Craving Ethics:
Considering Possibilities for Critical Ontology within
Modern Dietary Aesthetic Practices

By

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A thesis submitted to
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for the degree of
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2002, Robyn Smith
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submitted by Robyn Smith, B.A.
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Thesis Supervisor

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Abstract

This thesis takes up Foucault's pre-occupation with an aesthetics of existence as constitutive of a critical ontology. The thesis considers possibilities for critical ontology within modern dietary aesthetic practices. Aesthetics have enabled the mediation of universal individuality and therefore have been central to the experience of modernity. Foucault perceived, in the aesthetic character of this experience, the possibility for critique and critical transformation of what we are, do and think in the present. Foucault was further pre-occupied with the bodies of modern subjects. The experience of modern subjects is characterized by an aesthetics of appetite, sensation and desire. Therefore, any critical work done with an aesthetics constitutes a critical ontology. In this thesis I consider the constitution of various forms and styles of vegetarianism as modern dietary aesthetic practices. I then use this empirical evidence to show the limitations to critique, and critical ontology, of Foucault's conception of aesthetics of existence as a permanent re-activation of an attitude. I conclude by suggesting criteria from theoretical aesthetics by which a critical aesthetics of existence might be possible.
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"It is an amazing power: you show your friend your weakness, and somehow you are both the stronger"
-Martin Amis, Experience
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Foucault perceived, in the form of relationships that modern subjects establish for themselves, with themselves, a will to heroize the present and a will to transformation. These relationships, these ethics, are work done by modern subjects "at the limits of ourselves"; work done to produce ourselves (Foucault 1997: 316). As agents of this transformation, modern subjects recognize in what they are currently that which is contingent and "the possibility of no longer being, doing or thinking what we are, do, or think" (Foucault 1997: 315-316). This is the work of criticism and "the undefined work of freedom" (Foucault 1997: 316). In this work individuals examine the modes and techniques, the manner by which they are subjects of modernity. And in this way, modern subjects might recognize the modes, techniques and manner in which they are governed in what they are, do, think and desire. The relationships that modern subjects establish for themselves, with themselves, through this will to transformation, are characterized by aesthetics.

Further, Foucault is centrally pre-occupied with the bodies of modern subjects. The modes and techniques by which subjects constitute themselves are both affected and effected by and partly constitute our ontology. In this thesis, when I refer to ontology or bios, I will be concerned with ways of being. Within our ontology, our ways of being, we can consider ways of thinking, desires, cravings, appetites and even revulsion. The ethics of modern subjects are also established through a will to transform bodily sensibilities, desires and appetites. Foucault wants this work of transformation to be made in the correspondence between "historical analysis and the practical attitude" (Foucault 1997: 316). Again, this is the work of criticism; it is work appropriate to a critical ontology. "I shall thus characterize the philosophical ethos appropriate to the critical ontology of ourselves as a historico-practical test of the limits we may go beyond, and thus as work carried out by
ourselves upon ourselves as free beings” (Foucault 1997: 316). A critical ontology is a way of being that tests the conditions of possibility for any particular way of being.

The ontology of modern subjects then, their ways of experiencing the world as particular subjects, their particular sensibilities, becomes material for an aesthetic relationship, bias as material for an aesthetic process. Foucault proposes aesthetics of existence as a permanent re-activation of this modern attitude by which we might cultivate a critical ontology (Foucault 1997: 314). Ultimately, in this thesis, I will argue that while aesthetics has the capacity by which we might cultivate a critical ontology, a permanent aesthetics smothers that which makes aesthetics critical and so cannot constitute a critical ontology.

Pursuing the Foucauldian interest in aesthetics of existence, cultural and social theorists have proposed the aesthetics of food and eating as both a way to fashion ethics and a way to understand culinary aspects of society. Food and eating have been established as a most highly effective site of aesthetics as ethics by the confluence of several streams of academic and popular interest. Feminist interests in everyday food concerns, post-structuralist interest in the unbounded character of subjectivity, as well as academic and popular concerns regarding global food economies and security have effectively established aesthetics of eating as a new form by which to understand and fashion social and political life. It was here that aesthetics of food and eating caught my attention. As a vegetarian, born of a mother who was 21 in ’68, I was interested in knowing whether aesthetics might re-vitalize what I saw as a flagging critical capacity in contemporary vegetarianism.

In this Introduction I will provide practical and semantic definitions of aesthetics and then consider the ways aesthetics of existence has been and might be related to sociological imagination. First however, I want to argue for the profundity of aesthetic processes in contemporary social life.
Embellished Experience
Aestheticization of social life is readily apparent when considering human bodies. People's bodies become works of art. Tattoos, body piercings, cosmetic surgery, even simply clothing fashions are all processes of aestheticizing everyday life. Processes of aestheticizing everyday life are also plainly visible when considering the built environment, such as houses, and the products of industrial design. In contemporary society, aestheticization processes are often meant to embellish experience. No longer do you buy a pair of glasses, you buy an outlook. Indeed in much leisure culture, the aesthetic is the entire experience. We need only look as far the local Cineplex to see aesthetics as experience. Aesthetics can embellish, or create entirely, experiences of food and eating as well. Restaurants are designed to create an atmosphere that will be sought after by diners. Indeed, food is an important life-style product on the market today. Individuals can stylize their identity through stylized food and eating. One particularly compelling example is a current diet called, "Eat Right for Your Blood-Type". Here food is not just an indication of taste, style or status, but of your blood. Practitioners of this diet experience themselves as a particular blood-type through the stylization of their diet. These life-style processes and products are the means by which experience is aestheticized, by which existence is made an aesthetic concern.

Undoubtedly, these processes are undergone and these products created and consumed to improve life through beauty, at least style. This principle of the aestheticization of life is not new.

Semantic Definition
It is clear from the above that some of the processes of aestheticization under consideration are 'excess' and a mere 'proliferation' and others are constitutive of beauty. Such ambiguity also characterizes the discipline of aesthetics and the theoretical considerations possible therein. For example, under the heading aesthetics one can discuss
beauty, nature, art, perception, judgment, knowledge and subjectivity. Processes and theoretical concerns so different in character can be dealt with using the same concept. Any unity to the term and to the discipline comes from an overlap of usage, rather than any essence of the field of study. Nose jobs, movie theatres, prints of great art, and art in the gallery have no one thing in common, yet they are related to one another in many different ways, thus we can refer to them all as aesthetics (Welsch 1996 8-9). I am addressing this issue here because I will continue to use the term ‘aesthetics’ in all its ambiguity throughout the thesis. Ultimately, because I am interested in aesthetics’ capacity for critique, I will draw criteria by which that capacity can be determined. In the conclusion, I will use criteria from theoretical aesthetics to draw these lines.

Definition by relation is characteristic of the field of aesthetics itself. The discipline of aesthetics is concerned with relationships. That is, the aesthetic is determined by relationships. For example, nature and subjectivity can be considered using aesthetic philosophy when they are in a specific relationship. When two things are related in a certain manner then they can be considered aesthetic. I will explain the character of this relation below.

An aesthetic experience must be of the order of sense. That is aesthetic experiences “correspond to perception of sensuous qualities” such as appearance, taste, smell, or sound (Welsch 1997 9). Not every sensuous experience is an aesthetic experience. An aesthetic experience must have an elevatory component. That is, the sensuous experience must be approached from some elevated, or cultivated, consideration that will necessarily be marked by our social location. The aesthetic is born at this confluence of perception of the sensuous and the elevation, or modification, of the sense or perception (Welsch 1997 9). Finally, the social subject must be transformed by the aesthetic experience. Again, this transformation will be marked by our social location. I will expand on this definition presently. In the
empirical chapter we will see historical vegetarianism as a practice whereby practitioners consider their taste for food from an elevated perspective. This perspective might be to consider their food from the vantage point of God’s will, nature’s call or temperance in an intemperate modern world. They eat their way into being people who consider from the vantage point of God’s will or nature’s call or temperance. Thus they are transformed through their elevated consideration of their sensuous experience of fruit and vegetables.

**Practical Definition**

To be in an aesthetic relation two things must be related through sense. Whatever is an aesthetic relationship is a sensuous relationship. However, not every sensuous relationship is an aesthetic relationship. To be an aesthetic relationship, a sensuous relation must have another element. This is an elevatory element of consideration, or reflection. That is, the sensuous must be almost once removed; it is a higher form of sensuousness. What is elevated is never constituted by a transcendental norm. It is always a socially situated and developed consideration; aesthetic consideration is not simply elevated but cultivated. The aesthetic must be sensuous but it must also be experienced through a cultivated attitude. “Only both elements together—the aesthetic and the elevatory element—comprise the full semantics of the semantic group of ‘aesthetic’ referring to the sensuous” (Welsch 1997 10).

Aesthetic perception is of a particular order. So it is not simply the perception that food is getting to our gut and so satisfying in that, but the perception of the arrangements and harmonies within the food and the meal. Not simply, “this is a meal” but the relations of food and individuals that constitute the meal. “Thus, wherever ‘aesthetic’ refers to such perception, a form-and proportion-related element shifts into the foreground” (Welsch 1997 11). The pleasure therefore comes from perceiving in a particular manner, a particularly reflective manner. And in aesthetics it is this reflective perception and experience, which is the end in itself.
In its elevated, or cultivated character, aesthetic perception is peculiar. This type of perception characterizes the aesthetic, and thereby an expanded usage of the term aesthetic is enabled. "This usage follows on from the peculiarity of aesthetic perception, noticing things different and farther-reaching wherever ordinary perception perceives only the ordinary" (Welsch 1997 14). The aesthetic then can refer to the development of sensitivity in areas such as social or political relations.

**Contemporary Social Theory: Imagining Critical Ethics**

The elevated consideration of aesthetics is related to sociological imagination through concern with ethics. I want to introduce aesthetic concern for ethics now for several reasons. First, current theorizing on aesthetics of existence offers itself up as an ethics and I will want to explore these possibilities and their limitations. Second, I will argue for the ethical possibilities and limitations of dietary aesthetic practices. Finally, ethics are inherent to aesthetics as such and so cannot be ignored. There are two ethical moments inherent in aesthetics as such. First, there is the imperative to do justice to the demands of sensibility. And second, is the imperative to step above the immediately sensible to a higher sensibility. Both are sociological questions of ethics.

The primary ethic in aesthetics is to determine what is good in life and to orient or avert one's attention as required. These interests are sociological possibilities. This ethic is so fundamental as not to appear an ethic at all. However, in determining what is good, beneficial or detrimental, aesthetics serves the vital interests of life (Welsch 1997 63). Thus, aesthetic acts serve the rudimentary ethical goal of sustaining life and thereby relates to sociology through ethics.

The second ethical consideration is an imperative within aesthetics. It is an imperative to rise above the immediately pleasurable, to rise above whatever is primarily sensible. What is meant to rise above the immediately sensible will depend upon who we are. This is not an imperative to rise above any specified location of experience. As I argued
above, what is constitutive of the elevatory is only ever a sociological question. Therefore, this is not an imperative to which only a select few are subject. Within aesthetics, any sensibility can and must be risen above. Aesthetics is an attempt to extend and unfold the sensible, and because the sensible is a sociological possibility, aesthetics can be of use to sociology.

Aesthetics are being used two ways in current social theory. The contemporary ways of expanding aesthetics are fashioning of reality and understanding of reality (Welsch 1997 87). Many cultural and social theorists propose and understand aesthetics and aesthetic processes as ‘new critique’ (Bauman 1993; Maffesolli 1996; Probyn 2000). In so doing, they miss the ‘old’ and non-critical aspects of aesthetic processes. The extent of aesthetics as fashion or embellishment of lifestyle to date has been under-diagnosed. Contemporary social theories of aesthetics of existence propose an ethics of critique to fashion an understanding of reality. However, theorists who would like to establish aesthetics as critical ethics do not question the limits of critique within aesthetics of contemporary social life and so over-diagnose the critical capacity of contemporary aesthetic processes in social life.

The Thesis and the Chapters
Food and eating practices are effective entry points to understanding the aesthetic processes of social life and to consider the critical capacity of the aesthetic processes in social life. Considering aesthetic practices of food and eating, their possibilities, and limitations is to pay attention to the manifestations of aestheticization of the everyday, its possibilities and limitations. In this thesis, ultimately I will argue that given empirical evidence from dietary aesthetic practices, an aesthetics of existence as a permanent re-activation of an attitude cannot fulfill aesthetics’ requirements for justice and so cannot constitute a critical ontology.

In Chapter One I will take up Bourdieu’s conception of habitus. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus provides us with a particularly comprehensive understanding of the embodiment of social relations. That is, for perception and sensibility as embodied social processes.
Bourdieu's thoroughgoing analysis of the embodiment of social processes leaves his conception of habitus more static than cultural and social theorists of aesthetics would like. To introduce theoretical dynamism into habitus, I will introduce, in this chapter, Kant and some of Kant's aesthetics. I take issue with Bourdieu's anti-Kantian aesthetic and argue that these bodily classificatory and classifying schemes of perception and practices can undergo aestheticization. I will suggest that in criticizing Kant, Bourdieu uses the same sort of argument for which he wishes to denounce Kant. In this manner, I will argue that bios can provide material to aesthetics.

In Chapter Two I analyze an empirical corpus of vegetarian tracts and cookbooks. Through this analysis I argue that vegetarianism can be considered a modernist dietary aesthetic practice because its practice enables subjects to develop life-stylization and reflectivity through cultivated, or elevated consideration of their food and food sensibilities. I examined cookbooks in order to see the projects of composition and ordering that make up vegetarian lifestyles. I show that written into the organization of diet, meals and dishes are the subjective experiences of the dietary practices, the elevatory or cultivated sensibility by which to approach food and some of the critical reflections available to practitioners. In this manner I show that dietary aesthetic practices can constitute a permanent reactivation of an attitude as well as critical insight regarding social life from an aesthetics of food.

Finally in Chapter Three, I pursue this empirical conclusion and apply theoretical aesthetics to determine why an aesthetics of existence as a permanent re-activation of an attitude cannot yield a critical ontology. To this end I first explicate the way Foucault and social theorists following him would capitalize upon Kant's explication of the aesthetic character of the experience of modernity to yield a critical attitude by which we might perform the undefined work of freedom. I consider criteria for critique within two aspects of aesthetics: representation and difference of form. I compare various dietary aesthetic
practices with these criteria. I make this comparison to show where dietary aesthetic practices, as aesthetic practices of the everyday, do and do not fulfill aesthetics' requirements for a critical ontology.

Finally, I conclude by suggesting an aesthetic criterion for determining aesthetics and aesthetic practices that will fulfill the capacity of critique for justice, and thereby aid us in our pursuit of ethics and ethical social relations.
Introduction

Bourdieu is logical to consider when considering the idea of *bios* as a material for an aesthetic piece of art. This is because of his thorough analysis of the embodiment of social schemes and systems of classification into habitus. As well, Bourdieu's is a profoundly anti-Kantian aesthetic. Because, ultimately I wish to consider Foucault's Kantian-inspired aesthetics of existence, I will do what I can to reconcile habitus with Kantian aesthetics. In this chapter I will explicate Bourdieu's analysis of habitus. In doing so I will focus upon the frameworks of classification and the knowledge that the body has in its sense of taste, in order to explain how these might function in an aesthetic. Individuals are effective agents within their social location because of the accumulated social history within their bodies, however, agency is enacted in a moment of non-complicity between bodies and social relations. I will dwell on the hysteresis effect in order to argue that agency can be enacted in this moment through aesthetics. Finally, before criticizing him, to abscond with all that I can of Bourdieu's habitus, I will use Bourdieu's example of food and eating habits as the quintessential example of the bodily constitution of judgments of taste. I will then criticize Bourdieu's anti-Kantian aesthetic. In this manner I will show that *bios* can be the material for an aesthetic practice.

Social Space

Systems of taste develop within “observable social conditions” and vary according to the conditions of their acquisition (Bourdieu 1984: 100-101). The social space is that delimited by the relations producing conditions of existence. The material determinates structuring the conditions of existence for social classes defines the social space where agents develop their taste preferences. There is a necessary and systematic correlation between the practical logic of agents’ social location and their dispositions; economic and
social conditions give a specific form to agents’ systems of dispositions. Taste and aesthetic preference develop within material determinates. In analyzing social conditions it becomes apparent that dispositions for various goods, or our tastes, are relational. Agents are subject to and embody the differential power relations that structure the social world.

Agent’s perceptions and tastes are the embodiment of differential relations and exist within these differential relations of power. Therefore our perceptions and tastes are also the embodiment of the value assigned to their place within differential social relations. Our perceptions and tastes therefore have relative value within social spaces and social relations. That is, our perceptions and tastes are capital; in differential social relations, agents’ perceptions and tastes have greater and less value.

**Considering Habitus**

Habitus is the on-going effect of conditioning to the conditions of our social location. That is, social agents embody the conditions of their existence, and their location within social structures of those conditions of existence. These conditions of existence are constitutive of agents’ structures of perception and appreciation. From this embodied structure, perception generates a structured system of classifiable practices as well as systems of schemes of perception and appreciation. Habitus is made up of the relation between systems of schemes generating practices and systems of schemes generating perceptions (Bourdieu 1984: 170-171). Habitus generates actual practices of action and perception, perceptions of actions and actions based on perception (Bourdieu 1984: 171).

This has two important implications. First, because social relations are constitutive of our categories of perception and action, agents’ perceptions and actions are generated within an embodied social structure. “The habitus entertains with the social world that produced it a real ontological complicity” (Bourdieu 1990: 11-12). It is the embodiment of the social structure that, according to Bourdieu, constitutes individuals as social agents rather than mere social subjects. The necessity of the relationship between agents’ sense and sensibility
and situations enables agents to be positioned so as to manoeuvre more and less effectively within various social spaces, and fields of conditions. It is not simply that individuals are subjected to rules and laws of practice of which they have no immediate understanding or knowledge. Rather, they are agents of the development of their own embodied cognitive structure.

Second, the logic of the relation between the practices and the situation is intelligible, and has meaning produced by habitus and within social structures, which can be apprehended. Agents encounter the world through classifiable systems of perception and act in the world through classifiable practices. Therefore, our presence in the world, our existence, is a classifying operation.

The habitus, an objective relationship between two objectivities, enables an intelligible and necessary relation to be established between practices and a situation, the meaning of which is produced by the habitus through categories of perception and appreciation that are themselves produced by an observable social condition. (Bourdieu 1984: 101)

The conditions of existence of agents’ practices and situations are observable and classifiable. However, this logic of habitus functions within the materiality of bodies, practices simply make sense, subjects simply have a feel for practices appropriate to situations. Because habitus is a generative structure that leads to objectively suitable strategies within empirical reality, individuals have agency in any particular social situation. There is logic to the sense agents have of the social situation. The objective chances of a particular future are incorporated in an agent and so generate effective strategies for moving through the social world. This logic is not experienced as such. Action aimed at ends is not the result of a conscious process of reason but rather develops out of and is deployed by the practical sense of habitus. “You need only think of the impulsive decision made by the tennis player who runs up to the net, to understand that it has nothing in common with the learned construction that the coach, after analysis, draws up in order to explain it and deduce
communicable lessons from it” (Bourdieu 1990: 11). Agents rely upon, yet perhaps never make explicit, the system of classification to which they are conditioned.

This is significant to considerations of bios as material for an aesthetic. Our sense of the world develops within communities of sense. Habitus, or the embodiment of social structures, therefore can account for the judgments of taste, which makes practices and acts signs of belonging and distinction, or individual belonging. Our bodies are an expression of our judgment of taste within our community of sense. Our bios then is a judgment of aesthetic.

The Insensible Future
Taste is knowing one’s place. From the accumulated history of social relations within their bodies, agents anticipate the shape of the field in the next moment. Agents live with a generative and cognitive structure born of the past. It is because the habitus is not of the present that there is opportunity for chance and change within strategy and thus the possibility for change in habitus. “Agents are not completely defined by the properties they posses at a given time, whose conditions of acquisition persist in the habitus (the hysteresis effect)” (Bourdieu 1984: 109). Agents have the capacity to manoeuvre through conditions that were, which will not be duplicated in the present. There will be a gap in ontological match between objective conditions and strategies. Bourdieu refers to this as the hysteresis effect. Its significance is that agents are not defined by the conditions of the acquisition of their habitus. The moment of anticipation, of habitus, never quite arrives. This provides us with critical opportunity.

Although they are always perpetuated in the dispositions constituting the habitus, the conditions of acquisition of the properties synchronically observed only make themselves visible in cases of discordance between the conditions of acquisition and the conditions of use, i.e., when the practices generated by the habitus appear as ill-adapted because they are attuned to an earlier state of the objective conditions. (Bourdieu 1984: 109)
Hysteresis in habitus affects and effects objects in the social space as well. Material objects take on their properties as distinctive signs from within perceptions of taste (Bourdieu 1984: 175). Distaste occurs when agents encounter an object that is not sensible, that does not accord with their practical logic. Because of the complicity between the symbolic order of the social world and agents’ sensibilities, hysteresis can make an object distasteful.

Here I will provide an example of the possible critical power of the hysteresis effect. Two young women, Sarah Kramer and Tanya Barnard, write the cookbook, *How it All Vegan*. In the book’s “Introduction”, the two women tell the stories of their conversion to veganism. The essays in the “Introduction” are exemplar of the manner in which the hysteresis effect enables a change in taste, a change in bodily perception within a symbolic order. Further, the essays show that the hysteresis effect is a moment when it is possible to reveal the conditions of acquisition of our bodily schemes of perception.

A preliminary introduction explains the book’s conception and development. This introduction tells the reader that the women were devoted vegetarians who decided to switch to a vegan diet. The logic of their vegetarian practice led them not to repeat their perceptions or subsequent actions but rather to change their perception of food and their eating habits. As a consequence (an effect) of the hysteresis effect the women were able, in their individual essays, to describe the revealed conditions of acquisition of their previous schemes of taste, as well as accounts of the critical effects of previous moments of hysteresis. In the final chapter I consider how the aestheticized images of food in the cookbook also capitalize on the hysteresis effect.

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1 Simultaneously, encounters with illogical, or insensible objects can capitalize on the hysteresis effect to either reveal conditions of acquisition of practical logic, or provide agents with opportunity for chance and change in strategy. We will see this effect in later chapters when we consider various methods of aestheticization.
The essay by Sarah Kramer appears first. "I have an extraordinarily strong connection to the kitchen—the warmth, the smells, the sounds. I was born and raised vegetarian in Regina, Saskatchewan" (Barnard and Kramer 1999: 12). Kramer tells us that the few times in her life when she has eaten meat were moments when, "that's all there was", which is sensible to her given the conditions of existence as a vegetarian in Saskatchewan. Yet, they were still moments when she felt revulsion that required effort to overcome. Although it was sensible for her to be surrounded by meat-eaters, meat eating was insensible to her, insensible to the point of nausea. She tells us how, when she left her mother's home, food became less of a priority, became less sensible in her life. That is, in the moment when the anticipated sensibility for food (mum's warm kitchen) didn't arrive, food became insensible. And then she changed again, "I moved from Regina to Victoria, B.C. in late 1988. I wanted a fresh start, to reinvent myself a little" (Barnard and Kramer 1999: 13). Note that she doesn't want to invent herself a new with the move, but to reinvent herself: "Slowly I learned how to cook the foods my mum used to make me" (Barnard and Kramer 1999: 13). Here she is reinventing herself by re-establishing for herself the schemes of perception and action that were the conditions of her existence growing up.

The moment that Kramer decides to become a vegan occurs when she simply doesn't feel well. "I became so ill I couldn't work, could barely function, and was bedridden for over a month... and I decided a vegan life-style would be the best for me" (Barnard and Kramer 1999: 13). Kramer's experience of the world, her sense of her existence was no longer logical or sensible, she didn't feel well. The anticipated moment of existence (well-being) never arrived and this caused Kramer to change her perception of her conditions of existence, and subsequently to change her actions within those conditions. She decided to no longer see animal products as food and so know longer consumed them. Clearly this new
system of perception and action is not meant merely to restore herself but to change herself and the conditions of her existence.

The essay by Tanya Barnard makes apparent the accumulation of conditions of existence into the systems and schemes of habitus. “I grew up in a household where it was believed that ‘meat is the fuel that keep [sic] bodies healthy and strong’. My father was an adamant meat-eater; he loved the stuff” (Barnard and Kramer 1999: 14). Then later she tells us, “Meat-I used to love the stuff” (Barnard and Kramer 1999: 14). A shift in categories of perception has obviously occurred somewhere because people are not generally want to refer to the food they eat, as stuff. A build up of consequences from hysteresis effect brought about changes in Tanya’s perceptions. “Leasa, my best friend in high school, introduced me to the idea of vegetarianism. Her passion and convictions intrigued me, but while I was interested in her ideas, I still thought in order to be health, I had to eat meat at least twice daily” (Barnard and Kramer 1999: 14). Although Tanya was intrigued by this effect of the hysteresis effect, it wasn’t sufficient to change the sense she had of food. “Leasa and I moved into our first apartment together after finishing high school . . . and after a while, I gave up eating meat for good. That’s when I started to call myself a vegetarian” (Barnard and Kramer 1999: 14). The same sort of effect caused Tanya’s transition to veganism. “This transition didn’t take place overnight . . . Luckily, I have Sarah. We were sharing a house with some other people when we both decided, at around the same time, to take the plunge into veganism” (Barnard and Kramer 1999: 15). Here, just as social conditions accumulate, so do effects of the hysteresis effect build and become a logic of sense. There is opportunity then, to stylize bodily schemes and perceptions, or bios.

**Tasteful Bodies**

As we saw when considering habitus, taste, and judgments of taste are not the privileged realm of a view from above, or a sensible consideration of objects seen from a certain distance from necessity. Taste, and judgments of taste are anthropological
possibilities. Food is an effective arena from which to critique this notion of Taste, if only because assigning primacy to food in considering the embodiment of contemporary social relations is an effective method by which to demonstrate and understand the visceral level at which taste operates. Food and taste for food effectively demonstrate the extent of the necessity of the social situation of judgments of taste. This is because agents interact with their food in a way that is sensible to that particular social space and location. “[A] way of feeding [the body] . . . reveals the deepest dispositions of the habitus” (Bourdieu 1984: 190). Hunger (or appetite) is one system agents have of making sense of the social world. Embodiment makes these social structures cognitive structures. That is, social structures become the Kantian required rational frameworks because they are bodily. Bodies are a structure of knowledge of the world they inhabit. Bodies are bios of logical sense.

Bourdieu argues that understanding our bodies as bios of logical sense precludes the possibility of aesthetic judgments. Now, having acknowledged that Bourdieu thoroughly establishes the sensible, cognitive and generative capacities of our bodies in habitus, I will answer his criticisms of Kant’s aesthetic judgments.

The Space and Place of Kant in Bourdieu’s Analysis and Critique

Implicit within the subtitle of Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste is the argument that the judgment of taste is nothing more than a social phenomenon, an anthropological possibility. Bourdieu’s is a distinctly anti-Kantian aesthetic (Douglas 1982: 125). It is to this end that Bourdieu amasses the empirical evidence with which he effects his critique. However, I argue that, as an anthropological possibility, the judgment of taste has considerable critical potential.

Mary Douglas has taken up Bourdieu’s reading of Kant with some perspicuity. We can deduce from Douglas’s reading of Distinction in In the Active Voice that her concerns are about whether Bourdieu reads Kant correctly and whether he is not re-inscribing and
assigning the very base nature to the working classes that he attempts to defend them against (Douglas 1982).

Bourdieu argues that Kant’s pure aesthetic is problematic because pure aesthetic is a taste for form, rather than function. According to Bourdieu, this is clearly elitist and therefore problematic in its claim to universality and transcendental status because the working classes have a taste for function, rather than form (Bourdieu 1984: 194). Where Bourdieu misses the Kantian mark is in failing to appreciate the form of working class taste. It appears as though Bourdieu is arguing against Kant by pointing to the working class and saying, “These people have no appreciation for form”. That is, some people have (class) form, while others have no class (form). Therefore, he retrenches the very problem he has with Kantian pure aesthetic.

Bourdieu’s discussion of habitus has more in common with Kant than he would care to admit, although he has conceded a debt to Kant in other places (Bourdieu 1990, 1998). For Kant, aesthetic judgment is a cognitive process, which is notable by bodily experience (Douglas 1982: 127). Both Bourdieu and Kant consider that the social world defines and structures our systems of perception and appreciation. “It is only in society that it occurs to him to be not merely a man, but a refined man after his kind” (Kant 2000: 175). Bourdieu also claims, with Kant, that all people\(^2\) have structured systems of perception and appreciation, or taste by which they make judgments. To critique Kant therefore Bourdieu would have to launch an epistemological argument regarding the cognitive process of judgment, which he never does.

Bourdieu takes issue with Kant’s pre-supposition that aesthetic judgments are disinterested. Bourdieu claims that the dis-interest of Kant’s pure aesthetic is unavailable to those without the power to claim universality for their aesthetic judgments (Bourdieu 1998:

\(^2\) Admitteedly, Kant denies universal personhood.
Bourdieu tells us that it is the relational power to claim disinterestedness, not epistemology, constitutes an aesthetic judgement. In effect Bourdieu denies the possibility of any epistemological significance to aesthetics of any kind of taste or sensibility. In this way he denies himself the possibility of using Kant’s epistemology to further critical considerations of all judgements of taste. I will consider how an active engagement with Kantian aesthetics might further Bourdieu’s project.

With Kant, indeed “to be more Kantian than Kant”, Bourdieu claims that we must be sensitive to the social and historical conditions which make possible the dispositions necessary to the functioning of aesthetic appreciation (Bourdieu 1998: 134). Presumably some of these dispositions would include distance from necessity, and the subsequent ability to claim dis-interestedness in one’s judgments. However, if we take Bourdieu seriously, dispositions are determined in exactly the same manner, the same form, in social agents throughout the social order. This idea will be important again in the final chapter when I argue that it is the structure of desire and not merely the field of distribution which is embodied in habitus.

In seeking to locate categories for judgments of taste in history and the social order, Bourdieu claims pure aesthetic judgments are no different than any other judgments of taste, that is, they are “anthropological possibilities” (Bourdieu 1998: 136). That is, the aesthetic values of normative culture exist within culture in the anthropological sense (Bourdieu 1984: 99). Bourdieu tells us that aesthetic judgments are anthropological possibilities but fails to acknowledge that even he is universalizing the functioning of judgments of taste. According to Bourdieu, this nullifies the possibility for aesthetic judgments\(^3\).

\(^3\) I want to suggest briefly that this is because Bourdieu holds more strongly to a humanist subject than does Kant, regardless of Kant’s transcendentalism. For Bourdieu aesthetic judgments occur only as an effect of judgments of higher capital. For Kant the pleasure of the aesthetic can be had, regardless of the relative value of our taste.
There are economic and social conditions under which [abilities or capabilities of judgment] are atrophied, annulled. This is to say that one cannot, at the same time, denounce the inhuman social conditions of existence imposed upon proletarians and sub-proletarians, especially in the black ghettos of the United States and elsewhere, and credit the people placed in such situations with the full accomplishment of the human potentialities, and in particular with the gratuitous and disinterested dispositions that we tacitly or explicitly inscribe in notions such as those of ‘culture’ or ‘aesthetics’. (Bourdieu 1998: 136)

Bourdieu posits that the development and deployment of habitus occurs along the same lines for all social agents, this is similar in effect to Kant’s claim that judgment functions along the same lines for all social agents. However, I argue that if categories of aesthetic perception are categories of perception nonetheless, then judgment not only lets us historicize the purported transcendence of the aesthetic judgment, but also subjects all forms of taste to a Kantian analysis. Kant’s epistemological project was to develop a framework within which judgment functions, the purpose of which was to determine the socially created categories of perception available to particular social agents at particular times. It is not particularly Kantian to rely upon the particular charms of some of those dispositions to determine what is a true aesthetic judgment and what is not. Bourdieu never applies a Kantian framework to working class judgments. While I understand that the valorization of working class sensibilities as aesthetic may have the effect of keeping them in their place, again, mine is less a concern with the substance of the agent’s judgment than with the functioning of agency and judgment.

Without acknowledging the universal possibility that he himself is writing, Bourdieu fails to correct something in Kant which he might have insisted upon. Through their common theory of the universal anthropological possibility of aesthetic judgments, Bourdieu might have established Kant’s short-sightedness in denying aesthetic power to our sense of taste. That is, our very sense of taste might provide material to an aesthetic.
Absconding with Habitus for Aesthetics

Others interested in pursing Foucault's intrigue with bios as material for an aesthetic have challenged Bourdieu's historical materialism\(^4\) by pointing to the aesthetic character of our sense of taste. Here I will present some of the ideas Elspeth Probyn has for using habitus, and particularly our sense of taste, as material for aestheticization. Using the concept of habitus but arguing against Bourdieu, Probyn argues that while material conditions constitute our tastes, we do not as a necessary consequence have a taste for the maintenance of our social location within a social order. Rather, Probyn suggests, eating demonstrates the aesthetic aspect of modern subjectivity. "As Bourdieu so famously argues, we are our tastes, yet, contra Bourdieu, eating demonstrates our taste for change" (Probyn 2000: 9). Eating for Probyn has tremendous capacity for the will to transformation. She argues that this capacity for transformation is because of the hysteresis effect, and an elaboration upon the Kantian consideration of the desire to be otherwise.

Because we do not hunger and immediately consume the desired object, Probyn argues, there is a particularly attenuated hysteresis effect to eating. Probyn's particular suggestion on several occasions is a politics of restraint. Here she is talking about taking responsibility for the constitution of privileged identities. She wants to suggest that those with relatively privileged access to abundant food resources are capable of taking responsibility for the ways we are constituted as privileged individuals. Her suggestion is that through restraint we enact a moment similar to that of disgust. That is, we hold off the sensible moment of eating, and allow ourselves time for reflection on our hunger. Restraint functions to provide elevated consideration of our tastes and hunger. Through restraint Probyn wishes to aestheticize eating practices.

\(^4\)What we have seen above is Bourdieu's version of historical materialism, with its analogous capital and history proceeding through agents' bodies. Both embodiment and consciousness for Bourdieu are determined by the historical, material conditions of existence.
By enacting an ethics of restraint when we eat, we attenuate the consequences of the hysteresis effect. One of these effects, the one Probyn wishes to draw out is that the conditions of existence of the acquisition of tastes are revealed. Because our tastes are constituted by the interwoven relationships of the conditions of our existence, our hunger and our eating practices that “continually interweave individual needs, desires and aspirations within global economies of identities” (Probyn 2000: 13). That is, our hunger contains the knowledge of who we are and what we are becoming. Eating reveals these positions, to ourselves and to others, we demonstrate our taste and so our belonging. The experience of eating means that our categories of taste are always pressing and tangible (Probyn 2000: 132). The boundaries policed by taste are tangible in moments of hunger and eating. If we enact an ethics of restraint, Probyn argues, the ontological complicity between our taste and the social space will be loosened and we might become aware of some of the relations that structure our taste, and thereby begin to reflect upon the categories of our understanding.

The implications of this need consideration before we accept uncritically a politics of restraint. We might want to think about how subversive a politics of restraint can be in a culture where diets and “lite” foods are valorized. Further, the appeal to restrained eating habits goes against much feminist analysis of the sexual politics of food and eating as themselves based in a politics of women’s restraint. Without a sufficiently critical analysis, a politics of restraint could rapidly degenerate into a conservative common-sense abhorrence of fat. Finally, a politics of restraint is a privileged politics within what is certainly a culture of excess, but also a society structured around deep inequity between the rich and the poor. “[A]n ethics and practice of restraint is only possible, and that it may be the only possibility, within a culture of excess” (Probyn 2000: 99). A politics or an ethics of restraint might very

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5 For example, a friend recently broke her vegan diet and explained to me that she had thought she had maintained the diet based on politics, but found when she went to buy herself some yoghurt, that she was really very afraid of the fat content. Contra Probyn, this moment of transforming her sense of taste occurred, not when she stopped to think about her food, but when she splurged and bought herself some yoghurt.
well allow responsibility for the construction of privileged identities. I suggest critical judgments of taste in eating can be exercised, and therefore cannot suggest that to do so you need to have the privilege to exercise restraint. Further, an ethic of restraint when eating might only enhance a well-documented conservatism in food choices, rather than Probyn's desired dynamic of transformation.

Probyn sees in eating a particularly poignant opportunity for a will to transformation. Eating, and hunger present us with the opportunity to think differently about the structure of our tasteful social relations. We eat to become. “In eating, the diverse nature of where and how different parts of our selves attach to different aspects of the social comes to the fore and becomes the stuff of reflection” (Probyn 2000: 14). That is because we hunger for what is tasteful, the structure of our perceptions and appreciation are always present in moments of hunger, appetite, and is never identical to the current situation. Therefore in eating we might have an example of a moment of awareness of who we are in the present along with a will to become otherwise. Because agents eat to become something they are not yet, eating provides the stuff of reflection on the structure of social location and identity.

Eating, according to Probyn, is a moment when we desire to bring something other than ourselves, into ourselves. It is a moment when we desire transformation. Probyn is able to suggest that we crave and attempt to consume change because she relies upon a Kantian framework to understand the functioning of judgments of taste. For Kant, this will to transformation occurs in moments of reflective judgments, when the categories of our perception and appreciation are in flux and are indeterminate. Probyn would like to use this instance of taste for change as an opportunity for political analysis and potential political

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6 For Kant, as well as for Probyn, the experience is pleasurable because it provides us with an opportunity to see that things might be otherwise. Of course, eating is not always pleasurable. As we saw above, in disgust, expectations and desires are not met. In the experience of distaste, the structure of taste is revealed. Probyn is suggesting that, while perhaps less readily available for analysis, it is in moments of tasteful eating, the structure of our taste is necessarily present, and therefore available for critique.
change, an opportunity when we dare to know for ourselves. These then are all arguments for why taste, and judgments of taste might provide bios as the material for an aesthetic.

So Probyn wants us to take the time before we eat to consider the social conditions under which we acquired our appetites and to think about why we would want to become that which we crave. I want to suggest two things. One point that I want to gesture towards now but take up in Chapter Three, is that not all our eating practices can be stylized (or restrained) to critical effect. Second, changes in diet and social relations attendant to such changes do not necessarily require restraint. Sometimes, in eating with a new group of friends we need to gulp down whatever it is they are enjoying. Or because we are with a new group of friends, find ourselves in new conditions of existence, we find it possible to desire a food which we had until then found abhorrent. Most of us know the experience of coming to know foods, which had previously repulsed us (olives, oysters or cheese), as new foods through new social settings. Certainly with the consumption of new foods we constitute for ourselves new social relations as well as new capacities for ourselves, even if the only change was a capacity for discussion of the merits of olives, oysters or cheese.

Probyn is also close to Kant when she suggests that active agents within the social world take an active part in the constitution of the sensibility of our particular communities. Social agents are constantly determining new and different relations as tasteful, and incorporating new attachments into our structure of perception and appreciation. This in turn shapes the structure of the social space and therefore the perceptions, actions and the perceptions of actions within the social space. “In these actions, the individual is constantly connecting, disconnecting and reconnecting with different aspects of individual and social life” (Probyn 2000: 17). This analysis of facile connections made, broken and re-made at will appears immediately idealist and transcendental. However, in analyzing the socially created categories of taste, this analysis is a developing realism, and dependent upon the empirical to
order analytic considerations. To consider subjectivity and consciousness through food is constantly to return the analysis to fact.

Conclusion

Our selves are alimentary assemblages. That is, the relations shaping our sense of taste constitute us. Just as our social location is created by relational differences and differential power, our taste for food is constituted within a social space created by relational difference and differential power. These relational differences are constitutive of taste and the relations between these tastes constituted our selves as alimentary assemblages. We develop a taste for food, which is sensible to our social location. Lines of power converge in different and differential ways in each of our mouths. Critical reflection upon taste can reveal for political analysis, “how at any moment we live our bodies” (Probyn 2000: 30). In this chapter I have argued that our bodies have an intimate knowledge of the structure of social relations, which constitute us, and which we might come to find distasteful. In order to live our bodies, we stylize our taste for food. Certainly then, we can shape the tastes of our bodies. Tastes then can be bios as material for an aesthetic piece of art. The stylization of taste to meet the enlightenment imperative to dare to know for yourself is exemplified in vegetarianism. In the next chapter I will consider an empirical corpus of vegetarian cookbooks to consider how this modern attitude and lifestylization have been constituted in vegetarian tastes, sensibilities and food.

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7 Clearly we are affected and effected by relations that do not influence our taste for food.
Chapter Two
Certain Concern:
Considering Vegetarianism and Food Reform as Modern Dietary Aesthetic Practices

Introduction
Vegetarianism is a technique of self-identity, one which addresses the doubt, risk and reliance upon expertise which are characteristic of modernity. Vegetarianism is a technique by which subjects create themselves as individuals responsible to know for themselves, within communities of sense. It can act as such because it is constituted by discourses, practices, mechanisms and techniques that answer the questions, “How can we be certain about our doubt? How can we be certain that we are truly progressing?” Vegetarianism can function as an effective balm against the ambivalence of modernity, that is the difficulty of living free of authority and dogmatism, because it provides the reflexivity required for successful negotiation of and progress through the modern world (Giddens 1991: 2). Through vegetarianism people have been able to assure themselves as people of concern. Vegetarianism is one way for individuals to establish for themselves certain (i.e., both specific and assured) concerns of the time and develop assurance through reflexive identity formation along these lines. As a response to the ambivalence of modernity vegetarianism is also a technique of transformation. Therefore the self, identified within and by the practices of vegetarianism, is a self of progress, a progressive individual. As I will show, these processes are typified in practices of dietary reform.

These sorts of reflexive considerations of food and eating practices are characteristic of the constitution of modern selves. They are also present in food practices that are not reform oriented. “For example, in the working classes, fish tends to be regarded as an unsuitable food for men, not only because it is a light food, insufficiently ‘filling’ . . . but also because, like fruit (except bananas) it is one of the ‘fiddly’ things which a man’s hands cannot cope with” (Bourdieu 1984: 190). I am suggesting therefore that modern selves are constituted in part as dietary assemblages (Probyn 1999: 60). However, because I am
concerned here with aesthetic practices it is important to note that the constitution of dietary assemblages is not always an aesthetic process. "Ordinary' eaters are not simply less devoted ascetics" (Gronow 1997: 125). Vegetarianism can be considered a modernist aesthetic practice because its practices enable the capacity for life-stylization and reflexivity and the inter-development of these capacities through elevated consideration of the sensibility of food.

Because vegetarianism is a diverse set of practices in which differing relationships and attitudes to meat are encouraged or tempered, it is difficult to see, or argue for, the unity of these practices. Even within the discourses of vegetarianism there are detailed descriptions of various kinds of vegetarians. Vegetarianism in some instances is simply the elimination of red meat from one's diet. Other vegetarians eat neither red meat nor chicken but allow themselves fish. Ovo-lacto vegetarians eat no flesh but do eat eggs and dairy. Vegans deny themselves all animal products, even honey. Fruitarians eat only uncooked fruit and vegetables. Vegetarians express more and less concern, or acceptance, for the different practices of other vegetarians. The name "vegetarianism" is about all that remains consistent to characterize sets of practices that vary over time and space. These differences can be considered across and within different vegetarian movements. In exploring the concerns taken up in 'vegetarianism' we explore the constitution of subjects of concern and the ways vegetarianism has been made amenable to these concerns. I will address specific differences in this chapter.

What unites the practices of this empirical study is a concern for reflexive changes in lifestyle and sensibility through an elevated sensibility in food practices. It is this capacity for an elevated sensibility in relation to food that is partly constitutive of these as aesthetic practices. Therefore, the objects under investigation are dietary aesthetic assemblages across senses (and/or sensibilities) and periods. Early practitioners referred to themselves as
vegetarians, I will call these practices vegetarianism; current practitioners are not want to mandate a vegetarian diet, I will call these practices both food reform and vegetarianism.

In this chapter therefore I will explicate three points from an empirical corpus: first, that the various vegetarianisms advocated within the texts of the empirical corpus are techniques of self-identity; second that the food practices advocated function as effective and practical responses to the ambivalence of modernity; finally, while not reflectively developed as such, the discourses, practices, mechanisms and techniques of vegetarianism are constitutive of aesthetic practices. To begin then, I will establish the context of the texts that I will be discussing. I will briefly discuss the genre of cookbooks, the methods by which I examined the cookbooks, and the individual cookbooks in this study. In conclusion I will summarize and extend the ideas explored herein in anticipation of the next chapter where I will consider the analytic and ethical possibilities and limitations of dietary aesthetic practices.

**Organizing Dietary Aesthetics**

Because the symbolic qualities of food to be considered vary over time and space, the emotive responses evoked by aesthetic practices of food, the experience of aesthetic practices of food, vary over time and space, regardless of whether the word to describe such diverse practices somehow sounds the same.

Food practices are and have been constituted in part by the pre-existing social organization of the other strategies along lines of class, race, and gender. Dietary practices remain viable techniques within various moments because they are techniques that might be crossed by the paths of various strategies. “It is one of the most characteristic features of vegetarianism that it rarely occurs alone, but comes in conjunction with a complex of other beliefs, attitudes and parallel movements” (Twigg 1979: 16). Distinct aspects of dietary concern are fore-fronted as they are fitted with different strategies and techniques appropriate to the time and place. These concerns coalesce and the dietary practices provide
strategies for highlighting and alleviating them. Therefore, and to reiterate, dietary practices constitute subjects of timely and pertinent concern. I will now consider the contexts of these concerns.

**Vegetarianism(s) in Context(s)**

Vegetarianism, of course, has not always been known as such; it is not now always known as such. Prior to vegetarianism, the most similar type of diet advocated was the Pythagorean diet. The Pythagorean diet consisted of practical guidance in regard to food selection and preparation, as well as moral and ethical lines by which to guide one's conduct. Pythagoreans were concerned with vitality, bodily humors and the stimulation of bodily humors. Through this empirical study I have noticed that vegetarian movements pay small debt to predecessor movements. Indeed, only historical accounts of vegetarianism mentioned the Pythagorean diet, and it was never mentioned in vegetarian tracts themselves.

The practices of the Pythagorean diet were re-named vegetarianism with the inauguration of the British Vegetarian Society in 1847. “The Vegetarian Society in fact, coined the term ‘vegetarian’ at its inaugural meeting-and immediately attracted ridicule. The magazine Punch reported that ‘a prize is to be given (by the society) for the quickest demolition of the largest quantity of turnips; and a silver medal will be awarded to the vegetarian who will dispose of one hundred heads of celery with the utmost celerity’” (Whorton 1994: 1106). However, the practices were so named, not in reference to the nature of the staple of the diet, but to the Latin word vegetabilis from vegetare meaning, “to quicken, to make lively and lusty”(Weekly 1967: 1583). The name then was a show of deference to the practical outcome of the Pythagorean diet.

The rise of the vegetarian movement under discussion here began in the 1830s with the ideas and practices of Sylvester Graham. Graham’s contemporaries were abolitionists, suffragists and temperance reformers. Graham developed his ideas of dietary reform in conjunction with another temperance advocate, William Metcalfe. “The traditional story is
that Graham became acquainted with Metcalfe in Philadelphia in 1830, and that it was from this encounter that Graham acquired his own vegetarian leanings” (Nissenbaum 1980: 39). Graham was an American Presbyterian minister and a rather idealist temperance lecturer and reformer. While it was apparent that alcohol was the substantive problem of intemperance, Graham argued that intemperance was not a problem that was limited to drink. Any substance that had the power to stimulate desire for more, for example, white bread, was a concern for Graham.

Graham's concern was stimulation, or excitability. Graham developed his concept of nervous stimulation in a kind of “parallel physiology”, coincident with contemporary physiology (Wharton 1994: 1105). In this way he was different from his mentor, Metcalfe, whose teachings were biblical. Partly because of his scientificity and partly because he was not selling anything, Graham's message was taken seriously. He, and his ideas, became very popular; a movement of Grahamites developed.

Graham retired as the leader of this movement in the 1840s. His disciples however remained active and ran the movement and successfully spread the message of its practices throughout Britain and America. Health houses and sanitariums were established, publications were produced and the American Physiological Society was established for the purposes of distributing these publications (Shryock 1931: 177). There was established a tremendously successful sanitarium in Battle Creek Michigan which “also became [a] centre of publication as well, and from whence there issued in increasing numbers books, pamphlets, periodicals and eventually ‘breakfast foods’” (Shryock 1931: 180).

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8 While Graham’s concerns included dress, temperance, chastity, hygiene, suffrage and masturbation, for the purposes of brevity I will focus specifically on his food reform work.
9 Often in the writings and speeches of these followers, moderation, or temperance in dietary habits were given pre-eminence. The elimination of meat from the diet was an aggressive manner of addressing temperance habits. Meat consumption became a more pressing concern when its digestibility was called into question. I will return to the importance of digestibility later.
10 Graham suffered from various debilities all his life and died at the young age of 56.
11 These practices of sanitariums, and publications as well as societies have been maintained as food reform practices until the present day.
John Harvey Kellogg acquired the stewardship of the vegetarian movement through a line of disciplinary descent from Sylvester Graham. He was to take vegetarianism more fully into the public light by his focus upon the nutritional benefits of a vegetarian diet. In the mid 1870s, after completing training in medicine and hydro-therapy Kellogg took control of the Western Health Reform Institute, the site of Seventh Day Adventist headquarters, located in Battle Creek Michigan (Whorton 1994: 1106). Soon the institute became the Battle Creek Sanitarium, which ran until World War II. Because the collection of books for this empirical analysis encompasses the dates which Kellogg was the steward of the movement I will describe his activity and explicate two concepts which functioned as part of the context of vegetarianism at the time: digestion and the will.

Kellogg's central pre-occupation was with auto-intoxication. Poor digestion of protein caused the secretion by the intestinal tract of substances which, "were determined to be toxic when injected directly into the bloodstream in animals" (Whorton 1994: 1106). Kellogg therefore assumed that these toxic substances would wreak havoc when they passed from the intestines to the bloodstream of human beings. The propensity for meat to decay was problematic for the proper internal (moral and physiological) functioning of humans. Kellogg's anxiety regarding indigestion is typical of English and Anglo-American taste and anxiety in the late nineteenth century (Mennell 1988: 2). This concern for digestion is of central importance to all the historical cookbooks in the empirical corpus and I will discuss it further later.

According to the logic of the health food movement, individuals had lost institutionalized moral authority. It was especially the demise of familial and church authority that spelled danger and provoked fear in the minds of many, although it was also the source of satisfaction to others. While this disintegration of moral authority induced anxiety (and upset stomach apparently), it also provided the niche wherein individuals could
seize modernity's opportunity for progress. Because of the perceived disintegration of institutionalized moral authority and order, members of the health food movement argued that individuals must therefore become personally responsible to develop themselves as morally and socially acceptable individuals. Members of the health food movement saw the individual who lacked self-control as the harbinger of modern living. These concerns were informed by a struggle “between the needs for social order and the fears of social control” (Gusfield 1992: 76). Vegetarians concerned themselves with the development of the man who could exert himself in the responsibility for social and moral behaviour. Of course, this was also Kant's concern, that people be responsible to know for themselves.

Modern men and women were capacitated in this regard through the development, indeed the elevation, of their will. “The pursuit of the ever-elusive free will . . . is always enacted in specific sites, using historically specific technologies” (Valverde 1989: 18). Here, the specific technologies are the practices of vegetarianism. The practices of vegetarianism, the reasoning contained within them, and their significance to progressive people link through the idea of the will. For example, an ad in the Vegetarian Times of 1908 states: “Nutreto is the drink that breaks the coffee link”. Coffee attacks at the link between mental and physical well being, that is, the will. The will is an aspect of both morality and physiology during the time and functions effectively to unite several concerns under the banner of science.

Here I will draw out the significance of digestion and then return to the significance of the will. The concern for digestion is what makes these practices dietary practices. Food is a field of action and provides the material medium for the support and manifestation of other levels of social and political alignments and opportunities (Bower 1997: 10). The concern for food is effective insofar as it provides the material medium through which people can take action on all these levels of alignment. Digestion was the concept around
which they organized their sensibilities and that enabled them to constitute a sensible practice of diet. Diet is a possibility for practical reflective life-stylization because digestion is a concern. Without the concern for digestion, all that is possible by a diet would have been unavailable to these reformers. The concept “diet” contains multifarious practices and techniques of modern subjects. Digestion, as a problem, enabled the material practicalities and activities of “diet” to answer the questions, “How can we be certain about our doubt? How can we be certain that we are truly progressing?”

Concern for the will is an important contextual marker for our purposes, as it marks these practices as aesthetic practices. To be aesthetic practices, practices of sensibility and sensing require an elevatory component and concern for the will provides this. Within these practices, the will is capacitated as an elevatory function. To develop a higher consideration of the sensuous world they negotiate, practitioners reflect upon their habits of consumption through the lens of the will. It functioned to elevate perception, and was the means whereby practitioners enacted dietary aesthetic practices in response to the ambivalence of modernity. The aesthetic practices require an initial dietary practice; hence practitioners enact dietary aesthetic practices.

**Another Context, Another Dietary Practice**

Current vegetarian practices also pose a response to the ambivalence of modernity. However, the difference in what is posed as the source of ambivalence creates central differences in the ethics and practices of the two movements. The current food reform movement emerged with and within a broader counter-culture movement in the 1960s. In the food reform of the 1960s and 70s, the primary concern was an over-abundance of institutionalized moral authority.

In particular, activists were involved in the anti-Vietnam war movement, the civil rights movement and women’s liberation. The culture against which they countered themselves was typified in war, whiteness and the man. A turn to natural foods was a way
through and out of the perceived problems of institutionalization and socialization, a way out of civility. For the most part, reformers knew what they were against but had not yet determined what they were for. Food provided an excellent avenue through which to cook and eat themselves into new identities, new social relations, and a new social order.

The will can be found in the appeal within current food reform to a rational self, which exists prior to socialization. It was clear that suitable moral authority was not to be found in the over-institutionalized sensibilities of sociality. Cultivating a rational, pre-socialized self was practiced to the end of controlling the excesses of modern life. Food reformers were concerned to over-throw sociality, to de-socialize society and themselves. This counter-cuisine began with an attitude, an “affirmative vision of modernism”, that produced and provided an avenue by which to construct a material politics and an identity which enabled the continuous revolution of society (Berman 1982: 32). This modernist affirmation is there in the counter-cuisine’s playfulness, the excitement about colour, texture, taste, smell, and the combining of material and ideal which food and cooking provided. In this approach to food and eating is the stuff of a new society.

Here I will summarize the similarities and differences between the contexts and the practices of the two movements. The ambivalence felt by the practitioners of historical vegetarianism arose out of a loss or degeneration of institutionalized moral authority. As a result, the responsibility for the maintenance and reproduction of moral behaviour and sociality rested with the individual. A concern for digestion encompassed many of the concerns and doubts of individuals facing the modern world without pre-ordained moral behavioural standards. The concern for digestion enabled practitioners to deploy the mechanisms and techniques of diet in the constitution of themselves as modern individuals. The will was a mechanism by which practitioners might elevate their consideration of the sensuous experiences to be negotiated in the modern world and so these dietary practices
became dietary aesthetic practices. They were also aesthetic practices in that they enabled life-stylization.

Current vegetarian practices arose out of the dietary practices of the counter-culture of the 1960s. Practitioners were part of a movement concerned with the over-institutionalization of moral authority, and its imposition upon individual and collective lives. Aspects of this over-institutionalization, as they cross and constitute food, were fore-fronted for concern. Members of the counter culture adopted an attitude of opposition; an attitude they felt took them beyond or above the excessively institutionalized food practices. With a new attitude to food, practitioners of current vegetarianism could concoct new understandings of society and its ills and cook up a new society. In both movements then, concern for food enables the deployment of the techniques and mechanisms of diet, the materiality and practicalities of food practices. In both movements, food and diet enable the elevated consideration required for aesthetic practices. Therefore both vegetarian movements are dietary aesthetic practices by which practitioners constitute themselves as dietary aesthetic assemblages.

**Tracts and Cookbooks**

The answer of vegetarianism to the question of modernity is constituted in part through leaflets, pamphlets, manuals, monographs and cookbooks. I examined cookbooks because I was interested in the mechanisms by which aesthetic experiences of dietary practices have been ordered. Given that cookbooks treat food as a project of composition and ordering, and that they pay attention to the matching and formation of tastes and taste experiences, I thought they would be a good place to look for the form of a vegetarian aesthetic experience. In vegetarian cookbooks we find the ordered ingredients of a vegetarian practice (Cotter 1997: 58).

I looked for the concerns behind the diet, as well as the mechanisms by which consideration of food was elevated and so became an aesthetic experience. These concerns
and practices are detailed, assumed and made explicit in the vegetarian cookbooks and tracts that I examined. In the cookbooks I looked for the manner in which people approached their vegetarianism, or their food practices. When reading these books, what were the lines along which individuals stylized their tastes, and what were the techniques, strategies and sensibilities of their vegetarianism? I assumed that written into the cookbooks were the distinct strategies by which a vegetarian lifestyle, at any period, is made workable. I read the books for presuppositions and logical sensibilities. I assumed these spoke to the problems to which vegetarianism was posing itself as a solution. The concerns behind the diet are always present in the books examined, and only sometimes are the mechanisms of an aesthetic experience of food outlined.

The historical cookbooks collected include a single tract regarding the Pythagorean diet from 1743 and then four books that range in date from 1879 to 1910. The first tract is written about one hundred years before these practices were known as vegetarianism and is a discourse given in Florence and translated from Italian to English. The four books within the 31 year date range encompass the era during which John Harvey Kellogg was the steward of the vegetarian movement (Whorton 1994: 1106). I will explicate some of the detail of each of the tracts and books and present an analysis of the concerns and practices presented therein as dietary aesthetic practices.

Two Tracts

"Pythagorean Diet, or Vegetables only Conducive to the Preservation of Health and the Cure of Disease"

First I will examine the 1743 tract, "Pythagorean Diet, or Vegetables only Conducive to the Preservation of Health and the Cure of Disease". I cannot claim this tract to be representative of the movement but it is interesting and pertinent when considering the constitution of subjects as dietary aesthetic assemblages. In this tract on the Pythagorean diet, what is presented more than anything is the aestheticization of epistemology, the
stylization of truth. This happens on several levels in the tract. The author is asking his listeners to stylize their lives, and to stylize the truth by which they stylize their lives. He does this by explaining the style of Pythagoras's aesthetics, and by showing the way Pythagoras stylized his truth for his audiences.

First we see that epistemology is an aesthetic practice when the author tells us of Pythagoras: “As Pythagoras was a most shining figure as a learner and philosopher, having joined together so much and such knowledge, we can't deny him the farther praise of having been one of the most useful and amiable men that can be imagined in common society. He was healthy, well made and clean in his person” (Cocchi 1743: 13). The style of Pythagoras's deportment is not so much assumed as it is granted because of his knowledge, because of the truths that he bestowed. The truth here is an aesthetic, a higher consideration of life-stylization. This is the first, and most readily available aesthetization of epistemology in the tract.

The author goes on to tell us how Pythagoras stylized his epistemology for his listeners. Then the author asks his own listeners to stylize their life and their learning by what he will tell them is Pythagoras’s truth and true aesthetic. Of Pythagoras, the author tells us, “His doctrines were veiled from common people under strange expressions. His knowledge was only released verbally. If we could know the circumstances we would understand why he was so close with his philosophy” (Cocchi 1743: 15). So there was the strange and the veiled way to disclose and encounter the truth and presumably the possibility of a more straightforward encounter with the truth. Truth is stylized to some end.

It may be the pleasure of doing good to others, or even the love of praise which great souls are generally the most desirous of, induc'd him to suppress certain important truths however proper it might be to conceal them from the multitude, which was thought antiently, uncapable of being otherwise instructed than through the means of some falsehood, universally infatuated with a useful kind of fallacy and then spread abroad and supported more and more by all possible machinery and invention. And because all truths are connected one with another, and assist each other for the expelling and abolishing of falsehood and that all sovereign power
have, from the nature of their constitution, the free distribution of coercive force; on that account from that time even to our own not the Pythagorean only, but in a manner all schools have found it absolutely necessary for their preservation to make use of the famous method of teaching two doctrines, the one secret, and the other open; that which was taught at home clear and direct and that which went abroad obscure, oblique and involv'd in symbols. (Cocchi 1743: 15-16)

Here stylization of the truth is done in the name of truth itself; epistemology is an aesthetic possibility. Stylization of truth here also occurs in the name of power. It is clear here in a way that it may not be clear in the later tracts, that the stylization of truth, or epistemology is linked directly to power in society. Pythagoras stylized truths in his comportment, his diet as well as for truth’s dissemination.

The author shows us the stylization of Pythagoras’s truths in order that he might inform us of the true Pythagoras after whom we should stylize our lives. “The Pythagorean were most exact: measuring the quantity of victual and drink, of exercise and of rest by rule; determining the coice and manner of what they were allowed” (Cocchi 1743:16). The guidelines of the Pythagorean diet can be followed exactly, producing the truth of life-style propounded by the philosopher.

I mean the Pythagorean Diet which consisted in the free and universal use of everything that is vegetable, tender and fresh, which requires little or no preparation to make fit to eat such as roots, leaves, flowers, fruits and seeds: and in general abstinence from everything that is animal whether it be fresh or dried, bird, beast or fish. From this only faithful exposition of the Pythagoean Diet, we may immediately see that it agrees with the best rules in physic, drawn from the most exact knowledge the moderns have acquir’d of the nature of the human body and of the alimentary substances. One can hardly doubt that Pythagoras had health principally in view, as well as that so-much-to-be-desir’d tranquility of mind, that is a consequence of it, and that results from a more easy supply of our want, a more uniform calm of the humours and a constraint of habit of suppressing, by temperance, our most noxious desires. (Cocchi 1743:23).

This ‘only faithful exposition’ is a sort of promise that if the reader remains true to this outline of diet they can reach the experience of truth available to the followers of Pythagoras. Cocchi’s is a ‘faithful exposition’ as it is contrasted to that which Pythagoras told the commoners regarding his vegetarianism (Cocchi 1743: 15). So the author is
advocating that his listeners, as dietary practitioners make choices according to these principles, that they stylize for themselves a ‘true’ Pythagorean diet.

The trouble with meat according to these guidelines is its propensity to cause the body to decay. Meat takes a heavy toll on the vital fluids of the body; it causes them to stagnate. “The fluids of the body must move or they decay” (Cocchi 1743: 30). Therefore meat is simply unsuitable food for humans. However, the stylization of life according to these guidelines also generates an elevated experience of life. “People may sometimes find themselves constrained by various accidents of life; and tho’ many may, for the sake of gratifying their palate such is the influence that health has over the pleasures that those small gratifications of the senses are stopped by it” (Cocchi 1743: 34). The experience of pleasure in maintaining this diet then is a greater one than the small gratifications of the senses. This is a higher order of pleasurable experience in diet and is therefore a dietary aesthetic practice. The power of pleasure and gratification, as well as the stimulating power of meat remained as concerns for dietary reform and can be seen in the corpus from 1879-1919.

**Vegetarianism: The Radical Cure for Intemperance**

Of the four books within the date range of 1879-1919, the first I will examine is a book called *Vegetarianism: The Radical Cure for Intemperance*. It is not a cookbook but a tract on the benefits of a vegetarian diet, and is a perfect example of the concern for digestion during the time. It provides a thorough analysis of the cycle of consumption, digestion, debility and intemperance.

This cycle of indigestion functioned as singular reason in late nineteenth early twentieth century vegetarianism (Mennell 1988: 5). It is constituted by the joining and blurring of lines of reason that appear as separate forms of reason to contemporary Anglo-American sensibilities. The joining of the concerns of intemperance, debility, consumption and digestion constitutes the functioning of this singular unit of logic. The practices of dietary reform were material activity by which individuals could address themselves as
subjects of concern by actively and practically joining these lines of reason. This book is an example of the material practicality of the concern for digestion.

It is perhaps the easiest book of the empirical data in which to see the establishment of the cycle because of its unique attempt to break the cycle at the point of digestion. Most books concern themselves with the establishment of temperate habits through vegetarianism. This book’s cure is radical because it does not attempt to establish temperate habits but rather to break the cycle at the point of consumption. The cycle is apparent in the book’s seamless transitions between discussions of biological sciences to habits of temperance.

Vegetarianism: The Radical Cure for Intemperance is a manual by which women might successfully eliminate their husbands’ intemperate habits through the elimination of meat from their diet. The author argues that a vegetarian diet will eliminate the indigestion, which inevitably leads to drunkenness in those of intemperate habits.

Meat, by its irritating effect upon the mucous membrane of a diseased stomach, increases gastritis inflammation of the stomach, which disease almost always exists in drunkards. By increasing gastritis, it increases thirst, its accompaniment. Thirst calls imperatively for liquor. Therefore meat perpetuates intemperance. (Fowler 1879: 36)

Furthermore, according to Fowler, meat may lead to intemperance by its stimulating effect upon the drunkard’s nervous system. According to Fowler it is because of the powerful physical effects of meat and alcohol that “moral and religious influences are so often powerless to save” (Fowler 1879: 40). Eliminating meat then will physically stop the cycle leading to debility and intemperance (Valverde 1998: 36). Once the vegetarian diet is insisted upon however, “then we may consistently pray that God may bless the means used for [the drunkard’s] reformation” (Fowler 1879: 40). The elimination of the problematic substance must work in tandem with the habitual program of prayer for and by the intemperate one.
Fowler is concerned for the lifestyle of modernity and not for the products of modernity. One became addicted not to sugar, flour, alcohol or tobacco but to intemperance itself (Fowler 1897: 10). For Fowler it is the mode of living producing such habits (and indeed the substances as well) that is problematic. For example, we are informed of the success of a vegetarian diet in curing drunkards of their habits with reference to two "military pensioners, aged respectively 56 and 63, who had contracted habits of intemperance in India. They led wretched lives on small pensions, until induced to adopt vegetarianism. They were cured in about six months" (Fowler 1879: 12). The significance of the pensioners' time in India is the effects to be had from time away from civility. A lack of institutional moral and civil authority is the condition for intemperate habits of modern men. Mrs. Fowler's radical intervention into processes of the will, will enable men and women to develop the self-control needed to negotiate a world of degenerating institutionalized moral authority.

What is required is a mode of living, which will guard and guide men and women through the incivility of modernity. Often in the context of historical vegetarianism (and indeed current vegetarianism) women are responsibilized to order this mode of living for others. "These cookbooks inscribe a narrative which figures household protagonists as protectors of domestic sanctity able to deliver the family from disorder, disease, and waste" (Newlyn 1999: 35). Women are inscribed as gatekeepers of the threshold of temperate and godly living in modernity.

One passes through the threshold of temperate and godly living via good digestion. Throughout the book, good digestion is dependent upon the organizational success of the women of the house. The moral and physiological unity of the will is apparent in that what women will affects and effects directly the physiology of the family. The protagonists of this book are responsibilized for the ordering and routinization of hunger and even the
conditions of fatigue in the family. "The 'gaunt, insomniac ... takes dinner or tea at six or seven o'clock p.m., he should eat only just enough to be moderately hungry at ten or eleven o'clock--a time when all honest people should be in bed" (Fowler 1879: 35). This address of "he should" is made not as instruction to the gaunt insomniac himself, but the female readers of Fowler's instruction manual.

The success of this diet is contingent on the practice of all in the family, the organization of which is the responsibility of women. There is a long discussion and explicit instructions regarding the rewarding of pie to one's husband but not one's children.

Then make them this little speech; "Children, pie is not good for your health, and it is not good from mine to make it for you. So you will have no more pie; for you are my children, and I have a perfect right to control you and make you obey me. Your father wishes me to make it for him, and I shall do so, for he is my husband, and it is my duty to please and obey him". (Fowler 1879: 76).

Here conditions are given so that the mother might only ask what she has done wrong when her children begin, inevitably, to whine about the situation. Never, to be indulgent, this pie allowance is godly as "we are a pie eating nation" (Fowler 1879: 75).

Indeed much of the greatness of the nation rides upon women's ways in the kitchen "for it is in reality a question of diet, if the mistresses of the kitchen withhold their hearty co-operation, the whole thing will be a failure. The women of our land have done nobly in the great Temperance Reform of the past few years" (Fowler 1879: 78). While we might read this as a form of women's power, we might also read it as an effecting the maintenance of women's place in the kitchen particularly given the role of the cookbook protagonist as the deliverer from chaos, the restorer of order.

The closing remarks in the book are to remind women that their wayward husbands are the children of god, and the plea, "do not despise them" (Fowler 1879: 79). In god's world the drunkards are all right, and so it is clear that it is this world, and its ways which are wrong, and which must be remedied. The effects that a vegetarian diet will help to alleviate
include "shattered nerves", "nervousness" and, time and again, peculiar "nervous organization". These express a sense of how people felt in their surroundings, the level of comfort experienced in the structure of social life. Clearly it is a troubling experience. Practitioners see in the modern world opportunities for progress and development as well as decline and debilitation. Deblity and intemperate habits are "the inevitable thorns in our beautiful rose of a civilization" (Fowler 1879: 30). Clearly there is some greatness to civilization, the concern is whether the greatness wont be swept away in all its products and effects. Vegetarian practitioners develop in themselves and others, the self-capacity to handle these debilitating effects, and thereby become individuals of progress, unscathed by the thorns of civility.

**Cookbooks**

The above is an example of the textual mediation of the social relations constituting vegetarianism. The following text is a cookbook and is significant in that it encodes and inscribes institutionalized practices. Cookbooks are non-literary texts that encode and project systemic beliefs and categorizations. The mechanisms of cookbooks establish these as textually-mediated social relations. Textually mediated social relations are mechanisms whereby social relations are dis-embedded from "specific locales, recombining them across wide time-space distances" (Giddens 1991: 2). This allows for a dispersed social contact with expert knowledge, which is necessary to successful negotiations of the doubts and the risks of modern life.

Vegetarian cookbooks then, effectively stabilize certain uncertainties of modernity, order the managed response to this ambivalence and export it to various locales. The reader (presumably also the cook) is not simply left to the cultivation of a meat-free diet but instructed in combinations of foods, and even serving manners proper to a vegetarian diet. In following the directions in the book the reader/cook is making themselves, their relations and the meal. Therefore, an analysis of cookbooks will also provide insight into the relation
between “discursive practices and the practical subjectivities” of vegetarians (Valverde 1991: 177).

**Healthful Cookery**

The author of the book *Healthful Cookery* (1904) is Mrs. Emma E. Kellogg, the wife of John Harvey Kellogg. She writes from, and with reference to, the Battle Creek Health Sanitarium. The example of this particular cookbook provides insight into the dispersion of an institutionalized authority into the constitutions of vegetarian homes and subjects. In her book Mrs. EE Kellogg states:

> It has not been the purpose in the preparation of this book to furnish a complete compendium of cookery, but to present a selection of well-tested recipes suited to the needs of the constantly increasing number of people who are desirous of making health the object of their daily meals. (Kellogg 1904: 5)

This book is for individuals who want to make their meals an object of reflection, a point over which they will concern themselves with themselves. Because this book is published through the Battle Creek Sanitarium and because Mrs. Kellogg makes frequent reference to her years of experience in its kitchen we are assured we are availing ourselves of expertise through the book. Mrs. Kellogg brings to the book the power of institutionalized vegetarianism, and in *Healthful Cookery* we can read the zeal of a moral reformer accessing kitchens across the land with her knowledge of whole and civilized processes.

Mrs. Kellogg assures us that we might have the sanitarium-like conditions in our own home: “a careful following of directions will produce satisfactory results” (Kellogg 1904: 6). The processes of the sanitarium’s vegetarianism transpose themselves across time and space and insert themselves as necessary processes within widely disparate social settings. People may or may not read the book’s zealous introduction, however, the processes of institutionalized food practices are written directly into the directions for cooking.
While digestion is of concern in this book, Mrs. Kellogg’s focus is on the importance of effective ordering and organization of a diet by the reader/cook; hence the title, *Healthful Cookery*. The reader is instructed in healthful processes of ordering consumption. It is the health of the process one brings to the vegetable that will bring about the hygienic and healthful effects of the vegetables. “Hygienic cookery requires the attainment of these objects [palatable foods] through simple processes, and the exclusion of all unwholesome ingredients, such as chemical leavening agents, vinegar, pepper-sauce, mustard, and other pungent and irritating condiments, and the excessive use of free fats” (Kellogg 1904: 9). It is in the focus on process that *Healthful Cookery* (and healthful cookery) can be posed as a solution to the ambivalence of modernity.

Complex processes are at the root of the ills of the human race; fermentation is clearly a problem. And simple processes are the answer. Simple processes, natural and whole foods are valorized and allow for the reflexive critique of the complexity of social processes (Twigg 1979: 24). Because of the import of words such as “whole”, and their association with spiritual and emotional wholeness, the concern for simplicity is a consideration that works well in the cycle of indigestion. Thinking about simplicity lets us see how these foods will work to the benefit of that cycle as a whole.

Work is done with and on foods to constitute them as pure for human consumption. The practices of their purchase, preparation, presentation and consumption are all geared toward developing a pure human comestible. For example, meat and its by-products, such as gravy or consommé, contain waste matter that accumulates in the system. “It is now well recognized that beef tea and meat broths should be wholly discarded in cases of fever, as the patient is already suffering from the accumulation of waste matter in the system to such an extent that even the small additional amount obtained from beef tea may lessen his prospects of recovery” (Kellogg 1904: 248). Mrs. Kellogg instructs us that invalids need
“blood-building material” (Kellogg 1904: 249). These considerations of what constitutes and re-constitutes strength rely upon the rhetoric of purity associated not only with moral purity but racial purity as well. In the drive to erase impurities from their food, we can see a connection between these considerations of what goes into your mouth, self-pollution and miscegenation.

Right relations are required in the building of the body of a suitably social individual. For Mrs. Kellogg these are the right relations between foods, their order of preparation and serving. Indeed, the digestibility of food (that is its proper place in relation to the will) is dependent upon the temperature at which the food is served, the order of the dishes, the size of the portions, and the appearance of the prepared dish. "The combination of materials for the production of dishes to serve the purposes of nutriment in body-building and health-preservation demands the utmost painstaking and care" (Kellogg 1904: 13). Here again is the moral and physiological unity of the will. A sufficiently willed care is required to bring about proper material for physiological well-being. Given the concern for purity, it is not surprising that central to the proper effect of these processes is the erasure of their material and practical origins, "It is always desirable . . . to prevent spilling the liquid upon the floor or table" (Kellogg 1904: 14). The material result then appears to have emanated directly from mother's elevated levels of care.

It is in the establishment of a higher order of consideration of the relations and sociality of the family that we see Mrs. Kellogg advocating a dietary aesthetic practice. She wants the readers of her cookbook to give the sociality of her household a form of elevated consideration. Vegetarian conduct is thus inscribed which affects and effects a cook concerned with her own behaviour when considering the well-being of those around her. She is both the penitent and the rescuer. Both Radical Cure and Healthful Cookery, inscribe
the active organization of gender around processes of mental, moral and physical patterns of civility and health.

The responsibilities of the practitioner are some times more than others inscribed insidiously in the text. Bread’s digestibility is something that Mrs. Kellogg tells us the cook is responsible for, yet she also places the possibility of digestible bread beyond the reach of even the most controlling baker. Good bread is made digestible in part through “careful management during the processes by which [the ingredients] are converted into a well-baked loaf” (Kellogg 1904: 19). The process by which something becomes well-baked occurs in a stove and so is beyond the manipulative capabilities of any person. Inscribed in these instructions is a woman whose very conduct during baking can have an effect upon the digestibility of the food she is serving. Perhaps it is only her concern with the baking loaf while it is in the oven that will keep her family from debility and intertemperate habits.

It is no mere waste of ingredients that is at stake in a poorly baked loaf. “Good bread is a staff upon which all the functions of life may with safety depend” (Kellogg 1904: 27). Because bread provides safety, there is an implicit danger. Therefore a well-baked loaf contains the eaters’ possibility for a life lived successfully through negotiations of the unsheltered modern world. And so the baker’s actions even during a process with which she cannot involve herself affect the final success of the vegetarian project of securing certainty in the face of ambivalence.

**The Jungborn Dietary: A New Vegetarian Cookery-Book**

As with the Kelloggs and their Battle Creek Sanatorium, many important figures in the early vegetarian movement ran institutions and published tracts and manuals for living based on their institutional practices. Adolf Just was an important figure in the historical vegetarian movement because of his work entitled *Return to Nature* (1907), which “laid down and explained a really Natural Mode of Life from all points of view” (Just 1917: 1). The work was very popular and was advertised in vegetarian periodicals at the time
(Vegetarian Time 1908). He also ran a successful vegetarian sanatorium called Jungborn, established in 1896 (Just 1917: 11).

The cookbook I will examine here had appeared as an appendix to Return to Nature. Just eliminated the cookbook from the seventh edition of the book and published it as a separate monograph. He did this so that the cookbook might more readily be presented to others as a gift (Just 1917: 1). This consideration is revealing in what it says about the orientation of the purchasers of the book. They are thinking of others, and the author wants them to be able to think about, and do for, others. Indeed the book is published so that practitioners of Just's brand of vegetarianism might the more readily think of others.

In The Jungborn Dietary: A New Vegetarian Cookery-Book (1917), Adolf Just presents us with "the natural cure and natural mode of living". Presumably what is cured is an unnatural mode of living. The book describes an approach to the choice and combining of foods, as well as their preparation. As with Kellogg we are informed that following these directions will lead out of the chaos of modernity to natural living. "In a period of extreme departure from Nature and of highest civilization, many have already responded in more than one respect to the cry 'Return to Nature!'" (Just 1917: 1).

Just tells us that those suffering illness have made this entreaty most often. The diet presents cures to a wide range of illnesses, from digestion through debility and intemperance. This cookbook also proposes its practices as a radical cure for intemperance. If man's food is in a proper state then there will be no cravings for drink. "Nature offers food to man in the solid state. This causes him no thirst. In Nature there is no drink other than water" (Just 1917: 10).

However, Just places more weight than did Fowler on the capacity of the elevated will to overcome the evils of low material things. In The Radical Cure, foods were eliminated in order that the will could function as it ought. Just, however, appeals to what the will
ought and what man ought to do in order to eliminate the degrading foods. “Man . . . is the image of God; he is a spiritual being and ought not to seek his heaven in low material things, in meat and drink” (Just 1917: 11). Just is also aware of the powerful effect material interference will have on the diet and the cycle of indigestion: “much that is unnatural should disappear with many of the unnatural articles of food” (Just 1917: 11). Because he sees in materialism the source of modern man’s troubles, Just cannot make material considerations his first concern. “If we start from the higher standpoint of humanity it behoves us to avoid all fanaticism in our advocacy of a natural diet, and not to lead men to a low materialism, and to the idolising of the body. The spiritual and moral side must always have precedence” (Just 1917: 12).

The ambivalence of dietary reformers to modernity, their own bafflement and the confusion of others, lead them to conclude that there is no god in processes of modern life. It is a lack of spiritual or moral assuredness that has led men to the ‘idolising of the body’, led them to seek their heaven in low, material things. There is no way to live a natural or true life within the effects and products of modernity, the complex processes, the changing relationships, city life. The “deceptive pleasure” of the “means of enjoyment in use at present such as meat and highly spiced food, alcohol and tobacco” is what makes the change in diet so difficult and so essential (Just 1917: 17). The processes of modernity have removed god from the world and the practices entailed in the Jungborn diet will help to bring god back to the world. In order to develop this lifestyle then our eyes must turn first to god. “The right goal to be arrived at is a real Christianity” (Just 1917: 11). That is, the consideration of lifestyle must occur from an elevated position.

Ultimately the goal is to align one’s will with the will of god. “I must, however, emphasise again the point that man must consider first, whether his life has a high spiritual aim, for ‘Man does not live by bread alone,’ and eating and drinking even in accordance with
nature are of subordinate importance” (Just 1917: 15). We eat and drink of the Jungborn diet that we might better do god’s will. “By means of a simple and natural mode of life man can obtain room and breathing space for his higher powers” (Just 1917: 16). Elevated considerations are primary, yet the considerations require a diet for their activation.

Just tells his reader always to take the same foods, except in instances of illness, “a man ought to get rid at once of all anxiety about eating and drinking” (Just 1917: 18). It appears as though the simple consideration of complexity is ungodly. In combining foods we come rather closer to medicine than the simple making of food and, Just informs us here, science is a suspect activity. The truth of simplicity is higher than that presented by science, “We do not allow ourselves to be led astray by the constantly varying scientific theories about [sic] albumen, nitrogen, uric acid, and the different kinds of chemical foods” (Just 1917: 13). The complexity and ensuing confusion and conflict carried out in the name of truth speaks to us of the godlessness of science.

A Manual of Vegetarian Cookery

Briefly, because it touches on the theme of science as well, I will consider one final cookbook, A Manual of Vegetarian Cookery (1908) by George Black, M.B [sic]. At the beginning of A Manual of Vegetarian Cookery there is an ad for the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection, containing its basic tenets:

The British Union works for the total prohibition of Vivisection:
(1) Because it is an abuse of man’s power over the lower creatures.
(2) Because history has proved that it cannot be effectually controlled.
(3) Because it is opposed, not only to morality, but to the principles of true Science.
(Black 1908)

The concern with the control of the process of a science of vivisection is harmonious with the concern that people are swept away by these processes. In its association with the anti-vivisection movement vegetarianism can rely upon a science that does not destroy in the

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12 God’s will at Jungborn includes an early bedtime and so meals are ordered to fit this prescription. “Dinner is at 6:30 in Jungborn, because bedtime is 9 o’clock” (Just 1917 20).
production of knowledge but rather concerns itself with the "true" powers of man (presumably the godly powers of man).

As with the previous two cookbooks, this is a manual that gives direction for living according to those followed by a dietary reform institution. "For several years I had a Vegetarian Home at Belstone" (Black 1908: 1). Had we any doubts that these cookbooks effectively inscribed ideal institutional relations to be followed in the home, Black makes his desire for this explicit. Visitors to the sanitarium might avail themselves of the information available within the kitchen. However, this did not have the far-reaching consequences desired by Dr. Black. "Of course this could only be done in a fragmentary manner, so I thought if I could bring these recipes together, and present them in a convenient and more permanent form, it might supply a want" (Black 1908: 1). Perhaps then, just as we can see in vegetarianism a technique in answer to the ambivalence of modernity, we can see in cookbooks a mechanism of operating this answer as well. By bringing the inscription of authoritative and institutional guidelines into the home as a suggestion for organizing household relations to food, cookbooks can answer to the loss of institutions of value and morals within modernity. While all the historical cookbooks I consider originate from institutions, it is a central concern of the contemporary books that they not be considered institutional authorities.

**Cookbooks, 1960-2000**

**Diet for a Small Planet**

The crowd of customers is momentarily bewildered, hands extended into the void, as shopping carts evaporate; then the customers themselves are also swallowed up by the vacuum. From consumer I work back to producer: I abolish all industry, light and heavy, I wipe out raw materials and sources of energy. What about agriculture? Away with that, too! And to keep anyone from saying I want to regress toward primitive societies, I eliminate hunting and fishing... Renouncing things is less difficult than people believe: it's all a matter of getting started.

*If on a Winter's Night a Traveler*, Italo Calvino

In the older books, vegetarianism was a concern that addressed the disintegration of institutional moral authority in modern society. In the current books the trouble is an over-
institutionalization of moral authority, or too much authority, moral or otherwise, within society’s institutions. These excessive institutions imposed guidance to the point of manipulation in food selection. In 1971 Frances Moore Lappe took her attitude of opposition and her ensuing curiosity about food into the library and challenged the assumption that meat was the most effective source of protein for humans.

In *Diet for a Small Planet* (*Diet*), Frances Moore Lappe tells us, “Previously, when I went to a supermarket, I felt at the mercy of our advertising culture. My tastes were manipulated” (*Lappe* 1971: xiv). The directives in the supermarket were manipulative because they were the selection made available through the same system bringing us the war, white supremacy and the man. These were not ‘real’ choices, but rather represented the ‘plastic’ choices of contemporary society.

Because the concern of current vegetarianism was to extricate individuals and their food practices from excessive moral authority, advocates were reticent to mandate the cessation of meat eating. Such a forced practice would simply further degrade the individual’s self-constitution. What was advocated was an attitude of opposition. The practical elimination of meat from the diet would result from eating for resistance. Practitioners of food reform adopted an attitude of opposition and then found what they could to eat. Food then was the material that enabled a practical attitude of opposition, the development of a practice of this new, freer society. Much of the focus was on the process by which food arrived at the practitioner’s mouth. The transformation of eating practices resulting from this processional attitude could occur at any point in food production (as in *Diet*) from industry to new combinations of flavours (as we will see in the *Moosewood*).

The work that Lappe does in *Diet* is to reveal the truth of protein production hidden under the apparently skewed facts told to us by the cattle and grain industry as well as the American government (*Lappe* 1971: 13-15). She will reveal this truth, and thereby free us
from the falsehoods insidiously perpetrated by the beef industry and the culture of meat-eating. Lappe proposes an anti-institutional way of thinking about protein production and consumption (Lappe 1971: 19). Once we have come to understand her perspective then we have available to us a process of thinking which will consistently orient us to the truth.

As you are reading, you may discover that many of your beliefs about protein have been culturally conditioned. I know that mine were, and that just getting the facts has been marvelously freeing. So that you can understand my perspective, I want to share with you how I came to write this book. (Lappe 1971: xi).

The elevated considerations of life-style through food and possibility for continual re-orientation to the truth mark these dietary considerations as aesthetic practices.

The first half of Diet is an examination of worldwide food production. Lappe’s ambivalence to modernity is characterized in her concern with efficiency. She is concerned with what is destroyed, or wasted (energy, soil, water, lives, nutrients) in processes of protein production. She sees in the world production of grain and cattle, industries of “spectacular growth, capable of appalling waste and devastation, capable of everything except solidity and stability” (Berman 1982: 19).

To Lappe, the industrial complex authorizes and institutionalizes uncertainty in our lives. Inefficiency means uncertainty because it makes the future of protein production and the present of protein allocation insecure. She is providing us with information by which we might eat our way out of the uncertainty that the beef and grain industries have caged us into. If the cage here is industry and ‘culturally conditioned’ beliefs about beef then outside the cage is nature and the efficiency of natural protein production and selection. According to Lappe, “nothing inherent in livestock production requires this enormous waste of protein. Potentially, livestock can function as ‘protein factories’; they just aren’t given a chance to do

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13 In fact, any voice of authority, was a voice of uncertainty. “When your mother told you to eat everything on your plate because people were starving in India, you thought it was pretty silly. Since then you’ve probably continued to think that making any sort of ethical issue about eating is absurd” (Lappe 1971 3).
14 She does not mind the production of animal protein for human consumption, her concern is with the inefficiency of present day practices.
so" (Lappe 1971: 13). It is the production relations that fail to take advantage of this natural system.

The trouble with development and modernization is the extent to which they deviate from the earth’s productive forces. Nature provides an ideal for development. In nature, nothing is wasted. “This harmonized view of nature is then used as a yardstick against which to measure the inadequacies of human society” (Beardsworth and Keil 1992: 259). This diet will allow us to continue to produce protein for human sustenance without the uncertainty attendant to the wasteful products of industry. Living within the means specified by nature will save us from the chaos of modernity. We are ready now to move into a new and secure present of protein production and consumption.

Lappe is the voice of non-institutional authority and is the perfect authority for vegetarianism of the 60s. The success of Lappe’s book was partly due to the manner in which it spoke directly to the counter-culture’s tendency to improvise in their food creations. She shows that creative combinations and new mixes of foods provide humans with efficient protein intake by which to sidestep the inefficient industry and institutionalized authority. “The adventure was the discovery of ways, the best, most delicious ways, of making the most of the earth’s productivity” (Lappe 1971: xiv).

Even Lappe’s concern for protein consumption is based in a concern for efficient relations. The presence of protein in the body is necessary to prevent the build up of excessive acid or base in the body. “Protein in the blood helps to prevent the accumulation of either too much base or too much acid. In this way it helps to maintain ‘body neutrality’, essential to normal cellular metabolism” (Lappe 1971: 34). Protein enables the body to maintain a right relation with itself. Proteins too have more and less efficient manners of relating and must be combined correctly so that they are used most efficiently. “One reflection of how closely the amino acid pattern of a given food matches that which the
body can use is what nutritionists term the ‘biological value’ of a food protein” (Lappe 1971: 37). Lappe establishes for us “protein guides” by which we can follow the most efficient pattern of protein consumption (Lappe 1971: 61-87).

In Lappe’s concern for efficiency we see concern for truth and rightness. It is the relations and not substances, which make food more or less efficient. Lappe’s concern for efficiency functions in an elevatory capacity, thus Lappe’s diet is a dietary aesthetic practice. Efficiency allows us to concern ourselves with our relation to the planet, others, society, and ourselves. By considering relations from the point of efficiency, food reform practitioners can develop new understandings of the world they inhabit and thereby change themselves, the constitution of themselves as subjects. “Hopefully this discussion will be useful to anyone wishing to rely more on plant protein and less on meat protein for any reason-be it ecological, ethical, financial, or medical” (Lappe 1971: 33). She wants us to consider the relations we enter through food from an elevated vantage-point and suggests efficiency as that vantage-point.

Through efficiency we might establish a direct line to our true selves, to the true facts about agriculture production, to our true tastes in the grocery store, to our true place on the planet. If we relate ourselves efficiently, then we might rise above some of the more questionable aspects of modern living. Efficiency provides certainty for the modern self to be established through these relations. This is not so much so that we can be better people but so that we can have better relations, relations that are less marred by the falsehoods and inefficiencies of modern living.

Efficiency allows us to be concerned with agricultural relations, our own food selection, our bodies and the science of nutrition. By participating in the more efficient relations of eating, we will find more certainty for our being and our future. In this diet we
find the material by which to establish the true lines of ecological, ethical, financial, or medical relations.

**The Second Edition**

In the second edition of *Diet for a Small Planet* the focus remains upon efficiency and relations but with a stronger emphasis on right relations to yourself and your body. This tenth anniversary edition attributes the success of the first edition to the book’s prescient solution to the popular question “how can we do anything [about] social problems . . . world hunger and ecological destruction” (Lappe 1981: 7). The weight of the problem has shifted somewhat in this second edition. In the first edition inefficient agricultural production relations were the primary problem. The facts were not a problem; Lappe simply informed us of them. Now, the powerlessness due to a lack of knowledge, regarding inefficient production relations has become “the very root of our predicament” (Lappe 1981: 7). The diet is now an answer to this powerlessness, rather than inefficient agricultural production. Lappe tells us that the success of the book has been due to the number of people looking for a first step in answer to feelings of powerlessness. Right relations with oneself move to the forefront of the discussion.

Don’t we just have to leave these problems to the ‘experts’? We try to block out the bad news and hope against hope that somewhere someone who knows more than we do has some answers. The tragedy is that this totally understandable feeling—that we must leave the big problems to the ‘experts’—lies at the very root of our predicament, because the experts are those with the greatest stake in the status quo. (Lappe 1981: 7)

We engage in the efficient relations presented by Lappe as an answer to our concern regarding our power in the world. The efficiency of the relations established then becomes increasingly self-referential.

In this second edition there is a section entitled “Power and Responsibility: Changing Ourselves” (Lappe 1981: 50). Power and responsibility are constitutive of changing ourselves, changing our eating habits, and eating according to this diet. In the first edition we
were going to eat our way out of the nation, now power and responsibility coalesce to form nothing more than our diet. The self-referential position of the diet allows for a certainty that we are making our way in the modern world.

In this second edition there is fresh information on the politics of food production and global political struggles. However, the presentation of this information suggests that this knowledge of the politics of food production is an addition to the self, to be accumulated much as material possessions. In a section entitled “Direct Experience of Oppression” Lappe describes her own and others’ trips to South America, Africa and American soup kitchens (Lappe 1981: 193). She recommends these “direct experiences of oppression” to anyone looking to increase their personal knowledge of the effects of global food politics.

In the first edition a truer self is acquired through and establishes truer relations with others. In this book, a truer self is acquired through and establishes truer relations with self. Readers acquire truer knowledge, perhaps the true, or direct, experience of oppression to the end of having a truer, more knowledgeable self. This exhortation to self-knowledge takes on a moral tone. Self-knowledge is obtained in order to understand how best to do good. “Self-love is not guaranteed to achieve what it is about, unless enlightened-supported and guided by properly understood self-interest. Indeed, interest properly understood” (Bauman 1993: 27). Because all relations, all reasons for choosing this diet are to be found within the individual reader, the readers’ ethical interests and choices boil down to a question of self-interest. Now one has a moral responsibility, at least an ethical interest in developing and increasing their self-interest.

The Third Edition

In the third edition Lappe is looking for a “new myth of being” (Lappe 1991: xxiii). She is concerned with how we think of ourselves, and in the “New Myth of Being” section, tells us that, “the health of the whole is literally essential to the individual’s well-being”
(Lappe 1991: xxvii). It is no longer that the relations engaged in by individuals affect worldwide relations. Rather, our concern with worldwide relations is with how they affect us individually. If we take our self-interest seriously enough we will inevitably find ourselves in relation to others (Lappe 1991: xxv). We find the relations at the end of our path of individual fulfillment, rather than the fulfillment being the establishment of true relations. There is no longer any question of who defines our interests, no talk of manipulation in the grocery store; interests are self-interest. And so the relations behind the diet are right insofar as they contribute to the definition of the self who eats from them.

A ‘correct diet’, one centered in the plant world, one based in less processed and non-chemically treated foods, is not a ‘should’ as much as a freeing step. It helps us find our place in nature. In so doing, we are reminded of the primary fact of our being—that we are defined by relationships. (Lappe 1991: xxix)

Our eating now defines ourselves, rather than having our selves (the ones which Lappe freed from cultural concepts of protein production) define our eating. We are presented with a solution to the question of how to live with ourselves given that we cannot change (or have not changed) the order of relations worldwide.

Clearly there is individualism throughout the three editions of Diet. However, the possible effects that individuals might have has been scaled down considerably. The individualism established by Lappe’s diet now appears to be solely an attempt to protect one’s self from the ambivalence of modernity. The end of an elevated consideration of food in the third edition is simply life-stylization. Maybe in this self-centred concern for food production relations we see agency in the face of monolithic bureaucracies and industries of modernity. But this is not the same force for freedom, the same push to fell these systems that characterized Lappe’s initial project.

**The Moosewood Cookbook**

The *Moosewood Cookbook* is also concerned to free its readers, cooks and eaters, from institutionalized experiences of food. However, where *Diet* was concerned to establish
new food production relations, the Moosewood is more interested in presenting new experiences of cooking and eating.

The Moosewood is in fact a restaurant in Ithaca, New York. A collective of seven people opened it in 1973. Mollie Katzen, the author of the Moosewood Cookbook, was only one of the co-owners. The first edition of the cookbook was a 78-page spiral-bound hand lettered collection of recipes that Katzen expected only friends to use. The first 800 copies that Katzen printed sold out in a week and another 2000 copies sold in six months. This was when the publishing company Ten Speed Press asked Katzen for the rights to publish a revised and expanded edition of the book which was published in 1977. In this section I will explore the dietary aesthetic practices within and the similarities and differences between the 1977 edition and the 1992 edition of the Moosewood Cookbook.

The development of the restaurant as a vegetarian restaurant typifies the diversity of practices contained in vegetarianism: “Eventually, we dropped the meat, and with the exception of serving fish on weekends, the restaurant quietly and unofficially went vegetarian” (Katzen 1992: viii). This quietude about diet is also typical of the 1970s’ counter-culture’s penchant for developing practices from attitudes of opposition to institutional authority. It is a similar attitude, in some respects, to the attitude found in Diet, in that a vegetarian diet is not advocated. However, it is different from Diet in important respects for the consideration of aesthetics.

The experience of food is the experience of freedom in the 1977 edition of the Moosewood cookbook. Katzen does not wish to advocate the use of the recipes or the mode of cooking suggested for any reason other than the experience. She wants the Moosewood to guide the reader in their search for this freedom. Freedom in the Moosewood is to be experienced and Katzen makes suggestions for how to experience food as freedom. This then is clearly an aesthetic practice that requires food, a dietary aesthetic
practice. In Diet, freedom is to be put together; you organize your freedom and then eat. In the Moosewood, eating is an organizing principle of freedom.

Under the Moosewood’s directives, cooking is all about experience. It is through this process that eating will organize your freedom. In the first edition of the Moosewood, Katzen responds rather positively to the ambivalence of modernity. There is a tone of excitement that it could all be different tomorrow; brand new monuments to life might appear through our own self-will. The ‘new foods’ and the new food experience offered by vegetarianism in the 1977 edition are a means by which the future might be taken. And this will occur through dietary aesthetic experience.

This early edition of the Moosewood is probably the closest practical lesson I have encountered on the aesthetics of food. The pleasure of an aesthetic experience traditionally is partly due to the experience of having how you think about the world, and who you are in the world, changed. In the Moosewood, experiencing the beauty of your sprouts can change your understanding of the world. If you experience, if you know the beauty of sprouts, then this perspective cannot help but infuse your outlook on society. Written into the Moosewood are suggestions for how to change your experience, your knowledge and your understanding of the world. There is an appeal to lose yourself, all that you have been, in the process of experiencing the food.

The index to the first edition is the perfect example of the experience and the process in which Katzen wanted her readers to lose themselves. Readers can only get lost in this index because it is simply impossible to find anything! The headings of the index are specific vegetables and then listed underneath are all the recipes in which you might find the ingredients. For example, there is no heading ‘soup’, nor is there a heading ‘salad’. To find the soup recipe you want, you need to remember some ingredient and then sort through all
the other recipes that also have that ingredient. Of course, the trouble is that cooks look for recipes partly because they cannot remember, or don’t know, a dish’s ingredients.

Katzen has organized the index this way to “enable you to plan your cooking around specific items you might have around and wish to use up” (Katzen 1977: 215). It is intended that readers look through and consider the many possible ways one ingredient might be experienced. Certainly this would provide ample opportunity to develop new understanding of the aesthetic possibilities of various foods and their combinations. However, the index also requires an amount of time many readers did not and do not necessarily possess and so in the end has been a source of frustration, rather than enlightenment (Belasco 1989: 45).

The *Moosewood* aims to guide the development of specific subjective experiences. Katzen wants the reader to bring a new “atmosphere”, a new sense, to the kitchen: “an old-fashioned approach to soup . . . enriches the atmosphere of our modern expedient kitchens” (Katzen 1977: 2). The recipe for fruit salad, “How to Carve a Most Beautiful Fruit Salad” is exemplar of this sense of cooking “Fruit salad should serve to help people forget all their worldly cares” (Katzen 1977: 50). It is suggested that you find in your fruit salad, “captivating citrus sections” and there is a hand drawn image of rays emanating from a peeled orange (Katzen 1977: 50). There is a long discussion of whether removing the watermelon pits is properly done from an act of love for the fruit salad or if the watermelon’s personality is lost in the process.

These considerations are an appeal to the readers’ subjectivity and ask readers to form their judgements along these lines. These are “macro-evaluations” regarding the reader’s relationship to food which inscribe sensibilities for the reader (Cotter 1997: 63). Katzen is clearly facing the ambivalence of modernity. In appealing to tradition and presenting herself as an authority (to find citrus fruits captivating) she alleviates anxiety as she seizes the opportunity for new taste experiences for her readers.
A hand-drawn image of a clearly contemplative woman with the thought bubble "Desserts" lets us know that dessert is a matter of great consideration in the Moosewood. The dessert section is one of the few sections after the forward to have a discussion. In this we are told, "the idea is to present people with a choice which acknowledges the fact that we are all human beings whose sensuality and sensibility take turns dictating tastes harmoniously as possible. Variety without too huge a dose of dogma is a goal" (Katzen 1977: 182). The purpose behind the food is to acknowledge and cater to people's sensuality and sensibility, to push at the limits of taste (variety) without mandating that one type of food or eating is essential to the experience of freedom (dogma). "If we judge objects merely according to concepts, then all representation of beauty if lost. Thus there can by no rule according to which anyone can be forced to recognize anything as beautiful" (Kant 2000: 62). Aesthetic pleasure is the experience sought from the food, a change in sensibility arising from the sensual experience of the food.

The orientation of the readers' approach to the food is described not just in relation to itself but to the outside world as well. Katzen provides her readers with guides to acquiring the food components needed for Moosewood recipes. In the guides can be found the social location of the reader and the social relations constitutive of freedom. Phrases that serve to locate the reader include, "your typical grocery store", "this kind of cooking", and reference to "health foods sections" (Katzen 1977 xiii). At times, the reader is both located and the desired experience written into the text, "Peanut oil (planter's is fine)" and "Cheese: Please use only pure, real, unprocessed cheese" (Katzen 1977 xiv). The discussion of "Celebratory Sandwich Fillings" is an example of an aesthetic that locates the reader.

It is suggested that you put surprises for yourself in your sandwich such as grapes, raisins, seeds, and "You will forget you put them there, and at lunchtime you'll get a pleasant surprise to cheer you up" (Katzen 1977: 84). Here again the reader is located and the
experience of freedom delimited. The reader is someone who packs a lunch for herself, presumably this woman then has a job, or perhaps young readers are off to school. But because the Moosewood experience is inserted into the day as a point of cheer, we can be sure that the place to which the sandwich is packed is not somewhere the reader goes with cheer. The sandwich is a reminder of the experience of freedom. Work or school is an experience limiting this freedom. This approach to food then can provide the freedom by which to throw off the drudgery of institutions of work or school. It is apparent that Celebratory Sandwich Fillings are meant to be an aesthetic pleasure because of the opportunity for renewed contemplative pleasure they provide. That is, they provide aesthetic pleasure when you make the sandwich and they provide aesthetic pleasure again later, when the you are surprised and cheered eating the sandwich.

The 1977 edition of the Moosewood embraces the ambivalence of modernity. ‘Think of the potential’, the narrative seems to be saying, ‘we can eat new things, and we can make ourselves into something new.’ “Modern man’s sense of himself and his history ‘really amounts to an instinct for everything, a taste and tongue for everything” (Berman 1982: 22). Eating is a technique by which to seize the opportunities inherent in the ambivalence of modernity, to become otherwise.

The Second Edition
The first two editions of The Moosewood Cookbook (1977, 1992) are radically different from one another in character. We are given a taste of the changes to come in the Introduction to the 1992 edition. Under the excited heading “Welcome to the Moosewood Cookbook!” we are told that in an effort to eliminate fat from the Moosewood, some recipes have been eliminated altogether15 (Katzen 1992: v). In place of those though we are consoled with “new lowfat” (one word) recipes.

15 This is a similar sort of quandary to the definition of vegetarianism. Are we entering a self-same named cookbook if the recipes have been changed and some eliminated altogether?
In this edition, Katzen is excited about belonging in the thick of a life-style movement\(^\text{16}\) (Katzen 1992: vii). As in the later editions of Diet, self-understanding is a central ethic of this movement: "Greater awareness of our bodies and our health has played a major role" (Katzen 1992: vi). In the initial book, people could transform themselves through their relation to the food. In this book, the goal is to have the food transform your relation to yourself. That is, the food provides you with a lowfat diet, and a chance to belong to this lifestyle movement. The purpose of the initial book is transformed retrospectively: "People have brought these books into their lives for the simple purpose of getting a few ideas for good things to cook and eat, and sometimes they have come out with more" (Katzen 1992: x).

The primacy of the appeal to aesthetic experience and freedom is downplayed. For example, when converting dairy to non-dairy ingredients, aesthetic concern goes as far as, "it will taste fine" (Katzen 1992: 1). The inexplicable power of the aesthetic is no longer an aspect of the cooking experience to which the Moosewood appeals. Rather, the aesthetic is downplayed precisely because it is inexplicable "This will enhance something (I don't know what) about the experience" (Katzen 1992: 39). The discussion of the personality in the pits of the melon is not present and while desert still has its muse, the discussion has been narrowed to a listing of the 'lowfat' recipes (Katzen 1992: 185). The celebratory sandwich filling is now inspiration to get away from the same old sandwiches, rather than an insertion of cheer into the everyday world. "If you pack a lunch for yourself or for members of your family, and you need some inspiration to get away from cheese, egg salad, and peanut butter and jelly, try some of these sandwich filling ideas" (Katzen 1992 117). It is lunchtime food, not the institutionalized rationale of lunchtime from which we can free ourselves.

\(^{16}\) The beauty of the food is mentioned only once in the introduction, when discussing the fringe culture to which the Moosewood initially belonged (Katzen 1992 vi).
The most significant and telling change in this second edition is the centrality of the concern for fat and oil. Throughout, the text is riddled with exclamations and underlining of "NO OIL!" (Katzen 1992: 41;73;123). Discussions of how to put the dish together, of how to relate the foods to each other are dominated by suggestions for trimming fat, rather than enhancing tone, texture, or spice. This is a significant shift, from embracing an alternative approach to food to cooking this way from fear of some specific ingredient or component of the food.

In this second edition lies the opportunity to get away from different aspects of food, not to get into the experience of food. In the 1992 edition of the Moosewood, the need to respond to the risk of abundant eating far outweighs the possibility of embracing the ambivalence of food through an attitude of opposition. What Moosewood readers were once certain about, that is, the abundance and availability of America's foodstuffs, has now become the source of uncertainty. This abundance, it has become apparent is, amongst other problems, a source of health concerns and so the Moosewood must become overzealous in reassuring its reader. I will consider briefly the effects this uncertainty of abundance has had on the marketability of vegetarianism and the marker's affect on vegetarianism. Then I will consider in more depth the change in the Moosewood's ethic effected by this uncertainty.

This abundance of uncertainty has meant an upsurge in the marketability of vegetarianism. A concomitant effect has been that the previous Moosewood’s aesthetic of embracing the doubt to alleviate monotony (or hegemony) could no longer be seen as viable for the market. The object of vegetarianism in the later Moosewood is used to address health concerns while still enabling creative consumption. I will return to the importance of creative consumption shortly.

Corporate capitalism, haunted by an anxiety that people might begin to consume less in order to preserve the environment, has enthusiastically begun to produce 'green
products', for whose marketing the 'green shopper' is the essential subjective precondition. This subject position, which insofar as it is within the system of big business is bound to be fragmented and ambiguous for internal reasons, is further complicated by its relationship to neighbouring subject positions: 'worker in manufacturing', 'working mom wanting convenience foods', 'tax-payer resenting government regulation which makes products more expensive'. (Valverde 1991: 183)

These difficult negotiations cannot be written into the text of a book that addresses the concerns of a large and diverse population. The only way then to assure the reader of the ethics of the diet is with a singular concern that appeals to self-interest. And it is through a concern with fat and oil that this happens in the Moosewood.

There is never a political dissertation on oil or fat, the only ethic marking it is an ethic of self-interest. The concern for oil and fat can be read as an assurance to the reader that the primary concern of the Moosewood is their self-interest. “In its apolitical course, the current movement differs considerably from the counterculture movements of the 1960s-at least in the uses it makes of natural foods” (Gusfield 1992: 95). The risks of abundance, such as inefficient production processes, the accumulation of pesticides, bland food and the problems associated with eating too much are now fully contained within the risk of fat. Fat has become a “marked” category of food (Cotter 1997: 68). In the second Moosewood the concern with oil does perform a similar function as indigestion did in the historical books. Perhaps we can consider “four broad types of motivation: moral, health-related, gustatory and ecological” as the stops in the cycle of concern with oil and fat (Beardsworth and Keil 1992: 269). Light (or lite) health products, a light taste, a light ecological effect, and light morals might be the lines of reason which join and blur to function as a unit of concern.

The concern for oil, and fat, and the “lite” solution offered by vegetarianism allows us to concern ourselves at once with health, taste, ecology and an ethic of self-interest. Concern for ‘lite’ solutions is a marker of character capital (Valverde 1994). In the pall of current food reform self-interest is cast as pure because the practitioner wants only to take care of her or himself. That is, self care, and not accumulation or prestige is the limit of
their lifestyle motivation. Within this light, self-interest arises from a character that is pure or unmarked by the interests or desires that are marked within this reform movement. "Life politics" – concerned with human self-actualisation, both on the level of the individual and collectively- emerges from the shadow which 'emancipatory politics' has cast" (Giddens 1991: 9). Ironically then, singularity of purpose in the self arises as an elevated consideration from this movement concerned with the global politics of food.

The object of vegetarianism in the later Moosewood is used to address health concerns, and the insecurity of abundance, while still enabling creative consumption. Vegetarianism must be sold as securing the old forts, assuring the contemporary reader that they might resume their place as the recipient of certain (again, both particular and assured) abundance. We see this in Diet for a Small Planet when Lappe reflects upon her mis-naming of the original book and her suggestion that it might instead have been a "Diet for an Abundant Planet". She goes on to tell us that the world's food resources are abundant; we need only specific practices to assure ourselves of this abundance.

Moosewood readers must also be assured of their distinction. Certainly readers choose the Moosewood because it presents a diet that addresses health concerns and the insecurity of abundance. However, the book also functions as a source of life-stylization. And readers want to be assured about the stylization they are performing on their lives. Although the tone and the mechanisms within the Moosewood have altered radically between editions, the tradition of the Moosewood is written into the second edition\(^\text{17}\). It is there in the introduction where we read a history of the book, and it is there in the hand-drawn and hand-lettered design of the book. This allows the book to reassure the reader and indeed protects the reader from any ambivalence regarding the diet (Beardsworth 1990: 11).

\(^{17}\) This pattern of introducing health concerns while grounding the reader in tradition is a style common to cookbooks generally (Cotter 1997 61).
To guarantee its success, the project in this edition of the Moosewood must appeal to its previous incarnation. The Moosewood can be a reliable source of guidance in life-style transformation because of its tradition in the counter-culture. We see this in directions for Carrot-Mushroom Loaf.

I don’t know why this is called a loaf, since it is baked in a 9x13-inch pan. But it’s been called a loaf for so long, I hate to tamper with tradition. The original version had 4 Tbs. Butter and 5 eggs. Now it’s been pared down to 1 Tbs. Butter and 2 eggs. (Katzen 1992: 184)

The surety of this life-stylization is guaranteed in the naming of tradition. Even though the reasons behind, and the approach to, the recipe have changed, readers can still be certain of the purity of interest and the tradition of stylization upon which they embark by cooking this recipe. The description of Stuffed Eggplant is telling: “1970s ALTERNATIVE LIFESTYLE-STYLE-still good!” (Katzen 1992: 151). The eggplant’s ability to provide life stylization remains potent.

**Conclusion**

Eggplant in the 1992 Moosewood provides individuals with precisely that which Kant hoped the aesthetic could provide: opportunity to act freely and autonomously and a sense of social belonging. As an exemplar of alternative lifestyle, this eggplant recipe provides the cook or eater with a source of both distinction and identification. The practices of vegetarianism presented above are apparent negotiations of the modern imperative to be free. “One of the best ways of conceptualizing the impact of modernity upon food is in terms of an antinomy between novelty and tradition. Novelty threatens us with disruption, but promises excitement, while tradition offers authenticity, but threatens us with monotony” (Jones and Taylor 2001: 179).

As a modern aesthetic technique of the self, vegetarianism and food reform are both an embracing of a kind of doubt and an attempt to alleviate doubt. “How can we be certain about our doubt? How can we be certain that we are truly progressing?” Doubt about how
to live freely in modernity without meta-narratives is alleviated by embracing a considerable amount of doubt about one's food (Twigg 1979: 30). In providing solutions to such pervasive doubt, vegetarianism functions as an alternate meta-narrative. Food reformers deal in systemic meanings of food. Therefore, vegetarians are able to establish for themselves a social system from which to denounce meta-narratives and distinguish themselves from the status quo. According to Kant, the social system within which this identification and distinction are negotiated is sensus communis, that is, a community of sense, or a community of meaning.

Aesthetic practices of food push at the limits of our understanding of the meaning of food. To do this, aesthetic practices of food must make the meanings of food apprehensible. Aesthetic sensitivity occurs at the place where symbols, or categories of understanding function and so aesthetic reactions are involved with the apprehension of meaning. “An aesthetic [is] a merger of discovery and emotional response in the appreciation of qualities presented to experience” (Korsmeyer 1999 117). Each book presented different qualities of the food to experience. The different qualities fore-fronted to experience are not inherent but symbolic qualities of the food. Registering these symbolic qualities in food requires perceptive and emotive sensitivity. The practice of registering and reflecting upon these qualities in food is enjoyable\(^{18}\); it is the aesthetic pleasure of food. The pleasure of these aesthetic practices comes from stretching our considerations of food. As they stretch practitioners’ considerations of food, dietary aesthetic practices enable practitioners to constitute themselves as distinguishable, progressive individuals.

In some respects it is the mediation of the desire to be free and the desire to belong that structures the desire to consume in the modern individual. And because the modern desire to consume is tied so insidiously to such resilient machinations of domination and

\(^{18}\) It is these reflective pleasures which are dis-interested pleasures. According to Kant aesthetic pleasure is reflective pleasure.
oppression, it is important to consider the sociological possibilities and limitations of an aesthetics of existence. I will pursue these lines of inquiry in the next chapter.
Chapter Three
A Subject of No Limits:
Defining Critique within Aesthetics

Introduction
The merging of ethics into aesthetics is characteristic of modernity. That is, modern individuals relate to themselves, experience themselves, in part, through aesthetics. It is through aesthetic practices that people make themselves subjects of modernity, subjects of progress, development, and absolute truths. In the empirical analysis of food reform it was evident that aesthetics enables subjects to situate themselves within their contemporary systems of meaning, or truths and, by attaining an elevated level of consideration of those systems of meaning, pursue a certainty within which they could distinguish and identify themselves. Foucault has said that it is this aesthetic aspect of modernity that enables subjects to develop an “ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era” (Foucault 1994: 312)\(^\text{19}\).

Following his interest in the bodies of modern subject, as well as \textit{bios} as material for an aesthetic practice, Foucault and others since have argued that we might constitute a critical ontology through aesthetics of existence (Venn 1997: 2). Foucault proposes and diagnoses this aestheticization of ethics, or aesthetics of existence as a method to enact freedom, to resist the government of individuality. While the notion of a critical ontology is appealing and certainly there is empirical evidence for a modernist ethics in aesthetics, it is questionable whether these ethics, as aesthetic practices, always constitute a critical ontology, or critique. Vegetarianism and food reform, as dietary aesthetic practices, provide effective empirical evidence to rub against this proposal. There are two reasons for this. First, dietary aesthetic practices are increasingly arenas for the government of individualization and

\(^{19}\) Throughout this chapter I rely heavily on Foucault’s text “What is Enlightenment?” in which he cites Kant as having answered the question “what is enlightenment?” in a new manner. Kant, according to Foucault, see enlightenment as a ‘way out’ of immaturity whereby we rely upon the authority of someone else, at times when we ought to rely upon our own reason. Foucault sees this Kantian process of modifying relations of will, authority and reason, as a particularly modern experience (Foucault 1994:303-319).
second, food and food practices are so clearly constitutive of ontology. "The way to understand this is to take seriously the corporeal reality of subjectivity, and thus imagine how we live autonomy directly in our body, within the spatial and temporal 'enframing' of the here and now" (Venn: 1997 13).

One of the criticisms of Foucault's aesthetics of existence is that his conceptualization of aesthetics is lacking (McNay 1994: 130). I will trace aspects of theoretical aesthetics, including its place in modernity, against the empirical evidence of the cookbooks to show where dietary aesthetic practices do and do not support a subject of critical ontology. Ultimately I will argue that because it is a "permanent re-activation of an attitude", aesthetics of existence can not meet theoretical aesthetics' requirements for justice and so can not be a critical ontology (Foucault 1994: 314). To this end I will first consider the role of aesthetics in structuring the desire of modern individuals. Then I will outline how Foucault would have us use this modern attitude of aesthetics to consider the relations governing the constitution of our sense of taste. To consider theoretical aesthetics I will discuss the role of representation in aesthetics, and the role of representation in dietary aesthetic practices. Finally, I will consider the role of form and difference in theoretical aesthetics and aesthetic food practices.

Desiring: The Modern Subject

The mediation, through aesthetics, of the desire to be free and the desire to belong structures the desire for a particular type of experience. I consider the manner in which the structuring of this desire occurs in order to be able to explicate its capacity for critique. In the experience of modern individuality what occurs is the marking of the singularity of our present, of who we are in the moment. This has been referred to as a 'heroization of the present' (Foucault 1994: 310). It is the will to establish who we are and what it is possible to be, at the moment, in our communities of sense. This is a self "elevated to its own conditions" (Smith 1996: 42). This elevated condition is partly what marks modern subjects
as aesthetic in character. These engagements are explorations of the limits of the singularities that mark us. To know that our experiences are marked in some ways is to acknowledge our limitations and know that there are ways in which we are not marked. This is so even if we cannot conceive of what those ways might be. This moment is the pleasurable awareness that the manifold of our intuition is far greater than the limits of our understanding. It is this imagining the present and imagining it otherwise, this free play of the faculty of understanding over imagination that characterizes modernity, and the enlightenment. It is an aesthetic moment when we see that things might be otherwise. Therefore, the experience of modernity is marked by a will to transformation. "What distinguishes the modern consciousness is the unsettling demand that it takes both itself and the period in which it exists to be the object of a constant interrogation and renewal" (Venn: 1997 1).

This will to transformation is characterized as a particular type of desire. What is desired is an experience of the self, the fulfillment of a self. Modern subjects are subjects of our own desire; "our desire sustains us" (Coward 1985: 1). Modern subjects want to be recognized as distinct individuals. The attitude of modernity can be characterized as a desire to be different; different from others and different from what we are now, a fulfillment of self.

[Ethics and sanctions] derived from the idea of a "covenant" or compact between each individual and his own "self", in which in return for acknowledging one's duty to serve the spirit of self, that spirit would in turn bring happiness to the individual. Heaven is such a doctrine is the fulfillment of self, hell the subjugation of self to the constraining demands of custom and convention; hence not rationalizing self-denying activity but consistent self-gratificatory activity becomes a revolutionary force. (Campbell 1983: 293)

Here aesthetics also relates to ethics as aesthetics provides the community of sense for the development of a meaningful individuality. Within a community of sense and aesthetic practices, people are enabled to act freely within the guiding lines of the aesthetic
practice, or the practices of a community of sense. Thus, there is a sense that the practitioners of aesthetic practices act completely from an inside-out dynamic. Therefore, the very act of aesthetic practices themselves, constitute this notion that they herald an inner essence, heed an inner call (Haug 1987: 138). This is further assurance that our experience is of a distinct self, a distinguishable individuality. Our desire to experience ourselves as distinct individuals appears to emanate from our selves, rather than as structured through our relation to our community of sense. Aesthetic practices are “the source and setting for ‘depth’ of personality and truly intensified ‘lived experience’” (Scaff 1989: 103).

Both food and eating, as subjective, sensuous experiences, have lent themselves to this process. While the subjectivity of taste as a sensation has proved to be a difficulty in theorizing the aesthetics of food and eating, this subjectivity makes food an effective tool in the aesthetic mediation of universal individuality. While others can see the food you eat and see you eat the food, only you can taste the food. Only you can know what you taste like. Eating and taste then are ways to know who you are, a way to recognize yourself in the most intimate recesses of your body, to experience the knowledge of yourself on your tongue. “Taste as well as taste, are techniques of self-identity. Further, because of the subjectivity of taste, it lends itself very directly to the experience of a depth of individuality.

Further, as Probyn suggests, eating is particularly characteristic of modern subjects’ will to transformation. It is an apparent example of individual quest to bring something other than ourselves, outside who we are now, into our selves. “I propose that in eating we lose ourselves in a wild morphing of the animate and the inanimate; what Foucault calls ‘that obscure desire . . . to become other than oneself’” (Probyn 2000: 8).

We saw this quest for transformation exemplified in the early edition of the Moosewood (Katzen 1977). I am thinking of the direction to use “peanut oil” with the concession “Planter’s is fine”(Katzen 1977: xiv). She suggests transcending the peanut oil
consumers that we are now by allowing the brand name to be merely ‘fine’, but not beyond. “Planter’s is fine” is a concession. Katzen points out Planter’s as that which we need to transcend, that which lies at the limit of our experience. And she wants this process to occur on our tongues. The reason that planter’s is fine and no more is because of the way it tastes; Katzen would have us push at the constitution of our sense of taste. Foucault would have us consider the relations governing the constitution of our sense of taste.

From the above it is clear that the aesthetic moment in the experience of modernity is entirely self-centred. Modern individuals subject themselves to this elevated consideration of who they are in the present in a quest for self-fulfillment. The extent to which this process enables subjects to consider others is limited to the affect and effect others have on self, not the affect and effect of one’s self on others. Subjects are not enabled in a capacity for justice. If justice is required of critique, then this process cannot be a critical one. I will return to this consideration; first I will consider the critical capacity of a desire for experience of capitalism.

Critique and Capitalism

I have argued above that modern individuals experience fulfillment in the cultivation of a distinct individuality. The commitment to the self by modern individuals can be constituted and signified, to others and to oneself, through consumption practices. In this, the mediation of universal individuality through aesthetics connects to the market. “The major dynamic that transforms the universe of convention within which the struggle for distinction occurs, is rooted precisely in the conditions of individual existence peculiar to capitalism” (Friedman 1987: 128).

Capitalism requires the development of this consuming individuality. The experience of modern individuality is constituted as ‘true’ insofar as it is constituted over and against
capitalism and its attendant and concomitant social forces\textsuperscript{20}. The aesthetics of consumption is both effected by and effects a lack of control over broader conditions of social life. Aesthetic distinctions become decisive expressions of control. Individuals can decide, can establish, if nothing else, the expression of themselves as distinct individuals. Indeed, within modernity no other capacity is more important. In this romantic revolt, aesthetic practices of consumption negotiate between the will to transformation, or revolution, and distinction.

The civilizing process then contains the establishment of modern individuals and their distinction through consumption. This process involved an increasing control of the emotions, sense of disgust at bodily betrayal, the smells, sweating and noises of the body, and sensitivity to one's own bodily space. This increased control over one's person attended the general decrease in certainty regarding one's livelihood in modernity. Temperance vegetarianism then is an example of the controlled de-controlling of emotions and sensibilities. The cookbook authors felt powerless in the face of the economic organization of food production and turned to an aesthetic practice to counter their sense of powerlessness. Ironically then, practitioners push at the limits of sensibility, but only as an attempt to further control over their sensibilities.

However, commodity capitalism quickly integrates the cultural distinction of any insubordination. The insubordinate becomes subordinate. When art, or aesthetics, become the everyday in capitalism, it does not provide critique an avenue into the smallest aspects of everyday life, but makes way for sustained capitalism in the everyday. This will be important again later when I consider the critical capacity of a permanent aesthetics. Perhaps, given that the sustaining desire of modern individuality was forged in the fire of developing

\textsuperscript{20} The development of this 'true' life is also constituted as 'true' as it is constituted as occurring outside the rationalized and technocratic aspects of modern experience. Through aesthetics, modern individuals conceive themselves into glorious being as free personalities over and against the cage of routinization and rationalization.
capitalism, it does not matter what we desire to consume; capitalism assures us of our desire. I will take this up further in the next section on Bourdieu.

**Distinct from Bourdieu**

I have noted an important distinction between an embodied desire and the embodiment of distributive fields of tastes, or styles. It is important to make explicit the distinction between the techniques of consumption and the objects of consumption. This then is a question of how we live our bodies, rather than simply with what. It gets to the notions of techniques and technologies, which are not questions in Bourdieu's work. From this perspective the desire to consume, rather than the taste for specific objects fall under consideration. "This culture is . . . a structure of desire, of emotions; of habitus" (Friedman 1987: 122). It is not simply the distributive field embodied in habitus, but also the structure of desire. Consumption fulfills the desire for a specific type of existence, a "social identity in itself, one that is not a mere distinction" (Friedman 1987: 124). Bourdieu's non-questioning predicates rather than questions the ground of desire for consumption in a particular manner. "It may be that there are different modes of identity and habitus formation and deformation emerging which make the significance of taste and lifestyle choices more blurred" (Featherstone 1990: 13). This spirit of consumption is not incompatible with conspicuous consumption. However, the process of distinction does not contain or exhaust the desire to consume in modernity. "What triggers the decision to purchase is not the use-value but the promise of use-value" (Haug 1987: 122). Consumerism feeds on modernism and romantic revolt. So consumption in modernity is not simply making a virtue of necessity, but making a virtue of desire. Foucault echoes this sentiment when he wishes to make a virtue of modern subjects' will to transformation.

**Government of Individualization**

Foucault characterizes the will to heroize the present, the will to transformation and this mode of relating to oneself, as the 'attitude' of modernity. "And by 'attitude,' I mean a
mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task” (Foucault 1997: 309). Foucault sees the potential for a critical aesthetics of existence in individual capacity to re-activate this attitude of modernity.

The permanent, subjective, re-activation of this attitude constitutes aesthetics of existence as ethics. For Foucault there is critical potential in this manner of constituting and relating to the self. Key to Foucault’s project was considering that by which we are governed in our desire. “‘Government’ did not refer only to political structures or to the management of states; rather, it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed” (Foucault 1982: 790). In marking the singularity of who we are, modern subjects can mark the way the way they are governed in their individualization. That is, modern subjects might consider what, in their communities of meaning, is constitutive of government.

Modes of subjection occur through individuals’ relations to rules, others and the self. The marking of what we are in the present, and subsequent modifications which may occur, enable individuals to explore the manner in which their capacities might change or increase without concomitant intensification of relations of authority (Foucault 1997: 317). Because, as we saw above, this ethics inheres in a will to transformation then it has the capacity to enable modern individuals to “struggle against the forms of subjection” directing their conduct²¹ (Foucault 1982: 782). What is changed then, what individuals will to transform in

²¹ For Kant the experience of freedom was in the aesthetic moment when our understanding plays freely over our imagination and we are enabled to see the world and ourselves otherwise. Foucault sees this moment of will to transformation as freedom, and because it inheres in the mediation of our individuality, “freedom is a permanent political task inherent in all social existence” (Foucault 1982 792).
this moment are the relations informing their desire for an experience of a particular self, “in relation to that by which we are governed and those who govern us” (Osborne 1999: 53).

This task marks itself as a task for individual freedom in and through its roots in aesthetics. As an aesthetic project this task takes place not in or of political or social relations (people must continue in their social obligations and responsibilities), but the aesthetic sphere, the entire purpose of which is critical reflection. This way too, the will to transform oneself ought not to be compelled by any particular epistemological or administrative duty. Thereby this is clearly a task for individuality, freedom and individual freedom.

The permanent activation of an attitude is apparent in the temperance vegetarian cookbooks. They prescribed the cultivation of an approach to the links between reason, the will and authority. Practitioners turned to the books as aids to manifest a shift in the relation between sense, or reason, the will and authority. Practitioners and reformers, “sought to determine the principles that would enable individuals to engage in them at the appropriate intensity and to distribute them in the right way, according to circumstances” (Foucault 1990: 136). The cookbooks were intended to be used as guiding lines to establish right relations with a subject’s desire: desire for meat, desire for drink, even desire for white bread. In this ethical transformative relationship of the self, individuals constituted themselves as subjects of knowledge (Foucault 1990: 86). They were subjects of such various knowledges as of the digestive system, the workings of the human soul and food production processes. The ethical relationship of the practitioners’ authority over the practitioners will was mediated through this knowledge. And it was the activation of this attitude to just this constellation of reason, will and authority that was the constitution of a free subject.

Finally, it is apparent that early vegetarians established for themselves an aesthetics of existence when we read the similarities between the Greek ethos Foucault considers and
the rhetoric of the books. For the Greeks dietetics were a “rational mode of behavior” (Foucault 1990: 108). The idea was to have a ready to hand discourse that would enable practitioners the self-reliance they required to modify their desires into healthy practices (Foucault 1988: 100-101). Again, what makes these practices aesthetics of existence is not the standards of behaviours reasonable for practitioners but their characterization as a type of attitude to the self, a relation to the self, a particular experience of the self (Foucault 1988: 144).

Foucault would like this ethic to constitute a critical ontology. However, insofar as a critical ontology would be an ontology of critique, the possibilities of this ethic fall short. I am positing and have suggested previously that critique requires critical reflection upon others, that is, a component of justice to fulfill itself as such. Because aesthetics of existence as an ethic, is not an ethic of justice, it does not fulfill the requirements of critique and so cannot constitute a critical ontology. Further, because it does not consider what is outside the limits of who we are in our present, neither does this ethic constitute an aesthetic. I will consider here who and what is accounted for in a critical ontology. Then I will consider how aesthetics of existence falls short of aesthetic requirements for justice.

**Critique, Others and Justice**

“It has been argued that there is very little trace of the other to be found in this ethics: since Foucault focuses exclusively on the relation of the subject to itself, he omits any account of inter-subjectivity” (Thompson 1999: 198). Foucault is concerned with inter-subjectivity insofar as he wishes to trace the outlines of the limits of one’s subject position. His primary concern seems to be to discern the subject position ordained or constituted for and by our selves. However, his analysis of inter-subjectivity never extends so far as an analysis of the ‘other’ subject positions ordained, or ordered by the constitution of our subject position. Clearly absent from this picture are the ones we govern in the constitution of our subjectivity. Which is not to say that such an analysis cannot be undergone. For
example, the concern of early food reformers for the treatment of animals in food production and vivisection was for the manner in which animals were degraded by human processes. Food reformers had to trace the conditions constituting humans in this relation to animals in order to denounce the subject position as degrading to both animals and humans.

Insofar as the considerations of a critical ontology are concerned with power and its exercise, there is the potential to consider the position of domination that one occupies in inter-subjective relations. This is a stance that Foucault approaches, but does not explicate. “I dwell on grasping the mechanisms of effective exercise of power; and I do so because those who are inserted in these power relations, those who are implicated in them, can, through their actions, through their existence of their rebellion, escape from these relations, transform these relations, in other words no longer be in a position of submission” (Foucault in Custer 1988:137). It is a relatively simple theoretical step to go from here to consider the ways our subject positions are constituted in domination as well as subordination. This may be a problem inherent in the constitution of the modern individual. This marking of who we are in the will to transformation is not undergone to the ends of the establishment of inter-subjectivity, but to the end of an individual subjectivity.

It would seem that while the practices that we use to govern and invent ourselves may benefit from the work-of-art metaphor of which Foucault was so fond, it is by no means clear that those forms of ethical work that involve responsibility to others—especially unknown others—would be improved by being regarded as fundamentally aesthetic. While personally and politically concerned with social and political justice, therefore, Foucault’s analytical interest was more in freedom—as a relation of self to self-than in justice, as a relation toward others. (Valverde 1999: 670)

**Representation**

Above I have considered the role of aesthetics in the experience of modernity in order to consider the possibilities and limitations for an aesthetics of existence to yield a critical ontology. For the most part I have argued that an aesthetics of existence is entirely too self-centred to function as critique or a critical ontology. Here I will argue that an
aesthetics of existence is insufficiently concerned with difference to fulfill the requirements of critique within theoretical aesthetics. I will begin with the self-referentiality of food as a cultural representation and then consider difference of form necessary to the proper functioning of aesthetics.

Representations are of central concern within aesthetics. Aesthetics requires for its functioning a symbolic order, a system of representations or a community of sense. “Representation concerns the multiple ways in which realities can be encoded in a system of signs, typically through . . . the symbolic order” (Turner 1994: 1). I am positing that foods function as such within a socially significant symbolic order. “Taste [is] knowledge of the principles of classification, hierarchy and appropriateness” (Featherstone 1990: 9). This is, of course, sociologically significant. We saw in Chapter Two, that taste must become a sociological question. Therefore, we can perceive the intimate relation between what we perceive to be true and what we perceive to be tasteful. Food has “a role in securing social categories and classifications” (Probyn 2000: 11).

The role of food as cultural representation is to represent multiple subjective and inter-subjective connections. Subjective connections represented by food include an array of “feelings, hopes, pleasures and worries” and inter-subjective connections represented by food include the axes of race, gender and class (Probyn 2000: 11). It is because of food’s role in securing categories and systems of classification in societies that theorists have been interested in considering the analytic and ethical potential of aesthetics of diet.

Aesthetic dietary practices can change our understanding and sense of food. By extension then, they can change our understanding of the inter-subjective connections they represent. The categorical and classificatory understandings represented by food can be

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22 Vegetarians can provide numerous examples of the embodiment of these symbol systems and their truth claims (Cox 1980). Recently, I watched as a friend choked on a mouthful of soymilk and exclaimed, “Liquid isn’t supposed to taste like that!” Apparently a symbol system for liquids (indeed, THE symbol system for liquids) is coded directly on to the tongue.
allowed to drift; our understanding of that which is represented by food might shift. In the reflective consideration aesthetics enables, dietary aesthetic practices might forefront some of the connections within and between the subjective and inter-subjective connections represented by food. Aesthetic techniques of representation will attempt to either point to the fact and function of a system of signs, in an attempt to de-naturalize their workings, or attempt to elide a signifier in an attempt to shift the immediacy of meaning in a symbol (Welsch 1996: 17). I will provide examples of aesthetic representations of food and their effect, throughout the remainder of this section.

Food reform is an aesthetic practice in part because it transforms reality into imagery (Featherstone 1992: 267). That is, part of the practice of food reform is the generation of images and representations. (Haug 1987: 133). Indeed, within food reform, eating gives meaning to various aspects of politics and social life. For example, the image of vivisection or cruelty to animals is the constellation of reality, of the significance of social and political relations into images which can stand in for a discussion of these realities. The image of the drunkard, or the debilitate was of significance to early food reformers and the image of wasteful, destructive white man was of significance to counter culture food reformers. Food came to represent these images. The aspects of politics and social life contained within concerns for cruelty to animals, drunkards, war, whiteness and the man are given meaning in part through the images representing them. And the images created of course depend upon the social relations creating them. However, these images neither exhaust, nor contain the reality of social relations. Social relations are constituted, in part, by struggle over meanings but are also contained within broader relations of force. I will return to this discussion to consider the analytics limitations of aesthetic representation. For now I will continue to consider the workings of aesthetic representations.
The early edition of the *Moosewood* is a good example of how representations in aesthetics can shift our understanding, sense, and experience of food. The *Moosewood* presents the food in such a way that asks the reader to shift their experience, and understanding of food. For example, the book describes an array of things which the reader may never have encountered before (soy sauce, nuts and seed, various oils, tofu) and then asks readers to consider these things to be food. The book presents these new things as ingredients and then says, "... this kind of cooking..." (Katzen 1977: xiii). The book represents and wants the reader to know a particular, a new, kind of food, cooking and eating. More particularly, the Moosewood represents a new experience of food to be known, "this kind of cooking", which is represented by a taste experience. Therefore, we are learning something about the world (this food, that food) in the experience of the food. What we know about *this* food, and *this* kind of cooking is represented by a taste experience. For example, what we know about brand name food, Planter's, is that it tastes "fine". Fine here is the limit, beyond which we might find superlative. It is an example of how we can know the will to transformation on our tongues.

At this point I will refer back to *How it all Vegan*, the cookbook under discussion in Chapter Two. The images used to stylize the book are particularly compelling examples of the aestheticization of dietary practices, or the symbol systems of food. *How it all Vegan* (1999) is filled with photos of '50s styles and images. These could be considered images of tradition and a conservative politics except that, in the context of the progressive cookbook of the '90s the meaning of the images, the flow of their significance is interrupted.

In *How it All Vegan*, there are numerous images of women that could be taken directly from an etiquette guide. The first image in the book is of a young woman with a '50s hairdo and severely shaped, raised eyebrows. She is smiling widely and holding up a jar of home-preserves, presumably her own accomplishment (Barnard and Kramer 1999: 10).
Subsequent images include that of a different woman with a similar hairstyle, and similarly shaped and raised eyebrows and a smile to match the first woman’s. She is wearing an apron and a man standing behind her, holds her waist and peers over her shoulder into her face, clearly delighted as she forks a strip of bacon onto a plate.

The authors are not advocating this diet of bacon, nor are they apparently advocating the approach to food represented by these smiling etiquette-schooled women of domesticity. I suggest that through the ironic use of these images, the authors are attempting to produce a sense of scorn for that which is represented by the images. They are playing on the tradition of pictorial representations of food and serving suggestions in women’s magazines (Coward 1985: 105). And so the authors are attempting to arouse in the reader a sense of dis-taste, an uneasiness regarding these images from which to consider their food choices. The idea behind these images is to make the reader consider that which they expect and that which they enact in a meal. The un-ease causes the reader to consider and “rework the body’s relation to others and selves” (Probyn 2000: 134).

The aestheticization of the vegan diet, as presented in the book, disrupts the flow of representation of both the images and vegan food. What the images in How it All Vegan do, and what aesthetic dietary practices make it possible to do, is to dramatize our instincts and introduce discontinuity into our being (Foucault 1984: 88). The images, in this context force the reader to consider the limits of some of the systems of classification and categorization of food, and to see that something lies outside those systems, beyond those lines. The representations of food and what they signify are disrupted and the lay of the field in which a struggle for meaning is carried out is exposed slightly. In this way, the book points to the

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23 Throughout the writing of this thesis I have been reminded of a play once produced entitled, “Eat Me” (Munsil 2001). In it, a woman in a bathrobe sits alone, clearly melancholy, in front of a television when suddenly a fairy-like creature carries in a shopping bag from 7-11. From the shopping bag, the woman withdraws, with dramatized respect and admiration, a box of Oreo Cookies. The play continues to dramatize the woman’s consumption of the cookies in a manner that exposes for the audience her relation to herself, the box, and individual cookies.
fact and function of symbol systems in food. The authors are not asking readers to look into themselves to discover a true self in relation to the food, they are asking rather that readers "skate across the surface of the alimentary"; to see what has come together and what is represented by food (Probyn 2000: 23).

Further, these representations, aesthetic representations of food, establish a struggle over food itself, to have vegan food recognized as food. Therefore, the struggle over representation is a struggle over food itself. The images enable reflective consideration for the readers' understanding of food to go beyond that represented in the images. In disrupting the flow of significance of representations, the images are reflections of the consideration that "This meat free diet can be food too". Certainly these images can't show the international economy in food production but it can expose the existence of a field in which meanings are struggled over.

Here I will consider a particular example of the meanings of food and the way they are represented as taste experience. I will rely upon the example of How it All Vegan-type images to suggest that aestheticization of dietary practices can disrupt the meanings and the taste experience of food. Consider Sunday dinner. While by no means universal, what is represented by Sunday dinner is sufficiently pervasive throughout the cultures we have been discussing to function as a fairly succinct example. An aesthetic representation of Sunday dinner or the food that makes Sunday dinner can disrupt the flow of meaning of the taste experience. Rosalind Coward uses just such an image in her book Female Desire (1985). In the midst of her feminist criticism of the ways female desire is tied to power, Coward inserts an image of a large family gathering that also might have come from an etiquette book. She does indeed go on to discuss the sexual politics of highly symbolic meals such as Sunday dinner and Christmas dinner. In inserting the image within the context of her analysis she is asking the reader to reflect critically upon what is represented by a Sunday dinner. That is,
to consider an aestheticized representation of Sunday dinner is to have changed that which is represented by the taste experience of Sunday dinner. All kinds of connections and considerations of sexual politics, domestic labour and the labour of caring work can be made in thinking of the social relations within the family home that produced for example the Sunday roast (Probyn 2000: 24). In a dietary aesthetic practice, reflective consideration might bring about a changed understanding of that which is represented by the taste experience of Sunday dinner. Perhaps then consideration of these social and political arrangements can change our taste for food.

The Limits of Representation
Here I will consider the limitations of aestheticization of food representations. First I will point to aesthetics' cultural self-referentiality as a limit to its potential as an analytic concerned with others. Second, I will consider the limitations of pervasive images in contemporary everyday life. In order to consider the analytic limitations of aesthetic food representations I will draw an uneasy distinction between cultural studies and social studies. While I recognize that representations are a part of culture, which shape social relations and that of course social relations shape culture, I maintain the distinction here as it quite succinctly points to some of the limitations in aestheticization of representation in dietary practices.

The cultural turn within the social sciences showed us that there are no boundaries around human subjectivity and so changed our understanding of empirical reality (Rojek and Turner 2000: 235). However, while it has removed the humanism it has also left behind the materialism and so, cannot propose a way forward in politics (Rojek and Turner 2000: 237). With aesthetics and the cultural turn we can read and write politically; however, material reality is not encompassed by the textual. We can read the politics off a diet, and we can represent the politics of a diet to be read, but we have more work to do in accounting for the techniques that go into the formation of a diet. The social relations constitutive of food
cannot be exhausted within representational work even of that of the food itself. This is partly due to the self-referentiality of culture. Because the aesthetic is a struggle over meaning occurring within culture, it must remain self-referential, can expose the struggle over meaning but cannot show, for example, the field of production that intersects with the other fields.

The self-referentiality of the cultural turn in part also means that aesthetics of dietary representations cannot account for others and so cannot be accountable to justice and so is not sufficient to a critical ontology. As an analytic concerned for others, aesthetics of food as representation can only go so far. “Cultural knowledge is not directly utilisable because of the substantial problem of mutual recognition between groups” (Warde et al. 1999: 124). For example, Warhol’s Campbell’s soup cans are an aesthetic representation of an everyday foodstuff. They are the aestheticization of the everyday and of representations of food. However, a viewer who is unable to conceive of Campbell’s soup as an everyday foodstuff, and associate significance to it as such, would miss the critical edge to this aesthetic consideration of the everyday.

In contemporary social theories of aesthetics, the everyday is infused with artistic character. In seeing and analyzing the way lives are stylized, theorists must focus solely upon culture, the image, appearance. The distinction between reality and image is effaced. A concentration on this type of analysis then only lets the signifiers drift while more than the images of contemporary society need to be re-worked. Aesthetics then loses its critical force as both an analytic and an ethic. To say that everywhere reality is image, which can be changed simply by eliding the signifier is to say that we are duped by this play of signs into social relations that deny or negate our power to transform or create original meaning. In addition, aestheticization of the everyday loses its revolutionary zeal when the power

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24 Various modernist movements have called for the extension of art into the everyday, and the extension of ethics into aesthetics. The called for extension of art had been about making art that which has not been.
relations of the images do not come into the play of signification. While shoppers in the mall might be stylizing their lives, this is hardly an awareness of the contemporary power relations structuring the socio-economic location of shoppers; it is not exemplary of a will to revolution. Ultimately then the critical force of aesthetics is lost.

This is not to say that the aesthetic and the real world are separate entities but it is to say that not every Sunday trip to the store is critique. Not every moment of consumption, even if it is a life-stylization is a moment of critical reflection. While the aesthetic and the everyday are both effects of broader social and political relations, aesthetic possibilities are effected as distinct from, and not necessarily commiserate with the everyday. It is the non-identity of the everyday and aesthetics that lends the critical edge to aesthetic consideration of the everyday; it asks us to de-naturalize our approach to the everyday.

It cannot be assumed that the everyday is a critical aesthetic simply because of the pervasive role of image, or opportunity for stylization in contemporary society. We need to ask the sociological questions of the development of aesthetic appreciation, such as food. For example, while we could ask who can afford to stylize their eating habits, often a reflective awareness of the social and political implications of the materiality of food and diet, is undertaken by those whose marginalized positions have made them reflective about their social location and identity construction (DeVault 1991: 227). Thus, as I argued in Chapter Two, the materiality of aesthetic judgments, the stuff of critical reflection is not the privileged domain of specific judgments of taste. It is clear that representations do not account for the material reality of social relations, as these reflective representations by marginalized individuals do not gain currency in the play of life-style images.

Within cultural studies, the critical edge of aesthetics has been over-diagnosed. When only the image, and not the materiality of social relations, is considered, cultural and social theory becomes politically incompetent. The affect and effect of constituting a ‘free’
individual essence and of the neutrality of aesthetic spheres imply limitations to the ethical
effect of aesthetic practices. “If the aesthetic space is kept politically incompetent, then that
means . . . that within it politics can find refuge from where it is no longer possible as
politics” (Haug 1987: 140). Here I will cite an instance within current food reform practices,
which points to the potential for aesthetics incompetence in matters of politics. The
example is a seemingly innocent image on a package of instant re-fried beans. The image is
an illustration of an open-air market of several stalls with fruits and vegetables on display.
Open-air markets are rare events, really, in Canada and the US and we are further informed
of the exotic contents of the package by the image of the adobe house in the background of
the market. The market is empty of people, inviting the consumers to enter the image
themselves. Here we have then the promise of a Latin American experience contained within
the package. In this package the consumer might discover an emptied Latin America, the
fruits of which are laid solely for the North American consumer. The politics of this
exoticization of Latin America can remain un-checked precisely because it is possible for the
aesthetics of food reform to remain politically incompetent.

Again this is the difficulty presented by the utility of cultural knowledge in aesthetic
representations. The refried bean package is an example of aestheticized representation of
vegetarian food; it is presented in order that subjects might participate in a dietary aesthetic
practice. However, it relies upon images that are dependent upon the subjectification of
Latin American others. While these packaged beans might be part of a dietary aesthetic
practice, they do not aid in the constitution of a critical ontology. This representation cannot
help North American dietary aesthetic practitioners to get free of the effects of subjugating
others. As an aestheticized image of food, the package does gesture to a conception of food
that is not everyday, that is outside the buyers’ categories and classifications of food. Buyers
are meant to think of the beans, not as the TV dinner they are, but as a trip into Latin
America. In this aesthetic representation of food, buyers see at the limits of what is instant, that which is exotic.

**Aesthetic Considerations of Difference and Form**

Here I will consider a second aspect of theoretical aesthetics in order to further assess whether an aesthetic of existence can meet aesthetics' criteria for critique. Aesthetics cannot be everywhere or permanent. It requires difference and sensitivity to difference. If everything is, for example, beautiful, then nothing is beautiful. Some things must lie outside the realm of aesthetic sensitivity in order for it to function as such.

I will explicate this detail of aesthetic theory in order to press the point that this critical capacity of aesthetics occurs only in acknowledging the impossibility of a permanent aesthetics. Aesthetic experience requires experience that is not aesthetic. “Marsden in his description of Sumatra makes the remark that the free beauties of nature surround the spectator everywhere and thus lose their attraction for him” (Kant 2000: 99). Music requires silence. Thus, aesthetic sensitivity enables the awareness of difference in form, that is, in its functioning, aesthetics acknowledge that things exist, the principles of which are not contained within the aesthetic framework (Welsch 1996: 18). Aesthetic sensitivity thereby enables sensitivity to form and difference. Without this sensitivity to difference and difference in form, the critical capacity of aesthetics cannot be fulfilled.

Aesthetics must follow the considerations of the time and place in which it functions. While aesthetic sensitivity might be set to transcend these limitations, it does not need to appeal to a transcendental substrate. Therefore awareness of the specifically located structure of its object it is required of a properly functioning aesthetic sensitivity. For our purposes, aesthetics enables sensitivity to social formations and the differences in principle to be found between social locations within social formations. “This analogizing of aesthetic and living conditions is legitimate because the relationship between ways of life are structurally the same as the relationships between aesthetic complexes” (Welsch 1996: 18).
Aesthetic consciousness is sensitized to differences of form and therefore can perceive different life forms. What lies beyond the bounds of the awareness of the present is an awareness of what is not our present. So aesthetics is perfectly suited when it is called for to recognize and do justice to difference. In the development of these sensitivities to difference and form lie the possibilities for aesthetics to intervene in, but not carry the weight of, social life.

Food, as culture, does more than the work of representation. Representations convey meaning within and help to construct social formations. Further, food as material helps to construct social formations and representations. Aesthetic sensitivity in food practices then, can provide practitioners reflective consideration of the social forms and relations, the materiality, bringing them food (Simmel 1997: 131). I will provide examples of aesthetic reflection upon the social relations bringing us our food.

The early edition of the Moosewood is an excellent example of a dietary aesthetic practice that is sufficiently attendant to difference and form required of and functioning within an aesthetic. In the Moosewood, not every aspect of life is an awareness of the pleasures afforded through an aesthetic of eating. Fruit salad is meant to provide people with a chance to forget their everyday cares, and Celebratory Sandwich Fillings are created to insert some cheer into an everyday routine. The appreciation of the food, the reflective awareness that the food provides pleasure is right up against the awareness that existence is not constituted by moments of pleasure.

Furthermore, difference and form between foods and within recipes in the Moosewood are important to the food experience sought. For example, Katzen appeals to the personality of the watermelon, in fact, she goes on to consider whether pits are, in principle, of or outside the aesthetic experience of watermelon in fruit salad. She asks the cook to pay attention to the glory of oranges in fruit salad. We are asked to be attentive to
these differences in order to do justice not only to individual fruits, but the fruit salad as a whole as well as to the end of the fruit salad. The attention to difference is essential in this instance as it is essential to a glorious experience of fruit salad. It is the pleasure of the food that lets us experience the limits of what we are in our present. Without attention to the glory of the fruit salad, everyday cares could not be alleviated. It is the form of the food that lets us see people in their everyday cares and boredom, whatever those might be. The consideration of form begins prior to food preparation.

In the Moosewood we are not asked to consider all food as an aesthetic object and every instance the opportunity for an aesthetic experience, but to be sensitive to what might be an aesthetic. For example, the book suggests that we consider when and where fruit is available (Katzen 1975: xii). In choosing the foods for our meals we are asked to be aware of what is not available, that which will not be part of the aesthetic experience of food. We are meant to reflect upon the process that has presented the food to us in this particular form and what will do justice to the food (and all that goes into producing it as such) and the experience of eating. Here we see an aesthetic sensibility, in its awareness of difference, enabling the shifting of categories of understanding. In their pleasurable consideration of food, readers are pushed to the limits of the category of “available”, and to be aware of the other side of “available” as well, and to let the meaning of the category “available” shift. Having considered the first edition Moosewood as an example of an effective sensitivity to difference and form, here I will discuss the temperance vegetarian aesthetic as an example of the ineffective, because permanent, ethics of aesthetics of existence.

**Same Difference**

A permanent will to aestheticize cannot yield critical insight because it will aestheticize that which is common sense. For example, temperance vegetarians were asked

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25 It is important to note that Katzen does not outline a politics of bio-regional food consumption and cannot be read as advocating such. For instance, it is just as viable to consider a change in availability to mean a change in the amount we are willing to spend to have the item in our food.
to consider all their food always from the position of an elevated will, to make every aspect of their relationship to food an aesthetic experience. Yet, the successful functioning of this aesthetic relied upon the subjectification of some individuals. The work of freedom in temperance vegetarianism could not be such without the concern of a wife or mother. Representations and formations of food within that vegetarianism were tied to the emotional work of the temperance vegetarian housewife.

In the early food reform texts we saw that homemakers were indeed compelled to consider the limits of who they were, the limits of the social relations within which they found themselves. They were meant not only to see the conditions of existence in which they lived but to seek to transform those conditions and relations. And while this was sometimes done in the name of freedom, that freedom often was not their own but that of their drunkard family member, or the children. In their aesthetics of existence, homemakers did not constitute their freedom or autonomy; they were further responsibilizing themselves for matters apparently beyond their control.

This emotional work lies against but cannot be considered within the arguments for freedom found in temperate vegetarian discourses. Women’s emotional work, even within politicized lifestyle movements, often was and often is commonsense. Here, aesthetics of existence as a permanent re-activation of an attitude ties the common sense to the aesthetic. Common sense relations are merely considered from a higher order of purpose. Women’s work is now for freedom, or the nation, they are asked to give a higher order of purpose to the same old relations of production and reproduction. The relations subjugating women, and women’s role in these relations are spruced up, no more.

This example shows us that an aesthetics of existence as a permanent re-activation of an attitude cannot necessarily act as a force for freedom, let alone justice. Housewives practicing this permanently aestheticized existence were not thereby enabled to reflect
critically on the constitution of themselves as subjected and subjugated individuals. Vegetarianism was not a practice by which they could explore how their capacities might change or increase without concomitant intensification of relations of rule and subjection.

This aesthetic practice is a will to glorify all that the practitioners see, or encounter in themselves and their relations. From the perspective of the elevated will, practitioners mark the limits of their present. Practitioners seek to free themselves within the limits of their present. It is an entirely self-centred search for freedom. In its attempts to aestheticize everything, it seeks only to aestheticize this present, but does not see other presents which lies beyond it. This does not cultivate an awareness of that which practitioners cannot see, the blind spot or the silence required for the critical functioning of aesthetics. Without a cultivated awareness of these blind spots, practitioners cannot be aware that what lies beyond the limits of their present are the limits of others. Within the limits marking their present, practitioners can free themselves, but it would require an awareness of the limits of others to cultivate a sensitivity of justice. Therefore, because it does not cultivate a blind spot, it is unable to see its reliance upon a government of individualization. Through the cultivation of an aesthetic sensitivity to aesthetics’ blind spot we might cultivate an awareness that the limits of others lie at the limits of our own present might provide “more complex representations” of the workings of social life (DeVault 1991: 242). A permanent aesthetics cannot be sensitive to its blind spots.

**Reflective Blind Spots**

The cultivation of this blind spot in aesthetic theory also reiterates the point that a specialized taste is not required for aesthetic sensitivity. Because aesthetics requires the cultivation of respect for the far side of our own limits, there is an attendant awareness that our own limits are the far side other limits. Our limits might be the blind spot of others’. Aesthetic sensitivity in others would make this the case. The sociability of food and the reflections to be had from dietary aesthetic practices will vary from social location to social
location. Resources determine, in part, sociality and uses of food. Therefore, aesthetic practices and the critical insight to be had from them will vary with material resources. Social formations create representational differences and material differences that will affect aesthetic considerations. Material differences mean differences in the experiences of feeding and eating. Because of its sensitivity to form and difference aesthetics has the capacity to handle these differences in principle of experience and enables critical reflection from various social locations. “Just as life produces the forms of art which in turn draw their content from life again, so sociation produces the social form of sociability which likewise then draws its content from social life” (Davis 1973: 324).

In aesthetics we can see different forms of sociality and suspend the concepts by which we understand these. Structures of sociality have material bases that we might be able to see through an analysis of their forms without the determinate concepts that attribute their meaning in culture. And because no specific taste is necessary to aesthetics, these analyses might come from different social formations and social locations. In the cultivation of this blind spot then, an aesthetic sensitivity would be open to representations by others of social relations, in which we ourselves are involved. This would be to see, or taste a different set of categorical understandings for the limits of our present. But again, this could only occur if our aesthetic experiences are sensitive to that which they are not. An example of this might be the Sunday dinner previously discussed. Our taste for the meal might shift as we come to new understandings of the social formations bringing us the food. Or, we might think of the new taste of “available” the Moosewood asks us to consider.

In thinking about the constitution of the limits of our presently available food, we might shift our understanding of “available”, regardless of what is on the market, and so experience new tastes of “available”. In this way, the cultivation of a blind spot will lead to
the ability to think of our relationships to others, an ethics of justice and thereby fulfill the
requirements of critique.

Conclusion

It seems that social theories that elide ethics into aesthetics undermine the ethical
potential of aesthetics. I have argued that this is the case because aesthetics of existence as
an ethics of a permanent re-activation of an attitude do not allow for a blind spot or the
sensitivity to difference that is the critical edge of aesthetics. A simple aestheticization of the
moment is entirely self-referential and cannot concede anything to social relations beyond
the representation of the present moment. I have argued that social relations are not
exhausted by their representations whether those are the representations of taste or image.
Finally, it is only through the cultivation of a blind spot, the development of an awareness of
that which is not encompassed by aesthetics that aesthetic practices can do justice to the
social formations represented by food. It is aesthetics’ sensitivity to that which is other than
itself that provides it with the capacity for justice.

Our concern with our relation to ourselves must not only be a concern for the ways
we are subjected. Critique must be concerned with justice as well as freedom so that our
ethics might concern us with our roles in government and in subjection.
Conclusion
Aesthetics of Food and Eating: Defining Critical Possibilities

An aesthetics of existence as a permanent re-activation of an attitude to aestheticize, cannot be sensitive to difference, or justice and so cannot yield a critical ontology. This is for two reasons. First, it is only with an eye to that which it is not, that aesthetics can aid us in marking for transformation what we are, do and think in the present. Second, to fulfill its capacity as critique, a critical ontology requires the functioning of justice. That is, critique must be accountable to justice. Here I will review the manner in which I came to this conclusion, and point to aesthetic considerations by which to determine which aestheticization processes will lead to critical reflection.

I have argued that aesthetics have been central to the experience of modernity. Aesthetics provides the community of meaning where the mediation of a universal individuality might occur. It is within this aesthetic experience that modern subjects constitute themselves as individuals of progress, subjects of a will to distinction and transformation. Further, in this chapter I argued that, although excluded from traditional aesthetics, food and eating fulfill in principle the requirements to be an aesthetic object and an aesthetic experience and as such have lent themselves to the aesthetic experience of modernity. Because food is constituted in part through the symbol systems of our communities of meaning and because of the bodily character and subjective experience of eating, food lends itself to the experience of a depth of personality - individuality.

In Chapter One, I pursued the embodied experience of taste and judgments of taste through a considerations of Bourdieu's conceptualization of habitus. I relied upon Bourdieu's characterization of our taste for food as the bodily composition of judgments of taste. I argued against Bourdieu's anti-Kantian aesthetic by accusing Bourdieu of what he accuses Kant. By arguing that Bourdieu, in conceptualizing habitus, missed the aesthetic
character of embodied processes of taste and judgments of taste, I argued that *bios* can provide material for an aesthetic practice.

In Chapter Two I analyzed an empirical corpus of vegetarian tracts and cookbooks. It was in this chapter that we first saw the non-critical results of an aesthetics of existence as a permanent attitude. This conclusion is illustrated in several of the cookbooks examined. In *Diet for a Small Planet*, a permanent elevated consideration of our food choices devolved into a primarily self-concerned effort. Even when the government of others was considered it was considered to the end of increasing self-knowledge with which to pursue self-interest. In a permanent aesthetic attitude, everything becomes about stylizing one's own life. As we saw in the vegetarian cookbooks from the early twentieth century, this attitude does not always lead to freedom, let alone justice. In those tracts and books, a common sense understanding of women's labour, emotional and otherwise was simply seen through a stylized lens, given a higher order of purpose. The everyday aesthetic practices of these women did not provide them critical insight into the manner in which they were governed by their relations, and it certainly would not have provided their family members insight into the manner in which they governed in their relations to these women. This effect is the first reason that a permanent aesthetics cannot yield a critical ontology. A permanent aesthetics only stylizes a higher order of purpose to, rather than provide the will to transform, what we are, do and think in the contingency of the present.

To follow the empirical insight that aesthetic practices are not always constitutive of critical reflections, in Chapter Three I returned to theoretical aesthetics to argue that aesthetics of existence as a permanent re-activation of an attitude cannot meet aesthetics' requirements for justice and so cannot constitute a critical ontology. Insight into relations of rule cannot always be provided by aesthetics as it occurs in contemporary social life. This is because aesthetic processes have tended toward the embellishment of everyday processes.
Further, theoretical attempts to develop ethics contained within aesthetics cannot affect a critical politics. In theories of aesthetics as ethics the result is that processes of aestheticization are decreed as processes of ethics. Thus social theory does not explain the lives of social agents through their place in material relations, but image and style are decreed as constituting the lives of social agents. And so we see that an all-encompassing aestheticization cannot serve as critical reflection.

I hold that aesthetic sensitivity can provide critical reflection upon social relations. This can only occur through an awareness that critique, and justice, are not served through an aestheticization of everything. It is only through sensitivity to difference, encouraged by the blind-spot of aesthetic sensitivity that we can be aware of differences, in principle, of ways of life. And it is only in this manner that we might take responsibility for the modes of government to which we subject others. Aesthetic processes that will enable us in this responsibility will be only those that meet the criterion of acknowledging the limits of those aesthetics.

Only through aesthetics and aesthetic practices that observe the two-fold relationship of heeding and excluding might we be sensitive to others, whose lives and lifestyles are in principle different from our own. Indeed it is precisely its capacity to be sensitive to difference that allows aesthetics to intervene upon social processes. In the early Moosewood cookbook we saw that an aesthetic experience that is sensitive to its blind spots, to that which it is not stylizing can give us insight into what lies outside the aesthetic. For example, the Celebratory Sandwich Fillings in the first edition are an aesthetic experience, which is constituted against that which is not an aesthetic experience, the work world. Because the sandwich, or the food is an aesthetic experience inserted into the workday, we gain insight into the material relations of the everyday, even if this insight is only that work is not a place of cheer. Perhaps this is not a particularly profound insight but it is more
profound than the insight provided by the more self-concerned second edition, that
sometimes packing a lunch can get boring. These sandwiches are examplar of the depth of
insight provided by an aesthetic practice meant to stylize an entire life. Permanent processes
of aestheticization cannot enable us to see in the contingency of the present what might
change in what we are, do and think. Permanent aesthetics enable subjects to stylize the
possibility to remain the same. Therefore, such processes do not aid us in the undefined
work of freedom. Further, an aesthetics sensitive to difference and exclusion could be
sensitive to the practices of exclusion in forms of daily and social life.

Being sensitive to differences in principle between individuals and groups within
social life enables us to see through imperialisms and think in terms of justice. Thinking of
others and thinking of justice are not normative terms with transcendental substrates to
which I appeal. Considerations for justice and the way we rule are the result of the
constellation of political, social and cultural relations. However, regardless of their character
as artifacts, they are sufficient, unto themselves, and necessary to a critical and progressive
politics and sociology. Aesthetics provides critical insight when aesthetic experiences are
constituted against an awareness of that which they are not. The pleasure of the sandwich is
to be had within the simultaneous awareness of work as a different order of experience. The
sandwich is pleasurable because of an awareness of fundamental differences between
experiences.

Similarly, the pleasure of critical reflection upon social life is constituted within an
awareness of and sensitivity to difference, in principle.
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