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THE EVOLUTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
IN KANO EMIRATE, NORTHERN NIGERIA

by
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A thesis submitted to Carleton University in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in political science

Carleton University
Ottawa, Canada

September 1974
The undersigned recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies acceptance of the thesis

THE EVOLUTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
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submitted by Robert O.F. Ola, M.A.
in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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October 28, 1974
ABSTRACT

The thesis examines the evolution of local government institutions in Kano Emirate, Northern Nigeria, during the three periods of colonial (1900-1950) self-government (1950-1965) and military (1966-1972) rule. Local government institutions are assessed in relation to selected objectives derived from both the democratic-participatory school, and the efficiency-service school, of local government theory and practice.

The explanation for the non-achievement of objectives is attributed to several political, administrative, economic and social variables and to the influence of imported institutions such as the practice of indirect rule, the institution of the political officer, and the English legal system.

Policy proposals, based upon a modified system of regional federation, are presented to enhance the
efficient and effective performance of local government in Kano emirate. An assessment of the application of these proposals in general and to other emirates of Northern Nigeria is also presented.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This is the end product of more than five years of study at Carleton. It is right, therefore, to begin by thanking those who showed me the way to this institution—Silverio Chimaka and Mrs. Florence Barclay. Both were formerly of the School of Public Administration. I had lived in Ottawa for months before fate brought me in contact with these people.

In my research travels to some parts of North America in the spring and summer of 1973, I was fortunate to meet with many helpful people. I can only mention a few of them by name. Miss J. Grey of the Library of Congress, Washington, not only showed me what was available at their African Division, but also directed me to Mrs. Doris Calvin of the African Studies Centre, Boston University. I found her equally helpful. Professor Alfred Opobor, Director, African Studies Centre, Michigan State University at East Lansing, made much valuable material available to me, and also introduced me to Mrs. Kalu Ezera of the University Library. Professor John Paden of Northwestern University, Evanston, was very liberal with his time and advice. I'm grateful to them all.
I also want to thank others at the Library of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., the Institute of Developmental Studies at McGill University, Montreal, the Data Bank of the Institute of Behavioral Research of York University, Toronto, the University of Toronto Library, the National Archives and Library and the Supreme Court Library, both at Ottawa.

Alhaji Maitama Sule, Kano State Commissioner for Information, and Commissioner in charge of local government in the Military Governor's Office, deserves my special thanks for his interest and continued help since I met him in January, 1974. He has requested a copy of this thesis, hoping it would be of some interest in Kano.

Controller J. Alex McGivern of the Borough of North York, Alderman Paul B. Pickett, Q.C., of the City of Toronto, J. Tanner, Executive Assistant to Metro Chairman Paul Godfrey, and Frank Longstaff of the Planning Department at Metro, all of Toronto, gave generously of their time, and I thank them. I also would like to thank friends and old-colleagues of mine at the University College Ibadan, some of whom are now in the
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... Omo Ol'ogotun Ogbolu,
Ira Ule Ado,

who for the past several years, in this strange country, has fulfilled with admirable grace her radically changed role, and has continued, almost single-handedly, to bring up our children.

I only need add that none of the people mentioned above can be held responsible for any errors of judgement, mistakes or omissions in this thesis. That responsibility is mine and mine alone.
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INTRODUCTION

The study of Nigerian local government has received considerable attention in the last two decades. Among the studies that have appeared on the subject are those of Akpan, Harris, Cowan, Campbell and Wraith. The approaches of these authors have been similar. In general, they have been descriptive, legalistic and institutional.¹ That is, they have described and explained the existing organization of local government councils, their daily operation, their legal bases, sources of finances, committee structures, etc. However, no study has, so far, been carried out centering on the problem of why local government in Nigeria has been unable to maximize the aims and objectives set for it in the past. In particular, hardly any attempt has been made to consider the causes of such non-achievement of objectives and the influence

of imported institutions, ideas and practices on such functioning of local government in Nigeria or on any part of it.

This study, therefore, selects a part of Nigeria—in this case Kano emirate—examines the evolution of local government there, and tries to evaluate its performance and to identify and account for the deficiencies and inadequacies that made for non-attainment of objectives. The study examines in addition how imported local government institutions, ideas and practices contributed to these deficiencies.

In attempting to assess the performance of local government, and to identify and account for past deficiencies in local government operations in Kano emirate, this study relates the performance to objectives of local government derived from both the democratic-participatory school and the efficiency-service school of local government. Then we attempt to reconcile the aims and objectives of the leaders who have control over what local government should do, in the three eras of the study, to these objectives. In addition to this, by using expressed statements and declarations of the leaders who had or have control over the aims and objectives
of local government, and also by extrapolating from various situations, the aims and objectives set for local government in each era are determined. Deficiencies and inadequacies in functioning will be identified. The role of imported institutions in creating such deficiencies or sustaining such inadequacies during the three periods of the study will also be explored.

The thesis will show that in Kano emirate in the three broad periods of this study—the colonial, the self-governing and the military periods—a number of political, economic and sociological factors made the attainment of the aims and objectives of local government difficult. In addition, the importation of certain foreign institutions, ideas and practices (foreign to Kano emirate) contributed in each era to the difficulty of attaining the stated objectives. Depending on the particular institution, idea or practice, each contributed either to non-attainment of some objective, or to the non-maximization of the objective.

The findings of this study indicate that the importation of the various institutions in the various
periods of the study contributed to the deficient performance of local government. In addition, the study examines what factors are important for consideration in importing institutions in order to ensure that further importations might have a higher probability of contributing to, rather than hindering, the performance of the system into which they are introduced.

WHY KANO EMIRATE?

Kano emirate among the thirty-eight emirates in Northern Nigeria has been selected for this study primarily because Kano exemplifies very well the conflict between traditionalism and modernity that is apparent in many parts of Northern Nigeria today. Kano does this perhaps better than any of the other thirty-seven emirates. With the Emir, a very powerful traditional ruler, local
government was deeply entrenched in the hands of, and dependent on, the ruler in the colonial era. In the period from 1950 to 1965, the conflict between the forces of traditionalism and modernity was most acutely represented in the efforts of the Emir to retain his hold on Kano (especially on Kano representatives to the state legislature, the Northern House of Assembly), and in the efforts of the Premier of Northern Nigeria, the Sardauna of Sokoto, to have direct control over his party men (as the legitimate leader of the government party, the Northern People's Congress). Since 1968 there have been further interesting experiments by the military administration to introduce some form of decentralization of government, indicating a fresh approach to local government.

Northern Nigeria, as far as being a subject of academic study, has been more neglected as an area of study than Southern Nigeria. Yet its importance is no less. Politically the area gave Nigeria its first Prime Minister—Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. The present military head of state, General Gowon, also comes from Northern Nigeria. In area, Northern Nigeria covers more than two-thirds of the entire country and
its population is greater than that of Southern Nigeria. In 1970, Northern Nigeria's population was estimated at 29,809,000 in an area of 281,782 square miles, whilst Southern Nigeria had 25,882,000 people in an area of 94,887 square miles.\footnote{Figures from United Nigeria Calendar (Lagos, 1970). The figures for the 1973 census are not used here since they are, meanwhile, provisional and in certain quarters controversial figures.} In the new reorganization into states in 1967, six of the twelve states including Kano were created in Northern Nigeria. The fact that these states, and Northern Nigeria as a whole, have not received as much academic attention, especially from Nigerians, as Southern Nigeria appears to have received, necessitates a change in emphasis.\footnote{Of the five books mentioned on p.xiii, Campbell's book is on Northern Nigeria, whilst Harris, Akpan, Cowan and Wraith dwell far more on the South. Akpan, the only Nigerian author, among the five, is also more concerned with the South.}

Kano, in particular, presents a very rich avenue for examining the evolution and progress of local government in Nigeria, and affords an opportunity of discovering which factors account for what will be shown to be its limited success, and the impact that imported
ideas, institutions and practices had on local government in the emirate. Besides this attraction for study is Kano State's historical and economic importance, its strategic position of wealth (the wealthiest of all the Northern states), its historical importance as a prominent commercial centre in the Western Sudan and its high density population of 5,755,000 people to 16,680 square miles, an average density of 330 persons per square mile (the highest in Northern Nigeria).\footnote{1 United Nigeria Calendar (Lagos, 1970).} All these factors make Kano state unique. They show the state as important and a study of its local politics or government as a desirable exercise.

**OUTLINE OF THE STUDY**

The first task of this study is to develop, in Chapter One, and describe the objectives and functions of local government. Hence the chapter explores the theoretical and normative literature on the aims and purposes of local government in western democracies, as well as in the developing nations of the world.
In assessing the shortcomings and inadequacies identified, the study will examine the aims set for local government by the bureaucratic elite (the colonial administrators) in the colonial era, the political elite (the leaders of the governing party in the region) in the self-governing era, and of the military elite (the ruling army officers) in the post-1966 period. The study will identify the extent to which these objectives were achieved in each period and what factors were responsible for non-achievement. Chapters Two, Three and Four are therefore devoted to a description and evaluation of the three periods of the study. Chapter Two will deal with the colonial era, from about 1900 to 1950; Chapter Three with the self-governing era, 1950 to 1965; and Chapter Four with the military era from 1966 to the end of the study. It is, however, to be made clear that this study is not a detailed examination of the day-to-day operation of local government in Kano emirate in the three periods 1900 to 1950, 1950 to 1965, and 1965 to about 1972.\footnote{An example of such day-to-day activities of local government in Northern Nigeria is given by M.J. Campbell, \textit{op. cit.}, Chapters 6-8.}

Rather, it is a study of the broad evolution of general
objectives and performance of local government in the three eras.

Chapter Five will consider the general problems involved in the transfer of political institutions, in order to help us to understand more fully the impact of the imported local government institutions on Kano emirate. In doing this, it will also examine the theoretical literature and from this, endeavour to come up with certain factors that are considered important in the transferring of institutions.

It is important to make clear from the beginning, that this study has a clear-cut policy emphasis. The study consciously attempts to examine Kano emirate local government in the past, with a view towards improving its performance in the future. In the light of this, parts of Chapters Six and Seven will present policy proposals, designed to enhance the efficient and effective performance of local government, and for the consideration of both students of public administration and its practitioners in Kano emirate. In the conclusion (Chapter Eight), we consider among other things, how these proposals might have general appeal and be applicable to some of the other emirates of Northern Nigeria.
METHODOLOGY

The study has employed primary sources, i.e.,
official documents and statements, government circulars,
press releases and publications, policy statements,
military decrees and edicts, as well as the usual secondary
sources--published materials such as books and articles
by scholars working on this area. It has also employed
the interview approach in collecting information about
the existing systems in Metro Toronto and in Kano.
Financial limitations have made on-the-spot observations
in Kano impossible. Instead, concentrated efforts have
been made to gather as many relevant documentary sources
as possible on Kano emirate in particular and on Northern
Nigeria in general, by visiting various African studies
centres in the United States, e.g., those at Boston,
Northwestern, and Michigan State Universities and the
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, as well as the School of
Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins
University at Washington, D.C. Further research was
also conducted at the Library of Congress, African
Division. Canadian universities with an interest in
developmental studies, notably McGill, Toronto and York
Universities, also provided additional avenues for research in the spring and summer of 1973.

Because of its policy emphasis, the approach of this study has been to assess the performance of local government in Kano emirate in each period in the light of the aims and objectives developed for it.
CHAPTER ONE
THEORIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

One of the major motivations that gave rise to this study was the feeling of challenge which the author felt on reading W.J.M. Mackenzie's pronouncement that "there is no theory of local government", and that "there is no normative general theory from which we can deduce what local government ought to be doing . . . a theory from which we can devise testable hypotheses about what it is." It was decided, after reading this, to make a further extensive search into the literature. What was found, however, was far from satisfying. Largely it was a lament on the situation Mackenzie had identified and a very passive acceptance of it. "No obstacle to analysis would arise", commented C.S. Whitaker, "were there universally accepted functions and purposes of modern democratic local government, but, of course, there are none." W.H. Wickwar also wrote, "No great authority


like Austin, Bentham or Mill, has thought it fit to
determine the principles of local government as distinct
from the principles of government in general."

It is readily apparent from this that there is
no generally accepted theory of local government.
Nevertheless both W.J.M. Mackenzie and L.J. Sharpe have
written on the theories of local government, and L.H.
Wickwar has entitled his recent study, *The Political
Theory of Local Government.* It is the contention of
this study that the existing literature provides sufficient
and suitable grounds on which to build a list of criteria
of what local government ought to be doing, what theoreti-
cally it ought to be engaged in. Such a list of criteria
will provide a basis for assessing how well a local govern-
ment system has performed its functions, or, how far the
specific aims and objectives of leaders who set the
objectives of local government, were relevant at a par-
ticular time to our list of criteria.

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1 W.H. Wickwar, *The Political Theory of Local Government*

2 W.J.M. Mackenzie, *op. cit.* L.J. Sharpe, "Theories of
   Local Government" in L. Feldman and M. Goldrick, *Politics
   395-405 and W.H. Wickwar, *op.cit.*
THE USE OF NORMATIVE CRITERIA
IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

One avenue for comparative study that has been open to social scientists in the past, has been the setting up of normative criteria that can be employed in varying circumstances. In the social sciences, it appears that progress can be made through the formulation and application and refinement of such normative criteria. In the more mature sciences, grand theories such as the laws of physics and chemistry exist. In the social sciences, we lack such grand laws. As such, social scientists have to avoid

... dwelling upon illustrations drawn from the more mature sciences—such as physics and biology... because their very maturity permits these disciplines to deal fruitfully with abstractions of a high order to a degree, which it is submitted, is not yet the case... with the social sciences. Thus if avenues such as the application of normative criteria are not taken advantage of, progress might be limited to particular case studies,

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the old area-by-area studies, possessing little or no capacity of being applied generally or cross-nationally. This was the situation that Maurice Duverger was observing when he commented that,

> in the last fifty years, the social sciences have made big advances in the field of specialist research ... but there has not been the same development in theory.

He went on to comment that,

> At the present time, this inertia of general theory constitutes the principal obstacle to the development of the social sciences. It holds back research or makes it sterile because of the lack of suitable organizing principles.

Some of what Duverger refers to as specialist research is apparently what has been referred to by other political scientists as national (area) studies. What he refers to as the inertia of general theory, this work interprets as the scarcity of theoretical frameworks or normative criteria. There are in the discipline innumerable examples of in-depth, well-researched political studies of a particular country or a part of it, or some institutions within it. Such studies, as has been observed, rarely attempt to make generalizations that

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can be applied across nations. The point is not that there is no place for such studies in the discipline. Rather, it is simply that such localized, descriptive studies do not directly encourage the development of a general knowledge that can be applied to differing situations.

This study takes a functional approach to the construction of the normative criteria. Such an approach consists basically of an attempt to understand social phenomena in terms of their relationship to, or within, some system. It attempts to assess the part played by an observed pattern of behaviour in the maintenance of some larger system in which it is included.\(^1\) In trying to construct a list of criteria for local government, this study therefore examines what functions local government should perform as a subsystem, within the national polity.

It is also clearly admitted that the list of criteria developed here has a western bias, inasmuch as it employs concepts that, up till now, have been

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traditionally identified with western democratic nations. The concepts of democracy, participation, service, efficiency and effectiveness, are, however, not exclusively western. They are world-wide ideals. They are African as they are western. The Tanzanian President, Dr. Julius Nyerere, made this point very forcefully when he reminded his audience that:

Democracy is often spoken of as if it were something alien to the African which he must be taught. Quite well-meaning people will ask, "Can democracy survive in an independent Africa?" ... During the early stages of our struggle to free this continent from colonial rule, the question asked by our critics was, "Can these Africans govern themselves?" That question is no longer asked, for it is too obviously absurd.... But this question they are now asking is no less absurd than the earlier one--for democracy in its true sense, is as familiar to the African as the tropical sun.1

The same is true of the concept of participation, and of efficient and effective service. To employ these concepts or others that might subsume them in a list of criteria to be applied to a developing area, is hence not an attempt, by any means, to impose foreign ideals or norms.

It is important to note also that the study employs the list of criteria to evaluate the aims and objectives of local government in a part of Nigeria, a developing nation. In other words, the study has a very special interest in the developing areas. The author believes that in the developing nations, far more than in the developed nations of the world, the social sciences need to produce a body of general propositions applicable to the process of social and political engineering. In these countries, scholars cannot afford to engage in research merely as an academic exercise. They will have to go further by becoming more directly involved in the policy-making process, in other words, by combining academic analysis with prescription. Otherwise, policymakers will be forced to make critical decisions without the help of the social scientists, decisions that will be based in many cases on mere intuition, or in some cases on inappropriate models that officials have seen or observed on an arranged tour of Washington, Ottawa, London or elsewhere.

In developed countries, there normally exist a cadre of social scientists and institutions, not necessarily attached to universities, which government
can draw upon for policy background material and policy advice. (For example, there is the Economic Council in Canada, the Brookings Institution in the United States, and many others.) These institutions and personnel do not exist in most developing countries. Hence there is something of a moral obligation, for an upcoming social scientist from a developing area, to deal with real-world issues. Non-applied research in a developing nation, as John Paden discovered, is regarded as a luxury.¹

It is clear from this that we cannot remain content with the status quo as Mackenzie and Whitaker have described it. We must be bold enough to take a plunge into the dark in an attempt to deduce what local government ought, theoretically, to be doing. And it appears that using the existing literature, and from our present knowledge of what local government does in some developed and some developing nations, as well, we can arrive at this theoretical list of criteria of what local government ought to be doing.

WHAT IS LOCAL GOVERNMENT?

In order to be reasonably certain of what our central concern in this thesis is about, a definition becomes essential. We will therefore begin by defining local government. The United Nations office for public administration defines local government as

... a political subdivision of a nation, or (in a federal system) state, which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs, including the powers to impose taxes or to exact labour for prescribed purposes. The governing body of such an entity is elected or otherwise locally selected.

This definition has been found acceptable to many scholars. Both the Cambridge Conference on Local Government in Africa (1961), and the United Nations meeting on Administrative Aspects of Decentralization, held at The Hague, also in 1961, considered and adopted the definition.

Hugh Whalen, in a later definition, noted that

... each unit of local government in any system is assumed to possess the following characteristics: a given territory and population, an institutional structure for legislative, executive and administrative purposes, a separate legal identity.

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a range of power and function authorized by delegation from the appropriate central or intermediate legislature, and lastly, within the ambit of such delegation, autonomy--subject always, at least in Anglo-American tradition, to the limitations of common law such as the test of reasonableness.¹

To avoid any confusion, it is necessary to make a distinction between local government as it is generally used and local self-government as it is used here. Whilst Whalen's definition might be acceptable for local government, an essential element is missing when it is considered as a working definition for local self-government. This is the element of election, or local selection. The United Nations definition, on the other hand, presupposes the existence of a given territory and population, as well as an administrative and executive structure. Local self-government, then, cannot include rule by local notables, by traditional or hereditary rulers, elite, etc., as a matter of right. Neither is local self-government reconcilable with the running of local affairs by local men nominated for the purpose by the central government. The participation of the local population in the selection of representatives, whether by election

¹ H. Whalen, "Ideology, Democracy and the Foundation of Local Self-Government", in Feldman and Goldrick, op.cit., p. 312.
or in some other way, this study regards as a fundamental characteristic of local government.

It is also necessary to state that the source of the powers of local government, anywhere, always derive from the central government. In a unitary political system, as in Britain, that central government is easily identified. Physically, it situates in the capital. In a federal system of government, as in Canada, United States and Nigeria, the powers of local government derive, not from the government in the national capitals, but from the provincial and state governments in each case. Generally, the powers of a local government are contained in the statute of the particular central government that sets it up. It operates within the legal limits of the statute. If it acts outside the limits of the statute, it acts outside its powers, and its actions, in such a case, are regarded as "ultra vires", i.e., outside the law. If it acts within its legal limits, its actions are legal and can only be challenged in a court or overruled by a retroactive legislation of the central government that set up the local government.¹

In this study, the performance of local government will be seen to be affected by the different approaches of the central government to local government in all three eras. During the colonial era, as well as in the present military era, decision-making authority was not transferred by the central government to local government. Central government, rather, kept its own officials in the local areas to superintend and in fact decide and implement what the central government desired. This type of approach by the central government towards local government we regard as devolution of authority. In contrast, during the self-governing era (1950 to 1965), decision-making power was, within their legal guidelines, left to the local councils. Central government officials were, to a far greater extent than in the other two eras, advisers to local government. This approach we regard here as decentralization of authority. In Chapter Four, below, these administrative terms will be further explained and illustrated.

**WHY LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT?**

A good number of scholars of political science and public administration have attempted to justify the need for local self-government. Stated briefly, the
The principal justifications given for local self-government can be summed up as follows.¹ There is first a presumed superior capacity of local people to understand and conduct their own local affairs. People in a local community presumably know their locality very well, and are apt to understand its needs far better than others from a distance. In other words, they are thought to be more able to secure a closer adaptation of public services to local needs than can officials looking at the locality from afar. This is because each locality has its own economic, social and physical advantages and disadvantages, its own historical tradition and stage of social and economic evolution, its own way of life and its own customs, beliefs and orientations within the larger context of the national culture.

Quite apart from this, people are assumed to be resistant, or, at least, not very sympathetic, to impositions from above. On the other hand, it is argued

¹ L. Feldman and M. Goldrick, op. cit., Part Eight, especially pp.311-348.
that the same people will tend to defend with a sense of conviction and commitment what they, by themselves, have decided upon. There is also the idea that local government stands

. . . as a hedge against undue centralization which might become dangerous to liberty or bury the state under the load of an excessive amount of business. This idea of alleviating the excessive amount of business in the centre, the idea of de-congesting the national government, is a most practical one. At an age when the functions of government seem to be expanding, and when government is continually being pressed to regulate more and more of human life and behaviour, and when the welfare state is becoming more and more universal in concept, it seems impractical to concentrate all functions in the hands of one government, be it central, intermediate or local. . . .

Apart from the practical expediency that local self-government stands as a hedge against undue centralization, it is also presumed to uphold personal liberty. It is, as L.J. Sharpe says, "the seedbed of democracy in that it holds out against the depredation of majoritarian tyranny and provides a chance of local political pressure upon the central government." Other advantages of local

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self-government are that local groups can more easily venture new undertakings, and local mistakes are less risky and more easily corrected in the light of experience.

A further justification of local self-government is that it can be an instrument of political education. Often it is said to provide a school of citizenship, or, even more generally, a means of socializing those who participate. Bryan Keith-Lucas, for example, justifies local self-government "... not so much for its own sake as for its value in educating people who would in due course take over political responsibility for the government of their countries."¹ This was the concept of Jeremy Bentham and also Harold Laski, who saw local government as a sub-legislature or a nursery for the supreme (i.e., national) legislature. This is not the place to enter into the debate over whether or not local government experience equips a person for central or national parliamentary success, nor is it the place to contest Laski's belief that "... if members were required ... to serve three years on a local body, they would gain the feel of institution ... necessary

to success."¹ Laski was referring to members of Parliament. What is important at this stage is not to renew the debate on these views, but to realize that such beliefs exist and are used to uphold and justify the existence of local self-government.

The argument with respect to the general population is that local self-government constitutes a valuable opportunity for the political education and political socialization of citizens. This it does by creating opportunities for local political activities and participation, e.g., voting in the local party organization, making financial contributions, giving assistance in campaigns, and other means of support, including standing as a candidate for local election. In these ways, it socializes the citizen in relation to his community whilst it improves his political education.

On these bases, local government would appear to justify its existence within the national polity. Historically, Alexis de Tocqueville saw a great benefit in the local and provincial independence which existed both in England and America in 1835, and he placed the advantages

¹ Quoted in B. Smith, "The Justification of Local Government" in Feldman and Goldrick, op. cit., p.335.
of local institutions in the foremost position as contributory to the power, wealth and prosperity of these nations. John Stuart Mill asserted a quarter of a century later that, "... it is but a small portion of the public business of a country which can be done or safely attempted by the central authorities."¹ James Bryce, writing about democracy and liberty after World War I, stated that, "... the best guarantee for their success is the practice of local self-government."² These historical impressions and testimonies by themselves afford some justification for local government. But the real justification of local government must be seen to transcend such historical arguments and impressions. It is a political subsystem within a national system, which over the years has continued, through its support of the larger system, and through the services it provides and the opportunities it offers for political education, to justify its position within that larger political system. This concept of local government as a subsystem performing functions within a larger system will be developed more fully in this study.

¹ J.E. Belmont, op. cit., pp. 36-43
² Ibid.
Lest the following sections of the study should appear tautological or repetitive, it is important to note at this point that some of the arguments cited for the justification of the existence of local government must again be taken up in discussing the views of the various schools of thought about the functions of local government, and finally, in the listing of the criteria at the end of this chapter.

THE DEMOCRATIC-PARTICIPATORY SCHOOL

A number of schools of thought have arisen in considering what functions local government should perform within a polity. Two schools have been most prominent in their advocacy, each holding that its view was the more important or more acceptable one.

What we shall call the Democratic-Participatory school, holds that local government functions to bring about democracy, and to afford opportunities for political participation to the citizen, as well as to educate and socialize him politically. Central to this school of thought is the concept of democracy. Democracy is a difficult political concept that has been variously
defined. For the purpose of this school of thought, democracy is a way of life, that ". . . demands that one another's point of view and one another's interests be mutually appreciated."\(^1\) It is a concept that assumes fair play, tolerance and respect for the rights of others (even when those others are in a minority), a concept that accepts these to be intrinsically undeniable values.

This approach does not define democracy in terms of its external characteristics, such as regular elections, adult suffrage, the right of every citizen of age to participate, and majority decisions.\(^2\) All these are important aspects of democracy, but the concept stressed here is the ethical one.

Local politics, like all other politics, of course, deals with conflict and conflict resolution. Hence, at this grass-roots level, citizens are called upon and learn to make choices, to tolerate the views of minorities, and to respect others' opinions, be they in favour of or against their own. This function of local

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\(^1\) K. Panter-Brick, "Local Government and Democracy", in Feldman and Goldrick, \textit{op. cit.}, p.347.

government, this school of thought holds to be most important.

From another perspective, local government, it is contended, nurtures the citizen by engaging him in political education and political participation. Studies that have been done of prior service on local councils by members of Parliament, tend to support the contention that local councils are a good recruiting ground for upper levels of government and hence a source for greater participation. Keith-Lucas, in an English study, concluded that the number of British members of Parliament who had served on local authorities showed the importance of local government as a recruiting ground for the British Parliament. David Butler also found that in the British general elections of 1964, fifty-three per cent of Labour members of Parliament, and forty-five per cent of the defeated Labour candidates, as well as twenty-nine per cent of Conservative members, and forty per cent of the defeated Conservative candidates had been local authority councillors.1 William Mackenzie has also produced statistics showing

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1 Figures are cited by Brian Smith, in L. Feldman and M. Goldrick, op. cit., p.336.
that this is in no way a peculiar British phenomenon and that the trend proves local government's importance as a nursery for Parliament, i.e., its importance in drawing citizens into political participation at the higher level. In Italy, for example, Mackenzie found as follows:

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TABLE I

EXPERIENCE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT IN 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEMBERS</th>
<th>TOTAL GIVING INFORMATION</th>
<th>LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>REGIONAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPUTIES</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENATORS</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```


For the sake of this analysis, Mackenzie regarded experience in regional and provincial assemblies to be local government experiences. Ignoring these for the sake of argument, and considering only "communal" experience, about fifty per cent of Deputies and about the same percentage of Senators had had local government experience in the Italian Parliament.

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Mackenzie's findings with Belgium were as follows:

**TABLE II**

**PARTICIPATION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE BELGIAN PARLIAMENT IN 1950**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEMBERS</th>
<th>TOTAL MEMBERSHIP</th>
<th>BOURGMESTRESS</th>
<th>ECHEVINS</th>
<th>COUNCILLORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REPRESENTATIVES</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENATORS</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Ignoring the Bourgmestreess and Echevins, representatives who had had local government experience amounted to over fifty-five per cent, though the percentage of Senators was considerably less.

France provides another good example. There the common course for the successful deputy is to serve his political apprenticeship at his local council as mayor.¹

In Canada also, examples abound of central and provincial parliamentarians whose political education began at the local level. All these do not necessarily prove very convincingly that local government always provides a training ground for higher levels of government. What is demonstrated is that a tendency exists in many countries for local government elected offices to serve as a training ground for the higher levels of government.

Further, the role of local government as a political educator of the citizen in bringing him close to public affairs is to be appreciated in the opportunities it creates for political activity and interaction. In this respect, one need not be alarmed by the low turn-out for local government elections that appears to be so common in many countries. The political training lies more in the activity than in the electoral process. Such political activities as elections to council, election or selection to the council's committees and boards, decision-making and legislation, pressure group and interest group

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1 An exception to the low turn-out in local government elections can be observed in France. In Britain, United States, Canada and a good number of the developing nations, this low turn-out is apparent. On the high turn-out in France, see F. Ridley and J. Blondel, Public Administration in France (London, 1969), pp. 85-122.
activities, and public debates, all are inherent in local government. Hence, it is contributory to political participation and political education, and can be viewed as a buttress of democracy.

THE EFFICIENCY-SERVICE SCHOOL

There are many scholars who do not see any relationship between local government and democracy and who downgrade the former's participatory role. Georges Langrod rhetorically put the question thus, "Is there really, as is often argued, a relation of cause and effect between democracy ... and local government?" To Langrod, democracy does not necessarily come into being where local government appears, nor is it necessarily absent when local government disappears.\textsuperscript{1} Langrod, typical of this school, holds that democracy is, in fact, diametrically opposed to local government because of what he terms the incompatibility of democratic principles with the practice of decentralization. Langrod's concept of democracy is more collectivist and based somewhat on Rousseau's "general will", a concept that makes personal liberty and tolerance,\textsuperscript{1}

and respect of minority views, difficult for him to appreciate as ideals of local government.¹

To Langrod, as well as to Leo Moulin,² and others of what we shall call the "efficiency-service school", the essential function of local government is not to bring about democracy, nor is it to provide a base for political participation and political education. "Local government exists to provide services, and it must be judged . . . by its success in providing services up to a standard measured by a national inspectorate. . . ."³ The point, it is argued, is that local government, because of its closeness to an area, can provide certain services far more efficiently than can the central government. These services, when allotted to it, are its main functions. On the efficient performance of these functions, it must stand or fall, since, as Mackenzie reminds us, "local authorities are subordinate, not ultimate or primary."⁴

¹ Ibid., pp.25-35.
⁴ Ibid., p.14.
Hence to mention support for democracy and/or political participation and political education as the major functions of local government is (to this school) to miss the point.

L.J. Sharpe, in this regard, restressed the views of J.S. Mill, who provided a very strong case for local government on the grounds that it was the most efficient agent for providing those services that are essentially local.\footnote{L.J. Sharpe, \textit{op. cit.}, p.355.} Sharpe is, in fact, of the view that if local government did not exist, something else would have had to be created in its place. This it would appear could not simply be a decentralized branch of the national government. He sees that it is possible for central departments to organize field agencies by staffs resident in the locality, but such agencies cannot have among them the coordination that local government would have, since they would be responsible to different central departments. Such an arrangement could again impair efficiency. Hence, in order to effectively carry out really local duties and to achieve the maximum efficiency (the best of services), local government is necessary.
The efficiency-service school also does not fully agree with the participatory functions stressed by the democratic-participatory school. Langrod admits that "local government can play a very important part in the work of the democratic education of the people", but, in fact, he believes that within local government "... though the citizen acquires ... a more or less profound knowledge of local affairs ... what he learns can be reduced to the strategy of small town politics." This, he argues, soon becomes in him "a keen defence of sectional and piecemeal interests, with a permanent struggle against the centre."¹ In other words, the participatory aspect is here perceived only as potentially advantageous and ultimately dysfunctional to the total system.

It can be seen that these two schools of thought, which have pervaded local government theory in western democracies, hold views that in certain ways contradict each other. In some aspects the differences between them have been mild. In practice, however, the concepts and ideas of both schools have been integrated and used in most western democratic countries.

¹ G. Langrod, op. cit., p.34.
HAVE THE IDEAS OF THE TWO SCHOOLS BEEN APPLIED ONLY TO WESTERN DEMOCRACIES?

This brief examination of the literature might give the impression that the two schools have concerned themselves only with local government in developed western democracies. After all, from Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill to James Bryce and to contemporary theorists such as James Sharpe and William Mackenzie and Hugh Whalen, the emphasis has been on Western Europe and North America. Even among these theorists from western democratic nations, a fairly distinct dividing line can be drawn. The Anglo-Americans tend to be the chief advocates of the democratic-participatory concept, whilst the western Europeans, with a stress on the German theorists (from Rudolf Von Gneist to Georges Langrod), stress the efficiency-services approach.

It is no surprise then that both viewpoints have had their major advocates in western democratic nations and have been, perhaps, better known in these countries. Nevertheless, their consideration, as well as their application, have not been limited to western democratic nations. They have extended to the developing countries. An illustration from the local government of West Africa will make
the point. In this region, there are fourteen countries, which fall into four English-speaking and ten French-speaking nations (excluding Liberia, for the moment). Local government in the English-speaking areas, inheriting the tradition of Britain, which was formerly responsible for the political evolution of these countries, followed a basically British model. After achieving political independence, local councillors were usually elected to take charge of local government affairs, suffering little interference from the central government. In the French-speaking areas, a central government official, in the tradition of the French prefect, had full control over local government and saw to it that affairs at the local level were run as efficiently as possible. If it were considered in the interests of efficiency, his views superseded those of council. Moreover, he was directly responsible to the central government. Thus, in the latter areas, we see elements of the views of the efficiency-services school in practice, whilst in the former we see the ideas of the democratic-participatory school at work.¹

These, of course, are models. They are a drastic simplification of the complex reality of local government in English and French-speaking West Africa. It is not suggested here that English-speaking West Africa adheres completely to one school to the exclusion of the other, or that the African French-speaking countries believe in and practise the one and not the other. In fact, Ronald Wraith, far less of a theorist than any of the scholars mentioned above, but with a wealth of practical experience in Nigeria's local government, argues on the side of the efficiency-services school in his study of English-speaking West Africa.¹

The simple point made here is that the theory and practice of the two schools do not apply only to countries of Western Europe and North America. This study will now consider what other theoretical values have been propounded for local government, especially in relation to the developing countries.

¹ R. Wraith, op. cit., pp.41-53.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR DEVELOPING NATIONS:
A FUNCTION IN NATION BUILDING

Whilst both the democratic-participatory and the efficiency-services schools have had their adherents in developing nations, local government has been found to mean more to these societies than either approach has advocated.

Emil Sady, who to date is Chief of the local government section of the division for public administration at the United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs, has suggested that local government can play a prominent part in the process of national development by:

a. Decongesting government at the centre, thereby freeing national leaders from onerous details and unnecessary involvement in local issues;

b. Increasing people's understanding and support of social and economic development;

c. Making programs to foster social and economic betterment at the local level more realistic and lasting;

d. Training people in the art of self-government;

e. Strengthening national unity.¹

Some of Sady's suggestions have already been discussed under the two schools above (a and d, for example). The importance of the others to developing nations must now be considered.

One of the major problems of the developing nations of the world is to achieve a reasonable level of political integration in societies that are culturally plural, and in some cases culturally diffuse.¹ Local sentiments and attachments are usually very strong and oftentimes stronger than the national ones. In other cases, a national sense is just emerging, and has to be built up and sustained. Problems in such developing nations, thus, tend to be more urgent or at least more apparent, at the national level than at the local level. This, of course, does not deny the fact that local problems and peculiarities exist to which the local people must find their own answers. It does not mean, as Fred Burke seems to suggest, that "the problems in the new African countries are . . . national . . . not local."² We must recognize that, in these countries, problems exist at both levels, though

¹ A substantial literature exists in this area. A good example is C. Ake, A Theory of Political Integration (Homewood, Illinois, 1967), Ch. 1 and 2.

we must agree, as well, that more emphasis must continually be put on national problems, till these countries achieve a reasonable level of national integration. A solution might lie in having the locality play a part in solving national problems whilst it solves its own problems as well.

It can be argued then that not only in developed nations, but even more so in the developing ones, local government can help to reduce congestion at the centre, it can help to avoid excessive centralization and thus bring the government nearer to the people—becoming, thereby, a foundation of faith in popular government and an "instrument through which the attachment of the people to the nation as a whole can be strengthened."\(^1\) Whilst promoting national interests in this way, it will also be serving its particular locality. This, as will be shown below, is partly how local government has been employed in the western democracies, for example, in Britain, Canada and the United States. Such a practice appears to have contributed to the stability and general output of these systems. Such can also be the case in developing areas.

\(^1\) C. Jha, "Local Government in Developing Nations", in J.E. Belmont, op. cit., p. 66.
It can also be argued that, in developing countries, local government will be most effective in programs that aim at constructing the infrastructure necessary for an improved standard of living—a clean water system, public latrines, public transportation, schools, dispensaries, town halls, community centres, recreation grounds, feeder roads. All these figured prominently, for example, in Atatürk's village development programs in Turkey. This program, for example, trained teachers for the villages and localities in institutes set up by the national government in rural areas of Turkey, and other assistants (in health, agriculture, family planning, community development, transportation, etc.) at other centres. The products of these institutes were then put at the disposal of local government as leaders in their various fields.

In developing nations where the infrastructure is just beginning to be built, the problem of building it rapidly and at low cost is perhaps more important than in the developed nations. In the latter, social and economic development generally exist at a high level.

and the funds for further development are relatively available. It is, of course, another problem to try to investigate whether or not, and how well, local government contributed to development in such countries.

Further, it has also been argued that if local government is well led, it is in a better position than most other agencies—the central government, political parties, etc.—to stimulate initiative, drive and experimentation.\(^1\) It can concentrate on available local skills and make experts of these, and it can learn from its own mistakes whilst it encourages the local people to contribute their quota. In this way, it contributes to national development and provides the machinery for discussion of local needs and for the provision of local services. The example of metropolitan Winnipeg, Manitoba, attests to this. There the community committees, headed by the local councillors, help to involve the people by sounding their opinions in many issues, and thereby contribute a great deal of input into the system.\(^2\)


It is also argued that local government can play another role in nation building. In this regard, even the source of supposed inherent dysfunction (tendency to overemphasize local interest at the expense of national interest), about which some scholars have expressed concern, can become functional. Local government can provide an avenue for the outlet of parochial and local feelings. The build-up of such feelings, without such a safety-valve, can mean a build-up of tension that might cause the entire political system to break up. Intermittent expression of pent-up feeling, a system of "letting off steam", might prove to be in the interest of not only the subsystem, but the entire system. In this way it can strengthen national unity. As Samuel Humes put it, "... it serves to reduce rather than accentuate sectional tension." There is also the point that it can offer the younger element leadership positions which the central government cannot offer, and in which youths can use their training. In sum, such reasonable arguments can be made to suggest that local government


2 Ibid., p. 22.
in developing countries has an important place in the role of nation building. But it has a role in other areas as well. We will now consider some of these.

A ROLE IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REGIONAL COOPERATION

One of the lessons that has been learned from the study of developing areas in recent years is that socio-economic development cannot easily and profitably be imposed from above. Development—economic, political or social—cannot, it appears, be fully achieved simply through small or large doses of foreign aid in whatever form. Development must come from within, by the will and desire of the people. The people by themselves must recognize the need to improve their socio-economic and political conditions. They must also accept that such development means more work, more self-confidence and a personal desire to improve existing conditions. In this process local government appears to be in a good position to make a substantial contribution. It can act as a bridge or broker between the citizens and the national government, which to many villagers is often distant, anonymous, or even alien. Thus it is in the local communities that one might begin to seek a fresh approach
to social, political and economic development. The tenacity of the people, the type of leadership they possess or can find at local level, how their resources are harnessed and guided—all these must affect their development. And in all these, it is suggested, local government has its own contributions to make, as a sub-system within the total system.

Local government, we might also say, can speed up the process of social and economic development as well as promote area or regional cooperation. It has been suggested, for example, that it could this by:

a. Its promotion of agricultural development;

b. Its deliberate transformation of certain local communities into growth poles;

c. Its organization of active participation of the community through setting up small projects;

d. The creation and improvement of social services and amenities (health, education, housing).\(^1\)

The fact is that the economy of most developing areas depends on agriculture for its subsistence. Home consumed goods are mainly from local agriculture, whilst the source of wealth, for many, lies in the export cash

\(^1\) IULA, *op. cit.*, p.35.
crops like cocoa, palm produce and rubber. \(^1\) Thus, local
government would be assisting economic development by
promoting agriculture. Further, masses of the people
in developing areas live in small communities where small
projects are more ideal than the big industrial projects
(financial limitations apart for the time being). By
setting up such small labour-intensive projects, local
government ensures economic involvement, participation
and development. There is the fact, too, that in the
developing areas, people look towards improvement in
education, health, good housing and other social amenities,
as essentials to an improved standard in a modernizing
world. Projects such as these, if done at the local
level, are apt to have more influence on the orientation,
views and outlooks of the people and, thus, make for
more rapid social progress. It may be true that this
expectation has not always been fulfilled in some of the
empirical studies available. Studies in East Africa,
especially on village projects in Tanzania, appear to

\(^1\) The Economic Commission for Africa found in 1969 that
90% of the continent's population depended on agriculture,
whilst agriculture accounted for 99% of Ethiopia's
exports, 98.8% of Malawi's and 95.8% of Somalia's.
raise questions about the fulfillment of these hopes, whilst those in Venezuela have supported this contention. In the Venezuela case, following the Act of Bogota (1960), between the United States and eighteen members of the Organisation of American States (all except Cuba and Dominican Republic), agreement was reached on establishing a special fund for inter-American social development. It was to involve "the encouragement of agrarian education . . . and the raising of the productivity of Latin American agriculture." Noting that over half the 200 million people in Latin America got their livelihood from the soil, it was agreed to give a great deal of attention to agricultural techniques and allied things. Thus the problems of the individual small farmer, the problems of housing loans, eradication of illiteracy and other such problem areas were left to local government. The result was a considerable increase in the availability of these amenities in Venezuela.


3 Ibid., pp. 50-56.

4 F. Fitch, op. cit.
If then the development process involves the improvement of skills, improvement of ways of living, the introduction of new and better techniques of production, it appears that local government might indeed become a major agent of change by becoming more involved in these activities in the developing world.

The various schools of thought having been discussed, we must now attempt to put together our list of criteria of what local government should be doing.

FUNCTIONAL CRITERIA OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

This study has so far laboured under a number of more or less implicit assumptions. A major assumption is that it is desirable and possible to formulate a list of criteria of what local government ought to be doing based on a functional approach, i.e., an approach that attempts to identify what functions local government as a subsystem performs in maintaining the larger political system. The fact is that whatever political system is examined—be it totalitarian or authoritarian, liberal or democratic, developed or developing—local government seems to be a feature in its functioning. In all cases,
it is valued as one of the contributory elements to the maintenance of the system as a whole.

This study, as has been mentioned earlier, is concerned with local government in a developing area. In the developing nations, more than elsewhere, what seems to be required is an effective agency for fostering political and social, as well as economic, progress. In these countries, it is the performance of functions designed to promote this progress that is crucial.¹ How does local government help to contribute to the administration of development? It might do this by contributing to political development—to participation, political education and political socialization of the people, to the ideals of freedom and liberty and to stability and integration. Also, it could do this by contributing to social development— influencing the orientation of the people about work, leisure, self-esteem, self-confidence and their hopes for the future. It might also do it by contributing to economic development, to a better standard of living.

¹ F. Burke, Local Government in Uganda (Syracuse, 1964), pp. 36-38.
Hence, a functional approach which assesses the efficiency (i.e., total output in terms of input) and effectiveness (i.e., achievement or non-achievement of objectives) of local government as a tool to aid the development process--social, economic and political--seems to be most appropriate to developing nations.

Our list of criteria sets up local government functions into two major categories. These we have termed the "General" and the "Developmental". Under the "General" category, and summing up the several objectives arising from our previous discussion, local government is needed to promote:

1. Democratic ideals
2. Political participation
3. Protective services
4. Infrastructural services.

Under the "Developmental" category, our study propounds the following objectives (i.e., that local government is desirable in order to foster):

i) National integration

ii) Social and economic development

iii) Manpower resource development (through education).
With reference to No. 1 above—the promotion of democratic ideals—the problem does not appear to be, as Langrod views it, whether there exists a cause and effect relationship between democracy and local government; rather, it is the contention of this study that local government can be contributory to and should encourage the growth of democratic ideals. As for No. 2, we must disagree with those who argue that political participation of the citizen is relatively unimportant as a function of local government. It is true that in most countries, polling turn-outs at local government elections are usually far lower than in central government contests. Yet the fact remains that local government does provide additional avenues for citizen participation, such as affording the opportunity to serve in council or on council committees and thereby to partake of local affair.

We have seen that writers basing their approach on democratic ideals have taken for granted that local self-government is, or should be, the training ground for the citizen's tolerance of, and consideration for, other views and opinions. Local self-government also
affords the opportunity for many more citizens to take part in the government process. Thus it enhances equality when it affords individuals of age to exercise the vote. It also enhances liberty in making for freedom of speech and freedom of action at local elections.

The concept of political participation, as used here, contains the idea that local government provides avenues for training of, and in fact is a training ground for, the elite. It trains them for functions on the national scene, whilst it provides the ordinary citizen avenues for self-expression and interaction, as well as avenues for redress of grievances. It also acquaints him with his political responsibilities, such as the need to cast his vote at elections, and to help to support and maintain political parties, interest and pressure groups and other associations with political motives.

The protective and infrastructural service functions to which reference is made above, include the functions most effectively performed entirely, or at least mainly, at the local level. They include services such as: police, fire-fighting, night-watchmen and patrols, beach patrols and forest guards, health, water supply,
sewerage, street care, garbage collection, public transit, etc. In other words, under our "General" objectives both the democratic-participatory school and the efficiency-service school are taken to be supplementary rather than contradictory, in the functions they see local government performing. Under this category, the views of the two schools have been integrated. These "General" functions, as the title suggests, are regarded as applicable universally. Another point should be made clear: in the past, the democratic-participatory school tended to over-stress the "democratic" functions of local government and assumed its service functions to be unimportant to local government, or even to be better performed by, and so better in the hands of, the central government. A redress of that balance is overdue. Both must be regarded as vital, as worthy of being included in any list that tries to set out what local government should be engaged in.

The "Developmental" functions of local government include promoting national integration. As suggested earlier, local government can do this by decongesting the national government, providing for expression of local interests, local views and local peculiarities,
and fostering voluntary cooperation with neighbouring localities in one another's interests and also in the interests of the larger political system.

Social and economic development may include the provision of sanitary facilities—latrines, clean water, incinerators—, concern about attitude to work, to leisure, to study, and to wealth and the acquisition of property. It can include the provision of factories, whether labour-intensive or capital-intensive, interest in the establishment of big or medium-size or small-size business and the provision of local and indigenous industrial enterprises. It will also include agricultural and community development.

Education, the main source of manpower resource development, remains most important to most of the developing nations.

Manpower resource development thus refers to the level and rate of growth of education—be it primary or secondary, public enlightenment or adult education, in-service training or on-the-job training, continuing advanced education or extra-mural education and the provision of mobile or permanent libraries.
It should be clear that it is not the view of this study that local government has to keep all the "General" and "Developmental" functions, listed above, exclusively to itself. Our contention is that, as a subsystem playing its part within a political system, local government has to make its contribution in these areas. The extent to which it does this will depend on the local situation as well as the interaction, relationship or negotiation with the central government. Where, however, a function, for example, agriculture, is concentrated absolutely in the hands of the central government, it is our contention that local government will be inhibited from effective functioning. There will, of course, be functions like local street care, garbage removal, etc., that should be exclusively local government's. There will also be others, like foreign affairs and defense, that, for security and other reasons, have to remain exclusively in the hands of the central government. Apart from such exceptional areas, local government has an important part to play in the other areas in bringing about improvements in living standards, better services, democracy and participation.
Further, the two basic divisions in this list of criteria need further elaboration. A convenient parallel to the division into the "General" and the "Developmental" categories is Gabriel Almond's functional theory of comparative politics, to which this study, it must be acknowledged at this stage, owes a lot of inspiration. In this work, Gabriel Almond put his functional theory under two major categories--Inputs and Outputs. He derived his functional categories from Western political systems in which structural specificity and functional differentiation had taken place. Like his, this study has also derived its general functions partly from the local government systems of Western nations where the General functions are performed by local government. It has also derived the Developmental category partly from the local government systems of developing areas where the developmental functions are being performed. Almond, in addition, confirms that his Input functions are more applicable than the Output functions to developing (non-Western) nations. This is because the output functions--rule making, rule application and rule adjudication--may not be functionally differentiated in some developing countries. Our criteria also suggest, like Almond's,

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1 G. Almond and J. Coleman, *op. cit.*, Ch. 1, pp.16-17.
that our general category may be more applicable to
developed Western nations than the Developmental
category. This is because most of the developed Western
nations have reached a high level of political and
economic development and do not have to concern them-
selves very much with these problems, at least not as
much as the developing nations have to do.

One might legitimately wonder how the particular
objectives on our list have been selected for building
up the criteria. Political participation and democratic
ideals, as seen above, have been borrowed from the
democratic-participatory school and integrated into the
list. The protective and infrastructural objectives have
been the products of comparative observation. An examina-
tion of the functions and services local government has
performed in several developed democratic countries
revealed a number of common elements. Britain, France,
United States and Canada were taken as examples of
developed Western nations and their local government
systems examined. It was found that in these countries
police and fire protection are functions or services
that are provided mainly or entirely by local
government. Though in all of them the central government has some police force of its own, local police forces have helped local government in its role of preserving law and order. Peace, as well as law and order, are presumably desirable in every community of every country developed or developing. Hence is the need to emulate what goes on in these developed nations, and also the need to include protective services under the "General" functions.

A further examination of the services provided by local government in these four countries reveals that public transportation, water supply, sewerage, welfare, street care, garbage collection, public works and education (primary and secondary), are services usually provided by local government. This has helped, in these countries, to alleviate the problem of mass transit, especially in the urban areas, to provide hygienic drinking water, a clean environment, and necessary

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utilities as well as a desirable level of education. All countries presumably aspire to similarly improved conditions of living. Hence, those which we have referred to (in most cases) as infrastructural services, have also been included under the "General" functions as desirable for local government in general. (Education is put under the separate head of manpower resources because of its great importance in developing areas.)

The how and why of the "Developmental" functions have already been explained above—the special needs and problems of the developing nations, and the need for local government as an essential subsystem playing its part in the system maintenance. In other words, the contention is that local government has an essential part to play in promoting national integration in the developing countries. This it might do in the ways that have been suggested above and which we have seen in practice, for example, in Turkey. Local government also has an important role in promoting social, economic, manpower, agricultural and community development as discussed earlier. On the practical plane, an examina-


as India and Southern Nigeria, has revealed that considerable emphasis is placed on these functions.¹ This practical emphasis in these developing areas has strengthened our conviction that these particular factors should be included in our criteria of the main "Developmental" objectives, just as the practical emphasis in Britain, France, United States and Canada on our "General" category had strengthened our conviction to include those services under the "General" category.

It would appear, however, that the "Developmental" category, whilst more applicable to the developing areas, is also applicable to local government in developed nations. The problem of relevance to the developed nations is only a matter of degree, just as an assessment of these functions in some developing countries--Israel, Brazil, Nigeria and Lesotho, for example--must yield substantial differences. No doubt there are varying degrees of development within the developed nations, just as there are within the developing countries. Hence the Developmental category, like the General category, does offer us a measure for assessment, though

its relevance will vary with the stress that a nation places on political, social and economic development as desirable objectives.

In general, any study applying these criteria will have to establish which ones are likely to be most relevant and most profitable to it. In the social sciences such a choice will always be partly normative, based on personal subjective considerations, limitations, the availability of relevant materials and other factors. For example, in applying Almond's Input and Output functions, Lucian Pye, Myron Weiner, James Coleman, as well as Dankwart Rustow, were free to select the indices they regarded as most useful and most relevant in their contributions on the politics of Southeast Asia, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Near East respectively. This study will preserve a similar degree of flexibility. The choice of indices must be left to the discretion of the scholar and will depend on the area and circumstances of his study. Nevertheless, in considering this list of criteria, it will be necessary first to ask whether each of the ideals is within the legal powers of the local government. Where the power is held solely by the central government, the situation will be regarded,
as has been mentioned above, as one that inhibits an efficient functioning of local government. Where the power is granted to local government, an assessment or evaluation of how the power has been employed can then be made.

An examination of whether and how well a system of local government performs certain functions is not all that is required to assess its adequacy or to provide an answer to its problems. Although it may have the legal power to perform certain functions, it may not have the financial resources to do so. Thus a number of political scientists have argued that financial resources of governments must be distributed in such a way that local government can have a strong fiscal footing.¹ This, undoubtedly, is essential if the functions required of local government are to be carried out. Others have suggested the expansion of existing boundaries and the erection of larger local government areas, embracing a number of basic units. This new creation has been referred to as "Regional government". Our study includes this structural aspect in its concluding parts.

Meanwhile, to restate our intention very briefly, in Chapters Two, Three and Four, efforts will be made to extract the various aims and objectives of the respective elite (of each period) for local government. An assessment of how far these aims and objectives were achieved will be made, and factors responsible for non-achievement or deficient and inadequate performance, i.e., poor functioning, will be identified. It is, as has been indicated, the main theme of this thesis that among the factors that have contributed to the deficient performance, in all three periods covered by Chapters Two, Three and Four, has been the importation of foreign institutions. In these three chapters, efforts will be made to bring out the relationship between each importation and the deficiencies to which it contributed. These importations, it is our contention, continuously contributed in all three periods of this study, to the inability of local government to maximize the values and objectives that were set for it. We will now go on to examine the first of our three periods.
CHAPTER TWO

INDIRECT RULE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE NATIVE AUTHORITY SYSTEM

This chapter deals with local government in Kano emirate during the period 1900 to 1950. The necessity of dividing administrative or political history into epochs can be misleading. The division must be somewhat arbitrary and may even be inexact. The impression can also be given that the beginning and the end of each era are precise and definite, if not abrupt. In this chapter, the dates 1900 and 1950, selected as the dates opening and closing this period, which we can call the colonial era, have been selected for convenience. Indeed, British administration was not established in Kano emirate till 1903, though British overlordship over Northern Nigeria had been proclaimed by Sir Frederick Lugard by 1900.1

This chapter will not deal in any detail with the Fulani conquests of the Hausa states in Northern

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Nigeria, led by Othman Dan Fodio in the nineteenth century. It is not a recounting of the story of the British conquest of the Fulani overlords, 1894-1900, nor does it go into the trading activities of the Royal Niger Company in Northern Nigeria before its charter was revoked by the British crown and direct British administration established in 1900. These important and interesting aspects of the history of Northern Nigeria, especially as they concern Kano emirate, have been very ably covered in other studies.¹ Our major concern in this chapter is to examine with reference to this period what system of local government existed in Kano emirate, its functioning during this colonial period, its problems and achievements, and the causes of its shortcomings during this period.

THE SETTING OF THE EMIRATE

Kano emirate is one of the four emirates that comprise the modern Kano state of Northern Nigeria. The present-day Kano state was the former Kano province before the country was divided into twelve states in 1967.¹ (See Figure I.) The other three emirates are Kazaure, Gumel and Hadjia. An emirate is an administrative unit and recognises an Emir as its paramount, traditional ruler. Traditionally it usually has an emirate council as a form of legislative and administrative authority. Subordinate to the Emir and appointed by him are district heads and town and village heads. They also usually select some councillors to advise them.²

¹ The twelve states were created on May 27, 1967. See Decree No. 14 of May 27, 1967 in Federal Republic of Nigeria Gazette (extra-ordinary), No. 37, Vol. 57.

² C.S. Whitaker, op. cit., Ch. 5, passim.
FIGURE I

THE FEDERATION OF NIGERIA: SHOWING THE TWELVE STATES

BOUNDARY OF (FORMER) NORTHERN REGION WITH SOUTHERN NIGERIA
Kano emirate, as Figure II shows, constitutes about eighty-five per cent of the physical area of Kano state. According to the 1971 population estimate, it contained a population of 4.9 million out of a total population of 5.8 million for the entire state. It is a state with a relatively high density of population. Whereas the average density of population for Northern Nigeria in 1970 was about seventy persons per square mile, and that of Kano state was 346 per square mile, in metropolitan Kano (shown on map in Figure II), the density rises to some 580 persons per square mile.¹

Economically, Kano emirate produces many agricultural products. The principal crops grown are groundnuts, millet, cotton and cassava. Groundnut farming is very well established with the entire Kano state, producing more than half the total for former Northern Nigeria, which reputedly is the world's largest producer.² Metropolitan Kano has since the early 1950's developed a number of manufacturing industries. Economically the emirate can be said to be well off, especially in comparison with its Northern Nigerian neighbours.

¹ United Nigeria Calendar, 1970.
² The Fascinating Provinces of Northern Nigeria, (A monograph) (Kaduna, undated).
FIGURE II

KANO STATE: SHOWING THE FOUR EMIRATES

Note: Kano emirate is the shaded portion of the map.
Kano state is the only ethnically homogeneous state among the six states in former Northern Nigeria. Apart from the Southern Nigerian immigrants, foreign nationals and those from outside the state, who are mostly temporary residents, the state comprised 2,650,060 Hausa-Fulani, out of a total population of 2,882,414 (92%). It is interesting to compare Kano's homogeneity with the heterogeneous nature of the other five states. North Western state consists mainly of people of Fulani and Nupe ethnic origin, North Central of Hausa and Gwaris, North Eastern of Kanuri and Shina-Arabs, whilst Benue Plateau state consists of Tivs and Idomas and Kwara state consists of Yorubas and Igbirras and Igalas. Thus Kano state alone, of all Northern states, can boast of having a predominantly Hausa-Fulani population. This ethnic homogeneity advances the Hausa culture and language in Kano emirate and in the state as a whole. It also probably makes for high social integration within the state as well.

Ethnically, both Hausas and Fulanis now speak the Hausa language due to extensive intermarriage and


2 The information in this section was got through the Nigerian High Commission, Ottawa.
interaction which has taken place over the years.
Customs die hard however, and so there is still the
tendency to resent the Fulanis and to associate those
of pure Fulani origin with the conquests of the Hausa-
states. Nevertheless, the facts that both, by religious
conviction and practice, are Muslim, have, in modern
times, substantially bridged the ethnic differences
between them.  

KANO EMIRATE IN PRE-COLONIAL TIMES

The period before the establishment of British
authority is, quite surprisingly, within the living memory
of some aged citizens of the emirate. An elderly woman
who lived on a farm was interviewed intensively by a
social scientist some years ago. Asked of her memories
of the pre-British period, she repeatedly compared Fulani
rule in the emirate unfavourably with British rule. She
referred to the pre-British era as the period "before the
world was settled", to indicate a condition of public

1 For a history of the Fulani conquests, see A. Burns,
examination of the various Muslim brotherhoods in the
emirate, see J. Paden, Religion and Political Culture
in Kano (Berkeley, California, 1973), Ch. 7. We do
not need to go into the details of the history and
religion here.
insecurity due to slave raiding and other acts of lawlessness and oppression.\footnote{R. Heussler, \textit{Research on Pre-British Northern Nigeria: A Note on Limitations and Potentialities} (Durham, North Carolina, Commonwealth Africa Studies Centre, 1966), p. 529.} To her, as to many of her contemporaries, the most remarkable difference between Fulani rule and British rule was the exchange of a state of fear and uncertainty under the former for one of peace and order under the latter. Under the former, slave raiding, inter-emirate warfare and constant fighting with neighbours caused considerable fear and a sense of insecurity and uncertainty among the populace.

It was a period when might was right and when law and order was a preserve of the strong man. But in the midst of the insecurities for the common man and often at his expense, the Hausa emirates had, by the early sixteenth century, developed a well-organized fiscal system, a definite code of land tenure, a regular scheme of local rule through appointed district and village heads, as well as a trained judiciary which administered the tenets of Islamic law.\footnote{Lord Hailey, \textit{An African Survey} (London, 1959), p. 453.}

Thus, it would be highly inappropriate to suggest
that the pre-British era in the emirate was one of anarchy, an era of a state of grave economic problems or that the system lacked a legitimate organizational hierarchy with distinct professional specialization and differentiation. On the other hand, one must accept that equality among the population did not exist. Nor was it claimed by anyone. The society was highly stratified—the members of the ruling elite belonged to a class quite distinct from that of the learned teachers (the mallams), and were even more separated from that of the slave. This stratification of the society appears to have been taken for granted and accepted as such by the bulk of the population. ¹

The position of the Emir as head of Kano emirate has been vitally important from pre-colonial days. In fact, as John Paden observes, "The structure of authority in Kano emirate is centred around the office of the Emir. The Emir has been considered the repository of religious, executive, legislative and judicial functions." ² The Emir ruled by divine rights, his rule was not dependent

on the popular will of his subjects.\textsuperscript{1} His administra-
tors were chosen on the basis of their individual loyalty
to him, rather than on merit or any universalistic criteria.
The emirate local government at that time was a classic
system of theocracy. The ultimate legislative function
was centred in the will of God, hence the actions of the
Emir were supposed to be divinely inspired. As sole
interpreter of divine legislation, he was an intermediary
between his people and the Supreme Being. In this task
he was assisted by a council of advisers selected by
himself, but he was by no means bound to accept their
advice.\textsuperscript{2}

This local government unit, from the Colonial
era, was formally titled a Native Authority, or simply,
N.A. Known more popularly to the people as "E'Ne", this
is the unit of local government that has been most
responsible to most citizens. It is also what they have
always recognised as their local government.\textsuperscript{3} The lower

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{1}{This point is also made by B.J. Dudley, "Traditionalism
and Politics: A Case Study of Northern Nigeria", Government
and Opposition, Vol. 21, 1967, p. 516.}
\footnote{2}{B.J. Dudley, \textit{Ibid.} Also J.N. Paden, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 229.}
\footnote{3}{R.E. Wraith, \textit{Local Administration in West Africa}
\end{footnotes}
units (whether district, town or village councils) were never as popular with the people. They were, in any case, as will be seen later, very subordinate to the N.A. In April 1968, the Military Governor of Kano State, Alhaji Audo Bako, stressing the derogatory impression the word "native" has always given, changed the title of N.A. to L.A. (Local Authority). (See Chapter Three below.)

The Emir, in addition to his legislative responsibilities, had the right to make changes in public offices and among their holders. For, not only were office holders liable to peremptory dismissal on the death of their patrons, their officers were also liable to be transferred to another rank and given to persons of different status, since the allocation of office was governed by the King's political situation and needs. . . .

The Emir, especially in appointments, thus had a lot of patronage in his hands. He was in essence a most vital fulcrum of a theocratic system: the religious, executive, administrative and judicial subsystems depended very much on his person. This traditional position of the Emir is important to observe, if we are to appreciate the controversy surrounding his changed position with the establishment of British rule, after 1900.

ESTABLISHMENT OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION

The Berlin West African Conference of 1884-1885 was a major historical event for Tropical Africa. It was at that conference table, in the heart of Europe, that the map of Africa was redrawn, each European power interested in colonial possession obtaining a slice of the continent. Among the territories that went to Great Britain at Berlin was present-day Nigeria. The conference acknowledged Britain’s claims to the basin of the Niger River. Britain, on the other hand, very unprepared to assume the financial and administrative responsibilities of a colony, chartered a company, the Royal Niger Company, "... to administer, make treaties, levy customs and trade in all territories in the basin of the Niger and its affluents."¹ The Royal Niger Company was thus able to maintain a monopoly of trade along the Niger basin until 1900.

Various factors such as political pressure at home, demands for protection of British citizens resident in Africa, and the social and economic prestige associated with such imperial possessions as India, Canada and South Africa gradually modified the feelings of the British

¹ J. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley, California, 1965), p. 41.
political elite towards taking more active interest in their colonial possessions. By 1900, in short, the charter granted the Royal Niger Company fifteen years earlier was revoked, and direct British administration replaced the company's rule. Sir Frederick Lugard arrived in Nigeria towards the end of 1899 and took over the administration from the Royal Niger Company. He took the title of High Commissioner of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria (distinguishing it from the administration of Southern Nigeria and that of the Colony of Lagos). In an impressive ceremony on the morning of January 1, 1900, he hoisted the Union Jack in place of the company's flag and proclaimed the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. Direct British rule, as distinct from the rule of the Royal Niger Company, had begun.  

Lugard made no secret of the British intention to exercise an overlordship. In a public statement at Sokoto in 1903, he made it clear that,

... all the things which the Fulanis by conquest took the right to do, now pass to the British. Every Sultan and Emir and the principal officers of the state will be appointed by the High Commissioner.  

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1 For the historical details, see A. Burns, op. cit., Ch. 5, passim.

Fulani rule, in other words, was to be replaced in every way by British rule. The principles Lugard expressed in words, he also implemented in his directives. For example, from 1904 the emirate authorities were required to pay a quarter of the taxes they collected to the British administration. ¹ Other changes brought about will be elaborated upon below.

Himself a soldier, Lugard preferred men of military training to serve with him as administrators in Northern Nigeria. This was partly because in this early period of British administration, there was some resistance to British rule. Therefore he preferred that each of his political officers should be both a soldier and an administrator. He had an innate confidence in the ability of anyone who had gone through the rigorous training of the military. A good number of the men who served him belonged to this category. By 1903, a military administration had been set up in Kano and the emirate was reasonably at peace with British administration. By 1906, a trunk road had connected Kano with Lagos on the coast, and by 1911, ¹

the railway lines from Lagos had reached Kano. The impact of British administration was beginning to be felt.

AIMS OF BRITISH COLONIAL ADMINISTRATORS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT

In order to assess the achievements of a political system or of a political institution, it is essential to know what aims and objectives were set for it, what values it was expected to maximize, and what aims and objectives it generated internally. True scholarship calls for this, as Anthony Kirk-Greene observes, in order that the academic person might avoid the common pitfall "... of looking at 1900 through the spectacles of 1950 or judging 1910 by the standards of 1960." In taking this approach, we can attempt to assess performance from the perspective of the particular period we study.

Major Burdon, one of Lugard's ideal type of military-administrative officers, was a close associate of Lugard and seems to have known his master intimately. In one of his statements, he made an admission:

1 Sir Charles Orr, op. cit., p. 189.

Our aim, he said, is to rule through existing chiefs to enlist them on our side in the work and progress of good government ... (the) hope is that we may make of these born rulers high types of British officials working for the good of their subjects in accordance with the ideals of the British Empire ... 1

Hence, an important aim of local government in this period was to rule through the chiefs, and to give the chiefs both political and administrative education in order to make them comparable with other administrators found in the British Empire at this time—including those of Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, Australia and India.

What then was the objective of local government as regards the ordinary citizen? Sir Donald Cameron, later Governor of Nigeria (1931), and perhaps the most renowned disciple of Lugard, put it figuratively, "... our desire is to make him a good African." 2 This objective, he said, could not be achieved if we destroy all the institutions, all the traditions, all the habits of the people, superimposing upon them what we consider to be better administrative methods and better principles. 3

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1 Quoted in C.S. Whitaker, op. cit., p. 16
3 Ibid., p. 196.
Thus native institutions, traditions and habits were to be preserved rather than impose totally new and unfamiliar ideas from outside. In other words, native development was to come about through the delegation of authority to chiefs, in this case, the Emir, and through the gradual participation of the citizens. How this aim was later contradicted will be examined below.

However, the measure of decentralization desired was designed to enable the British to achieve another objective for local government: to maintain the unity of existing local ethnic groups.¹ So tenaciously was this held as a belief that the British could hardly conceive of an official from Kano emirate going to Lagos or elsewhere, outside Kano emirate, to perform the same or similar functions. It was this localization policy which they felt would assure the "independence of free Pagan races . . . and develop all that is best in the indigenous methods and institutions . . . ."²

To do this effectively, it was essential, as Lugard saw it, that the chiefs were to be supported in every way and their authority upheld by the Resident.

² A. Kirk-Greene, op. cit., pp. 528 and 89.
(the British political officer in charge of each province, such as Kano). This objective of supporting the chief in order to further this localization policy and in an effort to achieve the purity of their local ethnic group received various interpretations. It was perhaps best interpreted by C.L. Temple who was Lieutenant Governor of Northern Nigeria from 1914 to 1917.

To put this policy into effect, said Temple, means first of all that you must shut your eyes, up to a certain point, to a great many practices which, though not absolutely repugnant to humanity, are nevertheless reprehensible to our ideas.¹

This support of the chiefs at all costs was thus a way of enhancing a policy. Sir Donald Cameron, in an official memorandum, reminded his fellow administrative officers that centuries of difference lay between them as British people, and the people of Northern Nigeria. This, he held, could not be bridged in a generation or two.

We are not allowed, he stated, to depose a chief or to refuse to recognize the lawful successor to an office merely because we do not find in the person concerned standards which might be expected in the best sections of English public life . . . .

¹ Quoted in J. Smith, "The Relationship of the British Political Officer to his Chief in Northern Nigeria", in Crowder and Ikime, op. cit., p. 14.
He finished by recommending that abuses be condoned. "As regards abuses, it must be remembered that abuses are inevitable."¹ Thus standards were to be tailored according to what was regarded as the local requirement.

Perhaps the central objective in this period was implicit in the degree of support given to the chiefs. The chief and his emirate authority were in general to maintain law and order, to prevent crimes, to arrest persons who had committed or were considered to be about to commit crimes.² Law and order were extremely important to the British. Commerce can hardly flourish in a state of anarchy or one of perpetual fear and insecurity. Though the Royal Niger Company was no longer the country's political ruler, its successor, the United African Company (U.A.C.) was an influential force and very manifestly interested in trade. Also, the British citizens who lived in Northern Nigeria desired peaceful and tranquil living conditions. Thus the preservation of law and order became the prime objective of local government in this era, not only in Kano emirate but in

¹ Sir D. Cameron, Principles of Native Administration and Their Application (Lagos, 1934), p. 28.

the other parts of Northern Nigeria. Subsidiary to it, then, was the desire to support the chiefs, and to train and educate them, making way for decentralization of the administration and participation and development of the people in a way free of foreign imposition.

In summary, the aims and objectives of the colonial administrators for local government in Kano emirate in the colonial era, explicit in the above statements, were:

i. To develop the chiefs to be very good administrators;

ii. To assist the people to develop at their own pace, whilst bringing them close to their government;

iii. To ensure the purity of the local ethnic group;

iv. To preserve law and order.
REGONCILING AIMS WITH LIST OF CRITERIA

Before going on to evaluate the extent to which the above aims and objectives were achieved in the local government of Kano emirate in this era, let us briefly examine their relevance to the criteria set up in Chapter One of what local government ought to be doing. Let us begin by discussing the relevance of the aims and objectives to democratic ideals.

It would appear that the development of the Chiefs, as Major Burdon put it above, was to involve their taking decisions after a patient and very painstaking examination of the needs of their people. The idea of justice and fair play "in accordance with the ideals of the British Empire", were meant to include equality and freedom, for all.¹ Thus it can be argued that there was some concern for democratic ideals in the local government of the emirate at this time. The same can be argued with regards to political participation. According to Sir Donald Cameron, the development of the people was to be gradual and methodically planned, rather than

¹ Quoted in C.S. Whitaker, op. cit., p. 16
"superimposing on them what we consider to be better...

Thus some amount of involvement, however little, was anticipated. The most relevant of the aims of the colonial administrators to our criteria, appears to be their desire to preserve law and order (and the need for local government to promote protective services). How well this was done will be examined below.

There are, however, areas in our list of criteria that did not seem important to, and were not considered by, the colonial administrators. Their aims do not include the promotion of infrastructural services, or the encouragement on any large scale, of socio-economic development and manpower resource development or the fostering of national integration. The latter is usually the preoccupation of the nationalists and hence usually comes to the forefront only after colonial rule. The others were unimportant to the colonial administrators, more because colonial administrations tend to be more law and order rather than development oriented administrations. 2

For example, considering Table III below, whilst the

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1 Quoted in A.H. Kirk-Greene, op. cit., p. 196.

2 This point is also made in J. Paden, op. cit., p. 228.
least vote for the year 1910-11 went to the item Special grants for economic development, the next smallest was spent on hospitals and sanitation in Kano. Hence, if 1910-11 figures are in any way characteristic of the era, both social and economic development suffered in the hands of local government. This, it will be apparent from Table III, was not due to lack of funds. It was a problem of priorities. The Native Authority (N.A.) kept seventy-five per cent of the revenue it collected and was required to pass only twenty-five per cent to the central government. Apart from rather warped priorities, the colonial administration usually had to depend on local taxes, which often did not suffice to pay administrative costs, let alone embark on development projects. The colonial office was in addition usually unwilling to supplement. The policy of spending the minimum possible on the colonies was very implicit in British colonial administration.\(^1\) Of the little that was spent, most went into areas of law

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\(^1\) This point is stressed in M. Perham, *Lugard: The Years of Authority* (London, 1960), Ch. 5, passim.
and order, and the least went into socio-economic areas. This is seen clearly in Table IV below, which shows that education had the least consideration, i.e., 0.5 per cent, whilst in Kano emirate itself, education, as seen below (Table III), got only two per cent of the funds. Again, it was a problem of the priorities of the colonial administration.

Nothing, in fact, was done about public enlightenment till 1943, which indicates the depth of the deficiency of local government in performing this function in this era. Even then, the initiative, when it came in 1943, was from the central government, not the N.A. Thus attention did not focus on the developmental ideals in the aims of the colonial rulers in Kano emirate. A noticeable exception to this general trend, in this era, was the modest interest in agricultural development. Margery Perham, for example, reported on her visit to Kano in 1935 of seeing "... a waterworks and a power station costing the N.A. £300,000; a £30,000 hospital and a model farm experimenting

1 A.Y. Eke, op. cit., p. 6.
2 Ibid.
### TABLE III

**TYPICAL DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS TO NATIVE TREASURIES, 1910–1911**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>Sokoto</th>
<th>App. %</th>
<th>Kano</th>
<th>App. %</th>
<th>Katsina</th>
<th>App. %</th>
<th>Bornu</th>
<th>App. %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration and Treasury</td>
<td>25,303</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>41,946</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>4,408</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>9,100</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,760</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police and Prisons</td>
<td>2,688</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3,207</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4,836</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,178</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital and Sanitation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,024</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special grants for economic develop-ment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>29,693</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>57,013</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8,086</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>12,742</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Annual Reports on Northern Nigeria, 1900–1911, p. 740.
(Courtesy of Michigan State University, East Lansing)

### TABLE IV

**SELECTED EXPENDITURES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTHERN NIGERIA, 1910–1911**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEAD</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>76,515</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posts and Telegraphs</td>
<td>17,455</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>34,715</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Forestry</td>
<td>2,654</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works</td>
<td>30,188</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways</td>
<td>24,443</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>184,893</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in mixed farming."\(^1\) The interest in mixed farming at this time is significant. It shows that the N.A. was interested in introducing other crops to improve the economy, whilst the existence of the model farm suggests interest in training personnel to work the farm and to assist the local farmers. In other words, some progress was made in the field of agricultural development.

It becomes important then, to state that, because developmental and some of the general objectives were ignored in the aims and objectives of the colonial administrators in this era, even the aims and objectives set for local government in the era did not make for the most ideal functioning. In other words, even the objectives set for local government in this era were inadequate. Having made this admission, it is the view of this study that, since local government in the emirate in the colonial era did not aim at the developmental objectives, our assessment of the performance of local government in the emirate at this time, whilst acknowledging this setback, must be based on the more or less explicitly stated, or extrapolated, aims and objectives. This is the reason for not employing our

theoretical and normative list of criteria (developed in the last chapter) as the primary basis of assessment of the performance of local government, whether in this era or in the subsequent two eras of the study. The study will now consider how far local government in the emirate performed the objectives that were set down for it by the colonial administrators, who directed the policies, not only of the central administration, but also of the local government (the Native Authorities).

PERFORMANCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FROM VIEWPOINT OF AIMS SET

(1) Developing the Chiefs to be very good administrators: A significant fact about administration in the colonial era was the extremely cautious and imprecise style of the policy laid down. This fluidity in itself beclouded objectives. In the case of chiefs, for example, whilst the policy appears to have been to endeavour to train them to become competent administrators with modern approaches, this was contradicted by the desire to leave them with a lot of their ancient traditional powers.¹

¹ Lugard's speech in Sokoto in 1903 for example supports this idea. He said for example that, "The Emirs and Chiefs who are appointed will rule over the people as of old times . . ." See A. Kirk-Greene, op. cit., p. 43.
The end result was a haphazard and confused, rather than a planned and coordinated program to develop consistently the skills of the chiefs. One effect, as has been observed, was that more than necessary attention was concentrated on the Chief. Local government in this colonial era got over-centred in the Emir. Local government, as has been seen, was of the sole authority system at this time, i.e., a one-man rule, rather than one in which elected or selected representatives had inputs.

In an effort to improve the administrative ability of the Emirs of Northern Nigeria, a few trips were arranged for leading Emirs to visit the United Kingdom in this period. Apparently these were supposed to be educational tours in which the chiefs saw local government in action, interacted with local administrators and watched the decision-making process in a developed environment. In fact, they became pleasure trips in which chiefs were sent hurriedly from one local council to another after a period of impressive sight-seeing.  

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1 One of these courses in 1950 included attachment to a local authority, a field project and visits to rural community councils and planning departments. The latter took the lion's share of the time.
The other problem was, as John Smith put it,

... we were all too cautious of change. When you have known an Emir in his emirate surrounded by the pageantry of tradition and the pomp of power, it is hard to think of him in any other circumstance. ¹

That is, it was hard to think of him as a modern administrator sharing his powers, consulting patiently and slowly, regarding and treating every citizen equally, delegating his authority, taking decisions by majority voice, and establishing department heads with specific responsibilities as managers and with a known hierarchy of officials working with and ultimately responsible to them. These the colonial administration neither insisted on, nor encouraged, nor developed in the local government of the emirate. The end result, in brief, was that the British fell short of their aim to develop the chiefs to be very good administrators.

With the chiefs giving local government its leadership at this time, and with them very ill-prepared for that job, a most vital element in the success of any organization had been neglected. Leadership within an organization contributes towards clarifying its objectives,

¹ J. Smith, op. cit., p. 21
achieving those objectives, establishing a legitimate line of communication and re-evaluating at intervals the goals and achievements of the organization.¹ When, as in this case, the leadership itself is weak or poorly placed, the organization begins with a huge deficit, as the leadership is crucial to the success and even the survival of an organization.

Thus in Kano, British officials did not directly administer local government (the N.A.), and because the Emir was sole authority of the emirate, he held formal authority for local government revenue collection as well as for judicial administration. But the Resident in effect had real, though informal, authority. For example, approval for actions and decisions of the Emir were required from him. The Emir was to obey the laws of the Governor and "... act in accordance with the advice of the Resident."² While sitting on the fence, the Resident could interfere—delay or nullify decisions, and in this way make the local government inept or at least inefficient while it lost face with the people, its image considerably reduced.

¹ C. Bernard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, 1938, Ch. 2 and 3.

² A. Kirk-Greene, op. cit., pp. 43-44.
The Emir of Kano was aware, as were most other Emirs in Northern Nigeria, that the Resident was no mere adviser but possessed real power. No politically prudent Emir could afford to disagree seriously with the Resident. Any disagreement with the Resident might mean a report to the central administration. Such a report could lead to loss of position. The fact is that colonial rule was a rule of coercion,\(^1\) and for the British in such a regime to aim at implementing a decentralized administration based on a competent Emir with modern motivations was like adopting a policy of eating your cake and yet having it. Coercion and decentralization, based on trust, the delegation of authority and free exercise of initiative, could hardly go together. In theory, decentralization existed in the emirate. In practice, with so much real power concentrated in the hands of the Resident, the administrative skills of the Emir were allowed little development in this era.

(ii) Assisting the people to develop at their own pace: In this era, as has been observed, the old way of regarding local administration as a trust from God, reposed in the Emir, was allowed to continue in the sole

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authority system. In effect the Emir chose his own native advisers, and met them when he wished. It is important that there was neither an obligation for him to accept their advice, nor to meet them in public or at regular intervals.¹ Development in the local government system of the emirate was slow and extremely gradual.

The attachment of the British administration to this rather slow and gradual pace of development is also seen in the fact that from 1922, a Legislative Council existed in Lagos for the Colony and the Protectorate of Nigeria. The council contained a small minority of Nigerians. In 1922, for example, it had four Nigerian members, three selected from the municipality of Lagos and the other from the township of Calabar, out of a total of thirty-six members.² How and why Kano emirate and all Northern Nigeria was left out in the selection, no one except the British administrators who took the decisions, will ever be certain. It is, however, possible that the idea of a very gradual development for the North was responsible. The poor educational level, according

¹ This practice is cited by M.J. Campbell, op. cit., p. 17.
to British standards (compared with Lagos or Calabar) as well as the uncertainty of the propriety of sending an Emir to Lagos, or selecting a moderately educated man instead, was probably contributory to the neglect of Kano and other parts of the North at this time. It was not until the Richard's Constitution of 1946 that Northern Nigeria was represented by nine of the twenty-four Nigerian unofficial members in the Legislative Council.  

What notion the British had of the pace suitable for the people of the emirate is difficult to determine. What seems certain is that whilst people in Southern Nigeria, for example, progressed comparatively rapidly in representative institutions, especially at the closing of this era, in Kano local government was concentrated in the hands of the Emir till the end of the era.  

(iii) Ensuring the purity of the local ethnic groups: The British appear to have succeeded in one of their aims for local government—the preservation of the unity of  

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2 We do not need to go into developments in Southern Nigeria since our major objective is to assess achievement or non-achievement of set objectives in Kano. However, a basic book, such as P.J. Harris, *op. cit.*, will give a picture of progress in the south at the ending of this era.
the local ethnic groups. This is not to say that there was any limitation on free movement from one emirate to another. It is to say that the homogeneity of each local administration was preserved whilst little encouragement was given to a local government body to recruit personnel from outside its administrative area. As C.L. Temple put it,

... an educated native could only be employed in the community which bore him. I can just conceive an educated native of Kano being employed as a police officer or as Assistant District Officer in Kano emirate, but to so employ an educated native of Lagos in Sokoto would be a blunder of inconceivable magnitude.

The aim of maintaining emirate administrative purity, it can be said, was achieved in Kano emirate. Emirate personnel were mainly Hausa-Fulani people from the emirate. Extreme localization was the result. It must be accepted, nevertheless, that it was a period of scarcity of trained personnel. Even if an attempt had been made to recruit outside-emirate personnel into local government at this time, few would have been

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1 A. Kirk-Greene, op. cit., p. 52.

available. Also, each emirate had few resources and very little to spare. The dearth of trained personnel especially, and of course other resources, had given birth to Indirect Rule itself. What made this favouring of local personnel significant, even at this time, was its adoption as policy. Whatever its later effects, what seems certain is that the objective of local government in this regard was achieved, as far as local government personnel was concerned. There was purity of administration in the emirates in the sense of administrative personnel being wholly Hausa-Fulani.

(iv) Preservation of law and order: The emirate had the authority to set up its own Native Authority police, and Native Authority police existed in the colonial era. The force worked hand in hand with the Nigerian Police. Indeed in the colonial era, law and order were established all over Northern Nigeria. In Kano emirate, the establishment of law and order was not the sole doing of the N.A. police, but one shared with other law-enforcing agencies—the Courts, the District Officers and the Resident, not to mention the Emir and the Nigerian Police. Yet it is incontrovertible that the local N.A. police in the emirate contributed its share.
It would appear then, that the objective of local
government at this time, for the establishment of peace
and the preservation of law and order was achieved. By
and large, Margery Perham is right in stating that,

... a period of peace and goodwill was
secured ... oppressive and extravagant
methods of government checked. With the
Muslims restrained from the wastefulness
of their own war-like activities and the
Pagans freed from the terror and loss of
slave raiding, the energies of both could
be absorbed in peaceful exertions.¹

Peace and order, as mentioned above, were made possible
by the concerted efforts of the Native Authority Police,
the Nigerian Police, the Native Authority Courts, the
Magistrate and other English Courts and the District Officer (DO)
Resident and the Emir. It is important to clarify at
this stage why some of the contributions of non-local
government functionaries, e.g., the Nigerian Police
(a federal force) and the Magistrate Courts (state
government institutions) must influence our assessment
of the performance of local government. Drawing an
analogy from a familiar Canadian example will make the
point. If one of the objectives of the Regional munici-
pality of Ottawa-Carleton is to preserve law and order

¹ M. Perham, op. cit., p. 154.
in this area, a number of police forces will get involved. A clash on Bank Street, or on Bronson or Somerset Streets will be taken care of by the City of Ottawa police. Another on the Queensway will be looked after by the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), whilst a confrontation at Uplands Airport, the Parkway or on Parliament Hill will be promptly attended to by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The fact remains that neither the OPP nor the RCMP is responsible to the local government of Ottawa area. Yet their action is extremely important in the achievement of the objective of the local government of the area for law and order.

The situation becomes clearer when it is realized that in Nigeria (including Kano emirate) no dividing lines as to jurisdictions of the various police forces have existed. Often different forces work hand in hand. In fact, in Kano, as will be seen in Chapter Four, the N.A. police in the state have now been put under the control of the Nigerian Police. The point is thus made that in this era and the others, federal and state forces were contributory to the performance of local government's aims and objectives for peace and order.
This is because, as the system operates, it is unrealistic to think of the subsystem of local government, in isolation or single-handedly, achieving its own objectives. The colonial era was relatively peaceful for all citizens, irrespective of class or status. During Fulani rule, fear and insecurity, violence and internecine warfare had been the order. In this regard in Kano, as in most emirates of Northern Nigeria in this period, local government achieved its objective. Partly as a result of the establishment of law and order, we observe the following favourable results, not only in Kano emirate, but in the other emirates of Northern Nigeria as well.

1. The costly and economically enervating wars were brought to an end as the Pax Britannica was imposed. Internal security was vastly strengthened and people travelled without fear.

2. Trade improved, with the heavy cowrie shells formerly used as currency being replaced by coin currency.

3. Existing caravan trails were enlarged into all-weather motorable roads—a paradoxical achievement that transferred slave routes to modern, peaceful trade routes.
4. The legal status of slavery was abolished and every one, high or low, was free to move.¹

In sum, though it can hardly be said that the British administration succeeded in its aim of decentralizing the administration to the locality and bringing the government to the people, it can be said that it was relatively successful in its aim of establishing peace and imposing law and order in Kano emirate in this era, as well as in its aim of preserving the unity of ethnic groups. We will now examine the deficiencies in the local government of the emirate in this era--its non-achievement of at least two of the objectives set for it.

THE CAUSES OF DEFICIENCIES

The causes--of the shortcomings in local government in the emirate in this era are not hard to seek. Local government was not development oriented, hence the Developmental functions were ignored. Local government was directed towards the areas that interested the central government--especially to the establishment of peace and

the preservation of law and order at the cheapest costs possible. Pressure for limiting expenses as mentioned above continuously came to the administration from the colonial office. Further, local government at this time was the job of one individual--the Emir.

Perhaps more important was the fact that a number of foreign institutions that did not quite fit the environment of Kano emirate were transplanted there. Such at this time included Indirect Rule, the office of Resident and the English legal system. How, in effect, did these affect the performance of local government in Kano emirate in the colonial era? This they did by being the source of a number of contradictions. We must now consider what contradictions these three transplanted institutions and practices brought into the local government of the emirate.

As already mentioned, Northern Nigeria was not the original home of Indirect Rule. The broad concept of Indirect Rule had been learned from Lugard's early experiences in India.¹ There Indirect Rule had worked with the Indian princes for two centuries. In Uganda,

Lugard had found a favourable ground to transplant the institution. Immediately after the victory of the English forces at Mengo in 1892, Lugard had asserted the intention of ruling through the people's institutions.¹ The paramount ruler of Buganda, the Kabaka, was probably as powerful as any of the Indian princes. Hence, Lugard succeeded in introducing Indirect Rule into Kabaka's territory. In 1903, when he made a similar declaration before the Emirs at Sokoto, he was assuming that the Emirs were traditionally as strong and powerful as the Kabaka was in his kingdom and as the Indian princes in theirs. He was only partially right in his estimate. Though the Emir had autocratic power, he as a devout Muslim was expected to exercise that power as an agent of Allah (the Almighty), to whom he believed he would be accountable. A benevolent, though autocratic rule, based on religious conviction, was peculiar to the Hausa emirates. The absurdity in the assumption that the Nigerian chiefs were as powerful as the Indian princes and the Ugandan Kabaka was not to be discovered until Indirect Rule was imported to Eastern Nigeria, and instead of finding similarly powerful chiefs, the

¹ Ibid., p. 78.
British had to set up the Warrant Chiefs. (Warrant Chiefs were mere nominated group leaders; they had no traditional legitimacy). Such were the contradictions in expectations and concepts. We must now consider what in effect Indirect Rule was and how it affected the local government of the emirate in this era.

INDIRECT RULE

As an administrative or political institution, Indirect Rule was introduced into Northern Nigeria by Sir Frederick Lugard. It is probable that, of all the facets of colonialism that must continue to attract the attention of scholars from the former European colonized countries, none is likely to hold the stage for them with the same challenging persistence as the philosophy of native administration. Kirk-Greene notes, "... among the diverse doctrines of native administration, pride of place goes to the theory and practice of Indirect Rule."²

What, in essence really, was Indirect Rule?

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¹ L.G. Cowan, Local Government in West Africa (New York, 1958), Ch. 6.
² A. Kirk-Greene, op. cit., p. 1
Some think it was a system of administration, others that it was a fluid concept applied to satisfy certain expediencies in Northern Nigeria, and later in other British colonial territories in Africa.\footnote{O. Ikime, "Reconsidering Indirect Rule", \textit{Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria}, Vol. IV, No. 3, 1968, p. 430, and A. Kirk-Greene, \textit{Ibid.}, p. 48.} What is indisputable is that Indirect Rule recognized the traditional position and the legitimacy of Emirs, other chiefs and their local councils, and the Native courts of justice. It also recognized the executive authority in the hands of the Emir that required him, among other responsibilities, to be in charge of the collection of taxes.

Through Indirect Rule, the European keeps himself a good deal in the background and leaves the mass of native individuals to understand that the orders which come to them emanate from their own chief rather than from \ldots the white man. \ldots \footnote{A. Kirk-Greene, \textit{Ibid.}, p. 48.}

The British may not have realized that the mass of native individuals were aware of the actual power behind the chiefs. But even if the British fully realized it, that realization did not detract from their belief in, and continuing support of, this type of rule in the emirates.
Indirect rule, as an administrative system, was thus dependent upon a strong centralized authority—that of the Emir. In addition to his being the religious leader binding the community together, around him was established a system of administration based on acceptance of taxation and complete obedience to chiefly rule. The theoretical assumption of Indirect Rule then was that the Emir as ruler possessed a considerable amount of authority, arising out of his religious and traditional legitimacy. This being so, it would benefit both the British administration and peace and progress in the particular colony, or area, if he were to have authority to make laws and punish offences, whilst he (the Chief) was allowed only a limited amount of interest in social and economic development of the people.

Indeed, there was nothing very original in the idea. It was no innovation in the field of administration. Lucy Mair observes that conquerors throughout the ages had established their position by reducing conquered peoples to the status of tributaries. She noticed that, "... rulers who already have their own organization for the collection of revenues are simply required to
hand over part of what they collect to the conqueror."¹

In other words, they were recognized as agents in the conqueror's new administration. The situation with the Emirs in Northern Nigeria was parallel. The Emirs became, in a very real way, British agents.

The situation in Northern Nigeria was, however, not exactly identical. There were other reasons for Indirect Rule. For example, the area was large, communications were poor, and there were very few British administrators in the early days of their administration. Hence, Lugard did the obvious by employing available resources. The British government could not afford the cost, whether financially, or in terms of personnel, of establishing direct administration over the area. This had been learned in India, and the two centuries of Indian experience were now to be put to use. The fact was that a great proportion of India consisted "of independent states ruled by their own sovereigns, collecting their own revenues and applying their own forms of justice."² Hence, when these elements were found in

Northern Nigeria, and the complications of limited financial and human resources were added, it was only sensible to fall back on a tried and rewarding experience, and attempt to institutionalize it.\(^1\) Indirect Rule, in other words, began out of expediency in Northern Nigeria. Originally pragmatically motivated, it was to be institutionalized, after decades of usage, into an administrative system and indeed, into a theory or philosophy of local administration.

\section*{INDIRECT RULE AND THE N.A.}

The position of the Emir, we have seen, was central to the administrative system of Indirect Rule. The authority in some places (where he is sole authority of the N.A.) reposed absolutely in the Emir. In Kano, as mentioned above, he had nominal advisers. In Kano, as well, there existed bureaucratic officials who executed the duties of the administration. They were the Native Authority officials. There were also the native courts. The basic elements on which the Native Authority (i.e., local government) was built in the emirate at this time,

\footnote{This issue is dealt with at length in M. Perham's \textit{Lugard: The Years of Authority} (London, 1969), p. 39ff.}
were generally as follows:

1. The strong chief—the Emir.

2. A long-established tax system and a treasury.

3. An effective legal system based on Muslim laws.  

In the colonial era, i.e., up to the end of the period covered by this chapter, no Native Authorities (N.A.s) had elected councils. Three types of N.A.s existed—the Chief, the Chief and Council, and the Chief-in-Council. Some clarifications as to their differences need to be made.

1. **THE CHIEF.** Here the Emir was a Sole Authority, i.e., he literally, and indeed, had all the power in his hands. All authority emanated from him. He made all appointments and was responsible to the Resident of the province and to the colonial administration in general for all local government affairs. Kano emirate is a good example here.

2. **CHIEF-IN-COUNCIL.** The Emir in this type of council was absolutely at liberty to accept or reject the advice

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1 These three factors are accepted by many scholars, e.g., M.J. Campbell, *op. cit.*, Ch. 2, *passim*.

2 Ibid.
of his council. What distinguished it from the sole authority type of local government at this time was the existence, on a formal organizational plane, of the council. Kano became a Chief-in-Council N.A. in the self-governing era, as will be seen in Chapter Three of this study.

3. **CHIEF AND COUNCIL.** In this case, the chief had a council of advisers who shared with him the decision-making authority. In other words, he did not all alone make decisions of appointment, priorities, etc. Concurrency of his council was necessary. This type of limited or constitutional Emir was not a common occurrence in this era. It existed among the Tivs and many of the other lower North N.A.s.

Even though in Kano emirate, our focus of study, the N.A. in this era was that of chief as sole authority, a number of Northern Nigerian political leaders of later periods (i.e., post-1950), appear to have looked with disfavour, if not scorn, at the sole authorities, suggesting in effect that the British legitimized them in the emirates. "In the years immediately following the British occupation", wrote Sir Ahmadu Bello, the late Premier...
of Northern Nigeria,

government policy had tended to place undue emphasis on the authority of the chief, and this has been reflected in the appointment under the N.A. ordinance of the chiefs alone as N.A. without reference to . . . council.¹

The point Sir Ahmadu makes here is that the British, in this way, installed and aided undemocratic practices, to an extent hitherto unknown in Northern Nigeria.

**INDIRECT RULE AND THE RESIDENT**

Kano emirate, as we have noted, was a theocracy. Under British rule, all authority, as in any sole authority, remained under the personal guidance of the Emir. Though he had an executive council of his own that met with him daily, they had no manifest power. As Margery Perham concludes, "It would be extremely difficult to carry on the government . . . unless the position of Emir were held by a man of character and industry."²

What impact, then, did this system of Indirect Rule have on Kano emirate during the period under review? During this period, as already pointed out, the Resident

for Kano province, with headquarters in Kano, had considerable influence over the local government (N.A.) of Kano emirate. In fact, it can be argued that in Kano the Resident held paramount power. Though all responsibilities of local government were theoretically to be carried out by the Emir, the Resident, we have observed, did more than advise. He had the power "to arrest, try and sentence natives in his own court without referring in any way to native rulers."¹ He also investigated "complaints of overassessment or extortion and generally carried out a direct interference in all the internal affairs."² The prudent native ruler had to make the British Resident feel he was the boss, for he was aware that the Resident could sit on his council, audit his books, exert pressure on expenditure (outside the mandatory twenty-five per cent that the Emir had to send to the central administration), and veto his appointments.³

On the other hand, others have argued that under British rule the Emirs attained a position of power far

¹ C.W.J. Orr, op. cit., p. 277.
² Ibid.
³ Committee on African Studies, Indirect Rule and African Reaction (Boston, 1968), pp. 3-5.
exceeding that ascribed to their traditional role.\footnote{C.S. Whitaker, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 106.} This view, if applicable in some emirates (for example where an Emir and council system existed), does not apply to Kano where the Emir, as mentioned above, had ruled as sole authority from time immemorial and where the religious and the political had always been powerfully fused. What the British introduced (the influential Resident) appears then to have detracted from the influence of the Emir of Kano over his emirate, since the Emir no more had absolute powers but had to reckon with the Resident and depend on him approving his actions.

The power of the Emir over his people was in another way weakened by the very liberal attitude of the British administration. In a society that normally frowned at avaricious and acquisitive behaviour and which extolled honesty and prudent living, Temple counselled the political officers (Residents, District Officers and their Assistant District Officers, to
... shut your eyes ... to a great many practices which though not absolutely repugnant to humanity are nevertheless reprehensible to our ideas ... you must have patience with the liar ... you must have patience with the peculator of public funds ... you have to make up your mind that men are not all equal before the law ... 1

The result, as some have observed, was that some Emirs grew corrupt under British rule. And because the system was so flexible, District heads and Emirs took advantage of it. 2 In Kano emirate, cases of corruption did not actually erupt into the open till the self-governing era. This we shall discuss in the next chapter.

INDIRECT RULE AND EDUCATION

Education has for a long time been seen as an important element in the process of political and economic development, as a key that unlocks the gate to modernization. It has been argued too, that no other type of investment, public or private, will produce a greater return per unit of outlay than investment in education. This is probably true, especially of developing and modernizing societies,


considering the fact that formal education has a cardinal role to play in producing the bureaucratic, managerial, technical and professional cadres required for modernization. The importance of education in the local government of Kano emirate becomes evident when we consider the skills available to the emirate at this time. If the N.A. (the local government) system of Kano was to change from a traditional theocratic system to one able to meet the challenges of a developing era, competent personnel were required. But what did we find in the emirate in this era?

In Kano emirate, as in other Muslim parts of Northern Nigeria in this period, the British administration followed the pledge of Lugard to the Northern Emirs in 1903. In that year, at the installation ceremony of the Sultan of Sokoto, Lugard had declared that "... all men are free to worship God as they please. Mosques and prayer places will be treated with respect by us ..."¹ In 1917, the colonial office, in support of

local officials regarding their educational and religious policies, declared that "... whatever threatened the Muslim religion threatened the authority of the Emir and so endangered the system of Indirect Rule ...".\(^1\)

Thus the Islamic nature of Northern Nigeria was to be kept pure. The result was that Christian missions and their educational authorities were kept out of Muslim areas.

It was not that Lugard and other political officers were against modern education as such. Lugard himself was no doubt interested in education. For example, he had been the founder of the University of Hong Kong.\(^2\) But the immediate success of British administration was more important to him than a modern educational system, which could seemingly only be bought at an immediate cost of alienating some conservative and devoted, but influential, Muslim leaders. The fruits of education are reaped in a future time; the British administration wanted stability for the present. Further, Lugard's ideas about education were conveniently allowed to give

\(^1\) R. Bell, Native Problems in Africa (New York, 1960), p. 734.

\(^2\) P. C. Lloyd, op. cit., p. 31.
way to those of Sir Hans Vischer, the Native Education expert, who favoured a perpetuation of the existing set-up—Vischer's program favoured instruction in Hausa and the teaching of local crafts rather than giving a western-style education in the 3 R's and preparing a cadre of students to fill the local government needs in the future. It is highly probable then, that whilst Lugard was opposed to Dr. Walter Miller of the Church Missionary Society (CMS), in his effort to open a missionary station in Kano in 1903, he regarded this prohibition as only temporary.¹ The policy of Vischer was to make such temporary measures difficult to lift in this period.

The cost of education in terms of the level of the revenue devoted to it at this time suggests the level of its effectiveness. Considering statistical figures available, the net cost of education for the whole country in 1916 was only 1.6 per cent of the ordinary governmental revenue of the country. It was 1.4 per cent in 1917. Henry Carr, who was head of the education department at this time, estimated that one in every

180 children of school age in the southern provinces received any kind of education. In the North, "... the number is probably ten times less".¹ A clearer picture is given of the years 1906 and 1926.²

**TABLE V**

**ASPECTS OF EDUCATION IN NIGERIA IN THE COLONIAL ERA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PRIMARY SCHOOLS</th>
<th>SECONDARY SCHOOLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO. OF SCHOOLS</td>
<td>ENROLMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SOUTH NIGERIA</td>
<td>NORTH NIGERIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>3,826</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** N/A means Not Available.

**SOURCE:** Olav Stokke, *Nigeria: An Introduction to Political and Social Setting of Modern Nigeria.*

By the end of the era, the position was hardly better as will be seen below in the figure for 1952 (in Chapter Three).

It is apparent from these figures, that educational facilities in the North were, in number, less than those in the South (with a lower population) and so were markedly inadequate at this time. [In total population, 1931 census figures show that the North had seventeen

¹ F. Lugard, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

million people and the South, thirteen million.] And since the responsibility for primary education, at this time, was mainly in the hands of the N.A. (the central government had to provide grants), the inadequacies in primary education must rest more on the N.A. This inadequacy persisted to the end of this colonial era, and even beyond, into the self-governing era, as will be seen below.

In the area of adult education, the record was as poor. No foundation was laid in this field, either by the N.A. or by the central government, till 1943. Between 1943 and 1951, however, over 3,500 adults were in N.A. schools in Northern Nigeria.\footnote{A.Y. Eke, \textit{Eradication of Illiteracy}, (Lagos, 1972), address to Nigeria National Conference on Adult Education, March 25, 1972, p. 6.} This, no doubt, was an improvement over the pre-1943 situation when adult education was virtually non-existent. But, it it cannot be regarded as adequate. The figures indicate that both the formal school system and the adult education system in Kano emirate, as in other parts of Northern Nigeria, were extremely restricted in their scope and potentials. They could hardly hope to satisfy the demands of personnel needed in the local and central government, considering the size and population of the area to be served.
IMPACT OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM

One of the most important aspects of the N.A. in the period under review, and as has been mentioned above, was its judiciary. By design, a number of practices of the native judiciary had to give place to the imported English practices.

A feature introduced from the English legal system was oath-taking. Muslims (and Kano emirate was predominantly Muslim), are apt to consider oath-taking insulting to them and a slur on their character. It was apparent, even to Lugard as stated in his Political Memoranda, that the native custom was only to swear a man on a point of essential importance, or if and when his evidence was contradicted by a person of comparable status. Yet oath-taking became a general procedure in the native courts.\(^1\) An oath on the Koran thus became very perfunctory, and a highly respected religious symbol became little more than a joke.

On the other hand, the British colonial administration introduced into the N.A. judiciary a principle of appeal, and laid down channels of appeal. As Sir

Ahmadu Bello has explained, in Muslim law there is no provision for an appeal. The decision of the Alkali (the Muslim judge) is final. The only exception is that a case may be reviewed by the Ruler, and in a case involving a death sentence, the sentence has to be pronounced by the Emir.\(^1\) The new appeal system did cause some consternation on occasion. As Sir Ahmadu commented, in his dismay,

\[\ldots\] a case might very easily get thrown out and the startled public in some village would see to their astonishment that young Audu, who had been taken away for execution for a crime well known to them \[\ldots\] was again walking about \[\ldots\] as free as air.\(^2\)

It must be said that the British were probably quite sincere in their efforts to combat any possible injustice, and to give the accused and litigants the maximum opportunity to get justice in the British sense. The fact remains that such a foreign concept could hardly be imposed on an unprepared public with any measure of success. A small amount of consultation might have revealed some more legitimate or indigenous channel of

\(^1\) Sir A. Bello, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 98.

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 98.
appeal. As it was, British rule in this period, like any colonial rule, did not take into consideration the preferences of the people. Hence, for long after the appellate system was set up, many litigants were uncertain as to where to go. Some continued for a while to lodge complaints with the political officers. The belief remained for a long time that the political officer "... is the last refuge of justice and the citadel of protection against injustice."¹ This instance of legal appeal alone, demonstrates the great gap in culture, tradition and societal assumptions which separated the inhabitants of Kano from the British colonial rulers. This gap made the objectives set by the colonial rulers, in this era, difficult to appreciate.

SUMMARY OF IMPORTATIONS, CONTRADICTIONS AND IMPACTS

It was the philosophy of Indirect Rule, as seen above, that the British employed in confirming the powers of the sole authority of local government in the Emir.

That change in status made the Emir more authoritarian than ever before. In the past his benevolent rule had been done by divine rights. He was very conscious of his responsibilities to Allah and to his people. Though no less conscious of that responsibility to Allah in the colonial era, he now was obliged to think more of his responsibility to the British colonial masters who had made him sole authority and to whom he was accountable. It was Indirect Rule as well that was responsible for the low level of education. By confirming sole authority in an Emir who by himself was unappreciative of the need for raising educational standards, the British used Indirect Rule to deny the people the education that might have aided them in participating in and understanding local administration. And because of the double standard that the British set under Indirect Rule, thereby excusing "... a great many practices ... repugnant to humanity",¹ the British allowed that practice to enhance low morale and low standards to the detriment of maximum output or full achievement in local government.

It was also the institution of Resident (the Chief political officer in a province), also an importation from Lugard's Indian experience, that was

used indirectly and rather paradoxically to interfere with local government and detract from the influence of the Emir. This was done through the various supervisory and audit powers, mentioned above, which were given the Resident. In fact, the Resident was the real power feared by all, though behind the scene, whilst the Emir to many, and as argued above, was his tool.

The English legal system, the third foreign importation in this era, imposed a new appellate system. This, in itself, undermined the existing Emir's appellate rights (as Sir Ahmadu Bello points out above). In addition, the English court practice of oath-taking greatly undercut the religious belief and practice of not taking oath, unless it was absolutely necessary and where a disreputable character was involved. Thus, apart from undermining the traditional local legal system, the new introduction generated demoralising effects. The confusion involved in the many avenues for appeal in local problems—-to the Emir, to the Resident, and to the Magistrate Court, did not enhance efficient functioning of the system.

Thus by introducing these foreign institutions into local government in the emirate in the colonial era,
the contradictions mentioned--a more authoritarian rule, poor education, low morale, loss of respect for tradition, etc.,--resulted, as has been demonstrated above. These contradictions, in other words, contributed to the non-maximization of the objectives set for local government and partly account for the rather poor performance of the system in this era. We must now go on to examine what the situation was in the self-governing era, 1950 to 1965.
CHAPTER THREE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORMS IN KANO EMIRATE, 1950-1965

Most political scientists who have studied Northern Nigeria, or part of it, tend to agree that the appearance of political stability there up to the military coup d'état of January, 1966, depended generally on its favourable socio-political climate. It was on the whole a climate in which the traditional and political elite found a willing, and hardly challenged, acceptance of their authority by the masses. The political elite, on the other hand, deliberately pursued a policy of phased modernization, one that held the best chances of not alienating the traditional elite (the Chiefs), whilst it very gradually attempted to satisfy the upcoming young, educated radicals by encouraging political and economic development. In no period in this study is the clash of tradition and modernity more apparent. Rather paradoxically, in none other is the attempted accommodation of the young, seemingly precocious

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1 Some of the scholars are L.G. Cowan, op. cit., M.J. Campbell, op. cit., C.S. Whitaker, op. cit., and B. J. Dudley, op. cit.
educated elements, by a political elite with very strong links and attachments to tradition, seen more clearly. It is these combinations that distinguish this era from the colonial era that it followed.

BRITISH LABOUR GOVERNMENT'S LOCAL GOVERNMENT DISPATCH

The distinguishing line that can be drawn between the colonial era (the era of Indirect Rule) and the self-governing era, is the British Labour government's dispatch of 1947. The end of the Second World War saw the coming to power in Britain of a Labour government. In power, Labour saw an opportunity to implement some of its ideas about colonies. And when Arthur Creech Jones was promoted Colonial Secretary in October, 1946 (after being Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies from the coming to power of the Labour government in June, 1945), a man of deep and longstanding interest in colonial questions became Colonial Secretary.¹ Creech Jones put Labour policy simply. According to him,

a) Territories should be administered by colonial powers as a trust for the Native inhabitants, the principal object of the Administration being the welfare, education and development of those inhabitants.

b) ... a primary object of the Administration should always be to train the native inhabitants in every possible way, so that they may be able in the shortest possible time to govern themselves ... The test of our policy should not be British advantage, but the happiness, prosperity and freedom of the colonial people themselves.¹

It was a shift from the earlier concept of a dual mandate, which held the view that the British were no philanthropists. It held that they had come out to the colonies to benefit themselves, but that in advancing their own interest they had the other mandate to advance the interests of the native peoples.² Thenceforth, it was to be (at least as Creech Jones wished it), a uni-mandate, i.e., a single mandate for advancing the happiness, prosperity and freedom of the colonial peoples. How this was to be achieved was also laid down. It was to be done through goodwill and cooperation and participation of the local peoples. Thus,

¹ Ibid., p. 6.
In all the planning, they should be consulted, their representative organs should be developed, responsibility must grow in executive as well as legislative machinery, they must be trained to play their part in administration and the services, and in the economic activities necessary for the building of their country.

It was a direct call for popular participation by the masses, a shift in emphasis from a concentration on training and using of, mainly, the chiefs, a call for development of the legislative, executive and administrative arms of government. It was a landmark in colonial administration, a blow on Indirect Rule.

In its elaboration on this document, the Fabian society made clear its concept of local government. It was of the opinion that administrative bodies, boards, committees and such are not local government bodies if set up by a central government (whether or not composed of local inhabitants nominated for the purpose). Rather, local government accepts a measure of responsibility for the formulation of policy and its execution, a sufficient degree of authority to plan the services, and sufficiency of money to maintain them at a satisfactory level.

1 A. Creech Jones, op. cit., p. 9.
efficiency. The real question from the point of view of the Fabians, either in Britain or in the colonies, is whether good government is preferable to self-government. To them it is not. Self-government, they hold, should be the choice everywhere. The impact of the Fabian society on the British Labour party has been tremendous from its foundation. Indeed a lot of its theoretical concepts have oftentimes been adopted as official Labour policy. Local government has been no exception to this.¹

The Labour government (1945-51) policy, then, was to attempt to convert the conservative system of Indirect Rule into a representative and development-oriented local government. Local government in the emirate, as will be shown below, especially as it passed, in this era, from the hands of the colonial administrative elite into the hands of indigenous Northern Nigeria political leaders, was to become a means not only to political but also to economic development, and to the political education of the people, functions which, as seen above, had hardly been considered for local government in the colonial era.

¹ R. Hinden, (ed.), Local Government and the Colonies (London, 1950), pp. 6-14. For example, H. Morrison and the Fabians had advocated the idea of public corporations for years before the Labour party finally adopted it.
AIMS OF NORTHERN NIGERIA POLITICAL LEADERS
FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Northern Nigeria, as has been seen in Chapter Two, was deeply rooted in tradition. Respect by the people for traditionally established authority and the acceptance of the authority of the Chief as divinely endowed, as already discussed, contributed to the Emir’s legitimacy in Kano emirate. Gradual changes were introduced in this era, changes from chiefly rule to rule involving mass participation, changes which meant great strides not only at the local, but at the regional and national levels. In brief, by 1950, elections were held to the new Northern House of Assembly and the first clear step was taken towards the road to responsible self-government.¹ That election put the affairs of Northern Nigeria in the hands not of the Emirs, but in the hands of some men of aristocratic birth and some of common lineage. For example, the Sardauna of Sokoto, who became leader of government business, came of the royal lineage of the Sultan of Sokoto.² It is no wonder, then, that he later assumed the post of Minister of Local Government, forming,

¹ A. Bello, op. cit., Ch. 2, passim.
² Ibid.
thereby, a deliberate link between the new political rulers and the old traditional rulers.

Thus, one of the most cherished and one of the dearest aims of the new political leaders for local government, in Kano emirate as in all Northern Nigeria, was to continue to show traditional respect for the Emir and to accept his continued importance. In this regard, Chiefs were to continue to preside over N.A. councils as active chairmen, taking a full part in the formulation of Native Authority policy . . . . Administratively, the Chief should confine himself to supervision, i.e., satisfying himself that the policy of the regional government and of his N.A. is being properly carried out. That judicially the Chief should continue to enjoy the position established by past practice as modified and modernized by recent judicial legislation. He should always retain the right to hear complaints at any time in any place.¹

In other words, the role of the Emir which heretofore was that of a Sole Authority was to be gradually, but very cautiously, altered. He was to begin, on a formal plane, to share his authority. N.A. policy-making responsibility

¹ Ministry of Local Government, Northern Nigeria, Policy Circulars (Kaduna, 1966), Circular 80, 1962, MLG 4123/S.1/100. Though formally put in as a policy circular in 1962, the Northern People's Congress (NPC) had shown a favourable disposition towards the Emirs since assumption of power in 1950.
was to be taken away from him, though ultimately, both in the judicial and legislative aspect, his power was to dwindle to that of a constitutional monarch, with very good opportunities to advise, warn and even insist on occasions. It was apparent to the political leaders of the Northern Region of Nigeria, in this era, that the urgent need for development and reform in many directions, including that of the position of the Emir, could not be disputed. Yet, they realized that care would have to be taken to ensure that the balance of traditional authority was not upset by too rapid a change.

Another primary aim in this era appears to have been for economic development. To serve this end, N.A.s were permitted, provided the approval of the Minister of Trade and Industries was given, to engage in trade which might further the development and welfare of the area, especially if such cannot be adequately served by the private sector. ¹ In addition, N.A.s were permitted with the approval of the Minister of Finance to raise loans within the country for the purposes of capital expenditures, e.g., for purposes of the acquisition of

¹ Northern Nigerian Government, Local Government Law (Kaduna, 1954), Ch. 77, Sec. 30.
land, erection of buildings and the execution of other permanent works. Later in this period, surplus funds in the hands of N.A.s were encouraged to be channeled into a short-term deposit fund operated by the Regional government's Accountant-General. As the Northern Regional government circular put it,

The development and future prosperity of Northern Nigeria must depend very largely upon the amount of money that can be made available both to N.A.s and to the government. It is of the utmost importance that all available funds are put to work . . . and this is the reason why it is necessary to ask N.A.s to place as much of their surplus in the short-term deposit fund.  

The idea of economic development had been of little importance in the colonial period. In this period, it was to receive some attention at the local government level. Brian Smith has suggested that a major policy for local government in this period was the desire to replace Indirect Rule with democratic and efficient local government, and to prepare the people for political independence.

1 Ibid., Sec. 83.


A number of measures were attempted to ensure efficiency in local government. For example, in preparing their estimates the N.A.s had to comply with certain financial stipulations such as not putting more than forty-five per cent of recurrent expenditure on personal emoluments. Along the lines of capital expenditure, as well, N.A.s were required to keep within a certain percentage of capital expenditure for each Department or groups of Departments.

In disposing of the reports of the boards of survey (the boards were set up to condemn obsolete and useless or unserviceable materials), local government was to adopt a policy of caution. If the original value of materials involved was over £200, report of the board had to be forwarded to the Ministry of Local Government, asking if there was any objection to the course of action proposed by the boards of survey.

After consultation with the Director of Audit, the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government, will either confirm the recommendation of the Board of Survey, or issue further directions regarding the action to be taken.

1 A.S. Gaya, Local Government in Northern Nigeria (Kaduna, 1965), p. 7. Though printed in 1965, Alhaji Sule was describing what had been in operation since the NPC took control of Northern Nigeria affairs.

The fact that the boards were aware of the possibility that the Regional government could perform further examination of such surveys, tended to make such local government surveys very efficient in this era. For example, no complaints were raised by the Ministry with respect to Kano emirate.

Steps were taken in the interest of economic development to combat declining standards in the Native Treasuries. As a way of fighting problems such as:

i) Outstanding general tax at close of the financial year,

ii) Losses of funds,

iii) Improper preparation of N.A. estimates,

Divisional Officers (DOs), the political officers in the divisions in charge of treasuries below Grade A category (there were Grades A, B and C, rated according to the financial capability), were required to carry out a monthly check. A Native Treasury could be down-graded if the DO found it inefficient, i.e., not meeting its financial obligations. Efficiency, it appears, was looked upon not for its own sake, but as a factor which, if established and maintained at local government level, would assist economic development and the building, eventually, of a strong nation.
The old practice of one N.A.s to itself was, to some extent, dropped, in this era. Joint projects were encouraged to bring about efficient and effective service. For example,

... where two or more N.A.s desire to make provisions for the joint operation of services of any kind (which term shall include police, prisons, a treasury and other service which a single N.A. may lawfully operate) they may, with the approval of the Minister, by instrument jointly and severally, establish a committee for the purpose (herein-after referred to as a joint committee), to consist of a person appointed in a manner agreed between the N.A.s concerned and subject to the provisions ... jointly and severally delegate to such joint committee all or any of their functions in respect of the operations of such services.¹

Such joint projects could bring together some of the leaders in the respective N.A.s. Such elite cooperation, it was assumed, would promote understanding and might contribute to political stability, and hence, ultimately to local and national development.

Local government was not used in this way alone, to attempt to serve national interest. N.A. officials were encouraged to go on leave of absence to serve in

¹ Ministry of Local Government, Local Government Law (1954), Sec. 70.
the more senior governments--Regional and Federal levels. In such situations, a N.A. official who went to serve as a Regional or Federal Minister or Parliamentary Secretary, had his post retained in the estimates (without provisions and with an explanatory footnote). And whenever he returned, he returned to his former position or was given a post equivalent in status and salary. In serving the nation's interest in this way, the N.A. was, as well, contributing to political education as well as the level of participation of the elite. Though N.A. officials were non-councillors, the political experiences acquired at regional and/or federal level, were all related to the political process and were, like all experiences, to serve as aids in their contacts (with councillors as well as in administrative duties).

In this era, as well, we see a departure from the ascriptive and particularistic method of recruitment and promotion of N.A. staff. We see a gradual effort to change to universalistic and achievement criteria. N.A.s, for example, were required to appoint staff officers. The duties of such staff officers (or Personnel

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Officers) were to include appointments, promotions, postings, transfers, retirement benefits, in-service training, discipline, etc.\(^1\) Further, no one was to be recruited who did not have a secondary two educational qualification or higher.\(^2\) It was part of the move to gradually modernize local government.

Local government was also employed to get the mass of the people involved in the political process. Apart from the Native Authorities that were set up, outer councils were created in addition to the subordinate councils. The outer council was a body with no executive power, consisting of Federal and Regional legislators for the area, the N.A. councillors, members of various interest groups—ethnic, religious and others interested. In Kano emirate, the outer council elected its chairman (never the Emir), and it gave its views on development projects and any other subjects.\(^3\) The subordinate councils, on the other hand, were creations of the N.A. for the emirate. The Kano N.A.

\(^1\) Ibid., Circular No. 59, MLG/971/1, 24 October, 1958.
\(^2\) Ibid., Circular No. 41, MLG/823/7, 5 September, 1961
\(^3\) Northern Nigeria Government, Provincial Annual Report (Kaduna, 1952), Kano Chapter.
divided its area into districts, villages and towns and chose district heads and village heads. It then delegated a few of the N.A. responsibilities to such district and village councils.\(^1\) With some elected representatives in the district and village councils which gradually came between 1954 and 1965, the scope of participation in the political process was widened whilst the opportunity for administrative and political education increased.

The Native Authority Law, 1954, formally legalized the creation of subordinate councils, as well as the outer councils. A N.A., it said, may

\[
\text{with the approval of the Minister, divide the area under its jurisdiction or any part of that area into districts, village areas and wards or such other administrative sub-areas as it may consider expedient, and appoint a person to be head of any district, village area.} \quad \text{\(2\)}
\]

The outer council, on the other hand, was to be

\[
\text{... a representative or consultative body to perform such duties on behalf of, and to render such assistance and advice to the N.A. as may be specified in the instrument establishing the council.} \quad \text{\(\ldots\) the}
\]

\(^1\) Northern Nigeria Government, *Native Authority Law* (Kaduna, 1954), Sec. 55.

outer council shall have no executive powers or functions, and shall not form part of the N.A. ¹ (emphasis added).

The aims of the political leaders of Northern Nigeria (i.e., the leaders of the NPC, the government party in Northern Nigeria) for local government, in this era, can now be briefly summarized. From the above discussion, they can be said to have been:

1. To preserve the traditional authority of the Emir and at the same time get him to share his authority;

2. To involve the people in the process of government—improving their chances for political participation and also enhancing their political and administrative education;

3. To bring about economic progress and to assist local government to be financially self-supporting;

4. To gradually evolve a modern system of local government.

Before examining what reforms were introduced in local government in this era, as a step towards achieving these objectives, let us consider how these aims and objectives

¹ Northern Nigeria Government, Local Government Law (Kaduna, 1954), Sec. 56.
compare with the list of criteria of what local government should be doing, developed in Chapter One. That is to say, we shall examine how the set aims were in line with normative theoretical criteria set up in that Chapter.

**RECONCILING AIMS AND OBJECTIVES WITH NORMATIVE CRITERIA**

Implicitly, it appears that all items on our normative list of criteria are represented in the aims and objectives laid down for local government in this era. For example, in getting the Emir to share his authority, making way for a partially elected and so more representative N.A., both democratic ideals and political participation of the people would be served. In fact, the aim of local government to involve the people in the process of government is directly relevant to our normative ideal for political participation of the masses. Also, in aiming at bringing about economic progress, the aim of local government in this era appears congruent to that of the normative criteria that suggest a need for local government to promote infrastructural services (like public works, health, etc.) and foster socio-
economic development. Also, the ideals that local
government should be engaged in promoting protective
services and fostering national integration, are some-
what implicit in the objectives of bringing about
economic progress and evolving a modern system of local
government. It appears, however, that the emphasis placed
upon protective services, in this era, is done not for
its own sake, as in the colonial era (not just for preser-
vving peace and order) but rather in order that certain
infrastructures and parts of the economy might not be
misused, ill treated or destroyed. There is hence a
shift from individual protection to protection of the
infrastructure, in this era. This makes the preserva-
tion of law and order more secondary and less apparent
as an objective in this era. In the colonial era it
was a major objective.

National integration, it might be said, was not
looked upon as a function of local government in this
era. However, we find that in encouraging joint opera-
tions between two or more N.A.s, the earlier policy
of exclusivism—the policy of one council to itself--

1 Ministry of Local Government, Local Government Law,
1954, Sec. 70.
was to give way to an era of cooperation. Since such elite cooperation involved Kano, Kazaure, Gumel and Hadjeija emirates in road projects at this time, local government was promoting development, understanding, as well as stability and confidence in the system. All these are not only in local interest but in the national interest as well.

It would appear then, that all the criteria of what local government should be doing developed in Chapter One above, are somehow implicit in the aims and objectives of local government in the emirate at this time. This, in itself, shows the marked contrast between this period and the earlier one (in which some of the criteria, the development category, especially, were not given a place) and also the following military era (where, as we shall demonstrate, some of these ideals are also lacking). In the self-governing era, local government appears to have been at its best. Political parties and competition existed (though admittedly the Opposition parties were weak). Nationalists struggled to bring independence and with it improvement in the ways of living. We must now go on to examine the major reforms in local government in this era.
INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE N.A. SYSTEM

The structure and working of Native administration in Northern Nigeria, did not please a number of Northern Nigeria educated elements in the years before 1950. The N.A. was, however, so directly identified with the Emirs, that no one had ventured, or dared, to come out openly against it, till 1950. In August of that year, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa broke the ice. In a rather dramatic action in the Northern House of Assembly (the regional legislature), he moved a motion to the effect that an independent commission be set up

...to investigate the system of N.A. in the Northern provinces and to make recommendations for its modernization and reform.

The motion of Tafawa Balewa (later Alhaji Sir Abubakar, Nigeria's first Prime Minister), was supported by such eminent personalities as Yahaya Ilorin, the Wali of Bornu, Muhammadu Ribiadu of Adamawa and Shettima Kashim of Bornu.¹ This measure of support made it apparent that something almost radical would emerge from the demand. Yet it was a few years before the local

government Reform Bill was produced. Study committees had to be set up and it was not until the summer of 1954, four years after the issue was first raised, that the celebrated Native Authority Law was enacted.¹ That law, with very minor amendments, remained the pivot of local government throughout this era.

The N.A. law of 1954 can, in some ways, be regarded as a radical document, a type of Northern Nigeria "Great Reform Bill", or even the "Magna Carta", in the field of local government. It was a document that began a progressive trend to democratizing and modernizing local government. On the other hand, it has been seen as a law that,

...did not impose a new system of local government, but rather legalized and modernized a system of government that had existed over large areas of the North for a long time...²

Both concepts can be justified. The law, for example, brought more opportunities for mass participation and involvement. On the other hand, the new arrangements

¹ The major study was the Maddocks-Potts, Report on Local Government in Northern Nigeria (Kaduna, 1951). See also D.A. Potts, Progress Report on Local Government in Northern Region, Nigeria (Kaduna, 1953).

² Northern Nigeria Local Government Year Book, 1966, p. 79.
were based on the old geographical boundaries and the pre-1950 traditional system of the N.A.

**TYPES OF COUNCIL:** A major change brought about by the 1954 law was the disappearance of the Sole Authority in the N.A., i.e., the system whereby the Emir alone was recognized as the absolute ruler of his N.A. It was the disappearance of the Sole Authority that one of the select committees on the relationship of the Chiefs to his Council tried to justify when it argued that,

"Both by tradition and by current practice... the relationship between Chiefs and their councils would be more accurately described by the phrase Chief in Council than by the existing appointment of Chiefs as Sole Native Authorities."

In the new law, Native Authority councils were classified into three categories:

1) **Chief in Council:** In this type of council the Chief presided at all meetings of council, had a casting vote in the event of a tie (though not an original vote) and acted in accordance with the opinion of the majority of the council when consulted. He could, however, when he thought the matter to be decided was too unimportant to require the advice of his entire councillors, or to

---

1 Quoted in A. Bello, *op. cit.*, p. 77
him the matter was of such urgency that calling the
council would be unwise, consult with only two members.
In such a case, the Chief had to communicate to the
council the measure that had been adopted and the reasons
for such. Also, the Chief, in case of disagreement with
council, was allowed to take what action he thought best
in the interest of order and good government. But then
he would have to report such a disagreement to the Gover-
nor of the Region.¹ The Emir of Kano, whose jurisdiction
is our special interest, operated in this era as a Chief-
in-Council.

ii) Chief and Council: Here the Chief had an original
vote and a casting vote in case of a tie. The major
difference with the sole authority was that in the exer-
cise of his functions, the Chief in this type of council
had no power to act contrary to the advice or decision of
the Council.² Thus, the decision-making power of the
Chief here was less than that of a Chief-in-Council.

iii) Council: This type of N.A. varied not only in
structure but also in composition and procedure. It
could be:

¹ Northern Nigeria Government, op. cit., Ch. 77, Sec. 7.
² Ibid., Sec. 8.
a) A council of wholly elected members;

b) A council with a Chief and traditional and nominated members, and a majority of elected members;

c) A council with a Chief and other traditional and nominated members with equal number of elected members;

d) A council with a Chief and other traditional and nominated members with a minority of elected members.¹

For one thing, the law laid down what percentage of people were to be nominated to councils. Others had to be selected by popular election (a distinguishing feature of category iii above). In the cases of categories i and ii above, no stipulations were laid down as to whether members of council should be only traditional or popularly elected members. In this era, they included both types. In a recent study, Billy Dudley of the University of Ibadan, found that of the 1,680 N.A. councillors in 1963, 399 were ex-officio members; 427 were nominated, and 854, i.e., about fifty-one per cent, were elected.² Dudley showed that in all three categories

¹ B.J. Dudley, op. cit., p. 243.
² Ibid.
of councils, the trend was towards making the councils more representative of the people, by making them elected councils. There can be little doubt that this trend was a radical change from the pre-1950 situation when no elected councillors existed.

The N.A. councils, at this time, operated in one of three ways--by the portfolio or ministerial form; by the committee form, or by the administrative councillor form. We can attempt some clarification of the three forms.

The Portfolio or Ministerial Form: This was the form in which Departments were grouped into "portfolios", and these portfolios were then allocated to selected councillors called portfolio councillors. They were, in other words, made responsible to the full council for the supervision of the Departments within their portfolio and the respective councillors were responsible for seeing that the Departments under their charge would carry out the responsibilities of their portfolio. A councillor with a portfolio may be an elected or a nominated councillor. A portfolio councillor who is a traditionally nominated member could hold his portfolio indefinitely while an elected councillor could hold his own for the life of the council.  

1 Northern Nigeria Government, Policy Circulars, p. 79, Part II of the Constitution of the N.A.s.
The Committee Form: The basic difference here was that the portfolio, instead of being allocated to one person, went to a committee.

The Administrative or Executive Council System: Here again the basic difference from the portfolio form was that only the elected councillors were selected into the administrative or executive council portfolio. This was with the hope that such an arrangement would make for better accountability and differentiation: accountability, because elected councillors will be easier to criticize than traditional members of council, and will think of their re-election; differentiation, because the traditional role of the traditional members of council can be distinguished from formal council executive and administrative roles. Thus, the working here was similar to the portfolio system.

In brief, changes brought into local government by the 1954 Act and which remained in the emirate throughout this era, can be represented comparatively and diagramatically to show the N.A. and the subordinate District and Village councils and the outer council:
**FIGURE III**

**LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN KANO EMIRATE,**
**DIAGRAMATIC COMPARISON OF COLONIAL AND SELF-GOVERNING ERA**

**COLONIAL ERA PRE-1950**

- CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
  - KANO NATIVE AUTHORITY (SOLE AUTHORITY)
    - District Authority Chief
    - Village Chief
    - Village Chief
    - District Head Chief

**SELF-GOVERNING ERA c. 1950-1965**

- REGIONAL GOVERNMENT
  - OUTER COUNCIL
    - Informal
    - Legal, statutory authority to
    - Non-statutory Discretionary
    - Only Delegated
  - KANO NATIVE AUTHORITY
    - Dist. Council
    - Town Council
    - Dist. Council
    - Dist. Council
    - Village Council
    - Village Council

Having given a very brief description of the structure and working of local government in this self-governing era, especially as it was altered by the local government Act of 1954, and having given a brief diagramatic comparison of it with local government in the colonial era, we must now attempt to assess how far the aims of the Northern Nigeria political leaders for local government were achieved at this time.
EVALUATING PERFORMANCE IN TERMS OF THE AIDS SET

The main aims of the political leaders for local government in this era have been examined above. In brief, they were:

1) The desire to preserve the traditional authority of the Emir and yet get him to gradually share that authority;

2) To involve the people in the process of government;

3) To bring about economic progress;

4) To evolve a modern system of local government, based on achievement and other universalistic criteria.

How far were these aims achieved in Kano emirate at this time?

The Role of the Emir: This was in the forefront in the conflict between Sir Ahmadu Bello and Alhaji Sanusi, discussed in full below. The Emir himself, as will be seen in the discussion, had expressed the desire to share his authority at the beginning of his reign. What the 1954 local government law did with respect to him, then, was to legalize what had been voluntarily conceded.

Whatever the situation, a Chief-in-Council N.A.- replaced
the old system of Sole Authority N.A. in the emirate. In effect, the Emir had a council and thus shared the decision-making authority. But, complaints of favouring political and religious friends were made against the Emir.\(^1\) This, indeed, gave legitimacy to the Muffett inquiry of 1962, set up to investigate the activities of the Emir in relation to the N.A. finances. (This is discussed more fully below.)

In this era, it can be said then, that the role of the Emir was gradually modified, and he, in fact, did come to share his authority to a great extent. Till the end of the era, the N.A. remained a Chief-in-Council with considerable amount of authority still in the Emir's hands. Since a Chief and council system was not imposed on Kano emirate, the Emir did not become one among equals. Rather, he still retained his superior position, though now he formally accepted the advice of council. In this light, an attempt was made to preserve to a reasonable degree the traditional authority of the Emir. It is, however, very doubtful whether the office of the Emir retained the same respect, awe and reverence accorded

\(^1\) J. Paden, op. cit., pp. 267-270.
to that traditional office, in 1965, after the Sanusi showdown (see below), as it held at the beginning of this era in 1950. The fact that the Emir had to concede some of his authority to the elected representatives with the coming to force of the new local government arrangements meant relinquishing some of his traditional powers. The office of Emir, in other words, saw some change (partly as a result of the gradual policy pursued and also as a result of the new legislation). The question remains as to whether or not the system would have done better with a less gradual approach and with more equality among the population.

Involvement of Local People in Process of Government: There are various levels of political involvement. They include the elementary act of exercising one's right to vote in an election, becoming a formal member of a political organization, taking part in various interest groups and pressure groups, contributing in cash or in kind towards the party, e.g., working for a party at election time or between elections, and being a candidate for an election. In the emirate, in this era, twenty-five district councils and two Town councils were created and recognized
by the Ministry of Local Government. In all of them there existed the traditional and ex-officio members (non-elected), and from the 1958 local elections, a percentage of elected councillors.¹ The period thus offered opportunities for mass involvement. Local elections in which councillors were elected from wards were held in 1958 and 1961, Regional elections to the House of Assembly (the Regional Legislative) were held in 1956 and 1961, and Federal elections to the Federal Parliament came in 1954, 1959 and 1964. All these elections gave citizens the opportunity to select their leaders at the local, regional and federal levels. Other more active citizens had the opportunity to serve as party officials, and party representatives at pools, as well as join in planning of party strategies, whilst still others had the chance to actually become representatives in council and/or the legislatures. These elections were by secret ballot and (because the political leaders insisted on preserving Muslim tradition and practice), manhood rather than adult suffrage. In other words, opportunities for political participation at very close

¹ J.N. Paden, op. cit., p. 309.
quarters were made available. Some very interesting
trends are observed in Kano emirate in this era. Among
the successful candidates to the Federal House of Rep-
resentatives, in the very first election to that House
in 1954, eight out of eleven were by occupation N.A.
councillors or N.A. employees. The following table
shows their background. ¹

**TABLE VI**

**FEDERAL ELECTIONS, 1954. SOME DATA ON KANO CANDIDATES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>BIRTH DATE</th>
<th>ETHNICITY</th>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>POLITICAL STAMP UP TO 1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Maikano Dutse</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Fulani</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.P.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Baba Daradara</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Nupe</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.P.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mudi Kazaure</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Hausa/Fulani</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.P.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Umaru/Gumel</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Hausa/Fulani</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.P.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Rilwanu Abdullahi</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Hausa/Fulani</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.P.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Mahmud Bayero</td>
<td>c. 1932</td>
<td>Fulani</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.P.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Baba Dinbappa</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>TRADER</td>
<td>N.P.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Adamu Danguwuwa</td>
<td>c. 1916</td>
<td>Fulani</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.P.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Muhtari Sarkin Bai</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>Fulani</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.P.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Maitama Sule</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Hausa/Fulani</td>
<td>TEACHER</td>
<td>N.P.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Ahmadu Rufai</td>
<td>1917</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>TEACHER</td>
<td>N.P.C.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the 1959 Federal elections, on the other hand, eighteen of the thirty N.P.C. candidates in that year were N.A. councillors or N.A. employees, whilst seven were District or Village Heads. In other words, in 1954, 72.7 per cent of all Federal Members of Parliament (M.P.s) from Kano had had their political tutelage in local government (in the N.A.). In 1959, the percentage was 83.3,1 showing an overall high level of participation.

In the Northern Region by itself the Upper House of the Regional legislature was made up entirely of Chiefs who, as Alhaji Sule Gaya said, "... are daily engaged in the business of local government." In fact, by 1965 there were five Chiefs who were Ministers, and "the majority of Ministers and parliamentarians have held positions of authority in their own N.A."2 Hence, whether with respect to the Northern Region Legislature, or to the Federal Parliament in Lagos, local government in Kano emirate, in this era, was a good training ground for the upper levels of government and hence a source of involvement in the process of government. In fact, in none of the other two eras did local government succeed

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in training the leaders of local government for the higher levels of government. In no other was local government also offered the same opportunity, for in the colonial era, the Governor's advisers were few and the composition of the Legislative Council, as mentioned above, was not based on mass election. In the military era, on the other hand, as will be shown in the next chapter, all representative assemblies were eliminated by Federal government decree.\footnote{See Decree No. 33 of 1966, in \textit{African Law Digest}, Vol. 2, 1966, p. 199.}

Apart from the practical, on-the-job education, local government also offered the local leaders formal education. A course was organized at the Institute of Administration, Zaria, for district and village heads and scribes. Here administrative as well as political training was given, and Kano emirate, like the other emirates, continuously sent in candidates. This was not all the opportunity for formal education. The courses at the Institute of Administration at Zaria were supplemented by other courses offered by the Ministry of Local Government at Kaduna.\footnote{Northern Nigeria Government, \textit{op. cit.}, Circular No. 19, MLG/L/LGT/71/77, 30 April, 1965.}
employees who took the courses are not set aside from others in the region, it is apparent from the reasonably efficient way in which the financial affairs of the councils were conducted that considerable improvements had occurred in the areas of accounting and auditing practices, and in the reporting systems—areas in which courses were offered at Kaduna as well as Zaria. In this era then, there can be little doubt that local government indeed aided involvement in the process of government. The question however remains how well this was done, and at what expense.

**Economic Progress:** Here again, considerable strides were taken, especially if we compare this era with the colonial era. What Hadley Cantril said of Nigeria in general, was true of Kano emirate in this period. Cantril saw Nigerians, . . . as a people bubbling with aspirations . . . sophisticated with respect to their desire for cultural and economic development. They are self-consciously concerned with . . . development which they see (can help them to) attain greater unity and raise their standard of living . . .

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1 The Financial Memoranda for use in Native Treasuries, issued on the direction of the Minister of Local Government, Northern Nigeria, was published in this era (1951 and 1954).

Kano emirate is one of the areas where this aspiration is easily perceived at this time. Economically, the emirate grew very fast after World War II. From 1954 to 1962 a considerable number of new industries were established there. The industrial growth slowed down from 1963-1965, partly because the Regional government decided to concentrate its attention on Kaduna and Jos. In total, by 1960, Kano emirate had 231 industrial establishments (twenty-two per cent of entire Northern Nigeria's).\(^1\) Though this was no direct achievement of Kano N.A. (since the industrial projects were mainly set up by the Regional government), it did show the calibre of leadership that the emirate possessed, a calibre of men who saw the need for, and were able to negotiate, such deals with the Regional government. And though local government cannot claim credit for industries set up by the state government, it is the fact that the attraction of the industries to the emirate affected its economy. This has shown once again, as earlier demonstrated, with the instance of the maintenance of law and order in Chapter Two, that the activities of another level of government

\(^1\) J. Paden, *op. cit.*, pp. 318-319.
can favourably or unfavourably, directly or indirectly, aid or hinder another level of government in the achievement of its aims and objectives.

Let us briefly examine an aspect of staff matters. In matters dealing with technical staff, a measure of cooperation and assistance can be seen apparently directed at enhancing economic development. Regional government officers were

... to have more influence in regard to recruitment, promotions and disciplinary action over N.A. technical staff ... When matters of policy require decision, the responsible N.A. councillor must first consult the appropriate Ministry representative before submitting his proposal to council ... ¹

Such restrictions were for the purpose of ensuring that the right advice was secured and that the usually better-trained Regional government official gave the necessary direction to the N.A. official in the interest of economic progress. This, apart, there was easy flow of communication and personnel interaction between the officials and Ministers of the Regional and Federal governments.²

² S. Gaya, op. cit., p. 9
This made for better utilization of skills of state government officials in the interest of economic progress. It is noteworthy that some expansion in another direction was characteristic of the period in the emirate. For example, concentrated efforts were made to improve the provision of water supply. The quantity made available increased from 450 million gallons in 1955 to 565 million gallons in 1959, and the situation progressively improved in the urban areas. As mentioned above, industries grew up and at a rate that was the highest in the region. This industrial development, however, slowed down after the Sardauna-Sanusi conflict reached its crisis, as already noted above, showing in some way what a breakdown in good relations between the N.A. (local government) and the Regional (state) government could mean to local development.

Viewed from another direction, a comparison of employees in various jurisdictions at this time would give a rough estimate of how much local government participated in the economy of Kano emirate. Local government, in other words, employed about thirty-four per cent

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3 Northern Nigeria Government, Statistical Yearbook
of all employed people in the province in 1956 and over thirty-five per cent in 1957, and has since maintained a reasonably high figure.\(^1\) (See Table VII below.)

Agriculture, as mentioned above, has always been an important aspect of the economy of the emirate. The old school of agriculture at Samaru continued to provide training in modern agricultural techniques. In January, 1964, a Home Economics course for women was added, not only to orient the attitude of women in the community, but also to teach domestic science courses. In May of 1964, too, another school of agriculture was opened at Kabba.\(^2\) Kano N.A. took advantage of these training schools in the region. Its performance, in this regard, can be compared with that of the Regional government. In 1962-63, for example, Kano N.A. had nine products from the schools, the Regional government produced only seven (for the various government experimental farms). In 1963-64, the government had four, and Kano N.A. had twelve, whilst in 1964-65 the table turned in favour of

\(^1\) B.A.W. Travallion, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

| YEAR | TOTAL OF ALL EMPLOYED | FEDERAL EMPL. | % | REGIONAL EMPL. | % | LOCAL EMPL. | % | PUBLIC COOPERATION | % | COMMERCIAL | % | VOLUNTARY AGENCIES | % |
|------|-----------------------|---------------|---|----------------|---|-------------|---|-------------------|---|-------------|---|-------------------|---|---|
| 1956 | 17,429                | 348           | 2 | 2,118          | 12| 5,864       | 34| 2,329             | 14| 6,770       | 38| N/A              | - |
| 1957 | 15,745                | 546           | 3 | 2,126          | 13| 5,396       | 35| 1,237             | 7 | 6,440       | 41| N/A              | - |
| 1958 | 18,473                | 1,813         | 9 | 2,830          | 15| 5,848       | 33| 1,868             | 10| 6,114       | 38| N/A              | - |
| 1959 | 21,147                | 1,775         | 7 | 2,942          | 14.5| 5,284     | 26| 1,344             | 6 | 9,699       | 46| 103              | 0.5 |
| 1960 | 21,797                | 1,166         | 5 | 3,361          | 15| 6,050       | 28| 1,305             | 6 | 9,783       | 45.3| 132             | 0.7 |

the Regional government. It produced twelve to the emirate's nine.\footnote{1} There is no doubt that some progress was made in improving the economy in this era. The question that arises, however, is whether the system attained its maximum capacity. If, as it is apparent, it did not, our problem then is to account for the factors that were responsible for the non-maximization of capacity in terms of the objectives identified.

Modern Standards Based on Universal and Achievement Criteria: It was the attempt to introduce these ideals, for example, educational excellence rather than birth, and a non-corrupt administration, that led to the Emir's crisis in the emirate, discussed in full below. That recruitment and promotion had to be solely on the basis of merit was a radical departure from the earlier practice whereby officials held their positions at the personal pleasure of the Emir. The effort to introduce universalistic and achievement criteria, in other words, conflicted with traditional practices and views. This conflict is seen in the fact that whilst at Kaduna, the Regional (state) Capital, political and bureaucratic

\footnote{1 Statistical Yearbook, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 120.}
leaders worked hard to establish in practice the principle that any highly qualified and sufficiently experienced person could serve the region anywhere he was required, the Emir of Kano, as will be discussed below, was resisting the appointment of a commoner as a provincial commissioner for Kano, when the provincial system was to be set up. ¹

It was the accepted norm for the Emir, as sole authority of local government (the N.A.), to show favour to his favourites and close advisers. Up till the 1954 Act, this went on unabated. After that, local government in the emirate was gradually modernized and democratized. In fact, by 1959 there was a majority of elected members in the councils of the emirate. ² Traditional and nominated members, however, continued to sit on council and the emirate council was a Chief-in-Council type. Qualification for voting at the

¹ The attempt to set up provincial administrations all over the region was one of the sources of conflict between the Emir of Kano and the Sardauna of Sokoto (the Premier of the Region), as discussed below.

² C.S. Whitaker, op. cit., pp. 239-245.
local level was set by the Regional government, and just as existed at the Regional level and in accordance with Muslim practice, it was by manhood suffrage. Meetings of councils, after 1959, were open and accessible to all interested. ¹ A typical N.A. council had the Emir's stool directly facing that of the council's scribe. Other officials and councillors sat to the right and left of the Emir according to party affiliation. A modern parliamentary arrangement was hence in existence. Also, all council members were formally accorded equal status within the council in debate. ² Hence, it can be claimed that from about 1959, a reasonable amount of formal freedom and equality (guaranteed in the statute books), rather than real freedom and equality (i.e., both formal and informal) existed in the local government. Informally each person knew his place. The council's opposition members, all the time very small in number, were given very little hearing. ³ With the new freedom

¹ Ibid.

² Northern Nigerian Government, op. cit., p. 82.

³ For details of this between 1954-59, see B.J. Dudley, op. cit., Ch. VII, passim.
and equality the people could stand on their own and make accusations of favouritism or bribery and corruption against the Emir, as in fact they did at the Muffett Inquiry. But if corruption is behaviour of public officials which deviates from the accepted norms in order to serve private ends, as Samuel Huntington defines it,\(^1\) then one must wonder if the newly set standards had become accepted norms.

Further, a good educational system would appear very essential if a modern standard based on qualification and achievement is to be adopted. Yet Kano emirate was ill-prepared for it. In the area of primary education, which is basic to any higher education, for example, the situation in 1952 was as follows:\(^2\)

**TABLE VIII**

**PRIMARY EDUCATION 1952: NORTHERN NIGERIA AND KANO PROVINCE COMPARED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population Seven Years and Over</th>
<th>No. Literate in Roman Script</th>
<th>Percentage Literate in Roman Script</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northern Nigeria</strong></td>
<td>12,163,561</td>
<td>250,713</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kano Province</strong></td>
<td>2,484,990</td>
<td>23,405</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^2\) Source: Nigerian Census Reports.
Percentage of literate people in Kano, in other words, was far below the regional average at the beginning of the era; a figure of two per cent, which by itself was very low. Primary education, it might be added, was in the hands of the N.A.s, though a few government and voluntary agencies' schools existed.¹

Literacy, it must be acknowledged, is here measured in terms of the level of education according to western standards. It is presumably another western bias of this study. Admittedly a lot were well-schooled in Arabic. Unfortunately, however, the language of administration and accounting was English.

In 1960 the universal primary education scheme was launched in Kano with the opening of thirty-one new junior primary schools. Four new primary schools were also opened in the emirate and an expansion was made in the provincial secondary school to accommodate 240 pupils in nine classes.² Such an effort was no more than a drop in the ocean.

It must be said, however, to the credit of the emirate, that it led the campaign for adult education in

² Northern Nigeria Government, Provincial Annual Report, 1960, p. 82.
this era. The practice was adopted in the emirate whereby the N.A. financed all classes. If a majority of students in the class passed the final examination, the class earned a grant of £10 from the Regional government. If it failed to, the emirate absorbed the loss.\(^1\) The argument was that if the N.A. or District council was aware that it had to pay £10 for each unsuccessful class, it was likely to take a greater interest in ensuring the success of the class. It was hardly considered that many adults probably attended courses, not with a view to passing some examination, but for the practical purpose of improving themselves.

Judging from the primary education and adult education levels, local government in the emirate was hardly in a position to adopt achievement criteria (due to the rather low educational level), and the obvious problem of providing trained personnel remained unsolved.

This apart, the clash of tradition and modernity in the emirate, in this era, created problems. They made the accomplishment of this aim of establishing a local

government with modern standards, based on achievement, difficult. They brought about that head-on collision between the traditional leader of the emirate (the Emir) and the chief political leader of the region, the Premier, which we discuss below and which, as we have seen with its impact on economic progress, was detrimental to the maximization of the objectives of local government.

EXPLAINING THE DEFICIENCIES IN THIS ERA

The aims set by the political leaders, as we have seen, were, in certain respects, as in the colonial era, achieved in this self-governing era. Some of the authority of the Emir was preserved, the people got involved to some extent, in the process of government. But there were problems in attempting to establish a modern local government based on achievement criteria as well as in the aim of bringing about economic progress. The shortcomings or inadequacies making for these problems in the local government of Kano emirate, in this era, were due to a number of factors. First, it can be claimed that the two major characters in the political drama of this period, Sir Ahmadu Bello and Alhaji Sanusi, as will be seen, were out for a show-down. Each felt that the full
strength of his influence and authority had to be clarified and demonstrated to their utmost. There was little desire for a conflict-resolving approach, a conciliatory and humble attitude. This hampered the effectiveness of the leadership available to the emirate. Further, a good number of the emirate leaders were drawn to Kaduna (to the Regional government service), or to Lagos (to the Federal government service). This local brain-drain denied the emirate of necessary and much needed personnel. The poverty in personnel was worsened by the poor planning for educational development. Poverty was not restricted to the personnel level alone. Financially, the emirate, though relatively rich, got little encouragement from the Regional government to embark on crash programs in modern education. In fact, the few government schools in the region were vacated by the government and given over to N.A.s.\(^1\)

Thus, poor financial resources, the dearth of personnel, little encouragement of the central government (the Regional government at Kaduna), all contributed to the non-achievement and non-maximization, i.e., to shortcomings and inadequacies in local government in

this era. Perhaps the factor that contributed more than any other was the indiscriminate importation of local government institutions, ideas and practices that appeared to the political elites of this period to have worked satisfactorily in other places. Thus, the three-tier system of local government was imported, where no real demands had been made for it. Partisan politics, already in Federal and Regional governments, soon crept into local politics and government. The fact that some councillors were on the government side, while others were on the opposition side of council, brought much antagonism. This was because opposition to ideas and proposals came to be, not usually on the basis of principles, but on some ethnocentric concept—"our side must win, we cannot be wrong", type of attitude. This frustrated many in the opposition who found the nepotism and favouritism that went with the practice hard to live with.\(^1\)

\(^1\) C.S. Whitaker, op. cit., Ch. 5, passim.
the question, it carefully avoided the vague, abstract concept and limited itself to an examination of customary presents.\(^1\)

Whilst it will be accepted that a lot of success was achieved in the local government of Kano emirate in this self-governing era, a number of deficiencies also appear on the balance sheet. Having identified some of the sources of deficiencies, we must now consider with more specificity what part the imported institutions, ideas and practices played in the local government of the emirate in this self-governing era. The assumptions we will try to prove are that the introduction of partisan politics and of government and opposition in this era brought about intolerance, friction, nepotism and corruption; whilst the effort to introduce achievement criteria strengthened the forces of nepotism, bribery and corruption in the local government of the emirate. Thus the importations were responsible for some contradictions in the system. It was this contradiction in values and expectations, as in the earlier era, that helped to generate the deficiencies in the system of local government.

\(^1\) Northern Region of Nigeria, Report of the Exchange of Customary Presents (Kaduna, 1954).
THE IMPORTED INSTITUTIONS, IDEAS AND PRACTICES

In an attempt to modernize and democratize local government in this era, we see a number of institutions, ideas and practices imported into the local government of Kano emirate. In many of the importations the influence of British local government is apparent.

In Britain, for example, outside the County Borough, there is the county council, the district council and the parish council. This makes the three-tier structure of British local government. In Kano emirate, the three-tier idea was adopted in this era. The N.A. council, the district council and the town or village council came into existence. What of course was not imported was the autonomy and the independence that each level had from the other in Britain. In Kano, the N.A. council of its own free will created the district councils and the village councils. In this era, twenty-five such district councils existed and two town councils.¹ Some authority and responsibility, in

other words, were granted or delegated by the N.A. to these councils. In Britain, even the parish council in every area has its own statutory responsibilities, very clearly demarcated from those of the district council.¹

Thus the importation of a three-tier system of local government, with the two lower tiers completely subordinate to the upper tier, neither made for autonomy nor independence of action. Rather it enhanced the supremacy of the N.A. which only used the lower tiers as tax-collecting agencies.

Partisan Politics, Government and Opposition: Party politics in Kano emirate in this period, is mainly a story of the competition between the Northern Peoples Congress (N.P.C.) and the Northern Elements Progressive Union (N.E.P.U.). Since the competition between the two parties, at this time, has been ably covered by other scholars, this study will resist the temptation of large-scale repetition.² What is important to note is that with the birth of these political parties came a


struggle for power, first at the Regional level, and later at the local level. In 1958 came the big test at the local level. The competition between the two was fierce and keen but the N.P.C. won.\(^1\) With this election had come secret ballot, manhood suffrage and direct election to the council. All these were newly-imported ideas and practices in local government and they made their marks. (All three ideas had been employed in the Federal election of 1954, the Regional election of 1956, but were coming into local government for the first time).\(^2\)

What was visible to most people, as resulting from the introduction of these new ideas, was the warlike confrontation that marked party politics. Also, there was the realization that these introductions meant the beginning of the end of privilege and birth. For example, in a Kano City ward, the election saw the defeat of Mallam Aminu Kano, leader of the N.E.P.J., and one who came from a highly respected, learned family. He suffered defeat by the hands of a local school teacher, Alhaji

\(^1\) J. Paden, \textit{op. cit.}, Ch. 8, passim.

\(^2\) B.J. Dudley, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 94-96.
Maitama Sule, a man of humble birth, a commoner who originated from a slave family.¹

The situation was complicated by the support the Emir and the traditional leaders had to throw behind the N.P.C., the governing party at the regional level. Partisanship became the accepted norm, even among the traditional leaders who traditionally had been recognized as father of their people and hence were supposed to be non-partisan. Now, however, neutrality was becoming something of a myth. Chiefs had to be partisan. For one thing, they were allotted a number of seats in the Regional Cabinet (as members coming from the Upper House—the House of Chiefs) and hence they were bound to support the government party and identify with it.² Whatever the merits of such contention, the fact remains that with the Chiefs identifying with a party, the myth of non-partisanship or neutrality was gradually exploded.

¹ The author had the benefit of interviewing Alhaji Maitama Sule in January, 1974. A former Nigeria Federal Minister of Mines and Power, till the 1966 military take-over, he is presently Kano State Commissioner for Information and specially in charge of local government in the State. Mallam Aminu Kano is currently Federal Nigeria Commissioner for Health.

² C.S. Whitaker, op. cit., p. 304.
Local government, in this era, also adopted some universalistic criteria in its efforts to become modern. The practice of recruitment on the basis of achievement was introduced. N.A.s were required to recruit "... persons for their clerical staff with educational qualifications of Secondary II or higher."¹ A councillor was also required to ensure that "... promotions of N.A. staff are based on merit, experience and qualifications, and ... he must insist on those criteria being followed."² In the same manner, illegitimate presents to Chiefs were to be forbidden and people were to develop a greater feeling or sense of independence. What gifts were proper, which ones were to be stopped, became, however, a bone of contention. Views about this, "... were far from unanimous. They ranged from an opinion that nothing should be done [to change the existing situation] ... to a recommendation for almost complete abolition."³ That is, whilst some held that customary presents should continue to be given according to tradition, feeling that it had nothing to do with an individual's growth.

² Ibid., p. 86.
of an independent mind; others felt that it should be abolished outright. The result was a compromise between the two extreme views. A partial list of legitimate gifts was drawn up. It consisted of

... personal gifts to Chiefs or district or village heads on special occasions, such as the marriage of members of the Chief's family. ... Religious alms ... provided they were small, given out of compassion to or for the support of the genuinely aged, infirm or helpless. ... Reasonable hospitality was also justifiable. ... nor were small gifts to servants and wives by a parting guest to be dis-couraged.¹

The report positively recommended (for abolition), that

... No gifts, or presents of any kind should pass between Chiefs, district heads, and their people, or between superior and subordinate N.A. officials, and the general public, e.g.

a) All gifts in connection with appointment or promotion.

b) All gifts or payments made in order to secure some favour either in goods, service or money.

c) Gifts made to a superior in the knowledge that under local custom he would be obliged to give some larger presents in return.

d) Presents to village or district heads or Chiefs on religious

¹ Ibid., p. 4.
festivals like the Greater Beiram, the Lesser Beiram, etc.

e) The practice of working on farms, belonging personally to the Chief or district or village head.¹

Ideas such as these were innovations, they were new ideas introduced into the local government in this period, with the hope that they would assist the development of local government, and help to bring about the democratization and modernization of the subsystem. The impact of their introduction was rather negative, as will be illustrated from the following cases in the emirate in this era.

IMPACT OF THE IMPORTED INSTITUTIONS, IDEAS AND PRACTICES

The Kano Riots, 1953

Perhaps no incident illustrates better the impact of the imported institutions of government and opposition and the imported practice of partisanship in politics than the crisis that occurred in Kano in 1953. It is apparent that ethnic differences played a major role in causing the riots and accentuating its severity. In this study, however, it is the part which imported institutions

¹ Ibid.
played in causing and accentuating its severity that is most relevant to us. The facts are that party politics, government and opposition as well as elections, had been known in Kano, as mentioned earlier, since 1950. And though the local government Act was not passed till 1954 and the first local elections were not held till 1958, the impact of political activities at upper levels (Federal and Regional) were to be felt at the grass roots. The immediate spark which brought about the explosion was the proposed tour of Northern Nigeria by the Action Group party (the A.G.), to be led by Chief Samuel Akintola. The Action Group as a political party was opposed to the governing N.P.C. in Northern Nigeria. In the Federal House of Representatives in Lagos, the A.G. members deeply resented the N.P.C. political philosophy of gradual development (a policy we have seen in their dealings with the Chiefs at local level, and one they held in the process of political evolution of the country to independence). In terms of achieving national independence, whilst the A.G. wanted independence immediately, the N.P.C. preferred gradual political evolution which would culminate in the same end, but with a number of years delay.\(^1\) Different views in

\(^1\) A. Bello, *op. cit.*, Ch. 5
policy were to generate highly partisan reactions, and to bring about conflict in Kano.

The roots of the Kano riots of 1953 are to be found in the newly introduced partisan politics, in the resentment of non-accommodation of one party and its approach by the other, in the bitterness with which party supporters came out against the opposers of their leaders. In the debates in the House of Representatives, for example, Chief Awolowo, the A.G. leader, had made what appeared to some to be derogatory remarks about Ottoman Dan Fodio—the revered Fulani leader who led the jihad or holy war that established Fulani hegemony over most of the Hausa states, from 1804. To many he is a saint. Chief Awolowo's remarks were thus unhappily received and deeply resented in many parts of the North (Northern Nigeria). When in addition, on the adjournment of the House, northern members (mainly of the N.P.C.) became an object of attack and assault by young over-enthusiastic southern political thugs, the N.P.C. men got the message from their political opponents. The final assault that left the N.P.C. members with no

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doubt about what to do with their political opponents took place within Northern Nigeria. After the adjournment of the House, and on return to the North, a small demonstration was organized by some local A.G. leaders at the Zaria train station. As the train went by, on its way to Kano, the N.P.C. members were amazed to see, even in their own region, a repetition, though on a smaller scale, of what had happened to them in Lagos.¹

When, therefore, the A.G. supported newspaper, the Daily Service, announced on May 9, 1953, that "six units of the A.G. ... will storm every part of the country next week in a national crusade for freedom", N.P.C. supporters saw a possible chance of avenging themselves of their adversaries. The A.G. was supposed to hold its rally in Kano on Saturday, 16 May. The local N.P.C. leaders decided to hold a procession in the city that same day. After a protracted discussion with the Senior Divisional Officer for Kano, the proposal of the local N.P.C. to hold its procession on the same day with the A.G. was abandoned. It was made clear that it was likely to cause a breach of the peace and the procession was fixed for Friday, May 15. The Daily

¹ Ibid., p. 5.
Service did not make the situation any better in its report. Rather, it hastened an imminent clash. In its issue of 15 May, the paper reported that,

The proposed tour of Northern Region by the A.G. to educate the masses has scared officialdom and their stooges, the Sardauna Group, both of whom are now organizing N.A.1 officials to demonstrate . . .

Even if the N.P.C. had been aiming at a peaceful procession, this attitude of the A.G. supported media was suggestive of other avenues. One such avenue, a violent demonstration, rather than a mere peaceful procession, the N.P.C. youths and supporters preferred, as later developments showed.

By early Saturday morning, 16 May, there were apparent signs of growing tension within the city. Messrs. A.G. Leventis and Company (a Department store) reported having sold 172 matchets on Friday afternoon; in the night a lot of their scrap iron had been stolen and the United African Company (U.A.C.) Motor Department also reported that their grindstone was worn right down overnight. People had been using it to sharpen matchets and scrap iron.²

1 Ibid., p. 6.
2 Ibid., p. 8.
The situation had become so explosive that at midday on Saturday, 16 May, the law officers in a broadcast, announced the cancellation of the A.G. rally. This, however, did not please the N.P.C. youths. By about 3 p.m., acts of violence had started to occur. By Saturday night there had been three people killed and fifty-two others injured. The situation got more out of hand on Sunday, 17 May. Casualties, on that day, amounted to fifteen dead and one hundred and three wounded. The rioting continued into Monday, 18 May, when the casualties known were eighteen dead and sixty-seven wounded. It was not until local representatives of the major political parties--N.P.C., A.G. and others that had been anti-N.P.C., especially the N.E.P.U. and its ally, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (N.C.N.C.), took a joint drive through the city (using one another’s vehicles freely, i.e., with A.G. and N.E.P.U. members in an N.P.C. man’s car and vice versa), did the rioting begin to subside. From that Tuesday, till Friday, 22 May, when peace was virtually restored, no fatalities were reported.\(^1\)

\(^1\) *Ibid.*, pp.11-40.
The incident of the Kano riots of 1953 is important to this study. It demonstrates the impact of party politics or partisanship in politics. True enough, partisan politics had entered Regional and National politics before it was introduced into local government. The fact, however, is that its impact was felt at the local level in Kano long before the first local elections of 1958. The partisanship in Federal elections, as in the Regional elections, had taken very strong roots in the localities. It was this local antagonism between the N.P.C. and anti-N.P.C. local supporters that brought to a crisis an already explosive situation in May, 1953. In other words, though formal partisan local elections were not held till 1958, party politics, as long as they were strong in the Federal and Regional levels, and as long as the leaders needed grass-roots support, had been entrenched in the localities. Thus political partisanship, rather than being functional to the subsystem, generated intolerance and poor accommodation of citizens, one by the other. It brought the friction and conflict that cost many their lives in the 1953 riots.
Sardauna-Sanusi Conflict

One other case which illustrated the impact of importing universalistic criteria such as qualification and performance in this era was the rather startling and forced abdication of the throne of Kano by Alhaji Muhammadu Sanusi in 1963. What we stress here is the way in which the modern and imported universalistic ideas were used to tread over well-known and long-established practices. This is not to suggest that the author is on the side of perpetuating traditions that do not make for progress (respect for birth and class rather than ability, for example). Rather, the problem here is the style and type of universalistic ideas introduced. Alhaji Sanusi had ascended the throne in 1953, in the midst of great optimism on all sides for his regime. For the older generation he was legitimately ascending the throne of his father. For the younger ones, the beginning of the reign gave a promise for the satisfaction of their aspirations for more consultation in the affairs of the N.A. At his coronation, Alhaji Sanusi had made the declaration that
There have in times past been criticisms of the administration of Kano on the grounds that it was too centralized, too autocratic, too much in the hands of one family. . . . I now solemnly promise that I will consult my Council on all matters . . . .

It was a concession that augured very well for the future. Within a year of the declaration, however, this voluntarily declared intention of goodwill and cooperation was legalized by the Regional government in the well-known N.A. law of that year. Royal grace had been superseded by the decision of the new and more powerful rulers at Kaduna. Meanwhile, royalty in Kano was unappreciative of the fact that the new hands at Kaduna were capable of showing their new power in a way that could contradict, negate or make little his own. In the events that led ultimately to the Emir's abdication of his throne, he was, at a belated time, to learn this hard fact.

Before 1963, any observer of the political scene in Northern Nigeria would be very skeptical of the possibility that under the then existing conditions, any Emir who strongly supported the N.P.C. could ever be brought down under any offence, condition or misdemeanor. In particular, it appeared as if the powers of the Sultan

1 C.S. Whitaker, op. cit., p. 278.
of Sokoto, the Emir of Kano, and the Shehu of Bornu (they held the three biggest emirates in Northern Nigeria) were in many ways synonymous with those of the Regional government, to which they had always given their support and which they had helped to retain power. One can, in fact, argue that because of their immense influence in their big emirates, and the way they exercised it to help the N.P.C. retain power, the government's power, to a large extent, emanated from their will. A respected scholar of this era holds that, "Only these three (i.e. the Sultan of Sokoto, the Emir of Kano and the Shehu of Bornu) could have been justified in saying of themselves . . . as M.G. Smith remarks apropos of the Emir of Zaria in 1950, 'L'état c'est moi' . . ."¹ This well-known sentence of Louis XIV of France, it appears to the author, could be more appropriately applied to these three Emirs in consideration of their immense influence, not only in their emirates, but in the Regional politics of Northern Nigeria.

Conflict between the Kano N.A. and Kaduna (the Regional capital), began to be apparent by 1962. The Emir did not look favourably on some of the key pieces

¹ Ibid., p. 296.
of legislation sponsored by the Regional government. In particular, he was opposed to the provincial administration bill of 1962 which divided the Region into twelve provinces and set up a Provincial Commissioner over each province. It must have appeared at first no more than a question of bad taste or perhaps a lack of judgment to see the government led by the Sardauna of Sokoto sending to Kano as Provincial Commissioner a person from a Sokoto slave lineage. This "slave descendant" was now to take precedence over the Emir of Kano in any public occasion in Kano province. ¹ Later, the whole idea appeared to the Emir to be intolerable if not outrageous and indefensible to attempt to impose a commoner on royalty. Educational qualifications, experience, or any other achievement criteria were hardly thought of as important as traditional practice and procedure.

The Regional government was, however, decided on setting up the Provincial administration. This was a challenge to the Emir, one he was convinced in his own interest and that of his emirate he had to answer. First,

he attempted to mobilize the N.P.C. members from the province in the Northern House of Assembly. He little realized that their political allegiance was to their party, not to some sectional pride or to their traditional leader. Partisanship in politics was difficult to comprehend. If the members of the Northern House of Assembly came from Kano, the Emir seemed to have assumed they were to represent Kano's interests and were to listen to what Kano's interests were from the Emir. It took some time to realize that as N.P.C. partymen, they had a duty to party leadership, to maintaining party discipline and solidarity.

That effort not achieving its objective, the Emir employed some tactics that touched on personal relationship (as distinct from the official). This was with the hope that such action would convince the Sardauna, the Premier, to give up the abhorred arrangement. The Emir's son, married to the daughter of the Emir of Gwandu, the Sardauna's cousin, divorced her.\(^1\) That, unfortunately also, did not help matters. Rather, it

\(^1\) C.S. Whitaker, op. cit., p. 280.
worsened the situation. Because of this conflict and the rather unyielding attitude of either party, the Emir, Alhaji Sanusi and the Premier, Sir Ahmadu Bello, stood out as the two most dominant and uncompromising political figures in Northern Nigeria at the beginning of the 1960's.\(^1\) The clash of tradition and modernity had become personified in the two figures.

The fact remains that the Emir was unclear as to the limits of his traditional authority. He little comprehended the amount of power that had passed into the hands of the political elites in Kaduna. He was unable or unwilling to grasp the hard facts that the secret ballot had put a lot of power in the hands of the elected representatives in the Regional Assembly, more power than any N.A. could withstand. Also, he failed to grasp that politics had instituted a system of Government and Opposition, and members (except they prefer to be rebels) are obliged to continue to support the party. The Emir also could not accept, or did not understand that, with the adoption of achievement criteria in government, the origin (and even the sex as was to be seen later) of an individual were to be gradually passed over as

\(^1\) J.N. Paden, *op. cit.*, p. 266.
irrelevancies in deciding the utility and position of an individual in society. What made things more complex was that the Emir had almost singlehandedly controlled the nomination of Kano members to the Federal and Regional Houses in 1959 (Federal), and in 1956 and 1961 (Regional). The Emir's choices had in every case been elected. As long as this favoured the governing party there was no conflict. But soon, as we have seen, conflict was to arise and the true impact of the new institutions was to be seen.

Unfortunately for Alhaji Samusi, through a rather high-handed approach at home, he had alienated the loyalty of some of his councillors. There was a lot of dissatisfaction. There were charges against him of favouritism, nepotism and corrupt use of N.A. funds. As sole authority under British rule, probably most of these would have passed unnoticed. After all, different yardsticks were used in that regime to measure the uprightness of the British administration and the Nigerian Chiefs. In this era, however, new ideas and standards had been

1 Ibid., p. 266.
2 A. Kirk-Greene, op. cit., p. 49. See our discussion of this double measure in Chapter Two.
adopted. This high-handed deal in N.A. affairs helped to bring the Sanusi-Sardauna conflict to a climax. On September 18, 1962, the Northern Nigeria government appointed Mr. D.J.M. Muffett, an Administrative Officer, as Sole Commissioner, "to inquire into the deteriorating financial position of the Kano N.A."¹

By late September all the supporters of the Emir had been suspended from office in the N.A. (and were never reinstated). By March, 1963, the report of the inquiry was submitted to the Ministry of Local Government. Though the report per se never saw the light of day, its main findings were made public. As a result of the publicized findings, the Emir abdicated²

Apart from the personal antagonism involved, two points come out clearly in this episode. Both go to show the contradiction in traditional values and concepts and the newly imported ideas. One was the unwillingness of the Emir to accept qualification and achievement and other universalistic ideals in the question of appointing a provincial commissioner to Kano. It was simply improper for a commoner to be a lord over royalty.

¹ J.N. Paden, op. cit., p. 267
² Ibid., p. 269.
Second, the new universalistic ideals as againstascriptive ideals of selection had tried to deny the Emir the right to pick his own men (or favourites) for positions in the emirate. This was a traditionally legitimate right.

What followed the Emir's abdication is probably very relevant to our further understanding of the impact of partisan politics at this time. Soon after the Emir's resignation, there emerged a new political party, the Kano People's Party (K.P.P.). It centred around dissident N.P.C. members and fomented anti-Sardauna feelings. Such feelings rose high indeed and for a while Kano was in a state of turmoil.¹

One other question that arises from the inquiry is whether or not corruption did take place in the N.A. The Muffett Commission, as it was reported, claimed it existed. The Emir, it said, was corrupt and he had to give way to reforms. These reforms were to be based on the adopted universalistic principles. Grand as these principles were, they came rather suddenly and took little account of generations of tradition and practice. In the heat of introducing the new ideas, it was forgotten

¹ C.S. Whitaker, op. cit., p. 282.
that often

... what Britons saw as corrupt and Hausa as oppressive, Fulani (might) regard as both necessary and traditional, and hence that ... in a study of political corruption, we must take an account of the history and structural factors which define these behaviours and their context.¹

We must, for example, find out if the main causes of corruption were traditions that made it normal for officials to receive gifts for the performance of a service, family favouritism or nepotism, low and irregularly paid salaries, delays in official actions that often induce bribes to speed up the process, the laxity of controls inviting misappropriation of funds and contract irregularities, and such problems. If these are the conditions, the solution would appear to lie in a campaign of politically socializing the population against such norms rather than legislating them out of existence or introducing forcibly certain ideals and practices that contradict them. When, for example, the government announced in August, 1965, that

There have been several cases in recent times of N.A. officials subscribing and making presentations to a government officer who is going on leave or transfer, and recommended that,

... presentations must not be made in the future ... appreciation can properly be done by means of a letter, a group photograph and/or the holding of a small informal and inexpensive reception at which the departing officer could be the guest of honour.¹

the government was educating some portion of the population rather than coercively exercising its power or introducing any alien concept. Unfortunately, this appears to have been the exception rather than the rule.

Impact of Importations—A Summary

What is implicit in the above discussion is that whilst the introduction of the three-tier system of local government resulted in creating in the emirate very weak, subordinate, non-autonomous and non-independent councils, the creation enhanced the legitimization of a very powerful, almost autocratic N.A. This situation created obstacles to democratizing local government. Partisan politics as well as division into government and

opposition, as argued above, were partly responsible for the intolerance and friction and conflicts of the Kano riots of 1953. These, and the universalistic ideals imported, as seen in the above cases, account for the charges of nepotism and favouritism as well as the charges of bribery and corruption made before the Muffett Commission. Finally, the importation of the secret ballot, the practice of direct election to council and the institution of manhood suffrage heralded the end to privilege and birth. In an attempt to make the most of the new situation and to gain control of local affairs, what resulted was a warlike confrontation between the N.P.C. and N.E.P.U. and other parties. Even Chiefs who had been traditionally regarded as the father of their people had to take sides.

The transplanted institutions hence did not bear the expected fruit. No ground had been prepared for them and no efforts had been made to familiarize the masses with them. Why these institutions, and those imported in the other two eras, contributed to a great extent to the non-maximization of the aims and objectives of local government in Kano emirate is examined in Chapter Five. For now, the trends in the military era will be examined to complete the three periods of the study.
CHAPTER FOUR

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN KANO EMIRATE

January 15, 1966, is a very significant date in the political history of Nigeria. That day saw the end of the civilian regime and the declaration of military rule. In an early morning, very bloody coup d'état, pre-planned by some middle class, young military officers who were thoroughly dissatisfied with the political rulers and with the political situation of the nation, a number of key political leaders were assassinated at Lagos, Ibadan and Kaduna. ¹ Speaking on Radio Kaduna, just after noon on that Saturday, 15 January, Major Kaduna Nzeogwu, who led the coup in that city, declared martial law over Northern Nigeria in the name of the supreme council of the Revolution. He declared, "The constitution is suspended and the Regional government and elected Assembly are hereby dissolved."² Nzeogwu remained in control in Kaduna till Tuesday, 18 January, when he accepted the authority of the head of the army, Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi.

² R. First, op. cit., p. 284.
Once formally invested as Head of the Military government, General Ironsi, backed by the military chain of command, decreed that the Federal military government was the supreme authority of the country. He replaced Regional authority with the Military Governor, proscribed political party activities and started on a course of unifying the public services and the judicial services. With the proscription of political activities, political parties, tribal and cultural organizations, and the banning of any new ones, not only did the Federal Parliament and the Regional Assemblies dissolve, the various local government councils (the N.A.s in Northern Nigeria), also ended their existence. Local government affairs, as will be elaborated upon below, came to be directed by appointed and traditional members rather than elected councillors. The coming to power of the military government was hence to be of significance, not only at the national and regional level, but also at the local level. This is the same, whether we think of the Ironsi regime (January to July, 1966), or the present Gowon regime (which has remained in power since July, 1966).

AIMS OF THE MILITARY LEADERS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT

What objectives did the governing military elite establish for local government in this period? It is important to observe, at the outset, that the aims set by the military leaders for local government are probably more important in this era than the aims set by the colonial bureaucratic elite and the indigenous Northern Nigerian political leaders in the colonial and self-governing eras respectively. This is because, despite the fact that in all three periods local government remains the creature of the central government (the colonial administration in the colonial era, and the Regional government in the self-governing period), with the military administration more direct control in accordance with military tradition is being exercised over local government. The strictly hierarchical structure and organization of the military makes flexibility in the implementation of objectives less common, and tighter control from the centre more the practice. In this era we see a rigidity and inflexibility in keeping with military practices, both at the Regional (and later after creation of states, at state) level as well as at the local government level. We also see a
situation in which some of the general objectives for local government are laid down by the Federal government, a practice which in the self-governing era would have been regarded as unconstitutional since local government was a responsibility of the Regional government.

Hence, we see General Yakubu Gowon, the Head of the Military government (since July, 1966), stating the objectives that every level of government should have in its forefront. He said:

...we are now at the threshold of what could be a great decade of faster development and modernization. The government is very conscious of the needs and aspirations of the ordinary man for peace and security, a rising standard of living and better opportunities for his children. These are the things which matter, the challenge before every government... be it local, regional or the Federal government.1

The priorities, in this era, were, in other words, to be for fast economic development and modernization, to try to raise the standard of living in so doing, and to re-establish peace, security and a proud heritage and better opportunities for posterity.

In local government these generally stated aims for every level of government were directly and indirectly expressed. In February, 1966, the Military Governor for Northern Nigeria, Lieutenant-Colonel Hassan Katsina, announced that native courts were to be brought under the control of the Chief Justice, that the N.A. police forces were to come under the operational control of the Inspector General of the Nigerian Police (the Federal government police force), while steps were being taken to fully integrate the N.A. police with the Nigeria police. N.A. prisons were also to be handed over to the Federal government.¹ Hence, most of the law and order functions that had been of the topmost priority in the colonial era and which had sapped the energy, attention and finances of the N.A.s in the self-governing era were to be given up to the Federal government. N.A.s were thereby encouraged to concentrate far greater attention on service rather than protective or coercive functions. At least they got

¹ G.V. Summerhayes, "The Changing Relations Between the Native Authorities and the New Northern States", Administration, Ile Ife, April, 1969, p. 213.
more opportunity "... to concentrate on the development of social services and natural resources."

In a policy statement on November 11, 1968, Alhaji Audu Bako, the Military Governor of Kano State, stated further the objective of his government to achieve an efficient administration. Starting on a rather sentimental note, he clarified his terminologies.

I begin straightaway by abolishing the use of the term 'Native Authority', which I consider derogatory and old-fashioned. From now on, it shall be known as 'Local Government Authority', throughout this State.

Then he went on to announce that,

... for an administrative convenience, Kano emirate will have five administrative areas for the purpose of quick development.  

Efficient administration might as well have been substituted for administrative convenience in Alhaji Bako's announcement. This, and 'quick development', were to remain of utmost priority to local government, not only in Kano emirate but in the other three emirates of the

1 B. Smith, op. cit., p. 42.

of the state. His determination was unequivocal.

... In the field of local government,

he announced,

it is my government's intention to pursue with the utmost vigour, the implementation of the reforms introduced at the end of 1968. State government and local government staff are being deployed to the newly created administrative areas, and working as a team, they will perform the multiplicity of functions, which this modern age requires.¹

What appears more important to the military government is the performance of functions, getting aims and objectives carried out as speedily as possible. It does not appear, as seen in the previous period, that this regime is concerned with involving as many citizens as possible in the political process.

The aims of local government in this military era, from the above discussion, can on the whole be briefly summarized to be:

i) A desire to help establish peace and national unity,

ii) A desire to bring about economic progress and an improved standard of living, and with this, a speedy and efficient government.

¹ A. Bako, Policy Broadcast (Zaria, 1969).
Before going on to examine the changes that were introduced into the local government of the emirate from the inception of Kano state in April, 1968, and before attempting to assess how far these objectives were realized in this era, we must first reconcile these aims and objectives with the normative criteria set up in Chapter One.

NORMATIVE CRITERIA COMPARED WITH
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

Very close similarity exists between the desire to help establish peace and national unity at this time, and the normative criteria that local government ought to assist in promoting protective services and to foster national integration. In establishing peace, the various protective agencies are no doubt important whilst to bring about national unity is, in fact, the same as having a well-integrated country.

In the same way, the second objective of local government, that of bringing about economic progress and

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1 Though the twelve states were created on May 27, 1967, the period May 27, 1967 - March 31, 1968, was a transitional one in Northern Nigeria. The states did not really begin to function till April 1, 1968.
an improved standard of living appears to agree with the ideals that local government should promote infrastructural services, should foster socio-economic development as well as manpower resource development. Economic progress includes not only industrial and technological progress, but also social progress (i.e., progress in the areas of attitude and ways of living of the people) as well as the infrastructural--roads, health, and even education, which because of its special importance, is categorized separately here.

Two ideals of local government listed in our normative criteria, however, appear to have been neglected in the aims and objectives set for local government in this era. These are democratic ideals and political participation. Why these two ideals would be ignored as objectives of local government in a military era, following two bloody coups d'état, is not hard to understand. For one thing, the military, as will be further explained below, took over power by force and intended to run the affairs of state in a purely military style, i.e., through a kind of military chain of command. To aim at democratizing the administration was, therefore, out of their consideration,
just as the idea of popular participation had been ruled out by the edict promulgated (as seen above) as soon as the military assumed power.

In this era then, the ideals of democracy and political participation do not have a place in local government. The absence of these ideals must be mentioned and admitted as grave shortcomings in the effective functioning or running of local government in this era. We would also argue that their absence would constitute a defect in the functioning of local government in any self-governing era. However, it is primarily the objectives extracted from the statements and releases of the military rulers that must be used in assessing the performance of local government in the emirate in the military era. In other words, we must admit the initial defect in setting the aims and objectives and hence the obvious limitations in the achievements and performance of local government. Having done this, we must still assess actual performance of the system in terms of the particular objectives (however inadequate) that the leaders of the period set for local government.

Before going on to that evaluation, let us now examine some of the important changes that came into local government in this era.
CHANGES IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT SINCE 1968

Kano emirate N.A., as seen on the map in Chapter One, has jurisdiction over seventy-five per cent of the total area of the state, leaving the remaining twenty-five per cent to the other three emirates. It also has eighty-five per cent of the state's tax payers.\(^1\) It employs about 5,000 personnel.\(^2\) It is hence, a sufficiently big organization to merit a very careful appraisal before any changes within it can be introduced. Furthermore, as Summerhayes has suggested, "It was . . . necessary for the states to settle in, before carrying out . . . any reforms."\(^3\) Thus, there were no changes made in the local government system from the time of the second coup d'état in July, 1966 to April, 1968, despite a change in military leadership. Until then, the three-tier structure (the N.A., the district and town/village councils) remained, though they functioned through administrative personnel and some traditional and nominated officials.\(^4\)

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\(^1\) S.K. Panter-Brick, op. cit., p. 132.

\(^2\) Northern States of Nigeria Local Government Yearbook, 1972-73, p. 89.

\(^3\) G.V. Summerhayes, op. cit., p. 214.

In his policy address of November 11, 1968, mentioned above, Alhaji Bako announced the division of Kano emirate into five administrative areas for the purpose of quick development. These administrative areas were:

a) Kano Metropolitan, with headquarters in Kano City, and comprising Waje, Ungogo and Kunbotso.

b) Kano North-Central Administrative area, with headquarters at Dambatta, and comprising Babura, Garki, Gabasawa, Gezawa, Minjibir and Ringim.

c) Kano South-East, with headquarters at Birnin Kudu and comprising Dutse, Gaya, Jahun, Sumaila and Gwaram.

d) Kano West, with headquarters at Gwarzo and comprising Dawakin Tofa, Bici and Karaye.

e) Kano South-West, with headquarters at Rano and comprising Wudil, Dawakin Kudu, Kura, Kiru and Tudun Wada.

Though, as Alhaji Bako claims, the division was made mainly for administrative convenience, it was also a measure for maximizing efficiency. In the creation, however, no clear-cut, consistent criteria for deciding on the size of an area appear to have been considered. For example, Kano Metropolitan has three district councils; and when we include the capital district in
each case, under Kano North-Central there are seven; Kano West has four; whilst under Kano South-East there are six and Kano South-West has six as well.¹

Each administrative area was to have a council with representatives from each of the districts forming the administrative area. The emirate was to have a council consisting of:

1) the Emir as Chairman.

2) The traditional kingmakers

3) Elected and nominated members and the District Officer in charge of the Emirate.²

In the military era, however, "membership of every council shall be nominated by the Military Governor."³

In the case of the administrative areas, the chairman was to be nominated by the Military Governor (he was later named to be the District Officer in each administrative area). Its Secretary was to be a full-time officer appointed by the council.⁴

¹ A. Bako, op. cit., p. 3
² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
FIGURE IV

KANO EMIRATE (UNSHADOED AREA) SHOWING THE NEW LOCAL GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENT INTO ADMINISTRATIVE AREAS, NOVEMBER, 1968

ADMINISTRATIVE AREAS

1. Kano South-East
2. Kano North-Central
3. Kano West
4. Kano South-West
5. Kano Metropolitan
The administrative area council was to be composed of:
a) The Administrative Officer in charge of the administrative area, who shall be its chairman.
b) Representatives of each district in the administrative area to be nominated from the district council.
c) The head of each government department in the administrative area.
d) The district head of each district in the administrative area.¹

The new arrangement was to have some impact on the traditional line of allegiance, and hence to affect the legitimacy of the existing system. Hitherto, it had been the tradition and practice for the district head to owe his allegiance to (and so pay homage directly to) the Emir. Henceforth, that allegiance is to become partial. It is to be shared, under this arrangement, with the District Officer who now heads the administrative area council, of which the district head is only

a member, and to whom he is therefore responsible.\textsuperscript{1} If it happens that he is nominated to the emirate council, he continues to have formal relations with the Emir; if he is not nominated, his formal role is with the administrative area council, and contact with the Emir becomes informal and traditional. The Emir, on his part, has no direct impact on the administrative areas. Though his name appears on the list of local government authorities for the five administrative areas, it is more as an adornment, a decoration, a symbolic gesture for legitimizing the new arrangement in the minds of the people of the emirate. Thus, the announcement said:\textsuperscript{2}

His Excellency, the Military Governor of Kano State of Nigeria, has appointed, with effect from 1 January, 1969, the persons whose names appear below . . . to be the local government authority for the areas showing against their names:

1. Alhaji Ado Bayero - Emir of Kano.

2. Sani Bala - Administrative Officer-in-Charge, Kano Metropolitan administrative area.

\textsuperscript{1} R. Wraith, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 209.

3. Ibrahim Bello - Administrative Officer-in-Charge, Kano South-East administrative area.

4. Zubairu Chedi - Administrative Officer-in-Charge, Kano South-West administrative area.

5. Uba Adamu - Administrative Officer-in-Charge, Kano North-Central administrative area.

6. Lawal Tundun Wada - Administrative Officer-in-Charge, Kano West administrative area.

Thus, the Emir's name appears as that of an overall supervisor of the administrative areas, a general superintendent of areas that have already been designated as others' spheres of influence!

In other ways, the legitimacy of the system was undergoing a period of reorientation and reshaping. The relationship of the Emir to council (as Emir-in-Council) has disappeared. He (the Emir) is to be simply Chairman of the emirate council, with a casting vote. The earlier prerogative to act against the advice of his council, when he thought that necessary, and in the name of peace and good government, has been taken away.¹

¹ J.N. Paden, op. cit., p. 351.
In fact, the situation has been such that the Emir, in the interest of peace and good government (and this time in the interest of his own reputation as well), has had to withdraw from attending the emirate council meeting for a while.\footnote{Ibid., Ch..9, passim.} This is because feelings about the role of the Emir at one time became divided into a royalist and an anti-royalist camp and it was necessary for the Emir to steer clear, attempt to mobilize the masses and leave the emirate council to look after itself. After a while, however, the tension went down and the Emir was able to take part in council deliberations again.

It cannot be overemphasized that the Administrative Officers, heading the administrative area councils, are State government officials. Their loyalty is to the State government, not the locality. Further, among the tasks they are required to perform are those that tend to challenge the authority of the traditional rulers--from the Emir to the district and village heads. For example, the District Officer has responsibility for touring the villages in his area and explaining government policy. Some of them have been in the habit
of convening community meetings to listen to complaints. Reports of such were then sent, first, to the Military Governor, then to the local government authority and to the district itself. If complaints deal with the district head, the matter is called to the attention of the local government councillor responsible for district heads (the Mądaki). In other words, the D.O.s have been placed above the Village and District Heads and in some ways above the Emir of Kano in relation to the Kano Metropolitan area. Yet, by birth, all holders of the position have been comparatively young people who traditionally would be unfit to stoop down and brush the dust off the Emir's slippers. Hausa society, like African societies in general, adheres to an unwritten rule which bestows respect on age and restricts the young, inexperienced men from holding traditional positions and positions of influence and power. Ethnically, also, only two of them, at one time,

\[1\] J.N. Paden, op. cit., p. 342.
FIGURE V
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN KANO EMIRATE IN THE MILITARY ERA COMPARED WITH THE SELF-GOVERNING ERA

SELF-GOVERNING ERA

REGIONAL GOVERNMENT

NATIVE AUTHORITY

OUTER ADVISORY COUNCIL

DISTRICT COUNCIL

DISTRICT COUNCIL

TOWN COUNCIL

TOWN COUNCIL

VILLAGE COUNCIL

VILLAGE COUNCIL

VILLAGE COUNCIL

PARTIAL ELECTION, TRADITIONAL CHIEFS, & NOMINATED MEMBERS

MILITARY ERA

STATE GOVERNMENT

EMIRATE COUNCIL

ADMINISTRATIVE AREA COUNCIL

DISTRICT COUNCIL

DISTRICT COUNCIL

TOWN COUNCIL

DISTRICT COUNCIL

DISTRICT COUNCIL

VILLAGE COUNCIL

VILLAGE COUNCIL

VILLAGE COUNCIL

VILLAGE COUNCIL

ALL NOMINATED AND OFFICIAL
had pure Hausa blood in their veins, as shown below:¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADMIN. AREA</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>BIRTH DATE</th>
<th>ETHNICITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Kano West</td>
<td>L. Tundun Wada</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kano Metro.</td>
<td>Sani Bala</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Kano South-West</td>
<td>Zubairu Chedi</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Fulani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Kano N. Central</td>
<td>M. Uba Adamu</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Fulani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Kano South-East</td>
<td>Ibrahim Bello</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Fulani</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: John Paden, Religious and Political Culture in Kano, p. 418.

It is also important to note in this regard the disappearance of the Ministry of Local Government. Local government has become an arm of the Military Governor's Office.² Though one might argue that this gives the Military Governor a more direct contact with local government, and that he probably regarded it as of great importance to merge it with his own office, it would

¹ Ibid., p. 418.
appear that the inevitable result must be a reduction in the attention given to local government, since it exists in the Military Governor's Office, along with other equally important areas of interest to the Governor. This, no doubt, is a factor that can be expected to affect the services that local government can make available. In Kano State, of course, it has been impossible to assess comparatively the impact of bringing local government under the Military Governor, since this was done as soon as the State was created.

But if the new changes of 1968 brought efficiency, they did not encourage mass participation, nor did the use of State government officials in the administrative areas encourage contact with the machinery of local government. It is probably right that people tend to be more at home with the people they know. In an environment of relatively limited modernization, some awe and fear are still attached to the bureaucrat, more so when he is known to represent a military government. The changes introduced into local government cannot, for example, be said to be an improvement over those of the self-governing era. That argument must be left
for a later section. For now, let us follow our examination of these significant reforms with an evaluation of the performance of local government in the emirate in this era, using as the basis of evaluation the aims and objectives we extrapolated as set by the military leaders for local government.

**EVALUATING PERFORMANCE IN TERMS OF AIMS SET**

Two major aims and objectives were earlier identified for local government in this era. Briefly stated, they are:

i) the desire to help establish peace and national unity;

ii) the desire to bring about economic progress and an improved standard of living.

Let us now consider the first objective.

**Peace and National Unity:** In an attempt to establish peace, efforts were embarked upon early in the military era in the name of efficiency, to transfer the control of the Native Authority police to the jurisdiction of the Inspector General of the Nigerian police. And since 1970, the local police force has been placed under the direct
control of the Federal Inspector General.\(^1\) This relationship has made available to the Kano police force training and facilities which it did not possess before this era.\(^2\) The interest of the military administration has also been apparent in the establishment of peace and order following the ethnic clashes of 1966-67.\(^3\) Hence, we see this concern in improving the quality of the N.A. police. For example, grants are in this era made to each local authority for each of its policemen who attends the Kaduna Police College course. Also, allowances are made to reimburse all expenditure if a certificate of good conduct is obtained.\(^4\)

It is not suggested that there has been absolute peace and harmony and that cases of lawlessness are rare in this era. In fact as Colin Legum reports,

\(^1\) Northern States of Nigeria Local Government Yearbook, 1972-73, p. 50.

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 51.

\(^3\) For an account of the ethnic clashes in Kano and other parts of Northern Nigeria, prior to the civil war, see R. First, op. cit., Ch. 6, passim.

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 51.
... corruption flourishes at all levels of society and in all parts of the country, everybody knows about it and everybody talks about it, the press is constantly referring to it, so does General Gowon and other national leaders. ... colossal thefts and embezzlement by high officials are matched by rampant petty bribery on the lowest levels of the police, army and civil service. ...1

In other words, even the machinery for protecting peace, law and order had its own problems. Legum, for example, makes mention of the fifteen unnamed Third Division Army Officers arrested in the wake of the army census, as well as the case of some three Kano local government officials who were charged with setting fire to the archives to cover up large-scale fraud. In another incident, during the execution of two robbers in Kano in 1972, the crowd, estimated at half a million, stampeded, killing three, whilst pickpockets got away with an estimated $5,000.2 These isolated incidents do not show the amount of concern that both local and central government had for protecting the peace. They, however, indicate how difficult protection of peace, law and order can be, whether left partly in the hands

2 Ibid., p. 654.
of local government (as was the case before 1970), or taken over by the Federal government, as happened after.

Apart from ensuring that the major agencies for protecting the peace were taken care of, little else was done however to ensure harmony between the Hausa-Fulani group and the Southern-Nigerian minorities in the emirate. Kano emirate council, for example, did not include a single Southern-Nigerian, as seen in Table X below. Even Kano metropolitan administrative area council, with a comparatively large Ibo and Yoruba population, did not have a single Ibo or Yoruba on its council, as seen from the composition of the council, in Table XI below.

In discussing national unity, it is interesting to observe a highly accelerated rate of central support, in terms of central officials assisting L.A. officials in this era. As has been noted above, both central and local government officials work hand in hand to operate the administrative areas. Secondly, cooperation between two or more councils was actually implemented by Edict in this era. Thus, four district councils were brought together, cooperating in the working of the Kano metropolitan administrative area. A number of others were
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPRESENTING</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>FORMER POLITICAL PARTY</th>
<th>ETHNICITY</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Traditional Kingmakers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Madaki</td>
<td>Shehu Ahmad</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Makama</td>
<td>Bello Kano</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Sarkin Bai</td>
<td>Muhammad Muhtari</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Sarkin Dawaki Mai Tuta</td>
<td>Bello Dandago</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>HF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. District Representatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Ungogo</td>
<td>Dahiru (Mustafa) Muhammad</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Kano City</td>
<td>Ahmadu Trader</td>
<td>NEPU</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Waje</td>
<td>I.D. Ahmad</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>HF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) B. Kudu</td>
<td>Da’u Al’iyu</td>
<td>NEPU</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Jahun</td>
<td>Muhammadu Dan Kwano</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>HF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Gwaram</td>
<td>Bayero Na Ali Gwaram</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) Gaya</td>
<td>Sule Gaya</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) Sumaila</td>
<td>Tijjani Hashim</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>RF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13) Dutse</td>
<td>Yahai Baranda</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>HF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14) Gwarzo</td>
<td>Maikano</td>
<td>NEPU</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15) Gwarkin Tofa</td>
<td>Garba Dawakin Tofa</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16) Bici</td>
<td>Garba Bichi</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17) Karaye</td>
<td>Ibrahim Nagodi</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18) Rano</td>
<td>Sani Barkum</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19) Dawakin Kudu</td>
<td>Yusufu Nadabo</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPRESENTING</td>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>FORMER POLITICAL PARTY</td>
<td>ETHNICITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Continued</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20) Kuru</td>
<td>Yusufu Nadabo</td>
<td>NEPU/NPC</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21) Wudil</td>
<td>Also Wudil</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22) Tudun Wada</td>
<td>Aminu Kofar Gabas</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23) Kiru</td>
<td>Ibrahim Kiru</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24) Dambatta</td>
<td>Abdulkadir A. Koguna</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25) Minjibir</td>
<td>Sule Minjibir</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>HP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26) Gezawa</td>
<td>Sani Gezawa</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27) Babura</td>
<td>Umaru Babura</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28) Ringim</td>
<td>Sarki Usman Ringim</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>RF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29) Gabasawa</td>
<td>Ahmadu Rufa’i</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>HF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30) Garki</td>
<td>Shimali</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Other Interests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31) Qadiriyya</td>
<td>Nasiru Kabara</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32) Tijaniyya</td>
<td>Tijjani Usman</td>
<td>KPP</td>
<td>HB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33) Business</td>
<td>Ibrahim Musa Gashash</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>HA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34) Business</td>
<td>Sanusi Dantata</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35) Business</td>
<td>Inuwa Wada</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36) Business</td>
<td>Musa Iliyasu</td>
<td>NEPU</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37) Local Govern.</td>
<td>Muhammadu Gwarzo</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38) Local Govern.</td>
<td>Sarki Abbas Dan Iya</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>RF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39) Local Govern.</td>
<td>Abubakar Waziri</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40) Local Govern.</td>
<td>Umaru Yola</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F = Fulani
H = Hausa
HA = Hausa-Arab
HF = Mixture of Hausa Fulani
HB = Hausa-Beriberi
RF = Royal Fulani

Source: J. Paden, Religion and Political Culture in Kano, p. 419.
### TABLE XI

**COMPOSITION OF KANO METROPOLITAN ADMINISTRATIVE AREA COUNCIL, 1969**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA REPRESENTED</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>FORMER POLITICAL PARTY</th>
<th>ETHNICITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. UNKOO DISTRICT</td>
<td>Dahiru M. Muhammad</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Fulani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ibrahim D. Fulani</td>
<td>Kano People’s Party</td>
<td>Fulani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hassan R. Malam</td>
<td>NEPU</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. LUNBOMET DIST.</td>
<td>Sani Mariri</td>
<td>NEPU</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdur Reza</td>
<td>NEPU</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yusufu Jajira</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Hausa-Darija</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. KANO CITY</td>
<td>Ahmadu Trader</td>
<td>NEPU</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hande</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Fulani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sani Zango</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. WAJE COUNCIL</td>
<td>Ibrahim Datti Ahmad</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Fulani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mahamut Haido</td>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>Buzu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muhammad Dangalau</td>
<td>NEPU</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

brought together, as seen above, for the other administrative areas. Though these cooperative ventures came through military edicts rather than the people's choice, their continued existence since 1968 shows that they are of some value.

In this era also we see interstate exchanges involving the grass roots. Exchange of secondary school students between Kano State and other states in Southern Nigeria continued. In March, 1972, on the occasion when some forty Mid West students left for Kano, on this type of exchange program, the Mid West State Commissioner for Education, Bayo Akpata, observed that "... such interstate visits can break ethnic barriers."¹ Reporting the same incident, the Daily Times of Nigeria was so impressed by the arrangement that it went further to recommend that

... students from one state should undergo their entire secondary school course in the host state. There should be greater flexibility in curricula ... to include the study of the main languages and cultural displays of the participating states. Students can visit their states of origin during their short vacation, but the long vacation should be spent on community development projects among the people of the host state.²

² Ibid.
The initial success of the arrangement in forging a spirit of understanding had, in other words, encouraged further attention and suggestions to make it of greater utility.

But, just as there had been signs of cooperation, understanding and warm relationship at the grass roots, so also do we observe interaction and mutual interest at the traditional rulers' level. Commenting on the situation in the self-governing era, one of the Nigerian dailies observed:

It was almost a bizarre endeavor for any notable person, or traditional ruler, to visit his contemporary in the other Region. Once, the visit of a Regional Premier sparked off an avalanche of tirades and violence in the region he visited . . . . In this regard, the frequency of exchange visits among Military Governors and traditional rulers have unravelled the gamut of cooperation among their states. ¹

Not that one can assume that these frequent visits amount to the existence of unity. The fact is that they opened the channel to communications, respect for each other and one another's views and outlook, and hence, promoted elite cooperation which is usually a strong base for the unity and stability of any political system.

¹ Daily Sketch, February 29, 1972.
Let us now consider the second major objective in this era.

Economic Progress: General Yakubu Gowon enumerated some of the achievements of the military government, achievements which according to him have been contributed to by States as well as local governments. He said, recounting some of the achievements before military takeover and then those of the military government:

In 1959, we exported only half a million tons of crude petroleum. In 1969, 27 million tons, and this year the figure should exceed 50 million tons... Industrial production has risen during the decade by over 300 per cent...1

Oil is important to this thesis because it has affected the country's economy (i.e., including that of Kano emirate). And since one of the aims set for local government in this era was to improve economic conditions, the oil boom becomes a relevant factor to our study. With the oil boom, the country has found the resources to develop its economy, and hence has embarked on projects to expand education, provide necessary social amenities and improve living conditions. To give Nigerians in any state or council area the chance to improve his economic status, the Nigeria Enterprises

1 Y. Gowon, op. cit.
promotion decree was promulgated in February, 1972.¹

This decree established the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board, which was to advance the promotion of Nigerian enterprises, establish an enterprise promotion committee in each state, and provide for specified enterprises that are to be exclusively reserved for Nigerian citizens, and another group of enterprises that may be operated by aliens under certain conditions.

According to the provisions of the decree, twenty-two selected enterprises are to be reserved exclusively for Nigerians, aliens are barred from ownership or part ownership of thirty-three other businesses where paid-up share capital does not exceed £200,000.² In other words, aliens could participate in a business enterprise that is worth more than £200,000. Thus, this decree reserves many important areas of commerce and industry to indigenous businessmen, with little capital, men who in the past (without it), would be squeezed out in competition with non-Nigerian business tycoons. Among the reserved fields, for example, are

¹ The Federal Government Promulgate Decrees; the State Governments' Edicts, see Decree No. 4, 1972, in Daily Sketch, March 6, 1972.

² Ibid.
retail trade (not department stores or supermarkets) and haulage of goods by road, fields into which small businessmen in Kano emirate would have to move, taking over from the Lebanese businessmen who presently control them. This will mean improved economic situations for many in the emirate, and hence an improvement in the position of the local governments in the emirate.

Efforts have also been made in other directions. For example, additional social welfare staff were made available, the state paying fifty per cent of actual expenditure made by L.A.s on personal emoluments of trained social welfare staff. The same, also, applied to the training of cooperative inspectors, whilst with Juvenile Reformatories, the state reimburses actual expenditure of feeding juveniles mandated by a Magistrate's court in a Local Authority Reformatory. Also, fifty per cent of actual expenditure of capital construction, though not to exceed £1,500 in each case, is granted for the erection of Remand Homes and Reformatories. The environment has also improved and sanitary services

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1 The provisions of the decree will come into effect on April 1, 1974.

have improved through the State's assistance. Two-thirds of the amount in current township estimates related to sanitary services are now the responsibility of the State government.¹ No doubt a good amount is being done through state government assistance, but with such assistance, local government in this era is contributing to social development.

The military administration has also encouraged local authorities in making certain infrastructural services more available. For example, £100 grant is made available to local government for each approved dispensary, health centre, welfare clinic and voluntary agency dispensary that provides a service [this would normally be the responsibility of the local authority].² Capital grants are also made available (for the erection of dispensaries, health centres and welfare clinics). Such grants amount to fifty per cent of total expenditure.³ But, despite the encouragement and progress made, facilities available have continued to fall short of requirements. The following table indicates the

¹ Ibid., p. 54.
² Ibid., p. 51
³ Ibid., pp. 52-53.
estimated number of beds, which will be required at the end of each five-year period, and the number of beds that must be provided to make up the current shortfall.¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>MAIN PROGRAM BEDS</th>
<th>SHORT FALL PROGRAM BEDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: B.A.W. Travallion, Metropolitan Kano, p. 71.

Thus, if Travallion's forecasts are any indication of the existing situation, the shortage and inadequacies, in provision of hospitals and hospital beds in Kano, may not begin to decline until after 1977.

In the same way, assistance has been given the L.A. in agricultural and community development. The State government assists the L.A. in the training of agricultural staff. This is done by making available to trainees,

¹ B. Travallion, op. cit., p. 71.
fifty per cent of their salaries. Also, trainee veterinary officers in a two-year course are assisted by the State government by a grant to the L.A. of £150 per annum. Those on the one-year course have £50 granted to their L.A. Thus the State government, by these forms of assistance, has compelled the L.A. to focus its attention on agricultural development. In a place like Kano emirate where interest (as seen in the self-governing era) has always been shown in this area, i.e. agricultural development, the increased support has been beneficial to the emirate.

Interest has also been shown in primary and adult education. The trend in the improvement of education has continued in this era. Within Kano State, the percentage of children receiving primary education has risen from 5.5 per cent in 1966-67 to 7.6 per cent in 1972-73. This is a very gradual evolutionary development, one that falls short of over 40 per cent of children of primary school age group receiving education in primary schools in Kwara State, and over 80 per cent in parts of Southern Nigeria. This level of educational

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2 B. Smith, op. cit., p. 12
3 Ibid., p. 8
4 A.Y. Eke, op. cit.
development, though an improvement on the earlier level, falls far short of the nation's average, as the above figures suggest. The role of the L.A. also becomes important when it is realized that the L.A. in Kano emirate, as in other parts of the state, has taken over control of the government schools in this era. In return, a grant of £350 per classroom is paid by the State government to the L.A. Other grants may be paid in respect of a new school or extension of existing schools as well. With this amount of assistance to the L.A.s, it must be held that inadequate progress has been made in stimulating education, as part of bringing about economic development.

Adult education also has not been forgotten. The public enlightenment campaign observed in the earlier eras has continued. The State government pays a L.A. £3 per each satisfactory class per session (a half year), or £6 per annum. In addition, it assists each organizer with £50 in each session. Where, however, a class does not secure the number of passes required, it forfeits the State's grant, making it the responsibility of the L.A. to absorb the loss. This, as in the previous

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2 Ibid.
self-governing era, is to make questionable the whole objective of adult education. As it is, in this era, it has continued to be very examination-conscious because assistance has depended on success in examinations. This, it can be suggested, has limited the effectiveness of the campaign.

What is apparent from these forms of assistance and cooperation from the state government is that through the state government a measure of economic progress has been brought about. On the other hand, the orientation has been very centralist. In this era, there has been little initiative allowed at the grass roots. The aids seem to have been thrown down from above, and this has hindered the performance of local government by leaving it little opportunity to evolve in its own way. For example, with no concern for the choice of the population, no consultation as to their preferences, the military government of the state introduced the administrative areas system. By this system, well-qualified and skilled state government officials (technical, executive and administrative), were at the disposal of the administrative areas and so at the disposal of local government. No doubt it was an improvement on the level
of personnel hitherto available to local government. In other words, speed and efficiency can probably be said to be the mark of this era. Hence, the trends toward national unity and economic progress that can be discerned came not so much through the direct effort of local government (in the emirate), but through the benevolence of a highly centralist regime.

In its final summary re the alternatives open to central governments in their relationship with, or treatment of, local government in Africa, the Cambridge Conference of 1961 hinted that,

One possibility would be to go back to full centralized rule, that is to local administration through executive and technical officials of the central government. In other words, to give up the local government experiment as a bad job. Central administration may be the best organization for getting things done. It may be the way to develop the economy.1

One must wonder whether Kano State government, in re-organizing local government in 1968, borrowed a leaf from the Cambridge Conference, or was merely acting in pure military tradition.

EXPLAINING THE DEFICIENCIES IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN MILITARY ERA

One rather distinctive characteristic of government in this military era has been its fused and undifferentiated structure. With the suspension of the nation's constitution at the beginning of military rule, very hazy dividing lines existed between the authority and jurisdiction of the Federal military government and the Regional governments (later State governments). More hazy still was the dividing line between the jurisdiction and authority of the State government and local government. In fact, central control over local government in this era was incomparably greater than what existed in the self-governing era and is perhaps parallel to what existed in the colonial era. This is because all local government power seems to concentrate in the hands of the State government, which out of its goodness set up local government machineries—all filled with nominated councillors (apart from the traditional Chiefs).

If, as has been suggested, the object of local government is
simply to supply services, then the maximum possible centralization may be an acceptable answer. If, however, the object is to increase local participation in government and make services more responsive to local feelings, then the (standard of the) services may often suffer heavily.¹

To the military administration, the object was to supply services efficiently and speedily. It was not a question of doing that, and at the same time making services responsive to local feelings by increasing local involvement. The military has no orientation towards mass participation. Hence, the military government did away with elections—local, state or federal. Political parties disappeared; and the administrative officer did not only take part in making the law and by-law, he sat as head of the council. In fact, both at the local and state level (and also at the national level), the administration was getting the best it ever had, whilst the masses of the population never anticipated so little local participation.

This overemphasis on efficiency and on provision of services at the expense of participation of the people, and at the expense of democratic ideals that had started

¹ West Africa Magazine, March 5, 1971.
to grow in the self-governing era—ideals of freedom, equality and tolerance, was partly responsible, as mentioned earlier, for the inadequacies in local government in this era. Having once given the people a chance to taste of the benefits of self-rule at the local level, it would appear like turning back the hands of the clock to find central government officials taking over affairs of councils for which elected councillors had been responsible. In the same way, it must appear rather strange to find major orders about local matters coming down from the State capital, in form of edicts, rather than mainly from council as in the self-governing era.¹

Totalitarian regimes (or at least autocratic ones), it has been observed, are very intolerant of local government.² This is probably due to the fact that they look upon any form of decentralized authority as a possible source of confrontation with their own power. A modernizing autocracy, on the other hand, usually possesses certain characteristics:

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¹ See for example, Kano State of Nigeria, Edict No. 8, 1972, establishing noise pollution control in all public places in the State.

1) Hierarchical authority,
2) Exclusivism,
3) Strategic flexibility,
4) Unitarism.¹

All four traits appear to be identifiable in the Nigerian military regime in its relation with local government in this era. Strict hierarchy, of course, is a common military characteristic. Exclusivism in terms of establishing a closed system of local government has been referred to above. Within the select group, those favoured by the regime, a strategic flexibility of the codes of ethics, as distinct from the rigid general provisions applicable to others, exists.² There is also the trend towards unitarism. Though states exist, the personification of the state, the Military Governor, is very well aware of his allegiance to the military head of state. He is aware that by a decree the head of state could replace him at will, if his loyalty were in doubt. These totalitarian and autocratic tendencies, though characteristics of military organizations, have not made for continued political development in this era.

² Decree No. 4 of 1968, setting up special military courts for the armed forces.
Any new regime, it would be expected would endeavour to take good care of a number of things. One is the 

... need for a machinery which will accommodate local pressures and the intense politics they generate and provide access to the local populace.

Another is,

provision of sufficient resources for the services which can be appreciated at the local level.

A third is,

the provision for posts of leadership which can defend local interests. 1

In this era, in the emirate, the fact that local government was directed at doing only the second and did not make adequate provisions for any machinery consisting of the people's choice, to accommodate local pressures, and did not encourage the growth of local leadership, led to rather poor achievements. A development of one of these at the expense of the others, accounts for some of the frustrations and imbalance (an imbalance

that almost amounts to the nonexistence of local government) in this era.

In this era, then, we see that the lack of local leadership, as in the earlier era, due to the orientation of the military to ignore democratic ideals, the State government's highly exaggerated regard for economic progress, at the expense of political participation, the military government's doing away with elections and party politics, the existence of bribery and corruption in high places, are factors that limited the successful functioning of local government.

One other contributory factor, however, that stands out distinct from the others, has been the indiscriminate importation of foreign practices and ideas. Administrative decentralization was a major practice that was imported. Our contention here is that, unfortunately, a confused form of decentralization was adopted. Rather than decentralize the administration, as has been argued above, what has been done is to deconcentrate it. Also, with State government officials heading local government, clash of interest and loyalty of the official and loss of interest by the local people became inevitable. In effect, a fused state-local government system evolved. Local leadership was left
dormant, and popular participation, as indicated, was reduced to near nil.

There is also the alien dictatorial tactics of the military government—the tactics to rule by Decrees and Edicts, by a near unitary system, if not in theory, at least in practice. This, we will hypothesize, has been the source of personal and ascriptive-based appointments which have become a practice with the military, a development that has made the government very suspect in a society where ethnic influences are very strong.¹ Thus, as will be shown, the practice has created further suspicion of a government already distant from the masses. Over-control of political activities, it has been suggested, might do permanent damage to political interests and personal political ambitions. It is partly on this basis that even supporters of the regime, like Mallam Aminu Kano, the Federal Commissioner for Health, who hails from Kano, has pleaded for a lift of the ban on political activities, and the opening of "frank discussions . . . at all levels . . . ."²

¹ Some explain the fall of General Ironsi as due to Ibo paternalism.

These transplanted or imported foreign ideas and practices, introduced into Kano emirate (and to the other local government in Kano State) in this era, exacerbated an already poor situation. They bred a tendency to look at the administration, not as the local people's, but with a feeling of detachment. We must now examine these importations more closely.

IMPORTATIONS IN MILITARY ERA

Two foreign ideas or practices have been identified as importations in this era. They are:

1) An unusual form of decentralized administration.
2) Some military-dictatorial tactics, (i.e., the practice of ruling by Decrees and Edicts, and the practice of personal ascriptive-based appointments).

Both were foreign institutions to the emirate. Decentralization was originally a British phenomenon. By it, parliament gave to the various local councils (as explained in the Introduction) certain legal limits within which to act. On the other hand, deconcentration or devolution (some corrupt forms of decentralization) had had their roots in French local government.
Through them officials of the central government in Paris had superintended and directed the local councils. Decentralization, whether in the classic British form, or in the different French form, was alien to Kano.

Military dictatorial tactics were new too. They had their home in Latin America. In El Salvador, for example, the army has a

... responsibility to uphold the institutions and honour of the nation should self-seeking politicians jeopardize the constitution or the institutions of the nation... it is the duty of the military to intervene.\(^1\)

In Peru, the situation is still clearer:

... The purpose of the armed forces is to assure the laws of the Republic, compliance with the constitution and laws, and the conservation of public order...\(^2\)

This it can do in the way it deems most desirable. This, of course, includes seizing power from civilians and ruling by edicts and military laws and suspending all political activities. This alien practice was what was introduced to Nigeria.

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The New Decentralization

The word decentralization itself is one which seems to occur with increasing frequency in the discussion of systems of government. Usually, in popular usage, it produces very favourable reactions. This is probably because of its association with initiative, effectiveness, grass-roots participation in the decision-making process, i.e., with the achievement and preservation of the basic values of a free society. Centralization, on the other hand, is often associated with delay, red tape, efficiency at the expense of erosion of local preferences and local liberties. This very favourable association has resulted in decentralization being applied even to circumstances where its very opposite could very well be argued to apply.

Deconcentration of administration involves the delegation of authority adequate for the discharge of specified functions, to staff of a central department


2 J.W. Fesler, op. cit., p. 373.
who are outside headquarters.\(^1\) It usually pertains to the establishment of local administrative units of a central government with extremely limited discretionary powers given to its officials sent to the local areas. Such local entities are field agents of the central government and usually decisions of any consequence require central approval or action.

Normally when we refer to decentralization of power, we refer to the delegation of power in a geographical setting. In delegating power, both doctrinal and pragmatic considerations incline the careful delegator to specify the conditions governing the use of the delegated powers.\(^2\) But, if the criteria to guide local decision-making are prescribed so precisely and comprehensively that field officials can only perform the clerical operation of matching the characteristics of each decision against detailed prescriptions, rules or regulations, discretion suffers and decentralization becomes a farce.

Looking at the problem from another perspective, two basic patterns of field services have been identified—

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1 J. Heaphey, Spatial Dimensions of Development Administration (Durham, North Carolina, 1971), p. 25
2 J.W. Fesler, op. cit., p. 373.
the functional and the prefectorial. Let us consider the préfectorial system. This system had its origin in France and divided the country into provinces placing a prefect in charge of each. The prefect was the personification of the entire government, and all field agents, administrative, technical, scientific, etc., were under his supervision. Even communications upwards to the departments in Paris had to flow through him. The same system, or at least parallel ones, have been established in French-speaking African States. There, prefects (or their equivalents known by different names), have been posted to the provinces, not with the authority to make on-the-spot decisions, but partly to reduce administrative workload in the centre, whilst authority and decision-making, in practically all important issues, still remain with the centre.¹

In Kano emirate, in this era, it can be argued that what we have is a pattern of this French deconcentrated system. The Administrative Officer personifies the state in the administrative area. Like the prefect, he supervises all State officials in the administrative area.

Like him, he has full control over local government. In fact, unlike the French prefect, the Kano emirate D.O. heads the council, the administrative area council. But like the French prefect, also, he is in constant touch with the capital for directives and constant consultation.

In Kano the impression has been given that the changes in 1968 were brought about to bring the government closer to the people and make for greater participation in decision-making; in other words, that a decentralized administration in the interest of grass-roots participation and initiative on the side of the people was the main factor. In fact what we see in Kano emirate was the dispersal of officials to the administrative areas, certain responsibilities allotted to them, and for these they had to report to their headquarters in all cases for making final decisions. Added to this is a conscious recognition that they are responsible to the State government. Thus it was a very hybrid form of decentralization, if not really an ideal deconcentration, that was imported.

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1 A. Bako, op. cit., p. 2., G.V. Summerhayes, op. cit., p. 214.
This can be claimed because some amount of decision-making ability remained with the D.O., at least in routine and minor matters. It is difficult to admit the claim, however, that the newly introduced system brought the people closer to their government. It was rather a system which gave the field administrator very little freedom, and yet put him in a position which the local people had seen their own elected councillors fill in the previous era, and hence for which they hardly found him legitimate.¹

Military Dictatorial Tactics

This era also saw the introduction of a number of totalitarian and autocratic tactics. Perhaps these were, as already argued above, in line with the military's usual dictatorial approach. The idea of promulgating decrees and edicts, without its theme ever being discussed by the people's representatives, had been known in many Latin-American countries.² It was alien to Nigeria.³ The nomination of people into local government councils, as observed earlier, was like turning

¹ Impression gathered in personal interview with Alhaji Maitama Sule, Kano State Commissioner for Information, Toronto, January 24, 1974.
² A good example is El Salvador; see M.C. Needler, Political System of Latin America (Toronto, 1964), Ch. 2.
³ Notable among the pressmen who fled Nigeria as a result of his critical attitude to military Decrees and Edicts was Peter Enaboro, popular Peter Pan of the Times group.
the hands of the clock a few decades back—to the colonial
days and earlier, when the Emir selected his council,
all by himself.

These new ideas were to have their impact on
the working of local government in the emirate. It may
be justifiable to argue that the suspension of political
parties and political activities, the introduction of a
system of personal selection of councillors, the use of
edicts, all gave the government a breathing space to
mend its fences and to achieve, both at local and
central levels, what it probably would have failed to
achieve by persuasion and reason.\footnote{West Africa Magazine, February 20, 1971.}

Probably the end product can compensate for an unsavoury dictatorial
and autocratic approach. It must be clarified that a
military regime, hopefully acting as an emergency or
stop-gap government, cannot be expected to be as liberal-
democratic as a popularly elected government that
intends, through people's support, to continue to rule.
The military administration wants to get certain projects
completed; such priority projects they intend to accomplish
before 1976, the year they hope to withdraw into their
barracks.\footnote{Y. Gowon, Text of the Twelfth Anniversary Broadcast, October 1, 1972.}
SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT OF IMPORTATIONS

This unusual form of decentralization thus brought into the local government of the emirate a leadership that, as argued above, many did not find legitimate. The system also did not make for development of local leadership as in the previous era. The new decentralization also brought about a fused state-local government relationship in Kano State. So functionally fused is the role of the Administrative Officer as head of the administrative area council, and as a state government official, that a differentiation of his one role from the other is virtually impossible. He is both the D.O. of the previous era, as well as Chairman of the local council.

Further, the new decentralization brought about, as argued above, low participation, lack of awareness and lack of interest. Since the people knew that the central government official (the Administrative Officer of D.O.) was in charge, and since he could hardly be as approachable as the councillors of the earlier era, their interest, awareness and concern in local government were bound to suffer. In other words, local government came to mean far less to the people in this era than in the earlier era.
The military dictatorial tactics listed above, especially the personal appointments aspect of them, brought a quiet anger. It brought more bribery and corruption. Recently, for example, the Administrative Officer (or D.O.) in charge of Kano Metropolitan Administrative Area, Mallam Uba Adamu, was dismissed at the instance of the Rufai Commission finding him guilty of showing flagrant favouritism in the allocation of market stalls. On the whole, the military dictatorial tactics have shown the intolerance of the military towards the ordinary man's sentiments and values, his slow indecisive approach, his desire to choose who rules him locally, his wish to be able to show an interest in local affairs, when so interested. Since these were taken out of local government in this era by the imported military tactics, and since men fear the barrel of the gun, the tendency has been to move far back and watch the running of local government from a distance.

The new importations have thus had adverse impacts on the performance of local government in this era. Just as has been argued and seen in the two

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earlier periods, the contention is not that the importations were solely responsible for the deficiencies in the functioning of local government in the various eras. Rather, it is that in all three eras, these importations have consistently played a critical part in bringing about the non-maximization of the objectives laid down for local government in the various eras.
method in the colonial era, as well as the drain on local personnel in the self-governing era, further complicated problems. In the latter period, as already mentioned, a number of local personnel became interested in Regional and Federal politics and administration. They were therefore unavailable, in most cases, to local government. In the present military era, state government officials, especially in the administrative areas, have to a great degree been allowed the functions of local leadership, rather than the traditional leaders and the local notables. Thus, the scarce human resources waste away in this era.

The poor educational planning, apparent in the progress made in the area of formal primary education, as well as adult education in all three periods, was paradoxical. The emirate was comparatively rich, yet educationally, its development was one of the lowest in Northern Nigeria in this entire period. The emirate's lack of adequate planning, and its late start in this field, contributed to the inadequate supply of the skilled personnel that might have helped to build and improve the system.

The problem of bribery, corruption and nepotism was more of a contagion, during the latter two periods (the self-governing and the military eras). In Kano the Muffett
Commission found against the Emir and though there are confusions in the concept of corruption, or what constitutes bribery or nepotism, it is probably appropriate to observe that in the self-governing period, demand for a fair chance for all, irrespective of birth, background or place of origin, and the desire for an independent mind and self-confidence, gained ground. Thus, bribery and corruption, which in the earlier period might have been condoned, got the attention of the masses and led many to wonder if their resources were being used for the right purposes.

The clash of personalities was another problem. The confrontation between Alhaji, Sir Ahmadu Bello, and Alhaji, Sir Muhammadu Sanusi, attests to this. It gave those opposed to the attitude and behaviour of the latter, in his management of council and its funds, the opportunity to support a commission of inquiry. In the present era, clashes between the Emir and the emirate council have, as has been seen on one occasion (described above), led to the Emir's voluntary, though temporary, withdrawal, whilst the district heads do not have to look on the Emir as a Sole Authority to whom they are responsible.¹

¹ Alhaji Maitama Sule contests this. From his observation the district and village heads in Kano emirate have regarded the creation of the administrative areas as a deliberate slight on the Emir. They have therefore, at the present, rallied round him, far more than in the past,
There is also the exaggerated regard for efficiency and the provision of services. This was partly the reason why in the colonial era the political officer had to superintend most local government activities. In the military era, it has led to placing local government in the hands of nominated persons, some officials and the traditional Chiefs. The "luxury" of having the masses indicate interest in their welfare has been sacrificed to efficiency or probably regarded as unnecessary.

The lack of adequate toleration of people from outside the emirates (including other parts of Nigeria) inhibited progress in local government. For example, the Kano riots of 1953, as well as the regulations against vagrant stranger-elements (who could be ordered to leave, and were allowed limited avenue of appeal), tend in the one case to suggest political immaturity and in the other, discrimination against outside elements. Neither made for progress and development in the local government of the emirate.¹

The lack of distinction between state and local government, especially in the military era, and the fused conditions between the colonial administration and the N.A. in the colonial period, were other hindrances. In the latter, it made for uncertainties, submissiveness and timidity as the

¹ For the law against vagrant strangers and their legal recourse, see Northern Nigeria N.A. Law, 1954, Cap. 77, Sec. 48.
N.A. had to look to the political officers of the colonial administration (officers of the central government), before embarking on any important projects. In the former, as already discussed, the state officials became so prominent in local government that one is apt to wonder if their replacement of legitimately selected representatives has not robbed the system of the most basic element of local self-government.

These problems, by themselves, i.e., the scarcity of leadership, the poverty and poor planning, the nepotism and corruption, the exclusion of the masses from participation in the name of efficiency and excellent provision of services, the intolerance (some latent or in some cases very apparent), personality clashes, the lack of differentiation between state and local government, and other less important factors peculiar to each era, were enough to account for the malfunctioning of local government in Kano emirate in the three eras of this study. But they did not constitute all the problems. An examination of the three eras has revealed the continued importation into local government of various foreign institutions, ideas and practices.
THE IMPORTATIONS - A SUMMARY

In the colonial era, such importations included the practice of Indirect Rule and the institution of political officer (Resident, District Officer and his Assistant in this case). As mentioned earlier, both had worked successfully in India. There was also the importation of another practice, the English legal system. It brought new ideas, standards and the norms of another society. Its establishment as a parallel system to the Native courts had a dysfunctional impact; it confused, rather than clarified. When it is realized that the political officers also had some judicial powers, could hold their own courts, could send instructions to the Emir, could sit on his council and in his court, the confusion brought about by this importation becomes apparent.

In the self-governing era, other importations included the three-tier structure of local government, partisan politics, the institutionalization of government and opposition in council, the secret ballot and direct elections to council, as well as a manhood suffrage form of franchise. The three tiers, as has been argued, did not function like their British counterpart. The lower tiers, the District and Town/Village councils were at the mercy of the emirate council (the N.A.). The institution of government and opposition conflicted with traditional concepts and practices. Hitherto, the Emir
had used councillors and advisers in conducting the affairs of the N.A. Opponents of the Emir were either conciliated or withdrew from the political scene. Opposition had never been formally institutionalized. Now the N.A. system was to have not only the Emir's governing side, but it was also to have the opposition side, pointing fingers at the Emir and his men on the other side. This abolishment of the method of consensus in the process of decision-making, and the substitution of majority rule for consensual rule, was to bring a strained relationship and bitterness.¹ The political conflicts in the emirate, discussed above, attest to this. Thus, rather than having all hands on deck, especially in such a case as in the emirate, where the total of such hands is few, some came to be regarded, not as the opposition side is regarded in the country from which the institution was copied (as Her Majesty's loyal opposition, whose views could occasionally be adopted by the government side) but as a people not to reckon with.

¹ The consensual rule was a very well known African approach to decision making. See Julius Nyerere "Democracy and the Party System", op.cit., p.2. Here elders sit and talk over points of disagreement with no one given the chance to go for a break, a meal, or even the washroom, till all had agreed on a consensus.
In the present military era most of the earlier importations have disappeared - partisan politics, government and opposition, secret ballot, direct election, manhood suffrage, the usual political officers of the colonial era (especially the Resident), as well as Indirect Rule. As has been observed, Indirect Rule gradually disappeared after 1954. The slate was almost wiped clean in local government, just as on the national scene, almost every evidence of the earlier regime was discarded - the constitution, political parties, parliament, etc. What resulted, as seen above, was the new system, in Kano emirate, of the administrative areas and the re-establishment of the dying out, political functionary of the colonial era, the District Officer. Thus, in the local government of the emirate, a full cycle had evolved. It was a cycle starting in the colonial era with the political officers responsible to the Governor or High Commissioner, in the self-governing era, becoming one through representative and elected councils, and in the military era, turning back to the institution of the D.O. (one of the powerful political officers of the colonial era). In Kano emirate, even the title of D.O. has been resurrected. As mentioned above, the practice of administrative decentralization
was imported, to work the new system, just as what we have termed military-dictatorial practices came into the local government in this era.

In all three periods it appears that, in addition to the other problems mentioned above which by themselves were big enough to account for the deficient working of local government, this other factor, i.e., indiscriminate importations, as has been discussed in Chapters Two, Three and Four, consistently contributed to greater inadequacies. The importation of political institutions, ideas and practices from other cultures and other lands, without a full consideration and an appreciation of the problems this involves, has been a common trend. And since the transfer or importation of institutions is a problem that may continue to stare both administrative and political theorists and practitioners across different cultures in the face, now and in the future, we must examine, in a section below, the question of acculturation in the total problem of institutional transplantation, and in another section, consider what factors must be taken into consideration when we envisage the transfer or importation of an institution, idea or practice across cultures.
METHODS OF INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFER

The transplanting of institutions is a process that has gone on in various parts of the world for centuries. As W.A. Robson says, "...Few civilized countries have lived entirely on their own stock of ideas or depended on institutions which owe nothing to external influences."¹ In other words, most countries have from historic times found some of the institutions of their neighbours, or others, relevant to their needs and have adopted them. Other practices have come in through contact with other peoples, whilst yet other institutions and ideas gain entry without the people's awareness, at that initial stage, of what is being imported into their system.

Three major methods that have been used in transplanting institutions are identifiable.² First is the method of war and conquest. This has been a very potent force for spreading the culture, ideas and institutions or practices of the conquerors. Having been conquered, the subjugated have little choice than to accept the conquerors as masters. Each of the great empires of history, the Roman or Greek for example, imposed or imported its own institutions on conquered peoples in their Empires. Thus in the Roman Empire,

² Ibid.
Roman governors were set up and Roman laws established. Oftentimes, however, the conquerors absorbed the institutions of the conquered.  

Another method of transplanting has been the peaceful method. Religion and colonization have been the two common factors here. By gradually introducing foreign religious practices to a people, the innovator not only brings a new idea but one which has the potential of changing the attitudes and ways of life of the people. This is because most religions teach ethical principles. They lay stress on people's regard for a supernatural Being and attempt to regulate the relations of man to man. The method of transplanting through colonization is probably more subtle than that of war and military conquest, and probably more far-reaching. Nevertheless, a relationship of master and subordinate still exists and a master group, in this case, imports its ideas and practices to a subordinate group.  

Another method of transplanting institutions has been through commerce between nations. As commercial interaction increases, people can be expected not only to exchange materials for money, but also to adopt the customs and practices of each other. As more money becomes available, new practices are thought of and new introductions can be adopted.  

1 A relevant example of this is the way the Fulani conquerors of the Hausa states absorbed the Hausa customs and institutions. See J.D. Anderson, West Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Ibadan, 1971), Chapter Four, passim.
Interactions between people, whether in the form of violent or peaceful ones, have made for one people to transplant the institutions, ideas and practices of others, at times to alter or change their own practices, and in other cases resist the new institution. In the modern world, "The practice of borrowing and imitation has become ubiquitous in scope and enormous in scale."\(^1\) Examined historically, or in contemporary times, one can only conclude that the transplanting of political institutions is a process that has come to stay.

In the following sections, this study does not really deal with institutions of one particular country or state transferred by one of these three methods to the other. It does not deal with Kano emirate alone, though the sections should help us to appreciate, in a broader perspective, how the imported institutions referred to in Chapters Two, Three and Four, above, contributed to the inadequacies in the functioning of local government in Kano emirate. In effect, this chapter examines the institutions, practices and ideas of a country, that are brought, knowingly or inadvertently, to the other country. Ideas and practices imported are usually very current practices and tend to be

\(^1\) Ibid.
passed from one culture to another, often by personal contacts. Institutions on the other hand, as Daniel Lerner defines them, are the "behavioral patterns performed by people, whose goal is to enhance as much as possible, the values which they hold important."\(^1\) Because these values are held important by a people, such people tend to carry them along wherever they go. If such people settle down, they attempt to establish the same institutions, as we will observe below with the British, in their contact with their colonies. This is why some have suggested that "... the process of the transfer of institutions ...(is) a process of acculturation or cultural diffusion."\(^2\) It is a process that involves at least two cultures, and one that goes deeper than a people's desire to give an institution of theirs to another people. It is this lack of the realization that political institutional transfer subsumes acculturation that can be observed in the three periods of this study, i.e., in Chapters Two, Three and Four.


\(^2\) Ibid. p.27
THE PROBLEM OF ACCULTURATION

The result of cultural borrowing, or from the other viewpoint of cultural lending, is what is referred to as acculturation. It is by itself a part of the more generalized phenomenon of social change.

Herskovitz has defined acculturation as comprehending

... those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact with subsequent changes in the original cultural patterns of either or both groups.

What then do we mean when we talk of groups having different cultures? We mean that each group has a different set of ordered interdependent activities - political, economic, military, kinship, religious, educational and social-recreational. When a society that has this exhaustive list of the principal activities of most societies, interacts with another society that has its own set, one or the other of these activities, or an aspect of one or more of these activities, may be affected. In such a circumstance, the acculturation process has taken place.

Other factors about the transfer of institutions are


important to note. Man, as a social animal, has the peculiarity that he alone of all animals has a culture. 1

Other animals, and insects as well, have societies, but only man uses language, manufactures tools and possesses art, religion and other aspects of culture. The concern with culture thus emphasizes the specifically human element of man's behaviour. 2

His cultural potentials, thus, enable man to engage in thinking, in acting, in transferring institutions, in accepting one and rejecting another.

Also, it is worthy of note that when two cultures interact, usually there is mutual modification and adaptation on both sides, just as there is resistance. As Bascom and Herskovitz express their experiences in Africa,

There is no African culture which has not been affected in some way by European contact and there is none which has entirely given way before it . . . . 3

They might as well have added that in many ways the contact had altered some of the resident European culture as well.

On the whole, it can be said that the only constant phenomenon in acculturation

... is the establishment in the two cultures involved, of mutual modifications and adaptations, which will enable the two groups to live together. 4

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2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p.3.
4 Leonard W. Doob, Becoming More Civilized (New Haven, 1960),
The problems involved in acculturation have not occupied the attention of political scientists as much as they should have till now. An expert in tropical agriculture, for example, will not transplant a cereal or any other plant without carrying out a careful survey of the soil and the climate of the area to which he is transferring it. Public administration practitioners, on the other hand, have engaged in institutional transplantation on a widespread scale in the past, without any attempt being made to survey the social and economic soil, . . . or the climate of opinion prevailing in the areas to which they were to be implanted. 1

It is a blunder that the averagely experienced expert in tropical agriculture, referred to above, is unlikely to make. This aspect of institutional transplantation, therefore, throws a challenge to contemporary scholars (since the practitioners are usually too preoccupied) to evolve a schema of considerations that need be examined before transplanting political institutions.

In Africa, especially, recent events have shown just how serious is the problem of thrusting western political institutions, ideas and practices onto its cultures.

Studies of African countries have revealed serious stresses

1 W.A. Robson, _op.cit._, p. 413.
and strains in their attempts to accommodate not only
the imported political institutions, but also the values,
mores and ethos that are required to legitimize them.
The result in most parts of the continent has been some break-
down in the political system, and in others, a takeover of
government by the military. The fact is that every society
has over many generations gradually built up an accretion
of conventions that are taken for granted in the working
of its socio-political system. It is these conventions
that need identification if aspects of the political system
(some of its institutions and practices) are to be imported
to another culture. If such conventions, or similar and
comparable ones, are reasonably present in the other culture,
then it might be reasonable to expect success in transplantation.

Another problem is that, hitherto, the primary concern
of political scientists has been

the fate of the institution being intro-
duced into a society, rather than a
concern for what happens to the traditional
institution.  

It is often assumed that the new institution has displaced
or is displacing the old. It is forgotten that not all

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1 Michael F. Lofchie, (ed.), The State of the Nations
(Berkeley, 1971), Ch.1 and 2, Passim.

2 Committee on African Studies, Untitled Paper, Boston
cases of institutional transfer are ones where even gradual displacement of the traditional system is taking place. "In some situations, traditional institutions may continue to exist with new ones,"\(^1\) thereby showing the persistence of the older (indigenous) culture. Some cultures, in other words, have resisted change far more strongly than others. This, as has been observed, is particularly the case with the Islamic cultures of the Western Sudan, of which Kano emirate, our focus of study, forms a part.\(^2\)

The main reason adduced for this resistance is socio-anthropological. It is hypothesized that an autocratic attitude and a strong hierarchical structure of society tend to lead to a strong sense of subordination, if not submissiveness to the higher person in the hierarchy, and hence a clinging to tradition and the status quo. Societies with egalitarian imprint, on the other hand, it is suggested, offer fertile soil for the transplanting of innovative ideas.\(^3\) Kano emirate, as was seen in Chapter Two, was a stratified society, with an upper traditional class, a learned religious middle class of teachers, and then the mass of the population. Educational development, as already

\(^1\) Ibid.


pointed out, has been slow. Hence it has not been as effective as it might have been in changing that social setup. In other words, Kano is one of the societies with strong hierarchical structure.

In this type of culture, therefore, extra efforts become essential to ensure that satisfactory grounds are laid for any importations. As Doob observes,

... any shift in culture requires some kind of adjustment ... which means that difficulty and pain are the lot of people anywhere, either when they receive new ways from the outside society, or when they themselves migrate from one country to another.¹

These difficulties and pains can only be made worse in a strongly hierarchical society, if the importations are imposed from above, be it by a colonial power, an indigenous political elite, or worse still, by a military elite that does not have to be very responsive to the climate of opinion because of a forthcoming election.

In his study among the Maoris of New Zealand, Raymond Firth found a generally accepted principle in acculturation theory to be true: that is, the first and easiest transfers between societies and cultures are those in the field of material culture; the transfer of forms of social organization is more difficult and slower; and finally, transfers

of beliefs and values are slowest, and meet the stoutest resistance and greatest obstacles.¹

Simon Ottenberg's study among the Ibos of Southern Nigeria also tends to validate this theory and affords some comparison with the Hausa culture in Kano emirate. Ottenberg found the Ibos a highly individualistic people. While in that society a man is dependent on his family, lineage and residential grouping for support and backing, strong emphasis is placed on his ability to make his own way in the world.² The individualistic approach is not stressed by the Hausa. The Hausa sees himself as a member of, and within, a corporate society. His way in the world is not distinctive from the way of that corporate whole.³

In Ibo society, Ottenberg found that the possibility of enhancing status and prestige, authority and leadership, was open to every individual. In Hausa stratified society, there was a limit to which a slave could aspire (though this could be very high, especially for 'royal' slaves, serving

¹ B.F. Hoselitz, "Advanced and Underdeveloped Countries: A Study in Development Contrasts", in Hamilton, op.cit., p.28.

² S. Ottenberg, "Ibo Receptivity to Change", in Bascom and Herskovitz, op.cit., p.136.

³ Ibid.
royal members). The openness in Ibo society did not, in other words, exist in the same degree in Hausa society, where leadership, for example, was inherited.¹

Ibo culture, then, tends to be characterized by its emphasis on individual achievement, initiative, alternative prestige goals and paths of action, and a tendency towards equalitarian leadership. On the other hand, Hausa culture tends to be characterized by greater emphasis on collective or corporate achievement, a happy acceptance of the role that falls on one to play within the group, a more guarded search for prestige, an acceptance of a hierarchy of authority within the group, and an initiative that is controlled and not utilized for self-aggrandisement, but rather to serve legitimate authority and the consensual desire of the group.

The Ibo type of culture is what John Embree has characterized as the "loosely structured", or the "flexible" society.² Ottenberg suggests that it is this flexibility that makes it easier for the Ibo to accommodate importations in education, politics, commerce and law, perhaps more easily than

¹ E.S. Bowen, *Return to Laughter*, (New York, 1964), Ch. 4 and 5, Passim.

In other words, to be successful, any importation must be ready for change, ready to adjust to fit new conditions. The political, social and economic conditions of an environment must be known, and a new importation should be able to adjust to them. A hope that an institution would survive in a new land exactly in the form in which it existed in its home country may be unrealistic and be no more than wishful thinking. It is like the dream of an inexperienced young man, migrating to another country and hoping that things will be, in his new home, exactly as they were in the old.

H.C. Barnett has also contended that to be successfully adopted a new importation must demonstrate that it is culturally compatible with other elements of the society. He claims that, "A novelty must provide some basis for an identification which will permit assimilation or projection to proceed . . .".¹ This implies that a conscious study must be made of the relevant aspects of the society's political, economic, military, kinship, religious,

elections, universal adult suffrage, the legal system, various administrative institutions such as the Ombudsman, the Auditor General and other practices such as parliamentary supremacy and the establishment of public corporations, the Prefectorial system; most have been imported into former English or French colonies in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and elsewhere. The practice of importation has, in other words, been a very popular one indeed. What is also undeniable is that political institutional transfer in all these areas disrupted the traditional, or the existing society of the time, to varying degrees. It also created rather extraordinary situations in which the inhabitants found themselves not at peace with the old, nor fully with the new. A good example that demonstrates the effect of such indiscriminate and unprepared-for importation is seen in a case study from Bornu province of Northern Nigeria.

This experiment, which imported a modern agricultural technique to Magumeri district, succeeded in fertilizing plots and in raising production by as much as 300%. On

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1 D.C. Rowat, The Ombudsman Plan (Toronto, 1973). See the Preface for the spread of various ideas and practices, including the Ombudsman.
the other hand, it failed, because the people of Magumeri rejected it. No one, despite its technological success, was interested in purchasing the fertilizer afterwards.\footnote{Ronald Cohen, "The Success that failed: an experiment in cultural change in Africa", \textit{Anthropologica}, Vol.III, No.1, 1961, p.9.}

A number of lessons, applicable to the natural as well as the social sciences, can be drawn from this Magumeri technological success, but socio-cultural failure. It tends to suggest that a total analysis of social change would, as a matter of course, take into account the following stages in acculturation. If the agricultural experts at Magumeri were aware of this, they did not heed it. If they were unaware, that lack of awareness certainly contributed to the failure of their experiment. The stages are:\footnote{The same stages are identified by Bernard Magubane, "A Critical Look at Indices Used in the Study of Social Change in Colonial Africa", \textit{Current Anthropology}, Vol.12, 1971, p.419}

1. An initial period of contact between the invading culture and the invaded.

2. A period of acquiescence.

3. A period of resistance.

If an imported institution is to succeed, it would appear that the importers should not wait complacently for stage three to evolve. If they do, then the imported institution may face a resistance that it may be unable to overcome. At
the acquiescence stage, necessary communication and education
and, in fact, persuasion may be necessary to make known
the worth or value of an institution, idea or practice. If
this period is devoid of such efforts, the institution may
get strangled, due to lack of domestication by the time it
gets to the third stage.

The lessons from the Magumeri case, though in practical
agriculture, provide an eye-opener to the problems posed by
the importations into the three periods of this study. In
the first period, for example, the English legal system and
the institution of the Resident, were introduced. Little effort
was made to educate the people about these new social and
political institutions. The attitude was that of the Magumeri
agricultural expert; a question of the master graciously
bringing an institution from a superior culture to benefit
a primitive culture, one that needs it very much, and must
obviously appreciate the value of what is brought in. As
earlier mentioned, three legal avenues of appeal were open to the
citizen; the political officer, the N.A. court, and the
English courts. Even then the Emir, traditionally, settled
disputes. There were biases against the new system because
of its erosion of the avenues hitherto open. Yet the
importation of the English legal system survived the initial
and acquiescence stages and never really went into the resistance stage. On the other hand, the office of Resident, which also was transported to Nigeria from the British experience in India, survived for a while but disappeared during the self-governing era. Why one importation from a different culture survives all three stages and becomes a part of a new culture, whilst others contribute to the problems and inadequacies of the existing system will be looked into in the next section.

FACTORS ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESSFUL IMPORTATION

Paul Singh, writing about the West Indies, has claimed, and his claim can very well be extended to apply to West Africa, that the British experiment of transplanting local government institutions has not been altogether unsuccessful. One might add that, indeed, it has succeeded in some ways, though its success has been limited. But, says Singh,

Unlike human heart transplants, which completely fail when the patient's body rejects them, institutional transplantation can be saved by making suitable adjustments in their original models...¹

In other words, to be successful, any importation must be ready for change, ready to adjust to fit new conditions. The political, social and economic conditions of an environment must be known, and a new importation should be able to adjust to them. A hope that an institution would survive in a new land exactly in the form in which it existed in its home country may be unrealistic and be no more than wishful thinking. It is like the dream of an inexperienced young man, migrating to another country and hoping that things will be, in his new home, exactly as they were in the old.

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educational, medical and socio-recreational life. On the basis of this study, the compatibility of the proposed importation can be assessed and the chances of its becoming part of the new culture gauged. This is not to be interpreted to mean that every proposed importation will go through all the above analysis. In every case, however, the scholar or practitioner should make a careful selection of the relevant aspects to look into, depending on the type of importation, before recommending or deciding on importation.

It will be essential, as well, for the scholar to establish, as mentioned above, whether the new importation belongs to the area of:

1. Material culture,
2. Social organization, or
3. Beliefs and values.

As indicated above, a high level of success may be expected if the grounds above have been investigated and seen as satisfactory, and if it is an importation that introduces some material (that could economically benefit the people). The level of success will be less if the importation belongs to the social organization area (attempting to change or influence family, clubs, groups, etc.). The scholar would be most skeptical of success (or, at least, hold out the
least hope) if the importation belongs to the area of beliefs and national values of the people (be they superstitious or unscientific).

In addition, as John Embree has seen, if the society is "loosely structured", or flexible, as we saw with the Ibos of Southern Nigeria, the potentials of successfully introducing an innovation would appear to be higher than for a more rigid, hierarchical society.

But why, despite all these, some importations may still survive and become part of another culture, while others may only cause problems for its new environment, must now be examined. This listing will summarize earlier discussions and suggest what further factors to look for, in aiding successful importation. Briefly, the principles are as follows:

1. The principle of utility. That is, a people will retain the old custom or accept a new one depending upon which one has the greatest immediate usefulness to their life. However, if the advantages of an

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importation were not known to the people, they tend to resist its importation, or are at best very lukewarm to it.

2. The principle of function. The idea is that if the importation performs an adaptive or adjustive function for the social system, then it will have a high probability of survival.

3. The principle of integration. An importation will survive if it can be integrated into or identified with the existing system of ideas and sentiments.

4. The principle of consensus. The more an importation acquires common consent within a culture, the greater its tendency to persist. Thus adult suffrage might tend to survive longer in a place like Kano than might the institutions of government and opposition, which tend to segregate the society.

5. The principle of early learning. That which is learned and internalized in infancy and early childhood is most resistant to change (i.e., tends to survive).

Thus, if we know the point in the life career of an individual, at which every aspect of culture was transmitted, we would find that what changes most readily was
learned late in life; and what was most resistant to change (i.e. what survived most with him) was learned early.¹

Though the above principles are in most cases still more of hypotheses, they do give us insights into what hypotheses a careful innovator might need to consider. If the innovator expects a successful transplant of a particular institution, idea or practice, it is essential that he considers the above principles. In our examination of a regional federation for Kano emirate, an attempt will be made to consider how these principles apply with regard to the proposed institution.

Daniel Lerner has suggested that,

\[ \text{modernity is a style of life, a whole composed of parts that have to go together. Hence it does not work merely to transfer an institution such as a constitutional code or an electoral device, or a school system or a farming technique or a public health program . . . modernization is likely to produce abortive monstrosities in sum, unless it entails a comprehensive transformation of institutions . . . .} \]

Though making an important contribution here, Daniel Lerner is, to say the least, being very idealistic, and also somewhat irrelevant to the public administration practitioner.

¹ Ibid., p.196.

A "comprehensive transformation of institutions", if this means a wholesale importation of an institution, though desirable, may be no more than an ideal, perhaps a dream. This is because, with our present level of technology and knowledge, a wholesale transformation of institutions or a major transplantation of the institutions of one culture to another would be extremely difficult. Man must continue to live by piecemeal importations from one culture to another. The hope must be that as long as the basic principles, suggested above, are investigated before an importation is embarked upon, the chances of successfully injecting a new institution, or a modified form of it, into a new culture to its advantage, will remain.

As William Robson says,

The transplantation of political institutions and ideas, is or should be a continuing process, and no country should ever be too proud to learn from others . . . . The best political institutions belong not to any one country, but to the whole world.\(^1\)

One cannot disagree with Robson. But in transplanting or importing ideas, practices or institutions across cultures, or even within the same culture, we must become more disciplined in our approach. We must become more discriminating.

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\(^1\) W.A. Robson, *op. cit.*, p. 418.
in what we expect and as to where we import certain institutions. We must become more alert to the responsibility that the failure of an importation may disrupt the existing economic, social or political system or practice, bring confusion and uncertainty as to the future course to pursue, and so frustrate expectations and hopes that have been unduly excited.

In considering any importations as a possible solution to what we have already identified as a deficient local government system in Kano emirate, the principles isolated in the above discussions will be important. These are the principles of utility, integration and consensus. These principles, in addition to other factors that will be brought out in the latter part of Chapter Six, will be our close guide in making a suggestion for the improvement of local government in Kano emirate.

It would appear that if these essential factors had been considered in importing the various institutions, very few of the institutions would have been imported. Indirect Rule had some utility, at least, in the sense that it served a purpose at a time when government would have been impossible without it. The Chiefs were essential
since the British administrative officers were not numerically strong enough to rule directly. In some sense, also, the practice continued to develop the political experience of the Emir. It was a practice that integrated reasonably well. Manifestly, the Chiefs appeared to hold the decision-making machinery whilst the administrative officers seemed to work behind the scenes. This lent to the institution a legitimacy and a consensual support of the masses.

This cannot be said of the other institutions, such as that of the Resident, and the English legal system in the colonial era, or the three-tier structure of government and opposition and universalistic criteria in the self-governing era, or of decentralization and military dictatorial tactics in the military era. The utility of the Resident—be it judicial or administrative—was very limited. The Emir had held the power he now assumed. His functions were thus unclear to many. Though it is true that the Resident tried to integrate, learn the language and make himself accessible, the confusion in his functions and utility made very difficult a collective acceptance of the Resident in a way that the Emir was acceptable to the people.
The English legal system no doubt had some utility in providing an avenue for justice and conflict resolution. But its functions conflicted with the Native Courts, the Resident's court, and the traditional system of taking reports to the Emir or District and Village heads. Hence confusion existed as to the right course of action. And because the English legal system required extensively and specially trained judges and lawyers, it could not integrate easily into the political system. In other words, no consensual acceptance of it existed.

The three-tier local government structure, as has been argued, did not function as it did in Britain. The lower tiers—the district and village councils—were too subordinate. Though of some utility in tax collection and essential statistics gathering, the people usually looked to the "E'NA", as they called it (the N.A.) for their usual local government needs. Government and Opposition in the same way merely divided the population into factions whilst the universalistic criteria, though of some utility, could not function as expected because they clashed with tradition and practice. They could not integrate into the system and they were abhorred by a section of the population.
This group saw the government as theirs and wanted to use its facilities to their own advantage rather than to the advantage of all. The concept of a parliamentary opposition was difficult to grasp.

In the military era, decentralization, despite its apparent utility in the developed countries like Britain and Canada, functioned in a rather truncated form. Military dictatorial tactics, on the other hand, have not been accepted. People have continued to press for a change to a civilian mass-elected representative government.

The above arguments go to show that the essential factors for importation were not considered well enough in Kano emirate. If they had been, some political education of the masses would have been found necessary to prepare the people for these importations. In fact, a considerable amount of modification of each institution would have been essential before importing the institutions, and, in fact, better substitutes would have been found for the Resident and the three-tier local government structure.
CHAPTER SIX

THE NEED FOR A CHANGE IN KANO EMIRATE

In Chapters Two, Three and Four of this work, we discussed the causes of the inadequacies in local government of Kano emirate. These deficiencies in the system of local government call for a change. In what areas can the change be anticipated; in the structural, functional, or personnel areas, or in relation with upper level governments, in all of these, or in others? As a prelude to the attempt to answer this question, this chapter examines briefly the existing structural set-up in the emirate. In light of the problems identified, the chapter then goes on to discuss the types of regional government in operation elsewhere today (with a view to suggesting a form of regional government for the emirate). The chapter then considers the conditions under which regional federations will work and finally scrutinizes how the system has worked in a well known case of regional federation, that of Metropolitan Toronto.

KANO EMIRATE TODAY

As discussed in Chapters Two to Four, the Emir's traditional position, though not quite as strong as it was in the pre-colonial days, continues to be a powerful one.
He still has a lot of influence over the administration of the emirate. He still appoints the district heads (though subject to the approval of the state government), as well as the village heads. Traditionally, he takes the views of the local people into consideration in making a decision.\footnote{This view was stressed in an interview with Alhaji Maitama Sule, in Toronto, January, 1974.} Whilst the village head is in charge of one village in the emirate, the district head takes charge of an area of larger population, while coordinating the responsibilities in the villages that make up the district. Both the village and the district has its respective local council. Such councils in the colonial and self-governing eras discharged such responsibilities as were allotted to them by the Kano N.A. In the present military era, both appear to have been made still more ineffective, if not totally swallowed up, by the creation of the administrative area councils. What has happened is that nominations are made by the Military Governor from each district council (three from each) to the administrative area council.\footnote{John Paden, \textit{op. cit.}, p.345.} Some have observed that at the present there are only \"... three distinct levels of authority\"\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.339. These are the State authority (embracing the emirate and three others), the emirate authority - the L.A., and the administrative area authority.} in the emirate. The district
and village councils have degenerated into poorly structured advisory meetings. Thus, whilst the district and village councils have, legally speaking, not disappeared, a lot of real power and responsibility now lies with the administrative area council.

As in the past, legal powers are still given to the emirate council (the Local Authority) to structure its lower tiers. The Local Authority, the regulation said,

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\text{may with the approval of the Military Governor, divide its area into districts and these into village areas. Such areas have district, village or clan heads and may have formally constituted councils. . . . . Local authorities may delegate functions to (these) subordinate councils . . . funds are made available, but must be supervised closely by the local Treasury.}
\]

The real situation since the 1968 reform in Kano State has thus been the existence of:

a) Four Local Authorities,

b) Eight Administrative Areas (five of which are in Kano emirate),

c) One Township.

This is exclusive of the subordinate district and village councils. The four L.A., of course, are Kano emirate L.A.,

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Kano emirate L.A., on the other hand, has formally continued to retain its 25 district councils. The tax population, and hence the financial resources of most of the district councils, are very limited. The districts along with their tax population and estimated tax for 1971-72 are shown in Table XIII of Chapter Seven. Real power, as has been said, does not, however, lie with these districts, let alone with the village councils. It is in the hands of the administrative areas, i.e., Kano South East, Kano West, Kano South West, Kano North Central and Kano Metropolitan.

It must be reiterated immediately that both the district head and the village head still perform a number of very important functions. The village head, for example, is responsible to the Emir and the L.A. for the peace and happiness of his village. He is the representative of his village in meetings with other villages and with the district head. For the L.A. too, he carries out whatever orders are required of him; for example, he counts the villagers each year, pronounces how much tax each taxpayer in the village
must pay each year and compiles vital statistical reports as required by the L.A.¹

The district head is also responsible for similar duties in his district. Since it is impossible for the Emir to govern the villages directly, it is necessary for him to have an official to be responsible for all that goes on. The district head, therefore, carries out the orders of the Emir and reports back. With both the village and district head, their most vital function, of keeping law and order, continues to be important, and they continue to retain their importance by carrying out this function.

It must be mentioned as well that whilst the Kano L.A. has a staff of over 5,000 people, some of the district and village councils usually can boast only of a very small number of personnel. This usually includes the district or village head's scribe, his assistant and messengers. In addition, are the Alkali (Judge of the Local Court), the sanitary inspector, the forest guard and an agricultural assistant. Usually their budgets are incorporated into that of the L.A.² Hence, they do not have much financial autonomy.

¹ Northern Nigeria Government, Local Authority Staff Regulations (Kaduna, undated), p. 7.
² Information gathered by interview with the Commissioner for Information, Kano State, January, 1974.
The present situation in the emirate is important to this work. It shows that among the deficiencies identified in the functioning of local government in the three eras in this study, the structure of local government in Kano, by itself, calls for a change. A change is desirable if the local government of the emirate is to be able to carry out the functions that we suggest (in our list of criteria) to be essential for a modernizing age.

The view of this study is that a thorough-going (though not very radical) change is desirable and necessary. Our view is that the basis of local government in the emirate was laid long before the British era. Some of the institutions are now moribund. Though they served the requirements of their days, modern needs are drastically different. It is therefore time not only to discard some of the archaic and functionally unsuited institutions and practices, but also to change the structure. It is not a question of reforming these. Rather than refine the horse and buggy, man has chosen the car, and even now looks for an atomic powered one. In such an age, one cannot afford to keep certain structures and institutions of doubtful value, just for the sake of doing so. It is with this belief that this work, in its concluding part, suggests a rather comprehensive change in the local government of the emirate.
TYPES OF REGIONAL GOVERNMENT

In considering the systems of local government that might provide a solution to some of the deficiencies in local government in the emirate, attention will be given to regional government. What is meant by regional government?

It is ... a responsive and responsible governmental authority to which an appreciable number of important functions are assigned, and whose territorial extent is greater than that of existing local municipalities . . . .1

Dupré assumes that the existing local municipalities will continue as the lower tier and stresses the allocation of functions that stretch over the whole area to a new body, bigger and more encompassing than the usual and existing units. Both points, i.e., function and size, are also stressed by other authors. "Autonomous units of government, acting in their own behalf", claimed Ostrom and others, are considered incapable of resolving the diverse problems of the wider metropolitan community. . . . The prescription is reorganization into larger units, to provide a general metropolitan framework . . . .2

Both views here place the emphasis on the creation of


a new extra-territorial government, i.e., one exceeding the boundaries of any existing unit, one that brings together many units in forming the new one. In considering regional governments in those countries where they exist (Canada, especially Ontario, is a good example), the emphasis has been on the formation of this larger body. In Kano emirate, on the other hand, this larger body, comprising the entire emirate, has existed from pre-colonial times. In considering regional government for the emirate, therefore, emphasis will be on a form of lower tier structure that will most adequately perform the functions required of local government, as well as the changes that, for this purpose, may with profit be brought about in the Kano emirate L.A.

There are many types of regional arrangements. The most modest of these and perhaps the most popular, because it does not require new governmental structures, is the voluntary regional association. This type of cooperative venture exists in San Francisco, Washington, D.C., and Detroit. California, however, is the state in which the most extensive use has been made of cooperative agreements. There, cooperative agreements between municipalities total over 2,000.\(^1\) In 1961, the Association

of Bay Area governments was formed in the San Francisco region. Governments participating tend to be municipalities and counties, and representatives who serve on the area council are elected office holders, such as the mayors or aldermen of their respective councils. Much of the emphasis of the cooperative scheme has been placed on research and planning.

Unitary or single-tier regional government can come about through consolidation, amalgamation and/or annexation. This approach is usually an extremely bold and ambitious one. In some countries, such as the United States, it involves constitutional rearrangements. Under this approach, existing local government units are thrown into the junkyard and replaced, en masse, by a new metropolitan or regional government, one that assumes total responsibility for its new jurisdiction. This "one government" approach is attractive to many because of its simplicity. Yet government today is besieged by a great and multifarious aggregate of duties and functions, and if only on the principle of division of labour, as J.S. Mill contends, it is essential that these responsibilities be not concentrated in one body.¹

This is more important where the government covers a wide geographical area, and the possibility might arise that local interests would have little chance of consideration.

This apart, it is interesting to note that in the United States there have been constitutional problems in relation to such "one government" approach. Annexation is usually made difficult by state laws. Two recent cases of consolidation into one government in metropolitan areas can be taken as examples. Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in 1947, consolidated the city and county. Before, however, the change could be made at the local level, an amendment to the state constitution had to be passed by the voters of the entire state. The same happened in the case of Nashville, Tennessee, in 1962.¹

More relevant for our purpose are the two-level types of regional arrangements. One of these is the comprehensive urban-county plan. There have been several attempts, again in the United States, to adopt this system. In Houston, Dayton, Cleveland and Pittsburgh, the attempts have failed because the implementation required the approval of the majority of voters in the respective counties. Only in

¹ Ibid.
Miami has such approval been given and the system installed. There the upper tier government (the urban-county board) works by having the county members elected at large (from the whole county), whilst the other members are elected from the large cities with populations over 60,000.

The more popular of the two-tier regional arrangements has been that of regional federation. This, unlike the comprehensive urban-county plan, means the establishment of effective governments for the lower and upper tiers, rather than establishing a board that is little more than a planning board at the upper level. In this way it differs from the urban-county plan. It is obviously different from the consolidation or annexation arrangement since both levels of government remain very effective, having very definite powers and functions in each case. It is also not a mere voluntary association since the upper level has a strong government with distinct legal responsibilities.

Federations of municipalities are nothing new. That of

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London came into being in 1888. Indeed the London County Council inherited its boundary from the Metropolitan Board of Works, established in 1855 to take charge of the planning of the whole area.\(^1\) In 1888, the London County Council, a new-tier municipal council, distinct from the existing level of municipalities, was established. It covered the existing city and the suburbs. Soon, however, London spilled over the boundaries of the lower municipalities into large sections of Kent, Surrey, Hertford, Essex and the whole of Middlesex. Thus a lot of places within the London region were outside the jurisdiction of the London County Council. By the middle of this century, over eight million people were clustered together in the area. In 1957, a Royal Commission (headed by Sir Edward Herbert) was appointed to examine the system and working of local government in the Greater London conurbation and to recommend whatever changes in the local government structure, and whatever distribution in the functions, it thought appropriate.\(^2\) The Herbert Report that appeared in 1960\(^3\) recommended a Greater London Council.

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as an upper tier government for the entire area, and fifty-two boroughs (as the lower tiers). The British government accepted the broad lines of the report and the London Government Act of 1963 implemented the recommendation, though only thirty-two boroughs were created. The two-tier, regional federation has since continued to operate in London.

The idea of regional federation has also been seriously discussed in the U.S. at least since 1896.\(^1\) In that year, such a proposal was made, unsuccessfully, for Boston. Other unsuccessful efforts were recorded in Oakland in 1916 and in Pittsburgh in 1929. These failed again, because of constitutional limitations - the voters of the area did not approve of them as required by the states' constitutions. The schemes for St. Louis and San Francisco, in fact, never reached the voting stage, i.e., decisions were never made on them by the state voters. The schemes were outvoted in the state legislature.\(^2\)

One other interesting regional experiment in the United States has been the twin cities model of metropolitan

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government in Minnesota. This is basically a federal system of municipal government with powers divided between the upper tier unit—the Metropolitan council, and the lower tier units—the counties and the municipalities.\textsuperscript{1} The Metropolitan council consisted of fifteen members, fourteen selected (by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate) from equal population districts, whilst the fifteenth, the Chairman, was selected by the Governor with Senate approval.\textsuperscript{2} In this arrangement, no provision was made for a popular referendum on the question of creating the council.\textsuperscript{3} Apart from being a planning agency for the whole area, it is also in charge of criminal justice and appoints service boards to execute policies in various areas developed by the council.\textsuperscript{4}

In an assessment of the twin-city experiment, Stanley Baldinger has observed that it is

\ldots the most promising and innovative means yet to plan and govern major metropolises \ldots the council plans, coordinates, and controls the comprehensive development of an urban region

\footnotesize
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid.
\item Minnesota Statute, Chapter 473B.
\item Ibid., Ch. 473C and 473E.
\end{enumerate}
containing 1.9 million people, seven counties, two large central cities and some 300 units of local government.

It will be apparent from the above that the upper tier in the twin-city experiment is basically a planning unit. Further, it comprises selected members, which makes it rather unrepresentative. And though, in its planning efforts, it has the power to suspend the plans of any council, board or agency in conflict with its own guide, such a suspension could be appealed to the State legislature. Thus, the twin cities model, though an attempt at a regional federation type of local government, has a lot of limitations. It is in light of the limitations perceived in the U.S. approaches that the Ontario experiment in regional and metropolitan government has posed a most interesting challenge.

In Canada, and especially in the province of Ontario, regional federations have been set up. Beginning with Metropolitan Toronto in 1953, a good many regional federations have been created. These include the Regional

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Municipalities of Ottawa-Carleton, created in 1969, and
Niagara, created in 1970. Others created since then
include the Regional Municipalities of Sudbury, Waterloo,
York, Halton, Hamilton-Wentworth, Durham, Peel, Haldimand-
Norfolk and the District Municipality of Muskoka. These
municipalities have been set up simply by the provincial
government passing an Act, in each case, to set them up.¹
Such federations have meant the existence of several lower-
level municipal governments and an upper-tier regional govern-
ment. The upper tier is usually composed of the Mayors
and Reeves (executive heads) and/or some aldermen of the
lower-tier municipalities, depending on the terms of the
Act setting up the federation. The Toronto example will
be examined below.

OTHER SOLUTIONS

Other solutions have often been employed in attacking
the problems of a region. Chief among these has been the
creation of ad hoc metropolitan special purpose bodies —
such as those for water supply, sewage, etc.² The most

¹ Information as to existing regional federations in Ontario
has been supplied by the Ministry of Treasury, Economics
and Intergovernmental Affairs, Toronto.

² D.C. Rowat, op.cit., p.18.
significant operational difference is that whilst municipalities perform a bundle of functions and services, special purpose bodies, being ad hoc bodies, usually confine their activities to the provision of one or a few very specific services. This is a device often employed in the voluntary association arrangement. The problem with the special purpose bodies is that where local authorities enter into many such arrangements, their responsibilities get fragmented, and this leads to public confusion and a lack of accountability to the electorate.

The other solution to regional problems has been a total take-over by the central government. This method, as Rowat argues, is one which all who value local self-government must find undesirable. Apart from the excessive workload that it would create, the probable neglect of local interests that might result makes such a system still less desirable.

THE MOST FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

The major purpose of a reorganization of government is to achieve greater efficiency and responsiveness. What

1 Ibid.
form of regional government is most likely to bring this about in a particular area will depend on many factors. Frank Smallwood has suggested that it is possible to equate the feasibility of, i.e., efficiency and responsiveness to be brought about by, the various alternative arrangements to both internal and external political conditions. This feasibility, he suggests, is a function of the relationship between external support and internal opposition. Expressed as an equation, the feasibility of a local government reorganization is as follows:

\[
\text{Feasibility} = \frac{\text{External Support}}{\text{Internal Opposition}}.
\]

External support, here, refers to support from the senior governments - the state and/or federal or national government. Internal opposition refers to opposition by groups and governments within the proposed governmental area. The failure of regional federations in the U.S. attests to the weakness of external support and the strength of internal opposition. In Ontario one might argue that the applicability of the formula is dubious. Why? Because, whether

or not there is internal opposition, the reorganization can still be effected by provincial legislation. In other words, in this case, external support can easily override internal opposition. On the other hand, it must be instantly said that legislating a reorganization into existence says nothing of its success in bringing about efficiency and responsiveness in local government. The support it gets from the mass of the population will always be important. Smallwood's formula appears, then, to be a useful tool.

REGIONAL FEDERATION: DESIRABLE CONDITIONS FOR ITS SUCCESSFUL OPERATION

A number of criteria have been suggested in the literature as essential conditions for the successful working of a regional federation. This section makes a brief review of the literature before drawing its conclusions.

Trevor Price has suggested that eight criteria are essential for a regional government to be successful.

Summarized, these are:

1. A sense of community
2. A balance of interest
3. A sound financial base
4. Adequate size
5. A definite boundary
6. Component parts that are distinguishable
7. A boundary that could be used for other administrative purposes.

8. The existence of a lower tier.\textsuperscript{1}

It must, however, be said that though Price's criteria were designed for Ontario, some of them do have universal application. For example, the sense of community here is taken in terms of the region sharing the same history, having the same or similar ethnic backgrounds, as well as other sociological traits. This will appear to be essential in most regional federations. In the same way, it will appear that if any unit of the regional federation is to pay its way, then it must have an adequate tax base, i.e., a sound financial base, and this assumes an adequate size, in terms of area and population, form which to collect the revenue.

The units that make the federation should have peculiar local characteristics of their own. They should have distinct geographical boundaries marking them one from the other. These conditions, as has been suggested by Price, are essential.

The Acton Trust Society, on the other hand, recognized three essential conditions for the successful working of a regional federation:

\textsuperscript{1} T. Price, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 53. See also a parallel list by W. D'arcy McKeough, Ontario's former Minister of Municipal Affairs, in "Regional Government in Ontario", \textit{Municipal World}, Vol. 79, 1968, p. 323.
1. Economic unity
2. Social unity
3. Administrative viability.\textsuperscript{1}

Here again, the idea of a sound financial or tax base is reiterated. Social unity takes the place of Price's "sense of community", whilst administrative viability must take into consideration the size of the area, the availability of adequate personnel, etc.

Rowat, however, added a new idea (decentralization) as a desirable condition for the successful set-up of a regional federation:

1. Community of interest
2. Administrative efficiency
3. Financial efficiency
4. Decentralization.\textsuperscript{2}

Decentralization here implies local autonomy and independence in the areas allotted to each level of government. Without such a free hand and initiative, different tiers of government, in effect a federation, could hardly be said to exist. Rowat's administrative and financial efficiency are combined

\textsuperscript{1} B.C. Smith, \textit{Regionalism} (London, 1965), p.35

under the economic unity and sound financial base in the two lists above. The list of the Ontario Committee on Taxation does not add much that is new. It examines the sense of community, financial viability, and functional efficiency, as the important factors to be considered in successfully setting up a regional federation.¹

One problem that must be faced in working out a regional federation is the successful organization of institutions capable of developing the concerted program necessary for an interdependent metropolitan area, without sacrificing the independence of the localities. A sacrifice of the independence of the localities, as already said, means the end of two tiers. In other words, to operate successfully, the lower tier of a regional federation must not be too weak financially if it is to be effective, nor can it afford to depend mainly on hand-outs from the upper tier government. In other words, a regional federation cannot, for the sake of better participation by local people and better attention to local interests, run weak and functionally inefficient lower tiers. The two types of criteria, financial autonomy

and interdependence, must be balanced if the federation is to be established successfully.

Another essential factor that must be present is leadership. Even when a sound financial base exists and a sense of community exists, and other criteria are met, effective leadership must be available to translate proposals into action. Finally, it would appear that the British type of "representative" or "leadership" type of democracy, rather than the American "direct" or "mass" democracy, would be more agreeable with the setting up and successful running of a regional federation. This is not the place to confirm the arguments of James Sharpe, that in the U.S. the many opportunities, through the ballot box, to express approval or disapproval on certain issues has made government rather ineffective. It is not the place, either, to refute Frank Smallwood's defense of that direct democratic system.\(^1\) The hard reality is more our concern: that a lot of attempts in the U.S. at setting up regional and metropolitan governments, as seen in the examples given above, have been foiled by employing the referendum. In most cases, it would

---

\(^1\) F. Smallwood, "Game Politics and Feedback Politics", in Robert Morlan, Capital Courthouse and City Hall (Boston, 1966), pp.313-9
appear such a referendum was on a topic the masses could hardly have comprehended fully. In the representative system, on the other hand, though doubts might exist in the minds even of some leaders (and who can be very certain about the impact of a new reorganization?), there exists the necessary hope and faith in the system in a representative rather than direct democracy. In the process, avenues open for further clarification and better understanding, and for toleration of a new institution and reorganization. If, finally, the new system does not work, it can be replaced.

A SUMMATION

We will sum up by suggesting that certain politico-economic-geographic conditions are very essential to the successful set-up of a regional federation. The political aspect embraces a sense of community support from within the system, as well as from the senior government (the national government in a unitary constitution). It also includes effective political and administrative leadership. The economic requirements include good revenue sources and a sound financial base on the whole, whilst the geographic requirements include adequate size, definite boundary and distinct physical features. These conditions, it is suggested, should exist both at the regional government level and at the local (lower tier) levels.
The existence of a sense of community has interested many scholars of regional government. What exactly this concept includes has, however, not been agreed upon.¹ What we can claim for sure is that a sense of community is a sense of shared interest, and that it arises, as the Ontario Committee on Taxation makes plain, from such elusive factors as history, geography, economic relations and sociological traits. MacIver explained its basis as follows:

... any area of common life, village or town or district, or country or even a wider area, to deserve the name community, the area must be somehow distinguished from further areas, the common life may have some characteristics of its own such that the frontiers of the area have some meaning ... Whenever men live together they develop some kind and degree of distinctive common characteristics - manners, tradition, modes of speech ... These are the signs and consequences of an effective common life.²

This sense of community plays a concrete and essential role in making a government unit viable.³ It is what


³ Ontario Committee on Taxation, Report, Vol. XI, 1967, Ch. 23,
gives local citizens the determination to "fight to
death against the liquidation of dear old Oshkosh Junction".\footnote{D.C. Rowat, \textit{op. cit.}, p.18.}

It is what gives people that strong devotion to what they
acknowledge to be theirs and would see preserved or im-
proved. It is what instils the sense of sacrifice
and the sense of absolute commitment to see a scheme
work. Thus, a sense of community is essential to regional
government.

The other aspects of our political conditions, internal
and external support, and leadership, have been discussed
above. Our two criteria under the economic conditions have
also been discussed. What is an adequate geographic size
will depend not only on population and area, but more on
financial capacity. Hence this again ties in with the
economic conditions. Distinct physical features assume
that within the region there will be some minor natural
barriers. Thus, hills, mountains, lakes, would mark out the
areas, but should be situated in such a way as not to make
intra-regional communication too difficult.
In considering the regional federation of Metropolitan Toronto, this work will not go into details in demonstrating the existence of these essential conditions there. The idea is not to establish whether a regional federation can be successfully set up and whether it can achieve a reasonable measure of success in Toronto. That has been done already. Rather, the objective is to examine from that case, the practical problems involved in establishing and running a regional federation. And Metropolitan Toronto, because of the successful establishment of a regional federation there since 1953, appears to be ideal for that purpose.

METROPOLITAN TORONTO: A WORKING REGIONAL FEDERATION

Canada, unlike Britain and the United States, has made very few contributions to the development of governmental organizations in a democratic society. It is, however, in no way an exaggeration to state that Metropolitan Toronto has been a most significant political innovation developed since the end of World War II. To many, it is a model, the classic of regional federation in North America. Many have hailed it as a signal and a most original response to the
peculiar problems that beset large metropolitan or urban-rural regions.\(^1\) In creating the regional municipality of Toronto in 1953, the province of Ontario not only showed its willingness to experiment boldly, it also showed that it was at the forefront in the area of local government reforms and reorganization anywhere.

What is it then that made reform or reorganization necessary in Ontario? To put it simply, as the former Ontario Premier, John P. Robarts, put it,

\[\ldots\] The seeming inability of our present municipal structure to deal adequately with the needs of our urban population \(\ldots\) (necessitates) \(\ldots\) the development of regional governments in Ontario.\(^2\)

The general argument is that the basis of local government in Ontario was laid more than a century ago, with the requirements of those days in mind. Today's needs are very different. The small size of most municipalities is generally regarded as the chief symptom of a disease afflicting local government, one to which a remedy has to be found in good time. Since piecemeal remedies

\(^1\) Ontario Committee on Taxation, \textit{op.cit.}, p.499

\(^2\) John P. Robarts, \textit{at a Progressive Conservative Riding Association Meeting, Toronto, Ontario, 1966.}
alone might be insufficient to cure the century-old institution, comprehensive remedies have had to be devised.

Though Premier Robarts spoke generally about inadequacy in dealing with needs, he in fact referred to the inefficient provision of services, the out-dated distinction between urban and rural needs and amenities and the inequities between municipalities in service levels and tax rates. Such were the problems in municipal governments that the Robarts government and the previous administration had to find answers to. Fortunately, in looking for a solution, the obstacles, referred to above, which had prevented the successful establishment of regional federations in the U.S., were not present in Canada. The Ontario provincial legislature, as the representatives of the people of Ontario, could go ahead and pass legislation to reform or reorganize local government. This would not need the popular votes (referendum) that had killed many similar schemes in the U.S. And a provincial Cabinet, because of its majority support in the legislature, could easily take the lead in promoting such legislation.

In discussing the experiment of regional federation in Toronto, a little bit of the history of the area becomes
inevitable. Before the formation of Metropolitan Toronto in 1953, the governing structure of the area consisted of twelve suburban municipalities and the central city. Most of the twelve municipalities were found inept in meeting the rising needs of a rapidly growing urban community. The needs for water supplies, education, public transit, arterial extensions and sewerage, as well as housing, were growing in the suburban municipalities. In addition, it was apparent that the residents of the twelve municipalities used city facilities - streets, arterial highways, shopping centres, public transit, recreational facilities, etc. At the same time, the settlement of new urban areas on the fringe brought a whole series of problems to the relatively small and rather poor municipalities.

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1 Some of the materials for this section are drawn from Albert Rose, *Governing Metropolitan Toronto*, Berkeley, 1972, and from *Metropolitan Toronto*, editions of 1961, 1967, 1970 & 1973 (a brochure published occasionally for the Metropolitan Toronto Council by the staff of the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board) and other minor materials. Interviews were also held in City Hall, Toronto, with a representative of the Metro Chairman. Other interviews were held with Alderman Paul Pickett, J.C., an Executive Committee Member, City of Toronto, and with Controller J. Alex McGivern of the Borough of North York, the largest of the suburban municipalities.

2 The twelve suburban municipalities were the Township of York, Etobicoke, Scarborough, Weston, Mimico, New Toronto, Leaside, North York and East York and the Villages of Forest Hill, Swansea and Long Branch.
It is no wonder, then, that in 1950 the City of Toronto initiated an application, sent it to the Ontario Municipal Board, requesting an order to amalgamate the twelve municipalities with the City of Toronto. The Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) received the application late in 1950, and scheduled hearings for 1951 and part of 1952. All the suburban municipalities, except Mimico, opposed the city's application before the OMB.¹

In January, 1953, the Board issued its report. In brief, it rejected the application of the City of Toronto and the Township of Mimico. But, while admitting that it had not been asked to propose a solution to the problems of the metropolitan area of Toronto, the Board suggested the creation of a metropolitan government in the form of a two-tier system of local government. One month later, in February, 1953, the Premier of Ontario personally introduced Bill 80. That Bill created the new political unit, the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, with a metropolitan council consisting of twelve representatives from the city, and one, the Mayor or Reeve, from each of the suburban municipalities.²


The Bill thus brought the City of Toronto and the twelve suburban municipalities under the umbrella of one regional government, the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, (popularly called 'Metro'). Yet it was done in such a way that the suburban municipalities could continue their traditions, could preserve their own identity by administering local services, whilst uniting with the City in making more than local decisions. It is important to note that in setting up regional government, the provincial government was astute enough to realize the need to build on existing political institutions, to avoid drastic and sweeping changes and ensure orderly transition. Hence the boundaries and the internal governmental structure of the various municipalities were left untouched. Metro-wide functions such as water supply, air pollution control, transportation, health and welfare, justice, housing, planning and civil defence were left to Metro. The local municipalities handled property tax, zoning, local parks, local roads, sidewalks, local water distribution, garbage collection, fire protection, building bylaws, vital statistics and the electoral voters' list.1

The government, in introducing Bill 80, promised to review the experience of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto no later than five years from its inception. However, considerable opposition to the existing suburban municipalities grew up, and a review became necessary before the five years were up. On May 2, 1957, a formal inquiry was initiated by Order-in-Council. \(^1\) Nothing substantial was done, however, till Mr. Gathercole, the Deputy Minister of Economics, in cooperation with the Department of Municipal Affairs, presented a report that proposed a consolidation of the area municipalities (the twelve lower-level or local municipalities) into boroughs in November, 1961. Mr. Gathercole proposed a consolidation of the twelve suburban municipalities and the City, into four boroughs, namely:

1) the borough of Toronto,

2) the borough of North York,

3) the borough of Scarborough,

4) the borough of Etobicoke. \(^2\)

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\(^1\) Ibid., p.32

\(^2\) A. Rose, *op.cit.*, p.87.
It is worthy of note that three of the suburban boroughs suggested by Mr. Gathercole were among the five ultimately created in 1966 (came into effect January 1, 1967).

Meanwhile, early in 1963, the City of Toronto passed a resolution renewing its request that the OMB consider its application that the thirteen municipalities within Metropolitan Toronto, i.e., the City plus the twelve lower-tier municipalities, be amalgamated into one unified city. In this call, the City had the support of the three major newspapers of Toronto, the *Globe and Mail*, the *Telegram* and the *Daily Star*. The pressure was such that the Ontario government had to set up a Royal Commission, headed by Carl H. Goldenberg, to study the situation. Set up early in 1964, the Commission reported on June 10, 1965. Its recommendation was very similar to that made in Mr. Gathercole's study in 1961. The report recommended a four-city system by suggesting the Cities of Toronto, North York, Scarborough and Etobicoke. It also made recommendations about representation in the metropolitan council, staffing, the franchise, etc.  

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In accepting the report, the provincial government announced that the two-level form of metropolitan government would continue. The thirteen municipalities would be consolidated into six municipalities — the City of Toronto and five boroughs, namely North York, Scarborough, Etobicoke, York and East York. The metropolitan council was still to consist of indirectly elected members. Twelve were still to represent the City of Toronto, whilst 20 were to represent the other five boroughs (distribution to be based on the 1964 population). The chairman was to be elected by the metropolitan council.

LESSONS FROM TORONTO

The Toronto experiment illustrates a number of points. Politically it has illustrated the immense importance of the sense of community in regional government. It was that sense, the sense of a common identity and a common destiny, that partly motivated the city and the Toronto press to insist on the creation of a one-tier system of government. It was this same sense which gave them the willingness to accept the two-tier federation when it was established. Though they fought to see a one-tier government implemented, they did not become an obstacle to the new reorganization of their government.
Toronto's metropolitan federation has experienced a growing but gradual support for the metropolitan level by Metro councillors. In 1953, as Harold Kaplan observes, metropolitan councillors saw themselves no more than "municipal spokesmen attending an intergovernmental conference."¹ To them, they were municipal officials first and metro-councillors last. That approach and attitude of the municipal official sitting on metro council to protect his municipality from unwelcome intrusion and from the metro giant is gradually subsiding, and Metro councillors are getting more Metro- rather than local-conscious.² The representative of Metro interviewed for this study held that some representatives of the suburban municipalities still see themselves as champions of local interest, and have no great feeling of Metro interest. Controller McGivern of North York, the largest of the five boroughs, on the other hand, held that the problem was that some members of the City of Toronto in Metro often acted as though the city alone comprised Metro.³ Alderman Paul Pickett, Q.C., of the City of Toronto, was particularly Metro in approach and confessed to being an amalgamationist.

¹ H. Kaplan, "The Integration of Metropolitan Federations, in Lithwick and Paquet, op. cit., p. 160.
² A. Rose, op. cit., p. 106.
³ Interviews with Frank Longstaff, Assistant Secretary, Metro Planning Division and J. Alex McGivern, Controller, Borough of North York and member of Metro Council, Alderman Paul Pickett, Q.C., Executive Committee Member, City of Toronto.
Thus, internal support for Metro, it can be said, has not been area-wide, but has grown very gradually with time. External support or the support of the provincial government, was apparent from the first when the OMB suggested a two-tier government and the provincial government implemented it and later set up a number of bodies to study the situation. Thus, external support has been the more relevant factor in the setting up and running of Metro.

Politically, however, Toronto has been lucky with leadership. The first Chairman of Metro, Fred Goldwin Gardiner, was popularly known as "Super Mayor," "Big Daddy," or "Metro Goldwin Mayor." ¹ He was an extremely flamboyant politician who, through his personality, was able to convince suburban politicians that Metro was in the interests of their various municipalities. The next Chairman, Mr. W.R. Allen, was a well-known, highly efficient administrator. Though in many ways different from Gardiner, their contrasting personalities added variety and colour to Metro Toronto politics. Fred Gardiner was a prominent Conservative. Allen was only a fairly well-known Liberal. Gardiner was a

¹ A. Rose, *op. cit.*, p.116
prominent member of the Protestant establishment in Toronto. Allen was only a son of a trade unionist, and a Roman Catholic. As a second leader of Metro, Allen's administrative skill and his thoroughness proved most essential to Metro's development.¹ The third Chairman, Albert M. Campbell, was unable, because of ill health, to do very much. His successor, the present Chairman, Paul Godfrey, is a young man of thirty-five, who has brought his youthful vigour and ability into Metro government. A University of Toronto trained chemical engineer (graduated 1962), he is the first Metro Council Chairman of Jewish descent. His apprenticeship had been served as Alderman and later Controller in the Borough of North York and in various Metro Commissions. Politically a Conservative, this political stamp is bound to be an advantage in his dealings with the Conservative provincial government.²

Financially, the boroughs have been at a greater

² Information gathered from arranged interview with Chairman Godfrey's representative, Frank Longstaff, and from 'Biography of Paul Godfrey' made available to me by Mr. Godfrey's Executive Assistant.
advantage than the former municipalities. The problems of finance that plagued the twelve municipalities prior to 1953 have declined considerably. For example, local municipalities no longer issue debentures on their own. Their requirements for debenture financing are submitted to Metro, and Metro determines, subject to an appeal to the Ontario Municipal Board, what local financing should be done by debenture. Such requirements are then issued by Metro. In this way, financing of capital projects and other long-term assets by the suburban municipalities has eased a great deal.\footnote{Metro Toronto, 1961, p.} In the same way, because Metro has taken over major Metro-wide functions, the finances of the lower tier municipalities can be concentrated on less demanding items. For example, functions such as sewerage, major roads, transportation, etc., which are normally costly, are in Metro hands.

One other factor that is amply illustrated by the Toronto experiment is that with a regional federation, whilst democratic ideals and political participation can be fully served, and through the lower tier, preserved,
services can be more efficiently provided in the overall area. There can be little doubt in Rowat's belief that,

One cannot expect citizens to endure patiently either the non-supplying or the inefficient supplying of important social services, merely for the sake of the theoretical and intangible objective of keeping democracy at home.¹

Yet, it is important that democracy should be kept at the local level. But in doing so, local government must perform the services that are required of it in the second half of the twentieth century. It is for this reason that this study, in attempting to suggest a solution to the inadequacies that we have seen in the local government of Kano emirate, recommends the consideration of a regional federation type of local government.

**FACTORS THAT CAN BE ISOLATED FROM METRO TORONTO**

The Toronto regional federation experiment helps us to isolate certain factors that are of importance when considering whether regional federation of the Toronto model can be successfully established in Kano emirate. First, we identified the politico-economic-geographic factors.

These should be identifiable in both the proposed lower and upper tiers of governments, as argued above.

Also, if these factors exist and a regional federation is successfully established, a number of other factors appear important to ensure that the institution of regional federation succeeds, i.e., that it aids in improving the conditions (political, economic and social conditions) of the emirate. First is that there should be both internal and external support, as defined above. There should also be available the local leadership to work the system. Also, it should be feasible that other benefits, such as in the areas of finance, transportation, education, sewerage, housing, recreation, etc., would accrue. There should be the chance, as well, that the new institution will make for more political equality among the mass of the population and also for greater participation in local government. These factors, extracted from the Toronto experiment, will be added on to the principles identified at the closing of Chapter Five, and will be employed in our consideration of a regional federation for Kano emirate in the next chapter.
CHAPTER SEVEN

A PROPOSED REGIONAL FEDERATION FOR KANO EMIRATE

This work does not pretend to be a Royal Commission, or a public inquiry, or a task force set up to find specific solutions to the problems of local government in Kano emirate. It is an academic study oriented towards theoretical analysis and a general solution to problems, rather than a detailed proposal which might unnecessarily arouse sectional indignation and controversy. Our proposals for the emirate are therefore presented here in general terms and are then backed up by the theoretical considerations laid down earlier.

The need for a change in the emirate has been discussed. The deficiencies in the provision of services have been observed, as well as the lack of leadership, political and administrative. Problems of organizing the resources available and a need for better distribution of educational facilities have also been seen. It is in order to find a remedy for these maladies that this study suggests a comprehensive reorganization in the functioning as well as the structure of local government in the emirate.
THE PROPOSAL

Our proposal is not for a total amalgamation or consolidation of all local government units in the emirate for the sake of greater administrative efficiency. Such a step might stir up strong resentment among the younger elements in the emirate. It might give the impression of a deliberate attempt at setting up a government in the emirate to rival the Kano State government. Nor is our proposal for the state government's takeover of certain costly local government functions, so that such functions could be handled with greater efficiency.¹ Such a course would deny local government its real place and merely shows an inability to look for more imaginative solutions. Rather, our proposal is based on a philosophy of self-government tempered by political expediency. As Samuel Humes has pointed out:

> it is generally more prudent and productive to build political institutions on what already exists, rather than attempt to start all over again.²

In avoiding drastic and sweeping changes, and using the existing set-up as much as possible, an orderly transition can be ensured and local governments can be strengthened,

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so that they can, whilst combining the old and the new, do jointly what they cannot do separately. A regional federation form of local government, which is the system we propose for the emirate, is one that does not have to alter the existing boundaries. Fortunately, in the emirate, the five administrative areas exist as well as the twenty-five district council areas.

Figure VI shows the five administrative areas and the twenty-five districts. The tax population and estimated collectable tax are used here, since financial viability is most crucial for the successful operation of any local government. Table XIII gives this information, according to 1971-72 figures.¹

### TABLE XIII

**THE DISTRICTS IN KANO EMIRATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>TAX POPULATION</th>
<th>ESTIMATED TAX COLLECTABLE 1971-72</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Birnin Kudu</td>
<td>35,831</td>
<td>£ 94,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dutse</td>
<td>44,306</td>
<td>117,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Gaya</td>
<td>48,593</td>
<td>131,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Gwarin</td>
<td>18,545</td>
<td>49,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Jihatun</td>
<td>33,069</td>
<td>87,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Sumain</td>
<td>38,032</td>
<td>102,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL, KANO SOUTH EAST ADMINISTRATIVE AREA</strong></td>
<td><strong>219,375</strong></td>
<td><strong>583,378</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Gwarzo</td>
<td>44,730</td>
<td>123,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Baci</td>
<td>56,933</td>
<td>156,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Dawakin/Tofa</td>
<td>60,662</td>
<td>166,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Karaye</td>
<td>28,297</td>
<td>76,459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL, KANO WEST ADMINISTRATIVE AREA</strong></td>
<td><strong>190,622</strong></td>
<td><strong>522,999</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Kanu</td>
<td>35,053</td>
<td>97,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Dawakin/Kudu</td>
<td>36,633</td>
<td>98,921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Kiru</td>
<td>31,340</td>
<td>84,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Kura</td>
<td>29,420</td>
<td>79,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Tundun/Lada</td>
<td>20,232</td>
<td>53,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Judil</td>
<td>33,580</td>
<td>90,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL, KANO SOUTH WEST ADMINISTRATIVE AREA</strong></td>
<td><strong>136,263</strong></td>
<td><strong>504,757</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Dambatta</td>
<td>28,774</td>
<td>77,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Gobasa</td>
<td>18,392</td>
<td>49,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Gezawa</td>
<td>18,268</td>
<td>49,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Garki</td>
<td>16,486</td>
<td>44,526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Minjibir</td>
<td>19,694</td>
<td>53,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Ringim</td>
<td>32,804</td>
<td>91,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL, KANO NORTH CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE AREA</strong></td>
<td><strong>155,369</strong></td>
<td><strong>419,814</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Ungogo</td>
<td>14,460</td>
<td>39,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Kumbotso</td>
<td>14,256</td>
<td>38,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Kano</td>
<td>39,323</td>
<td>103,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL, KANO METROPOLITAN ADMINISTRATIVE AREA</strong></td>
<td><strong>68,039</strong></td>
<td><strong>181,335</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL, KANO L.A.</strong></td>
<td><strong>819,688</strong></td>
<td>£ 2,213,156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE VI
KANO EMIRATE SHOWING THE EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE AREAS AND DISTRICTS

KEY TO DISTRICTS

KANO SOUTH EAST ADMINISTRATIVE AREA
1. Gwaram
2. Birnin Kudu
3. Dutse
4. Jahun
5. Gaya
6. Sumaila

KANO NORTH CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE AREA
7. Ringim
8. Gabasawa
9. Gezawa
10. Minjibir
11. Dambatta
12. Garki
13. Babura

KANO WEST ADMINISTRATIVE AREA
14. Bici
15. Dawakin Tofa
16. Gwarzo
17. Karaye

KANO SOUTH WEST ADMINISTRATIVE AREA
18. Kura
19. Kiru
20. Tudun Wada
21. Rano
22. Wudil
23. Dawakin Kudu

KANO METROPOLITAN ADMINISTRATIVE AREA
24. Ungogo
25. Kumbotso
26. Kano City (Township)
One of the chief reasons why the district councils have been very subordinate to the N.A. in the past has been financial. A brief look at the small estimated tax revenue above, for 1971-72 shows how limited responsibilities district councils can be expected to take on, since they depend, to a great extent, on this personal tax. The other major source of taxation, apart from the personal tax, is the cattle tax. This usually provides about 12½% of what is got from personal tax. Even if the district councils were in a position not subordinate to the N.A., this limited financial situation would have curtailed their effectiveness. In any suggested reorganization, financial viability will therefore be important to take into consideration. In other words, a new unit as small as the present district council may be inadvisable for adoption as a lower tier government in any reorganization.

Our proposal, to put it directly, is that the lower tiers of the regional federation proposed for Kano emirate would comprise, to begin with, the existing administrative area councils. The present district and village councils, which have always been subordinate councils, and which

1 Alhaji Sule Gaya, Statement on Local Government in Northern Nigeria (Kaduna, 1965). See Appendices C and D. Other sources of revenue apart from personal tax and cattle tax, producing negligible revenue, include receipts from Native Courts, interest on investments and repayment of loans, grants from senior governments and commercial undertakings.
apparently are too small to be viable local councils, might still play very vital and useful roles. They might constitute legally powerless, but politically influential local committees. Such local committees, like the outer councils of the self-governing era, would be a forum for free expression and participation. In the smaller villages, they might take the form of pure Athenian democracy, in which every adult citizen was free to take part. In the others, they might take the form of the community associations of Metropolitan Winnipeg. There, members of the metro council from the local area assume leadership, bring people together, and attempt thereby to get to understand more the desires and demands of the population. Such institutions would be of value in the districts and villages in Kano emirate, with the lower-tier councillors taking the leadership in their organizations.

The upper tier, of course, would have nothing very new to it. The old N.A., renamed Kano L.A. in 1968, might as well retain that name since the name by itself has nothing to do with the functioning of a regional federation. In

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other words, the reorganization should contain no radical changes that could excite a large measure of opposition. It would, however, transform existing institutions and give them new functions and a new outlook. Hence, whilst the upper-tier government might retain its present name of Kano L.A., the lower tier, the present administrative area governments, would be better called Divisional Councils. This is because their present primary role as agents of the State government (already discussed in Chapter Four) would have to change in several ways.

In the first place, it will be desirable that representatives to the lower-tier council i.e. the Divisional Council, should be elected directly from the villages and towns according to population. In addition, the present system of having some traditional rulers on council should continue. At this level, council should be free to select its chairman from within the council, be he (the Chairman) a traditional ruler or a common citizen.

Two methods of selecting members of the upper-tier council have been employed to date in existing regional federations. They may be directly elected, or they may be indirectly elected by first becoming elected members of the
lower-tier units and then being designated to sit on regional council, as we have seen in Metro Toronto. In Kano, to avoid the confusion that might be created by setting up the emirate council (the L.A., the upper-tier council) as a rival institution to the state legislature, both located in Kano, and to make for closeness of personnel and efficient operation of both levels of government, indirect elections would appear to be preferable. In this way, the possibility of seeing the new practice as rivalling election to the state legislature would be reduced. Direct emirate-wide election would be only to the state legislature, and representation to the emirate council would comprise designated members of the Divisional Councils, who are already fully aware of the running and the problems of the lower tier. To avoid any possibility of a Divisional Council using its size to influence decisions and thereby having a stronger voice than some other Divisional Councils, each of the five divisions should have equal representation of commoners, as well as of traditional rulers, in the L.A. This will put all the divisions at par, and make it difficult for one Division to collude with another to the disadvantage of some, especially of the smaller ones. In Kano, the chairmanship of the L.A. should be left to
the Emir, the proclaimed ruler of the emirate, or, in his absence, the next chief in rank. The Emir, as legislative head, would have the administration responsible to him. The administration, on the other hand, would be governed by the State's local government manual of ethics and regulations in the discharge of their duties and responsibilities. In the past, only a ceremonial role has been ascribed to the Emir. It is time that a constructive role such as this be found for the paramount chiefs in our local government. Other chiefs could be required to serve on council committees, and where possible, as hinted above, to head lower-tier councils.

To make this scheme easy to implement, and to ensure that for the time being, all people work towards a common objective, there should be a continuation of what the military government has introduced into all levels of government, i.e., non-partisan politics. This should exist in both levels of local government. This is not because local matters are less important than state or national ones, or that political polarization in local affairs is less acute than in state and national politics. It is also not because the resources of local councils are too limited in proportion to their responsibilities or because they usually have poorly skilled personnel in comparison with higher levels of government.¹ These are rather secondary aspects of the problem. Its primary aspect is that, if we must expect local people (with limited education and experience) to continue to participate in local councils,

¹ There is a lot of controversy about the need for party politics in local government, even in the western world. See J.G. Joyce and H.A. Hosse, *Civic Parties in Canada* (Ottawa, 1970).
the level of the sense of responsibility and the tolerance required, need to be considerably raised. This can be done better if we do not involve such local people in the concept of government and opposition, the "we - they" dichotomy. This consideration is particularly relevant to local government in most developing areas, including Kano emirate, as we have seen in its experiences in the self-governing era, discussed above.

FUNCTIONS - Having disposed of the composition of the two levels of local government and having proposed non-partisan politics at both levels, let us now consider what functions should be performed by each level. That is, how should local government functions be divided between the two tiers of local government? This is important in a regional federation. Such a division has to have legal backing probably in a statute, a decree or some form of law from the central government. This distinguishes the arrangement from a voluntary cooperative venture, a one-tier consolidation, or a two-tier system where the upper tier merely hands out certain responsibilities to the lower tiers. The latter has been the situation in the emirate. The district and village councils have, up till now, had no statutory functions like the British district and parish councils, as has been
mentioned above. The present arrangement, as seen already, gives the L.A. the freedom to create the district and village councils at its discretion and to delegate to them whatever responsibilities it chooses. Thus the system to date is far from being a federal one with each tier having independent functions (and, of course, some joint functions).

In the new regional federation, statutory arrangements should govern the functions of the two tiers of government. Only local government functions that are clearly emirate-wide should be handled by the L.A. These, it is suggested, would include:

1. Emirate-wide planning.

2. Tax collection (at present this is done with the assistance of the district and village chiefs, and should continue).

3. Capital borrowing, both for the Kano L.A. itself, and for the lower tiers, since creditors will be more willing to deal with a bigger and evidently more viable body.

4. Police (so as to achieve an area-wide efficiency and standard).

5. Roads of prime importance to the emirate economy, outside those maintained by federal and state governments.

6. Water supply.

7. Electricity supply.

8. Education and health.

The last three above will make possible the maintenance of a emirate-wide standard in areas that are of great importance.
The lower tier, on the other hand, would handle the more local matters. These might include:

1. Local planning.
2. Local roads.
3. Sewerage and general sanitation.
5. Community centres.
6. Agriculture.
7. Recreational facilities.

The needs in each of these would differ from one Division to the other. Fire prevention, for example, whilst needing considerable attention in Kano Metropolitan Division, because of the centre-city population, will be of less importance in the others. The same goes for public transit. On the other hand, more emphasis will be put on agriculture in the rural divisions than in the urban division.

**OTHER FACTORS TO ALTER** - The lower tier government, it has been suggested, should handle native law and custom. This is to ensure that each Division is free to adopt, whether partially or in whole, Islamic law (the Maliki law) in its courts. In Kano Metropolitan, where there is a large population of Nigerians from outside the emirate, it might be
necessary to set up some ad hoc forms of native courts to deal with the large minority population. One thing that will be important to ensure is that the native courts have their own distinct appellate system, quite separate, from the bottom to the top, from the English legal system. Any matters beyond the highest native court in the emirate should be appealable to the State's Supreme Court only on a point of law. This would preserve native laws and customs more, and alleviate the present difficulty of distinguishing the areas in which one court could have jurisdiction and the others not. This means that the judiciary (as well as the police) taken over from local government and given to the federal government in the military era, would be returned to local government. If native law and customs are to be applied, the Alkalis (Judges) who apply the law, should be aware that they owe their allegiance to the local traditional ruler, the local council and the people, not to a distant, far-off government. This feeling of not owing allegiance any more to the local ruler and council appears to pervade the military era, and does not appear to be in the interest of the emirate.¹

¹ Alhaji M. Sule stressed this point in the author's interview with him, January, 1974.
The division of responsibilities will, of course, depend to a large extent on what functions the state government decides to leave to local government. In other words, these functions may not all be secured at once. Securing them may mean continued negotiation by the two tiers of local government with the state government. It is assumed here that both tiers will, in such a negotiation, succeed in securing the most logical local functions for themselves and that the state government will be gracious enough to see the granting of functions to the two tiers of local government as a means of building an effective government, rather than having the state government keep the functions to itself.

Even then it is conceivable that a number of functions might be difficult to allocate. There would be functions to be shared between the regional federation and the state government, e.g. regional planning. There may also be others to be shared between the upper tier and some particular lower-tier governments such as regional parks, agricultural institutes, etc. Special arrangements could be entered into for such special sharing. This is because, though lower-tier government responsibility, it might be found more efficient to allow the upper tier to get involved in these areas in particular Divisions, in the
interests of efficiency and satisfaction. The limits of such special sharing will have to be spelled out in the agreement.

Our concern in making this proposal, as suggested above, is not to bring about a startling or radical change in the structure and functioning of local government in the emirate. Less still is it our concern to preserve a form of government merely because of its historical longevity. We do not think, either, that one should maintain the status quo in the emirate simply because it is familiar, and because of a fear to take a cautious plunge into the dark of reorganization because of the risks. This study contends that, with the functions enacted by regulation or edict in the military era, the new scheme would enable the best possible job to be done at the most appropriate level.

How then would this new structure, with its division of functions be put into effect? In line with our philosophy of expediency and a cautious reform, rather than wiping the slate clean, existing administrative arrangements could be transformed incrementally. At the moment there exist in the L.A. several departments, each having its own head. No unity of control exists at the top. What appears to be needed, as L. Rowlands and S. Humes
suggest, is a chief administrative officer who could provide overall direction to the activities. This position, they suggest, should be filled by an educated and trained and experienced administrator. His position with regard to the staff of the council, they contend, should be like that of a Permanent Secretary (or Deputy Minister) to his Ministry or Department. ¹ The Secretary, who is the administrative officer responsible to the Chairman of the Council, the Council's political head, can be brought up to this level. Some have suggested that in doing this, his title should change from that of Secretary to the equivalent of City Manager, probably Council Manager. ² This study does not worry about titles in particular. Rather we worry about reforming and reorganizing institutions so that they can be more efficient and effective. Therefore, the title of Secretary might remain. But whilst having jurisdiction over the clerical and administrative staff of council, as heretofore, he should become the executive head, to whom all the department heads are responsible.


² J. Ajila, op.cit., Ch.4, Passim.
This is a drastic change in responsibilities and expectations. Hence a change in training, educational requirements, and experience becomes important. In Kano, an intensive crash program will be required for the quick re-training of many of the present employees of the L.A. with long years of experience. When their training is complete, they can be absorbed into the administration of the L.A. (the upper tier) or into the Divisional Councils (the lower tiers) in appropriate capacities.

For the time being, some of the central government administrative officers who presently are chairmen of the administrative areas could be loaned to the Divisional Councils as secretaries. Having been in constant contact with local government since 1968, and having before then acquired a broad and general education (equivalent to university graduation), they should be able to fill the positions with confidence. The fact is that under the new system, it would be unnecessary for the central government to send an administrative officer (as a District Officer) to the Division, as is done at the moment for the administrative area. The Secretary of the Divisional Council would have direct contact with whatever department of the
state government he needed to deal with. Hopefully, too, the decentralization of government departments will continue and more opportunities will open for the executives of the Divisional Councils to deal with representatives of different state government departments. This, it is hoped, will come through further decentralization of the state government operations, away from Kano City to their Divisional Council headquarters.

The office of District Officer, instituted in the colonial era, discontinued in the self-governing era, and re-introduced by the military administration, would disappear once and for all. It would be an expression of faith in the ability and sense of responsibility of the secretaries of the proposed Divisional Councils to allow them some initiative rather than have the District Officers keeping an eye on them.

Sir Donald Cameron was very direct in discussing why District Officers were necessary in the colonial days. He admits that,

they do not exist in the United Kingdom and in the Dominions, because the people are educated and have, through the course of many generations, imbibed the precepts of law and order which must regulate the conduct of a civilized people. . . . This is not so in the protectorate of Nigeria.

1 Sir Donald Cameron, op.cit., p.2.
Surely after one and a half centuries of continuous contact with the British and its civilizing influence, the people must have imbibed enough of the precepts of law and order to be able to administer their local affairs without the superintendence of a District Officer.

**GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS**

Our proposals, then, are relatively simple and easy to implement. In the military era, an edict from the Military Governor of the state would put the scheme into effect. In a civilian era, a statute would be required. The two tiers, the L.A. and the Divisional Councils, would be no innovations. The new local committees in the various villages and districts would be a way of resurrecting a useful institution, i.e. the outer council of the self-governing era, mentioned above. The added responsibilities of the Secretaries of the L.A. and the five Divisional Councils will necessitate new men, men with a breadth of vision and with minds able to cope, to control and coordinate a large organization. Whilst the Secretary of the L.A. would be chief executive officer, the Emir would be chief political officer of the L.A., the upper-tier government. In the absence of the Emir, his next in rank among the chiefs would take
responsibility. Hence the rank of the traditional rulers would be implicit. Some would use their talents on committees. In the past, committees' memberships had been left exclusively to commoners. In the Divisional Councils, whilst the political leadership of council would not necessarily rotate among district heads (this would involve a risk of having a chairman who cannot read or write), they would be eligible for election to the chairmanship and to the leadership of council committees. No title like that of Mayor or any such grand title is suggested for either tier of government. The popularity of some demagogue in such a position might adversely reflect on the popularity of some averagely popular chief and cause a conflict. Such a conflict, if not effectively resolved, might generate a breakdown in the system. And with a developing, fragile system, conflict avoidance appears preferable to conflict resolution, especially if such conflicts affect the very top of the system.

The two-tier structure summarized above will constitute a sufficient number of tiers for local government. Peter Self has suggested that a desirable thing about the structure of any local government system is that it should be simple and understandable.\(^1\) Even in Britain, the three-tier

\(^1\) Peter Self, \textit{op.cit.}, p.7.
system, the parish council, district council (or county borough) and county councils, have been regarded as unsatisfactory and confusing. A two-tier system has hence been proposed, consisting of a lower tier of Town and District Council, and at the upper tier, a regional government.¹ In Kano the need for a simple structure is apparent, if one considers the low level of education of the masses.

Finally, our proposal includes an end to partisan politics at the local level, the bringing back of the police and judiciary into the sphere of local government, and a complete renegotiation and redistribution of functions among the two tiers and the state government. Our proposals having been put down in a skeletal form, we must now examine whether the theoretical considerations put forward above provide sufficient justification for such a scheme in Kano.

ARE THE GROUNDS REASONABLY GOOD FOR ITS SUCCESSFUL IMPORTATION?

In Chapter Five, we suggested that in importing a foreign

institution, a number of important variables must be con-
sidered to ensure that there are reasonable grounds for such
an institution to succeed in its new home. Among them were:

a) An investigation of the political, economic and
social compatibility of host country and mother
country.

b) Does the new institution affect military, kinship,
religious, educational, medical or socio-recreational
life?

c) Is the institution concerned with the area of
material culture, social organization or beliefs
and values?

d) Is the host society loosely structured (flexible)
or rigid?

e) Is the new institution of apparent utility, of
immediate usefulness?

f) The integrative principle: Is the institution
easily modified for integration into the new
society?

In considering a) above, it appears that the political
factor is the most relevant since here we deal with a
political institution. Before the 1966 military coup,
Nigeria, like Canada, had a federal and a liberal democratic
system of government. It had both its federal and regional governments, government as well as opposition parties; it also had fully dressed debates in parliament, and encouraged free discussion, both generally and in the press. However, since 1966, two military regimes have ruled the nation. At best what we now have is a modernizing autocracy, a benevolent rule by the military. Yet some of the democratic traditions remain. Recently, the Head of the Military government and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces announced that political activities banned in 1966 would resume in October, 1974. There is hope then that the military will allow two years of public discussion, before they hand over power, as they have promised, in 1976. If the old tradition is kept, Nigeria's style of representative democracy, a system which also, we observe, exists in Ontario, will provide a good ground for transplanting a regional federation. If the government accepts the idea and decides to give the reorganization a trial, no obstacle in the form of a referendum would stand in the way of a successful transplant.

1 West Africa Magazine, January 7, 1974, p.25
b) The institution does not seem to be one that would make any particularly adverse impact on kinship, religious, educational, medical or socio-recreational relations. Rather, as advocated above, it can only make stronger the traditional bonds that existed emirate-wide, and strengthen those of the components of the newly created individual Divisions.

c) The new institution appears to be mainly concerned with the area of social organization. It would not disrupt the social set-up however. Since it would preserve the traditional prestige of the Emir and of the district and village heads, it would, in fact, put them more in the limelight in their society. It would also open new avenues for commoners who might desire to climb up the political ladder to lead a lower-tier council.

d) Truly, as Ottenberg discovered, Kano emirate, unlike Iboland, is rigidly structured. It holds to tradition and tends to leave the position of authority to those in the ruling class. This, however, is becoming a myth rather than the practice. A lot of commoners are involved in government, as seen in Chapter Four above in the composition of Kano emirate council of 1969.¹ Even then, the rigid

¹ See also John Paden, _op. cit._, p. 419.
structure makes for more harmony in this case since it ensures that what the leadership embraces will more than likely be accepted by the masses. And in this case, the edict, regulation or statute, to implement a regional federation will be the work of the leadership.

c) The new scheme's immediate utility might not be obviously apparent. The existence of local committees, the bringing back of local police and alkali courts into the hands of the local government, and the handling of education and health by the regional government, are items that in the very short run will be seen as improving the lot of the common man.

f & g) Regarding the integrative principle, a regional federation in Kano, in the form we have proposed, would have shed a lot of its Toronto characteristics in order to be accommodated in Kano. For example, no lower-tier Mayors would exist, the boroughs in Toronto become Divisions in Kano, the elected metro Chairman in Toronto becomes the traditional permanent Chairman (Emir) in Kano, and the representation in Metro Toronto according to population becomes equal representation for the Divisions in Kano. With these changes, and the flexible approach to adapt the system to Kano, and the above observation that
regional federation is unlikely to antagonize any particular section of society, the institution, if transplanted, would have a good chance of succeeding.

DOES THE PROPOSAL SATISFY THE CONDITIONS DESIRABLE FOR THE SUCCESSFUL ESTABLISHMENT OF A REGIONAL FEDERATION?

We have suggested above, and have seen from the factors isolated in our study of Metro Toronto, that certain politico-economic-geographic conditions (for both the upper and lower tiers) are desirable for the successful establishment of a regional federation. We will now attempt to apply the criteria to Kano.

1) Under the political conditions, we mentioned the sense of community, and have discussed the acceptance of representative democracy in Nigeria. Our observation, based on the success in Toronto and the problems elsewhere in the United States, is that a Regional Federation will do very well in a representative democracy (where a leadership concept is accepted by the people). It will do less well in a direct democracy (where referenda are required, now and again, for various issues). In Kano emirate that leadership concept has been a part of the tradition; hence the summation that a Regional Federation would have
a chance to thrive there. In Chapter Two we elaborated on the ethnic homogeneity of the emirate. We made the point that the sense of a tightly-knit community has existed in the emirate from time immemorial. Hence, no problem arises about this, in terms of the upper tier government. At the lower tier, it must be accepted that the villages and districts have been the units of government known to the people for a reasonably long time. On the other hand, the fact remains that the Administrative Areas, the basis for our Divisional Councils, have been in existence since 1968. In addition, in composing the Administrative Areas, no districts have been divided up, as seen in Chapter Seven. Whilst it must be agreed that the sense of community in the Divisional Councils might not be as strong as it is in the districts and villages, it will most likely build up, especially if the Divisional Councils have reasonably adequate outputs in the area that affects the masses.

11) Internal and External Support. These no doubt are important. Frank Smallwood's equation that the feasibility of a regional government is directly related to the ratio of its external support to its internal opposition, might be difficult to apply here. This is because we are
uncertain what the external support will be (since the higher governments have had no opportunity to express an opinion on it). What is likely, from our examination so far, is that little (if any) internal opposition would be aroused by the scheme. Since the changes advocated are subtle, though important and far-reaching, rather than drastic, sweeping and superficial, people will only see the old familiar institutions dressed up in new, though more effective and more satisfying, fashion. This will mitigate against antagonism and opposition.

iii) Leadership. The need for a crash program for the development of administrative leadership has been mentioned. It has also been mentioned that, with cooperation between state and local government, personnel problems in the area of administrative and technical staff can be solved through a loan program.

Political leadership, on the other hand, would be no great problem. With the Emir and the District and Village Heads, a strong leadership base exists. And with the Emir as chairman of the Regional Federation, and some district heads as chairmen of councils or committees in the lower tiers, a lot of supporters will get more interested. In the same way, non-partisan politics would draw in many who feared the mud-throwing involved in party politics. Also,
the fact that in the absence of local party politics, members of senior governments would have no hindrance in participating in local government, should open further avenues for political talents. Of course, it must be clarified that partisan politics would not be banned simply by legislation. It must pass through a process of political socialization. Citizens would have to be educated on the advantages of the old tradition of nonpartisanship and the consensual method of taking decisions. They would be made to realize that opportunities for expressing opinions freely would still exist. Further, they would see that it would make for a smooth transition from the military regime (which has decreed partisan politics out of existence) to the civilian regime.

iv) Finance. The emirate has always had a strong tax base. The Community (or personal) Tax (Haraji) and the Cattle Tax (Jangali) are collected for, and the level set by, the State government. (There is no particular need that this very efficient system be changed for the Toronto model. There, as in other parts of Ontario, local government sets its own level of property tax and collects it.) Eighty-five per cent of this is now retained for the L.A., whilst

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only fifteen per cent goes to the state government. In the past, the L.A. had decided on its own how much to transfer to the district and village councils (depending on how many responsibilities they had). Under the new scheme it would be necessary to decide what percentage should go to each tier of government. Revenue from sources like grants, loans and contributions from recurrent revenue would in future have to go to the two levels of local government rather than only to the L.A. With the characteristic promptness of collecting taxes in the emirate, the economy of both tiers should remain sound. Also, with the L.A. taking charge of loan financing - the issue of debentures for itself and the Divisional Councils - the latter would have better chances of financing capital and long-term projects.

v) Geographical Factors. The problem of adequate size has been discussed above in considering the taxable population, and the estimated tax collectable (using 1971-72).

\[1\] Ibid., p. 41
The emirate, as shown on the map, is big in area. The divisions would bring local government near enough to the people, whilst still ensuring that it remains at an efficient level (rather than the subordinate levels of the present districts and villages).

The questions of satisfactory boundary and distinct physical features have also been discussed. The lower tier Divisional Councils would follow the present boundaries of the Administrative Areas whilst the upper tier boundary would be the same is the old L.A.

Although it can be argued that the case for external support has not been established, it appears that other politico-economic-geographic factors desirable for the successful establishment of a regional federation are present in our proposed scheme.

Having tried to establish that this scheme can be successfully transplanted to Kano emirate, let us now examine what possible impact it might have on the emirate. What are the advantages that might accrue from adopting this system of local government?
degree of functional efficiency. It will lead to essential development in vital areas such as the areas of education and transportation, as illustrated above. In serving these essential developmental problems, it should bring a change to the personnel and leadership problems as well as the problem of inadequate planning, all of which have been identified as serious problems in the emirate.

The size of our proposed lower units must, at first glance, appear monstrous. However, size has to be balanced with resources. Further, it is better, at the beginning, to err on the side of having a large, efficient and effective lower tier, and later have to split it into smaller units, than to err on the side of having many small units, resulting in inefficient, ineffective and financially non-viable administration, and then have to merge the units later.

Our proposal, whilst enabling efficient and effective services to be performed, also stands for serving democratic ideals better, and improving political participation. To this end, it anticipates an open franchise and a local government which every adult
POSSIBLE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL

In our consideration of Metro Toronto, we established that adopting a regional federation brought a number of advantages to the area. These were:

1. Financial advantages.
2. Transportation advantages.
3. Service advantages (e.g., education).

What then are the chances that similar results would be achieved in Kano emirate?

First, as far as financial advantages are concerned, by having five autonomous Divisional Councils, as distinct from the present twenty-five subordinate district councils, the resources of at least four districts, as in the case of the present Kano West Administrative Area, would be made available to the new Divisional Council. The financial position will thus improve, and with improved financial position, the Council will be in a better position to carry out its functions.

As suggested above, the upper-tier government will take charge of loan financing, both for itself and for the lower tiers. Creditors, it will be agreed, are always more confident and more willing to deal with bigger and apparently very
viable institutions. With the upper-tier government floating such loans, this confidence will very likely be shown by creditors and hence more money will be available for capital projects.

Grants, which hitherto had been made available only to the L.A., we have also suggested, should now be distributed to both the L.A. (the upper tier) and the Divisional Councils (the lower tiers). In this way, as well, more resources will accrue, to the advantage especially of the new lower tiers.

Transportation conditions are apt to be considerably improved under this scheme as well. As noted above, roads of primary importance, i.e., major roads running through the emirate, now in the hands of the State government, will be the responsibility of the upper-tier government, whilst only those of local or minor importance will be handled by the Divisional Councils. This division of labour, as always, will make for clarity of functions and for a spirit of rivalry which should enable each Divisional Council to desire to develop its roads (and other communication networks) better than its neighbours.

Various services will, in like manner, be shared, and so receive more attention than when they were concentrated
in the hands of the L.A. and the L.A., of its own free choice, delegated some of these to its subordinate councils. Education, because of its special importance, is the example we have selected for illustration here. This has been left in the hands of the L.A., the upper tier. This is essential so as to maintain an emirate-wide high standard and to be able to provide adequate institutions for the entire emirate. From here the teachers produced can be deployed to areas where they are most needed in the emirate. Curricula and the general educational system could then be identical or very similar. Teachers as well as schools will at least be supervised by the same inspectors. The upper-tier government would also be in a position to set up one or two technical and vocational training institutions, in places it regards most desirable, for the whole emirate. Such costly programs would be more easily financed by the upper-tier government. The same applies to public enlightenment campaigns, campaigns for adult education, the provision of mobile libraries, mobile cinemas, etc., all of which, as argued already, have been poorly developed to date. With these programs in the hands of the upper-tier government, the lower-tier Divisional Councils would have the opportunity to concentrate on other less demanding aspects of development.
It is important to observe that here we deal with primary, secondary, and teacher training education. Higher education is under the direction of the Nigerian federal government. 1

The vital advantage is that under this scheme no part of the emirate would be allowed to lag behind the other, either because its Divisional Council did not make enough provision for primary or secondary education, or because it did not train enough teachers for the schools. In this way a son of a professor at Abdullai Bayero College (a branch of Ahmadu Bello University at Kano) will get the same facilities of public education as the son of the ground nut farmer at Sumaila, in the very extreme of the present Kano South East Administrative Area. At the moment varying standards exist in the different administrative areas. 2

From the above, it would appear that the prospects are very good that a regional federation introduced to Kano emirate in the terms proposed here will bring about a high


2 Note that at the moment only primary education is almost completely in the hands of the L.A., only half the teacher training colleges are in the hands of the L.A., and about two-thirds of secondary schools belong to the L.A. See Northern State of Nigeria Yearbook, 1972-73, pp.95-6.
degree of functional efficiency. It will lead to essential development in vital areas such as the areas of education and transportation, as illustrated above. In serving these essential developmental problems, it should bring a change to the personnel and leadership problems as well as the problem of inadequate planning, all of which have been identified as serious problems in the emirate.

The size of our proposed lower units must, at first glance, appear monstrous. However, size has to be balanced with resources. Further, it is better, at the beginning, to err on the side of having a large, efficient and effective lower tier, and later have to split it into smaller units, than to err on the side of having many small units, resulting in inefficient, ineffective and financially non-viable administration, and then have to merge the units later.

Our proposal, whilst enabling efficient and effective services to be performed, also stands for serving democratic ideals better, and improving political participation. To this end, it anticipates an open franchise and a local government which every adult
citizen would fully comprehend and consult. It also anticipates mass involvement in politics, rather than leaving politics to a few. Direct election and the freedom and chance for any aspiring citizen to get a place in the upper levels of government are inherent in it. The uniqueness of the proposal, then, lies in its satisfying, at one and the same time, the democratic-participatory school, the efficiency-service school, and the developmental theorists.
CHAPTER EIGHT

REFLECTIONS

The paradox in this study, one which must be apparent to every reader, and which some might even regard as a contradiction, lies in its rather gloomy picture of institutional transfer at the beginning, and its proposal at the end for the transfer of a political or governmental institution to Kano emirate. A second look, however, will reveal that the conclusion has not really been inconsistent with the development of the arguments. Indiscriminate transfers and importations have been condemned. On the other hand, the need for institutional transfer has been accepted as crucial, and one which must continue. If it must continue, we contend, the approach to institutional transfers must be more responsible, more objective, more scientific. As such, this study has come up with a number of criteria that any scholar or practitioner should carefully consider before taking a stand on transplanting an institution.

These criteria have been dealt with in Chapter Five, and have been considered in relation to Kano in Chapter Seven. In this brief closing chapter, we will reflect on the possible impact of transferring the institution of regional federation to the other emirates of Northern
Nigeria and to some parts of Southern Nigeria, and in a final section, put together the main findings of this study.

One point must be made clear: the need for a careful consideration of the criteria referred to above is not restricted to transfers across nations and across different cultures. In transferring institutions, even among similar cultures, these criteria need to be taken into consideration. In this way, unguarded optimism and enthusiasm can be kept in check, and much of the disappointment that might follow can be kept to a minimum, if the chances have been thoroughly assessed at the beginning.

REGIONAL FEDERATION TO OTHER EMIRATES AND OTHER DEVELOPING AREAS?

Northern Nigeria, it has been observed, consists of thirty-eight emirates. These emirates differ considerably not only in their structure, composition, and functioning, but also in their size. The largest, Bornu emirate, with an area of 32,955 square miles, and a population of 1,970,416 people, is in area bigger than each of Western, Lagos,

\footnote{C.S. Whitaker, \textit{op. cit.}, p.178. Whitaker lists all the emirates, their area and population, using figures from the Yearbook for 1966.}
Mid-Western, Rivers, South-Eastern, East Central and Kano States. On the other hand, Jamaire, with an area of 149 square miles and a population of just over 20,000 people, is just about the size of an average city. Yet, as Sir Ahmadu Bello claimed, because of the long historical connection and association, and the strong sense of community and belonging that had consequently developed, this apparent imbalance did not need to be redressed. This same feeling has been expressed by the present Commissioner for Information for Kano State. Despite the fact that Kano Emirate occupies eighty-five per cent of the state's area, leaving only fifteen per cent to the other three states, the commissioner would not entertain any need for redressing the imbalance.

A consideration of whether or not regional federation could or should be transplanted to the other emirates would involve a detailed examination of individual cases.

1 Republic of Nigeria Calendar, 1970.
2 C.S. Whitaker, op.cit.
3 Sir Ahmadu Bello, op.cit., Ch. 5
This brief concluding part of the thesis does not pretend to aim at covering the other emirates and the other parts of the developing world in the same detail as has been done with Kano emirate. This will be outside our scope. What we will do is consider the position of these areas in relation to a limited number of the criteria considered above. If a particular area appears to satisfy these preliminary criteria, then we suggest that there is a need to continue further investigation. Such investigation will be along the lines of ensuring:

(1) that the principles laid down in Chapter Five for justifying any importation are satisfied;

(2) that the other politico-economic-geographic conditions summarized in Chapter Six as desirable for the successful establishment of a regional federation are also reasonably satisfied.

Neither of these sets of conditions will be examined in detail in our consideration of the other emirates and other parts of Southern Nigeria. Rather, we will limit our consideration to a number of "preliminary criteria", drawn mainly from the politico-economic-geographic factors.
These "preliminary criteria" are:

a) the size of the area;

b) the population;

c) the chances of elite support;

d) how well or how poorly the existing governmental system is working.

These "preliminary criteria" have been selected because they constitute, in brief, a summary of the most salient aspects of the politico-economic-geographic conditions discussed above. Size will indicate probable communication problems. In a very vast area (and with poor communications not only in Northern Nigeria, but also in Southern Nigeria), a one-tier system of government would appear unwise. If the population is large, as much as 500,000 people for example, we suggest that to have a reasonable span of control for each administrative unit, a two-tier government would be preferable in such an area.\(^1\) Also, if there is elite support, then a

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\(^1\) The figure of 500,000 population has been suggested as the average in considering a regional federation in Nigeria. This will ensure a reasonable tax base for the two levels of government (approximately 20% of the total population). Various writers have suggested various figures. Rowat suggests a minimum of 50,000 for Ontario, whilst Lord Radcliffe-Maud in his report on local government in England, suggested vaguely a figure "substantially more than a million".
good basis would exist for the anticipation of the successful working of a new system. Finally, if the working of the existing system appears to us to be unsatisfactory, we suggest a need for a change.

In the case of Kano emirate, for example, we were satisfied that an area of about 12,900 square miles and a population of 4.9 million (urban and rural areas) provided a possible base for this type of institution. The fact that the new introduction would make no radical changes, but changes that would very markedly enhance the position of traditional rulers as well as encourage ambitious young men, gave us the hope for elite support. As to the functioning of existing governmental machinery, we noted the deficiencies in the village and district subordinate councils and the excessive influence of the central government in the Administrative Areas. If then we consider some of the emirates in Northern Nigeria and some parts of Southern Nigeria, what do we find?
CONSIDERATIONS FOR BAUCHI, ADAMAWA, BORNU, MURI, SOKOTO AND KONTAGORA

As mentioned earlier, Northern Nigeria has different sizes of emirates. Hence, each has to be considered in its own right. Let us consider some emirates in the North East and the North Western States. In the North Eastern state, apart from Bornu, we find Bauchi (14,516 square miles and a population of about half a million people), Adamawa (area 18,558 square miles and population 779,000 people) and Muri (area 10,684 square miles, population 260,000 people). In the North Western state, Sokoto with an area of 25,108 square miles and a population of 2,020,340 people, as well as Kontagora (area 9,132 square miles and population of only 123,000 people) easily catch the eyes.¹ This study has suggested that a large size, in terms of area and population, is desirable for regional federation. On the face of it, all the six emirates mentioned above appear to be reasonably big in size and perhaps in population. (Doubts may arise, using our subjective figure

¹ For a map showing all the Native Authorities of Northern Nigeria (including the non-Hausa areas that do not have the emirate system), see M.J. Campbell, op. cit., p.i.
of 500,000 people, in the case of Muri with 260,000 and Kontagora with 123,000). On the other hand, some scholars have suggested that a minimum population figure for a regional government might be 50,000. ¹ To such scholars a population of 123,000 would be very adequate. Rowat, however, it must be said, was particularly concerned with developed countries, more especially with a part of Canada, i.e., Ontario, in his proposal. The minimum figure must therefore depend on the particular area. In developing areas personnel problems will have to be kept in mind, so that too many governments are not created without the personnel to take charge of them. Revenue collectable must also be borne in mind. In a non-industrialized community with a population of 50,000 and a tax population of 10,000, enough taxation revenue can hardly be realized to run a government. Thus, in the six emirates named above, doubts arise as to size and population of two of the emirates. How about elite support? Here again it would appear that since regional government will not affect the traditional

¹ D.C. Rowat, op.cit., p. 160.
boundary of the emirate, whilst it would boost the level of participation of both traditional and educated elites, it will not antagonize these sections of the communities. As to problems that are faced by the existing governmental system, it will be enough to realize that Kano emirate is reputedly the strongest financially, and the one with the strongest administration. ¹ Yet we found a lot of deficiencies in the running of its government. Powerless subordinate councils exist in all these five emirates. Hence far too much responsibility is left in the hands of the L.A., just as in Kano. ² There would appear to be no doubt, then, for a need to re-examine the larger emirates with the idea of introducing regional federations into them. That is to say, after satisfying this preliminary consideration, each emirate must be examined in its own right in terms of our criteria for considering whether the grounds are good enough for importations, and then in terms of our politico-economic-geographic factors above.

¹ C.S. Whitaker, op.cit., p.178

On the other hand, in a consideration of an emirate like Jama'are with an area of 149 square miles and a population of some 20,000 people, or Bedde (area 2,000 square miles and population 45,000 people), we would on the basis of size and population alone, have taken an initial negative decision about transplanting a regional federation to any such emirates. Thus, the larger Northern emirates, it would seem, provide potentially good grounds for further investigation.

In considering other parts of Nigeria, mention will be made of a part of Southern Nigeria. Southern Nigeria has been selected because this thesis, concerned with a part of Northern Nigeria, can hope to be of interest to scholars and practitioners in the other half of the country. The problems of the structure and function of local government are not limited to the North alone, they cut across the Niger. Hence, the South hopefully can benefit from lessons learned by the North.

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1 Ibid.

2 For the similarity between the North and South in the problems of structure and functions, compare the above to Samuel Humes, "Governing for Local Development: The Experience of Western Nigeria", Paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association, Montreal, August, 1973.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR SOUTHERN NIGERIA: EKITI DIVISION

In Southern Nigeria, western state is an area we might concentrate upon, rather than try to examine all six states. In Western Nigeria, no emirates have existed, as in Kano. Native Authorities however existed in many parts till the local government law of 1952 was passed. With that law, a three-tier form of local government was set up (generally the local, the district and the division). In some areas where the community is small in size and population, a two- or even one-tier system was set up.¹

It is the areas of bigger size and population that we are concerned with here. In many such areas, a sense of community, of historical connections, of ethnic and linguistic affinity, and of longstanding belongingness existed. Yet the Divisional Councils set up for them soon crumbled like a pack of cards and had to be abandoned.²

For one thing, partisan politics and distrust of opposite sides made reconciliation impossible. Also, far too much power was given to the Divisional Councils. The governing

¹ For the 1952 Act, see P.J. Harris, Local Government in Southern Nigeria (Cambridge, 1957), pp.141-240.

² James Ajila, op.cit., pp.60-64.
Act, for example, stated in one part that,

If it appears to a Divisional Council that any other council within the area of its authority has made default in the performance of any function conferred upon it by an instrument which specified that it is the duty of such council to perform such function, the Divisional Council shall report such fact to the Minister.¹

For the Divisional Council to be able to override the District Councils in such a way was intolerable to the lower tiers and did not make for cooperation in the working of the system. Further, the districts resented the financial demands of the Divisional Councils. Thus the Divisional Councils dwindled from eighteen in 1955 to eight in 1954 and then to six in 1970.²

The point being made here is that, in considering the transfer of regional federation to Southern Nigeria, areas such as the eighteen Divisional Councils in Western Nigeria (1955 figure) would be ideal for examination. A typical example (one of those disbanded) was the Ekiti Divisional Council.³ With an area of about 2,000 square miles and a population of about 900,000 people, the Division contained a few urban centres and a large rural population. The

¹ P.J. Harris, *op. cit.* p. 184, Sec. 74.
² James Ajila, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
people there have had a common history and a common identity for long.\textsuperscript{1} The Divisional Council there collapsed because of the type of overbearing attitude and the interference of the upper tier in the activities of the lower tiers mentioned above. The generation of the feeling of distrust between the two levels added to this. Partisan politics did not help matters either. Yet it must be said that if solutions are found to such interference and distrust, Ekiti Division's size and population make it a potentially suitable area for the type of regional scheme proposed for Kano.

A good amount of the educated elements in Ekiti Division would support such a scheme. In addition to once again bringing together the entire Division, it would open a new avenue for their aspiration. The traditional rulers would support it as well since it puts them in the forefront in dealing with the affairs of their people. Here arrangements as to the chairmanship of the upper tier would differ from that in Kano, since there is no one paramount ruler for the

entire area. That office might rotate among the paramount rulers of the Division.

At the moment, the Division has no local government unit that binds it together. Eight distinct district councils exist there. Yet Division-wide matters, cultural, transportation, education, etc., will no doubt benefit from the existence of such an upper tier of local government. Consultation between councils can go some way, but they can be no substitute for satisfying the sentiments of having a council bearing the name of the Division, and responsible for Division-wide subjects, and leaving very specific matters to the lower tier district councils.

Thus, in Southern Nigeria as well (any of the six states), we must ensure that the size and population of a proposed area are reasonably large, that its elite have a chance to support the scheme, and that the new re-organization would be one that probably revives an historic association, is of some value, and one that would be welcome. After being satisfied with this

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1 Local Government Manual of Western Nigeria, Cap.68, p.393.
preliminary investigation we will conclude that the institution of regional federation may have a chance. Only then would we proceed to further investigation of the other politico-economic-geographic factors, and the other factors dealt with in Chapter Six.

These brief preliminary examinations have demonstrated one thing. They have shown that whilst in Northern Nigeria there are emirates like Jama'are into which the institution may not fit, there are others in which a further study of its possible successful establishment and operation or functioning would be very useful. The same, as seen already, applies to the Southern part of the country considered. In North America, especially in Ontario, regional government has been a means to bring about better services and to make local government more responsive. In the developing areas regional government could do a lot more than this. As has been seen in our preliminary examination with Southern Nigeria, it can be an instrument for healing old wounds, retrieving broken associations, and reuniting people who probably, for politically motivated reasons, had been set apart. These are among its potentials as we have seen in our discussion of Ekiti Division.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

A British author has rightly observed that a concluding chapter can be a hazard for both reader and writer:

"... for the reader because he may be sorely tempted to read this chapter alone, in the hope that it will tell him everything of importance which has gone before. ... a hazard also for the writer because, foreseeing the temptation to which his reader will be exposed, he may produce a final chapter which summarizes the rest of his book and might at a pinch serve as a substitute for it."

This final section of the study attempts to avoid that temptation of summarizing the contents of the earlier parts. In brief, it tries to restate the objectives of the study, assemble only its main findings, and review the justification for a two-tier rather than the present and earlier systems of local government in Kano emirate.

The main task of the thesis has been to describe and evaluate the evolution of local government institutions in Kano emirate in the periods 1900-1950, 1950-1965.

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and 1966-1972. The study has sought to evaluate the performance of local government in relation to several objectives set for local government in the three eras. The non-performance of objectives is explained by several major political, economic, administrative and social factors. The role of imported institutions has been an important influence. Moreover, since the importation of institutions must continue to pose a challenge to administrative theorists and practitioners, the study has developed criteria essential for consideration before an importation is decided upon. As a way of improving the maximization of the aims and objectives set for local government, the study finally suggests a two-tier governmental system for Kano emirate local government.

In developing the list of objectives, the study has attempted to integrate the views of certain distinct schools of thought in the discipline—those of the democratic-participatory school, the efficiency-service school, and the developmental theorists. It is hoped
that this synthesis of local government analysis will assist other researchers.

A regional federation has been suggested for Kano emirate because of its superiority over the existing system of local government, which is one tier in practice. A regional federation has two active levels of government and hence it will open greater avenues for self-expression and involvement in government. It will make government more easily accessible, more effective, as well as more expeditious, in the areas that fall under a particular level of government. In these ways it is superior to the existing system as well as to the three-tier system of the self-governing era (which subordinated the two lower tiers), as well as to the system in the colonial era (which was centred far too much on the Emir). For example, with this system, with the mass of the population (those of age) exercising their vote in electing the lower-tier local government, in organizing support for candidates for election, and in participating in the activities of their local committees, political participation would be markedly improved.

Regional government, as has been argued, will also affect the society by affecting the economy. A strong, viable lower-tier government would be in a position to engage in permissible business enterprises and developmental
projects, and to negotiate and contract in its own interest with the upper tier. Also, by rearranging functions and having specific functions assigned to the lower tier (rather than the upper tier delegating functions, at will) autonomy, independence, prestige, as well as a distinct division of labour, would be achieved. The magnitude of the output of government should be considerably more with such a distinct and reasonable division of responsibilities.

One can expect, too, that, realizing the traditional values to be enhanced in making the Emir the political head of the upper council, and bringing the other chiefs into the various committees in both tiers, whilst not cutting off the aspirations and ambitions of commoners, the rigid political culture will adapt. New orientations, hopes and beliefs as to the place of the traditional chiefs and as to the capability of the system might evolve. With political parties gone from the local councils, new groups would tend to rally around individuals, public issues and economic interests. In this way, a new breed of leadership can arise, based not on lofty political ideologies, but rather on local bread and butter, everyday issues, and on the credibility of the individual leadership (rather than the earlier political leadership dependent on the national
party). With these new changes the capability of the system, its output, its effectiveness and efficiency would be considerably enhanced, whilst differentiation would have been achieved by the new functional division, as well as by the new roles of the traditional rulers and the commoners.

Some impression has been given that the institution of regional federation, if transferred to suitable environments in the developing areas, would bring hopes of better living. It must, however, be said that the early phase of introducing any new institution of government is always a period of uncertainty. People have to get to know the new institution, the new functions and the roles to be fulfilled by various sectors of society. The new patterns of political participation and leadership would also have to be understood.

Thus, in the early part of introducing the institution, some patience will be necessary, patience for it to find its feet, to get itself understood and to settle in its new home, before it starts producing.

If the patience can be found, a regional federation, like any other institution, will need a basis of legitimacy.
In this case, a regional federation would soon be found not only to be fulfilling the efficiency-service functions of local government, but also to be bringing local government home to the people in encouraging local participation and democratic ideals, as well as being an instrument and a hope for progress in some parts of the developing world.
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