A Refuge from Militarism?

by

Jessica Squires, B.F.A., M.A.

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Abstract

This thesis offers the first comprehensive history of the network of the anti-draft groups that sprang up to support the American Vietnam war resisters who came to Canada, in the years during which the phenomenon was at its height. It brings new insights into the development of this movement, especially concerning its interactions with government agencies and police, its methods, its internal tensions and debates, and its relations with the wider Canadian political culture.

More precisely, it shows how the movement had an impact on government policy through various tactics. Government actions, such as police surveillance and policy shifts, affected the movement’s priorities. In turn, the war resisters and their supporters contributed to debates about nationalism and Canada’s relationship to the United States. This thesis explores specific relationships – between Canadians and Americans, activists and the public, as well as support groups and government agencies, including police. The actions of anti-draft groups in promoting the government’s programs while still pressing for positive change were a characteristic case of interpenetration between the “state” and “society,” and their mutual reinforcement.

All this occurred at a moment when the idea of Canada as a “refuge from militarism” was entering the vernacular as one of the key myths about the nation. The myth, which this thesis questions, has become that Canada, a more peaceful country than the United States, allowed the draft dodgers and deserters from south of the border to find refuge from militarism.
Inspired by hegemony theory and new institutionalism, this work seeks to explain this struggle for hegemony within an institutional understanding of government, which grants the bureaucracy a degree of autonomy, while recognizing the influence of the values of elites who were engaged in a war of position with social movements. It shows that the influence of citizens, or sections of the population, on government departments and officials’ behaviour and decisions, and vice versa, underlies the history of war resisters in Canada. In particular, the actions of both local police and the RCMP, and Department of Immigration officials, illustrate the battle for hegemony in the realm of attitudes towards war resisters.
Acknowledgements

This research would not have been possible without the support and guidance of a great many people: friends, family, colleagues, and acquaintances. I cannot possibly name them all; I hope those I omit will forgive me and know that I nonetheless thank them sincerely.

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I would especially like to lend my voice as a historian to the chorus of acknowledgements of the contribution of various archivists to the historian's work. For this project, archivist Laura Madokoro and the ATIP analysts at LAC must certainly receive my warmest thanks, not least for the ream of formal requests I made to consult the records of the RCMP. The staff at the archives of the University of Toronto, University of British Columbia, York University, McMaster University, and Dalhousie University was always professional and helpful.

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I would most like to thank my partner, Benoit Renaud. His unwavering faith in me allowed me to keep focussed, even at the most difficult moments in the process. He has accepted sacrifices we have made to this project in time and resources with absolutely no resentment, and only ever offered me positive encouragement and constructive criticism. Should he ever wish to change careers, he could certainly make a living as a combination counsellor and copy editor!

Finally, I would like to honour the new generation of war resisters. No matter how one feels about a particular war, and no matter their individual reasons for coming to Canada, the actions of young people seeking to avoid the soul-killing effects of fighting
them can, I think, only really be understood as courage. Their courage is inspiring us now, as those resisters in the sixties and early seventies inspired an earlier generation, to imagine a world without war.
# Table of Contents

**Abstract**  

**Acknowledgements**  

**Table of Contents**  

**List of Figures**  

**List of Appendices**  

**Introduction**  
- Approach  
- Scope  
- Terminology  
- Sources  
- The Personal Dimension  

**Chapter 1** Historiography of War Resistance, Theory, and Argument  
- A Selected Historiography of War Resisters  
- Immigration and Migration  
- State, Society, and Social Movements  
- Bureaucracy and Policing  
- Conclusion: A Multidisciplinary Approach  

**Chapter 2** The Anti-Draft Movement: its Inception, Activities, and Impacts  
- Part I: Canadian Anti-War and Anti-Draft Sentiment  
  - Canadian Anti-War and Anti-Draft Sentiment  
  - Resisters’ Perceptions of Canadian Welcome  
  - Motivations of Supporters  
- Part II: Emergence of the Anti-Draft Movement in Canada  
  - Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters (MCAWR)  
  - Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors  
  - Ottawa Assistance with Immigration and the Draft (AID)  
  - Toronto Anti-Draft Programme (TADP)  
  - Other Toronto Anti-Draft Groups  
  - Black War Resisters  
  - Women War Resisters  
  - Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors (NSCAWO)  
  - Other Anti-Draft Groups’ History  
  - Exile Groups’ History  
  - The Anti-Draft Movement: Transnational, Pan-Canadian
Part III: Support from the U.S. and from Other Canadian Groups 118

United States Connections of the Anti-Draft Movement
Canadian Support for War Resisters Outside the Anti-Draft Movement
Church Support for War Resisters
Church Support for War Resisters: the Canadian Council of Churches
Voice of Women Support for War Resisters

Part IV: The Impact and Effectiveness of the Anti-Draft Movement 135

The Anti-Draft Movement Established
Inter-Group Communication
The Movement's Impact on Resisters
From Disparate Beginnings to a Stable, Decentralized Network

Chapter 3 Deserter(s): Treatment, Tactics, Identity 154

War Resisters and Supporters' Expectations and First Impressions
Differential Treatment and Perception of Deserter(s)
Tactical Debates Among Anti-draft Groups, Activists, and Resister(s)
Pressure to Assimilate, Pressure to Identify as American
Canadian Nationalism and the Pressure on Americans to Assimilate
The Impact of Pressures to Assimilate or Not to Do So

Chapter 4 Left Nationalism and Its Limits: the Campaign to Open the Border to American Deserters, 1969 197

Part I: Regulatory Changes and Departmental Exchanges, 1966-69 198

Lead-Up to, and Implementation of, the Points System
The Anti-Draft Movement's Interventions Before and After the Points System
Anti-Draft Movement: Discrimination Against War Resister(s), 1967
Regulatory Changes: A Directive to Exclude Deserters
Impact of the Directive to Exclude Deserters

Part II: The Anti-Draft Movement Campaign to Open the Border to Deserters, January 1969 to May 1969 226

The Campaign's Use of the Media
Impact of and Support for the Campaign
Part III: Nationalism in the Campaign to Open the Border to Deserters

Letters in Support of War Resisters
Letters Against War Resisters
The Limits of Left Nationalism as Shown in Letters
Left Nationalist Perspectives on American War Resisters
Effects of Left Nationalism on the Expectations of the Movement
Economic Discrimination in the U.S. Selective Service and the Canadian Immigration Points System
The Campaign to Open the Border’s (Limited) Success

Chapter 5  “Politicized in a Canadian Way”: Perceptions of Legitimate Anti-War Work and Tactical Debates in the Anti-Draft Movement

Debating the Political, Radical, and Liberal
Divisions and (Re)unifications

Chapter 6  Policing the Anti-draft Movement: Department of Immigration suspicions, RCMP Surveillance, 1966-1973

Police Surveillance and Raids
Interaction of Immigration and RCMP Officials: a Jurisdictional debate

Chapter 7  “Last Chance to get Landed”: Immigration Department Strategies, Anti-Draft Movement Responses

Addressing the Appeals Backlog
Media and Anti-Draft Movement Responses to the Revocation of Section 34
The Adjustment of Status Program: Implementation through Cooperation
The Anti-Draft Movement Responds to the Adjustment of Status Program
Program Promotion by the Anti-Draft Groups
Criticism and Cooperation
Impact of the Adjustment of Status Program on the War Resisters Story
Conclusion: A Social Movement Playing A Government Role

Conclusion  Canadian Support for Vietnam-Era American War Resisters

Bibliography
List of Figures

Figure 1  Covers of the *Manual for Draft-Age immigrants to Canada*, Second and third editions, edited by Mark Satin and published in 1968 and 1969  91

Figure 2  Covers of the *Manual for Draft Age immigrants to Canada*, fifth and sixth editions, edited by Mark Satin and published in 1970 and 1971  94

Figure 4  Bus with painted slogan “Last Chance for Landed Immigrant Status,” used to tour rural areas to find war resisters living outside urban centres. Anti-draft groups undertook a campaign to promote the Department of Immigration’s Adjustment of Status Program, 1973. Source: TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 14 - Canadian Adjustment of Status Program, Folder 26, Bus Promotion, n.d., circa September 1973  376
# List of Appendices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appendix I</td>
<td>Source Notes</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix II</td>
<td>Interview Subjects and Ethics Approval</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix III</td>
<td>People Mentioned in Order of Appearance in the Text</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix IV</td>
<td>Groups Mentioned and Abbreviations</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix V</td>
<td>Selected RCMP Surveillance of Anti-Draft Groups, Other Supportive Groups, and War Resisters, 1966-1975</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix VI</td>
<td>Ministers of Manpower and Immigration and Deputy Ministers of Immigration, 1966-1973</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix VII</td>
<td>Timeline of Events and Actions by Central Groups and Government</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix VIII</td>
<td>Shifts in Immigration Regulations and Tactics of Counselling and Border Crossing</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

Je viens de recevoir
Mes papiers militaires
Pour partir à la guerre
Avant mercredi soir.

Monsieur le président
Je ne veux pas la faire,
Je ne suis pas sur terre
Pour tuer de pauvres gens.¹

Wars are divisive. They divide countries from each other, and they also divide populations and families. As the Vietnam War took hold of the American consciousness, opposition to that war became more and more widespread. At first the opposition was mainly expressed by youth, and later by people from a variety of ages, political, economic and social backgrounds.² The question of military service increasingly became a focus for debate and acrimony.³ The debate continued throughout the duration of the conflict, and into the years following its end in 1975: the 1976 U.S. election was partly about the issue of amnesty for Americans of draft age who had emigrated.⁴

This upheaval also had a considerable impact on people living in Canada. Many Canadians still remember protest movements against the Vietnam War. One particular aspect of Canadian history regarding the conflict has become a Canadian legend: the image of Canada as a harbour for Americans of conscience, “draft dodgers,” to a lesser

³ Miller, On Our Own, 196-197.
extent “deserters,” and their families and friends. In fact, one reason for undertaking this research project is to question that legend. In general the draft dodgers’ phenomenon is one of the events to which Canadians often point, uncritically, to emphasize the differences between them and Americans. The myth is that Canada, a more peaceful country than the United States, allowed the draft dodgers and deserters from the U.S. to find refuge from militarism across our border.

This myth represents an important part of the larger image of Canada as a peaceful nation, which, in turn, is often attributed to the government of the day, the Liberal administration of Pierre Trudeau. One example of its tenacity is the ubiquitous presence of the following quotation attributed to Trudeau:

Those who make the conscientious judgment that they must not participate in this war … have my complete sympathy, and indeed our political approach has been to give them access to Canada. Canada should be a refuge from militarism.

This quotation crops up in two of the important works on the subject of war resisters in Canada: in Renée Kasinsky’s 1976 work, Refugees from Militarism: Draft-Age Americans in Canada, and in John Hagan’s 2001 book, Northern Passage: American Vietnam War Resisters in Canada. It has also been mobilized by today’s left alternative

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5 Draft dodgers were avoiding their induction into the U.S. military; deserters were inducted and subsequently fled their posts. I will discuss these terms more fully later in this chapter.

6 The myth is analyzed to some extent by Finkel and Donaghy, who both examine the content of nationalism in the 1960s and consider it be imbued, at least in part, with pacifism: Alvin Finkel, Our Lives: Canada after 1945 (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1997), 156-158; Greg Donaghy Tolerant Allies: Canada and the United States, 1963-1968 (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 166-169. The extent to which this myth is shared can be seen in such examples as Dan Springer, “Canada Plans Draft-Dodger Monument,” Fox News, September 21, 2004, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,132971,00.html, accessed April 27, 2005. It is also interesting to note that the policy to admit draft dodgers is still contentious on both sides of the border.

press and the current campaign to allow American war resisters from the Iraq conflict to stay in Canada.⁸ Archivist and Vietnam war resister Joseph Jones has traced the origins of the quotation to erroneous newspaper reports, and has concluded that the quote is actually an amalgam of two statements by Trudeau, one in 1970 and one in 1971. Jones suggests that Trudeau's statements about war resisters were limited to these two disparate declarations made to religious groups in the context of what Trudeau may have perceived as theological discussion. He goes on to point out that Trudeau also made at least two statements in 1969 that suggest that he believed deserters should be treated differently from draft dodgers.⁹ Jones thereby suggests that the notion that the Trudeau government and, indeed, Trudeau himself unequivocally supported the U.S. war resisters of the Vietnam era is overstated at best.

It is true that, in a series of speeches in early 1969, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and his Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Allan MacEachen, instructed immigration officials that military service was not a matter for interrogation at the border or in immigration offices when considering applications to move to Canada.¹⁰ But the

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Trudeau quotes came after the announcement concerning the border. The events leading to that decision were more complicated than the myth leads us to believe. The experience of war resisters and those who supported them was far from uniform as they interacted with government officials, police, and each other, both before the 1969 announcement, while the majority of American war resisters coming to Canada were draft dodgers, and after, when the balance shifted towards deserters. The Canadian anti-draft movement’s interaction with government officials and police varied from openly antagonistic to fully cooperative. The interactions between activists and resisters were equally complex. To fully understand this interaction, which is the centre of this study, we must also understand the context and makeup of the movement, and, more broadly, the response of Canadian society to the war resister phenomenon.

There was a broad-based and quite vibrant movement to support American war resisters in the Vietnam War era, who came to Canada to avoid the draft or to avoid the war. The support for these immigrants, however, was neither monolithic nor unanimous. Many of the topics of contention in the movement and in the broader anti-war movement reflected domestic debates about relations between the U.S. and Canada, conducted at the level of the federal government. The war resisters and their supporters contributed to the debates about nationalism and Canada’s relationship to the United States that pervaded this period. Accordingly, in one sense, this paper represents a part of the history of international relations from the bottom up.

Americans arrived in a Canada in many ways similar to the United States they had left. In Canada, as in the U.S., the movements for civil rights and against the war in Vietnam mingled with burgeoning feminist movements, and those for Black Power, Red Power, and gay rights. Many of these social movements were influenced by similar activity in the United States. They were also developing at the same time as important ideas were under debate, such as Pierre Trudeau’s “Just Society,” Quebec separatism, and debates about Canadian sovereignty and Canada’s place in the world. Of this mix the Canadian anti-draft movement was both a part and a separate ingredient.

The American movement against the draft as it existed in the late 1960s had roots in the civil rights movement and cold war pacifism, conscientious objection movements of World War I, and the “peace churches.” The Canadian movement had similar origins, but also incorporated the immigrants themselves into the work. The history of the Canadian anti-draft movement, as such, has not been written. The Canadian support for war resisters, which is the object of this study, is a topic that connects with a daunting array of intersecting literatures. If we consider just one of the more obvious aspects of the question – cross-border relations – the complexity becomes apparent. Cross-border relations are often seen as a reflection of diplomatic history. Instead of using a diplomatic historical approach, perhaps the question to be answered is: how do Americans and Canadians talk to each other? Do American and Canadian public opinion

and expression about Vietnam war resisters reflect any degree of what might be termed "crosstalk" – evidence of public opinion in one country directly affecting opinion in the other? What factors need to be considered in asking such a question – and how does one go about researching them? To answer, recourse is necessary to a great variety of literatures. Nationalism, immigration history and migration studies, bureaucracy history and theory, policing history and sociology, and the interplay of government, police, and society all have significance for the topic.\textsuperscript{13}

This work sets out several objectives. First, it lays out as complete a story as possible of the development of the anti-draft movement in Canada. Second, in doing so, it seeks to understand the transnational nature of the story, undermining common assumptions that call into doubt the existence of home-grown autonomous social movements with mature and complex relationships with movements in the United States, in contrast to social movements which merely imitate or are part of American ones.\textsuperscript{14}

Third, it shows how the ideas, ideals, and mutual perceptions of anti-draft activists and war resisters interacted in interesting and often unexpected ways. In describing this interaction I hope to shed new and additional light on the tensions that existed between

\textsuperscript{13} The portions of this thesis pertaining to bureaucracy and policing were first drafted as unpublished papers for the Carleton University History course History 6904, Canadian Historiography PhD Tutorials, directed by Dr. Duncan McDowall; and for a major field essay completed in the summer of 2004 as part of the requirements for completion of the major field: Jessica Squires, ""Truth Demands of the Secret that it be Artfully Revealed:" Canadian Secret Police, Secrecy, and Bureaucracy," Summer 2004; and "Strikebreakers and Red Serge: A Partial Historiography of Canadian Policing," November 2003.

\textsuperscript{14} I first encountered the idea of Canadian movements as merely derivative of American ones in presenting parts of Chapter 4 to a Canadian Historical Association meeting in 2005. It came up again in a panel discussion I attended at the New World Coming: The Sixties and the Shaping of Global Consciousness conference at Queen’s University in the summer of 2007. On transnationalism see Patricia Clavin, "Defining Transnationalism," \textit{Contemporary European History} 14 (2005), 4 [special issue: "Defining Transnationalism"], 421-439.
Canadians and Americans of the time. I suggest that these tensions can neither be reduced to Canadian nationalism nor to anti-Americanism.

Fourth, in examining the story of the campaign to open the border to deserters in May of 1969, I show how movements make use of ideas to press for change. I argue that the decision to open the border came about, in large part, because of a campaign by the anti-draft movement utilizing public pressure and the mainstream media. The ideas mobilized in this campaign continue to resonate today. Fifth, I consider the state apparatus in the form of police and RCMP surveillance of the war resisters and their supporters, to illustrate the contingent nature of hegemony. And last, I discuss how a particular confluence of events – an increase in unemployment at the same time as a rapid increase in immigration – combined to make strange bedfellows, allying civil society groups such as the anti-draft movement with government agencies such as immigration offices to achieve temporarily shared ends.

Chapter 1 of this work introduces the literature specific to war resisters, and the more general historiographies of pacifism, immigration, nationalism, and the Vietnam War. It also presents ideas that have influenced the approach and direction of this work, from theories of state and society relations, policing, political economy, and Gramscian notions of hegemony and consciousness. The story I am telling is one of the interaction between government and civil society groups which, in Gramscian terms, was a hegemonic struggle for domination of both the public discourse and the concrete actions taken by various actors related to this discourse. It is also about the capacity of different institutional actors, both in and outside of government, to form independent opinions and
act upon them. Here, I also draw on the ideas of Theda Skocpol and Max Weber. In Chapter 2, I outline the basic shape of the Canadian anti-draft movement, focussing on the network of anti-draft groups that existed in Canada from 1965 until the late 1970s. By focussing on these groups I privilege the experience of what might be termed the mainstream anti-draft movement, as opposed to the myriad experiences that occurred outside the network of anti-draft groups. I do not neglect the experience of peripheral actors to this (itself fairly marginal) ‘mainstream.’ I consider the interaction between war resisters and Canadians both inside and outside the movement, including their respective perceptions of motivation and effectiveness. I emphasize the transnational nature of this movement, referring to ideas developed by International Political Economy theorist Robert Cox.

Chapter 3 deals with the deserters and the question of their treatment and perception by both the anti-draft movement and the government, as well by the deserters themselves. It also addresses the role played, or not played, by anti-Americanism in this story. Chapter 4 undertakes a detailed account of the events during the months leading up to the May 1969 official decision to open the border to deserters. The campaign to do so reflected debates about Canadian nationalism, which had an important impact on the campaign and its effectiveness. In Chapter 5, I suggest larger contexts to make sense of the interconnection between the deserter issue, exchanges about nationalism and other ideas in the movement, and the sometimes acerbic dialogue between activists about politics, the anti-draft movement, and what could validly be called “real” political work.
Taken together, Chapters 3 to 5 constitute an analysis of a battle for hegemony in the perception and treatment of war resisters in general, and deserters in particular.

Chapter 6 considers more generally the relationship between the anti-draft movement and government institutions. On one hand, anti-draft groups were under constant surveillance, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) pressured the Department of Immigration to find reasons to deport young American immigrants. At the same time, the lobbying activities in early 1969 were an example of a more regular, although adversarial, relationship with government. Eventually the situation developed into an uneasy truce when the Department introduced its Special Measures in 1972 and its Adjustment of Status program in 1973, under both of which immigrants could gain landed status in temporarily relaxed conditions. The anti-draft program promoted these government programs and sometimes met with immigration officials to assist in evaluating the effectiveness of the programs. These final developments are considered on their own in Chapter 7. Together, these two chapters offer an interesting case of the blurred line between government actors and social movements in the realm of social policy and practice.

The remainder of this introduction will outline the methodological choices I have made in approaching this work concerning the research, scope, sources, methodology, and terminology, respectively.
Approach

Taking an interdisciplinary approach to a historical topic arguably yields better results because of the depth of analysis that ensues. In this way, social historical approaches benefit from “bringing the state back in,” and conversely political historical approaches benefit from an understanding of emerging or widely held cultural beliefs and ideas and their effect on actions. Accordingly, a history of the Canadian anti-draft movement should encompass the policing and surveillance of its proponents, the effects of individuals on movements, the movement’s effects on politics and on ideas. This inclusivity, in turn, will provide a comprehensive understanding of this history, from the ground up. The overarching view of how state and society interact, intersect, and overlap both physically and culturally is drawn from Antonio Gramsci’s hegemony theory and Marxist approaches to consciousness and to the state. “Civil society” groups are as much shaped by those around them and by state regulations as the state is pushed and moulded by civil society. Regulatory regimes in the form of, and enforced by, government institutions are powerful forces, but when lived experiences cannot be forced into predetermined moulds the result is often regulatory and legislative change. Ideas about how society should work, promoted by government actors, produce expectations in that society that those ideas will be implemented, which in turn pressures the government

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15 Portions of this analysis were first elaborated in course work completed to satisfy the requirements of a Specialization in Political Economy, drafted as an unpublished paper for the Carleton University Institute of Political Economy course PECO 6000W, Political Economy: Core Concepts, directed by Dr. Laura Macdonald and Dr. Wallace Clement; Jessica Squires, “Studying Canadian Support or Vietnam Era American War Resisters: the Limits of History,” April 12, 2006.


17 Chapter 1 contains an elaboration of this theory.
to accommodate these ideas (for example, the “Just Society,” “Canada the good”) in a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. A complex consideration of these forces and their interaction yields a rich history with much to offer both to historians of the social movements of the 1960s and theorists of the present-day movements against war and to protect conscientious objectors. To historians, it is an example of the new political history: an illustration of how an approach using several perspectives can result both in a history to which ordinary people can relate, and a history which takes account of the role of government actors without privileging their role in events. To today’s social movements it offers lessons about the successes and failures of movements past, in which a better understanding of similar issues arising in today’s struggles may be grounded.

Scope

This project is national in scope. War resisters were an important phenomenon to communities across the country. Consequently any consideration of the movement that supported them, of its potential impact on government policy, and of the interest of policing officials in these groups needs to be pan-Canadian. This pan-Canadian approach is also necessary because the anti-draft movement was very decentralized, comprising many different and disparate groups in many cities and town across the country. The result will be the first geographically comprehensive approach to this aspect of Canadian 1960s history.

I have chosen to concentrate my research on the period 1965 to 1973. The earliest reference I could find to war resister interaction with Canadian activists was from 1965. Most American war resister immigration had apparently ended by 1972; however, the
presence in Canada of large numbers of resisters whose immigrant status remained unclear meant the anti-draft movement had a raison-d'être until 1973, the last efforts by Immigration officials to provide opportunities for illegal immigrants to acquire landed immigrant status before that last loophole was closed. That year, 1973, was also the year the U.S. officially ended its involvement in the Vietnam War. While the anti-draft movement continued to exist until well into the late 1970s, its focus shifted to the question of amnesty for those wishing to return to the United States. Because its focus was thereafter no longer on the Canadian government and public, I consider this shift to be a valid periodization marker.¹⁸

Terminology

Decisions about terminology had to be made especially for two significant elements of this study. These decisions were rendered more complex by their relationship to the tensions present in the very history I am attempting to tell. First, I use the term “anti-draft movement” throughout the work. I decided to use the term for several reasons. First, it serves to differentiate the movement to support American war resisters from the anti-war movement. Second, it is in large measure how the movement described itself, with several groups naming themselves “anti-draft programmes.” This term provokes certain questions. In 1965 Canada had not seen conscription for twenty years, and the word “draft” was largely an American term for conscription. Did the notion of a Canadian anti-draft movement imply that the movement was an importation, or an imitation, of an American idea? The earliest use of the term anti-draft to describe a group

¹⁸ The movement for amnesty is well considered in both Kasinsky and Hagan.
in Canada was by the Student Union for Peace Action (SUPA)'s Anti-Draft Programme. The involvement in this committee of American war resister Mark Satin largely explains the use of the term. However, it also implies a perception by SUPA activists that it was useful to oppose a policy of the American government as part of general activities in favour of peace. The term describes a movement whose unstated goal was to undermine the American Selective Service Program – the legal name of the program that ran the American military draft – by helping young Americans men avoid its talons. Additionally, the term “anti-draft” is a reminder of the international linkages within the movement so termed, and the internationalist outlook of many of its activities.

The second important question of terminology was the use of the expressions “war resister,” “draft dodger,” and “deserter.” In the course of the research I encountered many Vietnam era war resisters, especially at two “Our Way Home Reunion” conferences in Castlegar, British Columbia, in July of 2006 and of 2007. Some of them advocated rejecting the terms “deserter” and “draft dodger” because of their negative connotation. These often advocated, instead, the use of “war resister.” Others, however, wanted to use the terms “deserter” and “draft dodger” as an act of reclaiming the terms and changing their connotation. Some pointed out that the terms actually describe fairly well what the men were doing. “War resister,” on the other hand, is more inclusive of the

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19 Chapter 2 contains a detailed account of the development of these groups.
20 Under the Selective Service Program American males were (and are today) required to register on their eighteenth birthday. During the Vietnam War a draft was in place which placed the names of registered Americans into a lottery for military service. Those whose names were drawn would be sent an induction notice.
21 As far as I know I am the only historian to use this term in this way.
women (and men) who came to Canada in the period not to avoid the draft or military service, but out of a rejection of American policy and life.

Complicating this discussion is the fact that the Canadian government treated draft dodgers and deserters differently in the immigration regulations until May of 1969. War resisters at the time also contested the terms they used to describe themselves. Further, the anti-draft groups also treated them differently, because of the different needs, both perceived and real, of draft dodgers and deserters upon arrival, and in terms of continued immigration counselling. There is, therefore, a need to use the terms in order to account for these historical distinctions.

I use all three terms. I use “war resister” when the draft status does not matter to the story, and when discussing war resisters as larger group including women and others whose decision was not related to military status. I use “draft dodger” and “deserter” when discussing individual experiences, the approaches anti-draft groups took to various kinds of immigrants, and to discuss political campaigns and debates centred around the question of deserter status, in particular. “Draft dodger” refers to Americans who evaded the American selective service program in some way, either by leaving the United States and going to Canada or Sweden, or by some other method. A “deserter” in this work is someone who has enlisted in, or been drafted into, the American military forces and subsequently decided to leave his post. I have avoided the term “draft resister” or “draft evader,” both because of the vernacular use of the term “draft dodger” in the period, and because the terms “draft resister” and “draft evader” are mainly useful to differentiate

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22 See Chapter 4, in which I elaborate the policy, the campaign to change it, and the importance of these events.
between different anti-draft tactics in use in the United States, a problem which does not form a part of this study. A “war resister,” for the purposes of this project, is any American immigrant who came to Canada to avoid complicity in, or out of opposition to, their government’s actions in Vietnam.

Finally, throughout this work I refer to pressure groups and movements including social movements. A word is necessary on how I differentiate these terms. The definition of pressure groups I am using is similar to, although slightly broader than, that developed by political scientist A. Paul Pross. Pross’s description of pressure groups and their function suggested that in a pressure group, “members act together” to influence public policy to “promote a common interest.” But they do not seek power.23 This is distinct from a movement, which often includes many pressure groups as well as individuals.24 I augment these ideas with the acknowledgement that not all members of a pressure group or a movement may be equally mobilized. A government agency, on the other hand, differs from a pressure group in that its membership is not voluntary, it does not have autonomy in its use of its resources, and its “common interest” is not self-defined.25 As for defining a social movement, one could do worse than David Snow et and his colleagues’ definition which states that social movements are “collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or ending extant authority, whether it is

25 Pross, 7.
institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are a part." While I do not share all of the aspects of these approaches to groups and movements, these definitions work well when integrated into the framework I set out in Chapter 1.

Sources

The sources drawn upon for this work mirror the multifaceted approach outlined above. Department of Immigration, Foreign Affairs, and RCMP records were systematically reviewed. They reveal a preoccupation with the question of war resisters, particularly in the Department of Immigration, peaking in early 1969 but constant throughout the period.26 The papers of the anti-draft groups, such as the Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors and the Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors; the personal papers of activists in such groups as Ottawa Assistance with Immigration and the Draft and the Toronto Anti-Draft Programme (TADP); and movement books and publications such as AMEX Magazine and the TADP publication the Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada,27 reveal a great deal about the historical development, ideological positioning, makeup, and extent of influence among Americans, of the Canadian anti-draft movement. Twenty-three groups were listed in the Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada; their history, ideological

26 While other archives might include relevant material, such as provincial and municipal archives (for instance, it would be interesting to examine the record, if any, of municipal police), the vast majority of public archival records relating to American war resisters in the 1960s is not in these more local places. The papers of immigrant support groups with a broader focus than American immigrants alone might yet yield additional relevant material, especially as regards the interaction, if any, of American immigrants with other immigrant groups. Time precluded the examination of the latter.

27 For the full list of sources see the Bibliography.
positions, and effectiveness doubtless also varied.\textsuperscript{28} Calgary, Edmonton, Vancouver, Victoria, Winnipeg, Fredericton, Moncton, Sackville, Newfoundland, Guelph, Hamilton, Kingston, Kitchener-Waterloo, London, Oshawa, Ottawa, Peterborough, Port Arthur - Fort William, Toronto, Windsor, Charlottetown, Montreal, Regina, and Saskatoon all had committees or contact people.\textsuperscript{29}

The papers of groups and activists peripheral to the anti-draft movement were also consulted and analyzed, since war resisters did not always interact with the anti-draft groups, but sometimes contacted or were supported by other kinds of groups. Finally, the personal interviews conducted by other researchers and on file in archives were augmented by personal interviews conducted by me, with several anti-draft activists and war resisters. The interviews help to provide a picture that is as accurate as possible of the culture of the anti-draft movement. The sample was developed using a snowball method; many contacts were first developed at war resister conferences, and contacts yielded more contacts. The selection method yielded a certain similarity between interviewees: all were interested in encouraging my research. The testimonies of those who were not interested by, or who did not hear about, my research might have provided a richer sense of the ordinary lives led by those who assimilated completely into Canadian society and had no interest in being associated with the anti-war movement. This, however, did not make for a similarity of experience or a lack of richness in the

\textsuperscript{28} To my knowledge I have reviewed all of the extant records of these groups. Any additional records remain in the hands of individuals who were involved at the time, and whose records have yet to be made public through deposit at an archive or by other means. For instance, a former activist with the Montreal Council to Aid War Objectors has so far refused to allow researchers to consult his records.

accounts of those I did interview. Indeed, the interviewees provided a range of different motivations, of experiences with crossing the border, of experiences in Canada, of perceptions of the interaction of Canadians and Americans, and of depth of involvement in anti-draft work. The interviews also serve as an effective means to fill in the gaps in the record. They corroborate, or interrogate, the documentary record of the development of the anti-draft movement, provide a personal counterpoint to the more general political dimension of the story, and provide a voice to those directly involved.\textsuperscript{30}

The Personal Dimension

As Karen Dubinsky has noted, the personal experience of historians in doing their research is a consideration not yet fully appreciated by the profession, nor thoroughly theorized.\textsuperscript{31} While my research may not seem to be quite as personal as Dubinsky’s, in conducting this work I found myself again and again reflecting on my personal connections to this story. To begin with, at one point the need to keep the identity of oral interviewees anonymous on request conflicted with a portion of my personal past. (It is impossible to give more details without compromising my research ethics.) At other points, and more significantly, some of those interviewed were part of a present-day war resister support movement with which I am involved, albeit peripherally. Does this connection cast doubt on my “objectivity” as a researcher of this story? Or does it make me an ideal person to do the research? Like Bernard Cohn, who interrogated his role as

\textsuperscript{30} These interviews were conducted in accordance with the ethics rules and guidelines in place at Carleton University. For a list of interviews and methods, as well as copies of the ethics approvals, see Appendix II.

\textsuperscript{31} Dubinsky has spoken on this topic several times. See for instance her, lecture: “The Politics of Babies: A Personal/Scholarly Odyssey through Transnational Adoption in Canada, Cuba, and Guatemala,” Carleton University, Shannon Lecture Series, October 19, 2007.
an anthropologist able to “pass” as a historian, I sometimes wondered if I was a war resister “passing” as a historian, or the other way around.  

In a similar fashion the question of the past as colonized territory came up for me in my interpretation of the actions of figures from this history, both living and dead. David Lowenthal’s preoccupation with the misuses of memory is compelling, including “how memory establishes personal identity; the links between personal and communal memory; how recollections are verified; [...] the function of forgetting; how time alters old and invents new memories.” He notes, “we brainwash ourselves into believing that we simply reveal the true past – a past which is unavoidably, however, partly of our own manufacture.” To this, I would add that we are partly of its manufacture; that, as Cohn would say, culture is historically constructed as much as history is culturally constructed. I thus, perhaps facilely, justify my presumption to interpret the actions of others in the past, and to thereby use bits of their stories to make a new story.

Accordingly, it is a story with which many will not agree. Another repeated experience during the process of undertaking this research was that of presenting portions of my work, formally and informally, and having its truth challenged by people who “were there.” I had to remind myself that documents are not the ultimate source of truth; but neither, of course, is memory. I have tried to be as honest as possible with the evidence. I hope I have acknowledged fairly the understandings of those whose stated

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recollections of the story differed from my retrospective compilation and selective emphasis, whether or not I came to agree with them. Here, it is useful to recall the words of David Lodge – that history is the judgement “of those who were not there on those who were.”

I hope that my attempts here are more in line with Donald Ritchie’s caution to remember that “oral history is a joint product,” shaped by both the researcher and those she interviews. Further, I value the contributions of those I interviewed, not for their ability to shed light on the facts, although they certainly did so, but for their memory of the experience of being part of this movement I am studying at the time it was taking place. The value is in their lived experience, and its interaction with my own as a researcher.

There is once again an unpopular American war going on overseas, in which Canada is not a direct participant. A few Americans have made their way over the border as deserters from that war. Of course the specific circumstances have changed. But a study of the war resisters and anti-draft activists of the late 1960s and early 1970s will provide both knowledge and inspiration for those who, today, want to make sense of the

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36 Ritchie, 30.

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current situation. \textsuperscript{39} I believe this story will contribute significantly both to our understanding of the past and how we got here, and to the future.

\textsuperscript{39} Perhaps, here, crisis would not be too strong a word since, at least as far as the American military is concerned, the Pentagon itself admitted to 5500 AWOLs in 2004 alone: Tom Reeves, \textit{A Draft By Any Other Name...Is Still Wrong: Exposing the Coming Draft}, nodraftnoway.org: 2005, http://www.nodraftnoway.org/exposingthecomingdraft.pdf, accessed April 26, 2005, 4.
Chapter 1

Historiography of War Resistance, Theory, and Argument

draft resister
watching the ducks
fly south¹

To talk about war resisters is to talk about a series of events and experiences which are situated within a great number of different areas of scholarship. Because this study is about the war resister support campaign and its interaction with the government, the most important literatures in which to situate it include the twentieth-century historiography of war resisters, United States-Canada relations, and the Vietnam War, with a less central importance given to the broader literature on pacifism and American history. But the topic also touches on immigration history and, because of the prominence of nationalism in the 1960s in Canada, some attention must also be paid to that arena. The importance of these last two areas is greater with respect to the negotiation of the theoretical aspect of this topic. Finally, because this work weaves together both social, cultural and political histories, the theory of the state, and of relations between state and society, is an important factor. Theoretically speaking, then, consideration will be given to the relationship between ideas, movements, and politics; nationalism in Canada; transnationalism; American immigrants as a category; and the relationships between state and civil society, bureaucracy, and policing.²

² Other possible theoretical contexts for this history might have included the history and theory of international relations at the level of governments, and questions of morality and pacifism beyond the experiences of the individuals involved. These contexts have been set aside; the first, because, while society certainly has an influence on international relations at this level, such influence is not my subject
A Selected Historiography of War Resisters

The historiography of U.S.-Canada relations is mostly silent on the topic of draft dodgers. For instance, Greg Donaghy’s history of U.S.-Canada relations from 1963 to 1968, *Tolerant Allies*, does not mention draft dodgers at all; nor does J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer’s broader work *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*. Similarly, Alvin Finkel’s *Our Lives*, on Canadian identity in a global context, reserves only a paragraph to the issue. Even Douglas A. Ross’ *In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam, 1954-1973* does not include a single page about the draft dodgers, although Ross does grant a minor role to what he terms left-liberal critiques of the war. Robert Bothwell and Jack Granatstein devote less than a page to the phenomenon, contextualizing it narrowly within a discussion of Canadian nationalism and identity. Robert Bothwell’s most recent book on Canadian foreign policy, *Alliance and Illusion*, devotes a chapter to Canada and Vietnam, and three pages to the war resisters. However, Bothwell’s treatment of the phenomenon is incidental to his main matter. The philosophical questions of morality and pacifism similarly have only indirect relevance to my work beyond the consideration of motivations of individuals, for whom the centrality of the ideal of pacifism and the morality of war varied.

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1. Donaghy; J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1991); Finkel, 154. Other examples include J.L. Granatstein, *Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986), 211, which, while mentioning the protests of youth against the Vietnam War, omits the draft dodgers issue; and Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, *Canada Since 1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991). Donaghy does mention the House of Anansi Press, a publishing house created by a number of what Donaghy calls the “new nationalists;” this is important for this research, as House of Anansi published the *Manual for Draft Age Immigrants to Canada*.


objective, which is to discuss relations between Canada and the United States during the Vietnam War. For him, the war resisters are symptoms of larger public sentiments on both sides of the border, in the context of a minority government in Parliament – although, as the current study shows, the important period for the war resister question was during Pierre Trudeau’s first government, which was a majority Parliament.⁶

Another important exception is Victor Levant, who addresses the question of draft dodgers in his book on Canadian involvement in the Vietnam War entitled *Quiet Complicity.*⁷ Levant’s is the historiographical opposite of *In the Interests of Peace.* This type of opposition in the literature has been underlined by Andrew Preston, scholar of American history and the Vietnam War, in his review of Donaghy: the historiography on Vietnam is “basically contested between those [such as Levant] who argue that Ottawa was complicit in, and even helped facilitate, an aggressive American war, and those who argue that Ottawa did its best to remain outside the fray and act as an intermediary to bring the warring parties to the conference table.”⁸ The otherwise considerable silence on the topic of draft dodgers by most authors is curious considering the extent to which the draft dodgers’ era in Canadian history has taken on a mythical aspect.

This myth has not always had the hold it does now, or was beginning to in the sixties. The history of war resisters is as old as the history of modern wars. During World War I, according to a British study conducted after the conflict, “50,000 Englishmen

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pledged never to take part in another war;" amongst them there were 16,000 refusals between 1916 and 1918, and 1300 went to jail, refusing to take advantage of alternative service provisions for conscientious objectors.\(^9\) Public fascination with the phenomenon is almost as old. Amongst studies of resisters, much of the literature on the Vietnam War era has either attempted to answer questions about what motivates resisters, or told their stories in quite an intimate way, often emphasizing spirituality or morality, or it has combined these two approaches.

Many books on the war resister story compile a group of twenty or thirty interviews. In *Hell No We Won't Go: Vietnam Draft Resisters in Canada*, journalist Alan Haig-Brown draws twenty profiles, including that of John Hagan, whose own book is discussed below as part of the more recent work devoted to American war resisters.\(^10\) Historian Frank Kusch, writing about the sixties from a conservative viewpoint, does the same in *All-American Boys: Draft Dodgers in Canada from the Vietnam War*. His book has been criticised by Frances Early, a historian of the peace movement, for casting draft dodgers as monolithic "class-privileged and race-privileged disaffected loners."\(^11\) A false polarity between voluntary expatriates – Americans who wish to renounce their ties to the U.S. – and political exiles – Americans who wish or intend to return home to the U.S. – is common in this mostly journalistic literature. Kusch's emphasis is on the


American-ness of the draft dodgers, and how their individualism survives into their renunciation of their citizenship.

Almost no one has examined the role played by Canadians in the movement, and the importance of the connections between the Canadian and American anti-draft movements. Canadians indeed are rarely a part of the picture painted in this literature, whether the author is Canadian or American. There are exceptions, however, such as *Desertion: in the Time of Vietnam*, where Jack Todd describes the Canadian anti-draft movement scene in these terms:

> [T]he [Vancouver] committee [To Aid American War Objectors] draws the usual suspects from the radical fringe in the late '60s: crunch granola hippies, Trotskyites, Maoists, wide-eyed do-gooders, zonked-out druggies, moochers, marchers, anarchists, macho types who babble endlessly about guns and bombs and revolution, deserters who have been to Vietnam and back (or claim they have) and who seem always on the verge of some subterranean explosion.\(^\text{12}\)

Another major exception is law professor and sociologist John Hagan’s *Northern Passage: American Vietnam War Resisters in Canada*. Mostly devoted to the political history of changing immigration regulations, the sociology of the American exile ghetto in Toronto in the 1960s and early 1970s, and the socio-psychological impacts of war resistance on the future activities of war resisters, it also examines the role of the Toronto Anti-Draft Programme in welcoming American immigrants, finding them housing and other services.\(^\text{13}\) Hagan’s focus is on the war resisters themselves, however, and the Canadian support movement appears only peripherally. Hagan’s treatment of the anti-

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\(^{13}\) John Hagan, *Northern Passage*. Hagan was one of Haig-Brown’s twenty interviews, as we have mentioned.
draft movement is general and overwhelmingly positive. Hagan, a draft dodger himself, is now researching the influence and activities of the descendants of draft dodgers in Canadian society. Historian David Churchill’s study of state motivations for changes in immigration regulations regarding draft dodgers and deserters also focuses on the war resisters.\footnote{David S. Churchill, “An Ambiguous Welcome: Vietnam Draft Resistance, the Canadian State, and Cold War Containment,” \textit{Social History/Histoire Sociale} Vol 27, Number 73 (May 2004), 1-26. See also Churchill’s PhD Thesis, \textit{When Home Became Away: American Expatriates and New Social Movements in Toronto, 1965-1977} (University of Chicago, August 2001).} Churchill’s work addresses the complexity of the discussion at the level of the Department of Immigration, while Hagan tends to place power more centrally in the hands of Cabinet Ministers. Both Churchill and Hagan frame government approaches to the war resister issue, and particularly the events of early 1969, as part of a public debate about Canadian sovereignty. Churchill’s and Hagan’s work is an important starting point for this research. However, while both leave a place for anti-draft movement pressure on officials, and both afford a place for the influence of ideas on events, neither centres their attention on the movement’s impact on government and policy.

On the topic of draft dodgers in Canada, then, there is first and foremost a lack of any broad historical work on the Canadian groups and individuals who worked to support and encourage American war resisters, deserters and draft dodgers in their quest to come to Canada and settle here.\footnote{There is a curious symmetry in that draft resistance is not often treated as part of American histories of the Vietnam War, as Michael S. Foley notes: , Michael S. Foley, \textit{Confronting the War Machine: Draft Resistance During the Vietnam War} (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 13.} There is also a lack of research on the interplay between Canadian political culture, Canadian anti-draft activists, Canadian government officials and state apparati, and American war resisters. This project therefore both builds upon earlier work, and fills a gap in the historiography that others may in turn build upon to
illuminate particular aspects of the story—the experience of women war resisters, for example. It also has direct relevance for today’s war resisters, whose current struggle has a number of common elements with the history of the American war resisters in the period 1965-1973.

Immigration and Migration

As draft dodgers and deserters were also immigrants, the field of immigration history is an obvious point of reference. But in most historical work cross-border relations “below” the interaction of states are considered rarely and, if considered at all, are often seen as a mere reflection of diplomatic history. A bottom-up approach can emphasize the processes going “on the ground,” as it were, and their influence on political processes. For instance there is a rich and growing literature on the treatment of border history, as I discuss later in this chapter. The bottom-up approach also opens up space within which to consider whether American immigrants ought to be studied as a group of immigrants like any other, or whether, as I argue, enough substantial differences exist to merit a different treatment. The central questions here are: how is the immigrant

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16 Lara Campbell, Professor of Women’s Studies at Simon Fraser University, and Robin Folvik, Simon Fraser University Graduate Student, are currently conducting research on this topic. They presented some of their findings at the conference New World Coming: The Sixties and the Shaping of Global Consciousness, held June 13-16, 2007 at Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario: Lara Campbell, Simon Fraser University, “Women’s Liberation and ‘U.S. Chauvinism’: Vietnam War Resistance and Feminist Activism,” and Robin Folvik, Simon Fraser University, “They Followed Their Men into Canada”? American Women in Canada during the Vietnam War era” (papers presented at New World Coming: The Sixties and the Shaping of Global Consciousness conference, Queen’s University, June 16, 2007).

17 For more information see: War Resisters Support Campaign, www.resisters.ca; Jeremy Hinzman, personal web site, jeremyhinzman.net; Brandon Hughey, personal web site, brandonhughey.org; all accessed May 17, 2005.

seen, perceived, and defined in Canadian political culture? Does racialization – the
categorization and differentiation of people on the basis of race – play a role? If so, how
does the American immigrant – whose nation of origin, the United States, arguably has a
very similar dominant idea of national identity to that of Canada – fit in?

In 1997, to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Canadian Citizenship Act,
Citizenship and Immigration Canada commissioned a retrospective.¹⁹ For Valerie
Knowles, the book’s author, the points system²⁰ introduced in 1967 was “designed to
eliminate caprice and prejudice in the selection of independent immigrants.” For
Knowles, the points system’s appeal was its “elimination of discrimination based on
nationality or race from all classes of immigrants.” The points system was a refinement
of policy moves that had been taken by politicians in the early 1960s towards eliminating
racism in the immigration system. But amongst Canadians, immigrants remained a
generally racialized group; that is, cultural perceptions of immigrants as people of colour
with different languages, cultural practices, and behaviours continued to dominate long
after 1967. As sociologist and political scientist Anna Triandafyllidou puts it, “Othering
the immigrant is functional to the development of national identity, and to achieving or
enhancing national cohesion…. The immigrant poses a challenge by threatening to
‘contaminate’ the in group’s presumed unity and authenticity.”²¹ Triandafyllidou
criticizes Benedict Anderson and other theorizers of the cultural construction of nation

²⁰ The points system allocated points for certain characteristics of potential immigrants – training, education, etc. potential immigrants had to be allocated a minimum number of points to be granted permission to immigrate. The system replaced an earlier regime which emphasized quotas of immigrants from particular countries. See following chapters for further elaboration on this system and its effects.
and national identity for neglecting the “othering” phenomenon. While she does not deal
with the question of racialization and any role it may play in the “othering” process, she
does argue convincingly that the process is present in any nation-state.

For this study, the focus is Canada. In Canada, the racialization of immigrants is
linked to a cultural notion – contested, but dominant – of Canadian identity as white. A
decade ago, sociologist Himani Bannerji stated:

The political grammar of “national” life and culture, as far as the near and
far right are concerned, is common-sensically acknowledged as
“English.”… English/Europeanness, that is, whiteness, emerges as the
hegemonic Canadian identity. This white, Canadian and English equation
becomes hegemonic enough to be shared even by progressive Canadians
or the left.22

If Canadian “whiteness” is still hegemonic, how does the process of exclusion play out?

Bannerji suggested one way was through the use of implicitly racializing terminology
such as “visible minorities.” She continued,

…one is instantly struck by [the term’s] reductive character, in which
peoples from many histories, languages, cultures and politics are reduced
to a distilled abstraction. Other appellations follow suit - immigrants,
ethnics, new Canadians and so on. Functional, invested with a legal social
status, these terms capture the “difference” from “Canada/English/French
Canada” and often signify a newness of arrival into “Canada.”23

Other terms, like “ethnic” and “immigrant,” play a similar racializing role. The result is a
system whereby “all white people, no matter when they immigrate to Canada or as

22 Himani Bannerji, “On the Dark Side of the Nation: Politics of Multiculturalism and the State of
‘Canada.’” Journal of Canadian Studies (Fall 1996): 103-129.
carriers of which European ethnicity, become invisible and hold a dual membership in
Canada, while others remain immigrants generations later."^{24}

For Americans, Bannerji's observation that, historically, "decisions about who
should come into Canada to do what work, definitions of skill and accreditation, licensing
and certification, have been influenced by "race" and ethnicity," is important for its
recognition of the political economy of immigration in the 1960s and early 1970s. For
this observation, Bannerji drew upon the Gramscian ideas of "common sense" and
hegemonic processes affecting everyday life. The hegemony of white Canada produces a
situation where "East European immigrants are seen as desirable because they can be
included in the ideology of whiteness."^{25} As sociologist Rose Baaba Folson also points
out in her study of immigration in Canada, "white immigrants are often constructed as
citizens, while non-white citizens are constructed as immigrants."^{26}

The vast majority of American war resisters were white.^{27} Their country of origin
has a similar paradigm of "whiteness"; those immigrants who were racialized as non-
white in the United States, were also racialized as non-white in Canada, and not because
they were American.^{28} They continued to be racialized sometimes despite expectations

^{24} Bannerji, "On the Dark Side of the Nation."
^{25} Bannerji, "On the Dark Side of the Nation."
^{26} Rose Baaba Folson, "Representation of the Immigrant," in Rose Baaba Folson, ed., Calculated Kindness:
Global Restructuring, Immigration and Settlement in Canada (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2004), 21-
32.
^{27} I will return to this topic in more detail in Chapter 2.
^{28} On "whiteness" in the United States and the racialization of immigrants, see David R. Roediger, Working
Toward Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White: The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to
the Suburbs (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color:
European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Harvard University Press, 1999); Eileen Boris, "The
(1995), 160-180; Héctor R. Cordero-Guzmán, Robert C. Smith and Ramón Grosfoguel, eds., Migration,
of different treatment. However, the vast majority fit quite well into the dominant norm, with the exception, perhaps, of an audible accent. As immigration historian Franca Iacovetta and sociologist Tania Das Gupta put it:

Nation-building, the privilege of a few, is a process of inclusion and exclusion, of distinguishing between “us” and “them,” of conferring rights of citizenship to some but not “others.” … In the highly-charged and vastly inequitable “game” of “who gets to be a Canadian?” white Canadians, especially but not exclusively bourgeois men from dominant majority races, enjoy tremendous though not entirely uncontested privilege. Moreover, those most severely handicapped by the pernicious “rules” of this high-stakes game… experience most directly the harsh hypocrisy of liberal democracies that promise opportunity and freedom to everyone.29

If American immigrants could most closely “pass” in the context of the dominant white Anglophone Canadian, they still experienced the “othering” process, although not as racial others as suggested by Triandafyllidou. They shared some experiences with immigrants in general in that they were sometimes suspected of stealing jobs from Canadians, of importing radicalism, and of misbehaving. But, unlike many other immigrant groups, the most important factor for Americans’ experience as immigrants was their socioeconomic background.

Thus, for this study I do not situate American immigrants as a group of immigrants, but I rather place analytical emphasis on those aspects of policy which more directly affected them – the class bias in the immigration policy, for instance, is examined in Chapter 4. There is clearly some overlap in experience between Americans as immigrants and, say, immigrants from Barbados; for instance, fears about immigrants

taking jobs away from Canadians certainly applied to Americans as well. However, in general, most discrimination against Americans was associated primarily with their country’s foreign policy and not with their individual character. Further, character-based discrimination that did exist was more about their military status and less about their American-ness. The question of racism and black war resisters remains a topic deserving a great deal of study. Space restrictions and the focus of this study on Canadian support for war resisters prevented it from being a major part of this one, although it is addressed briefly throughout the work. I hope to develop this aspect of the story in future research.\textsuperscript{30}

Canadian immigration history has benefited from approaches thinking outside the national box. In particular, recent emphasis on immigration as a consciousness-changing experience both for the immigrant and for the host society, as Franca Iacovetta has argued, has clear implications for this research.\textsuperscript{31} Such an emphasis will help further to outline a picture of international relations, as I elaborated in the introduction, as one of multiple players and layers, and not merely of interactions between diplomats and leaders, which we regularly read. Development of a bottom-up approach will be necessary for a study of the anti-draft movement, because the actors are generally not government officials, but Americans and Canadians interacting “on the ground” in ways affected by both nationalism and internationalism. The bottom-up approach will also help


to differentiate between American immigrants and immigrants in general. While American immigrants were, by definition and in the eyes of government, immigrants like any others inasmuch as they crossed the border in order to live in Canada, in practice their experiences were quite different.

Questions about both migration and Canadian national identity tend to intersect with analysis of borders and nations. As American migration historian David R. Smith argues, North American migration has a political economic aspect to it. He argues that economic development and the movement of goods and capital are an integral part of the picture. As such, American immigration was “consistently outpaced” by the flow of Canadians moving south throughout the post-war period.\textsuperscript{32} Further, he argues that “as a negotiated outcome of [a colonial struggle between Great Britain and its colonies], the border is somewhat arbitrary and does not delineate the limits of inherently distinct nationalities.”\textsuperscript{33} On the other hand, historical geographer Randy William Widdis cautions against a view that reduces Americans and Canadians to a unified and homogeneous whole.\textsuperscript{34} Because Canadians and Americans share some history, as well as a dominant language and many cultural norms, social movements in the two countries have often embarked on similar trajectories. A great many articles in various disciplines consider the cross-border and transnational relations between unions, social movements,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[33] Bukowczyk et al, 151.
\item[34] Bukowczyk et al, 153.
\end{footnotes}
and individuals.\textsuperscript{35} As we will see in Chapters 2 and 5, the history of the Canadian antidraft movement is one such movement, strongly influenced by, and sharing a history with, the American pacifist movement and the involvement of the "peace churches".\textsuperscript{36}

These transnational linkages intersected with questions of national identity and nationalism in Canada.

If nationalism must be considered as part of the political culture of the 1960s and 1970s, then perhaps this concept might form a dialectical unity with transnationalism.\textsuperscript{37}

As political scientist Robert Cox points out in a reflection on the limits of neorealism—a concept still influential in international relations theory, which assumes a basic similarity between the structure of states, and which allows no place for the influence of social movements—a better conception of the state's role in international relations may in fact be a "state/society complex as the basic entity of international relations." For Cox, there is a clear lineage between this approach back to certain types of Marxism (he


\textsuperscript{36} For good overviews of this history from both the war resister and the pacifist perspective, see Foley, 61-67; Thomas Socknat, \textit{Witness Against War: Pacifism in Canada, 1900-1945} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 289-291, 295; Peter Brock and Nigel Young, \textit{Pacifism in the Twentieth Century} (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1999), 266-267, 281-286, 289-295.

\textsuperscript{37} A dialectical unity is an irreducible and irresolvable grouping of categories, influences or trends in contention with each other which, taken together, may present a full enough picture from which to generalize. See notes 42, 56.
differentiates between Gramscian historical materialism and Althusserian structural Marxism, preferring a Gramscian analysis), with its dialectical approach to conflict, its analysis of imperialism, and its conception of society, including class groupings and production, as interrelated with the state. Cox seeks a way of accounting for the influence of social movements on international relations.\textsuperscript{38}

Similarly, in her \textit{States and Social Revolutions}, sociologist Theda Skocpol centralizes the "Janus-faced" nature of the state – its inherent connection to international networks of states and its dependence on social legitimacy – and incorporates into her analysis the notion of states as organizations.\textsuperscript{39} These formulations, tempered with respect for the impact of ideas on events, have fruitful uses in a history of international relations from the bottom up.

\textbf{State, Society, and Social Movements}

An important part of telling a story based on such an analysis that takes account of the government-society axis, must of course consider the role of government and institutions as well. The analysis must also account for the roles of social movements and groups, as well as intellectuals, and how they interacted. A number of government departments were involved in the story of war resisters. Why did the government act the way it did? What role was played by intellectuals and bureaucrats inside and outside government departments? How did the governed interact with these processes?


\textsuperscript{39} Theda Skocpol, \textit{States and Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 32.
The “state” has been understood by many scholars, including historians, as a set of practices, administrative, legal, economic and social.⁴⁰ This position finds its roots in the debate between political scientists about the “relative autonomy” of the state from elites, originally between Marxists Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas.⁴¹ One “side” views the state as an administrative, coercive set of institutions under executive control. Here, the state is an object, or set of objects, available to be studied. The other describes a cultural state, and is primarily focussed on the ability to regulate individual behaviour: the state as a process.⁴² The present study is a history in which the state plays a role, both as a set of institutions, and as a process. It uses an approach that sees the state, like Theda Skocpol, as “Janus-faced,” not monolithic; and like Dominique Marshall, sees government as a contingent set of outcomes of negotiations between groups of various size and influence. It employs ideas from the theory of social movements, especially that which sees movements themselves as actors.⁴³ As such, it can be placed within the new political history of Canadian historiography.

As Marshall explains, the new political history “includes all relations of power within a society... these relations contribute to the creation (and perpetuation) of the large categories of social relations, studied in the new history, among classes, genres,

⁴² Greer and Radforth, 10. Many Marxists would likely disagree with this formulation, but it is arguably closer to a dialectical approach to the state than many self-described Marxist formulations. See notes 37, 56.
generations, regions, nations, and ethnicities." As Lawrence Jacobs and Theda Skocpol assert, "we need to know more about the ways in which society and government condition one another. [...] The reality is that society and government influence and limit each other; each is an ‘environment’ to the other." 

Skocpol’s defence of what she and others call “historical institutionalism” sets out effectively an integrated approach to any study of society – historical or otherwise – that can account for all of the nuances and factors inherent in any particular event:

[I]nstitutions for me are sets of relationships that persist, although in an inherently conflictual and tension filled way. Institutions may be formal organizations or informal networks. They have shared meetings and relatively stable bundles of resources attached to them. I take an organizationalist approach to institutions, viewing them as actual patterns of communication and activity, rather than seeing them primarily as values, norms, ideas, or official rules. I am primarily interested in studying political processes and outcomes, and I see these as brought about, usually without intentional foresight and control, by actors whose goals and capacities and conflicts with one another are grounded in institutions.

... It is not enough just to explore how people talk or think. We must also find patterns in what they do. I do not think that institutions are simply or primarily systems of meaning or normative frameworks. Group identities for me are grounded in organizational linkages, access to resources, and some sense of “success” over time in political undertakings.

Skocpol sees individuals, groups, and government as historical actors. This perception is valuable because it offers an array of explanatory mechanisms for describing historical

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events. The choice of either state or society is refracted into many different potential agents of change.

Next, I will address the question of ideas and their relationship to events. In the section below on bureaucracy, I will explain how Gramsci is used in this work to incorporate the role of intellectuals into the state-society relationship, without letting go of the importance of “grounded” group actors. It is Skocpol’s historical institutionalist approach, applied to both movements and groups including government, combined with a Gramscian analysis of history, that provides the framework for my approach in this study.

Sometime between 1929 and 1935, while in prison in Mussolini’s Italy, Antonio Gramsci wrote the texts later grouped by scholars as the *Prison Notebooks*. One part of his work developed the theory of hegemony. In this theory, autonomous ideas, as part of relatively cohesive sets of ideas or ideologies that inhabit the political landscape, exist in relations that are historically established and recognized as part of a philosophically coherent whole. This conception, Gramsci’s idea of a “common sense,” can help explain the commonality of certain ideas to groups holding different interests.47

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47 Stuart Hall, “Gramsci’s Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity,” in *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*, ed. David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen (New York: Routledge, 1996), 431. This, preceding and following ideas are drawn from an exceptionally clear and useful interpretation of Gramsci laid out by Hall in the essay cited. It has also informed my earlier research. See also Gramsci’s “The Study of Philosophy, in the *Prison Notebooks*, translated and edited by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, New York: International Publishers, 1971, 333: “The active man-in-the-mass has a practical activity, but has no clear theoretical consciousness of his practical activity, which nonetheless is an understanding of the world in so far as it transforms it. His theoretical consciousness can indeed be historically in opposition to his activity. One might almost say that he has two theoretical consciousnesses (or one contradictory consciousness): one which is implicit in his activity and which in reality unites him with all his fellow-workers in the practical transformation of the real world; and one, superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed.” See also Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, alternative title: *The Manifesto of the Communist Party* (New York: International Publishers, 1948) (1998 edition), 28-29.
In Gramsci’s conception of cultural formation, the build-up over time of accepted and often dominant practices provides a backdrop of ideas, politics, and relations between people which must be involved in any strategy to make fundamental changes in that culture. It also means that emergent or new ideas probably have a better chance of succeeding if they include elements in common with the current culture. Gramsci suggested that “‘agents’ of ideological formation... are intellectuals aligned with either the historic bloc most clearly dominating the state, or with emerging groups and ideas.” “Historic blocs” – group of people with similar ideas and interests, positioned to act in such a way as to have a concrete effect on the common-sense of the day – can sometimes bring together unlikely allies. And because this is a process shaped by contingencies, the outcome of events cannot be predicted.

In the war resisters story, public perceptions of the resisters and their supporters changed along with the anti-draft movement’s relationship to government institutions; and government attitudes shifted in a dialectical reflection of public opinions. These interactions are well described in the “new political history.” For example, Ian McKay’s Gramscian approach, as outlined in his seminal article, “The Liberal Order Framework,” and in his book, Rebels, Reds, Radicals: Rethinking Canada’s Left History, centres a study of Canadian social movements in their relationship to a dominant ideology of liberalism as expressed through government institutions.

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48 Hall, 439.
49 Hall, 423-424, 432.
Bureaucracy and Policing

It remains to introduce into the framework an approach to bureaucracy that can allow for government agencies to be historical actors. Bureaucrats are often seen as being allergic to change, seeking only to perpetuate the status quo. However, bearing in mind that bureaucracies are made up of individuals, and that there is a flow of influence between bureaucrats and bureaucracy, as well as between bureaucracy and society, will help to avoid the pitfalls of stereotypical treatment of state and government activity as the result merely of a technocratic strategy.

The branch of Canadian historiography that deals in a general sense with the development of Canadian government departments and institutions, while immensely valuable in its breadth and depth, has tended to disregard theory.51 The other lineage, while employing theoretical frameworks in its critical appraisal of aspects of ongoing state formation, has made use primarily of either analyses such as gender, or theories of hegemony.52 An integration of bureaucracy theory will add much to an understanding of ongoing Canadian “state formation,” discussed above. For the present study I will draw

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52 Two examples of this approach are, for the U.S., Camilla Stivers, Bureau Men, Settlement Women: Constructing Public Administration in the Progressive Era (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000); and, for Canada, Gary Kinsman, “Character Weaknesses and Fruit Machines: Towards an Analysis of the Anti-Homosexual Security Campaign in the Canadian Civil Service,” Labour/Le Travail 35 (Spring 1995), 153-159.

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upon the foundational ideas of Antonio Gramsci, Max Weber, and the work of Bruce Curtis and others, to clarify my approach to the relationship between government institutions, police, anti-draft groups and individuals.

A government in its entirety may be considered a bureaucracy; so may a department, or a layer of leadership at the top of a public or private institution. This may be self-evident to most. But bureaucracy has also been studied as a modern mentality, an aspect of modern consciousness. And it may also apply to private institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and civil society groups. Again, Gramsci will provide a useful frame within which to describe and situate this complex of interactions between different actors and groups of actors.

In the section now called "The Modern Prince," Gramsci asked if the process of producing "a new type of functionary" had been "a necessary one, or, as the "pure" liberals claim, a degeneration in respect of the ideal of self-government?"\textsuperscript{53} The hub of the issue Gramsci was raising was the often complex interface in modern democracies between the executive and judicial branches of government: that is, parliamentary bodies and the institutions of rule. In another section of the Notebooks, Gramsci outlined his ideas about the role intellectuals played in modern society. For Gramsci, intellectuals were a specifically "professional category" which could be associated with classes ("fundamental social groups"). The specific functions of intellectuals, for Gramsci, were the creation of social hegemony and political government. These functions accrued to

intellectuals who played the role of “deputies” to the “dominant group,” or ruling class. Gramsci pointed out that organizing social hegemony requires an extensive division of labour, which accounts for the huge expansion, at the time, of intellectuals as a social group. According to Gramsci, “mass” training standardized individuals both psychologically and in terms of individual qualification; thus, competition between potential functionaries was induced.\textsuperscript{54}

Gramsci further suggested that the division of labour brought about the formation of a “caste” of bureaucrats, a group to which specific power accrued.\textsuperscript{55} Gramsci’s dialectical method\textsuperscript{56} situated intellectuals in a complex set of social and cultural relationships, from which he generalized a set of ideas that could adequately explain the many different roles played by intellectuals in society. This interpretation presented here offers a way to discuss the interaction between individuals and structures without collapsing into conspiracy theory or rigid structuralism. It also points to the importance of interest groups in society, and has implications for both the formation of and the enforcement of laws and public policy.\textsuperscript{57}

Both the historical institutionalism of Skocpol and her colleagues and Gramscian ideas find interesting echoes in the bureaucracy theory of Max Weber (although only Skocpol explicitly refers to Weber in her work). For Weber, bureaucracies are characterized by general rules and observable tendencies. Bureaucratic jurisdictions

\textsuperscript{55} Gramsci, “State and Civil Society,” in Hoare and Smith, 245-6, 254
\textsuperscript{56} A dialectical method is a complex understanding of how change occurs, which Gramsci developed by examining tensions in a given whole – in this case, 1930s Europe and fascism – and drawing conclusions by considering the whole without reducing it to one or the other pole of tension, nor to a new synthesis. See notes 35, 40.
\textsuperscript{57} Gramsci, “The Philosophy of Praxis,” in Hoare and Smith, 330, 344-5.
contain official duties, and are governed by rules and regulations; they attribute stable authority to specific people, and those people are judged to be qualified to ensure that the duties are carried out. The degree of specialization created allows for the “objective discharge of business… ‘without regard for persons.’” In turn, this objectivity allows for predictability and calculability of administration. The bureaucracy demands, therefore, the “objective expert.” Thus the bureaucratic mechanism exists independently of personnel. This Weberian formulation is the basis for the idea of bureaucracy, as opposed to government, group, or individual, as actor. But it must be tempered with Gramsci’s observations about intellectuals and hegemony in order to be a comprehensive approach.

Other cultural approaches to this aspect of “state formation” have examined the construction of the population as a category of administrative management. Bruce Curtis’ Foucauldian Politics of Population sees government as a “circular process,” whose “subjects…are not passive. Official classifications and categorizations may be opposed or subverted as well as embraced,” for “in the art of government the task is to establish a

59 Gerth and Mills, 200-204, 214-216, 221, 228-229. Of course the implication is that the only rational legal system is one which upholds the class interests of the propertied class, because the right to own property is upheld. For further analysis on bureaucracies as historical actors or agents of change see Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger and Hansfried Kellner, The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness (New York: Random House, 1973), 8-9; Peter M. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy: A Study of Interpersonal Relations in Two Government Agencies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955); James A. Desveaux, Designing Bureaucracies: Institutional Capacity and Large-scale Problem Solving (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995); James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967).
continuity, in both an upwards and a downwards direction.\textsuperscript{61} In effect, Curtis asserts that administrative forms such as censuses and other measurements affect what they measure, encouraging people to fit the new categories as they develop. Those categories are shaped by interactions with the objects of measurement. In turn, as Curtis underlines, access to the general ideas underlying those categories may affect how well people feel they understand the society in which they live.\textsuperscript{62} Analyzing government and the mutual influence of multiple actors helps to explain the influence of individual Canadians and small groups on the process of policy change.

The phenomenon of policing, with its overlap with the history of bureaucracy and professionalization, will need to be approached with an understanding of police as both individuals and parts of an organization. Examining why certain groups were targeted for surveillance, and how the RCMP had to fight with other branches of the state for its interpretation of the immigration regulations to be considered, can tell us much about more general government goals in dealing with the question of American immigration. The war resisters and their supporters were the focus of both overt and covert attention by police. Police are relatively minor actors in this study, but to omit them would gloss over important aspects of the history.

\textsuperscript{61} Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (Toronto: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 91, 99. Foucault suggests that the introduction of the category of the population allowed for the focus of government to shift from the family to the individual.

Rather than focus on police as individuals, this study addresses the interaction of police institutions with other government functions, and with anti-draft groups and individuals. As Allan Greer has argued, police are a "visible human embodiment" of the "state." As such, to study policing offers an avenue into discussing larger dimensions of political culture. It is perhaps not surprising that the area of policing which appears to have merited the most attention in Canada is the activity of secret police forces. Writers concerned with the Canadian secret police forces have mostly treated them as either an extension of the state, or as its tool of repression. One such approach takes the RCMP Security Service as an entity with its own ability to intervene in events, making mistakes and taking action as an institution rather than as a group of individuals. It is seen as an institution with an interest in constantly establishing new enemies of the state in order to remain relevant in times of less dissent. Bureaucratic inertia, not the conservatism of individuals, is seen as the reason the Service was slow to change its ideas. Even when the Service did make changes to its outlook and methods, the changes still tended to remain within original boundaries of behaviour and targeting. Such an approach, which de-emphasizes the role of the individual actor while also largely avoiding the influence of actors outside the structure, might for our purposes be termed "institutional." The

institutional approach, typified in Steve Hewitt's *Spying 101*, coincides with a period of polarization of opinions about secret policing. Authors, purposefully or not, situate themselves within the debate by their words and by their conclusions.\(^{65}\)

Despite its relative exclusion of individuals as actors, institutional work integrates cultural influence, in both a top-down and a bottom-up direction, into its approach. Questions around traditional mythologies such as the division between criminal and political policing, formal versus informal law, professionalization, and scientific methods are framed in both intra- and extra-institutional ways.\(^{66}\) Hewitt's emphasis on image and legitimation finds obvious resonances in cultural approaches to history such as those utilized by, among others, historical sociologists.\(^{67}\)

Hewitt and others make central a contention that institutional change reflects something in society. They maintain that to judge the justice system and greater society only by its written laws ignores change, the human element in legal institutions, and the

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particulars of a situation. Law and order is more than just its institutions; it reflects a set of values. The behaviour of police and the policing of behaviour in the story of Canadian support for American war resisters shows how broader society perceived the question, and how at least some branches of government sought to control it.

The influence of populations, or sections of populations, on state departments and officials and their behaviour and decisions, and vice versa, underlies much of this part of the story of support for war resisters in Canada.68 The actions of police and Department of Immigration officials illustrated the battle for hegemony in the realm of attitudes towards war resisters. The involvement of anti-draft groups as pressure groups in promoting the government’s programs was a characteristic example of the zone of interpenetration between the “state” and “society,” and their mutual reinforcement.

In addition to accounting for the roles of the state and civil society, interpreting the specific effects of police organizations on events must account for the effects of both the institution and the individual. Police institution “behaviour,” such as surveillance, is not merely a result of a combination of a paranoid mindset and an individual desire to conform, as Irving Janis and disciples argue.69 Instead, police behaviour says something about society, because individual police are themselves part of society.70 What is called for is an analytical approach that accounts for the internal dynamics of organizations and

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68 See, for example, Curtis, The Politics of Population, and Scott, Seeing Like a State.
70 Hewitt, Spying 101.
institutions; the individuals within them; the institutions’ effects on society and government; and the influence of individuals on the government and in society. These layers of influence and interaction are implicit in a Gramscian approach to state and society, which uses a dialectical method to analyze events and ideas. This dialectical method shows how the influence actually takes place: through a mutually defining relationship between ideas and actions.

Conclusion: A Multidisciplinary Approach

The movement to support American war resisters in Canada was a social movement with a complex relationship to the state and its institutions. It played a role in, and was influenced by, hegemonic processes buffeting around ideas such as the changing role of immigration, the legacy of old movements and the rise of new ones, and nationalism and national identity. The complex interaction of actors from government officials to police, from anti-draft groups to individual activists and war resisters, calls for theoretical framing which can account for this complexity without reducing it to the realm of either material experience or cultural practice.

A history of the Canadian anti-draft movement should encompass the policing and surveillance of its proponents, the effects of individuals on movements, the movement’s effects on politics and on ideas, the interaction of individuals and groups across borders, and so on, to gain an understanding of the entire picture of international relations from the ground up. Finally, an overarching view of how the state and society interact, intersect, and overlap both physically and culturally will be necessary. The result will be a history supported by theory. As Robert Cox points out, “theory is always for

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someone and for some purpose.”71 This theory is a tool to help define questions to start with, and then to know where to look for answers to my questions, arising from the records, and in the mind of a historian situated in a specific historical moment. These theoretical suggestions, and this history, are also for the war resisters – those from the Vietnam Era who live in Canada now, and those who are arriving today to avoid the Bush regime’s “War on Terror.”

The preceding ideas will inform the remainder of this thesis. The next chapter will lay the ground by setting out a history of the development of the network of anti-draft groups that formed the core of this social movement. It will flesh out the multifaceted support the movement received, and offer an evaluation of the movement’s effectiveness.

71 Cox, 207.
Chapter 2

The Anti-Draft Movement: its Inception, Activities, and Impacts

I wish that I were able to incite
Young men in every land to disobey
For wars will cease when men refuse to fight.

To kill our brothers for a nations right
Is not a method we can use today.
I wish that I were able to incite.

When leaders threaten to resort to might,
I know that idols all have feet of clay.
For wars will cease when men refuse to fight.

The cause of peace is shared by black and white
And freedom fighters show a better way.
I wish that I were able to incite.

Non-violent resistance has no bite
While undecided pacifists delay.
For wars will cease when men refuse to fight.

With power to reinforce in what I write
The things that protest-singers try to say,
I wish that I were able to incite
For wars will cease when men refuse to fight.¹

Part I: Canadian Anti-War and Anti-Draft Sentiment

If the late 1960s were a period of readjustment of the hegemonic order, the anti-
draft movement in Canada was in the thick of it. Discussions about nationalism, culture,
Quebec and the American war on Vietnam percolated in complex ways among the
general public and in the halls of government. Canadian support for American war
resisters in the Vietnam War Era was similarly complex. The movement manifested itself

¹ Tom Earley, Incitement to Disobedience, unknown date. Tom Earley (1911-1998) was a poet from South
Wales: Dennis McIntyre, International Who's Who in Poetry and Poets’ Encyclopaedia (New York:
Routledge, 2001), 158.
in various ways. A network of anti-draft groups emerged across the country to provide various services to the American immigrants before and upon their arrival. Among other things anti-draft groups dealt with a quickly changing employment situation, which went from a labour shortage and 3-4 percent unemployment in 1966 to 5-6 percent unemployment in late 1969 and early 1970, with spikes especially among youth seeking employment, and in regions outside Ontario. There were many who helped these immigrants without ever coming into contact, directly or indirectly, with the anti-draft network. There was broad sentiment against the draft not only among activists, but also among student organizations and others not directly involved in the anti-draft movement. But some of these groups were actively involved in supporting war resister immigration, either working with the anti-draft groups or independently. In this chapter I will outline the development of the Canadian anti-draft sentiment and movement, the network of groups – old and new – involved, and their interaction with American “visitors” and immigrants. Once these institutional features and the social relations around them are established, I will reflect on the ways by which that interaction shaped, more largely, the public and personal perceptions of anti-draft activists and groups in Canada.

The term “anti-draft group” refers to all types of groups specifically organized around the issue of American war resisters in Canada. Within that broad type exist “aid groups,” groups whose purpose is to aid war resisters no matter what their motivations, and usually containing both Canadian and American activists; and “exile groups,” groups defined by a membership comprised solely of American immigrants. The evidence

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discussed below shows that war resisters who received help from both types of groups formed mostly positive impressions of the anti-draft groups, and had mostly positive experiences of Canadian support. The groups were fairly effective, although not always entirely reliable.

The anti-draft group activists and the resisters who interacted with them had their disagreements. Debates about the relative value of draft dodging and deserting as anti-war actions, about assimilation and nationalism, and the right way for Americans to be “political” surfaced both in public disagreements and in private moral and tactical dilemmas. Despite this complexity, what emerges most strongly from the extant documents and from interviews with anti-war immigrants and supporters is the sense of a fairly cohesive movement engaged in a dual role: direct support for immigrants, and political advocacy.

**Canadian Anti-War and Anti-Draft Sentiment**

The anti-draft movement emerged in a political landscape in which strong feelings about the American draft and the war in Vietnam were not in short supply. There is ample evidence of sentiments against the draft amongst the broader Canadian peace movement, especially on campuses. Indeed, these sentiments were generally related to the broader Canadian peace movement, as students associated GI resistance with the campaign to end the war. For instance, a 1968 flyer from Students Against War in Vietnam (Toronto) which advertised an “April 26: Student Strike” included demands to bring the GIs home now, end the draft, for self-determination for Vietnam and Black
America, and to end high school and campus complicity with the war. Another flyer from the same organization linked the draft in the United States to opposing the war when it advertised an “International Student-faculty Strike Against the War in Vietnam, Racial Oppression, and The Draft on April 27.” Draft resistance was part of anti-war movement demands, and war resisters were often directly involved as participants. For instance, a report on anti-war activity at Carleton University in Ottawa, written in late 1967 by a group called the Young Socialists, reported that a sit-in against Dow Chemical had drawn “the [Communist Party], New Left Committee, the draft dodgers, and a couple of profs.”

In addition to the peace groups, students were also an important component of anti-draft sentiment. During the student union election at the University of Toronto, probably in 1969, a Student Administrative Council President, Tom Faulkner, who had resigned to run against an anti-draft-dodger candidate, was re-elected. According to RCMP files, as early as 1967 the University of Toronto Student Administrative Council had given money to the “Toronto Anti-Draft Movement.” The anti-war movement itself also drew strong links between opposition to the war and draft resistance. On September 22, 1967, the University of Toronto Student Administrative Council, in a resolution opposing the draft and the war, stated:

> "We hereby call upon all students to rise up and fight to save our campuses from the destruction wrought by the Vietnam War and the draft. We will not stand idly by while our schools are turned into training grounds for the war."


LAC, RG 146, Vol. 765, Students Against War in Vietnam Toronto, Ont., flyer: “International Student-faculty Strike Against the War in Vietnam, Racial Oppression, and The Draft on April 27.” These two flyers may have advertised events occurring in successive years, as years were not included in the dates of the events advertised.


LAC, RG 146, Vol. 22, Req. 93-A-00016, Vol. 2804, Brief No. 325 - Student Administrative Council, University of Toronto, 1970-71, 16. The report suggests that most students opposed the donation, but there is no indication as to the source of that idea.
14, 1968 in Toronto, a Vietnam Mobilization Committee conference heard a speech by “ex-P.F.C. [Private First Class] Howie Petrick on the situation within the U.S. Armed Forces.” The flyer describing the conference called for a Toronto march on October 26th, with the slogans, “bring the troops home now!”, “end Canadian complicity now!”, “self determination for Vietnam!”, and “end the draft now!”

More generally, in 1968 the Canadian Union of Students (CUS) began to take an interest in the issues of the Vietnam War and American war resisters. The first time CUS discussed the war was at its 32nd Congress in the early fall of 1968, apparently on the initiative of the current executive. In October of 1968 the organization considered becoming a “bureau of inquiry” for draft dodgers, and perhaps setting up a “cross-Canada link-up.” Also in this period then-president of CUS Peter Warrian was invited to speak in Toronto at an anti-war demonstration; the specific invitation came from the “Trots” and “Canadians for the National Liberation Front.”

At CUS’ 33rd Congress & Rebuilding Conference, the speakers’ list included Melody Killian, based at Simon Fraser University and involved in Vancouver “American Draft Exile” work. Killian’s presence signalled a continuing interest among CUS’

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11 LAC, MG 31 D66, Peter Warrian Fonds, Vol. 1 – CUS Files, File # 20 CUS – Correspondence, Memoranda 1968-1969, memo, October 8, 1968, regarding “Secretariat Meeting, September 28, 29 and 30,” from Lib Spry. ‘Trots’ refers to an un-named Trotskyist group, perhaps the young Socialists who were active in Toronto at the time; ‘Canadians for the National Liberation Front’ is a reference to an anti-war group who valorized the Communist-led resistance in Vietnam.
12 LAC, MG 31 D66, Peter Warrian Fonds, Vol. 1 – CUS Files, File # 6 CUS - 33rd Congress & Rebuilding Conference. A possible reason for the need to rebuild could have been that Quebec student
leadership in supporting American war resisters. In March and April of 1969 Warrian exchanged correspondence with Killian on the topic of how to assist war resisters. Killian requested such support in the context of what she perceived to be a Canadian government campaign to deport American deserters, and an anti-draft movement campaign to stop them. Killian asked for help to get people to Sweden, then the only other country known to be accepting any appreciable number of American war resisters, and for legal support. Warrian suggested that assistance should be provided to the Committee to Aid American War Objectors in the form of ten plane tickets to help ten people get to Sweden. His reply appears not to have been sent, perhaps because of Killian’s apparent shift to exile politics; Killian played a role in the developing political differences among anti-draft activists, a topic which will be discussed later.

On this activist base, a movement to support the American war resisters was built which enjoyed fairly consistent, albeit passive, support from the Canadian public. War resisters would generally have good experiences with both the movement and individual

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Canadians. The motivations of those involved in supporting the resisters were clarified through these interactions.

**Resisters' Perceptions of Canadian Welcome**

The recollections of Canadian activists and American immigrants confirm that the reception for resisters in Canada was generally supportive. Lee Zaslovsky, a deserter who arrived in Toronto in 1970, observed:

> [a]lthough there were some Canadians who regarded us as cowards, etc., I found that most Canadians were very welcoming. When I would be asked about my background.... I would say I had deserted, and the response would often be “That’s what I would have done.”... Canadians based their welcome in part on their opposition to conscription, as well as, in many cases, to their opposition to the Vietnam War. But conscription was seen as wrong in itself.... I became a cab driver soon after arriving in Canada, and I met draft dodgers and deserters from a number of countries, including Israel, Yugoslavia, and even Norway. They, like me, benefited from the Canadian attitude to [U.S. Selective Service] conscription.\(^{15}\)

“James,” a draft dodger who arrived in 1967, shared the view that Canadians in general supported war resisters, or at least that negative opinions were not in evidence, in a country where, it seemed to him, political opinions were not sharply expressed: “I had the sense that they thought that what the U.S. was doing in Vietnam was basically wrong, and at that time public opinion was against it. Of course then as now there were Canadians who thought everything the U.S. did was right as rain.... But Canadians don’t get in your face so much.”\(^{16}\) Still, for some, the extent of Canadian support came as a surprise. “Ben,” an anti-draft activist who immigrated to Canada in 1978, “pretty much assumed that Canadians were just like Americans except for a couple accidents of history. I remember being quite surprised to hear from a couple resisters who had come to

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\(^{15}\) Lee Zaslovsky, email interview by the author, October 30, 2006.

\(^{16}\) “James”, telephone interview by the author, July 10, 2006.
Canada that they were treated with respect here, that many people were actually friendly toward them.”17 “Ben” expected Canadians to be suspicious of war resisters, perhaps because of negative experiences in the U.S. These general perceptions helped shape these potential immigrants’ opinions of Canada.

Motivations of Supporters

Their general perceptions about Canada augmented war resisters’ direct experiences interacting with individual Canadians. These interactions solidified the resisters’ idea of a welcoming Canada. Their experiences also demonstrate connections between general political culture and the positioning of government. The motivations of individual Canadians who support war resisters were linked, at least for some resisters, to official policy on the war and on the draft dodgers.

Perhaps not surprisingly, some war resisters had experiences with individual Canadians that pointed to pacifist motivations. Marvin Work, a draft dodger from California who arrived in the Kootenays in British Columbia in June of 1970, remembers:

During my first months in Canada we rented a small house from Doukhobor landlords who knew that I was a draft dodger, but were extremely supportive. Being pacifists, they were happy to receive us and to provide support. Once a week they made borscht for us, let us have their buttermilk gratis, and taught my wife to bake bread. We established a very close relationship with them. We were similarly supported by other friends we made in the community.18

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However, the motivations of Canadian activists probably varied a great deal. Hardy Scott, a draft dodger from New York City who arrived in Vancouver in 1967, recalls:

[The views of the Canadian anti-war folks, like their counterparts in the U.S., varied considerably. There were pacifists. There were Canadian veterans who saw this particular war as being unjust. There were Canadians who were angry at the U.S. for threatening economic sanctions against Canada for Canada’s selling buses to Cuba.... The common element is, “this war is unjust and refusal to cooperate is only one of the means to show opposition and give others the courage to show opposition in their own ways.”]

Some resisters made assumptions about the individual opinions of Canadians based on the positioning of political parties at various levels of government. For them, the generally favourable immigration regime towards them meant that Canadians felt generally well-disposed towards war resisters. Michael Goldberg, a draft dodger who arrived in 1967, observed the positive immigration environment for draft dodgers created by the points system, adopted in 1967. The points system awarded points to potential immigrants on the basis of such factors as age, job offer, education and training. While the system was crafted to facilitate the immigration to Canada of all individuals with education, training or job experience the government felt were needed in Canada at the time, the result was that American immigrants in particular had an easy time immigrating, at least in Goldberg’s estimation:

[The] federal government was incredibly supportive, both with the way they set up the immigration rules in the Trudeau era and everything else at the federal level. The barriers were made as simple as possible for people

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19 Hardy Scott, interview by mail by the author, October 31, 2006.
20 Alan G. Green and David A. Green, “The Economic Goals of Canada’s Immigration Policy: Past and Present,” Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques Vol. 25, No. 4 (Dec., 1999): 432-433. See also Chapter 4 on the vagaries of the points system.
to get landed, is the feeling that I had. The points system – at that point you only needed 50 points to get in. \(^{21}\)

And at the [BC] provincial level the opposition party, the NDP, was clearly supportive, and the federal NDP was clearly opposed to the war in Vietnam.

The vast majority of Canadians I felt had serious reservations about the efficacy of the war. At the city level one of the things I found was that politics in Canada was much more entertaining, things didn't always converge in the middle because you had multiple parties here so people would try to stake out their territory. So even when the right was in power you still had left wingers who were supportive and made public pronouncements, so the right wingers were often upset with the "hippies". \(^{22}\)

Through connections with Americans still in the U.S., activists in Canada became aware that the idea of a welcoming Canada was a fairly common one south of the border as well. However, they were divided on whether that welcome was appropriate, as we shall see. Joan Wilcox, an American immigrant who arrived before most American war resisters and was a founding member of Ottawa Assistance with Immigration and the Draft (AID), interacted with friends who remained in the U.S., from whom she and her husband gathered impressions of opinion south of the border:

[Some] thought we were terrible communists...[and others] were laudatory. We had come from the States, and many of our good friends there were politically active; the majority of them tended to feel that from their point of view, they would rather see them continue the fight there in the States. But there were others that were very supportive and very interested in what was happening here. \(^{23}\)

The view that Americans should stay in the U.S. and try to end the war from there was a common theme of debates in the anti-draft movement on both sides of the border, and

\(^{21}\) Michael Goldberg, telephone interview by the author, July 11, 2006.

\(^{22}\) Goldberg interview.

was the principal disagreement with some elements of the American New Left. However, Wilcox was philosophical: “By and large Americans felt strongly about it one way or another; a lot of Canadians couldn’t have cared less.” Canadians, for the most part, did not consider that either immigration to Canada or going to a U.S. jail was a preferred mode of draft resistance.

Groups and individuals got involved for various reasons, rooted in traditions and in current political dialogues. The groups that formed to support the war resisters reflected this complexity of beginnings. The next part of this chapter will explore the beginnings of this movement and trace it to its establishment as a decentralized, yet fairly unified, network of groups and individuals well placed to advocate on behalf of war resisters throughout the period.

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24 Joan Wilcox interview.
Part II: Emergence of the Anti-Draft Movement in Canada

While the problem of the draft was a part of a larger concern about the legitimacy of the Vietnam War for Canadian antiwar activists, eventually a specific movement arose to support those Americans who came to Canada to avoid the draft or to desert from military service. The groups through which Canadians worked to support them were numerous, and geographically dispersed.25

Social movements produce a great deal of published evidence. The Canadian anti-draft movement was no exception. In addition to the various correspondence and flyers, the anti-draft groups also produced pamphlets which now constitute a valuable source of information on the groups, their history and their activities. The most valuable of these is probably the Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada, but many other documents fill in the blanks. The groups were the subject of at least one academic study in the few years following the war's end: Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky's Refugees From Militarism: Draft-Age Americans in Canada remains an essential documentary of the anti-draft movement, as does Kenneth Fred Emerick's more journalistic War Resisters Canada: The World of the American Military-Political Refugees.26 Kasinsky, an American immigrant and sociologist who secured her status as a landed immigrant in 1969 and who was involved with the Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors (VCTAAWO),27 drew upon the files of the Committee, as well on issues of Amex Magazine, current affairs

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25 For ease of Reference Appendix III, People Mentioned in Order of Appearance in the Text, provides some information about each of the many people mentioned in this exposition of the movement's beginnings. Appendix IV, Groups Mentioned and Abbreviations, in Alphabetical Order, does the same for the groups mentioned.


27 UBCL RSC, "Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky: An Inventory of her Papers in the Library of the University of British Columbia Special Collections Division."
books, the Parliamentary *Hansard*, movement publications, and dozens of rigorously conducted and documented interviews and questionnaires analyzed in both quantitative and qualitative ways. Emerick's endeavour was the result of less rigorously approached interviews and experience – Emerick, a disenchanted American academic looking for inspiration, spent several months in Canada living with and among American war resisters. Kasinsky and Emerick both sought to document and to contextualize the war resisters and their experiences. Both wrote about their topics in a positive light – Kasinsky from the standpoint of a war resister with critiques of Canadian immigration policy, and Emerick as a largely sympathetic observer.

Twenty-three groups were listed in the *Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada*, a publication of the Toronto Anti-Draft Programme (TADP); Calgary, Edmonton, Vancouver, Victoria, Winnipeg, Fredericton, Moncton, Sackville, Newfoundland, Guelph, Hamilton, Kingston, Kitchener-Waterloo, London, Oshawa, Ottawa, Peterborough, Port Arthur - Fort William, Toronto, Windsor, Charlottetown, Montreal, Regina, and Saskatoon all had committees or contact people. Their history,

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28 *Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada*, 4th edition, 69-71. The 3rd and 4th editions of the Manual listed the following anti-draft committees, in order alphabetically by province. For a more extensive list see Appendix I:
- Calgary Committee on War Immigrants
- Edmonton Committee to Aid American War Objectors
- Alexander Ross Society
- Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors
- Victoria Committee to Aid Draft Resisters
- Don Pentland, Winnipeg, Manitoba
- Nelson Adams, Fredericton, NB
- Martha and Peter Kellerman, Moncton, NB
- New Brunswick Committee to Aid American War Objectors, Sackville, NB
- Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors
- Newfoundland Committee to Aid American War Objectors
- Guelph Anti-Draft Programme
- Southern Ontario Committee on War Immigrants, Hamilton
ideological positions, and effectiveness also varied. According to Kasinsky, only a few Americans got involved in these groups, but they were very influential; some groups were run at various times by anti-war activists. Here, Kasinsky may have been referring to Bill Spira, a figure in the Toronto Anti-Draft Programme, and Joan and Jim Wilcox, American immigrants who played key roles in the initiation and operation of Ottawa AID. As we will see, in fact, Canadians and Americans shared the leadership of this movement.

The anti-draft groups counselled anyone and everyone who requested it, regardless of their motivation for immigrating. This lack of bias was likely the result of the connections this new movement had with the draft counselling movement south of the border. The groups were not typically very structured, although some did have a board. Groups provided headquarters and message boards as well as drop-in centres, and

Joan Mackenzie, Kingston, ON
Roy Officer, Walter klaasen, or Dr. Ronald D. Lambert, Kitchener-Waterloo
London Information Committee for Draft Refugees
Glen Tenpenney, London, ON
Oshawa Anti-Draft Programme
Goldie Josephy, Ottawa
Ottawa AID: Assistance with Immigration and the Draft
Rev Jim Allman, Peterborough
Lakehead Committee to Aid American War Objectors, Port Arthur-Fort William
Toronto Anti-Draft Programme
American Immigrants Employment Service, Naomi Wall, Toronto Anti-Draft Programme
Information ‘68-‘69, Windsor
Teach-in Committee Against the War, Charlottetown, PEI
Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters
Dunc Blewett, Regina
John Warmock Jr., Saskatoon
Black Anti-Draft Programme, Afro-American Brotherhood, Toronto

29 Kasinsky, 77, 85. Joan Wilcox was discussed in an earlier section.
30 Emerick, 229, 233.
developed expertise in correspondence, dealing with the media, and doing research for publications.\textsuperscript{31}

It is generally understood that the first committee to be formed was the Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors (VCTAAWO).\textsuperscript{32} While the size and weight of that committee make such an impression understandable, the files of Hans Sinn call the claim into question. The truth is probably that committees formed in Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal at roughly the same time, taking different routes for their development. Undated correspondence between Glenn Sinclair, Collections Librarian at McMaster University, and Francis Marion, later an activist with the Vancouver group, states that the VCTAAWO was founded in October, 1966.\textsuperscript{33} This information would establish that the Montreal Council was the first active Canadian anti-draft group, since activity in Montreal began in February of that year.

From the start the transnational nature of the anti-draft movement and its shared roots in pacifism were evident.\textsuperscript{34} Early correspondence and documents of the nascent committee in Montreal establish a picture of a group with international and pan-Canadian

\textsuperscript{31} Emerick, 232.
\textsuperscript{32} For instance, this view was held by at least some resisters attending the Our Way Home Reunion conference in Castlegar, BC, in July of 2006.
\textsuperscript{33} McMaster University, William Ready Division of Archives and Research Collections (hereafter WR), Peter Warrian fonds, Volume 4, file 13, CTAAWO (Vancouver); UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 1-2, Correspondence – VCTAAWO.
links, a movement which took its role very seriously and which placed a premium on the sharing of information.

In February 1966, Montreal-based *Sanity* magazine co-editor Hans Sinn, responding to multiple requests for information from draft resisters, began compiling information for the publication of a fact sheet for potential American immigrants.\(^{35}\) The inquiries may have come as result of the February 1966 issue of *Sanity*’s feature article on war resistance. He wrote to the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors (CCCO) and the War Resisters League (WRL), two well-established American pacifist organizations, on February 7, asking for information on an American’s status with regard to citizenship, draft board requirements and legalities should he decide to immigrate while in various stages of the draft, including desertion. Sinn followed up with telegrams on the 28\(^{th}\), and contacted a war resister couple with whom he was acquainted: Virginia and Lowell Naeve. They had been sponsored to immigrate to Canada by friends. Lowell was a Quaker registered for alternative service in the U.S., who had decided to evade even that. The Naeves were in touch with many other Americans who were interested in immigrating.\(^{36}\) Virginia Naeve wrote:

> There simply needs to be more concerted effort. If I have the information at my fingertips and can pass on information and get people together then that will be good. The better the information the less bog down.
> I need information for people to hang onto. All they know for the most part is they can’t stand the idea of their sons or themselves tolerating the situation in the USA.

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\(^{35}\) *Sanity* was a newsletter of the Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CUCND) until 1965, and ended publication in 1968: Newman, 48-49.

\(^{36}\) WR, Hans Sinn fonds, Vol. 1, File 2, Correspondence with Potential Draftees; WR, Hans Sinn fonds, Vol. 1, File 8, *Sanity: Peace Oriented News and Comment*, 1965-1967. Alternative service was an option offered to American men who successfully applied for conscientious objector status. It typically involved non-military service for two years. See below, this chapter, for more on Quaker pacifism.
I have the contacts in the USA who can help once they know we can help up here. I've been on the steering comm. [sic] of WSP since it was started. CNVA I've worked with, the Quakers, WRL, WILPF....

On March 4 Sinn received a reply from the CCCO, apologizing for the delay. Arlo Tatum went on to refer Sinn to the Student Union for Peace Action (SUPA) fact sheet being drafted at the same time in Toronto. Tatum replied to Sinn's questions and went on to suggest contacting SUPA's Tom Hathaway, a landed immigrant who had just been ordered to report to the draft board. Apparently seeking more, and clearer, information, Sinn sought legal advice and on March 25 received a letter from Richard S. Gottlieb of Gottlieb and Marcovitch, based in Montreal. Gottlieb had met with an immigration official and passed on the information that draft avoidance was not a problem for immigration. Further, no sponsorship was required, although a job or student status would help. Potential immigrants were advised to apply from outside Canada, however such application could be made at a border point or from inside the country after entering as a visitor. Gottlieb referred to a "certificate" to allow non-immigrants to work or study during their stay. Tatum later sent a second letter elaborating on the information already provided. On that basis Sinn drafted a four-page fact sheet entitled "Fact Sheet on Immigration to Canada." Perhaps not surprisingly given Sinn's status as a journalist, the original fact sheet was treated as a media release. However, it appears that upon

receiving the Vancouver pamphlet, “Immigration to Canada and its Relation to the Draft,” Sinn stopped producing the *Sanity* fact sheet.

Sinn’s inquiries led to further requests from the U.S., as U.S. groups referred draft resisters to Sinn for information. The Naeves began receiving forwarded correspondence from Sinn, and *Sanity* subscribers were asked to help support war resisters. In April 1966 inquiries about BC prodded Sinn into writing to SUPA’s Sandy Read, based in Richmond, BC, seeking information on the involvement of BC residents in anti-draft work. Sinn, Virginia Naeve and her colleague Mary considered whether to do a mass mailing of the information sheet. Eventually several dozen copies were sent to American groups. Sinn also contacted Hathaway and sent him copies of the *Sanity* fact sheet. As the campaign in Montreal progressed, more and more Americans residing in the country illegally were approaching *Sanity* clandestinely, seeking legal advice and hoping to keep a low profile, as Sinn’s May 21 1966 letter to Hathaway indicates:

> We have had some experience with draft dodgers who are here furtively. They contacted us asking for legal advice without even giving their name. There seems to be some quite unjustified fear, that the peace movement would make a big thing of things for publicity purposes of its own. All we do is give them the name of a lawyer who has agreed to give free advice….

> We send the names and addresses of people who are willing to assist U.S. refugees to Virginia for now. Like yourself we are still trying to get the hang of things, to find out the best procedures and the actual potential….

> A meeting of all those actively interested should certainly be arranged…. Alfred Friend of the Toronto Peace Center is interested and has some names of Toronto people who are willing to help. If you have not done so already please contact him.

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We have tried to establish contact with people in Vancouver but so far no luck. SUPA has also put out a fact sheet and we were told that a Vancouver lawyer put the information together. Maybe you can trace him through Toronto SUPA. ⁴⁰

The Toronto names to which Sinn referred were Bill Spira, Robert McNamee, and Rev. A.M. Little. ⁴¹

On May 23 Read replied to Sinn’s letter, stating that “rumour has it there is some group around Vancouver which will supply aid (mainly legal). I would imagine it is the civil liberties council but I don’t know because it was a Mauist [sic] who told me about it (PWM) and he wasn’t saying too much. As for myself – I can’t do much but I could probably put someone up for awhile when they first arrive.” ⁴²

Into late 1966 and early 1967 Sinn continued to reply to letters and to seek out networks with activists in other cities. In a January 1969 letter Sinn told the recipient that “for some time now committees in Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal have been aiding U.S. draft resisters to get settled in Canada. Enclosed you will find the information sheet of the Vancouver group which is the most up to date.” In the same letter Sinn went on to ask whether deserters could go to Sweden, because deserters had begun showing up in Canada and the groups were unsure whether deserters could be deported. ⁴³

A letter from the same period mentions Sinn having met the Browns of the VCTAAWO, that Canadian anti-draft publications were getting wide circulation in the U.S., and that the Arlington, VA Underground had published the Vancouver fact sheet. The letter closed with references to nascent committees in Ottawa and Winnipeg, and

⁴⁰ Ibid.
⁴¹ Ibid.
⁴² Ibid.
⁴³ Ibid.
mentioned that Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the main student New Left
group in the United States, had “overcome their initial reluctance” and were doing anti-
draft work. The February 1967 issue of Sanity re-printed the SDS resolution on draft
resistance, which stated in part:

Since the primary task of SDS is building a movement for social change in
the United States, we do not advocate emigration as an alternative to the
draft. Nevertheless we realize that this option is being considered by many
young men. We will thus provide information about emigration, and will
encourage those who emigrate to build international support for the draft
resistance unions and to work for an end to the war.

SDS was willing to assist emigration, and that assistance was framed as an extension of
the antiwar movement. Their statement implied an expectation that émigrés would be
engaged in antiwar and anti-draft activities. The same issue listed the VCTAAWO, the
Toronto SUPA office, and the “Montreal Committee” as groups set up to “aid U.S. draft
resisters.” These groups had strong connections to the antiwar movement, but as a rule
they did not require, or even expect, immigrants to get involved. As we will see, the
tension this engendered between activists, both American and Canadian, provoked debate
in the anti-draft movement.

In 1967 individuals in various cities began corresponding with each other about
setting up committees. In January 1967 Sinn corresponded with Nancy Pocock, later of
the Toronto committee, who sought copies of the fact sheet, mentioned that she and

44 Ibid. SDS history is outlined in Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage (New York:
  Bantam Books, 1993), Helen Garvy, Rebels with a Cause (Los Gatos, CA: Shire Press, 2007), and
Kirkpatrick Sale, SDS: Ten Years Toward a Revolution (New York: Random House, 1973). For more on
the New Left see Doug Owram, Born At the Right Time: A History of the Baby Boom Generation (Toronto:
  University of Toronto Press, 1997), 216-247.
45 WR, Hans Sinn fonds, Vol. 1, File 2, Correspondence with Potential Draftees; WR, Hans Sinn fonds,
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
others had been helping draft dodgers in Ottawa, and asking if there were border troubles. Sinn replied, recommending the Vancouver fact sheet. Later in January Don Pentland of Winnipeg asked for fact sheets and suggested setting up a committee based on the University of Manitoba campus. Sinn replied suggesting he order the Vancouver fact sheet from Benson Brown in Vancouver, and to ask Brown to include the Winnipeg Committee on the next edition of the fact sheet. He also offered advice, suggesting “it is our experience that the U.S. draft resisters are interested, once they are settled, to help their friends in the U.S. That means our group as well as those in Vancouver and Toronto are comprised of Canadians as well as recent U.S. immigrants. Experience will teach you where the best point of entry closest to your area is. We are finding out that those immigrants who arrive at Montreal Airport have the least trouble...” While this might have been true at this point in time, correspondence throughout the period shows that border experiences tended to change over time, making the sharing of information even more important for this very decentralized movement. 48

Also in January, Sinn replied to a request for information from Olive Johnson, the former “chairman” [sic] of the CCND in BC:

The most interesting cases are also the most delicate, namely the army deserters. Obviously we can’t make their problems, how they meet them or fail to meet them public. As it is, we are receiving more and more draft resisters referred to us from Toronto because the border points in that area are getting harder and harder to cross even for those young Americans who are not in trouble with the U.S. authorities.

In Montreal we are working from two locations.... we have seen face to face about 100 draft resisters and we have given assistance by letter, phone, references, etc. to more than another 100.

48 Ibid.
We do not refer people to other organizations but try to accommodate them through people we know on an individual basis. Now a formal committee is in the making in anticipation of a greater influx. 49

Sinn informed Benson Brown of the VCTAAWO in January 1967 that the Toronto border conditions were deteriorating and that many resisters were being diverted to Montreal; and that “John and Sandy have finally received landed immigration [sic] status and are now setting up the committee [in Montreal].” Sinn went on to suggest that Brown contact Olive Johnson for assistance and contacts. 50

Into mid-1967 the CCCO and WRL continued to refer inquiries to Sanity. Sanity, meanwhile, became a source of information on draft dodgers and probably played a role in encouraging war resisters to immigrate. 51

**Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters (MCAWR)**

Thus the Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters (MCAWR) proper was formed in 1967, but had existed in nascent form for almost two years prior to that point. It appears to have been more formally structured than the VCTAAWO, as it had a board of directors and was formally registered as a business. The board had a division of labour which include public relations, treasurer, and secretarial positions. The Montreal Committee’s practice continued to be one of information sharing and communication, and, like other groups as we shall see, becoming more and more formalized in its approach. All of its documents were in English.

The Montreal group used research and materials produced by the VCTAAWO and the Toronto Anti-Draft Programme (TADP). 52 It also produced its own materials

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49 WR, Hans Sinn fonds, Vol. 1, File 2, Correspondence with Potential Draftees.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
including fundraising flyers and form letters containing additional advice and updates enclosed with copies of Immigration to Canada and its Relation to the Draft. MCAWR published reports to the “Friends of the Council,” donors solicited by form letter in 1967. The Montreal Council also provided training to their counsellors. Besides the myriad copies of counselling manuals on file on group archives, a letter from Vance Gardiner of the MCAWR indicated that a group had been recently trained.

As the years passed the Montreal Council would establish its own inner sense of history. A 1970 letter to Glenn Sinclair of the McMaster special collections stated that the Council had been founded in 1966 by Nardo Castillo and John Callendar, passing into the “hands” of Ed Miller, and Vance Gardner from 1967 to 1969, and then operated by Bruce Garside, a McGill professor, and Ed Miller. In late 1969, the letter stated, Bill Mullen was “added to the leadership.” The Montreal Council also “pressed” the federal government to clarify its policy on deserters in early 1969. They worked with Ottawa AID, TADP, and VCTAAWO on that campaign and others, and had informal links with other groups. An April 1969 form letter introducing the group to other groups, including those on the mailing list of the American group, the CCCO, stated that the MCAWR was formed in 1966 from “concerned Quebecois and U.S. exiles,” and asked for help with distributing Council materials. In May of 1971 the MCAWR merged with the American Deserters Committee to form the American Refugee Service, probably to

52 Kasinsky, 96; Emerick, 229.
53 WR, Quebec Social and Political Organizations, Vol. 9, Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters.
54 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 5-20, Canadian Aid Groups.
55 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 1-3, Correspondence – Other Canadian Organizations with Committee.
56 WR, Quebec Social and Political Organizations, Vol. 9, Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters.
57 Ibid.
reduce duplication of services, and perhaps as a result of the agreements reached at the
pan-Canada Conference (see below).\textsuperscript{58}

**Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors (VCTAAWO)**

The VCTAAWO was formed in October of 1966 by a group of University of
British Columbia professors, some of their family members, and a lawyer. The group
initially performed some research, perhaps due to their campus connections, and then
began counselling American immigrants. Demand forced them to further formalize their
operations, eventually opening an office, conducting research, receiving and responding
to correspondence by mail, and publishing information sheets aimed at educating
potential draft dodgers and deserters about how to immigrate to Canada, and what to
expect upon arrival. The VCTAAWO counselled more and more individuals, and began
connecting immigrants with community members for housing and employment, legal and
health care services.\textsuperscript{59} Here, again, was a group whose origins were informal, but which
became more and more formalized in its approach over the next several years.

Groups such as the Vancouver Vietnam Action Committee referred potential
immigrants to the VCTAAWO as early as 1967.\textsuperscript{60} The VCTAAWO engaged in
fundraising and began to forge links with other anti-draft groups in Canada.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{58} Dalhousie University Archives and Special Collections (hereafter DAL), MS-10 Reference, AMEX-
Canada, AMEX (May-June 1972): 15. See also Gary W. Davis, “The Montreal Council to Aid War
Resisters and the American Refugee Service,” personal web site, http://www.nuclearmidnight
\textsuperscript{59} Kasinsky, 92-94; WR, Peter Warrian fonds, Vol 4, File 13, Committee to Aid American War Objectors
[Vancouver].
\textsuperscript{60} UBCL RBSC, Vancouver Vietnam Action Committee papers.
\textsuperscript{61} Kasinsky, 92-4; WR, Peter Warrian fonds, Vol 4, File 13, Committee to Aid American War Objectors
[Vancouver].
The VCTAAWO pamphlet “Immigration to Canada and its Relation to the Draft,” which we encountered earlier, could be found on file in many of the anti-draft offices that subsequently formed. It likely informed anti-draft group counsellors as well as potential immigrants. The Vancouver information sheet was adapted and published by the Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters (MCAWR), and was updated and re-issued until the early 1970s. Among other things, contact information for other anti-draft groups was updated.62 For instance, the November 1966 version emphasized that “a number of Americans who have immigrated to Canada have renounced their citizenship and have thereby voided their military obligations,” and referred to the anticipated changes to immigration policy, which were finally enacted in 1967.63 Further revisions did not much emphasize the renunciation of citizenship tactic; there was some disagreement among the groups regarding the efficacy of the tactic, and although the practice did continue, the points system made such a move unnecessary.64 The Montreal committee solicited information from other anti-draft groups for new editions of the broadsheet.65 The May 1967 revision listed only the Montreal Council for Montreal-bound immigrants, and listed Goldie Josephy for Ottawa; the 1969 revision included the Montreal American Deserters Committee, and Ottawa Assistance with Immigration and the Draft. The

62 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 5-20, Canadian Aid Groups.
64 It was not necessary to renounce American citizenship in order to be landed in Canada or to gain Canadian citizenship; renouncing American citizenship only had the benefit of voiding any military obligations to the U.S.
65 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 1-3, Correspondence – Other Canadian Organizations with Committee.
pamphlet was mailed to individuals who had made inquiries, and to some American draft
counselling groups.\textsuperscript{66}

Other VCTAAWO publications included an addendum memo to “Immigration to
Canada and its Relation to the Draft,” updating certain sections on regulations and
providing advice about additional reading in making the decision about whether to
immigrate to Canada; “Teaching in British Columbia: An Unofficial Guide,” aimed at
immigrants who had the qualifications necessary to apply for teaching jobs; and copies
of “Why They Chose Canada,” an article from \textit{Weekend Magazine}, November 26, 1966,
distributed in response to requests for discussion of “the position of emigrating to
Canada” in \textit{WRL News}.\textsuperscript{67} The VCTAAWO used the media to good effect. Hardy Scott, a
draft dodger who arrived in 1967, recalls that \textit{Ladies Home Journal} did articles for which
he was interviewed. He agreed to those on the condition that they also print the
Committee’s address. As a result the committee received more inquiries.\textsuperscript{68}

Like the Montreal Council, the VCTAAWO had its own sense of its history. An
undated letter to Glenn Sinclair, collections librarian at McMaster University, stated that
the VCTAAWO was founded in 1966. Another undated letter, probably from mid to late
1969, stated that the work was done by volunteers, and that linkages to other groups,

\textsuperscript{66} Kasinsky, 93.
\textsuperscript{67} WR, Peter Warrian fonds, Vol 4, File 13, Committee to Aid American War Objectors [Vancouver].
\textsuperscript{68} Hardy Scott, interview by mail with the author, October 31, 2006. Philadelphia’s \textit{Ladies Home Journal} – published by Curtis Publishing Company until 1968 – with their largely white, largely prosperous
readership, may be seen here as part of a continuum with the Canadian magazine \textit{Chatelaine}; Valerie J.
Korinek has broken the dichotomous analytical mould of magazine as vehicle for either pleasure or
ideological indoctrination: Valerie J. Korinek, \textit{Roughing It In The Suburbs: Reading Chatelaine Magazine
In The Fifties and Sixties} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000). See also, though it covers an earlier
period, Jennifer Scanlon, \textit{Inarticulate Longings: The Ladies’ Home Journal, Gender, and the Promises of
Consumer Culture} (New York: Routledge, 1995). Korinek asserts, convincingly, that \textit{Chatelaine} was first
to promote feminist ideas and was first to shift its demographic appeal to women of average aspirations:
Korinek, 59-65. In this context, sympathy to the war resisters is not surprising.

76
while they did exist, were fairly informal. VCTAAWO activities, the letter stated, included counselling, immigration, jobs, and housing for an average about 5-6 immigrants per day, of which half were deserters. The letter also explained the motivations of the committee: “We help them because their need is great and because they come to have this need through a belief that ‘wars will cease when men refuse to fight,’ which we share.” By February of 1969 Meg Brown’s (and perhaps Benson Brown’s) tenure at the VCTAAWO was over (in fact one letter suggests it was spring of 1968), perhaps because they moved, and Stephen Strauss had taken over, likely overlapping with Betty Tillotson’s involvement. Strauss, a draft dodger, expressed his gratitude to Brown for her work, with Myra Riddell, in setting up the committee originally.

In late 1969 the “Committee” consisted of an office and its volunteer and meagrely paid staff; no actual committee existed. Around this time, the VCTAAWO had to move because of a pipe freeze and a rent increase. Letters to the VCTAAWO in this period were replied to by Francis Marion. By this time, the VCTAAWO was using its own letterhead – a further sign of formalization and also an indication that they had access to resources. The VCTAAWO’s networks with other groups were yielding information for prospective immigrants about other cities, border conditions, and employment prospects. Some letters referred to better job prospects in the East, including the prairie provinces. One letter gave contact information for the Calgary committee.

69 WR, Peter Warrian fonds, Vol 4, File 13, Committee to Aid American War Objectors [Vancouver].
70 Ibid.
71 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 1-3, Correspondence – Other Canadian Organizations with Committee.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
Another stated that draft dodgers were still crossing the border more easily than other American immigrants, although by late 1969 deserters should not have been subject to discrimination at border points; the Minister of Manpower and Immigration had announced on May 22 that deserter status would not be used to keep immigrants from entering Canada, as a result of a campaign to change the policy.\footnote{UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 1-2, Correspondence – VCTAAWO.}

The Vancouver group also did its own research and produced briefs as part of anti-draft group attempts to influence immigration policy. The document “Note on Fugitives from Justice” from May of 1967 is one example; it was an opinion piece regarding the soon-to-be-announced points system and its potential for abuse and manipulation by immigration officials. Other documents were written in response to the unfair and uneven treatment of American immigrants that subsequently developed at border points and in immigration offices within Canada. In late 1967 the VCTAAWO wrote “A Note on the Handling of Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada,” a document aimed at informing then-Deputy Minister of Immigration Tom Kent (who served under Minister Jean Marchand until July of 1968) about discrimination at the border against draft-age Americans in general. The brief appended statements from thirty-six recent arrivals, whose experience with officials had been negative. In January of 1969 the VCTAAWO prepared a brief, “A Further Note on the Handling of Draft-Age Americans Who Apply for Entry Into Canada.” The brief formed a part of the 1969 campaign to open the border, and included affidavits from war resisters.\footnote{UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 8-8, A Note on the Handling of Draft-Age Americans Who Apply for Entry Into Canada; 7-13, A Further Note on the Handling of Draft-Age Americans Who Apply for Entry Into Canada.}
The VCTAAWO was one of the most active committees, because a large number of war resisters decided to move to Vancouver, perhaps because of its reputation as a northern counterpart to California. One resister, who later became involved in the committee, recalls "It was an active committee; there were many people who would provide initial housing for people to stay, help to find jobs, be drivers to take people down to the border and then bring them across again, to meet people when they did come in; the three big things were housing, jobs, and getting landed.... We seemed to never be in dire straits." 76

Another Vancouver anti-draft group, Immigration AID to Refugees of Conscience, also produced materials, including "On Being a Kept Person," a flyer originally published by the Unitarian Church group Canadian Assistance to War Objectors (see below). 77 It aimed at encouraging war resisters to keep a low profile as boarders with temporary housing, and exhorted "No fraternization with teenage daughters (it’s been tried)...nor will parents of older children be receptive to having their offspring counselled on ways and means of subverting parental authority (it’s been done)." A commensurate document, "So You’re Having a War Resister," exhibited the same light tone in encouraging housing volunteers to be clear about their expectations from boarders.78 It is unclear who participated in this group (and several others mentioned here) due to the paucity of documentation.

76 Goldberg interview.
77 For a discussion of church involvement see below, this chapter. See also above, this chapter, note 32 on sources for pacifism.
78 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 1.2, Various publications; UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 7-29, Minutes – Canadian Assistance to War Objectors – Steering Committee, "On Being a Kept Person," CAWO 1968.
One other Vancouver group, the Unitarian Church’s Canadian Assistance to War Objectors (CATWO), had a steering committee which met regularly from at least January until August of 1968, and kept minutes of its discussions of the job situation, setting up a hostel, etc.\textsuperscript{79} The January meeting of the steering committee welcomed a guest from the VCTAAWO, Mrs. Riddell, who outlined the need for job offers, a hostel, drivers, money, duplication services, and volunteers.\textsuperscript{80} The CATWO began funding the VCTAAWO at $100 per month in March of 1968. It sought to avoid duplicating efforts of the VCTAAWO, and concentrated on job counselling. Eventually it was decided to discuss amalgamation, and consider the same for the North Shore Housing group, because “an accident of history” had resulted in three overlapping groups forming at the same time.\textsuperscript{81} It is unclear whether the amalgamation ever occurred, but the VCTAAWO certainly continued to exist until at least 1972. “The Care and Feeding of War Objectors” was the CATWO precedent to “So You’re Having a War Resister,” titles which compared war resisters to pets and babies, respectively.\textsuperscript{82} The humorous tone was likely adopted in order to approach non-activists in a friendly way, to encourage their active

\textsuperscript{79} Churches and religious communities played a large role in the anti-draft movement. See below, section on the Canadian Council of Churches. See also Donald W. Maxwell, “Religion and Politics at the Border: Canadian Church Support for American Vietnam War Resisters,” Journal of Church and State, Vol. 48 (Autumn 2006); and his PhD Thesis, forthcoming, Indiana State University.

\textsuperscript{80} UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 7-29, Minutes - Canadian Assistance to War Objectors - Steering Committee.

\textsuperscript{81} UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 7-29, Minutes - Canadian Assistance to War Objectors - Steering Committee: “Seventh Meeting of the Steering Committee.”

\textsuperscript{82} Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 7-29, Minutes – Canadian Assistance to War Objectors – Steering Committee, “The Care and Feeding of War Objectors,” CAWO 1968. “The Care and Feeding of [Such-and-such]” is a common title for a how-to manual or set of instructions. In fact, the phrase may have been coined by Marion Balfour Chalmers in her 1913 Address, “The Care and Feeding of Babies,” to the Tri-County Nurses Association of Akron, Ohio; Marion Balfour Chalmers, “The Care and Feeding of Babies,” American Journal of Nursing, Vol. 13, No. 6 (Mar., 1913): 357-365 and 424-427. A search of just one database – JSTOR – yields no fewer than nineteen results – articles and reviews with titles regarding the ‘care and feeding of’ chest tubes, ideas, English departments, freshmen, words, marketing consultants, intellectual property, and future British political elites, to name a few. “So You’re Having a Baby” is ubiquitous in popular culture as a title for advice to new mothers.
support through the provision of housing. Depicting war resisters as dependent and in need of help was also part of the tone of these flyers.

**Ottawa Assistance with Immigration and the Draft (AID)**

In Ottawa, the group Ottawa Assistance with Immigration and the Draft (AID) helped immigrants with immigration regulation legalities, spending a third of its budget on that service. According to contemporary accounts, Ottawa AID was founded by Jim Wilcox, an American who became an English professor at Carleton University, but Joan Wilcox (Jim Wilcox was her husband) recollects (below) that the group was started by two women.\(^{83}\) Ottawa AID established The Coffeehouse as a gathering place in a francophone United church at the corner of Elgin and Lewis Streets, run in late 1970 by Mennonite Bob Janzen and his wife.\(^{84}\) By that time Jim Wilcox had stepped back, but the committee was still very active. Joan Wilcox recollects:

> We started up really under the tutelage of the Toronto Anti Draft Program…. Originally… for two reasons, one, they had been doing a lot of work, but they were primarily getting people landed at the border which was then possible under the Immigration Act, but sometimes the border was getting increasingly tight…. So they enlisted the Ottawa Peace in Vietnam group to work with Parliament to try and do what could be done... and secondly to assist with the actual immigration of those young men who would qualify with an internal application…. So those were the two initial reasons for our start up, and then it just expanded and expanded.\(^{85}\)

> ... My husband and I had just recently moved here, and he was in his first year teaching at Carleton, he was teaching all new courses and I was

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\(^{83}\) Emerick, 227. Emerick thought very highly of Ottawa AID’s service quality.

\(^{84}\) Emerick, 231; UBCL RBSC, Renee Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 6-4, Canadian Publications — *AMEX*: “Ottawa: Amexiles who settle in Ottawa easily forget from whence they came,” *AMEX* Vol. 2, No. 6 (October – November 1970). Janzen’s wife’s name was not provided. Mennonites are one of the peace churches. Emerick makes reference to a francophone Anglican church, which seems highly unlikely; the *AMEX* reference is probably accurate, especially since there is today a francophone United church at Elgin and Lewis streets in Ottawa: http://st-marc.freehosting.net/, accessed September 10, 2008.

\(^{85}\) Wilcox interview.
looking for something to keep me busy and was ready to start getting a little more politically active, and I wound up attending a meeting of the Ottawa group for peace in Vietnam, whatever it was called, and found that their most pressing need at the time was to develop something Toronto had been asking the peace group here for help [with], and they’d had the odd draft dodger come and they didn’t know what to do with him and so on. So another young woman and I, the wife of a sociologist from Carleton and I, said well, [it] sounds like we could do that. So we got a hold of copies of the immigration act and it just grew from that. My husband became interested; he was more interested in lobbying, although we both did some of everything, but that’s where he focussed. And gradually our group expanded.\textsuperscript{86}

Wilcox was one of many women involved in the anti-draft groups. Although one might expect that women in the anti-draft movement did the menial jobs, there is no noticeable gender division of labour. Women in these groups, however, were acting in the context of growing awareness of women’s rights on the one hand and persistent masculinisation of activism and war resistance on the other.\textsuperscript{87} The treatment of women as war resisters will be discussed later.

As the Ottawa group expanded, so did its services:

[We did] Everything there was to be done (laughs). Our primary focus was providing info and support to the young men and women who were here as a result of the war. Mainly draft dodgers, increasingly war deserters, and their partners if they came with a partner... The specific work entailed immediately providing for their physical needs, housing, food, that sort of thing, but in the long term providing... [assistance with] preparing their applications... helping them get documents, helping them understand the forms, helping them understand the ways of presenting themselves that would be truthful but the most positive.\textsuperscript{88}

As Wilcox recalls, the Ottawa group met from time to time with the TADP and a group from Montreal:

\textsuperscript{86} Wilcox interview.
\textsuperscript{87} See note above in Chapter 1, regarding the research of Lara Campbell and Robin Folvik.
\textsuperscript{88} Wilcox interview.
We worked closely in the sense that Toronto would send us people that they were feeling they might have trouble with or just their overflow, and Montreal would send us people they thought we could be more of assistance with.\textsuperscript{89}

The Ottawa group also placed great importance on information and communication across the growing pan-Canadian network.

\textbf{Toronto Anti-Draft Programme (TADP)}

The TADP formed in late 1966 out of a committee formed by the Student Union for Peace Action (SUPA) at the University of Toronto. SUPA was originally connected to the Canadian University Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, acting as student wing, but by 1965 had broken from it.\textsuperscript{90} SUPA had placed the VCTAAWO publication “Immigration to Canada and its Relation to the Draft” on its literature list, and received dozens of requests for it and for further information. SUPA subsequently set up an office on the University of Toronto campus.\textsuperscript{91}

One of the earliest examples of media coverage of the draft dodger phenomenon was Philip Smith’s “U.S. Draft Dodgers Tell Why They Chose Canada,” in \textit{Weekend Magazine}, Nov. 26, 1966.\textsuperscript{92} In the piece, Smith interviewed Canadians and American immigrants. The feature profiled, among others, Tony Hyde of SUPA, pictured beside an

\textsuperscript{89} Wilcox interview.
\textsuperscript{90} WR, CCUND, 1-8, Board of Directors minutes 1965.
\textsuperscript{91} Kasinsky, 96-7.
American immigrant, smoking a cigarette. Tony Hyde, the article stated, was a 20-year-old University drop-out from Ottawa. He was involved with SUPA doing research, information and publications work, and helped, to that date, “about 50' young Americans,” meeting them at the bus station and finding them temporary housing. According to Hyde, SUPA had begun to receive requests in winter of 1965, which resulted in the SUPA pamphlet “Coming to Canada?” Hyde asserted that SUPA did not encourage Americans to immigrate because they did not want to offend the American peace groups who wanted them to stay home to oppose the war. Instead, Hyde said, SUPA counselled immigrants about work regulations, and helped with filling out forms and the process for getting landed status. “It’s all very informal, but we might have to get some kind of organization going,” he said. Hyde depicted war resisters as representing many different political attitudes and backgrounds.

Smith’s position was generally favourable towards SUPA, which he described as “a kind of loosely-knit new left pro-civil rights and anti-Vietnam group that grew out of the Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament,” and towards the immigrants. The piece asserted that while some war resisters might have been cowards, many were articulate, bright, intelligent, and morally conscientious. As Smith pointed out, “[m]ost of them seem to come from a middle-class, big-city background and to have some academic experience. ‘Guys who don’t go to college don’t even know you can come to Canada,”

94 Ibid.
one of them told me." Smith’s off-hand remark was to the point: as we will see in
Chapters 4 and 5, class was one factor that determined resisters’ experiences with both
government and activists.

The article also contained interviews with American exiles, some of whom
expressed views about the Canadian support they received. One Vancouver resister, who
immigrated with his wife, said “it was very comforting, when we had this feeling of
fleeing, that there was somebody who could give us advice and help us. We had no one
really to talk to in the United States. There has been a real loss of freedom, I think.”
Another resister, settled in Toronto with his wife, did not require assistance apart from
advice. Both reflected the importance, again, of information to those coming north.

Eventually SUPA published its own pamphlet entitled “Escape from Freedom, or
I Didn’t Raise My Boy to be a Canadian.” Boasting a yellow cover with a political
cartoon lampooning an American mother, reflecting both the familial connections and the
often-tense relations in those connections held by many American immigrants, its twelve
pages dealt with the question of how to oppose war, how to deal with conscription, and a
basic outline of immigration laws including prohibited classes, visitor status, student
status, and landed immigrant status. It suggested that “any American deserter would not
be accepted as a landed immigrant.” The booklet instructed potential immigrants on how

95 Ibid. Tensions around the income and education disparity between draft dodgers and deserters will be
treated in the next chapters.
96 WR, Doug Ward fonds, Vol. 1, File 1, Student Action, Philip Smith, “US Draft Dodgers Tell Why They
Chose Canada,” in Weekend Magazine (Nov. 26, 1966), 12-14, 16-18. It is typical of the time that the
men’s wives were not identified nor interviewed.
97 Escape from Freedom, or, I Didn’t Raise My Boy to Be a Canadian, Toronto: SUPA, volunteer labour,
1967. Escape from Freedom was penned by Richard Paternack, a University of Toronto student and draft
dodger: David Churchill, When home became away: American Expatriates and New Social Movements in

85
to apply (in person from within Canada, by nomination, by mail from outside Canada, or in person at the border), and details of the border application. Finally, it outlined questions of extradition and deportation, and the basics of life in Canada. While the authors’ position on desertion was somewhat inaccurate, they were correct in stating that deportation was illegal, describing it as a “blatant infringement” on individual rights. The pamphlet concluded with contact information for consulates, immigration offices, SUPA’s 658 Spadina Avenue offices, and the Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors. There was also a leaflet form of “Escape from Freedom,” condensed, as noted in its final paragraph asking for contributions. The ironic title was typical of many anti-draft publications and fact sheets, and reflected a common war resisters stance on U.S. foreign policy. It also quoted Erich Fromm’s 1941 work, Escape from Freedom, a Freudian and Marxist-influenced analysis of social tendencies to seek out authority. Fromm was a member of the Frankfurt School at the same time as Herbert Marcuse, whose influence on the New Left is well documented. The title thereby suggested that to leave the United States was to resist authority.

For various reasons, including pressure from New Left figures such as Tom Hayden, who viewed draft dodging as a weaker tactic than desertion or direct opposition to the war, SUPA eventually dissociated itself from the anti-draft movement shortly before SUPA ceased to exist at the University of Toronto. In 1965 the CCND publication Sanity had already reported that a December 1964 to January 1965

98 WR, Peter Warrian fonds, Vol. 7, File 17, Toronto Anti Draft Programme [sic].
100 Kasinsky, 97-98.
conference had decided to disband CUCND, instead forming the Student Union for Peace Action. However, by 1967 SUPA was facing financial difficulty. Between 1965 and 1967 SUPA was involved in discussion about its internal structure and purpose. A 1967 proposed constitution included a method of requiring individual members to pay dues. The federal council meeting that year also heard a report from the SUPA draft resisters programme. Eventually SUPA dissolved, leaving the draft resisters programme and its office as a legacy of its Toronto activity. The anti-draft committee reinvented itself as the Toronto Anti-Draft Programme.

An early form letter to a potential immigrant from Mark Satin was on SUPA letterhead, and had a return address for the TADP at 658 Spadina Avenue – the SUPA offices. The letter offered copies of “Escape from Freedom” for fifteen cents. Another letter, aimed at raising funds and finding housing, explicitly stated that “Since going to jail has proved a relatively ineffective means of protest, coming to Canada is perhaps the most significant way, both symbolically and actually, of refusing to support U.S policy in Asia.” The letter was signed by “Mark Satin, Director, and Peter Milne, Secretary, Anti Draft Programme.” As the war progressed the aid groups refined their own information and that provided to potential immigrants. The SUPA Anti Draft Programme fact sheet “Twelve Errors in Escape From Freedom” was supplemented in September

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103 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 7-11, Exile Group Publications: Toronto, Montreal.
104 Ibid.
1967 by "A Summary and Analysis of the New Immigration Regulations." Another fact sheet was titled "Answers to the Twelve Most Frequently Asked Questions."\(^{105}\)

The TADP, like other anti-draft groups, existed mostly because of the willingness of volunteers to act in various capacities, including immigration counselling, help with housing, and employment.\(^{106}\) A series of individuals played a coordinating role, starting with Mark Satin, who worked with the TADP from before its break from SUPA in 1967 until several years later. Satin drafted the first edition of the *Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada*. In September of 1967 the TADP set up a restructured Anti-Draft Committee to provide assistance with the programme, with subcommittees and regularly scheduled meetings. The sub-committees included Information Campaign, Fund Raising, Legal Research and Aid, American Immigrants Employment Service, and Newsletter.\(^{107}\)

Kasinsky interviewed TADP activist and Quaker Nancy Pocock in early 1970.\(^{108}\) Pocock and her husband Jack had been "active in [the] exile movement since 1965." The Pococks administered a Quaker fund used to support the immigrants with their immediate needs upon arrival. The funds came in large part from American Quakers, and many of the immigrants were Quakers themselves.\(^{109}\) Pocock recalled that her daughter had been a SUPA member, and that SUPA had been receiving many inquiries from the United States regarding immigration regulations: "pretty soon they were almost swamped, and finally one of them, Tom Hyde, took it on as a full-time thing... everybody finds after

\(^{105}\) Ibid.
\(^{106}\) Emerick, 229.
\(^{107}\) UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 7-11, Exile Group Publications: Toronto, Montreal.
\(^{108}\) Quakers are one of the peace churches.
\(^{109}\) UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-12, Interview with Nancy Polchaw [sic], May 1970, Toronto, Quaker, Active in Exile Movement Since 1965, Quaker social justice activism is the subject of a huge literature. See for instance Peter Brock, *The Quaker Peace Testimony, 1660 to 1914* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1990).
they do it for a while, they get completely exhausted and drained.” Pocock went on to explain how the programme was taken over by an American immigrant and his wife, and that eventually SUPA folded, but the programme continued.\footnote{UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-12, Interview with Nancy Pokhawk [sic], May 1970, Toronto, Quaker, Active in Exile Movement Since 1965.}

Pocock and her husband, Jack, were central figures in the TADP from its inception. Nancy described, in a May 1970 interview, that “[Jack has] been on the committee [executive board], ever since they’ve had it.... We were always sort of advisors for the Toronto-Anti-Draft [sic]... they put him onto dealing with the media.... We had a steady stream in here of newsmen from all over the world.”\footnote{Ibid.} Along with Bill Spira, the Pococks likely represent the steadiest involvement in the anti-draft movement by Canadians. Spira, also interviewed in 1970, stated that at that time the TADP had five full-time staff, of which he was one by virtue of his having been on the board, and then having initiated the sub-program for deserters.\footnote{UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-14, Interview with Bill Spira of the Toronto anti-Draft Program, June 1970.} Pocock recounted that Rich Paterack ran the TADP after Tom Hyde, and after that it was Mark Satin, who developed the Manual, upon whose sales the TADP continued to exist. She also referred to church involvement with the program.\footnote{UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-12, Interview with Nancy Pokhawk [sic], May 1970, Toronto, Quaker, Active in Exile Movement Since 1965.}

Arguably the most important document produced by the Canadian anti-draft movement, the Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada is also a window into the activities of Canadian supporters of draft dodgers and deserters from the American
military between 1967 and 1970.\textsuperscript{114} The \textit{Manual} promoted itself and the TADP as the authority on immigrating to Canada, and discouraged the use of “amateur” or “underground” information sources.\textsuperscript{115} It also documents a history of political events and achievements and swiftly changing ideas among anti-draft activists and immigrants. The \textit{Manual} was published six times, from January 1968 onwards. Several editions were published at House of Anansi, later briefly housed at Rochdale College, a bastion of the Toronto New Left.\textsuperscript{116} It provided a snapshot of the diversity of the Canadian anti-draft movement, with contributors representing a cross-section of anti-war and New Left circles in Toronto, where anti-draft activity was the largest and best organized.\textsuperscript{117} Editions of the manual updated information such as group listings and changes in immigration procedures, and in 1971 referred potential immigrants to American draft counselling services in part to reduce the number of refugees given the high unemployment rate of the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{118} The \textit{Manual} described the TADP as the largest of the anti-draft groups, and credited the Vancouver Committee with starting the movement, when SUPA began distributing their pamphlets.\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{114} There was also a \textit{Manual for Draft-Age Americans in Europe}, published by War Resister International. It isn’t clear which pamphlet was published first: WR, Doug Ward fonds, Vol. 3, File 3, Vietnam 2, pamphlet: “Literature List 1969,” War Resisters League, NY, NY. A copy may be found at the Modern Record Centre, Warwick University, UK, in the papers of the group Release. For additional analysis of the content of the \textit{Manual} see Churchill, \textit{When Home Became Away}, 188-192.


\textsuperscript{116} WR, Peter Warrian fonds, Vol. 6, File 31-2, Rochdale College.

\textsuperscript{117} University of Toronto, Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library (hereafter TF), Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 29, Printed items.


\textsuperscript{119} TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 29 Printed items.
The first four editions were edited by Satin, TADP Director from 1967 to 1968, and published by House of Anansi, with the involvement of the TADP. The first edition had a limited run of 5,000. Small invoice flyers were often included with shipments of the Manual, asking for payment of $2.00 per manual. The invoice asserted that copies of the Manual were always shipped first, trusting that payment would eventually arrive. A 1968 invoice was in red ink with a maple leaf in the border. The demand for the first edition was such that in the Spring of 1968 Mark Satin, Allen Mace, and Jim and Carol Oliver distributed a letter regarding delays in shipments, and

![Image of Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada](image1.png)

![Image of Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada](image2.png)

Figure 1: Covers of the Manual for Draft-Age immigrants to Canada, Second and third editions, edited by Mark Satin and published in 1968 and 1969.

120 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 1.2, Various publications
121 WR, Peter Warrian fonds, Vol. 7, File 17, Toronto Anti Draft Programme.

91
announcing a second printing. The second edition of the *Manual*, in March 1968, had a run of 20,000, and the third, 10,000.¹²²

The 4th revised edition of the *Manual*, published in December 1969 but cover-stamped 1970, also in a run of 10,000, contained quotations from two Immigration officials. The first was from John Munro, a parliamentary secretary for the Department of Immigration, who on June 12, 1967, said “an individual’s status with regard to compulsory military service in his own country has no bearing upon his admissibility to Canada either as an immigrant or as a visitor, nor is he subject to removal from Canada because of unfulfilled military obligations in his country of citizenship.” The second was an extract from Minister of Manpower and Immigration Allan MacEachen’s May 22 1969 speech in the House, stating “if a serviceman from another country meets our immigration criteria, he will not be turned down because he is still in the active service of his country...the selection criteria and requirements applying to him will be the same as those that apply to other applicants.”¹²³ These quotations were probably included for political reasons, coming as they did soon after the May 1969 victory of the anti-draft groups’ campaign to open the border to deserters. By including them, the anti-draft movement both asserted its victory and claimed responsibility for it.

The fifth edition, late 1970, was the first edition without a maple leaf on the cover, sporting instead a silhouette of Canada. It was revised and edited by Byron Wall, published by House of Anansi, and published with the support of the Social Action

¹²² WR, Peter Warrian fonds, Vol. 7, File 17, Toronto Anti Draft Programme; DAL, MS-10 Reference, Toronto Anti-Draft Program.
¹²³ DAL, MS-10 Reference, Toronto Anti-Draft Program.
Committee, First Unitarian Congregation of Toronto – more evidence of both the fluid nature of the movement and the breadth of support the movement received. The 1970 edition listed 32 anti-draft groups across the country. The sixth edition, Spring 1971, abandoned all national symbolism for an engraving of a grieving mother figure holding two dead children. This last edition was largely typewritten and lower in production values than the previous five editions, perhaps a reflection of both the dwindling number of war resisters and the shift in focus of the groups after the pan-Canada conference, described below. It included a section entitled “Of Frying Pans and Fires,” by Ron Lambert, outlining a debate between two streams of Canadian nationalism – one resistant to United States domination, and one, “colonially-minded,” justifying U.S. foreign policy and its domination of Canadian decision-making – and encouraging readers to choose one or the other. The cover images and the inclusion of Lambert’s essay point to how Canadian nationalism and debates about tactics and identity intertwined in interesting ways among American war resisters and Canadian anti-draft activists.

Other TADP publications included a leaflet, probably from 1968, entitled “Many More Draft-Resisters Expected This Summer,” consisting of an update on TADP activity. It stated that the caseload of the 2279 Yonge Street office had risen to 20-25 per day from 5-6. It also mentioned the arms-length American Immigrants Employment Service, a group listed in the VCTAAWO pamphlet “Immigration to Canada and its Relation to the

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124 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 1.2, Various publications.
125 Ibid.
126 A discussion of these issues will be undertaken in Chapters 4 and 5.

93
Draft,” but never listed in the TADP’s Manual. 127 Another TADP leaflet, “So You Want to Teach Public School in Canada,” also likely from 1968, included information on getting teacher status in seven provinces – an indication of how popular that profession was as an employment goal for war resisters, and also evidence of the early tendency to focus on the better-educated war resisters.128

The TADP kept copies of other groups’ publications on file. A pamphlet distributed by Social Science Research, Victoria, Canada, reproduced from an American pamphlet called “The Draft: Your Rights, Your Choices: the New Draft Law,

128 Ibid.

94
Conscientious Objection, Student Deferments, Other Classifications,” contained a section on Canada, and the information that draft dodgers were not barred from entering. It suggested that landed immigrant status was better than student or visitor status. The TADP also kept copies of CCCO publications on counselling and military regulations on such topics as conscientious objection and discharge; counselling handbooks; and international and American government publications, such as U.S. Department of Defense directives and regulations on “Brigs and stockades,” courts martial, and medical fitness. Canadian publications on file generally tracked policy and legislative changes to immigration processes, included the Canada Immigration Act; Immigration Acts bills and amendments, 1972-1973; and the November 6, 1972 revocation of section 34 of the regulations, thereby prohibiting achieving landed status from within Canada. The breadth and precision of the files indicates the extensive counselling available to American war resisters at the TADP offices.

Correspondence with anti-draft groups in the United States and Canada kept people informed about rumours and facts about border crossings and other factors useful in counselling prospective immigrants. For instance, a 1968 letter stated that rumours regarding plans to “close” the border had been denied by Department of Immigration officials; but that the Detroit/Windsor, Toronto Airport, Buffalo/Port Erie, and Lake Champlain (NY) border crossings were not reliable due to officials “believing] in the

\[129\] Ibid. No information seems to exist about Social Science Research.
\[130\] TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 12, CCCO Publications; TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 9, US legal publications; TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 7, International and U.S. Legal Publications; TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 5, File 1, Handbook for Training Draft Counsellors; TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 3, Counselling Resource Binder 2; TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 3, Counselling Resource Binder 1.
\[131\] TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 6, Canadian Legal Publications.
war;” “we are keeping the draft counsellors listed in Chapter 24 [of the Manual] informed of all new developments.”

By 1968, the *Manual* stated, the TADP was receiving one hundred letters and an average of seventeen visitors every day; it had six staff, provided hostel accommodations and an employment service, a loan fund, and legal referrals. Its support came especially from church groups and University of Toronto faculty members, some of them perhaps recently involved in student movements. The Programme made use of volunteers, both Canadians and immigrants. Historians, including J.M.S. Careless, Professor and Chairman, Department of History, University of Toronto; Elliott Rose, Associate Professor of History, University of Toronto; and Kenneth McNaught, professor and editor of *Saturday Night Magazine*, helped with the general text of the *Manual* and with the sections on war resisters’ immigration history. In that section, the claim was made that Canada’s history was one of providing sanctuary to various kinds of war resisters. This idea was a major part of advocacy efforts on behalf of war resisters, as we will see. The introductory section, entitled “words from Canadians,” contained short messages from lawyers and church officials, welcoming American immigrants. These pages suggested that Canada and the U.S. were not much different from each other in many important ways; and that Canadians ought to welcome resisters, without judging them.

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135 *Manual*, 4th revised edition, 68-7, 88-89. Some of these professors were also connected with the University of Toronto Faculty Committee to End the War in Vietnam: Elliott Rose, for instance.
136 *Manual*, 4th revised edition. Lawyers included Vincent Kelly and Robert D. Katz; church officials included Rev. Roy G. de Marsh, Secretary, Board of Colleges, United Church of Canada.
The idea that resisters deserved support no matter their personal reasons for coming to Canada was commonly held by activists in the network of anti-draft groups.\textsuperscript{137}

TADP received financial support from a variety of sources at various times. Donors included individuals, such as lawyers, professionals, Rabbis, Reverends, immigrants, and individual Canadians; and groups, including the Buffalo, NY branch of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, Women for Peace, the Queens College of the City University of New York Student Activities Financial Board, the United Methodist Church, the Friends meeting of Washington, and the Windsor War Resisters.\textsuperscript{138}

As the largest of the anti-draft programs, the TADP eventually developed a low level of bureaucracy to keep track of its activities and communications. A TADP counsellor form tracked first and repeat visits and phone calls, and queried American/non-American, priority/non-priority.\textsuperscript{139} A description of services from around 1971 shows that the TADP classified immigrants in order to prioritize their being processed. The “middle-class draft dodger,” 20-24 years old, with wives or girlfriends, often with money, a car, and familial support in the U.S., were the easiest to get landed. The “working-class draft dodger,” 18-21 years old, with a high school diploma but few skills, not much money, usually no prior counselling, often either returned to the U.S. in a panic or was sent back for counselling and a more considered decision. Deserters, the “largest and most difficult group,” were mostly working-class, stereotyped by a negative

\textsuperscript{137} As we will see in Chapter 3, there was a debate about tactics, but it tended not to affect the decision of whether or not to support individual resisters.
\textsuperscript{138} TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 24, TADP Administrative Files, Folders 3-9, Donor Letters
\textsuperscript{139} TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 2 TADP Records, Folder 1-4, Front Desk Inquiry records, 1972-1973.
perception of desertion, typically alienated from family, had little if any work experience or skills, sometimes had no high school, and often had no hope; some deserters, typically aged 17 to 21, were deported for breaking laws in Canada.\textsuperscript{140} The remarkable level of detailed categorization of clients was matched by precise record-keeping; in 1972 and 1973 weekly reports were filed, as well as meticulous daily records kept.\textsuperscript{141} These records coincided with a high volume of services in the period 1972-1973, when the Department of Immigration introduced programs to fast-track visitors and illegal immigrants.\textsuperscript{142}

People's roles in and out of the committees were of varying durations. Different accounts recall different individuals as important. TADP counsel Paul Copeland remembers a number of activists, but there were probably more:

The two main people were Dick Burrows and Naomi Wall, but there were a number of other people who floated around. There was a guy who worked under the name of Allen Mace, his real name is Les Widdington... and his father was in the U.S. army and it was just embarrassing to work under the real family name. There was a guy named John Levy who worked there sometimes, who was a student at the University of Buffalo, he actually had [conscientious objector] status but was opposed to the war. I knew him as John Levy for about four years until he finished law school in Canada and ended up being my partner, his name was actually John Liss. And I knew tons of people. [Some Americans changed their names] to avoid trouble of one sort or another.\textsuperscript{143}

... There was one [person] named Sylvia Tucker who worked there a lot... who later, she and her husband Ray Leland[?] ran a theatre company called Open Theatre Company in Toronto.... There was a woman I worked with there, [Katie] McGovern... I remember Mark [Satin]'s name, he was the Deserter Committee, the American Deserter Committee? I wasn't
involved when the manual was prepared. That was little before my time.

Bill [Spira] was an activist... I dealt with him a lot. I don't remember what his background was. I would guess he was about fifty at the time, big barrel-chested guy – very committed to the struggle, and he did stuff with the Toronto Anti-Draft Program, helped dodgers and deserters in any way he could. We just... worked together occasionally.  

Overall the movement was fast-paced, with a high degree of mobility and turnover. It is worth noting for that reason how remarkable it is that such extensive archival records remain, spotty and subjectively organized as they are. In part, this generation of large amounts of paper was part of the social movement architecture of the late 1960s. The knowledge produced in this endeavour was driven in part by intellectuals including journalists, students, clergy, and academics. Self-conscious as a movement with a purpose, and requiring documentation to keep track of the sheer volume of work that crossed their desks or passed through their offices, these groups created a paper trail that both allows for this study to exist, and that contributed directly to the ideological debates playing out in the period.

Other Toronto Anti-Draft Groups

The TADP was not the only anti-draft group in Toronto. In 1970 the Black Refugee Organization (BRO) formed to cater to the needs of black American immigrants, about whom we will learn more below. The BRO worked with the TADP, the TADP

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144 Copeland interview.
145 Copeland interview.
146 The involvement of historians in this process is a demonstration of the blurry line between public and private history, as Margaret Conrad has addressed. See Margaret Conrad, "2007 Presidential Address of the CHA: Public History and its Discontents or History in the Age of Wikipedia," *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association* vol. 18, no. 1 (2007): 1-26.
referring black immigrants to the BRO.\textsuperscript{147} After 1970 it appears that further Toronto services to black resisters were provided by Ebony Social Services.\textsuperscript{148}

Red, White and Black, also formed in 1970, attempted to foster communication between Americans, Canadians, and the various anti-draft groups through its publication \textit{EXNET}, which provided updates from the anti-draft groups.\textsuperscript{149} A flyer entitled “Red, White and Black” stated the purposes and intentions of RWB: a free school, news bureau, drop-in centre, bulletin and news; fostering a sense of community among Canadians and American immigrants; and fostering communication between anti-draft groups.\textsuperscript{150} Its offices, donated by the University of Toronto Student Administrative Council, contained its services, and a drop-in centre.\textsuperscript{151} The communications link was the result of a proposal tabled by RWB at a pan-Canadian conference held in Montreal in late May and early June of 1970. RWB proposed an information network via a newsletter and structured flow of information.\textsuperscript{152} RWB sought to become a “clearing house” in Toronto for information from the regions where groups existed. They proposed weekly updates and articles in \textit{AMEX} to include information on housing, immigration statistics, employment, “atmosphere”, financial and economic updates on groups, and warnings about conditions in the cities or at the border points. The newsletter would be printed by

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\textsuperscript{147} Kasinsky, 101.
\textsuperscript{148} Emerick, 231.
\textsuperscript{149} Kasinsky, 101-102. The origin of the name of the group is unknown, but two theories were shared with me by participants in the Our Way Home Reunion conference in 2007 in Castlegar, BC. One is that the colours of the American flag had been shifted to reflect the darkness of the period - black replacing blue. The other, which is probably more likely, was that the name reflected a desire in the group to bring together white people, black people, and aboriginal people in common cause.
\textsuperscript{150} WR, Peter Warrian fonds, Vol. 6, File 30, Red, White and Black.
\end{flushright}
RWB, and cost-shared among the groups.\textsuperscript{153} The proposal was approved, and the first issue of EXNET was published on June 16, 1970 using updates from information hubs in Montreal, Vancouver and Toronto, gathered by mail according to specific information needs.\textsuperscript{154} The first issue, double-sided on legal sized paper, included updates from Vancouver, New York, Montreal, the Toronto ADC, and RWB.\textsuperscript{155}

While RWB saw itself as a community of “political, creative and religious refugees” from the U.S., it was part of the network of anti-draft groups not specifically made up of refugees because of its communication and information exchange function. Information exchange within the “exile community” was its main task, but it also sought to establish “self-help” for housing and jobs, specifically broadening the service base beyond the TADP network. RWB sought to make immigrants an asset to Canada. Again, RWB had its own history: A flyer entitled “About Red, White and Black,” apparently a draft of “Red, White and Black,” stated the group had been formed in January 1970.\textsuperscript{156} The RWB flyer, “Immigration to Canada,” suggested to prospective immigrants that they contact the TADP, VCAAWO, or MCAWR, and use the \textit{Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada}.\textsuperscript{157}

RWB also successfully forged links with Toronto-area groups, including churches. Around 1970 RWB held a Vietnam War memorial service at Queen’s Park; in


\textsuperscript{156} WR, Peter Warrian fonds, Vol. 6, File 30, Red, White and Black.

attendance were representatives from the Canadian Council of Churches, Anglicans, Mennonites, Catholics, Lutherans, the United Church, Presbyterians, Anglicans, Jews, Buddhists, and atheists. Music at the event was provided by “Munoz,” a deserter.\footnote{LAC, MG 30 D 326, Judith Merrill Fonds, Vol. 14, File 14-24, Red White and Black – 1970.}

RWB also operated a free school and held meetings. At its February 23 1970 meeting a steering committee was created that included author Judith Merril, herself a recent immigrant from the United States, and seven others.\footnote{LAC, MG 30 D 326, Judith Merrill Fonds, Vol. 14, File 14-24, Red White and Black – 1970, Copy of RWB Newsletter, Number One (26 Feb 1970).} RWB also succeeded in maintaining a network and communication between anti-draft groups for several months.\footnote{LAC, MG 30 D 326, Judith Merrill Fonds, Vol. 33, File unnumbered, Subject Files: Anti-war Movement in Toronto, non dated, 1970-1972, “Some Groups in Canada Assisting American Exiles (continued).”} RWB also maintained links to American groups. In 1970 Merril was invited to speak in Detroit about war resisters in Canada after activists there heard her on the radio.\footnote{LAC, MG 30 D 326, Judith Merrill Fonds, Vol. 33, File unnumbered, Subject Files: Anti-war Movement in Toronto, non dated, 1970-1972, Letter to Merrill from Olga Penn, Mt. Clemens, Michigan, Detroit Women for Peace, October 30, 1970.}

In 1970 the TADP, TADC and RWB discussed merging into the Committee to Aid Refugees from Militarism (CARM.).\footnote{DAL, MS-10 Reference, AMEX-Canada, “Toronto: Groups Amalgamate and Begin Struggle for Asylum; Second Conference Tentatively Planned for Late October,” AMEX, vol. 2 no. 5 (August-September 1970), 15.} By some time that year RWB had become closely related to CARM, although they apparently remained separate organizations.\footnote{LAC, MG 30 D 326, Judith Merrill Fonds, Vol. 33, File unnumbered, Subject Files: Anti-war Movement in Toronto, non dated, 1970-1972.} Possibly, CARM was a coalition of the three anti-draft groups in Toronto. CARM established itself in a community center in a Toronto area high in immigrants, especially
Chinese. CARM and RWB were at some points supported by the Canadian Council of Churches.\textsuperscript{164}

**Black War Resisters**

Some black draft dodgers came to Canada as well. One compared his situation to that of the slaves who came on the Underground Railroad.\textsuperscript{165} However, numbers remained low in proportion to the percentage of military personnel who were black. American scholars have examined the economic stratification among war resisters that divided deserters from others along class and racial lines. Kasinsky, Kusch, and historian David Sterling Surrey all argue that war resisters with “marginal” backgrounds were more often returned to the United States by border officials and immigration officers, and that Black dodgers found immigration particularly difficult and wished to return because they could “go underground” more easily. This argument stands in stark contrast to the explicit use in contemporary media accounts of the term “underground railroad” to describe the conduit for draft dodgers and deserters seeking to cross the border – a large part of myth of Canada as a haven for war resisters. The beneficiaries of this “underground railroad” were, apparently, overwhelmingly white.\textsuperscript{166} As one black draft dodger told Kasinsky, “from where I was the tendency for the blacks was to go into the army because that was a way out.... It represents a way out for any poor person.”\textsuperscript{167}

\textsuperscript{164} Emerick, 231.
\textsuperscript{165} UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 8-4, Newspaper articles: “Black Draft Dodger Speaks Out on Canada,” *AMEX*, n.d.
\textsuperscript{167} UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 3-12, Interview with Johnny, Southern Black Draft Dodger, Montreal, May 1970. For a good overview of the race bias in Canadian immigration policy see Yasmeen Abu-Laban, “Keeping ‘em Out: Gender, Race, and Class Biases in Canadian Immigration
In 1970 black war resisters in Toronto formed their own aid group, the Black Refugee Organization, because they noted the Manual did not even mention a black community in Canada, and because they saw a need for housing with black families and for counselling for blacks by blacks to make the experience less alienating. As one black war resister commented at the time, “there’s not much in the way of a concentrated black community, like in the big U.S. cities. They’re just not organized here – they’re very un-together. And a lot of American kids, the whites, are here for bullshit reasons – that makes it hard on the rest of us.”

This resister may have been referring to a perceived lack of commitment to the cause of war resistance. Black resister groups formed in response to this lack of community and support. The BRO was explicitly conceived as having “no political thing in mind. Like, there’s no political objective or anything like that. Like, our main concern is the guy that is in trouble with the military. The organization itself is just to help black resisters [sic] and deserters.”

Bill Spira of the TADP gave anecdotal evidence that hardly any resisters were black. He estimated 2 percent of resisters who contacted TADP were black, which he put down to a combination of economic deprivation as a motivation for staying in the army, and the availability of close-knit black communities in which to take refuge instead of emigrating.

In 1970 Black deserters told Race Relations Reporter of a “subtle anti-black bias” among Canadians and surmised that the reason for lower numbers of black

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170 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-14, Interview with Bill Spira of the Toronto anti-Draft Program [sic], June 1970.

104
war resisters was racism. The Vancouver Monthly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends suspected racial discrimination at the border. In a June, 1969 letter to minister of Manpower and Immigration Allan MacEachen, the group described the demeanour of an immigration officer towards a white war resister whose wife was black, both of whom had recently tried to immigrate. The letter was a follow-up to a face-to-face meeting that had occurred in May.

Women War Resisters

Although many women were active in the anti-draft movement, it is unclear to what extent women and black war resisters formed part of the approach of aid groups to war resisters. At least some anti-draft activists took note of the existence of these resisters. In early 1970 AMEX, the magazine of the Union of American Exiles in Toronto, reported the creation of a women war resisters group made up of wives of resisters. A women's caucus meeting at the May-June 1970 pan-Canadian war resisters conference was rated a success by AMEX; the women made a “non-proposal” to respect women war resisters equally with their male counterparts, critical of the common assumption that they were there only because their husbands or boyfriends were. The October-November 1970 issue contained a letter from Stephanie Durant berating AMEX

173 Copeland interview.
for continuing to report that *ANTITHESIS*, the Montreal ADC publication, was written by
deserters, thereby excluding women from their report. Generally both the anti-draft
movement of the period and scholarship about American war resisters has neglected
women war resisters, treating them as either companions of men or ignoring them
completely.

Some women war resisters became part of the women’s movement in Canada.

Carolyn Egan recalls:

We came in August of 69. I think in the Spring of 1970 I was walking
down Bloor Street and saw posters for a series of meetings being put on by
the Toronto Women’s Liberation Movement and I got involved in that,
and that was my first political involvement aside from my union. ... I
started getting involved in meetings of the Toronto Women’s Liberation
Movement, which was a movement made up of women from the student
movement for the most part, some working women, who came from a
socialist perspective and had been active in the anti-war movement, and
one of the first things I got involved with was the Indo-Chinese women’s
conference, which the Toronto Voice of Women got involved with, and
other women’s groups.

... It was primarily Canadian women who were involved in organizing it, and
it was very political, very anti-imperialist, and it was a very good
organization.... Quite a good group to get involved with; the Toronto
Women’s Liberation Movement saw itself as a socialist organization, and
the war was seen as important part of our work.

Women who came to Canada as war resisters probably found their voice through the
women’s movement. Only rarely, however, did they find their voices as women, as an
organized voice, within the anti-draft movement.

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176 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 6-4, Canadian Publications – *AMEX*: “Male
177 See chapter 1, note on Lara Campbell’s research.
178 Carolyn Egan, interview by the author, June 1, 2006.
179 One exception was Voice of Women: see below, this chapter. Judy Rebick’s recent book, *Ten Thousand
Roses: the Making of a Feminist Revolution (Toronto: Penguin, 2005)*, makes it clear how complex the
broader women’s movement was, and how difficult to sum up in relation to the anti-draft movement. In

Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors (NSCAAWO)

Like other groups, the Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors (NSCAAWO) was part of the pan-Canadian network, keeping regular contact with other aid groups. The Nova Scotia committee also kept copies of publications on file, and, like other groups, monitored border conditions in order to advise potential immigrants. The Nova Scotia committee existed at least from 1966 until 1972, overlapping with the Halifax Committee to Aid War Resistors [sic]. The period during which the best records were kept was 1970 to 1972, while Quaker and landed immigrant war resister Richard Lind was the main organizer, with assistance from Rev. Don McDougall, the Dalhousie University Chaplain. According to contemporary accounts by Lind the NSCAAWO had existed since 1965 or 1966. In 1971 both of the main NSCAAWO counsellors were students and landed immigrants. The 1971 personnel included Lind, Eric Stine, and counselling volunteers Brad and Margot Sorrell and Mike Panella, but Lind made several references to there being only two counsellors, Lind and Eric Stine, until 1972.

fact, Rebick does not talk much about the Vietnam War in her book, although as Egan points out at least some women’s groups saw antiwar work as central. The experience of women as war resisters and as anti-draft activists is important; but a full exploration of it will, for space and time considerations, have to be left to other researchers. For more on women and the war resisters movement see Chapter 5. For a general overview of women’s experience in Canada in this period see Alison Prentice, Paula Bourne, Gail Cuthbert Brandt, Beth Light, Wendy Mitchinson, and Naomi Black, Canadian Women: a History (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), esp. 319-366. For an exploration of the roots of women’s movements in earlier movements such as civil rights and an the anti-war movement, see Sara Evans, Personal Politics: The Roots of Women’s Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979).

181 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 1.4, News clippings, “Expatriates in Halifax: A Reasonable Alternative,” The Phoenix (August 31, 1971); DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.7, Correspondence with various anti-draft and peace groups.
182 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.2, Index card records of American immigrants and other contacts; DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War
The NSCAAWO kept in touch with other anti-draft groups, including the
Winnipeg, Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal committees, and American exile
organizations such as AMEX Magazine. For instance, a 1969 letter from the TADP asked
other aid groups for information for the 1970 edition of the Manual, in order to re-
distribute the load of immigrants from Toronto to other areas. A 1972 letter from Lind
updating groups on the status of the NSCAAWO was copied to the TADP, American
Refugee Service, Winnipeg committee, Vancouver committee, and Eric Stine. The
Committee also kept lists of other anti-draft groups in Canada and how to contact them,
as well as some directories of American counselling centres.

In order to facilitate counselling, the Committee kept copies of government
publications such as the pamphlet “Who Can Come to Canada,” aimed at sponsors;
“Admission of University Students to Canada,” and the “Immigration Manual, Copy of
the Act and Regulations.” Like the TADP and other groups, it also kept copies of
Immigration legislation. The NSCAAWO made use of the MCAWR broadsheet, and
the Manuals, as well as TADP fact sheets such as one from 1973 which outlined the new
immigration regime as of 1973, which eliminated the possibility of applying for landed

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Objectors, File 1.5, bulletins, posters, publications on amnesty; DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to
Aid American War Objectors, File 2.7, Correspondence with various anti-draft and peace groups.
183 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.3, Correspondence
from American Immigrants.
184 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, 2.7, Correspondence with
various anti-draft and peace groups.
185 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.11, contacts and
directories.
186 Department of Immigration, “Who can Come to Canada” (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1969); “Admission
of University students to Canada” (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971); DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia
Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 1.1, Manpower and Immigration publications;
Immigration Manual, Department of Manpower and Immigration, Copy of the Act and Regulations, August
1971, 49-82.
187 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 1.3, Copies of
Immigration legislation.

108
immigrant status from within Canada, and severely curtailed the possibility of appeal:
“the golden age of easy immigration to Canada is now a page of history.”

The Committee also kept track of difficult border points and monitored the ongoing status of immigrants, and kept clippings from U.S. newspapers on developments in the war and in draft policy, as well as documents from anti-draft groups.

Presumably this practice was linked to assessing the potential impact on war resisters, as well as, perhaps, individual interest by committee personnel. Lind pointed out in a news interview in 1971 that an increase in immigrants might be expected if the war in Laos and Cambodia was heightened. Also in 1971 the Committee noted that more immigrants were finding their own way through the system, but anticipated more referrals from Toronto and Montreal due to the increased capacity of the Nova Scotia committee. In a December 1972 letter to AMEX magazine, Lind made reference to the “crisis” of an influx of immigrants seeking counselling, resulting from the November 1972 changes to regulations that restricted the entry of visitors. The Department of Immigration had announced a new regime under which visitors could no longer apply for landed status from within Canada or at border points. In 1972 and 1973 the Department undertook programs to deal with appeals backlogs and to allow fast-track landing of illegal

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188 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 1.2, Various publications.
189 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.2, Index card records of American immigrants and other contacts; DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 1.4, News clippings.
191 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 1.5, bulletins, posters, publications on amnesty.
192 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.7, Correspondence with various anti-draft and peace groups.

109
immigrants; anti-draft groups interacted with, and in some cases promoted, these programs.

The NSCAAWO maintained correspondence with Nova Scotia church organizations, and with supporters, including university professors, who offered temporary housing to American war resisters. It received its 1971 funding from the Canadian Council of Churches, the Halifax Friends Meeting, and individual donors. Housing was provided by committee members and in the Friends Meeting House, established in part because of the anti-draft movement.

Like some other anti-draft groups, the NSCAAWO files included copies of correspondence between immigrants whose applications for landed status had been rejected, and the Department of Manpower and Immigration Canada. One rejection was from December of 1970; the other two were from January 19 and October 31 of 1972. Other files included correspondence with immigrants seeking assistance, a common presence in anti-draft group records.

The NSCAAWO also maintained links with local clergy and student groups, and with international groups and organizations. For instance, a June 1971 letter to Members of the Halifax Clergy discussed the details of a planned conference to take place on June

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193 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.2, Index card records of American immigrants and other contacts]; DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 1.5, bulletins, posters, publications on amnesty.

194 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 1.5, bulletins, posters, publications on amnesty.

195 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.2, Index card records of American immigrants and other contacts.

196 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.3, Correspondence from American Immigrants; DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.4, 1971 correspondence; DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.5, correspondence from various, mostly Draft Dodgers.
8, and provided some history and facts about the committee. In 1973, a letter from Bob Sisk, President of the Student Union of the Nova Scotia College of Art and Design, thanked Lind for an October 1973 meeting, to which there had been a good turnout. The NCAAWO also kept in touch with the British Committee for American War Resisters; the CCCO; the War Resisters League; and various other American peace and anti-war groups. 197 While many anti-draft groups had links to church organizations, it is possible that the records in Halifax were more numerous due to Lind’s personal status as a Quaker, perhaps inclining him towards keeping those records.

**Other Anti-Draft Groups’ History**

Dozens of other groups existed in various centres, at various times from 1966 to 1974. For instance, the Lakehead Committee to Aid American War Objectors formed in late 1969 or early 1970. 198 The Winnipeg committee was likely established in 1970, and formally closed its operations on April 17, 1974. 199 The Alexander Ross Society was founded in early 1968. 200 The Alexander Ross Society, based in Edmonton, published a document entitled “Notes on Immigrating to Canada” in March of 1970. It outlined the factors considered in the points system of assessment for immigrant status, and information on sponsorship, nomination, and student status. 201

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197 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.7, Correspondence with various anti-draft and peace groups.
198 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 5-13 Assorted Articles, “Thunder Bay, Ont.; A New City and a Reorganized War Immigrant Committee,” *AMEX*, n.d.
200 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 7-29, Minutes - Canadian Assistance to War Objectors - Steering Committee: “Fifth Meeting of the Steering Committee.”
201 WR, CCSPO, Vol. 1, File 6, Alexander Ross Society. An in-depth study of the histories of these groups did not form a part of this chapter, primarily because their records are thin or non-existent. Additionally, it is likely that much of their material and information would have matched that found in the files of the
Exile Groups’ History

Another type of group was the exile group. Exile groups existed in several centres, and were made up exclusively of American immigrants. They were narrowly defined as self-identified exiles – that is, participants understood themselves to be maintaining an American identity. Groups such as the Union of American Exiles and its magazine, AMEX, provided mutual support and fostered analysis aimed at promoting the idea that while the act of immigrating was itself political, still exiles had a further specific political duty to continue to oppose the war. Even when exile groups did not carry this orientation, they still assumed that Americans had an American identity and that Americans should help each other. In general, exile groups either worked for assimilation of Americans into Canadian society (a minority viewpoint), or advocated a militant set of exile politics. This debate was played out inside the groups and in the pages of exile publications such as AMEX. Tangled up with these ideas were contested notions of Canadian independence and colonial status, and contending ideas of what types of actions and ideas could in fact be considered political.

The Toronto-based Union of New Canadians was founded by Mark Satin, with whom we are already familiar as an activist with the TADP, and others in May of 1967. As its name suggests, it was oriented toward assimilation. The group sought to maintain a

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major groups. Possible reasons for the better condition of the records of some groups are their longer existence, their more central location, and their access to resources: see Chapter 2.

202 The activities of these groups were important for the purposes of this study insofar as they played a role in debates within the anti-draft movement in Canada about political approach and Canadian politics more broadly. Their history and impact deserve broader study beyond that analysis provide here. For more on the exile groups see Kasinsky, 99-101, 105-107, 148-150. See also Jason Young, "To define a community in exile": Producers, Readers, and War Resister Communication in AMEX Magazine, 1968-1977," MA Major Research Paper, York University, August 2006. Young argues AMEX promoted a sense of community among war resisters, who generally shared a political outlook.
decentralized structure, with a meeting chairman and a secretary to keep notes, and an editor for a publication, the *New Canadian*. A later formation, the Toronto-based Union of American Exiles (UAE), was formed sometime before February of 1969. Their initial goal was also the acclimatization of Americans into Canadian society. A UAE flyer explicitly called for Canadians to offer housing to Draft Dodgers and Americans to help with acclimatization. It announced office hours of 5 to 11 pm, at 44 St. George Street on the University of Toronto campus. Another flyer invited Americans “in social exile” to drop by a table with a UAE banner to get help with “employment, housing, and social contact.” A drop-in was held that evening at the Newman Centre, corner of Harbord and St. George. Eventually the Union of American Exiles and its magazine, *AMEX*, began promoting the idea that while the act of immigrating was itself political, still exiles had a further specific political duty to continue to oppose the war. The pages of *AMEX* make the transition clear, as we will examine below in the section entitled Politics.

The Toronto American Deserters Committee (TADC), formed in December 1969, was an example of an exile group whose orientation was on the supposedly inherently radical nature of desertion and the need to maintain the deserter, and ergo American, identity as means of opposing imperialism. The TADC’s stated goals were the housing and feeding of deserters or draft resisters, until they could become landed immigrants; providing facilities for socializing; and providing personal counselling including medical

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203 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 7-30, Union of New Canadians.
204 WR, Canadian Student Social and Political Organizations (CSSPO), Vol. 1, File 8, Union of American Exiles.
and psychiatric care.\textsuperscript{206} The TADC developed a belief that deserters were not only a special group with special needs, but that the act of desertion, as opposed to draft dodging, was inherently radical, as this excerpt from a TADC flyer illustrates:

Failing to understand the sequence of events involved in the act of desertion is to have failed to comprehend the act itself and the effect desertion has on the future of the individual and the society in which he will assume a role.

We must impress upon the reader that Desertion in the 60's is a reality to be recognized as a significant force in the future of the world. For 1969 alone, it is estimated that 73,000 Desertions will have taken place from the U.S. machine....

A breakdown in the understanding of Desertion as a total life commitment [sic] comes precisely at this point. This breakdown is revealed in a common misconception of people involved in aid work and those people who should be involved but are not because of a failure to understand the commitment [sic] required and the application of energy and resources necessary to fulfill the needs demanded by the act of Desertion and its newfound relationship to the world community.

This failure has derived from aid persons and groups recognizing their role, at this point, as being only one of:
1. finding immediate shelter, food and a means of self-support;
2. immigrating the individual as soon as possible;
3. help in finding a job, educational opportunities, etc.;
4. opposing discriminatory practices of the country into which the Deserter has sought safety.

... They are essential; but to stop here, could, in fact destroy all that of value which has been accomplished thus far. ...\textsuperscript{207}

The American Deserters Committee outlined further needs that could be fulfilled, including psychological counselling and transition measures that must embrace the act of desertion, not merely treat deserters like any other immigrants. Implicit in their outlook

\textsuperscript{206} WR, CSSPO, Vol. 1, File 7, American Deserters Committee of Toronto, TADC Newsletter Vol. 1.
was the assumption that deserters would maintain their identity as a deserter, and thus that they needed to be connected with deserter-oriented community work, the form of which was not specified. Of course the other implicit identity to be maintained was American.

Another example of this type of exile group was the group with which Melody Killian was involved.²⁰⁸ The Yankee Refugee group, based in BC, established an American Deserters Committee Program in 1969. The program took partial credit for Minister of Manpower and Immigration Allan MacEachen’s admission of discrimination at the border, and the internal directive to bar deserters, in his “early June” announcement. The success had been a result of movement activity, not benevolence on the part of government, the group argued in its newsletter.²⁰⁹ Killian, at least, was pessimistic about the possibility of success of the campaign and even went so far as to attempt to find ways to ship deserters to Sweden. While MacEachen had indeed admitted to the policy of discrimination at the border, his policy reversal took place in May. The inaccuracy of the Yankee Refugee group’s knowledge of the campaign timeline and the evidence of animosity between, at least, Killian and members of both the VCTAAWO and the TADP, cast doubt on their active involvement in the campaign.²¹⁰

The group asserted that summer 1969 did not mark the end of the “deserter crisis,” a reference to the border difficulties supposedly addressed by MacEachen’s May 22 policy announcement, and urged readers to apply class analysis to the issue. They

²⁰⁸ Killian was introduced at the beginning of this chapter.
²¹⁰ Killian also wrote at least one article that was positive about the VCTAAWO: Melody Killian, “Canadians Know, Even if Germans Didn’t,” the Odyssey (Friday, March 14, 1969). It is unknown if Killian wrote this article with the knowledge of VCTAAWO activists.
were drawing attention to the ongoing issues deserters in particular were having with amassing the necessary employment and education points to get landed status. In the meantime, the Vancouver ADC Program was committed to several ongoing tasks, with a particular radical twist to each: aiding all deserters — including providing underground sanctuary; fighting repression including RCMP harassment; making propaganda, armed with which draftees could enter the military and disrupt from within; organizing American immigrants within Canada because “deserters are the most radically conscious”; supporting Canadian and Quebec struggles for “self-determination and socialism”; fighting “American chauvinism in ourselves”; and being active as revolutionaries. The group expected that getting Canadians involved in these activities would “radicalize” them as well.211

The exile groups did of course undertake concrete actions of great use to immigrants. The Vancouver ADC, for instance, ran two hostels.212 The Vancouver and Montreal deserters groups published newsletters. The Montreal group had an informal division of labour with the MCAWR, whereby the ADC helped deserters and the MCAWR helped draft dodgers. Over six months in 1969 and 1970, the Montreal ADC claimed to have helped around 500 deserters, and estimated a further 1200 would be helped by the end of 1970. The Montreal ADC also operated a hostel, and participated in public meetings and demonstrations.213 A deserter committee also existed in Ottawa.214

212 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 5-8, Analysis of desertion - ADC’s Political activity [clippings and articles]: “American Deserters Committee Running,” The Peak (Oct. 15, 1969).  
The Anti-Draft Movement: Transnational, Pan-Canadian

Throughout the period during which Americans required their assistance, the Canadian anti-draft groups forged and maintained a domestic network of communication amongst themselves and with the resisters. These connections included communication and interaction between the Canadian anti-draft movement and similar groups and activists in the United States, and with disparate Canadian groups and individuals including lawyers, churches, and the Voice of Women, many of whom had their own cross-border connections, and an interest in involving themselves in the anti-draft movement’s cause.

Groups in the United States provided assistance in distributing materials and information. In Canada, lawyers and intellectuals, MPs, and especially church groups, were instrumental in helping the war resister network pave the way for immigration. The actions of these external groups and individuals shaped, in turn, the perceptions held by war resisters of Canadian society and the Canadian anti-draft movement. These external groups are the topic of the next part of this chapter.

Part III: Support from the U.S. and from Other Canadian Groups

United States Connections of the Anti-Draft Movement

The Manual's title highlights the reality that draft dodgers and deserters were also technically immigrants, which is, perhaps, the source of the transnational nature of this movement. Anti draft groups maintained links with dozens of American groups, including Quakers, Students for a Democratic Society, and the War Resisters League. New Left politics, with its U.S. origins, had a great deal of influence on the anti-draft movement. Heather Dean, author of a section in the Manual about Canada's political system, was a figure in the Canadian New Left. And Mark Satin, the Manual's editor for its first editions, was himself a former American New Left activist. A pan-Canada conference on war resisters and deserters was held in Montreal in 1970, and was attended by Carl Oglesby and Tom Hayden of the American New Left. These links helped Canadians reach out to potential immigrants by providing access to American groups, such as Students for a Democratic Society, the American Society of Friends, and the War

215 As Franca Iacovetta has argued, immigration is a consciousness-changing experience. Bruce Elliott’s understanding of “chain migration” also has some relevance for a class of immigrants who often followed friends over the border: Bruce S. Elliott, Irish Migrants in the Canadas: A New Approach (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988); Franca Iacovetta, The Writing of English Canadian Immigrant History (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, with the support of Heritage Canada, Government of Canada, 1997). However, as I explain in the Introduction, I do not see the American war resisters as immigrants in the way Iacovetta’s Ukrainian immigrants, or Elliott’s Irish, were.


219 Hagan, 140.
Resisters League, which could distribute the Manual south of the border. This cooperation was the continuation of earlier connections between the Canadian and American movements. For instance, in the summer of 1963 the War Resisters League News July-August 1963 had carried an article covering a joint conference of the U.S. and Canadian Peace movements in Nyack, New York. The conference was weighted towards New Left politics, with participation from Tom Hayden of the American New Left and Dimitrios Roussopoulos of the nascent Canadian New Left.

**Canadian Support for War Resisters Outside the Anti-Draft Movement**

In addition to these relations with American activists, the anti-draft movement also enjoyed the participation of a wide array of groups at home. On December 1, 1967, the Faculty Committee on Vietnam at the University of Toronto released a “Statement on Draft Resisters,” calling on Canadians to welcome them. The Committee included more than forty faculty members. The statement called upon Canadians to welcome the war resisters out of respect for their decision, a desire to avoid discrimination, and recognition that they would be valuable additions to Canadian society. Coffee houses, clinics, hostels, and community centres also lent support.

Lawyers played a key role in supporting immigration and providing accurate information to immigrants. For instance, Ottawa movement lawyer Vincent Kelly wrote the introduction to the Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada, entitled “We are Happy to Welcome you.” In it, he noted the legal similarities and differences between


\[222\] UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 7-11, Exile Group Publications: Toronto, Montreal

\[223\] Emerick, 229.
the two countries, encouraging potential immigrants to seek advice from "an anti-draft
programme" who might, in turn, put them in touch with legal counsel.\textsuperscript{224} Besides their
contribution to the \textit{Manual}, lawyers also provided direct legal counsel to the movement
and to the resistors it helped. Paul Copeland, a Toronto-based lawyer, and his partner
Clayton Ruby, were probably the most highly involved, but there were many others.

Copeland recollects:

Clay Ruby and I were the movement office in Toronto. We did all the
American Exile work in central Canada. There were a couple of other
people who did it but we were mainly the people who did it. There was
guy named on Rosenbloom out in Vancouver who did some of it, Bernard
Mergler, whose greater claim to fame was he negotiated the FLQ people
going to Cuba in exchange for Mr. Cross, he did most of the Montreal
work. There was a link across Canada, there were links to the United
States, we were just all very hooked up. It was harder than it is now, no
internet, but long distance phone calls worked pretty well.

Lawyers and activists [were hooked up]. We were counsel to the anti-draft
program and worked really closely with the TADP. There were Quaker
groups in the United States, there was something called the New York
Law Commune in New York City that did a lot of the work, and they were
counsel for Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman.\textsuperscript{225} I mean, you name it, we
represented them.

There was also a guy named Dee Knight.... After the war was over or
around when it was ending, he actually worked for me as a secretary. Clay
and I practised together from 69 to 72, and we were doing activist stuff
before that. I was called to bar in 67 and he was called in 69.\textsuperscript{226}

As Copeland states, besides the expected professional connections, the lawyers also had
some U.S. connections, which were put to good use during the Heintzelman publicity

\textsuperscript{224} \textit{Manual}, 4\textsuperscript{th} revised edition, 1-2.

\textsuperscript{225} Rubin and Hoffman were prominent anti-establishment figures in the 1960s United States, associated
with the Yippies movement, Berkeley, and the protest against the Vietnam War. See for instance Buzanco,
pp 98-99, 236-7; for an unsympathetic view see Gerard J. DeGroot, \textit{A Noble Cause? America and the
Vietnam War} (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2000). See also Marty Jezer, \textit{Abbie Hoffman, American
Rebel} (New Brunswick, N.J : Rutgers University Press, 1992); and, by fellow Yippie Jonah Raskin, \textit{For

\textsuperscript{226} Copeland interview.
stunt – a stunt in which five students posed as deserters, tried to cross the border, and documented the results. Copeland recalls:

I spent the day actually playing bridge in a lawyer’s office in Buffalo, and Clay [Ruby] spent the day in I think in Detroit trying to provide legal advice for the people in case anything got ugly.\(^{227}\)

Thus lawyers were both directly and indirectly involved in the movement to support the war resisters.

**Church Support for War Resisters**

Church groups and clergy played an important role throughout the entire period in question, both as activists and as a source of funds for the anti-draft groups.\(^{228}\) Historian Donald Maxwell contextualizes the official church support – that coming from the national and international structures of the churches, and from clergy – in relation to the anti-draft groups, noting both individual church support and donations, and the extensive support program offered by the Canadian Council of Churches beginning in 1970 (see below, this chapter). Church support also came directly from church members. Churches and their members provided funding, of course, but also lent direct help in the form of housing; and activists often had church backgrounds, as we have seen. Maxwell notes that assistance in the form of donations and individual aid came from Catholics, Unitarians, the United Church and its members, the Canadian Jewish Congress, and the

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\(^{227}\) Ibid.

\(^{228}\) For a good overview of church pacifism see Peter Brock and Nigel Young, *Pacifism in the Twentieth Century* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1999), 332-365. Church involvement in this movement is a vast topic deserving of a great deal more research, for which I do not have space here. Donald Maxwell has made a beginning (see next note). See also earlier note on pacifism and its connections to draft counselling, above, Chapter 2.
Quakers. As we will see, assistance was also forthcoming from Mennonites, Unitarians, and Anglicans. In fact, it is difficult to think of a major church that is not mentioned in the literature or in the documents as having helped, in some way, the resisters and the groups that supported them.

Many examples of this church and church member support can be found in both activist recollections and in the movement documents and literature. Copeland recollects that “The Quakers did a ton of that underground railroad stuff,” and Quaker involvement is evident in the early history of the committees, as we have seen. Perhaps the Quakers were the source, or a source, of the idea that Canada had a pacifist tradition. As Quaker activist Nancy Pocock stated in a 1970 interview:

This sort of thing’s been going on for a long time, you know. In the Revolutionary War, what we call United Empire Loyalists were coming because they didn’t agree with the war. And then there’s a place in New Brunswick, called Skedaddle Ridge, and it was called that because men from Maine who didn’t want to be drafted into the army during the war, the Civil War, came over to New Brunswick and settled there. I have a recipe for Skedaddle Ridge cookies, which I often make for the boys, and they get quite a kick out of it. So it’s not a new thing to Canada. And remember, too, many Dutch boys came here during the Indonesian War, to escape going into that war. And of course many young Greeks and Italians have escaped conscription, so nowadays it’s not a new thing for Americans to be doing it, but they get more publicity.

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230 Copeland interview.

231 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-12, Interview with Nancy Pohkhw [sic], May 1970, Toronto, Quaker, Active in Exile Movement Since 1965. For background on Skedaddle Ridge see Bill Hamilton, Place Names of Atlantic Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996. See also Peter Gzowski/Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “From Naked Man Hill to Skedaddle Ridge,” on *Morningside*, broadcast date October 25, 1996, [http://archives.cbc.ca/lifestyle/travel/clips/0463/](http://archives.cbc.ca/lifestyle/travel/clips/0463/), accessed June 26, 2008. See also Bill Hamilton, “The Lost Names of New Brunswick,” on page “New Brunswick, things you might not know,” Moncton Forum, [http://www.moncton.net/forum/thread/69689.aspx](http://www.moncton.net/forum/thread/69689.aspx), accessed June 25, 2008: “In the 19th century there were three New Brunswick communities named Skedaddle Ridge: two in York County and one in Carleton. All had the same origin. During the American Civil War (1861-65), isolated areas of the province became a haven for the first American draft dodgers. Of the three, only the last mentioned, located southeast of Knowlesville, is on contemporary maps.”
Multi-faith organizations also played a role. For example, in December of 1969 the American group Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam (CALCAV) raised money and donated goods to support Canadian aid groups. In a 1969 media interview Peter Malley of the VCTAAWO stated that the funds would primarily be used to help deserters in need, in the tough employment climate of that period. Canadian church supporters were also organizing Christmas dinners for five to ten war resisters at a time. Around 1970 the Toronto-based Inter-Faith Committee on U.S. Exiles formed, with members from the Jewish Temple Emann-El, Metro Toronto Urban Church Board, and Anglican, Wesley United, Mennonite United, Unitarian, Dutch reformed, United, and Presbyterian churches. The group held executive committee meetings and provided some funds to the TADP.

For some church leaders, the level of assistance coming from the churches was not adequate, and steps were required to encourage further commitments. In 1970 Frank Epp, of the Canadian Council of Churches, published I would like to dodge the draft-dodgers, but... The book was intended to allay the fears of the rest of the church community in Canada, and to encourage them to support both the draft dodgers and deserters and those Canadian groups who helped them. The book featured people

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233 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 6-13, CBC Weekend Transcript; Deserters Department Case; Interview with Rosenbloom: “Excerpt, CBC Weekend, February 8 1970.”
234 The terminology may seem confusing, but terms like exile and draft resister were fairly interchangeable at the time.
235 TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 21, Canadian Council of Churches, Folder 25, Other Anti-War Religious Groups.
236 Ibid.
237 Frank H. Epp, ed., I would like to dodge the draft-dodgers, but... (Waterloo: Conrad Press, 1970), 68-76.
involved on anti-draft work, including some from the Ottawa Mennonite Church and the Canadian Council of Churches. The Council’s Jim Wert and Leonard Epp contributed a chapter entitled “…some churches and their leaders are calling for help,” in which they pointed out that most of the money for war resister support in Canada came from Americans. In 1969, they suggested, Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver combined had spent around $35,000, emphasizing how much assistance was needed. The book was not only exhorting the churches to donate money; Wert was also concerned by the fact that the Council had not yet taken a stand on the fact (for them) that draft dodgers and deserters were taking fundamentally moral action in refusing to fight. Frank Epp donated an office to Ottawa AID, and Mennonite farmers hired draft dodgers and deserters to work on their farms, providing valuable employment offers to help in the immigration process. Epp, Wert and others were motivated by a concern that all war was immoral, and hoped to convince church members and clergy that war resisters ought to be supported in as many ways as possible.

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238 Epp, 8, 68.
239 Epp, 70.
240 Epp, 71. Mennonites believe that
241 Kasinsky, 82-83.
242 The Mennonite tradition in particular places an emphasis on conscientious objection and pacifism, as do the other historic peace churches. In Canada the Quakers, Mennonites, Hutterites and Doukhobors were historically guaranteed the right to live according to their pacifist beliefs: Thomas Socknat, “Pacifism,” www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com, accessed September 12, 2008. See also earlier note on pacifism and its connections to draft counselling, above, Chapter 2. Mennonites were attracted to Canada because of its guarantee of exemption from military service. Waves of immigrants arrived from Eastern Europe due to religious persecution, and then from the U.S. to avoid conscription: Frank H. Epp and Rodney J. Sawatsky, “Mennonites,” www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com, accessed September 12, 2008. There is a huge bibliography on Mennonite pacifism. See for instance Marlene Epp, Women Without Men: Mennonite Refugees of the Second World War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999). See also Maxwell; Michael S. Foley, Confronting the War Machine: Draft Resistance During the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Thomas Socknat, Witness Against War: Pacifism in Canada, 1900-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987); Brock and Young.

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Church Support for War Resisters: the Canadian Council of Churches

Pressure on the churches to make tangible commitments to the cause came from both church members like Epp and from the anti-draft groups themselves. In early December of 1969, Bill Spira of the Toronto committee notified Betty Tillotson of the VCTAAWO that he also was working on securing funding from the Canadian Council of Churches (CCC). His efforts appeared to bear fruit. Indeed, a Canadian Council of Churches document entitled “A History of the Involvement of Canadian Churches in Programmes of Assistance to U.S. Draft Age Immigrants in Canada,” sent to members of the Halifax clergy in 1971 by the Nova Scotia Committee, stated that the “Windsor Consultation” of December 1969 was the inception of the CCC’s Ministry to Draft Age Immigrants.

The “Windsor Consultation” was a meeting of clergy from the U.S. and Canada, and followed a similar consultation between that had taken place between the CCC and the National Council of Churches on December 2. It discussed how to receive and

244 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 1-3, Correspondence – Other Canadian Organizations with Committee.
245 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.7, Correspondence with various anti-draft and peace groups.
246 According to Council records, in attendance were the Reverends Gordon K. Stewart, Chairman of the Canadian Affairs Commission; Elmer Stainton; Dr. Charles Forsyth; D.C. Candy; Roy Hamilton; Dr. T.E. Floyd Honey; Dr. A.B.B. Moore; Dr. R.M. Bennett; Canon M.P. Wilkinson, Secretary; Mr. Fred Haslam; and Miss Anne Davison. A visitor, the Reverend Richard Killmer, attended on behalf of Clergy and Laity [sic] Concerned about Vietnam. Regrets were sent from the Baptists’ Reverend A. Coe, and from Lt. Col. Wm. Gibson of the Salvation Army: LAC, MG 28, Vol. I 327, Canadian Council of Churches fonds, Box 39 File 39-6, Commission on Canadian Affairs Minutes – Ministry to Draft-Age U.S. Immigrants – Accountability Committee and Others, 1969-1973.
distribute funds, whether it should hire staff, and how to prepare a “project request” to the Division of Inter-Church Aid, Refugee and World Service of the World Council of Churches proposing a matching of funds. At the meeting, CALCAV reported it had raised $5000 already, $500 of it given to each of four groups in Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, and Ottawa; the rest would be transferred to the CCC’s Ministry. The CC should expect up to $100,000 to come from CALCAV’s efforts. The NCC reported it had hired a staff member dedicated to the issue of war resisters in Canada, whose concerns would include, for instance, ministering to the parents of resisters.

The CCC reported that the Ministry’s mandate was to raise funds in Canada, and also to locate resources for jobs, housing, and the like; to act as a repository for donations; to motivate churches to help; to evaluate and strengthen the aid groups; to help with information and interpretation; and to establish a network of resources for war resisters. The CCC was considering sending Bill Spira of the Toronto group on a tour to outlying regions to help them, and to outreach to other churches. Gordon K. Stewart of the United Church of Canada announced plans to contact the Montreal and Ottawa groups in January. He intended to gather information on the groups’ activities and aspirations, their knowledge about other groups, their case load, and their most urgent needs.

\[249\] Ibid.
In early 1970 the CCC formally initiated its Ministry to Draft-Age Immigrants. While individual churches, officials, and members certainly did their part, Maxwell suggests, and the evidence supports, the view that the Canadian Council of Churches’ Ministry to Draft-Age Immigrants was by far the most important form of support received by the movement and the support groups. The anti-draft groups received a big financial boost when the Council established its Ministry. Until that point, funding had been a significant challenge.

After the Ministry’s inception, individual churches appeared to take notice. In February of 1970 the Draft Dodger Project of the First Unitarian Congregation of Toronto sent an appeal to 1300 Unitarian churches, receiving back 20 negative letters and 240 cheques totalling $6400. Their appeal, addressed to “fellow Unitarians,” mentioned the great number of immigrants arriving at the TADP offices. It reported on the December consultations. Finally, attached to the letter was a general appeal to North American Unitarian churches. The Vancouver Unitarian Committee, called Immigrant Aid to Refugees of Conscience, also raised funds for the VCTAAWO. By mid-1970, church support was consistent.

The CCC received financial support from American churches including the United, Methodist, Presbyterian, and Protestant Episcopal churches, as well as the Church of the Brethren, the Disciples of Christ, the United Church of Christ, the National

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250 Emerick, 234.
251 Emerick, 234.
252 Emerick, 234.
254 Emerick, 235.
Council of Churches, and Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam. Internationally, they received funding from churches and church organizations in Denmark, Germany, France, and the Netherlands. Canadian official support came from the United, Lutheran, Presbyterian, and Anglican churches, as well as the Mennonite Central Committee.\footnote{Maxwell, 819. Since church support was not forthcoming in any major official way until 1970, it cannot be argued that the Canadian movement arose in order to spend American money. However, as Maxwell indicates, there is an interesting phenomenon which could be explored: both the National Council of Churches in the U.S. and the Canadian Council of Churches received some funding from their respective governments' international aid agencies (respectively, the U.S. Agency for International Aid and the Canadian International Development Agency). Thus, indirectly, the war resisters support groups received funding from the two governments.}

Canadian church involvement was remarkable, not just for fundraising, but for church members’ involvement in the movement directly.\footnote{Socknat argues the “religious factor” in the peace movement is uniquely Canadian: Socknat, 295.} The CCC ministry staff was Jim Wert, of the Mennonites, who volunteered and worked a 3 day week for six months. The ministry also sent Bill Spira of the TADP on a speaking tour to visit “all aid centres from Thunder Bay to Victoria,” and sent Canon Wilkinson to visit the councils of churches and the aid centres. Based on the information gathered from Spira’s tour the ministry began grants to Winnipeg, Regina, and Vancouver anti-draft groups. The result of the World Council of Churches appeal was that Robert Gardner was added to the staff.\footnote{DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.7, Correspondence with various anti-draft and peace groups.}

The CCC operation, like other CCC undertakings and like other sections of the anti-draft movement, was very professional in its organization and methods. Groups were required to provide receipts and staff reports for the ministry’s accountability committee. The Ministry and its committees met regularly and kept records, and published a newsletter to aid groups. Groups did not always receive funding. For instance, the
NSCAAWO submitted a report in late 1971, but made no request. In the third quarter of 1971 aid groups received a total of $8640. The Calgary Committee on War Immigrants received $300 for hostel expenses; TADP received $2250 mostly for staff expenses. Edmonton, Halifax, Ottawa, Regina, Vancouver, Victoria and Winnipeg all also received funding.  

The potential reasons behind the involvement of churches are many, and certainly deserving of more exploration. As we discussed above, some churches took the official stance that war is immoral. Others may have seen supporting the war resisters as part of a Christian duty to help those in need: John May of the Canadian Unitarian Council was quoted as saying that “The [CCC Ministry to Draft-age Immigrants]... is not a matter of being for or against U.S. policy in Vietnam,” but rather a matter of supporting men who had made a decision in good conscience which had subsequently placed them in a position of needing “urgent” assistance. One other possible thesis might be that churches lent legitimacy to the movement by their involvement. Certainly, as we will see, this involvement did have a positive impact on the participation of some groups – Voice of Women, for instance. However, the reverse is also possible, and even likely, considering the evidence given by Maxwell that church members did not support the war resisters to the same extent as clergy. In addition, what the churches lent in terms of legitimacy to the entire anti-draft movement they sacrificed in terms of their own members’ support. The evidence examined here neither supports nor undermines

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258 Ibid.
260 Maxwell, 827.
Maxwell's contention that the churches - or at least the United Church - knew they could benefit from their association with the resisters by demonstrating their relevance in a changing world.\footnote{Maxwell, 808, 823-826.} Indeed, they may also have sought simply to adhere to their own morals despite the opinions of their members.

**Voice of Women Support for War Resisters**

Another significant and steady source of support for war resisters was the Voice of Women (VOW). Originally predominantly a maternalist women's organization with roots in first-wave feminism, by the mid to late 1960s VOW's membership had taken a turn towards a more egalitarian emphasis, situating the group as a bridge between first- and second-wave feminism.\footnote{Marlene Legates, *In Their Time: A History of Feminism in Western Society* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 337-338; Christine Ball, PhD Thesis, “The History of the Voice of Women/Les Voix des Femmes - the Early Years” (University of Toronto, 1994), pp. 1-33; and Joanna Dean, “The Gendered Politics of Nuclear Fallout” (paper presented at Ottawa Historical Association, April, 2008).} VOW's activities were varied, and included a great deal of attention on the Vietnam War.

VOW's central office kept files on the issue of American war resisters from 1966 to 1973.\footnote{LAC, MG 28 Vol I 218, Voice of Women fonds, Box 12, File 12-3, Draft Resistance: Correspondence; printed material; clippings, 1966-1973.} A Canadian peace organization formed in 1960, VOW had branches, or chapters, in several provinces, as well as significant international links.\footnote{Kay Macpherson and Sam Good, “Canadian Voice of Women for Peace,” *Peace Magazine Toronto: Canadian Disarmament Information Service (CANDIS)* (Oct-Nov 1987): 26, http://archive.peacemagazine.org/v03n5p26.htm, accessed June 25, 2008. See also “Our History,” Voice of Women, http://home.ca.inter.net/~vow/index.htm, accessed June 25, 2008. According to Macpherson and Good, international linkages included an International Women's Conference in September 1962, organized by VOW, which included women from the Soviet Union; support for the international call for a Test Ban Treaty which resulted in the Partial Test Ban in 1963; hosted delegations from the Soviet Union and Indochina; and a conference of Women for Peace during Canada's Centennial Year, attended by women from 30 countries. It also organized exchanges with Vietnamese women and "a close bond with American 'peace' women," as well as women from Greece, Cyprus, Indochina, Chile, Bolivia, Africa, Japan, and Britain.} VOW support for the war resisters was fairly steady. For instance, chapters in BC spearheaded a petition...
campaign which probably played a role in opening the border to deserters in May of 1969. VOW chapters also sometimes referred inquiries to the anti-draft groups. For instance, in January of 1970 Mrs. Matthew T. Corso wrote to VOW Toronto, announcing her imminent arrival with her son, and wondering if she should bring bedding with her.²⁶⁵ Mrs. Corso had already contacted TADP and the Toronto ADC.²⁶⁶

The National Executive adopted a policy statement in January of 1970 which stated:

At a time when the number of deserters and draft resisters coming to Canada is increasing daily, it seems appropriate to clarify Voice of Women's position. We have avoided making public statements and resolutions because until May 1969 Canadian Immigration policy regarding deserters and draft resisters was unclear. Publicity might have jeopardized the chances of some men to complete the requirements for immigration.

The statement outlined the May 22 announcement of an open border by Allen MacEachen, and went on to encourage their members to provide homes and a welcome to incoming war resisters.²⁶⁷ It showed a concern for those resisters who had remained underground, and echoed some of the anti-draft movement’s fears about publicity. VOW’s records suggest that VOW supported war resistance as an act that concurred with their advocacy of peace. But VOW’s positioning on the issue was not without tension, and at least some chapters were late in adopting policy.

²⁶⁵ Accounts such as these help to dispel the myth that war resisters were overwhelmingly single men with no support. See above, Chapter 1, regarding the research of Lara Campbell and Robin Folvik.
In early 1970, then-president Muriel Duckworth corresponded with several members about how to approach the question of draft dodgers and deserters. In a January letter to Mrs. Freda Pryce of Vancouver, Duckworth thanked Pryce for her letter outlining the Vancouver chapter’s programs, and congratulated her on their work with draft dodgers and deserters, which was “going ahead marvellously in several aspects of VOW work.” However, a letter to “Betty” from Duckworth in February defended the National Executive decision, addressing the correspondent’s concerns about the rule of law:

This is the way I feel about giving asylum to draft resisters and deserters. It seems to me that this is what we are called upon to do now [sic]. As I said in a previous letter, these young men have made a decision to do what men were severely punished for not doing in World War II – by the Nuremburg trials . . . it is by actions of this sort that laws are changed to respond to the needs of the times.

By such a statement, Duckworth illustrated her own commitment to civil disobedience, if not necessarily VOW’s. Civil disobedience was a common tactic of the civil rights movement, whose connections to the anti-draft movement we have already touched upon. Duckworth also replied to concerns about VOW participation in questionable events, stating “The notion that the actions in which the VOW of Vancouver wish to take part [are inappropriate] I find hard to understand. Is it not correct that the United Church is

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officially supporting this project?" The last sentence indicated an awareness of church activities, and, indeed, the VOW files contained correspondence from churches on the topic: the First Unitarian Congregation of Toronto appeal for funds referred to above, for instance.

An interim report to the British Columbia grouping in February of 1970 reflected the apparent divisions in the BC organization, suggesting that more research was needed, but that action ought to be taken as well on the issue. In February 1970 a decision was made to send observers to a meeting of Canadian Aid to American War Objectors (a group of Vancouver Groups). In March a document by Nancy Pocock, "Opinion on draft dodgers and deserters," likely solicited by Duckworth, stated emphatically that there was no reason not to help the war resisters; that individuals make individual decisions about how to oppose the war. Pocock suggested that Freda Pryce had received erroneous information, which, it was implied, was swaying her opinion against supporting war resisters. If Duckworth solicited the document from Pocock it serves to further illustrate the development of a hegemony among peace groups that war resisters were worthy of support. It also shows that there was a connection between VOW and the TADP.

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270 Ibid.
273 LAC, MG 28 Vol I 218, Voice of Women fonds, Box 12, File 12-3, Draft Resistance: Correspondence; printed material; clippings, 1966-1973. Pryce had previously reported on VOW involvement with war resisters in her January letter.
By virtue of the support it received from various quarters, and having developed networks of communication and counselling skills, the anti-draft movement began more and more act in concert. The final part of this chapter offers an analysis of the movement's effectiveness and impact as advocates for, and supporters of, war resisters.
Part IV: The Impact and Effectiveness of the Anti-Draft Movement

The Anti-Draft Movement Established

By all accounts, the anti-draft group offices and gathering places were social in atmosphere, with political posters, message boards, reading materials, socialist publications, and immigration counselling guides all occupying the same space. By 1969 the committees in various cities had become a network, in regular correspondence and occasionally meeting face-to-face. They shared funding provided by the Canadian Council of Churches, and shared information, albeit of varying accuracy, with each other about border conditions, employment issues and immigration regulation interpretation and changes. The groups relied on volunteers, and although Canadian involvement remained strong throughout the period, American involvement was steady as well. The anti-draft groups ebbed and flowed with the political tide. They experienced a spurt of activity after such incidents as the announcement of the invasion of Laos and the elimination of student deferments in the Selective Service System (see Introduction).274 They occasionally attended delegated meetings with each other and with groups from the U.S. and Canada. They worked together on some campaigns and priorities, and debated with each other about strategy and tactics. This vibrant dynamism allowed the movement to respond quickly to events as they developed. Through sharing information and resources the movement became more and more skilled at supporting the resisters whose existence was their raison d'être.

Although some, if not most, groups were founded by Canadians, by early 1968 American immigrants were also involved, and in several cases were the key activists. Joseph Jones, a draft dodger, observes, “I never had any sense that the Canada-based groups were composed of much besides Americans. I suspect that was generally true by the time of my arrival in 1970. From my research, I think Americans had a lot of involvement even at the outset. The Canadians who spring to mind are Tony Hyde at SUPA, the Pococks at TADP, Frank Epp in Ottawa, and Walter Klaassen in Waterloo.”

To this we can add Hans Sinn, Virginia Naeve, several lawyers, and dozens of others. According to Bill Spira, interviewed in 1970 by Renée Kasinsky, the TADP board was the same number as the staff, and only one of the 5 board members was American, the rest Canadian. Spira asserted that the involvement of Canadians led to broader community support for the committee’s work.

Of course the very existence of the anti-draft movement in Canada was a result of American policy. Without the war, and without American actions, there would have been no movement. As Marvin Work, a draft dodger who arrived in 1970, observed:

“American foreign policy and American attitudes influenced Canadian anti-draft groups by encouraging them to offer refuge and support to American war resisters.”

Americans also directly influenced the groups in two other ways: by becoming involved as volunteers or staff, and through the debate about politics.

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276 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-14, Interview with Bill Spira of the Toronto anti-Draft Program [sic], June 1970.
277 Marvin Work, email interview by author, November 28, 2006.
Americans often went on to provide housing or other assistance to newer arrivals. They also used their new connections to help war resisters secure employment. Michael Goldberg recollects, "A number provided services once they landed themselves. People who became landed provided short-term housing for new draft dodgers or deserters; if people were in employment situations where a job opened, they would try [to find employment for newcomers] through a number of employers, who were incredibly helpful. Whenever they had job openings, they would try to get them filled by people from the U.S. They were part of the movement."  

About the media, anti-draft activists were pragmatic. Bob Lanning of Ottawa AID told Emerick that "radio and television usually give us a fair shake and are usually more objective. The newspapers in Ottawa are very bad, although the [Sun] is far worse than The Citizen." Bruce Garside in Montreal commented that the CBC and the Montreal Star were "very favourable." However, Emerick himself considered that the American media gave poor coverage to the anti-draft movement. This pragmatic approach to the media stood the activists in good stead when it came time to use them in a concerted effort to open the border to deserters in 1969, as well as in other efforts.

**Inter-Group Communication**

These groups, taken together with their transnational and pan-Canadian links to other groups and to individuals, formed a movement acting together with a common set of goals. Intellectuals played an important role in the development of the knowledge necessary to intervene in the realm of public opinion and perceptions, and its impact on

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278 Goldberg interview.
279 Emerick, 238.
280 Emerick, 239.
govern actions in turn. The anti-draft movement was decentralized, and often divided on questions of priorities and structure. As we will see, the anti-draft activists also occasionally intentionally and unintentionally undermined each other in movement publications. There were also debates about the appropriate use of resources, especially after the inception of the National Council of Churches’ funding mechanism. But overall it was unified in its support of war resisters and sought to better their situation in various ways.

Personal conflicts did flare up, sometimes connected to political debates among the anti-draft movement activists. A letter from Steve Strauss of the VCTAAWO to Allen Mace of the TADP stated, “It irritates me when I call long distance to be lectured for ten minutes about the misconduct of this office... especially when it turns out that what Bill Spiro [sic] didn’t like was the Yankee Refugee and Melody Killian, neither of whom are connected with the Committee. He says the trouble with us is that we aren’t a liberal organization. Whatever the hell that means.”281 This particular conflict will be examined later as part of an examination of political debates within the anti-draft movement.

Despite the divisions that existed, the anti-draft movement was in constant communication. Groups shared information about employment prospects, border conditions, regulation changes and interpretation, and individuals who were causing trouble for groups. Examples of this communication pepper the group histories outlined above. Additional examples include an October of 1968 communication between Stephen Strauss of the VCTAAWO and Allen Mace at the TADP. Strauss sought information on

281 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 1-3, Correspondence – Other Canadian Organizations with Committee.
jobs in Toronto, and border information. He indicated to Mace that no jobs were to be had in BC. In August of 1967 Meg Ryan of the VCTAAWO corresponded with Ed Miller of the Montreal Council (who had recently replaced John and Sandy) on the topic of their broadsheet. The letter was a list of questions and concerns about the Montreal publication, and it suggested polling efforts into a pamphlet for bulk-distribution, and a longer booklet with detailed information. Ed Miller responded in September, addressing his reply to “Myra” [Riddell]. Further correspondence between the two included securing Immigration documents, and including Mark Satin of the TADP in the effort to streamline the publications.\(^{282}\)

Groups also shared lists of immigrants, resisters or posing as such, who had stolen from groups or supporters, or who were perceived as dangerous. For example, a comradely letter from the Nova Scotia New Democratic Youth in February of 1969 informed AID about a suspected poser. Ottawa AID also shared with other committees lists of immigrants, resisters or posing as such, who had stolen from the committee or its supporters, and one who was perceived as dangerous. A December 1969 letter from the VCTAAWO to the TADP shared similar information about one individual.\(^{283}\) Wilcox recollects, “as time went on and we found ourselves getting burned more and more we would let [other] groups know who had come and ripped us off or whatever, because there would be some who would just hop from one group to the next looking for free housing, free room and board, who might not have had any military record; there are

\(^{282}\) Ibid.
\(^{283}\) Ibid.
always a few of those.\textsuperscript{284} The anti-draft groups saw themselves as part of a pan-
Canadian network, a movement that was, more or less, united.

The Movement’s Impact on Resisters

Overall the anti-draft movement provided a valuable service to American war
resisters. Resisters often knew about the Canadian movement publications and were
inspired by articles derived from them in American magazines. However, the information
and services provided to American war resisters was of varying accuracy and
effectiveness. Although it will likely never be known for certain, it appears that many –
perhaps most – immigrants had little or no contact with anti-draft groups before
immigrating. However, some did acquire information they needed to make the trip, in
ways that suggest that the North American network of anti-draft groups was at least
somewhat effective in reaching potential immigrants as early as 1967. On the other hand,
immigrant experience was varied and showed that the anti-draft groups were not always
reliable sources of accurate information or assistance.

Letters to the VCTAAWO provide evidence that potential immigrants also
communicated, directly or indirectly, with other groups as well. One letter referred to
having read the Montreal committee’s broadsheet, and others referred to the \textit{Manual}. The
letters show that often potential immigrants wrote on behalf of their spouses.
Approximately half were from women in heterosexual couples. Immigrants also sought
information on employment availability.\textsuperscript{285} Letters to the NSCAAWO expressed
gratitude and optimism. A letter from a resister immigrating to Canada via Sweden said

\textsuperscript{284} Wilcox interview.
\textsuperscript{285} UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 1-2, Correspondence – VCTAAWO.

140
his appeal was “coming from the utmost depths of my heart. The one which doesn’t have a bullet in it yet.” Another stated “This is just to say that it feels very good to have people to rely on just being there.” Other letters sought advice on employment, and reflected impressions about the employment situation elsewhere in Canada. One letter sought employment for a man with a “multi-engine commercial pilot’s license,” and went on to say the writer was “contemplating the purchase of an expensive FM stereo receiver. Are there any hip progressive FM stereo stations in your area such as the ones in the San Francisco area?” Letters in this period reflected a general (and erroneous) perception that teaching jobs were fairly easy to come by in Nova Scotia.\textsuperscript{286} Letters from parents sought information on their sons. Letters from resisters mentioned having been referred by American groups.\textsuperscript{287}

The VCTAAWO eventually adopted a simple but effective technique for dealing with the volume of letters. Letters received were marked with the date a reply was sent, and notes were made on the letters as to what to include in responses. A notation, “send 3,” appears to have been a note on inclusions; several such notations included making reference to specific parts of the inclusions having to do with homesteading or teaching.

\textsuperscript{288} Notations also included “blue” and “green,” apparently referring to colour of paper on

\textsuperscript{286} DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.3, Correspondence from American Immigrants. Emphasis on teaching jobs coincided with the shift to service work in the Canadian economy. By late 1969 the beginning of the end of the post-war boom meant unemployment was on the rise, albeit slowly.

\textsuperscript{287} DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.3, Correspondence from American Immigrants; DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.4, 1971 correspondence; DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.5, correspondence from various, mostly Draft Dodgers.

\textsuperscript{288} UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 1-2, Correspondence – VCTAAWO.
which inclusions were printed. The blue inclusion was a list of Canadian groups and their contact information. 289

Not all immigrants communicated with groups before immigrating. The vast majority (93 percent of both draft dodgers and deserters) of the more than four hundred immigrants interviewed by Kasinsky, for instance, did not communicate with an anti-draft group before immigrating, although the records do not clarify how many nonetheless had access to Canadian anti-draft publications. 290

The groups fostered communication with individual Americans through American anti-draft groups. Contact information was also printed in left publications in the United States. One of Kasinsky’s interviewees mentioned finding Montreal contacts in the Movement out of San Francisco, a copy of which he found in Kentucky. 291 A full-page ad in AMEX for a magazine called Contact asked for assistance in facilitating communication between war resisters and Americans who might be supportive. 292 Canadian contacts were also printed in American publications such as “It’s Your Choice: Guide to Opportunities Open to Volunteers for Military Service,” a pamphlet distributed to GIs and military personnel encouraging them to desert and explaining how. 293 There were also examples of less direct experiences. As “James” explains:

289 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 1-3, Correspondence – Other Canadian Organizations with Committee.
290 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 2-7, Interview Analysis/Questionnaire Analysis and Code. According to one handwritten note, 341 draft dodgers were tabulated of which 23 had corresponded with a committee; and 110 deserters, of which 7 had done so.
291 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 3-11, Interview with Bill, Vietnam Vet, Montreal.
293 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 7-20, booklet – “It’s Your Choice: Guide to Opportunities Open to Volunteers for Military Service.”
I might have been in [the Spadina TADP offices] once.... I ... found the office, and I don’t think I was in there more than once or twice, but I never used any of their services.... They were there had I needed anything, but I prepared very carefully for the whole adventure.

I got in the country on a student visa at the U of T... and then I proceeded to get a job at the U of T. And at that point I went down to the border with a job offer in hand, and everything else it took, item by item on what you were supposed to do when you got to the border.... [I’m] not sure [how I knew what I needed]. I had been in contact with the Canadian consulate. I actually made a trip from [my hometown] to Chicago with a friend of mine, trying to find out about moving to Canada. The guy there was very uncooperative. ...

I went across Niagara Falls, walked around a bit, walked right up to the pedestrian crossing, I was wearing a white shirt, cleanshaven, short haircut, pressed pants, and all the documents required. ...

Where I got the idea, it would have been early 1966, or maybe 1967, when I read a copy of Ramparts magazine, one of the articles, I think the title was “Sanctuary.” They had a picture, and arch-like entrance to Canada, and they gave a description of what people were doing, taking off to Canada and everything was cool. ... Then I found out on my own the rest of the things.

... I may have gotten the [Spadina address] from Ramparts, but I don’t remember.

... The first guy I met was... anything but antiwar; he befriended a number of draft dodgers, and he let a deserter from the American army stay with him, so he was very sympathetic on a personal level.... He was in favour of American involvement in a certain way, but his friends were all draft dodgers.

As far as any organized Canadian groups, I never was involved. 294

“James” experience indicates that the anti-draft movement was effective, but at least some of the time the effect was indirect. “James” asserts he did not get the information he had about what to do at the border from any specific source; but he was exposed to at least one movement source. The Ramparts article in question, entitled, as

294 “James” interview.

143
“James” recalled, “Sanctuary,” did not detail how to go about contacting Canadian supporters; but it did mention the existence of anti-draft offices, and gave the Spadina address he mentions. It also combated the idea that emigrating was not a responsible way to oppose the war.  This information likely gave James a sense of security in attempting the crossing.

The information sent to American groups was received and redistributed to potential immigrants. “Ben,” a draft counsellor based in New Mexico who arrived in Canada in 1978, recollects:

My main involvement was with New Mexico Resistance, a group which mostly provided draft counselling, but occasionally participated in public education and consciousness-raising. I first contacted them to get advice about my own draft liability, then took training sessions from them so I could help others as I had been helped. Promotion was fast in that organization, as all the senior people went underground, off to jail, or off to Canada, and within a year or so I was heading up the counselling for most of the state. There were never more than 10 or 12 people working with our group.

The immigration manual put out by the Toronto Anti-Draft Programme was our main connection to Canada. We routinely encouraged people to fight within the system as long as possible and clog up the Selective Service appeals process, with emigration to be considered only as a last resort. When people were getting close to induction, I sometimes put them in contact with the Toronto group, but after contact was made I had no further involvement with Toronto except to buy their booklets.

Carolyn Egan recalls having consulted with a Buffalo group for advice about immigration:

We didn’t [get advice directly from anti-draft support groups in Canada] although we were aware of [them], simply because had our own connections so we didn’t need it. We had spoken to people in Buffalo in the anti-draft movement and they filled us in on things that were important.

296 “Ben” interview.

144
to know, but I think we were lucky in that we knew people here, so we could connect with them and had the support of living with them, and we applied at the border and they gave work permits when you applied. At the end of December the landed immigrant status came through.\footnote{Egan Interview.}

For some immigrants group connections were direct, but tenuous. Marvin Work came into contact with anti-draft groups only once, and very late:

Essentially I had no contact with Canadian Anti-draft groups until 1977 when I was contacted by a group in Winnipeg and told that I was about to be granted amnesty for my refusal to submit to induction. They suggested that I contact the attorney general for the San Francisco area. I called him, and when I spoke to him, he confirmed that he had just signed the paperwork granting my amnesty.\footnote{Work interview.}

Similarly, David Brown, a resister who arrived in 1968, was only “aware in a vague way that they existed and could offer support, but… did not personally try to contact a Canadian anti-draft group.”\footnote{David Brown, email interview by the author, November 6, 2006.}

Probably most immigrants arrived with some information, provided by some groups, whether American or Canadian, and got most of what they needed after their arrival. However, despite all the efforts described above, the information received was often low quality. As Mark Phillips, a draft dodger who arrived in 1968, recounts:

We came, Ruth [Phillips’ wife] and I came in June of 68, and prior to leaving, we were coming directly from Berkeley, and prior to leaving we phoned the group in Vancouver. I don’t think I contacted the people in Toronto. The amazing thing was that they warned me that the border was unfriendly and that we would be stopped, and that if Toronto was my destination I should in fact not come across there, but instead head east. It was June of 68.

We came through there, went through the immigration process, we had to go and get an x-ray and do something about the brakes in our car. And then we got in the car and headed across the continent. I just wanted to get
across the border a quickly as possible. So I ignored what they told me, and it turned out to be a sensible thing to do.

In Toronto my concern was mostly what I was going to do, whether I'd be able to go to university. I had been told, second piece of misinformation that I should not apply to U of T before coming because I would end up with a student visa. So I expected to be out of school for a year or so. 300

Anti-draft group correspondence shows that the border situation changed constantly, so the misleading information was understandable there – or, perhaps, Phillips was lucky.

Similarly, Joseph Jones, a draft dodger who arrived in 1970, received uneven information. He describes his trajectory:

After I decided to pursue the possibility of emigrating to Canada, my initial information came from a young faculty member and nearby Quakers. A low number in the December 1969 draft lottery 301 left me with the apparent choices of military service, jail, or Canada.... My transition to Canada was made easier by knowing a Canadian student in Toronto, through whom I connected with another student in Montreal, where I spent my first year. Both of their ordinary middle-class families provided welcome and hospitality and things like holiday dinner invitations.

In the summer of 1970, before emigrating, I visited the Toronto Anti-Draft Programme and the Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters. TADP counsellor Dick Burroughs just said go back to the U.S., we won't help you. Montreal counsellor Bill Mullen went over my case and gave me effective information on when, where, and how to enter Canada. In the fall of 1970 I attended one University Settlement House meeting of what I now realize must have been the Montreal American Deserters Committee, and found it tendentious.... While associated with AMEX I had occasional contact with TADP people, and with representatives from other groups when meetings were held in Toronto.... In Vancouver I had some contact with the Vancouver American Exiles Association, mainly in the period before the 1977 international conference. 302

301 Although all American men were required to register for the draft, the process of choosing who would actually be drafted was a lottery process based on drawing birthdates and initials from a drum.
302 Joseph Jones, email interview by the author, November 21, 2006. Jones probably recollected these experiences so clearly partly because his own current research focus is on the anti-draft movement.
Jones' negative experience with TADP was both during a period of high volume when the TADP had a triage approach to cases, and after the decision of anti-draft groups at the Montreal pan-Canadian conference to recommend to immigrants that they consider all other options before deciding to come to Canada. ³⁰³ Whatever the reason, Jones' experience was not unique. It shows that the information anti-draft groups provided was not necessarily reliable. His multiple contacts with anti-draft groups show the extent of potential incidental encounters by some immigrants.

Similarly, “Daniel,” a deserter who arrived sometime after January of 1968, had multiple incidental contacts with the anti-draft movement. “Daniel” also became peripherally involved himself:

I don't remember the groups, but in Canada I received help from the Winnipeg office for deserter/resister support that was funded by an alliance of church groups in the U.S. I was featured in one of their magazine articles. I also represented Manitoba deserters/resisters at a national (international?) conference in Toronto in the winter of 1973.... Following graduation I was employed as a civilian analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency - the intelligence arm for the Joint Chiefs of Staff - and joined the Air National Guard in the fall of 1965 to avoid being drafted. Becoming disillusioned with the Vietnam War and contributing to it through this job, I resigned and returned to graduate studies, only to have my unit activated in January 1968 following the Pueblo Incident, and, following the receipt of orders to go to Vietnam, I took an extended leave without pay from the U.S. Air Force to immigrate to Sweden, where I obtained “humanitarian asylum”.... In Sweden, I knew the group that tried to help similar Americans, but I don’t remember their name. They were funded by American religious organizations.³⁰⁴

Another type of American immigrant experience was that of Michael Goldberg, a draft dodger who came up without Canadian assistance but subsequently got deeply involved:

³⁰³ This conference is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
I had been very involved in opposing the war, and the civil rights stuff, and the grape boycott, back in the early sixties, and it became pretty clear to me working in SDS [Students for a Democratic Society] and other things that there was no chance that I was going to go to Vietnam.... One week there was a recruiter from the Peace Corps, and I filled it in on a dare, asking whether I wanted to go into the Peace Corps to avoid the draft, and I got admitted to the Peace Corps.

But it became clear to me that carrying that kind of community development work... wasn't quite what I was interested in doing. So when I left the peace corps I had been back in the U.S. for 3 days when I received my notice to report for induction. So I came to Canada. That would have been in '67. I had already driven through Canada. I was going into the Peace Corps, so I came through Canada in the summer of '67, and decided to go ahead and go to India, and see what it was like.... So when I'd come through Canada I had come north through Milwaukee, and had driven across the country, and had a job offer in Vancouver, and had turned it down. And three months later when I called from Denver to ask "is the job still there," he then sent me a letter down as quickly as possible so I could come up to Canada.

I had been in touch with the [American Friends Service Committee] in Chicago, and knew that the immigration law was changing. It changed in October '67, and I came up on October 8, '67. So I knew that if I was going to emigrate to Canada having a job offer would be a really helpful set of points.

[I had no contact with Canadian anti-draft groups] until I arrived here. I became involved the second day I arrived here, with the Committee to Aid American War Objectors in Vancouver. I had my job offer, with the Jewish Community Centre, as a youth worker. I had been a youth worker at the JCC in Milwaukee, and the president of the [group] provided me with a place to stay when I first arrived, and I got in touch with the Committee to find other war resisters, and maybe to share an apartment, which I ended up doing. And that was '67.

And then [I] was able to offer jobs and help other Americans become landed through my work at the JCC. We would drive people down across the border and that kind of stuff. My wife was very involved with the antiwar movement.... She’d been writing the prisoners in the U.S. I then went back to school to do a Masters degree at the school of social work, and for my practicum I was assigned to an entity called the inner city service project, and my work for the entire summer with them was to help
American war objectors. I did most of the counselling in the summer of 69.\textsuperscript{305}

In contrast, some immigrants relied quite happily, and to good effect, on the anti-draft groups. Lee Zaslofsky, a deserter who arrived in 1970, was one immigrant who received helpful support and information in Toronto.

I received help from the Toronto Anti-Draft Programme (TADP), especially when I crossed the border several months after arriving in Canada, as part of applying for Landed Immigrant status. The help included arranging travel to a “safe house” in Welland; arranging for travel to a Catholic college adjacent to the border; arranging for me to be picked up by an American supporter and driven into the U.S. (she waited in her car while I applied), and then being driven back to the college and back to Toronto. I did not volunteer at the Programme as I was preoccupied with finding work, etc.

I believe they offered assistance in finding housing. They also connected war resisters with employers who were willing to sign Offers of Employment for use in applying for Landed status.\textsuperscript{306}

Similarly, Hardy Scott recalls the Vancouver committee and his subsequent involvement with its work. Scott, a draft dodger who arrived in Canada in January 1967, came to Canada after seeing an article in the New York Times which gave the address of the VCTAAWO. Scott’s experience with the Vancouver was positive, partly because he knew the woman he had contacted and, it turned out, they had met previously while both lived in Philadelphia. She, an American Friends Service Committee member, had known him under a different first name. She had married a Canadian doing civil rights work in Mississippi. Scott recalls that the VCTAAWO gave advice about immigration, where to secure housing at cheap rent rates, finding work, and accommodation sharing. Scott

\textsuperscript{305} Goldberg interview.
\textsuperscript{306} Lee Zaslofsky, email interview by the author, October 30, 2006.
worked with the VCTAAWO answering letters from potential immigrants. He used a pseudonym for this work. 307

Some Americans got involved, at least temporarily, with the anti-draft groups.

Dick Perrin, a deserter, started a group himself:

I started an organization called the Regina Committee of American Deserters. My wife of that time and I rented a house, then two, then three houses, and we provided shelter and immigration help to resisters arriving in Regina. I was a resister myself and wanted to remain involved in the effort to stop the war, and in Regina establishing the RCAD seemed a good fit.

When I arrived in Regina there were a few people loosely organized to help resisters, mostly professors. [They provided] immigration counselling, shelter, sometimes counsel for emotional difficulties, especially for veterans of the war. They were mostly leftist professors, mostly Canadian but a couple of Americans too. At least two labour leaders were involved. [They had] a wide variety of views, from Mennonite to Maoist, and I worked comfortably with all. 308

The varying interactions immigrants had with the anti-draft groups show that, although the anti-draft groups may not always have been reliable sources of support or information, the anti-draft network as whole, through its exchange of information with other groups both in the U.S. and in Canada, had a positive impact on many individual lives. Further beneficial effects of the movement derived from the successful political campaigns waged by the anti-draft movement.

The Canadian anti-draft movement only existed for about seven years. 309 It is possible that, given time, some of the problems the movement experienced would have worked themselves out. An early example of this potential was the 1972 Repatriation

307 Scott interview.
308 Dick Perrin, email interview by the author, December 12, 2006.
309 After 1973 the movement had shifted its focus to the debate about amnesty, and was almost entirely dominated by American immigrants.
Project. In March of 1972 the CCCO requested assistance from Canadian aid groups with its Repatriation Project, whose aim was to restore freedom to travel for war resisters. The CCCO requested that the Canadian groups seek evidence of erroneous induction, screening for war resisters whose records might thereby be expunged.\textsuperscript{310} In February 1972, CCCO staff gave a training course in military counselling in Montreal. The Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters and the Montreal American Refugee Service hosted the event, and Rick Gooding of the Montreal groups contacted at least one other Canadian group – the Nova Scotia Committee – about the training. The training was attended by Canadians and Americans from the CCCO, AFSC, MCAWR, and NCTAAWO, as well as Vietnam Veterans Against the War.\textsuperscript{311} By June of 1973, as the war was winding down and after the Canadian government had tightened its immigration policies, only the Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver committees were still active.\textsuperscript{312}

\textbf{From Disparate Beginnings to a Stable, Decentralized Network}

As Theda Skocpol has posited, the shape and activity of social movements are historically determined.\textsuperscript{313} The network of anti-draft groups reflected the times. Rooted in the New Left, its very decentralization also lent itself to the needs of a movement aimed at supporting American immigrants who could cross the border at any one of dozens of different points. Through its unification by communication and information-

\textsuperscript{310} DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.7, Correspondence with various anti-draft and peace groups.
\textsuperscript{311} DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.9, correspondence and CCCO Manual.
\textsuperscript{312} Kasinsky, 81-82.
\textsuperscript{313} Theda Skocpol, \textit{Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life} (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003), 17.
sharing, it was able to overcome its geographical characteristics to mount effective campaigns to change immigration policy.

The Canadian anti-draft movement had disparate beginnings, and ended as a network of support groups which, despite disagreements about some questions of tactics, maintained a constant line of communication. It enjoyed a neutral-to-favourable public opinion, and was strengthened by both horizontal linkages to other groups in Canada, and vertical linkages to groups in the United States. Its roots in and methods partly from pacifist tradition, partly the New Left, it reached out to potential immigrants and, in many cases, lent a solid hand.

The anti-draft movement managed to effectively help war resisters from 1966 until around 1974. After that the movement shifted focus, becoming centred on exile issues and, in particular, amnesty from United States government prosecution should resisters choose to return to the U.S. The movement was uneven, and enjoyed its ups and down in terms of effectiveness. It also carried out debates centred around questions of citizenship, engagement, and nationalism. Despite the complexity of the scene, the anti-draft movement helped thousands of war resisters successfully immigrate to Canada.

Its social work methods combined with political advocacy both increased its effectiveness and contributed to tensions, as we will see. Although there were disagreements about how to go about it, the movement also undertook political advocacy on behalf of American war resisters. In this work the anti-draft groups received support from dozens of other groups and individuals, such as church groups, student groups, MPs and lawyers, without which many of their achievements would have been impossible.

152
Chapter 3 will introduce some of the tensions that emerged in the anti-draft movement after its formation. Chapter 4 will examine a specific advocacy campaign and the intersection of debates with the actions taken by the war resister support groups.
Chapter 3

Deserters: Treatment, Tactics, Identity

This I believe: to oppose
Is the only fine thing in life.
To oppose is to live.
To oppose is to get a grip on the very self.¹

In a way, draft dodgers and deserters were not much different from each other. Both groups were resisting the same war. However, real differences existed between the groups in general terms. The draft dodgers came to Canada in larger numbers at the beginning of the period, while deserters arrived in larger numbers later. Deserters and draft dodgers were also different from each other to the extent that they had done different things prior to arriving in Canada: deserters had usually served a tour of duty in combat, and arrived with that experience and little else in terms of formal training or education. Draft dodgers tended to be from higher income brackets and were much more likely to have some post-secondary education. Deserters were further differentiated from draft dodgers by the Canadian government and by anti-draft group activists. Initially, anti-draft groups attempted to protect deserters from exposure, by helping them live “underground,” until government policy forced a different strategy. Government policy at first seemed not to differentiate between draft dodgers and deserters, but later the Department of Immigration took action to exclude deserters from Canada, provoking a campaign to reverse the measures. This differential treatment of deserters was one of the reasons for some deserters’ tendency, and later the tendency of other war resisters, to

organize into exclusively American groups. In turn, the trend provoked some controversy among anti-draft activists.

The question of differential treatment and consideration of deserters and draft dodgers must be understood as part of the broader interaction between war resisters and anti-draft activists in Canada. In turn, this interaction was taking place in a context of developing ideas, prevalent especially among youth, about how to effect social change, and about how Canada might shape itself as an opposition to the United States’ bad behaviour.

Thus, in the first part of this chapter I will examine the experiences of anti-draft activists, both centrally and peripherally involved in the network of anti-draft groups. Their experiences were shaped by the context in which they took place. These experiences began to affect the interaction they had with Americans, and to affect some of the resisters’ perceptions of the anti-draft movement. The anti-draft movement became more conscious of its own ideals of universal assistance to resisters, and this maturation of the anti-draft movement exposed debates that had initially been of lesser importance. Some of these debates developed into serious divisions, which I will analyze in chapter 5. Here, I will set out how these developing debates impacted on the movement’s ability to act on behalf of war resisters. In part, these debates brought about discussions of the differences between deserters and draft dodgers.

In the second part of this chapter I will discuss a related question that preoccupied Canadian activists greatly: the ways in which anti-draft groups treated deserters differently from draft dodgers, and why. I will explore how, and to what extent, a
judgement about the effectiveness of desertion as an anti-war tactic played into this differential treatment. On this question, there were differences on both sides of the border between the orientation of groups and the opinions of the activists in those groups. I will show that the judgement of difference, where it existed, was largely on the part of American immigrant groups. However, the individual American immigrants interviewed for this study largely regarded it as a matter of individual conscience. I will explore how the motives of the resisters, real and perceived, both encouraged the differentiation between deserters and draft dodgers, and contributed to the romantic image of the act of emigration. I will examine how perceptions of the tactical differences between emigration and staying in the U.S., desertion or otherwise avoiding the war, impacted on Canadian groups' choices between encouraging Americans to assimilate, or to retain their American identity. Some argued that in order to effectively oppose the war, Americans needed to be separately organized into exile groups or deserter committees. Partly, this assertion belonged to a developing debate about what constituted effective, or even "real", political or anti-war work. The debate, influenced to some degree by anti-Americanism from some in the Canadian left, at first impacted the resisters little, if at all. However, in future chapters we will see a developing instability in the anti-draft movement brought about by these debates.

War Resisters and Supporters' Expectations and First Impressions

Church groups and members, antiwar activists, American immigrants, professors, students, and far left activists all worked together to support the waves of Americans arriving on a daily basis. The reasons for doing so were varied. Some anti-draft activists
certainly viewed draft dodging as an anti-war act. Others, like Voice of Women, saw it as part of a tradition of civil disobedience. The VCTAAWO viewed draft dodging as “at least a minor obstruction” of the Vietnam War. Their correspondence with Glenn Sinclair at McMaster University also explained the reasons behind the existence of the committee: “We help them because their need is great and because they come to have this need through a belief that ‘wars will cease when men refuse to fight,’ which we share.” While only a snapshot of the principal motives of various groups is provided here and in the previous chapter, the experiences of individual activists were varied.

Starting from a deep commitment to sets of ideas like pacifism, or acting out of professional interest, or through incidental involvement in the anti-draft movement, Canadians’ perceptions of the resisters were shaped and changed by real experiences with war resisters. Many activists held the romantic notion that all resisters were acting out of basic courage and from the principle of resistance to the war. Others never harboured such illusions. Just as some immigrant experiences were peripheral to the anti-draft movement, as we have seen, so some Canadian involvement with the anti-draft movement was also peripheral to the main network of anti-draft groups. The evidence shows that, the closer to the organized networks an individual supporter was, the less likely they were to either romanticize the cause, or to expect war resisters to adopt an explicitly “political” outlook upon their arrival.

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2 Kasinsky holds that the groups did not see themselves as part of the antiwar movement, but cites no evidence to support this statement: Kasinsky, 77-78.  
4 WR, Peter Warrlan fonds, Vol. 4, File 13, CTAAWO (Vancouver); UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 1-2, Correspondence – VCTAAWO.

157
Ken Fisher, then a student at Queen’s University and a Canadian peace and civil rights activist, was one individual whose lack of proximity to the organized networks meant he injected his own predisposition to be anti-war into his expectations for war resisters. Below, he describes his experience as a border courier for deserters as a young man hoping to make a difference through involvement in anti-war work, and by helping these resisters specifically. While his involvement was brief and limited, his experience was so far from his idealistic expectations, based on an idea that war resisters were themselves idealists, that it had a profound effect on him. In his description of his involvement, one can hear his perception of himself as a young man, involved for romantic reasons in helping men he expected to behave as heroes behaved. His young self, whom he forgives for this naivety at a time when protest was romanticized, had a rude awakening about the deserters he was helping: they sought to avoid being killed, and their motives were no more protest-oriented than that. His conclusion, in retrospect, was that he was not aware of the reality of the situation such young men faced:

Growing up in Ottawa I was... involved in student politics, and as the war in Vietnam progressed, I was peripherally or directly involved. I would go to the antiwar demos and all that. I was [the Queen’s University] SUPA [rep] and at SUPA I was with the [Combined University Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament]... and I was enamoured with SNCC [Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, an American civil rights group]. I don’t remember how it happened, but I was approached to see if I would be a courier so to speak, and go to the United States somewhere over the [unintelligible] bridge, and pick up three deserters. And I agreed to do that.... [The initial contact] could have been in conjunction with the SUPA. There was a group that was concerned about draft dodgers, it could have been a draft dodger connection. Being a deserter was another step along the way.

... Part of the period was a deep romanticism about social change and the future, and this was before Kent State, before it became apparent to what
extent the state would go to repress social change. Romanticism was unbridled. There was free love, free imagination, you would engage. So considering the risk I took at that time in terms of my record, my ability to travel, anything, I gave it no consideration whatsoever.

So I borrowed a friend’s 58 Studebaker, my roommate at Queen’s.... As we were heading back to Kingston I started to talk to these guys. Their general impression of Canada was that we skied all year, there were no high rise buildings, it was just some rural fantasyland north of the United States. In other words, what I got was that they had no politics other than saving their own ass, they did not want to die in Vietnam and they were scared shitless, and they knew nothing about the real world other than that. Perhaps I’m exaggerating slightly. So the romance of, in my little narcissistic mind of doing something extraordinary, of having new colleagues in the great campaign to make a new earth or however you want to talk about it, was reduced to rubble on this trip because these guys knew nothing about the world whatsoever, and I started saying to myself “I’m risking life and limb, for what?” That was part of the experience for me.

And I was truly scared myself. It was all theoretical until you got to the American checkpoint, there’s these guys with guns, and you really are breaking the law, and you really could get caught. I mean there were lots of people who did far more than I did, I mean that was my contribution, and that’s the way it looked to me at that moment. My feeling was that if I was stopped in the United States assisting deserters to leave the country, and they were already known to be deserters, that I would be aiding and abetting.

I wouldn’t have traded that moment of disillusionment for anything. Disillusionment is one of my best friends in terms of having another chance to create a world, see how that world works. I was even more frightened for myself, I realized how stupid I had been. I was as confused as they were, as naive as they were. In terms of what was going on, how to deal with it... there was a naivety within myself that I had to deal with.... It altered [my convictions] in the sense that things weren’t black and white.

I realized the coefficient of adversity was a whole lot greater than I could possibly imagine, because these guys were coming to be citizens of Canada and knew nothing. The way the draft was working it was... sucking up young men who had no skills and no options. Guys with
resources and good families were somewhere else. That was the way their society was circulating their youth.\(^5\)

Thus, Fisher was acting out of an idealistic expectation about war resisters, which he shared with many people his age in the 1960s. His experience changed his outlook, and shook his assumptions that resisters were uniformly acting out of idealistic anti-war sentiment, like he was. Who knows how different his experience would have been had the young Americans he was helping been among those with political convictions.

Fisher’s experience and that of others can be seen as part of a general culture of fashionable radicalism and political activism. As historian Doug Owram has observed, “the idealism of the era meant that individual causes or concerns – Vietnam, Native poverty, campus politics, women’s liberation – could gain the support of many who were far from being political activists.” The “media and the peer group” reinforced the message that “to be youthful was to be politically aware, politically critical.”\(^6\)

Only a small percentage of young people in the 1960s were political radicals, but a much greater number, especially in the universities, grew up in an age in which youth and radicalism were connected. New ideas swarmed over the generation.\(^7\)

Of course not all of the activists considered in this study fall into the category of youth; but this movement, like others of the time, was nonetheless part of the tapestry of youth-identified protest causes. Historian Cynthia Comacchio emphasizes the cultural aspect of the category of youth, and the mutually determining categories of young and old.\(^8\) The

\(^5\) Ken Fisher, interview by the author, June 9, 2006. Fisher’s comments about class are relevant to the discussion of class I will undertake in Chapter 5.
\(^7\) Owram, *Born At the Right Time*, 218.
\(^8\) Cynthia Comacchio, *The Dominion of Youth: Adolescence and the Making of a Modern Canada, 1920-1930* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2006), 7. Comacchio’s study is about youth as
constellation of concepts wrapped up in the term youth include its cultural and social dimensions, as well as its relationships to other concepts. This layered complexity, groundwork laid in the period between the world wars, is the context within which youth movements existed in the 1960s.⁹

Ken Fisher’s experience was probably not unique, but it appears to be unusual in light of the beliefs of other activists. Most activists involved in the anti-draft movement knew exactly how much work there was to be done, and harboured no illusions about who the draft dodgers and deserters were. For them, the resisters were just individuals who needed help, and the act of helping them might indirectly affect the outcome of the movement against the war in Vietnam. The resisters’ political views were, by and large, not relevant to the anti-draft activists, as we shall see.

Most of the key activists in the anti-draft groups did not consider resisters’ reasons for immigrating to be a factor in whether they should receive assistance. Nancy Pocock and her husband Jack were Quakers, and long-time peace activists. In a 1970 interview with Renée Kasinsky, Pocock expressed how she had found working with the young Americans and their supporters refreshing. From 1965 to 1970 there was a steady stream of immigrants staying with the Pococks.¹⁰ Pocock believed that Canada had a pacifist tradition. This pacifism led Quakers to an unconditional support for war resisters, no matter their personal reasons for leaving the U.S. On deserters, Pocock was candid but sympathetic:

adolescence, or teen agehood; when, how, and why the term youth came to include anyone under thirty is a subject requiring further study.

⁹ Comacchio, 1-4.
¹⁰ UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, RS 4-12 Interview with Nancy Pokhawk [sic], May 1970, Toronto, Quaker, Active in Exile Movement Since 1965.
[F]or the deserters, most of them have just cut and run, and they’re bewildered, many of them younger than the other boys. Less educated, less thoughtful, and they just know they don’t like what they saw down there. And they don’t like what they’re being forced to do in the army. But I think that they’re a positive thing for peace... and the fact they just said, “No, I’m not going to!” Whatever their motives, it’s a good thing.\(^{11}\)

Bill Spira’s reasons for involvement were similarly characterized by a concern for the larger impact of the anti-draft movement, and not for the individual beliefs or principles behind resisters’ decisions to come to Canada. He saw helping war resisters as far more effective than anti-war demonstrations. As he recounted to Kasinsky, “A lot of people have asked me, why are you doing it for Americans? My answer always is I’m not doing it for Americans. I’m doing it for the Vietnamese.”\(^{12}\) Joan Wilcox, of Ottawa AID, shared his commitment to opposing the war:

Were my expectations [of having an impact on the war] met? Yes, but maybe I’m kidding myself. But I’d like to think we were one cog on a very major wheel that helped grind the war down, maybe not as soon as we would have liked but sooner than it would have otherwise.... We saw a lot of young men who would have had wasted lives if had they gone to war, become very fulfilled and fulfilling citizens of this country and some who went back to the States but also did lead productive lives, and that’s always fulfilling.... Absolutely, [opposing the war] was [one of the primary reasons people got involved.]\(^{13}\)

Paul Copeland’s interest might be expected to have been purely professional. But he, like the others involved, was a product of the times. It is interesting to compare his story to Fisher’s. Both were typical of youth culture in the sixties; but Copeland’s path led him to a deep commitment to the needs of “exiles”:

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\(^{11}\) UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-12, Interview with Nancy Pokhawk [sic], May 1970, Toronto, Quaker, Active in Exile Movement Since 1965.

\(^{12}\) UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-14, Interview with Bill Spira of the Toronto anti-Draft Program [sic], June 1970.

\(^{13}\) Wilcox interview.
This is a story I tell fairly regularly. I come from sort of a leftist family... and what I regard as the seminal point of my life, was, I’m thirteen years old, I’m in high school in Toronto, I’m a member of the ham radio club in high school, and I have in my bedroom a converted tank set that allowed me to listen to short wave radio. And I’m reading the media some, I was sort of a weird kid, and I’m reading the media some about what’s happening at Dien Bien Phu. And the Western Media is saying the French are fighting the communists for control of Vietnam. And one night I’m listening to Radio Moscow. They had an English language news program on late at night, and Radio Moscow they say, “The Vietnamese are fighting the French for freedom,” and I said, “Holy shit, that sounds really a lot more accurate...” And it was the first time I sort of woke up and said “gee, there are biases in the media...” It was really for me a... pivotal point in my life for how I approached things.

So there I am however many years later, during, I guess when I’m in law school, I was getting more radical, I had been a little bit radical but there was nothing going on in University. I started university in 1957, I took five years to complete a three year degree, I drank a lot, played a bit of sports, did a bit of political stuff but there just wasn’t very much going on, a bit of ban the bomb stuff. And then when I was in third year of university... there was a lot of stuff going on in the United States with the civil rights movement.... And I thought, I was in geophysics, I could finish geophysics and go off and be a geophysicist, I could do political work maybe two days a year if I happened to be in the city.

... I was certainly supportive generally speaking of the North Vietnamese during the war. I was an admirer of Ho Chi Minh, I mean he was quite a remarkable man... one of things I remember about HCM was he went to Versailles, and pitched independence of Vietnam. An amazing, amazing man. And a Vietnamese nationalist, and he happened to be a communist, but who gives a shit. It’s a pretty rotten system in Vietnam, but, between the American puppet regimes in Vietnam and the Viet Cong, the Viet Minh before, there was no question in my mind whose side I was on. And then working with the Exile community, and just the people who didn’t want to go and fight that war, was obvious.... We certainly hoped [to weaken the American war effort]. It wasn’t the overarching theme. We were representing every demonstrator almost that existed, so, there was a lot of antiwar stuff going on in Toronto, it got bigger as it went on, probably the largest demonstrations with the largest number of arrests are in May of 1970, just after the invasion of Cambodia.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{14} Copeland interview.
Copeland, like Fisher, places his experience in the context of the sixties counterculture and protest movements. Both were idealists; but, perhaps because of Copeland’s family connections to the left, Copeland’s idealism did not lead him to expect all war resisters to be committed to opposing the war, and he did not have the rude awakening Fisher experienced.

In general, American immigrants and war resisters also did not particularly care what beliefs or political orientation Canadian activists held, at least in the first few years of the period. Resisters who came into contact with the anti-draft groups generally felt positive about them, at worst finding them somewhat irrelevant. Resisters interviewed by Emerick thought Canadian groups could use more money, that they took in more people than they could handle, and that they needed better publicity in the U.S. Some felt that exile groups were oriented towards deserters to the exclusion of draft dodgers. Others felt that the exile groups needed to interact more with Canadians. One or two felt that the Ottawa group was better organized than other anti-draft committees.\textsuperscript{15} Many immigrant memories of Canadian activists and Canadian attitudes were either shaped by electoral political choices or by chance encounters with Canadians. Wilcox, who was an American immigrant herself but who had immigrated in the early 1960s, remembers the political orientation of those she worked with as

primarily NDP, however the Liberals were in power at the time and we got very good support from the Liberal bureaucracy, and we didn’t much ask each other how we voted. One of our counsellors was a very strong feminist. But we all generally took the point of view that first of all we disagreed with the war in Vietnam and basically anything we could do,

\textsuperscript{15} Emerick, 236-7.
well anything legal that we could do to throw a spanner into the works was a good thing.\\textsuperscript{16}

Regardless of how non-partisan the atmosphere inside the groups might have been, as Wilcox suggested, there is no question that the anti-draft activists were seen to be on the left of the political spectrum. Lee Zaslavsky, a deserter who arrived in 1970, remembers the following anecdotes about TADP activists and Toronto politicians:

I remember two of the people at TADP: Joe Spira, an older man, and a woman about my age, Naomi Wall. They were helpful in making the arrangements mentioned above. Naomi, I remember, also commented on my enthusiasm for the NDP (wow! a socialist party!), saying many people found the NDP “wishy washy.” She was right!

... I remember attending a public meeting of the “Waffle” [an internal caucus of the NDP which sought to reform it into a socialist party], at which I asked Walter Gordon during the question time about his attitude towards people like me, and he was very welcoming, saying “Welcome Aboard.” I don’t think he was an MP at that time, though. Mel Watkins was also on stage with him.\\textsuperscript{17} I was aware of the NDP being supportive, and became active in the NDP in 1971, during a provincial election in which Dan Heap was a candidate. He and his supporters were very antiwar and pro-war resister.\\textsuperscript{18}

This general left positioning combined with a dedication to assisting war resisters had an effect on the anti-draft movement’s interaction with the broader anti-war movement. One resister recalls that “[Canadian activists] seemed like reasonable people, caring and humane.... [They were] generally supportive [of the broader movement], but not always willing to be co-opted to the extent that it diverted them from their primary goal of being

\\textsuperscript{16} Wilcox interview.
\\textsuperscript{17} Walter Gordon was the author of a prominent, and controversial, report, on American control of elements of the Canadian economy, which became known as the Watkins report due to the involvement of then-Liberal-leaning Mel Watkins in its production. For a good overview of these concerns see Stephen Azzi’s study of the left-wing strain of ‘new nationalism,’ Stephen Azzi, Walter Gordon and the Rise of Canadian Nationalism (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), and my discussion of left nationalism in Chapter 4.
\\textsuperscript{18} Zaslofsky interview.
supportive of deserters and resisters." By this he meant that the anti-draft groups were focussed on support for war resisters, and did not want their energy and resources to be drawn into broader anti-war efforts. They also resisted efforts to promote war resisters as symbols of the anti-war movement.

Overall, contact with the anti-draft groups reinforced war resisters’ views of Canada as a welcoming country. Draft dodger Michael Goldberg’s view of the VCTAAWO linked the individual political views of activists to broader strategic debates within the movement, and to the electoral political scene in Vancouver:

There were clearly differences just like there were in the U.S. about which direction the antiwar movement should take. There were lots of arguments about how many Marxists there were on the head of a pin, and all the usual kind of stuff that was going on, but the big thing that impressed me was just how open the country was compared to the U.S. In part that may have been a bit of luck on my part, because at the Jewish community centre where I worked, the exec director of Jewish family services, which was a very small family counselling group, was a person who later became the premier of the province a couple of years after that, and we became very good friends, so I had this extraordinary introduction to Canadian politics, that were just closed to people like myself in the U.S., folks who didn’t have money or connections or anything else. So I walked in as a refugee, I got a job, and make friends with a person who three years later was the premier of the province. 20

For Goldberg and others like him, the important thing was the support received, not the reason it was given. As more and more resisters arrived, and many got involved in the anti-draft movement, that shifted.

Thus, individual Americans had an appreciation for the commitment of Canadian activists and for Canadian society, finding it generally open and welcoming, and connecting the anti-draft movement to the mostly friendly reception they received.

19 "Daniel" interview.
20 Goldberg interview.

166
However, they did not, at least at first, need or want a very deep understanding of the motivations of the Canadian activists; nor did they expect them to feel one way or the other. In turn, as we have seen, the Canadian anti-draft activists, by and large, did not expect war resisters to actively oppose the war. Of course not all Canadians supported the war resisters; but for the most part the non-supportive Canadians had no impact on resisters, and made their presence felt in the Department of Immigration mostly when public debates were taking place about immigration policy, such as the early 1969 discussion about border policy and deserters.

As the movement progressed and events unfolded, the actions and interactions that took place began to have an impact on the views of those involved. The resisters who were in touch with the anti-draft network discussed how to be an effective part of the anti-war movement; but in order to resolve that issue they had to answer the question of whether, or to what extent, they were still American. For the anti-draft activists’ part, various considerations, both external and internal, had from the start exerted pressure to treat deserters and draft dodgers differently from each other. This pressure provoked discussion and debate about the relative merits of various types of war resistance.

**Differential Treatment and Perception of Deserters**

One source of the differentiation was the American immigrants themselves. Renée Kasinsky observed that deserters, compared to draft dodgers, experienced disproportionately discrimination from both the Canadian aid groups and the Canadian government. While government policy changed several times between 1966 and 1973, no matter the current policy, war resisters often experienced discrimination from
immigration officials. In 1968 and 1969, immigration officials were explicitly directed to prevent the entry of deserters, while draft dodgers were still ostensibly allowed to enter under the same rules as other immigrants. This situation continued until May of 1969. Aid groups, for their part, differentiated between the two categories of resisters, at first due to their differing legal status both inside the United States and in Canada. Later, the groups also recognized that deserters were typically less educated and experienced, and therefore faced specific obstacles to being landed.

Canadian anti-draft groups did treat deserters differently from draft dodgers, at least at first. Bill Spira told Kasinsky that eventually TADP research and experience showed that draft dodgers and deserters were not different legally. They observed, however, that despite this equivalence, government authorities still treated the two groups differently.21 Unknown to activists, a secret memorandum from the Department of Immigration was sent to immigration officers instructing them to take unfulfilled military obligations into account with border applications.22 Spira asserted that the anti-draft groups did not treat deserters differently as a direct imitation of differential treatment by government, but because of the anti-draft movement’s ignorance about the fact that the resisters were legally equivalent. He also suggested that the differential views of deserters and draft dodgers were also partly a reflection of American attitudes towards resisters, which saw deserters as breaking the law more blatantly than draft dodgers.23

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21 It is not clear that this differential treatment on the part of the government was actually illegal, but that was certainly the perception of those who supported opening the border. See Chapter 4.
22 The memo was circulated in order to exclude deserters without necessitating a public debate. See Chapter 4.
23 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-14, Interview with Bill Spira of the Toronto anti-Draft Program [sic], June 1970.
Anti-draft groups also dealt with deserters differently because deserters tended to require different counselling. While no clear statistical proof exists because no scientific study was ever conducted, the evidence is overwhelming that deserters tended to be less educated than draft dodgers. The “meagre” evidence Vietnam veteran David Cortwright, now a Peace Studies scholar, was able to amass in 1975, such as United States Department of Defense statistics presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on desertion in 1968, supports this notion. The recollections of resisters bolster this theory. War resister Joseph Jones remembers that deserters were different “in terms of socioeconomic class, personal adaptability, needs for counselling and support, ease of immigration, etc.” Immigration was more difficult for deserters because they could amass fewer points – based on education, skills, and work experience – towards landed immigrant status. Since many deserters had also seen combat, it is worth pointing out that Vietnam veterans are well known to have suffered in great numbers from post-traumatic stress and other problems perhaps not yet fully understood, even by sympathizers. This, combined with the stress of leaving the U.S. to come to another country full of strangers, would have made immigration more difficult as well. Also, the U.S. Selective Service program had a way of streaming men from the lower-income strata of American society into the military, as Joan Wilcox describes:

25 Jones interview.
[It's] probably true [that deserters had lower levels of education]. For one thing if you were going to university that generally equalled a deferment until after university, and so a lot of people who otherwise qualified [for the draft] would go to university who might not have done, in order to get another 4 years of deferment, hoping the war would be over; so that automatically added to their eligibility [for further deferments]...27 Secondly, the better educated, and I use that term loosely, generally had a better understanding of the political situation, an awareness of what was happening in the Far East, and an awareness of what going to war meant, and were in a little better position to assess their options. And also... an awful lot of the deserters came from very poor, very ill-educated backgrounds who hadn't a hope in hell of getting a decent job as it was then, and to go into the military, they could be promised the moon on a string... and it wasn't until they got into the military that they realized what they had signed into.28

These political and cultural factors combined to make the deserter experience qualitatively different from that of other war resisters.

In response to my questions about the difference between deserters and draft dodgers, those I interviewed corroborated the sense of differential receptions. Their responses are augmented by the views of those interviewed by Kasinsky in 1970. War resister Marvin Work suggested that “the public perception of deserters was more negative than that of draft-dodgers.”29 Michael Goldberg, a draft dodger who arrived in Vancouver in 1967, remembers similar trends from his work with the VCTAAWO:

I think from my experience when I was working at the committee and seeing a lot of both draft dodgers and deserters, that generally draft dodgers tended to have higher levels of education. That made it easier for

27 This aspect of the Selective Service System, while less familiar to many, is well documented and is confirmed by the United States Government at Selective Service System: History and Records, http://www.sss.gov/viet.htm, accessed July 29 2007. See also Gerard J. Dregroot, A Noble Cause? America and the Vietnam War (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2000), 512. I explore this phenomenon in more detail in Chapter 4.
29 Work interview.
them to get landed, [for] the vast majority of draft dodgers who came up. Among the guys there were also women who came up but they were either with males or just were really pissed off at what was going on in the U.S. -- but among the draft dodgers almost all of them had some university or were in university. Among the deserters it was rare that you had that. I did have one deserter who had a Masters degree, but that was an exception rather than the norm.  

Ken Fisher, who was a movement activist on the periphery of the anti-groups, also believes the trend existed, although his experiences with war resisters were comparatively limited.

[Draft dodgers] had a much clearer vision of where they were going and why, and for me, my major awareness learning souvenir of talking to men who were draft dodgers, is that without exception they became more Canadian than Canadians... Their process of becoming Canadians was to become [today’s] devoted Canadians. In contrast to the deserter who knew nothing, they became extraordinary contributors to Canadian society. That's my without exception experience.  

The differences were lost on many Canadians, who conflated all resisters into the category of "draft dodger." Lee Zaslovsky, a deserter who arrived in Canada in 1970, notes:

There was (and is) a lack of clarity among many Canadians as to the difference between "draft dodgers" and "deserters" -- the common term was "draft dodger", and Canadians based their welcome in part on their opposition to conscription, as well as, in many cases, to their opposition to the Vietnam War. But [U.S.] conscription was seen as wrong in itself.  

30 Goldberg interview.
31 Fisher interview.
32 Zaslofsky interview.
Dick Perrin, who deserted in Germany in 1967 and arrived in Canada several years later, noted that deserters tended to be poor and uneducated, which made it harder to get immigration papers.33

One reason for the different treatment of deserters by anti-draft groups was a desire to protect deserters from exposure. This desire was the reason why TADP ran a separate – and, at first, secret – program for deserters. As Pocock explained in a 1970 interview with Kasinsky:

[TADP activist Bill Spira ran] what we called the sub-program. We weren’t sure at that time just how deserters stood, with the government... [in] ’67-68, when we started getting deserters.... And the press was very anxious to get this story about deserters. They knew they were coming, and they were poking and prying all the time. They haunted the office. So we decided the best thing to do was to handle deserters separately. So Bill took over that, and we called it the sub-program. He had a group of advisors who advised in their own homes... and kept the boys in their own homes.34

Spira claimed to be the first person to start counselling deserters, as part of the TADP sub-program.35 He thought that deserters had begun to outnumber draft dodgers after the decision by MacEachen to open the border to them. Kasinsky asked Spira if the spike in deserters was because of the May 1969 announcement. Spira thought it might be so, and also because draft dodging in the United States had become “a sophisticated art where guys can dodge for two or three years...”, and because desertion was becoming more “socially acceptable” because of increased opposition to the war in public opinion

33 Dick Perrin and Tim McCarthy, G.I. Resister: The Story of How One American Soldier and his Family Fought the War in Vietnam (Victoria, BC: Trafford Publishing, 2001), 130-132. The class aspect of the story will also be explored more extensively in Chapter 4.
34 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-12, Interview with Nancy Pokhaw [sic], May 1970, Toronto, Quaker, Active in Exile Movement Since 1965.
35 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-14, Interview with Bill Spira of the Toronto anti-Draft Program [sic], June 1970.
both in the United States and in Canada. As more men deserted, others saw it as a better option than they had before.\textsuperscript{36} By around 1970 the number of deserters coming through the TADP was high enough to require a triage approach to the counselling.\textsuperscript{37}

The differential treatment of draft dodgers and deserters at the border continued to be reflected in the application of the Canadian immigration points system, even once the border situation was changed to allow deserters to enter more easily.

**Tactical Debates among Anti-draft Groups, Activists, and Resisters**

Despite their desire to tailor counselling to the needs of different kinds of war resisters, anti-draft activists outside of the exile groups did not assign a value to one tactic over another. This approach may have been handed down to them from American draft counselling materials and training, as “Ben” recalls below. Whatever the reason, most activists maintained a neutrality that was not contrived. Joan Wilcox recalls:

> I personally didn’t care, and I think most of us here didn’t care if they were dodging or deserting.... My position I think it was fairly representative of our group is, if you knew the situation in the States you’d realize how poverty-stricken some of these young men were, all of the forces that would cause them to and the political hype and so on, and they had no idea what they were getting into.\textsuperscript{38}

Michael Goldberg also recalls the debate among anti-war activists, but affirms that the groups he worked with approached the question neutrally:

> The debate I remember is that there seemed to be three choices: go and gum up the works by joining the military; go to Leavenworth [military prison], refuse the draft and go to prison, but stay in the country; or leave the country. I think for different people, different things worked for them. While there was a debate about what was better, it became very clear that

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid. For an excellent overview of the many ways resisters in the U.S. could avoid the draft see Foley.

\textsuperscript{37} TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection Box 13 - Lobbying and Public Relations, Folder 1, TADP Statements and Lobbying.

\textsuperscript{38} Wilcox interview.
it was a debate about nothing, that all of them were important ways in which to get across the point, it was time to move away from "the most important strategy" to "strategies." The strongest debate was probably whether to stay in the U.S. and fight through the anti-war movement either underground, in the prison system or directly in Vietnam, or leave the country, and I always felt, and I think it's where many people got to, that it wasn't an either-or issue. It depended on the circle of people and what they felt would work for them.  

Although Canadian activists generally did not question the tactics or commitment of resisters, American exile groups largely viewed all kinds of immigration as only a beginning, a first step, in political activity and anti-war action. New Left activists, especially those in the United States, believed emigration was a cop-out, and that anti-war Americans of draft age should stay at home and oppose the war directly. This position was in stark contrast to the views of at least some of the anti-draft groups that were not identified as exile groups. However, in Canada, aid groups and exile groups alike varied as to whether their outlook would be one of outright political advocacy in the form of pressure on government, or one of mainly aiding immigrants with concrete problems such as housing and immigration status. Moreover, amongst groups, personnel varied in their personal views about the tactical debate about draft dodging; some believed resisters should stay in the United States, while others thought the method of war resistance was an individual decision.

Another, and starker, debate concerned whether desertion was more effective than dodging the draft. Related to this question was the further problem of the meaning of desertion itself: some deserters groups asserted that desertion was only a radical act

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39 Goldberg interview.
40 The New Left was introduced in Chapter 2. The American New Left view of emigration was consistent with the core of American New Left politics which was, despite its subversive nature, still American.
41 Emerick, 240.
when motivated by opposition to the war, and that desertion for other reasons was not real desertion. This particular position led to public disputes, and alienated some war resisters from anti-draft groups. For example, according to Emerick, the American academic who visited the war resisters and wrote a book about it, the Montreal “scene” was seen by some resisters in the early 1970s as “extremely political…it discouraged immigration so long as an alternative possibly existed, and advocated obstruction of Selective Service or the military establishment [over desertion or draft dodging]….the political emphasis invariably led to less effective aid and obviously turned many resisters off completely…”; resisters “described the scene in Montreal as unfortunate.” The impression Emerick described was formed at a time when the Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters was trying to work constructively with the Montreal American Deserters’ Committee; at one point they even moved into the same office. However, the move would be short-lived because MCAWR came to understand that the ADC wanted to select deserters to help on the basis of their political orientation, a position they could not share.\textsuperscript{42} Thus the debate had a real impact on groups’ ability to help immigrants.

This debate simmered in Montreal throughout the period. In early 1970, Bill Mullen of the Montreal Council described the group’s role as immigration counselling and assistance with integration, a role he saw as explicitly different from, and broader than, forming a Union of American Exiles, an option some advocated.\textsuperscript{43} In contrast, the American Exile Counselling Center [sic] sought to deliver political education to “undermine the individualistic motivation of a possible resister,” and to “destroy the

\textsuperscript{42} Emerick, 235-6.
\textsuperscript{43} WR, Quebec Social and Political Organizations, Vol. 9, Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters, Letter from Bill Mullen to Glenn Sinclair, March 10, 1970.
myth of Canadian neutrality.” Its overall purpose was to help non-political American immigrants to radicalize. In November of 1970 a letter of information concerning the American Exile Counselling Center found its way into the Voice of Women files; its self-description made its political divisions with MCAWR clear. The center was conceived as an alternative to both the “apolitical” Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters (sic) and the Montreal ADC, beleaguered by a lack of resources and by the political orientation of “liberals.” In other words, the center sought to position itself as the most radical option for war resisters in Montreal. As we have already seen, such efforts were not always well-received by Canadian activists and left figures. Later such purposes were seen as a threat to Canadian autonomy.

Another example of how this division of approaches played out in a way that could affect the groups’ ability to help war resisters is laid out in documents regarding the life of the Vancouver American Exile Association (VAEA). In an essay dated August 12, 1975, to accompany a submission to the archives, Ed Starkins, a co-founder of the Association (sometimes known as VEA and VEU), explained that the group was formed in 1971 by a group of Americans looking for support beyond what was offered by the VCTAAWO. Retrospectively, Starkins viewed the importance of the group as “somewhat minor” in terms of its impact compared to the VCTAAWO. The VAEA held social events and had a public face in the media. Its most public period was during the debates

45 UBCL RBSC, Starkins papers – Biographical Information. Starkins’ resignation letter states that the VAEA started in 1972.

176
about Ford’s amnesty of 1974.\textsuperscript{46} The VAEA existed only for a year, in 1973-4, with a “largely political, and somewhat social, program.” Starkins suggested in his document that many exiles were not interested in the group because they wanted to move on and assimilate as Canadians, while the VAEA was more concerned with securing an unconditional amnesty from the U.S. for war resisters to return there. Also, its self-image as “political” was a problem: “The VAEA’s internal problems were monumental, taking a minor root in the radical-liberal divisions of the displaced American Movement [sic].”\textsuperscript{47} The commitment of members of the group to conflicting ideological outlooks led to the organization’s disarray. Starkins’ resignation letter, undated, states that he resigned as chair of the VAEA because of conflict with the programme director: “my participation in the group has become a kind of holding action designed to keep certain parties from ripping off the organization financially and otherwise representing their Georgia Strait-Abby Hoffmanesque delirium as the “line” of Canadian resisters [sic].”\textsuperscript{48} Starkins was referring to his perception of those “parties” involved as being associated with the left newspaper Georgia Strait, known for its New Left leanings.\textsuperscript{49} A further letter urges a potential funder to support the VCTAAWO instead, stating that the VAEA had been taken over by a small group of personal friends who apparently share an obscure leftist political orientation…we have been systematically alienated from the [VAEA] through a number of tactics ranging from the calling of illegal [that is, unconstitutional]… meetings to the use of epithets like ‘bourgeois’ and ‘class enemy.’ These tactics, in our opinion, have served to discredit the VAEA…. In short, we feel that the VAEA is no longer representative of the local exile community.

\textsuperscript{46} UBCL RBSC, Starkins papers. The Ford amnesty was announced in September 16, 1974; it “required up to two years of community service and a ‘reaffirmation of allegiance to the United States’”: Hagan, 161.
\textsuperscript{47} UBCL RBSC, Starkins papers.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{49} It is not clear on what he based this impression.
However, it would not be accurate to conclude from this letter that the divide being expressed was a left-right one; Starkins and his colleague, Lawrence Warren, signed the letter "Yours for Peace and a Universal, Unconditional Amnesty," which was not a moderate position at the time.\textsuperscript{50} They were, therefore, aligned with at least some left-leaning opinion on some issues. Their frustration was probably more due to their inability to maintain the group as one which did not try to represent itself as the voice of all war resisters, and which therefore was more able to help resisters regardless of their ideological beliefs, motivations for immigrating, or future plans.

It appears that these debates had their origins in discussions about the relative effectiveness of draft dodging, deserting, or disruption as an anti-war tactic. Since it seems likely that a large number, if not the majority, of war resisters did not undertake their journey solely, or even partly, as an anti-war tactic, it is not surprising that the question was contended. The most radical argument, expressed early in the period by American New Left figures and some anti-war activists, was that rather than run to Canada, men should remain in the U.S. and resist the war directly, by going to jail, going underground, or by other means. To emigrate merely meant that some other man would take the place of the dodger or deserter on the front lines. This view saw war resistance in terms of its immediate effect on the war, and not as part of a set of tactics which, taken together, had an increasing impact on public opinion, and could be seen as just one part of a broad anti-war movement. In contrast, war resisters interviewed for this project are

\textsuperscript{50} UBCL RBSC, Starkins papers. The question of American war resister responses to the debate about amnesty in the U.S. is important and deserves its own study. John Hagan has done some analysis on this: Hagan, 138-179. See also Kasinsky, 237-268.
nearly unanimous in their opinion that the question of whether not to dodge or desert, or to stay in the U.S. to oppose the war from there, was a matter of individual conscience.

Draft dodger Joseph Jones remembers:

Early on, there was a notion that “real resisters” go to jail, or maybe into the army to organize – but not to Canada.... There were a lot of players, a lot of jostling, and a lot of events cobbled together.... I did not like the thought that some other body would take the place I left vacant, but the bottom line was that I could only choose for myself and not for anyone else. If everyone had chosen something besides military service, the army would not have existed. Anyone who presumed to judge how someone else should resist was just plain arrogant. 51

Similarly, Marvin Work thought that both draft dodging and deserting “were effective anti-war tactics”:

Although draft-dodgers refused induction [the call to report for duty] into the U.S. military and deserters had joined and then made a decision to desert the military, in my mind I have lumped these two categories together because both were critical of the war in Vietnam and both made the choice to leave the U.S. 52

Finally, “Daniel” also thought the decision was up to the individual:

I think it is a very personal decision depending on individual circumstances and it is more important that both groups maintain a united front and acceptance of each other’s different life experiences.... I knew the difference [between draft dodgers and deserters] but it never mattered to me.... There was much variation in backgrounds, education, and motivation. Most were principled people as opposed to being opportunists. 53

So resisters tended not to place a value on various forms of draft resistance, including immigration to Canada. On the other hand, a distinction could be made between the attitudes of an individual and the approach of a particular group. There could be a

51 Jones interview.
52 Work interview.
53 “Daniel” interview.
disjunction between members' ideas about the difference in tactics, and their group's policy. "Ben," the draft counsellor (an individual who advised young men on their options for avoiding the draft), remembers that anti-draft and anti-war were generally synonymous. While he himself made a distinction between draft dodgers and deserters, the New Mexico Resistance - the anti-draft group he had worked with in the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s - was careful not to make the distinction, leaving the choice to the individual:

At the time I don't think I made much distinction between anti-draft and anti-war. My own concern was with the draft, and interest in the broader peace movement didn't develop until several years later. In our counselling, we were very emphatic that resisters should NEVER accept [being drafted]; that they were much better off to face whatever sanctions awaited them as civilians. I didn't see it as an issue of effective protest.

... [But] I think I made a very sharp distinction in my own mind. Which puzzles me. Even as I worked through the moral issues around resistance, I never applied them to desertion, as it somehow seemed a very different circumstance.

... In the prevailing ethic of the resistance movement, emigrating to Canada was considered less heroic than going to jail - better than serving, even as a noncombatant, but still a bit of a copout. I wrestled with the decision when it looked like I would be facing jail myself, and at first resolved that I would go to jail instead, but as the moment of truth got closer, Canada was looking more and more like the better option. (I ended up getting a classification as a conscientious objector, so I never had to make the choice.)

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54 In Chapter 2 we saw the influence of American anti-draft groups and their counselling practices on the Canadian movement. This point is further reinforced in Chapter 5, where I consider the tensions and connections between "old" and "new" left and their impact on the anti-draft movement.

55 "Ben" interview. To achieve "conscientious objector" status, a possibility in the U.S. in some form since World War I, applicants had to go through a rigorous process of questionnaires and interviews, had to secure reference letters, and complete a length form. The military frequently did not inform soldiers of the possibility of applying. Despite this, applications increased rapidly during the Vietnam War. For a good introduction to this process and its employment as a resistance tactic see Cortwright, 15-17. The internal debate "Ben" went through reflected contemporary ideas about masculinity and heroism. This is an important aspect of the overall history war resistance but it is not the subject of the present study. Others have taken it up: see Chapter 1, notes regarding Lara Campbell's research.
The group “Ben” worked with received training from similar groups in California.

Similarly, Mark Phillips, himself a draft counsellor before his arrival in Canada, recalled that the counsellors in Boston were careful not to differentiate, but individuals nonetheless did find resisters intriguing:

In the Boston anti draft group which I was part of we used to [try to] persuade people who were about to be inducted that they had one last chance, that sort of thing. We were a bunch of scared college kids really, showing some bravado. But I don’t think it was ever debated in those terms. We were instructed to take as even a hand as possible, to give them information rather than to push them in any way. But there was a kind of awe around draft dodgers, let alone actual deserters or resisters who had been in the army, because we knew that their lives were tough.56

So, deserters were seen as more awe-inspiring by the young men counselling them; but the policy of the groups was not to discriminate. However, the element of risk did lend a certain romantic air to deserters and resisters who did not dodge the draft.

Lee Zaslovsky draws a distinction between the tactical issue and differences of how the two groups were perceived. Zaslovsky, a deserter who was helped by the TADP, wasn’t aware of such a debate [about tactics]. I thought they were both effective [tactics], in that they denied cannon fodder to the U.S. military.... I have always insisted on being known as a deserter rather than a draft dodger, in part because that is an accurate description of me, in part to resist stigmatization of myself or others [through the act of reclaiming the word], since “deserter” is thought by some to be a demeaning term. But I don’t think what I did was “better” or more effective than what draft dodgers did.57

Regardless of this equivalence in Zaslovsky’s eyes, according to Kasinsky, American immigrants reversed the status of the two groups, giving desertion a higher standing since

56 Phillips interview.
57 Zasloffsky interview; UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 2-7, Interview Analysis/Questionnaire Analysis and Code.
it carried a greater risk. Additionally, as resister David Brown, who arrived in Canada in 1968, points out, there were very good reasons to be afraid for one’s personal safety if one decided to go to jail for the cause:

The floors in the military prisons had a lot of wax on them, and prisoners had a tendency to slip on this wax and break ribs and jaws or sustain damage to their testicles. For this reason many people felt that if you were going to refuse military service and allow yourself to be captured by the pigs (U.S. Department of Justice, or the military, depending on circumstances), it was better to get sent up on civilian charges before induction and go to a U.S. federal prison, rather than get sent up by court martial under UCMJ [the Uniform Code of Military Justice] and go to a military prison.

... No one really knew what was effective and what was not, except that the individual personally could deny his body to the war machine. Then the pigs (Selective Service) would call up someone else, and it would fall to that person to decide whether to allow himself to be inducted or not. But what would happen if they gave a war and nobody came?... [But] neither [the draft dodger or deserter nor the resister who went to jail] is a tool of American imperialism.\(^{58}\)

In a similar vein, Hardy Scott, a draft dodger who arrived in Canada in January 1967, recalls that a certain differentiation was imposed by a combination of somewhat romantic notions about desertion, and the need to be more careful with deserters at the border:

[T]he Americans who came to Canada included a wide array of folks. Many were here for what I perceived to be personal and selfish reasons. Some were here because they opposed all war and violence. Others saw that particular war as immoral.

... I always considered the deserters to be more daring and greater personal risk-takers. In helping people, deserters and draft dodgers, go into the U.S. from Canada and make the U-turn to come back and apply at the border for immigrant status, I always felt a greater degree of fear when I had deserters in the car.\(^{59}\) In casual conversation we would commonly refer to

\(^{58}\) Brown interview.

\(^{59}\) See Appendix IX, Shifts in Immigration Regulations and Tactics of Border Crossing.
each other as deserters and draft dodgers to identify one’s status towards the U.S. authorities.\textsuperscript{60}

So the aid groups, and at least some, if not most, individual American war resisters, did not tend to privilege one tactic over another, or to differentiate between draft dodgers and deserters, apart from their differing material needs.\textsuperscript{61}

The question of tactics is linked to the question of whether all, most, some, few, or none of the war resisters made their decision to immigrate solely, or even largely, in order to oppose the war. There has been a tendency on the part of historians and academics to conclude that most war resisters were ideologically opposed to the war, and were likely to go on to become activists of one sort or another.\textsuperscript{62} It is likely that at least some of the conclusions of these authors have been based on the biases associated with self-selecting samples.\textsuperscript{63} As Mark Phillips states:

It’s an optical illusion [that war resisters were activism-oriented]…. If you follow the people for whom [being activists] was their identity, that distorts the results of a study. You can’t just look at the people who were cured of cancer, you have to look at all the smokers. And it’s much easier to contact the people who retained that identity…. My own sense is that if you want to understand the phenomenon you need a much much broader lens than [the myth].

I don’t think I exaggerate much to say that every little autobiography that you read certainly a very very large number of them carried a kind of secret handshake of that time…. [T]his person’s whole life was somehow deflected, changed, reworked, by selective service. They [may] never [have] showed up on the record as draft dodgers, but that was the central preoccupation of two years, four years, six years of his life, and that was true for every single [one].\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{60} Scott interview.
\textsuperscript{61} Hagan also addresses this discussion, framing it as a moral choice, but only in passing: Hagan, 23-24.
\textsuperscript{62} See for instance Hagan, esp. 135-137.
\textsuperscript{64} Phillips interview.
“James” is an excellent example of a war resister whose motives were anti-war only in the most general sense:

I arrived on the 1st of September, 1967. I have very clear memories of the day and the preparation, why I did it etc. I had been called up [to begin service], and that’s what why I did it. I had gone through my physical, and I became A-1, in other words I could be drafted at any time. I wasn’t willing to be drafted, I got into Canada before I was actually drafted or was drafted and then I informed my draft board where I was living and why, and nyah nyah, you can’t get me almost. I don’t know why I did that, exactly, I was playing everything for number one, me, to stay out of the clutches of the military; that was it, that was pretty well it. I mean I was against the policies, et cetera, but I really didn’t want to get involved with the military, even if there wasn’t a war going on, but especially because there was a very dangerous sort of thing going on. 65

Even if most resisters did not, there is no question that some American war resisters, in particular deserters, did differentiate between the tactics, and so did at least some individual activists within the aid groups. A letter from Francis Marion of the VCTAAWO to the Yugoslavian embassy (seeking alternative havens for deserters in the months before the border was opened to them in 1969) stated that the committee saw desertion as “a politically and tactically effective act, and as such we encourage it. We also feel that aiding desertion is a means of lending more than just tacit support to liberation struggles throughout the world and most especially that of the Vietnamese people.” 66

Pressure to Assimilate, Pressure to Identify as American

Another question around which the different approaches of groups to this tactical debate arose, was that of the choice between assimilation into Canadian society, and the

65 “James” interview.
66 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 1-3 Correspondence – Other Canadian Organizations with Committee.
retaining of American identity. The aid groups were in favour of assimilation (or at least perceived as such), while exile groups pressed Americans to retain their American-ness. Joseph Jones recalls, “The aid groups tended to focus on social work and wanted their clients to assimilate quickly and quietly.... [AMEX Magazine] went through several phases, and my direct experience was limited to the final phase, the campaign for amnesty. At the time, I was scarcely aware of the [American Deserter Committees].” In contrast, Mark Phillips’ experience illustrates the pressure exile groups brought to bear on war resisters. Phillips remembers the TADP as being among the groups pressuring him to keep his American status, but it was more likely the American exiles he also mentions:

We had some connection with friends who were involved with the Toronto group, I think it was the Toronto Anti-Draft Programme, and they seemed to be wanting to keep Americans together as a group, which wasn’t my intention.

... I had been active in antiwar activities from a very early age, so well before Vietnam, my parents were politically very aware.... So I had been involved in SANE nuclear policy [the U.S. based Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy, a group with origins in the civil rights movement] stuff, I had been in big marches, I had been a draft counsellor in Cambridge Mass, I had organized the Vietnam summer group in my home town outside Boston. So in terms of information I had as much information as others. But also I knew in coming to Canada I had made a decision to leave the United States, so I wasn’t interested in retaining Americanness, I wasn’t interested in the condition of exile.

... When I received my draft notice I wrote back and said I had left and I wasn’t American anymore. And essentially they said prove it, and so I went to the American consulate and renounced my American citizenship. Which was something the draft groups didn’t like, didn’t want you to do.68

67 Jones interview.
68 In fact early on anti-draft literature explained how to do it, but it was only effective if done prior to committing an offence, and carried the disadvantage of cutting off any chance of return: Kasinsky, 25-26. It
Their interest was maintaining a kind of cohesiveness of the Americans in Canada, where I had certainly gone through a struggle about leaving but it wasn’t a struggle about whether I was going to spend the rest of my life as an American, it was a struggle about what was the appropriate action. And having once left, my idea, and I think it was Ruth’s [Phillips’ wife’s] as well, was to make a new life as quickly as possible in my new country.

... I know I raised the issue around Canadian citizenship and was discouraged from that.... I can’t remember in any specific way that there was anything in the literature.... I don’t remember where along the line I came across it, but I remember there was a strong group at U of T, whose sense of cohesion was about that, and I really strongly felt the other way around.

... There was obviously a huge amount of anti-Americanism amongst these Americans.... And I may have been responding to the Union of American Exiles as much as anything, which had a presence in Toronto.

... I think there was strong assumption which people shed over time, that of course in the end you were going to go back. And I just didn’t have that assumption from the first moment. The first year in Toronto was the best year of my life. I just loved it. 69

Despite some perceptions that they were in favour of Americans’ assimilation into Canada, anti-draft activists recall the same neutrality as they held on draft dodgers and deserters when it came to questions of citizenship. Joan Wilcox of Ottawa AID, herself an American at the time of her involvement, remembers that the group “felt that [citizenship] was an individual choice.”70 Like her, Michael Goldberg recalls that “No one said you ought to [assimilate]. I was probably the strongest anti-American in my group.... I renounced my American citizenship and became a citizen the day it was legal for me to do so.”71 Similarly, Hardy Scott recalls that he “was happy to become a Canadian citizen [as soon as possible] after 5 years as an immigrant. When the [United

69 Phillips interview.
70 Wilcox interview.
71 Goldberg, interview. There was a waiting period of two years after attaining landed immigrant status before once could become a citizen.
States] Justice Department sent me the forms to formally renounce my U.S. citizenship I just threw them away with little thought to the consequences. I was thankful just finally to be a citizen of the country of my choosing."72 Interestingly, both Phillips and Goldberg consider the attitudes of some Americans to have been anti-American. Both were talking about opposition to American policy, and not opposition to American people. This is an important distinction for a discussion of anti-Americanism among Canadians as well.

Different groups and individual activists took different positions on the question. Nancy Pocock, interviewed by Kasinsky in 1970, did express a belief that Americans should assimilate:

We found out more about our own country at this time, the differences between Canada and the U.S.... That it's a less violent society, that they should not bring their Americanism up here. They should just listen for a while and do a lot of reading, try to get to know Canadians. Always pushing them out into knowing Canadians, rather than staying together. We felt it was better for them, and better for their adjustment and better for everybody, if they made contact with Canadians.73

Pocock went on to state that most American immigrants were interested in settling in and adjusting well, and agreed with the interviewer that they were "pretty well assimilated."

She pointed out that most of the war resisters were not interested in amnesty, because they wanted to stay in Canada, and become Canadian citizens.74

Many war resisters and anti-draft activists believed that separate American exile groups were not a positive development. One deserter stated, "I think [American Exile

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72 Scott interview.
73 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-12, Interview with Nancy Pokhawk [sic], May 1970, Toronto, Quaker, Active in Exile Movement Since 1965.
74 Ibid.
groups are] a bad idea. Because the Canadian people feel that you’re an American exile just waiting for your chance to return. And recently they thought of changing their name to the Union of American Expatriates, which to me has exactly the same meaning. I would be in favour of a name like “The New Canadians” because this is my idea, to become a Canadian.” On the same question, TADP activist Bill Spira said to Kasinsky:

Politicization yes, American organizations no. There’s absolutely no need for them and I think we’re really only talking about a minority of people that come in. For those who are politically aware and have been politically aware in the States, their awareness usually does not go so far as to realize that they are in a different country; all our Coca Cola signs look the same, Americans are not generally known for their understanding of the national aspirations of other people and even the American radicals that come, especially the American radicals, are very insensitive about it. While many of them bring their body here, it takes a good two to three years till their head catches up with them. For the first two years they’re still fighting the battle of the imperialists, they’ll fight American Imperialism around the Pentagon and this is the thought I’m afraid of in the polls. This is why I’m opposed to organizing Americans as Americans. We have the same spectra of ways of political persuasion that you have in the States and there’s absolutely no reason to organize SDS [Students for a Democratic Society] in exile or any of the other groups. We have our Trotskyists and our Maoists and if someone wants to get into that let them organize politically in the Canadian groups, instead of trying to organize Americans as such.... If Canadians and those Americans who are serious really want a way of ending the imperialist role, their role is very clear, try for Canadian independence. In effect we’re like an American colony and we have to wage an anti-colonial struggle.

Spira considered real radicals to be the ones who had joined in with Canadian political organizations and anti-war efforts. For him, Americans should support the Canadian movements, not merely import American forms and targets of protest. Later in the interview he added “I probably misled you when I said they were not political – what I meant was that they were not political activists. I can’t think of a single one who hasn’t

75 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-11, Interview with Larry Lynch (Officer), Deserter, Toronto, Summer 1969.
been radicalized in the process at least in their attitudes to the United States. So that will
certainly have an impact on Canadian politics.” Spira also asserted that the involvement
of Canadians in the TADP had led to broader community support for the committee’s
work, whereas in Vancouver a small group of self-defined exiles alienated the
community’s support by putting out a newsletter called The Yankee Refugee which was
implicitly against assimilation of American immigrants, and which often contained
articles denouncing Canadian complicity in the war. He anticipated that the broad appeal
of the committee in 1970 would overcome the problems created.\textsuperscript{76}

The opposite viewpoint, that Americans should remain American, was predicated
on the assumption that Americans could more effectively oppose the war by opposing the
American government as exiles. Americans who organized separately mostly did so in
order to continue to oppose the war. As deserter Fred Gardner wrote in AMEX, “[The
ADCs do not] put down the other committees as do-gooders; they understand [their]
worth.... But the ADC people want – for themselves and their constituents – to retain
their political identity as Americans. The objective of their counselling is not a smooth
adjustment to Canada, but continued opposition to the war and confrontation with the
Mother Country.”\textsuperscript{77} Similarly, Joseph Jones gravitated towards the exile groups once he
had become settled, because he sought an outlet as an American immigrant to oppose the
policies of the American government:

> When I came to Canada, I believed that I could never return to the United
States and that I needed to establish myself. This was a primary reason for

\textsuperscript{76} UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, , 4-14, Interview with Bill Spira of the Toronto anti-
Draft Program [sic], June 1970.

\textsuperscript{77} UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 5-8, Analysis of desertion - ADC’s Political activity
avoiding connections with any American groups, although I did attend scattered events, meetings, and demonstrations.... After I had been in Canada for three years I was a graduate student with a good fellowship and felt established. In the summer of 1973 I connected with the people at [AMEX], liked the group, and agreed with the politics. Part of my motivation was to put my exile in the face of the United States. The two fundamental issues were the ongoing injustices of the Vietnam War and the wide range of people whose lives might be improved by a universal unconditional amnesty (not least the deserters who could not get established in Canada).... For two years I regularly participated in meetings, demonstrations, magazine production, and media work.... For a while we had a separate group oriented toward this called the Toronto American Exiles Association.\textsuperscript{78}

The use of the word “exile,” likely popularized by the magazine \textit{AMEX} (short for American Exile), carries with it connotations of affiliation with the country of origin. Mark Phillips’ surmise that self-identified exiles expected to return to the U.S. was therefore not surprising, and probably accurate.

Often the assumption made by American exile groups was that Canada was a colony of the United States – a view they shared with activists like Spira who were opposed to American-only organizations. As Tom, a deserter Kasinsky interviewed, put it succinctly,

\begin{quote}
I think that Americans in Canada have a lot to contribute. It’s the old melting pot thing. Canada doesn’t quite melt, though – everything just kind of sits there. There’s not this pressure to conform to some Anglo Saxon way of life. But, the Americans as such can offer a lot. Especially to Canadian politics, Canadian groups, and things like that. Also because we have to stick together to assist people coming up.
\end{quote}

Although these comments do not suggest a clear idea of what, exactly, Americans could actually contribute as Americans to the Canadian groups, they also indicate both a perception of Canada as a “mosaic,” a notion, still popular today, connected to the idea of

\textsuperscript{78} Jones interview.
Canada as welcoming. These comments also indicate an underlying assumption that Americans were better off preserving their American-ness. Tom did not believe it was possible to assimilate so much that one could ignore the United States completely, partly because of the similarity between the two countries and their people:

It's possible to assimilate and become a Canadian, but I think it's kind of foolish to imagine there's nothing there beyond the border, whereas actually it affects your whole life as a Canadian.... Little things from the U.S. influence everything. The bad things of the U.S. seep in, and of course the U.S. corporations own so much of Canada. You're fooling yourself... a lot of people... say they've dropped out and this is it. Canada. Start off anew. And you know, you can't do it. Canada's the 51st state, for all intents and purposes.... I'll always be an American. I can't help it.  

The pages of AMEX captured some of the discussion. As one writer explained,

"We can help by joining in and helping a young but growing movement for Canadian Independence. By studying things like the Watkins report on Foreign Ownership of Industry.... By informing our many contacts Stateside of the concrete situation with regard to U.S. domination and the growing resistance to it." The article suggested that real Canadian nationalists should see draft dodgers and deserters as allies in their cause, and not react "chauvinistically" — that is, in a biased and prejudiced way — to average working-class Americans. The article encouraged the formation of autonomous Unions of

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79 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-15, Interview with Tom, Draft dodger, Toronto.
80 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 5-8, Analysis of desertion - ADC's Political activity, clippings and articles, Vladimir B. Brown, "Uncle Sam, Canadian Independence and the American Exile, AMEX Vol I, No. 6 (Nov. 24-Dec. 7 1968). The Watkins Report, actually Foreign ownership and the structure of Canadian Industry: Report of the Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry, Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968), was a document prepared to expose foreign ownership and control of Canadian corporations. A foundational text in left economic nationalism in Canada, its conclusions that Canada was inordinately foreign controlled have since been questioned. See also Chapter 4.
American Exiles, as long as they did not "adopt weird ideas of Canadian nationalism" such as those asserting the importance of assimilation.⁸¹

**Canadian Nationalism and the Pressure on Americans to Assimilate**

As we have seen, accounts vary on the question of whether anti-draft groups put pressure on Americans to assimilate into Canada, or to maintain their American identity. Some historical accounts have asserted that Canadians in general, and not only anti-draft activists, wanted Americans to assimilate, and certainly there is some evidence of such a viewpoint.⁸² For instance, influential leftist Robin Mathews, an academic and promoter of the so-called "Canadianization movement," wrote a letter to the Department of Immigration in 1969 stating:

> If the reasons for difficulty at the present time are that the Canadian government fears to offend the U.S. govt., [sic] then the Canadian government deserves the criticism it is receiving. If the Canadian govt. [sic] fears the results of influx, then it had better set up citizenship courses that make possible for immigrants some idea of Canada other than that it is a cow to be milked by whatever hand reaches for the udder. ⁸³

The letter was, paradoxically, one among many exhorting the government to open the border to deserters. However, its decidedly ambivalent tone likely reflected a trend

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⁸¹ UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 5-8 Analysis of desertion - ADC's Political activity, clippings nad articles, Vladimir B. Brown, "Uncle Sam, Canadian Independence and the American Exile, AMEX Vol I, No. 6 (Nov. 24-Dec. 7 1968).


⁸³ LAC, RG 76, Vol. 725, File 5660-2, Complaints and Criticisms, Robin Mathews, Ottawa. to Minister of Manpower and Immigration Alan MacEachen, May 1969. For more on Mathews and the Canadianization movement, see Jeffrey Cormier, The Canadianization Movement: Emergence, Survival, and Success (University of Toronto Press, 2004), and below, Chapter 4. Mathews and his contemporary, James Steele, responded to Cormier's book, criticizing it as omitting significant facts and distorting others: Robin Mathews and James Steele, "Canadianization Revisited: A Comment on Cormier's 'The Canadianization Movement in Context,'" Canadian Journal of Sociology Vol. 31 (2006): 491-508. In his review of the same book, Bryan Palmer questions whether Mathews really led a social movement, or had much influence; B. D. Palmer, Review: "The Canadianization Movement," Pacific Historical Review v. 75 no. 2 (May 2006): 369-71. Both reviews granted that Cormier was researching important areas, but suggested there were gaps in his research.
among at least some Canadians who saw themselves as progressive to see American immigrants’ resistance to assimilation, and their influence on Canadian activism, as a problem.

Sometimes, Canadian nationalism manifested itself as anti-American sentiment.\(^{84}\) However, most individual American war resisters apparently encountered very little of this sort of thing. For instance, Lee Zaslovsy recalls “I never encountered anti-Americanism among Canadians until the past decade. I was sort of anti-American myself in a way – I had seen some of the ‘ugly American’ side of things in the years before I came to Canada, both personally and as a member of the American public…. I regarded myself from very early on as a ‘New Canadian.’”\(^{85}\) He continued:

My own view was that I had come to a new country, and I had little prospect of ever returning to the U.S., so I should adapt as quickly as I could, become involved in Canadian life, and take up Canadian citizenship when I could (I applied the day I was eligible). I know others saw themselves as “exiles” and tried to influence American events, etc. I didn’t.\(^{86}\)

On the other hand, Joseph Jones recalls no personal negative experiences, but had one or two general recollections in the vein of the increased Canadian nationalism of the early 1970s, epitomized by Mathews’ movement:

For the first seven years I mainly lived in student ghettos in large cities and went to university. I had no negative experiences and encountered occasional personal sympathy from people – like the mother in Montreal

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\(^{84}\) This was certainly the case, at least, for economic nationalism – born of concerns about foreign, and more specifically American, investment and control of the Canadian Economy. I explore these ideas in more depth in Chapter 4. See Norman Hillmer and Adam Chapnick, eds., *Canadas of the Mind: The Making and Unmaking of Canadian Nationalisms in the Twentieth Century* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), esp. Stephen Azzi, “Foreign Investment and the Paradox of Economic Nationalism,” 63-88.

\(^{85}\) Zaslofsky interview.

\(^{86}\) Zaslofsky interview.
who sold me her son’s used bicycle through a newspaper ad. Generally I felt invisible, which is what I was aiming to be.

... Two specific memories. A professor at the University of Toronto told our graduate English class that Americans would be ill-advised to take a seminar with Robertson Davies, because he routinely assigned low grades to Americans. Some UBC administrator involved with student housing wanted to see Americans who came to Canada “burning their bridges.” If I had been more sensitive I might have noticed more. 87

Similarly, Marvin Work recalls:

In the early 1970’s there was a wave of Canadian nationalism that was heavily anti-American. It suddenly became much more difficult for an American professor to come to a Canadian university, or for a school teacher to teach in a Canadian school. Documentation was required showing that there were no qualified Canadian citizens available who could do that particular job. I was glad that I no longer had a strong American accent! 88

Others had no recollection of such sentiments whatsoever. 89 Mark Phillips describes that his and his partner’s “experience was of overwhelming welcome”:

We were amazed by how supportive, how open, how liberal the country was towards us. The symbol of that for me was that we ended up going to London for Ruth to pursue her doctorate... the two of us on Canada Council fellowships. We thought, what kind of amazing utopian country is this?... And that support seemed to be there in daily life.

There were occasional remarks; the doctor who examined me in... Vancouver said to me inappropriately, “Well I guess they would have taken you!” So there were a few signs of negativeness, but not much. 90

Carolyn Egan, war resister in Toronto, recalls a generally welcoming atmosphere in the women’s movement:

I was aware that I was American, and you got the odd barb about [being American] because there was a certain Canadian nationalism around, and  

87 Jones interview.
88 Work interview.
89 “Daniel” interview.
90 Phillips interview.
you did get that on occasion. I think, and I don’t know how broad this was or widespread, but I think Americans coming here were very conscious of being American in a different country and therefore being respectful or sensitive to that, and I think even the use of “I’m an American,” well, this is North America, how do Canadians even view the word… you were never sure how people would take things. But on the whole, because there were a fair number of Americans in the progressive movements here at the time, I don’t think it was a stumbling block at all. I think people were aware of where we were coming from…. I think that the acceptance and the ability to function politically as an American in Canada was not a stumbling block.⁹¹

Overall it seems that Canadians made a distinction between the actions of the American government and the individual Americans they encountered. However, occasionally, as in the case of Robin Mathews and others, the distinction was not so clear, likely because of the rise of Canadian nationalism as a form of resistance to American influence on several aspects of Canadian society.

The Impact of Pressures to Assimilate or Not to Do So

Deserters and draft dodgers were treated and perceived differently from draft dodgers, by activists, groups, and government. American immigrant groups, in part responding to this treatment, decided to organize separately as “exiles” or “refugees.” Although most activists did not place a value on different draft resistance tactics, the debate that did exist, and the very formation of the American groups, impacted on groups’ policy on assimilation. While anti-Americanism among the Canadian left was connected to this push for assimilation, for the most part the anti-Americanism that did exist did not have a great effect on individual resisters.

To today’s anti-war activists some of these debates may ring familiar. The debates were apparently quite acrimonious at times. However, while activists were

⁹¹ Egan interview.
debating politics, the anti-draft groups, whether exile groups or not, along with individual Canadians and American immigrants, were engaged in campaigns which were clearly aimed at affecting Canadian politics. Perhaps the most important of these was the 1969 campaign to remove barriers to deserters attempting to enter Canada and gain landed immigrant status. As we shall see, the debates outlined in this chapter were reflected to some degree in various aspects of the campaign.

These discussions interacted and combined in ways that produced a minefield of obstacles to effective coordinated action on the part of the movement. Its capacity to continue to be effective as a movement is a testimony to its rapid maturation. These debates continued to develop, with consequences that made themselves felt in ongoing efforts to improve the situation for war resisters. Debates about the role of Americans in the anti-war movement were connected to broader concepts and ideas held by Canadians about their country and its relationship to the United States. Ideas that may be termed “left nationalist” were present in almost every debate on the Canadian left in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the war resister support movement was no exception. In the next chapter, I will examine the effect these ideas had on one specific episode in the anti-draft movement: the campaign to open the border to deserters in 1969.
Chapter 4

Left Nationalism and its Limits: the Campaign to Open the Border to American Deserters, 1969

One of the first things I noticed when I arrived in Canada was that men seem to write on bathroom walls less than they do in the U.S.

Yes, I thought, the people are sane here; they do not have to relieve their aggressions by writing on bathroom walls.

Since then I’ve been thinking maybe they wash the walls in the bathrooms every night or maybe it’s because there’s less people or maybe it’s because they are not as violent or maybe they are just lost for words.¹

In this chapter, divided into four parts, I will examine a relatively brief but intense period in early 1969 during which the anti-draft movement used a variety of methods to influence government policy towards deserters. Part I describes the development of the policy; Part II describes the campaign. They employed ideas in their campaign which I describe in Part III as “left nationalist.” Part IV considers the impact and limitations of this set of ideas when applied to immigration policy.²

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² Appendix VI, Ministers of Manpower and Immigration and Deputy Ministers of Immigration, 1966-1973, Appendix VII, Timeline of Events and Actions by Central Groups and Government, and Appendix VIII, Shifts in Immigration Regulations and Tactics of Counselling and Border Crossing, may help navigate these somewhat complex events, and those outlined in Chapters 6 and 7.
Part I: Regulatory Changes and Departmental Exchanges, 1966-1969

In mid 1968 the Immigration Manual, which guided the actions of officers at the border, was amended by a directive to allow the use of discretion to assess whether an applicant had an unfulfilled legal, contractual or moral obligation in their country of origin. Instead of requiring proof of discharge from the military, immigration officers now had the “discretion” to refuse an applicant, even if they met all other criteria, if they suspected that there were obligations which might make it difficult for the applicant to settle in Canada. A list of examples of such obligations was provided to the officers, and one was military status. This measure encouraged immigration officers to question the military status of young American men, both draft dodgers and deserters; and while previously, if they had not volunteered the information, they had a fairly good chance of being able to enter the country, now all resisters began to feel the effects of the new directive.

Thus, while strictly speaking military status remained irrelevant under Canadian immigration law, through regulations applied in practice immigration officers were prejudiced against deserters and prevented them from entering, going so far as to report them to American authorities as they returned to the American side. As opponents claimed, this prejudice was implicitly encouraged by the regulatory regime in place. As we will see, at first the Minister and his staff denied the existence of the new instructions. In the end the discretionary power was removed, partly because of a pan-Canadian and

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3 Criminal charges pending, deserted heads of families, child support, and debts without arrangements were the other examples of moral, legal or contractual obligations that might prevent an immigrant from properly settling in Canada: LAC, RG 76, Vol. 983 and 1210, File 5660-1, Military Personnel – Draft Dodgers – General, Memorandum to the Minister from the Deputy Minister’s Office file, January 30, 1969.
coordinated campaign undertaken by Canadian anti-draft groups and war resister supporters.

Anti-draft groups took various types of action to pressure the government against refusing entry to deserters. In addition, likely at the encouragement of the anti-draft groups, hundreds of individual Canadians wrote letters to then Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Allan MacEachen, for the same reason. At the same time, lobbying efforts took place. The movement also made a special use of the mass media. The campaign and the debates it engendered were characterized by a discussion about nationalism, with proponents of an open border using left-wing nationalist arguments, while those opposed to war resisters used right-wing nationalism. Arguably, the use of nationalist arguments made possible the success of the campaign to open the border. However, at the same time, the left-wing nationalist position put deeper critiques of the Canadian state and its immigration policies out of reach.

**Lead-Up to, and Implementation of, the Points System**

Early 1960s discussions in the Department of Immigration suggested that attracting American immigrants would be a good policy for the Canadian job market, which then lacked skilled labourers. In 1962, for instance, internal discussion indicated that despite ongoing changes to the Canadian immigration regulations, the preferential treatment of American immigrants would not be affected; they would still only be required to be “of good health, of good character, and have sufficient funds to maintain themselves until they have obtained employment.”

Moreover, a mid-1965 memo from

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4 Library and Archives of Canada (hereafter LAC), RG 25, Department of Employment and Immigration, Series B-1-b-i, Vol. 830, File 552-1-637, Immigration from USA – Policy and Instructions Brief on 199
the Deputy Minister, J.L.E. Couillard, to R.B. Curry, Assistant Deputy Minister (Immigration), outlined Cabinet approval of a plan to initiate an “active program…to attract suitable immigrants to Canada from the U.S.⁵ In 1966 Immigration correspondence continued to show a desire by immigration officials to see increased immigration from the U.S.⁶ By then, however, the draft dodger issue was beginning to complicate things. For instance, the United States was still seen as a potential source of skilled workers, being conveniently located and highly educated, most American immigrants had pre-arranged job prospects, although they did not know much about Canada.⁷ But while the war in Vietnam was identified as a factor encouraging immigration to the benefit of Canadian employers, the “draft dodger issue” caused some concerns about appearing to encourage war resisters. In a 1966 branch-wide memo, R.B. Curry, Assistant Deputy Minister (Immigration), listed uncritically some “social factors” in the U.S. at the moment that were encouraging immigration: “the coloured problem,
...the war in Vietnam, ...the economic situation and loss of gold reserves." He insisted, however, that the department "should take into account the potential sensitivity of the draft dodger issue."  

In August 1967, Canada introduced, through an order-in-council and a set of regulations, a new protocol for establishing the eligibility of potential immigrants to come to Canada. Called the points system, it was supposed to remove any bias from the immigration process, in contrast to the previous system which had relied on quotas of immigrants from specific countries — a practice seen as racist because it excluded people based on their country of origin. Some historians have agreed with the official story, and understood this shift to be motivated by a desire to eliminate racism in immigration policy; others have seen it as purely an economic measure to address changes in the post-war labour market.  

Probably both were true. In any event, the changes were significant. Under the points system, potential immigrants answered a questionnaire about their education and skills, and were awarded points on that basis; some points were still awarded at the discretion of immigration officers. Fifty points were required to be

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8 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 830, File 552-1-637, Immigration from USA — Policy and Instructions: 1966 Report summary, in memo from R.B. Curry, Assistant Deputy Minister (Immigration), to Information division, Economic and Social Research Division, Planning branch, Foreign branch, Head of secretariat. It was not the first time Canada had benefitted from political tensions in the U.S.: see J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1991).

successful. The general outline of the system was the following: up to twenty points could be awarded for education; ten for vocational training; fifteen for occupational demand; ten for age; ten for a job offer (at the border only); ten for language; fifteen for personal suitability; five for a relative living in Canada; and five for destination.\textsuperscript{10} Accompanying the new system's implementation was section 34 of the regulations, which allowed entry to the country as a visitor and subsequent application for "landed immigrant" status from inside Canada.\textsuperscript{11} In 1967 legislation also introduced the "Immigration Appeal Board," which, as we will see, would experience a significant backlog by the late sixties.\textsuperscript{12}

**The Anti-Draft Movement's Interventions Before and After the Points System**

The changes in the system were announced, at first, as part of Trudeau's 1966 White Paper on Immigration. The White Paper called for increased immigration, but also for the creation of categories of barred immigrants. The policy incorporated categories of people to be automatically barred from entry to Canada, membership in which could be only subjectively judged by immigration officers. It also endorsed earlier moves away from quota systems. In general, it laid the ground work for the points system. From the outset, anti-draft activists saw the potential legal pitfalls of the new immigration proposals. In May of 1967 the Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors (VCTAAWO) wrote a letter to Minister of Immigration Jean Marchand, Deputy Minister Tom Kent, Minister of Justice Pierre Trudeau, and MPs Andrew Brewin and Gérard


\textsuperscript{11} Pendakur, 79-81.

\textsuperscript{12} Pendakur, 82-83.
Pelletier. The letter objected to the White Paper on Immigration’s “stress on the need
to re-evaluate those classes of people who should be barred from Canada because they
represent a danger to public health and safety.... The White Paper proposes a new
prohibited class, “fugitives from justice.” We feel that this proposal... might restrict the
immigration into Canada of Americans who refuse to participate in the war in
Vietnam.”\textsuperscript{13}

The VCTAAWO included with their letter a submission, “A Note on “Fugitives
from Justice,” in the form of a brief – a method whose choice probably stemmed from the
involvement of intellectuals in the anti-draft movement. The brief suggested that such a
category could conflict with existing treaties, that the term was difficult to define, that
administration would prove difficult, that the category would invite biased manipulation,
and that the measure would contravene “one of Canada’s oldest traditions” in its
restriction of entry of war resisters – an idea that was taking hold in Canada, and that
would be used to good effect in the campaign to open the border in 1969. The brief also
made a prophetic statement regarding the future pressures on the department. The
VCTAAWO was arguing that by including the “fugitives from justice” category as not
admissible to Canada, the Canadian government would, in effect, be taking a position on
the American draft – a position they might not be able to defend:

Should this [category] be written into law, then the Immigration
Department will have to take a definite stance on offences against
American draft laws... The Immigration Department will no longer be
able to rely on the argument it has used up to now that “there is no basis in
law for barring their entry” [a quote from a letter from then-Deputy
Minister Tom Kent to \textit{Ramparts Magazine} in September of 1966]. In order

\textsuperscript{13} UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 6-17, Communication with High Officials – Fugitives
from Justice submission.

203
to maintain the present policy the... Department will have to defend that policy by a political argument about the nature of obligations laid upon American citizens by their government, and about Canada’s... recognition or non-recognition of the “justice” of these obligations.\textsuperscript{14}

The brief also asserted that immigration officials would adopt a policy of rejecting all war resisters if only some draft-related offenses were considered part of a “fugitive from justice category” of immigrant: “It could well become the practice of most immigration officials to deny entry to any American eligible for the draft.” The brief concluded by suggesting that, if the clause were to remain in the law, then it should be defined as applying to non-military and non-political offences and should apply only to cases in which the law being broken is also a Canadian law.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, they suggested that for immigrants to be excluded they needed to have committed an offence that broke a Canadian law – to which their military status bore no relevance.\textsuperscript{16} War resisters were breaking American laws by coming to Canada, but, the VCTAWWO argued, they should not be considered law-breakers in the eyes of Canada. It should be noted that no extradition agreements existed for military personnel unless they had deserted while on duty in Canada, and had not for some time.\textsuperscript{17} Be that as it may, these words fell on deaf ears, and the fugitives from justice exclusion category proposed in the White Paper survived into the new system in 1967. Perhaps concerns about the draft dodger question as expressed by Curry in 1966 had even encouraged the government’s eventual decision to create the category.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} It was illegal to desert from the Canadian military, but not illegal to desert from the military of another country.
Anti-Draft Movement: Discrimination against War Resisters, 1967

The story of regulatory changes in the Department of Immigration between 1967 and 1968 is one presentation of a public face that was very different from the behind-the-scenes discussions and actions department officials were taking. In other words, the government said one thing, while doing quite another. The story also shows the strength of the bureaucracy in proposing its own solutions to various problems, even against the opinions of the Minister. This tale presents a very different picture from the one often painted in Canadian historiography of civil service mandarins hand-picked for their political loyalties – with autonomy, to be sure, but operating within a specific framework.\(^{18}\) It also shows that, during a short period of time, changes took place at such a rapid pace that the Minister of Immigration seemed to be forced to react immediately to public pressure and public opinion, rather than proactively initiating policy with some measure of autonomy. Governments always respond to some extent to public pressure; but departmental analysis which might normally have allowed MacEachen to anticipate public reaction and weather various storms in this case failed him, and he was in a reactive mode for several months.

Almost immediately after the implementation of the points system in August of 1967, resisters began encountering problems at the border that had not existed before. In fact, the increased occurrences began before its implementation, indicating that public discussions around the White Paper had an impact on immigration officer behaviour well before 1967. In response to these occurrences, in late 1967 the VCTAAWO wrote a

second brief, "A Note on the Handling of Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada," a document aimed at informing then-Deputy Minister of Immigration Tom Kent (who served under Minister Jean Marchand until July of 1968) about the discrimination at the border against draft-age Americans during the preceding several months. The brief appended statements from thirty-six recent arrivals, whose experience with officials had been negative. The brief argued that false information was being provided to applicants by immigration officials at consulates in the U.S., border crossings, airports, and immigration offices inside Canada. Many of the examples cited were cases of conscious and explicit obstruction by immigration officers.  

Immigration officers, the brief argued, had been using various methods to obstruct entry, including withholding of readily available forms; refusal to process border applications; refusal to recognize qualifications; refusal to grant medical examinations; and random application of rules whose existence was dubious, such as parental consent or marital status, or amount of cash on hand. These practices, the group argued, stood in stark contrast to a new system that was supposed to be free of bias. Generally the cases cited described "derogatory, sarcastic, offensive, and generally discouraging" attitudes on the part of immigration officials. The brief asserted that personal views were motivating these officers, and that such personal "biases" ought not to play a part in the decision of whether to accept immigration applicants. Indeed, the authors suspected a too-great degree of autonomy was being granted the officers -- significant, since the regulation encouraging the use of discretion would not be introduced until the following summer. In one border station the officers falsely cited a

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19 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 8-8, A Note on the Handling of Draft-Age Americans who Apply for Entry into Canada.

206
new “policy” of requiring applicants to apply by mail, which apparently came into force “around the end of July.” Another indicated that “the laws are going to be changed ‘to keep people like you out of Canada.’” A photocopy of an immigration form was attached to one of the 36 cases, and carried the handwritten note, by an immigration officer in Douglas, B.C., “Note: wishes to apply for permanent admission, Ops Memo 117??” Still unbeknownst to the brief’s authors, this instance was an explicit reference to the instruction to immigration officers discussed above, which initially required proof of discharge for admission to Canada, and which was a short time later amended to list military status as possible grounds for exclusion from entry.  

The brief used the accumulation of cases as proof of a systemic problem. It argued that its “sample” could have been much larger, but that the cases had been selected to present a “gamut” of experiences. The brief called for changes in regulations to instruct immigration officers not to inquire regarding draft status; to make forms available upon request, along with a summary of criteria applied; and to process American applicants at the border. It also recommended closer supervision of immigration officers, clearer directives to the officers, and elimination of provisions which could be applied according to personal biases.  

The anti-draft movement probably found Tom Kent, then Deputy Minister of Immigration, fairly communicative; their correspondence began in 1966 and continued until 1968, when Kent became the Deputy Minister of the Department of Regional Economic Expansion, and was replaced as deputy minister by J.L.E. Couillard (see

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20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.

207
Appendix VI). Kent replied to the Vancouver committee’s brief at length in November of 1967, issuing reassurances that were consistent with earlier statements. As Renée Kasinsky recounted in *Refugees from Militarism*, in 1966 Kent had penned a letter to *Ramparts Magazine* stating that potential draftees were not barred from entering Canada. Perhaps he was merely expressing what he believed to be his own department’s policy.

The Department of Immigration opened a “Draft Dodgers – Complaints and Criticisms” file in late 1967. The file at this time was full of newspaper clippings on the issue of draft dodgers and deserters. At this point, immigration officers were still not directed not to inquire into draft status. In late 1967, with this increased public attention in mind, Tom Kent wrote to his counterpart in the Department of External Affairs, Undersecretary of State M. Cadieux, to express his department’s growing concern about the immigration of deserters: “there seems to be little doubt that public opinion is developing in a way that would make any deportation of a deserter highly controversial.” But although deserters were not legally a prohibited class of immigrant, Kent worried to Cadieux that to allow American deserters to immigrate would provide uncomfortable comparisons for treatment of Canadian deserters, who faced “heavy penalties.” “One can urge, of course, that the cases are not completely analogous; we are not engaged in a highly controversial war and we do not have a draft. But the distinction is a difficult one.”

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22 “Thomas Wormald Kent,” *Canadian Who’s Who 1997 On the Web*, http://www.utpress.utoronto.ca/cgi-bin/cw2w3.cgi?p=kelly&t=72665&d=2243, accessed December 20, 2008. Tom Kent, an Oxford scholar and journalist, lifetime public servant, and businessman, had been a policy advisor to Prime Minister Lester Pearson from 1963 to 1966. As such, he was a transitional figure in the Liberal party as power shifted to the Trudeau leadership.
Kent asked for advice about this apparent public relations quandary, and for information regarding any indication of American government opinion about deserters immigrating to Canada. He noted that as the numbers of deserters were likely to increase, it would be wise to think ahead. Thus Kent expressed his belief that the Department of External Affairs had a role to play in setting policy, or at least that U.S. government opinion was something to be taken into account.

**Regulatory Changes: A Directive to Exclude Deserters**

Adding to this new immigration situation for deserters was the fact that, until January of 1968, proof of discharge had been required to process immigration applications. Between January and July of 1968, such proof was no longer required for applicants from within Canada, but was still required for applicants from outside the border. Deserters were able therefore to enter Canada as visitors and, once in Canada, apply for landed immigrant status. In July 1968, the government “withdrew” this practice and secretly, as we have discussed earlier, replaced it with “discretion” by immigration officers on whether to consider or disregard military status. The trouble was that reports from the border suggested that many, if not most, border officials were more frequently using their discretion to exclude draft dodgers and deserters from entering the country. In fact, internal departmental memos indicate that this regulation change was

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27 Ibid.
intended to prevent deserters from entering Canada. At first, as we have seen, this policy was not public, and anti-draft groups could only form suspicions. When the policy became public knowledge, immigration officials, especially the Minister, found themselves under fire in the House of Commons and in the media for keeping the policy secret, and accused of circumventing public debate.

The lobbying efforts of the anti-draft movement were making themselves felt. In late January of 1968 NDP MP for Kootenay West Herbert Herridge received a letter from Kent that stated

People seeking admission to Canada must be examined either as immigrants or non-immigrants as defined in the Immigration Act. Those seeking permanent residence, as most deserters do, must be dealt with as prospective immigrants, and this means among other things that they must be able to meet the requirements set forth in Sections 31, 32, 33, or 34 of the Immigration Regulations, copies of which I am enclosing.

Section 34 of the Regulations... makes admission contingent on various qualities which are objectively stated and assessed on a point rating basis. There is, however, no specific reference in this assessment to someone’s military status in his home country. Therefore, if an applicant is otherwise able to meet normal immigration requirements he has nothing to fear from this department regarding his military status.

Also in January of 1968, Herridge received a letter from then-Minister of Manpower and Immigration Jean Marchand which stated, in part, “It is not the policy of the Government to encourage the admission of military deserters or draft dodgers. However, if someone in either of these circumstances applies in Canada for immigrant status and otherwise meets

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29 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 6-19, Copies of letters from Deputy Minister, Ministry of Manpower and Immigration, Letter from Tom Kent, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Manpower and Immigration to Herbert Herridge, MP, January 31, 1968.
the conditions set out in the Immigration Act and Regulations, there are no legally valid
grounds under our present legislation for denying his application.\textsuperscript{30} These letters
coincided with the window, between January and July of 1968, in which proof of
discharge was not required at the border, and the instructions regarding legal, moral and
contractual obligations had not yet been issued. The situation was not to last long. Both
letters found their way into the files of the Vancouver Committee. The Committee
apparently communicated with BC Members of Parliament as well as with Cabinet
members such as Marchand.\textsuperscript{31} The Minister’s and Deputy Minister’s answers were very
similar, indicating that at this point, at least, there was a degree of internal coherence that
was reflected in the department’s public face.

Despite the earlier statements from the Ministry of Manpower and Immigration,
experiences at the border did not change, and in fact they became worse after the secret
directive was issued. The VCTAAWO’s predictions of bias appeared to be coming true.
In 1969 the \textit{New York Times} reported that Canada was considering closing the border to
deserters completely, and had already issued a memorandum to its personnel restricting
entry for most deserters. The article reported that officials had been instructed on July 29,
1968 to consider whether applicants were currently serving members of the military. As a
result Toronto counsellors were encouraging applications from within Canada. The
article went on to describe how Immigration department officials were considering
defining deserters as a prohibited class. In the article, James S. Cross of the Department

\textsuperscript{30} UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 6-17, Communication with High Officials – Fugitives
from Justice submission, Letter from Minister of Manpower and immigration Jean Marchand to Herbert
Herridge, MP, 1968.

\textsuperscript{31} Herridge may also have been seeking to help potential immigrants in his area of BC, the Kootenay, today
known as a common destination for war resisters from the Vietnam era: http://www.ourwayhomereunion
of Immigration pointed out that military status was “only one of five guidelines laid down to help... determine when to reject applicants who [meet] other criteria.” The other examples included family desertion and debt.\textsuperscript{32} A \textit{Vancouver Sun} report stated that the Department of Immigration was denying any crackdown on deserters.\textsuperscript{33} The instructions to immigration officers were also reported in the \textit{Globe and Mail}, on January 30, 1969. A \textit{Baltimore Sun} report placed the first issuance of the instructions in January of 1968.\textsuperscript{34} Many of these reports were probably derived from reading other newspaper stories.

Internal Department of Immigration correspondence makes it clear that the purpose of the guidelines directive issued in July of 1968 to immigration officers was to exclude draft dodgers.\textsuperscript{35} As a May 1969 memo from Assistant Deputy Minister R.B. Curry later stated,

\begin{quote}
While 24.03 12(g) [immigration regulation] was designed to exclude deserters, the public posture has been that its purpose was to give examples of various "substantial legal, contractual or moral obligations," to our officers which they should take into account in the exercise of their discretion.\textsuperscript{36}
\end{quote}

Several writers whose letters were filed by the Department of Immigration guessed as much. These letters, taken together, indicated a high degree of coordination of content,
shared ideas about a Canadian tradition of pacifism, and awareness of media and pressure
campaigns being waged by anti-draft groups. I will explore these letters further, and the
government’s response to them, below in this chapter. For now, these two examples are
an indication that members of the public suspected that bureaucrats operated separately
from government, and that the practice of barring war resisters at the border was no
accident:

I suspect some bureaucrat with an inflated sense of his own wisdom has
circulated a memorandum with the intention of bending the law to suit his
own political views. I certainly hope this discrimination is not official
government policy.

Angus M. Taylor, Toronto, to MacEachen, February 12, 1969

Why are some bureaucrats in the Immigration Ministry able to enforce
their petty decisions or feelings, over and above the apparent policy of the
minister? I feel this needs looking into.

Ray Morgan, Toronto, to Donald A. McDonald, MP, Rosedale, January
31, 1969

Although the origins of the July 1968 guidelines to exclude deserters using
immigration officers’ discretionary powers is unclear, department records indicate, as
suspected, that the decision was made by Kent shortly before he left the post at
Immigration. 37 Indeed, internal memos suggest that, despite his public statements, Kent
knew that even some draft dodgers were already being turned away if they did not intend
to stay in Canada – that is, if they were using the possibility of entering as visitor as a
way to seek refuge from the draft and nothing else. 38 In effect, the instructional memo

37 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 983 and 1210, File 5660-1, Military Personnel – Draft Dodgers – General,
Memorandum to the Minister from Deputy Minister’s office file, January 30, 1969.
38 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 983 and 1210, File 5660-1, Military Personnel – Draft Dodgers – General, Memo to
Assistant Deputy Minister, Immigration, from Director, Planning Branch, “Divisional Instructions on U.S.
issued in July of 1968 was an endorsement of already-existing, but less formal, practices of excluding war resisters from Canada. In any event, once the instructional memo became public (as a result of the anti-draft movement campaign, as we will see), the department claimed that the decision had been made

on the basis of a decision made by the former Deputy Minister, Mr. Kent, prior to his departure. He felt there was no basis under the Immigration Act or regulations to instruct immigration officers to refuse an application from a deserter and that the only way that their entry might be prevented was in the exercise of the discretion granted to them under... the Regulations. As already stated, the purpose of the July 29 amendment was to provide the officers with guidelines on the use of their discretion.  

Impact of the Directive to Exclude Deserters

In January of 1969 the VCTAAWO prepared a third brief, “A Further Note on the Handling of Draft-Age Americans Who Apply for Entry Into Canada.” The brief formed a part of the campaign, now begun in earnest, to open the border. Like the earlier “Note on the Handling of Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada,” it cited examples of biased behaviour by immigration officials in the treatment of American visitors and applicants for entry, and included statements by American men and women that testified to their ill treatment by border officials and others. It called explicitly for the elimination of discrimination against deserters, since it was legal for them to enter if they were otherwise qualified. The brief was delivered to MPs, followed by lobbying by Jim

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Draft Dodgers,” and “Operations Memorandum To All Holders of Immigration Manual” No. 117 (revised), August 24, 1967.

39 Discretionary power was contained in sections 32 and 33 of the regulations. The elements to consider in exercising discretion were the subject of the instructional memo: LAC, RG 76, Vol. 983 and 1210, File 5660-1, Military Personnel – Draft Dodgers – General, Memorandum to the minister from Deputy minister’s office file, January 30, 1969.

40 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 7-13, “A Further Note on the Handling of Draft-Age Americans Who Apply for Entry to Canada.”

214
Wilcox of the Ottawa group and others.\textsuperscript{41} This seems to have been the first brief the use of which the VCTAAWO had coordinated with other anti-draft groups. The Vancouver Committee probably led the campaign because of its experience in the development of such documents, although the other groups certainly engaged in lobbying of various kinds as well. This brief was part of the larger campaign, discussed below, to open the border to deserters.

Reacting to the media attention and to public pressure, in January of 1969 MacEachen announced a review of policy regarding military status of potential immigrants.\textsuperscript{42} Indeed, during the next few months the pressure brought to bear on the department by the anti-draft movement and supporters of American war resisters was reflected in departmental statements, both public and internal.

Initially, draft communications and briefing notes to Cabinet by Department of Immigration staff, as well as other internal documents, consistently made the argument that deserters ought to be excluded, on several grounds. The argument was made that desertion was worse than draft dodging, and that deserters should rather have applied for conscientious objector status at home. Also, to allow deserters explicitly to enter Canada could be interpreted as a judgment about American laws – the draft – and to pass judgement on American laws would be inappropriate from the government of another country. It was also claimed that most Canadians opposed letting in deserters (although it is not clear if this was true, or where the information came from). Overall the direction of the discussion was towards their exclusion, and MacEachen’s public statement in


\textsuperscript{42} LAC, RG 76, Vol. 983 and 1210, File 5660-1, Military Personnel – Draft Dodgers – General.
Washington on March 25 took that tentative position, as did a media release on March 5, a public response to Moderator R.B. McClure of the United Church on April 30, and a speech to the Committee on Labour, Manpower and Immigration on May 8. A proposed revision of regulations was even prepared for legal review, and was presented to Cabinet.\textsuperscript{43} It is worth noting that these statements took place concurrently with both a discussion about Canada’s future role in NATO, and the beginning of Richard Nixon’s term as President, who had made an election promise to eliminate the draft.

Taking note of the negative press the existing policy was receiving, the department eventually produced talking points for internal use, and even met with reporters in order to clarify, in their view, the actual situation of American war resisters in Canada. In the meeting with journalists Department of Immigration communications staff, along with representatives from the Department of External Affairs Information Division, urged visiting American journalists to offer a more balanced, less sensational view of the war resister phenomenon.\textsuperscript{44} The department also continued to monitor the anti-draft support groups, and took note of pressures from the United Church – an indication that they were keeping track of the breadth of the movement and considering how seriously to take it.\textsuperscript{45}


During the campaign to open the border to deserters, anti-draft groups were joined in their efforts by several committees whose sole purpose was to secure the revision of the immigration regulations to allow deserters to enter Canada. It is with the arrival of these campaign-specific committees in the campaign that the coordination of the overall efforts to have the border opened becomes most evident. There was some overlap in membership, and an important connection, between these committees and the anti-draft groups. For instance, as lawyer Paul Copeland remembered, “June Callwood... did a bunch of stuff, we had been working with her on other issues than draft dodgers, and she was sympathetic to them.” In Ottawa, Jim Wilcox had a hand in promoting the committees’ demands on Parliament Hill. In Toronto, the TADP’s Bill Spira participated in the presentation of the committee’s demands to Immigration officials.

Further, the committees’ demands were reflected both directly and indirectly in the letters written to the government, as we will see below.

One such committee was the Toronto Committee for a Fair Immigration Policy, formed in February of 1969 by author June Callwood, journalist Dalton Camp, politician Mel Watkins, and other prominent figures whose support lent legitimacy to the cause.

46 Copeland interview.
48 LAC, RG 76, Department of Manpower and Immigration Fonds, Vol. 725, File 5660-2, Military Personnel – Draft Dodgers – Complaints and Criticisms, Memo from District Administrator, Toronto, to Director, Home Services Branch, Department of Immigration, “Military Deserters – Petition by Committee for Fair Immigration Policy,” May 9, 1969.
The group sent a brief of its own to MacEachen, and met with MPs. The brief argued that Canadian policy should not discriminate against American deserters, and that to do was unfair — a theme present in many of the letters the department received on the topic. It received media coverage in the *Vancouver Sun*, among other places, which reported that “a delegation made up of Members of Parliament and representatives of church groups, labour unions and the business, legal and academic communities” met with MacEachen and presented him with the document. The article reported on the contents of the brief and its Ottawa signatories, including Dr. Pauline Jewett of Carleton University, MPs NDP Andrew Brewin of Toronto-Greenwood, PC Gordon Fairweather of Fundy Royal, and Liberal Mark McGuigan of Windsor-Walkville; and Rev. John McRae of the Ottawa Anglican Church. The article reported on the group’s contention that changes to the law were unnecessary, and that what was required was fair treatment and the application of existing laws.\footnote{Epp, 50-54; LAC, RG 76, Department of Manpower and Immigration Fonds, Vol. 725, File 5600-2, Draft Dodgers and Deserters — Complaints and Criticisms. Press release, from Toronto Committee for a Fair Immigration Policy, signed by D. Camp, J. Ludwig, F. Mowat, R. Fulford, B. Frum, J. Callwood, D. Anderson, H. Adelman, W. Kilbourn, V. Kelly, S. Clark, Mel Watkins, C. Templeton, Watson, Russell, M. Moore. Rev. Gordon Stewart, Jane Jacobs, W. Spira, Allen Linden, attached to Memo from District Admin, Toronto, to Director, Home Services Branch, Ottawa, subject: “Military Deserters — Petition by Committee for Fair Immigration Policy,” May 9, 1969.}

Following the Committee for a Fair Immigration Policy’s brief and media release, the Minister made a public statement on March 5 responding to the briefs, and outlining the policy of discretionary powers. In the statement MacEachen also tried to assert that the earlier public statements by Kent and others regarding deserters had in fact only
applied to draft dodgers.\textsuperscript{51} From late March until May 12 this statement accompanied the department’s responses to the letters they received (see below, this chapter).

A few days later department officials began drafting a “Statement on Draft Dodgers and Military Deserters” for eventual presentation to Cabinet. The document went through several revisions, but it consistently called for deserters to be designated a prohibited class of immigrant.\textsuperscript{52} This orientation was apparently the preferred position of J.L.E. Couillard, the new Deputy Minister of Manpower and Immigration.

The argument of the Department of Immigration was as follows: the review of policy and procedures relating to draft dodgers and deserters was complete. The policy on draft dodgers should remain the same. However, “[m]ilitary desertion must… be clearly distinguished from draft evasion.” The statement outlined the development of the revised instructions to immigration officers, and asserted that a better policy was required to avoid requiring immigration officers to make difficult decisions, and in order to be consistent in the application of policy for applicants from within or outside Canada. The draft statement said that “[t]he Government believes it is in principle improper for Canada to admit military deserters from the armed forces of friendly countries” as both “detrimental to international interests” and inconsistent with past practice. It also


highlighted the possible perception of unfairness, since Canadian deserters were punished.\textsuperscript{53}

The document went on to take up, one at a time, potential arguments in favour of allowing deserters to enter Canada. To the argument that deserters are conscientious objectors, the document responded that individuals could have applied for conscientious objector status before serving. To the argument that to exclude deserters would make Canada an enforcer of the laws of other countries, the document responded that policy decisions should be made on the basis of politics, not on questions of legal technicalities.\textsuperscript{54} The document concluded with the following unambiguous statement:

The Government believes that it is not, on balance, in Canada's interest to accept military deserters from foreign countries. It has therefore been decided to provide a regulation under the authority of section 61 of the Immigration Act which would limit admission to Canada of military personnel of foreign countries to those who are on authorized leave or official duty. This will have the effect of prohibiting military deserters from coming to Canada wherever they may apply.\textsuperscript{55}

In effect, the past practice of excluding deserters through the use of secret guidelines taken as permission to exclude them was to be replaced by an explicit and public acknowledgement that they were excluded.

At around the same time Department of Immigration personnel were working on responses to some of the more organized pressures being experienced by their Minister. In late March of 1969 Couillard sent a memo to Minister MacEachen dealing with some of the arguments made in the brief submitted by the Committee for a Fair Immigration


\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.

220

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Policy. According to the memo, analysis had revealed, first, that the affidavits by war resisters that had formed part of the document filed had had little merit; and second, that the group presenting the brief was the same as the Ottawa-based anti-draft group, Ottawa Assistance with Immigration and the Draft. Accordingly, the memo asserted, it appeared there was “an organized effort by certain persons in this country to help United States Army Deserters obtain permanent residence in Canada by any means possible. In this connection you will recall that I recently sent you a copy of an RCMP report dated March 3, concerning this matter.” The Minister was unlikely to have found that surprising, given the number of letters he had personally received on the matter. Here, Couillard was betraying a certain dismissive attitude towards pressure groups.

In April of 1969 Cabinet committee discussions about how to resolve the problem of ambiguity in the regulations regarding deserters revealed divisions in the Liberal caucus. An outline of one such meeting recounted how Jean Marchand, the previous Minister of Immigration, was puzzled because he felt he had already made it clear no distinction was to be made between draft dodgers and deserters regarding admission; the current practices therefore seemed odd. John Munro, former Parliament Secretary for Manpower and Immigration, said in the meeting that he thought earlier departmental public statements had applied to both groups. In contrast, Marchand’s successor, MacEachen, expressed the position that their statements had really only applied to draft

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56 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 983 and 1210, File 5660-1, Military Personnel – Draft Dodgers – General, Memorandum to the Minister, from Deputy Minister of Manpower and Immigration, subject: “Draft Dodgers and Military Deserters from the United States,” March 28, 1969. This RCMP exchange was part of a jurisdictional struggle between the RCMP and the Department of Immigration: see Chapter 6.

57 After a brief stint as Trudeau’s Secretary of State, Marchand had moved on to, first, the Department of Forestry and Rural Development, and then to a post as the Minister of Regional Economic Expansion: Privy Council Office, “Guide to Ministries Since Confederation: Twentieth Ministry,” www.pco-bcp.gc.ca, accessed December 21, 2008.
dodgers. During this meeting, Marchand expressed his own strong feeling against banning deserters – a position that was not evident in internal communications. MacEachen, for his part, noted that the impact of the current policy was to exclude only American deserters, and not necessarily deserters from other countries. In his view, the idea that some deserters, and not others, could be admitted, was having the effect of making immigration policy dependent on foreign policy, because to exclude only American deserters could only be justified in terms of preserving good relations with the U.S. Government. (Remember that Tom Kent, formerly the Deputy Minister under Marchand, had written to the Department of External Affairs specifically to ascertain whether the policy regarding the treatment of American war resisters could have any impact on relations with the U.S.) Marchand responded that it appeared the Department of Immigration wanted to be discretionary without asking the officers to exercise discretion. He suggested letting all deserters across the border, and then excluding certain countries by way of an order-in-council. 58

In the third week of April, Deputy Minister Couillard made one last attempt to persuade the Minister once and for all against opening the border, and to fight for the recommendation in Cabinet. He acknowledged that some ministers were against the recommendations in the Department of Immigration’s Cabinet submission, and that there were concerns about “somewhat sweeping” legislation with no exceptions for

“meritorious applicants.” To address these concerns, he pointed out that an order-in-council might still let them in. Further, he asserted,

...in the meantime, the problem of U.S. deserters is embarrassing for Canada, for the government, for you and your department. The matter is rife with inconsistencies and it places an unwarranted and unfair burden on our examining officers. We should not continue to drift and temporize, leaving these defects untouched on the rather blind assumption that the war will soon go away and with it our difficulties.  

Couillard re-asserted that deserters were different from draft dodgers, despite perceptions to the contrary amongst the public. He dismissed the notion that Canadians would stop supporting the government if a decision was made to exclude deserters, calling the fear “questionable” and suggesting that most support for deserters came from “‘protesters’ in our society.” Again, Couillard dismissed the movement’s demands. The proposal that deserters should be allowed entry and then undesirables deported, he dismissed as unworkable; instead, he reaffirmed, ban them all and admit only those from countries for which Canadians have sympathy. Such a position could allow deserters from the USSR and not the United States, for example.

Whether due to internal debates, external pressures, or a combination of the two, Jim Wilcox believed that the Liberal caucus eventually split evenly, rumoured to be 50-50 with MacEachen breaking the tie. It is interesting to note that none of the recorded arguments in favour of open borders from the Cabinet meeting were nationalist in nature, such as that Canada must have an autonomous policy independent from American pressure. Instead, they emphasized such considerations as international relations,

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60 Ibid.
61 Epp, 57.
legalities and public opinion. The Cabinet discussions reflected both the influence of the movement and that of the Department of Immigration bureaucrats, including Couillard. In the end the divisions in Cabinet, fortified by the efforts of activists and campaigners, resolved themselves in favour of opening the border to deserters. The decision was made on May 15, and on May 22, 1969, MacEachen announced that henceforth deserter status would not be taken into consideration at the border. A new revised instructional directive was sent to immigration officers directing them to explicitly state, should the subject arise, that military status was irrelevant, whether the information was volunteered or not: this was the part that changed. In keeping with earlier policy, neither proof of discharge nor proof of draft status was to be demanded. As long as applicants met the requirements for temporary entry, they were to be allowed in; if they met the requirements for landed immigrant status under the points system, then that status should be granted. This revision was done with care not to expose the real motives behind the instruction: the exclusion of deserters. As Assistant Deputy Minister R.B. Curry urged,

To repeal the entire section at this time would indicate the true purpose of the July 29 1968 amendment should it become known. For that reason I suggest we delete the example of membership in the armed forces and rewrite the final paragraph to make it clear that such membership is not to be taken into account.

Although the movement had had their work cut out for them, it was a well-planned campaign, itself a din of a maturing social movement, that allowed for the

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64 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 983 and 1210, File 5660-1, Military Personnel – Draft Dodgers – General, Memorandum to the Minister from Deputy Minister’s office file, January 30, 1969; RG 76 Vol. 983 File 5660-1 Military personnel – draft dodgers – general, Memorandum, From Assistant Deputy Minister (Immigration) signed by James S. Cross for [RB curry] to Deputy Minister [Couillard], May 23, 1969.
change in policy to be made. In the next part of this chapter I will examine in greater
detail the methods employed to secure this change.
Part II: The Anti-Draft Movement Campaign to Open the Border to Deserters,

January 1969 to May 1969

The Committee for a Fair Immigration Policy and the briefs from Vancouver had formed part of a concerted effort, a campaign to open the border to deserters, undertaken by the anti-draft movement. While only the Committee briefs and some movement lobbying efforts were directly reflected in the Department's internal dialogue, other aspects of this public pressure campaign, including communications from citizens to the Department of Immigration and the movement's use of the media, were certainly felt as well. The campaign's messages regarding fairness and tradition contended with most of the opinions expressed in the Department of Immigration discussions, and with more conservative ideas about the Canadian nation expressed in some of the letters received by the department. On tradition, the anti-draft movement invoked precedents of allowing war resisters into Canada; Couillard and others maintained the opposite. On principles and consistency, Couillard argued that it was unfair to Canadian military personnel not to punish American deserters, while the anti-draft movement advanced that it was unfair to discriminate against deserters among other immigrants at the border. Additionally, anti-draft activists did not consider the difference between draft dodgers and deserters to be a valid reason for different treatment at the border. Most Canadians supported draft dodgers, and by using an argument against distinction, the support could spread to include all war resisters. As we will see in the following analysis of the discourse of the campaign, the constellation of arguments made by the anti-draft movement, taken together, shared themes with emerging left-wing notions of Canadian nationalism, in
contrast to equally nationalist, but more conservative, ideas about deserters as criminal cowards.\textsuperscript{65}

By late 1968 it had become clear amongst the anti-draft groups that the situation with deserters was getting urgent, because of the regulatory changes described in Part I of the chapter. On February 3, 1969, activist Stephen Strauss of the VCTAAWO asked activist Allen Mace of the TADP for better information to counsel deserters. The letter indicated that many more deserters than had previously been seen were coming across the border, and were in need of help.\textsuperscript{66} Strauss received five pages of single-spaced text in reply, which started:

The deserter scene is complicated as hell and changing every day now... the border from S.S. Marie [sic] east is bad all the way along for deserters. Not only are they having trouble with Canadian immigration, but it [is] becoming almost impossible for deserters to get out of Canada into the U.S.... Hence we have almost completely stopped sending d.'s [sic] to the border for the time being.... We are at present reduced to this: deserters with a potential 40 to 42 points [and not the required 50] without a job offer... are being sent to Ottawa. This means that the rest are... unlandable people.... The choices for those who don’t have the points for Ottawa are three: (1) go underground (2) go back to the states or (3) go to Sweden.

Allen Mace continued, explaining that even the deserters with adequate points were getting held up somehow in Ottawa. Allen Mace’s advice to Strauss makes clear how, because of the points system, levels of education and work experience had a bearing on the deserter’s ability to be landed, an issue explored below.\textsuperscript{67}


\textsuperscript{66} UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 1-3, Correspondence – Other Canadian Organizations with Committee, letter to Allen from ‘S.’, February 3, 1969.

\textsuperscript{67} UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 1-3, Correspondence – Other Canadian Organizations with Committee, letter to Steve from ‘A.’, February, 1969.

227
Eventually it became clear that a campaign would be necessary, because the changes in border policy in order to bar deserters from entry made it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, for deserters to live openly in Canada. In January and February of 1969 aid groups decided it was necessary to land deserters from within Canada, and stop risking applications at the border, even though there was a higher requirement for employment offers when applying from within the country. The TADP’s "sub-programme" to help deserters came out in the open.68 Bill Spira of the TADP suggested a year later that one reason the TADP went public with the deserters’ issue was because when the border closed, they had nothing to lose, stating that “the Minister of Immigration simply denied that American deserters were treated differently from anybody else so the next phase was to prove that [MacEachen] lied. Not only lied to us but he lied to the press and to the public.”69

The campaign began with an assessment of the current situation, and continued with efforts to get the various anti-draft groups working together on the issue. In his letter to Strauss, Allen Mace pointed to “[Department of] Immigration [plans] to bar people with ‘military obligations.’ So we decided to fight it out with immigration. We are using legal briefs and the press.” The campaign had three goals: stop discrimination at the border; return Ottawa to its (perceived) original policy on deserters; and shift public opinion so that any move to bar deserters would meet with a public outcry: “So there it is,” continued Mace, “a head-on fight with immigration…. I don’t like it at all, personally,

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69 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-14, Interview with Bill Spira of the Toronto anti-Draft Program [sic], June 1970.
because I don’t like the media, but so far we are doing all right and probably in fact winning.” Mace concluded by stating that “at this point our best hope is to get Ottawa to back down. If possible, then deserters might continue to apply within with success.... One way or the other, if this fails, we will have to take more desperate measures... we’ll think of something.”

Another letter Mace sent around the same time asked Strauss to secure one or two resisters’ testimonials of border experiences for attachment with a brief to be presented to the government. A further letter, dated February 26, provided an update on the campaign, making reference to a “delegation” to be meeting the minister later that week. This coordination, initiated by the Toronto group whose expertise was respected by other activists, and supported by the experience of the Vancouver group, was likely the first substantial test of the network’s strength. The pan-Canadian conference of war resisters in Montreal the following year recommended that such coordination be formalized among all of the groups, including the exile groups, and it placed the emphasis on communication, and not action. This campaign shows that the anti-draft groups were taking the lead among all groups, including exile groups, in coordinating their efforts.

Other anti-draft groups quickly joined the TADP and the VCTAAWO. Jim Wilcox, a leader of the group Ottawa Assistance with Immigration and the Draft (AID), described the campaign to improve the border situation in a chapter of the book, I would like to dodge the draft dodgers, but... [sic]. In his essay, “...they are up against the

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70 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 1-3, Correspondence – Other Canadian Organizations with Committee, letter to Steve from ‘A.’, February, 1969.
71 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 1-3, Correspondence – Other Canadian Organizations with Committee.
Canadian border [sic],” Wilcox detailed the campaign. He recalled how anti-draft groups in 1967 and 1968 had hidden the fact they helped deserters, because they weren’t sure their actions in doing so were legal. According to Wilcox, Ottawa, Toronto, and Montreal anti-draft groups subsequently engaged in a campaign of publicity and lobbying. In February of 1969 the three groups sent fake immigration applicants across the border under the shared false identity of William John Heintzelman; the media coverage of the ambiguous results and questions in Parliament embarrassed the government (see below). Citizen petitions were signed and gathered across the country, on an initiative from the Victoria Voice of Women, and sent to the Minister of Immigration. Seven hundred and fifty signatures were filed, which came from many different towns and cities, small and large. They also indicated the occupation of those signing, clear evidence of how broad the movement was, at least in those terms.74

In Montreal activists had their hands full as well. On February 2, 1969, a press release issued by the Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters announced that a brief was being presented to government. The brief, compiled by Ottawa AID, included affidavits from the Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters (MCAWR), Toronto Anti-Draft

72 Epp, 7, 49-60.
Programme (TADP) and the VCTAAWO. The press release also referred to the 1967 letter from Tom Kent which had stated military status was irrelevant (referred to above, this chapter). The brief referred to was almost certainly that presented by the Committees for a Fair Immigration Policy. At the same time, Ed Miller of the Montreal group issued a collective letter to "friends," to calm potential fears resulting from the press release that the border was about to be completely closed to deserters. The release resulted in an article in Le Devoir, "Ottawa veut 'démoraliser' les déserteurs américains," which referred to the brief and made mention of the allegations of discrimination at the border and the secret memo. A day later, an article in the Montreal Star, entitled "Ottawa Accused of Prejudice," also referred to the brief submitted to Parliament. The Montreal American Deserters Committee (ADC), meanwhile, organized a rally and press conferences in support of the campaign.

In Toronto, the TADP's Peter Warrian drafted and distributed a flyer to garner public support for the campaign:

Another Case of Complicity

...Due to American pressure, the Canadian Immigration Act is being bent to suit the wishes of the U.S. Military. Immigration Minister MacEachen is justifying the refusal of border officials to let Americans who have deserted from the army immigrate into Canada.

...The right of Canada to maintain its own immigration policy without outside interference and pressure must be actively defended by all those

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75 WR, Quebec Social and Political Organizations, Vol. 9, Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters.
77 WR, Quebec Social and Political Organizations, Vol. 9, Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters, Montreal Star, "Ottawa Accused of Prejudice," by Brian McKenna, February 6, 1969.
78 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 6-20, Declaration of purpose and history of American Deserters' Committee Montreal.
are fighting against the war in Vietnam and all those who oppose the piecemeal sell-out of Canadian sovereignty.

... It is crucial that you write or visit your MP, demanding the return to a fair immigration policy. And also that you send a letter of protest to Minister of Manpower and Immigration Allan MacEachen and to Prime Minister Trudeau. Our information indicates that a fairly large number of MPs favour a non-discriminatory immigration policy as regards deserters, but others are undecided. If you fail to act, you may be responsible for deserters being returned to the stockades. 80

The references to American pressure and an independent foreign policy in this leaflet were typical of the campaign. These documents followed the lead of the 1967 VCTAAWO brief, “A Note on Fugitives from Justice,” which had asserted that “one of Canada’s oldest traditions” was to welcome deserters, and that Canada should not be responsible to uphold American law. These four ideas – independent foreign policy, American pressure, the rule of Canadian law, and a tradition of haven for deserters – were about to become the nucleus of the campaign, and the campaign gave them a coherence they had not had before. The divisions among MPs referred to by Warrian’s flyer were also to become very important, as we have already seen.

The campaign raised a few problems for anti-draft groups. Among other things, there was the very danger which had helped keep deserters underground before, that a public fight with the Immigration Department would translate into rumours south of the border that the border was closed. Similar fears had earlier led TADP and the Toronto Union of American Exiles, then based at the University of Toronto Student Administrative Council offices, to avoid taking political action on the issue. 81 The

80 WR, Peter Warrian fonds, Vol. 7, File 17, Toronto Anti Draft Programme.
campaign was further complicated when the fairly new Montreal American Deserters’ Committee erroneously announced that it was easy to be a deserter in Canada. As we have seen, this particular group had earlier antagonized others in the movement. The ADC had not consulted anyone with experience counselling deserters before issuing the statement that the deserter’s life was easy. Perhaps as deserters they thought they knew best. For their part the TADP began referring deserters to Montreal, perhaps in order to force the ADC to deal with the consequences of their statement.82 A month later, the New York Times confirmed that some anti-draft movement activists worried that anti-deserter sentiment might grow as a result of the revolutionary rhetoric of a Montreal ADC.

Despite these fears and problems, however, the movement found ways to undertake the campaign. Along with letters and lobbying, the movement made a particular effort to use the media to shift public opinion. The campaign was conceived of as having three stages: a public relations stage, an exposure of government practice stage, and a stage in which high profile people lent their support. As Bill Spira recalled in 1970,

Jim [Wilcox] in Ottawa spent a fantastic amount of time up on the hill; I spent some time lobbying and we got together about 26 of their votes, all of the NDP members and at least two in the conservatives... In one day 4,000 cards and letters were sent to the House of Commons. This plus the expose plus the fact that the media constantly gave it a very sympathetic show... and the pressures simply started building up on that when we got to the third stage of our campaign – the first one was simply to meet your deserter, the second was to prove that MacEachen was a liar and the third

82 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 1-3, Correspondence – Other Canadian Organizations with Committee.

233
one was where we got some very straight people that simply said they would disregard the Immigration Act.\(^{83}\)

**The Campaign’s Use of the Media**

The campaign garnered a great deal of media attention, which was often “incredibly sympathetic,” in the view of the editors of *AMEX Magazine*.\(^{84}\) Part of this was directly due to the methods of the campaign by the anti-draft movement. Perhaps the most sensational of the actions undertaken by anti-draft groups in the campaign, specifically to gain media attention, was the William John Heintzelman publicity stunt. On February 9, 1969, five students from Glendon College – Bob Waller, Graham Muir, John Thompson, Chris Wilson, and Jim Weston crossed over the American side of the border at border points across Ontario.\(^{85}\) Each posing as the same existing American deserter, William John Heintzelman, they each attempted to cross the border in the Detroit-Windsor area. They had five different experiences, but none were allowed through. The stunt was undertaken in this manner to allow for comparisons of treatment at different border points. In several cases, they concluded that the Canadian authorities had called ahead to the American side to let American authorities know a deserter was headed their way. After a busy night, the five students went public with their experiences. Eventually, they signed affidavits which were filed as part of a package of material

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\(^{83}\) One such favourable report appeared on the *Globe and Mail* Editorial page: George Bain, “Too Much To Swallow,” Tuesday, May 20, 1969. Bain took issue with MacEachen’s reasons for not publishing the instructions to immigration officers regarding deserters.


\(^{85}\) Graham Muir, “ ‘Deserters’ were refused entry at border,” *Pro Tem*, Volume VIII, Numéro 19, Toronto, Canada, le 13 février, 1969.
presented to government officials in lobbying efforts by anti-draft activists.\footnote{UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-14, Interview with Bill Spira of the Toronto anti-Draft Program [sic], June 1970.} Lawyer Paul Copeland recalls his involvement as a lawyer representing the five students who crossed the border in the publicity stunt. As he waited in a lawyer’s office in Buffalo, the five men were turned back at the border. In one case Copeland had to go in person to secure the release of one of the Canadians, who was being detained by the Canadian officials:

... the Heintzelman stuff, it was just one off growth of this when we found that the borders were closed to deserters, or I guess when the TADP found the borders were closed to deserters, we then got involved in trying to figure out a strategy of how to deal with it. I spent the day actually playing bridge in a lawyer’s office in Buffalo, and Clay spent the day in I think in Detroit trying to provide legal advice for the people in case anything got ugly.

They all hit the three Niagara frontier border points and the Detroit tunnel and bridge at the same time; that was part of the plan. They were all turned back.

... [I]t was finally decided the safer route for everybody was... to use these photocopied documents from this American army deserter named William John Heintzelman. So he was actually a real person.

... For people immigrating... it was much easier for people to come here, get a job offer, turn around, go back into the United States, and then apply. And that’s basically what was done by the five guys who posed as William John Heintzelman. They all had a job offer, they had everything.... There was a whole organized group [helping them do that].

... I was sitting in a lawyer’s office in Buffalo playing bridge most of the day, and we were trying to keep track of where the people were, and that guy when he hit the Canadian border originally had been turned back... and they wouldn’t let him in, wouldn’t really say why; he goes back to the American side; as he’s going back across the bridge he rips up all of his William John Heintzelman stuff; gets to the American side, and says hi I’d like to come in. And they said what’s your name and he tells them and they say, “well, do you have any identification?” “Yeah,” he shows them
some identification and they say, "well, do you have any other identification?" "Yeah,... and he pulls out his passport, and they say, "well, it's a Saturday, we can't check to see if this is a valid passport," and they turn him back. We, meanwhile, are sitting wondering what the hell had happened, and we call the [U.S. personnel on the] American side and say, "have you seen this guy using his Canadian name," and they say "yeah, he just went back to the Canadian side," so we call the Canadian side, and say, "have you seen this guy?" "Oh yeah, he's here with us." I say I'll be right over [as his lawyer], and he had been detained for about an hour by this point, that's my recollection anyway. By the time I got there they had let him out. But he had come back to the Canadian side and the Canadians were sort of nice, they had just turned him away, and they said, "Mr. Heintzelman, you've come back," and he said, "well no actually that's not true," which is why they were interrogating him and by the time we showed up they had released him....

In every case [the Canadian border officials] had tipped the Americans. [It] may well be true [that they routinely alerted the American side], but why you would [tell them] he was a U.S. Army deserter is another question. 87

The actions of Canadian immigration officials in "tipping" the Americans was of great interest to the media, because it seemed to indicate a situation in which Canadian officials were doing the Americans' work for them. They seemed, in effect, to be enforcing American laws, since no extradition agreements existed for military personnel unless they had deserted while on duty in Canada. 88

A flurry of media coverage followed the stunt. 89 As lawyer Paul Copeland recalls, "the Heintzelman stuff was really critically important, because... up till then there

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87 Copeland interview

236
was no publicity that Canada had closed the border. The guys when they came back did a press conference, and it was quite a bit of favourable media coverage.⁹⁰ One of the five students involved, Bob Waller, wrote an article for the Toronto Star to report in detail the results of the experiment. Waller claimed that his experience and the experience of one other student, Graham Muir, then editor of the Glendon College student newspaper Pro Tem, proved collusion between U.S. and Canadian immigration authorities. The stunt was undertaken to expose discrimination at the border by Canadian immigration officers. Waller, Muir, Thompson, Wilson, and Weston tried to cross at five different border points. Waller concluded, “The authorities actively turned me away while I was posing as a deserter, as were my four comrades. This is directly contrary to immigration department policy. The Canadian authorities unlawfully gave information of a private nature to officials of a foreign country. Had I really been a deserter, they would have been responsible for turning me in to the American authorities to suffer the consequences.”⁹¹

On February 10, national news coverage carried interviews with the five, and the incident was mentioned in stories until the May 22nd announcement. In its coverage, also written by Waller, the Montreal Star quoted John Munro, the previous Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, who had stated a year earlier that military status had no bearing on admissibility. It went on to describe the Heintzelman incident in detail, in an account which matched exactly that of the students themselves – unsurprising, since the author was one of the five students; what was

⁹⁰ Copeland interview.
remarkable was its publication in a mainstream newspaper. The article suggested that the government sanctions collusion between Canadian and American border guards.\textsuperscript{92}

The stunt was the source of several questions in the House of Commons, directed at Minister of Manpower and Immigration Allan MacEachen. As a result of the Heintzelman events, in mid-February Minister MacEachen faced questions in the House of Commons from opposition MPs, about the treatment of deserters at the border, and about Canadian officials cooperating with American officials regarding their transfer to the U.S. authorities. The news coverage had highlighted the main source of concern for MPs: the contradiction between previous public statements by the Department, and current statements and actions. Throughout February, March and April NDP MPs continued to ask for clarification of the policy, and for the text of the directive to immigration officers regarding discretion. NDP MP for Winnipeg David Orlikow asked MacEachen if there was a policy against admission of deserters. It was in reply to this question that MacEachen referred to the July directive, after differentiating between draft dodgers and deserters.\textsuperscript{93} It was the first explicit public reference to the directive made by the Minister himself, and took away any remaining doubts as to whether the border experiences of deserters were a matter of an express policy to exclude, or merely of policy not properly upheld.


Impact of and Support for the Campaign

Thus on February 18, nine days following the Heintzelman event, MacEachen appeared to fully corroborate the conclusions war resister support groups had drawn from Heintzelman affair, explaining publicly how deserter status could be grounds for denial of entry – at the discretion of the individual immigration officer. If the officer felt that a “contractual obligation” had been violated, he might then still deny the person entry notwithstanding his qualification otherwise. MacEachen also stated that it was common practice for Canadian officials to notify American border officials that an American had been turned away – confirming accounts provided in the two briefs from the VCTAAWO. Toronto Star reporter Robert Stall, covering the debate that day, observed that “previous government statements had implied that an individual’s military status had no bearing on his admissibility to Canada.” Stall reminded readers of the Heintzelman affair, and suggested it had exposed the truth about border policy regarding deserters.  

In his interview with Renée Kasinsky a year later, Bill Spira of the TADP recounted how well the campaign had worked:

Now we of course gave [the Heintzelman information] to the press and... that, in my opinion, plus all the other things that we did to MacEachen, proved that we had an excellent lobby going.  

The NDP and the United Church took the results of the stunt seriously. In response to the Heintzelman incident, the Church passed a resolution later in February, that stated “concern that the traditional admissibility of otherwise admissible persons to  

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95 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-14, Interview with Bill Spira of the Toronto anti-Draft Program [sic], June 1970.
Canada without regard to military obligations abroad, except as provided in NATO agreements referring to forces in Canada or participating in NATO exercises, be continued.\(^96\) On April 30, 1969, United Church Reverends Robert B. McClure and Reverend Ernest E. Long sent a telegram to Minister MacEachen, on behalf of the United Church General Council, denouncing the existence of secret regulations; these had been an “immoral and intolerable evasion of public responsibility… which we call upon the minister to abandon at once.” Furthermore, they disagreed with the position, now made public, that desertion was a breach of a “contractual obligation,” probably because of the existence of the draft. They also asserted that government actions to bend the law by issuing secret guidelines had resulted in immigration officials acting as enforcers for foreign powers. Finally, the two reverends invoked the tradition of allowing in dissenters and deserters. They argued that the present conditions of society gave a renewed importance to such traditions, and to government transparency:

> in an age of vast complexity of social organization, it is all too easy for persons to be lost in the maze and human rights and values to disappear as victims of a nameless “they.” In such an age the complete visibility of legislative and regulative process is essential and government by bureaucratic process and secret “guidelines” is both dangerous and evil.\(^97\)

MacEachen responded by telegram, and released both letters to the media. In his reply he accused McClure of “allegations… ill-founded and erroneous to the point of

\(^96\) LAC, RG 76, Vol. 983 File 5660-1, Military personnel – draft dodgers – general, Pt.5, Memorandum to the Deputy Minister from the Minister, MacEachen, Feb. 21, 1969, accompanying document.

irresponsibility;” in particular, he denied that the directive to immigration officers was secret.98

The stunt and its publicity also drew the support of Ontario’s trade union federation, directly involving for the first time a constituency that had so far remained distant from the movement, at least in any visible way.99 D.B. Archer, President of the Ontario Federation of Labour, wrote to MacEachen on April 1, informing of a resolution of their executive council: “the OFL calls upon the Minister of Manpower and Immigration for an assurance that his dept is applying with equity the Immigration Act.” The Federation also took the position that immigration officers should not be allowed to use discretion, and that discrimination should not be tolerated. Archer expressed the Federation’s desire to see such changes in policy debated by Parliament, and not adopted through regulatory changes by the Minister or staff. It is interesting that Archer used the discrimination argument here, and likely indicates either a direct involvement of union members in the campaign or lobbying of the OFL by activists to secure their support. MacEachen replied personally, unusual at this time due to the volume of letters being received, as we will see. He acknowledged and thanked Archer for the letter, and stated that assurances were “hereby given” that the Department of Immigration was not discriminating. MacEachen ended by mentioning the policy review underway.100

Some MPs went so far as to threaten to break the law in order to protect resisters. Lawyer Paul Copeland recalls how Liberal MP Marcel Prud’homme was prepared to resort to illegal measures in the name of fairness to deserters, as Bill Spira indicated above. His threat of harbouring deserters would have been illegal had the government decided to publicly close the border instead of opening it, as lawyer Paul Copeland recounts:

Prud’homme... threatened to run an underground railway to bring the deserters in. Publicly. That was just after we had done the William John Heintzelman stuff. 101

Taken together, the letters and other campaign tactics had an impact which exceeded the anti-draft movement’s expectations. Campaign activists were not uniformly convinced of its potential success. For instance, Francis Marion of the VCTAAWO even wrote to the Yugoslav Embassy in February seeking assistance with taking in deserters should the campaign fail. This move was apparently a way to secure passage for resisters en route to Sweden. 102 As we have seen, the campaign succeeded, because the campaign was able to exploit and further develop divisions among MPs on the treatment of deserters at the border. As of May 22, 1969, the border was open to deserters. A year later, Bill Spira recalled:

[The] Cabinet then decided for MacEachen – we even knew from the members of the Parliament what the line-up in the Cabinet was and there was a majority so MacEachen had to back down. It was the first and only political action that I was ever engaged in that was successful. After we

101 Copeland interview.
102 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, I-3, Correspondence – Other Canadian Organizations with Committee. For more on Sweden’s role as a haven for resisters see Chapter 2 and notes.
were successful we said My God what did we do wrong, we’ve succeeded.\textsuperscript{103}

Successful as they may have been, the anti-draft movement had mobilized ideas which could cut both ways when it came to criticizing Canadian immigration policy. In the next part of this chapter I will examine the use of "left nationalist" ideas in the letters and telegrams to the Department of Immigration, and examine how those ideas could be used against war resisters.

\textsuperscript{103} UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-14, Interview with Bill Spira of the Toronto anti-Draft Program [sic], June 1970.
Part III: Nationalism in the Campaign to Open the Border to Deserters

In early 1969 hundreds of letters and telegrams reached the Department of Immigration from all regions of Canada, calling for the border to be open to deserters. While no information exists about how or even to what extent the letter-writing was coordinated, so many of the arguments used quote directly from the ideas of the Committees for a Fair Immigration policy that there can be little doubt that the letters were part of the same campaign. The issues raised by the Heintzelman stunt were reflected in the letters as they were in the briefs to government officials. Why were immigration officials asking immigrants about their military status, when supposedly that status was irrelevant? Were immigration officials acting without instructions? If not, then why was no one informed of the policy?

And why did Canadian officials call the American side to warn them they were sending back a war resister? These questions stirred sentiments among nationalists, raising questions about independence from the U.S. and the use of deceit to achieve a political goal; and in the end their arguments, expressed to government officials, were successful in securing an open border. However, the relationship between nationalism and war resistance was contradictory. At times, left nationalist arguments would lead to support for Canadian immigration policy that ran counter to the anti-draft movement’s interests.

Left nationalism has a long pedigree. The foundational work in this area is George Grant’s *Lament for a Nation*, a 1965 call for the defence of Canada in the Tory tradition;
it expressed concerns about American cultural domination. Further works followed
one of several strands: work documenting and implicitly supporting a conservative
Canadian nationalism, as typified in Charles Taylor’s *Radical Tories: the Conservative
Tradition in Canada,* work implicitly supporting Canadian liberalism, as typified by
Frank Underhill, *In Search of Canadian Liberalism,* and, recently, a re-conception of
Canadian nationalism as a cultural phenomenon, as typified by Ian McKay’s seminal
article “The Liberal Order Framework,” and cultural theorist Erin Manning’s
*Ephemeral Territories: Representing Nation, Home, and Identity in Canada.*
Nationalism as a historical phenomenon has also experienced a recent surge of interest.

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104 George Grant, *Lament for a Nation: the Defeat of Canadian Nationalism* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965). It is interesting to note the number of times the book has been re-issued, most recently on 2005 by McGill-Queen’s University Press, a 40th anniversary edition. For an interesting interpretation of Grant’s work see David Tough, “A Global Introduction to George Grant’s Lament for a Nation” (paper presented at New World Coming: The Sixties and the Shaping of Global Consciousness conference, Queen’s University, June 15, 2007). Tough argues that Grant’s work cannot be categorized as left or right wing.


Ryan Edwardson in particular has attributed the “new nationalism” of the sixties to intellectuals:

English-Canadian new nationalism, then, was a reaction to economic continentalization and Americanization. An intelligentsia-based movement that sought to reclaim Canadian sovereignty through political and social activism, it was more than just a force of reconfiguration, it was an entire nation-building project seeking to construct and popularize new conceptions of Canadian identity.\(^{110}\)

Despite the more recent studies, typologies of nationalism are debated, and a common definition of left nationalism remains elusive.\(^{111}\) For the purposes of this work I follow authors who define “left nationalism” in Canada as a perspective which ascribes several specific characteristics and values to Canada. These are mainly the notion of a Canadian tradition of pacifism; an ingrained tolerance for cultural and linguistic minorities; a respect for individual and collective rights; and an adherence to a view of Canada as being in a colonial or subservient relationship to the United States. In the 1960s, a left nationalist movement made use of these ideas to build momentum for positive reforms, but also to assert Canadian sovereignty and to preserve Canadian jobs for Canadians. Such a movement, as analysts and contemporaries have argued, was

\(^{110}\) Edwardson, 145.


246
limited by its reliance on essentialist notions of Canada which prevented the deeper critique of Canada and its place in the world that other sections of the left were calling for.\textsuperscript{112}

The anti-war and anti-draft movements were to a large extent motivated by this kind of left nationalism. Many anti-war Canadians were concerned that Canadian foreign policy might be being shaped by American officials and pressures. The letters about the border, described below, illustrate that worries about American influence were centred on the actions of the U.S. government, as opposed to the actions of individual Americans. Thus, the campaign can be seen to be inherently internationalist – emphasizing that which ordinary people have in common across national categories over what they have in common with citizens of their own country – as well, because it expressed solidarity with individuals and a movement in another country above the interests of its own government and elites.\textsuperscript{113} In this case an aspect of nationalism – the view of Canada as pacifist – became the justification for the internationalist actions of the Canadian anti-draft movement. At certain points, however, the movement debated this division, and some even suggested that American immigrants were themselves bound to be an imperialist influence. The tensions between anti-American sentiment and solidarity with Americans were, later in the period, made more acute by the radicalism of the political orientation and actions of some of the American immigrants themselves.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{113} Contrast this to Hagan's framing of the letters as part of a stark Canadian sovereignty vs. personal suitability debate: Hagan, 49.
\textsuperscript{114} See below, this chapter, and Chapters 3 and 5.
The history of Canadian activism in the 1960s and 1970s runs in parallel with the development of the field of Canadian Political Economy (CPE) amongst intellectuals. CPE’s scholars’ preoccupation with and criticism of the prevailing idea of Canada as a country in need of protection from the U.S. has its roots in some of the same ideas circulating among intellectuals in the 1960s. In fact these ideas played a role in shaping the movement to support resisters in substantial ways. Mel Watkins, for instance, whose seminal economic nationalist report on foreign ownership in Canada took the country by storm in 1968, was directly involved in the anti-draft movement.

Perhaps the best example of the concern for Canadian independence from the United States, from the anti-war movement beyond the anti-draft groups, was Claire Culhane’s 1972 book, *Why is Canada in Vietnam: The Truth about Our Foreign Aid*. Rather than look at Canada with rose-coloured glasses, Culhane, a nurse who had spent some time in Vietnam, considered Canada’s foreign policy to be imperialist. She suggested that, if only Canada could be free of the yoke of American imperialism, it could play a decent role in the world. For Culhane, Canada was a “colony” of the United States. Echoes of this concern reverberate through the pages of Canadian Political

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Economy foundational texts such as *Capitalism and the National Question in Canada*, which called for a Canada of "independence and socialism":\(^{118}\)

The appearance of autonomy...is illusory....Should capitalists from another country dominate the economy, political subservience shifts to favour the interests of the alien owners of capital. In this case, the nation whose economy is held in sway by foreign capital becomes, as well, a political satellite of the controlling state.\(^{119}\)

Such concerns were also reflected in other Canadian Political Economy works including Kari Levitt's *Silent Surrender* and Ian Lumsden's collection *Close the 49th Parallel*, among many others.\(^{120}\) Similar arguments speckled the pages of *Canadian Dimension* magazine, founded in 1963 as a magazine of the left.\(^{121}\) The Canadianization movement, a movement that insisted on keeping Canadian university posts for Canadians, contributed later to the idea that American immigrants were taking Canadian jobs.\(^{122}\)

These intellectuals, and those discussed in the subsequent discussion of left nationalism, can be seen as Gramscian "organic intellectuals."\(^{123}\) They are both independent, and connected to existing groups with existing material interests.

Intellectuals organically connected to the social movements around the resisters were

\(^{118}\) Gary Teeple, ed., *Capitalism and the National Question in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), xv.

\(^{119}\) Teeple, x.


\(^{123}\) Hall.
ranged against intellectuals and bureaucrats in the Department of Immigration whose ideas were shaped by, and in turn shaped, the concerns and responses of government.

**Letters in Support of War Resisters**

These concerns about American influence and for the preservation of the pacifist tradition were reflected in the campaign to open the border to deserters, and particularly in the early 1969 letters and telegrams sent to the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Allan MacEachen, and to Prime Minister Trudeau. As well will see, the letters were overwhelmingly in favour of opening up the border. The letter-writing and telegram portion of the campaign was remarkable in its breadth and consistency. While they displayed a certain amount of confusion about the current policy and laws and about the difference between a deserter and a draft dodger, most letters on both sides of the issue employed mainly nationalism to make their points. There were, however, different understandings of nationalism. Those in favour of opening up the border appealed to a perceived tradition of hospitality towards political refugees and war resisters. They also insisted that Canada maintain an independent policy from the United States, and referred to supposed American pressure to keep deserters out of the country. Those on the side of keeping deserters out, however, suggested that loyalty to the nation was the very definition of good character, and that those disloyal to the U.S. would not be loyal to Canada either.

The Department of Immigration’s “Draft Dodgers – Complaints and Criticisms” file was opened in late 1967.\textsuperscript{124} However, only two items appeared in that year, both in

\textsuperscript{124} A series of complaints files on various topics was apparently opened in the 1960s, based on a cursory search of the holdings of RG 76 at LAC. However, more research is necessary in order to determine if this
October. The trickle of letters did not increase substantially during 1968. Only four were
filed, of which one was an individual citizen, Mrs. J.S. Allan of Bobcaygeon, Ontario
expressing concern that Americans would take Canadian jobs, and were “causing an ill
feeling [sic] towards our good neighbor [sic] the States.” By letting them in, she said,
Canada was being charitable; but she expressed doubt the Americans would become good
citizens of Canada. She wrote: “Please sir, stop military age men at the border our own
men need help and jobs - & charity begins at home [sic].” These letters were fairly
typical of those from 1969, as we will see, in that they emphasized the negative effects of
an influx of American deserters on Canadian society. The war resisters did not interact
directly with the writers of these negative letters; but they should be seen as part of the
political landscape in which the campaign to open the border took place.

Two of the letters in 1968 were from the anti-draft movement, and therefore
supportive of the resisters. The Alexander Ross Society, a group in Edmonton devoted to
supporting war resisters, telexed the Minister to ask for the transcript of an August 5th
speech given in Calgary by Colonel Koss, Assistant Director of the U.S. Draft. The
Society suspected that “the FBI and the RCMP are working together to expose
organizations that support draft dodgers in this country as well as the U.S.” Jakob
Letkemann, Executive Secretary of the Board of Christian Service of the Conference of
Mennonites in Canada, wrote to insist that the borders should “remain open” to American

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125 This letter and all others hereafter except as otherwise noted: LAC, RG 76, Vol. Vol. 725, File 5660-2,

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immigrants. Referencing the post-war experience of Hungarian and Czech refugees, who had fled wars in their countries, Letkemann praised Canada’s current practice of “providing a new home for American draft age immigrants who are unable to support their nation in its present military policy.” MacEachen replied to Letkemann in order to set the record straight: Canada was not, in fact, “providing a new home for American draft age immigrants who are unable to support their nation in its present military policy,” but rather no encouragement was given one way or another to war resisters.\textsuperscript{126} Letkemann’s letter, in particular, was a harbinger of the ideas used by supporters of war resister immigration in later letters, especially in his mention of Hungarian and Czech refugees.

These letters and the Ministers’ replies foreshadowed both the flood of correspondence the department was to receive between February 3 and May 23 of 1969, and the department’s response. The Mennonites’ concerns coincided with those held by hundreds of others whose engagement with the issue prompted them to write. For MacEachen’s part, as the flood of letters increased fewer and fewer received more than a brief acknowledgement from staff. But when MacEachen did take the time to respond, his missives also were consistent, often taking the shape of form letters, shifting only as events surrounding immigration policy progressed, and reflecting the department’s manifest desire to do damage control.

By far the largest group of letters was received in early 1969 – three hundred and ninety-one were received before MacEachen’s May 22\textsuperscript{nd} statement announcing the open

border, an eighty-fold increase over 1968. Some were referred by the Prime Minister’s Office. Between February 3 and February 28 alone some eighty-two individual letters arrived in department mailboxes. Fifty-three arrived in March, seventy-nine in April, and one hundred and fifty-six in May. Several dozen more arrived after the decision was announced; the last letters were in September of 1969, and in October of 1970 from a previous writer attempting to secure a response. To explain the sudden increase in early 1969 we need to look at events outside the Department of Immigration. The deluge was part of a campaign, as the activists involved in supporting war resisters asserted at the time and shortly thereafter: a concerted effort to convince the Government to open the border.

The letters received by MacEachen during this period show that a campaign was undertaken and had some effect. Letters from both Wilcox and the editor of “I would like to dodge the draft-dodgers, but...”, Mennonite Frank H. Epp, were received at the Department on April 2 and February 14, respectively, with a second reference to an earlier letter from Wilcox, with brief attached, in a memo to the Minister by staff. That brief was also referred to in the submission by the Toronto Committee for a Fair Immigration Policy (CFIP).127 Wilcox and CFIP member Mel Watkins were cited in

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253
numerous newspaper articles during this period.\textsuperscript{128} In all, twenty or so letters specifically made reference to the CFIP.

The letters showed signs of coordination in both wording and concepts.\textsuperscript{129} A significant number of them included strikingly similar wording and expression of ideas. Many of the letters referred to a "tradition" in Canada of allowing deserters in, making specific reference to Hungarians and Czechs. The majority urged the government not to "bow to U.S. pressure." Since Canada was supposed to be more tolerant than the United States in general, it was significant that many of the letters, including those from university professors and organized groups, referred to the practice of excluding deserters as "discrimination." A subset of these referred to the practice of the immigration officers using discretion as illegal, an idea also set out in the briefs submitted by the anti-draft movement.

The arguments used in these letters were remarkable for their cohesion. The invocations of Canadian "traditions" of allowing war resisters to enter the country, or suggestions that to prevent American deserters from entering Canada was "discriminatory," were accompanied by other very common arguments. These included opposition to the Vietnam War; the position that the war resisters were making a moral decision which deserved admiration; and the opinion that they would likely make very good additions to Canada. "Humanitarian" values and "liberal" values were also referred to, such as universality and "fairness" — referred to in the very name of the campaign


Committees for a Fair Immigration Policy, as we have seen. Also very common was the argument that Canada’s policy should be kept independent of “external pressures” from the American government.

MacEachen’s statements in the media and in Parliament were reflected in both the timing of the letters’ arrival and in their content. MacEachen’s March 5 statement asserting the right of Immigration officers to exercise discretion was specifically referred to in a few letters. After a public radio address on or around April 23, 36 telegrams arrived in a six day period. The public exchange with R.B. McLure and Ernest E. Long of the United Church in late April (see above, this chapter) received a great deal of attention, as did MacEachen’s trial balloon around the same time about excluding deserters entirely. The last days of April and first days of May saw the arrival of petitions collected by individuals from BC and Ontario, as well as further letters and telegrams from individuals and groups including peace groups, unions, and church officials. Many of the letters specifically stated their purpose in writing was to “support the aims of the Committee for a Fair Immigration Policy,” the group which had submitted briefs and sent delegations to meet with MPs and the Minister several times between February and May. Later in the spring letters argued explicitly against MacEachen’s public statements that military status should be considered an “outstanding legal, contractual or moral obligation,” arguing that being drafted or inducted should not properly be considered a contract since it was signed under duress.

A left understanding of nationalism in the letters supporting an open border comes through quite clearly when they are read all at once. To give an idea of the impressions
created by the letters, several of them are presented here as examples containing specific left nationalist ideas.\textsuperscript{130} As we will see, while these ideas may arguably have made a victory possible for the anti-draft movement, they also contained contradictions which limited the extent of critique the movement could engage in.

Of the roughly 250 letters received by Manpower and Immigration Minister Allan MacEachen between February and May of 1969, several dozen, including those below, expressed concern over Canadian autonomy from the United States, including fourteen that mentioned either sovereignty or independence:

I have come to wonder recently whether Canada is an independent country in fact as well as in theory.

\textit{Robert R. Kerton, to MacEachen, February 19}

...shocked and disgusted...why have the immigration officers not been instructed – ordered – to take a more liberal policy?... I deeply regret this collaboration with American imperialism.

\textit{Ken Carpenter, York University, to Trudeau, February 10, 1969}

Such reprehensible actions move us further under the U.S. thumb...is freedom to find no home in Canada at all? And do our northern islands go next?

\textit{Mrs. Muriel Luca, Foremost, Alberta, to Trudeau, March 10, 1969}

URGE YOU TO HOLD TO CANADA'S SOVEREIGNTY AND PERMIT ENTRY US ARMY DRAFT DODGERS JUST AS YOU PERMIT CZECH IMMIGRANTS

\textit{Dorothy Livesay, Telegram to MacEachen, April 26, 1969}

I URGE YOU TO KEEP OUR BORDERS OPEN TO DESERTERS FROM THE AMERICAN ARMED FORCES, AS TO ALL QUALIFIED

\textsuperscript{130} A table consisting of the letters and who wrote them, as well as the date they were received, acknowledged, and/or replied to and by whom, and notes regarding their contents, was omitted from this work for reasons of length, but is available upon request from the author.
IMMIGRANTS. LET THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT SOLVE ITS OWN PROBLEMS. IT IS NOT CANADA’S BUSINESS TO ENFORCE AMERICA’S POLICIES

Ronald D. Lambert, Dept of Sociology, University of Waterloo, Ontario, Telegram to Trudeau, April 27, 1969

WE ARE THOROUGHLY ASHAMED OF THE VIOLATION OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT BY MR MACEACHEN AND HIS DEPARTMENT STOP AMERICAN DESERTERS MUST RECEIVE THE SAME TREATMENT AS ALL OTHER IMMIGRANTS STOP LIBERALISM MUST NOT COME TO BE EQUATED WITH SELL-OUTS TO US PRESSURE

Bill Spira, John Levy, Bernard Jaffe and Allen Mace, Toronto, 2279 Yonge St [TADP office], Telegram to Trudeau, April 21, 1969

Another way the letters reflected left nationalist ideas was by linking the “Just Society” with the rule of law. Even more intriguing was the letters’ use of the idea of the “Just Society” to convince the Liberal government to change its attitude, showing both a level of political acumen, and the ways in which the Liberal claim to stand for a “Just Society” could come back to bite them when their actions did not conform to expectations – an idea explored by Ian McKay in reference to liberalism in his Rebels, Reds, Radicals. These letters were employing the nationalist idea of a good Canada. The “Just Society” was a concept evoked by Trudeau in his leadership acceptance speech in 1968; it was a broad enough, and vague enough, concept to encapsulate many different ideas of social justice.131 For their part, the letters regarding the deserters issue insisted that the government live up to its own claim to support the idea. Ten mentioned a “just policy,” a

“just society,” or a “just decision,” and thirty-two used the words “fair play” or simply “fair,” while nineteen referred to their desire for an “open” immigration policy:

Just what sort of a ‘Just Society’ are you thinking of Mr. Immigration Minister?

Mrs. Hilda J. Peterson, Merritt, BC, to MacEachen, March, 1969

Where is the just society, when immigration laws are being violated by the immigration department to deny Americans entry into Canada.

Malcolm Campbell, MJPJC, London ON, to MacEachen, February 14, 1969

If the immigration act is really framed in so sloppy a manner than national policy formation can so fortuitously slip into the hands of people who are not responsible to the electorate, then you should be more concerned with amending the Act rather than justifying its more dicey provisions.

Mark Segal, Montreal, to MacEachen, February 19, 1969

WE URGE THAT CANADIAN LAW BE ADHERED TO AND THAT OFFICIALS THEREFORE NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE MILITARY STATUS OF APPLICANTS FOR IMMIGRATION INTO CANADA

Nancy and John Pocock, Toronto, telegram to MacEachen, c. March 5

I URGENTLY REQUEST YOUR CONTINUED SUPPORT OF AN OPEN BORDER POLICY FOR THE ENTRY OF QUALIFIED AMERICAN DESERTERS INTO CANADA

Marie Aprile, Scarborough, telegram to Herb Gray, MP, Windsor West, April 30

Many of the letters made reference to Canada’s tradition of pacifism, as well as its image abroad. Twenty-six mention a “tradition,” either of “asylum” (mentioned by eleven writers), or of a destination for “political refugees” (mentioned forty-four times); twenty-
seven letters mentioned the waves of immigrants from Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 as examples of this tradition, and five or six mentioned the United Empire Loyalists.

WE SUPPORT LANDED IMMIGRANT STATUS FOR AMERICAN DRAFT RESISTORS [SIC] AND DESERTERS AS A POLICY CONSISTENT WITH CANADAS TRADITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF OTHER REFUGEE NATIONALS

*T.M. Cox family, Telegram to MacEachen, April 27, 1969*

DEAR SIR: IF WE WISH TO MAINTAIN OUR WORLD IMAGE OF A HUMANITARIAN NATION WE MUST GRANT ASYLUM TO US DESERTERS. TO DO LESS WOULD BE TO NULLIFY THE GOOD WE HAVE DONE IN AIDING REFUGEES FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA HUNGARY GERMANY UKRAINE. WE MUST NEVER FORSAKE THIS GREAT TRADITION

*Rob Ward, Telegram to MacEachen, April 26, 1969*

AS CANADA HAS PREVIOUSLY OFFERED SANCTUARY TO HUNGARIAN CZECHOSLOVAKIAN AND OTHER REFUGEES, WE SUPPORT A GOVERNMENT POLICY OFFERING ON THE SAME BASIS THE STATUS OF LANDED IMMIGRANT TO US DESERTERS AND DRAFT RESISTORS [SIC]

*Bruno Friesen, Rae Friesen, 89 others, Telegram to MacEachen, April 28, 1969*

DISMAYED AND SHOCKED TO HEAR OF YOUR PROPOSAL TO RESTRICT IMMIGRATION OF US SOLDIERS AND DRAFTEES PROTESTING WAR IN VIET NAM YOUR PROPOSAL WOULD FLOUT CANADA'S TRADITION OF POLITICAL ASYLUM AND GIVE AID AND CONFORT TO THOSE FAVOURING CONTINUED US FIGHTING IN VIET NAM

*Dr. James Endicott, Canadian Peace Congress, Toronto, Telegram to MacEachen, April 24, 1969*

The expression of the pacifist tradition went so far as to suggest that loyalists were war resisters, and to encourage a similar treatment of those from the Vietnam war:
As a Nova Scotian (are you not?) you know with what pride folks announce to less fortunate ones: ‘We’re descended from United Empire Loyalists, you know’. History books and teachers in the U.S.A., however, depict those same early Canadians as Benedict Arnold, or deserters…for years I have watched the Liberal party sell Canada down the river to the U.S.A., but your attitude does go a little far, wouldn’t you agree?

A.H. Walkley, Toronto, to MacEachen, February 19, 1969

Finally, the letters reflected the idea that Canada should return to a non-discriminatory policy towards deserters. Fully forty-three letters specifically demanded the elimination of “discrimination” from either immigration policy or its application. A further fifteen took issue specifically with the discretionary powers applied by immigration officials, and a further eighteen explicitly linked the discretion with discrimination, such that, by the end of the period, discretion and discrimination were almost synonymous. Twenty-one of the letter writers also stated opposition to the fact that being drafted was considered a contractual obligation by current immigration regulations:

…it is most offensive to arrogate discretionary power to order functionaries…

Ronald D. Lambert, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Sociology and Psychology, University of Waterloo, to MacEachen, February 18, 1969

[I am] opposed to any discrimination or tightening of laws or practices against draft dodgers or deserters from the U.S. Army or other armed forces... [and] alarmed [at discretionary powers].

Rev. W. Grenfell Zwicker, United Church of Canada, Toronto, to MacEachen, March 10, 1969

[Immigration officers] being given greater ‘discretion’... [means] arbitrary exercise of bias, pique, and guile...

Dr. Eugene Kaellis, Saskatoon, to Trudeau, March 7, 1969

260
WE STRONGLY URGE OPEN IMMIGRATION FOR AMERICAN MILITARY DESERTERS SELECTIVE SERVICE IS NOT REPEAT NOT A "VOLUNTARY" CONTRACT

M.L. Benston and L. Foldhammer, Telegram to MacEachen, April 27, 1969

URGE YOU DECLARE CANADA WON'T DISCRIMINATE AGAINST US ARMY DESERTERS OR DRAFT RESISTERS MEETING LANDED IMMIGRANT QUALIFICATIONS. PRECEDENT AND SOVEREIGNTY DEMAND SAME. ALTERNATIVE IS NATIONAL SHAME ... BETRAYAL OF AMERICANS WHO RISK IMPRISONMENT ...

Charles Boylan, Telegram to MacEachen, April 26, 1969

This small sample is only a taste of the content of the letters. In the context of questioning in the House of Commons, media attention to the issue, and pressure through other means, such as lobbying and briefs, Minister MacEachen and his staff must increasingly have seen the letters as a reflection of public opinion. Indeed, on May 9 the Committees for a Fair Immigration Policy simultaneously delivered copies of a "Petition to Concerned Canadians," apparently either the same or a very similar document to the briefs previously submitted, to the District Administrator of Immigration in Toronto, and in Ottawa to R.B. Curry, the Assistant Deputy Minister of Immigration. The document, which the Committees requested be transmitted to the Minister, read, in part:

IMMIGRATION OFFICERS SHOULD IMMEDIATELY BE INSTRUCTED TO IGNORE MILITARY STATUS IN ANOTHER COUNTRY AS A LEGAL, MORAL OR CONTRACTUAL FACTOR – DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY – IN DETERMINING AN APPLICANT'S ELIGIBILITY FOR IMMIGRATION TO CANADA.

WE INVITE CONCERNS CANADIANS FROM ACROSS THE COUNTRY TO WRITE THEIR MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT, THE
MINISTER OF IMMIGRATION AND THE PRIME MINISTER SUPPORTING THIS POSITION.

COMMITTEE FOR A FAIR IMMIGRATION POLICY

Nearly one hundred and forty letters arrived in the department in the first two weeks of May. Perhaps we may surmise from this deluge that the Committee for a Fair Immigration Policy’s appeal for letters had been shared through the communication networks of the anti-draft groups. Letters also increased immediately following media stories about the Heintelman stunt, MacEachen’s public statements about the discretionary powers of immigration officers, and a media release on March 5, as we saw in Part I and II of this chapter.

By the time of the last major submission to the department from the Committee for a Fair Immigration Policy, received just about the same time as the announcement of the open border, the momentum was clearly on the side of the campaign to open the border. The last set of signatures, date stamped May 26, included:

Dr. A. Barland, Executive Secretary Designate, Canadian Association of University Teachers
Norm Bernstein, Civil Liberties Action Committee
Dr. Fred Caloren, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa
Muriel Duckworth, Halifax, Fredericton Voice of Women
Dr. Frank Epp, Ottawa
Roy Faibish, Exec Asst to Managing Director, Drama, CJOH
Dr. Allen Fenichel, Dept. of Economics, McGill; Treasurer, Civil Liberties Action Committee
Rev. Mr. Eilert Frerichs, Chaplain, University of Toronto
Irving Greenberg, Businessman, Ottawa
Mrs. Grace Hartman, Ottawa, National Sec-Treasurer Canadian Union of Public Employees
Rev Mr. John G. Hilton, Chaplain, University of Toronto
Dr. Pauline Jewett, Dept. of Political Science, Carleton University


262
Dr. Gordon Kaplan, Dept. of Biology, University of Ottawa
Vincent Kelly, lawyer
Dr. Laurier Lapière, Dir. French Canada Studies Program, McGill
University
Rev Mr. Doug Lapp, Britannia United Church, Ottawa
John F. Macmillan, Ottawa, Director of Organizing, Canadian Union of
Public Employees
Mrs. Kay Macpherson, Toronto, past President, Voice of Women
Rev. Prof. W.E. Mann, Dept of Sociology, York University
Rev. Mr. John F. McRae, Deputy Dir. Of Program, Anglican Diocese of
Ottawa
Dr. Edward J. Monahan, Asst. Exec. Secretary, Canadian Association of
University Teachers
Mrs. Nancy Pocock, Society of Friends, Toronto
Rev. Father Louis Raby, O.M.I, Chaplain, University of Ottawa
Dr. Elliott Rose, Dept of History, University of Toronto
Larry Sheffe, International Representative, United Auto Workers
Alex Sim, North Gower, Ontario
Dr. Percy Smith, Executive Secretary, Canadian Association of University
Teachers
Dr. Frank Vallee, Department of Sociology, Carleton University
Dr. James Wilcox, Dept. of English, Carleton University

These signatures, some repeated from earlier iterations of the petitions, show both the
breadth of the campaign and its impact among intellectuals. All of the letters, combined
with the impact of the prominent signatories to the Committee for a Fair Immigration
Policy briefs and communications, and the use of the media, had a significant and
cumulative effect that the Department of Immigration, the minister, and Cabinet could
not ignore. In the end, as we have seen, Cabinet decided to formally open the border to
deserters in May of 1969.

Letters against War Resisters

Before the announcement on May 22, 1969, sixty-four of three hundred and
ninety-one letters received were against opening the border. Like the letters supportive of
the anti-draft movement, they arrived in clumps following media discussions. About ten
were received following early March media statements and interviews about the review of policy underway. The majority of these expressed conservative Canadian nationalist sentiments: "they are not refugees seeking sanctuary from oppression and tyranny but merely shirkers seeking a skunk-hole," said D. Patrick, M.M. (likely a military designation), of Foam Lake, Saskatchewan, on May 11, 1969. Not only the draft dodgers and deserters, but "student radicals, agitators and the hippie type crowd, the black power set and the professor[s] linked to subversive groups" should be kept out, suggested Harry Bagot, of Edmonton, Alberta, on April 15. "Through the aid of a number of pacifist centres, Marxist-oriented groups, so-called anti war, anti draft and anti imperialist and other narrow-minded anti American clubs, a continuous program is in effect to assist these deserters circumvent their duty..." said A. MacAllistair, of Cornwall, Ontario, on May 12. "No doubt on inspection the most of them will be long haired Johnnies with strong communistic tendency and would be a liability," argued Ms. Scott, who did not provide an address, on May 6. For these writers, draft dodgers and deserters were part of an overarching threat to the social fabric.

Some of the arguments against opening the border were common to several letters. As we will see, many of these letters used the term "undesirable" to describe these potential immigrants. They argued that a propensity to break the law would be carried into Canada. Further, they argued that disloyalty to the United States would produce disloyalty to Canada. They often associated American war resisters with campus unrest, communism, drugs, and hippie culture. A good number of them also grouped American war resisters as part of an influx of non-Anglo-Saxon stock, appealing to the government
to prevent the entry of immigrants of colour: for instance, "you keep adding to our
problems by admitting Hippies, Desereters and Negroes," wrote an anonymous
correspondent on June 6, 1969. One writer, after the May 22 decision to open the border
to deserters, said "I do not agree with present 'liberalising' [sic] of our former
immigration policy any more than I can stomach the 'liberalising' [sic] of our laws on
homosexuality." Another referred to herself as a reactionary. Others expressed anti-
Quebec and anti-French views.

In general, all of the letters against the open border suggested that some aspect of
the perceived character of war resisters was a threat to Canada and Canadian values. The
following examples will serve to illustrate the strands of argument present in these letters.
Some were objections to the failings of the resisters as cowards, freeloaders, or
subversives:

...our whole existence is threatened if we continue to allow this type of
rabble into our country.... I would like your assurance, sir, that the present
government will not bow to pressure being brought forward by anarchists,
and will continue to prohibit this cowardly element from polluting our
Canadian security.

_G.H. Carley, Oakville, ON, to MacEachen, February 17, 1969_

It is entirely proper that the questioning of would be immigrants by
immigration officials should reveal other qualities than their job
expectation. The word personal integrity is little used in Canada. By and
large the desertes [sic] do not seem to raise the level of this desireable [sic]
characteristic of Canadian citizen [sic]. Many of the landed desertes [sic]
seem inclined to undertake highly undesireable [sic] activities. Therefore
the grilling of Immigration minister ... by a combination of lawyers and
churchmen is a proper political game, but not to the good of the well-being
of Canada.

_Mrs. Henry Aruja, Don Mills, to MacEachen, March 1, 1969_
Call it bias, discrimination or what you will. We don’t need the deserters from the U.S. here. We have enough of that type – people that want freedom without responsibility. Maybe just a free ride. Keep them out!

*J.A. Brewster, Toronto, to MacEachen, March 10, 1969*

With every particle of my being I commend you for your reply to Maclure [sic]. My only fault, and I do not mean this critically, with our Govt. [sic] is that they are not severe enough upon the dreadful horde of Yankee trash coming into our country, to evade the responsibilities of citizenship in their own country. More power to your arm.

*James M. Cameron, Ottawa, to MacEachen, May 3*

Some letters, like those below, expressed objections to specific aspects of the character of immigrants, such as cowardice and disloyalty. References in the letters to Stanley Gray, Pierre Bourgault, lawyers, churchmen, and intellectuals call to mind the Gramscian idea of the influence of intellectuals in civil society. Gray, a leading intellectual in the movement Opération McGill to eliminate English control of McGill University in 1969, and Bourgault, a militant Quebec activist for Quebec independence, must have seemed to the author to be gaining momentum in the sixties political climate. The letters did not make reference to intellectuals opposing the war resisters, although some did oppose them. They also tended to lump all of these intellectuals with connections to social movements or the counterculture together in one category, rather than recognizing any differences of opinion that might exist among them: for them, the left was a monolithic group of people. Remarkably few of the letters invoke citizenship, taxpayer status, or veteran status as a claim to a hearing for their view:

I have never in my life ever seen such trash as these American Draft Dodgers in my life, whom we as Canadians have to support and cater to, after they haven’t got the guts to fight for own country what in hell are they going to do for CANADA, the country I love so much.

W.J. Arthur Fair, Jr., B.A., Edmund Burke Society, to Peterborough MP Hugh Falkner and MPP Walter Pitman, February 13, 1969

These draft dodgers and deserters are cowards and will not fight for their country... Keep Canada a proud land, not a country that allow [sic] garbage in.

J. Gadziola, Toronto, to MacEachen, February 18, 1969

Surely we have enough problems without welcoming men who do not have the courage to face up their convictions or fight for their country... intellectuals say we should welcome such men!!!

Bedbrook, Winnipeg, to MacEachen, March, 1969

What good would be served to Canada as a whole by granting Canadian citizenship to these unwashed cowards...[who] have already taken part in the disruption of our educational institutions, which are being maintained by my taxes... I would suggest, if you go underground, that you take Stanley Gray and Pierre Bourgault with you and, after due disruption of the democratic process, said gentlemen having had lots of experience in those tactics, that you all prevail upon the Canada Council (again functioning because of my taxes) to give these brave upstanding young deserters a Canada Council Grant.... [the] definition of a deserter is...a 'rat.' Perhaps Mr. Trudeau will see fit to create a department headed by another Pied Piper of Hamelin who, together with his pipes, will get rid of the rats. Mr. MacEachen, a good Scotsman should know some good pipers.

R.J. Perrier, veteran, Montreal, to Marcel Prud’homme, MP, May 5, 1969

Why should we as Canadians continue to keep these “BUMS” in our country when they have no loyalty to their own.... I say keep the “BUMS” out. What good are they to Canada? Why have they not to pay income tax, etc., why do these homosexuals get special privileges?

W.J. Arthur Fair, Jr., B.A., [Edmund Burke Society], Peterborough, to MacEachen, February 21, 1969
Finally, several letters took issue specifically with resisters’ expected association with, and encouragement of, questionable elements within Canada:

...for every one who is honestly motivated, there are nine who are not. These nine I would consider are emotionally disturbed. They are anti-government, anti-authority, anti-religious, anti-school and anti-home... [One I met] preaches love and flowers and is against anything that has any degree of organization or responsibility to it... he associated with characters in Yorkville and made contact with strangers on the street or highway.

Dr. E.SA. Bartram, London, ON, to James S. Cross, Acting Director of Programs and Procedures, January 31, 1969

...carefully screen proposed immigrants. You are being badgered by various individuals who have allowed misguided humanitarianism and an inverted sense of values to distort their thinking... professional troublemakers and dissidents... a small but extremely vocal minority of misguided sentimentalists and professional do-gooders who go out of their way to champion the cause of the unworthy... [I] will continue to agree that proposed immigrants be screened... before being granted the privilege of immigrating to our country.

V.T.B. Williams, P. Eng, Ottawa, to MacEachen, May 7 1969

David Surrey’s 1980 study of class among war resisters in Canada described negative stigma attached by Canadians, whose sense of duty was affronted, to both draft dodging and deserting. According to Surrey, Canadians in general wanted war resisters to assimilate, although attitudes changed with time and with shifts in anti-war sentiment.135

It is interesting to note that the negative letters do not mention a desire to see war resisters assimilate; this may be accounted for the fact that nearly all of them were written in response to a specific event – the public debate about deserters and the border – and not the broader question of how Americans should behave once they had arrived.


268
Despite the letters against the open border and Surrey's findings that Canadians wanted Americans to assimilate, it is important to emphasize that the large majority of the letters – around five-sixths – were in favour of opening the border without qualification. What the letters against opening the border show is that opinion was not unanimously in favour of allowing war resisters to come to Canada, or allowing them to stay once they arrived. These views were reflected in some media reports as well (see below, this chapter). They also point to a fatal flaw in the left nationalist arguments. At their most basic, both sets of letters used nationalism to make their points. The line between left and right nationalism is very thin indeed, as we shall see.

**The Limits of Left Nationalism as Shown in Letters**

The letter-writing campaign and the other measures taken by anti-draft activists and supporters were successful in opening the border to deserters, but in at least two aspects the letters were also evidence of the limits imposed by a left nationalist orientation. First, hostile language was not limited to the anti-resister letters. In at least one case the letters in favour of opening the border made use of racist ideas (see below). The fact that letters could use such seemingly contradictory ideas in one argument was a comment on the murky border between left and right wing nationalism. Others, while not as reactionary, were at best contradictory to an open approach to immigration, and ambivalent at best towards a universally open border, even for Americans:

The one chance you get to obtain morally decent, well-educated immigrants from the U.S. you immediately muf[f]it and import uneducated ignorant and unequipped immigrants instead, i.e., [black] domestics from Barbados. How would Mtr. [sic] MacEachen like to go to Vietnam? Or you, for that matter?

269
Rita Belkin, to Trudeau, February 6, 1969

Your ambiguous and, if I may say so, gutless, remarks re deserters from the American Armed Services surely please neither those eager to refuse entry to all save the lily-white and proven “patriotic”, nor those who, in an excess of sympathy and mercy, would open the borders to any and all…. My husband and I would prefer that those who have made the soul-searing decision to leave family, friends and homeland forever, be allowed to come into Canada…if they misbehave there are lots of people ready to report them.

Mrs. A. Gibson, to MacEachen, March, 1969

Probably the clearest example of this ambivalence was the following letter from Robin Mathews, also mentioned in the chapters above. Mathews, an academic and leader of the left nationalist Canadianization movement, was a professor at Carleton University. We will return to his ideas later, but for now his letter in support of an open border is worth re-stating as a very good example of the contradictions within left nationalism:

I should like to make clear, as a Canadian publicly committed to the battle for Canadian viability that I hold the traditions of asylum as sacred to the definition of the country. Secondly, we must guard – within the legislation of the nation – against rigging or appearing to rig procedures that may in fact pervert the intention of legislation under which procedures exist.

The government, in my view, has never done enough to make guests and immigrants to this country aware of its uniqueness and of their responsibility to it.

Partly, problems of the present nature, arise from what is a general failure of consistency and purpose in immigration policy.

If the reasons for difficulty at the present time are that the Canadian government fears to offend the US govt., [sic] then the Canadian government deserves the criticism it is receiving. If the Canadian govt. [sic] fears the results of influx, then it had better set up citizenship courses that make possible for immigrants some idea of Canada other than that it is a cow to be milked by whatever hand reaches for the udder.

Robin Mathews, Ottawa, to MacEachen, May, 1969

270
Mathews' position on American war resisters evolved, as we shall see. However, this letter already showed how left nationalism could eventually lead to the conclusion that Americans should assimilate, contribute meaningfully to Canadian society by getting jobs and learning about Canada, and not become a drain on social programs. From here, for Mathews, it would only be a short step to conclude that they should also not get privileged access to Canadian jobs – a clear contradiction from the position in this letter that resisters should not “milk” the “udder.” Economic nationalism hovered just below the surface of these discussions.

**Left Nationalist Perspectives on American War Resisters**

As we began to explore in Chapter 3, debates about assimilation permeated both the anti-draft movement and the resister community. Accounts vary on the question of whether anti-draft groups put pressure on Americans to assimilate into Canada, or to maintain their American identity. Some have asserted that Canadians in general wanted Americans to assimilate, and certainly there is some evidence of such a viewpoint.\(^{136}\) Further, while most participants in the campaign to open the border to deserters took issue with American government actions and not individual Americans, Robin Mathews, a leader of the Canadianization movement, and others also believed that war resisters were part of American imperialism.\(^{137}\)

In 1970 Mathews, who had previously lent qualified support to the campaign to open the border to deserters in 1969, wrote an article for *AMEX* entitled “The U.S. Draft Dodger in Canada is Part of U.S. Imperialism in Canada.” Critical of American

\(^{136}\) Surrey, 170.

\(^{137}\) See Chapter 4.
immigrants for their contempt for Canadian citizenship, their air of cultural superiority, and their attitude of entitlement to positions of influence in Canada, he suggested they represented cultural imperialism. This cultural imperialism made it “difficult” to “like U.S. citizens, individually.” Mathews criticized draft dodgers not for holding positions of influence per se, but for having the same accent, “to the Canadian ear,” as those Americans in posts which should have gone to Canadians; and for taking Canadians’ jobs. He further criticized them for distracting Canadian activists from Canadian problems by importing terms such as “pig” to describe police, and by insisting on focussing on such incidents as the Kent State massacre of students by national guardsmen. That focus, for Mathews, was associated with the act of breaking windows at Eaton’s, a Canadian company, in a demonstration at the time:

That was such a bad tactic it was ludicrous. I don’t believe it was a tactic. I believe it was the result of hell-raising, U.S. style. Where were the window breakers when the Dunlop factory was being closed, putting hundreds of families out of work as a result of the imperial organization of the multi-national corporation? Window breakers who were trying to bring Canadian attention to U.S. imperialism would surely not break the windows of one of the last Canadian companies of any size which has not yet been taken over by the U.S.

Mathews concluded his article by disputing that the war resisters were politically aware. Instead, for him,

In Canadian intellectual history the American has always been recognized as a threat to survival. That is a fact.... The U.S. citizen has in recent years done an immense amount to divert Canadian attention from Canadian interests. That is where the U.S. draft dodger is today. He is part of U.S.


imperialism in Canada. His existence in Canada must cause many problems – problems that he must face, problems that Canadians must face. It will not be easy. It will not be easy. [sic] 140

Another left academic, sociologist Ron Lambert of the Kitchener-Waterloo Anti-Draft Programme, who had lobbied for Canadian content at the University of Waterloo, debated with Mathews about the influence of war resisters. The pages of AMEX carried a debate between Lambert and Mathews on whether the war resisters were a new wave of American Imperialism. 141 Lambert also participated in similar debates at the first pan-Canadian War Resisters Conference in Montreal in May of 1970. 142 Lambert felt that Mathews was wrong in suggesting that war resisters were an American issue, since the Vietnam War was not solely an American issue. Lambert pointed out that American immigrants had no particular power in Canada, and rejected the implication that Canada was inferior to the U.S. Lambert also took issue with the equation of American ownership in the Canadian economy, to “the radical rhetoric of military resisters.” However, he was most assuredly in favour of American immigrants assimilating calmly and without confrontation into Canadian society.

At the same time, on one or two other points Lambert agreed with Mathews. He objected to American resisters who uncritically drew parallels between the failures of American representative government and police behaviour and the corresponding Canadian institutions; and he agreed that most American exiles were “ignorant” about Canada and should approach Mathews and others, and presumably himself, for

140 Ibid.
141 Dalhousie University Archives and Special Collections (hereafter DAL), MS 10 Reference, AMEX-Canada, AMEX (May-June 1972): 10.
instruction. American objections to Canadian nationalism, for him, were similarly inappropriate. For Mathews and Lambert, Canadian nationalism and the Canadian Parliament were the only possible tools to subvert Canada’s support for the American Empire, and not American-style street demonstrations.  

The debate, published as it was in AMEX, had at least some influence. Renée Kasinsky’s 1970 interview with Nancy Pocock of the Toronto Anti-Draft Programme shows the influence of left nationalist ideas on the leaders of the anti-draft movement. In response to a line of questioning about a perceived shift in the anti-war movement towards more violent tactics, she replied:

Of the people that have passed through [my] house, very few of them are political because they find it very hard to fit into any Canadian thing, and I’m very disturbed about what’s going on here. There’s a copy, and I think it’s a colonial copy of the movement in the U.S. because I can’t see how it helps the war in Vietnam to call a Canadian policeman a pig and kill him. It’s irrelevant. It will do nothing to stop a war anywhere. It will only bring violence into Canadian cities. And it’ll turn our policemen into pigs. And I feel very strongly that this is something very bad we’re getting from the U.S. and our Canadian youth are following along, and they’re showing they’re true colonialists instead of Canadians.

Pocock may have been influenced by the article in AMEX, or perhaps by another article by Robin Matthews on the same topic. In effect, Pocock saw politicization as an Americanized strand of the Canadian movement, and a violent strand of the American movement:

For instance, if they want to be political, I would like to see them taking on the problem of our complicity, of what factories do for the American

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143 Ibid.
144 UBCL, RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-12, Interview with Nancy Pokhawk [sic], May 1970, Toronto, Quaker, Active in Exile Movement Since 1965.
war effort. I'd like to see them picketing those factories. I'd like to see them talking to those workers, interviewing the management.... I don't say I'm against their being politicized. I think it's a shame when they come here and lapse into nothing. But I'd like to see them politicized in a Canadian way. Not an American way. Heaven knows, I don't know what they can do. I don't know what I can do. 146

Pocock went on to describe a meeting where a discussion was had about reaching out to the police after a recent demonstration which had turned violent, and how Americans at the meeting had refused to listen to the Canadians who wanted to argue that Canada is different. 147 She went on:

I sometimes wonder... why we work so hard at it, because some of them do bring their own pattern of life and their own violence and there is Imperialism of the left as well as of the right. And there is a certain arrogance, and oh, blindness and insensitivity. I hope I don't hurt your feelings by saying that, but... the U.S. is a very... strong country, I mean strong character, strong ideas, and Canada isn't. We are more quiet, reserved, and we've always been in a sort of colonial position. So, thank goodness we're not very patriotic. In fact we've only had a flag the last 2 or 3 years. That's what I like to point out to some of the boys. And we've escaped a lot of these things through our history. 148

However, Pocock either did not see her sentiments as nationalist, or was troubled about it, because she soon added:

[T]here is a wave of nationalism going through Canada which is a dangerous thing. I welcome it because I feel it myself. I feel we have something unique here we should preserve. And it's a real dilemma how we can preserve it, being so close to the states.... When you're faced with a human being who needs help, what can you do but help him? And hope that it turns out right! And this is why in our contact with the boys, we have taken time to talk to them.... But whether we'll keep [Canada the way it is] or not I don't know. Because we can't isolate ourselves, we can't be

146 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-12, Interview with Nancy Pokhawk [sic], May 1970, Toronto, Quaker, Active in Exile Movement Since 1965.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
a little island in the world. So you just go on and do the best you can from
day to day.\footnote{149}{Ibid.}

The Toronto Anti-Draft Program's Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada
ported a maple leaf on its cover until its fifth edition was published in 1970. The sixth
edition, Spring 1971, abandoned all national symbolism for an engraving of a grieving
mother figure holding two dead children (see figure 2, p. 93). This last edition was
largely typewritten and lower in production values than the previous five editions. It
included a new section entitled "Of Frying pans and Fires," by Ron Lambert, outlining a
debate between two streams of Canadian nationalism – one resistant to U.S. domination,
and one, "colonially-minded," justifying U.S. foreign policy and its domination of
Canadian decision-making – and encouraging readers to choose one or the other.\footnote{150}{DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 1.2, Various publications.} In
effect, Lambert was suggesting that to adopt the latter position was the only effective
path.

\textbf{Effects of \textit{Left Nationalism} on the Expectations of the Movement}

These ideas, that I have referred to as left nationalism, were perhaps not yet
dominant on the left on the sixties, but they were certainly on the rise. There were,
however, other ideas available on the left, and many of these contended directly with left
nationalist ideas about Canada and its policies. One of the more radical critiques of the
Canadian anti-draft movement was its failure to engage with the way the immigration
system channelled immigrants of lower income backgrounds and with less education –
and therefore, deserters more than draft dodgers — away from successfully obtaining landed immigrant status.\textsuperscript{151}

In 1969 Melody Killian, who we met in Chapter 2, of the \textit{Yankee Refugee}, penned an article entitled “Oh, Canada!” which provoked hostility from Toronto and Vancouver activists because of its assertion that anti-draft movement efforts to help Americans immigrate was “not anti-war work.” Killian asserted that while

the belief of most counsellors [in existing aid groups] is... that anti-draft work... is in some way anti-war work; that is it humanitarian and moral work and saves lives; that it is vital work which must take priority over political work.

The “Vancouver Yankee Refugee group,” and Killian herself, had

reached different conclusions.... [O]ur being here or helping other to come here is NOT anti-war work. Only work that aims at destroying the economic system that CAUSES the war (capitalism) is anti-war work. We know that we are allowed into Canada because of manpower needs of capitalism in Canada... the only justification for being out of jail or Vietnam is to fight the system more effectively from here. We will not remain quiet or complacent to protect work that is not really humanitarian in terms of our long-range goal of ending an anti-human system.\textsuperscript{152}

The piece, and Goldie Josephy’s indignant response,\textsuperscript{153} reflected a debate about the relative value of certain kinds of anti-war work that may seem petty from the standpoint of 2007. Certainly Killian’s approach might have benefitted from a more generous appraisal of the legacy of the peace movement in Canada. However, in suggesting that the Canadian movement was missing some key points of analysis she was correct. Killian

\textsuperscript{153}UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 6-3, Canadian Publications, Letter from Goldie Josephy and reply from the editors, \textit{Yankee Refugee}, no. 5, 1969. See Chapter 5 for further discussion of this exchange and its significance.
pointed to economic motivations behind at least some of the American and Canadian governments’ actions and policies. While there was some awareness of how the points system functioned to screen out deserters in particular, there was never a campaign on the scale of that to open the borders to deserters, aimed at removing economic and educational discrimination from the points system – only one to remove the discrimination against deserters as opposed to draft dodgers in the application process.

Arguably this analytical bias was at least partly due to the dominance of Canadian nationalism on the left in Canada. Because this left nationalism had at its heart the idea of Canada the good, it encouraged a view that, once Canada was free of American influence, its policies would be empty of discrimination. Drawing from Bruce Curtis, we might consider this an example of “black-boxing.” a term he uses to describe how the obfuscation of the inner workings of a “made science” is achieved through the embedment of assumptions which are not questioned, and which, indeed, questioning is not possible because they do not enter awareness. Such ideas are “‘black boxed’: that is to say, [their] dependence on particular modalities of investigation and [their] enlistment of supportive allies have receded into the background, while [their] claims have entered the realm of the taken for granted.”

It is also an example of Gramscian common sense in his theory of hegemony: left nationalism was hegemonic among the anti-draft.

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278
movement, and arguably on the left more generally, because of its roots in earlier ideas, and because it contained ideas that were contradictory in their effects.

**Economic Discrimination in the U.S. Selective Service and the Canadian Immigration Points System**

As Bruce Curtis has explored, administrative forms based upon measurements affect what they measure, encouraging people to fit the categories. The categories are shaped by interactions with the objects of measurement.\(^{155}\) While the categories of the points system were not fundamentally altered by public pressure and interaction with immigrants between 1962 and 1972, the points system certainly shaped who could immigrate. The black-boxed economic basis for immigration policy implied exclusion of immigrants without the proper skills; therefore, by virtue of their economic background and lack of access to education and skills, they could not become immigrants.

In fact, economic discrimination was a process that, for these young men, began with the Selective Service System in the United States and continued with the Canadian immigration points system. Economic and educational differences between draft dodgers and deserters determined their trajectory as war resisters and immigrants. Economic and educational stratification was part of life for American men while the Selective Service Program was in existence. Mark Phillips remembers the way the Selective Service system worked to select those with fewer resources:

> The overwhelming evil of the Selective Service program was that it was indeed selective. And in my Boston suburb, almost nobody went into the service. Most of my classmates at Harvard likewise. I could have gotten out. If you had the resources and the determination.... There was a

struggle, people went through hell to make themselves unavailable, but they didn’t go. So people that went were either working class or gung ho.

In effect, “working class” young men could either expect to be drafted, or to see the military as their only option for a good job. Phillips recalls:

I spent a year in Cambridge [MA] high school as a teaching assistant, as a volunteer.... I was teaching in a very tough class in a very tough school. Cambridge was a very poor town, and every one I was teaching, they were all my own age; every day they had it on their record that that was what they were going to after grade twelve, they were going to join the army. It was a class thing. So people who went from my town were football players, gung ho, and of course it was a much tougher problem for [deserters] to turn around and the penalties were much worse.\textsuperscript{156}

Discussing the tendency of the Selective Service to encourage young men to make specific decisions, Mark Phillips observed

I think you can dramatize [the political nature of the decision to avoid the draft or desert] too much, I think that people made very personal accommodations to a system that was always designed to control the lives of people who were never going to be in the army. That was the point, it wasn’t a way of filling the ranks of the military; it was designed to control young men’s lives... The draft dodgers were a subset of the much much bigger group of guys whose lives were distorted.\textsuperscript{157}

Phillips touches on an issue that needs further study: the idea of the draft as social control. Social control analysis has been applied to public services, but not to the American draft.\textsuperscript{158} The notable exception is the numerous articles by New Left writers in the late 1960s and 1970s on the idea of “channelling.” This interest on their part is no

\textsuperscript{156} Phillips interview.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{158} The sole more recent exception appears to be John Whiteclay Chambers II, \textit{To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America} (New York: The Free Press, 1987).
surprise given that social control analysis and debates about its utility were coming into

However, there was a much stronger reason for this analysis. The Selective
Service was explicit in its own documents about the social control function of the Draft.
In a 1965 orientation document, excerpts of which were reproduced by \textit{Ramparts
Magazine} in 1967, the Service affirmed:

> One of the major products of the Selective Service classification process is
> the channelling of manpower into many endeavors, occupations and
> activities that are in the national interest.

> While the best known purpose of Selective Service is to procure
> manpower for the armed forces, a variety of related processes take place
> outside delivery of manpower to the active armed forces.... The process of
> channelling manpower by deferment is entitled to much credit for the
> large number of graduate students in technical fields and for the fact that
> there is not a greater shortage of teachers, engineers and other scientists
> working in activities which are essential to the national interest.

> The System has also induced needed people to remain in these professions
> and in industry engaged in defense activities or in the support of national
> health, safety or interest.

> The meaning of the word “service,” with its former restricted application
> to the armed forces, is certain to become widened much more in the
> future. This brings with it the ever increasing problem of how to control
effectively the service of individuals who are not in the armed forces.

> Throughout his career as a student, the pressure – the threat of loss of
> deferment – continues. It continues with equal intensity after graduation.
> His local board requires periodic reports to find out what he is up to. He is
> impelled to pursue his skill rather than embark upon some less important
enterprise and is encouraged to apply his skill in an essential activity in the national interest.


In Canada, this specific social control purpose or effect of the Selective Service Program were discussed by several New Left writers. So were the effects of the Canadian immigration points system on deserters, notably by Melody Killian and Rick Ayers. Their article \textquoteleft\textquoteleft Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide,\textquoteright\textquoteright in \textit{The Movement}, June of 1969, drew direct parallels between the two systems:

The Canadian immigration regulations are paired almost perfectly to the Selective Service Act in its channelling effect. The poor, the non-white, the unskilled and \textquoteleft\textquoteleft inarticulate\textquoteright\textquoteright are denied entry to Canada and left to face the draft in the U.S., while skilled and educated middle-class (and therefore mostly white) young men are welcomed because they are potentially useful to the Canadian branch-plant economy. In general, immigration rules exclude those who could not have received deferments [for attending university] in the U.S.
Killian and Ayers had a great impact on Renée Kasinsky, who included several sections on channelling in his 1976 book, *Refugees from Militarism*. She wrote:

Certainly the most important feature of these provisions [the points system] was its continuation of the class-based, manpower channelling system that operates in the United States during most of the Vietnam War years through the Selective Service System. [The points system] would favour the middle-class draft dodger over his working-class deseter compatriot. Working-class youths were not able to meet the educational and occupational requirements sufficiently to raise their scores above the 50 points necessary to [become] landed immigrants. Since the bulk of the deserter population fell into this category, most of the exiles had great difficulty in moving from underground to landed status in Canada. Thus, the same youths who were channelled into the United States Army in the first place found that the same negative selection operated against them in their efforts to start life anew in Canada after desertion.163

While Killian, Ayers and Kasinsky all made some questionable assumptions about class, as we will see below, their basic interest in the class-stratification effects of American and Canadian policy was well-placed. Lawyer Paul Copeland’s memories of the question of deserter education levels, already discussed in Chapter 3, also show how deserters continued to experience exclusion once they arrived in Canada, even after the explicit discrimination was removed from the application process, because the job offer made such a big difference to the points system:

If you had pre-arranged employment when you made the application you got ten points out of the fifty you needed. Inside the country you didn’t get the points for the pre-arranged employment, so it was much easier to apply at the border. Also, the immigration offices in Canada were generally swamped, so if you applied from inside the country it might take you three, four, five, six months before you actually got interviewed. You couldn’t work during that time; at last legally you couldn’t [work].164

164 Copeland interview.
War resisters with higher education levels got more points to begin with. Those education levels, in turn, contributed to the possibility of a war resister being able to find employment. The job offer would also count towards the points required for getting landed. Thus, lower-educated immigrants had a harder time immigrating.

Although there is no statistical proof, enough anecdotal evidence exists to suggest that deserters in Canada did, in general, come from backgrounds with less education and/or less income than draft dodgers. David Surrey, in his 1980 study of class among war resisters in Canada, (see above, this chapter), found that, while deserters did generally have less education than draft dodgers, on average they came from fairly highly educated families.  

Further, he argued that war resisters with “marginal” backgrounds were more often returned to the United States by border officials and immigration officers. Black draft dodgers, he argued, found immigration particularly difficult and wished to return because they could “go underground” more easily – a claim remarkably similar to that made by anti-draft activists themselves.

Surrey corroborates claims of discrimination at the border; he quotes an anonymous immigration officer who was threatened with transfer to the Maritimes if he let in too many deserters. More importantly, Surrey emphasizes that while war resisters in Canada on the whole came from upper strata of income within their respective

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categories, deserters nonetheless did aggregate at the low end of the income data sample.\textsuperscript{169}

Surrey’s sample is quite small, and his conclusions could be explained by other factors – the availability of post-secondary education to one generation more than another, for instance. However, he is not alone in making such an assessment.\textsuperscript{170} Additionally, the number of draft resisters and deserters who came to Canada was only a fraction of the total who resisted; even the highest estimates of American immigration numbers pale in comparison to the quarter million estimated to have avoided the draft by merely omitting to register on their eighteenth birthday.\textsuperscript{171} In turn, the anti-draft movements were a sliver of the wider opposition to war in Vietnam. Further, Surrey’s finding that negative stigma accrued to both draft dodging and desertion is called into question by the experiences of many war resisters interviewed for this work and for others. However, Surrey’s conclusions do support Joseph Jones’ opinion that, despite the lower economic and education status deserters, those deserters who managed to escape to Canada were from the upper stratum of that lower stratum.\textsuperscript{172}

Killian, Ayers and Kasinsky tended to see all draft dodgers as “middle-class” and deserters as “working class.” A clearer analysis of these categories is provided by using income stratification and educational background instead of uncritically using notions of working- or middle-class to discuss differences between groups of war resisters. Further, it was a sweeping generalization, and false, to suggest that all non-white American war

\textsuperscript{169} Surrey, Choice of Conscience, esp. 73-74.
\textsuperscript{171} Miller, 196.
\textsuperscript{172} Joseph Jones, conversation with author, July 7, 2007.
resisters who came to Canada were deserters: for instance, Renée Kasinsky’s records refer to at least three draft dodgers who were black: Mike Vance, mentioned in an article in *Race Relations Reporter*; Mac Elrod, a former civil rights activist from Georgia, mentioned in reference to a CBC interview in 1970; and “John,” a draft dodger Kasinsky interviewed, who had arrived in Montréal in 1968.\(^{173}\) Important questions of racial and economic discrimination were obfuscated by the use of such rigid terms as those used by Kasinsky, Killian and Ayers.

However, the general conclusions of Kasinsky, Killian and Ayers are valuable and merit further study. The points system certainly did, and does, favour certain strata of economic and educational backgrounds, even today (although it is an improvement over the earlier race-based policy).\(^{174}\) Unfortunately, in the period in question, this kind of analysis was rare. The racial and economic discrimination present in the points system was not a major focus of anti-draft activism; instead, it focussed on removing explicit discrimination by immigration officials against deserters, leaving the implicit discrimination more or less intact. There were, of course exceptions; after the success of the border campaign, some activists turned to other measures necessary in their view to permit all war resisters to enter the country whether they met the qualifications or not. John Pocock of TADP told a 1970 Toronto public meeting that a category of political asylum was required to allow unqualified resisters to nonetheless enter Canada. Because

\(^{173}\) UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 5-14, Black Draft Dodgers [clippings].

\(^{174}\) For scholarly accounts that agree with this analysis see Yasmeen Abu-Laban, “Keeping ‘Em Out: Gender, Race, and Class Biases in Canadian Immigration Policy,” in Strong-Boag et al., 69-82; and my observations and notes in Chapter 1.
deserters were outnumbering draft dodgers, and the tendency was for deserters not to be able to qualify under the points system, he argued, such a category was necessary.\footnote{UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 8-5, Newspaper articles – Dodgers and Deserters, “Political Asylum is Demanded If Deserter Can’t Enter Otherwise,” \textit{Toronto Daily Star}, February 24, 1970.}

Let us consider what might have been the outcome if the movement had rejected Canadian nationalism. Arguably its campaign would have been less effective. What if it had used left nationalist arguments as a well-considered and intentional strategy? Perhaps that would have perpetuated the common-sense left nationalism all the same. What if the movement had evolved out of left nationalism to demand that the points system be reformed to stop discriminating against immigrants with less education and money? None of these questions can be answered by history. However, there is no doubt that the idea that the point system was fair and without discrimination permeated the letters to the Department of Immigration. The problem was not the law, but how it was being applied at the border. The dominant ideas imposed limits on whether, and how, the anti-draft movement could provide a deeper critique of the Canadian system of immigration laws and regulations.

\textbf{The Campaign to Open the Border’s (Limited) Success}

After the May 22, 1969 announcement by MacEachen, an additional flurry of letters, 73 of 119 of them against the decision to open the border, reached the department. However, this soon abated, allowing department officials to deal with the pile of unacknowledged and unanswered correspondence. Two letters from this period of May 23 to late June of 1969 indicate that a strategy for dealing with the correspondence had been required. The department had divided the correspondence into that requiring a
response beyond an acknowledgement, and that requiring no further reply. To ensure that no reply was needed, the Minister’s statement of May 22 was broadcast and distributed as far and wide as possible. The vast majority of letters, therefore, received either a brief two-line acknowledgement, or a brief two-line acknowledgement together with a copy of the statement. The exceptions were some peace group and labour representatives and church officials, government MPs, and many of the negative responses received after the May 22nd announcement. These last received a two-page explanation of the decision and its justifications, emphasizing that the Government was not encouraging desertion, but merely upholding principles of universality. Finally, at the direction of the deputy Minister, all correspondence originating in Nova Scotia was intended to receive a lengthier response. The lengthier responses went to those who could be expected to be former Liberal voters whose votes might be lost; to the leadership of social forces with some influence on the political decisions of their members; and to voters in MacEachen home province.

The unsustainability of the pre-May 1969 policy, with its contradictory approach of nominally allowing in deserters while unofficially barring their entry based on immigration officers’ discretion, was a major factor in changing Canadian policy towards war resisters. So was the comparatively small but very vocal and politically able movement to support American war resisters, deserters and draft dodgers. Not all Canadians supported or welcomed the war resisters, as we saw in the letters placed on the draft dodgers file in the Department of Immigration. Moreover, left nationalism and anti-

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Americanism played a role in limiting the extent of the critiques levelled at the government and its attitude towards war resisters from all sides of the political spectrum. Be that as it may, the campaign had had its intended effect. Working with activists in Ottawa, MPs, lawyers, and individual Canadian citizens, the Canadian anti-draft movement succeeded in their bid to have the border opened for deserters – draft dodgers were already theoretically safe from questions about their status. The regulatory situation continued uneasily for several more years. In 1972 Immigration officials announced plans to change the rules again to make it impossible to apply for landed immigrant status from within Canada. Measures to address the developing appeals backlog and, later the presence of thousands of illegal immigrants in Canada, only a fraction of them Americans, will be discussed in Chapter 7.

Those involved in today’s campaign to support the cause of American war resisters from the war on Iraq point out that the draft dodgers of the Vietnam War era were not immediately welcomed in Canada – they argue that it took a campaign by pressure groups to achieve that. The evidence shows them to be correct, even if not everyone involved in the campaign considered themselves to be part of the movement as a whole. However, the activists of the 1960s and early 1970s were also participants in a discussion about Canadian nationalism. The internal conflicts imposed certain limits on the critiques the movement was able to provide. Ultimately, the internal contradictions

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177 In 2004 four American military personnel came to Canada and subsequently applied for refugee status in Canada. They had deserted their outfits and refused to fight in Iraq. By October of 2005 the number had increased to over twenty, and many others have approached lawyers without going public. So far, the Canadian government is reluctant to grant them refugee status, and has recently decided to deport them.
within left-wing nationalism manifested in internal debates in the movement about strategy and tactics. The next chapter will explore these questions in further detail.
Chapter 5

“Politicized in a Canadian Way”: Perceptions of Legitimate Anti-War Work and Tactical Debates in the Anti-Draft Movement

Now, my co-mates and brothers in exile,
Hath not old customs make this life more sweet
Than that of painted pomp? Are not these woods
More free from peril than the envious court!
Here feel we not the penalty of Adam,
The seasons difference; as the icy fang
And churlish chiding of the winters wind,
Which when it bites and blows upon my body,
Even till I shrink with cold, I smile and say
This is no flattery; these are counsellors
That feelingly persuade me what I am.
Sweet are the uses of adversity;
Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous,
Wears yet a precious jewel in his head;
And this our life, exempt from public haunt,
Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
Sermons in stones, and good in everything.
I would not change it.¹

Discussions about anti-war tactics, assimilation, radicalism, and nationalism, were commonly subsumed under what was called, in the vernacular of the time, “politics”. Debates about the political orientation and activity of groups and individuals centred most often on questions of tactics in the anti-war movement; radicalism; and American influence. The debates about politics and tactics may have been rooted in tensions between “old” left influences and New Left sensibilities. Some of these discussions came to a head at a conference of war resisters in Montreal in late 1970. Although the debates made acting in concert at times difficult, ultimately, through discussion and compromise

¹ William Shakespeare, As You Like It, Act II, Scene I, The Forest of Arden.

291
as well as a certain amount of radicalization, the movement was able to overcome these differences and offer a renewed commitment to work together for the cause.

Whether a person or a group qualified as “political” was a relative attribute that depended on the political orientation of the individual or group making the assessment. One excerpt from a Kasinsky interviewee, Bill, outlines the tensions between the political aspirations of activists and their desire to help resisters well, describing his Vietnam veteran’s experience with the Montreal ADC:

[At first] the meetings themselves were just general discussions on housing etc. and just supporting deserters when they came up, that’s about all. There was a little controversy about politics but not much... Some of them were Canadians, there were a lot of deserters who had been there quite a while.

...I found out that you couldn’t get much help unless you went personally to people, like I couldn’t get a job until I went personally and until I made friends. I know people right now who it’s going to take them forever to get landed... because they won’t take an interest in [the A.D.C.]. There was a kind of [elitist] attitude, and there were a few people who formed kind of a [clique] and they all had good jobs and good places to live. [when] I became personally involved with them, I could take them aside... and ask them for a favour... I didn’t go all the time because each meeting was a little more depressing than the meeting before that and the last meeting went to [was]... nothing constructive, and nothing I was interested in. So a lot of people left. It just ended up as a place for people to stay.

...Then there were some people... [who] would put in all this work and effort and it would never be returned in any way so... just quit. The people just kept doing that — working hard for a few months and then quitting... [To better help deserters] they had to have some kind of organization structure, and that’s what Dr. Bourke [a Montreal-based medical doctor] was trying to do but he ran into all kinds of road blocks.

...[We were] people who didn’t want it political, people who weren’t radical. Like Dr. Bourke is a Marxist and I was or I am, and a few other people were, but try as we would [to help people] no-one would listen. They would just draw the line and would say well we don’t want to get mixed up in that, it’s too political.
So really you didn't want them to be Marxists, you just wanted it to be effective.

Right, we wanted to effectively aid desertsers, but at the same time provide to desertsers to extend their political involvement in Canada.

They just ran into road blocks because that people that came up weren't interested in it because they figured well I'm in Canada now and I'm safe, and I don't want to discuss it any more – I don't want to hear about the army, and I don't want to hear about the war.

Then the majority of the people just use it until they can get their landed immigrant status?

That's exactly it.... They use the efforts of these people and take advantage of them. 2

The interviewee went on to describe how a small group of immigrants opposed to Communist ideas had taken over the ADC and re-named it the American Deseters Cooperative by dominating the volunteer force. The group that took over effectively split the ADC into warring and ineffective factions. Other deserters even went so far as to destroy some of the group’s records. Bill regarded the negative consequences as being related to the damage done to the public image of the ADC: the group had no supporters because it had become a “clique.” 3 Bill was describing how the divisions created by certain group members’ adherence to one political ideology or another had created a culture of cliques, which had, in turn, made the takeover possible. As this chapter explores, this “clique” effect was common, and so was the notion that adherence to a particular idea or mode of action was necessary in order to qualify as political.

Divisions Between “Old” Left and New Left

2 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 3-11, Interview with Bill, Vietnam Vet, Montreal.
3 Ibid.
One possible root of these debates was the division between the old and the new left. This topic probably deserves an entire dissertation to itself, but several observations here will begin to illustrate how old left/new left divisions might have affected the debates in the anti-draft movement. Goldie Josephy's reply to Melody Killian, below, is one concrete example of this tension.

As we saw in Chapter 2, anti-draft groups had links with draft counselling groups in the United States, and many of those groups had existed since long before the war on Vietnam. They were often staffed by activists from older pacifist strains of the peace movement. At the same time, as younger activists got involved in this counselling, they did not always recognize the historical contribution of the older activists to the pacifist movement. Mark Phillips, a draft counsellor – someone who helped young men decide what to do about their impending draft, and how best to resist if they decided to do so – before his move to Canada, recalls that

[there was always that division, between the traditional pacifists and Vietnam antiwar groups. In those days I was sort of supercilious about it but now I'm chastened, because those people stayed [involved from a much earlier period]. They kept doing antiwar work in a way the rest of us didn't.... They produced the literature that we [counsellors] had [in the Oakland group he worked with] but they seemed to me at the time to be wholly apolitical.... There was this really strong division between traditional pacifists, who had organized those earlier things I was involved with, SANE\(^4\) and all that, but the groups that I would have contacted [in Canada] were people like me who were doing anti Vietnam War counselling. We got the [counselling] material from the old line pacifists.\(^5\)

\(^4\) See Chapter 3.
\(^5\) Phillips interview.
Phillips’ experience was with both the older models of civil disobedience, like SANE, and with newer counselling groups who made use of the material, but focussed on the Vietnam War specifically. His feelings about “traditional pacifists” seeming “apolitical” at the time are similar to those outlined earlier. Likewise, Hardy Scott, a draft dodger who got involved in the Vancouver group upon his arrival in 1967, was a former draft counsellor from 1964 to 1967 in New York City. Groups such as the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors coexisted with Students for a Democratic Society, the Boston Draft Resistance Group and others, and shared common roots and experience in the anti-nuclear and civil rights movements.

The influence of old pacifist and socialist movements and groups on young people getting involved in anti-draft counselling in the context of the Vietnam War was considerable. As early as 1966 an American Quaker from the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors in Philadelphia visited SUPA and the Canadian Quakers, likely in Toronto. In addition, the files of the Toronto committee, in particular, but also others, contained multiple copies of American anti-draft counselling manuals and other publications.

The influence of the older pacifist movement was felt in the anti-draft movement in Canada; but many of the activists saw themselves as part of a new generation. Canadian activist Ken Fisher’s experience bore some markings of encounters with old

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6 Scott interview.
7 See Chapter 1, note on pacifism.
left activists. In his case, he remembers cultural differences between old and new left, and a sense of a moment of transition:

First I met with some people from the old left, I can’t remember them [clearly] but it was the first time I really woke up to the fact the new left was just the moment, there was a whole history of things before that.

... And these guys [I met with] were communists. These guys were, I think, in the trade union movement somewhere in Ontario, and maybe they were retired, maybe still active.

[The] whole speech pattern was different in those days. [People] mimicked being stoned. We hesitated to say anything assertively. I can’t even imagine imitating the way we talked, but it was a very slow cadence. But these guys, they didn’t talk like that at all, they were like here’s the deal, here’s the analysis, here’s the situation, we’re going to do this. And there was something about them, I felt like I was talking to something like a backwater or a political eddy, I remember thinking this is really strange, this is a very strange culture that I’m playing with here, but it wasn’t a church culture, that I was familiar with. It had a different imagination, and a different integrity, and a different certitude.9

Finally, lawyer Paul Copeland, who helped war resisters in Toronto and was involved in the campaign to open the border to deserters, shares an anecdote which sheds light on the involvement of old left activists in the anti-draft movement. He jokingly suggests that he was unaware of the different political tendencies around him; but his words show that not only did he know about them, they all managed to work together in one way or another:

[T]he day that the Americans actually leave Vietnam, you know, the helicopter taking off with people falling off it and stuff, I go down to the Wheat Sheaf tavern to meet with the people from the anti draft program to celebrate the victory, and a bunch of people I had worked with for years, and towards the end of the evening [Canadian Communists] Nelson and Phyllis Clarke show up, and I sort of wonder, what are they doing here? And at the end of the evening they all stand up and sing the Internationale. And I think, what the fuck? (laughs) These people are all part of the Communist party? (laughs) We worked a lot with people from the

9 Fisher interview.
Communist party around the war stuff, there was a guy named Rich somebody who had been a union organizer and who was a member of the CP who I did a fair bit of stuff with... I always hated the CP and liked the new left because the CP was always so rigid, nobody smoked dope, nobody drank a whole lot, nobody... they were just way too serious,... I always thought that political work was important but enjoying the political work was important and enjoying life was important. And the CP just...

There were a million Trot groups doing antiwar work through various, there were the Young Socialists... they did a lot of antiwar work [but not much anti-draft work]. You go to any antiwar demonstration you had the Young Socialists carrying their flag, you had the League for Socialist Action, which may have been the Young Socialists, you had the Spartacist League, my favourite group used to be UJPO. They’d be these little short old people walking along, it was the United Jewish People’s Order which was a Jewish communist group, and UJPO always had a little contingent, just all sorts of people from all walks of life were involved in the antiwar movement, and it grew to be huge. And then there were sort of the new left groups floating around, doing both antiwar work and other work.

The CPC-ML did some antiwar work too, the CPC-ML who we also acted for [as lawyers], and who would occasionally denounce me. I mean, we were [all] a little nutty.  

Of the traditions outlined above, the least significant in the debate about politics encountered in this research was the communist or socialist tradition. Whether that was because communists focussed on being effective, as Bill suggested, and avoided the tactical discussions; because communists were mainly involved elsewhere in the anti-war movement; because of lingering cold war doubts about communism among the public; because communism was not very fashionable among the new generation of activists; or for some other reason, their ideas do not figure prominently in the arguments. On the other hand, the traditions of non-violent civil disobedience, churches and liberation theology, and pacifism, and the new approaches of the new left and anti-imperialism

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10 Copeland interview.
were most present. And they were at loggerheads for much of the period, until 1970
when, as we shall see, a conference in Montreal became the site of a new unity.

**Debating the Political, Radical, and Liberal**

The many debates among anti-draft activists and deserter and exile groups were
grouped around the questions of violence; radicalism; and effectiveness. Some activists
felt that a new strain of political action, one eschewing nonviolent traditions, was turning
new immigrants away from getting involved. The following excerpt from Kasinsky’s
interview with Nancy Pocock in 1970 is one example – we have seen this quote before in
Chapter 4:

> I don’t think the ones that come up here are very political. The
political ones are staying down there and fighting.... And the pacifist
ones are in jail.... [The ones who come up] think they can’t do any
good in jail, and they feel the movement is getting very violent, and
they don’t see how they can fit in.

... I think there was a movement for a long time before it became what it is
now. There was a very strong movement. The civil rights movement grew
out of a peace movement. And there still is a non-violent movement, as
well as the other movement. And I know many people who are working
down there in non-violent ways, and are not politicized.

*So most of the people who come here are apolitical?*

Yes. Of the people that have passed through this house, very few of them
are political because they find it very hard to fit into any Canadian thing,
and I’m very disturbed about what’s going on here. There’s a copy, and I
think it’s a colonial copy of the movement in the U.S. because I can’t see
how it helps the war in Vietnam to call a Canadian policeman a pig and
kill him. It’s irrelevant. It will do nothing to stop a war anywhere. It will
only bring violence into Canadian cities. And it’ll turn our policemen into
pigs. And I feel very strongly that this is something very bad we’re getting
from the U.S. and our Canadian youth are following along, and they're showing they're true colonialists instead of Canadians. 11

Pocock's concerns about violence were probably a response to mainstream media accounts of such incidents as the riots at the Chicago Democratic National Convention in 1968, Stonewall and the Days of Rage in 1969, and the Kent State events of May of 1970, as well as the Canadian example of Sir George Williams University in Montreal in January of 1969, where protesters occupied a computer lab over alleged mishandling of racism charges against the school. She continued:

For instance, if they want to be political, I would like to see them taking on the problem of our complicity, of what factories do for the American war effort. I'd like to see them picketing those factories. I'd like to see them talking to those workers, interviewing the management.... I don't say I'm against their being politicized. I think it's a shame when they come here and lapse into nothing. But I'd like to see them politicized in a Canadian way. Not an American way. Heaven knows, I don't know what they can do. I don't know what I can do. 12

For Pocock and others, American protest was violent, and therefore not Canadian. Pocock went on to describe a meeting where a discussion was had about reaching out to the police after a recent demonstration which had turned violent, and how Americans at the meeting had refused to listen to the Canadians who wanted to argue that Canada is different. 13 It is easy to see how the idea of Canada as having a pacifist tradition played into these debates. Here, political-ness was defined in relationship to violent and non-violent strands of the movement.

11 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-12, Interview with Nancy Pokhaw [sic], May 1970, Toronto, Quaker, Active in Exile Movement Since 1965.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
On the other hand, for some immigrants being political meant being radical, as one deserter Kasinsky interviewed suggested: "I’ve seen a large percentage of deserters switch very quickly to becoming political. I remember one case, especially, where a guy came up – from Detroit – he came up one day, that night went off to listen to [Black Panther leader and American radical] Kathleen Cleaver, came back the next day rapping dialectics, and had has steadily progressed leftward from there."  

Similarly, the Vancouver ADC expressed its outlook as a political one. We have evolved a Five Point Program for deserters, which includes propaganda (both of action and of word), educational classes, pointing out Canada’s colonial status and explaining the class bias of the selective service system in the States; a program to unify Canadian anti-draft organizations for great effectiveness; a pledge of support to all people and nations within North America fighting capitalist repression and imperialism. We have full information on the Canadian Immigration Act, and provide counsel and advice for anyone who needs it.

The Montreal ADC listed, as one of its reasons for existing, “The cultural corruption and economic exploitation of the peoples and natural resources of Quebec, Canada, and of all the countries into which the U.S. system extends.” It decided in April of 1969 that it needed to be “more political and more public” in order to reach its constituency. But, for them, at this point, that meant becoming involved in the campaign, instigated by the TADP, to open the border to deserters.

Groups adhering to these sets of ideas emerged in the later part of the period under study, the majority of them after the border was opened to deserters. Because of

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14 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-7, Interview with Doyle, Deserter, Toronto, A.E. Union.
16 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 6-20, Declaration of purpose and history of American Deserters’ Committee Montreal.
their radical ideological approach, the exile groups sometimes alienated potential
volunteers, and those who might need help. For instance, Lee Zaslofsky, a deserter who
arrived in 1970, wrote in AMEX that year that the Toronto ADC suspected him of being
an FBI infiltrator because of his short hair. In the article, Zaslofsky was generally critical
of exile groups.17 Sometimes these tensions were resolved in public. In an AMEX article
Bill Murray of the Montreal American Deserters’ Co-op stated, describing his own
perspective on the incident described by (another) Bill above, that “we... [have no
intention of ever going back to the U.S. but the other group we belonged to [the ADC]
and broke away from at their request, was more radical.... My men are neutral. We want
to live here and because the Canadian government was decent in letting us come we don’t
want to spoil things.” The ADC responded in the article that the “newcomers are either
crazy, ‘power-tripping’ individuals, or cops.”18 Here, he was expressing the anti-
authoritarian strain of the radical left, and fears about police infiltration of activist groups.
The conflict between the American Deserters’ Committee and the American Deserters’
Co-op was, here, explicitly over ideological orientation. For the Committee members
anyone who disagreed with their radical orientation must be mentally unstable or a police
infiltrator. If nothing else this episode gives a sense of how deeply felt were the
sentiments on either side.

17 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 6-4, Canadian Publications – AMEX. “Toronto ADC
18 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 5-13, Assorted Articles, “Montreal, P.Q.: An
Organizational Split (now there are three immigrant groups there) and a Bombing of One of the Groups,”
AMEX, unknown date.

301
In contrast, the Toronto American Deserters Committee had little political ambition. It initially sought to "provide deserters with the additional assistance needed for them to successfully conclude the immigration process and become contributing members of Canadian society."\textsuperscript{19} Similarly, the Toronto Union of American Exiles sought to "bring together exiled Americans for the purpose of self-help and social action" and to "complement and supplement the services of the Toronto Anti-Draft Programme."\textsuperscript{20} For these two groups, the orientation of immigrants was not a deciding factor. Nor was political agreement with other groups a condition in order to work with them. The UAE came in for criticism for this less radical orientation. Said one movement journalist:

The Union of American Exiles (UAE) is the largest, busiest and politically least effective exile group in Canada. It specifically defines itself not as a political group, but as a service organization committed to ameliorating problems such as loneliness, disorientation, the lack of housing and jobs.... The UAE has in the past addressed itself to questions such as whether to the group, which has a formal membership and a constitution, should "Become Political". But... the UAE has defined itself so far away from political self-consciousness that radical exiles living in Toronto usually cannot work with it.... Such an organization inevitably leads to Yankee chauvinism... and can only alienate Canadians along national lines. Americans, as Americans, are hardly an oppressed minority in Canada. Their need to organize themselves can be rooted only in opposition to U.S. imperialism, with the aim of liberating not only themselves, but Canadians also, from its grip.\textsuperscript{21}

The debate expressed in the above quotes appears to be ranged along the line between being a service organization and taking on an advocacy function that went beyond the

\textsuperscript{19} UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 5-8, Analysis of desertion - ADC's Political activity, clippings and articles.
\textsuperscript{20} UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 5-8, Analysis of desertion - ADC's Political activity, clippings and articles.
\textsuperscript{21} UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 5-11, Articles on Deserters, The Movement, June 1969.
assistance of individuals in securing landed immigrant status, jobs, and shelter. However, here again it is necessary to emphasize how subjective this judgement was, because to this date the largest advocacy campaign had been undertaken by the groups considered less political and more oriented to service. The advocacy the anti-draft groups undertook was not considered legitimate anti-war work by the more radical groupings, exactly because it was not sufficiently radical, ideologically speaking.

A good example of this argument about radicalism took place among BC activists, and was also made public in the pages of movement publications. As outlined in earlier chapters, some animosity existed between the TADP’s Bill Spira and activists in other anti-draft groups, including Melody Killian, a war resister who was involved in organizing American “refugees,” of the Yankee Refugee. That animosity was expressed in a letter from Steve Strauss of the VCTAAWO to Allen Mace of the TADP, which expressed irritation with both Spira and Killian:

It irritates me when I call long distance to be lectured for ten minutes about the misconduct of this office... especially when it turns out that what Bill Spiro [sic] didn’t like was the Yankee Refugee and Melody Killian, neither of whom are connected with the Committee. He says the trouble with us is that we aren’t a liberal organization. Whatever the hell that means.  

Here, liberal politics are opposed to radical politics. Spira probably saw liberal politics as a set of politics that did not challenge the system in any fundamental way, and therefore sought change from within, while radicals sought to change the system fundamentally. This conflict was a symptom of the debate about politics within the anti-draft movement.

\[22\] UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 1-3, Correspondence – Other Canadian Organizations with Committee.
Indeed, as we saw earlier, it was Melody Killian's 1969 *Yankee Refugee* piece, entitled "Oh, Canada!", that seems to have provoked hostility from Spira and others. It is worth quoting a second time at length. In it, Killian asserted that

the belief of most counsellors [in existing aid groups] is the following: that anti-draft work decreases the size of the U.S. military; that it is in some way anti-war work; that it is humanitarian and moral work and saves lives; that it is vital work which must take priority over political work; that in fact anyone doing political activity is jeopardizing the anti-draft programme and is threatening the lives of people because Americans doing political work in Canada could cause the "closing of the border."

Killian suggested that humanitarian work was not political. In contrast to these decisions by draft counselling groups, she argued, the "Vancouver Yankee Refugee group" had reached different conclusions... our being in Canada does not affect the size of the military machine, but... our men's places are simply filled up by others who cannot enter Canada... our being here or helping others to come here is NOT anti-war work. Only work that aims at destroying the economic system that CAUSES the war (capitalism) is anti-war work. We know that we are allowed into Canada because of manpower needs of capitalism in Canada.... The only justification for being out of jail or Vietnam is to fight the system more effectively from here. We will not remain quiet or complacent to protect work that is not really humanitarian in terms of our long-range goal of ending an anti-human system. We also do not believe in the eminent [sic] danger of our activities causing a change in the immigration act or causing deportation of our members. If... the Canadian government did undertake such moves, it would only reinforce our understanding of imperialism: that in fact there is no "refuge."  

Killian and *Yankee Refugee* were asserting a radical and anti-capitalist approach, suggesting that groups engaged in humanitarian work that did not relate war to capitalism were not really anti-war.

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23 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 6-2, Canadian Press on Emigrants, Deserters, Exiles, Melody Killian, "Oh, Canada!", *Yankee Refugee*, no. 4, 1969.
In the following issue of *Yankee Refugee*, Ottawa AID activist Goldie Josephy responded to Killian, stating that some of us who helped form a viable peace movement in Canada might take exception to statements by Melody Killian that places like Ottawa etc. need “political groups [...] to do real anti-war work.” I think my dear children, you need to do a little homework, and then you will find that groups like mine have been active for nearly 10 years – you might also learn something useful in the process.

In reply, the editors gave their own educational advice, urging Josephy to read Herbert Marcuse on “repressive tolerance.”\(^2^4\) As we saw in Chapter 2, Herbert Marcuse’s influence on the youth-dominated New Left is well documented.\(^2^5\) In this text, Marcuse argued that “within a repressive society, even progressive movements threaten to turn into their opposite to the degree to which they accept the rules of the game,” and that movements that do not challenge the status quo are doomed to perpetuate it.\(^2^6\) In this exchange, then, Josephy claimed that the underlying theme was one of experience over youth. By referring to her longer experience, Josephy invoked an older tradition of nonviolence, and implicitly claimed the wisdom associated with that experience, effectively accusing the *Yankee Refugee* of being hotheads. By invoking Marcuse, the *Yankee Refugee* claimed the debate was elsewhere, and accused Josephy of being part of the status quo. She could not be effective because she was not involved in fighting for fundamental changes within the system.

\(^2^5\) See also discussion in Chapter 2 and notes.
AMEX took on board some of Killian's criticism of the TADP in its editorial of early 1970, arguing that Bill Spira and the TADP were using a too-narrow definition of anti-war work and accusing them of being "liberal" – that is to say, accepting of the current democratic rule.27 Above, we saw that Bill Spira agreed, and, in fact, he thought that the Vancouver Committee was not liberal enough.

These debates had repercussions on the funding of the groups. The January 1970 issue of AMEX reported on a meeting of clergy and resister aid groups in Windsor, Ontario, claiming that there had been interference in the event by Spira.28 Later the Montreal ADC wrote to AMEX that they had been denied funding from the Canadian Council of Churches because Spira had convinced them not to fund "political" groups.29 In the next issue Vance Gardner of the Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters suggested that the churches (likely referring to the Canadian Council of Churches) merely saw the aid groups as doing work more closely aligned with their approach.30 A September 1970 letter to AMEX provided a "medium defence of Bill Spira...where was the writer when Bill Spira started working with Toronto Anti-draft. Sure, Spira is not the easiest guy to

get along with, but he’s worked hard and has a lot of knowledge we benefited from. You must be pretty damn cock-sure to go around bad-mouthing.”31

In his 1970 interview with Kasinsky, Spira was explicit on the question of whether the counselling groups should be “political.” Spira asserted that to place such a requirement would mean selecting volunteers for their political persuasions, which he regarded as “silly.” Spira was forthrightly hostile at times to exile groups – “AMEX has no constituency at all. AMEX is two or three people who write a magazine. They have no constituency, they don’t hold any meetings, etc.” – and just as hostile in his opposition to the holding of an exile conference in Montreal in 1970.32 For Spira, any group with no connection to a movement could not claim to represent anyone but its own members, narrowly defined. Therefore, it could not be effective.

However, Spira did not deny the political nature of war resistance: “I see the act of desertion as a highly political act. But that doesn’t mean that the individual fully realizes the full implications of his act.” Rather, his objection was to the expectation of a specific ideological orientation by aid groups and the potential effects that expectation could have on appropriate counselling. As he commented on the Montreal ADC’s approach, “If [a counsellor] thinks politicizing a guy is more important than to get him landed obviously [he] will spend much less time on it and also the selection of counsellors will be different. You look for someone with ‘the correct political line’

32 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 4-14, Interview with Bill Spira of the Toronto anti-Draft Program [sic], June 1970.

307
instead of somebody who knows the immigration scene.”33 In May, 1970, against Spira’s position, movement journalist Fred Gardner expressed the idea that to advocate against the formation of exile groups, as Spira was doing, was to explicitly take a position against the political nature of desertion as an anti-war tactic: “To criticize deserters because they merely want to stay alive is inhumane; to dismiss them as apolitical is not only wrong, but has the elements of a self-fulfilling prophecy.”34

As Jones noted, exile groups went through different phases of political orientation during their existence.35 AMEX magazine reflected these changes. The mainstream media noticed its politicization. A December 1970 Toronto Star editorial urged AMEX and American immigrants to fit into Canadian life, suggesting that the “revolution”-oriented American immigrants were in a minority.36 The debate raged to a lesser degree in some places than others. In Ottawa, for instance, the ADC and Ottawa AID were staffed in 1970 by the same people – evidence that deserter groups and aid organizations could get along.37 Even the Yankee Refugee, associated with the Vancouver ADC, went through different phases of orientation. One article by its staff suggested that “our constituency can only be the American community as long as it takes to dissolve that community – to effect meaningful assimilation into already existing groups or to create

33 Ibid.
35 Joseph Jones, email interview by author, November 21, 2006.
new groups that involve draft dodgers not as Americans but as new Canadians." 38 Here, instead of retaining American-ness, the Yankee Refugee argued for assimilation into the Canadian movement.


In May of 1969 the Toronto-based Union of American Exiles, one of the oldest American-identified groups, grew concerned about a deterioration in the sharing of information among groups, and a resulting inconsistency in counselling practices. 39 The group proposed a conference that would prove to be a turning point for the question of politics in the anti-draft movement. 40 The conference was planned for the purposes of improving consistency with counselling and other activities, and generally improving communication. 41 Other groups worked to promote the conference once it was planned, and although the idea came from an exile group, the promotors cast a wide net. VOW received a letter from the ADC describing the conference, and its purposes, as being "cooperation" and sharing of resources. The ADC emphasized that the event was expected to be the largest ever conference of anti-draft groups and refugee or deserter groups, with twenty to twenty-five groups attending, as well as many individuals. The draft agenda included a round-table; discussions about information sharing, government relations, the political role of resisters, the formation of a "political coalition," and next

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38 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 5-8, Analysis of desertion - ADC's Political activity [clippings and articles]: Yankee Refugee staff, "Americans in Canada," undated.
39 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 1-3, Correspondence – Other Canadian Organizations with Committee.
41 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 1-3, Correspondence – Other Canadian Organizations with Committee.

309
steps; and the establishment of a means of coordination. These agenda items were signs of a mature movement with experience working on behalf of resisters as individuals and as a group, and with the intention of overcoming political debates between liberal and radical orientations in order to move forward together in some unity.

The Pan-Canadian Conference of U.S. War Resisters was held in May and June of 1970. The conference was attended by both aid groups and exile organizations, as well as one or two international groups, and discussed sharing resources and ideas. The conference was attended by the aid groups, except Calgary, Winnipeg and Victoria; the anti-war and left activist groups the Front de libération populaire and Women’s Liberation; American anti-draft groups; the Canadian Council of Churches (CCC); American church organizations; Unitarians and Quakers; and coffeehouse projects.

At the conference a document was circulated entitled “Proposal from RWB [Red, White and Black] and AMEX for Structure and Operating Procedure of a Pan-Canadian Information Centre.” As outlined earlier, the aim was to establish a “clearing house” of information from the regions in Toronto, with a cost-shared publication. The session also included the distribution of cheques from the CCC, including to the ADCs. In

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46 Ibid.
some ways, this conference was the logical next step for a social movement that had had a victory the year before, and was looking for ways to be proactive, and to do so in a unified way. Perhaps the unexpected victory had resulted in a lack of focus for the movement. It also coincided with tougher times for immigrants in Canada, with unemployment increasing and public opinion beginning to turn against immigrants in general for that reason. There was a need to work together in this new climate, instead of turning against each other.

The conference discussed the condition of employment and the impact the increase in the numbers of immigrants was having on the ability of aid groups to find work for the influx. Thunder Bay, Sudbury, Saskatoon, Edmonton and Manitoba were exceptions. Conference participants discussed the recent open border policy and factors still restricting entry for deserters, including negative publicity regarding the political and other activities of war resisters. Participants also discussed funding with a representative from the CCC. Canon Wilkinson of the CCC announced that, although previously money had been issued only to the TADP, that now that the CCC knew about the other groups money was being distributed more broadly. The months following the conference would see additional funds sent to the MCAWR, Montreal, Regina, and Toronto ADCs, TADP, VCTAAWO, Winnipeg CTAAWO, and RWB. The CCC could

48 Ibid.
no longer be accused of funding only “non-political” groups. The conference and the unity it displayed may have been the impetus for this shift in the CCC’s policy.

On communication, RWB and AMEX proposed setting up their information centre, and the idea was adopted. Four regional information collection centres were established, to funnel information to Toronto. RWB, AMEX and The Alternative personnel formed the core group to publish the information as it was received. An elaborate plan to collect and publish the information was also adopted, with a publication schedule and contingency plans. The bulletin, Exnet, was published for several months by RWB.

The Vancouver representatives to the conference were Peter Maly and Peter Burton of the VCTAAWO; Steve Vernon of the Vancouver ADC; and Renée Kasinsky, representing her research company and likely attending in order to gather information for his book. Afterwards, the four representatives wrote an eight page report outlining the proceedings and the discussions about the state of the movement, the question of the “political role of American war refugees,” and the implications for the movement in Vancouver. On the question of “politics,” the Vancouver representatives reported that conference participants had discussed the role of Americans in Canada, how they could be more effective, and the relationship to the women’s liberation movement. Tom Hayden and Carl Oglesby participated in this portion of the conference. The report stated

51 UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 7-11 Exile Group Publications: Toronto, Montreal.

312
that the "general and growing Canadian resentment of 'left imperialism' or 'cultural imperialism'" (by which they meant imperialism of American leftists in the Canadian movement) meant that American "exiles" needed to be active in ways which were not explicitly along the lines of current exile groups. Rather, Americans should work to learn about Canada and participate as immigrants in Canadian politics.\footnote{Ibid.}

At the same time, there had been, at last, "general agreement" that leaving the United States for Canada was an undesirable anti-war tactic; but despite that, the "exodus" had been changed positively by the increase in the numbers of deserters. Therefore, the conference attendees had agreed, draft dodgers should be encouraged to stay in the United States if possible, while deserters were the highest priority for action to improve border conditions for immigration: "[American immigrants] should become active in the exile scene to the extent of making it easier for deserters, whose act is of a much higher political nature and who are in greater need and under more pressure."\footnote{Ibid.}

The conference was therefore a site of remarkable compromise and consensus, perhaps because figures such as Bill Spira did not attend. This consensus was likely also in part due to the pressure being put on the Americans to assimilate or go home by writers like Robin Mathews. At any rate, exile and deserter groups agreed to participate in Canadian movements, and in turn, anti-draft groups agreed to promote the needs of deserters.

On "the issue of women," the conference discussed what was referred to as "male oppression" and how to combat it within the anti-draft movement. Methods suggested included the cessation of giving women the "secondary or less glamorous work" of the
groups, and acknowledging that their act of immigration was "of...political consequence," rather than merely a by-product of actions taken by men.\textsuperscript{55} The event occurred in a context of increasing women's activism and criticism of sexist ideas within social movements, as analyzed by such authors as Sara Evans.\textsuperscript{56} As Evans notes, activist women in the sixties became disillusioned with their marginal role in social movements, and the resisters and anti-draft activists were no exception. As noted above, a women's caucus meeting at the conference made a "non-proposal" to respect women war resisters equally with their male counterparts, critical of the common assumption that they were there only because their husbands or boyfriends were.\textsuperscript{57}

*AMEX* coverage of the event included a description of a debate between representatives from exile groups and aid groups including TADP and MCAWR. The coverage emphasized a unity of opinion that aid programmes must be at least somewhat political.\textsuperscript{58} News of the pan-Canadian war resisters conference was also carried in the American alternative press, including the *National Guardian*.\textsuperscript{59} The Toronto delegates returned thinking that perhaps it might no longer be "enough to have just refused to go.... We are hardly free of the United States up here...perhaps it is our role to lead the fight,

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid. See also notes above regarding research on women war resisters.
physically, against the U.S. from our exile.” However, the resolutions passed at the conference did not deviate from the core activities of aid groups: communication, visibility, fundraising, and political involvement to protect the refuge Canada represented. 60

Aspects of this more political outlook had implications for the TADP’s ability to reach those it wanted to help. The April issue of AMEX reported that war resisters in Toronto were worried by reports that TADP was telling people to stay in the military to “resist from within,” or turning people away in a policy of “priority counselling.” Danny Zimmerman of the TADP clarified that the practice referred to a triage process to help deserters and delinquent resisters first. 61 The TADP was not turning resisters away, but merely responding to an influx of deserters, likely the direct result of the movement’s victory in May of 1969.

Divisions and (Re)unifications

Differences in the anti-draft movement about tactics and legitimate activity may have had their roots in different political cultures from earlier in the century. These differences could have resulted in the fracturing and further splintering of the movement; but instead, a pan-Canadian conference in Montreal developed a unified vision. The unity was brought about in part by the rise of left nationalism, but also by the pressures on the


315
movement brought about by economic and political conditions and the need to work together effectively to resist the negative effects of those pressures.

The anti-draft movement did not outlast the draft, although the resister community held together to fight for a conditional amnesty until the late 1970s. During its existence it engaged with government in order to push for reforms to the Immigration regulations. Its other interactions with state apparatuses included, most notably, police forces and two short-term immigration programs. The police interaction often took the form of harassment and surveillance of anti-draft groups and war resisters. The Immigration programs, one of which was intended to clear appeals backlogs and the other to land the many illegal visitors resident in Canada prior to a major shift in policy, were used effectively by anti-draft groups to land American war resisters. The next chapters will examine these interactions with government institutions, including the RCMP, local police, and the Department of Immigration, in more detail.
Chapter 6

Policing the Anti-draft Movement: Department of Immigration Suspicions and
RCMP Surveillance, 1966-1973

Cops
were raiding every
dream, & I went all
night about the house looking
for sleep,

under the waning,
silver moon I took
for a manacle.

I was in a fever, fitful
for Peace,

children
waking without mothers
or arms, holocaust, Hell
no, I wouldn’t go.¹

Debates about politics in the anti-draft movement only sometimes focussed on the
issue of the effect of American immigrants on Canadian antiwar efforts. For government
and the police, however, how to address what they perceived as a problem of an
increasing presence of American immigrants was the central question. This presence and
their support network were often seen as disruptive by government officials in the
Department of Immigration. This attitude reflected that of members of the Canadian
public, shown in some of the letters to the Department in 1969.

Theoretical debates about the influence of populations, or sections of populations,
on state institutions and on the behaviour and decisions of officials, and vice versa,

¹ Excerpt from Joe Nickell, “Hidden Places,” date unknown, in Allan Briesmaster and Steven Michael
Berzensky, eds., Crossing Lines: Poets Who Came to Canada in the Vietnam War Era (Hamilton, ON:
Seraphim editions, 2008), 162.
inform much of this part of the story of support for war resisters in Canada.\(^2\) In
Gramscian terms, there was a battle for hegemony over the population's attitudes towards
war resisters. This study of the actions of police and Department of Immigration officials
illustrates that some sections of Canadian society and some government officials did not
support the war resisters, and that the May 22 1969 announcement of the open border for
deserters would not quell fears about an influx of dangerous, shiftless or unreliable young
American men.

Throughout the period of this study, Immigration Department officials discussed
what, if anything, could be done about the potentially bad influence of U.S. immigrants
and their supporters on Canadian society. Interaction between Immigration officials and
the RCMP on the topic shows that the RCMP shared this constant preoccupation, and that
there were tensions around the two departments' respective jurisdictions, about whose
responsibility these potential troublemakers were, and about the efficacy of both
organizations' actions. The jurisdictional struggle, which occurred shortly after an intense
and more general discussion about the powers of the RCMP in the arena of security and
secret policing and some limitation of those powers,\(^3\) was marked by frustrated
exchanges of correspondence. The fact that several bureaucrats in the Department of
Immigration happened to agree with the RCMP about the trouble American immigrants
could cause, did nothing to alleviate the interdepartmental frustrations. The situation was
exacerbated by the change in border policy in May of 1969. As changes took hold at the
level of policymaking, bureaucrats' attitudes towards the anti-draft groups slowly

\(^2\) See Curtis.
\(^3\) Whitaker, *Double Standard*, esp. 218-233.
changed as well, increasing the differences in respective attitudes taken towards war resisters by the two departments. Meanwhile, federal police conducted raids on war resisters and their supporters, and the RCMP kept dozens of groups under constant surveillance throughout the period.\(^4\)

Municipal police, federal politicians, and the legal system all played a role in this widespread surveillance and occasional harassment of anti-draft groups and activists. Police behaviour was a reflection of opposition to the war resisters among Canadians. At the same time government actions such as the decision to open the border, and the manner in which government worked with, among others, the anti-draft groups to promote two programs in 1972 and 1973 designed to regularize illegal immigrants while closing the border, reflected the opposing view in what can be understood as a hegemonic struggle over the treatment of war resisters. Anti-resister and pro-resister sentiment, anti-draft group priorities, police behaviour, bureaucrat’s opinions, and government actions were in a state of constant change and conflict which was never completely resolved, although the balance shifted in favour of the war resisters in late 1969, and stayed there until well into the 1970s.

Below, we will consider, first, the police harassment and surveillance, public debates about it, and government responses. Then, we will examine the problem of the determining the jurisdictional responsibilities of various government departments regarding war resisters.

\(^4\) For a selected list of groups under surveillance, see Appendix V, Selected RCMP Surveillance of Anti-Draft Groups, Other Supportive Groups, and War Resisters, 1966-1975. For a good overview of RCMP surveillance of university campus peace groups and conclusions about the RCMP’s lack of inhibitions in spying on Canadians, see Hewitt, *Spying 101*, 93-172.
Police Surveillance and Raids

Many anti-draft groups attracted the attention of the RCMP. The RCMP spied on both anti-draft groups’ everyday activities and on their events, and on groups with informal links to them and to war resisters. The Regina Committee of American Deserters, for instance, experienced surveillance and questioning by RCMP and local police. For many war resisters, it was a matter of fact that RCMP officials were sharing information with the FBI. As Michael Goldberg, a draft dodger who arrived in Canada 1967, recalls,

When I came up here I had my job [in Vancouver] and I obviously didn’t report [to the draft board], but I sent a letter – one of the tactics that was standard was to send as much paper as possible, and delay as long as you could, so the file just got bigger and bigger and bigger. You know, like, send them a phone book and say, “here, my number’s in the phone book.” When they said you need to send us your newest telephone number I just sent them the Vancouver phone book. It was to try to flood them with paper. Eventually they got fed up and just said if you don’t show up on X day, you will be declared absent and your information will be sent to the FBI.

And about 2 months later I was visited by the RCMP at my workplace in Vancouver, so clearly the stuff went to the FBI and the FBI asked the RCMP. And what they were interested in was, “are you planning to stay in Canada?” And I said, “wait a minute, what are you doing their work for?” But they were simply saying, “is this going to be an active case or should we shut this thing down?” They were clear that I was going to stay [in Canada]. But the fact that they had no authority but that they would do the work [of the FBI] just appalled me. I was just astounded.

About three months later my sister got married [in the U.S.], but there were two FBI agents sitting outside the synagogue, who readily identified themselves as FBI agents [who thought] I might be there. That was clearly because of my activity with [Students for a Democratic Society]; we were a very active chapter.6

5 Perrin and McCarthy, 130-132.
6 Goldberg interview.
Goldberg’s assumption that RCMP officers were working directly with the FBI was widespread. Indeed, as early as 1966 the RCMP appeared to admit it under media scrutiny, suggesting that FBI agents even operated directly in Canada, accompanied by RCMP. 7

If an official policy to this effect existed it was negotiated in or after 1966. 8 It is probable that the question was considered as part of a government response to scrutiny around the case of Glen Briscoe, of Clark Road, Port Moody, BC, a Canadian who had turned eighteen in Canada and whose mother had been interviewed by FBI agent Alfie Gunn about his failure to register for the draft. 9 On March 24, 1966, the question came up in the House of Commons. Ron Basford, then M.P. for Vancouver-Burrard and a member of the Liberal government, asked whether FBI agents operated in Canada, and if so, how. Did these arrangements allow for supervision of, or the feeding of information

7 LAC, RG 146, Royal Canadian Mounted Police fonds, Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors, “RCMP Admits FBI Agents are Operating in Canada,” unknown newspaper publication, circa April 1966.
8 LAC, RG 25, Department of External Affairs fonds, Vol. 10842, File 20-1-2-USA, Political Affairs – Policy and Background – Canadian External Policy and Relations – Unites States of America, pt 3. Certainty on this statement is not possible partly because the following documents were exempted from release under Access to Information legislation from the file on FBI-RCMP cooperation – the existence and titles of which are themselves a strong indication that such collaboration took place:
• Memorandum from USA division re Canada-US Relations March 31, 1966, 3 pages
• “For Mr. Wall, Privy Council Office re RCMP – FBI Cooperation April 18, 1966,” 2 pages
• “From DC (2) division to USA Division April 21, 1966,” 1 page
• Telegram from External Affairs to Washington re RCP-FBI cooperation April 22, 1966, 2 pages
• Letter External Affairs to US embassy re RCMP-FBI cooperation, April 22, 1966, 1 page
• Memo for the Minister, May 9, 1966, 5 pages
• Memo for the Under-Secretary May 9, 1966, 1 page
• Memorandum from the Office of the Secretary for External Affairs, May 13, 1966, 1 page
• Memorandum for the Under-Secretary, May 14, 1966, 2 pages
• Memorandum for the Minister, May 30, 1966, 4 pages
• Hansard, April 25, 1966, re activities of FBI in Canada
• Aide-Memoire, April 22, 1966, 2 pages
• Memorandum for the Secretary of State for External Affairs re Canada-U.S. Relations, June 24, 1965, 17 pages.
to, RCMP or other police forces, he wondered? Did FBI agents question Canadians and residents of Canada without the presence of RCMP or other police? Did Alfie Gunn, an FBI officer, question members of the Briscoe family in the absence of the RCMP, and if so, under what arrangements? A week later opposition leader John Diefenbaker asked similar questions, making specific reference to draft dodgers and asking if they were being targeted for these interrogations. The same day, Prime Minister Lester Pearson agreed that it was improper.

Internal discussion in the Department of External Affairs during that week shows that a flurry of correspondence followed Basford’s question to determine what arrangements, if any, existed between the two countries in the area of police jurisdiction. After polling the RCMP and Privy Council the Department of Immigration determined that the arrangements were informal and implied rather than written or negotiated. The RCMP’s stance was that any FBI interrogations were in fact conducted with the aim of referring individuals to the RCMP. The Privy Council office communicated that they [had] been unable to find on our files any general record of instruction to either the Department of Justice or the R.C.M.P. regarding RCMP – FBI co-operation. There may be such instructions, and there may be instructions giving explicit guidance on how police, Federal or other, are to perform any duties which might bring them into Canada but we are unable to locate them. Nor have we found any record of a communication from the RCMP or the Dept of Justice giving direct or explicit information about any such arrangements between Canadian and U.S. police authorities.

13 Ibid.
The Privy Council office said there were, rather, implied arrangements, due to previous cases of confusion about police jurisdiction which had resulted in protests to the U.S. government being made by the Canadian government.\textsuperscript{14} Thereby, the executive branch refused any responsibility in the matter.

In the first few weeks of April there was no attention on the matter, probably because of the Easter recess. On April 22 the Prime Minister made a statement to the House that instructions had been sent to Washington to “make representations” on the case.\textsuperscript{15} The instructions in question were contained in an Aide-Memoire signed by Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin Sr. on April 22, 1966.\textsuperscript{16} Its contents demonstrate that, in the eyes of the government, the Briscoe incident had been a departure from normal practice:

\begin{quote}
It is regrettable that on this occasion the established practices were not followed. The Canadian Government considers that it is in the mutual interests of our two Governments that in this sensitive area there be no departure from the established procedures which are designed to provide a proper framework for the essential cooperation between these important agencies of our two Governments with full respect for the authority of each agency and for the rights of our citizens.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

Departmental officials continued to investigate whether any formal arrangements actually existed. Martin and other Cabinet Ministers began making public references to the long-standing and consistent arrangements regarding jurisdictional issues mentioned

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Paul Martin, senior, was a career politician who had served in three previous Cabinets. He left Parliament for the Senate shortly after these events.
in Martin’s statement of April 22.\textsuperscript{18} At the same time Cabinet decided to establish an interdepartmental committee of officials to consider more formal procedures for cooperation, so that the “present informal arrangements [would] be modified… so that in these matters contact by mail only, and not personal contract as heretofore, [would] be provided between special agents of the FBI and persons located in Canada.”\textsuperscript{19} Thus, the call for accountability in the House led to a call for more accountability in the administration, if not an admission of impropriety.

The Briscoe incident did not prove to be isolated, as Martin had suggested. In November 1966, eight months later, Diefenbaker asked in the House about journalist allegations that plainclothes FBI agents had conducted searches for deserters in Vancouver, apparently unaccompanied by the RCMP. Solicitor General Lawrence Pennell\textsuperscript{20} replied that he would look into it.\textsuperscript{21} These incidents became more frequent, increasing public concern and scrutiny of police behaviour.

Indeed, it may have been this police activity that initiated public interest in the question of war resisters in Canada in the first place. On May 11, 1966, Secretary of State for External Affairs Martin received a memo from his senior staff outlining possible questions in the House of Commons on the issue of the FBI in Canada.\textsuperscript{22} The memo

\textsuperscript{20} Pennell was appointed to the post in April of 1966.
\textsuperscript{22} RG 25, Vol. 10842 File 20-1-2-USA, Political Affairs – Policy and Background – Canadian External Policy and Relations – Unites States of America, pt. 3, Memorandum for the Minister From M. Cadieux,
followed a CBC television news program the night before that had claimed that young American draft dodgers were arriving in the country.\textsuperscript{23} The memo stated that the question would be difficult to answer in the absence of much definitive information about the phenomenon. “Our department has no official information on the subject and indeed we have no reliable unofficial confirmation [of this occurring],” wrote Under-Secretary M. Cadieux; “[w]e cannot affirm or deny that some young Americans seeking to evade the U.S. draft have come to Canada. Our department has had no approach of any kind on this subject from the U.S. Government.” Cadieux went on to explain that no treaty or agreement existed to allow the prevention of entry, or expulsion of, draft dodgers.

“Probably most of the young men involved purport to enter as visitors and maybe in some cases they will try later on to obtain landed immigrant status in Canada,” Cadieux stated prophetically. He then encouraged Martin to refer related questions to the Minister of Immigration. Finally, Cadieux cautioned Martin that “[a]lthough the Canadian government is not under any obligation by treaty or international law to the United States Government to help them enforce the U.S. draft law against U.S. citizens in Canada, I suggest that it might have an unfortunate effect on our relations with the U.S. if the Canadian Government were to give the impression that it is in any way pleased to have Canada become a place of asylum for such U.S. citizens.”\textsuperscript{24} Cadieux suggested a public positioning direction which emphasized that no communications had been received from


the U.S. on the issue; that no treaty existed to govern the situation; and that if the resisters returned to the U.S. they would likely be prosecuted.\textsuperscript{25} In October talking points proposed by his staff for Martin for press conferences in Boston addressed the draft dodger issue along the lines suggested by Cadieux. The situation was still that no representations had been received from the U.S. government.\textsuperscript{26} In the meantime the positioning of External Affairs and that of the Department of Immigration had been synchronized.\textsuperscript{27}

The synchronization had been informed to some extent by earlier discussions between the two Departments about the same topic. In 1955 a decision had been taken between the Department of Immigration and the Department of External Affairs to seek a mutual arrangement of apprehension of deserters, which would both allow for FBI and RCMP to work together to arrest deserters in order to relieve Immigration of the responsibility, and for Canadian deserters to be deported by the U.S. government. If a police cooperation agreement was not reached, Department of National Defence officials would ask for Immigration to be given the power to deport American deserters. However, according to 1960 correspondence, the decision was never acted upon, and a further


RCMP targeting of war resisters did not cease after the May 1969 announcement of the open border for deserters, which might have been expected to have an impact on RCMP behaviour. RCMP officers continued to conduct raids on war resister houses and those of their supporters. They also kept anti-draft groups and groups supportive of the cause under surveillance. For example, on August 12, 1969, Metropolitan Toronto Police Narcotics Squad, and RCMP narcotics squad, raided the Toronto home of Donna Baron Fine, ostensibly to search for drugs and an alleged drug dealer (and war resister) named Bob Farrell. The officers questioned Farrell without a lawyer present for fifteen minutes. One officer called someone to check on the identity of Farrell. Another officer made disparaging remarks about draft dodgers and deserters.\footnote{UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 7-21, Law Enforcement: RCMP Role re: American Exiles, Donna Fine, “Action Taken After Police visit of August 12, 1969.”} Subsequently Fine filed complaints and took the matter public.\footnote{UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 7-21, Law Enforcement: RCMP Role re: American Exiles, Donna Fine, “Action Taken After Police visit of August 12, 1969.”} Similarly, Vancouver war resister aid groups reported seven raids between April and December of 1969 on a hostel they had set up. RCMP entered and searched personal documents and files, while asserting they were looking for drugs. Steve Vernon of the Vancouver ADC assumed they were doing work
on behalf of the FBI, perhaps based on the earlier 1966 incidents as well as the personal experiences of resisters alluded to elsewhere in this chapter.\footnote{UBCL RBSC, Kasinsky papers, 6-13, CBC Weekend Transcript; Deserters Department Case: Interview with Rosenbloom, “Excerpt, CBC Weekend, February 8 1970.”}

Public concerns about police behaviour often played out most effectively in the debates over war resisters through scrutiny in the media. As we saw with the campaign to open the border to deserters, the media could have a significant impact on events. In the case of police harassment the media role was more ambiguous. At times they criticized the police; at other times they rather uncritically reported the anti-resister statements of public figures in the justice system. One example of the media encouraging critical scrutiny of the police was “RCMP Checks 2259 on U.S. Draft Status,” in the \textit{Globe and Mail} on November 11, 1969. Based on replies in writing to questions asked by New Democratic Party Member of Parliament for Yorkton-Melville, Lorne Nystrom, the article showed that police had targeted Americans for interviews, at the behest, at least in some cases, of “agencies of the United States.” The article was clipped and filed by the Department of Immigration.\footnote{LAC, RG 76, Department of Immigration fonds, Vol. 1210, File 5660-I, Draft Dodgers – General.} Around this time \textit{Georgia Strait} reported a case where five Americans were deported illegally under similar circumstances and later returned to Canada. The group, made up of two deserters, one draft dodger and a woman war resister, were purportedly asked by RCMP officers to sign statements that they were leaving voluntarily.\footnote{UBCL RBSC, Kasinsky papers, 7-21, Law Enforcement: RCMP Role re: American Exiles, “Voluntarily or Else,” \textit{Georgia Strait}, Nov. 11, date unknown.} This was not the only case of deportations; in February of 1970 three deserters were deported to the U.S. by the RCMP from an immigration office in BC. Even though the American officials involved reported having received the three men
from the RCMP, the Department of Immigration denied having deported them, suggesting they had left the immigration office without any problem. The three deserters, on the other hand, claimed they had been deported by an immigration official who had handed them over to the RCMP. The RCMP, for their part, claimed the men had asked to be transported back to the U.S. Since the men subsequently escaped U.S. custody and damaged a police officer's truck in the process, this account from the RCMP seems unlikely to be accurate.\textsuperscript{34}

Anti-draft groups noticed this police behaviour, and in some cases were also targets. In March of 1970, as a war resister hostel run by the Vancouver committee received continued visits by police, activist and deserter Pete Maly claimed in the media that RCMP passed information to the FBI on a regular basis.\textsuperscript{35} A 1970 letter from Vance Gardiner of the Montreal committee to the Vancouver group indicated that deserters had been "hassled" by the RCMP, who had as much as admitted that the Council's phones were tapped.\textsuperscript{36} The Vancouver ADC hostel was also raided around this time; in that raid, officers told deserters present to "shut up or we'll smash your fucking heads in." Again the raid was officially for drugs, but officers reportedly recorded names of financial supporters and ransacked files.\textsuperscript{37} War resisters were apparently routinely harassed; as one resister told Renée Kasinsky in 1970, "I was stopped several times by police. Wanted

\textsuperscript{34} UBCL RBSC, Kasinsky papers, 6-13, CBC \textit{Weekend} Transcript; Deserters Department Case; Interview with Rosenbloom, "Excerpt, CBC Weekend, February 8 1970"; UBCL RBSC, Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 7-21, Law Enforcement: RCMP Role re: American Exiles, "Inquiry Told RCMP Were There at Handing Over of U.S. Deserters," \textit{Montreal Star}, March 26, 1970.


\textsuperscript{36} UBCL RBSC, Kasinsky papers, 1-3, Correspondence - Other Canadian Organizations with Committee.

\textsuperscript{37} UBCL RBSC, Kasinsky papers, 7-21, Law Enforcement: RCMP Role re: American Exiles, "Cops Raid Deserters' Home: Ransack Files, Letters," \textit{Georgia Strait}, unknown date. Telephone tapping was already commonplace as an RCMP spying tactic, although as a practice it was regulated: Hewitt, \textit{Spying 101}. 329
to know if I was a deserter or a draft dodger.... Stopped driving my car (US plates). I was searched completely, and my house was searched also."^38

Supporting groups outside the network of anti-draft groups were also the subjects of RCMP scrutiny. An RCMP brief written in 1970 about the University of Toronto Student Administrative Council (SAC) noted that three years earlier, the SAC had given money to the “Toronto Anti-Draft Movement,” adding that most students opposed the donation (although the president was re-elected almost immediately on a pro-draft dodger platform).^39 A copy of “Toasting the Marshmallow,” the University of Toronto New Left Caucus “Working Paper on Strategy,” was also filed. The “Where we’re at” section of the “Working Paper,” the RCMP noted, referred to overtures from the Union of American Exiles to do work together.^40

The RCMP could not act with complete impunity. In the late sixties and early seventies, events such as the Front de Libération du Québec crises and student unrest on campuses led the RCMP Security Service to increase its activities, and even to set bombs to frame dissenting groups.^41 Among other trends and events, notably the implementation of the War Measures Act in October 1970, this heightened activity and the increased dissent to which the RCMP was reacting led to the convening of two Royal Commissions investigating some of these concerns in the late 1960s and 1970s. The Royal Commission on Security, or Mackenzie Commission, reported in 1969; the longer and more extensive Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted

^38 UBCL RBSC, Kasinsky papers, 1-4, Questionnaire Code and Identification.
^40 LAC, RG 146, Vol. 2991, New Left Caucus, Toronto, Ont.
^41 Steve Hewitt refers to these years as “The Crisis Years,” suggesting both the crisis of legitimacy of the RCMP and a political crisis to which the RCMP needed to respond: Hewitt, Spying 101, 146-170.
Police, or McDonald Commission, convened in 1978 and reported in 1981. In some small way the Commissions may be understood as one of many reactions of the government to war resisters. The RCMP’s centennial celebrations in 1973 coincided with increased uneasiness about the role played by secret police in Canada.

Exiles and their supporters were highly conscious of police attention, and saw it as “repression.” Aspects of this attention included RCMP cooperation with the FBI, such as interviewing war resisters at their request; and RCMP use of FBI information on individuals, as cited in the Globe and Mail, September 16, 1970. The worst action the RCMP could take, in the eyes of resisters and their supporters, was to hand over war resisters to American police forces for prosecution, often in collaboration with Immigration officers. When Canadian officials accused war resisters of lying and brought them before Canadian courts, resisters perceived it as persecution and a waste of money spent on enforcing American laws. Judges were perceived as biased against U.S. war resisters.

Individual cases became legendary among resisters and the anti-draft movement. One such was David Lutz, a schoolteacher who lost his job due to RCMP communication of false allegations of immoral behaviour to the school board in Fredericton. Another was

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43 For a good overview of these issues see Hewitt. See above, Chapter 1, for additional sources on police history. Two books, the publication of which coincided with the RCMP’s centennial, illustrate the competing views of police behaviour in the early 1970s: Kelly and Kelly, The Royal Canadian Mounted Police: A Century of History, 1873-1973, and Brown and Brown, An Unauthorized History of the RCMP. The Kellys’ book, taking an institutional approach, accent the nobility of the RCMP’s mission and calling; the Browns’ polemic work depicted RCMP officers as violent strikebreakers. See also Sawatsky’s excellent journalistic account, Men in the Shadows. Kealey and Whitaker’s work is a good starting point for cultural studies of the RCMP.
the case of three deserters, mentioned earlier, taken into RCMP custody in January of
1970 and subsequently illegally deported to the U.S. This case resulted in a judicial
inquiry which absolved the RCMP of blame and suggested that the resisters were victims
of circumstance, "misunderstanding, confusion, and coincidence," and not the intentional
actions of the police.\footnote{Ibid.; Kasinsky, Refugees, 3.}

Finally, the effect of the War Measures Act on war resisters was noted by exile
communities. All of the concern expressed by aid groups and exiles alike about these
activities by the Canadian state reflected public worries over sovereignty and contributed
to an increasing awareness of the behaviour of Canadian elites: as \textit{AMEX} writers
observed in a piece on police harassment, "The ruling class here behaves like the ruling
class anywhere else, notably like that in the U.S." The repression was a call to action for
solidarity between resisters and the people of Quebec, aboriginal people, and the people

At the same time, police actions were partially legitimized by the public
statements of justice system figures and elected officials. One judge in a BC court room,
committing a deserter to trial for assault, suggested (despite the right to be considered
innocent until proven guilty) that "...Immigration should be more meticulous in
accepting certain persons, especially draft dodgers.... This type of conscientious objector
has no conscience."\footnote{UBCL RBSC, Kasinsky papers, 7-21, Law Enforcement: RCMP Role re: American Exiles, "Deserter Suspects Committed to Trial," \textit{Montreal Star}, April 3, 1970.} The Mayor of Vancouver Tom Campbell also weighed in: around

\footnote{332}
October of 1970, he suggested also using the War Measures Act to deal with draft dodgers:

I’m not against dissent, but I believe the law should be used against any revolutionary whether he’s a U.S. draft dodgers or a hippie if he is in an organization that advocates the overthrow of the government by force.... I don’t like draft dodgers and I’ll do anything within the law that allows me to get rid of them. The whole Communist theory is to corrupt youth and the country will follow. Somebody is sure doing a swell job of corrupting a minority of our youth. I want the border closed to radicals. I’m looking at more than the loss of a few civil liberties. I’m looking at freedom. Take a few liberties but give me freedom.\(^\text{48}\)

These comments recall our earlier examination of radical politics, and point to the negative impact on public opinion some in the movement feared would result from more radical politics.

The RCMP actions regarding war resisters suffered from more bad publicity on the occasion of the raid of the home of a Montreal Star journalist, W.A. Wilson. Wilson was an outspoken supporter of the war resisters and critic of the RCMP. His wife had aided some war resisters in their home.\(^\text{49}\) During a raid of their residence on March 23, 1970, when neither Wilson nor his wife was present, the RCMP questioned Wilson’s children. The day after, Wilson reported on this fact in a feature article about RCMP targeting of war resisters and collusion with the FBI.\(^\text{50}\) Later that week the issue was a topic of discussion in the House of Commons.\(^\text{51}\) In early April Wilson accused the

\(^{48}\)UBCL RBSC, Kasinsky papers, 9-12, Vancouver Support for Dodgers and Deserters, “Vancouver’s Mayor ‘Not Against Dissent...’,” Toronto Daily Star, October 26, 1970.

\(^{49}\)Despite her clear involvement in the case, Wilson’s spouse was not identified nor interviewed.


RCMP of “taking a political role.” He justified his earlier reports on RCMP activities as a necessary element of a democracy. “One of the great barriers to the effective scrutiny of established institutions is an unnecessarily respectful attitude towards them,” he stated.\textsuperscript{52} In April of 1970 the \textit{Montreal Star} reported that they had secured information that indicated the RCMP would stop investigations of American immigrants pending a review of policy, perhaps because of Wilson’s articles, and the general publicity generated by cases such as that of Wilson and Donna Fine, mentioned above.\textsuperscript{53}

Wilson’s views reflected public concerns about the potential political abuse of power by the RCMP. In October, 1970, the War Measures Act seems to have been used by the RCMP to help deport at least one American, despite assurances to the contrary. American immigrant and war resister George Harrington claimed that his girlfriend’s apartment in Toronto was searched by RCMP officers claiming to be looking for members of the FLQ. Harrington subsequently returned to the United States of his own volition, to avoid being deported under the Act; he faced charges related to the incident at Kent State in May of 1970.\textsuperscript{54}

Police behaviour was both a reflection of, and an influence on, public concerns about both war resisters and the official response to their presence in Canada. Police raids and surveillance activities reflected divisions among both among ruling elites and the


\textsuperscript{54} UBCL RBSC, Kasinsky papers, 7-21, Law Enforcement: RCMP Role re: American Exiles, “War Measures Act to Deport U.S. Man,” \textit{The Odyssey}, October 20 1970. Kent State was the term used to refer to events of May 1970 at Kent state university, during which several anti-war protesters were shot dead or injured by the National Guard. The incident provoked massive demonstrations across the U.S., with several rallies held in Canada as well.
general public. This tension also expressed itself in internal discussions among
government officials.

Interaction of Immigration and RCMP Officials: a Jurisdictional Debate

As we will see in this section, police surveillance reflected official paranoia about
Americans and their influence on Canadian society. Those views were contingent and a
matter of some contention amongst officials. Police attitudes reflected debates occurring
among government bureaucrats, especially in the Department of Immigration. The
Department of Immigration and the RCMP exchanged quite a bit of correspondence,
especially after the May 1969 border policy shift. The correspondence and the
jurisdictional struggle it documented were part of the hegemonic process to develop an
attitude towards war resisters that both complied with public perceptions of Canada as a
refuge from militarism, and legitimized sentiment against the war resisters and their
activities in Canada.

During the year following the government’s 1966 White Paper on Immigration
and the initial trickle of war resisters arriving in Canada, the RCMP raised concerns
about how immigration policy was being enforced by the regional offices of the
Department of Immigration. Their concerns were partly documented in correspondence
placed on the Department of Immigration’s Draft Dodgers file. For example, in October
of 1967 the RCMP’s M.J. Nadon, the Superintendent and Officer in Charge of the
Criminal Investigation Branch, addressed an interdepartmental memo to the Director of
Immigration – Home Branch. The memo suggested that immigration officials were
withholding information necessary for a criminal investigation from the RCMP because

335
they were considered an “outside agency.” Nadon was inquiring if the action taken by regional officials reflected a change in policy, or a mistake by Winnipeg staff.\(^{55}\)

Even after MacEachen’s announcement of an open border for deserters in May of 1969, the RCMP continued to express concerns to Immigration Department Officials about its apparent lack of commitment to enforcing its own regulations. Late 1969 correspondence from Assistant RCMP Commissioner and Director of Security and Intelligence J.E.M. Barrette suggested that the Department of Immigration had been reluctant to enforce immigration regulations, which banned the use of visitor status expressly in order to apply for landing once in Canada; made working before securing a permit from Immigration illegal; and considered lying in an application to be grounds for barring entry. This lackadaisical approach, in the eyes of the RCMP, meant that Canada was “becoming a sanctuary for both political extremists and criminals.” Al Gorman, Chief of the Enforcement Section of the Department of Immigration’s Home Services, assured Commissioner Higgitt that such was not the case. Immigration officials, for their part, suspected the RCMP of being overzealous in their activities regarding immigrants; a draft of Gorman’s reply to the Commissioner carried an admonishment that the RCMP should not be encouraged to use section 16 of the act (which stated that all statements made in the application for entry to Canada must be truthful), since that would eliminate the need for an arrest warrant and would invite abuse by the RCMP.\(^{56}\)

\(^{55}\) RG 76, Vol. 983 File 5660-1, Military Personnel – Draft Dodgers – General, pt. 1, Office of the Commissioner, RCMP, to Director, Home Branch, Canadian Immigration Division, Department of Manpower and Immigration, “Re: Co-operation with the Department of Manpower and Immigration – Canada Immigration Division,” October 24, 1967. Nadon would later replace Higgitt as RCMP Commissioner in 1973.

\(^{56}\) LAC, RG 76, Vol. 983 File 5660-1, Military Personnel – Draft Dodgers – General, pt 1, Letter from Al Gorman, Chief of the Enforcement Section of the Department of Immigration’s Home Services, to
On March 3, 1970, in a confidential letter to Mr. E.P. Beasley, Director of the Home Services Branch of the Canadian Immigration Division, Barrette expressed frustration with the slowness of immigration officials to act regarding “criminal fugitives aided by radicals in the anti-draft movement.” Margin comments by immigration officials indicate a matching level of frustration: “Wait for further letters and then consider again [sic] asking for info [on whether any actual evidence of criminal activity exists],” said one margin comment.\footnote{LAC, RG 76, Vol. 983 File 5660-1, Military Personnel – Draft Dodgers – General, Nov 26 1969; Handwritten note from unsigned to “Al” [Gorman, Chief Enforcement Section of Home Services], Letter from Home Services Div, Immigration, to Barrette; handwritten notes, April 22, 23, and 24 1970.} Immigration officials were hesitant to act on the RCMP’s information because of a lack of evidence.

In April of 1970 the tension had still not resolved. A letter from Home Services to Deputy Commissioner Barrette insisted that, despite urging from the RCMP, there was no need to arrest American immigrants suspected of lying in the application process unless there was evidence that the individuals in question were criminals.\footnote{LAC, RG 76, Vol. 983 File 5660-1, Military Personnel – Draft Dodgers – General, pt 1, Letter from Al Gorman, Chief of the Enforcement Section of the Department of Immigration’s Home Services, to Commissioner W.L. Higitt, RCMP, Nov 26 1969; Handwritten note from unsigned to “Al” [Gorman, Chief Enforcement Section of Home Services], Letter from Home Services Div, Immigration, to Barrette; handwritten notes, April 22, 23, and 24 1970.} Meanwhile, several handwritten notes between April 22 and April 24, 1970 document departmental communication that shows that the concerns of local police, as well, were taken seriously, though judged unfounded. Telephone conversations to departmental staff indicated that the staff had determined that there were no grounds for deportation under Section 19 (i) (e) (viii), the section prohibiting the use of misleading information during the process of
applying for entry into Canada. It appears that a deportation was desired by the Toronto police, but that immigration officials disagreed.

Perhaps in an attempt to get the Department of Immigration to take the criminality of war resisters more seriously, the RCMP sometimes shared its information on draft dodgers support groups and activities with Department of Immigration officials. In 1970 the RCMP spied on the Pan-Canada Conference on War Resisters in Montreal. They interpreted the results of the conference as the movement’s having “adopt[ed] a more militant attitude.” The coverage of the conference in *AMEX* magazine was filed by the RCMP, along with a list of participating groups and individuals. The information was discussed at the highest levels. RCMP Commissioner William Higgitt notified the Privy Council, the Solicitor General, and the Assistant Deputy Minister of Immigration of the conference and the RCMP analysis. In July 1970 a memo to the Minister from Robert Adams, the Assistant Deputy Minister of Immigration, referred to an RCMP report which “contain[ed] disquieting information.” Following upon what prior investigation had established in 1967 and 1968, said the missive, there were 23 anti-draft groups in Canada helping draft dodgers and deserters enter. Other, unidentified organizations were doing the same. Some Canadian groups were working with US groups. These groups were distributing information on immigration requirements, and some had set up “escape routes” to help deserters and, perhaps, “black power fugitives” come to Canada.

However, they were not advising Americans to use false identification, and there was no apparent fraud being committed. The memo indicated that the Toronto movement was led by expatriate William Spira, supposedly exiled during the McCarthy era,\(^{62}\) and that a 33-year-old “post industrial anarchist,” Nardo Castillo, born in Spain and now a Canadian citizen, ran the Montreal committee. “Persons from all classes and walks of life” were helping committees, the memo went on; however, the 10,000 immigrants figure in wide use by anti-draft groups and the media was “grossly exaggerated.” Finally, the memo indicated that American targets were becoming the focus of some antiwar protests.\(^{63}\) Because the report was not made available through Access to Information requests, we may only guess what, of all of this, was considered “disquieting” by Robert Adams, the Assistant Deputy Minister of Immigration. We can assume that Spira’s and Castillo’s political affiliations gave him some pause.

The interdepartmental tension rose following a new arrangement of powers over immigrants coinciding with the 1966-1967 regulatory shift in immigration policy. The RCMP’s powers to deport were curtailed.\(^{64}\) The tension appeared to coalesce around differences in interpretation of the section noted. Correspondence in May of 1970 between Higgitt and Gorman showed a developing conflict with the RCMP about the application of regulations 19 (1) (e) (viii) and 16. The RCMP’s reports on the pan-Canada conference and the war resister support groups had at least some impact on

\(^{62}\) CBC archives suggest he had left of his own will, because of the McCarthy hearings: CBC Archives website, “Seeking Sanctuary: Draft Dodgers: How to Desert the Army in Three Easy Steps,” http://archives.cbc.ca /IDC-1-71-348-1931/conflict_war/draft_dodgers/clip8, original air date Feb. 21, 1970.


\(^{64}\) See note 3, above, this chapter.
departmental attitudes. A handwritten note attached to Adams’ memo suggests that “the
draft-dodgers and deserter problem has every indication of becoming more of a problem.
If the groups become more militant and conduct clandestine activities I would think this
would force immediate remedial steps. It would seem more prudent to be quietly
correcting a problem that appears to be developing than to wait for it to happen.”

From the perspective of the anti-draft groups, police behaviour constituted
harassment. At the very least the sheer scale of the surveillance is remarkable. The police
surveillance behaviour, and internal discussions between, and among, departmental
officials, along with the public interventions of judges and other officials, shows that
there were divisions both, as it were, at the top and at the bottom of society. Was Canada,
as so many implied at the time and many continue to believe to this day, a refuge from
militarism? Departmental debates about the border, the existence of Operational Memo
117 encouraging the exclusion of deserters from Canada, discrimination at the border,
and the behaviour of public figures and the police all indicate that, if Canada was such a
refuge, it was hard-fought and bitterly defended, as well as contingent and partial, refuge,
at best. Media scrutiny of police behaviour and the interplay between those discussions,
and events such as raids and deportations, meant that the anti-draft movement could get
out their side of the discussion. But the discussion never ended; the conflict never
resolved in one direction or the other.

Police behaviour was generally accepted until the mid-1970s, when the dirty
tricks scandal that resulted in a Commission of Inquiry undermined public trust in the

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65 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 983, File 5660-1, Military Personnel – Draft Dodgers - General, handwritten note
[names illegible], July 6, 1970.
66 For a discussion of the source of this phrase see Introduction.

340
institution of the RCMP. Police harassment and surveillance behaviours reflected
divisions at various strata of society. The surveillance also reflected public fears about
Americans and their influence on Canadian society in general, and specifically on
Canadian social justice movements. It also reflected debates among departmental
officials about how to treat war resisters as their profile increased in the public arena. The
May 22, 1969 announcement regarding opening the border to deserters was made; but
surveillance and police targeting continued.

As we will see in Chapter 7, in 1972 larger problems besetting the Department of
Immigration – backlogs of appeals, and thousands of “visitors” living illegally in Canada
– prompted new immigration policies which had an impact on war resisters and their
supporters. These visitors’ presence was the result of 1967 changes to regulations
allowing foreign nationals to apply from within Canada to become landed immigrants.
Those entering Canada as visitors could subsequently apply for landed status. The
backlog in the appeals program and the large number of visitors prompted the
government to cease the practice of allowing application or landing to take place from
within Canada. In 1972 the very policy the war resisters used to their advantage was
eliminated.

The uneasy relationship between the government and war resister supporters
changed as the new measures abolishing the policy on visitors, and the 1972
Administrative Measures and 1973 Adjustment of Status Program enacted to clear the
backlog and address the problem of illegal visitors, provoked, at first, new tensions.
Eventually, however, these programs elicited outright promotion by anti-draft groups,
greater interaction between Department of Immigration officials and anti-draft group activists, and a general entente as the war wound down and the anti-draft movement’s focus shifted to new priorities. The Department of Immigration could view the anti-draft groups as a part of the solution, while RCMP agents continued to keep files on the groups. These events are the topic of the next chapter. Meanwhile, the RCMP surveillance continued well into the 1970s.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{67} See Appendix V, Selected RCMP Surveillance of Anti-Draft Groups, Other Supportive Groups, and War Resisters, 1966-1975, for a sample. There are undoubtedly others. In 1972 the \textit{Georgia Strait} reported that Vancouver area American immigrants were being harassed by police regarding their use of welfare: UBCL RBSC, Kasinsky papers, 8-5, Newspaper articles – Dodgers and Deserters, “Immigration Hassle,” \textit{Georgia Strait}, January 20 – 27, 1972.
Chapter 7

“Last Chance to Get Landed”: Immigration Department Strategies, Anti-Draft Movement Responses, 1971-1973

His date to report has come
and gone, he can not leave now,
and although I think about it often,
I can’t either. So, we adjust. Find,
and lose jobs; move from place
to place. Come to terms, gradually,
with the decision we so quickly
made. “You must live with the consequences
of your actions,” my father
offers again and again
over crackly long distance lines.

We stay in this country
that is not home, until,
eventually, it becomes home.¹

By January of 1971 the changing political landscape including rising
unemployment in Canada and the evolving anti-war mood in the U.S., which encouraged resisters to stay there, combined to reduce the general number of American immigrants in Toronto. Naomi Wall of the Toronto Anti-Draft Programme guessed that the availability of legal advice on draft avoidance in the U.S., the memory of the previous year’s War Measures Act in Canada, and a “stay-and-fight-the-draft” mood among the U.S. young” were also factors. The proportion of deserters among the war resisters who came to Canada was also higher.²

A major episode in the history of immigration after 1972 was the decision by Minister of Immigration Bryce Mackasey to introduce new policy ceasing the practice of landing prospective immigrants from within Canada under section 34 of the regulations. The 1967 rule that had allowed application for landing from within Canada or at the border under the points system had resulted in an influx of self-identified “visitors” who had actually intended to immigrate. The same rule allowed appeals of deportation orders, which enabled many “visitors” who had been thereafter denied landed status from within Canada to stay even longer. By 1971, the result was a backlog of thousands of appeals, from immigrants from all over the world, which put enormous pressure on the Immigration Appeal Board. First, as we will see, Mackasey announced administrative measures to address the backlog. Subsequently, he revoked section 34 of the regulations, effectively putting a stop to the practice of landing from within Canada. The new Minister as of late November of 1972, Robert Andras, added punitive regulations that included fines and jail sentences for visitors intending to stay in Canada longer than three months, but who had not registered this intention with the department. To address the problem of the thousands of visitors “stranded” by these changes, Andras later introduced the Adjustment of Status Program, under which thousands of illegal visitors were landed, and the development and implementation of which were marked by interaction with immigrant groups and cooperation with, among others, anti-draft groups.

This chapter will examine how these new policies heralded renewed tensions between war resister supporters and the government. As we will see, Mackasey’s

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3 See Appendix VI, Ministers of Immigration.
4 The best overview of these shifts I have seen is in Knowles, esp. 161-165, 173.
5 Kasinsky, Refugees, 69; see Appendix VI, Ministers of Immigration.
administrative measures to allow those awaiting appeals to have their cases heard more quickly and with relaxed criteria were met with scepticism from anti-draft groups. Matters did not improve when section 34 was revoked altogether in November. However, when Andras’ 1973 program was announced, the anti-draft groups undertook to actively promote it. In some cases immigration officials and anti-draft activists, as well as other immigration activists, worked together to maximize the number of landings. These interactions showed how the social movement in support of war resisters could, when necessary, take on some of the role of the government. The interaction between the anti-draft movement and the government was marked by changing levels of mutual influence. The social movement and the government influenced each other in a dance reminiscent of Bruce Curtis’ “circular process” of government. The relationship was predominantly adversarial. However, by the end of the period, the groups were undertaking the same work as that of the government, while still maintaining their autonomy and their roles as advocates for American immigrants. The border between government institutions or functions and pressure groups or even individuals is constantly in transition and, like hegemony, never completely settled.

In this chapter I will explore the regulatory changes in 1972, and the anti-draft movement’s response to it. The anti-draft activists and war resisters were, as we will see, generally sceptical. I will examine how, in the months following the revocation of section 34 in November of 1972, the anti-draft movement pressed the government for solutions to the new problems facing war resisters who had not acquired status as landed immigrants. Finally, I will discuss the 1973 Adjustment of Status Program, and how its

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6 Curtis, 309.

345
shape was the result of both internal Department of Immigration discussions and
lobbying on the part of war resister supporters. Perhaps because of that interactive
process, the anti-draft movement ended by promoting the Program, albeit on their own
terms.  

Addressing the Appeals Backlog

In late 1969 it had become clear enough that a backlog in immigration appeals
was worsening, for a department file to be opened.  A year later, in September of 1970,
outgoing Minister of Manpower and Immigration Allen MacEachen announced plans to
review the three-year-old policy of allowing visitors to apply for landed status from
within Canada. The policy, combined with a liberal appeals policy which allowed anyone
to appeal once they had been denied landed immigrant status, were creating a backlog of
epic proportions.

Over the following months, the media took notice of the backlog. By early 1972
the media also documented conflicts internal to the government about how to address the
situation. A Toronto Sun article entitled “Immigration Heads to Quit Over Scrapped
Amendments,” for instance, indicated that Prime Minister Trudeau was balking at
proposed amendments to the immigration policy, and that some Immigration officials

7 The story of these regulations is touched upon (although never studied in depth) in other Immigration
histories cited in this research. However, to my knowledge no other historian has ever studied attempts by
immigrant advocacy groups to have an impact on these programs. One exception is an international study
by political scientist Freda Hawkins: Critical Years in Immigration: Canada and Australia Compared,
8 LAC, RG 76, Department of Immigration fonds, Vol. 1135, File 5235-6, Deportation – Appeals Backlog,
pt. 1, Memo from Assistant Deputy Minister (Immigration) to Deputy Minister, Nov. 14, 1969.
9 UBCL RBSC, Renee Goldsmith Kasinsky papers, 8-5, Newspaper articles – Dodgers and Deserters,
10 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 1135, File 5235-6, Deportation – Appeals Backlog, pt. 1, “Migration Logjam

346
were so incensed at this inaction that they were considering leaving the department.\textsuperscript{11} As we have seen in previous chapters, the media were not always friendly to the Department of Immigration. In this case they appeared to be rallying to the call for reform of the regulations. That the issue was controversial probably helped encourage the media to pay attention.

The aforementioned articles probably came from leaked information about Cabinet-level discussions that took place in January and February of 1972, of which there is some archival evidence. In January of 1972 Deputy Minister of Immigration L.E. Couillard made several suggestions to the brand-new Minister of Immigration Bryce Mackasey, aimed at addressing “alternative measures for dealing with current major immigration problems.” The suggestions included eliminating the “handicap” of ten points from within Canada, whereby applicants at the border received ten points for having a job offer in hand, but applicants from within Canada did not get the ten points. Eliminating this measure to award the points within the country as well would make attaining landed status from within Canada easier if the application was accompanied by a job offer. This would in turn lessen the need for an appeal. Couillard also suggested introducing new humanitarian criteria for admission, and, significantly for our story, offering “special transitional arrangements to permit inquiry officers to land immigrants who have submitted late applications or have taken unauthorized employment if they meet other provisions of the Act and regulations and if they were in Canada on a current date such as April 1 1972.” Further suggestions in the same spirit concerned the appeals


347
of deportation: to “re-examine applicants for landing who are awaiting hearing of their
appeals in the light of the provisions contained in [the above] proposals…” and to “secure
the cooperation of the Appeal Board to land with a minimum of formal proceedings
appellants who on re-examination are found to be admissible.”12 As we will see, many of
these measures were eventually taken up.

A month later, Minister Mackasey brought these ideas to Cabinet, proposing an
“Administrative Program to Reduce the Size and Growth of Immigration Inquiry
Backlogs.”13 Mackasey was aware that Cabinet had decided in December of 1971 to try
to resolve the immigration problems without passing legislation, probably to avoid a
contentious issue in a period leading up to an election, and a period of rising
unemployment. Mackasey argued that changes of a strictly administrative nature would
be important, but limited in their effect, and he sought to get Cabinet to agree to some
legislative changes and to provide additional resources.

The administrative measures he proposed broadly coincided with Couillard’s
suggestions. They included broadening the discretion of immigration officials to grant
landed status; allowing the consideration of humanitarian reasons; and retroactively
applying looser guidelines for addressing appeals. In the legislative field Mackasey
suggested that Cabinet consider a suspension of Section 34 of the Regulations, which
allowed for application to land from within Canada, for non-immigrants from “non-
contiguous territories.” Such a policy would have the effect of allowing only American

12 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 1135, File 5235-6, Deportation – Appeals Backlog, pt. 1, Memo to the Minister from
Deputy Minister L.E. Couillard, “Alternative Measures for Dealing with Current Major Immigration
13 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 1135, File 5235-6, Deportation – Appeals Backlog, pt. 1, Memorandum to the Cabinet
from Minister of Manpower and Immigration Bryce Mackasey, “Administrative Program to Reduce the

348
visitors to apply for landing, he stated, without explaining why this would be a good thing.

Mackasey’s recommendations included several suggestions from Couillard, such as the removal of the ten-point penalty for employment if within Canada, and the revocation of certain other regulations to allow for expedited consideration of landing of those in the country illegally or having taken illegal employment.\(^1\)\(^4\) Two months later, in April of 1972, a directive was issued by Cabinet to implement an Administrative Measures Program through a review of cases already in backlog on the basis of employment prospects, financial stability, efforts made by applicants to establish themselves in Canada, language improvements, and the length of their residence to date.\(^1\)\(^5\) Cabinet was implementing the administrative changes. They did not implement the suggestion to exclude “non-contiguous” countries from section 34, and the legal changes would have to wait.

Throughout May preparations were made, with the intent of launching the program on July 1. The ideas discussed by Couillard, the Minister, and Cabinet formed the core of the Administrative Measures Program announced publicly in June of 1972 to deal with the backlog of appeals. The announcement coincided with the declaration of the government’s intention to repeal section 34 of the regulations – an administrative change as well – altogether, eliminating the possibility of landing from within Canada or at the

\(^1\) LAC, RG 76, Vol. 1135, File 5235-6, Deportation – Appeals Backlog, pt. 1, Memorandum to the Cabinet from Minister of Manpower and Immigration Bryce Mackasey, “Administrative Program to Reduce the Size and Growth of Immigration Inquiry and Appeal Backlogs,” Feb. 17, 1972.

border.\textsuperscript{16} Despite the declaration, however, the revocation of section 34 would not occur for several more months.\textsuperscript{17}

On June 22, 1972, standing in the House of Commons, Minister of Immigration Bryce Mackasey announced \textit{``New Measures to Expedite Immigration Inquiry Cases''} through a review of current appeals cases in an expedited way. These measures were along the lines suggested in the internal communications of previous months.\textsuperscript{18} Special inquiry officers would review the current situation of applicants, considering such factors as employment, family, and letters of reference. After January 1, 1973, no more inquiries would be added to the backlog. The appeal process would be eliminated. The criteria of review, and the focus on the appeals backlog, meant that this was not a \textit{``general amnesty,''} but a short-term measure taken as part of a set of steps to be taken to fix the situation created by the 1967 regulations.\textsuperscript{19} The next day Mackasey announced further details to the public: the measures would only be available to those physically in the country as of midnight of June 23; those who had already been referred to an inquiry officer; those whose application for Landed Immigrant status was registered by midnight of June 23; and those legally in Canada who subsequently filed applications for Landed


\textsuperscript{17} See Appendix VII, Timeline.


\textsuperscript{19} LAC, RG 76, Vol. 1135, File 5235-6, Deportation – Appeals Backlog, pt. 1, \textit{``Statement by the Honourable Bryce Mackasey, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, in the House of Commons, June 22, 1972: New Measures to Expedite Immigration Inquiry Cases.''}
Immigrant status before the expiry of their non-immigrant status – that is, those who were bona fide visitors.\textsuperscript{20} The Administrative Measures Program, sometimes known internally in the Department of Immigration as Project P-80 (likely a financial account number), and sometimes as the “Task Force for the implementation of Administrative Measures,” had mixed results.\textsuperscript{21} All outstanding appeals were scheduled to be dealt with by an immigration officer. Many did not turn up for appointments, and did not reschedule, by the December deadline.\textsuperscript{22} As we will see, some war resisters thought the program was a trap to get them deported; immigrants from other countries likely thought the same. At the same time, the mere anticipation of a potential revocation of section 34 was resulting in huge increases in the numbers of applicants for landing. At first, the treatment of section 34 was ambiguous; the Department seemed to indicate that the intended revocation might only be temporary. Even so, a secret memo from Deputy Minister J.M. Desroches to Minister Mackasy indicated that while the backlog of immigration appeals was being worked out, the stated intention to revoke section 34 had resulted in an enormous influx of people attempting “to become entrenched in Canada” before the changes were implemented. At the end of September of 1972, new applications for landed status had reached 44,000 in 9 months, compared to 35,326 in all of 1971. The record number of applicants in one year, set in 1969, had already been exceeded by 3%.


\textsuperscript{21} LAC, RG 76, Vol. 1135, File 5235-6, Deportation – Appeals Backlog, pt. 1, Memo to the Minister from the Deputy Minister, Aug. 9, 1972; Memo to the Assistant Deputy Minister, from the Director, Home Services Branch, Aug. 25, 1972.

\textsuperscript{22} LAC, RG 76, Vol. 994, File 5855-12-7-2, Selection and Processing – Applications – Revocation of Sec. 34 of the Regulations – Statistics, Toronto International Airport, Officer-in-Charge, to Director – Home Services, Attn. Mr. McKenna, Dec. 9, 1972.

351
Extrapolation of the data indicated that the department might well receive up to 75,000 applications in 1972. According to Desroches, the influx was “evidence that the increase in applications is, at least from certain countries, an abuse of Canada’s Immigration policies.” Indeed, there were reports from overseas of ads in newspapers encouraging emigration, and reports of “commercial trafficking in Immigration to Canada,” and the Toronto airport office was barely coping with the levels of applications. Desroches urged Mackasey not to reinstate section 34.23

Desroches’ desperation did not prevail and, in February of 1973, “Project P-80 – Progress Report on Review Cases” would be officially deemed successful by the Programs and Procedures branch.24 The permanent revocation of section 34 called for by Desroches had been under review in the department for several months. In June of 1972, James Cross, Director of the Department of Immigration Programs and Procedures Branch, sent a memo to the Assistant Deputy Minister, Robert M. Adams. A “submission to the Minister respecting procedures for applicants from the United States” was being prepared, that included a recommendation to eliminate altogether the allowed-forward-under-examination procedure (AFUE) under section 34. Cross warned that, while it was recommended, such an action could create problems by introducing situations where applicants turned away within Canada would have to be deported. This, in turn, could affect public perceptions of the government negatively. Cross specifically mentioned possible ramifications stemming from the response of supporters of draft dodgers and

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23 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 994, File 5855-12-7-2, Selection and Processing – Applications – Revocation of Sec. 34 of the Regulations – Statistics, Secret Memo to the Minister from J.M. Desroches.

deserters. Preparations should be made to deal with such negative consequences, Cross implied.25 Five months later, on November 3, 1972, Mackasey followed the recommendations of his staff and announced the revocation of section 34 of the regulations.26 The negative attention by the press and the response of anti-draft groups and others soon coalesced into public pressure on the Department to take further steps to address the situation now facing illegal visitors inside the country’s borders.

**Media and Anti-Draft Movement Responses to the Revocation of Section 34**

An unanticipated consequence of the revocation of section 34 was that a large number of visitors and illegal immigrants who had either not yet received a deportation order at the time of the Administrative Measures Program, or, as we will see, who had not come forward out of fear that the program was a trap, were effectively stranded in the country with no recourse. The anti-draft groups had immediately begun informing their contacts in Canada and in the U.S. about the change in policy, and helped increase public pressure on the department to do something to allow this stranded group to remain in the country. In December of 1972 a meeting of “concerned members of the Toronto community” regarding “the current immigration crisis for war resisters,” took place. The meeting resolved to send a “deputation” to Mackasey, with a brief and a proposal for reopening the border for war resisters, thereby reversing the unfairness of the sudden November 3 announcement. Nancy Pocock of the Toronto Anti-Draft Program, Dee

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Knight and Jack Collingwood of *AMEX*, and lawyer Paul Copeland were present. Toronto area MPs were also targeted for lobbying.\(^27\)

The public pressure came from many different quarters, and media voices also increased. Many of the media reports reflected the myth, by now well-entrenched, of Canada as a haven, not only for war resisters, but for immigrants from around the world. For instance, in March of 1973 a *Toronto Star* article endorsed a suggestion by the “Session of the Bloor Street United Church” that those “caught in the middle” ought to be allowed to stay if they had entered as visitors between June and mid-November of 1972.\(^28\) A few days later a *Toronto Star* editorial asserted that “Stranded ‘visitors’ deserve[d] justice.” The article indicted Canada’s contradictory policy, and invoked the country’s international reputation for an open immigration policy. Having first attracted immigrant workers, the editors argued, and then effectively stranded them in Canada, the policy had forced some to work illegally, and for very little, in order to survive. The editorial called for those stranded by the change to be allowed to apply from within Canada for landed status; otherwise “[t]he world’s ‘kindest’ immigration policy [would be] a failure.” It added that the suddenness of the November 3 announcement had meant that policy was effectively retroactive, and had caused additional problems by initiating a flood of last-minute applicants from around the world now forced to hurry their applications in order to move to Canada before the policy change.\(^29\)

\(^{27}\) TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 13 - Lobbying and Public Relations, Folder 1, TADP Statements and Lobbying.


\(^{29}\) TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 27 [oversize], Folder 2, Continued from box 14, Folder 27, Adjustment of status program clippings.
In May the Quaker Social Concerns Committee of Vancouver lent their voice to the cause. In a letter to the Prime Minister they asked for “special consideration” to Americans facing deportation who entered before the November 1972 announcement who didn’t apply in time. In June, Richard Brown of the TADP wrote a letter to Andrew Brewin, NDP MP for Toronto Greenwood, raising concerns about illegal Americans in Canada who couldn’t return to the U.S. due to threats of felony charges, but couldn’t be landed, either, due to the elimination of section 34.

Other groups of war resisters also paid attention to the new rules, and began pressing for remedies to the situation of stranded illegal immigrants. A letter from a Miriam Pearson to the Nova Scotia Committee to Aid War Objectors, undated and unaddressed, outlined a resolution passed by the General Council of United Churches regarding the November 3, 1972 announcement, and highlighting what they perceived to be the racist effect of the policy. The resolution appealed to the government to allow for a retroactive application of the rules to allow those who entered before November 3 to use the old rules.

Thus, between November 3 of 1972 and the summer 1973 announcement of an Adjustment of Status Program six months later, anti-draft groups and supporters pressed for a solution. Meanwhile, the policy change did not mean the war resisters stopped applying for landing. For instance, the Halifax committee files included copies of

31 TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 14 - Canadian Adjustment of Status Program, Folder 10, Adjustment of Status Program – correspondence, press releases, notes, Letter to Andrew Brewin, MP, from Richard Brown, Toronto Anti-Draft Program (TADP), June 8, 1973.
32 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.6 [Correspondence 1972-1973].
correspondence between immigrants whose applications for landed status had been rejected, and the Department of Manpower and Immigration Canada. One such rejection was from December of 1970; the other two were from January 19 and October 31 of 1972.\textsuperscript{33} The Canadian Council of Churches (CCC) Ministry to Draft-Age U.S. Immigrants in Canada continued its funding and advocacy on behalf of war resisters. The Ministry’s Accountability Committee meetings in 1972 and 1973 heard a story of dwindling applications, and the need to re-adjust. Internal landings were now a “thing of the past”; Montreal’s case load was down, as was Toronto’s and Winnipeg’s. In the first quarter of 1973 the total allocation of funding for the four main groups was only $3400, down from about $8000 per quarter in 1971 and 1972.\textsuperscript{34} At the March 29 meeting of the CCC Accountability Committee, member Gordon Walker reported on a meeting with immigration officials at which he had pressed for a solution to the problem of dealing with the cases of applicants who fell between the November 3 announcement and the actual implementation of the order in council on November 5.\textsuperscript{35}

Meanwhile, the new regime also affected American groups who supported war resisters. A November 13, 1972 letter from the American Friends Service Committee, Chicago Regional Office for Illinois and Wisconsin, perhaps acting in concert with

\textsuperscript{33} DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.2 [Index card records of American immigrants and other contacts].


\textsuperscript{35} LAC, MG 28, Vol. 1 327, Canadian Council of Churches fonds, Box 39, File 39-6, Commission on Canadian Affairs Minutes – Ministry to Draft-Age U.S. Immigrants – Accountability Committee and Others, 1969-1973, Minutes, Accountability Committee, March 29, 1972. It may seem that churches were particularly concerned about this issue as opposed to others, but previous chapters have highlighted church involvement in lobbying efforts around various aspects of immigration policy. When records exist the story is strengthened. The amount of evidence on this issue is probably coincidental.
Canadian Quakers, asked why it had been so long between communications, and whether the anti-draft groups were still operating; the draft had continued, and war resisters still needed support. The TADP responded outlining the new rules and stating that application would have to be made through a consulate with a waiting period of three to six months. Visitor status was still possible, but it could no longer easily be transformed into a successful application for landed immigrant status.

Eventually public pressure was felt at the ministerial level, where shifts were occurring. These discussions were taking place at the beginning of a period of growing popularity of Canadian multiculturalism as policy and practice. Multiculturalism had gained in popularity in the public mind due in part to the work of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. It also probably owed something to left nationalism, which sought to distinguish Canadian society from U.S. policies and an American culture perceived as less tolerant.

In this climate, deciding what to do about illegal immigrants became a more and more sensitive issue. Department of Immigration staff briefed the new Minister as of

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36 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.7 [Correspondence with various anti-draft and peace groups].
37 TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 14 - Canadian Adjustment of Status Program, Folder 3, Letter on TADP letterhead, Nov. 16, 1972.
November 27, Robert Andras, in memos entitled “The Immigration Situation,” and
“Briefing Paper for Minister: Non-Immigrant Control and Non-Immigrant Applicants for
Landing in Canada.” The memos provided an overview of recent developments from the
department’s perspective. The Administrative Measures Program had been initially
successful, but had resulted in a huge influx of applicants fearing the changes; “visitors”
abused the opportunity to apply for landed immigrant status from inside Canada in the
lead-up to the implementation of the revocation of section 34. The “Revocation of
Regulation 34” had been announced on November 3, 1972 by the previous Minister upon
Cabinet consultation. Public pressure, the memo mentioned, had then increased to deal
with so-called visitors who had been stranded as a result, as of November 3. The possible
solutions to this issue and their potential effects were listed for the Minister’s
consideration.

One of the possible solutions, to stand firm on current policy, would require a
great deal of public image damage control, staff suggested: “There is... the outside
possibility, considering some of the people involved, of some desperate protest act such
as suicide, which would not help the Department’s image at all,” the memo said. Earlier
that summer a Polish woman facing deportation has committed suicide, casting attention
on the appeals backlog. 40 Subsequent news reports had indicated that Minister Mackasey
suspected his staff of providing him with misleading information about the status of the
woman’s case, suggesting she had not succeeded in achieving the necessary fifty points,
when in fact she had been denied a work permit and the appeal board had declined to


358
allow her to stay in Canada on humanitarian grounds. Mackasey had appeared to suspect the department’s staff of seeking to have the immigration policies applied in the strictest manner possible, instead of honouring the “small-l liberal” application Mackasey supported.41

On the other hand, the memos went on, to increase the variety of exceptions under the act – categories of immigrants allowed in by virtue of their membership in a designated group – would set another dangerous precedent like that set by section 34 in the first place. Further, to allow those who had arrived before November 5 to be considered would add hundreds or thousands to the backlog. Finally, to allow a future amnesty to those who had been working in Canada for a year would not be good policy as it would encourage people to work without permits.42 Staff appeared to be taking the opportunity of the Ministerial changes to press for a less “liberal” approach to immigration, and to urge the Minister not to allow current illegal immigrants to become landed. They did so by presenting a variety of options and pointing out their weaknesses.

In April of 1973 departmental discussions began in earnest of proposals for an Adjustment of Status Program to address the problem of the stranded immigrants. Essentially, the Minister had decided to allow those in Canada illegally to become landed immigrants by means of a special program. Appearing to respond to staff concerns about leniency towards illegal immigrants, Andras expressed concerns to his staff about visitors who had entered prior to November 3 being in “limbo,” and sought recommendations on

how to address their situation, “keeping in mind our international image and the concerns many have (rightly or wrongly) that our November 3 action had elements of unfairness.” The Minister intended to talk about the issue of stranded immigrants in an upcoming speech announcing Bill C-197, legislation to amend the Immigration Act, and hoped to introduce a program before an anticipated “assault on us by people trying to beat the appeal deadline under existing legislation:” a program included in the new legislation to eliminate the appeal process might mitigate the anticipated rush of last-minute appeals before the law was passed.\textsuperscript{43} On June 18, 1973, Andras announced that his department was planning to initiate a grace period to land illegal immigrants, to eliminate the remaining appeals backlog, and to eliminate “loopholes” which invited abuse.\textsuperscript{44} Two days later, in the House of Commons, Andras announced his plans to review all immigration policy. The immediate need, however, was to adjust the status of illegal immigrants, now that applying for landed immigrant status was no longer permitted from within Canada.\textsuperscript{45}

From there, things moved fairly quickly. This time, staff had presented a variety of options, unlike in 1969, when Immigration staff had apparently taken a position against opening the border until a political decision was made by Cabinet. Immigration officials now turned to making recommendations about how the program should be


\textsuperscript{44} TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 14 - Canadian Adjustment of Status Program, Folder 18, Manpower and Immigration Statements, Release, June 18, 1973.

\textsuperscript{45} TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 14 - Canadian Adjustment of Status Program, Folder 19, Release, “An Address by the Honourable Robert Andras, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, On Second Reading of an Act to Amend to Immigration Appeal Board Act,” June 20, 1973.
shaped and implemented and, in doing so, also responded to some movement criticisms. For instance, on June 20 of 1973, Deputy Minister A.E. Gotlieb\textsuperscript{46} made strong recommendations to the Minister on placing a time limit on the program. Gotlieb anticipated pressure to keep the program open-ended; the department has already received some correspondence in this direction. He insisted that options existed for any potential immigrants to apply for landed status in larger immigration centres and ports of entry, and by mail from more remote areas, and that therefore any claims that the program would be inaccessible were baseless. Additionally, he pointed out, the Department would be “advertising widely in the ethnic and daily press. This, combined with the grapevine of the ethnic community, [would] make it unlikely that those eligible for the program will not get the message.” In short, Gotlieb urged Andras to resist public pressure. If a longer period of time were to be chosen, at least the time frame should remain fixed.\textsuperscript{47}

On June 21 Gotlieb sent the Minister draft regulations for the Program. As proposed, the Program would allow the landing, under relaxed criteria, of sponsored dependants; anyone who would be given a Visa if applying overseas; refugees; anyone dependent on a Canadian citizen or permanent resident for support, or who was depended upon for support by a Canadian citizen or permanent resident; and anyone over eighteen who had “demonstrated the ability to become established” in Canada, judged by


361
immigration officials along the lines of employment, financial stability, efforts made to establish themselves in the country, their conduct in Canada, the presence of relatives in Canada, or their having established a business in the country. These criteria were in line with the criteria in the points system and existing sponsorship processes, and could be expected to be received favourably and perceived as fair.

When the new law was introduced in June and debate began, there was an immediate increase in the number of applicants at immigration offices. The Vancouver immigration office, for instance, telexed on June 22 to report the registration of 15 people and a high number of telephone inquiries. Later that day Adams reported to the Minister that as of close of business June 21, 357 people had notified immigration offices of their intent to register, clogging the phone lines to do so. However, unlike the Administrative Measures Program, Andras’ Adjustment of Status Program was well-planned, and the regional Directors General were prepared for the deluge. For financial purposes, the Program was assigned project number 97. On June 22 J.R. Robillard, Director of Operations (Immigration), telexed the code to Directors General in Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, and Winnipeg. Robillard also asked all Directors of Immigration Offices to report numbers daily and to regularly communicate the

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362
anticipated breakdown of dispensation of applications.\textsuperscript{51} On July 19 Director of Operations J.R. Robillard reported to McKenna that the proclamation of Bill C-197 was not anticipated to cause any problems in the regions.\textsuperscript{52} However, the process was not going to be universally smooth. For example, on July 18 a report reached the Deputy Minister that the Ontario immigration office had 170 cases on file of individuals who would be ineligible for the Adjustment of Status program because they entered Canada after November 30. Of these, about forty were still insisting on an appeal.\textsuperscript{53} The RCMP had concerns about the coming program, worrying that individuals they perceived as subversives might use the opportunity to get landed status; an undated memo to the Minister from Gotlieb mentioned this concern, citing a list of about 30 “persons of concern” including Hardial Dingh Bains, leader of the Communist Party of Canada—Marxist-Leninist, and eight lecturers or professors at Canadian universities.\textsuperscript{54}

As the Program’s parameters developed, the question of how to address the specific situation of students arose. July correspondence between the Programs and Procedures and Home Services Branch mentioned that the International Students


\textsuperscript{53} LAC, RG 76, Vol. 996, File 5875-5-1 pt 1, Status Adjustment Program — 1973 — Status Adjustment Procedures — General, Memo from J.E. McKenna, Director, Home Services Branch, to Director, Programs and Procedures Branch, July 18, 1973; Memo to the Deputy Minister from Assistant Deputy Minister (Immigration), “Immigration Adjustment of Status Program,” July 18, 1973.

\textsuperscript{54} LAC, RG 76, Vol. 996, File 5875-5-1 pt 1, Status Adjustment Program — 1973 — Status Adjustment Procedures — General, Memo to the Minister from Gotlieb, undated. See Hewitt for more on RCMP spying on university professors.
Organization had made inquiries about the status of students who went home for the holidays. Officials considered allowing students to apply if they were due back in September; landing students by special order-in-council; and disallowing anyone who had been absent from the country for any reason from benefitting from the Adjustment of Status Program. J.E. McKenna, Home Services Branch Director, communicated his position to the Assistant Deputy Minister, Immigration, that any indication that a person had been out of the country for any reason whatsoever on a passport since November 30, 1972, meant they were not admissible. Domestic pressure had more impact. On July 20 the Assistant Deputy Minister’s office received an unusual phone call from the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada expressing concern over the impact of the new law on the University community; on July 27 Deputy Minister Gotlieb suggested, and received agreement from the Minister, that leniency would be appropriate in dealing with students who might have crossed the border since November 30 for short periods of time.

56 Founded in 1958 “to ease the life of international students while away from their home country:” “About the ISO,” http://www.iso.org/about_ISO.aspx, accessed July 6, 2008.
The Adjustment of Status Program: Implementation through Cooperation

Bill C-197, assented to on 27 July 1973, abolished the right of appeal for individuals who had applied for landed status and been denied. Although the program's proclamation was on file on July 31, it took two more weeks before the Adjustment of Status program was officially launched on August 15. As of August 29, 12,383 individuals had registered their intent to apply for landing, with a total of 9461 dependants. The program was billed as a "once-and-for-all opportunity" for anyone in Canada, legally or illegally, as of November 30, 1972, to apply for Landed Immigrant Status. The "relaxed selection criteria" eventually resulted in about 50,000 people being landed, while the appeals backlog was effectively solved, for the time being. The Program was monitored by the House of Commons. Reports on the debates, along with statistics about the program, were sent to Directors of Immigration Offices.

In order to ensure the program would be effective, the Department of Immigration used the media to promote it. Immigration staff were advised that through the office of

Information Services, advertising was to be undertaken in daily, weekly, weekend, English, French, and “ethnic” newspapers; magazines, including foreign and religious publications; English, French, and “ethnic” television and radio; cinema; and transit and subway advertising spaces. In order to have a broad appeal, “Regional Information Service Managers can highlight human interest cases, [and] work with local political and community leaders.” One million brochures and 50,000 “counter cards” were anticipated. Information booths and vans in parking lots were encouraged to be undertaken by regional offices; poster campaigns were also encouraged. Visiting remote areas and workplaces “like construction sites and mines” was also part of the plan for outreach.63

Some of the Department of Immigration materials found their way into anti-draft group offices. One Department of Immigration pamphlet declared, “If you were in Canada by November 30, 1972 and have remained here since, as a visitor or without legal status, we’re going to give until midnight, October 15, 1973 to make our country your country.” The pamphlet went on to outline the process for applying, emphasizing the leniency in applying the rules during this period.64 A war resister support organization secured a copy of “Regulations Respecting the Adjustment of Immigration Status of Certain Persons in Canada,” also referred to as the “Immigration Adjustment of Status Regulations,” and a blank form affidavit attesting to the immigrant’s presence in Canada by November 30 and listing acceptable types of proof.65 The Department of Immigration

64 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 1.1 [Manpower and Immigration publications].
65 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 1.2 [Various publications].
certainly made significant efforts to get the information out. AMEX magazine reported that the Department had spent $1.2 million on advertising.\textsuperscript{66}

Perhaps because, unlike in November of 1972, they knew the Program was coming and had time to prepare, the anti-draft movement responded decisively to the announcement and the Program itself. In 1972, the anti-draft groups had only been able to react to the regulatory change, trying to improve matters after the fact. In contrast, in 1973, the movement was able to share information among groups and resisters; intervene in the debate about how the Program should be shaped; and plan, and wage, a significant media campaign of their own to first shape, and then promote, the program in their own way and their own words.

The Anti-Draft Movement Responds to the Adjustment of Status Program

As soon as the Program was announced, the anti-draft groups began to share information on the new situation. For instance, the TADP sent out information on the proposed legislation to other anti-draft groups. They estimated that 10,000 to 20,000 Americans might qualify for the program, and exhorted activists to spread the word to unlanded Americans about the sixty day window of opportunity.\textsuperscript{67} The memo, with the headline “Sixty Days of Grace: Your Last Chance,” outlined the grace period of August 15 to October 15. It suggested that, partly due to pressure from the anti-draft movement, the program had been introduced to help those who had had no recourse after the “arbitrary cancellation last November [1972] of applications for landed status from


\textsuperscript{67} FF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 14 - Canadian Adjustment of Status Program. Folder 4 – “Regional Coordinators” and TADP Memo on Canadian Adjustment of Status Program. The Department of Immigration did not make estimates based on country of origin.
within Canada and cancellation of the right to apply at Canada-U.S. border points,”
leaving many “caught stranded.” The document also described the temporary application
criteria under the current Program as “noticeably far more relaxed.”

To help Americans take advantage of the Program, the TADP produced a thirteen
Oct. 15, 1973.” The Table of Contents read as follows:

It’s Now or Never
People eligible for the 60-Day Grace Period
Admissibility Criteria
Rights of Appeal
Documentation
The Process of Applying
Helpful Folks

This document was probably drawing on the positive experiences with past publications
such as the *Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada*, and might also have been an
attempt to mimic government pamphlets. The last section was an indication of which
anti-draft groups were still active during 1973, after the official end of the Vietnam War
and with the elimination of the U.S. Selective Service Draft. It listed the Calgary
Committee on War Immigrants, Regina Committee to Aid American War Objectors,
Alexander Ross Society, Ottawa Committee to Aid War Objectors, the Halifax
Committee to Aid War Objectors, the TADP, the Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters,
the Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors, and the Winnipeg Committee

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68 DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 1.2 [Various publications]
69 TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 14 - Canadian Adjustment of Status Program, Folder 5,
TADP information Sheet and Drafts, “60 Days of Grace”.

368
to Assist War Objectors. The TADP also issued corrections to the *Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada*.\(^{70}\)

As the campaign for registration geared up, the Canadian Council of Churches once again worked with anti-draft groups to promote it. The Council met with anti-draft groups to allocate new funding for the program’s promotion. At an “ad-hoc” meeting in Winnipeg on July 2, a publicity campaign with two proposed budgets was discussed, one set at $80,000, and the other proposal for $110,000. The funds would be sent directly to aid centres, not through the Council, in order to save time given the limited duration of the Adjustment of Status Program. The discussion showed awareness and a willingness to help on the part of the CCC.\(^{71}\) The money was to pay for a lawyer; national staff to do a media campaign, liaison, and maintain contacts; meetings; aid centre case work; and materials.\(^{72}\) Other groups looked for resources to help as well; for instance, in mid-July Voice of Women asked their “contacts and friends from [the U.S.-based] Women Strike for Peace” for funding assistance to help with applications during the 60 days.\(^{73}\) The day after the program’s announcement the United Church announced its support for the

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\(^{72}\) TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 14 - Canadian Adjustment of Status Program, Folder 13, “US Draft Age Immigrants in Canada – Report on Meeting in Winnipeg;” TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 14 - Canadian Adjustment of Status Program, Folder 2, “CCC Meeting.”


369
“government olive branch to illegal immigrants,” noting that 15-20,000 Americans were among the estimated 200,000 illegal immigrants in Canada.74

As the Adjustment of Status Program neared its launch date, anti-draft groups began agitating for better regulations. In late July of 1973 several of the aid groups united to form the Canadian Coalition of War Resisters under the slogan “a unified voice in the struggle.” A media release declared that, after a period in which several groups had slowed or ceased operations, “[t]he national network of war resister aide (sic) centres has re-opened this week in response to the government’s new immigration legislation allowing for the ‘adjustment of status’ of unlanded immigrants in Canada.” The release quoted from Andras’ speech in Parliament. The Canadian Coalition of War Resisters responded by implementing its own program: nine centres opened, five of which had closed their doors after the November 1972 revocation of section 34, and after the U.S. ceasefire had been signed in January 1973. As part of a 60-day campaign, fundraising was planned, and so were additional media work, lobbying, and ad campaigns. The release also warned that, after the Program wound down, a crackdown could occur as stricter rules came into effect.75

The next undertaking was a pressure campaign to close an expected “loophole” which could prevent landing. Upon their arrival to register for the new Program, applicants without proof on their person of having entered by the November 30, 1972

date were in danger of immediate deportation. The same day as the Adjustment of Status Program was announced, the groups pointed out in a media release that the standard of proof of entry was unknown, because only immigration officers had access to the precise criteria.\textsuperscript{76} This demand for openness was reminiscent of the successful campaign used to cast doubt on the practice of "discretion" at the border in early 1969. Without such clarity, Americans in Canada illegally still hesitated to come forward, fearing that the program was actually a trap laid to deport them.

The campaign to improve the Program continued until its launch. An August 6, 1973 media release from the Toronto group raised the same concerns about the standard of proof of residence possibly resulting in multiple immediate deportations. The group promised legal assistance and protection from such deportation, but expressed worry about immigrants who might apply without first consulting them.\textsuperscript{77} It also expressed worry that this lack of clarity regarding proof would mean that counselling would be necessary before registering. Because many might assume no proof was required upon reporting to register, based on past experiences with the Department, there was a danger of immediate deportation.\textsuperscript{78} Ironically, such communications might have contributed to wariness of a trap on the part of some resisters. While this phase of the anti-draft movement's attempts to shape the program were largely ineffective, later, as we will see, the government appeared to relent and to agree to measures to reassure immigrants fearing a trap.

\textsuperscript{76} TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 14 - Canadian Adjustment of Status Program, Folder 8, Press Release July 31, 1973, 7:30 pm., and Drafts.
\textsuperscript{77} DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 1.2 [Various publications]
\textsuperscript{78} TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 13 - Lobbying and Public Relations, Folder 1, TADP Statements and Lobbying.
Program Promotion by the Anti-Draft Groups

Despite these misgivings, once the program started, the anti-draft groups actively encouraged war resisters to apply. However, their misgivings remained strong enough for them to insist that war resisters register through the committees, in order to secure pre-counselling. They did so through the media, poster campaigns, and by word of mouth. They also, eventually, engaged directly with the Program in order to improve the number of applicants.

The anti-draft groups, having received funding to do so from the CCC, the TADP among them, undertook significant media promotion of the Program. The TADP ran 51 ads on Toronto’s CHUM AM and FM radio stations, public service announcements on other stations, and ads in the Varsity newspaper, as well as in 7 News, the Ward 7 community newspaper:

UNLANDED WAR RESISTER?
OR JUST NOT LANDED YET???

Your last chance – that’s right – your LAST CHANCE to get landed immigrant status in Canada has already begun.

If you have been in Canada since Nov. 30, 1972, you have until Oct. 15 to register with the government.

The incredibly easy standards to get landed are for real, but the paperwork is quite tricky.

So see us first before you go to the government – it’s in the interest of your own safety.

Be sure to register.

And be sure to contact us first.

Toronto Anti-Draft Programme

372
TADP ads were also placed in other Ontario regions on the first day of the Program, in such newspapers as the *Mountain News, Dundas Star, Ancaster News,* and *Stoney Creek News.* Eric Stine of the Halifax Committee wrote an article regarding the Program, and asked local newspapers to print it – it is unclear whether any did so. Ads were placed by the Nova Scotia group in several regional papers including the Windsor, NS *Hants Journal,* the Charlottetown *Guardian-Patriot,* the *Brunswick,* and the *Amherst Daily News.* These newspapers were likely less expensive to advertise in, and could reach communities where resisters might not regularly listen to or read the major dailies. The anti-draft groups also attempted to shape the media coverage of the program; for instance, a TADP letter praised CBC Radio for its coverage, but encouraged them in future to refer immigrants to counselling groups. This interaction with the media was typical of previous campaigns as well, as we have seen. The Canadian Council of Churches used its...
influence to try to secure free air time for radio public service announcements recorded with the voices of popular singers Ian Tyson, Joan Baez, and Jesse Winchester.\textsuperscript{84}

The groups monitored their success in the media. They saw headlines like the \textit{Globe and Mail}'s on August 7, "Draft Evaders Fear No-appeal Deportation,"\textsuperscript{85} and September 11, "Offer of Landed Status No Trap, Andras Assures Illegal Immigrants,"\textsuperscript{86} as direct evidence of their impact on the government.

Posters were also used to promote the campaign. A Halifax poster on yellow paper announced "American War Resisters [sic], your last chance to become a legally landed immigrant from inside Canada ends on October 15. For free counselling and information on complying with the special regulations call or visit us immediately, the Halifax Committee to Aid War Resisters [sic]." Another such poster read:

\begin{quote}
Potential Immigrants or War Resisters [sic]\par
Now is your last chance to become a landed immigrant from within Canada\par
The government has granted sixty day amnesty period for those people living in Canada without legal status. Anyone who has been in Canada since on or before [sic] November 30, 1972, may apply during the period August 15 to October 15, 1973 to become a legally landed immigrant. The government has stated that those who come forward now will be free "from prosecution for the manner in which they came in [sic] or remained in Canada."
For more information contact: The Halifax Committee to Aid War Resisters [sic] \textsuperscript{87}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{84} TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 14 - Canadian Adjustment of Status Program, Folder 10, Adjustment of Status Program - correspondence, press releases, notes.
\textsuperscript{87} DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 2.1 [news clippings].
The text was followed by information on the address, office hours, and phone number for the Committee. Other materials such as leaflets were produced with similar messages.\textsuperscript{88}

Montreal's poster used the image of a beaver holding a placard reading "IMMIGRATE."

\begin{verbatim}
ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS: YOU MUST IMMIGRATE NOW OR NEVER. DO NOT REGISTER UNTIL YOU ARE FULLY PREPARED.
FREE EXPERT COUNSELLING AT AMERICAN REFUGEE SERVICE YELLOW DOOR – 3625 AYLMER ST. 843-3132 AUGUST 15 TO OCTOBER 15\textsuperscript{89}
\end{verbatim}

In order to reach as many potential immigrants as possible, the Canadian Coalition of War Resisters hired a driver from August 15 to September 26, to drive around in a school bus on a tour of Canada to find unlanded immigrants living outside urban centres (Figure 1).\textsuperscript{90} Activists also paid visits to nearby towns.\textsuperscript{91}

The groups also continued their case work. The TADP, for instance, tracked potential registrants, the number of visits they had made to TADP offices and the number of times they had called, and ranked them by priority. The fact that they also divided them into American and non-American inquiries indicates that the campaign had reached further than the immediate American immigrant community. Between August 15 and September 28, the TADP alone recorded 401 first visits, 77 repeat visits, 248 first calls, and 41 repeat calls from Americans. They kept weekly reports and meticulous daily

\textsuperscript{88} DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 1.5 [bulletins, posters, publications on amnesty].

\textsuperscript{89} TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 27 [oversize], Folder 2, Continued from box 14, Folder 27 – Adjustment of status program clippings.

\textsuperscript{90} TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 14 - Canadian Adjustment of Status Program, Folder 26, Bus Promotion.

\textsuperscript{91} TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 14 - Canadian Adjustment of Status Program, Folder 27, Newspaper Clippings, \textit{Bancroft, Ont. Weekly}, Aug. 8, 1973, "Anti-draft Program to Area."
Figure 3: Bus with painted slogan “Last Chance for Landed Immigrant Status,” used to tour rural areas to find war resisters living outside urban centres. Anti-draft groups undertook a campaign to promote the Department of Immigration’s Adjustment of Status Program, 1973. Source: TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 14 - Canadian Adjustment of Status Program, Folder 26, Bus Promotion, n.d., circa September 1973

records. In the end many of those counselled were immigrants from countries other than the United States. An AMEX Magazine report stated:

It breaks down like this: the Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors had counselled some 520 people at the half-way point [of the program’s duration]; 450 were Americans and 100 of these were war resisters. The Winnipeg Committee to Assist War Objectors counselled 175 people; 130 were Americans and 70 were war resisters. The TADP has counselled 800 people; 650 were Americans, and 400 were war resisters. Ottawa counsellors saw 170 people; 42 were Americans and 30 were war resisters. The Montreal American Refugee Service counselled

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300 people; 150 were Americans and 75 were war resisters. All these figures were approximations made by the counselling centres. No reports were available from the Alexander Ross Society in Edmonton, the Calgary Committee on War immigrants, the Thunder Bay Aid Committee or the Halifax Committee to Aid War Objectors.

Thus the anti-draft groups, at the point in the program where these numbers were amassed, had counselled a total of over 2000 people of which only 1422 were Americans, and fewer were war resisters.

**Criticism and Cooperation**

Meanwhile, anti-draft groups were still trying to find ways to keep the border open to American war resisters. On August 30, 1973, Immigration Minister Robert Andras sent a letter to Prime Minister Trudeau:

> Recently I received representations to allow American war resisters (draft dodgers and deserters) in Canada to apply for landed immigrant status despite the fact that on November 3, 1972, the Government announced that the right of an individual to apply for immigration status while temporarily in Canada had been revoked. The representations maintained that such persons were political refugees and hence deserving of special treatment. I thought that you might be interested in my stand in this matter.

Andras did not see conscription as persecution or discrimination, and therefore did not consider war resisters to be refugees under the international conventions adopted by Canada in 1969. Andras pointed out to Trudeau that war resisters could still qualify under C-197, the Adjustment of Status Program.

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The movement also pressed the government to double the duration of the Program. On October 10 1973 the NSCAWO, Halifax Committee to Aid War Resisters, Halifax Neighbourhood Committee, Black United Front of Nova Scotia, Sign of the Fish – Halifax, Canadian Council of Christians and Jews for the Atlantic Region, and the Coalition for Development sent a telegram to Robert Andras, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, requesting a 60 day extension of the grace period in order to allow for fears of deportation to be allayed and information to be disseminated to harder-to-reach regions. The Halifax Friends Meeting also supported the initiative, passing a resolution to that effect. A media release was distributed about the telegram and the Friends resolution. The Vancouver committee also called for an extension; once again, they highlighted fears of a “trap,” and worried that information was not reaching all affected people.\(^95\)

With the $110,000 provided by the CCC to publicize the program, the campaign was significant. But despite these efforts and those of the Department of Immigration, many potential registrants at first feared to come forward, perhaps, paradoxically, because of the very intensity of the promotional efforts being made. In early September of 1973 an advice column in the Ottawa Citizen printed a letter headlined “Illegal Immigrant’s Fear Unjustified.” The author of the letter explained that “this campaign scares me. I fear it is a ploy to have illegal immigrants expose themselves so they can be arrested and deported.” Advice columnist Roger Appleton assured the writer that “if you are a draft dodger from the United States, don’t worry. That won’t be held against you.

\(^{95}\) DAL, MS-10-7, Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 1.5 [bulletins, posters, publications on amnesty].

\(^{96}\) TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 13 - Lobbying and Public Relations, Folder 1, TADP Statements and Lobbying, Letter from Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors to Robert Andras, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Oct. 1, 1973.

378
here.” Appleton offered in his column to act as a “middle man” to protect illegal immigrants in the application process.97

By mid-September war resister supporters were sounding the alarm about the effectiveness of the program. Reverend Richard Killmer and Tim Maloney of Winnipeg wrote to the Department of Immigration to express concerns regarding the credibility of the program among “illegals;” their research indicated that only 25 percent of registrants were bona fide illegal immigrants, while 58 percent were students taking advantage of the program to fast-track their own plans to immigrate. In response to such concerns, and “as a result of an experiment [using anti-draft counsellors to pre-screen registrants] conducted in the Pacific region and recent consultations with the War Objectors Committee at Toronto,” Deputy Minister of Immigration A.E. Gotlieb recommended to Minister Andras the establishment of a “commitment officer” process for pre-screening for cases where immigrants fear to come forward. An officer would pre-screen, without prejudice, the documentation provided by potential registrants, and tell them what they needed to bring to their appointment to be registered. He also re-emphasized the need to deal leniently with short absences from Canada.98 As we will see, the commitment officer suggestion was adopted.

In order to do some damage control in the media, Gotlieb recommended that the Minister talk about the practice with regard to short absences from Canada, and to remind the public that the sixty day period, under fire from some quarters as inadequate, was

firm and legislated, and could not be changed. Intriguingly, he also recommended
soliciting support for the Program from the Canadian Labour Congress and the Canadian
Chamber of Commerce, probably in order to illustrate the breadth of the program's public
support. A media release contained quotes from Minister Andras about sincerity,
including the statement that the "government of Canada has shown its complete sincerity
in the processing of those already registered and the relaxed criteria being applied to
these cases mean that almost all of the applicants will be granted permanent
residence." Further media statements promoted the commitment officer process. The
coverage indicated that the war resister support groups had played a decisive role in the
decision to try it:

[T]he federal government is stepping up its campaign to convince the
public that [the Adjustment of Status Program] is not a trap. Starting this
weekend, a system of pre-registration is being introduced into Toronto's
ethnic communities so that illegal immigrants can find out in advance if
they are going to be accepted.... Unofficially, the Immigration Department
had already established links with organizations concerned with U.S.
draft-resisters to provide the kind of reassurance the mediators
[commitment officers] will be able to offer. An Immigration Department
Spokesman said that the Toronto anti-draft program has been phoning the
department with details of anonymous cases, and getting a kind of pre-
clearance before the individual came in to report officially. Here again, the war resisters' supporters had an impact on the entire immigration
picture, and not only on American immigrants.

Starting in early October regional immigration offices began directly reporting to each other on the progress being made with the program, in a process remarkably similar to the one used by war resister support groups to keep each other informed. This process was likely launched at an Assistant Directors General Conference held in Winnipeg, October 1, 1973. At the conference, reports were heard on actions being taken in each region. In Ontario, “[s]pecial offers [of cooperation] were made to Mr. Dick Brown of the Toronto Anti-Draft Program but he has yet to come up with any applicants [for a job promoting the program].” The Ontario office also reported that it was not receiving a high volume of applicants, possibly because the 1972 Administrative Measures Program had dealt with “a lot of problem cases,” and there was not a large pool of potential registrants. Ontario reported that they intended to “…continue with their Commitment Officers, particularly with the War Resisters (sic) groups.” In the Pacific Region:

4 persons have been hired to aid the War Resisters (sic)…. [A]ccording to the T.V. Hour Glass Program there were 2,500 resisters in the Vancouver area but they have not been able to turn up more than about 250. Another claim was that there were some 5,000 visitors in the Sloakum [sic] Valley area, but a visit does not turn up many — in fact Sloakum [sic] Valley does not have that much of a population… [we] believe we underestimated the results of project 80 [the Administrative Measures] on the Adjustment of Status Program.103

After the conference of Assistant Directors General, the regional promotion of the program was reported back to headquarters and then sent back out to the regions. In early October Director of Information Services A. Duckett reported to the Directors General in all regions, the Directors of Home Services and Programs and Procedures, and the Director General, Foreign Service, on “Information progress for Thursday, October 4,

1973." Regional information was provided. The report documented how immigration officials were working directly with, among others, anti-draft groups, to promote the Adjustment of Status Program:

Ontario – a meeting in Toronto between acting Director of Immigration Operations, Peter Murray, and members of the war resisters (sic) group was taped by radio stations CHIN, CHUM and CBC. The *Toronto Star* published a story on the Adjustment of Status Program.\(^{104}\)

A similar report for Tuesday, October 9, 1973 stated that in Ontario, “a mobile unit is currently travelling through Innisville, Golden Lake, Barry’s Bay and Pembroke.” In the Prairies, “[a]ssurances are also being given to a number of Americans who are afraid to register for fear of being turned back to the United States where warrants may be out for their arrests.”\(^{105}\) Small wonder, since border officials and the RCMP had previously collaborated with the FBI.

Anticipating the end of the 60 day period, the department decided to accept registrations by mail or telegram if they were postmarked by midnight October 15, instead of requiring a form and an interview.\(^ {106}\) In the end, about 50,000 people attained

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\(^{105}\) LAC, RG 76, Vol. 996, File 5875-5-1 pt 1, Status Adjustment Program – 1973 – Status Adjustment Procedures – General, Telecommunication Message, from Head, Regional Information Development and Internal Communications, Information Service, to Directors General, all regions, cc. Director, Home Services Branch; Director-General, Foreign Services; Director, Programs and Procedures, “Information Progress for Tuesday, October 9, 1973,” Oct. 9, 1973. The Department was also working with such ethnic communities such as Chinese, Ceylonese, and Caribbean groups in Toronto: Hartley, “Ethnic ‘Mediators’.”

landed status under the Program. On October 12 the Director of Home Services Branch reported to the Assistant Deputy Minister that no regions were reporting significantly higher numbers of applications that day; but, the memo continued, the Winnipeg War Resisters group was planning to meet with “ethnic groups [outside the American immigrant community],” “to coordinate efforts to prevail upon Immigration authorities that persons…apprehended after October 16 will be dealt with as leniently as those who register [under the Program].” Perhaps in response to such appeals, applicants who would have qualified under the Program after the 60-day period were treated as requests for consideration on humanitarian grounds. The Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors asked Minister Robert Andras for an extension of the Program, but because Parliament did not sit again until October 15, the last day of the Program, an extension was impossible, even had the Minister wished to consider it.

Impact of the Adjustment of Status Program on the War Resisters Story

The cooperation between the Department of Immigration and the anti-draft group network was unprecedented. Dick Brown of the Toronto group even received a thank-you letter on October 19 from G.D.A. Reid, Director General, Ontario Region, Manpower and

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107 The statistics reported were 31,879 registrants and 17,893 dependents, of which about 32 percent were illegal: LAC, RG 76, Vol. 996, File 5875-5-1 pt 1, Status Adjustment Program – 1973 – Status Adjustment Procedures – General, Memo to the Minister, “Adjustment of Status Program,” Oct. 23, 1973.
110 TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 27 [oversize], Folder 2, Continued from box 14, Folder 27 – Adjustment of status program clippings.
Immigration. However, the Administrative Measures and the Adjustment of Status Program do not appear to figure heavily in the memories of war resisters. The exceptions among those interviewed are Joseph Jones, a draft dodger who arrived in 1970:

I remember discussions at Amex about the sixty-day grace period from August to October 1973. Concerns included the limited time for publicity, the way in which church and perhaps government money was directed to politically dubious individuals and groups, the possibility that applicants would be rejected and deported, the possibility that the paranoia of life underground would keep people from applying, and the anticipation that Canadian immigration officials might attempt a program of deporting those who failed to apply.

“Daniel,” a deserter who arrived in 1968:

I didn’t know that they called them that. If this refers to no longer being able to gain “landed immigrant” status by application from within Canada after September, 1972, I remember it, but I managed to get landed just before they cut off this option.

and Paul Copeland, movement lawyer:

I vaguely remember the adjustment of status program. I think there were a couple of in-effect amnesties, I think the appeals board would get so backed up, certainly in some of the later refugee stuff they got so backed up that they did reviews, and adjustment of status programs. Anyone who was here long-term, in the adjustment of status program they could get landed.

This comparative lack of collective memory about these two government measures suggests that, for the anti-draft movement and war resisters, it mostly figured in the minds of those directly engaged in policy work or case work.

111 TF, Jack Pocock Memorial Collection, Box 14 - Canadian Adjustment of Status Program, Folder 10, Adjustment of Status Program – correspondence, press releases, notes.
112 Based on responses to interviews and informal conversations with war resisters and supporters at events and conferences between 2004 and 2008.
113 Jones interview.
114 Bruce Proctor, email interview by the author, Nov. 2, 2006.
115 Copeland interview.
Thus the effects of these programs on draft dodgers and deserters did not get incorporated into the mainstream narrative about draft dodgers in Canada. This is likely because the narrative about immigration tends to exclude Americans. Further, just as exact numbers of American war resisters coming to Canada are elusive, it remains unclear how many Americans were among those landed during the programs. The Adjustment of Status Program is promoted by today’s Canadian government as a part of the story of Canada’s open immigration policy, and is generally understood – or criticized – as such, and not as part of the story of war resisters specifically.¹¹⁶

At the time, the response from the war resister community was ambivalent.

“Immigration’s ‘last chance’ Ends: Get Back Jack!,” announced a Vancouver American Exiles’ Association newsletter issued after the Program ended. Although 49,230 immigrants had registered, the newsletter claimed that perhaps hundreds of thousands remained illegal. “Perhaps when one has lived underground anywhere from 2 [to] 10 years, a ‘60 day Immigration Act’ is not as convincing as the immigration dept. (sic) would like,” the newsletter quipped. The article told of “the looming prospect of a ‘deportation drive’ by Immigration authorities and RCMP.” The VA EA stated its commitment to “win a special refugee status for American war resisters.”¹¹⁷

Conclusion: A Social Movement Playing a Government Role

While Bryce Mackasey’s administrative measures to address the administrative problems of a large appeals backlog, and the subsequent move to remove the rule

¹¹⁷ TF, Jack Pacock Memorial Collection, Box 27 [oversize], Folder 2, Continued from box 14, Folder 27 – Adjustment of status program clippings.
allowing visitors to apply for landed immigrant status from within Canada, were viewed with suspicion by the anti-draft movement, the programs to allow for faster processes were actively promoted by the groups. The interaction between the anti-draft groups and government officials is an example of how the permeable barrier between the “state” and civil society sometimes allows for social movements to take on government roles themselves. The mutual influence of the movement and government, while predominantly adversarial, allowed for positive steps to be taken for American immigrants, while the groups were still able to maintain their autonomy and their roles as advocates.
Conclusion: Canadian Support for Vietnam-Era American War Resisters

[Let freedom ring]
it would be nice if it did ring,
but it doesn’t
it explodes and makes a mess¹

The “long sixties” has seen a surge of research interest in recent years, with the fiftieth anniversary of watershed years such as 1968.² The sixties resonate for those who lived through them, and for a new generation of Canadians looking to interpret current events that show a striking resemblance to the events of that famous decade. This work is intended to be a contribution to that understanding, by offering a critical and more complete understanding of the events of the sixties in Canada and around the world.

During this project, I was frequently asked what the topic of my dissertation was. I would reply that it was about Canadian support for Vietnam-era American war resisters. Very frequently – in fact, almost always – upon hearing this, the questioner would tell me they knew a draft dodger growing up, or that they were acquainted with a war resister. Similarly, anyone who I have talked to about it, and who later describes my project to someone else, tends to say it is about draft dodgers. The topic of Canadian support for resisters I was studying becomes the topic of the war resisters themselves. This may seem like a minor distinction, but I think it says a lot about the strength of the myth of Canada as a haven for war resisters. So strong is that myth that the support dimension of the story is easily dismissed, because part of the myth is that Canada has always been such a


387
haven. There is an assumption that the support would have been automatic, homogeneous and unproblematic from all levels of society, and so no movement to support resisters should have been necessary. This research shows that the experience of war resisters in Canada in the late 1960s and early 1970s, during which time the haven myth was entrenched, was actually the product a complex and varied set of relationships, actions, and interactions by and among various individuals, institutions, and groups.

The American and Canadian Vietnam era anti-draft movements got organized at the same time, around 1967. Between 1967 and 1972, about 40,000 Americans immigrated to Canada, many of them war resisters. Many Canadians supported the war resisters; others were not so welcoming. Canadian government officials were ambivalent towards these immigrants; they were both a potential source of trained labour, and a potential source of social disorder. The politically broad movement to support American war resisters was united in its support, but it also contained divergences of opinion, especially when the difference between draft dodgers and deserters was considered.

The exact number of American war resisters to immigrate to Canada between 1965 and 1973 was a matter of some debate, and remains so today. The consensus appears to be that some forty to fifty thousand young men arrived in Canada in the period to escape the draft. Women also came, and many of them saw themselves as part of the same group of people. Estimates of the number American war resisters in Canada suggest that this group represented a large percentage of the American men who took various actions to beat the draft. For instance, a quarter million young Americans are estimated to

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388
have avoided the draft by omitting to register on their eighteenth birthday. The numbers of these war resisters were small compare to the number of Canadians who participated in the wider opposition to war in Vietnam. But the size of this movement nonetheless helps explain the dominant idea of Canada as a haven for draft dodgers, an idea which has become part of Canadian identity. Answering questions about the draft dodgers who came to Canada, and the Canadians who supported them, can give us a better understanding of the cross-border solidarity experienced in wartime, and the contingent nature of the haven Canada provided to American war resisters.

This research shows that the anti-draft movement in Canada was a social movement with a complex relationship to the government of the day. More generally, this movement played a role in, and was influenced by, debates about the changing role of immigration, the influence of old movements on new ones, and nationalism. The interaction of government officials, police, anti-draft groups, individual activists, and war resisters, has been examined through the lens of a multidisciplinary theory which allowed for a consideration of the complexity of social interactions, including the relationship between material experience and culture. Through it, we have gained a richer understanding of this episode in Canadian history. Some of its elements had never been told in written form before, especially from the ground up. The story is usefully seen as a battle for hegemony between ideas and perceptions of war resisters, and between different ideas of Canadian nationalism. It also represents an interesting case of a movement’s relationship to the government – and shows especially well how a movement may act in ways usually considered the domain of government institutions.

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5 Miller, 196.
The Canadian anti-draft movement only existed for about seven years. During this time it experienced problems of unity stemming from internal debates, first about the relative effectiveness of draft dodging and deserting as anti-war actions and, later, about strategy, which manifested itself most tellingly as a debate about radicalism.

The decentralized network of anti-draft groups, rooted in the New Left, was well suited to the needs of a movement aimed at supporting American immigrants who could cross the border anywhere. Groups in the United States provided assistance in distributing materials and information; in Canada, lawyers and intellectuals, politicians and church groups, helped pave the way. The groups and individuals shaped, and were shaped by, the perceptions held by war resisters of Canada and the Canadian anti-draft movement.

Using methods partly taken from pacifist tradition, this movement reached out to potential immigrants. Social work methods combined with those of political advocacy. Their juxtaposition contributed to tensions within the movement, but they also often provided successful techniques of communication and information-sharing, and helped maintain the strength that comes from a shared commitment to a cause. Maturing over time, this movement developed an ability to face new situations critically, and used imagination, and open mindedness, to adjust their methods accordingly. Reliance on such varied traditions prepared the movement well to overcome both geographical and ideological obstacles to help individual war resisters and to effect changes to immigration policy. It was also strengthened by links with groups of an equally varied nature in the United States.

6 After 1973 the movement had shifted its focus to the debate about amnesty, and was almost entirely dominated by American immigrants.
The movement's campaigns made an especially effective use of the media, lobbying, and letter-writing campaigns. These methods, first put to good use in 1969 to open the border to deserters, worked well a second time in attempts to influence the two programs undertaken by the Department of Immigration in 1972 and 1973 to address backlogs in the appeals system and to address the large number of illegal immigrants in the country. At the same time, negative police attention, seen as harassment by anti-draft activists and war resisters alike, was significant. Behind such police behaviour, and underlying police interactions with Immigration officials, were divisions both at the top and at the bottom of society. Accordingly, the media at large was also to play a large role in the public scrutiny of police behaviour. The surveillance itself reflected wider fears in Canadian society, of Americans' influence on Canadian society in general, and on Canadian social justice movements in particular. In such a context, the interplay between institutions of government at many levels and the movement was part of a struggle for hegemony over perceptions of war resisters and of their influence on Canadian society.

Initially, most Canadian activists refrained from discriminating between the varieties of draft resistance tactics amongst Americans. Eventually, however, the formation of intransigent American exile groups, which valorized desertion and radicalism, provoked important debates amongst Canadian supporters. They resulted in a general preference, amongst Canadian supporters, for American actions geared towards assimilating to Canadian institutions and ideas. For the most part, such preferences were expressed as a desire for Canadian independence, and not as anti-American sentiment aimed at individual Americans. To be sure, vocal elements of anti-Americanism emerged among the Canadian left in connection to this push for assimilation, and were at times
aimed at individuals, but they were the expressions of a minority. These ideas about Canadian independence were part of a set of ideas I have referred to as "left nationalist."

While such promotion of Canadian independence allowed for gains to be made on behalf of resisters, it limited, to some degree at least, the movement's ability to challenge fundamental assumptions about Canada and its immigration policy. These internal contradictions reflected back on debates in the movement about nationalism, strategy and tactics. These contradictions complicated existing differences about tactics in the anti-draft movement which had their roots in divergences between political cultures from earlier in the century.

As the movement matured it began to engage more directly and assertively with government policy. In 1972 and 1973 it actively intervened and, once programs were in place, promoted government actions to help visitors get landed. In so doing the movement was a concrete example of the permeable boundary between "state" and society, and of how the state is constantly in formation, in a process of change and interaction, especially at those boundaries.

Many additional stories are embedded in the one told here. As I have noted, one most obvious missing story, that of women war resisters, is the topic of research for several historians, notably Lara Campbell (Simon Fraser University). Sexism was as much a part of the anti-draft movement as any other sixties movement. Racism, as well, is only touched on here; it is a future topic for my research. The impact that other classes of immigrants excluded by the Immigration Act, such as homosexuals, former mental patients, people who might become "public charges," alcoholics, or "mentally or physically defective individuals," had on potential American war resisters' decisions
remains unknown. Church involvement is also far more extensive than I have been able to explore in this work. As I have noted, some work has already been done in this area, notably by Donald W. Maxwell (Indiana University); more is certainly warranted.

Other kinds of questions arose in the process of conducting this research. For instance, in a few documents I found hints of marriage as a form of resistance, as immigrants sometimes married Canadians in order to get landed; this tactic has interesting resonances with marriage tactics in the Quebec student movement of the 1980s, when students married each other in order to avoid the government rule requiring students’ families to pay for their education. What was the impact of marriage as a tactic?

Also, what were the specifically regional qualities and cultures of the actions of anti-draft groups and the war resisters who settled near them? The studies thus far conducted do not address these questions. Although I examined a geographically diverse sample of this movement, I did not systematically investigate this dimension of the problem. Some initial ideas or investigation might include whether war resisters from specific regions of the US were attracted to specific Canadian locations, and why; whether war resisters from cities went to cities, those from rural communities settled on the land and so on; and whether cultural perceptions about different regions of Canada, such as, perhaps, an idea of BC as a warmer place both climatically and socially, trickled down to the movement in the U.S., leading to increased chain migration. Finally, and importantly, the war resisters tended to settle in concentrated areas. The study by Hagan, mentioned earlier, looked at two such “ghettos” in Toronto; but dozens of rural areas saw an influx of war resisters. What was the impact of Americans on these areas? These and many others questions deserve further research.
As the anti-draft movement wound down, American exile groups and deserter committees continued, with a new focus: winning an unconditional amnesty from the United States government. This focus was evidently one that privileged the desires of Americans wishing to return to the U.S. Two amnesties, one by President Gerald Ford, and one by President Jimmy Carter, were eventually decreed. Meanwhile, the new and newly re-forged movements of the sixties – women’s liberation, black and red power, anti-imperialism – continued well into the seventies. Hagan’s current research into the activism of war resisters in Canada may reveal just how much of an impact the war resisters had on Canadian society. Today’s war resisters may have a similar impact, provoking similar engagement with ideas of Canadian nationalism and pacifism.

The anti-draft movement managed to effectively help war resisters from 1966 until around 1974. After that the movement shifted focus, becoming centred on exile issues and, in particular, amnesty from United States government prosecution should resisters choose to return to the U.S. The movement was uneven, and enjoyed its ups and down in terms of effectiveness. It also carried out debates centred around questions of citizenship, engagement, and nationalism. Despite the complexity of the scene, the anti-draft movement helped thousands of war resisters successfully immigrate to Canada.
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Published Primary Sources – Nationalism in the Sixties

Secondary sources – Vietnam War Resisters in Canada
Secondary sources – War Resistance, Pacifism, and Conscientious Objection
Secondary Sources – The Vietnam War
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Secondary Sources – “State”, Society, and Social Movements
Secondary Sources – The Sixties: Social Movements and Their Influences
Secondary Sources – Bureaucracy and Canadian Political History
Secondary Sources – Policing
Secondary Sources – Immigration, Racialization, and Multiculturalism
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**Articles and Book Chapters**


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**Books**


**Articles and Book Chapters**


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**Conference Papers**


**Web Sources**


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**Conference Papers**


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**Web Sources**


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**Books**


**Articles and Book Chapters**


414


Conference Papers


Theses


Secondary Sources – Twenty-first Century War Resistance

Articles and Book Chapters


Web Sources

Appendix I

Source Notes

Source Abbreviations

Library and Archives of Canada  LAC
   Record Group  RG
   Manuscript Group  MG
University of British Columbia Library,
   Rare Books and Special Collections  UBCL RBSC
McMaster University,
   William Ready Division of Archives and Research Collections  WR
      Canadian Student Social and Political Organizations  CSSPO
Dalhousie University Archives and Special Collections
      Manuscript Series  DAL
University of Toronto, Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library  TF

Notes

All government records consulted at the LAC are subject to Canadians laws on access to information and the protection of privacy (ATIP). That means that all documents, unless previously reviewed, must be reviewed by ATIP analysts, and information that is indicated under the law must be redacted. Such information usually includes private information such as names, and information which might compromise national security. The full law and list of information not released is available at http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/atip-aiprp/index-eng.asp and in the links at that site to the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act.

Documents from RG146, Canadian Security Intelligence Service fonds, were normally at least partially redacted, especially if they were provided as part of a new formal ATIP request on my part. Notations such as Req. 93-A-00016 indicate that the material was subject to a prior review and was therefore open, and available for consultation at the reference room at 395 Wellington Street in Ottawa. With few exceptions RCMP documents’ authorship is impossible to secure, and thus authorship, where required, is ascribed to the RCMP.

For more on these and related issues see Steve Hewitt, Spying 101: The RCMP’s Secret Activities at Canadian Universities, 1917-1997, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002.
## Appendix II

### Interview Subjects and Ethics Approval

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Date of arrival in Canada</th>
<th>Interview type</th>
<th>Date and location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carolyn Egan</td>
<td>War resister</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>In person</td>
<td>Toronto, Ontario, June 1, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ken Fisher</td>
<td>Canadian activist</td>
<td>Circa 1967</td>
<td>In person</td>
<td>Gatineau, Quebec, June 9, 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Michael Goldberg</td>
<td>Draft dodger</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>By telephone</td>
<td>July 11, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“James”</td>
<td>Draft dodger</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>By telephone</td>
<td>July 10, 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Ben”</td>
<td>Anti-draft activist</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>By email</td>
<td>November 4, 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marvin Work</td>
<td>Draft dodger</td>
<td>June, 1970</td>
<td>By email</td>
<td>November 28, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joan Wilcox</td>
<td>American immigrant</td>
<td>Pre-1965</td>
<td>In person</td>
<td>Ottawa, Ontario, May 17, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Phillips</td>
<td>Draft dodger</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>In person</td>
<td>Ottawa, Ontario, July 11, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Copeland</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>Canadian</td>
<td>In person</td>
<td>Ottawa, Ontario, June 5, 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Daniel”</td>
<td>Deserter</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>By email</td>
<td>November 2, 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>David James Brown</td>
<td>War resister</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>By email</td>
<td>November 6, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dick Perrin</td>
<td>Deserter</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>By email</td>
<td>December 12, 2006</td>
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<td>Hardy Scott</td>
<td>Draft dodger</td>
<td>January 1967</td>
<td>By mail</td>
<td>October 31, 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joseph Jones</td>
<td>Draft dodger</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>By email</td>
<td>November 21, 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lee Zasovsky</td>
<td>Deserter</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>By email</td>
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# Appendix III

People Mentioned in Order of Appearance in the Text

## Anti-draft activists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Role</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Melody Killian</td>
<td>Vancouver, BC</td>
<td>Yankee Refugee group, Vancouver American Deserters Committee</td>
<td>American exile activist, circa 1969-1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Warrian</td>
<td></td>
<td>Canadian Union of Students (CUS)</td>
<td>President of CUS; student activist and war resister supporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renée Goldsmith Kasinsky</td>
<td>Vancouver, BC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Author and activist circa 1970-1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Spira</td>
<td>Toronto, Ontario</td>
<td>Toronto Anti-Draft Programme (TADP)</td>
<td>Key supporter of deserters; ran the &quot;special programme&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim Wilcox</td>
<td>Ottawa, Ontario</td>
<td>Ottawa Assistance with Immigration and the Draft (AID)</td>
<td>Key organiser; lobbyist for 1969 campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hans Sinn</td>
<td>Montreal, Quebec</td>
<td>Sanity Magazine</td>
<td>Editor of Sanity; early supporter of war resisters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia and Lowell Naeve</td>
<td>Montreal, Quebec</td>
<td>Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters (MCAWR)</td>
<td>Founding members; Quakers; American war resisters who were sponsored for immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Hathaway</td>
<td>Toronto, Ontario</td>
<td>Student Union for Peace Action (SUPA)</td>
<td>Early war resister supporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arlo Tatum</td>
<td></td>
<td>Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors (CCCO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nancy Pocock</td>
<td>Ottawa and Toronto, Ontario</td>
<td>TADP</td>
<td>Key activist, 1965-1972</td>
</tr>
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<td>Name</td>
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<td>Organization</td>
<td>Role Details</td>
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<td>----------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>John (&quot;Jack&quot;) Pocock</td>
<td>Toronto, Ontario</td>
<td>TADP</td>
<td>Key activist, 1965-1972</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don Pentland</td>
<td>Winnipeg, Manitoba</td>
<td></td>
<td>Early war resister supporter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Olive Johnson</td>
<td>Richmond, BC</td>
<td>Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CCND)</td>
<td>Early war resister supporter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meg Brown</td>
<td>Vancouver, BC</td>
<td>Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors (VCTAAWO)</td>
<td>Early war resister supporter; founder, VCTAAWO; 1966-1969</td>
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<td>Benson Brown</td>
<td>Vancouver, BC</td>
<td>Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors (VCTAAWO)</td>
<td>Early war resister supporter; founder, VCTAAWO; 1966-1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nardo Castillo</td>
<td>Montreal, Quebec</td>
<td>MCAWR</td>
<td>MCAWR co-founder, 1966</td>
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<td>John Callendar</td>
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<td>MCAWR co-founder, 1966</td>
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<td>Ed Miller</td>
<td>Montreal, Quebec</td>
<td>MCAWR</td>
<td>Key MCAWR activist, 1967-1969</td>
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<td>Vance Gardner</td>
<td>Montreal, Quebec</td>
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<td>Bill Mullen</td>
<td>Montreal, Quebec</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goldie Josephy</td>
<td>Ottawa, Ontario</td>
<td>Ottawa Assistance with Immigration and the Draft (AID)</td>
<td>Key AID activist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stephen Strauss</td>
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<td>VCTAAWO</td>
<td>Key VCTAAWO activist, 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>Betty Tillotson</td>
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<td>VCTAAWO</td>
<td>Key VCTAAWO activist, 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>Myra Riddell</td>
<td></td>
<td>VCTAAWO</td>
<td>Circa 1966; VCTAAWO co-founder</td>
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423
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Place, Province</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bob Janzen</td>
<td>Ottawa, Ontario</td>
<td>War resister</td>
<td>Mennonite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Coffeehouse, Elgin Street</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joan Wilcox</td>
<td>Ottawa, Ontario</td>
<td>Ottawa Assistance</td>
<td>Key organiser; co-founder</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>with Immigration and the Draft (AID)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tony Hyde</td>
<td>Toronto, Ontario</td>
<td>SUPA</td>
<td>Early war resister support, 1966-1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Satin</td>
<td>Toronto, Ontario</td>
<td>SUPA, TADP</td>
<td>War resister and key activist, 1965-1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ron Lambert</td>
<td>Waterloo, Ontario</td>
<td>Author, Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada; AMEX Magazine</td>
<td>Professor; activist, Waterloo anti-draft programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.M.S. Careless</td>
<td></td>
<td>Author, Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada</td>
<td>Professor and Chairman, Department of History, University of Toronto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elliott Rose</td>
<td></td>
<td>Author, Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada</td>
<td>Associate Professor of History, University of Toronto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth McNaught</td>
<td></td>
<td>Author, Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada</td>
<td>Professor and editor of Saturday Night Magazine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dick Burrows</td>
<td>Toronto, Ontario</td>
<td>TADP</td>
<td>Key activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naomi Wall</td>
<td>Toronto, Ontario</td>
<td>TADP</td>
<td>Key activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allen Mace</td>
<td>Toronto, Ontario</td>
<td>TADP</td>
<td>Key activist, circa 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Liss</td>
<td>Toronto, Ontario</td>
<td>TADP</td>
<td>Key activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvia Tucker</td>
<td>Toronto, Ontario</td>
<td>TADP</td>
<td>Key activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ray Leland</td>
<td>Toronto, Ontario</td>
<td>TADP</td>
<td>Key activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katie McGovern</td>
<td>Toronto, Ontario</td>
<td>TADP</td>
<td>Key activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judith Merril</td>
<td>Toronto, Ontario</td>
<td>Red, White, and Black (RWB)</td>
<td>Key activist, 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>City, Province</td>
<td>Organization/Role</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Lind</td>
<td>Halifax, Nova Scotia</td>
<td>Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors (NSCAAWO)</td>
<td>Key activist, counsellor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric Stine</td>
<td>Halifax, Nova Scotia</td>
<td>NSCAAWO</td>
<td>Key activist, counsellor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Epp</td>
<td>Ottawa, Ontario</td>
<td>Mennonite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leonard Epp</td>
<td></td>
<td>Canadian Council of Churches (CCC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim Wert</td>
<td></td>
<td>CCC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Klaassen</td>
<td>Waterloo, Ontario</td>
<td>War resister supporter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Lanning</td>
<td>Ottawa, Ontario</td>
<td>Ottawa AID</td>
<td>Key activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed Starkins</td>
<td>Vancouver, BC</td>
<td>Vancouver American Exile Association (VAEA)</td>
<td>Co-founder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Copeland</td>
<td>Toronto, Ontario</td>
<td>Movement lawyer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clayton Ruby</td>
<td>Toronto, Ontario</td>
<td>Movement lawyer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muriel Duckworth</td>
<td></td>
<td>Voice of Women (VOW)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Americans**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization/Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tom Hayden</td>
<td>Students for a Democratic Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carl Oglesby</td>
<td>Students for a Democratic Society</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Appendix IV

Groups Mentioned and Abbreviations, in Alphabetical Order

Anti-Draft Groups and Exile Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Ross Society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Deserter's Committee, Toronto</td>
<td>TADC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Immigrants Employment Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Refugee Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Anti-Draft Programme, Toronto</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Refugee Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Refugee Organization</td>
<td>BRO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calgary Committee to Aid War Immigrants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Assistance to War Objectors</td>
<td>CAWO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee to Aid Refugees from Militarism, Toronto</td>
<td>CARM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebony Social Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmonton Committee to Aid American War Objectors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guelph Anti-Draft Programme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information '68, Windsor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Church Committee on Refugees</td>
<td>ICCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Immigrant Aid Service</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kitchener-Waterloo Anti-Draft Programme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakehead Committee to Aid American War Objectors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Information Committee for Draft Refugees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters</td>
<td>MCAWR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal American Deserter's Committee</td>
<td>Montreal ADC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal American Deserter's Co-op</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick Committee to Aid American War Objectors, Sackville</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick Committee to Aid War Resisters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland Committee to Aid American War Objectors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors</td>
<td>NSCTAAWO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oshawa Anti-Draft Programme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa AID: Assistance with Immigration and the Draft</td>
<td>AID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEI Committee to Aid War Objecters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red, White, and Black</td>
<td>RWB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regina Committee of American Deserters</td>
<td>RCAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regina Committee to Aid Immigrants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint John Anti-Draft Programme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatoon Immigrant and Refugee Society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Ontario Committee on War Immigrants, Hamilton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teach-in Committee Against the War, Charlottetown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

426
| Toronto American Deserter's Committee | TADC |
| Toronto Anti-Draft Programme          | TADP |
| University of Toronto Anti-Draft Program |      |
| Union of American Exiles              | UAE  |
| Union of New Canadians                |      |
| Vancouver American Deserter's Committee | Vancouver ADC |
| Vancouver American Exile Association  | VAEA  |
| Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors | VCTAAWO |
| Vancouver Co-ordinating Council for American Refugees |      |
| Victoria Committee to Aid Draft Resisters |      |
| Victoria Committee to Aid War Resisters |      |
| Winnipeg Committee to Assist War Objectors |      |
| Yankee Refugee group                  |      |

**Other War Resister Supporting Groups**

| Canadian Union of Students | CUS  |
| Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament | CCND |
| Canadian Council of Churches | CCC  |
| Canadian Friends Service Committee | CFSC |
| Canadian Peace Research Institute |      |
| Carleton Committee to End the War in Vietnam |      |
| Faculty Committee to End the War in Vietnam |      |
| Ottawa Committee for Peace and Liberation |      |
| Student Association to End the War in Vietnam |      |
| Student Union for Peace Action | SUPA |
| Student Union of the Nova Scotia College of Art and Design |      |
| University of Toronto Committee to End the War in Vietnam |      |
| University of Toronto Student Administrative Council |      |
| Vancouver Vietnam Action Committee | VVAC |
| Voice of Women | VOW  |

**American and other non-Canadian Groups**

| British Committee for American War Resisters |      |
| Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors | CCCO |
| Fellowship for Peace and Reconciliation |      |
| Students for a Democratic Society | SDS  |
| War Resisters League | WRL  |
Appendix V

Selected RCMP Surveillance of Anti-Draft Groups, Other Supportive Groups, and War Resisters, 1966-1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Date of archival record consulted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Committee to Aid to Refugees from Militarism</td>
<td>1970-71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver Co-ordinating Council for American Refugees</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria Committee to Aid Draft Resisters</td>
<td>1968-72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of American Exiles (Toronto)</td>
<td>1968-69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick Committee to Aid War Resisters</td>
<td>1968-69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters</td>
<td>1967-72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Ontario Committee on War Immigrants</td>
<td>1968-71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEI Committee to Aid War Objectors</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland Committee to Aid American War Objectors</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regina Committee to Aid Immigrants/Regina War Resisters/Regina Committee of American Deserters</td>
<td>1969-74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winnipeg Draft Resistance/Winnipeg Committee to Assist War Objectors</td>
<td>1969-75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint John Anti-Draft Program</td>
<td>1969-71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors</td>
<td>1966-73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Information Centre for Draft Refugees</td>
<td>1968-73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice of Women (extensive surveillance)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa Committee for Peace and Liberation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Union of Students</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Friends Service Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Association to End the War in Vietnam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U of T Committee to End the War in Vietnam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-Canada Conference on War Resisters</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Draft Dodgers and Deserter Entering Canada in Relation to Protests of the War in Vietnam</td>
<td>1966-77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

428
Appendix VI

Ministers of Manpower and Immigration and Deputy Ministers of Immigration, 1966-1973

Ministers:

6. Robert Knight Andras, November 27, 1972 – September 13, 1976

Deputy Ministers:

1. Kent, Tom, October 10, 1966, Order in Council #1880
2. Couillard, J.L.E., July 15, 1968, Order in Council #1324
3. Desroches, J.M., April 7, 1972, Order in Council #565

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429
Appendix VII

Timeline of Events and Actions by Central Groups and Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Vietnam war begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>USA, Canada</td>
<td>Earliest articles regarding war resisters appear in mainstream newspapers in Canada and the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>Hans Sinn compiles fact sheet for war resisters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>Toronto Anti-Draft Programme (TADP) begins as Student Union for Peace Action (SUPA) Anti-Draft Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Halifax</td>
<td>Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors founded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters (MCAWR) founded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors (VCTAAWO) founded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>VCTAAWO “Immigration to Canada and its Relation to the Draft”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Ottawa</td>
<td>Points system introduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Ottawa</td>
<td>Ottawa assistance with immigration and the Draft (AID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td></td>
<td>University of Toronto Student Administrative Council gives money to Toronto Anti-Draft Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>TADP “Escape from Freedom, or I Didn’t Raise My Boy to be a Canadian”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Students for a Democratic Society issues a statement in qualified support of emigration to Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>VCTAAWO Brief: “A Note on Fugitives from Justice”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>VCTAAWO Brief: “A Note on the Handling of Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>TADP Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1968</td>
<td>Ottawa</td>
<td>Operational Memo issued to exclude deserters from Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>TADP Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada, 2nd edition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>War resister Howie Petrick addresses Vietnam mobilization Committee conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td></td>
<td>Canadian Union of Students considers becoming a contact point for war resisters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c1969</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>TADP Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada, 3rd edition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c1969</td>
<td></td>
<td>War resister Melody Killian addresses Canadian Union of Students congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>VCTAAWO Brief: “A Further Note on the Handling of Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>Tom Faulkner, pro-draft dodger candidate for University of Toronto Student Administrative Council, re-elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 22, 1969</td>
<td>Ottawa</td>
<td>Minister of Manpower and immigration Allan MacEachen announces open border to American deserters; issues revised operational memorandum to immigration officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1969 – early 1970</td>
<td>Windsor/national</td>
<td>Canadian Council of Churches Ministry to Draft-Age Immigrants established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1970</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Voice of Women (VOW) issues public statement in support of war resisters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-June 1970</td>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>Pan-Canadian War Resisters Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>Black Refugee Organization founded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>Red, White and Black founded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July-August 1972</td>
<td>Ottawa, national</td>
<td>Administrative Measures program allows relaxed criteria for the consideration of appeals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 3, 1972</td>
<td>Ottawa, national</td>
<td>Section 34 of the Immigration Regulations repealed; landing at the border or from within Canada no longer allowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1973</td>
<td>Ottawa, national</td>
<td>Bill C-197 debated and adopted, eliminating universal right to appeal and announcing Adjustment of Status Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 15 to October 15, 1973</td>
<td>Ottawa, national</td>
<td>Adjustment of Status Program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix VIII

### Shifts in Immigration Regulations and Tactics of Counselling and Border Crossing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Minister</th>
<th>Regulatory factors</th>
<th>Border conditions</th>
<th>Counselling and services</th>
<th>Possible immigration tactic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Jean Marchand</td>
<td>Points system introduced; immigrants answer a questionnaire about their education, skills, etc and are awarded points on that basis; some points are awarded at the discretion of immigration officers</td>
<td>Proof of discharge required for military, but not consistently queried</td>
<td>Job placement, advice on how to get maximum points</td>
<td>Resisters enter Canada at border points as visitors; get counselling; return to the U.S., make a U-turn and re-cross the border with a job offer to get landed immigrant status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jean Marchand</td>
<td>Applications for landed immigrant status permitted at border points, consulates, or from within Canada</td>
<td>Draft status not a factor</td>
<td></td>
<td>Deserter less likely to succeed; may go underground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Those entering originally as visitors can therefore apply for landed immigrant status from within Canada</td>
<td>Job offer at the border gains an additional ten points than with an application from within Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

433
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>January 1968</th>
<th>Jean Marchand (continuing from Lester Pearson’s administration into Trudeau’s, as of April 1968)</th>
<th>Proof of discharge no longer required for applicants from within Canada; remains a requirement at the border</th>
<th>Job placement, advice on how to get maximum points</th>
<th>Deserts now encouraged to enter as visitors and apply for landed immigrant status from within Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| July 1968 | Allan MacEachen | • immigration officers can use ‘discretion’ to prevent entry of individuals judged to have significant legal, moral or contractual obligations in their country of origin  
• List of examples includes military obligations  
• Intended as instruction to immigration officers to exclude deserters | Deserters routinely denied entry at border points; multiple examples of informing U.S. officials that deserter is returning to the U.S. side of the border crossing | Deserters counselled separately; many go underground, at least temporarily | Deserters tend to withhold their status, leading to legal problems later |
<p>| May 1969 | Allan MacEachen | “discretion” clause revised to delete the example of military status; MacEachen announces border is now open to anyone regardless of military status | Discrimination against all resisters continues, but no longer systematic | Deserters counselled separately because of their tendency to score fewer points on immigration questionnaire | Many resisters enter as visitors and never get around to applying for status, especially deserters |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July-August 1972</td>
<td>Bryce Mackasey</td>
<td>Administrative Measures program allows relaxed criteria for the consideration of appeals</td>
<td>Focus becomes counselling individual resisters together through the appeals backlog processing; anticipating revocation of section 34 of the regulations, groups encourage as many as possible to get landed quickly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 3, 1972</td>
<td>Bryce Mackasey, until November 26, 1972; Bob Andras, after November 27, 1972</td>
<td>Section 34 of the Immigration Regulations repealed; landing at the border or from within Canada no longer allowed</td>
<td>Selective Service draft ends December, 1972; last draftees inducted in 1973. Immigration no longer a viable option for war resisters; those already in Canada now illegal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Resisters continue to use the appeals process to get special consideration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Person</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Groups Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1973</td>
<td>Bob Andras</td>
<td>Bill C-197 debated and adopted, eliminating universal right to appeal and announcing Adjustment of Status Program</td>
<td>Anti-draft groups actively promote the Adjustment of Status program, encouraging resisters to be pre-examined by counsellors before meeting with immigration officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 15 to October 15, 1973</td>
<td></td>
<td>Adjustment of Status Program</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>