wrong place. Cars were driving into the wide yard and well-dressed men and women were getting out. All the women wore expensive fur coats, had beautiful hairdos, and were powdered and rouged. "They are probably all office-workers", I thought. I came early, for fear to be late, and now I remained at the entrance waiting for the women workers to appear. But they did not come. The same elegant young ladies continued to enter through a wide glass door. I felt conspicuous in this well-dressed crowd, even if before coming to Canada I thought I looked quite presentable.

Taking the elevator to the fourth floor I entered a large lighted room with fluorescent lights over each table. It was filled with these neatly dressed women and girls I noticed earlier. Each of them had her own locker in an adjoining room in which they hung their street clothes, taking out their work clothing consisting of a blue coat with white collar and cuffs. Nearly all the girls removed their dresses, putting on their work coats over their underwear. When I saw the underwear they had on I was flabbergasted. "Some working women", I thought. Back home even the kommisars'
wives do not have such underwear...50

Ira Dilworth would not have believed his ears.

Jean Désy's appointment as Director-General of the CBC International Service came to an end officially on June 30, 1953. The Ambassador was sent abroad again - this time to a prestige post in Paris. In the Department, it was felt that in one sense he had served the Government well. "His appointment and tenure of office", commented Dana Wilgress in May, "have helped to mute the clamour in Parliamentary circles for close supervision and direction by the Department of CBC-IS broadcasts".51 On his part Désy left convinced that "the International Service was performing the useful function of spreading knowledge of Canada and Canadian policies [and] fighting communist ideology and Soviet imperialism".52

The Director-General from External Affairs had succeeded in overhauling the mechanisms of liaison between the Department and the Service. The two agencies were now closer than ever before. Yet in the process of strengthening the bond and stiffening the radio's ideological backbone Désy had, without meaning to, succeeded in damaging Service morale even further. He was clearly an outsider resented by the broadcasters.
For a diplomat he had an uncharacteristically blunt and imperious manner. Many staffers who were not forced to resign were driven to submit their resignations in disgust.\textsuperscript{53} General CBC management, in the meantime, felt somewhat absolved from feeling responsible for the Service.\textsuperscript{54} This was unfortunate in itself, but it had the wider consequence of making the Department somewhat hesitant about repeating the experience with another official. Indeed, although his achievements were meaningful and important, it is significant that Désy was the last man from External Affairs ever to be seconded or assigned to IS on an ongoing basis. This meant that once again External became vulnerable to criticism on policy matters relating to the Service without having the ability to control the situation as it wished. Let there be no mistake: Désy never ceased regarding himself as a foreign service officer. It was beside the point for him to say that "I receive no definite instructions from the Department of External".\textsuperscript{55} He did not have to. Recognizing this, his colleagues could see the consequences of his departure. Wrote Wilgess,

\begin{quote}
It can be anticipated that...this Department will once again be attacked, rightly or (more probably) wrongly, for whatever the CBC-IS may be charged with having done or left undone.\textsuperscript{56}
\end{quote}
The likelihood of this presented the Government, as the
Under-Secretary saw it, with four clear options:

a) to carry on with the present operation, improving departmental liaison with and guidance for the IS and urging the IS to complete its organization to the desired level;

b) to abolish the International Service...;

c) to restrict the CBC-IS's activities to a much smaller volume of short-wave broadcasting and to have the IS concentrate on making recordings for medium-wave broadcasts in foreign countries;

d) to have this Department take over full operational as well as policy responsibility for CBC-IS...57

IS was at a crossroads.
NOTES

1. D. Wilgress - Minister, May 2, 1953, PAC RG25/G2/2203, DEA 9901-40. It may be assumed that these facts would have been well-known to External Affairs officials in 1951.

2. J. Désy - L. Beaudry, December 11, 1947, DEA 52 F(s).

3. Interview with Douglas Hicks, October 30, 1980.

4. J. Désy - L. Pearson (Draft), May 26, 1953, PAC RG25/G2/2209, DEA 9901-6-40. It is significant that this draft was far more detailed on the problems of the Service than was the final copy submitted to Pearson on June 10. Désy may have feared that excessive or extended emphasis on IS's early failings would give credence to Pearson's renewed doubts about carrying on the Canadian international broadcasting effort.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.


13. Ibid.


18. Désy - Pearson (Draft).


23. Ibid.

24. It is interesting to note that, despite everything, Désy himself suggested at the end of his term that IS be moved to Ottawa if at all possible. See "Relations Between the Department of External Affairs and the CBC International Service".


32. Ibid.

34. Ibid.


36. Ibid.


38. See J. Decore - L. Pearson, July 17, 1952, Ibid.


43. See D. Wilgess - Minister, January 22, 1953 in Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. W. Harris - L. Pearson, March 25, 1953, Ibid.

46. D. Wilgess - Minister, March 31, 1953, Ibid.


50. Ibid., pp. 222-223.

51. Wilgress - Minister, May 2, 1953.

52. "Relations Between the Department of External Affairs and the CBC International Service".

53. In all, nineteen "responsible editors and policy makers" left IS during this time. See "CBC-IS", The Ensign (Clipping), November 14, 1953, PAC RG25/G2/2203, DEA 9901-40.

54. See "Relations Between the Department of External Affairs and the CBC International Service".


56. Wilgress - Minister, May 2, 1953.

57. Ibid.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE DISSATISFACTION:

REVIEWS AND REVERSALS, 1953-56

In silencing some of the critics of International Service Jean Désy had only stimulated others. The ongoing furor reinforced Ministers' reservations about the general value of the Canadian broadcasting arm. By 1953 even Lester Pearson, who had taken such an interest in overseas information efforts after the Czechoslovakian events of 1948, had some sympathy for those who favoured the outright abolition of IS. He thought it wise, however, to exercise caution pending further study. The opportunity for this arose on January 7, 1954, when Cabinet set up an ad hoc committee (McCann, National Revenue, Chairman; Pearson, External Affairs; Garson, Justice; Lapointe, Veterans Affairs; Harris, Citizenship and Immigration) to review the purposes, operations, and accomplishments of the CBC-IS and to submit recommendations for future policy.

Before this body could meet, Pearson himself was forced to confront the matter. On January 11 he was informed that Treasury Board had recommended a cut in the CBC-IS budget for the upcoming fiscal year 1954/55 ($2,495,400); it was left up to him whether the reduction would be $100,000 or
$150,000.² This delegation of authority was significant in itself, as it demonstrated External’s extent of responsibility for IS, making a mockery of its earlier public insistence upon the prerogative of the CBC in the area. The decision, however, promised to have consequences for policy as well as funding. It appeared likely that the cuts could only be realized by the elimination of a major foreign language service. External Affairs was thus put through a “dry run” of the considerations which would later inform the Cabinet Committee. Its preliminary considerations were significant.

In a memo to the Minister, R.M. Macdonnell (Assistant Under-Secretary) noted that, as of early 1954, IS was broadcasting in fifteen languages: English, French, Spanish and Portuguese (to Latin America), German, Italian, Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish, Dutch, Russian, Ukrainian, Czech, and Polish. Of these the most important were judged to be English and French (for obvious international and domestic political reasons), Russian, Czech, and Polish (constituting the centre-pieces of the Canadian propaganda effort to Eastern Europe), Italian and German (beamed to prime targets for Canadian propaganda in Western Europe). Less important were the Latin American, Scandinavian, Dutch, and Ukrainian transmissions. Macdonnell was hesitant about all four. The Latin American broadcasts, he suggested, served little political purpose, although their trade value was not so easily dismissed.
The Scandinavian and Dutch services, while probably the best-run of all CBC-IS sections, and enjoying proportionately the largest audiences, were seen to be politically redundant given what the Assistant Under-Secretary described as "genuine friendship for Canada in Holland and Scandinavia". The most revealing analysis Macdonnell offered, however, was of the Ukrainian broadcasts. "A very good case", he asserted, can be made for suspending [these]...

In policy terms the Ukrainian operation has always been a problem, often an embarrassment, and sometimes even a danger. It is almost paralyzingly difficult to carry Ukrainian scripts without directly or indirectly appealing to Ukrainian separatist sentiment. I think it is true to say that the Ukrainian service has never been a satisfactory operation. Therefore, I can see little disadvantage, and, indeed, some advantage, in purely foreign policy terms, if these broadcasts were dropped.

Macdonnell realized nonetheless that the Minister's hands were quite possibly tied by domestic political realities: "[Of course] you must take into account factors unrelated to foreign policy".

The final recommendation on sections to be abolished therefore ran as follows: 1) Ukrainian, 2) Latin American, 3) Dutch and Scandinavian. For Pearson, it was an unpleasant choice. Whatever his personal predispositions, he felt it precipitous on tactical grounds to tinker with IS
too much at this stage, especially as there was a possibility of Cabinet scrapping it altogether. He would have wished the budget cut by only $50,000 with no major language change. This figure, however, was not possible, so he agreed to the smaller of the other two: $100,000. The axe would fall on the Latin American or Scandinavian services; Pearson would have preferred to dispose of the Ukrainian service, but, as he commented later to a subordinate, "this could not be done". Ironically, it was soon apparent that the agonizing that had gone into his choice had been unnecessary. The cut was ultimately realized without loss of any major section, although broadcast times in some languages were drastically reduced.

This did not solve the problem; it only postponed it. Wrestling with the issue itself, the Cabinet Committee of which Pearson was a part decided to appoint a Subcommittee of Officials to do the ground work for its broader deliberations. Included were the Secretary to the Cabinet (Bryce), the Chairman of the CBC Board of Governors (Dunton), the Director of CBC-IS (Delafield), the Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Fortier), the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Macdonnell), the head of External's Political Co-ordination Section (L.A.D. Stephens), the Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance (Deutsch) and an assistant, the Director of the Trade Commissioner Ser-
service (English), and an official of the Privy Council Office. Their assignment was two-fold: first, to report "the arguments for or against continuing the CBC International Service", and, secondly, to prepare recommendations "as to how a saving of approximately $250,000 could be effected in the operating costs of the CBC-IS".9

In practice, the Sub-Committee's discussions revolved more around the second matter than the first. This seems to have been due to Macdonnell's success in persuading the officials, despite their early scepticism, of the value of a Canadian international broadcasting service. The arguments which the Assistant Under-Secretary used to make his point were encompassed in a briefing paper Stephens had submitted to him on February 1:

1) International broadcasting has had the support of parliamentary committees from 1938 on;

2) Shortwave broadcasting has been considered worthwhile by 60-odd countries of the world;

3) Our opponents in the Cold War certainly consider international radio an effective medium. This is attested by

   a) the vast volume of Soviet and satellite broadcasting;
   b) the extraordinary measures taken by the Communist countries to jam Western broadcasts [this had been done systematically since 1949].
4) Radio is the only means to reach the Iron Curtain countries. Moreover, the available evidence is that Western broadcasts (including Canada's) get through despite jamming.

5) As one of the important media of communication, radio can and does play a role in getting information about Canada to the citizens of other countries. It is practically impossible to arrive at reliable estimates of audience numbers but listeners' letters indicate that there is an appreciable audience in friendly countries.

6) It is highly desirable to keep in being an apparatus which will almost certainly be called for in a time of war or lesser grave international emergency. The disbanding of the International Service would mean that allocated frequencies might disappear, the technical plant would have to be built up from scratch, and, perhaps more important, the experienced personnel would have been scattered. Further, audiences who had developed the habit of listening to Canadian broadcasts would have lost the habit; it would take considerable time to build these up again.

Yet cuts had to be made. John Deutsch was quick to note that IS had been established and developed in a period of budget surpluses and general expansion. With the tightening of the budgetary situation, the cost-effectiveness of IS operations had to be reconsidered. Deutsch agreed with Macdonnell that it would be unwise to get out of the business entirely. He suggested nonetheless that only a "core opera-
tion" in English and French be maintained. This would permit substantial savings. Unfortunately, the question was not so simply resolved. Restricting IS languages to English and French would result in the loss of foreign language audiences thereby, as Davidson Dunton pointed out, "all but destroying the usefulness of CBC-IS as an effective instrument of psychological warfare in times of conflict." The Subcommittee was thus plunged into a painstaking review of all aspects of IS activity, examining each language section in turn to determine its specific value to Canadian interests abroad.

With the important exception of German, the Subcommittee's evaluation of the worth of the West European services was negative. This was significant as here the Subcommittee had before it the most tangible evidence of a substantial IS listenership, and thus proof of the broadcasts' contribution, at least, to the stimulation of interest in Canada. In 1952 International Service had received more than 23,000 letters from Europe. Assuming a letter-writer ratio of 120:1, this yielded a daily European audience figure of over 2,500,000, and an "occasional audience" (multiplying by five times) of more than 12,000,000. The Subcommittee was unimpressed. Programmes broadcast to Europe (including UK) in English and French, it reported in May 1954, "accomplish relatively little in the promotion
of Canadian interest".\textsuperscript{14} As for the Italian, Dutch, and Scandinavian services, "it is not felt that the rather general and intangible purposes to be served warrant the scale of expenditure involved in the present schedules".\textsuperscript{15} A substantial reduction in transmission times was recommended in both instances, although the Sub-Committee did urge Cabinet to consider increasing CBC relays over local stations (via transcriptions). Scepticism reigned, even to the extent of prompting a "heresy" of the highest order: "there is some doubt that Canadian shortwave broadcasts can, in any significant degree, affect national policy or public opinion in these countries".\textsuperscript{16}

The Sub-Committee's analysis of the Latin American language services was similarly negative. Here its conclusions corresponded roughly to those of Macdonnell's January submission to Pearson. "The value to the average Canadian", wrote the Sub-Committee, "of possible goodwill and the 'projection of Canada' in Latin America is remote and the value to commercial relations is negligible".\textsuperscript{17} It did not, however, advise outright elimination.

Nevertheless, the termination of this service to the sensitive Latin Americans would be an affront, and some, even nominal appearance of a desire to cultivate friendly relations would probably be of a general political value.\textsuperscript{18}
This was judged to be particularly true in a context where the British, and more recently the Americans, had ceased to broadcast to the area.

In the consideration of Iron-Curtain broadcasts the Sub-Committee's attitude shifted 180°:

The Committee believes that short-wave broadcasting serves a useful and valuable purpose in reaching behind the Iron Curtain... More of the effort of the CBC-IS should be concentrated on this part of the work. 19

It was ironic that greatest support was given to those transmissions the effectiveness of which could be demonstrated only with difficulty, if at all. This is not to say that External Affairs in particular did not make the attempt: a February 1954 paper on "Effectiveness of Broadcasting to Iron Curtain Countries by the International Service" went to considerable length to downgrade the extent of Soviet and East bloc jamming, establish the fact of a potential audience (in an estimation of shortwave radio sets) and stress such positive indicators of efficacy as listener testimony to Canadian diplomats, refugee reports, and the trickle of letters from satellite countries. 20 Such considerations, however, were secondary. One addendum to the paper was far more revealing in its presentation of the arguments for continued Canadian broadcasts to Iron Curtain countries:
A. Internal policy reasons.

There are important minorities in Canada directly concerned with Iron Curtain broadcasts which would likely be upset if the government decides to cease broadcasting to Iron Curtain countries. We have several letters on file from Polish, Czechoslovakian, and Ukrainian associations in Canada requesting broadcasts to those countries. The Ukrainian Canadian Association [sic] has sent a letter to the Department with a petition which is said to have been signed by 17,741 [sic] persons.

B. External policy reasons.

1. Canadian broadcasting may be more effective than others from Western democratic countries because, although Canada is a world power, it is generally accepted that she has no extra-territorial or imperialistic ambitions.

2. To cease broadcasting to Iron Curtain countries would mean for our friends over there:

- either that we have lost faith in our ideals

- or that we dissociate ourselves from their fate in which case they might be inclined to commit themselves to Communist ideology, especially in the case of our friends in the satellite countries

- or that we cannot afford it because of an economic crisis as anticipated by Marxism, or because Canada is no longer a separate entity or finally because of an unconditional surrender in the "Cold War" or in the "cold peace". 21
The Sub-Committee seemed to agree. It began its report on Iron Curtain services by declaring that the lead effort, in Russian, "is worthwhile and should be expanded". The recommendation was pointed:

It is evident that the use [of transmission time] for programmes to Western Europe hurts the full effectiveness of broadcasts to the USSR. The Committee suggests that priority be given the Russian service.

At the same time the Sub-Committee submitted a new draft directive for the broadcasts. Although cast in Cold War terms, this was at once more sophisticated in its appreciation of the medium and less blustery in its rhetoric than its predecessor of October 1950. The latter fact doubtless reflected, in part, the relative lessening of international tension that had followed the death of Stalin. Six principles for the Russian service were established:

a) it should broadcast truthful news selected to be of interest to the intellectual and managerial classes in Russia (including the military), among whom the listeners are most likely to be found and who seem likely to be the ones able to have any influence on Russian actions.

b) it should include political commentary on international affairs reflecting Canadian policy and typical Canadian viewpoints and
should stress the fundamental tenet of Canadian foreign policy which is to develop mutually satisfactory relations with the USSR as well as with other countries and to ensure, at the same time, that Canada can effectively resist aggression.

c) enough should be included of our own internal differences of view and political controversy to suggest to the listeners that this is not simply government propaganda and that our political institutions are both really free and interesting.

d) it should include sufficient other material to indicate that Canadians are not solely interested in or obsessed by political and international affairs, but are doing other things which are of interest to the class of persons in Russia classified above.

e) it should also endeavour to arouse serious doubts in the minds of Russian listeners not only as to the veracity of their leaders' pronouncements on the political aims of other countries but also as to the intrinsic worth of Soviet policies, both foreign and domestic.

f) as a long term aim, the program should be directed to suggesting that peaceful relations between Russia and the West are possible, and that both have much to do that is more constructive and more satisfying than carrying on a cold war or planning a hot one.

To a substantial extent, these guidelines also applied to Soviet satellites. In addition, however, the following considerations were deemed relevant:
a) in many satellite countries, particularly Czechoslovakia and Poland, there undoubtedly exists considerable sympathy for the West. The main purposes of the programmes to the satellite countries shall be to encourage this trend since the mere existence in those countries of a sizeable body favouring the Western way of life might well deter the USSR from launching mass attacks against the West.

b) it should be made clear to the satellite countries that Canada recognizes their individual identities and is interested in seeing those identities preserved, and to this end the programmes should attempt to keep alive their hopes for independence as free nations.

c) international broadcasts such as those of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the Overseas Service of the BBC and the Voice of America, are the only means available to most of the nationals of the satellite countries to learn the truth not only about their relations with Russia but political developments within their own countries. Consequently, every effort should be made not only to give factual international news to listeners in these countries, but also to give dispassionate accounts of local happenings within the countries concerned together with detailed appraisals and political commentaries thereon.

The principal complicating factor in Canadian broadcasts to the East bloc was, of course, the IS Ukrainian section. Here the Sub-Committee of Officials recognized the political
constraints on action as defined in the External Affairs memo of February 18, but still felt, as had Macdonnell earlier, that dissolution was advisable and, moreover, opportune. The occasion of a general policy review, it suggested, would permit the discontinuance of the service without risking an "intolerable reaction" from Ukrainian groups in Canada. Any criticism that did develop could ultimately be met by the assertion that the policy of the Canadian government was to treat the Ukraine as part of the Soviet Union, and not as a separate political entity as was implied in broadcast treatment of Poland and Czechoslovakia. In any case, there was a substantial budgetary saving to be made here—elimination of the Ukrainian section would, added to related measures, allow a reduction of $650,000 to be made to the estimates of the International Service for 1955/56.26

The recommendation on broadcasts to the Ukraine was the only one which the Cabinet Committee did not accept.27 The remainder, however, were judged reasonable, and on June 4, 1954, the CBC-IS was directed to implement them by the onset of fiscal year 1955.28 The transmission schedule announced early that year reflected the review's conclusions. The time devoted to Russian, Polish, Czechoslovak, German and (ironically) Ukrainian programming increased; English, French, and Spanish broadcasts were slashed, and the Finnish service was eliminated entirely (see Table 3).


**TABLE 3**

**CBC-IS Old and New Broadcast Times (1954/1955)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Old</th>
<th>New</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(in hours:minutes per week)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>7:00</td>
<td>9:30</td>
<td>+2:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>3:30</td>
<td>4:45</td>
<td>+1:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakian</td>
<td>5:15</td>
<td>6:00</td>
<td>+ :45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>3:15</td>
<td>3:30</td>
<td>+ :15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>5:15</td>
<td>6:00</td>
<td>+ :15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>8:45</td>
<td>3:30</td>
<td>-5:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>14:00</td>
<td>5:15</td>
<td>-8:45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>7:00</td>
<td>5:15</td>
<td>-1:45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian, Danish, Swedish</td>
<td>2:20</td>
<td>1:00</td>
<td>-1:20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>5:15</td>
<td>1:00</td>
<td>-4:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>3:30</td>
<td>1:00</td>
<td>-2:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finnish</td>
<td>1:00</td>
<td>0:00</td>
<td>-1:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>14:00</td>
<td>7:00</td>
<td>-7:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>80:00</td>
<td>53:45</td>
<td>-26:20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The increased emphasis on broadcasts to Iron Curtain countries, and the introduction of new policy guidelines for them, made the problems of policy control within IS even more pressing. Indeed, these had worsened since Désy’s departure in mid-1953. Charles Delafield, a longtime IS staffer, had assumed the Director-General’s duties on an "acting" basis, but as his appointment was slow in being confirmed he lacked the publicly-expressed confidence of the Government and thus the ability to plan ahead and make firm decisions. The general uncertainty extended to the rest of the staff who, in the absence of governmental acknowledgement of Delafield in his new position, were slow to settle down to a new routine.\(^29\) It was soon demonstrated, however, that Delafield would need more than official blessing to achieve the degree of co-ordination both he and External Affairs desired. Applying pressure to delinquent sections, especially the Ukrainian, seemed only to incite more rebellious behaviour. Note, for instance, this excerpt from a letter to Delafield from the Ukrainian Section head, Gordon Panchuk, in May 1954:

It is impossible any longer to consider seriously the misguidance and petty nonsense which we receive in writing from Mr. Chevalier [the IS Policy Coordinator] under the cloak of "policy".\(^\ldots\) The letters are...for the most part fit for a kindergarten, [and are] completely void of any knowledge of the target area, the listening audiences, the principles of psychological and po-
litical warfare, the "cold war situation" and the threat to Canada and the free world....[T]hey can be shown to have been a defence of Russia and Communism and contrary to Canada's interests and the principles for which Canada and loyal Canadians have always stood. 30

This sort of inter-escine strife within IS was absolutely unacceptable. 31 A Departmental memo suggested that, given the possibility that Cabinet would refuse to abolish Ukranian transmissions, "somebody will have to give Mr. Delafield the backing necessary for him to take effective steps to bring the Ukrainian broadcasts into line". 32

Yet not until late 1954 did the Department seriously attempt to bring the confusion under control. In November Arthur Andrew, a middle-ranking officer, became the new head of External's Political Co-ordination division. Andrew sized up the problems during a visit to IS in his first month. His findings were hauntingly reminiscent of those which Désy had reported in 1952: International Service, he discovered, suffered from a "general lassitude and aimlessness". 33 Senior personnel regarded themselves as an instrument of the Department but were at something of a loss as the Department had not officially owned them as such. Clearly IS expected External Affairs to take the lead on matters of policy.
Remedying the situation, Andrew felt, necessitated a change of approach. Up to this point Political Co-ordination had been largely occupied with what the newcomer derisively called "homework correction" - going over broadcasts provided by IS. This was a time-consuming task, and totally "negative" in its orientation. The time had come to renew the "positive" side of guidance entailing the formulation and transmission of long-range plans and directives closely related to policy ends. 34 This, of course, had been done before. Cold War directives had begun to flow regularly to IS in 1950-51. With the exception of Arthur Pidgeon's German elections exercise of 1950, however, no one had tried to exploit the possibilities of propaganda in the relatively more restricted context of tactics, as opposed to general strategy. The Soviet government crisis of 1955 (Malenkov vs. Khrushchev) seemed to provide Andrew with precisely the inspiration and opportunity he sought. On February 17, he offered the following musings to his superiors in External Affairs:

CBC-IS has so far carried on its operations towards the Iron Curtain countries on the general principle of objectivity with specific guidance on matters of stated official Canadian policy. Little has been attempted in the way of a psychological offensive operation.... [This] is difficult to conduct on a continuing basis as it would have to be based upon constant, up-to-date, detailed and reasonably accurate analyses of Soviet developments, espe-
cially on the domestic front, [but] there are occasions like the present one when the Soviet Government seems to betray tensions which the intelligentsia (among whom we believe our listeners to be) must be aware of, which thus provides an opportunity that would be too good to pass up. . . .

What Andrew had in mind at this stage was a "genre" of propaganda more than anything in the nature of a co-ordinated operation. But a theme was emerging: "I would say that our object would be to exploit Communist contradictions in answer to Communist attempts at exploiting what they call capitalist contradictions". 36

Within a month, the general idea had been clothed with specifics. Andrew saw an opening: a divergence between the foreign policies of the former and current Soviet leadership. He posed the essential question:

[W]as not Moscow's choice between Malenkov and Khrushchev...not a choice between a Western orientation and an Eastern one, with the consequence that Khrushchev's victory over Malenkov has now tipped the scales in favour of closer Sino-Soviet ties against the Western world? 37

It was an engaging premise - if not provable, at least plausible. Associated with it were three tactical assumptions:
A. There must be a certain element of uncertainty and possibly of fear and suspicion of China in Soviet government and party circles [reasonable, given the record of Sino-Russian relations].

B. This uncertainty over the alignment with China does not yet amount to treason and may well be expressed in these same circles [reasonable, given the flux of the government change-over].

C. Radio monitoring reports, at least, are likely to reach these circles [again, reasonable given Soviet government procedure].

On the basis of these, Andrew suggested that it was now possible to extract some political gain from dividing the Russians from the Chinese just as Soviet policy was apparently striving to bring the two nations closer together. "The idea", Andrew continued,

is to impress on Soviet listeners the danger of the Chinese tail wagging the Soviet dog, of the Soviet Union becoming inextricably involved in Chinese diplomacy, strategy, and economic plans... The line of argument would be analogous to the familiar one that a rearmed Germany might control Western Europe rather than be controlled by it. We have the advantage of having acknowledged the existence of a problem in our relations with Germany where they have not done so in the case of China. If it were brought to the Soviet listener's attention, or if those already aware of its had it placed before them in a suitable fashion they should be able to see the clear parallel.
Four general themes were recommended to this end:

A. That Russia has outgrown its state of isolation but that the weight of China will prolong it, in other words, that Russia has outlived the need to resort to the myth of capitalist encirclement while China has an interest in maintaining it with potentially dangerous consequences for international relations.

B. That China is now less advanced socially and industrially than Russia was in the comparable state of its Communist era so that China could be a drag for Russia, keeping it in a state of relative backwardness.

C. That China could dangerously delay the Soviet drive toward the achievement of Western levels of national prosperity.

D. Past Russian fears of China.

And so Operation LOBSTER FESTIVAL (a code-name inspired by Andrew’s Maritime background) was born. Having concocted his plot, Andrew peddled it in three directions: first to his own Under-Secretary, next to IS, and, thirdly, to the BBC. He had no difficulty in the Department; indeed, the Minister himself appeared to approve of the initiative. Senior IS officials disagreed somewhat about the interpretations and analyses underlying the operation, but, once overridden by Departmental personnel, were quick to agree to an appropriate plan detailing broadcast co-ordination and timing. London looked upon the idea with favour.
all the United Kingdom authorities involved [are] in agreement that this is...worthwhile...[T]he BBC are prepared to make [it] one of the staple elements of their broadcasts over a substantial period....

The first Canadian LOBSTER FESTIVAL script was aired on March 30, 1955; others were produced and transmitted on April 12, April 18, April 21, April 26, and April 27. Problems were immediately apparent. Andrew, perusing the efforts, described them as "not exactly everything we would have wished them to be". Only two of the lot were deemed "on the whole in conformity with our ideas of the objective pursued". One of these was a report on Chinese-Soviet relations adapted from a Montreal Gazette editorial; the other was a general discussion of "China, the Soviet Union, and Formosa". The remaining pieces submitted suffered from various faults: unacceptable lines of argument, inappropriate conclusions, or plain confusion. IS was told to try again. This they did, on May 3, May 4, May 5, May 6. This time the results improved. The seeds of doubt were subtly planted, as can be seen from the following script excerpt:

[We can discern that the characteristic feature of the "friendship" between Soviet Union and China has already assumed a new quality and, although still nebulously, one has begun to talk about two equal partners, and not about followers of the Lenin-
Stalin cause in Asia....[I]t is now two years since Peking ceased being absolutely submissive to Moscow, and that therefore one can expect from Peking all kinds of surprises not only in relations towards the West, but also in relations towards Moscow. It is the free world's greatest anxiety that Peking's conduct might become the cause for the emergence of serious complications in the world, should Peking pursue its unreasonable demands too far. The question becomes more acute when we consider that under the new circumstances prevailing in the relations of the Soviet Union to China, the Kremlin will have to participate in certain activities which might have many unpleasant consequences for the Russian people.48

Work of this quality was, however, the exception rather than the rule. What IS delivered still did not match Andrew's expectations. Somehow the message was not getting through. Frustration - and a certain resignation - slowly infiltrated Departmental comments. Script after script was examined in hopes that, somewhere along the way, a sense of direction would become apparent. But there was none. On June 22 the Political Co-ordination Section chief wrote to Chevalier:

The exercise...has revealed, to me anyway, some of the tremendous difficulties one has to face in trying to undertake a "positive" propaganda operation of any magnitude.... Trying to adhere consistently to
pre-determined lines presents some fairly formidable difficulties.... Should the time come when we would find ourselves obliged to launch a large-scale and desperately serious operation, the practice we have had should be useful.49

LOBSTER FESTIVAL stumbled on for a while yet - it is mentioned in substantial terms as late as September 7, 1955 - but the spirit had been lost. In August its progenitor turned over most of his work to another FSO in preparation for re-assignment. Finally, the project died completely, with hardly a whimper.

To speak disparagingly of the strategic failure of LOBSTER FESTIVAL is somewhat unfair, since it assumes that the operation had a chance of achieving its declared goal. It did not. In fact, as Andrew acknowledged in retrospect, it was a rather naive undertaking which grossly overestimated the capacity of the Canadian shortwave arm - even acting in collaboration with the BBC - to contribute to the achievement of specific policy goals.51 Nevertheless, it was clearly, in form and inspiration, the high-water mark of Canadian radio propaganda. A co-ordinated exercise had been founded on a premise, linked explicitly to a set of tactical suppositions, and set to run according to a specific plan of action. The important failure, as Andrew intimated in 1955, lay on the operational side - successfully
implementing the agreed-to guidelines. In a post-mortem the disillusioned psychological warrior had some rather harsh things to say about co-ordination both within the Service and between the Service and the Department—the very problems which had brought him into contact with IS in the first place. "The broadcasting of an agreed propaganda line", he asserted,

requires the transmission of our policy guidance and background material—which are addressed to the Director of CBC-IS personally—to the Section Heads in one form or other. Seeing the same mistakes repeated in successive scripts in the past, we have long suspected that this transmission was not done. Our tighter and more demanding plan of operations has now brought this fact to light. In one instance the Director has acknowledged their failure to make use of an important guidance letter and three substantial guidance memoranda one full month after they had been sent. They had all gone to file before they had ever reached the CBC-IS Policy Coordinator. 52

This situation had led a disgruntled Andrew to scribble in the margin of one memo that IS had handled LOBSTER FESTIVAL and related projects "with all the subtlety, understanding, and rapidity of turtles". 53 But here he continued:

For some time [IS management] used their...unreliable Ukrainians as scapegoats for their shortcomings.... It seems, however, that the real prob-
lem posed by the Ukrainian section has been made worse in some proportion with the shortcomings of the CBC-IS heads themselves. They come to the office of the Political Co-ordination Section every week to discuss their internal problems... with us in an attempt - which we, of course, steadfastly resisted - to share the burden of responsibility with us. They are using such devices increasingly... to complicate the problem and magnify it to the point where its very magnitude, they hope, will make their shortcomings understandable and excusable. They thus act as an effective screen between us, as the providers of policy guidance, and the working units... 

How was the Department to escape this quandary? Andrew closed his memo with three suggestions:

a) by a change or an improvement in the leadership of the CBC-IS - this however is not for us to bring about;

b) by the posting to Montreal of an FSO responsible to us for receiving and transmitting our guidance in such a way that it will be carried out by the working units;

c) to disclaim any responsibility for guiding the policy content of CBC-IS scripts and eventually to stop all guidance operations on the grounds that they are rendered useless by CBC-IS failure to respond.

The problems of International Service seemed more intractable than ever.
The disenchantment of Arthur Andrew was a serious blow to External Affairs in its renewed effort to bring the International Service of the CBC under control and make of it an effective instrument of Canadian foreign policy. Here had been a man of imagination and drive who had seen his aspirations reduced in the face of managerial lethargy in IS. "He would", observed Robert Reford in later years, "have made a good Director [himself]." 56 Certainly he showed a willingness to take command of a situation. Walter Schmolka, commenting in 1956, agreed that this was precisely what was needed: "Mr. Dilworth had been a man of enthusiasm who gave direction and inspiration to his staff. Even Mr. Desy... at least knew what he wanted..." 57 With Delafield, however, IS was again left to drift. Slowly, but at an increasing rate after Andrew's departure from the Political Coordination Section, the Department lost faith in senior IS personnel. In a comprehensive June 1956 review of IS-DEA relations Douglas Hicks of External pinpointed the problem:

...it is essential that the directing staff should be persons in whose professional skill, judgement, and appreciation of international affairs, the Department has full confidence. Unfortunately, this is not the case at the present time... This does not contradict the statement... that the machinery for liaison between the Department of External Affairs and the CBC-IS is satisfactory. What is lacking is competent people to make it work. 58
Delafield, Hicks concluded, was simply not that interested in the foreign relations aspect of his job. This placed added responsibility on the shoulders of Chevalier, the IS Policy Co-ordinator. Next to the Director, he was the official required to be expert in political matters - particularly those pertaining to the Soviet Union and its satellites. He had to have clear ideas on the use of the propaganda instrument and the ability to firmly express his ideas to his staff. Unfortunately, Hicks noted, "Mr. Chevalier possesses none of those qualifications". 59

Ultimately, Hicks was led to the same disheartening conclusion as Andrew: as problems with IS burgeoned, DEM's choices for dealing with them narrowed. Taking IS over was still out of the question. The Department similarly had no intention, for reasons that will be recalled from Chapter Three, of replacing the IS Director with one of its own. Internal staffing problems precluded posting an PSO 4 or 5 to the IS Policy Co-ordination unit. These things did not mean, however, that the Department could ignore the situation. "It might be advisable", suggested Hicks,

for the Under-Secretary to speak to Mr. Dunton....We might quite frankly express our doubts about the usefulness of Mr. Chevalier as far as the interests of the Department are concerned and ask the CBC management to consider whether he might be transferred to some other
branch of their organization. The same question might be asked of Mr. Delafield...

Apart from this, Hicks was at a loss. There were, of course, other alternative, even supplementary paths:

the reconvening of the special committee of officials of 1954 might... bring about some improvements in the situation. [We might] also prepare a new directive for broadcasts to Russia and the satellites.

But these were essentially old ideas, the reintroduction of which merely demonstrated the paucity of the Department's options. Only one other remained: the disengagement recommended by Andrew (6) above). The Hicks memo passed over this without comment, but it doubtless remained in the minds of those Departmental officials who, rather to their distaste, were forced to deal with a recalcitrant IS on a daily basis. The attraction grew with the frustration. In what was increasingly perceived to be a hopeless tangle of administrative and policy complications, escape became salvation.
NOTES


3. Macdonnell - Minister, Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.


8. See Ibid.


11. "Interdepartmental Committee...Minutes".


13. Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, March 12, 1953, p.144. The ratios were those employed by VOA and BBC.


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.


22. "Report to the Special Cabinet Committee".

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. The Government's sensitivity to matters affecting the Ukrainian broadcasts was perhaps best typified in the following anecdote told many years later by Douglas Hicks:

Well, came Christmas 1955... It was after Christmas - the Ukrainian Christmas in January. Charlie Delafield called me up. He said "By the way, we've got a message here which the Ukrainian service wants to send out. It's a message to the faithful for Christmas Day in Russia. I don't think you're going to like it, so I'd like to send it to you, and you can tell us that we shouldn't use it, and that'll be fine by me." So he sent it up by teletype, and I got it. I read it, and it was dripping with blood - the whole works. "Well", I said to myself, "...we can't let that go, but I guess there's a bit of a political angle here, so I'd better go ask my boss" - Max Wershof, Assistant Under-Secretary. I said "Look at this piece. Charlie doesn't want to use it, and I don't want to use it, but I thought I better ask you". He read it, and said "Douglas, you're quite right - can't possibly let this go. However... there are certain internal political angles, and perhaps we'd better see the Under-Secretary". So we trooped in to
see Léger. Max said "Ah, we have a piece of the Archbishop's, but because it might have repercussions...", etc. So Jules read it and said "Yes, yes, you're quite right. But...maybe I should consult the Minister....However, I'll tell him. You cancel it, and forget about it."

You see, there was a Ukrainian senator, and a couple of Ukrainian MPs, and they regarded the CBC Ukrainian service as something which belonged to them. And this is why everybody was so nervous. They were terrified there would be questions in the House and so on...

Interview with Douglas Hicks, October 31, 1980.

28. "Relations Between the Department of External Affairs and the CBC International Service".


31. Problems were not confined to the Ukrainian section, as the head of the IS Russian section, Chripounoff, informed Pierre Trottier of Political Co-ordination in November 1954:

My visitor...[said his staff - all emi-gres] wanted a broadcast crusade and he had to keep them in check constantly since he conceived his operation not as "la Russie parlant sur un longeur d'ondes canadien mais la radio canadienne parlant russe". This, he said, entailed a [more] objective approach.... But, he added, to be objective and avoid belligerence amounts to treason and to being pro-Soviet in the eyes of several of his fellow workers....

This difficulty, however, never assumed critical proportion itself as there was no well-organized or numerically strong Russian ethnic group in the country to support the right-wing staffers. See P. Trottier - File, November 2, 1954, PAC RG25/G2/2209A, DEA 9901-6-40.

33. A. Andrew - J. Chapdelaine, November 9, 1954, Ibid. This was particularly disturbing considering the scope of political guidance which the Department was already providing. This was suggested by the following figures for March 1953:

1) 40 letters to CBC-IS which (a) transmitted memoranda suggesting treatment to be given certain subjects in broadcasts or, (b) provided the Director-General with information not for broadcasting but for his own guidance in planning political broadcasts, or (c) drew the attention of the International Service to particular developments or provided them with documents which they should know about to follow the suggestions made in memoranda of guidance;

2) 125 documents sent to CBC-IS without comment for their background information (about 15 of these were United Kingdom papers...the rest were from the Department or our missions abroad; over three-quarters of our documents were classified);

3) approximately 350 scripts sent by CBC-IS (these were all read in full or in part in Political Co-ordination Section in the initial screening process; 89 of these were sent on to the various political divisions in the Department for further examination and comment; a smaller number of scripts went to Iron Curtain missions for comment...).

These figures do not cover 1) correspondence commenting on scripts or 2) miscellaneous correspondence.


34. See "Departmental Policy Guidance for CBC-IS" (Draft), PAC RG25/G2/2209A, DEA 9901-6-40. This document is not identified by date or author. On the basis of its con-
tent and style one may however assume that it was written by Arthur Andrew, probably around March 1955.


36. A. Andrew - C. Delafield, February 17, 1955, Ibid.


39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. See "Minutes of a meeting held in the East Block", March 14, 1955, Ibid.

42. See Ibid.


44. A. Andrew - W. Chevalier, May 3, 1955, Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. "Chinese-Soviet Relations" (Script), March 30, 1955, Ibid.

47. "China, the Soviet Union, and Formosa" (Script), April 12, 1955, Ibid.

48. "The Suicide of Gao-Gan" (Script), May 4, 1955, Ibid.

49. A. Andrew - W. Chevalier, June 22, 1955, Ibid.


51. Interview with Arthur Andrew, April 30, 1981.

52. "Broadcasts to Iron Curtain Countries" (Draft), in PAC RG25/G2/2209, DEA 9901-6-40. Again, this is an undated and anonymous document. The presentation and substance of the memo nonetheless allow it to be attributed to Andrew with certainty. It seems to have been written about the same time Andrew wrote to Chevalier in June.
Actually, the problem Andrew was describing was not entirely new. Even in Dévy's time packages of documents had been returned to the Department unopened; those which were read were not passed on to script writers. Confidential interview.

53. See penciled comments (obviously written well after the inauguration of Lobster Festival) on Andrew - Chapdelaine, November 9, 1954.

54. "Broadcasts to Iron Curtain Countries".

55. Ibid.


58. "Relations Between the Department of External Affairs and the CBC International Service".

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.
CHAPTER SIX

DENOUEMENT:

THE IMPORTANCE OF "RESTRAINT", 1956-63

The problems the Department experienced in its relations with International Service made it increasingly alert to opportunities for depoliticizing IS broadcasts. Here, perhaps, lay the answer: render the programs more innocuous and one would reduce the necessity for close Departmental supervision. By 1956 circumstances were combining to make this feasible at last. International tension had lessened considerably since Khrushchev's February 1955 rise to power in the Soviet Union. The Geneva Conferences of that year, and the subsequent CPSU Party Congress (with its "secret speech") had contributed particularly to this trend. A certain "de-escalation" in the East-West "war of words" seemed appropriate. General Canadian foreign policy was in the meantime shifting slowly from its Cold War orientation, prompting at least one sceptic to comment in July 1956 that the very existence of the East European services was perhaps "a little out of step with [our] present foreign horizon".

The results of a June/July 1956 monitoring exercise conducted by Canadian missions only reinforced such reservations about the worth of the Canadian international broad-
casting effort. Reception of IS programmes, especially in Iron Curtain countries, appeared in many instances to be poor or non-existent. Prague, Warsaw, and Moscow all reported the same problem: jamming. In Ottawa, officials felt that this warranted a reappraisal of program guidelines, given what they saw as a new Russian willingness to suspend the activity (specifically against the BBC) if transmissions became less politically and ideologically "offensive". In late August R.A.D. Ford, now back in European Division, noted that "our immediate problem..."

is to alter the "tone" of our broadcasts to this end. We need a directive which will call for a wholly different atmosphere....The experience of the BBC...has surely demonstrated the lasting validity of its basic principles - absolute objectivity in the presentation of news, and a restrained and adult approach towards regimes for which the British people ultimately have no sympathy. It is in the sustained failure to observe these principles that the CBC has permitted a tone which differs mournfully from the sobriety and dignity of Canadian public expression as a whole.

The Department had brought this "failure" to the attention of the CBC before. Various informal representations newly received by Canadian envoys, however, gave their renewed efforts an edge. Indeed Czech officials, speaking to the Canadian Chargé in early 1956, had gone as far as to say
that CBC-IS broadcasts were "hostile" and "worse than those of Radio Free Europe".5

In this context the Department decided, in accordance with the Hicks memo of June, to formulate a new directive for CBC-IS transmissions to the Soviet Union and its satellites. If the Heeney letter of May 1950 ordered the IS into the Cold War, this document of September 1956 sounded the first notes of retreat. This is not to say that it ignored the political struggle. The directive still regarded IS activity as part of a "co-ordinated political offensive of the Western world".7 Nonetheless, the philosophy of attack was gone. Broadcasts, it declared,

should be restrained and moderate in approach, clear and vivid in language and style, and should show respect for the foreign listener's intelligence, common sense, and national feelings.8

The guiding considerations here were twofold. First, moderation was deemed "more likely to attract the listeners' attention and therefore more likely to be effective as propaganda".9 Secondly, moderation would make it easier to suggest to Soviet authorities that "if they are serious in their desire to promote good relations with Canada they should put an end to the jamming of our short-wave broadcasts".10
The body of the directive discussed, in sequence, content, tone, and special considerations for individual services. Content was itself divided into three categories: news, commentary, and "projection of Canada." News was clearly to remain the backbone of the shortwave service to the East bloc. As such, it was to be "reliable, balanced, and completely objective" to the point of frankly exploiting the problems of the Western group "to contrast the freedom of that community with the rigid conformity which characterizes the internal relationships of the Soviet bloc".11 Canadian affairs were to be high-lighted. A similar Canadian orientation was to guide IS editors in selecting commentaries. These were to be presented "from a Canadian point of view, giving due attention to the explanation of Canadian government policy".12 UN, NATO, and Commonwealth matters, about which Soviet listeners were likely to be ill-informed, were also to receive particular attention. Discussion of Soviet foreign and domestic policy was to be relatively restricted, although some coverage was inevitable. Care had to be taken here to treat irresponsible or unpopular Soviet actions "cooly and frankly, with restraint and reasonableness".13 "Helpful" policies or programmes were to be welcomed. IS was advised to abandon abstract discussions of the superiority of the Western system or the inconsistencies of Communist theory in favour of a more "pragmatic approach to developments which is ultimately more typical of Canadians".14
The brunt of the propaganda would come in the straight "projection of Canada", allowing listeners in Communist countries to make leading comparisons with their own conditions. This had the added advantage of simultaneously promoting an understanding of the Canadian nation and way of life.

The Departmental directive stressed that the recommendations on content changes could only be made effective by concomitant changes in broadcast tone. IS writers would have to remember the principles of "restraint", "vividness", and "respect for the listeners". Individuals in Communist-dominated countries, the paper commented on the first of these precepts,

are subjected to a constant stream of bombastic propaganda from their own authorities and are apt to discount and disbelieve most propaganda from the West. Our listeners should be made to feel that we are not trying to convert them, but merely to express the Canadian point of view in matters of national interest. Generalized and over-simplified condemnations of the Communist system serve no purpose. Judgement must be made of specific issues and conveyed gently. Phrases loaded with emotion should be avoided at all times.15

This was no excuse for dullness. "The criterion for any program", observed the author of the directive, "should be that it is alive and of interest to a reasonably wide group of listeners".16 Awareness of their sensibilities had equally
to be shown:

Preaching and moralizing should be avoided. Listeners should not be told, as news, facts about their own country which they know all too well such as the shortage of housing, the high cost of living,...etc. These facts can be referred to but they should be used intelligently and sympathetically in a way which will not antagonize the listeners. 17

The third section of the memorandum - "special considerations" - was most illustrative of the subtle changes which had occurred in the Department's general outlook since the early days of the Cold War. Note, for instance, the new balance evident in the analysis of the situation facing the Russian service:

It should be remembered that an entire generation of Russians has lived under communism for their whole lives and that the possibility of a counter-revolution has long since disappeared. Material conditions have improved substantially in the USSR during the past few years and the people are not basically dissatisfied with the Soviet system. They are conscious of the USSR's strength as a great power and are proud of their national achievements. They have also been so thoroughly imbued with their own peace propaganda that they are inclined to believe that all threats of war come from the "imperialist camp". 18
On the basis of this, argumentativeness in IS programming was no longer appropriate:

...the intellectual and political developments of the past three years—the destalinization campaign, the encouragement of criticism, discussion of "democratization" and decentralization—are evidence that new ideas are appearing and offer new opportunities for the West to force the Russians to think for themselves. In attempting to reach their minds, our efforts should be concentrated on dispelling the ignorance and misunderstanding caused by their isolation from the rest of the world, and on encouraging the native desire for a more liberal regime. 19

More interesting still was the analysis applied to Czechoslovakia and Poland. All references to eventual independence were gone now. Instead the directive declared:

We must recognize that the satellites, for geographical reasons alone, will be forced to maintain some kind of alliance with the USSR [although] it can be suggested that it need not be complete domination and that the people of these countries should not allow themselves to be exploited. 20

The September 1956 directive was a turning point, a central document to which Departmental officials would refer again and again in years to come. At its birth, however, it was only one of a number of items which the Department
submitted for the consideration of the Interdepartmental Committee on the CBC International Service. Hicks had recommended the resurrection of this group in June, by the end of the year it was deeply involved in yet another review of IS policy.

The 1956/57 review was clearly a lower-level exercise than its 1954 predecessor. This time there was no submission to Cabinet. The Committee nonetheless engaged, through a Sub-Committee, in an interesting study of IS effectiveness. It was agreed that the impact of the Service was dependent on four factors: the size of the audience, its nature, the reception conditions, and the quality of programming. Each of these variables posed significant analytical problems. On size, the officials could merely note some raw statistics: 30,357 letters received (1955), 168,840 schedules sent (1955). A BBC poll had suggested a CBC-IS listenership of 600,000 adults in France, and 400,000 in Germany. Beyond this, assertions became increasingly debatable:

it is our view that it is not possible to estimate with any certainty the size of the CBC-IS shortwave audience. All that can be said is that an international audience clearly exists....We suggest...that broadcasting of this kind must inevitably be to some extent an act of faith, particularly with respect to the very important target area of East Europe.
What audience existed, the officials ventured, was largely "middle class". But was the indirect influence which this group exercised on policy-makers (via public opinion, etc.) sufficient to warrant the attempt at persuasion? The investigators suggested it was, but went no further. They were similarly cautious in questions of reception and program quality, noting the variation of the former with atmospheric conditions and mode of transmission (shortwave direct from Canada, shortwave relay from Europe via BBC, or local medium-wave relay of transcriptions) and the difficulties of criteria selection for the latter. Ultimately the problems left the Sub-Committee paralyzed. Largely in consequence of this, the full Committee's May 1957 report offered only tentative conclusions, among which were recommendations that East Europe be considered the prime IS target area (hardly a novelty, especially after the 1954 review), that broadcasts to West Europe and Latin America did not appear to be justified (again, a hold-over from 1954, albeit taken a step further), and that study be given to increasing IS transmitter capacity.²⁶

These proposals were soon forgotten in the atmosphere of uncertainty that surrounded the upcoming general election and the final report of the Royal Commission on Broadcasting ("Fowler Commission").²⁷ The September 1956 directive was thus left, in the absence of an alternative,
to guide the operations of the International Service. This naturally posed a problem of implementation. Given the orientation of the Departmental paper, resistance was especially to be expected from the right-wing IS sections and their supporters. This is precisely what happened.

The trouble, as usual, started in the Ukrainian service. One could trace the origins of the 1957 controversy back to the dismissal of Gordon Panchuk the previous spring. By early 1956 the section head was finding his position in IS increasingly untenable. On the one hand, he was being severely criticized by External Affairs for being politically extreme; on the other hand, he was at the same time attempting to restrain certain elements in the Ukrainian community, especially some centered in Winnipeg, who demanded an even more forceful line. To make things more difficult still, he felt, as had Andrew, that section heads (and himself in particular) were not being supplied with the general directives and guidance necessary for co-ordinated and coherent strategic programming. This state of affairs he blamed on IS management, notably Delafield. Relations between the two became more and more strained. Finally, Panchuk was fired on grounds of "irregularities in...administration".

The action was inevitably coloured by the dubious circumstances surrounding it. The Ukrainian community cried
out that Panchuk had been dismissed for "political reasons". The Ukrainian-language press rallied to the cause; Senator William Wall of Winnipeg, representing the community, asked the Department for an explanation. The controversy heated up when it became known that Carroll Chipman, a non-Ukrainian Canadian, had "temporarily" taken Panchuk's place. On June 6, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) sent a letter to Delafield inquiring about the possibility of another Ukrainian being appointed as permanent section head. IS resisted the suggestion. The representations of the UCC became more pointed. On July 20 another letter was sent to Delafield:

The appointment of a Canadian of Ukrainian origin as head of that Section at the beginning and departure from that policy at the present time will most certainly produce unfavourable reaction especially among the Ukrainian ethnic group....

The Committee pushed its argument in letters on November 16 and December 10. Senator Wall intervened again; Delafield took the opportunity of several meetings (all held at the Senator's request) to impress the CBC position on him. Wall was persuaded to speak to the UCC's Executive Director. The storm seemed to be abating.

By May 1957, however, controversy had flared once more. This time disagreement centered on the distribution
of scripts. While Panchuk had headed the Ukrainian section of IS, the UCC had grown accustomed to receiving, on an unofficial basis, copies of broadcast programmes. This practice had naturally terminated with his dismissal. With the adoption of a "softer" propaganda approach, the UCC was understandably anxious now to renew its link with - and hence a certain amount of control over - CBC Ukrainian section transmissions. Delafield rejected the general proposal, offering instead to release particular scripts upon demand. This was not good enough. More fuel was added to the fire in June when, unexpectedly, the CBC International Service was presented with a citation for programming by the Ukrainian-American mayor of Buffalo, New York. The Ukrainian-language press, both in Canada and abroad, exploded. "What criteria did [the delegation] go by?" demanded Winnipeg's Ukrainian Voice, referring to IS Ukrainian broadcasts as "trash". Detroit's Ukrainian Prometheus described the citation ceremony as a "cunning move" conducted "at the bidding of two or three individuals from a certain circle". Ukrainian News, a paper published in New Ulm, West Germany, described the affair as an "ill-advised trick". Following a similar line, Winnipeg's Ukrainian weekly Canadian Farmer bewailed the obvious "machination". The Ukrainian Canadian Committee renewed its demand for scripts.

Delafield, worn down by all this, finally appealed to the Department for support. "Circulation on a regular
basis of political commentaries broadcast in our Ukrainian section", he wrote,

if they were sent to members of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee either here or in Winnipeg, would be bound to create unending discussions in view of the variety of political views which exist in any foreign language groups in Canada with emigre connections.

The Director's predicament forced External Affairs to reopen its own investigation of CBC-IS (Ukraine). Ironically, while the Ukrainian-Canadian groups had criticized the broadcasts for being too neutral, the Department found them much too combative in the context of the 1956 directive. A September 3 memo presented the following breakdown of Ukrainian script-types as a percentage of the total section programme:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Comments on communist and East European affairs (usually with a strong anti-Communist bias)</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Comments on the world situation, with emphasis on Canadian action and policy</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Projection of Canada abroad</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Music (Ukrainian and classical)</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Reports of the activities of Ukrainian communities abroad and especially in Canada</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Religious talks</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7) Canadian book reviews 2%
8) Ukrainian culture and history 1% 45

"[Type 1] scripts", commented the officer doing the survey,

are far too numerous... CBC-IS [Ukraine] has a strong anti-Communist slant and to any impartial listener CBC-IS [Ukraine] operations would appear to fight commun-
ist doctrine much more than to express the official attitude of Canada. It re-
mains a wartime or at least a Cold War service. 46

The inclination of the Department was thus much more to have IS clamp down on its Ukrainians than to allow greater input from the Ukrainian Canadian community. The latter course, opined an official,

would tend to transform the Ukrainian service into a Canadian Ukrainian broadcasting system or the voice of the Ukraine in exile instead of the Canadian voice to the Ukraine which it is intended to be. 47

Suggested another,

That a federal service, committed to the projection of the national voice, should be dominantly shaped by one minority, however intimate the latter's interests, is surely contrary to the tradition of government in Canada. 48
Nonetheless, some accommodation had to be made. Delafield was advised to cultivate "as friendly relations as possible" with the Ukrainian organizations and perhaps develop closer ties on non-political programmes.

Many Ukrainians found this unacceptable. Yet this time the Ukrainian Canadian community failed to launch a co-ordinated pressure effort along the lines of the 1951/52 campaign. There were several reasons for this uncommon lack of orchestrated activity. In part, the election of a new Conservative government with strong Ukrainian support was a factor. In part also, the attention of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee was diverted from the issue by general internal squabbling (certain groups within the Ukrainian community were agitating in the late 1950s for changes in the structure of the UCC; this led to the establishment of a constitutional reform committee in 1959). Ultimately, however, the UCC grew weary of fighting a seemingly interminable battle with the CBC, and decided to remain content with occasional non-political scripts forwarded from Montreal.

But the UCC's withdrawal from the fray did not mean that the problem slipped quietly into oblivion or that all elements of the Ukrainian community similarly abandon the cause. On November 6, 1957, Sidney Smith, the new Secretary of State for External Affairs, met with officials of the Cen-
eral Canadian League for Ukraine's Liberation. Articles continued to crop up in Ukrainian newspapers and periodicals: in the April 1958 issue of Nowi Dni (a monthly magazine published in Toronto), the September 1958 edition of Moloda Ukraina (the monthly of the Toronto-based Central Committee of the Union of Democratic Ukrainian Youth), the February 1959 issue of Nowi Dni, and the February 7 edition of Homin Ukrainy. All stressed the same two points: the ideological "weakness" of IS Ukrainian transmissions and the staff's ignorance of "true conditions" in the Ukraine. Some of the attacks on IS personnel were scathing, for instance this one appearing in the aforementioned February 1959 issue of Nowi Dni:

And now a special question for Mr., who not long ago landed in the Ukrainian section as the one and only "Easterner". Well, Mr., is a sort government position with a nice salary preferable to the fine resolution of helping your mother and father-free themselves from Moscow-Bolshevik enslavement? Have you forgotten how fat you grew in 1933 on Stalin's goodies, orach and shchryla [edible weeds]? Let us have your address: the Association of Victims of the Russian Communist Regime [sic] will be glad to make you a gift of the "White Book about the Black Deeds of the Kremlin" so that you will be reminded that for a Ukrainian, no matter where he lives...it was, is, and always will be a great honour to be a separatist. Rather than work in an institution in which Ukrainian separatism is considered a dishonour, it would be better to return to Toronto and to the job of delivering milk for "Rodger's Dairy". At least then you will be able to look your fellowmen in the face...
The UCC itself re-entered the debate in July 1959, endorsing a report which, as described in the Winnipeg Tribune, "blasted" the CBC's Ukrainian broadcasts. Yet the official record of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress of that year was relatively conciliatory in referring to a "normalization" of relations with IS. Most likely the UCC was seeking, without directly confronting the Government or the Corporation, to re-establish its leadership of the Ukrainian community by some such recognition of still important concerns. With this sally, however, the emigré agitation seems largely to have spent itself. Neither the CBC nor the Department of External Affairs showed any sign of modifying its position. There was too much to lose. IS had no desire to be entangled once again in the internal feuding that had attended the employment of a Ukrainian section head. It had less interest than ever in a running harangue with the Ukrainians over broadcasts. The Department, determined to end jamming and free itself from close supervision of IS, had no intention of reverting to propaganda lines which had been resisted even in the darkest days of the Cold War. This united stand did not of itself, of course, resolve the Ukrainian controversy. It did, however, help reduce the problem of external dissatisfaction to manageable proportions.

In its ongoing preoccupation with the Ukrainian-Canadian community IS had nonetheless failed to fully imple-
ment the Department's 1956 directive on Iron Curtain broadcasts. One External Affairs officer conducting a spot check of East European scripts in mid-1958 found them to be "largely critical in tone", prompting him to suggest that "we might want to nip in the bud any reversion to the Cold War approach which characterized so many of the political commentaries a couple of years ago". The extent of the emergent problem was driven home in early January 1959 when the Anglo-American section of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs justified difficulties which the Canadian mission in Prague had been experiencing as "suitable retaliation" for Canadian broadcasts. External decided this time that the fault lay just as much with it as with IS broadcasters or management: a paper prepared at the end of the month admitted that there had been a "degree of ambivalence" in the 1956 guidelines. "The strictures against ineffective and offensive tone", it commented, "were not applied against possible equally ineffective and objectionable content". Considering that the East bloc authorities were not likely to order an end to jamming until the situation was "corrected", the Department thought it wise to reiterate its advice of fourteen months previous:

...it would now be desirable to consider modifying our broadcast policy to Eastern Europe so that political commentaries will concentrate on the
"projection of Canada" approach rather than on the present offensive and ineffective criticism of the Soviet Union, the East European states, and developments within the Communist world. News broadcasts dealing with the Soviet bloc, except where the West was chiefly concerned, might also be ended.

In essence this proposal does not involve any radical change in policy. It entails rather a return to basic principles accepted in the past but which, in the light of the present CBC-IS practice, appear to require sharper definition. 65

The policy issue became critical in July. The Under-Secretary was informed on the 27th of the month that International Service wanted new transmitters: two 100kw devices to replace their ageing 50kw equipment. 66 Failure to do this, IS officials warned, threatened "the virtual termination of Canadian shortwave broadcasting within the next few years". 67 The one drawback here was cost: $2.89 million over five years, plus an annual operating expenditure of $115,000. 68 The Interdepartmental Committee on CBC-IS was reconvened to examine the proposals and their attendant premises. Their recorded deliberations of July 28 provide an interesting account of how the thinking of at least one high-ranking official, once a proponent of the service, had changed over the years. Gone was the cautious optimism of 1941 about the value of a shortwave organization. Instead, Norman Robertson, now returned to his former position of Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs, voiced weariness and scepticism:

He felt that while the broadcasts had served a useful purpose during the war and in the years immediately following, their returns were now diminishing and the domestic complications resulting from them was increasing, particularly in the form of pressures from ethnic groups in Canada which were having an unfortunate effect on the conduct of Canada's foreign policy.69

Robertson wondered out loud if there might be a more appropriate function for the existing plant, one conveniently in line with the predilections of the Prime Minister:

...could not [CBC-IS] be made available for shortwave broadcasts to the Canadian north as a first priority? [T]his shift... would provide a positive means of using these facilities to good domestic advantage and would at the same time serve a useful international purpose. For example, it might be possible in this way to provide Canadians living in northern Canada with news and other programmes which would limit the apparent effectiveness of present Soviet broadcasts to that area.70

This proved a popular notion; the Interdepartmental Committee decided to appoint an ad hoc group to study it further. Before this investigation could be brought to fruition, however, Treasury Board, in the context of a deepening recession, began pressing the Department and CBC-IS to prepare recommendations for renewed cuts to the IS operating
budget. Transmitters would have to wait. This forced External Affairs into yet another exhaustive review of Canadian international broadcasting policy. For many in the Department it must have seemed like 1954 all over again. After a January 1960 meeting of officials from European Division, Information Division, and the Political Coordination Section, Marcel Cadieux reported to Robertson:

It was considered inadvisable entirely to eliminate direct shortwave service to any of the three areas now covered by the International Service, e.g. Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and Latin America, although perhaps some reduction could be made in the number of languages other than English and French.... In the East European service, priority might be given to the situation of Polish, Russian, Czech and possibly Ukrainian with Slovak and Hungarian given a lower priority (it is possible, however, that for domestic reasons Cabinet would wish to see the last three services continued, at least on a token basis). In the Western European service, priority ought to be given German... and Italian, perhaps dropping out Scandinavian and Dutch. In the Latin American service, it should be possible to reduce the total number of broadcast hours.71

Memoranda reaching higher levels in the weeks that followed were likewise familiar: the same assertions on the value of the activity, the same reservations about effectiveness (and the same excuses for lack of evidence), the same policy cons...
clusions. Whatever the views of the veteran Under-Secretary, it appeared that his subordinates were much less willing to risk radical reduction or re-orientation of IS operations (although none of them were about to propose closer ties with the troublesome organization).

In the midst of this the Soviet Union suspended jamming BBC transmissions.\textsuperscript{72} Departmental officials scrambled to take advantage of the development. An end to jamming of Canadian broadcasts, at this point, would have had the added advantage of allowing External Affairs to claim, for the first time since 1951, that IS broadcasts to the USSR were effectively penetrating their target. The point was not lost. On February 8 a cable was dispatched to the Moscow embassy:

\begin{quote}
we have undertaken a further review of CBC-IS broadcast policy in the hope that objectionable political comment can be definitively eliminated and that eventually the Russians may be thereby encouraged to stop jamming... CBC-IS broadcasts. We hope to make this policy effective soon so that within the next few weeks it may be possible to make an approach to the Russians.\textsuperscript{73}
\end{quote}

Such efforts were in vain. On March 7 the Embassy reported to External:

\begin{quote}
Soviet jamming of CBC-IS broadcasts is continuing, even though BBC (and
on the whole, Voice of America broadcasts are no longer jammed. As long as this policy continues, our reply to questions concerning the value of CBC-IS broadcasts must be that they have little or no value at all, since they are not reaching Soviet listeners...

In the end the opportunity proved but a chimera; following the U-2 incident of May 1960 the Soviets resumed full jamming. This episode was interesting, however, as the Soviets had implicitly identified IS transmissions as more politically objectionable than either those of the BBC or - more interesting still - VOA (or at least this was the conclusion drawn in External). This challenged the conventional wisdom that the CBC held the "middle ground" - not quite as objective as the British, but not nearly so bombastic as the American radio. It also suggested that, given the Western broadcasters' common goal of programme "depoliticization" in this period, the Canadians had been least successful in co-ordinating policy ends and broadcast means once they had determined to do so. The same administratively arrangements that had stalled External Affairs' entry into the "war of words" in the late 1940s were now stalling its withdrawal.

Despite this setback, Department and IS officials continued to work on their joint submission to Treasury Board. This was finally ready in August 1960. While reaffirming
the usefulness of Canadian international broadcasting "as an instrument of Canadian foreign policy", the document made five key recommendations: the retention of East European transmissions; the elimination of all West European sections except for English, French, and German; reduction of the Latin American service; the inauguration of an English and French beam to Africa; and the expansion of the shortwave service to northern Canada. The second, in particular, was a drastic measure as it required scrapping the Italian, Dutch, Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish divisions. Yet Treasury Board officials still seemed dissatisfied. Why, they asked, could not the English, French and German broadcasts be abolished as well? Why not dispose of the Latin American section altogether? Lastly, could not External Affairs simplify Treasury's job as budgetary watchdog by assuming full financial control over International Service?

Departmental officials resisted all three of these suggestions. English and French services, they argued, were the core of the CBC-IR operation, and the Government would risk damaging national prestige and incurring complaints from "internal Canadian sources" if they were discontinued. The disappearance of German from the schedule would likely result in trouble in NATO, or at least questions in the Council. As for the Latin American services, the views of
the Minister, Howard Green, had to be taken into account; he was thought to "favour an increase rather than a decrease in service to that area". External Affairs seemed puzzled, however, about Treasury’s other point: financial control. The Department had reiterated on many occasions - indeed, in the submission to Treasury itself - its adamant refusal to be officially charged with IS. Why, then, was the point being reintroduced? A Treasury Board official explained:

...the reason was quite simple. Treasury would like to exercise the same control over the CBC and the CBC-IS as it does over Government departments. Under the existing CBC set up, this is impossible. To place the CBC-IS under External’s financial control would be viewed by Treasury as the thin edge of the wedge for some such arrangement (under another Government department) for the entire CBC.

External Affairs was not disposed to co-operate in this scheme, and let the matter rest.

After discussion amongst the Treasury Board Ministers themselves, the External-IS paper was accepted on November 30, 1960. Roughly $400,000 would be struck from the IS budget for 1961-62. Service to Western Europe and Latin America would be cut, though not eliminated; the East European services would remain intact. In addition, as original-
ly, recommended, direct transmissions in English and French in Africa would begin. Prior to 1960, that continent had been considered only as a placement area for IS transcriptions. The new idea does not appear to have originated with the Department; once broached, however, External Affairs had clearly been willing to entertain the new thought. As Arthur Blanchette, the Departmental officer then responsible for IS liaison, later explained,

...the Department supported [the idea of African broadcasts] wholeheartedly for two main reasons: 1) the political importance of emerging Africa and 2) the desirability of getting the CBC-IS out of the field of international political polemics as much as possible by making use of Corporation materials.\(^3\)

The latter point was important; the nascent African service would merely rebroadcast regular CBC-IS programming, paying minimum attention to the African audience per se. It was, nonetheless, a departure significant in itself. With the establishment of transmissions to Africa, International Service largely abandoned one of its traditional Cold War target areas (Western Europe) in favour of another, the political relevance of which was not primarily seen in the East-West context. January 29, 1961 - the day the new schedule came into effect - thus marked more than a beginning. For IS in the Cold War, it marked the beginning of the end.
By 1961 External Affairs had ceased to offer regular guidance to the International Service. It was no longer deemed necessary. Where once CBC-IS had been given a positive directive to fight the Cold War, it was now being told, with equal firmness, to keep out. Programming, despite all the problems of policy implementation encountered in the intervening period, was coming to reflect this. "There is", declared one memo of the time,

no systematic exploitation of ideological themes, of the internal workings of the Communist system, or of internal or intra-bloc affairs. Occasionally commentaries will be written on events taking place in the Communist world because they attract world attention and they cannot possibly be ignored... In such cases... all precautions [are] taken so that the tone and contents of commentaries do not make CBC-IS sound like a propaganda organ."

This approach was rationalized as a more effective means of influencing public opinion in Eastern Europe; at the same time DEA officials recognized its contribution to solving "our traditional difficulties in guiding and controlling CBC-IS in the pursuit of psychological warfare." "Depoliticization" of programmes did not mean, however, that the Department had cut off all liaison. True, the Political Co-ordination Section was no more, its functions having been subsumed in "Liaison Services". Still, many of the old channels of communication had been preserved: visits, tele-
phone conversations, and despatches of important documents. IS continued to send back programme reports to keep External informed of its output. But Ottawa was losing interest. Script reports went straight to file with hardly a comment. Policy papers stopped flowing altogether. Having come this far External Affairs was content to await the one thing that had eluded it for so long: an end to Soviet jamming.

This came in June 1963. The Russian decision to terminate their efforts seems to have been part of a broader acknowledgement of Western broadcasters' continuing attempts to eliminate or substantially reduce "objectionable" political material. The order in which the stations were freed from interference was nonetheless significant. The British Broadcasting Corporation was given access to its East bloc targets on June 10. Eight days later the Soviets ceased jamming the Voice of America. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's International Service remained jammed until June 25. If this were an isolated incident one could ascribe the sequence to coincidence. In 1960, however, when the Soviets had temporarily suspended jamming of most BBC and VOA transmissions, they had similarly persisted in their attempts to block domestic reception of IS programming. Indeed, they had gone to the extent of jamming the otherwise un jammed BBC whenever the British relayed CBC broadcasts. Perhaps the Russians had decided that there was less to be
gained in quickly terminating the "jamming of Canadian transmissions as opposed to their American and British counterparts. Or perhaps the repeated Russian inaction was more pointed. Certainly the Kremlin had no love for Mr. Diefenbaker, especially as he had become the only Canadian Prime Minister to make public statements about such sensitive subjects as a "free Ukraine" (note, for instance, his September 1960 speech in the United Nations).

But again, on the basis of well-established precedent, one could suggest that it was poor co-ordination between External Affairs and IS as much as anything that produced this strange result. To the last neither External nor IS management had been entirely successful in controlling or restraining the radio - the one-week delay and the Soviet displeasure it probably symbolized may be regarded as the penalties they paid. Yet if success had not been complete, it had finally been acknowledged sufficient. After fifteen years a tumultuous era in Canadian international broadcasting was drawing to a peaceful close. For the CBC International Service, the Cold War was over.
NOTES

1. The extent of the Department's concern was suggested by the following breakdown of Iron Curtain broadcasts over a one week period in early December 1955:

   72 broadcasts of direct interest to External Affairs (commentaries based on international news; commentaries on Iron Curtain developments; miscellaneous programs of political interest);

   11 broadcasts of possible interest to External Affairs (religious programmes; news of immigrants in Canada);

   107 broadcasts of little interest to External Affairs (newscasts, commentaries or reports on the Canadian scene; miscellaneous non-political programmes).


2. C.J. Webster - Political Co-ordination Division, July 10, 1956, Ibid.


6. "CBC-IS Operations".

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
27. See Political Co-ordination Section - Under-Secretary, July 27, 1959, Ibid.
29. Ibid.
32. See M. Wershof - Acting Under-Secretary, April 26, 1956, Ibid.
33. Ukrainian-Canadian Committee - C. Delafield, June 6, 1956, Ibid.
34. W. Kochan (Executive Director, UCC) - C. Delafield, July 20, 1956, Ibid.
35. Ukrainian Canadian Committee - C. Delafield, November 16, 1956, Ibid.
36. Ukrainian Canadian Committee - C. Delafield, December 10, 1956, Ibid.
38. See W. Wall - C. Delafield, March 1, 1957, Ibid.
39. See "Statement Re: Ukrainian Service".
41. "They Tried Too Hard", Ukrainian Prometheus (Translation), July 11, 1957, Ibid.
44. "Statement Re: Ukrainian Service".
46. Ibid.
47. "Complaints about the Ukrainian Section of CBC-LS" (Draft), September 12, 1957, Ibid.
49. "Complaints about the Ukrainian Section of CBC-LS".
51. Panchuk interview; also Yuzyk interview.


54. "How We are 'Fighting' Khrushchev's Propaganda", Moloda Ukraina (Translation), September 1958, Ibid.

55. "And this is called the 'Voice of Canada'?" Nowi Dni (Translation), PAC RG25/G2/2224, DEA 6033-40.

56. "What is the Situation with Regard to the 'Voice of Canada'?" Homin Ukraïny (Translation), February 7, 1959, Ibid.

57. There was a certain amount of truth in the latter assertion. A Department memo of September 1957 acknowledged that the "work [of the Ukrainian section] is hampered by the difficulty of finding a sufficient number of competent personnel…suitably versed in Ukrainian affairs". See "Complaints about the Ukrainian Section of CBC-IS".

58. "And this is called the 'Voice of Canada'?


61. G. Kidd – European Division, July 23, 1958, PAC RG25/G2/2206, DEA 9901-1-40. In early 1957 IS's Arthur Pidgeon had defended the Service in suggesting that complete depoliticization was impossible:

...[he] observed that in order to present programmes devoid of features irritating to the Soviets, one would have to practically ignore the realities of the international situation. It would be impossible to present news with Canadian comment or opinion....The mere reference to speeches by members of the Government, to press opinion, to United Nations discussions in the field of international affairs will remain offensive to Soviet leaders as long as the
present division remains between East and West.


63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.


68. Ibid.

69. "Interdepartmental Committee on CBC-IS" (Minutes), July 28, 1959, PAC RG25/G2/2204, DEA 9901-40.

70. Ibid.

71. M. Cadieux - Under-Secretary, January 14, 1960, Ibid.

72. It might be noted here that the Poles, under the new Gomulka leadership, had stopped jamming Western broadcasts as early as November 1956.


74. Moscow Embassy - External Affairs, March 7, 1960, Ibid.


76. Ibid. In 1959 the CBC was already transmitting 17/75 program hours a week to the North. See N. Robertson - Minister, December 9, 1959, PAC RG25/G2/2204, DEA 9901-40.

78. Ibid.

79. The Department stated the case in the submission as follows:

While maintaining a close working relationship with the CBC-IS the Department has at no time considered it possible or desirable to exercise day-by-day political supervision of an editorial nature over its operations. The assumption of budgetary control over the CBC-IS would make the Department directly responsible for broadcasting activities, which would require it to assume functions for which it has neither the experience nor the staff and which might result in increased rather than decreased operational costs to the Government. There would, moreover, be a danger of embarrassment to the Government if representations were made by other governments as a result of direct Departmental responsibility for Canadian international broadcasting. Consequently, the Department does not favour having the CBC-IS financed under the External Affairs appropriation.

See "CBC International Service: A Joint Submission".

80. Blanchette - Cadieux.

81. Neither was the Department anxious to have IS funds included directly in the CBC vote.

Since the Corporation operates as an independent government agency, it might be difficult - if not impossible - for the Department to offer adequate political guidance for international broadcasting purposes if the International Service were to be further integrated with the Corporation. The Department would in such circumstances be able to make freely available to the International Service only such material as could also be made available to the press and public information media.
a patently unsatisfactory arrangement. The International Service is a separate division of the Corporation, developing its own programme policies under general political guidance from the Department. This guidance takes place by the provision of appropriate documents, frequent consultations in person or by telephone, and has proved satisfactory both to the Corporation and the Department. It is therefore recommended that the present relationship of the International Service with the Corporation and the Department be maintained.

See "CBC International Service: A Joint Submission".

82. Under-Secretary - Posts, December 19, 1960, PAC RG25/G2/2209, DEA 9901-6-40. When the reduction was announced the Government braced itself for a concerted attack from Members of Parliament and the press. Although the matter was raised in the House, and at least one paper (the Halifax Chronicle-Herald) suggested that "false economies" were being practised, this did not materialize as feared. See Canada, House of Commons Debates, January 27, 1961, pp.1435-86; Halifax Chronicle-Herald, January 5, 1981.

83. A. Blanchette - Information Division, April 19, 1961, PAC RG25/G2/2209, DEA 9901-6-40.

84. CBC-IS had begun to draft its own guidance papers in February 1958; these were, of course, submitted to the Department for comment. See A.J. Pick - Political Coordination Section, February 11, 1958, PAC RG25/G2/2224, DEA 6033-40.


86. Ibid.


88. Ibid., p.15.

89. Ibid.

91. See "CBC-IS", April 25, 1960, PAC RG25/G2/2204, DEA 9901-40; also Liaison Services - Under-Secretary, November 8, 1960, Ibid.
CHAPTER SEVEN

"ALL TOGETHER NOW":

CANADA AND INTERNATIONAL CO-ORDINATION OF BROADCASTS, 1948-63

The CBC International Service was never more than a junior partner in the Western propaganda campaign. Its operations were constantly overshadowed by those of the Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Corporation's Overseas Service. Table 4 (overleaf) shows where IS stood in comparison to these organizations at the height of the Cold War.¹

Yet even this comparison is misleading. Truth to tell, Canada at this time ranked 32nd in the list of 66 countries engaged in international broadcasting.² Her output was roughly on a par with that of the Netherlands, Ceylon, Norway, and Greece. Nations of comparable or even slightly lesser importance in the world, e.g. Australia, Argentina, Poland, India, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Brazil, were exerting a greater effort.³ Considering, however, Canada's policy affinity for the US and UK, and the possible diplomatic gains to be made through demonstrative cooperation with their respective broadcasting agencies, Ottawa assumed that priority would be given to co-ordination of CBC, VOA, and BBC broadcasts.
TABLE 4

Comparative Distribution of Broadcast Hours by Areas,
CBC-IS, VOA, BBC (May 1953)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>CBC-IS (in hours per week)</th>
<th>BBC</th>
<th>VOA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western and Northern Europe</td>
<td>40:58</td>
<td>99:25</td>
<td>64:75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>20:00</td>
<td>92:25</td>
<td>103:25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45:50</td>
<td>26:25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>2:00</td>
<td>23:75</td>
<td>73:50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>21:00</td>
<td>27:75</td>
<td>24:50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>83:58</td>
<td>288:50</td>
<td>292:65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1) The two hours/week broadcast to the Far East is a troop broadcast for Canadians in Korea.

2) Broadcasts to North America and to the United Kingdom are not included in the table.

3) The BBC in addition to the broadcasting hours given above has 147 hours each week of broadcasts in English directed "to the world".

4) VOA English broadcasts to Europe (29:75 hours) are included in the total of 64:75 hours for Western and Northern Europe.

Realizing that they were engaged in a broad ideological struggle with the Soviet bloc, all three broadcasters had considered co-ordination at an early stage. Canada had herself contemplated an initiative in the context of the newly-established North Atlantic Treaty Organization; in December 1949 Lester Pearson was already talking about "some kind of planning machinery [in NATO] the object of which would be a concentration of effort". But it soon became clear to certain Departmental officials in Ottawa that the Minister was getting ahead of the game. "I am concerned", commented George Glazebrook in January 1950;

...that we have by force of circumstances not made as much progress in psychological warfare as we had hoped. The consequence is that we have no organization and very little in the way of plans [ourselves]... We have not fully faced the problem of the utilization of IS.

T.W.L. Macdermot, more aware than most of the situation in Montreal, agreed:

we are hardly in a position to co-ordinate our work with that of other countries for a number of reasons:

1) no single division has been assigned responsibility for psychological warfare;
2) apart from some preliminary thought by Mr. Rogers, no officer has been assigned to this work;

3) our relations with the CBC International Service are only just now to be put on a clear working basis with the appointment of Mr. McCordick as a Liaison Officer in Montreal....

Having got our own house in order... we could go on to consider the larger matter of co-ordination.6

Yet these criticisms had more to do with policy than technical matters. There is some suggestion that Pearson pushed the latter aspect of co-ordination at a NATO Council meeting in May 1950.7 Certainly by April 1951 CBC-IS had consciously altered its transmission pattern to the USSR and Czechoslovakia to ensure a more continuous Western "presence" on the airwaves.8

Dissimilar styles of propaganda complicated initial attempts at forging closer links. Broadcast tone and content were necessarily affected. A "split" between the BBC and VOA had been apparent as early as mid-1949. While the British radio had to this point preserved its image of relative objectivity (which it would continue to cultivate throughout the Cold War), the Americans were already throwing into their programs "anything and everything without discrimination",9 Gordon Graydon challenged Pearson on this during the Minister's testimony before the Standing Committee
on External Affairs in February 1953. "The information I have", Graydon asserted,

is that the...BBC and the Voice of America do not always follow anything like the same line and when the Minister speaks of our voice here in the CBC-IS, following these two it would be difficult if we tried to follow both of them.\textsuperscript{10}

Pearson was forced to agree: "the main thing is to make sure that we know each other's policies and try to work in with each other's policies...[C]entralized control...would be impractical".\textsuperscript{11} Given this, there remained a question of choice: whose "line" did the CBC lean towards? Dana Wilgess, testifying before the same committee later in the month, answered this way:

I think we take something of a middle line between the two. The Voice of America probably carries on a more direct psychological warfare and concerns itself less with statements of fact, news, and commentaries on the news.\textsuperscript{12}

The Department clearly wished to shy away from the American model, even if IS frequently adopted - without authorization - its bombastic style. Indeed, the growing hesitancy Pearson had evinced about closer allied co-ordination of broadcasting probably reflected, in part, a fear of becoming
inextricably associated with the harsher US radio arm.

Technical co-operation nonetheless continued and, with that, an exchange of programs, policy information, and background intelligence. This latter low-level co-ordinate function had begun as early as 1950 when it is recorded that Departmental officials showed the policy paper on the projected Russian service to officials at the State Department and the Foreign Office. By 1953 the practice had evolved considerably. Jean Désy described the arrangements:

Both the BBC and the Voice of America send us their material by teletype or otherwise. We know day after day the position taken by the Voice of America on this subject, and by BBC on another subject, and we know from these reports the reactions of the various countries to the broadcasts of both these systems. There is a constant flow of information, of material. It is a sort of Niagara of teletypes.

Soon after this the NATO Committee on Information and Cultural Relations recommended that a conference be called in an attempt to broaden the network. This was convened in Paris in January 1954. Ultimately it demonstrated the limits of inter-allied co-operation more than it extended them. The United States was unwilling to release its information on Soviet jamming. The British delegation
told the Canadians privately that "the BBC had compiled comprehensive data...but [they were] unwilling to table it...unless the American delegation did likewise".16 The Americans suggested that a general multilateral exchange of program information and materials be negotiated; the British were not enthusiastic about this either, as they were "afraid that the French delegation would then come up with some grand scheme for 'co-ordinating' such an exchange in a very ambitious manner".17 Trepidation hung over the whole exercise: many of the governments involved suspected "it might lead to a discussion of the co-ordination of program policy and content, and the setting of some central machinery for this purpose".18

Gradually a rather disparate reality was made a virtue. Some time after the 1954 Conference on Co-ordination of Broadcasts, the Canadian Chargé in Prague reported on a conversation he had had with visiting BBC officials:

They consider a...different approach of different countries of value. They would not favour anything of the nature of an agreed common broadcasting policy officially arranged between the Voice of America, BBC, and CBC. I gathered that some suggestion as to this had been made by the Americans but they did not consider it at all practical.19
Slowly, even such North Atlantic co-operation as had been previously established began to break down. Charles Delafield, appearing before the 1955 House Special Committee on Broadcasting, discussed this with an inquisitive Donald Fleming (Conservative MP, Eglinton):

Mr. Fleming: ...you are operating in this field of international broadcasting to countries behind the Iron Curtain quite independent of both the Voice of America and the BBC?

Mr. Delafield: Quite independently, and I would say it would be extremely difficult for us with our present staff to take the additional time which would be required to read their material and follow their day to day operations....

Mr. Fleming: It would be a fair statement to say that you are operating quite independently of the Voice of America and the BBC?

Mr. Delafield: Yes.

Delafieid also offered a rationalization:

the two broadcasting organizations in this field which [have been] mentioned, together with ourselves, feel that it is much better for information organizations to be co-ordinated in terms of general policy as it emanates from the various external affairs branches of the governments concerned, than in terms of day to day specific material, and in many ways it is perhaps gener-
ally better that these three organizations should not be presenting exactly the same things in their broadcasts. Thus the Iron Curtain area and the Soviet orbit generally will see that the Western world does not necessarily agree automatically on every single thing, and in that we are preserving a good approach to the listener, because the listener knows or should come to the conclusion that in listening to our service [he is not]...hearing opinions which are all worked out in advance in one place. 21

Co-ordination between CBC-IS and the principals in the Western broadcasting effort never really extended beyond simple program/information exchange and co-operative transmission timing. 22 That there existed a Canadian broadcasting organization that was able and willing to engage in this at all was nonetheless important. International Service was regarded as part of the "dues" the Government paid to facilitate its continued membership in the North Atlantic information/intelligence net. 23 Although one may in retrospect question the policy value of this, the Canadian radio arm did at least ensure a "seat at the table" when matters of psychological strategy were being discussed. In a more general sense, it was also deemed useful as an active demonstration of Canadian support for the Western cause in the "war of ideas" - evidence of continuing commitment. CBC-BBC-VOA co-ordination, minor in actual degree, was thus perceived to have greater symbolic value.
NOTES

1. Jean Désy had offered another standard of comparison in March 1953:

   ...the British Broadcasting Corporation operates 37 transmitters and uses approximately 85 frequencies. Its general overseas programs are prepared in some 40 languages... The Voice of America operates approximately 38 transmitters (in North America) and uses approximately 90 frequencies. It broadcasts in some 30 languages. The International Service of the CBC operates 2 transmitters, and broadcasts in 15 languages... using a maximum of two frequencies.

   Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, March 12, 1953, p.139.


3. Ibid.


5. George Glazebrook - R.A. Mackay, January 4, 1950, Ibid.


7. See "Draft Remarks for Minister's Speech", April 17, 1950, Ibid.


11. Ibid.


15. This was held under the chairmanship of Radiodiffusion Française, as the Committee had not unanimously agreed to hold it under official NATO auspices. See "Conference on Co-ordination of Broadcasts: Report by the Canadian Delegation", PAC RG25/G2/2224, DEA 6033-40.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.


21. Ibid.

22. There was, of course, one exception to this: Operation LOBSTER FESTIVAL.

CONCLUSION

A policy instrument can rarely be used to its full potential. Operational constraints are often confronted which limit its ability to function as intended. In the case of the CBC International Service, however, it is not so much the existence of constraints which is striking as is their absolute dominance of the policy making and implementing processes over the period 1948-63. Four categories of constraints may be identified: cultural, material, co-ordinative, and domestic political. Each will be examined in turn.

Suspicion of government as a communications agent is the primary cultural constraint affecting the activities of an official international broadcasting organization.¹ This was as true during the Cold War as it is today, as valid in Canada as in the United States, the United Kingdom, or other comparable Western states. Government communication has historically confronted a dilemma in liberal democracies. Official information is generally regarded as biased or self-serving; on the other hand, a government maintaining silence risks being accused of systematically denying the public its right to know. On the international level in particular many persons downplay information efforts while concurrently expecting them to achieve incredible results. When these are
not realized, disillusionment sets in. Especially sensi-
tive is the subject of "propaganda". Engaging in this al-
legedly deceitful activity is viewed in many quarters as
doing violence to basic democratic values relating to the
individual's right of free decision. To the extent that a
government broadcasting arm is seen to deal in this commod-
ity, it is viewed as ideologically illegitimate.

The tangible consequence of this for IS in the
Cold War was the lack of a powerful and broad-based domes-
tic constituency to support the psychological instrument.
People seemed uneasy with the notion of Canada "soiling its,
hands" in this way. It was, moreover, not an obvious activ-
ity for us - we appeared to have fewer global interests to
protect than the Americans, Soviets, or British. What con-
tribution could we make through broadcasting that they could
not? This was a fundamental problem, and it left IS vul-
erable. The service became a target for witch-hunters,
budget-cutters, and scattered attentive publics which could,
without fear of incurring general censure, impose their
views on International Service. IS was locked in a vicious
circle. Public suspicion and hesitancy about the organiza-
tion encouraged outside attacks. These harmed the service
in ways that created further controversy. Public reserva-
tions became self-fulfilling, leaving IS even more defence-
less than before. There appeared to be no way out.
Because of its diffuse nature, the cultural constraint was considered the most difficult to overcome. More particular factors, for example those relating to material, nonetheless proved equally awkward. The vital ingredients of the broadcasting operation were, of course, equipment and personnel. The former became of increasing concern to CBC engineers in the late 1950s and early 1960s as the age and lower power of the transmitters caused the IS signal to pale in the face of stronger competition. Nonetheless, over the period 1948-63 the matter of personnel proved of greater moment to both International Service and the Department of External Affairs. As Charles Ritchie noted in 1951,

in order to run an international broadcasting service, you have to make use of people of foreign origin, both from the point of view of language, knowledge of the culture and habits of the people to whom the broadcasts are being made. Moreover, emigrés who had recently left their countries are more likely to be in touch with...conditions than Canadians whose parents or grandparents may be of Czech, German, or Russian origin, who might be able to speak the language but who are out of touch....

International Service thus took on, unavoidably, a certain "foreignness" which only reinforced DEA's doubts about the trustworthiness of the broadcasters in delicate matters of policy. The fact that so many of the production staff were
immigrants also meant that they had ties with domestic ethnic groups and thus became, in some instances, "fifth columnists" for these organizations within the government agency. Finally, the restricted number of available linguists with extensive knowledge of the appropriate targets led IS, at least in the early days, to employ some persons who were "politically questionable" and whose presence ultimately resulted in scandal (e.g., the Keyserlingk accusations). Episodes such as these took a toll long after they had been formally "resolved" by resignation or organizational adjustment.

The third principal internal constraint on IS activity in the Cold War has here been labelled "co-ordinative", notably that pertaining to the DEA-IS liaison. It will be recalled that CBC-IS occupied a jurisdictional "no-man's land". Douglas Hicks recalled the problem and its consequences:

CBC-IS was... so isolated. It didn't belong to the main body of the CBC and it didn't belong to External Affairs. It was in-between, and was able to play each one against the other, so that Delafied and Pidgeon were independent little powers. If we tried to put the thumb on them too hard, they'd say "Well, we really belong to the CBC and we're not going to take any orders from you". And if the CBC tried to tell them to do anything, they'd say "Well, our [policy
is set in External Affairs, and we really belong to External Affairs, and you really can't tell us what to do either."

"Control" always eluded the Department. Even those who were directly involved with supervising IS were at odds among themselves on how to manage the situation. They wished to intervene effectively, but without taking over. In practice the dissociation was impossible. The rapid rotation of External Affairs officers in and out of their positions did not help matters. As Hicks commented, "we changed so often...I just felt I was getting to know what IS was doing when I moved". Few Departmental personnel ever reached the stage where they could even attempt to give firm direction. As E. Benjamin Rogers, one of the first DEA men to deal with International Service in the Cold War, recalled in later years,

I think everybody just groped. I don't think anybody knew what the objectives were...I don't think that there was ever established a clear "line". I don't know that it was established that IS should take direction from External Affairs, or that External Affairs should give it. Certainly the giving wasn't very systematic or well thought-out.

Those who did try to lead simply became frustrated. As Hicks put it,
every new guy put his shoulder to the wheel, and just got discouraged after a while. It was like pushing against a jelly - you push it, and take your hand away, and it oozes back out again. We never solved the problem. 6

The questionable administrative situation in IS only worsened things. As Andrew had reported in 1955, liaison efforts often founder on the CBC side. This failure could be partially attributed to an internal division of control between the Policy Co-ordinator and the Supervisor of Sections. 7 In the confusion, language heads operated pretty much as they wished, accepting or rejecting at will scripts written in the central pool. The result was chaos: intersection liaison and co-ordination broke down completely. Guidance was not effectively disseminated. In its absence, policy became a matter for the sections themselves to determine. But especially in the East European divisions, initiatives were seen only to result in interminable ad hoc criticisms from the Department. 8 Broadcasters felt in turn ignorant, frustrated, then bitter. Panchuk captured the essence of the problem:

...people either throw up their hands and quit, or they throw up their hands and say "Why should I worry...?" People...gradually lose heart, lose initiative, lose creativeness and work only to please the next person above. 9
Morale was devastated.

On top of this, senior IS personnel lacked enthusiasm and dynamism:

DelafIELD and Pidgeon hung on for a generation [neither retired until the 1970s]. There was this "dead hand" of these two guys keeping their jobs....10

The leadership fossilized. There was no movement, no cross fertilization: "once you were there you never got out, once you got out you never went back".11

In External Affairs, the deteriorating situation became a justification for the disdain many officers in non-information posts already felt for the International Service. It posed, in fact, a challenge to their own codes of conduct.12

Traditional diplomacy was formal and official. Propaganda was informal and engaged non-officials. Traditional diplomacy was private and quiet; propaganda was public and tended to be noisy and combative. Traditional diplomacy sought to avoid controversy, to smooth out differences. Propaganda, on the other hand, exposed and stimulated controversy. In sum, the proponents of traditional diplomacy became, over time, less and less inclined towards propaganda and the information function. Robert Relford contends that "the upper management
[of the Department] had to be persuaded that it was important. They remained, at best, lukewarm. "There was", observed Hicks, "a built-in prejudice."  

External Affairs' lack of enthusiasm for the CBC-IS and its utility as a peacetime instrument of Canadian foreign policy was an important political constraint, even more so as it related directly to another: Parliament. In committee after committee External Affairs, as policy guardian of the International Service, would be called upon to defend its ward. The officers from the Political Co-ordination Section would do their jobs - write their memoranda, present their cases - but increasingly with the knowledge that their own beliefs and concerns were not fully shared at higher levels; consider, for instance, the disillusionment of Pearson and Robertson. Cabinet, Treasury Board, and ultimately the Commons were thus allowed to wreak financial havoc upon the shortwave arm; during any government austerity campaign, it was always near the head of the cutbacks line. IS's inability definitively to prove its effectiveness as a policy instrument only hurt it more. Cutbacks, of course, were important constraints in themselves as they portended consequences for equipment procurement and/or maintenance, personnel, and policy.
The greatest operational constraint confronted in the Cold War history of IS was, however, the activity of domestic ethnic groups. Without question, the efforts of the Ukrainian, Polish, and, to a lesser extent, the Czech communities in Canada turned the International Service from the political path it otherwise would have followed. The Ukrainians in particular, although sincere enough in their beliefs, repeatedly embroiled IS in controversy and caused its program line to deviate seriously from official Canadian policy.

Domestic considerations gradually prevailed over international concerns. The ethnic groups - with the unwitting complicity of senior IS management, and to a lesser extent External Affairs - made the International Service of the CBC a "twisted arm" of Canadian foreign policy. Some sections did operate according to the Government's intention; relatively few difficulties were experienced in the Latin American or West European language divisions. The transmissions to Eastern Europe were, however, far more vital to the Canadian broadcasting effort. The centrality of the ethnic problem was inescapable.

Here, then, was an instrument of foreign policy out of control - an anomaly in a series of otherwise staid policy tools which had made an enviable diplomatic reputation for
Canada in the post-war world. In the so-called "Golden Age" of Canadian statecraft, the history of the CBC International Service stands out as a record of frustration and bungling. Domestic elements were allowed not only to scuttle effective prosecution of Canadian international broadcasting policy, but also in that course, as Robertson had commented in 1959, to complicate Canadian foreign relations in general.

But there was another dimension to the ethnic factor which made it a support as much as a constraint. Paradoxical as it may seem, the very pressures that twisted the IS in a policy sense helped preserve it as an institution by sensitizing the Government to the domestic consequences of eliminating the Service.¹⁵ There were, of course, other considerations involved: as Douglas Hicks explains, "It was done to keep up with the Joneses, it was done because we felt we had to...We also thought we should keep our foot in the door".¹⁶ The key to the Government's perseverance in international broadcasting is nonetheless best appreciated through an understanding of the demands of the emigré groups as these have been explored throughout this thesis. Certainly the retention of the International Service was not primarily a function of whatever effectiveness it may have been perceived to have as a psychological instrument of Canadian foreign policy. All this implies that IS was ultimately an instrument intended to be rather than to do; its very existence would help placate
domestic ethnic organizations, serve national prestige, and fulfill a vaguely appreciated contingency in the event of war. It was precisely the lack of a clear, active function in peacetime that was at the root of the difficulties the Service experienced from 1948-63. No agreement on such a purpose being reached, it became politic to muffle IS to restrict its negative impact. But the Government had neither the heart nor the political will to scrap the institution. In the end, what the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation achieved was perhaps more fundamental and more miraculous than the accomplishments of many of its sister operations abroad. IS survived. That was victory enough.
NOTES


3. Interview with Douglas Hicks, October 31, 1980.

4. Ibid.

5. Interview with E. Benjamin Rogers, November 8, 1980.

6. Hicks interview. A further structural obstacle existed for a short time in the early 1950s and is worthy of brief note. Just after the creation of the Political Co-ordination Section in 1953, a question arose in the Department as to the division of supervisory authority over IS that would be made between the hitherto responsible Information Division and PCS. An intra-bureaucratic dispute of some three months ensued. The terms of the "resolution" were expressed by an officer in Information Division in December:

The Information Division is not concerned with the political impact or psychological warfare emphasis of the programming as this is primarily the responsibility of the Political Co-ordination Section. However, we should deal with the normal and physical relationships of CBC and CBC(IS) with our missions abroad.


10. Hicks interview.


13. Reford interview.

14. Hicks interview.

15. As late as 1973, long after most had presumed the Cold War to have ended, a Radio Canada International task force report hinted at the still-latent domestic political consequences of eliminating various East European sections. See Radio Canada International, *Report of the Radio Canada International Task Force* (Montreal: RCI, 1973), p.111. There has also been some suggestion that RCI averted elimination in 1979 partly on the strength of representations made by the federal Minister of State for Multiculturalism. Confidential interview.

16. Hicks interview.
APPENDIX A

CBC-IS LANGUAGE SERVICES, 1944-61

1944
December 26 - Start of regular transmissions to Europe in English, French, German

1945
February 6 - Start of regular daily transmissions to Czechoslovakia
February 25 - Official inauguration of International Service
May 1 - Start of regular service to the Netherlands in Dutch
September 2 - Start of regular weekly service in Spanish, Portuguese, and English to Latin America and the Caribbean area

1946
July 1 - Start of daily service in English to Caribbean area. Weekly service to Norway, Sweden, and Denmark begun.

1947
April 23 - Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish services become daily
June [sic] - Start of daily Spanish service to Latin America
June 30 - Weekly programs in English to Australia-New Zealand area begun

1948
April [sic] - Daily service in Portuguese to Brazil begun
October 31 - Daily service in French to Caribbean area started
December 3 - Daily service in Italian to Italy started

1950
December 3 - Start of weekly service in Finnish
APPENDIX A (cont.)

1951  February 4  - Start of daily service to the Soviet Union in Russian

1952  July 2  - Start of daily service to the Soviet Union in Ukrainian

1953  July 11  - Start of daily service to Poland in Polish

1955  March 27  - Termination of Finnish service

1955  April 1  - Reduction of West European and Latin American transmissions

1956  November 12  - Start of service to Hungary in Magyar

1961  January 29  - Termination of Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, Dutch, and Italian services. Start of English and French services to Africa.

Source: Adapted from "Report on Sackville Transmitters" (CBC document), March 1959, PAC RG25/G2/2204, DEA 9901-40.
APPENDIX B

INTERNATIONAL SERVICE COVERAGE, 1954

### APPENDIX C

**CBC-IS OPERATING EXPENDITURES, FISCAL YEARS 1944-63**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expenditures</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>$142,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>548,137</td>
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<td>1946</td>
<td>871,662</td>
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<td>1,268,482</td>
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<td>1948</td>
<td>1,508,943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>1,564,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1,598,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1,824,581</td>
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<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1,858,246</td>
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<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1,928,870</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>2,094,625</td>
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<td>1955</td>
<td>1,614,625</td>
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<td>1956</td>
<td>1,636,446</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1,679,839</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1,859,991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1,983,217</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1,879,422</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,694,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1,770,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1,865,884</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Source: Canada, Public Accounts 1944-1963 (Ottawa: King's and Queen's Printer, various dates)*
## APPENDIX D

### INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING: A COMPARATIVE TABLE

(all figures are programme hours per week)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>1015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States **</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>1274</td>
<td>1495</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warsaw Pact ***</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>1009</td>
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<td>China (PRC)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>687</td>
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<td>558</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<td>191</td>
<td>326</td>
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### NOTES

* This list is not complete

** US total includes VOA, RFE, and RL
APPENDIX D (cont.)

NOTES (cont.)

*** Total includes Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary

**** The reader will notice that this figure is somewhat at odds with that provided on page 134. This is likely due to computational differences and a probable pre-April sample date.

Source: BBC Toronto
### APPENDIX B1

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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from James L. Hall, "The History and Policies of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's International Service" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio University, 1973), pp. 83, 90, 153. The present writer cannot definitively confirm these figures. On the basis of other reliable evidence, indeed, he has reason to suspect certain of them. The above table should therefore be treated only as a very rough guide, and is reproduced here but for lack of a better substantiated alternative.
APPENDIX E2

CBC-IS TOTAL HOURS BROADCAST WEEKLY TO WESTERN EUROPE, 1955-63 (hours:minutes)

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<td>9:15</td>
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<td>5:15</td>
<td>3:30</td>
<td>3:30</td>
<td>3:30</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1:00</td>
<td>1:00</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
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Source: Adapted from James L. Hall, "The History and Policies of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's International Service" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio University, 1973), pp. 83, 90, 153. The present writer cannot definitively confirm these figures. On the basis of other reliable evidence, indeed, he has reason to suspect certain of them. The above table should therefore be treated only as a very rough guide, and is reproduced here but for lack of a better substantiated alternative.
### APPENDIX F

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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Source: Adapted from James L. Hall, "The History and Policies of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's International Service" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio University, 1973), pp. 87, 90, 145. The present writer cannot definitively confirm these figures. On the basis of other reliable evidence, indeed, he has reason to suspect certain of them. The above table should therefore be treated only as a very rough guide, and is reproduced here but for lack of a better substantiated alternative.
### APPENDIX F2

**CBC-IS TOTAL HOURS BROADCAST WEEKLY TO EASTERN EUROPE, 1955-63 (hours:minutes)**

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<td>6:15</td>
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<td>4:30</td>
<td>3:30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
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<td>6:15</td>
<td>5:15</td>
<td>5:15</td>
<td>7:00</td>
<td>7:00</td>
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<td>1:45</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Adapted from James L. Hall, "The History and Policies of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's International Service" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio University, 1973), pp. 145, 235. The present writer cannot definitively confirm these figures. On the basis of other reliable evidence, indeed, he has reason to suspect certain of them. The above table should therefore be treated only as a very rough guide, and is reproduced here but for lack of a better substantiated alternative.
NOTE ON SOURCES

In the course of research, this writer discovered only two academic analyses of any substance dealing with the CBC International Service in the period considered in the present work. The first, contained in James Eayrs' *Art of the Possible* (based on an earlier article by the same author in *Canadian Public Administration*), stands as the only detailed published study. Eayrs clearly regards his subject as an instrument of Canadian foreign policy, but his discussion is unfortunately limited by the dictates of a broader context. Indeed, he is able to devote only nine pages to the specific undertaking. It nonetheless remains a very useful thumbnail sketch.

The second piece, James Hall's "History and Policies of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's International Service", is more problematic. First, it is written from the point of view of a media analyst rather than that of a political scientist; the paper itself was a doctoral dissertation submitted to Ohio University's School of Radio-Television in 1973. Hall thus pays much attention to areas which are of marginal importance in this study. Yet, he does purport to look at "policies". Although he was granted access to CBC files in Montreal, his attempt can be seen in retrospect to have been crippled by the Department of External Affairs' refusal to let him examine their Ottawa
records (see below). As a result, Hall's thesis is at best superficial, and only touches on some of the controversies that rocked the IS from its establishment. Hall's American setting poses a further problem: sections where he explains features of the Canadian governmental system in order to make his account more intelligible to an American reader are unquestionably tedious when perused by one more familiar with this country's political arrangements.

Given, then, the paucity or questionable quality of the available secondary research sources on CBC-IS, one is required to return to original documentation and reconstruct the Cold War history of the instrument from "scratch". Here I have been most fortunate to have had the cooperation of the DEA Historical Division, the staff of which not only guided me to the material, but also facilitated access to certain papers which currently remain closed to the public. Excluding special items pertaining to Canadian psychological warfare and NATO information policy, there are 211 volumes of Departmental files dealing with the International Service from 1939-63, all of which were screened, and the majority declassified, in 1977. The restricted files (which are scheduled for general release in 1990) are as follows:

- two volumes on "CBC-IS Relationship with the Department of External Affairs";
- two volumes on "Personnel";
- four volumes on "CBC-IS Shortwave Service to Soviet Union";
- three volumes on "External Affairs Liaison with CBC-IS";
- one volume on "CBC-IS Ukrainian Section".

Thanks to D.P. Cole of Historical Division and David Smith of the Public Archives of Canada this writer was able to examine, save for the last volume, all of the above with the exception only of a few documents in each which were stripped before the material was issued for inspection.

Through the efforts of Dr. Ian McClymont, Prime Ministerial Archivist, and the Hon. Jack Pickersgill, access was similarly gained to the W.L.M. King and Louis St. Laurent papers. In each collection, however, an exhaustive search yielded only one file of any use. Both are listed in the pages that follow.

Lastly, G.R.B. Panchuk permitted examination of some private correspondence dealing with the IS in the 1952-54 period. This, part of a much larger personal collection, has been officially signed over to the Public Archives, but is currently awaiting transfer and sorting.

One brief word of warning about the External Affairs files: glancing over the listings, the reader will note that most volumes deal with the transcription services. He must
not be misled by this fact, as it is much more reflective of the dictates of the Department's filing system than of the actual policy importance of transcriptions. Indeed, the file volumes on the recorded programs, such as they are, contain mostly correspondence regarding placement, and very little of policy consequence. They are nonetheless listed to make the bibliography as definitive as possible.

Interviews with persons involved in the events described in this work were invaluable in placing the mountain of documentation in perspective and filling in some of the "gaps" caused by security restrictions. Some comments were necessarily "off the record", others I am freely able to attribute. A list of interviewees is included in the bibliography that follows, along with the necessary references to files, correspondence, parliamentary and Corporation documents, theses and dissertations, books, articles, newspapers, and recorded programs.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Archival Sources

The following files pertain directly to the CBC International Service (for an explanation of the reference code, see page 35 above):


Archival Sources (cont.)


Archival Sources (cont.)


Archival Sources (cont.)


Archival Sources (cont.)


Archival Sources (Cont.)


Archival Sources (cont.)


Archival Sources (cont.)


Archival Sources (cont.)


Archival Sources (cont.)


Archival Sources (cont.)


Reference was also made to the following miscellaneous files:


Material relating to CBC-IS may similarly be found in the following collections:

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers (especially PAC MG26/J4/326, File P3439, "Radio Broadcasting").

G.R.B. Panchuk Papers (Private collection; unsorted).

Louis St. Laurent Papers (especially PAC MG26/L/151, File R90-D, "International Service of the CBC").

II. Interviews

Arthur Andrew (formerly of Political Co-ordination Section, Department of External Affairs), April 30, 1981.

Davidson Dunton (former Chairman, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Board of Governors), July 8, 1980.

Douglas B. Hicks (formerly of Information Division and Political Co-ordination Section, Department of External Affairs), October 31, 1980.
Interviews (cont.)

Eric Koch (former head of German Section, CBC International Service), February 12, 1981.

Jack McCordick (former IS Liaison Officer, Department of External Affairs), May 18, 1981.

G.R.B. Panchuk (former head of Ukrainian Section, CBC International Service), July 22, 1981.

Robert Reford (former Ottawa Liaison Officer, CBC International Service), February 12, 1981.

E. Benjamin Rogers (formerly of Information Division, Department of External Affairs), November 8, 1980.

L.A.D. Stephens (formerly of Information Division and Political Co-ordination Section, Department of External Affairs), May 14, 1981.

Senator Paul Yuzyk (Ukrainian Canadian Committee), July 27, 1981.

III. Correspondence

Letter from Michael Sheldon (former head of Intelligence Unit, CBC International Service), January 31, 1980.

Letter from Bernard Trotter (former head of English Section, CBC International Service), January 8, 1980.

IV. Public Documents

Canada. House of Commons Debates. November 19, 1940; November 25, 1940; November 26, 1940; February 25, 1941; March 21, 1941; May 5, 1941; June 1, 1942; May 12, 1944; October 22, 1945; August 30, 1946; May 6, 1947; June 28, 1948; December 6, 1949; March 31, 1950; May 14, 1951; June 15, 1951; June 29, 1951; October 26, 1951; November 9, 1951; April 24, 1952; July 4, 1952; December 5, 1952; December 8, 1952; December 9, 1952; April 10, 1953; May 5, 1953; June 4, 1954; June 10, 1954; March 7, 1955; March 8, 1955; July 26, 1955; July 12, 1960; January 27, 1961; February 1, 1961.
Public Documents (cont.)


V. Theses and Dissertations


VI. Books


Books (cont.)


Ukrainian Canadian Committee. The Fifth and Sixth Ukrainian Canadian Congress. Winnipeg: Ukrainian Canadian Committee, 1959.


VII. Articles

Articles' (cont.)


VIII. Newspapers

Newspapers (cont.)

Ottawa Citizen, December 31, 1939; June 30, 1944.


Montreal Gazette, March 14, 1951; March 22, 1951; March 23, 1951; March 26, 1951; March 28, 1951; December 5, 1952.

Toronto Globe & Mail, February 26, 1945; November 28, 1958.

Ottawa Journal, June 14, 1954.

Montreal Star, March 2, 1957; March 4, 1957; March 5, 1957.

Regina Star, December 12, 1939.

Winnipeg Tribune, December 27, 1939; July 11, 1959.

IX. Recorded Programs
