NAME OF AUTHOR/NOM DE L'AUTEUR: Shinichi Ogawa

TITLE OF THESIS/TITRE DE LA THÈSE: Japan's Defence Policy: Options and Constraints

UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ: Carleton University

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/GRADUATION DE GOR DE LA THÈSE: M.A.

YEAR DEGREE CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTEINTION: 1977

NAME OF SUPERVISOR/NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE: R.E. Bedesi

Permission is hereby granted to the National Library of Canada to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the microfilm.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

DATED/DATÉ: April 5, 1977

SIGNED/SIGNÉ: Shinichi Ogawa

PERMANENT ADDRESS/RÉSIDENCE FIXE: 977 Konaya, Shogawa-machi, Toyama-ken, Japan
NOTICE

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us a poor photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30. Please read the authorization forms which accompany the thesis.

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

AVIS

La qualité de cette microfiche dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de mauvaise qualité.

Les documents qui, font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, examens publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de ce microfilm est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30. Veuillez prendre connaissance des formules d'autorisation qui accompagnent cette thèse.

LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS REÇUE
JAPAN'S DEFENCE POLICY:
OPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS

by
Shinichi Ogawa, B.A., M.A.
(1977) by Shinichi Ogawa

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in International Affairs

The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada
March 1977
The undersigned hereby recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research acceptance of this thesis, submitted by Shinichi Ogawa, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

[Signature]

Philip E. Uren, Director,
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

[Signature]

R. E. Bedeski, Supervisor
The U.S.-Japanese military alliance has existed for twenty-five years. The two security treaties that were concluded for the partnership have been American unilateral security guarantees to Japan. The arrangements, though, have generally met with little favour among the Japanese public.

Since the beginning of the 1970's, paralleling the movements towards the multipolar world in the Far East, the fundamental basis of the defence arrangement has eroded. Upon reflection of the international trend and the polarized political and ideological situation in Japan, various Japanese defence options have been discussed. The discussants might be divided into two categories. One is the group which favours the military partnership with the U.S. The other, long dissatisfied with the U.S.-Japanese security arrangements, is studying various other defence alternatives. The arguments by the latter group range from a full-fledged nuclear Japan to an unarmed, neutral Japan.

This paper examines the viability of these defence alternatives to those built upon the U.S.-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty. The demonstration of non-viability of these security options for today's Japan is the principal objective of this thesis.
The current U.S.-Japanese security agreement has two major defects: the problem of U.S. force and base presence in Japan and prior consultation formula. In order for the military partnership with the U.S. to endure, however, some modifications of the arrangement are necessary. These measures will remove to some degree the people's dissatisfaction with the current arrangement and will make the security partnership more stable. Tentative policy suggestions for these modifications are discussed.
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I THE CHANGING CONFIGURATION IN THE FAR EAST</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II THE PROBLEMS IN THE U.S.-JAPANESE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III CONSTRAINTS ON JAPANESE MILITARY CAPABILITIES</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV JAPAN'S NUCLEAR CHOICE</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER V THE CREATION OF A NEW BILATERAL GUARANTEE OR NEUTRALITY</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VI JAPAN'S SECURITY UNDER THE MST</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 1 SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, SEPTEMBER 8, 1951</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 2 TREATY OF MUTUAL CO-OPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, JANUARY 14, 1960</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 3 PREAMBLE AND ARTICLE 9 FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 4 EXCERPTS FROM THE ALLIED TREATY OF PEACE WITH JAPAN, SEPTEMBER 8, 1951</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 5 EXCERPTS FROM THE SINO-JAPANESE COMMUNIQUÉ, SEPTEMBER 29, 1972</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 6 COMPARISON OF DEFENCE EXPENDITURES (1972 - 1979)</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 7  COMPARATIVE STRENGTHS OF ARMED FORCES, 1954 - 1975  187
APPENDIX 8  BASIC POLICIES FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE ADOPTED BY THE JAPANESE NATIONAL DEFENCE COUNCIL AND CABINET, MAY 20, 1957  188
APPENDIX 9  SUCCESSIVE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE DEFENCE AGENCY OF JAPAN  159
APPENDIX 10  CHANGE OF COMPOSITION OF DEFENCE BUDGET UNDER THE FOURTH FIVE YEAR DEFENCE BUILD-UP PROGRAMME OF JAPAN  192
APPENDIX 11  ORGANIZATION OF JAPANESE DEFENCE AGENCY AND SELF-DEFENCE FORCES  193
APPENDIX 12  THE NUMBER OF U.S. BASES, FACILITIES AND THEIR AREA IN JAPAN  194
APPENDIX 13  PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN JAPAN  195
APPENDIX 14  COMPARATIVE LIST OF JAPANESE POLITICAL PARTIES' DEFENCE AND SECURITY POLICIES AS OF AUGUST 1974  196
APPENDIX 15  防衛庁設置法(抄) 第三章国防会議  201
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY  202
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Air Self-Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Anti-Submarine Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>Democratic Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Ground Self-Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Inter-continental Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>Japan Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>Japan Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td>Medium Range Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Maritime Self-Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MST</td>
<td>The Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Between the United States of America and Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>The People's Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-to-Air Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self-Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>Missile Launching Nuclear Submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSM</td>
<td>Surface-to-Surface Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULMS</td>
<td>Undersea Long-range Missile System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The U.S.-Japanese military partnership defined by two security treaties has now lasted for twenty-five years. The first security treaty between the United States and Japan was signed on September 8, 1951, even though a few years earlier, the United States and Japan had waged a four-year bloody struggle across the Pacific. No one could have foreseen, after Japan attacked the U.S., the strange twist of history that would compel these two countries -- with such different pasts and cultures -- into a military partnership. The 1951 treaty was later superseded by the current security arrangement, the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security Between the United States and Japan (MST), which was concluded at Washington on January 19, 1960.

The fundamental issue that gave rise to these security arrangements was the strategic imbalance in the Far East; a defeated and unarmed Japan faced two powerful Communist neighbours. But what resulted in the U.S.-Japanese relations is paradoxical in two senses. The first point is that the Japanese accepted the U.S. forces as their protectors in spite of the previous acrimony between the two states. The other point is that a nation as large and potentially powerful as Japan has continued in effect to rely very heavily on another state for its defence.

In essence, both of the security treaties are unilateral guarantees of Japanese security by the United States.
Japan has undertaken no reciprocal obligations to act if American forces or U.S. territory were attacked. Instead of this, the U.S. has been permitted by the Japanese in the two arrangements to maintain its military bases and facilities on Japanese soil to support its Asian policies.

The two security treaties have given two advantages to successive Governments of Japan as well. First, they have spared Japan the economic burden of rearmament and thus allowed the country to devote itself to the work of post-war reconstruction. Second, the Japanese governments have been able to continue to avoid and neglect matters of defence which otherwise would have brought about serious domestic political discontent in the anti-military atmosphere of post-war Japan.

Since the end of the 1960s, various international movements and currents have transformed the strategic and power configuration in the Far East. These changes would include the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine; limited Sino-American detente; the establishment of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations; the rising Soviet naval capacity in the Western Pacific area; the commencement of peace talks between the two Koreas; the termination of the Vietnam War; and the resurgence of Japan itself. Clearly, the international milieu which had brought the U.S.-Japanese security arrangements into being has been modified in the recent period. It is, consequently, necessary to reassess the present U.S.-Japanese security relations and to remodel the MST to adapt it to the changing environment in the Far East.
Since the outset of the two security arrangements, all Japanese opposition parties except the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) have continued to take a strong stand against both agreements. A majority of the public in Japan also has opposed the treaties and, altogether, this disenchantment presents a contrast to the situation in the Western European countries where no strong opposition to NATO is visible. Moreover, antagonism to the current U.S.-Japanese security arrangement has intensified, especially in the light of the Vietnam War, Japan's own economic recovery, and the fact that the Sino-Soviet split has made a direct threat against Japan a more remote possibility.

Japan has long since acquired the potential to be a full-fledged military power. It has not, however, to date shown any sign of taking that course. The country seemed to prefer to draw away from nation-centered political rivalries and tried to remain wholly aloof from traditional balance of power politics. This self-restricting mentality observed in Japanese policies has not been understood by foreigners who remember only the aggressive and ultranationalistic policies of pre-war Japan.

Recently, despite Tokyo's self-restricting policies, growing economic power and the resulting increased influence in the Asian region are producing a new direction for Japan. Combined with the transformation of American Far Eastern policies, the changed Japanese standing has made it necessary to redefine U.S.-Japanese relations. The resurgence of Japanese self-confidence and economic power have forced the
Government to launch more autonomous policies, less dependent on the United States. The new uncertainties created by Washington's detente policies vis-à-vis the two Communist big powers have accentuated the public's desire. The United States and Japan have already begun drifting apart from the previous peculiar and unhealthy relationship. Paralleling the change in the overall relations of the two states, the long-lasting patron-protégé relations in the security aspect have come to be reassessed.

In Japan, security problems have long been discussed, but the people have been unable to reach a united view. The stunned reaction to the total defeat in World War II coupled with the experience of nuclear devastation have created an atmosphere that cannot be observed in any other country. The variety of security discussions, from an argument for a full-fledged nuclear power on the one hand, to an unarmed and neutral Japan on the other, have been the items for discussion of Japan's defence policies. The many-divided opinions about Japan's security have made the direction of Japanese defense policies uncertain. Accordingly, the principal purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the non-availability of defence choices other than those based upon military co-operation with the U.S.

In Chapter I, the political and strategic circumstances of the Pacific-Asian region in which Japan is placed are discussed. The East Asian-Pacific region is the area where the vital strategic interests of the United States, the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Soviet Union and Japan converge.
In contrast to the European environment, the region is mixed with rivalries and confrontations making it one of the most unstable areas in the world. Assessment of the circumstances of the region is necessary for an understanding of Japan's defense policies.

In Chapter II, U.S.-Japanese security relations will be discussed. I examine some of the underlining reasons for the unpopularity of the current U.S.-Japanese defense pact. The Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and the Komeito have advocated the abrogation of the MST. These three political parties together garnered about 45 percent of total votes in the 1976 election for the House of Representatives. Controversial points in the current U.S.-Japanese security 'arrangement include the advantages and disadvantages of U.S. bases and troops on Japanese soil and the prior consultation formula. Clarification of these two matters would help any future efforts to remodel the MST. Moreover, a transformation of the political and strategic circumstances in the Far East has eroded the foundations of the MST. Some problems arising from this change of power configuration in the Pacific-Asian area will also be discussed.

Antagonism held by a significantly broad segment of the Japanese people towards the U.S.-Japanese security pact obliges me to study several alternative defense options, other than those built upon security arrangement with the U.S. The demonstration of the non-availability of these various alternatives is a necessary precondition for reducing the unpop-
ularity of Japanese-U.S. military co-operation. From Chapter III to Chapter V, conceivable defence alternatives are examined. The assessment of the possibility of an independent and autonomous defence policy for Japan is detailed in Chapters III and IV. There are several unique obstacles to Japanese efforts in the direction of an independent defence policy. As to conventional military capabilities, because of the so-called war-renouncing clause, the Japanese Self-Defence Force (SDF) is inhibited from possessing "offensive-oriented" military capacity. In addition, because of adverse Japanese public opinion, the SDF has not been able to obtain popular support. In Chapter IV, Japanese nuclearization is discussed. Aside from public opposition to acquiring nuclear weapons, usually a moralistic-oriented one, my research has focussed both on whether or not nuclear weapons would provide Japan with nuclear deterrence and on the assessment of possible external and internal political reactions. An indigenous Japanese nuclear programme without any threat to Japan would be interpreted as a challenge to the status quo in the Far East and as a destabilising policy in the prevailing detente atmosphere.

In Chapter V, the feasibility of a security alliance with either the U.S.S.R. or the P.R.C. is discussed. A security alliance with either of the two Communist powers sounds unrealistic, but today's unsettled domestic political conditions compel an examination of the possibility. In the latter half of Chapter V, the policy of an unarmed and neutral
Japan, long advocated by the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), will be examined. Although the JSP's policy is a somewhat Quixotic one, one out of five Japanese support the JSP's policy in present Japan, and so it should be examined.

The study in Chapters III, IV and V force me to revert to the current U.S.-Japanese security arrangement. In Chapter VI, the prospect of crucial bilateral problems in the security relations -- American force and base presence in Japan and prior consultation, both of which have enough potential to disrupt the MST system -- shall be discussed. In the latter half of Chapter VI, Japanese security vis-a-vis the development of the Korean Peninsula becomes the major theme. Japanese policy toward the Korean Peninsula should be to serve the maintenance of peace in the Peninsula.

Recently, the U.S.S.R. has rapidly expanded its naval power in the Western Pacific. The Soviet Union had long been regarded a threatening power to the security of Japan and its general interests in the Far East, and this belief has not been changed among the Japanese public. After the frenzious efforts by Moscow, the Soviet Pacific Fleet has already become formidable as a deep water navy. The growing Soviet naval and air power in the Far East and the present Japanese defence posture is another dimension of Chapter VI.
CHAPTER I
THE CHANGING CONFIGURATION IN THE FAR EAST

A grasp of the present international relations in the Far East is a prerequisite to an assessment of Japan's defence policy. Four major powers, the U.S., the People's Republic of China (PRC), Japan and the USSR are involved to different degrees in today's Pacific-Asian region. This configuration could be characterized as "quadrilateral affairs" but only trilateral in effect in the military sense. In this chapter, by selecting and analyzing the main developments since late 1960s which have brought about today's conditions in the Pacific-Asian region, the international environment and its implications for Japan will be discussed.

The following might be viewed as salient developments:

2) The establishment of informal diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the P.R.C. after February 1972.
3) Taiwan's uncertain position.
4) The establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the P.R.C. and Japan in September 1972.

Other important considerations include:

1) The Sino-Soviet rift.
2) The tension in the Korean Peninsula.

The Enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine

The Nixon Doctrine was made public at Guam in July 1969 by the then U.S. President Richard Nixon and repeated in his
November, 1969 address to the United Nations General Assembly. 1

The doctrine was the first official signal of a U. S. policy shift to adjust and redefine U. S. roles in the changing global structure. The fundamental perception of the global situation by the Nixon Administration was that "... the post-war order of international relations -- the configuration of power that emerged from the Second World War -- is gone..." 2

The Administration picked out six major developments in the global scene which could be summarized as follows: 3

1) The regaining of economic activity, social cohesion and political self-assurance by Western Europe and Japan.

2) Increasing identity and self-confidence of new nations.

3) Political fragmentation among the Communist countries.

4) The expansion of Soviet military power and the resulting transformation of its former inferior status, in strategic weapons to one comparable to the U. S.

5) Transformation from a rigid bipolar world to a new era of multilateral diplomacy.

6) Increasing numbers of new issues that transcend geographic and ideological borders and call for a new dimension of international co-operation.

---

2Ibid., p. 3.
3Ibid., pp. 4-5.
Facing the above-mentioned conditions, the Nixon Administration set out the following three policy guidelines:

1. The United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

2. We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole.

3. In cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

Although this doctrine applies to all U.S. international relationships, it has a special meaning for Asia. Much has been written about the Nixon Doctrine but many of the interpretations of the doctrine differ. At present, there is no definite prediction of the direction and extent of future U.S. security commitment toward Asia. To this extent, U.S. security commitment toward Asian countries is uncertain. Perhaps an analysis of the Asian international environment and the U.S. commitment to the region in the late 1960s would provide us with a clue to understanding the doctrine.

In the late 1960s the U.S. had faced a major problem—the Vietnam War. The original justification of U.S. military intervention to Vietnam was based on containment policy. Although the Vietnam War was interpreted by the U.S. Administration as an act of Communist aggression, and in this sense

---

viewed as a challenge to U. S. security, the revolutionary effort enjoyed support within Vietnamese society. The U. S. finally found itself being placed in the position of backing an unpopular regime in Vietnam. For most of the Vietnamese, the war was based on strong nationalism rather than Communism. The costly and frustrating war had deeply divided the American people.  

The containment policy as well as the Vietnam commitment was seriously questioned by large segments of the American populace. The U. S. Presidential Report to the Congress of May 3, 1973 stated that "... America had been involved for eight years in a well-motivated but costly and seemingly endless effort. Every year we had sent more men to Vietnam. Our casualties, draft calls, and financial costs had risen steadily. The war dominated our national attention. Abroad it complicated our efforts to adjust to changing conditions. At home it fostered growing dissent."  

In addition, from a strictly military point of view Vietnam is not strategically vital to U. S. interests. The bleak prospects for U. S. military commitment to the Vietnam Civil War, the unpopularity of the intervention and Washington's desire for improved relations with Peking forced it to reassess its overall policy towards Asia -- the announcement of the Doctrine.

Before the Nixon Doctrine, as seen in the Korean War and the early days of the Vietnam War, the U. S. had been

---

6For example, in 1969, total American combat deaths were 14,561. See A Report to the Congress by Richard M. Nixon, op. cit., p. 59.

ready to make military commitments with its armed forces to Asian allies which were threatened by Communist penetration or Communist-oriented insurgency. The 1969 Doctrine, however, constituted a clear discontinuity in American policy from the principle of military commitment to U. S. allies over the previous two decades. Judging from the U. S. bitter experience in Vietnam and Paragraph 3 of the doctrine, one goal of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia would seem to be to divorce U. S. armed forces from future Asian conventional local wars which appeared to be essentially internally generated, by restricting itself to economic and military equipment assistance, thus permitting the U. S. the option of not becoming involved in terms of manpower.8 Although the total number of the U.S. military forces in Asia before the Doctrine was 740,0009 it had fallen to 149,000 by September, 1975.10 The reduction in the U.S. forces


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>78,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Army Infantry Division

The Seventh Fleet,
The Fifth Air Force and a Marine Corps.

The 13th Air Force.

The 8th Air Force.
in the region will continue because of the shortage of combat manpower with the end of the draft, a budgetary squeeze, and a general determination to concentrate on domestic affairs. To that extent, the United States would continue to entice its Asian allies to undertake a greater share of the responsibility, especially in terms of manpower, for the security of the region.

Sino-American Rapprochement

President Nixon's surprise announcement of his visit to the P.R.C. in July 1971 had a strong impact on the American allies in Asia, including Japan. Following the Nixon Doctrine as it had, the Washington announcement forced U.S. Asian allies to reassess their relations with the U.S. and the P.R.C. as Washington's decision to deal directly with its adversary reduced to some degree the importance of alliance relationships between the U.S. and the non-Communist Asian countries.

Although an immediate reason for the Sino-American rapprochement could be found in the fact that the U.S. had been experiencing mounting pressures from both domestic and foreign sources to finish the Vietnam War, the fundamental and important factor which necessitated the accommodation could be found in both Sino-Soviet relations and in U.S.-Soviet relations. Washington and Peking began to think it necessary to weaken the tension between the two states in order to strengthen the bargaining power of each vis-à-vis Moscow. In

other words, both sides had realized that the continuance of
severe tension between the two would enhance Moscow's position.

In the case of the U.S.-Soviet relations, the peaceful
co-existence policy had been in effect since Moscow's modif-
ication of its foreign policy in 1957. Peaceful co-existence
had become strengthened by the Moscow Test Ban Treaty in
August, 1963, and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons in July, 1968. The U. S., however, had
gradually perceived that even in the period of peaceful co-
existence Moscow intended to overcome the U. S. superiority
in military terms or at least to enhance Soviet military power
to the extent of parity with the U. S. Soviet naval power had
been increased in the Mediterranean Sea, in the Western Pacific
and in the Indian Ocean. The commencement of more intimate
relations with India, the establishment of formal diplomatic
relations with Malaysia and Singapore, the proposal of an Asian
collective security treaty: all these had increased Moscow's
influence in Asia. The U. S., on the contrary, had been losing
its influence in Asia at the same time as the Soviets were
improving theirs. Hence, for Washington, not only a settlement
of the Vietnam War, but also the achievement of a restraint on
growing Soviet influence, was a crucial matter.

The underlining reasons for the accommodation between
the U. S. and the P.R.C. become more apparent when seen in the
light of the long-standing Sino-Soviet rift. For Peking, the
growing dispute with the U.S.S.R. was a principal factor in
the reassessment of the antagonistic Chinese attitudes towards
the U.S. In the period up to the Cultural Revolution, the
P.R.C. followed a hard-line policy vis-à-vis the two super-
powers, both of which favoured the status quo. Since the
Cultural Revolution, Peking has pursued a more flexible and
pragmatic approach in its foreign policies. The main reason
for this policy shift could be found in: 1) the fact that the
hard-line policy before the Cultural Revolution had driven the
P.R.C. into international isolation, 12 2) the emergence of a
group among the Chinese elite displaying more flexible and
pragmatic thought, represented by Chou En-lai, and 3) the
formidable Soviet threat. The 1968 Soviet intervention in
Czechoslovakia and the subsequent enunciation of the Brezhnev
Doctrine, which justified intervention in other Communist
countries for the purpose of keeping a country in the Communist
c bloc, frightened Chinese leaders. The border conflict on the
Ussuri River in 1969 made Peking even more aware of the formid-
able nature of Soviet military power. Thus the principal pur-
pose of Peking's new approach to foreign policy was to make a
new counterbalance or restraint vis-à-vis Moscow. It seems
clear that the P.R.C. had confronted two potential enemies --
the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. -- before the Nixon Doctrine. For
Peking, it was a most crucial matter to avoid a two-front
confrontation. Peking, judging from the reception of the Nixon

12 Robert A. Scalapino, Asia and the Road Ahead: Issues
for the Major Powers, (Berkeley, Calif.: University of
Doctrine, welcomed the U. S. policy shift in Asia.

Another factor which encouraged Peking to accommodate the U. S. may have been the reemergence of Japan. By the beginning of the 1970s, in the period of the confusing Cultural Revolution in China, Japan had established economic dominance throughout much of Asia. As Japanese influences have grown, Peking has begun to recognize the necessity of policy change - rapprochement with the U. S. to check the growing Japanese influence in Asia. From Peking’s point of view, Japan represents a major, though long-range, threat to the security of the P. R. C. As long as the free-market economy system thrives in Japan, Japanese prosperity will threaten China’s Communist way. China’s border countries might turn their back on Peking’s Communist régime if they continue to see a prospering Japan and a lagging China. Already, Japan’s influence, represented in the export of capital and various kinds of aids, can be seen all around China’s border countries. Also, the Chinese are afraid that Japan’s industrial capability is bound to lead to political expansion in the Asian region. By 1971, the fundamental conditions had emerged which would permit an accommodation between Washington and Peking.

Taiwan’s Uncertain Future

Before the U. S. presidential trip to Peking, no improvement between the P. R. C. and the U. S. was possible until the Taiwan issue was settled. For Peking, the latter condition
had meant U. S. abandonment of all commitments to Taiwan. The noteworthy point in Peking's attitude in the process of informal normalization of relations with the U. S., however, was that Peking did not stick to the principle that the resolution of the Taiwan issue was a necessary condition for any improvement in relations with the United States. What caused the change in Peking's attitude to Taiwan? In the beginning of the 1970s, the P.R.C. had been facing two pressing problems -- how to counter the formidable Soviet threat and how to shift from isolation to international participation, both of which were life-and-death questions for the P.R.C. To solve those questions, the P.R.C. perceived its need of the U.S. and seemed to shelve the Taiwan issue temporary to improve relations with the U.S. In the summit talks between Chou and Nixon, however, the issue was discussed. In the Shanghai Communique of February, 1972, the U.S. stated that "... the United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China...."

13 The sentence is vague and ambiguous. Because judging from the fact that the U.S. has not yet recognized Peking as a sole Government of China and has still maintained formal diplomatic relations with Taipei, "China" does not necessarily mean the People's Republic of China. Thus, the Taiwan issue still remains as a crucial question for both the P.R.C. and the U.S.

Today, the focus in the Taiwan issue is being paid to Peking's policy of reunification to the P.R.C. In the Shanghai Communiqué, the U.S. pledged itself to ultimate military disengagement from Taiwan and expressed the hope that reunification would take place by peaceful means. Peking simply stated that "... the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all United States forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan..." Although, for a brief period in 1973, Peking spoke of "peaceful liberation", it is uncertain if Peking has real intention to promote a policy of peaceful reunification. It is said that the P.R.C. now seems to be taking a position that Taiwan can be reunified only by military force, given the current control of the Taipei Government over its people. The U.S. has not yet abrogated the U.S.-Taiwan Defence Pact and has not broken its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Washington will find it difficult to abrogate the defence tie as long as the P.R.C. continues to threaten the use of force to absorb Taiwan. In addition, the fact that nine out of ten Taiwanese prefer to remain separate from the mainland would intensify the U.S. dilemma.

14 The Shanghai Communiqué of February 27, 1972 stated that "... it reaffirms its interests in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan..." See Ibid., p. 438.
15 Ibid., p. 437.
17 Ibid.
However, the Ford Administration has recently appeared to accommodate more with Peking about the Taiwan problem. President Ford and leading members of his Administration, in prepared speeches and in presentations to Congress, made no mention of the U.S. defence treaty with Taiwan for a year despite their occasional references to treaties with other non-Communist Asian countries.\footnote{New York Times, August 15, 1976.} The Ford Administration had been carrying out an arms-sale programme intended to put Taiwan in a position to conventionally defend itself, without U.S. participation against an attack from the mainland.\footnote{New York Times, August 4, 1976.} Thus, despite the U.S.-Taiwan Defence Treaty, it is uncertain what kind of military commitment the U.S. will make in case of a conventional attack from the P.R.C.

On the other hand, even after the termination of the U.S.-Taiwan Defence Treaty, the P.R.C. could not visualize successful, low-cost reunification by force because of increasingly strengthened Taiwanese forces, especially its air forces. In addition, for Peking, there is simply not enough internal or external pressure on it to justify the cost of "liberating" Taiwan by force for the next few years.

For Japan, military conflict in Taiwan would not pose significant security problems aside from the possible loss of Japan's economic and trade interests in the country. Although, in the 1969 Communiqué between President Nixon and Premier Sato, Mr. Sato stated "... the maintenance of peace and security in
the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan. This passage did not imply Japanese obligation to support U.S. defense efforts in the Taiwan area. In any case, Mr. Sato's remark lost its significance after the P.R.C. and Japan established formal diplomatic relations in September, 1972. As for the trade and economic aspect, Japan does not import any strategically important resources from Taiwan. Taiwan is of marginal significance as a source of supply for commodities essential to the continued functioning of Japanese industry. Japanese investment and markets in

21 In the Joint Communiqué between President Nixon and Premier Sato in November 1969, Premier Sato stated that "... the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security....", "... the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan...." These two sentences have been called the Korean Clause and the Taiwan Clause respectively. Premier Eisaku Sato was the first Premier of Japan who made public Japan's interests in the regional defence of the Far East. See U. S., State Department, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXI, No. 1590, December 15, 1969, p. 555.

22 Main items of Japanese imports from Taiwan in 1973 were foodstuffs (33.7%), raw materials mainly composed of wood and lumber (10.6%), and mineral fuels (1.7%). Total import value for 1973 was $890,695,000, and this amounted to 2.3% of the total value of Japanese imports in 1973. See Japan, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, White Paper on International Trade: Japan, (Tokyo: Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 1974), pp. 9-10, and pp. 115-116.

23 Main items of Japanese exports to Taiwan in 1973 were heavy chemical products (78.1%), and light industry products (17.1%). Total export value for 1973 was $1,641,758,000 and this amounted to 4.4% of the total value of Japanese exports in 1973. See Ibid., pp. 9-10, and pp. 115-116.
Taiwan are valuable but not of vital strategic importance. Thus, even the complete severance of economic relations with Taiwan would not cause serious dislocations in the Japanese economy. In addition, unlike the case of South Korea, the geographical security assets that Japan would lose with the disappearance of Taiwan are small. Thus, the future military conflict in the Taiwan area would not give rise to significant security impact on Japan.

The Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations

Japan had continued to maintain close co-operation with the U.S. regarding the China policy -- containment policy -- after Japan regained the sovereignty. Successive Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Governments of Japan were reasonably certain that a country, which continued to co-operate closely on an important problem with another country, could expect prior consultation of a change in policy by the other country. The Sato Administration of Japan often emphasized the existence of the "intimate and frank" partnership between Washington and Tokyo. The American announcement of the presidential trip to Peking in 1971, however, showed Tokyo's position to be both complacent and naive. Though the Sato Government welcomed an effort by the Nixon Administration to improve relations with the P.R.C. as easing tensions in the Far East, it was surprised and frustrated at the fact that Japan had been neither consulted nor given more than the briefest notice in advance.
After that event, Tokyo became more apprehensive about whether the U. S. actually did regard Japan as one of its major allies and a true partner. The immediate results were renewed doubts about the reliability of the alliance with the United States and renewed public concern about the defence problem. To make matters worse, because of the secrecy of the Sino-American accommodations, the Government of Japan was suspicious about possible secret dealings in talks held between the two states. Tokyo's apprehension would be that the U. S. and the P.R.C. made their accommodation at the expense of Japan -- more specifically that both parties had reached an understanding of the scope of the influence of each in Pacific-Asian regions. Japanese political circles felt that the anti-hegemony clause stated in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, which was proposed by the then presidential advisor, H. Kissinger, though mainly targeted to the U.S.S.R., could be applied to a future Japan as well. Thus, despite the fact that Mr. Kissinger explained the discussions held in China to the Japanese Government in Tokyo, deep-seated doubt has continued to linger on the side of the Japanese.

On the other hand, Japanese public and the opposition parties showed a strong reaction to Nixon's announcement. Not only the opposition parties, but also a majority of Japanese public, seizing that opportunity, made further charges against the Government's awkwardness and credulity vis-à-vis Washington.

and against the way in which the LDP Government always followed
the footsteps of the U. S. China policy. They strongly urged
the adoption of a more independent and autonomous policy
towards China.

Then, on the 25th of September 1972, the new Prime
Minister Tanaka, feeling a sense of guilt on two counts, namely
the conduct of Japan in pre-war days and the co-operation with
the United States in its containment policy in post-war days,
started on a trip to Peking. Before Premier Tanaka visited
the P.R.C., the basic obstacles to normalizing the Sino-Japanese
relations had been Tokyo's legal attachment to Taiwan\textsuperscript{25} and a
powerful pro-Taiwan lobby representing Japanese business
interests in Taiwan. The P.R.C. had asserted that Japan could
start negotiations on normalizing relations with the P.R.C.
only after Japan accepted Peking's three principles\textsuperscript{26} which

\textsuperscript{25} Both Taiwan and Japan understood that the Taiwan-Japan
Peace Treaty was applicable to all territories that were then,
or that might thereafter have been, under Nationalist
Chinese Control. Later, on June 26, 1952, the then Premier Yoshida of
Japan made it clear that as the treaty would not apply to all
Chinese territory, he hoped to conclude a treaty with "one
total China" in the future.

See Chae-Jin Lee, \textit{Japan Faces China: Political and
Economic Relations in the Post-war Era}, (Baltimore: The Johns

\textsuperscript{26} The three principles for the normalization were as
follows:
1) The Government of the People's Republic of China is the
sole legitimate Government of China.
2) Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory.
3) The Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty was illegal, null and
void from the outset, and must be abrogated.

See Kuniro Muraoka, "Japanese Security and The United
States", \textit{Adelphi Papers}, No. 95, {London: The International
Institute For the Strategic Studies, February 1973}, p. 16.
asked Japan to recognize Peking as a sole government of China; consider Taiwan an inalienable part of Chinese territory; and abrogate the Taiwan-Japan Peace Treaty. Prior to Mr. Tanaka's trip to Peking, the Japanese Government accepted these three principles.  

On September 28, 1972, the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué was issued. It consists of nine articles. As for the Taiwan issue, the Japanese Government stated that "... Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of China..." The statement could be interpreted that Japan declared it had no right to refer to the future development of the Taiwan issue. As a result, Article VI of the MST, the so-called Far Eastern Clause, has become non-applicable to Taiwan. Specifically, the Taiwan Clause pronounced in the Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué of November, 1969, namely Tokyo's deference to the U. S. defense commitment to Taiwan, lost its foundation. However, although all opposition parties of Japan proposed that the LDP Government exclude Taiwan from the applicable region of the Far Eastern Clause of the MST and renounce formally the Taiwan Clause, both Premier Tanaka and Vice Premier Miki declined the proposal. Instead, they stated that obviously there would be no military hostility in the Taiwan area so that there is no need to renounce the clause in

28 See Appendix 5.
30 See Appendix 2.
formal language. 31

The impact on the U.S.S.R. of the Sino-American rapprochement and the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations was significant. For Moscow, emerging China has been perceived as the gravest threat to the security of the Soviet Union. The principal policy of the U.S.S.R. in East Asia, therefore, could be the expansion of its military power in the district of the Sino-Soviet border and in the rest of the East Asian theatre. The Soviet Union exhibits a dual character in its internal situation; militarily, it is a super power, whereas materially, it is like a developing country. If this gap is long continued, it would generate an internal split in the future. One of the motives of current détente policy in Moscow *vis-à-vis* Washington could be to bridge this gap. Thus, for the purpose of attaining the aforementioned two objectives, the U.S.S.R. planned to make the eastern Siberia another source of major military and economic strength. Moscow planned to obtain American and Japanese technology and financial aid for the development of Siberia. The cardinal motivation of the policy seemed to rest on the assumption that the Sino-American and the Sino-Japanese confrontations would continue. The U.S.S.R. could take advantage of the Sino-American animosity in dealing with Japan. As a result of the Sino-American rapprochement and the following normalization of relations between the P.R.C. and Japan, however, a major pillar of the Soviet East

---

Asian policy was shattered. Then, recognizing the swift improvement of relations between the P.R.C. and Japan, the Soviet Union has begun to undertake alternating policies of a conciliatory posture towards Tokyo and attempting to browbeat Tokyo to check it becoming closer to Peking. Japan has not so far accepted the various Soviet proposals of joint development plans of Siberia. The U.S.S.R. has found itself in a difficult position in East Asia. It must worry about the emergence of new Pan-Asianism which might develop closer relations between the P.R.C. and Japan.

Pacific-Asian Policy Guidelines of the Ford Administration

On December 7, 1975, U. S. President Ford announced guidelines of his Administration's Asian policy in Hawaii. According to The Guardian of March 7, 1976, the summary of it may be as follows:

1) American strength is basic to any stable balance of power in the Pacific;
2) Special ties with Japan, now elevated to the status of partner;
3) Normalization of relations with China and joint opposition to any hegemony in Asia;
4) Continued U. S. role in South East Asia;
5) Defence of South Korea;
6) A structure of economic co-operation reflecting the aspirations of all the peoples of the region. 32

There are some departures in President Ford's statement from the mainlines of the Nixon Doctrine. First, the P.R.C. has now entered into the picture of U.S. policy in the Far East and holds an important place in its Pacific-Asian policy.

Secondly, after the debacle of South Vietnam, the U.S. has attached much more importance to the Korean Peninsula. Thirdly, the U.S. regards continuance of close U.S.-Japanese relations as being crucial for the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East, and at the same time, the U.S. expects Japan to take an increasing share of the burden, proportionate to Japan's national power in maintaining peace and security in the region. Fourthly, the statement conveys a clear impression of a more determined U.S. security role in Asia than did the Nixon Doctrine.

In essence, however, President Ford's guidelines do not deviate from the Nixon Doctrine. The fact that the U.S. expects collaboration and help from Japan and the P.R.C. to stabilize the balance of power in the Pacific-Asian area, makes the Asian nations recognize further that the U.S. alone can no longer claim to be masterminding the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific-Asian region. That whether or not U.S. military commitment in the region is successful depends on the developments of U.S.-Japanese and Sino-American relations. It is natural, therefore, that the Asian people have continued to have considerable apprehension about U.S. ability and intention to use its military force. This feeling has been heightened since the fall of South Vietnam. Facing such uncertainty, non-Communist Asian countries will have to look not only for alternative sources of support but also to explore accommodation to some degree with the potentially threatening Communist countries.
The Continuing Tensions on the Korean Peninsula

A divided Korea is an unfortunate legacy of World War II and the following Cold War. The longing of the Korean people for a unified state has been frustrated by insurmountable ideological and political differences between the two regimes. In addition, the Korean War in the early 1950s produced profound mutual distrust among the two Korean peoples. Each of the two Korean regimes would like to see the Korean Peninsula unified under its own authority. South Korea has called on North Korea to solve the problem of divided Korea by means of U.N.-supervised elections throughout the Peninsula. North Korea, however, has denounced the idea of U.N.-supervised elections, insisting instead on the reunification of Korea through negotiations between the two Governments, without outside interference.

The intransigence of both regimes continued in the 1960's. Concurrently with Pyongyang's various proposals for negotiations between the two Koreas, North Korea has sent on various occasions, groups of armed infiltrators into South Korea to stimulate revolutionary activities in the South and ultimately overthrow the South Korean regime. The number of subversive and violent actions carried out by the North against

---

35 Ibid.
the South amounted to 1,780 from 1966 to 1970. However, Pyongyang's intensive campaign of armed infiltration of South Korea failed, as it led only to a more strengthened South Korean military capability and greater anti-Communist sentiment among the South Korean people.

In the 1970s, it seems that Pyongyang has now shifted its tactics toward the South. No conspicuous armed subversive infiltration of the South from the North has been reported (with the exception of the two tunnels in the demilitarized zone). Pyongyang seems to have switched to an effort to engage Seoul in negotiations. The most important factor in the international situation forcing the North Korean policy change was probably the improvements in relations between the U.S. on the one hand, and the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. on the other. They have effectively diminished the prospects of Chinese support for a policy of seeking to take over South Korea by military measures or so it would appear. At the same time, the U.S. overtures to both the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. in 1972 and the withdrawal of a U.S. division from South Korea also had significant influence on South Korean foreign policy. The U.S. policy shift from an emphasis on confronting major adversaries to an emphasis on negotiating with them, has created a new international environment requiring greater flexibility in Seoul's foreign policy.

36 Ibid., p. 163.
37 Ibid., p. 164.
The most significant indicator of the changing attitudes in North and South Korea was a successful agreement on July 4, 1972, between the two Governments on a set of principles for the reunification of Korea. From that time, peace talks between the two continued for one year. However, the North-South dialogue abruptly ended when the North demanded that the Communist Party be made legal in South Korea. The easing of tensions during 1972 and 1973 in the Peninsula was thus merely a short-lived one.

After the debacle of South Vietnam, some Korean observers have repeatedly expressed concern over the possibility of an outbreak of a second Korean War. North Korean President Kim-Il Sung's visit to Peking during the last days of the Vietnam War heightened this anxiety. On that occasion, in Peking, President Kim stated that the North would not stand idly by "... if revolution takes place in South Korea.... If the enemy ignites war recklessly, we shall resolutely answer it with war and completely destroy the aggressors." In response to this statement, South Korean President Park, on April 28, 1975, taking North Korean President Kim's statement as a warning of war, said, "If the North challenge us with war, the President and the people

---

38 In a 515-word joint communiqué, the two sides agreed on seven key issues aimed at easing tensions in the Peninsula and eventually reunifying the divided country. In the communiqué, South Korea agreed to the unification principle "through independent Korean efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference" -- a term long enunciated by North Korea. See Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 77, No. 28, July 8, 1972, pp. 12-13.


of Seoul will defend the capital to the death." The tensions in the Peninsula seems to be unabated.

But while the tension in the Peninsula has continued, it remains true that major military hostility has been avoided in the area since the Korean War. The most important factor that has contributed to the "peace" is obviously the sizeable U. S. military presence in South Korea contributing to what is, in reality, an American-enforced stability.

Judging from the trend of U. S. Asian policy and the public pledge of newly-elected U. S. President Jimmy Carter, however, the day of this American-dictated stability on the Peninsula might end in a few years, or at least the nature of the "peace" in the Peninsula will become a less American-coloured one. The tranquility in the Korean Peninsula must be maintained not only by more complex and flexible policies by the two Koreas but also by the four major powers, the U.S., the P.R.C., the U.S.S.R. and Japan that operate in the region.

---

\[41\] Ibid.
CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEMS IN THE U.S.-JAPANESE SECURITY ARRANGEMENT

The principal objective of this Chapter is to demonstrate the problems in current Japanese-American relations; in particular security relations. A clarification of the issues will help future attempts to modify the existing U.S.-Japanese security arrangement.

In this Chapter, three main areas will be examined. The first is a questioning of the original rational of the present U.S.-Japanese security arrangement. The second deals with some issues inherent in the current U.S.-Japanese security treaty, involving an examination of the problems arising from the presence of U.S. forces and bases in Japan. It also examines the problem of prior consultation. The third discusses contemporary U.S.-Japanese trade problems and the domestic political trends of each country. Both these aspects have an undeniable impact on the destiny of the U.S.-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty (MST).

Eroding Foundations of the MST

The imaginative and fluid diplomacy of the Nixon Administration during the early seventies -- that is the breakthrough in relations with the P.R.C., the presidential trip to Moscow, the reduction in U.S. forces throughout Asia in harmony with the Nixon Doctrine¹, and the U.S. view that its Asian allies must rely less on the U.S. ² caused the Japanese to

¹See footnotes No. 8 and No. 9 of Chapter I.
²See p. 3 of Chapter I.
recognize the dawn of a new era in the Pacific-Asian region. Such American policies, generally welcomed by the Japanese, have brought about general detente in the region.

Along with the American policy shift, the previous unhealthy, patron-protégé relations between the United States and Japan have been under a transition, in an attempt to adjust to the new global condition of an increasingly multipolar world. The expectation that detente will become more firmly established in this new era has led some Japanese to think of a gradual reduction in Japan's heavy reliance on the United States for its security. However, some Japanese Government officials, especially those of the Foreign Office, are afraid that expansion of Sino-American relations could reduce Japan's value for the United States and thereby weaken U.S.-Japanese relations or give rise to more increasing friction between the two countries.

Some Japanese are inclined to think that the U.S. will try its best not to become involved in even a conventional war involving Japan, since, they believe, the U.S. is not likely to regard the Japanese islands to be as strategically important as they were in the past. The possible American unwillingness will be reinforced by the ever-lasting Japanese pressure to eliminate the presence of U.S. armed forces and bases from Japanese soil.

Although the United States often gives verbal assurances of nuclear guarantees to Japan, the credibility of the American

---

nuclear shield over Japan has also become controversial. The
U.S. today still enjoys nuclear superiority vis-à-vis the
U.S.S.R. However, nuclear parity between the two countries
will soon be the rule in quality as well as quantity. Some
Japanese experts on defense in both the private and public
sectors are likely to believe that the day might come in the
near future when the U.S. will not risk its own security to
preserve Japan from a nuclear threat. They conclude that
Washington would find it difficult to act after Japan had come
under a nuclear attack. Judging from the fact that the value
of the American nuclear guarantee rests in the Moscow's un-
willingness to risk retaliation from the United States, the
danger rests in a Moscow's belief that the U.S. would not
react if it were to take action against Japan.  

Not only has a new international situation emerged in
the Pacific-Asian region, but bilateral relations between the
United States and Japan have themselves damaged the mutual
trust on which the MST has been founded. Despite the periodic
reaffirmation of the importance of maintaining a close relation-
ship between the two countries, frictions over a variety of
issues combined with the domestic political trend of each, have
already eroded the basis of trust on which the MST has rested.
The unilateral actions the U.S. took in regards to its China
policy and its new economic policies -- suspension of convert-
ibility of the dollar and 10 percent charge on its imports which

Fred Green, *Stresses in U.S.-Japanese Relations*,
was primarily targeted at Japanese commodities -- aroused the suspicion in Japan about the degree to which the United States actually values Japan. In addition, the habitual manner of American policy makers formulating important decisions on U.S. Far Eastern policies which affect Japan and then telling Tokyo, rather than consulting fully as a partner, has frustrated the Japanese and has given rise to anger with the United States. Dissatisfaction with excessive dependence on the U.S. and the resulting American high-handed policies with regard to Japan are strong motivations for the Japanese public to urge their Government for a more independent, autonomous foreign policy.

In response to the U.S. policies, a series of retaliatory-oriented Japanese foreign policies were launched in 1972 which furthered the widening gap between the two countries. The Government of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) showed a positive attitude towards the Fifth Russo-Japanese Joint Economic Conference in February 1972, the commencement of negotiations with Hanoi about rehabilitation plan for the bomb-ravaged country despite U.S. opposition, recognition of Bangladesh, normalization of diplomatic relations with Mongolia.

---


8 "Mainichi Shimbun, February 14, 1972", in Ibid., p. 87.

9 "Yomiuri Shimbun, February 10, 1972", in Ibid., p. 88.

10 "Yomiuri Shimbun, February 25, 1972", in Ibid.
all of these policies were implemented in February 1972, the month of Mr. Richard M. Nixon's trip to Peking. In September 1972, Japan quickly led to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with the P.R.C. Japan's support to the Arab countries in the energy crisis in 1973 was a clear sign for Washington that it could no longer assume automatic Japanese support to American policies.

Washington's most recent conceptualization of world affairs undercuts the basis for the MST. This prevailing outlook, concurs with the altered global power balance. In a speech delivered at Kansas City in July 1971, the then President Nixon for the first time expressed the new concept of a fine power multipolar era including the U.S., the U.S.S.R., the P.R.C., the E.E.C. countries and Japan.\footnote{Former President Nixon re-emphasized this view in his interview with The Times, January 3, 1972 in which he stated, "... we must remember the only time in the history of the world that we have had any extended periods of peace is when there has been a balance of power.... I think it will be a safer world and a better world if we have a strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance." See Ralph N. Clough, \textit{East Asia and U. S. Security}, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 45.} This concept suggests that the long-range strategy of the U. S. would be to treat Western Europe and Japan not as junior partners, but from the standpoint of American power politics on the same terms as the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C.

Today, Washington still regards Japan as a key partner in its Pacific-Asian policy. This situation will last without major change if either the Soviet Union or the P.R.C. is likely to dominate the area. Neither the U.S.S.R. nor the P.R.C. will
be able to launch such an adventure (because of the everlasting Sino-Soviet rift). Parallel with Washington's detente policy vis-à-vis the two Communist powers, which might be one of the American policies to materialize its long-range conceptualization of world affairs, Washington will press Tokyo more and more to shoulder Japan's own political responsibilities that would be generated by its growing economic influence in Asia. To this extent, the American pressure would erode the foundations for the current U.S.-Japanese security arrangement.

U.S. Force Presence and its Bases in Japan

Japan, in accordance with Article I of the 1951 Security Treaty and Article VI of the MST, has continued to grant the right to the U.S. to station its armed forces on Japanese territory. The American forces were supposed to be utilized to contribute to both the maintenance of the peace and security in the Far East and the security of Japan. When Japanese independence was restored in April, 1952, the U.S. military commitments authorized by the 1951 Security Treaty were significant. The total number of the U.S. armed forces stationed in Japan was 260,000. The number of U.S. military bases and other installations on Japanese territory were 2,824 and

12 See Appendices 1 and 2.
covered 1,353 Km². From that time on, the number of U.S. troops and bases have been progressively reduced. At the conclusion of the Korean War, the number of U.S. forces was 200,000. In the final year of the first security arrangement, 1960, their number was 58,000 and U.S. bases and other facilities totalled 187 covering 312 Km². In January, 1970, both the Government of Japan and the United States decided to automatically extend the MST. As of September, 1975, the total number of U.S. forces in Japan, including Okinawa, was 78,000 and the number of U.S. bases and installations stood at 133 covering 507 Km².

---


16 New York Times, September 14, 1975. For somewhat different figures -- 250,000 in 1953, see Appendix 13.


18 Japan, Defence Agency, op. cit., p. 150.


Japan proper -- 27,000 The Seventh Fleet
Okinawa -- 51,000 The Fifth Air Force and a Marine Corps.
For somewhat different figures -- 50,500 at the end of 1975, see Appendix 13.

20 Japan, Defence Agency, op. cit., p. 150.
From the outset of the security arrangements, the Socialists and Communists as well as the general Japanese Public, had several complaints pertaining to the garrisoned American forces. The 1951 Security Treaty had been aptly described by the Japanese public as merely an unequal pact dealing with the stationing of troops.  

First of all, the 1951 Security Treaty did not clearly obligate the U.S. to guarantee the security of disarmed Japan. Article I of the 1951 Security Treaty stated that "... Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of the international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against attack from without, ..." The U.S. was reluctant to spell out a unilateral promise in the 1951 Security Treaty, for one thing Washington seemed to regard it unnecessary since the presence of U.S. forces in Japan would, in itself, obligate the U.S. to defend Japan, and for another, because of its consideration of the Vandenberg Resolution in June, 1948.

Secondly, Article I allowed the U.S. to intervene during an internal Japanese insurgency. The article permitting U.S.

22 See Appendix I. (The underlined portion is mine).
23 Vandenberg Resolution was passed by the Senate in June, 1948, as the basis for U.S. participation in NATO. That resolution stated that the U.S. would associate with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid.

See Martin E. Weinstein, op. cit., p. 60.
24 See Appendix I.
intervention in internal disturbances, even though only at the request of the Japanese Government, was regarded by the public as a humiliating derogation of Japan's sovereignty. Thirdly, Article II of the Treaty obliged Japan not to grant base rights to a third party without U. S. approval. 25 Fourthly, the 1951 Security Treaty did not put any restriction on the use of U. S. bases on Japanese territory.

Even more significant than the provisions of the 1951 Security Treaty, the U. S. military bases and installations have created serious problems over the years for the Japanese public. The accidents caused by U. S. military aircrafts and vehicles, the noise around air bases in populated areas, the moral problems associated with garrisoning of foreign soldiers, frustrations over valuable property occupied by U. S. bases and installations, all together contributed towards Japanese antagonism for the American bases and armed forces. 26 The presence of large numbers of foreign troops in the crowded Japanese land became more intolerable. Usually, U. S. bases and forces remind the Japanese of their past defeat and bitter occupation.

Furthermore, the unpopularity among the Japanese public to the U. S. "hostages" was accentuated by the consistent

---

25 Ibid.
agitations from the Japanese Socialists and Communist Parties. They argued that antagonism between the U.S. on the one hand, and the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. on the other, generates the danger of Communist attack on the U.S. bases in Japan if Japan continued to provoke both countries by providing the U.S. with military bases. That argument was strengthened by the agitation from Moscow which followed the U-2 incident, when it was widely felt that the Soviet Union was prepared to strike back at military bases from which any plane took off to violate Soviet air space. Thus, Japanese dissatisfaction with the presence of American forces grew as the 1950s advanced.

Aside from the Japanese public, however, defence planners have continued to consider the U.S. forces in Japan as precious "hostages" which would oblige the U.S. to commit itself to the defense of Japan in case of an emergency. But because of the trend in Japanese public opinion regarding the presence of American forces, the Government of Japan thought it advisable and inevitable to revise the 1951 Security Treaty.

On January 19, 1960, the MST was concluded. The MST, the arrangement currently in force, differs in several important respects from the original 1951 Security Treaty. Article V and VI of the MST embody a formal, explicit U.S.
security guarantee to Japan. In these articles, the U. S. recognizes that the defence of Japan is a matter of common interest. Secondly, Japan got a prior consultation arrangement by which it would be consulted prior to substantive U.S. actions regarding its forces stationed in Japan. This was expected by the Japanese to protect their sovereignty. The provision for such prior consultation was contained in the notes exchanged between Secretary of State Herter and Premier Kishi which were put into effect with the MST on January 19, 1960. Thirdly, the two unequal provisions of the 1951 Security Treaty -- the reference to possible U. S. intervention to internal security; and Japanese inability to grant baserights to a third party without U. S. approval -- were eliminated. Thus, the MST was a substantially improved security agreement from the Japanese point of view. However, Japanese opinion towards the U. S. bases and forces did not improve. Various polls conducted in the 1960s showed the Japanese

29 See Appendix 2.
30 The use of U. S. bases and facilities is governed by the "Status of Forces Agreement" that was signed on January 19, 1960.
negative attitude towards them. Two important sources of the Japanese antagonism have been the belief that American bases and forces in Japan did not serve Japanese security needs but to maintain U. S. interests in the Far East and that, as in the case of the 1951 security arrangement, they were provocative and gave an aggressor a ready excuse to attack Japan. The Government of Japan, being uneasy about the opinion, despite the clear wording of the MST, continued to justify the U. S. bases publicly until November, 1969, on the ground that they were solely for the defence of Japan.

The Vietnam War made the base problems a live issue before the Japanese public and disclosed the wide gap of conceptions on U. S. bases between the Government of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the general public. The escalation of the War and the resulting increased use of bases and other facilities of U. S. forces in Okinawa and Japan proper drew


After the Sino-American rapprochement, the Mainichi Shimbun conducted a public survey in April, 1972. (N=3,015). In that survey, more Japanese favoured the reduction in the number of U.S. bases. The result was as follows: Complete removal 23%; gradual reduction 55%; status quo 15%; no answer 7%. See "Mainichi Shimbun, May 3, 1972" in Shimbun Geppo, (Documentary News of the Month), Vol. 307 (June, 1972), pp. 155-156.

33 Fred Green, op. cit., p. 51.
public attention to the relationship of the MST especially the so-called Far Eastern Clause (Article VI), to the Vietnam War. Article VI of the MST stipulates that "For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of the international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan..." 35 As early as 1960, the LDP government defined the area of the Far East, as the area north of the Philippines, in and around Japan, the territory of Taiwan and South Korea, the offshore Chinese islands of Quemoy and Matsu, Takeshima Islands, and the Soviet-occupied four islands. 36 Vietnam had not been defined as the area of the Far East.

When the U. S. had begun bombing North Vietnam in 1965, the then Sato Administration, however, justified the use of U. S. bases and facilities in both Japan proper and Okinawa on the grounds that the U. S. was entitled to use bases as long as the restrictions requiring prior consultation were observed and that Vietnam was geographically in the general area of the Far East and it was within the "operational area" in which U. S. military activities could be conducted. 37 In addition, it

34 The first combat troops to Vietnam were deployed from Okinawa and B-52 bombers were refueled at the U. S. major air base at Kadena in Okinawa. See Ibid., p. 49.
35 See Appendix 2.
36 Fred Green, op. cit., p. 37.
37 Fred Green, op. cit., p. 37, and John K. Emmerson; op. cit., p. 84.
stated that the war in Vietnam could affect the peace and security in the Far East.

The view of the LDP Government, however, did not command the majority of the public. The Japanese public, in general, seemed to sympathize with North Vietnamese as an Asian people fighting the U.S. The great majority of the public did not perceive the Vietnam Revolution as a threat to peace and security in the Far East nor to the security of Japan; rather they thought the U.S. commitment disturbed the peace and security in the region and held the possibility of escalating into a conflict between the P.R.C. and the U.S. with sinister consequences for Japan.

A majority of the Japanese public, because of the Vietnam War, came to believe further that the U.S. bases served mainly the interests of American power politics in Asia. This view of the U.S. bases and forces was reinforced by the then Under Secretary of State, U. A. Johnson's testimony before U.S. Congress; on that occasion, he stressed the non-Japanese orientations of the U.S. bases in Japan and Okinawa. 38

Since the beginning of the 1970s, both the U.S. and Japanese Governments have quickened the reduction in number of American military bases and armed forces stationed in Japan. 39 The Japanese Government, however, does not want a total dis-

38 Fred Green, op. cit., p. 50. and John K. Emmerson, op. cit., p. 90.
39 See Appendixes 12 and 13.
mantlement of the U.S. base systems because they assure to some degree, continuous U.S. military co-operation with Japan. The following are the future problems regarding the bases; what policy of consolidation should be drawn up and how should it be implemented.

Prior Consultation

The problem of prior consultation is closely tied to the issue of U.S. bases and forces problem. Though the issue of prior consultation had initially generated little public debates, it has gained importance as the Vietnam War became intensified.

Under the U.S.-Japanese exchange of notes between Secretary of State C. A. Herter and Premier Kishi, carried out at the time of the signature of the MST, it was agreed as follows:

Major changes in the deployment into Japan of U.S. Armed Forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article V of the said Treaty shall be the subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan. 40

Although Japan accepted the U.S. forces and bases on its territory, the right of prior consultation was regarded as a protection of sovereignty by the Japanese side. This was confirmed by the joint communiqué between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Premier Nobusuke Kishi issued simultaneously with the conclusion of the MST. It stated that "... the U.S. Govern-

ment has no intention of acting in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Japanese Government with respect to the matters involving prior consultation under the treaty. Accordingly, the Japanese Government has told the public that Japan could take general control over Japan-based U.S. military operations in the Far East and thus could avoid becoming involved in an involuntary war even if it offered the base rights to U.S. forces. However, the arrangement of prior consultation has proved to be not so clear-cut. It has two problems.

Firstly, although Japan can call U.S. attention to the prior consultation, it does not have the initiative of the prior consultation. Over the past fifteen years, consultations have never been held. The United States, even in the period of the Vietnam War when the U.S. bases on Japanese soil were frequently used, has never sought Japan's consent to any of its activities. The Japanese LDP Government, despite frequent and strong pressures from the public and mass media, has never sought to invoke prior consultation in any instance. These attitudes of the two governments have given rise to a suspicion over the function of the prior consultation arrangement.

---

41 "Hearing", op. cit., p. 1155.
42 Fred Green, op. cit., p. 67.
The second problem as to the consultation formula is that the definition of requirements for prior consultation is vague and no written documents exist between the two countries. The Japanese attention has been focused on the words "Major changes" and "combat operation" of the provision of the prior consultation. The Government of Japan itself developed details, which the U.S. tactfully accepted. In terms of "major changes in the deployment", sizes requiring consultation are one army division, one naval task force and air force division of 75 fighter-bombers. In terms of "major changes in equipment", it means nuclear weapons, intermediate and long-range missiles, and the construction of missile sites or launchers. Regarding port calls by nuclear-powered naval vessels, they do not require prior consultation. The Japanese Government has maintained this position consistently despite opposition from the Socialist and Communist Parties.

The situation is different in the case of naval ships with nuclear weapons. Since 1971, the Government of Japan has set up the so-called three non-nuclear principles: non-production, non-possession, non-introduction. In theory, therefore, Japan should include any port call by U.S. naval ship with nuclear weapons in the prior consultation. Tokyo, however, does not have any measure to tell if a port calling U.S. naval ship is equipped with nuclear weapons. The only

---

44 Fred Green, op. cit., p. 65, and "Hearing", op. cit., p. 1156, and p. 1190.
45 From November, 1964 to December, 1975, the total number of port calls by U.S. nuclear-powered naval vessels amounted to 116. Documents offered by the Embassy of Japan in Ottawa.
measure available for the Japanese Government is to put trust
in the U. S. The United States, on the other hand, continues
to be unclear on this point. The U. S. always insists that it
cannot inform whether or not a port calling ship carries
nuclear weapons because of strategic reasons. The entry into
Sasebo port by the attack aircraft carrier Enterprise in 1968
and Midway into Yokosuka in 1974 gave rise to strong reactions
among the Japanese public. The very size and function of the
two aircraft carriers aroused suspicion. In an opinion survey
of October, 1974 by the Sankei Shim bun, 86 percent of the
respondents stated that the U. S. had brought nuclear weapons
into Japan or might have brought them. 46 The Japanese Govern-
ment merely repeated that nuclear weapons could not be brought
into Japan without prior consultation and said as the U. S.
had not requested the consultation, therefore it was convinced
that nuclear weapons had not been brought in.

The Japanese Government interprets the term "combat
operation" to mean that the U. S. cannot engage forces based
on Japanese soil in actual combat without prior consultation
with the Japanese. In June, 1972, Tokyo made public more
details about the concept of the combat operation. It picked
out three typical examples of combat operation that require
prior consultation, namely: aircraft taking off from Japanese
soil to bomb, airborne troops from Japan going directly into
actual combat, and an American amphibious attack launched from

46 Fred Green, op. cit., p. 70. and
bases in Japan. Similarly, any naval vessel receiving orders, while in Japan, to engage in combat is subject to the consultation clause. But if U. S. air forces or ground forces leave Japan, and are ordered outside the Japanese administrative region to engage in direct combat, prior consultation is not necessary. The same applies to naval vessels. Many combat-support operations such as reconnaissance, intelligence missions, supply of materials to a combat zone, are immune from the consultation. U. S. aircrafts and air troops stopping over in Japan to engage in direct combat operations from bases elsewhere than Japan are not subject to the consultation.

Thus, in sum, the prior consultation system can place little restriction on the U. S. freedom to operate from Japanese soil and thus, cannot remove the Japanese fear of being involved in an American war. It is no surprise that the Japanese public want to have more restrictive measures to control Japan-based U. S. military activities.

Trade and Economic Problems

In the early stage of the 1970's, differences in trade and economic policies had created bitter frictions between the United States and Japan. Many observers in both countries

48 Fred Green, op. cit., p. 66.
49 "Hearing", op. cit., pp. 1136-1157.
50 "Hearing", op. cit., p. 1198.
were afraid that the tension might bring about political disruption and have a significant impact on the MST. Though the MST survived the danger, few would deny that other similar problems might surface in the future. The causes of friction were due to differences of culture, customs, value systems and national traits rather than to conflicts of interest in trade and economic policies themselves.

Those problems made both countries realize the deep gap in terms of culture and the manner of thinking. The Japanese, compared with Americans, have a slightly different way of looking at ethics. Japanese have a high regard for loyalty to a national or company goal. The Japanese believe that loyalty is more important than what Americans might regard as 'ethical business standards.' In addition, the "average" Japanese, in general, has a tendency to view international relations as vertical rather than horizontal. Many Japanese regard the U.S. as a greater power, an economically-strong country and thus have patron-protected attitudes in the thinking of the U.S.-Japanese relations. They continue to think of Japan as a small nation, unable to accept the responsibilities that its expanded national power requires. These Japanese attitudes seem to have irritated the U.S.

In the 1960s, the trade and economic problems centered on the Japanese protectionist-oriented policies. The continued Japanese imposition of restrictions on imports and foreign investment had aroused criticism. 51 In the beginning of the

1970s, the textile issue had become a problem. It was illustrative of the most stubborn problems in the U.S.-Japanese trade relations. Process of the settlement of the issue created anxiety, suspicion and ill will on both sides. Washington was disappointed greatly at the tardiness of the then Sato Government to carry out the promise of establishing voluntary restrictions on textile exports as a quid pro quo of the return of Okinawa and thus it undertook a high-handed policy approach. The Japanese, on the other hand, were unhappy and outraged by the way they believed the final agreement was forced on them. A major cause of the Japanese resentment was an ultimatum by the United States which demanded Japan to agree to U.S. terms or be confronted with mandatory quotas imposed by the U.S. under the Trading with the Enemy Act.\(^{52}\)

In August, 1971, President Nixon announced a series of new economic policies. One was the imposition of the 10 percent surcharge on U.S. imports. It was primarily targeted at Japanese commodities, since the U.S. trade deficit vis-à-vis Japan in 1971 was estimated at $2.7 billion.\(^{53}\) To make more effective the easing of U.S. balance-of-payments constraints, the U.S. urged the upward revaluation of the yen. After frank and emotional debates, Japan finally agreed to the U.S. demands and the yen was revalued 16.88 percent in December, 1971.


All these harsh trade and economic problems with the United States and the resulting new Japanese nationalism urged the LDP Government to decrease Japan's heavy dependence on the U.S. Many Japanese have come to believe that their heavy dependence on the U.S. in economic and security fields was the cause of weaker Japanese bargaining power vis-à-vis the United States.

Since 1973, the strain in the trade and economic relations have eased. Can such substantial problems be avoided in the future? It will not be easy for both countries to avoid these problems. Far from it, they will occur more frequently with greater intensity. In a country like Japan which has a large population and few natural resources, competition among the industries is fierce. This cut-throat competition is a prime reason for the expansionist-oriented Japanese economy. In addition, the Japanese economy, in terms of quality, is approaching that of the U.S. Japanese industry is shifting towards an information-intensive and high-technology orientation and, therefore, the competition with the United States would probably be intensified. 54

54 Robert A. Scalapino argues on this point as follows: "... the industrial composition of Japan will shift towards information-intensive type industries, with a heavy emphasis upon electronics, aircraft, new synthetic chemicals, sophisticated assembly industries.... In part, this would represent an effort to make Japanese industries less dependent upon extensive labour and large quantities of raw materials. But it also foreshadows greater, rather than less, competition with the U.S., since it is in many of these fields that American pre-eminence exists."

See Robert A. Scalapino, op. cit., p. 36.
On the other hand, will the Japanese be able to modify the present export-oriented economic policies in the process of implementing the various economic policies aimed at the structural transformation launched since the 1973 energy crisis? The answer would have to be negative. In July 1975, the Co-ordination Committee of the Industrial Structure Council, a governmental advisory council, presented a report which visualized a desirable industrial structure for the period up to 1986 with emphasis on a better life for the Japanese public. The Miki Administration, in accordance with the Council's plan, instructed its economic advisors to draw a new five-year basic economic programme. The plan commenced during the fiscal year 1976.

The programme is worked out so as to match the slow economic growth needed in light of the global shortage of energy and raw material supplies. But Japan will not be able to do without a relatively high economic growth. The various private and governmental economic research institutes conclude that a 6 or 7 percent annual GNP growth is necessary to maintain a healthy economy. In the case of 3 percent growth, for example, the Japanese economy will not be able to meet the people's needs, and will have to face a decline in the demand for labour putting 4.8 million people out of jobs in 1985.

56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
Therefore, even though some structural transformation of the Japanese economy will be effected by the new economic policy, the following fundamental pattern of Japan's economy would not be changed, i.e., Japan's relatively heavy dependence of its economy on international base.

As Japanese economic influence and its stake in the world grows, its interests will more frequently diverge from American interests. It is inevitable that the U.S. economy and Japanese economy will clash in many fields. Though the problems may be settled one by one, American-Japanese ties could be hurt. Would the American people and their industrial sectors continue to support the current burdensome MST at the sacrifice of the American people's interest?

American's View Towards Japan and the MST

Certain trends in American society might give rise to some obstacles to efforts at maintaining the MST. In the U.S., a shift in public consensus on U.S. policy priority had taken place. In the middle of the 1960s, Americans rated 1) keeping the U.S. out of war, 2) combatting World Communism, 3) keeping the U.S. military defense strong, as the most important U.S. policies. In mid-1972, however, the American people rated the domestic problems as the most pressing problems.

which should be settled, namely: 1) rising prices, 
2) the amount of violence in American life, 3) the drug 
problem. Obviously Americans have become more inclined to 
force Washington to pay more attention to their domestic 
problems than in the past.

As to the American public's attitude towards U. S. 
military policy abroad, the Gallup Poll conducted nationwide 
in the U. S. through April 18-21, 1975, shows an interesting 
result. The question asked was that "In the event a nation 
is attacked by Communist-backed forces, there are several 
things the U. S. can do about it -- send American troops or 
send military supplies but not send American troops or refuse 
to get involved. What action would you want to see us take?"
When asked if Canada is attacked, 57 percent of total res- 
pondents answered the U.S. should send troops, and 14 percent 
replied the U. S. should refuse to get involved. When asked 
if W. Germany is attacked, 27 percent answered the U. S. should 

60 Ibid.
61 Tom Reinken, ed., The Gallup Opinion Index, No. 121 

The Gallup Opinion Index 
July, 1975

(N = The Survey results are based on interviews with a minimum 
of 1,500 adults).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Should send U.S. Troops</th>
<th>Should send Supplies only</th>
<th>Should refuse to get involved</th>
<th>Can't Say</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
send troops and 33 percent said the U. S. should refuse to get involved. When asked if Japan is attacked, on the other hand, only 16 percent answered the U. S. should send its troops, and 40 percent replied the U. S. should refuse to get involved.

Although the Gallup opinion survey showed that a majority (53 percent) of Americans agree to U. S. assistance to countries that might be overthrown by Communist-backed forces, the content and the policy of the assistance the people support would be different from the past ones. Judging from the fact that the modern nation's defense and foreign policies must increasingly respond, at least in general, to the aspirations, values and mood of the society they serve, Washington could not completely ignore its people's opinion.

As for the American view of Japan and the people, the general public does not know about and is disinterested in Japan. Traditionally, Americans have turned their eyes to European affairs. Robert A. Scalapino discusses this point as follows: "... Only a very small portion of its territory lies in the Western Pacific, within the Asian perimeter. The Asian part of its population remains tiny in comparison with Americans of European background... Because the balance of economic, political and intellectual media power still inclines

---

62 Ibid.
toward the eastern seaboard of the U.S., moreover, these conditions are accentuated. In the most basic sense, American politics and the American people have always been Europocentric, and the ethnic groups strongly influencing American foreign policy, non-Asian. 64

Despite the increasing economic and cultural interchange between the United States and Japan, one out of four Americans still cannot give up their prejudice and still feels that orientals, including the Japanese, are sly and devious, and should not be trusted or relied upon as allies. 65 Even Japanese efforts to accept U.S. demands in trade problems have been frequently criticized as being insincere or devious. Racial and cultural differences still weigh much in the American view towards the Japanese. Ralph N. Clough points out this phenomenon in the rising awareness among Americans of expanding Japanese economy. "Submerged racial antipathy -- the counterpart of similar feelings among Japanese -- is likely to come more often to the surface as Americans become increasingly


Also see Japan Times Weekly, International Edition, June 7, 1975. The American Institute of Public Opinion headed by George Gallup conducted a poll in February, 1975. The Japan Times Weekly showed the result: "The poll covered 2,710 Americans aged 18 or older.... It showed that 49 percent of U.S. citizens put faith in Japan against last year's 36 percent. This was the highest credit accorded to Japan by American people since the poll was first conducted in 1965.... It showed 31 percent of the pollies labelled Japan as an unreliable U.S. ally, compared with 37 percent in the 1974 poll. As reasons for their doubt about Japanese credibility, 26 percent cited Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbour...."
aware of Japanese economic power and affluence... Americans who have long been accustomed to European travellers and European investment in the U.S. ... may be jolted by the idea of Japanese buying up American real estate and taking over American firms, or Japanese tourists swarming into popular vacation spots.  

In the American Congress, as in the case of ordinary American people, the members have little basis for understanding the social and political situation in Japan. The attitude of the House and the Senate members to Japan is somewhat patronizing, but at the same time, they have some mistrust conditioned by the experience of World War II. When relations between the U.S. and Japan operate smoothly, the mistrust and latent feelings in Congress against a strong and intimate relationship between the two countries would not be identical. As witnessed in the harsh textile issue, however, if Japanese actions appear to be the cause of any problems in the relations of the two countries or Japanese actions appear to violate the interest of the U.S., the latent feeling of distrust surfaces among members of Congress. This attitude of the Congress towards Japan is quite different from that of the Congress towards the Western European countries.

Ralph N. Clough, op. cit., p. 97.
Priscilla Clapp, op. cit., p. 50.
Ibid., p. 48.
Moreover, the U.S. Congress has become skeptical of the free hand of the U.S. President in deciding U.S. foreign policy. It is true that the lengthy war in Indochina, as well as the acrimonious debates over the Watergate scandal, have given rise to unhealed division in the U.S. President Ford's address on foreign relations to Congress in April, 1975, which called for co-operation between the White House and the Congress in the pursuance of a united foreign policy, suggests this tendency. The influence from U.S. Congress on U.S. foreign and defence policies will be stronger in the future. The attitude in Congress towards Japan depends on the submission about Japan, by the U.S. Government's Asian specialists.

The general, negative attitude of the American people and the Congress toward the U.S.-Japanese security arrangement are summarized in the following paragraph by Ralph N. Clough:

Among the American public and in the Congress, the desire to reduce U.S. burdens overseas is likely to remain strong. While this probably will not result in heavy pressure on the U.S. Government to abrogate the treaty (MST), there is likely to be a vigorous demand for Japan to share the financial burden of maintaining U.S. forces in Japan, especially if the U.S. should continue to run a substantial trade deficit with Japan. Criticism of the Japanese for exploiting a free ride will probably grow. Japanese unwillingness to compensate the U.S. in some way, combined with continuing Japanese public agitation against the bases, would cause many Americans to question the value of keeping U.S. forces in Japan.

---

70 Ralph N. Clough, op. cit., p. 104.
Traditionally, U. S. Far Eastern policy has been to check any country likely to become dominant in Asia. Historically, the U. S. has been on a seesaw in its relations vis-à-vis the P. R. C. and Japan. When relations with Japan deteriorated, relations with China improved, and vice-versa. The U. S. may still be on the seesaw, since relations with Japan have deteriorated since 1970, while relations with the P. R. C. have improved. The movement would be accentuated if Japan's influence, though only economic today, would increase further in the Asian region. If rivalry between the P. R. C. and Japan increases in Asia in the future, which is more probable than cordial co-operation, the U. S., under great pressure, would be required to take a stand on Sino-Japanese differences. This would pose the greatest test of the current U. S.-Japanese security arrangement.

Trends in Japanese Domestic Politics

In this section, attention will be focussed on domestic political trends which may have a significant impact on the MST.

71 Ibid., p. 117.
In today's Japan, there are six political parties including the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that has governed Japan since the end of World War II with the exception of short period of the Socialist-oriented Katayama Administration from May 1947 to February 1948. Among them, the LDP was the party which concluded the MST and the only party that consistently supported the U.S.-Japanese security arrangements. Three of the five opposition parties, the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and Komeito have disagreed to the continuance of the MST with different political colouring.

Six former members of the Liberal Democratic Party formed a party called New Liberal Club in July, 1976. As of December 10, 1976, the party standings in both Houses of the Diet are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>House of Representatives (511 seats)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komeito</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLC</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>House of Councilors (250 seats)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komeito</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nim/Club</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The LDP consistently won the majority of seats in the House of Representatives and, as a result, Japanese politics have shown relative stability. The position of the LDP, however, slowly but steadily declined. In elections for the House of Representatives, for example, the LDP gained 57.80 percent of the total vote in the 1958 general election, 57.56 percent in 1960, 54.67 percent in 1963, 48.80 percent in 1967, 47.63 percent in 1969, 46.87 percent in 1972 and 41.78 percent in 1976.\footnote{Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Bulletin 1973, (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1974), p. 2.}

The position of the JSP, the biggest opposition party, also has shown a decline in its strength. In the elections for the House of Representatives, the JSP gained 32.90 percent of the total vote in the 1958 election, 27.56 percent in 1960, 29.03 percent in 1963, 27.89 percent in 1967, 21.44 percent in 1969, 21.90 percent in 1972\footnote{Japan Times Weekly, International Edition, December 11, 1976.} and 20.69 percent in 1976.\footnote{Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p. 2.}

The JCP was the only party that had steadily succeeded in increasing its vote in the elections from 1958 to 1972. The JCP, which had been boosting its seats mainly in urban areas each time, scored gains in rural areas as well in the 1972 election. It more than doubled its strength in the House of Representatives to 39 seats, becoming the second most important opposition party after the 1972 election. The JCP \footnote{Japan Times Weekly, International Edition, December 11, 1976.}
increased its seats primarily by taking seats away from the two moderate parties, the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the Komeito. Although the JCP lost a considerable number of Diet seats in the 1976 election, the ratio of total vote changed little. The JCP gained 2.60 percent of the total vote in the 1958 election, 2.93 percent in 1960, 4.01 percent in 1963, 4.76 percent in 1967, 6.81 percent in 1969, 10.49 percent in 1972, and 10.38 percent in 1976.

Although the DSP, one of the two middle-of-the-road parties, increased its strength in the House of Representatives to 29 seats in the 1976 election, the party has kept maintaining around 7 percent of the total vote in every general election.

The Komeito appears for the first time in the 1967 election. The party maintained close relations with a Buddhist group and gained 5.38 percent of the total vote in the 1967 election and 10.91 percent in 1969. Although the party lost its seats in the 1972 election because of the severance of the relations with the Buddhist group, it increased its strength in the House of Representatives to 55 seats, becoming the second most important opposition party after the 1976 general election.

77 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p. 2.
79 Ibid.
80 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p. 2.
Before discussing the LDP, let me review the four opposition parties and their defence policies; together they polled 52.52 percent of the vote in the 1976 House of Representative general election.\textsuperscript{82}

The JSP has been a steadfast advocate, since 1951, of an unarmed neutral Japan. The JSP has maintained four basic principles espoused in the Katayama Administration in 1947-1948. Japan should 1) conclude one peace treaty with all its former enemies in the World War II; 2) maintain neutrality; 3) neither conclude military pacts with any one country, nor give military bases in Japan to any foreign country; and 4) not have any military capabilities.\textsuperscript{83} The JSP, along with the JCP, is the major political party which continually criticizes the U.S.-Japanese security arrangements and U.S. military bases on Japanese soil.

After the Sino-American rapprochement, the JSP displayed some confusion. Before the accommodation, all opposition parties, except the DSP, argued that the existence of the present MST structure served as an obstacle to the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. The JSP had been the vanguard of the group. Premier Kakuei Tanaka’s visit to Peking in September 1972, however, proved that the MST was not an obstacle to the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. Moreover, the fact that Peking has shown a favourable response to the MST and that former Chinese Premier Chou En-lai persuaded the Japanese

\textsuperscript{82}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{83}John E. Endicott, Japan’s Nuclear Option, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 79. Also see Appendix 14.
Socialists of the necessity of having a reasonable size of defence forces for Japan, have had a significant impact on the JSP. Premier Chou also made it clear that the JSP could not expect support for its policy of unarmed neutrality from the P.R.C. and advocated strengthening U.S.-Japanese friendship. Peking's sudden change in its attitude to the MST and the American-Japanese relations surprised the JSP. The JSP stopped arguing that the MST would draw Japan into an undesirable war. The party, however, has begun to discuss that the MST is no longer necessary for Japan and, therefore, should be abrogated. Although the JSP's formal defence policy is pursuance of an unarmed neutral Japan and abrogation of the MST, a group of JSP members proposed a tentative plan named the "Three Staged Plan for the Abrogation of the MST" in December of 1975. JSP seems to be in the throes of groping for a new party approach to defence policy.

The JCP, from the very beginning of its activities, has as its major objective the elimination of Japanese militarism. In every policy statement, the JCP argued for the abrogation of the MST which they view as American imperialism and an infringement of Japanese sovereignty. The JCP regards the Self-Defence Forces as an army that serves the U.S. and argues for

84 Ibid., pp. 79-80.
86 Japan, Defence Agency, op. cit., p. 54.
its dissolution. As well, the JCP argues for Japanese neutrality, but against an unarmed Japan. It holds the view that Japan should establish an army based on the people's hope. Recently, the JCP changed its purpose from the principle of pursuing broad-range proletarian revolution by force into a principle of parliamentary democracy and pursuing a flexible policy line. That policy change has contributed a great extent to the recent increase in the strength of JCP.

The Komeito has been active since the general election in 1967. In the early stages of its activity, the party advocated an omnidirected foreign policy and scaling down of MST. The Komei Party has advocated immediate abrogation of the MST and insisted Japan should be completely neutral, vis-à-vis three superpowers. The party, however, in its 13th convention in October 1975, decided to stop arguing the immediate abrogation of the MST, and instead issued the statement that the MST should be terminated through diplomatic understandings between Washington and Tokyo. The party, unlike the JSP, maintains that Japan should keep minimum defence capabilities which would secure Japan's territorial integrity. The party, together with the JSP, advocates the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Pacific-Asian region.

88 See Appendix 14.
91 *Japan, Defence Agency, op. cit.*, p. 54.
92 See Appendix 14.
The DSP was founded in January, 1960. The party continued to advocate a policy of minimum defence measures to defend Japan.\textsuperscript{94} In March 1972, the DSP issued a paper entitled "Establishment of a New Peace Order--Strategy Toward Reduction of Tension in an Era of Multipolarity".\textsuperscript{95} In the paper, DSP argued for the adjustment of relations with the U. S. to reflect the multipolar world, realization of diplomatic relations with the P.R.C., maintenance of peace in the Korean Peninsula, co-operation with the U.S.S.R. Regarding the MST, DSP maintained that the MST was based on the strategy of confrontation between the U.S. on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and the PRC on the other, and it was not a progressive condition of the present age of multipolarity. As well, the military articles of the MST had acted as a hindrance in the conduct of friendly relations between the U. S. and Japan.

Since 1960 and until quite recently, the DSP had advocated a new security treaty with the U. S. that would have no American bases and troops in Japan. The DSP, for the purpose of attaining it, promoted the concept of emergency stationing of U. S. forces in Japan, apart from a small peace time establishment of transport and storage facilities, in

\textsuperscript{94}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{95}John E. Endicott, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 81.
addition to naval bases for the U. S. Seventh Fleet. In November 1975, however, the DSP disclosed a more positive attitude in favour of the MST. It said that the MST should be maintained until a new security setup could be negotiated.

96. This DSP's concept had been expected to solve the U. S. base problems which have long given much trouble to the Japanese and, in addition, would reduce the cost and burdens to the U. S. However, the concept of emergency deployment had not gained popular support because it would greatly harm the function of the MST of protecting Japan. It would reduce the credibility of American protection by removing the hostages from the Japanese territory and, in addition, the deployment of U. S. forces in time of emergency would not be easy from a strategic point of view. As far as the SDF are not converted into the forces which can cope with any conventional attack, the concept of emergency deployment would only give rise to apprehensions among the Japanese people.

97. Other focal points of the DSP defence policy are:

1) Japan should maintain a defence ability capable of convincing foreign countries of futility of any armed attack on Japan.

2) A new standing committee should be created in the Diet on security and defence.

3) The National Defence Council should be reorganized to make it more operative.

4) Tension on the Korean Peninsula is easing, but a substantial relaxation cannot be expected in the immediate future. South East Asian countries fear external intervention in their domestic affairs and wish to keep a neutral stand.

5) While the Sino-Soviet confrontation continues, the Sino-American relations will become closer and the Russians will maintain the detente policy mainly because of their domestic situations.

6) Japan should be careful about its planned peace treaty with China. Japan's acceptance of the Chinese-proposed anti-hegemony clause in the treaty could antagonize Moscow.

Although it still calls for the withdrawal of the U. S. forces, it stressed the need to maintain the status quo under the MST. It also calls for promotion of defence co-operation with the U. S. and argues that prior consultation under the MST should not limit the U. S.'s effective deployment from Japanese bases to cope with another possible military hostility in the Korean Peninsula.

The LDP is a single political party but in substance it has been a coalition of many groups. It has embraced eight factions and each holds different views and pushes different policies. The LDP has swung sometimes right, sometimes left to cope with the internal and external situations of the times, with power being transformed from the right wing faction to the left wing. This flexibility helped the LDP continuing monopolizes powers.

Popular dissatisfaction with the LDP conservative regimes has been increasing annually. The decline in the strength of the LDP could be attributed to the following factors. First of all, the longer the LDP governs Japan, the more internal factional in-fighting and struggle for the Premier's office has intensified and corrupted money politics have prevailed. In every past LDP presidential elections since the end of the 1950s, huge sums of money have changed hands in intra-party vote buying. This practice has come under severe public censure.

The second factor, which is closely related to the first one, is that close relations between the LDP and big
business have given rise to deep suspicion among the public about the policies of the LDP. 98 Although this close and intimate relationship of the two has proved to contribute greatly to the rapid economic progress, the relations have proved to be an exploitable target for the opposition parties to criticize the LDP's policies.

The third factor is that in the process of the Japanese economic progress, the flow of population has occurred from rural areas that form the centre of LDP powers, to urban areas where the LDP is not so popular. 99 Ironically, rapid economic advancement resulted in a decline in the popularity of LDP.

Although the LDP consistently had until the 1972 election commanded a majority in the House of Representatives, the voters' support for the LDP at elections does not always indicate support for the defence policy of the LDP. Basically, the LDP wins the vote because the members have showed the ability to pursue the specific interests of their constituencies. The LDP's ability is now questioned in Japan. Judging from the fact that voters are relatively indifferent to foreign and defence policies and that they cast their votes on the basis of


99 Mr. Minoru Shimizu, a commentator of The Japan Times Weekly, writes that, "... the LDP's popularity rating in the larger cities has plummeted, with only one-third of the citizens now supporting the party." For detail, see the International Edition, December 6, 1975.

immediate self-interests, the LDP's future is gloomy. In June 1976, after criticizing the LDP regime as "a gerontocracy bent on chamber room power struggle," six LDP Diet members left their party. As the LDP loses its strength, the foundations of the current U.S.-Japanese security agreement will erode.

As discussed in this Chapter, the present U.S.-Japanese security treaty contains some inherent defects. Moreover, it is losing its foundations in the prevailing atmosphere of detente in the Far East. Today, the need for the U.S.-Japanese security arrangement is a pressing problem in Japan. Some people are making efforts to restructure the existing U.S.-Japanese MST to fit the new environment in the Pacific-Asian region. The others, long dissatisfied with the MST, have begun to study various defense alternatives, other than those built upon security arrangements with the U.S.

In the following chapters, I will identify the conceivable security options and discuss whether they are rational defense policies to replace U.S.-Japanese defense co-operation. After I demonstrate non-viability of these various alternatives, I will focus my attention in Chapter VI upon remodelling the current U.S.-Japanese security arrangement.

CHAPTER III

CONSTRAINTS ON JAPANESE MILITARY CAPABILITY

In this chapter, attention will be focused mainly on whether Japan could adopt independent defence policies. Generally, defence planners establish various defence plans in accordance with the national power and in response to the degrees of threats from outside. The situation in Japan, however, is different. Japanese armed forces are, legally and psychologically, inhibited and restricted in their capacities and actions as are probably no other armed forces in the world. These two handicaps with its attendant problems have long proved to be obstacles to the healthy growth of the Japanese armed forces. Problems in Japanese nuclear options will be discussed in the following chapter.

The Constitutionality of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF)

In Japan, the constitutionality of the maintenance of armed forces has long been disputed and for this reason the legitimacy of the SDF has been questioned from its inception and has not yet been settled. One Japanese court has declared that the SDF is unconstitutional. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, the "no-war clause", is the key element in the problem.

In a draft Japanese Constitution by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), which was made public by
the then Shidehara Government of Japan, on March 8, 1946, Article 9 reads as follows:

Chapter II. Renunciation of War
Article 9. War, as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force is forever renounced as a means of settling disputes with other nations. The maintenance of land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be authorized. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

When the draft Constitution was made public by the Japanese Government, the SCAP, in referring to Article 9, stated that, "By this undertaking and commitment, Japan surrenders rights inherent in its own sovereignty and renders her future security and very survival subject to the good faith and justice of the peace-loving peoples of the world." On June 26, 1946, the new Japanese Premier Yoshida set forth the Japanese Government's position: The provision of this draft concerning the renunciation of war does not directly deny the right of self-defence. However, since paragraph 2 of Article 9 does not recognize any military force whatsoever or the rights of belligerency of the state, both wars arising from the right of self-defence and the rights of belligerency have been removed.

Later, however, an amendment by Hitoshi Ashida was passed and accepted in the Japanese Diet. This added two phrases. The first at the beginning of the first paragraph, reads as follows, "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order,..." The other at the

---

beginning of the second paragraph states, "In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph..." Thus, the final wording of Article 9 reads as follows:

Chapter II. Renunciation of War

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the State will not be recognized.

Mr. Hitoshi Ashida, (who later became Premier of Japan) explained that his intention was to ensure that Japan did not give up the legitimate, sovereign right of self-defence. By adding the restrictive phrase, "...to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph," he said that the maintenance and the use of armed forces would be prohibited for purposes of aggression but not for purposes of self-defence. Thus, the interpretation of Article 9 by the Japanese Government changed and has come to mean that Article 9 permits the right of self-defence.

The Government of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) today maintains that the phrase "renunciation of war" in the first paragraph of Article 9 must be interpreted to mean "aggressive war", and thus Japan will not wage war, "as means of settling international disputes." If, however,

3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p. 52.
5 See Appendix 3.
6 John K. Emmerson, op. cit., p. 52.
there should be an attack on Japan, it can exercise the right of self-defence because military action in the form of self-defence is different from military action undertaken as a means of settling international disputes. In addition, since the Charter of the U.N. and the San Francisco Peace Treaty do not deprive Japan of its inherent right of self-defence, the ruling LDP concludes that existing Japanese SDF are purely defensive in character, and that they are, therefore, not unconstitutional.

Both the Japanese Socialist and the Communist Parties have, however, from the beginning, declared the SDF to be unconstitutional. The Komei Party has insisted that there is doubt concerning the legitimacy of the SDF. To support their view, they quote the preamble of the Constitution and two sentences of Article 9. Their argument is as follows: The preamble clearly expresses the basic idea of the Japanese Constitution. It declares: "...We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice

---

7 Asagumo Shim bun - Honshu Kyoku, Boshu Han Book, (Tokyo: Asagumo Shim bun Shuppan Sha, 1976), pp. 230-232. Since 1969, the LDP Government has set forth three conditions for the utilization of the SDF. Firstly, when Japan faces imminent, unjustified aggression. Second, when Japan has no available alternative counter-measures to it except for the mobilizing of the SDF. Third, the extent of the actions of the SDF will be only the minimum required to counter the aggression. See ibid., p. 251.

8 See Appendix 4.

9 See Appendix 14.

10 Ibid.
and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.11
Thus, the word "war" in the first paragraph of Article 9
should be interpreted to include every kind of military action
including those in the form of self-defence. In addition,
the second paragraph of Article 9 categorically prohibits Japan
from maintaining armed forces as well as other war potential.
Therefore, they argue that the current SDF is unconstitutional
under the present Japanese Constitution.

Several incidents have occurred which have obliged the
Japanese courts to express their views on this matter.
In the Sunagawa case, the Supreme Court for the first time
ruled that Japan had not given up the right of self-defence.
On December 16, 1959, the Courts declared that, "...this Article
renounces the so-called war and prohibits the maintenance of the
so-called war potential, but certainly there is nothing in it
which could deny the right of self-defence inherent in our
nation as a sovereign power. The pacifism advanced in our
Constitution was never intended to mean defenceless or non-
resistance."12 The Court, however, did not comment on the
constitutionalitiy of the SDF.

In the Naganuma case, the Sapporo District Court
made a historic ruling on September 7, 1973.13 It ruled the
SDF was unconstitutional. This was the first time that such
a ruling had been made by any court in Japan. In the

11 See Appendix 3.
Naganuma case, the plaintiffs claimed that the SDF were against the war-renouncing Constitution and thereby the construction of the SDF base would not serve the public interest. In his ruling, presiding Judge Fukushima of the Sapporo District Court admitted most of the plaintiffs' claims and said, "...the right to self-defence does not necessarily involve the use of force. But the SDF are capable of waging war and, therefore, they violate Article 9 of the Constitution." The LDP Government (The Tanaka Administration) immediately appealed the case to a higher court. At the beginning of August, 1976, the Sapporo High Court in its judgement reversed the 1973 lower court ruling. Judge Ogo, in handing down the ruling, stated, "...the constitutionality of the SDF is outside the scope of a judicial review unless a constitutional violation is observed as a plain fact." Judge Ogawa stated, "...acts of state of a highly political nature such as the government's basic policy on diplomacy and the nation's defense, should not be subject to judicial examinations unless such acts constitute a clear violation of the Constitution. The question of the SDF should be up to the judgement of the national Diet or the Cabinet, and in the long run up to the political criticism of the people." By saying so, the High

---

15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
Court avoided giving an unambiguous opinion on the constitutionality of the SDF. The ruling, however, means that it has virtually endorsed the LDP Government's policy of maintaining the SDF for purely self-defence purposes. Dissatisfied plaintiffs immediately appealed the case to the Supreme Court. Thus, the battle on the constitutionality of the SDF still continues.

On the other hand, as early as the 1950s, some Diet members of the ruling LDP advocated the revision of the Constitution, particularly the amendment of Article 9. They argued that "...the present Constitution was enacted under a foreign occupation and in the period of confusion immediately following defeat, it is natural that after independence, the nation's basic charter should be restudied...no Constitution was a true one unless enacted in a period of complete freedom." Although the revision of the Constitution is a political question of the highest order in the LDP, the issue has been seldom mentioned in the recent past. The more obvious practical reasons have been that the LDP has not commanded the necessary two-thirds majority in the two Houses of the Diet and also that it could not expect to obtain the required majority vote in a national referendum in the prevailing mood of the public attitude and the general thinking toward the armed forces.

19 Ibid.
Though the rationale of these seeking the amendment of the Constitution is, in my opinion, correct, the majority of Japanese public does not seem to favour the revision of the Constitution, especially Article 9. The reason for their opposition is that the revision of Article 9 would probably revive strong Japanese military power and would endanger the present peace. The trend of the present public's view towards armed forces, a strongly one-sided view, has proved to be the biggest obstacle to the proposed revision.

Prohibition Against "Offensive Warfare" and "Offensive Weapons"

Because of the Constitution, Japanese military capabilities have been greatly limited. In accordance with the stipulation of Article 9 of the Constitution, military capabilities must be strictly for defensive purpose. As previously discussed, the Government of Japan has not interpreted Article 9 to mean a denial of the right of self-defence. For this reason and also because an effective measure to exercise the right of self-defence can only be through Japan's own military power, the Japanese Government has been allowed to maintain minimum and defensive-oriented forces.

The White Paper on Defence published in June, 1976, stated that Japan cannot possess weapons which will pose a threat of aggression to other nations. Some examples of such weapons are the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), attack aircraft
carriers and long-range bombers. Each procurement of new military equipment has aroused controversy in the Diet as to whether it is offensive-oriented or not. Since it is very difficult to judge a military machine as offensive or defensive, the resulting lengthy discussions in the Diet have often hindered the advance of defence plans.

According to current strategic doctrine, a large part of the defence capability arises from deterrent capability. A deterrent capability implies the use or threat of use of offensive weapons. It is doubtful, therefore, that a military power lacking in such offensive armament can maintain an effective deterrence and hence an effective defence.

The SDF Cannot be Sent Abroad

The view that the dispatch of the SDF abroad is unconstitutional has remained undisputed. Both the LDP Government and all opposition parties agree on this point. This prohibition clearly affects Japan's ability to fulfill the obligations of any collective security arrangements. Partly because of this prohibition, the present MST does not obligate Japanese response in case of attacks against U.S. forces or territory.

This Japanese prohibition has given a negative aspect to relations with the U.N. Whether Japan might join in a U.N. peace-keeping force has been a subject of debate. Such a
policy has not been materialized and there is less likelihood of such a possibility in the future. Co-operation with the U.N. is one of the fundamental defence and foreign policy principles of both the ruling LDP and all other opposition parties in Japan. \(^{22}\) In every governmental publication, the co-operation with the U.N. has been emphasized. Co-operation and support of the U.N. activities is clearly declared in the Basic National Defence Policy espoused in May, 1957, which is still in force. \(^{23}\) It states in the first place that, "To support the activities of the United Nations, and promote international co-operation thereby contributing to the realization of world peace..." \(^{24}\) In addition to that, it declares to the effect that Japan expects more effective functioning of the U.N. in future in deterring and repelling aggressions and that the U.S.-Japanese security arrangement is temporary, pending the functioning of the U.N. peace-keeping. \(^{25}\) However, how can Japan co-operate with the U.N. to maintain international peace and security, when it does not participate in the U.N. peace-keeping operations? The Japanese Government seems to plan to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security by non-military measures, such as economic, educational

\(^{22}\) See Appendix 14.

\(^{23}\) See Appendix 8.

\(^{24}\) Ibid.

\(^{25}\) Ibid.
and technical aids. It is true that economic development and social stability of a region is one of the inevitable conditions for the maintenance of peace and security of the region. However, military measures are nonetheless important and have a direct impact on the maintenance of peace. The day might come when this Japanese hesitance, its inactive and inconsistent wait-and-see policy would bring about unfavorable reactions from other countries.

The Public Image of the SDF

Japan was defeated and lost three million lives and one-quarter of its national wealth in World War II. The people's reaction to the defeat was significant and still today, after 30 years, there exists a feeling of stunned reaction to the defeat. Because of the experiences in World War II, the Japanese public has developed unique prejudices to armed forces. The Japanese public is inclined to believe that a significant level of armed forces in Japan would cause tragedy rather than maintain the peace and security of Japan. The routine discussion that if Japan has strong military power the people would be drawn into a war, shows this tendency. Thus, it is no wonder that the prejudices have been turned towards the SDF. Some people, even though a minority, regard the SDF as an obstacle to peace in Japan and a potential origin of another war. The SDF has suffered from its origin and has

26 According to the Boei Hakusho of 1976, about fifty SDF members' applications to study at universities in Japan were rejected. See Japan, Defence Agency, op. cit., p. 61.
long been the outcast of Japanese society. A young writer charged students of a military academy in a newspaper, "Defence Academy students are a disgrace to our generation".  

Another cause of the unpopularity of the SDF in its early stages was the abnormal process of its establishment. On July 8, 1950, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers ordered the then Premier Yoshida to form a National Police Reserve composed of up to 75,000 men. The National Police Reserve served as the foundation of the current SDF. Thus, Japanese people are inclined to think that the SDF were created by a mandate of a foreign occupation power, not created with benefit of any initiative from a Japanese popular body. The SDF have long been denied the pride which glorify the histories of most modern armed forces. Although, today, 79 percent of the public support the existence of the SDF, Japanese society has not yet accorded it the status of a "military" body. The members of the SDF are called "special public servants" but not the military.

28 The National Police Reserve was converted in August, 1952, into the National Safety Force and again changed on July 1, 1954, to form the present SDF.
30 On March 31, 1967, the then Prime Minister Sato stated in a House of Councilors debate that "Now and in the future, we will not call the SDF military". See John K. Emmerson, Arms, Yen & Power: The Japanese Dilemma, op. cit., p. 107.
To overcome these prejudices and to obtain favourable public response, the administration of the SDF has devised various measures. The SDF members have been cautioned to be modest and gentle in all their relations with the public and have been encouraged to co-operate with their local communities. As one of the measures, the SDF has emphasized and carried out a variety of natural disaster reliefs. Article 83 of the SDF law provides that units of the SDF are available to assist in relief activities, in case of natural calamities and other disasters. During the numerous earthquakes, floods and typhoons, the SDF responded to 6,600 calls for relief assistance, and from 1970 to 1975 it responded to 4,019 calls. In the last 6 years, up to the end of 1975, it used a total of 457,470 personnel. These image-improving efforts have been successful. Its reputation as an organization ready to bring benefits to the people has grown and the image of the arrogant and domineering military of pre-war days has begun to fade.

Polls conducted under the auspices of the Prime Minister's Office show the gradual increase in the number who support the SDF. Three thousand people were asked in every national public opinion survey. When asked if Japan needs the

---

34 Ibid., p. 153.
SDF, 58 percent replied "yes" in 1956, 65 percent in 1959, 76 percent in 1963, 85 percent in 1965, 73 percent in 1972 and 79 percent in 1975.

In the same way, the number of people who replied that Japan does not need the SDF decreased from 18 percent in 1956 to 8 percent in 1975.

Similarly, the polls show the improvement of the public's image towards the SDF. When asked if they had a good impression of the SDF, 21 percent of the respondents of the 1975 poll answered that they had a good impression, whereas only 17 percent responded in this way in 1972. Also, the number of people who did not have a bad image increased from 42 percent in 1972 to 48 percent in 1975. On the other hand, the number of respondents who had a bad image decreased from 5 percent in 1972 to 4 percent in 1975, and the number of respondents who did not have a good impression decreased from 19 percent in 1972 to 14 percent in 1975. Those who maintain a negative attitude toward the SDF are, according to the White Paper on Defense published in June, 1976, "producing a detrimental effect upon the morale of the men in service."

Although, as seen in recent public polls, positive attitude to the SDF has gradually grown among the people, no powerful public sentiment for a growth in the strength of the SDF can be seen. When asked if the SDF should be strengthened, the respondents who answered that the present level should be maintained increased from 48 percent in 1972 to 52.6 percent in 1975. The people who replied in favour of strengthening

---

the SDF were only 13 percent in 1972 and 17 percent in 1975. Thus, it could be said that the general attitude of the public toward the defense establishment is to approve the SDF but only at its present level that can repel limited external aggression and subdue internal insurgency.

The chronic shortage of manpower in the SDF reflects the attitude of the public to the SDF. As of March 31, 1976, the authorized size of the SDF was 266,046, of whom 180,000 were authorized in the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF); its actual strength at that time, however, was only 154,748. The conditions of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) and the Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF) were better than those of the GSDF but still not completely enrolled to the authorized strength and the ratio of sufficiency was 96.6 percent and 96.7 percent respectively. Because of the gradual decline in the number of men suitable for enlistment, it will become more and more difficult for the SDF to expand its manpower strength. The present level of manpower strength would be the maximum available in Japan today.

The above-mentioned problems are ip-built in the SDF. Since the Japanese SDF is not equipped with offensive weapons, the SDF by itself cannot ever be capable of being a counter-threat and thus acting as a deterrent. In order to be a deterrent by being a counter threat, it is necessary for Japan to free the SDF from the prevailing prohibition of maintaining

37 Ibid., p. 57.
38 Ibid., p. 93.
39 Ibid.
offensive weapons. Thus, the revision of the Constitution is a prerequisite. However, the necessary Constitutional revision would not materialize judging from the present condition of the domestic political environment of Japan.

In theory, a highly effective defence posture can also contribute to deterrence. But the contemporary negative attitude held by the Japanese public and the opposition parties towards the further build-up of SDF's capability has created a climate in which it is not possible for Japan to establish such a posture for the time being. The Japanese attitude would not change, in my view, unless an imminent threat emerges.

The capability of the SDF limited in the way described above, has made it impossible for Japan to adopt independent and autonomous conventional defence policies. Thus, to form a defence plan that leaves no operational deficiency, today's Japan must depend on another military power which has the strength to prevent war.
CHAPTER IV

JAPAN'S NUCLEAR CHOICE

Today, because of the inhuman-and formidable destructive power of nuclear weapons, nuclear powers will most likely try to avoid employment of nuclear weapons if a war should break out, and try to limit their military means to lower levels, if possible. In this sense, the value of nuclear weapons as war-conducting weapons has been reduced. A war deterrent capability, however, is derived from the massive retaliatory military might of nuclear weapons. Thus, nuclear capabilities constitute the essence of defence policies of many countries. To assess the autonomous Japanese defense posture, it would be requisite to discuss Japan's nuclear weapons policy. Moreover, as argued in Chapter II, more and more Japanese have become skeptical about the U. S. nuclear guarantee to Japan. It is becoming worthwhile to examine Japanese nuclear options. Although Japan ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in May, 1976, the ratification will not relieve Japan from nuclear attacks nor blackmail. Article X of the NPT stipulates that "Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country."

the "extraordinary events" which jeopardize a country's "supreme interests" can be decided by each party. It would be decided arbitrarily. Judging from the stipulation of the NPT, it is still useful to research whether or not nuclear weapons are suitable for Japan.

In the first part of this Chapter, I will make a brief survey of Japanese technical and economic capacity for the development of nuclear weapons. In the following part, the strategic feasibility and political advantages and disadvantages of Japanese nuclearization will be examined.

As for technical and economic aspects, Japan does not have insurmountable obstacles to its nuclearization. In viewing the problem of strategic feasibility, Japan could have deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union through sea-based second strike capabilities; deterrence for the People's Republic of China (PRC) is totally impossible today. Although deterrence to the U.S.S.R. is plausible in theory, the lack of an adequate defence posture makes actual nuclear exchange almost unacceptable for the Japanese. A more important point is that Japan would not get nuclear status without damaging relations with its neighbouring countries. Thus, the most suitable course for Tokyo is to pursue a policy designed to improve its potential to be a nuclear power -- protonuclear power -- with particular emphasis on its defence posture.

Japanese Technical and Economic Capacity for its Nuclearization

Japan suffers from a shortage of high-grade natural uranium and lacks the capability to produce enriched uranium.
At present, Japan uses enriched uranium imported from the U.S., which is restricted to peaceful purposes. Although the U.S. and Japan have jointly taken preliminary steps to construct a uranium enrichment plant in Japan since 1973, Japan is also developing its own uranium enrichment plant. As for sources of natural uranium, Japan now has access to those in Australia, Canada, East Germany, South Africa and England. Co-operative surveys are under way in Kenya, Somalia and Niger.²

A simple explosive device or crude nuclear weapons could be produced without being tested in two years from the decision.³ But, the production of thermonuclear warheads deliverable by missiles would take about seven to ten years.⁴ The Japanese rocket programme, which has already succeeded in orbiting five artificial satellites, would be easily adaptable to military use although the development of a guidance system would need some time. The construction of Missile-Launching Nuclear Submarine (SSBN), however, presents some difficulty. Although Japan produced a nuclear-propelled surface ship, the Mutu, it has no experience with the type of reactors used for submarines. French experience suggests that it would take at least 10 years to make an SSBN operational without

⁴Ibid. This time prediction was also made by Prof. Edward Luttwak in a lecture given in February, 1976, Carleton University.
assistance from the U.S., although Japan is now ahead of France in the technology of this sector. The biggest problem though not insurmountable, would be found in the attitude of Japanese scientists who have strong pacifist leanings. It is probable that some of them would refuse to assist in the development of the guidance techniques required by a delivery system.

Total French capital cost for research, development, testing, production and construction of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles -- from the beginning of its programme -- is about $11.1 billion for 18 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM), 5 SSBNs each with 16 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) with a range of 3,000 km, and 36 Mirage IV-A bombers. This was an estimate made in a 1968 United Nations paper. This estimate has been overtaken by cost inflation since 1968. According to the Statistics Bureau of the Prime Minister's Office of Japan, the nationwide inflation index in November 1975 registered 177.3 as against 100 for 1970. It would be safe to say that in order to have the same nuclear capability as France, Japan will have to allocate about $20 billion. This is about 4.1 percent

---

6 This view is held by Prof. Edward Luttwak.
8 Ibid.
of GNP for the fiscal year of 1975. If the Government of Japan undertakes a 7-year plan for nuclearization, only 0.6 percent of GNP of each year would be enough. This is a proportion which could be absorbed without seriously upsetting national priorities. The technical and economic aspects would not be insurmountable obstacles to Japan's nuclearization.

The Strategic Feasibility of Japanese Nuclear Weapons

One of the prevailing arguments against Japan's possession of nuclear weapons is the impossibility of a feasible policy of nuclear deterrence for Japan. The argument against Japan's nuclearization is made by the following reasons: Japan is composed of four small islands and is densely populated in this limited area. Approximately 40-50 percent of Japan's total population is concentrated along the Pacific coast line from Tokyo to Kobe. About 32 percent of the total population inhabits the three separate 50 kilometer radial areas around Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka. These three cities are the important political, economic and military centers of Japan. Only three well-placed, medium-sized 10 megaton bombs would be needed to inflict catastrophic damage on these three major cities. The second strike capability from land military complexes could not be deployed. Even if Japan were to build a formidable submarine fleet armed with polaris-poseidon missiles, any possible Japanese retaliation against a pre-emptive attack by either the P.R.C. or the

---

U.S.S. R. would be inflicted only after the loss of 50 to 60 percent of the Japanese population. As for deterrence against the U.S.S.R., the lack of defence depth against an attack from the northwest, due to the narrowness of the Japanese islands and the short distance from a likely launching area of the Soviet Union, would make adequate warning of an attack very difficult, and defence against submarine launched missiles virtually impossible. Deterrence of China might be totally impossible. In the P.R.C., only 12 percent of its total population is living in the cities. Though major industrial cities are located along the coast line of the Yellow Sea and East China Sea, Japan would have to employ many nuclear bombs against the P.R.C. to cause it the same proportion of damage which Japan would suffer from one nuclear bomb.

China's agrarian economy gives it much less vulnerability to nuclear attack than any other country. The greater capacity of China to absorb a nuclear attack causes ambiguity in the level of damage that the Chinese people would be prepared to accept. This ambiguity cannot but weaken Japan's confidence in its own deterrent capability against the P.R.C. Japan is more vulnerable compared with the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and the P.R.C. It is very difficult for Japan to compensate for
its geographic and demographic disadvantages. 11

The above-mentioned reasoning against nuclear weapons
is based on the possible fact that, in every way, Japanese
damage in case of a nuclear exchange would be greater than
that incurred in an enemy country as a result of a Japanese
attack. Though it would be true that damage to Japan would
be much greater than that to an enemy, as the opponents to
Japan's nuclear weapon discuss, Japan also could inflict
damage on the enemy population, industry, and military com-
plexes by means of sea-based retaliatory attacks. Even
though the second strike capabilities on her territory would
be wiped out, the submarines deployed world-wide would not
be destroyed all at once. It would be impossible for any
enemy to wipe out all the sea-based second strike capabilities
of Japan at one time. Would not this remaining capability,
therefore, constitute a deterrent to some degree? In other
words, would not this capability deter Japan's enemy from
making a pre-emptive strike against Japan? Judging from the

11Koichi Saeki, "Japan's Security in a Multipolar
World", Adelphi Papers, No. 9, (London: The International
John K. Emmerson, Will Japan Remail? (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute For Public Policy Research,
World: The Crucible of the Washington-Moscow-Peking Triangle?",
Peter G. Muellen and Douglas A. Ross, China and Japan-
p. 112.
character of the formidable destructive power of a nuclear bomb, possessing a few bombs which are sure to be accurately delivered to enemy centers would constitute enough deterrent capability against an enemy country. J. B. Sorenson discusses this matter as follows:

"... The cardinal premise of deterrence, which is to hold an adversary's population hostage in order to dissuade it from initiating a major attack. With a countervalue (civilian) rather than a counterforce (military target) capability, it is possible that nuclear forces could provide security for Japan, in spite of its extreme vulnerability to nuclear attack." 12

Then what kinds of equipment are necessary to secure Japan's second strike capability? As a way to acquire that capability, Mr. Kunio Muraoka argues as follows:

If the secure second-strike capability were to be built, it would have to depend mainly on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, supplemented by high-performance strike aircraft equipped with nuclear-tipped air-to-surface missiles. Japan's small land area would make fixed land-based missile forces both physically vulnerable and psychologically detectable to the population. An aircraft-delivered nuclear force would have the problem of obtaining warning of an attack on air bases but, if it were combined with a submarine force, the problem for an attacker of launching a disarming first strike would be increased by the need to pre-empt both an aircraft and a submarine deterrent. 13

Thus, though Japan's handicap from the strategic point of view is bigger than that of any other nuclear power, should an enemy not be certain that its nuclear first strike could wipe out all of Japan's sea-based second strike capabilities,

13 Kunio Muraoka, op. cit., p. 23.
it is likely that the enemy would be deterred.

The above-mentioned argument suggests a deterrence capability vis-à-vis nuclear superpowers, particularly the U.S.S.R. In a conflict between the nuclear superpowers, the capacity to destroy about 20 percent of the enemy's population by a second strike could be considered a sufficient deterrent.\(^{14}\) A superpower, however, might be deterred by a smaller second strike capability maintained by a small nuclear state, because the punishment tolerable to the superpower might be reduced by the lower value acquired by destroying the small country.\(^{15}\) Thus, the sea-based Japanese second strike capability to destroy most of Siberian cities, which does not require long-range missiles, might probably be a deterrence against the U.S.S.R. If Japan deploys 10 to 15 Missile-Launching Nuclear Submarines each with 16 SLBMs (3,000 km) in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan, virtually all major Siberian cities east of Krasnoyarsk would be within the target range of sea-based second strikes. About 70 to 110 long-range bombers and 35 to 55 IRBMs would further the capability.\(^{16}\)

---

\(^{14}\)Ibid., p. 24.

\(^{15}\)Ibid.

\(^{16}\)Judging from the French experience written in the previous pages of this Chapter, total cost of this nuclear weapon system will cost about 40 to 60 billion dollars. This is about 7.1 percent to 10.7 percent of estimated Japanese GNP of 1976 ($560 billion).
Today, it would be difficult to deter the P.R.C. in a similar manner, but it would not be insurmountable for Japan to acquire that capability in the future if the following conditions are realized. Firstly, if the Japanese nuclear energy capacity increases as planned,\(^{17}\) Japan will be able to afford the production of a large quantity of nuclear warheads which could help to redress to some degree the geographic imbalance due to China's much greater size and population dispersion. Second, if urbanization of Chinese society increases as a result of its economic development, the Chinese capacity to absorb nuclear strikes will deteriorate.

Successive Japanese Premiers have reiterated that the possession of defensive nuclear weapons might not contravene the Constitution.\(^{18}\) Both the White Paper on Defence issued in 1970 and the paper published in June, 1976, discussed

\(^{17}\) By 1985, Japanese atomic energy power plants are planned to produce 60,000 megawatts in a year. A 6.6 megawatts capability can produce roughly 7 kg of weapon's grade plutonium. Seven to ten kg is probably sufficient to produce an atomic bomb.

Also see J. B. Sorenson, op. cit., p. 36.

\(^{18}\) J. A. A. Stockwin, "Where is Japan Headed For?" Pacific Community, Vol. 6, No. 4 (July 1975), p. 490.
the same thing. Because of the demographic conditions in Japan, however, defensive nuclear weapons designed to use against invading forces within Japanese territory would be too dangerous to be employed. Probably those defensive weapons could be utilized in the immediately surrounding sea or airspace of Japan. But the possibility remains that the possession or the employment of such weapons could escalate to the strategic nuclear level that is out of Japan's ability. Thus, the maintenance of the defensive nuclear weapons alone would not strengthen Japanese defence posture.

The Advantages and Disadvantages Caused by Japan's Nuclear Status

According to Wayne Wilcox, there are five benefits to be derived from the development of a nuclear force. Let me enumerate these five points and analyze whether or not the benefits of any of them apply to Japan.

1) The first reason is that it allows a government to create a deterrent relationship with a nuclear rival or a posture of nuclear intimidation toward a non-nuclear adversary. 20

19 The following is a citation from the White Paper issued in 1970. "It is possible for Japan from a legal point of view to possess small nuclear weapons if they are within the framework of minimum necessity for self-defence and if they do not pose the threat of aggression to other countries."


Most Japanese do not agree on Japan's nuclearization because of its vulnerability to nuclear attacks. It is true that Japan is at a disadvantageous position from a strategic point of view. There is no doubt that an actual exchange of nuclear weapons would bring about more casualties in Japan. In theory, however, holding certain amounts of an adversary's population as hostage by second strike capability will give Japan deterrent capability.

2) A second advantage that adheres to governments with nuclear forces is international status... 21

This concept of Wilcox is a totally anachronistic one. Today there are many near-nuclear states, such as West Germany, Canada, Israel, Sweden, Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, Argentina, Egypt, etc. Some of them have restrained from maintaining nuclear weapons and ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In such an international environment, nuclear weapons might add little to Japan's prestige among other countries. In addition, since no country doubts Japan's industrial and technical capabilities to build nuclear forces, Japan would not gain as much prestige as a power with dubious industrial potential such as India. Moreover, India's nuclear status seems to depreciate the value of nuclear prestige.

3) A third justification for a nuclear weapon's force is that it impresses a particular regime's constituents and neighbours... 22

21 Ibid., p. 31. 
22 Ibid.
This point does not apply to Japan except in an opposite way. Thirty years have passed since the end of World War II. Most of the Southeast Asian countries, Taiwan, South and North Korean and the People's Republic of China, experienced occupation of Japan. There are still unpleasant memories remaining in some of these countries that suffered most from Japanese occupation. The then-enemy countries, the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. and even the U.S., would be worried about a nuclear Japan. For a country defeated and branded as an invader in World War II, nuclear status would give rise to suspicions in international society about a challenge to the status quo. Anxiety among Japan's small neighbouring countries which experienced occupation would not be eased. This negative response could be turned into effective political and economic sanctions, if Japan were to ignore the opinions of those countries. Japan might get nuclear status at the expense of endangering present relatively stable relations with neighbouring countries, which has no sense in the prevailing atmosphere of detente.

4) A fourth reason to 'go nuclear' is that a nuclear weapons programme represents an apex technology and appears to have a technology 'forcing' function. ... 23

This hypothesis does not apply to Japan. Even though Japan does not have a nuclear weapons' programme, Japanese nuclear technology is, although not first rate, impressive. By July, 1972, Japanese atomic energy power plants had the capacity to

23_ ibid.
produce 1,320 megawatts of electrical energy a year. In the fiscal year of 1973, 1,820 megawatts was produced. The capability is planned to increase up to 60 million kw, namely 60,000 megawatts, by 1985 to cover more than 10 percent of the total energy needs of Japan.

5) A fifth reason to develop nuclear forces is as a weapon of last resort...

Aside from deterrent capability, because of Japanese geographic and demographic disadvantages, Japan cannot sustain any kind of nuclear exchanges. The Japanese vulnerability to nuclear attacks would not be easily overcome in the near future. Advanced Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) or the development of laser missile defences might prove effective to some degree against nuclear attacks. However, given the extreme concentration of Japanese population that renders even the most limited penetration of hostile nuclear missiles unacceptable, it is difficult for Japan to have confidence in its security even with the most sophisticated ABM system. In addition, in the next five to ten years, it will be almost impossible for Japan to solve the problem of inadequate warning time in case of attacks off its coast. Thus, Japan cannot

---

deploy nuclear forces as a weapon of last resort.  

There are some disadvantages which would be caused by Japan's nuclear power. The first cost would be seen in the relations between the U. S. and Japan. Japan's nuclear status would mean that the relations between the U. S. and Japan would no longer be the relations of politically dominant and subordinate. Japan would emerge as yet another power in the Pacific-Asian region in which she would play the balance

---

27 William H. Overholt discusses about the development of laser missile defences as follows: One of the more esoteric possibilities for Japan's military future is a development of missile defences. For instance, her emphasis on defensive weapons, together with her rapidly developing laser technology, could make feasible her deployment of laser defenses against missiles in the late 1980s. The decision to undertake construction of laser missile defences could be quite consistent with Japanese defensive ideals but might nevertheless trigger serious reactions by the major powers. Given the compact geography of the Japanese archipelago, even more conventional kinds of missile defense could conceivably prove effective against limited nuclear threats, particularly if Japan made use of her vast underground facilities for civil defence and solved the problems of inadequate warning time and radar. Japanese deployment of missile defences would effectively end the era of the mutually assured destruction philosophy and might well terminate strategic arms limitation agreements based on that philosophy. Thus, by a great irony, Japanese deployment of defensive weapons might trigger a historic arms race.

of power game with the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. That situation would never allow Japan to have the close relations with the U.S., which Japan has enjoyed since the end of World War II. It is said that some groups within the U.S. government entertain apprehensions about the behavior of Japan after its going nuclear. Both publicly and privately, American officials argue that such a development would greatly complicate international relations in Asia, would not be conducive to peace in the region, and would not produce great security for Japan.  

Should the U.S. decide to co-operate on a Japanese nuclear programme (U.S. co-operation in the development would be violation of the NPT), she would almost certainly demand in return; a degree of control over Japanese nuclear weapons. Although this position is thoroughly justifiable from the American point of view, intervention would create resentment among certain sectors of the Japanese people. That a Japanese nuclear programme without U.S. co-operation would mean tarnished relations, is already evident. Although development of U.S.-Japanese relations after a Japanese decision to go nuclear will depend on the attending circumstances, including the U.S. policy in the event, the particular nuclear programmes and policies of Japan, and the

---

MST arrangement after the event, a Japanese nuclear plan would lead to deterioration of its relations with the U.S.

The second disadvantage might be observed in the relations with the two Communist powers. Japan regards itself as wronged by the U.S.S.R., both at the close of World War II and during the long, harsh years that followed. Many Japanese have not forgotten the manner in which prisoners of war were treated, and the Carthaginian peace terms which the U.S.S.R. wanted to impose upon Japan. The Russians are foreigners with a culture of limited appeal to the Japanese people. So far, historic enmity and profound cultural differences have served as obstacles to Japanese-Russian rapprochement. There is no prospect of settlement of the Northern territory problem. Japan's nuclear status would bring about more unfriendly relations with the U.S.S.R.

Recent U.S. policy in Asia has convinced Moscow that Washington and Peking have come to an understanding to work towards isolating the U.S.S.R. in the area. In the policy guideline by the Ford Administration, the U.S. announced a joint opposition with China to any hegemony in Asia which is obviously attributable to the Soviet Union. Japan has long objected to the inclusion of this same anti-hegemony clause in a peace treaty with the P.R.C., though both countries have agreed that neither Japan nor China will seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, Japan has found itself in a three-way entente between the P.R.C., the U.S., and itself. Although the "three-way entente" is very
loose because of Japan's consideration of the U.S.S.R., Moscow has felt that it is isolated in the Pacific-Asian region. If Japan decides to go nuclear in this situation, it will be very likely that Japan would meet a hostile reaction from the U.S.S.R.

As to relations with the P.R.C., the question is complicated. As a result of the rapprochement between Washington and Peking, the P.R.C., in fact, not only no longer contested the U.S.-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty, but also went on to press for its continuation as a counterweight to the U.S.S.R. Thus, we might well expect the Chinese support for Japan's nuclearization. The fact would be, however, different from the expectation. China's policy toward Japan would be directed by the Sino-Soviet dispute and by the fact that China's military capability is much inferior to that of the Soviet Union. Therefore, for Peking, Japan is thought to be merely a temporary ally. From a P.R.C. viewpoint, Japan represents a major, long-range threat to China's security. As long as the ideas of capitalism thrive in Japan, it threatens China's socialist way. The Chinese are afraid that many of China's bordering countries would turn their backs on the Chinese Communist way if those countries continue to see a prospering Japan and a lagging China. Already, Japan's influence, export of capital, and various kinds of aid, can be seen all around China's
The Chinese are very afraid that Japan's industrial capability is bound to lead to militarism and political expansion in the Asian region. The Chinese would react sharply to the development of an indigenous nuclear capability by the Japanese if the Sino-Soviet split is moving to a settlement. It is highly likely that Peking would impute aggressive intentions and a resurgence of militarism to the Japanese and probably Peking would begin to criticize every move of a nuclear Japan as a movement to establish Japanese hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. As long as the Sino-Soviet split continues, however, the P.R.C. could not do more than register a token protest because China would not want to run the risk of pushing Japan closer to the U.S.S.R. So long as the Sino-Soviet dispute continues, Japan's nuclear programme would not meet insurmountable opposition from the Chinese. But if the revival of Sino-Soviet rapprochement appears, and this would be stimulated to some degree by Japanese nuclear armament, the conditions would be completely different. The Sino-Soviet split stems mainly from personality and leadership differences. Ideological similarities may generate a resumption of a kind of closer relations after a new generation of national leaders emerge, though fraternal solidarity

29 Since 1954, China has pledged $2.7 billion to developing nations. Throughout the world, less than half of which has been delivered, while Japan provided resources, public and private of approximately the same amount, $2.7 billion, in the single year 1972".

as in the 1950s might not take place. Should this happen, Japan, as a nuclear power, would fall into the situation where she would have to bear the brunt of possible hostility from the two Communist giants.

The third disadvantage may be seen in the relations with the Korean Peninsula and with Southeast Asian countries. Extreme antiJapanese sentiment still remains and is not on the wane among both Korean peoples. Even though close economic relations are maintained between the present Government of South Korea and Japan, most of the Korean people have apprehensions about the economic and political dominance over them by Japan. Japanese nuclear armament would highly stimulate their fear and provide an incentive to Korean Governments to acquire nuclear weapons to check Japanese political influence. As to the people of Southeast Asian countries, a Japanese nuclear programme would aggravate their fears of Japanese hegemony in the region. For Japan, this might prove economically counter-productive to an extent.

Thus, the author contends that although the continuing Sino-Soviet split has given a relatively free hand to Japan to go nuclear, any decision to go nuclear in the current prevailing atmosphere of detente would give rise to more costs than benefits in international political and economic aspects. Japan's prosperity undoubtedly depends on the peace and

stability of Asia or even the world. Japan needs Middle East oil, markets, raw materials, food, and freedom of the seas. In most of the cases, a nuclear weapon programme might provide Japan with little additional leverage. Rather, for a country like Japan that once tried to secure raw materials and markets by force, its nuclear programme would probably be perceived as only destabilizing actions and bring about suspicions in the Asian region as to Japan's intentions.

The Japanese Attitude Towards Nuclear Weapons

There are important elements in Japanese society today that would choose not to acquire nuclear weapons if a genuine alternative can be found. In the various polls that have been taken in recent years, two-thirds to three-quarters of the respondents have opposed the development of nuclear weapons. In the poll of August 1973 by the Sankei Shimbun, in response to the question, "Do you think it is necessary, or not necessary, for Japan to have its own nuclear weapons for the defence of the security of its own country?", 20 percent of those polled answered "necessary", 66 percent "not necessary", 13 percent "cannot say, one way or the other", and 1 percent "do not know". When asked, "Do you think that Japan will come to have its own nuclear weapons in the near future?", 28 percent thought it would, 42 percent thought not, 29 percent could not say one way or the other, and 1 percent did not know. The Yomiuri Shimbun conducted a poll in June 1973. When college students majoring in inter-
national politics were asked, "Do you think Japan should possess nuclear weapons in the future?", 1.9 percent of the college students thought that it should, 82.5 percent that it should not, and 15 percent that the matter should be left to future option. When asked, "Apart from your own view, do you think Japan will come to have nuclear weapons in the future?", 42.9 percent of the students thought it would, while 56 percent thought not. Judging from the above-mentioned public polls, anti-nuclear sentiments among the Japanese public seem to be widespread although the younger generation is becoming more immune to the "nuclear allergy".

The Japanese Diet, House of Representatives and House of Councilors, approved the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in April and May of 1976. The treaty was submitted to the Diet in April of 1975. The House of Representatives spent more than one year clearing it. At the plenary session of the House of Representatives in April, 1976, the NPT was put to the vote and the Japanese political parties, except the Japanese Communist Party voted in favour. In May, 1976, the NPT was approved by an overwhelming majority in the

31 Ralph N. Clough, op. cit., p. 58.
33 Ibid.
34 The Japanese Communist Party opposed it on the grounds that the NPT is apparently designed to endorse nuclear monopoly by nuclear powers. See Ibid.
In the House of Councilors, political parties except the Japanese Communist Party and 13 hawks of the ruling LDP approved it. The overwhelming approval of the NPT in both Houses endorsed the LDP's non-nuclear policy -- non-production, non-possession and non-introduction.

The ratification, though delayed for about six years, 37

36 The 13 hawks in the Liberal Democratic Party, mostly members of the Seirankan (a right wing group of the LDP), did not support the NPT because they fear that Japan will have to give up a free hand in the nuclear policy when it becomes a member of the NPT. See ibid.
37 Ryukichi Imai discusses the several reasons for the delay of Japanese ratification of the NPT. He states, "Two important issues remain without major progress; namely, freeing nuclear technology's international exchange (Article IV) and moving more rapidly toward meaningful arms control (Article VI). On the other hand, international safeguards (Article III) have been streamlined so that they are no longer regarded as the major obstacle toward NPT ratification, so that as satisfactory arrangements can be worked out with the IAEA.... If there is a discernible apathy among the Japanese about the NPT, it is because the treaty has so far failed to prove to be more than an intermediary step and political instrument for the assurance of European security.... There are people in Japan, although not many in number, who oppose their country's ratification of the NPT.... On the other hand, there is an even smaller number of people who would actively promote ratification and take upon themselves the responsibility for preparing a safeguards' agreement with the IAEA and maneuver through the political entanglement of the National Diet. The remaining 99 percent of the population would not object to ratification of the Treaty. This illustrates the fact that the NPT is a non-issue in Japan today and that no one in the political parties, civil service or industry can expect to make political or other gains by publicly promoting the cause of the NPT."

See his article, "The Non-proliferation treaty: the Japanese attitude three years after signing", in Nuclear Proliferation Problems, op. cit., pp. 245-246.
seems to have reconfirmed in Japan observers the current Japanese "pacifism", anti-nuclear sentiment and anti-militarism. However, anti-nuclear sentiment as demonstrated by the results of the various public surveys and overwhelming support in the Diet for ratification of the NPT do not constitute pacifism. 38 Although the Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment and the anti-militarism are widespread, they are mainly derived from fear of a dominance over the society by military circle, rather than derived from sincere pacifism. It would be important to mention here that the Japanese Socialist Party, the principal advocate of a policy of an unarmed and neutral Japan, had long remained obscure in its position on the NPT. 39 Moreover, it is said that the JSP supported the ratification of the NPT in May 1976, not because the party supported the treaty but as a manoeuver to gain a domestic political advantage. 40

It seems to be true that the anti-nuclear weapon sentiment and anti-militarism maintained by the Japanese public depend on a milieu in which the nation feels relatively secure. Thus, probably a severe security shock experienced by the Japanese either by an imminent threat from other countries or from an increasing feeling of unreliability about the U.S.

40 Ibid.
nuclear guarantee would be enough stimulation to change the Japanese attitude. The Japanese are capable of extraordinary changes of perspective on even fundamental issues when their perception of the environment changes. As much as any other country in the world, Japan has displayed a history of dramatic shifts in policy and international orientation -- from long international isolationism to international expansion, and from militarism to current quasi-pacifism. Thus, it is probable that if there is any serious and imminent threat to Japan, it would rally the Japanese to support nuclearization. The fact is, however, that there is no perceived threat to Japan now. But Asia is the most fluid geo-political area in the world. Although Japan has so far largely avoided the international balance of power game in the Pacific-Asian region, it might be finally drawn into the game because of its increasing influence. The long-range perspective is not clear.

Japan, therefore, should pursue a policy designed to create a protonuclear capability. As the Japanese potential to be a nuclear power is steadily augmented, the very existence of this potential would be an important consideration in the strategic planning of the possible adversaries and, as such, would add to Japan's security.
Chapter III and IV discussed the difficulties and obstacles of independent Japanese defence policies. Japan's nuclear choice without any serious threat would be carried out at the enormous cost of other national interests. It would not be rational to launch such a policy in the prevailing atmosphere of détente in the Far East.

It has become recognized that in the present world, no country except the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and probably, in future, the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) can assure their security by their own national powers. Non-superpowers usually join bilateral or collective security systems sponsored by those superpowers. Though today, Japan is under the security guarantee of the United States, insurmountable clashes of national interests between the U.S. and Japan in the future and the resulting removal of U.S. nuclear shield, or a Socialist and Communist oriented government in Japan, would force the Japanese to think over the possibility and rationality of a new security arrangement either with the U.S.S.R. or with the P.R.C. The countries which have the strategic capabilities to provide a security guarantee to

---

1 A Japanese Defence Agency official in uniform says: "Though there has been much talk about the SDF's inadequacy, we firmly believe that there is no country which is perfectly self-reliant except for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.... The point is that national defence power should be maintained according to the qualification of each country. No single country can defend itself on its own." See Japan Times Weekly, International Edition, July 5, 1975.

- 114 -
Japan would be the Soviet Union and possibly the P.R.C.

In the first part of this Chapter, the possibility of a Russo-Japanese and a Sino-Japanese military arrangement shall be discussed. In the latter part, the policy of an unarmed neutral Japan, long advocated by Japanese Socialists, will be discussed. The policy of an armed neutral Japan, argued by the Japanese Communist and Komei Parties, would be analogous to the question of the possibility of independent defence policies, and thus do not need to be examined in this Chapter.

**Security Arrangement with the U.S.S.R.?**

From Moscow's point of view, there are good reasons for improvement in relations with Japan. Politically, improved relations with Japan would give the Soviet Union a valuable entrance to Pacific-Asian affairs. The Soviet Union is rather isolated in the present Pacific-Asian context facing emerging U.S.-P.R.C.-Japan entente although this is far from solid. The U.S.S.R. will have to confront and compromise with the United States in the global scene and will continue to see itself in conflict with the P.R.C. Japan is one of the countries which the Soviet Union can regard as a potential with which to cooperate in Asia. Past trading between the U.S.S.R. and Japan suggests the existence of a factor which could give rise to closer relations between the two in the future. Japan has

---

been the largest trading partner for the Soviet Union among
the free market economy countries. Moscow's ambitious
programme for development of Siberia needs Japanese technology
and capital.

Japan, on the other hand, has pursued a policy of
diversifying its natural resource suppliers. Thus, for Japan,
the Soviet proposal of joint development of Siberia is
alluring. In addition, some probable transformation of the
political configuration in the Pacific-Asian region would add
to the conditions which could help the realization of close
Soviet-Japanese relations. If the United States follows
another unilateral China policy and establishes closer co-
operative relations with the P.R.C., as in the pre-war days
of President Roosevelt, no one can rule out the possibility
that Japan would feel that the U.S. and the P.R.C. would try
to co-operate together in Asian affairs at the expense of
Japan (The feeling has been held by some Japanese since
Nixon's visit to Peking). In that case, there is a possibility
that Japan would seek another way -- an establishment of close
relations with the U.S.S.R.

Despite the above-mentioned factors that would promote
the establishment of a close co-operation between Moscow and
Tokyo, there are more obstacles which hang between the two
countries.

3 Prof. Kosaka argues: "Economically, Japan might be
a better country from which to get capital and technology than
Europe or the U.S., as economic relations with Japan involve
fewer political implications." See Ibid.; p. 32.
1) The Sino-Soviet rift has made it almost impossible for Japan to establish closer relations with the Soviet Union. In a sense, Japan could enjoy an advantageous position vis-à-vis the two Communist powers because of their rift. But, this advantageous position depends totally on whether Japan, the weakest in military sense, can maintain a close co-operation with the U.S. Japan will have to deal very carefully with the two Communist countries. The P.R.C., a weaker power compared with the U.S.S.R., has reacted and might react sharply to any movement toward close relations between Moscow and Tokyo. Peking has so far criticized almost every important move in Soviet-Japanese co-operation as the collusion of Soviet revisionists and Japanese reactionaries. Peking held the National People's Congress in February, 1975 for the first time in 20 years and adopted China's new Constitution which defines "social imperialism" as a hostile force. Obviously "social imperialism" is Peking's thinly veiled name for the Soviet Union. Although Japan has already entered into negotiations for a peace treaty with the P.R.C., movement

4 Mr. Kazushige Hirasawa, a foreign policy adviser of former Premier Takeo Miki, has a different view. He stated that, "... The feud is not an asset but a liability for Japan's foreign policy. It does not enhance Japan's bargaining power, and it has the effect of dividing the Japanese public on policies toward both China and the Soviet Union." See Hirasawa's discussion in "Japan's Emerging Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54 (Oct. 1975), p. 160.

5 Masataka Kosaka, op. cit., p. 28.

towards the conclusion of the treaty has been very slow. So far Japan and the P.R.C. have concluded a trade and an aviation agreement. A Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Amity has been deadlocked because of an anti-hegemony clause proposed by Peking. Moscow has shown its antagonistic attitude towards the Chinese proposal. 

Tokyo seems to have no intention to accept the proposal given the strong disapproval indicated by the Soviet Union.

In essence, even after the normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations in September 1972, Japan has followed an equidistant policy vis-à-vis Peking and Moscow. In March 1975, the Government of Japan dispatched simultaneously the two senior members of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Mr. Hori to Peking and Foreign Minister Miyazawa to Moscow. Although some scholars and former U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, argue that equidistant diplomacy vis-à-vis the two Communist powers is a myth and no longer desirable, the best policy for Japan to avoid being involved in the Sino-Soviet rift would be an equidistant foreign policy.

7 The U.S.S.R. voiced no objections in 1972 to the anti-hegemony clauses in either the Sino-American Shanghai Communiqué or Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué. Moreover, the basic principles were agreed to by Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Nixon in May 1972 stated that "... The U.S. and U.S.S.R. make no claims for themselves and would not recognize the claims of anyone else to any special rights or advantages in world affairs". Moscow has begun to antagonize the Chinese anti-hegemony proposal only after Peking rejected the Moscow's proposal of Asian collective security treaty. See Kazushige Hirasawa, op. cit., p. 162.


9 Prof. Kosaka argues that, "Such an equidistant policy seems to be no longer desirable or possible, for Japan must now assume a political role which demands a closer working relationship with these two countries, and China and the Soviet Union are unlikely to continue to be satisfied with her cautious and aloof attitude..." See Kosaka's "Options For Japan's Foreign Policy", op. cit., p. 27.
2) The Northern Territory problem has inhibited any improvement in relations between the U.S.S.R. and Japan. Throughout the 21 years since the 1956 diplomatic normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and Japan, all moves for a comprehensive peace treaty between the two countries have been blocked by the territory problem. Tokyo adamantly argues that the settlement of the territorial problem is a precondition to the conclusion of a peace treaty. Moscow argues that the case of the four islands has already been settled. Although the U.S.S.R. showed some signs of flexibility towards the territorial problem before the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization, the Soviet attitude towards the problem has again turned back to a "hard-line". The four islands are important in neither a military nor an economic sense, but the problem has an important symbolic value for both countries. Obviously Moscow does not want to establish a precedent for other territorial claims. Japan, on the other hand, wants proof of Russian good-will in the form of the peaceful return of the four islands. Even if the Japan Communist Party (JCP) or the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) or a coalition of the left in Japan take government office,


11 Masaoka Kosaka, op. cit., p. 28.
they will still pursue a policy of restoration of these four islands. A rapid and sudden improvement in relations with the U.S.S.R. cannot be expected unless the territorial question is settled.

3) The difference of political structure and ideology counts heavily in the realization of close relations between the two countries. The working of the Soviet political system makes the Japanese suspicious of the U.S.S.R. A sudden change of Soviet policy and arbitrary modification of its policy might be possible and thus the Japanese could be disappointed and would not feel they could trust the Soviet agreements.

4) The psychological chill which has lasted in the past between the two nations is too big to be overcome in the short run. For the U.S.S.R., the miserable defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05, the Japanese expedition to Siberia which gave rise to the suspicion of Japanese territorial ambitions in the Civil War days of the Soviet Union, Germany-Japanese anti-Comintern Pact of 1936, Japanese activities in Manchuria which resulted in two big border clashes, and "Northern Expansion Plan" by the Imperial Japanese Army on the eve of World War II, are all bitter memories.

13 For example see Kosaka's "Options For Japan's Foreign Policy", op. cit., p. 29.
On the other hand, the following Soviet provocations have harassed the Japanese: the Soviet declaration of war against Japan at the end of World War II in violation of the neutrality pact between the two countries, the fact that half a million soldiers and civilians in Manchuria were taken to Siberia as a labour force and one hundred thousand of them never returned, the occupation of the four islands off Hokkaido, harsh peace treaty terms in the day of Japanese surrender, the current Soviet Navy maneuvers such as "Okean" in 1970 in the vicinity of Japan and the more than 200 sorties into Japanese air space in a year by Soviet military aircraft such as the "Tokyo Express".

Thus, despite some developments in recent years which appear to warrant an assessment of the possibility of closer Soviet-Japanese co-operation (e.g., the evolving relations between the U.S. and the P.R.C., the oil crisis that is compelling Japan to move closer to the Soviet Union), these developments have not acquired enough momentum to overcome the many impediments in relations. A close Soviet-Japanese co-operation would occur only through the extraordinary combination of the following circumstances: an emergence of a coalition government of the left in Japan, a significant deterioration in Japanese relations with the U.S. and/or the

P.R.C., and a sharp decrease in Japanese distrust for the Soviets. It therefore seems that relations between the two countries will continue as they have been.

Security Arrangement with the P.R.C.?

Sino-Japanese relations are different from the Russo-Japanese relations. The Chinese and the Japanese have similar cultural and racial origins and both countries have had strong, traditional historical relations. Most of the Japanese maintain respect and awe for the Chinese culture which has dominated in Japan from earlier times. Nostalgia for the origin of Japanese culture among the Japanese and a residual sense of guilt over the conduct of the Imperial Japanese Army during the fifteen-year Sino-Japanese War, greatly influence the Japanese. These Japanese feelings toward China, combined with long historical relations, unlike those to the U.S.S.R., have become a potent influence and overcome the suspicion derived from the fact that China is now under the Communist regime. The Japanese have an intuitive feeling that China is China irrespective of its political system. 16

There are some potential factors for the development of a close Sino-Japanese co-operation. Firstly, the P.R.C., unlike the U.S.S.R., seems to have put higher priority on the improvement in the relations with Japan. The Peking attitude was seen when Kakuei Tanaka took premiership of Japan in July 1972. The P.R.C., as a militarily less powerful compared with the Soviet Union, and facing the long standing hostility against that country, earnestly hopes to draw Japan to its corner or at least try to minimize any movement toward closer relations between the U.S.S.R. and Japan.

Secondly, the economic structures of the P.R.C. and Japan are complementary to each other. As seen in the rapidly increasing trade between the two countries (the amount of the trade between the two surpassed the amount of trade between Taiwan and Japan for the first time since World War II in the fiscal year of 1974), there is a prospect of close economic relations. Japanese businessmen expect to see a developed China. They regard the P.R.C. as another resource supplier and market, and as being the most economically suitable country for Japanese investment, because of its proximity to the country. China might wish for Japanese technological co-operation and investment after a possible modification of Peking's economic policy from a rigid self-reliant to a more...

flexible policy. Chinese delegations to Japan and the outside have been shocked to discover so great a social gap between the P.R.C. and the developed free-market economy countries. Peking will find it necessary to widen its channels for more interchange with the outside world.

Finally, both the P.R.C. and Japan could conceivably feel that a world order worked out by Soviet-American detente adversely affected their interests in the world. They might feel that they were both in the same position of being overpowered by the two nuclear superpowers. In that situation, both the P.R.C. and Japan might be inclined to co-operate with each other to resist the Soviet-American world order and to maintain their own interests.

When a balance sheet is drawn up, however, the odds are strongly against the close Sino-Japanese co-operation. Those negative factors are as follows:

1) As in the case of the relations with the U.S.S.R., the Sino-Soviet rift has made Japan cautious in any movement with the P.R.C. The military strength of the U.S.S.R., both nuclear and conventional, will continue to be well beyond Japan's ability to cope with for the foreseeable future. Establishment of a military alliance between the P.R.C. and Japan would bring about an antagonistic Soviet Union which

could harm Japanese interests because of the incipient military weakness of the alliance compared with the U.S.S.R. The development of the recent Chinese proposal of an anti-hegemony clause to incorporate into a China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Amity would be a cornerstone. For Peking, the anti-hegemony clause constitutes the hard core of its foreign policy as endorsed in the recent People's Congress, and is regarded as indispensable to the Chinese in the proposed China-Japan pact. 19 For the Japanese, however, it would be difficult to accept the clause in a China-Japan Peace treaty. Tokyo does not object to the first part of the clause that "... Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific Region...." 20 But the second part of the clause that "... Both nations oppose any efforts by a third country to establish hegemony" 21 has been objected to by Tokyo. The main reason for the objection is that it is not clear what means both nations would oppose a third nation's attempt to seek hegemony, and judging from the current international scene, the third nation implies the...

21 Ibid.
U.S.S.R. 22 An official of the Foreign Ministry of Japan states, "...we cannot support the Chinese position because we do not think such a statement related to hegemony is relevant to a peace treaty between our two countries." 23 In the judgement of this author, Peking desires to colour the Peace Treaty with military and close political implications, trying to create an atmosphere of understanding that leaves little room for Japan to adopt a pro-Soviet posture in Asian affairs. For the time being, it would not be necessary for Japan to collaborate with the P.R.C. to cope with the U.S.S.R.

22 Mr. Kazushige Hirasawa picked out three reasons for the Japanese objections to the anti-hegemony clause.

i) The concept of hegemony is ambiguous and not appropriate to be written into the treaty.

ii) It is not clear by what means both nations would oppose a third nation's attempt to seek hegemony.

iii) Since under the current international situation, a "third nation" implies the Soviet Union, it will have an adverse effect on the friendly relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.

Mr. Hirasawa discussed that "An identical expression was used in the Sino-American Communiqué of February and in the Sino-Japanese Communiqué of September 1972... A different expression but one with the same meaning was used in the American-Soviet Communiqué of May 1972... Since Japan, China, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. declared that they would not recognize the hegemony or special rights of any country, I can hardly see why hegemony should become the cause of controversy". Mr. Hirasawa argues for the inclusion of the clause in a China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Amity.


2) Although the Taiwan issue between the P.R.C. and Japan was almost settled in September 1972, the problem still casts a gloomy shadow over the future relations of the two countries. When the new Prime Minister of Japan, Kakuei Tanaka, came to power in July 1972, Peking showed a positive attitude to the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations (Peking rejected any negotiations with the former Sato Administration). For the Chinese, it seemed to be very important to hurry a Sino-Japanese rapprochement. This weaker Chinese position vis-à-vis Japan forced Peking to make a concession to Tokyo. Although, in subtle phraseology, the Government of Japan recognized Peking's sovereignty over Taiwan, the P.R.C. did not prohibit Japan from continuing trade and other economic relations with Taiwan. Immediately after the severence of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, Japanese companies became nervous about investing in Taiwan and new investment was withheld. By 1973, however, the substantial flow of capital from Japan had resumed. Taiwan and Japan have made an unofficial arrangement to permit most relations between the two to continue. On September 15, 1975, the first plane of "Japan Asia Airways", a subsidiary of Japan Air Lines, took off from Tokyo to Taipei. Flights between the two countries have been resumed after having been suspended since April, 1974, when Peking and Tokyo concluded an

24 See Appendix 5.
aviation pact. Quasi-diplomatic offices have also been established. The Taiwanese have the "East Asian Relations Association" and the Japanese have the "Interchange Association", both of which are composed of retired governmental officers, but are in charge of promoting the relations between the two. So far, Peking appears to have made no objections to this unique arrangement. If, however, the Chinese see an increasing Japanese economic stake in Taiwan, and if Peking begins to feel that Taiwan would fall into Japanese possession in essence if not in name, Peking might react sharply. For the Japanese today, the Taiwan problem might be considered in economic terms rather than military ones. Though trade and economic relations with Taiwan are

---

27 Ralph N. Clough, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

28 Although Japan's vital sea lanes stretch along Taiwan's east coast, the strategic importance of the Taiwan area has been reduced and limited. The rapidly expanding Chinese submarine forces would further discount the importance of the existence of a Taiwan that is independent of the P.R.C. According to the *Military Balance 1975-1976*, (London: The International Institute For Strategic Studies, 1975), "The naval and air elements of the PLA have only about one-seventh of the total manpower, ... but their equipments, notably that of the navy, is steadily being modernized.... China has one G-class submarine with missile launching tables but does not appear to have missiles for it.... R-and-W-class medium-range diesel submarines, in some numbers are being built for the navy. A nuclear-powered attack submarine has been under test for some years." (p. 48).
valuable for Japan, but not of strategic importance. Japan could write off Taiwan when a military conflict breaks out in the region. A powerful pro-Taiwan lobby in the LDP (e.g., former Premier Kishi and vice-Premier Shiina), however, has an undeniable influence on the Japanese policy towards Taiwan. Moreover, the bulk of present Taiwanese who are composed of 2 million mainlanders and 12 million indigenous Taiwanese seems to hope to continue the economic relations with Japan. Thus, Taiwan could be still a cause of friction between Peking and Tokyo.

3) The problem of the Senkaku Islands would become a hot issue in the future. The Senkaku Islands are a group of tiny, uninhabited islands on the outer edge of the continental shelf that lies under the East China Sea. They are about 100 miles east of the northern tip of Taiwan and about the same distance north of the southern group of the Ryukyu Islands of Japan. The Islands were included in the Ryukyu Islands which were regarded as territory under Japan's latent sovereignty during the days of U.S. administration. The Senkaku had

---

29 See footnotes No. 22 and 23 of Chapter I.
30 Kunio Muraoka, op. cit., p. 17.
not become an international issue until the survey was done in 1970, which indicated there might be larger undersea oil deposits around the Islands. Not only the P.R.C. and Japan, but also Taiwan now assert their sovereignty over the Islands. If the development of the oil fields around the Senkaku become materialized, the problem of the islands will give rise to a serious political dispute.

4) There is a kind of psychological conflict in the deeply ingrained attitudes of the Chinese and Japanese toward each other. The Chinese, with an overwhelming number of people, a huge territory, nuclear weapons, and historical predominance in Asia, seem confident of their own long-run superiority to the Japanese. The Chinese take it for granted that they should feel superiority based upon cultural pre-eminence. The Japanese, on the other hand, have a kind of feeling of superiority to the Chinese. Rapid modernization and the resulting growing economic strength have created a somewhat patronizing and condescending attitude among the Japanese towards the Chinese. Many Japanese are confident that if Japan tries, it will be able to overcome Chinese military capability.

The P.R.C. and Japan may steadily expand their relations, especially cultural and economic relations, but it would be difficult to see a close and co-ordinate political

---

33 See "Yomiuri Shimbun, March 23, 1972", in Ibid., p. 49.
34 Ralph N. Clough, op. cit., pp. 71-72.
or military co-operation between the two countries in the near future. As in the case of the Soviet Union, the P.R.C. also could not provide Japan with the profitable market that Japan now has in the U.S. because of its different economic structure and the lower purchasing power of the Chinese people. Moreover, the P.R.C. and Japan will be competitors in the Southeast Asian context in the future. If each feels that it should be the nation that leads other Asian countries, the competition will be intensified. It seems, therefore, that the possibility of a closer Chinese-Japanese political or military co-operation would be low.

**Unarmed Neutrality**

In the immediate post-war years, the people of Japan desired their country to be neutral. The incipient Allied Force Occupation policy introduced the idea of a neutral Japan by arguing for its transformation into a "Switzerland of Asia." The concept of a neutral Japan greatly appealed to the defeated, war-tired and disarmed Japanese people who faced two powerful neighbours, the U.S. and the Soviet Union (later the P.R.C. came to be considered as another powerful neighbour). Various nationwide public opinion surveys continue to show the strong

---

desire of the people to see a neutral Japan. Today, the JSP, JCP and the Komei Party advocate Japan's neutrality vis-à-vis the three big powers. The JSP adds a concept of an unarmed Japan to that of a neutral Japan. The JCP and the Komei Party, unlike the JSP, argue that Japan should maintain capabilities of self-defence. The JSP is the only party that advocates an unarmed neutral Japan.

The public survey conducted by the Mainichi Shimbun in May, 1972, showed the following results:

| Continuance of the Co-operation with the \ U.S. | 12 |
| Promotion of the Sino-Japanese co-operation | 20 |
| Promotion of the Russo-Japanese co-operation | 2 |
| Neutral vis-à-vis the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and the P.R.C. | 55 |
| Others | 11 |

See Appendix 14.

Ibid.

Ibid.
The policy of an unarmed neutral Japan of the JSP and its followers is based on the following hypotheses:

1) The emergence of nuclear weapons has made war meaningless because of their formidable destructive power, and nuclear stalemates between nuclear powers have made nuclear weapons themselves valueless.

2) The growth in the number and the dominance of Socialist or Communist countries which, the JSP says, are pacifist (whereas capitalist countries are imperialist), has made possible a policy of an unarmed neutral Japan.

3) A country like Japan that has to depend on foreign trade for its survival should be neutral in international conflicts and must keep away from those international disputes.

4) Japan is the weakest corner in the prevailing four-power system in the Far East, thus ideological neutrality and an unarmed Japan would save the country from being involved in the superpower confrontation.

Some criticisms can be raised about these assumptions and the concept of an unarmed, neutral Japan. First of all, the idea that Socialist or Communist countries are more peace-loving than capitalist countries is a very naive and biased one. North Korea's planned attack on the South in June 1950 (some scholars argue that the South initiated the war, e.g., R. J. Simmons), the Soviet intervention in Hungary
in 1956, the long-standing Sino-Soviet rift and the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact countries in 1968 -- expose the fallacy of the peaceful nature of the Socialist or Communist states.

The second criticism against the policy of an unarmed Japan is as follows: Today, military capabilities function mainly as deterrents for war. This would be true especially for nuclear weapons. Conventional weapons with formidable destructive power could be included in this category. The JSP and its followers, however, still regard the current military weapons as war-making and war-provoking ones. As for nuclear weapons, it is true that nuclear powers today face nuclear stalemates and, therefore, the possibility of usage of nuclear weapons would be low except in an unexpected accident. However, they are not valueless. The formidable destructive power of nuclear weapons itself is one of the reasons which brings about the present world peace. Thus, in this sense, nuclear weapons are quite valuable. As to conventional weaponry, judging from the post-war history, countries might continue to resort to conventional wars to settle some disputes as in the past. Although, today, military power alone does not safeguard a nation's security, it will play a central role in guaranteeing the security.

The third criticism is as follows: In today's world, there are several unarmed countries; namely, Andora, Monaco, Liechtenstein, Vatican City, San Marino, Iceland and Costa Rica. Except Iceland and Costa Rica, all of those
countries are very small and have a maximum population of twenty thousand. Policies of these countries would not affect their neighbours or the world. Although relatively larger countries, Iceland and Costa Rica do not maintain their own armed forces, but their unarmed postures are not due to the beliefs that unarmed policy would bring about security but due to their domestic difficulties in maintaining armed forces. On the other hand, Japan embraces 115 million people and its GNP is estimated at $560 billion in 1976 and its influence is growing in the world. Thus, the circumstances of these tiny countries are very different from that of Japan and hence they cannot be used as examples to argue for an unarmed Japan.

Fourthly, Japan is not endowed with enough conditions that allow it to be neutral and unarmed. The status of neutrality is given to a country after that country obtains agreements from all neighbouring and other major powers. Even if the country should succeed in obtaining a status of neutrality, the country must defend this status by a combination of its firm determination and its considerable military strength. Belgium's neutrality was violated in 1914 both because of its military weakness and its strategic location. The minimum conditions for successful neutrality require a country to be non-influential, to be in a geographically non-strategic location, and to be surrounded by a favourable

political climate. Today Japan is one of the largest trading countries. It cannot but influence the rest of the world. In addition, Japan is located in the region where the influences of the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and the P.R.C. converge. Each of the three great powers cannot formulate their Asian policies without paying attention to Japan. Both the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. are making efforts to pull Japan nearer to its respective camp. Obviously the present international political environment of Japan does not allow it to be neutral. For an island nation, in spite of a location of considerably strategic importance, people tend to make a hasty conclusion that Japan might acquire neutral status in some political environment with reasonable conventional forces by virtue of the natural barrier that the sea provides. However, as technology advances, and as neighbouring countries increase in their naval strength, this advantage has already been lost and could completely disappear in the near future.\footnote{Today, the U.S.S.R. has already acquired a capability of an amphibious operation against Japan because of its growing naval power in the Pacific. As to the P.R.C., it does not seem to have acquired the capacity. According to The Military Balance 1975-1976, "The PLA is essentially a defensive force and lacks the facilities and logistic support for protracted large-scale military operations outside China. It is, however, gradually acquiring greater logistic capacity." \textit{op. cit.}, p. 48.} 

Finally, the concept of unarmed neutrality does not fit the current international environment. Today's international politics is, as it has been for a long time, the
scene of power politics. A nation's security is primarily maintained by its own efforts. Although the United Nations seeks to take collective military action against the international illegal use of force, the practice of the Security Council of the U.N. since its establishment have proved to be almost impotent on this point. Because of the inability of the permanent members of the Security Council to reach agreement, it so far has not taken urgent military measures to maintain the international peace and security except in some cases. According to the Charter of the U.N., the Security Council is supposed to conclude special agreements with the U.N. member states which will obligate the countries to provide its armed forces for the establishment of the U.N. Police Force. However, at present, few countries have concluded special agreements with the Security Council and the U.N. Police Force cannot work as the Charter expects. In addition, the Military Staff Committee which was contemplated to support the Security Council to enforce its resolutions is not established because of the disunity among the members of the Security Council. It will take a long time to see a supranational organization which can automatically inflict punishment on a country for its illegal use of force. Thus, in the

---

43 See Article 43 of the Charter of the U.N.
44 See Article 47 of the Charter of the U.N.
present international environment, the concept of an unarmed Japan means Japan has to depend for its security on the "goodwill" of other countries. Today's world does not allow any country to depend on others' "goodwill" for its survival.

Summing Up

As discussed in Chapter III, IV and this Chapter, Japan can find no plausible defence alternatives other than those built upon U.S.-Japanese military co-operation. The political environment in the Far East and Japan's domestic circumstances do not allow Japan to be a full-fledged military power. In addition, the various conditions of both Japan's domestic and external affairs have placed important and significant restrictions on Japan's ability to operate effectively and independently on the international scenes. In the domestic scene, Japan faces the pressing problems of land, pollution, transportation and social welfare. In the external sphere, Japan will have to tackle the so-called North-South problem, namely the matters of shrinking natural resources and the resulting severe competition among natural resource hungry countries. Today Japan's sources of raw materials are dependent on the policy whims of other countries. Japan needs American co-operation to settle the North-South question, to maintain free trade system, to keep and create a healthy world monetary system. These problems are preventing Japan from moving too far from its dependence on the U.S. irrespective of the hope of the Japanese public, and mitigate strongly.
against Japan moving toward more forceful international actions and achieving world power status.

Thus, despite some problems in the current U. S.-Japanese security arrangement, Japan will have to follow its defence policy of co-operating with the U. S. as long as the U. S. is willing to do it.
CHAPTER VI

JAPAN'S SECURITY UNDER THE MST

As discussed in Chapter II, there are some problems that remain unsolved in the present U.S.-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty (MST). The MST relationship is an asymmetrical one, resting on the security guarantee by the United States. The imbalance is to some degree the fundamental cause of the problems. Removing the imbalance would satisfy the U.S. and subdue rising Japanese nationalism, thus making the MST more tolerable for both sides.

In the first half of this Chapter, the prospects and the tentative policy suggestions of the current problems in the MST system will be discussed. Among the problems pointed out in Chapter II, the presence of U.S. bases and forces on Japanese soil and prior consultation arrangement would be the most pressing and conspicuous. My attention will be focussed on these two problems. In the latter half, two potential threats facing Japan today and in the near future will be examined: development in the Korean Peninsula and the general Soviet threat. Subsequently, tentative counter measure policies will be discussed.
The Prospects of U.S. Bases and Forces

As of December 31, 1975, the U.S. armed forces have maintained 133 bases and facilities covering 360 square km. Six other bases and installations are under joint use with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Both the U.S. and Japanese Governments favour consolidating and reducing the number of them to meet U.S. operational requirements and Japanese political needs. But the scope and extent of the consolidations and reductions are not as yet agreed. The Japanese Government prefers the fewest number, consolidated into extensive bases and installations. However, many small bases would be more dependable for the U.S.

Various proposals have been made to solve the base problem. For example, the White Paper on Defence published in 1970 suggested that five categories be set up: 1) exclusive U.S. jurisdiction, 2) U.S. administration with use by the SDF permitted, 3) SDF administration with U.S. use permitted, 4) generally exclusive use by the SDF, and 5) installations returned to civilian use. The White Paper on Defence issued in June 1976 said that the base problem has been discussed looking toward arrangements along these lines in the U.S.

2Ibid.
Japanese Security Consultative Committee every year. In the 14th Consultative Committee held in January 1973, it was agreed that the area of 28.78 square km would be returned, of which 18.35 square km have been returned as of the end of December 1975. In the 15th Consultative Committee held in January 1974, it was agreed to return 29 square km in Okinawa to Japan, of which 8 square km have been returned as of December 1975. It is said that bases and facilities in Okinawa will be of the first priority in considering the matter in the future.

One alternative proposal calls for locating the U.S. bases in less populated areas. The suggestion, however, has its own limit because of the need to pair air and naval installations for maximum value to the U.S. There are several major U.S. air bases, namely: Misawa, Yokota, Tachikawa, Atsugi, Iwakuni and Kadena. Among them, all except Misawa are located in populated areas where antagonism against the U.S. bases is strong. Both Sasebo and Yokosuka are used by the U.S. Seventh Fleet as naval bases. Since 1972, Yokosuka has been a home port of the Fleet. The Japanese public, in general, is more passive to the U.S. naval bases than the air bases.

---

5 Japan, Defence Agency, op. cit., p. 69.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Fred Green, op. cit., p. 55.
Probably the reason would be that naval bases mean fewer American servicemen on Japanese soil, less noise and fewer plane accidents. To strengthen the durability of the MST, the Japanese Government will have to be more sympathetic with the public. For that purpose, some considerations on the above-mentioned six air bases should be made. The Government of Japan, however, well-aware of insufficiency of the Air Self-Defence Forces (ASDF) and the fact that the bases assure continuous U.S. military co-operation in case of emergency, does not want them completely dismantled. Here is a dilemma of the Government. The public opposes expansion of the strength of the SDF and, at the same time, opposes the existence of U.S. air bases. Thus, the Government's urgent policies would be to make the public recognize the insufficient capabilities of the ASDF, clarify the extent of the SDF's inability to provide for its own defence, and explain the necessity of minimum number of U.S. air bases for the security of today's Japan.\footnote{The incident of the Soviet Mig-25 in September 1976, illustrated the inadequacy of Japanese defence.}

The question of U.S. force presence is closely related to the base issue. The future size of U.S. troops in Japan would be decided in accordance with the scope and extent of future base establishments. As of the end of December, 1975, 5,000 ground forces, 31,000 naval forces and 14,500 air forces were garrisoned in Japan.\footnote{See Appendix 13.}
installations, both the U.S. and Japanese Governments seem to have agreed to reduce the U.S. forces to the greatest extent possible, thus lowering the frequency of irritants and disturbing incidents. As to what size of cutback is the best solution is disputable. One proposal, though not a governmental one, but rather a reflection of the public view, is the concept of a troop withdrawal with capacity to return in an emergency at Japan's request by revising the MST. However, the view, advocated by the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), has been regarded as reducing the credibility of U.S. protection by removing the U.S. forces from Japanese soil. Moreover, many people have argued that the proposal was essentially unequal and that the self-satisfied suggestion would make the U.S. believe the proposal as an attempt to get something for nothing. The more important point is, from the strategical point of view, that the U.S. forces could not carry out an effective return in time of emergency unless there remains some supporting forces on Japanese territory.

One important aspect which cannot be ignored is the aim and function of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan. The American forces in Japan are, according to Article VI of the

12 In November 1975, the DSP disclosed a more positive attitude in favour of maintaining the present MST system including the U.S. forces and bases. See Appendix 14.

current MST, to contribute not only to the security of Japan but also to the international peace and security in the Far East. Thus, if Washington continues to show the willingness to honor its treaty obligations vis-à-vis other non-Communist Asian allies, the United States can not accept the concept of emergency stationing.

One non-debatable point for the security in the Far East is the importance of the American naval presence. Given the continuing growth of Soviet naval power in the area, the only counter-balancing power conceivable today is the strength of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Even after the Fourth Defence Build-up Programme of Japan, Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Forces (MSDF) could be effective only in coastal and nearby waters. Evacuation of the Seventh Fleet from the sea near Japan would probably force the Japanese Government to build its own deep water navy even in the prevailing detente atmosphere. This policy, however, would give rise to a serious domestic political upheaval. Moreover, other Asian countries would not want to see the Japanese MSDF replace the task of American navy in the Far East because of the negative image of the Japanese armed forces that emerged from their experiences during World War II. Thus, as in the case of the base issue, an immediate task for the Japanese Government would be to bridge the deep

---

14 See Appendix 2.
15 Fred Green, op. cit., p. 61.
gap between the general public and the Government concerning the presence of the U.S. forces.

The Prospect of Prior Consultation

The present consultation formula has placed little restriction on U.S. freedom to operate from Japanese bases. Military vessels and planes are free to engage directly in combat, provided they receive orders only after they have departed from Japanese administrative areas. Deployments to combat zone are permissible as long as combat assignments come after arrival. Most combat-support operations from Japanese bases do not require the prior consultation. The more important factor is that the Government of Japan can not take the initiative, so far assumed to be U.S. prerogative, to seek prior consultation. Thus, it is no wonder that the Japanese public worries about the possible involvement in an American war.

The indispensable step the Japanese Government has to make regarding the prior consultation is to obtain the right of the initiative to seek the consultation. By having the initiative, Japan could raise specific inquiries and become better informed about the American force activities from Japanese bases. The right would drastically improve the Japanese control over future Japan-based U.S. force operation.

---

16 See Prior Consultation in Chapter II.
which would enable the Government of Japan to check any operation that might endanger Japanese security. The U.S., however, will be most unlikely to make known to the Japanese detailed information because of strategic reason. The Japanese, on the other hand, want to know as much as possible concerning the scope of U.S. operations from Japan in peacetime as well as in any future military conflict for the purpose of avoiding involvement in a crisis beyond the scope of Japanese interests. Unsatisfactory information by the U.S. will encourage prevailing nationalist sentiment among the Japanese people and accentuate the movement aiming to curtail U.S. extraterritorial activities. Persistent Japanese requests, however, could cause many U.S. officials to question the value of maintaining the U.S. forces and bases in Japan. A conflict between the U.S. obligation to consult and obtain permission from Tokyo concerning its activities and Japanese interests could possibly lead to sharp differences. For the Japanese Government, however, to remove the fear held by its people of being involved in an undesirable war, the restriction-oriented amendment of the prior consultation is necessary.

Japan's Security Interests in the Korean Peninsula

Today, the Korean Peninsula is one of the most heavily militarized areas of the world. With a total civilian

17 Fred Green, op. cit., p. 68.
population, totalling about 50.4 million, the professional military amounts to one million and ninety-two thousand.\textsuperscript{18}
Not surprisingly, the tension continues and the danger of military conflicts is unexceptionally high.

Then, to what degree is there a danger of the outbreak of military hostility on the Peninsula? While such anxiety is being voiced, it is doubtful that hostility will actually take place. The reason is that the military and political situation is much different today from twenty-five years ago. The following is a brief outline of the military and the political conditions in the area at the outbreak of the Korean War:\textsuperscript{19}

1. Secretary of State Acheson of the U.S. declared that South Korea lay outside the defence perimeter of the U.S. and thus the American forces were withdrawn from the Peninsula.

2. The Cold War was at its height.

3. South Korea did not have a well-trained army.

4. The U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) had a close relationship.

On the other hand, the military and political situation of the Peninsula today is as follows:

1. The South Koreans appear united and determined to defend themselves against attack from North Korea.

\textsuperscript{18} Japan, Defence Agency, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 29.

(2) 41,000 U.S. forces with tactical nuclear weapons are stationed in South Korea.
(3) The U.S. and the P.R.C. have established informal diplomatic relations and these relations are improving.
(4) Not only the U.S. and Japan but also the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. appear to desire peace in the Korean Peninsula.
(5) The situation of the Cold War has been replaced by a period of detente and a period of political multipolar situation.
(6) The P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. are antagonistic toward each other.

Recently, there have been strong indications that North Korea has no desire to precipitate a full-scale war of the type which it commenced in 1950. Firstly, Pyongyang seems to have been faced with internal economic problems. The North Korean annual economic growth rate in the 1960s averaged around 3 to 4 percent. Moreover, North Korea seems to have suffered from a shortage of foreign exchange, which has proved to be an obstacle to the healthy growth of its foreign trade. These factors led to Pyongyang's fears that the economic gap between the

---

South and the North would widen further. 22 Second, the ratio of military spending/total budget of North Korea has been decreasing since 1972. 23 In addition, the absolute amount of the defence budget has been significantly reduced. Finally, the overall tactics of Pyongyang towards the South seem to have changed into more peaceful ones. 24 On the other hand, it is even more difficult for South Korea to undertake a military operation against the North. Support, as well as

---


(Millions of Won, $1 = 2.05 Won)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Budget</th>
<th>Military Spending</th>
<th>Proportion of Budget for Defence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>4,812.9</td>
<td>1,559.4</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>5,048.6</td>
<td>1,565.1</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>6,186.6</td>
<td>1,917.9</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>7,277.3</td>
<td>2,183.2</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>7,344.0</td>
<td>1,256.1</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>8,543.5</td>
<td>1,281.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>9,801.1</td>
<td>1,568.2</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Donald S. Zagoria and Young Kun Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

24 See pp. 28-29 of Chapter 1.
as sympathy from both the U.S. and Japan would be lacking. However, the more important factor is that the Soviet Union or the P.R.C. would do anything necessary to prevent the military unification of the Peninsula by the South.

The four major powers, directly or indirectly involved in the Peninsula, which are the U.S., the P.R.C., the Soviet Union and Japan, do not seem to desire a military conflict in the area. The long-term U.S. objective in the region might be to reduce tensions to the point where it can withdraw its forces from the Peninsula. As one of the measures of achieving this, Washington would continue its efforts to achieve military balance between the two Koreas and try to reach tacit understanding with both the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. to maintain the status quo. One of the fundamental reasons for such a U.S. policy towards Korea would be found in its relations with Japan. For the U.S., the strategic importance of Korea lies not so much in the Korean Peninsula itself as in Japan. 25 Washington seems to be afraid that the political and military upheaval on the Peninsula would lead to insecurity in Japan and would give Japan a significant stimulus to build a strong army and rise once again as a powerful independent militaristic country. 26 Thus, the maintenance of the peace in the Korean Peninsula constitutes one of the major Far Eastern policies of the United States.

25 The Economist, August 28, 1976, p. 9. See also Harrison M. Holland, op. cit., p. 205.
26 Harrison M. Holland, op. cit., p. 205.
The Chinese too have strong reasons for desiring stability on the Peninsula during the next few years. Troubles in Korea would have a negative impact on the present Chinese economic development plan. They could also hinder Peking's progress towards improved relations with the U.S. and with Japan, and in this manner to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Moscow. Moreover, Peking would see some advantage in the U.S. military presence as a counter-balancing force to the troops of the U.S.S.R. along China's northern border. This Peking attitude towards the Korean Peninsula is evidenced in a joint communiqué between the P.R.C. and North Korea issued on April 26, 1975, in the final stages of the Vietnam War. The P.R.C. expressed in this communiqué "reasonable support" for North Korean efforts to unite Korea, but emphasized the "independent and peaceful unification".27

For the Soviet Union, a breakout of another Korean War would not serve its national interests. The U.S.S.R., facing potential military hostility from the P.R.C., does not seem to encourage North Korea's adventure. Rather, taking advantage of limited détente vis-à-vis the United States, Moscow appears to put its policy priority on the China problem and the economic development of its eastern flank to strengthen its strategic position against the P.R.C. Thus, the Soviet Union might not find any overriding necessity in risking military conflict involving the U.S. In addition, even if North Korea

should be viewed by the Soviet Union being a valuable buffer for its eastern flank vis-à-vis the U. S. and Japan, the Soviet Union might not need the expansion of the buffer zone in the days of U. S. disengagement from the Asian continent. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. would not hope to see an expansion of North Korean Communism which has been quite independent of Moscow, being afraid of closer co-operation between the P.R.C. and a united Communist Korea.

Japan, as well as the aforementioned three major powers; hopes to maintain the stability on the entire Korean Peninsula. Probably the Japanese hope would be stronger than that of the other three powers. Because of its proximity to Korea and because of its past wars against China and Russia which were fought in large part over the Korean Peninsula, the Japanese have long regarded the Peninsula as "a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan". The principal Korean policy by successive governments of Japan since the middle of the 19th century has been to maintain a friendly or at least a neutral regime on the Peninsula and to prevent any movement by which the entire Peninsula would come under the domination of a major power hostile to Japan. This traditional policy has not been changed and seems to be followed by today's Japanese Government. Today's Japan, however, is different from the Japan of pre-war days, in that it cannot adopt its own military policy towards the Peninsula to maintain stability in the region. The occurrence or not of military conflict on the Peninsula is almost beyond the scope of Japan's control. However, the Japanese security
interests in the region, together to a lesser degree with trade and economic interests on South Korea, is vital to Japan. The maintenance of stability on the Korean Peninsula is one of the major Japanese defence problems (these would include the problems of general Soviet threat and the protection of Japanese sea lanes) faced by contemporary Japanese defence planners.

As discussed earlier, although the possibility of a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula is slim, nobody can deny the chance of its outbreak. Any hostility in the Peninsula will inevitably draw Japan into the conflict, either directly or indirectly because of the following reasons. Japan is directly linked to the defence of South Korea through the current U.S.-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty (MST), particularly through Tokyo's re-manifestation of the so-called "New Korean Clause" in August 1975.28

Under Article IV of the MST, Japan and the U.S. are supposed to consult each other, "... at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace

---
28 The "New Korean Clause" reads as follows: "... the security of the Republic of Korea is essential to the maintenance of peace on the Korean Peninsula, which in turn is necessary for the peace and security in East Asia, including Japan." See "Documentation: Joint Announcement by President Ford and Premier Miki", in Survival, Vol. XVII, No. 5 (September/October, 1975), p. 244. In the period of the Tanaka Government (July 1972-December 1974), Japan exhibited a flexible diplomacy in its approach to North Korea. This changing diplomacy could be observed in several statements by the then Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura. He said, "There is no threat from North Korea against South Korea..., the Republic of Korea's Government is not the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula". Furthermore, he stated, "... the peace and security of the entire Korean Peninsula is vital to Japan's own security." These statements signified a departure from the policy followed by the Sato Administration. However, Miki's announcement of the New Korean Clause showed that Japan's approaches to the Peninsula seem to have reverted to those of the Sato Administration.
and security in the Far East is threatened.  

29 At the same time under Article VI of the MST, "... for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air, and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan."  

30 When the "New Korean Clause" was announced in the Miki-Ford Joint Communiqué on August 6, 1975, former Premier Miki declared that Japan would take a "positive" response towards a possible U. S. request to use its bases to support South Korea in case of break-out of hostility on the Peninsula.  

31 Although the "New Korean Clause" does not obligate Japan to allow the U. S. automatic use of its bases on Japanese soil, South Korea and the U. S. appear to have strong expectations that Tokyo would permit U. S. forces to use its bases for logistic and support  

---

29 See Appendix 2.
30 See Appendix 2
32 In November 1975, three months after the announcement of Miki's "New Korean Clause", the then Foreign Minister Miyazawa declared that North Korea does not fall within the definition of the "Far East" in the MST, implying that U. S. planes would not be allowed to attack North Korea directly from Japan in a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula. He added, however, that U.S. bases in Japan might be used if the U. S. response took place with U. N. approval. See William J. Barndt, "Old Issues in a New Context", in The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs, ed. William J. Barndt. (New York: New York University Press, 1976), p. 14.
purposes. In fact, whether or not the 41,000 U.S. forces stationed in South Korea could play a successful defense role in the Peninsula, would largely depend on Tokyo's attitude on this issue. This is a serious dilemma and some painful choices for the Japanese Government. If Tokyo decided to allow the U.S., as it almost certainly would, to use bases in Japan in the event of military hostilities in the Peninsula, there would always be a danger of attacks against these bases in Japan. In the worst case, Tokyo would have to contemplate the possibility of U.S. response with tactical nuclear weapons to a successful Communist offensive and the similar actions by either the P.R.C. or the U.S.S.R. Should that happen, the potential for further escalation and a spreading of the conflict to Japan would be very probable.

If, in the light of these possible situations, Tokyo decided not to allow the U.S. to use its bases in Japan, such a policy would give rise to a serious crisis in U.S.-Japanese security relations. Then Washington would be confronted with another powerful argument from those in the U.S. who are pressing the U.S. Government to avoid being deeply involved in any Asian war. Washington would not be able to find any reason to adhere to the MST which is a unilateral guarantee of Japan's security when Tokyo refuses to support the American forces in South Korea undertaken to a great extent to protect Japan. Resentment of the American people towards the Japanese would increase.
Given the increasing demand within the U.S. for military disengagement from the defence of a distant country, there is a possibility that the U.S. would not render the necessary assistance to South Korea in spite of Japanese preparedness to back U.S. response. If this happened, the repercussions in Japan would probably be far-reaching. The U.S. would be seen as having deserted South Korea, an ally whose survival was known to be considerably important to Japan. The reliability of the U.S. would be in question as at no time since the conclusion of the M S T.

On the other hand, if the U.S. and Japan decided to disassociate entirely from the Korean Peninsula and leave the way of reunification to the Korean peoples, the possibility of a neutral and completely dissociated Japan of becoming involved in another Korean war would significantly decrease. However, this policy of deserting a de facto ally would give rise to negative political and psychological impacts on the perceptions of Japan by other non-Communist Asian countries and long-term Japanese national interests would be jeopardized.

Another problem Japan may face in the event of a military conflict between the two Koreas is the possible domestic political repercussions that such a crisis could produce. Japan's polarized political community would display some confusion. If the Government of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) chose to support American efforts to defend South Korea, The Japanese Socialist and Communist Parties which together
gathered 31 percent of the total vote in the 1976 election, would paralyze the Diet and mobilize an anti-government mass-movement which might result in far-reaching political upheaval. Another disturbing factor would be the possible insurgency by the 600,000 Korean residents in Japan. These 600,000 Koreans are divided into pro-Seoul and pro-Pyongyang organizations. If the LDP Government should launch a favourable and positive policy to the defence of South Korea, the pro-Pyongyang organization might pose a problem.

The afore-mentioned discussions show that any kind of crisis in the Korean Peninsula could seriously damage not only Japanese security vis-à-vis external threats but also domestic political stability. Thus, Japan's security will be best served by a low-tension, stable balance between the two Koreas. Moreover, the tranquility in the Peninsula is important for Japan to avoid a possible disruption of U.S.-Japanese security relations.

Then, what policy can the Japanese Government adopt to maintain the "peace" on the Korean Peninsula? Although Japan's security interests will be best served by stable balance between the two Koreas, any kind of direct political and military action

---

33 See footnotes No. 76 and No. 78 of Chapter II.
34 At least two-thirds of the 600,000 Koreans now living in Japan are affiliated with the pro-Pyongyang General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan. Nathan White, "Japan's Security Interests in Korea", Asian Survey, Vol. XVI, No. 4 (April 1976), p. 311.
which is based on a two Korea policy would only result in
deteriorating relations between the entire Korean Peninsula
and Japan. Deep-seated suspicion and animosity maintained
by two Korean people towards the Japanese have been unabated. 35

Given the strong wishes of the people of both Koreas to reunite
their countries, Japanese direct two Korean policies by
political and military measures will doubtlessly further the
bitter animosity and suspicion held by the two peoples. Today,
the North Korean regime maintains impressive military cap-
ability. 36 The numerical strength of its army is approximately
four times as large as that of Japan's and its air forces have
enough power to strike cities of western Japan. Awkward

35 A public survey conducted by Choongang Ilbo, an influential
South Korean newspaper, Japan ranked as one of the least liked
countries by the Korean respondents. According to the survey,
Japan ranked as one of the three least liked countries behind
China and the U.S.S.R. by the respondents. In response to the
question, "which one of the two countries (the U.S. and Japan)
is likely to betray our confidence," 62% of the respondents
listed Japan, while 11% listed the U.S.

See Hong N. Kim, "Japanese-South Korean relations in the

36

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>410,000</td>
<td>560,000</td>
<td>155,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>39,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(44,000 tons)</td>
<td>(78,000 tons)</td>
<td>(168,000 tons)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>42,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(588 combat</td>
<td>(216 combat</td>
<td>(500 combat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aircrafts)</td>
<td>aircrafts)</td>
<td>aircrafts)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Military Balance 1975-1976, (London: The Inter-
national Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), p. 36.

Also see Japan, Defence Agency, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
Japanese intervention policy to Korea's unification movements will deteriorate its relations with not only the North but also the South and give rise to a threat to Japan. In the circumstances, ironically the most advisable policy that the Government of Japan should follow result, in my view, in the limitation of its relations with the two Koreas within the trade, economic and cultural sphere.

General Soviet Threat

Soviet military strength—both nuclear and conventional—will continue to be well beyond Japan's capability to cope with for the foreseeable future. In the past ten years, the Soviet military capability in the Far East has been gradually increased. From 1965 to 1975, the strength of its ground force increased from 180,000 to 300,000. In terms of equipment, the Far Eastern army is equipped with first-rate hardwares such as the T-62 tank, the BMP-76 armored vehicle and the ground-to-ground missile FROG-7. Some units of Strategic Rocket Forces equipped with ICBM, FRBM and MRBM seem to be located in the Far East. Soviet naval power in the Pacific has grown remarkably during the period, from 700,000 tons in 1965 to 1,200,000 tons in 1975. As of December 1975, the Soviet Pacific Fleet possesses approximately 750 vessels deployed in the Western

38 Ibid., p. 18.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., p. 17.
41 Ibid., p. 18 and p. 148.
Pacific, the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea. The Soviet Pacific Fleet is composed of Kresta-II-class ASW cruisers with SSM and SAM, Krivak-class destroyers with SSM and SAM, submarine fleets and other escort vessels. The submarine fleet is expanding rapidly. Today, the Soviet submarine fleet in the Pacific is composed of 80 diesel and 40 nuclear-powered submarines.

The Soviet Pacific Fleet has already acquired the capability of a deep water navy. The capability has been shown in the various naval manoeuvres conducted in the Western Pacific and the Sea of Japan. In 1970, the Soviet navy carried out the world-wide naval exercise named "Okean", in which the Soviets deployed its navy as far as the Guam Islands in the Pacific.

In the summer of 1971, about 40 cruisers made an exercise from the sea off Hokkaido to Hawaii. In the summer of 1973, about 10 destroyers and other military ships conducted an exercise near the Marshall Islands and the Guam Islands. In April 1975, the world wide manoeuvre named "Okean 75" was again conducted, in which 220 vessels and 400 aircrafts participated. In the summer of 1975, three medium sized naval exercises were conducted close to the Japanese waters, in the sea off Hokkaido.

---

44 Ibid., p. 19.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., p. 20.
Honshyu and Kyushyu. 48 One common point seen in every naval exercise is that the manoeuvres have been conducted near the Japanese waters. The Japanese Defence Agency views the primary task assigned to the series of Soviet naval exercises as being to prepare for a contingency operation in Taiwan, Japan, and to demonstrate their capability to the P.R.C. 49

Aside from the naval operations, activities off the coast of Japan by Soviet intelligence ships have long irritated the Japanese public, especially the fishermen. These Soviet activities reached unprecedented proportions in June, July and August of 1976. 50 According to the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) Staff Office, these intelligence ships were apparently interested in the radar facilities of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) and the MSDF's anti-submarine warfare devices. 51

The Soviet air force in the Far East has also been strengthened extensively. From 1965 to 1975, the number of combat aircrafts increased from 1,430 to 2,010. 52 Out of the 2,010 combat aircrafts, 580 are bombers and 1,300 are fighters. 53 Every year, Soviet reconnaissance aircrafts have made about 200 sorties into Japanese air space. 54 To counter these activities, the Japanese ASDF has been scrambling interceptor fighters.

48 Ibid., p. 19.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., op. cit., p. 148.
54 Ibid., p. 23.
which averaged 320 times in a year. According to the SDF
Staff Office, these Soviet reconnaissance aircrafts are
interested in the radar facilities of the SDF.

The strength of the Japanese MSDF and ASDF as of
December 1975, on the other hand, has been as follows: The
Japanese fleets maintain 137 vessels amounting to 168,000
tons. Because of the Constitutional constraint, they have
not been permitted to equip themselves with missile equipped
cruisers or attack aircraft carriers. The MSDF possesses
sixteen diesel-powered submarines, but no nuclear-powered
one. As for the ASDF, it is not equipped with long-range
bombers. The ASDF maintains 480 combat aircrafts. Both
the MSDF and the ASDF do not have effective anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) capabilities. The Soviet submarine fleets
are enjoying a free hand today near the Japanese waters.

55 The Number of Scramble in the Recent Years
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 Average per year
Number 370 345 306 257 323 about 320

See Japan, Defence Agency, op. cit., p. 115.
56 Japan Times Weekly, International Edition,
August 28, 1976.
58 Ibid., p. 35.
59 Ibid., p. 148.
60 The total number of ASDF's aircraft was 500
including helicopters and trainers. See Ibid., p. 148.
61 Ibid., pp. 106-107.
The strength of the U. S. Seventh Fleet and the air force deployed in the Far East decreased from 1965 to 1975. The total tonnage of the Seventh Fleet dwindled from 900,000 tons in 1965 to 600,000 tons in 1975. Particularly, the ASW capabilities of the U. S. Seventh Fleet dwindled to twenty-five percent of the level of its capacity maintained in 1965. The number of combat aircraft of the U. S. air force in East Asia decreased from 920 to 500 (including 150 aircrafts of the Seventh Fleet).

Facing the growing strength of the Soviet naval and air power and the gradual decline in the strength of the U. S. military power in the Far East, what counter policy is Japan taking today?

The fiscal year of 1976 is the last year of the current Fourth Defense Build-up Programme that has been carried out since the 1972 fiscal year. The programme, however, will end with a substantial proportion of the planned acquisition

---

62 Ibid., p. 17.
64 Japan, Defence Agency, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
of major equipments left unaccomplished. This is mainly due to the increased cost triggered by the oil crisis in 1973, and the budget crunch has hampered the procurement of hardwares.

According to Boei Hakusho (White Paper on Defence), these equipments are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>74-Type tank</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73-Type Armoured Vehicle</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Propelled Gun</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escort Vessel</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Aircraft (including 15 anti-submarine aircraft)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A SAM group with Nike-J</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Aircraft</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE I
DEFENCE EXPENDITURES COMPARED WITH OTHER BUDGET EXPENDITURES
OF JAPAN
(FY 1972-1975) (Y, $ Billion, %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>General Account Budget</th>
<th>Social Security</th>
<th>Education, Promotion of Science</th>
<th>Public Works</th>
<th>Defence B/A</th>
<th>C/A</th>
<th>D/A</th>
<th>E/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>114,677</td>
<td>16,415</td>
<td>13,046</td>
<td>21,485</td>
<td>8,002</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(382.26)</td>
<td>(54.72)</td>
<td>(43.49)</td>
<td>(71.62)</td>
<td>(26.67)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>142,841</td>
<td>21,145</td>
<td>15,702</td>
<td>28,408</td>
<td>9,355</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(476.14)</td>
<td>(70.48)</td>
<td>(52.34)</td>
<td>(94.69)</td>
<td>(31.18)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>170,994</td>
<td>28,908</td>
<td>19,633</td>
<td>28,407</td>
<td>10,930</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(569.98)</td>
<td>(96.30)</td>
<td>(65.44)</td>
<td>(94.69)</td>
<td>(36.43)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>212,888</td>
<td>39,269</td>
<td>26,401</td>
<td>29,095</td>
<td>13,273</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(709.63)</td>
<td>(130.90)</td>
<td>(88.00)</td>
<td>(96.98)</td>
<td>(44.24)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1. Every figure is the amount budgeted.
2. Exchange rate calculated as $1=300 yen.


As seen in Table I, the defence-budget/appropriated-budget ratio decreased annually during the programme. In addition, in a limited defence budget, more than fifty percent of the total budget accounts for personnel costs and rations and the ratio has been increasing, while appropriations for major
weapons and other equipments have dropped. The items left unaccomplished in the current Programme will be, according to the Defence Agency, incorporated in the new plan.

The former Director-General of the Defence Agency, Mr. Sakata, indicated in October 1975, that Japan should maintain the size of its SDF at the present level for the next ten years. In a lecture delivered at a Tokyo hotel, Mr. Sakata said, "Judging from the present international situation there is no immediate threat ... This condition is likely to continue in the foreseeable future -- in the next ten years." Mr. Sakata termed the idea of expanding the SDF's capability to match the military power of some of Japan's neighbouring countries as being not practicable. At the same time, however, he emphasized upon the need for a qualitative improvement of the SDF to "maintain basic defence power to provide the needed defence in time of emergency." Mr. Sakata's speech endorsed an idea made public earlier that Japan should maintain "peace-

---

66 See Appendix 10.
69 According to the Japan Times Weekly, October 25, 1975, the former Director-General Sakata gave two reasons for this. One is that many people as well as those neighbouring countries would have apprehensions about just how far Japan would go in keeping up its defence forces; the other is that with the Japanese economy heading for a period of slower growth, Japan cannot afford to spend too much on defence.
time defence requirements. These requirements, according to
the Defence Agency, are that defence expenditures should be
limited to less than one percent of the GNP and the SDF should
be maintained within the following framework:
- The GSDF: 13 divisions with 180,000 troops.
- The MSDF: 250,000 — 280,000 tons.
- The ASDF: About 800 aircraft.

These quantitative limits are expected to be incorporated into
the Post-Fourth Defence Build-up Programme starting in April,
1977.

Study of the new defence plan has been carried out in
the National Defence Council. In November, 1976, the Govern-
ment of Japan formally approved the "outlines" for Japan's new
defence build-up plan, submitted by the Council. The "outlines"
are supposed to serve as a guideline for the new plan, the Post-
Fourth Defence Build-up Programme, that is to follow the current
Programme. The "outlines" for the Post-Fourth Defence Build-up
Programme emphasized: first, the need for Japan to make efforts
to counter limited scale aggression; second, people's strong
determination to safeguard Japan's independence; third, the need
of the bilateral security arrangement with the United States to
deal with effectively full-fledged aggression as well as nuclear
threats. The "outlines" say:

70 "Peacetime Defence Requirements" were outlined in
25, 1975.
6, 1976.
73 Ibid.
1) Should there occur indirect aggression or any unlawful military activity with military force which might lead to aggression against Japan, Japan will take immediate action in response thereto, thereby settling the situation at an early stage.

2) Should there occur direct aggression, Japan will repel it at its earliest possible stage by taking immediate action in response and conducting an integrated and systematic operation of its defence capability. In this case, with respect to limited, small-scale aggression, Japan will repel it, in principle, by herself and even in cases where unaided repelling of aggression is difficult due to the scale, type and other factors of aggression, Japan will continue unyielding resistance by mobilizing all available means and repel aggression with the co-operation of the U.S.\textsuperscript{74}

Compared with the objective of the Fourth Defence Build-up Programme,\textsuperscript{75} the coming post-Fourth Programme does

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{75} The defence concept and objective of the Fourth Defence Build-up Programme was as follows:

1) The keynote of our country's defence lies in deterring aggression by possessing effective defence capabilities of our own, while maintaining the existing security arrangements with the U.S. Against nuclear threats we will rely on the nuclear deterrent of the U.S.

2) In the event of an invasion being launched against Japan, our country will counter indirect aggression and repel a small-scale direct aggression by our own efforts, and in the case of an armed aggression beyond such a scale, we will counter it with the co-operation of the U.S.

not, in essence, show radical change from the previous one. One difference in the newly introduced defence concept from the previous defence plan is the strong emphasis upon the qualitative improvement in all fields related to defence.\textsuperscript{76}

In the past four programmes, the target level of defence build-up efforts was decided in terms of quantity (the Fourth plan has put its priority on qualitative improvement of the SDF, as well as on quantitative improvement).\textsuperscript{77} The "outlines" for the post-Fourth Defence Build-up Programme, however, openly acknowledge the present level of the numerical strength of the SDF as being almost sufficient.\textsuperscript{78} It is likely, therefore, that the Government of Japan will continue to maintain the present structure of defence with a growing emphasis on qualitative improvement of the Self-Defence Forces.


CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Japanese defence efforts have long suffered from unique obstacles derived from the Constitutional restriction and the people's psychological conditions. As a result, Japanese Self-Defence Forces (SDF) can not acquire sufficient military capabilities to deter even a conventional aggression. The expected functions of the SDF are to subdue internal insurgency and to repelling any small scale direct aggression. The SDF do not have any capacity to cope with full-fledged conventional aggression. The Japanese public, however, does not show a strong desire to strengthen the SDF.

A public survey conducted by the Mainichi Shimbun clearly suggests the general view held by the people as to Japan's security. The survey picked out four categories as measures for the maintenance of security of Japan: 1) promotion of economic co-operation, 2) active diplomacy, 3) promotion of cultural and personnel interchanges, and 4) the building up of the SDF. Excepting the last one, 75 percent of the respondents answered very effective or effective for Japan's security. As to the category of the strengthening the SDF, only 40 percent replied very effective or effective and 46 percent answered not quite effective or not effective at all.

Obviously, a majority of the public is likely to express a desire to maintain the present level of the SDF's capabilities.

Successive Governments of Japan, well-aware of the insufficient level of the SDF's capacity, have tried to compensate by maintaining the security arrangement with the U.S. The people's attitude towards the military alliance, however, has been negative. Specifically, a great majority of the Japanese have consistently demanded the removal and withdrawal of U.S. bases and forces from Japanese soil. This is a dilemma for the Government of Japan. For the Government, American forces on Japanese territory are valuable "hostages" to maintain the U.S. credibility. The U.S., on the other hand, understands the use of its military bases in Japan as a quid pro quo of its security guarantee to Japan against conventional and nuclear threats. Complete removal and withdrawal of U.S. bases and forces mean the termination of U.S. military protection of Japan. Thus, as long as Japan does not maintain sufficient military capabilities to defend itself, the demand for a significant or complete removal of U.S. bases and forces from Japan can not be satisfied. Specifically, as long as Japan continues to confront the formidable Soviet naval and air power in the Western Pacific, Japan has little choice but to maintain a military co-operation with the United States.

In view of the domestic political needs of both countries, however, it is desirable for both the U.S. and
Japanese Governments to reduce the present number of U.S. air bases and level of forces in Japanese territory. The problems of area and scope of future U.S. forces and bases might be controversial. In my opinion, the following U.S. facilities and establishments (as a minimum level) -- a few naval bases and residences of the families of the Seventh Fleet -- would be necessary for Japan. The presence in some city near Tokyo of the American families of the Seventh Fleet would, as in the case of U.S. force presence, function as "hostages". The U.S. in turn, would be able to retain its capabilities to assure other Asian allies of its security commitments.

The unconditional use of the bases by U.S. forces in a crisis in the Far East, however, would give rise to a danger to Japanese security. The apprehension would be heightened in the possible military contingency in the Korean Peninsula. Efforts to strengthen the Japanese control over the future Japan-based U.S. military operations in the Peninsula would be quite important. Japan should impose the following conditions on the possible Japan-based U.S. operations at the outbreak of military conflict in the region: first, any kind of direct or indirect Japan-based U.S. military operations towards the area north of the 38th parallel should not be allowed. In other words, the use (for logistic and support purposes only) of U.S. bases and establishments in Japan
could be allowed only for the purpose of repelling invading forces to the territory of South Korea. Any kind of use of these bases by the U.S. should not be allowed in case of successful attacks by the South beyond the 38th parallel.

Second, in any circumstances, U.S. nuclear weapon task forces should neither be introduced into Japan nor deployed from Japanese administrative areas. Imposition of these conditions and restrictions on the use of U.S. bases would probably cause a conflict between the U.S. and South Korea on the one hand, and Japan on the other. However, as long as Japan continues to be vulnerable to external attack and to follow present modest defence efforts, the above-mentioned restrictions might be necessary.

Another solution to the problem would be for Japan to acquire full responsibility of defending itself against any conventional threat. This defence posture would probably mitigate fears held by the Japanese of being involved in a military conflict in the Peninsula. Judging from the internal situations of Japan, however, efforts to further strengthen the SDF would meet some difficulties. The Government of Japan would not be able to adopt this policy for the time being.

In the long run, however, this policy will become more persuasive because of the strong tendency in Japan to stress Japanese self-reliance. In addition, the policy will be able to surmount domestic political opposition if the disengagement of U.S.
forces from the Far East continues.

The probability of complete withdrawal of U.S. naval forces from the Western Pacific would be small, as long as neither the P.R.C. nor Japan builds a sufficient strong naval capacity to balance the growing Soviet naval power in the area. The ultimate objective of the U.S. Far Eastern policy, however, might be to make the P.R.C. and Japan balance each other in the region. In the light of this long-term U.S. policy, the destiny of the current U.S.-Japanese security arrangement is uncertain. Thus, the strengthening of the potential resources of Japan's defence might be necessary.

Today, Japan has massive economic and technological resources, particularly in such fields as shipbuilding, electronics, computers, missiles and nuclear energy. These resources constitute potential for a strong military capability. Japan's fundamental policy, therefore, should be to increase and improve these economic and technical resources to widen future defence options and to expand other potential for a rapid expansion of its military power on short notice if any future situation so required.
APPENDIX I
SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
SEPTEMBER 8, 1951

Japan has this day signed a Treaty of Peace with the Allied Powers. On the coming into force of that Treaty, Japan will not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-defense because it has been disarmed. There is danger to Japan in this situation because irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world. Therefore, Japan desires a Security Treaty with the United States of America to come into force simultaneously with the Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and Japan. The Treaty of Peace recognizes that Japan as a sovereign nation has the right to enter into collective security arrangements, and further, the Charter of the United Nations recognizes that all nations possess an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.

In exercise of these rights, Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan.

The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Accordingly, the two countries have agreed as follows:

Article I. Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air, and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of the international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside Power or Powers.

Article II. During the exercise of the right referred to in Article I, Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases or any rights, power, or authority whatsoever in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of maneuver, or transit of ground, air, or naval forces to any third Power.
APPENDIX 1 (Cont'd.)

Article III. The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and about Japan shall be determined by administrative agreements between the two Governments.

Article IV. This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and of Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan Area.

Article V. This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at the city of San Francisco, in the English and Japanese languages, this eighth day of September, 1951.

APPENDIX 2

TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN

THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, January 19, 1960

The United States of America and Japan,
Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,
Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,
Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations,
Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,
Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

Article I. The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

Article II. The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.

Article III. The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.
APPENDIX 2 (Cont'd.)

Article IV. The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

Article V. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article VI. For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air, and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of the United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

Article VII. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article VIII. This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.

Article IX. The Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.

Article X. This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan Area.

However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten-years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate
APPENDIX 2 (Cont'd.)

the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done in duplicate at Washington in the English and Japanese languages, both equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960.

APPENDIX 3

PREAMBLE AND ARTICLE 9 FROM
THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN

Preamble

We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty through this land and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution. Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. This is a universal principle of mankind upon which this Constitution is founded. We reject and revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith.

We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.

We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations.

We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.

Chapter II. Renunciation of War

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the State will not be recognized.

APPENDIX 4

EXCERPTS FROM THE ALLIED TREATY OF

PEACE WITH JAPAN, September 8, 1951

Article 5.

(a) Japan accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular the obligations

(i) to settle its international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;

(ii) to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations;

(iii) to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations may take preventive or enforcement action.

(b) The Allied Powers confirm that they will be guided by the principles of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations in their relations with Japan.

(c) The Allied Powers for their part recognize that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that Japan may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements.

APPENDIX 5

EXCERPTS FROM THE SINO-JAPANESE COMMUNIQUÉ

September 29, 1972

China and Japan are neighbouring countries separated only by a strip of water, and there was a long history of traditional friendship between them. The two peoples ardently wish to end the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries. The termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations between China and Japan—the realization of such wishes of the two peoples will open a new page in the annals of relations between the two countries.

The Japanese side is keenly aware of Japan’s responsibility for causing enormous damage in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches itself. The Japanese side reaffirms its position that in seeking to realize the normalization of relations between Japan and China, it proceeds from the stand of fully understanding the three principles for the restoration of diplomatic relations put forward by the government of the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese side expressed its welcome for this.

Although the social systems of China and Japan are different, the two countries should and can establish peaceful and friendly relations. The normalization of relations and the development of good-neighbourly and friendly relations between the two countries are in the interests of the two peoples, and will also contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the safeguarding of world peace.

(1) The abnormal state of affairs which has hitherto existed between the People’s Republic of China and Japan is declared terminated on the date of publication of this statement.

(2) The government of Japan recognizes the government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China.

(3) The government of the People’s Republic of China reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China. The government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the government of China and adheres to its stand of complying with article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.

(4) The government of the People’s Republic of China and the government of Japan have decided upon the establishment of diplomatic relations as from 29 September 1972. The two governments have decided to adopt all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of functions of embassies in each other’s capitals in accordance with international law and practice, and exchange ambassadors as speedily as possible.
(5) The government of the People's Republic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the peoples of China and Japan, it renounces its demand for war indemnities from Japan.

(6) The government of the People's Republic of China and the government of Japan agree to establish durable relations of peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. In keeping with the foregoing principles and the principles of the United Nations Charter, the governments of the two countries affirm that in their mutual relations, all disputes shall be settled by peaceful means without resorting to the use or threat of force.

(7) The normalization of relations between China and Japan is not directed against third countries. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific Region and each country is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

(8) To consolidate and develop the peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, the government of the People's Republic of China and the government of Japan agree to hold negotiations aimed at the conclusion of a treaty of peace and friendship.

(9) In order to further develop the relations between the two countries and broaden the exchange of visits, the government of the People's Republic of China and the government of Japan agree to hold negotiations aimed at the conclusion of agreements on trade, navigation, aviation, fisheries, etc., in accordance with the needs and taking into consideration the existing non-governmental agreements.

### APPENDIX 6

**COMPARISON OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES (1972-1975)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>$ per head</th>
<th>% of GNP¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.²</td>
<td>84,400</td>
<td>88,900</td>
<td>96,400</td>
<td>103,800</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>77,639</td>
<td>78,473</td>
<td>84,332</td>
<td>92,800</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>8,925</td>
<td>13,295</td>
<td>14,048</td>
<td>16,260</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7,360</td>
<td>9,818</td>
<td>9,102</td>
<td>12,250</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.R.C.</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>7,889</td>
<td>9,033</td>
<td>9,900</td>
<td>10,380</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2,728</td>
<td>3,769</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>4,484</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**
1. Percentages calculated in local currency.
2. The rouble defense expenditure is derived by adding 75 percent of the All-Union science budget to the official defense budget. The dollar expenditure using estimated conversion rates is the midpoint of a range arrived at by the method described in the *Military Balance 1973-4* pp. 8-9, which calculates the Soviet manpower costs at American military wage levels in dollars and converts their non-manpower budgetary costs at a computed rate of $1 = 0.5 roubles. The 1975 official exchange rate is $1 = 0.72 roubles.
3. There is no agreement on the resources that are devoted to defense. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has recently estimated the 1973 expenditure at $15 billion.

### APPENDIX 7

**COMPARATIVE STRENGTHS OF ARMED FORCES 1954-1975**

(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>U.S.A.</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>W. Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>U.S.S.R.</th>
<th>P.R.C.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>3,350</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>4,750</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>3,049</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>2,857</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>2,637</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2,552</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2,514</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>3,623</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>2,572</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>2,827</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>2,737</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2,687</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2,723</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>3,150</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>3,123</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>3,165</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3,446</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>3,220</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>3,547</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>3,220</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>3,454</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3,066</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>3,305</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2,699</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>3,375</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>2,391</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>3,375</td>
<td>2,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2,253</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>3,425</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>2,174</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>3,525</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2,130</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>3,575</td>
<td>3,250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** From 1954 to 1974, excluding forces enlisted outside Britain. The 1975 figure includes forces enlisted outside Britain.

APPENDIX 8

BASIC POLICIES FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE ADOPTED BY THE
JAPANESE NATIONAL DEFENCE COUNCIL AND CABINET

May 20, 1957

The objective of national defence is to prevent direct and indirect
generation, and once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby pre-
serving the independence and peace of Japan founded upon democratic
principles.

To achieve this objective, the Government of Japan hereby
establishes the following principles:

(1) To support the activities of the United Nations, and promote
international co-operation, thereby contributing to the realization of
world peace.

(2) To stabilize the public welfare and enhance the people's
love for their country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential
for Japan's security.

(3) To develop progressively the effective defence capabilities
necessary for self-defence, with due regard to the nation's resources
and the prevailing domestic situation.

(4) To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-
U.S. security arrangements pending more effective functioning of the
United Nations in future in deterring and repelling such aggression.

XV, No. 4, July/August 1973, (London: The International Institute

Japan, Defence Agency, Boei Hakusho (White Paper on Defence), (Tokyo:
# APPENDIX 9
SUCCESSIVE DIRECTOR-GENERALS OF
THE DEFENCE AGENCY OF JAPAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Tenure in Office</th>
<th>Age at Inauguration</th>
<th>Other Ministerial Careers Before Appointment as Director-General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mashihara Keikichi</td>
<td>Aug. 1950-Jan. 1951</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohashi Takeo</td>
<td>Jan. 1951-July 1952</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoshida Shigeru</td>
<td>July 1952-Oct. 1952</td>
<td></td>
<td>Concurrently Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimura Atsutaro</td>
<td>Nov. 1952-Dec. 1952</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omura Seiichi</td>
<td>Dec. 1952-Mar. 1955</td>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugihara Arata</td>
<td>Mar. 1955-July 1955</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunada Shigemasa</td>
<td>July 1955-Nov. 1955</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funada Naka</td>
<td>Nov. 1955-Dec. 1956</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishibashi Tanzan</td>
<td>Dec. 1956-Jan. 1957</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Minister of International Trade and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kishi Nobusuke</td>
<td>Jan. 1957-Feb. 1957</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Minister of Commerce (pre-war days), Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otaki Takeshi</td>
<td>Feb. 1957-July 1957</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsushima Juichi</td>
<td>July 1957-June 1958</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Minister of Finance (pre-war days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sato Yoshiaki</td>
<td>June 1958-Jan. 1959</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ito Shigejiro</td>
<td>Jan. 1959-June 1959</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 9 (Cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Tenure in Office</th>
<th>Age at Inauguration</th>
<th>Other Ministerial Careers Before Appointment as Director-General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akagi Munenori</td>
<td>June 1959–July 1960</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Minister of Agriculture and Forestry; Secretary-General of the Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ezaki Masumi</td>
<td>July 1960–Dec. 1960</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujieda Sensuke</td>
<td>July 1961–July 1962</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Director-General of Prime Minister's Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiga Kenjiro</td>
<td>July 1962–July 1963</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuda Taneyasu</td>
<td>July 1963–July 1964</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koizumi Junya</td>
<td>July 1964–June 1965</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Director-General of Prime Minister's Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsuno Raizo</td>
<td>June 1965–Aug. 1966</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Director-General of Prime Minister's Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masuda Keikichi</td>
<td>Dec. 1966–Nov. 1968</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 9 (Cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Tenure in Office</th>
<th>Age at Inauguration</th>
<th>Other Ministerial Careers Before Appointment as Director-General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nishimura Naomi</td>
<td>Aug. 1971-Dec. 1971</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Director-General of the Defence Agency, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ezaki Masumi</td>
<td>Dec. 1971-July 1972</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Director-General of the Defence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashihara Keikichi</td>
<td>July 1972-May 1973</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Director-General of the Defence Agency, Director-General of Administrative Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamanaka Sadanori</td>
<td>May 1973-Nov. 1974</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Director-General of Prime Minister's Office, Director-General of Okinawa Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uno Yusuke</td>
<td>Nov. 1974-Dec. 1974</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Minister of Education, Minister of Health and Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mihara Asao</td>
<td>Jan. 1977-</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>Minister of Education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1. The names are given in accordance with Japanese usage: that is, the family name first, the given name last.
2. Director-General of the National Police Reserve Agency.
3. Director-General of the National Police Reserve Agency.
4. Director-General of the National Safety Agency.
5. Hereafter, the position was referred to as Director-General of the Defence Agency.
6. Author's translation.

## APPENDIX 10

### CHANGE OF COMPOSITION OF DEFENCE BUDGET UNDER THE FOURTH FIVE YEAR DEFENCE BUILD-UP PROGRAMME OF JAPAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Expenses</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Rations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of Local Situation Adjacent to Facilities and Areas, and Relocation</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and Development</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:  
1. Procurement includes weapons and vehicles, aircraft and ships.  
2. Maintenance includes living costs, clothing, fuel, maintenance, and repair.  
3. Author's Translation

APPENDIX II

ORGANIZATION OF JAPANESE DEFENCE AGENCY AND SELF-DEFENCE FORCES

National Defence Council

Cabinet

Prime Minister

JDA
Director General
(State Minister)

Parliamentary Vice Minister

Administrative Vice Minister

Councilors

Defence Facilities Administration Agency

Internal Bureaus and Offices

Director General's

Secretary

Director's

Defence Bureau

Personnel and Education Bureau

Health Bureau

Finance Bureau

Equipment Bureau

Joint Staff
Council

Secretariat

Chief of the GSDF

Ground Staff
Office

Chief of the MSDF

Maritime Staff
Office

Chief of the ASDF

Air Staff
Office

GSDF Units and Organs

MSDF Units and Organs

ASDF Units and Organs

Auxiliary Organs

Note: Author's Translation.

APPENDIX 12

THE NUMBER OF U.S. BASES, FACILITIES AND THEIR AREA IN JAPAN

(in square km²)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>2,824</td>
<td>1,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>1,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The effective year of Security Treaty between the U.S. and Japan

The effective year of Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the U.S. and Japan

Okinawa Reversion

Note: Author's Translation.

APPENDIX 13
PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN JAPAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>260,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>210,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>117,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>77,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>58,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>48,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>46,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>46,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>18,100</td>
<td>34,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>8,200</td>
<td>11,400</td>
<td>19,600</td>
<td>39,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>11,400</td>
<td>19,300</td>
<td>40,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>8,700</td>
<td>14,600</td>
<td>18,500</td>
<td>41,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>26,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>10,400</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>16,100</td>
<td>54,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>31,500</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>53,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>50,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty
Normalization of Russo-Japanese Relations.
The First Defence Build-up Programme.
The MST.
The Second Defence Build-up Programme.
The First Chinese nuclear testing.
Beginning of U.S. bombing to North Vietnam.
The Third Defence Build-up Programme
The Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué.
Okinawa Reversion. The Fourth Defence Build-up Programme.
The Tanaka-Nixon Joint Communiqué.
The Tanaka-Ford Joint Communiqué.
The Miki-Ford Joint Communiqué.

Note: Author's Translation.

Source: Documents offered by the Embassy of Japan, Ottawa, 1976.
### COMPARATIVE LIST OF JAPANESE POLITICAL PARTIES’
### DEFENCE AND SECURITY POLICIES AS OF AUGUST 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Policy for Japan’s Security</th>
<th>Basic Policy for Japan’s Diplomacy</th>
<th>MST¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-operation with the U.N.; LDP, &quot;Maintenance of the MST; (406)&quot; Maintenance of the SDF.</td>
<td>Co-operation with the U.N.; Co-operation with the free world; Promotion of Japan’s identity as an Asian country.</td>
<td>Maintenance of the treaty; Consistent defence consultation with the U.S.; Stable base supply to U.S. forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abrogation of the MST; JSP Unarmed Neutrality; (180) Removal of U.S. bases; Disbandment of the SDF; Peaceful Co-existence.</td>
<td>Declaration of Japan’s neutrality.</td>
<td>Abrogation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP U.S. military pact; (59) Promotion of Japan’s neutrality.</td>
<td>Enactment of Japan’s neutrality.</td>
<td>Abrogation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate abrogation of the MST; Komei Party Promotion of peaceful, (54) independent and neutral policy.</td>
<td>Complete equi-distant neutrality.</td>
<td>Immediate abrogation.³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassessment of the MST; Staged dissolution of the MST; ⁴ DSP (30) Removal of U.S. forces and bases; Minimum self-defence capabilities.</td>
<td>Independent, peaceful co-existence.</td>
<td>Amendment of the MST to remove defects; Staged dissolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with the U.S.</td>
<td>Relations with the U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>Relations with the P.R.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LDP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of the MST; Principle of interdependence.</td>
<td>The good-neighbor policy.</td>
<td>The good-neighbor policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JSP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual non-aggression treaty.</td>
<td>Mutual non-aggression treaty; Peace treaty; Settlement of territorial problem.</td>
<td>Treaty of friendship and peace; Mutual non-aggression treaty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JCP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-aggression treaty; Notice of abrogation of Article II, c, of the San Francisco Peace Treaty; Peace treaty; Request for complete return of the Kurile Islands.</td>
<td>Non-aggression treaty; Other agreements based on five principles.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Komei Party</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DSP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjustment of Japan-U.S. relations; Amendment of the MST to remove defects.</td>
<td>Peace treaty; Request for return of Northern territory; Co-operation of Siberian Development.</td>
<td>Peace treaty; Earlier conclusion of other practical agreements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with South and North Korea</td>
<td>Regional Security Guarantee</td>
<td>Bases of Japan's defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The good-neighbor policy.</td>
<td>Investigation of regional co-operation system.</td>
<td>The minimum defence capabilities; Maintenance of the MSP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komei Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>Establishment of the diplomatic relations with North Korea; Promotion of simultaneous admission to the U.N.</td>
<td>Minimum defence capabilities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**APPENDIX 14 (Cont'd)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article 9 of the Constitution</th>
<th>Constitutionality of the SDF</th>
<th>SDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Constitutional</td>
<td>Gradual improvement and expansion in accordance with national power and environment; Transformation of Defence Agency into Ministry of Defence; Priority on defensive capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>Unconstitutional</td>
<td>Disbandment; Transformation into peaceful land construction corps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>Unconstitutional</td>
<td>Disbandment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komei Party</td>
<td>There is a doubt of unconstitutionality</td>
<td>Transformation into national police force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>Constitutional</td>
<td>Restrict to the minimum level; Priority on defensive power; Put the SDF under an obligation to serve people's welfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Control of the SDF</td>
<td>Nuclear Weapon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcement of the National Defence Council;</td>
<td>Three non-nuclear principles; Prohibition of nuclear testing; Trusting the U.S. nuclear deterrence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP Establishment of a Standing Committee on National Defence and Security in the Diet.</td>
<td>Declaration of non-nuclear country; Establishment of an Asian-Pacific nuclear-free zone.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP -------------------</td>
<td>Three non-nuclear principles; Nuclear weapon prohibition law.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP -------------------</td>
<td>Declaration of non-use of nuclear weapons from Japanese soil; Declaration of non-nuclear country; Establishment of an Asian-Pacific nuclear-free and neutral zone.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komei Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP Establishment of a Standing Committee on National Defence in the Diet.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**
1. The Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security Between the U.S. and Japan.
2. The number of members in the Diet.
3. In October, 1975, the Komei Party issued an official statement that the MST should be abrogated through diplomatic understandings between Japan and the U.S.
4. In November, 1975, the DSP disclosed a more positive attitude in favour of maintaining the MST. It stated that the MST should be maintained until a new security setup materializes to replace it. Author's translation.

**Source:** Boei Nenkan Kanko Kai, Boei Nenkan 1975, (Defence Year Book), (Tokyo: Boei Nenkan Kanko Kai, March 1975), pp. 84-85.
防衛庁設置法（抄）

第三章 国防会議

第六十二条

1. 国防に関する重要事項を審議する機関を設け、内閣に国防会議を置く。
2. 内閣総理大臣は、次の事項については、国防会議に出席しなければならない。
   二、国防の基本方針。
   三、防衛計画の大綱。
   四、前号の計画に関連する産業等の調整計画の大綱。
   五、防衛出動の可否。
   六、その他内閣総理大臣が必要と認める国防に関する重要事項。

3. 国防会議は、国防に関する重要事項について、必要に応じて内閣総理大臣に対し意見を述べる事ができる。

第六十三条

国防会議の構成、その他国防会議に関し必要な事項は別に法律で定める。

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

English Language Material

I. Government Publications


II. Books


III. Articles


Wakaizumi, Kei. "Japan's Dilemma: To Act or Not to Act." Foreign Policy, No. 16 (Fall 1974), pp. 30-47.


IV. Others.


The Economist.

The Far Eastern Economic Review.

The Japan Times Weekly.


The Globe and Mail.

The Manchester Guardian Weekly.

Japanese Language Material

I. Government Publications


II. Books.


III. Articles.


IV. Others.

Shimbun Geppo Henshubu. Shimbun Geppo (Documentary News of the Month).
Vol. 309, August 1972.
Vol. 311, October 1972.
Vol. 312, November 1972.