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TITO AND KHRUSHCHEV: HARMONY AND DISCORD.

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TITO AND KHRUSHCHEV:
HARMONY AND DISCORD

by

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ABSTRACT

In 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Communist bloc and all Soviet-Yugoslav relations broken off. In 1955, these were revived. Subsequently, however, their course has been an unusually unsettled one. From the second world war, to the present, the policies of Yugoslavia have been dominated by the leadership of Josip Brosz Tito. From 1955 to 1964, Tito's Soviet counterpart was Nikita Khrushchev; and, in this period, Soviet-Yugoslav relations revolved about these two personalities. Into 1956, the two leaders were in substantial harmony, at least externally. This was disrupted by the Hungarian revolt in October and November 1956. In 1957, the mood of rapprochement was renewed only to go awry at the Moscow conference of ruling Communist parties in November of that year and to degenerate in complete discord and dispute in 1958. From 1959 to 1964, Soviet-Yugoslav relations were characterized by a co-existence of varying degrees of cordiality. This vacillating pattern of harmony and discord in Soviet-Yugoslav relations between 1955 and 1964 is the subject of this thesis.
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PREFACE

Ever since the 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav dispute, the major issue in Soviet-Yugoslav relations has been the question of Communist discipline and Soviet primacy within the Communist bloc. Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform because Tito refused to submit to the rigid and restrictive system of Communist discipline under Soviet hegemony which Stalin demanded. Even after the latter's death, his successor, Nikita Khrushchev, while more liberal, was committed to the maintenance of a minimal standard of Communist internationalism, or discipline, which would ensure the precedence of the Soviet Union. This type of Communist internationalism, and the concomitant Soviet pre-eminence, was ultimately bound to conflict with the degree of national independence and operative influence upon Communist affairs which Tito sought.

Both Tito and Khrushchev, however, were concerned to promote the cause of international Communism. Both leaders, then, desired the popularization and stabilization of the Eastern European Communist regimes and the restoration of the dynamic appeal of the whole Communist movement after the stagnancy and rigidity which had characterized Stalin's last years. These common objectives tended to draw Khrushchev and Tito together. At the same time, however, neither was prepared to renounce his own individual prerequisites.
On de-Stalinization, Tito and Khrushchev were in accord, but the rents in Communist discipline which this process evoked in 1956 made it essential for Khrushchev to replace Stalinism with a formula of his own. One of Khrushchev's ingredients was his endeavour to establish a degree of ideological orthodoxy which would reinforce Communist discipline under Soviet authority through the medium of Soviet doctrinal pre-eminence. This Tito was unwilling to accept. Consequently, Tito produced his own theoretical programme and was again excluded from the bloc, branded as a potentially perdition, revisionist schismatic.

A new factor, however, at once symbolized and encouraged by the Sino-Soviet conflict, appeared to alter the Communist world so as to overshadow anew the irritating elements in the Tito-Khrushchev relationship: polycentrism. In the final years of Khrushchev's power, this phenomenon, which both Khrushchev and Tito had encouraged, brought the two into sympathy once more by diluting the power and influence of each and thus reducing the contrasts between them.

The history of the Tito-Khrushchev relationship, then, is an unusually unsettled one. And it is this instability which forms the subject of this thesis.
In completing this study, I have benefitted from a great deal of irreplaceable aid. However, I wish to express my particular gratitude to the following: St. Michael's College and the University of Toronto for my undergraduate education; the government of the Province of Ontario for a graduate fellowship; my parents for inestimable concern and consideration; Carleton University, especially the Political Science Department; Dr. Adam Bromke for invaluable assistance and advice in this project and in my obtaining a scholarship from the government of Yugoslavia to study in that country during the coming academic year; the library of Carleton University; and Mrs. F.A. Thomas for her patience, co-operation and ability in typing this final manuscript.

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CHAPTER I

THE COMMUNIST PRODIGAL, THE SOVIET CANOSSA AND

THE PRODIGAL'S RETURN

The Information Bureau considers that

... the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Yugoslavia has placed itself and the
Yugoslav Party outside the family of the fraternal
Communist Parties, outside the united Communist
front and consequently outside the ranks of the
Information Bureau.¹

With these words of June 20, 1948, the Communist Information
Bureau (Cominform) proclaimed, and announced to the world,
Yugoslavia's excommunication from the Communist bloc. This
pronouncement marked the culmination of a dispute between
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union which had evolved in the
preceding months in a series of correspondence between the
Communist parties of the two nations.²

The expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Communist world
instituted the first breach in the "Iron Curtain" as Churchill
had characterized the Stalinist system of Soviet hegemony that
had come to prevail in Eastern Europe following the Communist
takeovers there after the Second World War. Though the

¹ "Resolution of the Information Bureau Concerning the
Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, June 28,
1948", in Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury, The Soviet-

² The full text of this correspondence is available in The
Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (London: Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1948). Major excerpts appear in
Bass and Marbury, op. cit.
matters allegedly at issue in the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute were different, the implicit essence of the controversy revolved about the question of Stalinist discipline among the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe.

All of these regimes, with the exceptions of Yugoslavia and Albania, had come to power in the wake of the victorious Red Army and with the support of the Soviet Union. Hence, these regimes, unlike Tito's, owed their existence, actual and continued, to the Soviet Union. Moreover, as dedicated Communists, they looked to the Soviet Union for ideological and practical guidance and sustenance. Being thus dependent on the Soviet Union, these regimes were perfectly amenable to all directives emanating from the Kremlin. Furthermore, Stalin spared no effort to isolate these regimes from the West and from each other in order to consolidate Soviet dominance in the area. For Eastern Europe's Communist regimes in 1948, then, all roads led to Moscow.

Up to the time of the first exchanges in the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute, which culminated in the Cominform resolution of 1948, Yugoslavia, under Tito, had pursued internal and external policies which were more militantly Communist than those of the Soviet Union itself. Though apprehensive as to the Western reaction which these might evoke toward the
Communist world, Stalin was content to allow Tito to pursue his own particular policies. By late 1947, however, this apprehensiveness had convinced Stalin that, to protect his own interests, absolute control over the actions of the Eastern European Communist regimes was essential. Despite his fundamental Communist orthodoxy, however, Tito was unwilling to ignore entirely the particular national circumstances in which he found himself. Nor was he prepared to surrender completely his own ability to direct the policies of Yugoslavia with a modicum of independence. Even this modest degree of independent initiative which Tito wished to preserve, however, conflicted with Stalin's new determination to assert his own absolute authority in Eastern Europe. The first signs of Tito's reticence towards accepting such authority presented a challenge to the whole system Stalin sought to construct. It was a challenge to which Stalin felt compelled to react.

Early in 1948, in the initial stages of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute, Stalin is supposed to have remarked: "I will shake my little finger and there will be no more Tito. He will fall."¹ Regardless of the accuracy of the statement,

the sentiment expressed indicates the nature of the
discipline that Stalin sought to impose on the Eastern
European regimes. For his part, Tito's attitude, despite
his undoubted loyalty to Communism and the Soviet Union,
can be inferred from a statement which appeared above his
signature in one of the letters addressed to the CPSU by
the CPY in April, 1948. He wrote: "No matter how much
each of us loves the land of Socialism, the USSR, he can,
in no case, love his own country less, which also is
developing Socialism . . .". From these two statements,
it was evident that the policies of Stalin and Tito must
collide. The result was Yugoslavia's expulsion from the
Cominform, in itself an institution designed to ensure
Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Indeed, the fact that
Stalin took the bilateral dispute between the USSR and
Yugoslavia to a multilateral organization where he could
control the votes of all other participants indicates that
Tito had to yield or to leave. The result was predetermined.

The Cominform resolution accused Yugoslavia of
nationalism, a quality absolutely forbidden to a Communist
internationalist. Stalinist internationalism, however,
meant submission to Moscow. This Tito could not countenance.

1. "Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Yugoslavia to the Central Committee of the
Despite his fidelity to Communism and his genuine admiration for the Soviet Union as the first socialist state, the "fatherland of the proletariat", Tito believed that the fact that he had fashioned Yugoslavia's revolution largely without the aid of Soviet power legitimately entitled him to a degree of independence in the formulation of his own national policies. Moreover, this independence was to be used to construct a Yugoslav socialism which reproduced as faithfully as possible, taking account of national peculiarities, Stalin's Soviet model. But Tito could not accept the subordination of Yugoslavia's interests to those of the Soviet state, as distinct from those of international Communism, the identity of these in Stalin's mind to the contrary. The true cause of Yugoslavia's expulsion by the Cominform, then, was not so much because she embraced nationalism as because she rejected external, Soviet domination.

Following the act of excommunication, the Communist bloc, led by the USSR, gradually severed all contacts with Yugoslavia. All remaining Soviet military, technical and economic advisors were withdrawn; treaties and economic aid agreements were repudiated; trade evaporated. Stalin sought every means of pressure to force Yugoslavia's submission. Propaganda directed at Yugoslavia reached
excessive heights of vituperation and military movements on the Yugoslav frontiers threatened direct intervention. This threat never materialized however.

Despite the total hostility of his erstwhile Communist colleagues, Tito refrained from retaliation. Convinced of his innocence, Tito continued to believe that the wrong would be righted and the quarrel forgotten. Stalin's posture remained rigid, however, and it became apparent that reconciliation was beyond the realm of possibility. Faced with this recognition in early 1950, Tito set about the task of overcoming his isolation and resolving the anomaly of being a Communist without an International. Tito had thus become a heretic, a Communist prodigal.

Excommunicated by the East and ideologically at odds with the West, Tito apparently faced a blind alley in the rigidly bi-polarized world of the times. He could not, however, stand alone. Since he could return to the East only in abject surrender, necessity dictated that he turn to the West. Forced to choose between survival and ideology, he chose the former. Thus began Tito's ideological revisionism. In the West, Tito found a cautious but willing partner in the United States. Titoism thus comprised two elements: resistance to Soviet domination and the development

2. Quoted, Neal, op. cit., 253, and Neal and Hoffman, op. cit., 419.
military mission in Belgrade in 1951, though, Tito conceded that the alliance was "the logical consequence of Soviet policy" and pledged co-operation in all international matters which would not compromise Yugoslavia's principles.¹

The Eisenhower administration, which came to power in the United States at the beginning of 1952, continued to exhibit a sympathetic attitude toward Yugoslavia. American policy began to place greater stress on the extension of the Western alliance system however. As a concession to this, and in order to relieve his isolation in the Balkans, Tito concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with Greece and Turkey on November 28, 1953. Though Greece and Turkey belonged to NATO this treaty was restricted to economic, technical and cultural matters and informal consultation.

By this time, however, a new factor with far-reaching consequences for Soviet-Yugoslav relations had emerged. Stalin was dead.² With its author gone, Tito apparently entertained hopes that the doctrine of Stalinism had died with him. Commenting on Stalin's death on March 31, 1953, Tito indicated:

> We in Yugoslavia would be happy if they recognized some day that they had made a mistake with our country. We would be very happy. We shall wait. We shall see.³

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2. March 5, 1953.
3. Quoted, Zalar, op. cit., 269.
And, indeed, in June, diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the members of the Communist bloc were restored. The Soviets, however, did not go beyond this point although various delegations were exchanged between Moscow and Belgrade.

Despite these preliminaries, Tito proceeded in 1954 to extend his relations with the non-Communist world. On August 9 a mutual defense agreement, the Balkan Pact, was concluded between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. A permanent secretariat and regular consultations of foreign ministers were provided for. This treaty created an indirect link between Yugoslavia and NATO and was interpreted in the West as the prelude to Yugoslavia's accession to the alliance. In September, however, Tito warned the West: "Do not make us what we are not. We are Communists." Tito continued to indicate that formal adherence to NATO by Yugoslavia was a barren hope.

Nevertheless, the publication of the Balkan Pact had an impact on Moscow. In September, Moscow ceased to broadcast anti-Titoist propaganda or to jam Yugoslav radio broadcasts. The attitude of the other Communist regimes toward Yugoslavia softened and trade relations resumed. Noting this new attitude, Tito expressed cautious optimism

1. Quoted, Neal and Hoffman, op. cit., 422.
in October: "This beginning of normalization fills us with hope that the process will continue to develop."¹ While gently encouraging the Soviets on the one hand, Tito continued to refer to the Balkan Pact and to reassure the West on the other. "I want to make it clear," he said, "to . . . the Soviet Union and the Eastern countries that we cannot improve our relations with them at the expense and to the detriment of our relations with the Western countries . . ."² At the same time, Tito embarked upon an Asian tour to strengthen his relations with India's Nehru and Burma's U Nu.

With this trip, Tito instituted the final facet of a doctrine that has remained fundamental to his concept of Yugoslavian foreign policy, the doctrine of "active co-existence".

To the Yugoslavs, 'active co-existence' . . . means that while they will become a member of no bloc they will work positively in all ways possible, particularly in collaboration with other ' neutrals', to further peace and Yugoslavia's national interest.³

This policy of eschewing power blocs based on military or ideological considerations implied a number of positive advantages for Yugoslavia on the international scene. By early 1955, Tito had established satisfactory relations

¹. Quoted, Neal and Hoffman, op. cit., 423.
with the West. At the same time, Soviet-Yugoslav relations exhibited definite signs of improvement. By initiating increased contacts with the major uncommitted states, such as India, Egypt and Indonesia, Tito sought to complete a triangular pattern of diplomatic contacts which would preclude any isolation of Yugoslavia comparable to the 1948-50 period. Recognizing the increasing potential of the so-called "third world" as a viable alternative to adherence to either of the two major power configurations in the East and West,¹ Tito saw in this triangular pattern an opportunity to establish a power base for international negotiations and a guarantee of Yugoslavia's freedom of manoeuvre in foreign policy;² for if he should experience a falling-out with either of the major blocs he could still retain two sources of international support. This desire, or need, for an international power base also lay behind Tito's attempts at a Balkan federation in the late 1940's and his acceptance of the Balkan Pact in 1954. The rationale of Tito's external policy of "active co-existence" has been summarized as follows:

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1. Tito regarded this alternative as a "moral force consisting of all those who love peace and freedom." Quoted, Neal, op. cit., 262.

2. "Tito hoped to establish and legitimize himself with the non-aligned nations in order to obtain from them more effective political support for his independent position in the Balkans and to spread his version of Communism among them." William E. Griffith, "Yugoslavia", in Zbigniew Brzezinski, (ed.), Africa and the Communist World (Stanford: 1963), 116.
This was, in fact, the only policy the Communists in Yugoslavia could, or can, adhere to: co-existence of the two blocs is the only guarantee of the continued existence of their own regime. Were the Soviet bloc to disappear, Yugoslavia obviously could not survive as a Communist state. Were the Western powers still further reduced in their sphere of influence, the Soviet Union, even under the post-Stalinist leadership, would have few reasons not to liquidate the inconvenience that Tito's Yugoslavia represents.

Active co-existence represented more to Tito than a simple guarantee of his own regime's continuation however. In international polarity, Tito recognized the possibility of expanding his international influence and bargaining power. Both expedience and advantage thus dictated Tito's policy. Tito did not view the non-alignment implied in co-existence as equitable with neutrality however. Rather, he saw non-alignment as a freedom to adopt whatever international policies served his own national interests independently of the actions of the major international power blocs.

Nor did co-existence imply Tito's rejection of Marxism-Leninism or his desire to extend socialism in the world. During the period of ideological reorientation in

1. Ulam, in Drachkovitch, (ed.), op. cit., 150. A Yugoslav official has written: "Yugoslavia came to realize that an essential precondition of her independence in general, and of her independent advance towards socialism in particular, was to remain outside groupings which, by their very nature, would have tended to bring her into line with the general political and ideological outlook associated with that particular grouping." Dyura Nincic, "The Foreign Policy of Yugoslavia", in Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson, (eds.), Foreign Policies in a World of Change (New York: 1963), 267.
1950-51, Tito felt the necessity to postulate a Marxist-Leninist justification for economic and military co-operation with the West. Consequently, Tito, "... advanced the thesis that the West already contained socialist elements and the possibility of a gradual peaceful development towards socialism existed." At the same time, the USSR was criticized for bureaucratic degeneration and chauvinistic tendencies. Thus, in response to external pressures, Tito set out to develop the distinctive forms of socialist organization which form an integral part of Titoism. Titoism, in effect, became "an amalgam of nationalism and socialism".2

Even before the expulsion from the Cominform, Tito apparently believed that Yugoslav socialism contained certain exemplary features worthy of imitation by the other socialist nations. Thus, even while professing his loyalty to the Soviet model, Tito wrote: "We are also of the opinion that there are many specific aspects in the social transformation of Yugoslavia which can be of benefit to revolutionary development in other countries ...".3 The ideological revision of 1950-51 together with—the criticism of Soviet

practice strengthened Tito's belief in the quality of his doctrines. The policy of active co-existence seemed to provide a flexibility for the propagation of these theories which was in marked contrast to the stagnant rigidity of Stalinism in Eastern Europe. Through co-existence, Tito hoped to encourage socialism in the West and in the developing world.

The natural sphere for the application of Titoist doctrine, however, was in Eastern Europe. Moreover, Tito was ideologically at home only in the socialist world; co-operation with the West was, for Tito, a necessity accepted with reluctance. The death of Stalin raised the possibility of Tito's readmission to the socialist world. After 1950, however, Tito had established limits beyond which he would not go in any association with the USSR. Rapprochement with the Soviet Union, then, was conditional upon a redefinition of the pattern of relations within the Soviet bloc. Tito would not renounce his flexibility nor his independence. Thus, in March 1955, Tito defined his foreign policy as active co-existence and explained this as the desire, "... to develop the best possible relations with all countries which are prepared to recognize the principles of independence and equality."

At the same time as Tito was scrutinizing Stalin's successors, they in turn, cast their eyes towards Eastern

Europe. Just as no single Soviet leader could immediately assume Stalin's stature, the system that Stalin had constructed in Eastern Europe could not be unalterably retained. Just two months after Stalin's interment, popular unrest was manifest in Eastern Europe by the revolt in East Germany.\(^1\) The rigid control characteristic of Stalinism began to show signs of weakening. Moreover, the Stalinist system was essentially stagnant, the fundamental tenet being maintenance of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and avoidance of nuclear conflict with the West. To restore dynamism to the Soviet bloc a newer, more flexible strategy was called for. Under Stalin, Soviet predominance was founded upon naked power and rigid discipline. The problem confronting the new Soviet leaders was to find more pliable, but no less effective, alternatives.

The alternatives that finally emerged were, at once, institutional and ideological. In the latter half of 1953, a certain degree of domestic divergence from the Soviet model and internal liberalization was extended to the Eastern European states. At the same time, the collective leadership of Nagy and Rakosi, the former representing liberalizing tendencies, was instituted in Hungary. Despite this measure of liberalization, however, the Communist regimes continued to operate similar economic and political systems and to

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\(^1\) June 17, 1953.
remain loyal to Marxism-Leninism. Given the strength of
the USSR's own politico-economic system and the acknowledged
Soviet primacy as ideological interpreter, the Soviet
leadership felt that their moral authority would suffice
to maintain discipline in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the
bloc members were expected to render complete support to
Soviet foreign policy. And, on the international scene, as
the Soviet leadership moved increasingly toward a policy of
détente, the new internal liberality in the bloc was expected
to give substance to this policy and to increase the universal
appeal of socialism, particularly among the uncommitted
nations.

To supplement this Soviet reliance on moral authority,
certain new institutional bonds were introduced within the
Soviet bloc. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA) was resurrected from the somnambulance which had
characterized its early period and a multilateral military
alliance, the Warsaw Pact, designed, among other purposes,
to co-ordinate the bloc attitude to Soviet foreign political
initiatives, was concluded on May 14, 1955.

The more flexible attitude toward the Eastern European
states adopted by the Soviets, with its acceptance of limited
domestic deviations from the Soviet pattern and its emphasis
upon the moral authority of Moscow's ideological pre-eminence,
provided a general context within which to seek Yugoslavia's
return to the Soviet bloc. Tito, for his part, could retain
the national features of Titoism while rejoining the bloc on the basis of his own proclaimed fidelity to Marxism-Leninism. In co-operation the USSR and Yugoslavia could then affect a rejuvenation of the appeal of international socialism. Tito's effectiveness in this regard would be enhanced by his recent successes in courting the Asian neutrals. Finally, having charted a foreign political course of détente, inherent logic dictated a rapprochement with Yugoslavia.

In summary, then, the Soviet leaders saw the Soviet-Yugoslav breach as a mistake which had compromised the Soviet bloc and upon which the West had capitalized. Now, the Soviet problem, in Eastern Europe, was,

''... to govern the international Communist movement so as to ensure unity and, at the same time, to allow for the differing national perspectives and interests of the various Communist states and parties, which ... could not indefinitely be suppressed.''

In the new concept of intra-bloc relations which was being evolved, Tito's adhesion to the bloc could be obtained on the basis of adherence to the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism.

At the same time, [the Soviets] wanted to demonstrate to those uncommitted countries [they were] seeking to wean away from the West that there was nothing incompatible between independence and membership in the 'socialist family'.

2. Ibid., 51.
Thus, a Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement would strengthen the Soviet policy of détente while restraining Yugoslavia's flirtations with NATO through the Balkan Pact.

In rapprochement, Tito, for his part, saw the possibility of returning to the socialist camp from which he felt unjustly and unhappily excluded. There were limits however; Tito was determined to maintain his basic independence. On the other hand, with rapprochement, Tito could hope to remodel bloc relations according to Titoist concepts which he felt were legitimately Marxist-Leninist and capable of strengthening and stabilizing the Communist bloc. He also believed that he might possibly participate in the formulation of international communist strategy for the extension of socialism, which he had consistently sought. At the very least, Tito, "... saw an opportunity to increase his power and influence in world politics by strengthening his 'positive neutrality' position between the great power blocs."¹

There remained, now, the specifics of rapprochement. Diplomatic, trade, and cultural relations had been resumed and the Soviet's anti-Yugoslav propaganda terminated. Tito continued to drop cautious hints favourable to rapprochement and to indicate his intention to remain outside the Western alliance, although he repeatedly gave notice of his resolve

to maintain good relations with the West.

In October, on the anniversary of the meeting of Soviet troops and Tito's partisans during the liberation of Belgrade, the Soviet press made favourable references to Yugoslavia and Tito. On November 6, at the Moscow celebrations of the Soviet Revolution, Maxim Saburov of the CPSU Praesidium noted the improvement of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and stressed the identity of certain Soviet and Yugoslav interests. The Soviet government, he stated, considered it, "... to be in the interests of both countries to exploit all possibilities for the creation of normal and cordial relations." On November 28, Malenkov, Molotov and Khrushchev appeared at a Yugoslav embassy reception and toasted Tito and the CPY. The move toward rapprochement had begun.

At about this time, secret preliminary negotiations between the two protagonists must have begun. Interrupted by Tito's Asian tour, these continued in early 1955. However, in February, Molotov, addressing the Supreme Soviet, implied a degree of Yugoslav responsibility for the 1948 rupture while, at the same time, adhering to the general theme of the desirability of improved relations. Coming from an old


2. Richard Lowenthal states that he has received personal confirmation of this point from Yugoslav sources. World Communism (New York: 1966), 11.
Stalinist who, with Stalin, had co-signed the 1948 Soviet correspondence, Tito could hardly accept this for it suggested that the USSR could legitimately expect certain concessions of him.¹ Tito responded sharply in a March speech which was unexpectedly reprinted by the Soviet press. With Molotov thus chastised, the preliminary Soviet-Yugoslav negotiations presently achieved satisfactory results and on May 14, 1955, it was announced that Khrushchev would lead a Soviet delegation, including Premier Bulganin, to Belgrade at the end of the month.

The high level of the Soviet delegation attested to its importance. Moreover, Khrushchev's designation as its head, contained additional significance. With Malenkov's replacement as Soviet Premier by Bulganin in early February, Khrushchev's power was in its ascendancy. Khrushchev held the position of First Secretary of the CPSU. In the emerging system of bloc relations envisaged by the Soviets, the infallibility of Marxist-Leninist ideology was to serve as the central point of Communist unity and Soviet primacy. The traditional, rigid discipline of the Soviet party was to be transformed into an inter-state disciplinary system overseen by the various Communist parties. Hence the significance of Khrushchev's leadership of the Soviet delegation. In addition,

¹. For an excerpt from Molotov's remarks, see Halperin, op. cit., 256.
a success for Khrushchev in Belgrade would clearly strengthen his position in the Soviet hierarchy.

The date of the announcement of the forthcoming Khrushchev-Bulganin visit, May 14, is also noteworthy in one respect. This date coincided with the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact which linked all the Eastern European Communist states, except Yugoslavia, together with the Soviet Union in a multilateral defence organization. This coincidence underlines the dual institutional-ideological quality of the new Soviet system of discipline designed for Eastern Europe. The moment was ripe for Yugoslavia's integration in that system.

On May 26, the Soviet delegation landed at Belgrade airport. After the initial formalities, Khrushchev stepped to the microphone and read his prepared address. 1 From Khrushchev's opening salutation, "Dear Comrade Tito . . .", the new Soviet attitude to Yugoslavia was apparent. Khrushchev reviewed the early course of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and then turned to 1948. "We sincerely regret what happened", he said, "and resolutely reject the things that occurred, one after the other during that period."

1. The full text, from which all excerpts are drawn, may be found in Bass and Marbury, op. cit., 51-54. The statement is also in Vaclav L. Benes, Robert F. Byrnes and Nicholas Spulber, (eds.), The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (Bloomington, Indiana: 1959), 5-8.
He went on, "On our part, we ascribe without hesitation the aggravations to the provocative role that Beria, Abakumov and others - recently exposed enemies of the people - played in the relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR." The apology begun, Khrushchev continued:

We studied assiduously the materials on which the serious accusations and offences directed at that time against the leaders of Yugoslavia had been based. The facts show that these materials were fabricated by enemies of the people, detestable agents of imperialism who by deceptive methods, pushed their way into the ranks of our Party.

Having expressed his regrets for the past, Khrushchev held out hopes for better relations in the future. He then sketched the new Soviet policy:

... the government of the Soviet Union bases its relations with other countries, large and small, on the principles of peaceful co-existence of states, on principles of equality, non-intervention and respect for sovereignty and national independence ... .

The Soviet Union, he stated, understood and accepted Yugoslavia's desire to maintain good relations with East and West. Then, however, Khrushchev came to the ploy by which he hoped to draw Yugoslavia into close collaboration with the Soviet bloc:

As representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Party created by the great Lenin, we consider it desirable to have mutual confidence established between our Parties. The strongest ties are created among the peoples of those countries where the leading forces are Parties that base their activities on the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. Parties governed by the teachings of Marxism-Leninism achieve complete mutual understanding . . . .
Khrushchev then stressed the Soviet and Yugoslav community of interest in peace and reiterated that to attain this goal required, "... that the leaders of Communist and labor Parties establish mutual confidence between these Parties on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism". Khrushchev concluded by hailing peace, Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation and the Yugoslav people.

Tito did not reply to Khrushchev but brusquely escorted the Soviets to the waiting cavalcade. Nevertheless, he had reason to be satisfied. His 1948 stand had been vindicated and Khrushchev had accepted his independence. On the other hand, Khrushchev had placed the blame for the Cominform excommunication on Beria, Abakumov and nameless "others". ¹ Neither Stalin nor even Molotov had been repudiated, though Molotov was conspicuously absent from the Soviet delegation.

¹. Richard Lowenthal indicates that, prior to the Belgrade visit, Khrushchev proposed to Tito that the Soviet delegation blame Beria for the Soviet part in the 1948 conflict while Tito attribute the Yugoslav share to Milovan Djilas, a former colleague of Tito's expelled from the Yugoslav Party in 1954. Tito, however, would assume no responsibility for the 1948 dispute, scapegoat or not, and hence rejected the proposal. Moreover, Lowenthal quotes an anonymous source as stating, "Tito would not be such a fool as to give Djilas all the credit for the struggle for national independence." Tito's dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's reference to Beria and Abakumov thus resulted from the fact that Tito had rejected this part of Khrushchev's formula at its inception. Lowenthal, op. cit., 74.
In the succeeding days, several private discussions between the Soviet and Yugoslav leaders took place. On June 2, a joint declaration was issued. After expressing the two nations' desires to further improve their relations, a number of common principles for approaching international issues were set forth. Of principal interest are the following:

. . . respect for sovereignty, independence, integrity and for equality among states in their mutual relations and in their relations with other states.

Recognition and development of peaceful co-existence among nations, regardless of ideological differences or differences of social order . . .

Compliance with the principle of mutual respect for, and non-interference in, internal affairs for any reason whatsoever, whether of an economic, political or ideological nature, because questions of internal organization or difference in social systems and of different forms of socialist development, are solely the concern of individual countries.

The recognition that the policy of military blocs increases international tension, undermines confidence among nations and augments the danger of war.

In addition, the two countries pledged support to the United Nations and to the entry of Communist China into the world body and to work toward disarmament, the establishment of a European collective security system, settlement of the German problem and the restoration of Formosa to Communist China.

With respect to their own relations, the Soviet and Yugoslav governments agreed to co-operate on various economic, cultural and minor political matters including, notably:

1. The text is contained in Bass and Marbury, op. cit., 55-60.
... to take measures to do away with the consequences arising from the disruption of a normal treaty basis in the economic relations between the two countries.

... to facilitate co-operation among the social organizations of the two countries through the establishment of contacts, the exchange of socialist experiences and a free exchange of opinions.

What on balance had been achieved?

Tito, clearly, had obtained Soviet recognition of his "sovereignty, independence and equality" and validation of the legitimacy of his "different forms of socialist development" and his right to continue to create such forms. The condemnation of "military blocs" obviously suited itself to Tito's "active co-existence". Finally, Tito had gained a general Soviet undertaking to make reparations for the economic agreements abrogated by the USSR after 1948.

Khrushchev's successes were considerably more limited. Tito had endorsed the concept of "peaceful co-existence", which later became synonymous with Khrushchevian foreign policy, and various specific Soviet international aims. However, Khrushchev received no direct reference to ideological rapport on the basis of Marxism-Leninism or to party collaboration between the CPSU and the CPY, which was to have been the new bond between Moscow and Belgrade. ¹ The prospect

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¹. It is noteworthy that, throughout the visit, Khrushchev referred to Tito as tovarishch, comrade, while Tito addressed Khrushchev as gospodin, mister.
of such a bond materializing was, perhaps, hinted at in
the agreement to seek co-operation between "social
organizations" and to exchange "socialist experiences".
For the present, however, the bond was ephemeral.

Khrushchev had broached the question of party
collaboration but, with neither the Cominform as an
institution nor Stalinism repudiated, Tito demurred. The
tone of the discussion of party matters is conveyed by an
anecdote revealed by Khrushchev in 1958. During the
discussion, Khrushchev drew an analogy between CPSU-CPY
relations and a marching company of soldiers in which one
was out of step. Khrushchev then asked, "Who has to adapt,
the company to the soldier or the soldier to the company?"
Koča Popović, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, responded, "Who
is now the company and who is the soldier?"¹ Tito thus
stale-mated Khrushchev's concept of ideological discipline
vis-a-vis Yugoslavia. Tito was content with improved inter-
state relations which raised his prestige and influence and
strengthened the triangular basis of his policy of active
co-existence. For the present, he was not interested in
ideological solidarity and this was underscored by the
declaration's adherence to purely inter-state matters and
its signature on the Soviet side only by Bulganin, the Soviet
Premier.

1. Khrushchev revealed this exchange in a speech to a congress
of the Bulgarian Communist Party on June 3, 1958. See
Benes, Byrnes and Spulber, (eds.), op. cit., 268.
Khrushchev's had not, however, been an unqualified failure. He had laid a foundation for future efforts, and, realistically, he could have expected little more. Khrushchev's costs had been heavy: the abject airport apology and major moral and material concessions to Tito, the Communist prodigal.

The Belgrade Declaration signed, the Soviet delegation flew off to explain the new policy toward Yugoslavia in Sofia and Bucharest. Thus concluded the widely reputed "Soviet Canossa".1

1. This phrase, coined in the wake of the Belgrade visit, alluded to a humbling pilgrimage made by Henry IV in 1077 to ask forgiveness of Pope Gregory VII. The parallel to the Khrushchev visit, however, is inverted. In this case, it was not the Communist excommunicate but, so to speak, the Communist papacy which, in a sense, undertook a journey of repentance. Neal and Hoffman, op. cit., footnote, 425.

Conflicting extremes in the interpretation of the Belgrade visit are given by Sir Fitzroy Maclean, The Heretic (New York: 1957), and Ernst Halperin, The Triumphant Heretic. The latter views the results of the discussions as a significant Soviet success and the virtual formulation of a Moscow-Belgrade axis concealed by an elaborate façade. The former sees the success of the visit as Tito's in obtaining substantial concessions from the Soviets while retaining his essential independence of action. Neither of these views is completely satisfactory. Within the context of their own objectives, both sides benefitted though Khrushchev's concessions and, conversely, Tito's gains were considerably more evident. In view of his overall policy, Khrushchev did derive certain positive results but these were quite limited. No single source provides a comprehensive exposition of this evaluation. Reference might be made, however, to Lowenthal, op. cit., particularly chapter 1, and, in a more general context, Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (New York: 1961), especially chapters 8 and 9.
In Sofia and Bucharest, Khrushchev made it clear that he felt that the other members of the bloc should follow his initiative towards Yugoslavia. In their hesitancy to do so, however, the Eastern European regimes were not alone. At the July Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Molotov, while approving the normalization of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, voiced opposition to Khrushchev's ideological exercises as likely to create disruptive tendencies in the Communist bloc. Molotov's objections, however, were over-ruled by the proponents of rapprochement, led by Khrushchev, and the Central Committee approved the results of the Belgrade visit. In publishing this decision, the Soviet journal Pravda reaffirmed the core of Khrushchev's strategy towards Tito:

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union considers it desirable to establish contact and a rapprochement between the CPSU and the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles. The first results have now been achieved and the prerequisites have been established for this contact and rapprochement. It is hoped that rapprochement with the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia will continue and develop on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles.

Tito, however, continued to parry these Soviet ideological advances. In July, Veljko Vlahovic of the CPY's

2. Ibid., 176-177.
3. Quoted, ibid., 177.
Central Committee published an article \(^1\) which was cautiously critical of the concept of a Marxist-Leninist ideological bloc, noting, among other things, that Marxist-Leninist parties did not enjoy a monopoly of socialist progress - an argument compatible with the early phase of Titoist revisionism which claimed to perceive signs of such progress in the Western world. Later in the month, Tito himself disclaimed any tendency on Yugoslavia's part to affiliate with any bloc. Going beyond this, Tito, following Khrushchev's earlier initiative, urged the other Communist states to follow the Soviet example and to renounce their historical and current anti-Titoist attitudes. He particularly referred to Czechoslovakia and Hungary, where liberalization had been reversed with Nagy's removal as Premier and the re-assertion of the power of Rakosi, an anti-Titoist stalwart. For reasons of domestic security however, the Eastern European regimes remained extremely reticent. \(^2\)

In the meantime, Soviet-Yugoslav relations improved conspicuously. The USSR cancelled a pre-1948 Yugoslav debt of 90 million dollars and Tito waived his claims for reparations for the post-1948 Soviet economic blockade. Various governmental, commercial and cultural delegations

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1. This article is discussed in Lowenthal, op. cit., 19-20.
2. See Brzezinski, op. cit., 193 ff.
were exchanged, and in August, while Anastas Mikoyan "vacationed" in Yugoslavia, a new trade agreement was negotiated. All this activity aroused suspicion in the West, particularly in Washington, where criticism of Tito caused the State Department to withdraw an invitation for a projected visit. In November, however, Dulles, the American Secretary of State, visited Tito and the consultations resulted in a cautious reaffirmation of American-Yugoslav friendship.¹ Tito therefore continued to hold carefully to his middle-of-the-road posture of "active co-existence".

The next step in the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement came in February 1956, in spectacular form, with the convention of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. In his public address, Khrushchev elucidated and doctrinally justified three basic tenets by which he intended to govern his external policies. First, he proclaimed the policy of peaceful co-existence among states with different social systems, which coincided in essence with the fundamentals of Tito's active co-existence, both being designed to enhance the appeal of international socialism. Second, discarding entirely a

¹. See Neal, op. cit., 260 ff, and Neal and Hoffman, op. cit., 428 ff.
principal Leninist thesis, Khrushchev declared that war was no longer inevitable. This too found sympathy in Yugoslavia since the prevention of war was a professed aim of Tito's policy of non-alignment. Finally, Khrushchev proclaimed the validity of "different roads to socialism" thus granting ideological justification to institutional diversity within the Communist bloc. He specifically referred to Yugoslavia as a state which was constructing socialism.\(^1\) The increasing identity of Khrushchev's and Tito's views thus became apparent.

Even more than with these public remarks, Tito had reason to be gratified at Khrushchev's famous Secret Speech.\(^2\) Stalinism the doctrine had already begun to be diluted; now, Stalin the man was repudiated. The primary figure among the nameless "others" whom Khrushchev had blamed at Belgrade for the Soviet-Yugoslav rift was stripped of anonymity. Stalin's role in the "Yugoslav affair", said Khrushchev, was "shameful". The fact that Khrushchev indicated that there had also been faults on Tito's part could not offset the importance of the serious initiation of de-Stalinization contained in the Secret Speech.

To Tito, the Soviet Twentieth Congress appeared to

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1. See the excerpt from Khrushchev's speech in G.F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal and Roderick MacFarquhar, (eds.), The Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York: 1961), 42-46. The Congress also passed a resolution that, "... great successes in socialist construction have also been achieved in Yugoslavia." Quoted, Byrnes, loc. cit., 161.

mark a decisive turning point in Soviet policy. Khrushchev's espousal of peaceful co-existence seemed the final adoption by the Soviet Union of a flexible policy of international détente which contrasted sharply with the rigidity and aggressive hegemonism of the Stalin era. Moreover, Khrushchev had apparently renounced any Soviet monopoly of ideological wisdom. The ghost of Stalin, it appeared, had permanently been laid to rest while the appeal of Titoism was on the rise.

Early in 1956, Soviet-Yugoslav state relations were strengthened by Soviet credits to Yugoslavia worth 300 million dollars. In April, the Cominform, which might have served as a forum for Soviet ideological supremacy, despite its recent inactivity, was dissolved. Both the author and the promulgator of the 1948 resolution against Yugoslavia were thus discredited. At the same time, arrangements were under way for Tito to visit the Soviet Union beginning June 2. As a final Soviet gesture, Molotov, who personified the shadow Stalin had cast on the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement, was dismissed as Soviet Foreign Minister on June 1.

On June 2, the first anniversary of the Belgrade declaration, Tito arrived in Moscow to begin a three week tour of the Soviet Union. He was received with demonstrative cordiality and full ceremony by his Soviet hosts. And in the course of his tour he was the subject of immense popular acclaim. It was a triumphant visit for Tito, the Communist
prodigal. Indeed, "No prodigal son had ever been given such a reception."\(^1\)

Having received the laurels from his hosts, the time had come for more serious business. On June 20, Tito and Khrushchev issued a joint statement in Moscow.\(^2\) Referring pointedly to Tito's party position as Secretary-General of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia rather than his state title of President, the statement asserted that Tito and Khrushchev had, ". . . exchanged views . . . on relations and co-operation between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union". The two leaders reaffirmed the principles of the Belgrade Declaration and noted that relations in the intervening year, ". . . have created favourable political conditions also for co-operation between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union . . .". Taking account of Tito's continued wariness towards the implications of an ideological entente cordiale, the statement characterized the nature of this co-operation, with the various inherent limitations, as follows:


Abiding by the view that the roads and conditions of socialist development are different in different countries, that the wealth of the forms of socialist development contributes to their strengthening, and starting with the fact that any tendency of imposing one's own views in determining the roads and forms of socialist development are alien to both sides, the two sides have agreed that the foregoing cooperation should be based on complete freedom of will and equality, on friendly criticism and on the comradely character of the exchange of views on disputes between our parties.

To Tito, this implied his right to participate in the formulation of ideological precepts and to shape the socialist forms and relations based upon them, that is, to propagate Titoism. To Khrushchev, it represented a constructive step towards the system of ideological discipline he envisioned for a de-Stalinized Soviet bloc, including Yugoslavia. The ideological bond Khrushchev sought to impose on Tito had been tempered; there remained the hardening.

This ideological bond, it was clear, in Tito's case, could not be supplemented by the institutional ties being fashioned within the rest of the bloc. Khrushchev had, therefore, never attempted to bring Yugoslavia into the Warsaw Pact. And although Tito had stated in Stalingrad on June 11 that, "In time of war as well as in time of peace, Yugoslavia marches shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet people toward the same goal — the victory of socialism", this referred only

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to a similarity of ideological aims and was intended for Soviet consumption; for when Soviet Marshal Zhukov expressed parallel sentiments at the June 20 ceremonies, Popović issued a statement indicating that no Soviet-Yugoslav alliance was contemplated. At any rate, Khrushchev believed that ideological communion and inter-party solidarity would suffice for his purposes.

The course of Soviet-Yugoslav relations between 1948 and 1956, then, had ranged from recrimination to reconciliation. In retrospect, however, the course had been one of progression:

Stalin, intent on the total Sovietization of East Europe, refused to tolerate Yugoslav autonomy at home and ambitions in the Balkans; but he could neither intimidate nor overthrow Tito's partisan forged regime. Faced with no alternative, after the 1948 break Tito shifted reluctantly to liberalization at home and, abroad, to the West for aid and the non-aligned neutralists for allies. But Tito has always been a convinced and internationalist Communist, and when Khrushchev's 1954-56 overtures to Yugoslavia offered him the chance to rejoin a looser socialist camp and to regain and expand Yugoslav influence in East Europe, he readily took up the Soviet offer, and the rapprochement proceeded apace.  

At the same time as Tito was evolving his concept of active co-existence, with its triangular pattern of diplomatic contacts and policy of non-alignment, the Soviet leadership was reappraising its international policy with a view to

1. Neal, op. cit., 268.
recapturing the dynamism of Communism's appeal and stabilizing their position in Eastern Europe. The foreign policy of détente and peaceful co-existence which emerged together with the concept of a cohesive Communist bloc founded upon institutional and ideological solidarity both dictated rapprochement with Yugoslavia. Khrushchev thus sought rapprochement for reasons of Soviet power and, ultimately, for international flexibility while Tito perceived an opportunity to augment his international prestige and influence and, hopefully, to facilitate his promotion of the cause of international socialism. Thus the "Soviet Canossa",

... swept away, at least temporarily, the heavy clouds which had accumulated during the years of Stalin's vituperations against Tito. Stalin's heir and Yugoslavia's 'triumphant heretic' achieved an understanding based on a compromise. Yugoslavia adopted the basic current line of Soviet foreign policy while the Soviets signed the Belgrade declaration of June 2, 1955, thus accepting Tito's own conception of the relations between socialist states.¹

Tito, however, remained cautious and continued to develop active co-existence, disclaiming power blocs and receiving return visits from U Nu and Nehru in 1955 as well as assuring Dulles of his continued non-alignment. But Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress impelled Tito to move closer to the Soviet Union.

¹ Drachkovitch, in Kertesz, (ed.), op. cit., 298.
The thesis that internally the Soviet leaders were on the way to correcting Stalin's errors, and that in foreign policy they had already completely abandoned Stalin's policy of aggression in favour of a genuinely peaceful policy, served as an ideological prop for the justification of this attitude.1

There followed Tito's visit to the Soviet Union and the Moscow statement which affirmed the determination of Khrushchev and Tito to foster collaboration between their respective Communist parties.

On the international scene, Khrushchev's approach to Yugoslavia succeeded in retarding Tito's flirtations with the West and, as a result, the Balkan Pact which might have foreshadowed Yugoslavia's adherence to NATO gradually lapsed into a coma. In addition, "[Tito's] close ties with the 'uncommitted countries' of Asia and Africa were certainly instrumental in Khrushchev's successes in those regions in 1955 and 1956."2 In intra-bloc relations, Khrushchev appeared well on the way to establishing that ideological discipline intended to replace the oppressive, and hence brittle, order which was Stalin's heritage, and with Tito's concurrence. From the Belgrade perspective of the Communist bloc, "... Tito's ambitions [were] to accomplish a de-Stalinization

following the Yugoslav line, which would make the regimes more popular and thus politically more stable, . . . and to reshape Soviet satellite relations on the basis of the Belgrade Declaration.¹ In the circumstances of June 1956, Tito felt the moment had come to implement these designs. The Communist prodigal was preparing to reorient the Communist community.

CHAPTER II

DE-STALINIZATION AND UPHEAVAL IN
EASTERN EUROPE

Khrushchev's indictment of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress heralded a crucial period of instability and transition for Communism. The destruction of the myth of Stalin's omniscient beneficence created a vacuum at the very core of international Communism. The toppling of the superhuman image that Stalin had projected within the Communist world called into question the validity of the monolithic system of Communist discipline and Soviet authority, which he had personified. The revelation of Stalin's human fallibility together with the identity between Stalin's person and the Soviet system naturally precipitated a reappraisal of the quality of that system and the legitimacy of its claim to pre-eminence and to doctrinal authority within the Communist movement. Thus, a crisis of conscience and of authority enveloped the Communist world. The dogma proclaimed by the Mecca of international Communism could no longer be considered sacrosanct.

The void that Khrushchev had created was aptly summarized in June, 1956, by Palmiro Togliatti, the Italian Communist leader:
The Soviet model cannot and must not any longer be obligatory . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . The whole system has become polycentric, and even in the Communist movement itself we cannot speak of a single guide but rather of a progress which is achieved by following paths which are often different.¹

Thus was born the term "polycentrism". Implicit in this term was the feeling that the non-Soviet Communist leaderships could, and should, contribute to the creative adaptation and application of Communist ideology.

In this general atmosphere of objective reappraisal, Eastern Europe could not but be affected. There, the manifestations of ideological ferment and popular unrest, which originated, though in muted fashion, after Stalin's death, gained momentum. Having repudiated Stalin while lacking Stalin's stature, Khrushchev now entered, in the context of bloc relations, a dangerous transitory phase between the elimination of the old edifice of Stalinism and the erection of the revamped system of Communist discipline which he envisaged. In the USSR, where Communism was established and could look back upon a history of nearly four decades, this phase did not constitute a potential threat to the regime. In Eastern Europe, however, Communism

¹ "9 Domande sullo Stalinismo", (Nuovi Argomenti, no. 20, June 16, 1956), in The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism, 138-139.
remained a relatively young phenomenon without deep indigenous roots and still in the throes of its most restrictive phase. Moreover, Eastern Europe's Communist rulers had known no alternative to Stalinism. Thus, Khrushchev's experimental designs for a replacement opened important cleavages which threatened to undermine these regimes.

Whereas de-Stalinization constituted the negative aspect of Khrushchev's preliminary blueprint for his system of bloc relations, his evident endorsement of Tito supplied the positive ingredient. The scrutiny of the weaknesses in the Soviet system also recalled the criticism of bureaucracy and chauvinism levelled at it by Tito when Titoism found its origins in the early 1950's. To Tito,

The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and Khrushchev's criticisms of Stalin's cult of personality preceded and followed by some measures of administrative and economic decentralization within the USSR, seemed a sign of victory for Titoism in Moscow itself.1

There seemed no barrier, then, to the application of Titoism to intra-bloc relations and to the internal features of Communism in the various Eastern European states, especially in the context of polycentrism which Togliatti was about to define. Thus, with his visit to the USSR in June and the reaffirmation of the Belgrade declaration,

Tito now saw himself as occupying a role of pivotal importance in the Communist world and intended to use it to influence the direction of the entire Communist movement along the Yugoslav path.\(^1\)

At the same time, Tito,

. . . saw the Kremlin divided between 'Stalinists' and 'anti-Stalinists', and it seemed to be his hope that by heralding the policies of Khrushchev and Bulganin as a return to 'true Leninism' he could bolster support for the 'anti-Stalinist' forces.\(^2\)

With the influence of Stalin and his true spiritual heirs on the wane in Moscow, Tito focused his attention on the Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe.

Essentially, Tito wanted to return to the fold, but on his own terms; he wanted to continue pursuing an international policy of neutrality outside the Warsaw Pact; he wanted complete internal autonomy; and, moreover, he wanted other Communist countries to 'study' Yugoslav experience. Tito was thus both a Communist neutral and a Communist evangelist.\(^3\)

In the wake of Tito's tour of the Soviet Union, however, the evangelist was predominant. As if to underline the new measure of influence he felt he had secured in the course of his Soviet journey, Tito punctuated his return to Belgrade with a stopover in Bucharest for discussions with the Rumanian leaders.

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2. Ibid., 267.
Though the internal and external liberalization measures undertaken by the Soviet leadership after Stalin's death and the increasing intensity of the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement seemed to presage the emergence of an altered Soviet bloc offering a higher degree of autonomy to Eastern Europe's Communist leaderships, these regimes could not but feel an uneasy sense of apprehension. Their power had been established within the general context of Stalinism and shored up by an intense series of anti-Titoist purges which had uprooted any vestiges of a desire for national autonomy, such as Titoism engendered, within the ruling Communist elites. This anti-Titoist campaign now stood denounced. The whole pattern of the establishment of Communism in Eastern Europe was thus opened to criticism and at a time when the initial dislocations of socialist construction still met popular discontent and resistance since acceptance of Communism had not yet been inculcated in the masses. In addition, the mechanical imitation of Stalinist dogma practiced by the Eastern European regimes made them ill-experienced in autonomous action. Moreover, espousal of such autonomy would contradict the logic of the elimination of the proponents of autonomy which they themselves had carried out.

The apprehension felt by Eastern Europe's Communists not only reflected a concern for the survival of Communism
as a system, however, but also the threat which the new Soviet attitude implied for their personal power. The Communist leaders were identified with Stalinism and anti-Titoism, which were two sides of the same coin. Therefore, a rejection of these practices meant a rejection of themselves. And, of course, they lacked the flexibility required in the new order. If a new beginning was to be made, the immediate past had to be exorcized. But that past was their past, thus their personal positions were jeopardized.

In the early stages of the Moscow-Belgrade flirtation, the Stalinist regimes of Eastern Europe had been able and content to temporize. Following the Belgrade Declaration, these regimes had moved cautiously to normalize their diplomatic and economic relations with Yugoslavia, which had remained in suspense since the Cominform condemnation of Tito. They did not go so far as to disassociate themselves from the subsequent and virulent anti-Titoist campaigns they had conducted however. They restricted their efforts, at most, to half-hearted gestures designed to assign responsibility for their break with Yugoslavia to nondescript proxies much as Khrushchev had done with Beria and Abakumov. For the moment, they could look upon Khrushchev's advances toward Tito as a temporary,

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1. In short, "Stalin's break with Belgrade had resulted in purge, terror, and oppression throughout the Soviet bloc; its reversal was a necessary part of any effective de-Stalinization programme." William E. Griffith, "Eastern Europe and World Communism", in Stephen Fischer-Galati, (ed.), Eastern Europe in the Sixties (New York: 1963), 196.
tactical aberration of Soviet policy or hope for a resurgence of Stalinist influence within the Soviet leadership. They were, no doubt, encouraged by Malenkov's ouster which had removed an exponent of liberalization from his position of influence and which was shortly succeeded by Nagy's displacement as Hungarian Premier and the reassertion of the authority of the Stalinist Rakosi.

Khrushchev's uncompromising foray against the "cult of personality" and its purveyor, Stalin, at the Twentieth Congress, however, was a bitter blow. Implicitly, a verdict of guilt was pronounced upon the micro-Stalins of Eastern Europe. Now, the re-orientation of Soviet policy, the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement and the pressures for change that Tito had been applying since the Belgrade Declaration had to be taken seriously. Stalinism had to be reformed.

Late in March, posthumous rehabilitation was extended to Laszlo Rajk who had been the principal victim of Hungary's anti-Titoist purges in 1949. In April, seeking methods to eradicate manifestations of the "cult of the individual", the Bulgarian Communist Party's Central Committee rehabilitated Traicho Kostov, Bulgaria's leading Titoist, who had been hanged in 1949. And, amid general criticism of his Stalinist traits, Bulgaria's quasi-Stalin, Vuklo Chervenkov, resigned the Premiership. In May, partial rehabilitation was granted to Czechoslovakia's prime "Titoists", Rudolf Slansky and
Vladimir Clementis - as with the others, posthumously. In Poland, the release from imprisonment of Władysław Gomułka at the end of 1954 was publicly announced. These recantations and the concomittant promises to restrict the powers and role of the police found their parallels in the other Communist states. Though they had been motivated by Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin, these conciliatory gestures represented at least an indirect concession towards Tito, who welcomed them and whose frequent barbs had in part been responsible for their promulgation.

Essentially, the posthumous pardon of proto-Titoists was a symbolic and negative approach to de-Stalinization and reconstruction of the Communist bloc along more popular and, hence, stable lines. Changes in personnel were insufficient; changes in policy must follow. Rejection of the arbitrariness characteristic of police-state tactics with their ultimate reliance upon terror merely removed some malignant tissue from the exterior of the Stalinist model of Communist rule; a more fundamental operation was required. After the acclaim of his Soviet tour, Tito felt that the application of Titoist principles of national autonomy and internal liberalization, if not Titoist forms, could contribute the positive element to the popularization and stabilization of Communism in Eastern Europe. And this view apparently elicited at least tacit Soviet approval.
Consequently, Tito's pronouncements after his return from Moscow began to assume a more confident and authoritative air. He continued to press for further reforms.

This was coupled with an increasingly vigorous condemnation of those East European Communist leaders who were proving themselves unable to adjust to the post-Stalinist situation, with the operative criterion being their willingness to repudiate their past anti-Titoist activities. The Yugoslavs insisted on this with a firmness which, combined with the apparent willingness of Khrushchev to appease Belgrade, must have been discomforting to the other Communist regimes.\(^1\)

And, indeed, soon the first spate of posthumous rehabilitations was followed by more decisive shifts in current personnel. On July 18, under apparent Soviet pressure, Rakosi resigned as First Secretary of the Hungarian Party and, on August 4, the reinstatement of Gomulka in the Polish Party was announced.

In the initial phases of the rehabilitation cycle in Eastern Europe, the Communist parties involved, cognizant of the implicit threat to their authority and particularly to that of the ruling elite, attempted to maintain a tenuous balance. The admission of past errors due to the "cult of the individual" was counterposed by affirmation of the necessity of loyalty to the party's authority and the essential correctness of party policy. Nevertheless, the succession of rehabilitations was bound to resurrect old animosities within the various parties. As Belgrade properly

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pointed out, "in rehabilitated persons Stalinism has perhaps the most outspoken opponents . . .". This only served to heighten the general disaffection loosed in Eastern Europe as the aftermath of the Soviet Twentieth Congress. The reality of the insecurity that the Communist regimes felt in the face of rising popular and intellectual discontent and the urgency of Khrushchev's need to consolidate his revised system of Communist discipline within the bloc were underscored by the bloody riots which broke out in Poznan, Poland, at the end of June.

Yugoslav reaction to the Poznan riots appeared cautiously ambiguous. The underlying cause of dissatisfaction was seen as popular desire for internal "democratization".

Thus,

... the true meaning of the Poznan disorders must be sought in the attempt of reactionary forces to compromise the process of domestic development in Poland which, after long years of Stalinist deformation is now following the path of democratization and concern for the people's every day needs.

This reference to "reactionary forces" and, in the same article, to indications that the setting of the Poznan disturbances, allowing, as it did, international publicity,


3. Ibid., 140.

4. At the time of the Poznan disorders, an international fair was in progress in Poznan and Dag Hammarskjold was visiting Poland.
suggested to the Yugoslavs, that "antisocial forces" had taken advantage of spontaneous events. This seemed to imply that Western reaction had exacerbated the Poznan circumstances. At the same time, the general interpretation proffered and the allusion to "Stalinist deformation" implied that the "reactionary forces" might very well be domestic Stalinist elements. And, this first Yugoslav commentary on Poznan, concluded:

Really nothing would be less justified than an eventual attempt to proclaim the very democratization of social development as the culprit for the unfortunate events in Poznan, because in this way one would brand as the murderer that factor which alone has the possibility of playing the role of physician.

The second Yugoslav commentary on Poznan contained themes similar to the first:

The working people of Poland are resolutely supporting the process of democratization because this process serves their vital interests. However, we find as enemies of this positive aspiration all those who must, of necessity, suffer defeat as a result of its further penetration. The fact that this or that group of enemies is more tenacious and ruthless - this does not change at all their joint counter-revolutionary and anti-democratic position.

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2. Ibid., 140.
4. Ibid., 141.
This article concluded by lauding the Polish leadership for its handling of the Poznan events and their undertaking to continue "the process of democratization" because,

On the one hand, this attitude reflects the firm conviction that Poland has no other way if she wants to develop as a democratic and socialist country. On the other hand, it confirms the determination to have done with the past and with everything that has made that past harmful to Poland and her people."

From Yugoslav reaction to the Poznan riots, two observations on Yugoslavia's attitude to the circumstances prevailing in the Communist bloc seem valid. The Yugoslavs paid lip-service to the possibility of Western provocation in Poznan as a gesture towards Soviet concern for the external image of the Communist bloc. Simultaneously, however, the Yugoslavs implicitly attributed a major portion of culpability to Stalinist elements and revealed their intention "to have done with the past", i.e., to complete de-Stalinization, and to press for further democratization along Titoist lines.

The authoritative air of Tito's persistent evangelism together with the growing unrest and uncertainty in Eastern Europe, however, began to threaten the unity and cohesion of the bloc which Khrushchev was intent upon. With the specific impetus of Poznan, Khrushchev perceived the need for a period of quiessence in Eastern Europe during which to regroup the Communist regimes for the next phase in his grand design for

a revitalized but stable and unified bloc. "Khrushchev's task now was to define the limits of the anti-Stalinist aftermath (of the Twentieth Congress) and posit some common foundations for unity."¹

To this end, Soviet spokesmen began to, "... minimize the importance of many ways to socialism and to stress instead the special peculiarities of a common core, worked out through Soviet experience."² Thus, in July and August,

... there was a notable discrepancy between Yugoslavia's attempt to generalize the concept of independence so as to include all bloc parties and the Soviet attempt to limit the concept to the Soviet-Yugoslav relationship.³

Tito's constant pressure for internal reform in Eastern Europe, especially in the strained atmosphere then prevailing, contained the seeds of overt outbursts against the Communist regimes there after the Poznan example. This possibility, and Tito's posture as a source of genuine ideological and practical guidance, combined to produce a potential threat to the already reduced Soviet control within the area. However:

The Soviets, conscious of their power position yet wishing to place their leadership on a more reliable basis, were not primarily interested in a division of power, but in a voluntary acceptance of their primacy. To Moscow a common core and a center was a requirement dictated by the instability of the East European regimes and by the hostility of the non-Communist world.⁴

¹ Brzezinski, op. cit., 203.
² Ibid., 204.
³ Zagoria, op. cit., 51.
⁴ Brzezinski, op. cit., 206.
Thus, Tito's influence had now to be restricted, and his aid enlisted in executing a temporary retreat in the interests of re-assessing bloc strategy and mitigating the dislocations that de-Stalinization had promoted in Eastern Europe.

Early in September a secret Soviet letter was circulated among the bloc parties which stressed the necessity for continuing Soviet primacy and, at the same time, warned against imitations of Titoism which, it implied, was not wholly Marxist-Leninist in its outlook.¹ On September 19, Khrushchev arrived unexpectedly at Tito's retreat at Brioni for a private tête-à-tête. These extraordinary consultations were continued at Yalta between September 27 and October 5.

The Soviet-Yugoslav discussions, naturally, centred about the further course of policy in Eastern Europe. Opinion was divided. Tito held out for further reform and continued liberalization. The Stalinist element in the Soviet leadership pressed for retrenchment and a return to hard-line measures lest serious disruptions occur within the bloc. Khrushchev sought a compromise. As the architect of de-Stalinization and the new design for the Communist camp he could not accept without reservation a reversion to Stalinism. Nor, on the other hand, could he risk the dissolution of the bloc or the abdication of Soviet primacy which unfettered Titoism might entail.

¹. The exact content of this letter has never been made public but Borba confirmed its existence on October 12, 1956.
Khrushchev thus urged Tito to render support to Hungary's Communist leadership, whose temper was personified by Erno Gero, who had replaced Rakosi as First Secretary in July, and who was present at Yalta. To Tito, Gero "differed in no way from Rakosi"\(^1\) as an advocate of Stalinist practices. Tito, however, apparently recognized the importance of the choice he faced. If he refused, Stalinism might experience a resurgence, in which case, his influence in the bloc, which rested upon Khrushchev's sympathies, would be at an end. At the same time, Gero personally promised that reform would go forth at a reduced tempo and that there would be no resurrection of Stalinism.\(^2\) It is likely that Tito requested Nagy's reinstatement in the Hungarian party but, at any rate, he ultimately agreed to support Gero and to receive a Hungarian delegation in Belgrade.\(^3\) Despite his hesitations towards Gero, Tito probably looked upon the compromise as a temporary expedient which, though it retarded his plans, was preferable to the reversal of the recent trends in the bloc. He "hoped that by not isolating the Hungarian Party [he] could more easily influence that country's proper internal development."\(^4\)

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1. Address by Tito at Pula, November 11, 1956, (Borba, November 16), 1956, in Zinner, op. cit., 524.
2. Ibid., 524-5.
3. Ibid., 525.
4. Ibid., 525.
Khrushchev, of course, saw the Yalta results as a major step in his campaign to regroup the Communist leaderships. Tito's concurrence, in itself a success for Khrushchev's grand design for the bloc, would facilitate this regroupment.

The various parties had hardly returned from Yalta, however, when events began to occur which foreshadowed more momentous happenings. On October 6, the grotesque reburial of Rajk was staged in Budapest. Conceived as a salve for discontent, it served only to heighten popular unrest. On October 13, Nagy was reinstated by the Hungarian Central Committee. A week later Gomulka was returned to power in Poland with grudging Soviet approval and proceeded to erase the most obvious symbols of Soviet control and to promise a thorough re-examination of domestic policy. This was greeted in Belgrade with effusive praise for its wisdom in relation to Poland and for its contribution to the advance of socialism in general.

Even while Gomulka was launching the Polish upheaval, the previously arranged visit of Gero and his entourage to Yugoslavia was in progress. The final communiqué set forth

1. Thus, "... by September 1956, Soviet redefinitions could no longer contain the developments nurtured by the dissipation of Stalinism and crystallized by the reconciliation with Belgrade. The thaw was turning into a deluge." Brzezinski, op. cit., 206.


3. The full text, from which excerpts are drawn, is in Zinner, op. cit., 399-402.
the mutual determination of both Hungary and Yugoslavia to undertake a comprehensive improvement in state and party relations. The communiqué was notably explicit in stating that party relations should include the exchange "of constructive and comradely criticism based on positions of principle and taking into consideration the interests of socialist development" in order to "make impossible a repetition of past mistakes which caused serious harm to the workers' movement". The broad contacts between the Hungarian and Yugoslav parties envisaged by the statement made clear Tito's hopes of influencing Hungary's internal evolution in accordance with his own tenets. The communiqué therefore gave due, though implicit, recognition to the relevance of Titoism for the Communist states:

... the exchange of the rich experiences of socialist development and their adoption without any imposition, freely, and in a completely voluntary manner offers valuable aid to the cause of socialism in the individual countries.

With this communiqué, Tito conferred his approval upon the Gero regime as his contribution to Khrushchev's temporary policy of dénouement in Eastern Europe. It is evident from the statement's tone, however, that Tito intended no more than a momentary pause in the reconstruction of the Communist bloc. By this juncture, however, the possibility of the projected pause was illusory. Both Tito and Khrushchev had underestimated the momentum the forces
of change in Eastern Europe had attained in the preceding months. Gero had hardly returned to Hungary before the revolution began.¹

The initial stages of the Hungarian revolt seemed to imply that the Gero compromise and the transitional phase of Communist policy which it symbolized were to be drastically telescoped. Despite the early appeal by the Hungarian regime for Soviet aid in restoring order, Soviet reaction was hesitant. Nagy was restored to the Premiership and proclaimed a platform of internal reform and external adjustment of relations with the Soviet Union. Tito, though he could not but have mixed feelings about the uncertain course of events in Hungary, sent a message to the Hungarian Party on October 28 which expressed sympathy for the Hungarians' desire for change and their distaste for the past.² He welcomed the formation of the Nagy government but appealed for an end to violence, warning of the danger of "unforeseen consequences". For the Soviets, their transitional plans for Hungary had obviously gone awry. Gero was removed; and Soviet efforts shifted to containing the Hungarian upheaval and promoting a solution after the Gomulka pattern in Poland.³ Consequently, the

¹ Discussions of the Polish and Hungarian upheavals and their influence upon Soviet-Yugoslav relations may be found in Brzezinski, op. cit., especially chapters 10 and 11, and Lowenthal, World Communism, chapter 4. Major documents are in Zinner, op. cit..

² The complete letter appears in Zinner, op. cit., 446-8.

³ This pattern coupled domestic autonomy and internal reform with continued Communist rule and fidelity to Soviet ideological leadership and foreign policy.
withdrawal of Soviet troops began on October 29 and the following day Moscow issued the well-known October 30 declaration regarding the principles governing intra-bloc relations.¹ The revision of these relations this document seemed to engender hinted at a virtually complete victory for Titoist precepts. The concessions, unfortunately, came too late. The victory became pyrrhic.

In the first days of November, the internal momentum of the Hungarian insurrection carried it to the bitter heights of irreconcilable revolt. Outdistanced by events, Nagy was impelled to actions incompatible with continued Communist control in Hungary and, ultimately, with Soviet hegemony even in its projected, mild Khrushchevian form.² On November 4, full-scale Soviet military intervention crushed the Hungarian insurgency and Nagy sought asylum — symbolically enough — in the Yugoslav embassy.

The disaster in Budapest created immense difficulties for both Khrushchev and Tito. The transition from de-Stalinization to reconstruction of the Communist bloc was

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thrust into chaos. Balance had to be restored.

Tito's reaction to the Hungarian events was contained in a speech delivered at Pula on November 11. This address was preceded, on November 9, by an article in Pravda authored by Enver Hoxha, the Albanian Communist—a micro-Stalin whom Tito had persistently attacked. Hoxha praised the Soviet Union and impugned those who criticized the USSR or questioned Soviet doctrinal authority. The implicit butt of Hoxha's remarks was certainly Tito.

In his remarks at Pula, Tito conducted a complete tour d'horizon of Soviet-Yugoslav relations during 1956. He reiterated all the major themes that had shaped his policy in the preceding months. He rejected Stalinism and its advocates, past and present, including "such a would-be Marxist as Enver Hoxha, who only knows how to utter 'Marxism-Leninism' and not one word more." He approved the Soviet Twentieth Congress but pronounced the Soviets wrong in blaming the errors of Stalinism only upon the cult of personality rather than upon the system which spawned it. He confirmed his belief in the exportability of Titoism by indicating that, in his view, the Belgrade and Moscow declarations "should in fact be significant not only in [Soviet-Yugoslav] relations

1. The full text of the speech, from which all excerpts are drawn, is available in Zinner, op. cit., 516-41. Major excerpts are in Bass and Marbury, (eds.), The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy 1948-58, 68-74.

2. See Zinner, op. cit., 509-16.
but also in relations among all socialist countries". Depicting the split he perceived in the Soviet leadership between the Stalinist and anti-Stalinist elements, Tito explained that he had anticipated the eventual outcome of this division in favour of those "who stand for stronger and more rapid development in the direction of democratization, abandonment of all Stalinist methods, the creation of new relations among socialist states, and the development of foreign policy in this same direction as well". Tito thus revealed the logic of his intense concentration on bloc relations during the preceding months. He believed Khrushchev's design for the bloc coincided with his own concepts. Moreover, he expected Khrushchev to consolidate his power in the Soviet hierarchy. By aiding Khrushchev, Tito expected to refashion the Communist bloc in a more satisfactory and effective mould and increase his own status and influence in the future formulation of international Communist doctrine and policy.

Turning to the Hungarian situation, Tito pointed out the bankruptcy of the policies of Rakosi and Gero. Tito claimed to have warned the Soviets early that these "could only bring about grave consequences". He had deferred to the Soviets, however, to avoid "conflict with the Soviet Comrades". And he explained the rationale of his short-lived support for the Gero regime previously cited.
With respect to the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian insurgency, Tito deplored the principle of foreign intervention in general. The first Soviet intervention, he said, "was absolutely wrong". However, Tito gave credence to the view that, in the latter stages of the Hungarian revolt, it had been exploited by counter-revolutionary forces. Further, he denounced Nagy's twelfth hour actions which threatened the collapse of Communist rule in Hungary. To Tito, the Hungarian situation had then presented distasteful alternatives: "There could be either chaos, civil war, counterrevolution, and a new world war, or the intervention of Soviet troops which were there." But, ultimately, "... if it meant saving socialism in Hungary, then, comrades, we can say, although we are against interference, Soviet intervention was necessary." This justification, however, was qualified: "But had they done everything that should have been done earlier, there would not have been any need for military intervention."

Tito's verdict upon the immediate outcome of the Hungarian affairs was negative: "It is our tragedy — the tragedy of all of us — that socialism has been dealt such a terrible blow. It has been compromised." In a spirit of modesty, Tito observed that he "would not like us now to beat our chests and to take pleasure in all this and say, 'We told you so!'", but, from a number of remarks in his speech, it was quite clear that he believed he had.
Tito did profess to see positive aspects that could germinate from the scorched earth of the Hungarian episode. He felt that the Hungarian tragedy would be the last one required "to jolt the Soviet comrades" and "leaders in other countries" into the realization that Stalinism was a sterile posture and that a total re-orientation of Communist internal and intra-bloc policy was of the highest priority. Some rebuilding, of course, was required and Tito called for support for Gomulka and Janos Kadar's revamped Hungarian regime. This was not intended only as a dressing for the Communist bloc's wounds however; but also as a foundation for a new campaign of reform in the bloc. Tito saw himself and Khrushchev as the co-founders of a reinvigorating Communist reformation. Even in the Hungarian aftermath, he hoped to salvage the partnership and the movement, but he could not sacrifice his own prominence:

Now the question is, will this course be victorious or will the Stalinist course again prevail. Yugoslavia must not withdraw into her own shell, she must work in every direction . . . in the ideological field, through contacts and talks, and thus to insure the victory of the new spirit.

Soviet reaction to Tito's Pula address was ambivalent. It appeared in Pravda on November 23.¹ The Soviet party

¹. See Zinner, op. cit., 541-62. Extracts are in Bass and Marbury, op. cit., 75-84.
organ welcomed Tito's reference to counter-revolutionary tendencies in the Hungarian uprising and his critique of Nagy's actions and the Anglo-French invasion of Suez, which coincided with the Hungarian upheaval. All these positions jibed with the Soviet line; but the Soviets were not absolutely satisfied. They scored Tito for his compromising attitude towards Soviet intervention and for his implication that Hungarian discontent was both widespread and justified even among loyal socialists. They also rejected his attribution of major faults to the Soviet system rather than to the cult of personality, which, they claimed, was external to that system. Tito was also chastised for his thrusts at Hoxha and other Communists who adhered without deviation to the Soviet version of the Hungarian incidents. Finally, though Yugoslavia's right to its own brand of socialism was still conceded, Pravda cast doubts upon the quality of the brand and especially upon Tito's rather self-righteous tendency to prosyletize about ideological and practical issues. In this vein, Pravda could not resist exposing some of Yugoslavia's economic ills and harking back to an early period to remind the Yugoslavs sarcastically about the aid they were receiving from the capitalistic West.

This Pravda article indicates the various contradictory pressures influencing Soviet policy which the Hungarian debacle exposed. Khrushchev sought liberalization within
the bloc, but not at the expense of its fundamental unity under Soviet control. To him, Tito's co-operation would strengthen both trends; yet Tito's persistent guardianship of his own independence and his zealous campaigning for democratization had, without doubt, tended to intensify the undercurrents which ignited the Hungarian explosion. In the wake of the Budapest rising, consolidation of the bloc's shaken unity and minimization of the damage done to the USSR's global image took precedence over liberalization. Hence, Khrushchev felt the need to chastise Tito and to rally all possible support, even from Stalinist sources, for the Soviet position. Both Khrushchev and Tito had particular motives to maintain whatever degree of accommodation could be preserved after the shock administered by Hungary. Tito had yielded some ground at Pula; thus, the Pravda critique was relatively restrained and limited to those features of Tito's remarks which failed to meet the minimal Soviet priorities.

The Hungarian revolt marked the climax of the crisis of de-Stalinization which engulfed the Soviet bloc in 1956. The origins of this climax sprang out of the proceedings of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. This Congress, and the elemental definition of the concept of polycentrism which followed, also removed significant obstacles in the path of
the fledgling rapprochement being nurtured by Khrushchev and Tito. This rapprochement was, to a considerable extent, crystallized by Tito's visit to the USSR in June 1956. The deference paid Tito during the course of this visit was construed by Khrushchev as a step towards reorientation of the Communist bloc along more popular, stable and dynamic lines. This objective appealed to Tito and, at the same time, Khrushchev's apparent candor in his approach to Tito augmented the latter's confidence in his ability to play an influential role in the anticipated reorganization of the bloc.

Consequently,

For a short period, prior to the Hungarian and Polish events of 1956, the role of Tito greatly expanded, as he sought to push Khrushchev further along the road of de-Stalinization, especially in the European satellites such as Hungary, and to persuade him to accept the Soviet-Yugoslav relationship of parity as the model for the entire bloc.  

The ardor with which Tito took to his role, however, and the insecurity generated in Eastern Europe by de-Stalinization and the rehabilitation of purged "Titoists" impelled Khrushchev to attempt to establish a less precipitous pace, or controlled transition, towards his grand design for the new Soviet bloc. This was the meaning of the Gero compromise worked out by Tito and Khrushchev at Yalta in

September. Unfortunately for both, the pace of events in Eastern Europe could not be stayed. The proportions and complexities of the pressures loosed in Eastern Europe during the summer placed them largely beyond the control of either Khrushchev or Tito.

The violence in Budapest created dilemmas in both Moscow and Belgrade. Initially, Tito favoured the Nagy regime and its program\textsuperscript{1} since his espousal of Gero had never amounted to more than a temporary expedient dictated by Soviet apprehension. With Nagy's failure to gain control of the situation, however, Tito felt himself threatened by a potential East-West confrontation on his border, by the possible contagiousness of the anti-Communism of the Hungarian populace and, ultimately, by the precedent created by the final, decisive Soviet intervention. Khrushchev saw, in Hungary, the prospect of the decimation of bloc unity, even in the form he envisaged, and coincidentally, Soviet primacy in Eastern Europe. When it became clear that the Gomulka pattern of domestic autonomy combined with ideological solidarity with, and subordination to, the Soviet Union was inapplicable to Hungary, it became necessary to sacrifice

\textsuperscript{1} Richard Lowenthal feels that Tito was interested in promoting joint Yugoslav-Hungaro-Austrian co-operation based on an international policy of non-alignment. He suggests that, following the Austrian State Treaty of May 1955 which guaranteed Austria's neutrality, Nagy developed a similar notion which he had conveyed to Tito. See Lowenthal, \textit{World Communism}, 76 ff.
Nagy, the symbol of Hungarian autonomy, to the higher interests of Soviet primacy even though this required a momentary relapse to extreme Stalinism. Hence, the Soviet intervention.

Disturbed by the serious dangers inherent in the Hungarian crisis, Tito's reactions during its course apparently evolved spontaneously under the pressures of the moment. On October 28, Yugoslavia voted against a proposal to place the Hungarian issue on the Security Council agenda at the United Nations. At the same time, Tito issued his appeal for an end to the violence in Hungary which threatened the entire policy which he had so assiduously pursued during the preceding months. He may have briefly considered intervening directly in Hungary on his own but, because of the innumerable risks involved, this could never have been a really serious possibility. At any rate, on November 4, the fate of the Hungarian revolt was sealed by Soviet troops.

The violent nature of the Hungarian revolt and its final fate dealt a critical blow to Tito's plans for a reconstructed Communist bloc. Whether or not Tito approved the final Soviet intervention in advance, Yugoslavia's United

1. See Lowenthal, op. cit., 83.

2. Evidence that Tito had given some form of advance approval is presented by Lowenthal, ibid., 83-4. Beyond Lowenthal's indication, no conclusive proof of this point is available.
Nations' delegation abstained twice on November 4 on resolutions calling for Soviet withdrawal. And, as discussed previously, Tito gave a qualified though deflected endorsement to the Soviet action in Hungary in his Pula speech. Also, on November 22, Nagy, whose actions in the final stages of the revolt Tito had disowned, left his asylum in the Yugoslav embassy. Despite a promise of safe conduct from the Kadar regime, Nagy was arrested and spirited to Rumania. This the Yugoslavs protested vigorously but the matter never became a major issue.

By his actions at the United Nations, and the various themes in his Pula address cited previously, Tito succeeded, in large part, in assuaging the irritation he caused to the Soviets, which was all the greater because of the Soviet concern to minimize the unfavourable international publicity to which the Hungarian episode exposed them. Tito thus managed to contain the inevitable Soviet criticism. Moreover, Khrushchev, too, wished to confine this criticism to the minimal extent consistent with the broader perspectives of his policy in order to preserve insofar as possible the basis for the new bloc policy he still believed could be successfully implemented.

By conciliating Khrushchev and professing support for Gomulka and Kadar, Tito undertook to maximize the residue of the expanded influence he had enjoyed in the Soviet bloc prior
to the Hungarian catastrophe. Soviet intervention, though, had now sharply defined the unalterable features of intra-bloc relations, irrespective of certain less significant national deviations. These invariables were continued Communist rule and ultimate fidelity to the Soviet priorities which the Soviet leadership designated as non-negotiable. Though Tito tried to maintain his image as a leading force for liberalization in the bloc, this image had been doubly tarnished. The fact that he had encouraged the pressures which precipitated the Hungarian explosion compromised his status as a trustworthy confidante of Khrushchev's; on the other hand, the fact that, in the last analysis, he had opted to endorse Soviet resort to brute force reminiscent of unrepentant Stalinism effectively circumscribed his ability to champion change in the bloc independently of Khrushchev. Nevertheless, both Tito and Khrushchev determined to persevere in the re-orientation of the Communist bloc. The upheavals in Eastern Europe had called a drastic halt. Consolidation and cautious rebuilding were now expedient.
CHAPTER III

KHRUSHCHEV'S RESTORATION OF DISCIPLINE IN
EASTERN EUROPE AND TITO'S DISSENT

The initial disturbances in the Hungarian revolt on October 23 and 24 heralded the beginning of the end of the controlled transition to the new system of Soviet intra-bloc relations which Khrushchev had attempted to effect in September. The compromise solutions involved in this attempt at a strategic retreat in Khrushchev's campaign for de-Stalinization and re-orientation of the Communist bloc were dictated by the interests of stability in Eastern Europe; but the premises upon which the plan was based proved overly optimistic. At the end of October, however, this was not yet clear. Thus, impelled by the Hungarian events, the Soviets tried one final, rather desperate manoeuvre: the publication of the October 30 declaration on relations between socialist states.¹

This document stated:

United by the common ideals of building a socialist society and by the principles of proletarian internationalism, the countries of the great commonwealth of socialist nations can build their mutual relations only on the principles of complete equality, of respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty, and of non-interference in one another's internal affairs.

¹ The full text is in Zinner, National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe, 485-9.
In this statement, the fundamental principles of Khrushchev's grand design for the post-Stalin Soviet bloc are compactly integrated. The bloc's unity was to be ensured by ideological community and "proletarian internationalism", which was synonymous with Soviet doctrinal and political primacy. These cohesive elements would counterbalance the limited diversity and liberalization within the bloc promised by the specific principles enumerated and implicit in the characterization of the bloc as a "commonwealth of socialist nations", a designation introduced by the Soviets as early as 1955.¹ Despite the revision of intra-bloc relations offered in the balance of the October 30 declaration however, in the temper of the moment in which it was promulgated, it could not serve its intended preventative function and, consequently, provided only a hopeful, but ultimately frustrated, prelude to the final paroxysm of the Hungarian revolt.

Throughout the interim between the Soviet Twentieth Congress and the final Soviet intervention in Hungary, the Soviet leadership had been concerned, to a greater or lesser extent, to establish distinct proportions to the legitimate diversity authorized by the concept of "different roads to

¹ See Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, 179.
socialism". This effort had been a failure; yet the resultant eruption in Hungary which symbolized the failure of the Soviet attempt to contain disintegrative development in Eastern Europe also, paradoxically, marked, in a sense, the successful culmination of the effort, though in a violent and undesired form. Soviet suppression of the Hungarian rebellion demonstrated unambiguously the existence of limits to intra-bloc diversity. The nature of these limits remained what had always been implicit, at least, in Soviet pronouncements, including the October 30 declaration. The essential qualities were the continuance of Communist rule and the maintenance of Soviet control. These fundamental themes were reiterated on the November 6 anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution by the leading Soviet ideologue Mikhail Suslov.¹

This Soviet statement, however, was largely obscured by the welter of reactions and criticisms focused upon the course of the Hungarian disaster, particularly, with respect to Soviet-Yugoslav relations, by those surrounding Tito's speech at Pula and the subsequent Soviet rejoinder discussed previously.

This exchange was succeeded, on the Yugoslav side, by an ideological exposition of the meaning of the Hungarian uprising in a speech delivered by Eduard Kardelj on December 6.²

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¹. See Neal and Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, 442, and Brzezinski, op. cit., 273.
In his analysis, Kardelj attributed Hungarian dissatisfaction to the old bogey of bureaucratic degeneration of the socialist system which had produced a reactionary brake upon socialist progress by counterposing the Hungarian regime to the legitimate interests of the working classes. This antithesis, according to Kardelj, could be overcome only by democratization, which would allow the working class to exert an influence upon socialist development. Regardless of the influence of counter-revolutionary elements upon the Hungarian revolutionaries, claimed Kardelj, the original grievances which spawned the disturbances were valid and rooted in distortions of the socialist system. Thus, a critical reappraisal of the system and genuine reforms were necessary. Only if this were done successfully could the Soviet intervention be justified:

What is at issue is the need for radical changes in the political system, and not a change of people and the correcting of individual errors. Only when this is achieved will it be possible to reduce the negative consequences to socialism of Soviet intervention.

Kardelj's analysis reasserted the principle themes of Tito's Pula speech in ideological terms. The criticism of the shortcomings of the Hungarian regime under Rakosi and Gero obviously reflected a critical attitude towards the Soviet model. In addition, Kardelj refused to convey unequivocal Yugoslav approval for Soviet intervention. Such approval was held in abeyance, conditional upon further
positive reforms in the socialist systems of Eastern Europe.
Moreover, Kardelj's remarks continued to exhibit Yugoslavia's confidence in the soundness and applicability of Yugoslavia's socialist experience to the problem of eliminating those negative features in Eastern Europe which had provoked the Hungarian "tragedy". Kardelj also aptly summarized the position in which the ambidexterity which Tito had attempted in his Pula speech had placed the Yugoslavs:

[Our attitude] is now under fire from two sides. In the name of proletarian internationalism, some reproach us for not supporting Soviet intervention without reserve. Others, on the basis of noninterference in internal affairs and democracy, reproach us for failing to oppose this intervention categorically.

The Kardelj speech made it abundantly clear that Tito and his conferees remained convinced reformers unwilling to desist or to defer to Soviet sensitivities, which were then concentrated upon the necessity to justify their Hungarian actions and to reassemble the damaged unity of the bloc. It was apparently with a view to this same objective that the Chinese issued an official statement on intra-bloc relations on December 29. ¹

Seeking to explain the strife which had been manifest within the bloc, the Chinese advanced, in true dialectical, Marxist-Leninist fashion, the theory of essential and

¹. This statement is discussed by Brzezinski, op. cit., 277-9.
non-essential contradictions. The former were said to prevail between the socialist and capitalist worlds, while the latter were such as might occur within, or between, socialist states. These non-essential, or non-antagonistic, contradictions were not, in the Chinese view, fundamental and derived only from wrong attitudes towards particular questions of Communist ideology or policy or from partial clashes of interest. Having thus doctrinally minimized the significance of disunifying disagreements within the Communist bloc, the Chinese focused upon more practical political issues. They rejected the proposition that the distortions of Stalinism were inherent in the Soviet system, a formulation incompatible with Yugoslav postulations. Specifically addressing themselves to Tito's Pula observations on Hungary, the Chinese statement asserted:

It is understandable that the Yugoslav comrades bear a particular resentment against Stalin's mistakes. In the past, they made worthy efforts to stick to socialism under difficult conditions. We also agree with some of the points in comrade Tito's speech, but we are amazed that, in his speech, he attacked almost all the socialist countries and many of the Communist parties ... This can only lead to a split in the Communist movement ... Clearly the Yugoslav comrades are going too far. Even if some part of their criticism of brother parties is reasonable, the basic stand and method they adopt infringe the principles of comradely discussion ... 1

The intent of this Chinese commentary seems to have been to encourage limited diversity within the Communist bloc, including Tito's position, while, at the same time, bowing to the imperatives of bloc unity and the need to rally to the support of the Soviet interpretation of the Hungarian situation.

On the same day as this Chinese statement appeared, a joint Polish-Yugoslav communiqué published in Belgrade declared that, "... under the present conditions bilateral inter-party relations constitute the most correct form of co-operation between the Communist and Workers' parties."¹ The motive for this assertion obviously lay in Gomulka's desire to consolidate the recently achieved modicum of autonomy he had secured from the USSR and in Tito's interest in sustaining Gomulka as a potential ally in promoting further "democratization" of the Communist bloc. The reference to inter-party relations paid heed to Khrushchev's repeated stress upon the cohesive qualities of fidelity to Marxist-Leninist ideology; but, at the same time, the emphasis upon bilateral contacts indicated the preponderant interest of both Gomulka and Tito in maintaining their own respective minimal areas of independent action² and their mutual

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2. Zagoria states, "... a Warsaw-Belgrade axis was being built up on the basis of a common desire to resist undue Soviet interference in their internal affairs." Ibid., 52.
determination to resist the recreation of any multi-
lateral party organization which might restrict that area
by providing a vehicle for the renewed imposition of strict
Communist discipline under Soviet authority.¹

The Chinese statement of December 29 was rapidly
succeeded by the dispatch of Chou En-lai, who interrupted
an important tour of southern Asia, on a mission to Eastern
Europe and Moscow. Prior to analysis of the purposes of
this junket, some examination of the evolution of Chinese
policy towards Eastern Europe, and Yugoslavia, is necessary.

During the post-1948 period of frigidity between
Belgrade and Moscow, China fully supported the Stalinist
denunciation and ostracism of Yugoslavia. After Stalin's
death, Peking gradually moved to adopt the more conciliatory
Soviet attitude towards Tito. Sino-Yugoslav diplomatic
relations were established, for the first time since Mao
Tse-tung's victory in China, in late 1954 and cultural and
economic exchanges began in 1955. At the time of the
Cominform's dissolution in April 1956, the Chinese Communists
conceded that Stalin had "made a wrong decision on the question

¹ Zagoria notes that, "... both parties were resisting
any efforts to recreate organs such as the Cominform or
Comintern which could be used to impose the Soviet will
on member parties." Ibid., 52. And Brzezinski points
out that, "To [the Poles], the Comintern was a reminder
that the Polish Communist Party had been dissolved as a
'fascist conspiracy' with most of its leaders shot ... To [the Yugoslavs], the Cominform symbolized the very
of Yugoslavia”. Up until the momentous autumn of 1956, however, the Chinese had exhibited only a limited interest in Eastern Europe or in the overall fabric of intra-bloc relations. This restraint was increasingly diminished by the growth and strength of polycentism within the Communist bloc.

When the pressure generated by the initial Hungarian disorders called forth from the Soviets the October 30 declaration suggesting the advisability of a re-examination of intra-bloc relations, the Chinese were prompt in their response. In a November 1 statement, the Chinese welcomed the Soviet declaration as being "of great importance in correcting errors in mutual relations between the socialist countries and in strengthening unity among them." The Chinese conceded that "mistakes" had occurred in intra-bloc relations, particularly in the Yugoslav, Polish and Hungarian cases, and expressed sympathy for Polish and Hungarian aims, though they warned against the possibility of reactionary elements taking advantage of the Polish situation. This caveat was applied only to Poland because the Hungarian violence preceding November 1 had not yet lent itself to the counter-revolutionary characterization later applied.

Reflecting the Soviet declaration, the Chinese set out their

version of the principles upon which intra-bloc relations should be founded. These, in essence, conformed with the Soviet formulations and the Chinese felt confident that their consistent application would eliminate "estrangement and misunderstandings among the socialist countries."

The Chinese attitude to intra-bloc relations gave sympathetic recognition to the need for reappraisal with the proviso that a requisite degree of unity be maintained:

The socialist countries are all independent, sovereign states. At the same time, they are united by the common ideal of socialism and the spirit of proletarian internationalism.

This elemental deference to the binding qualities of ideological solidarity and, implicitly, to Soviet leadership was carefully circumscribed, however, by the Chinese acknowledgement of errors in intra-bloc relations and, more vividly, at the article's conclusion, by the observation that:

... it often happens that certain personnel of socialist countries neglect the principle of equality among nations in their mutual relations. Such a mistake, by nature, is the error of bourgeois chauvinism. Such a mistake, particularly the mistake of chauvinism by a big country, inevitably results in serious damage to the solidarity and common cause of the socialist countries.

1. As stated, these were: "... mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-intervention in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence..."
On this basis, the Chinese pledged themselves to "resolutely oppose" chauvinism; moreover, by implication the Chinese also suggested that Soviet introspection would reveal faults on the score of chauvinism within the Soviet Union.

The apparent support for the alteration of intra-bloc relations which the Chinese tendered on November 1 was quickly followed, on November 2, by a second article in which the emphasis was definitely upon Communist unity. Despite the existence of flaws in the organization of the Communist bloc, the Chinese felt that the process of rectification was underway. As a result, the Chinese opined:

... this kind of [error] can never be a pretext for breaking the unity of the socialist countries and friendship with the Soviet Union.

The Chinese once more hailed the Soviet October 30 declaration and left no doubt that they regarded it of the utmost importance to "safeguard the great internationalist solidarity of the socialist countries with the Soviet Union at the center ...". Moreover, the Chinese underscored their commitment to support the Soviets and several times referred to a formula for a Communist bloc "headed by the Soviet Union".

The precise interplay between the Soviets and the Chinese during the Polish and Hungarian shocks is uncertain

1. The relevant excerpt is in Zinner, op. cit., 491-2.
but there seems reasonable evidence to support the conclusion that the general Chinese attitude encouraged Gomulka's assertion of a limited independence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.¹

Nonetheless, the Chinese did not hesitate to endorse the final Soviet action in Hungary. By December, however, the residual dangers of the Hungarian outburst had largely subsided and Peking republished Kardelj's December 6 analysis of the Hungarian episode and Tito's Pula address. There followed the comprehensive Chinese statement of December 29 which, as indicated previously, attempted to thread the needle between a new concept of the Communist bloc which encompassed limited diversity and a framework of fundamental unity. In this vein, the statement repeated the theme of Soviet leadership while once more sounding a warning against "big power chauvinism". And, while the Chinese were critical of the effect of Tito's Pula remarks upon the solidarity of the Communist bloc, their remonstrances were more moderate than the barbs directed at Yugoslavia by the Soviets and some of the Eastern European anti-Titoists.

Chou's trip to Poland apparently brought a renewed Chinese undertaking to support Gomulka's position. Chou reiterated the prevailing Chinese themes of the desirability and, indeed, predominant need for Communist unity and Soviet

¹. See Brzezinski, op. cit., 257-58, and Whiting, loc. cit., 147 and 151.
primacy within the bloc along with the pacifying rejection of chauvinism. Gomulka ignored Chou's constant stress upon Soviet primacy but he did consent to an undertaking not to force his ideological differences with the USSR or to propagate his views outside of Poland and to accept the rudiments of proletarian internationalism. The communiqué issued in Moscow after Chou's consultations with the Soviet leadership admitted the existence of past errors in socialist interstate contacts and reaffirmed the October 30 principles of bloc relations. Only the minimal generalities of Communist unity received direct attention.¹

Chou's journey to Eastern Europe represented the first direct extension of Chinese influence into the European theatre in contemporary history. In addition, though it was motivated by the extraordinary situation which prevailed in the Communist bloc as a result of the fissures created by the Hungarian and Polish events, it manifest the potential and interest of the Chinese in exerting a significant influence on intra-bloc affairs. The pattern of Chinese participation in these affairs in late 1956 and early 1957 contained contradictory themes. "In brief, the Chinese seemed determined to set up a pattern of ideological and political

¹. This interpretation of Chou's trip is based upon the discussions in Brzezinski, op. cit., 279, and Whiting, loc. cit., 153-4.
unity while recognizing the possibility of limited local diversity."\(^1\) On one hand, the Chinese referred to errors in intra-bloc relations, the need for adjustment and the iniquities of "big power chauvinism". On the other, they emphasized Communist unity, the fundamental soundness of proletarian internationalism and the continuation of Soviet primacy. Despite such intricate juxtaposition, the general Chinese attitude and their relatively objective treatment of both Gomulka and Tito offered encouragement to the concurrent interests of both the latter in a revised and liberalized pattern of intra-bloc relations.\(^2\) And China's value as a generally sympathetic adherent of such a notion was magnified by the degree of influence which the Chinese were increasingly in a position to wield with the Soviet leadership.

For their part, the Soviets were satisfied with

\(^1\) Brzezinski, op. cit., 279.

\(^2\) "Tito's hopes of achieving 'socialist solidarity' while maintaining Yugoslav independence were buoyed in no small degree by the active interest the Chinese Communists were showing in international Communist matters. Although the Chinese had also taken issue with Tito's Pula speech, their criticism was milder than the Russians'. Moreover, soon thereafter they appeared to be throwing their influence toward an interpretation of 'independent paths to socialism' more pleasing to Belgrade than Moscow. Premier Chou En-lai, visiting Warsaw in January 1957, seemed to be encouraging the Poles to stand up to the USSR, and Peking had several times referred critically to the 'great power chauvinism' displayed by Stalin." Neal and Hoffman, op. cit., 443.
the performance of the Chinese on the issues raised by Hungary and Poland. Khrushchev could look upon the Chinese Communists as reliable allies in his design to promote a more diversified - but not divided - Communist bloc which was ultimately susceptible to Soviet control and direction. Much more than the Chinese, however, Khrushchev's attention in early 1957 was fixed upon ensuring a unitary core of bloc solidarity.

On New Year's Day, Khrushchev convened a meeting in Budapest of the conservatively inclined bloc states of Eastern Europe in order to establish a post-Hungary harmony among them. Quite significantly, Poland and Yugoslavia were absent. And in the months following, Khrushchev's energies concentrated upon insulating the balance of the bloc against the disruptive tendencies symbolized by Gomulka and Tito.¹

At the same time, the Eastern European Communist leaderships, who, for reasons of their own domestic positions and policies, distrusted the precepts of Gomulka and Tito, launched vigorous campaigns which deprecated Titoist and Gomulkaist notions. In the circumstances existing, these leaderships, including the Bulgarians and, of course, the Albanians, perceived the opportunity to downgrade and, perhaps, 

¹. Thus, "... throughout the early months of 1957 the torn fabric of East European Communism was being mended by weaving together a new formula for Soviet-satellite relations ... through a series of bilateral party agreements or declarations which served to re-emphasize certain common principles...". Brzezinski, op. cit., 281.
to quell the post-Stalinist postulations of Tito which, for reasons noted earlier, were inherently dangerous to them. The central issue was Soviet primacy and the weight of thrust of the anti-Titoist critiques coupled with the interruption of Soviet trade credits to Tito in February propelled this campaign to heights reminiscent, at least, of the post-1948 period.

Despite these polemics directed at Tito and the deterioration of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, Khrushchev was not prepared to abandon outright his attempt to re-integrate Yugoslavia into the more moderate Soviet bloc, or "commonwealth of socialist nations", which he was sponsoring. The situation which arose within the bloc in the wake of East Europe's October dictated that Soviet efforts be concentrated upon resuscitating the broader international image of the USSR and in ensuring that the Hungarian eruption remain a unique example. Because Tito personified the forces which had provoked that example and had declined to aid unconditionally in overcoming the residual consequences, he had had to be rebuked. And since Soviet energies had been required to mount a consolidating effort within the bloc they had obviously to be deflected from the move towards rapprochement with Belgrade. But Tito's post-Hungarian actions had not demonstrated any conclusive incompatibility between Tito's policies and Khrushchev's designs, thus, the Soviet leader remained optimistic even though rapprochement was in suspension or even, to a certain extent, in retreat.
From his vantage point, Tito could look upon Hungary as an unfortunate spasm which had temporarily resulted in a resurgence of Stalinist influence within the bloc. Nevertheless, he still regarded Khrushchev as a liberally inclined reformer of the same cut as himself whose policies were experiencing a minor eclipse due to a retrogression of his domestic position engendered by external circumstances. The fulminations of the Eastern European Stalinist dogmatists to the contrary, Tito focused his hopes upon the reassertion of Khrushchev's authority in the USSR. At this point, the temporary prominence of the retrograde, Stalinistic tendencies in Eastern Europe would be extinguished and reform could again proceed smoothly. In this expectation lay the roots of Tito's espousal of Gomulka and Kadar from whom, also, he could expect reciprocal support. Moreover, the Chinese attitude appeared propitious for further reinforcement of reformist tenets. On this score, Mao's late February exhortation to the Chinese to "Let a hundred flowers bloom; let a hundred schools of thought contend", and the resultant liberalization boded well.¹

¹. "Although Mao Tse-tung's promise of February 27 to 'let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend' was shortlived, it too helped convince the Titoists that they might not be alone in their efforts to influence the Kremlin." Neal and Hoffman, op. cit., 443. The whole speech in which Mao revealed the "hundred flowers" campaign is in Dan N. Jacobs, (ed.), The New Communist Manifesto (New York: 1962), 135-168.
Thus, despite recurring negative thrusts against Titoist precepts by various Communist sources, Tito and Khrushchev remained, in essence, favourably disposed towards rapprochement. It was not unusual, then, that in April, in spite of a late March statement by Bulganin linking the Yugoslavs to Hungary's "counter-revolution", Khrushchev expressed a desire to improve Soviet-Yugoslav inter-state and inter-party relations. Tito's response was positive:

The shift in Soviet attitude [to critical] raises the question, Can we ever trust them again? It would be a mistake to say no, because one day, we hope not in the too distant future, this improper, insincere and uncomradely behaviour toward us will gradually subside.  

These flirtations were followed by a mutual suspension of critical remarks at Tito's suggestion.  

At the end of June, Tito's lieutenants Kardelj and Rankovic led a Yugoslav delegation to Moscow and shortly thereafter the Soviet credits to Yugoslavia postponed in February were reinstated. But the more significant event

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1. During a visit by Kadar to Moscow, on March 28, Bulganin commented: "All know that Imre Nagy and his group received practical support from the Yugoslav leader. This sustained and inspired Nagy and it is not by accident that when the counter-revolution in Hungary was smashed he found asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy." Quoted by Andrew Haven, "Tito and Gomulka: Some Contrasts and Comparisons", Problems of Communism (Washington: 1957), vol. VI, no. 4, July-August 1957, 11.

2. Quoted, Neal and Hoffman, op. cit., 443.

3. Ibid., 443.
that occurred in June was the Soviet anti-party ouster of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov, which Khrushchev engineered. The Stalinist rump of the CPSU leadership which Tito had persistently interpreted as hampering Khrushchev, with whom he identified, was finally purged along with the others who resisted Khrushchev's personal authority. And Khrushchev announced some Tito-like internal Soviet reforms. This seemed an appropriate prelude to an attempted revival of an active entente between Tito and Khrushchev. And, indeed, a meeting was arranged for Bucharest on August 1.

The Bucharest discussions seem to have ranged over a broad scope of issues and to have required much compromise in order to achieve a viable reconciliation of the views of the two delegations.¹ In keeping with Khrushchev's design for Communist unity founded upon basic ideological conformity to which the Yugoslavs could agree, inter-party contacts commanded special attention. Agreement was reached on the complete cessation of critical ideological exchanges. Khrushchev appears, too, to have expressed a willingness to continue to promote further liberalization within the Communist bloc, which coincided with Tito's objectives. In consequence, the principle of "separate roads to socialism"

¹. The course of these discussions is discussed in Brzezinski, op. cit., 311-2, Neal and Hoffman, op. cit., 444, Zagoria, op. cit., 176-7 and Lowenthal, World Communism, 88-9.
and those governing intra-bloc relations established at Belgrade and Moscow in 1955 and 1956 were confirmed. At the same time, Khrushchev must have emphasized the necessity of reasonable guarantees of socialist unity. Despite the fact that the final communique, reflecting Tito's reticence, failed to make any mention of proletarian internationalism or Soviet primacy, Khrushchev did manage to extract certain undertakings from the Yugoslavs. These took the form of an agreement for stronger inter-party contacts and the final communique stressed the "special importance of continuing to strengthen the unity and fraternal co-operation existing between Communist and workers' parties and peoples of all socialist countries."¹

By the time of the Bucharest meeting, Khrushchev seems also to have arrived at a decision to convene a multilateral conference of ruling Communist parties in order to draft a broadly acceptable statement of Communist principles. The forthcoming fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in November afforded a suitable opportunity for this purpose. In such a conference, Khrushchev could rely upon his ability to muster a majority in favour of his own formulations. The result would be a Soviet promulgated ideological outline which would strengthen

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the unity of the bloc and reinforce Soviet doctrinal authority and, hence, Soviet primacy. At Bucharest, Tito apparently accepted an invitation to this conference and was assured by Khrushchev that he would have the opportunity to scrutinize the proposed statement of principles in advance of the November conference.

In the course of the Bucharest discussions, Khrushchev probably raised once more the question of Yugoslavia's adherence to the Warsaw Pact but with Tito ill-disposed and committed to retention of his own flexibility, which, he argued, was ultimately beneficial to Soviet objectives, this point was not likely the object of serious negotiation. However, since Khrushchev had consolidated his domestic power with the ouster of Molotov and company in June and could view the post-1956 situation in Eastern Europe as having been stabilized, he was preparing to chart a more vigorous extra-bloc Soviet policy. In this, Tito's collaboration could be a definite asset, particularly with respect to the non-aligned states. Employing the themes of Communist unity and flexibility, Khrushchev must, in retrospect, have prompted Tito to a promise of more deliberate support for Soviet foreign policy, particularly on the German issue.

The accords reached at Bucharest produced satisfaction in both Moscow and Belgrade. Khrushchev had won Tito's commitment to broad support for Soviet foreign
political initiatives and closer inter-party co-operation which, when cemented by the November deliberations of the ruling parties, would produce an impressive bond for a unified Communist bloc presided over by the Soviet Union as ideological arbiter. Tito had avoided endorsing Soviet primacy while once more obtaining Soviet approval of his principal premises on bloc relations and his own independence. Tito again felt himself an intimate of Khrushchev's and he conceived of the projected November Communist meeting as an appropriate forum in which to forge "a triumvirate with Khrushchev and Mao at the head of a decentralized Communist world".¹

The stage thus appeared to be set for a return, on a modified basis, to the diversity which the Yugoslavs so desired, and Tito was preparing for his triumphant appearance at the Moscow celebrations as one of the chief leaders of Communism, on a par with Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung, not to mention Gomulka.²


2. Brzezinski, op. cit., 312. Also, "Again, as at Moscow in 1956, Tito seems to have been carried away by his dream of influencing the Kremlin and the Communist movement." Neal and Hoffman, op. cit., 445. And, "... the Yugoslav leader was now back in the same mood as a year previously ... and he envisaged the forthcoming Moscow celebrations as the second act of his triumphant tour of Russia - again with Khrushchev as his guide, but this time with the whole elite of international Communism, including Mao Tse-tung, welcoming him back to the fold and listening to his words." Lowenthal, op. cit., 90.
The view from Belgrade now had three perspectives: Moscow, Peking and Warsaw. In the spring of 1957, the Peking perspective had presented an encouraging picture. China's "hundred flowers" had also added a pleasant feature. And, in July, exhibiting his confidence in the liberalism of Khrushchev and specifically Mao as positive presentiments for expanded polycentrism which would augment his own influence, Tito was quoted in a personal interview with the American commentator Edward R. Murrow as stating that his views on Communist affairs were "to a great extent identical to those of Mao Tse-tung."¹ In September, this concurrence seemed to be confirmed during the visits of two Yugoslav delegations to Peking for discussions with Chou and Mao.²

At the same time as Tito was striving to achieve an understanding with the Chinese Communists, there existed ample mutual grounds for a revitalization of the similarity of views which Tito and Gomulka had tentatively established in December 1956. This similarity, of course, rested upon the interest that Tito and Gomulka shared in limiting Soviet authority within the Communist bloc. As a result of this common interest, the Polish reaction to Tito's remarks at Pula were notably impartial and economic co-operation between Yugoslavia and Poland increased in early 1957. At the same

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time, much of the criticism being directed at Tito's attitude toward Communist affairs might equally well have applied to Gomulka. This tended to augment mutual Polish-Yugoslav sympathies but Gomulka did not wish to further strain his relations with the Soviets and the rest of the bloc by an unambiguous collaboration with Tito. This restraint was lessened when Khrushchev succeeded in ousting the "anti-party" faction from the Soviet leadership, which had spearheaded the opposition to renewed Soviet flirtations with Belgrade. In September, Gomulka arrived in Belgrade from Warsaw for talks with Tito. The outcome of these discussions balanced expressions of the independent aspirations of Tito and Gomulka with concessions to Khrushchev's concern for a degree of Communist cohesion. By this time though, both Gomulka and Tito were interested in further co-operation with Khrushchev who they felt was sympathetic towards their other objectives. This was particularly true for Tito since his meeting with Khrushchev in Bucharest. The overall outcome of the Gomulka visit for Tito, then, was a further move toward cordiality with his Soviet counterpart. Cautiously, Tito indicated propriety for a limited degree of Soviet

leadership within the Communist bloc:

When we speak of the leading role of the Soviet Union, we mean that the Soviet Union, as the first country of socialism, is primarily responsible for the preservation of peace and for just relations between socialist countries. We do not deny this great role of the first country of socialism.  

He was not, of course, abandoning his commitment to sovereign equality and independence among the Communist states; but he was prepared to accede, to an extent, to the concept of Communist cohesion: "... we think it is wrong to isolate ourselves from the great possibilities of strengthening socialist forces throughout the world." He indicated that bilateral or multilateral contacts were acceptable. In general, Tito seems to have at least passively accepted that ideological solidarity and proletarian internationalism were, in essence, reasonable axioms provided, of course, that they did not infringe too greatly upon his own independence or impede the degree of personal influence he hoped to exert on Communist theory and policy.

Tito's dealings with Mao and Gomulka served as precautionary measures to widen the basis from which to emphasize his opinions at the Moscow parley in November. While courting this external goodwill, however, Tito was far from ignoring the Soviet horizon of his triple perspective.

In September, Yugoslavia opposed a resolution in the United Nations' General Assembly condemning the Soviet intervention in Hungary and, on October 15, Tito extended diplomatic recognition to the German Democratic Republic, East Germany, the first non-bloc and non-aligned leader to do so.¹ In the West, this action provoked a review of American policy towards Yugoslavia and Bonn severed diplomatic links with Belgrade.

In the Fall issue of the American journal *Foreign Affairs*, there appeared a comprehensive exposition of Yugoslav foreign policy under the authorship of Tito himself.² Taken as a whole, the article went far towards extending that broad measure of Yugoslav support for Soviet foreign policy with which Khrushchev had been concerned at the August discussions with Tito in Bucharest. To Tito, the policies of Stalin and Molotov were still anathema, but he argued that, since Stalin's death, Soviet policy had changed and that consequently:

> If prior to Stalin's death it was his policy which constituted the main element of cold war, fear and uncertainty, the responsibility for a continuation of such a state of affairs has been shifting during the last few years more and more to those in the West who persist in the view that the different outstanding questions should be tackled from positions of strength.

¹ "This act was regarded as especially significant because it was taken to mean that Tito considered demonstrations of 'socialist solidarity' more important than good relations with the West." *Ibid.*, 445.

He specifically singled out Dulles' policy of military encirclement of the USSR and, implicitly, the Republican slogan of "liberation" of Eastern Europe as contributing to international tensions. Further, he asserted a conviction that if NATO had originally been the effect of Stalinist policy, the alliance was now the cause of the Warsaw Pact and that NATO's dissolution would be reciprocated. On Germany, Tito hoped for a solution evolved by the Germans alone, but in Khrushchevian terms, he stated:

One should be realistic and take into account the fact that . . . there are today two Germanies with different social systems.

And in terms that eventually became synonymous with the overall course of Khrushchevian foreign policy, Tito posed, and answered, his own query:

What then remains, if we reject war as a method of settling international differences? The only alternative is, of course, co-existence among states and nations regardless of their different social systems.

Tito rounded off his critique of Western policy with a condemnation of the Suez intervention, while that in Hungary was conspicuously ignored. Middle Eastern restiveness was attributed to a general Western bent for interference.

Tito ignored no-one in his exposition. He struck an anti-colonialist note for the non-aligned and dependent nations, gave an approbative nod to the attempts to seat Communist China in the United Nations and, though he
acknowledged differences of internal policy and ideological interpretation with the USSR, he indicated that, "... these are not such weighty matters that they should lead to tensions in our mutual relations."

Though Tito himself admitted that the views expressed might be "one-sided", their pro-Soviet bias was not absolute. Tito indicated that he felt no inclination to join the Warsaw Pact or any rigid ideological grouping: "I am opposed to the division of the world into military blocs, and to blocs in general". And in a double negative to American and Soviet flirtations Tito pointed out: "We have never given anybody reason to hope that we would join the Western bloc, or any other bloc for that matter." Nevertheless, Tito had given positive hints to Khrushchev, but he reaffirmed his prerequisite that Soviet-Yugoslav relations should be based upon the Belgrade and Moscow declarations and he put Khrushchev on unambiguous notice that there would be no exclusivity about his foreign policy:

There is nothing out of the way in the fact that, in establishing good relations with the USSR and the other Eastern European countries, we have not the slightest intention of impairing our relations with the Western countries.

The nature of Tito's actions from the conclusion of the Bucharest talks with Khrushchev, especially as characterized by his article for *Foreign Affairs*, indicate that, while he would not be diverted from the major features
of his own foreign policy or his views on intra-bloc relations, for which he sought maximal external support, notably from Poland and China, he was striving to obviate all possible obstacles to a real meeting of minds with Khrushchev. In October, however, Tito received the text of the proposed declaration to be issued in November and the Soviet-Yugoslav situation was drastically altered.¹

The first section of the draft mounted an uncompromising assault upon the whole spectrum of Western policies underscoring the traditional Soviet dichotomic image of a world irreconcilably divided into contending Communist and capitalist sectors. And though a number of the Soviet postulations coincided with those proffered by Tito in Foreign Affairs, the general tone was far more aggressive than Tito's analysis of the global scene.

On intra-bloc relations, the draft employed the nomenclature of a "commonwealth of socialist states" and once again reaffirmed the "principles of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in one another's internal affairs", but the importance of the "solidarity and close unity of the socialist countries" was repeatedly stressed. In addition, though opposition to military blocs was voiced,

¹. The Declaration in its final form, is in Benes, Byrnes and Spulber, (eds.), The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, 12-25, and Hudson, Lowenthal and MacFarquhar, (eds.), The Sino-Soviet Dispute, 46-56.
the necessity for the preservation and reinforcement of the Warsaw Pact in view of the sharp division of international forces was underlined.

Ideologically, Marxism-Leninism was represented as a principal binding force within the Communist movement. And, the draft indicated that, "... the socialist revolution and the building of socialism are governed by a number of basic laws applicable in all countries embarking on a socialist course." These "laws" were enumerated, including "proletarian internationalism", but, it was noted, national peculiarities should not be ignored in the application of Marxism-Leninism. This was obviously a legitimization of "different roads to socialism" but, simultaneously, a warning against exaggeration of the role of national peculiarities was issued. In addition, revisionism, and therefore, implicitly, Titoism, was portrayed as a potent danger to the Communist movement.

Upon general examination, even with its redeeming aspects, the document's stress upon Communist solidarity, ideological proximity, and the concomitant aspersions cast upon revisionism, and the presentation of a dichotomic vision of the international arena all ran counter to Tito's aspirations in regard to the November conference. Even though the proposed declaration included no overt assertion of Soviet primacy, it was evident that Khrushchev's intent was to establish maximal Communist unity and conformity under
strong Soviet doctrinal and organizational authority. Such a programme contradicted Tito's ideas on international Communist strategy, restricted the scope of intra-bloc diversity and the flexibility of the individual states and, quite effectively, precluded Tito's elevation to any notably influential position in the international Communist hierarchy from which to promote the adoption of Titoist doctrines. For all these reasons, Khrushchev's formulation was disappointing and, in fact, unacceptable to Tito; for to consent to such a statement would be to submit to, what was to Tito, a retrogressive degree of centrist Communist discipline and Soviet predominance. The upshot of Tito's perusal of Khrushchev's draft was the onset of a diplomatic ailment which prevented Tito's attendance at the November conference.¹ Kardelj and Rankovic substituted.

The presence of these two delegates at Moscow, who, even without Tito's personal prestige, represented the highest echelons of the Yugoslav Communists, suggests that Tito was unwilling to withdraw in toto from the liberally inclined element in the Communist bloc, which he conceived

¹. "The triumphant return of the prodigal son to the fold thus never took place." Zagoria, op. cit., 178. "When Tito saw that draft, he knew at last that the gamble on his influence with Khrushchev had been lost. The dream of his triumphant return to the Communist world general staff was ended, and his own visit to the Moscow celebrations had to be called off." Lowenthal, op. cit., 92.
as including Gomulka and Mao. But, from the first, Kardelj and Rankovic indicated to Khrushchev that they could not sign the final declaration in its original form. To this, Khrushchev once more replied that Yugoslavia could not continue to sit "in two chairs" and that if the Yugoslavs persisted in non-signature, "We will attack you!"\(^1\)

The course of the conference did produce alterations in the draft of the declaration. Unfortunately for Tito, these only increased his agitation, and his isolation. Gomulka was not prepared to challenge Khrushchev and the Chinese executed a distressing about face.

During the summer the internal liberalism of the Chinese Communists had been progressively reversed. The dramatic "hundred flowers" campaign had wilted and given way to a strenuous drive for ideological rectification. Leftist tendencies among the Chinese hierarchy had become more and more pronounced and this had been accelerated by internal economic difficulties. Moreover, the Soviets had demonstrated a growing amenability to expanded Chinese participation in the overall direction of international Communist policy. And, in the early autumn, when the Soviets achieved their first spectacular successes in ballistic rocketry, Mao concluded that the time was ripe

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for a more militant Communist attitude towards the West. To this end, Communist ranks had to be closed and a solidly unified front guaranteed. In this, Mao's interest was heightened precisely by the prospect of a major role in the direction of such a tightly disciplined movement. As a result, the Chinese, at Moscow, gave Tito an unpleasant surprise by insisting upon the specific inclusion of references to Soviet primacy. Thus, in a devious way, "... China in reality emphasized equality — but only ... her equality, not necessarily that of Poland and Yugoslavia." In the final analysis, though Mao, like Tito, preferred a division of Communist authority, he opted to attempt a duumvirate with Khrushchev rather than a triumvirate including Tito or a four way split promoting Comulka.

The course of the Moscow conference, then, only increased Tito's discomfiture. Of those whom he had counted on for support against the possibility, which had materialized, that Khrushchev would move to resume a generally undiluted Soviet authority within international Communism, Comulka had surrendered and Mao, for his own reasons, had defected. Tito would do neither and so no Yugoslav signature appeared on the final version of the Moscow declaration of 1957. The Yugoslavs did identify themselves with the Peace Manifesto

issued at the same time, which endorsed most of the objectives of Soviet foreign policy, but the really significant act for them was the one of omission. It meant that Tito's pains-taking efforts to erase the recollections of late 1956 and to affect a final alliance with Khrushchev at the apex of the Communist movement had once more been frustrated. Khrushchev, on the other hand, had succeeded in reconsolidating the Communist bloc and Soviet authority and though Tito remained a maverick, that was of minor consequence, especially since he had been relegated to solitary divergence.
CHAPTER IV

REVISIONISM AND DISPUTE

With the November 1957 Communist conference in Moscow, Khrushchev achieved a major success for his intra-bloc policy. Limited national autonomy and diversity within the bloc, particularly in Poland, had been preserved while, at the same time, the damage inflicted upon the bloc by the convulsions of October and November 1956 had been repaired. The divisive concomittants of intra-bloc diversity had been eliminated. Consequently, Khrushchev had succeeded to a degree in assuaging the unpopularity of Communism within the bloc by sanctioning a reduction in the domestic restrictiveness of the policies of the individual Communist regimes which had provoked the violent reactions of 1956. The operative internal autonomy granted, however, had been incorporated into a sufficiently cohesive general pattern of bloc unity. The November conference and the concluding declaration had consolidated this pattern and explicitly restated the legitimacy of Soviet primacy within the bloc. The conference itself provided an organizational precedent for ad hoc assertions of this predominance and the declaration of Communist principles re-established the substance of Soviet ideological authority. The strength of the Soviet
pre-eminence within the bloc was significantly magnified by the enthusiasm with which Mao Tse-tung had insisted upon the specific endorsement of Soviet primacy.

It was because he had anticipated the general outcome of the November conference that Tito had declined to participate. Having thus been once more rebuffed in his efforts to exert a decisive influence on Communist affairs and finding himself an isolated dissenter and "revisionist" both prone to, and fore-warned of, extensive criticism, Tito resolved, and indeed found it essential, to adopt a new approach to influencing the Communist movement.

A concise up-to-date programme for Yugoslav Communism was long overdue and, after the Bucharest meeting with Khrushchev in August 1957, plans for the publication of such a document had once more been suspended. With the collapse of Tito's hopes for incorporating the essence of Titoism within an international programmatic statement of Communist doctrine, it became expedient to promulgate the Yugoslav alternative. And, since by early 1958, the Communist press, taking its cue from the November declaration, abounded with shrill critiques of revisionism, of which Titoism alone could be the primary object, the publication of a handbook of Titoism could not initiate a breach in the Tito-Khrushchev relationship.

1. Lowenthal, World Communism, 91.
entente since this had never materialized. As a result, the task of drafting a new programme for the League of Yugoslav Communists began in earnest in late 1957.

Despite the prolific nature of the anti-revisionist criticism levelled by the Communist press early in 1958, Yugoslavia was never explicitly designated as its target. At the same time, Soviet-Yugoslav inter-state relations continued on a normal plane. Khrushchev's rationale seems to have been that, as matters stood, Tito represented an ideological vagrant whose isolation should be maintained by avoiding any dialogue which would only provide a platform for Tito to publicize his views. In addition, a rupture in state relations would only recall unproductive Stalinist practices and be detrimental to the Soviet international image. Thus, Khrushchev hoped to consign Tito to the status of a Communist nonentity with no appeal within the bloc but without precluding the possibility of his accession on favourable terms.

By March, however, Tito's draft programme had crystallized. The result was a comprehensive compendium of Titoist views on Communist affairs. The document represented an alternative to the November 1957 Moscow declaration and, therefore, a challenge to Soviet doctrinal authority which could not fail to provoke sharp criticism. And, the draft was circulated throughout the Communist bloc for comment.
Implicit in this last action was Tito's hope to appeal to elements within the bloc whom he felt shared many of his views as a substitute for the defunct ideological entente with Khrushchev. "This was the first attempt by anyone to codify a set of 'revisionist' principles and then to circulate them throughout the Communist movement."¹ In his search for support within the bloc, Tito naturally looked to Gomulka and Kadar. No immediate Soviet reaction was forthcoming and, on March 27 and 28, Kadar visited Yugoslavia for discussions with Tito.² Khrushchev consulted Kadar immediately upon the latter's return to Budapest and apparently concluded that Tito was indeed intent upon creating an "autonomist" bloc within the Communist movement. And, since Khrushchev realized that Kadar, and particularly Gomulka, were, to an extent, receptive to Titoist notions, he determined to take definite steps to stifle the Titoist challenge and to intensify Tito's isolation.³

Until the Kadar visit, Khrushchev probably relied upon the hope of being able to impress upon Tito the

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3. "... Yugoslav overtures to both Kadar and Gomulka, and the receptivity of both, apparently convinced Khrushchev that Tito was trying to form an 'autonomous' bloc within the Communist movement." *Ibid.*, 179. See also Lowenthal, *op. cit.*, 92-3.
acceptance of the Soviet criticisms of his programme in order to reconcile it with the November declaration and reinforce the Soviet prominence as ideological censor within the bloc. Now, more direct action was called for, and, on April 5, the Soviet and other Communist parties confidentially informed the Yugoslavs that a decision had been taken to boycott the Yugoslav party congress at which the new programme would be considered. On the same day, the Polish press published Tito's draft without comment. This attests to the sympathy with which Gomulka viewed the Yugoslav attitudes but he could not be entirely satisfied especially since he was aware that a sharp break between Yugoslavia and the bloc was impending which, he felt, would both damage the bloc and reduce the flexibility of the individual members, of which he and Tito were the principal examples. Nor, on the other hand did he wish to risk estrangement from Moscow by upholding Tito's theses in toto. Consequently, between April 5 and 15, two members of the Polish Politbureau attempted to convince Tito to accept the main Soviet criticisms of the Yugoslav draft programme in order to mitigate the effects of its final adoption.¹ Tito's concessions were minimal. Some

criticisms of the Warsaw Pact, Soviet hegemonism and internal Soviet mistakes were moderated and minor references to positive post-Stalin trends in Soviet policy included, but no extensive alterations were undertaken.\(^1\) Therefore, on April 15, the unanimous decision by the bloc parties to absent themselves from the Yugoslav Congress was made public and the Polish press printed a moderate critique of the Yugoslav propositions.\(^2\)

The Seventh Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists convened on April 22 in Ljubljana.\(^3\) The diplomatic representatives of the bloc states were in attendance but not as emissaries of their respective Communist parties. However, during Alexander Rankovic's speech\(^4\) which laid decisive emphasis upon the correctness of Yugoslav ideas and upon Communist equality, thereby rejecting Soviet primacy, even these bloc observers, excepting the Polish, demonstratively walked out of the Congress led by the Soviet ambassador. As expected, and in a complete inversion of the pattern of the November Moscow conference, the Yugoslav party approved


\(^2\) A brief summary of the Polish comments is in Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, 329.

\(^3\) Excerpts from Tito's opening address are in Goldwin, (ed.), with Stourzh and Zetterbaum, *Readings in Russian Foreign Policy*, 548-552.

\(^4\) A portion of this speech is in Bass and Marbury, (eds.), *op. cit.*, 166-170.
the new programme in spite of the stern disapproval of the rest of the bloc parties.

The Yugoslav programme in its final form\textsuperscript{1} expounded Titoist precepts on a broad spectrum of issues bound to impinge on Soviet-Yugoslav relations. In its introduction, the Yugoslavs laid claim to having formulated a thoroughly Marxist analysis which was of general value to the whole socialist world. The programme explicitly confirmed Yugoslav faith in the validity of the concept of "different roads to socialism" and, in keeping with the earliest traditions of Titoism, reasserted the view that socialist tendencies obtained throughout the world, even beyond the Communist bloc. Once more, the Yugoslavs explained the propensity of socialist systems to develop retrogressive bureaucratic distortions. From these, according to the Yugoslav logic, developed the negative manifestations of Communism in Eastern Europe. In addition, in keeping with their conception of the existence of evolutionary socialist tendencies in the non-Communist world, the Yugoslavs concluded that, "The conception that the Communist parties have a monopoly over every aspect of the movement of society towards socialism . . . is theoretically

\textsuperscript{1} The relevant portions are the Introduction and Chapters 1-3 inclusive. This author has drawn the excerpts cited from the full edition of the programme edited by Kurt Dowson, \textit{The Programme of the League of Yugoslav Communists} (London: 1959). Extracts from the programme's first three chapters are in Bass and Marbury, (eds.), \textit{op. cit.}, 110-140, and these chapters in full are also reproduced in Benes, Byrnes, and Spulber, (eds.), \textit{The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute}, 27-92.
wrong and in practice very harmful." Moreover, the Yugoslavs confirmed the necessity for the ruling parties to subject themselves to introspective self-criticism and reappraisal in order to revitalize their policies and, implicitly, to promote internal democratization.

Focusing upon Soviet history, the Yugoslavs elucidated the development of the bureaucratic degeneration of Stalinism and the emergence of the "cult of personality" and justified Yugoslav actions during the 1948-53 rupture as, "a struggle against bureaucratic-letalist and hegemonic distortions . . . [which] was consistently socialist and progressive and . . . contributed to the enhancement and progress of socialism in the world in general."

From a general analysis, which included the preceding major points, the Yugoslavs moved to present their views on more contemporary issues. On ideology, the Yugoslavs felt that, ". . . Marxist thought in the course of the past few decades has failed to keep in step with the advance of contemporary society . . .". The Yugoslavs clearly felt capable of helping to overcome this. They, too, condemned "revisionism" but their definition of "revisionism" was at odds with that of the Soviets. To them, "revisionism",

... is bureaucracy and etatism. Closely related to this phenomenon is the tendency towards ideological monopoly, as well as the attempt to transform Marxist thought— which can retain its vitality and revolutionary character only by being
continually developed on the basis of practice and experience—into a static collection of rigid dogmas and abstract truths, adjusted to meet certain temporary needs . . . . Yet this very dogmatism which, while carrying out a radical anti-scientific revision of Marxism and Leninism, condemns as revisionism any genuine effort towards the real promotion of Marxist thought in contemporary social conditions.

Thus, paradoxically, to the Yugoslavs, revisionism was dogmatism and Titoism was a legitimate extension of Marxism-Leninism. Further, dogmatism was the source of the infection which caused disaffection within the Communist bloc and, while this dogmatic revisionism should be repudiated, Titoism should be fostered. Communists, it declared,

... must combat any attempts to thwart the efforts necessary for the further development of the scientific basis of Marxism and for the scientific Marxist interpretation of new contemporary trends . . . .

With respect to relations among the Communist parties, the ideological interpreters, the Yugoslav programme approved both bilateral and multilateral cooperation provided that equality, nonimposition of views and noninterference were respected. However, the Yugoslavs declared a preference for bilateral dealings since earlier multilateral arrangements, obviously the Cominform, had "produced negative phenomena which caused great harm to the struggle for socialism and peace."

Among these negative qualities, ideological monopoly was singled out as particularly offensive. Consequently,
equality in intra-party relations was essential and in approaching this the Communist parties,

... should start from the principle that the validity and progressive nature of a given ideology, or of given forms of socialist development depends exclusively on the vital capacity and verifiability of that ideology in practice, and not on the approval of one or another international body.

Thus, the Yugoslavs were unalterably opposed to any type of multilateral forum, which must certainly have included ad hoc conferences after the November 1957 pattern, which might serve to consolidate ideological discipline under the control of one individual party. And, while they acknowledged that one party might temporarily become the vanguard of socialism, the Yugoslavs explicitly rejected the notion that this entitled that party to any monopoly position, least of all in the realm of ideology. The Yugoslavs accepted a general community of socialist goals but they reiterated the reality and legitimacy of socialist diversity and noted that:

To proclaim the path and form of socialist development in any single country as being the only correct path and form is nothing but a dogma obstructing the process of the socialist transformation of the world.

The notion of the compulsory Soviet model was thus rejected and instead:

The freedom of internal socialist development and the absence of any attempt to impose specific forms on others, non-interference in the internal life and internal development of other movements, and free and equal exchange of experiences and socialist
theoretical thought, should be the fundamental principle in mutual relations between socialist countries and movements.

The ideal of proletarian internationalism, to the Yugoslavs, comprised a definite commitment to promote the expansion of socialism and to render mutual aid to other similarly disposed parties. Fidelity to the USSR, while formerly a valid standard, was considered by the Yugoslavs, in the current period, to be an inappropriately narrow criterion for pronouncing a verdict upon any party's espousal of the doctrine of proletarian internationalism. And further, any emergence of "inequality, chauvinism or hegemony" in inter-state relations should be staunchly opposed.

In their general survey of the international scene, the Yugoslavs attributed a major share of blame for the existence of international tensions to the creation of military-political blocs which hindered normal political and economic intercourse among nations. Moreover, the growth of these blocs erected obstacles to the complete sovereignty and independence of individual nations. The Yugoslavs recognized the increasing importance of international interdependence but they insisted that this must be the result of common interests shared by equal and independent nations. Thus,
... political and economic independence means the establishment of conditions in countries or states and relations between peoples which make it possible for them to accept voluntarily and on the basis of equality, those international obligations which correspond to their own interest and to the interests of other peoples.

Stalin's hegemonistic policy had been an incursion upon this understanding which the Yugoslavs had rightfully resisted. Noting the improvement in intra-bloc relations in the post-Stalin period, the programme again expressed the Yugoslav feeling that "the principles of independence, full equality, and respect for the specific features of each individual country" should prevail in these relations. Resistance to any retreat from these tenets, the Yugoslavs claimed, was correct and beneficial to the overall cause of socialism and any criticism of such resistance was improper and unacceptable. Once again, Tito's aversion to any form of Soviet primacy in the Communist movement is evident.

In the Yugoslav analysis of the contemporary international situation, world war was no longer inevitable. The sole alternative, then, was peaceful co-existence. Such a policy, however, should be dissociated from the notion of international power blocs. Thus,

... co-existence must not remain passive, bogged down on the level of power bloc politics; it should be active and directed towards the goal of expanding mutual co-operation between peoples.
From this, the Yugoslavs indicated their preference for the policy of non-alignment which eschewed association with international blocs in order to facilitate their dissolution and thereby to reduce international tensions and further multilateral co-operation. As a minor concession to Soviet sensitivities, the Yugoslav programme portrayed the Warsaw Pact as a logical response to NATO, German rearmament and certain other Western policies. But, for themselves, the Yugoslavs chose a foreign policy of "active co-existence" which combined respect for independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states with non-alignment and non-participation in any international bloc. On this basis, the Yugoslavs concluded,

The foreign policy of socialist Yugoslavia—based on the historical experiences of the Yugoslav peoples and their resolve to safeguard their independence and sovereignty at all costs—serves the independence and interests of the free socialist development of the country, and contributes to comprehensive co-operation between peoples.

And the Yugoslavs perceived no conflict between this policy and their commitment to the cause of socialism whether or not the Soviet views corresponded to their own.

The Soviet rejoinder to the multitude of issues raised by the Yugoslav programme appeared in advance of the Yugoslav Congress and before the minor revisions subsequently
made but it crossed swords with the Titoist formulations on all significant points. This Soviet rebuttal was published in the Soviet journal Kommunist on April 15.¹

From the first, Kommunist indicated that the whole idea of a Yugoslav programme with pretensions to international relevance was displeasing to the Soviets. To the Soviets, the Yugoslav theses departed from Marxism-Leninism on matters of principle as well as on a wide range of specific topics. Most important, the Yugoslav programme was "contrary in a number of important aspects to the appraisal of the Declaration and Peace Manifesto adopted by the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties in November 1957." This constituted a major theme of the Soviet article for the Soviets regarded Tito's programme as a deliberate alternative and, therefore, a direct challenge to their own ideological text as proclaimed in the 1957 declaration:

On the basic problems of socialist revolution and construction of socialism there is a collective Marxist-Leninist point of view expressed in the Declaration of 1957 . . . The authors of the draft programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia are making vain attempts to oppose their far-fetched conception to this point of view, which generalizes the entire experience of modern social development.

In addition, Kommunist's ideologues drew upon suitable writings of Lenin in order to refute Yugoslav postulations and their pretext of being genuine refinements of Marxist-Leninist thought.

Kommunist contested the validity of the Yugoslav theme that evolutionary tendencies toward socialism existed in the capitalist world. The Soviets therefore accused the Yugoslavs of incorrectly denying the leading role of Communist parties in the struggle for socialism and denounced the Yugoslav claim that such parties lacked a monopoly of socialist wisdom and consciousness. The Yugoslav programme was also found wanting in its failure to emphasize sufficiently the solidarity and cohesion of the international Communist movement in the wake of the 1957 meeting. Instead, the Yugoslavs had put forth negative, improper and disunifying criticism of the various Communist parties.

Kommunist was particularly disturbed by Yugoslav allusions to ideological monopoly. Such terms, to the Soviet commentators, could not but weaken the unity of the Communist movement. What's more, the Soviets stressed the collective nature, unanimity and, hence, correctness of the November conference in promulgating a number of universally applicable ideological tenets and confirming the propriety of Soviet primacy. In this way, the Yugoslavs were discreetly reminded that they alone were dissenters in the Communist movement.
and that there were certain fundamental ideological axioms which all should heed. This the Yugoslavs had failed to do.

Kommunist also found fault with the Yugoslav international perspective. Essentially, the Yugoslavs had failed to paint a sufficiently dichotomic image of the international scene and had not differentiated between the socialist and capitalist worlds in assessing responsibility for international tension. This contradicted the 1957 Peace Manifesto to which the Yugoslavs had been a party and the final declaration issued simultaneously. Also, the indiscriminate Yugoslav condemnation of international blocs was implicitly detrimental to Communist unity.

Also on the matter of Communist relations, the Yugoslavs had over-estimated the importance of past mistakes and had improperly characterized "proletarian internationalism" by reducing it "exclusively to the principles of equality and non-interference in internal affairs." Summarily,

The theses that are advanced in the draft programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia do not facilitate the strengthening of unity and solidarity of the countries of socialism.

And, in this regard, the Yugoslavs were certainly lacking in the justice done to the Soviet Union as the operative core of Communist unity.

As is evident from the preceding detailed discussions of the 1958 Titoist programme and the Soviet counterthrust,
there existed an extreme dichotomy between the positions of the two sides on a wide range of individual issues. Certain recurring divisive themes may be generalized however. Tito's programme constituted a comprehensive ideological alternative to the Soviet sponsored November 1957 declaration and the Soviets construed it as such. Considering the direct relationship between Soviet doctrinal authority and Soviet primacy within the Communist movement, the Yugoslav programme raised a distinct challenge to Communist discipline and over-riding Soviet predominance. Organizationally, it threw into question the utility of multilateral intra-party conferences after the 1957 model as vehicles for the exhibition of Communist discipline and the assertion of Soviet priority. Moreover, while Tito stressed the individual Communist nation's independence, internal diversity and external flexibility, the Soviet emphasis was upon Communist community, bloc unity and solidarity in foreign policy under Soviet direction. Soviet and Yugoslav priorities thus conflicted and it was imperative for Khrushchev to deflect the potential threat Titoism posed to his long-sought, but still destructible, re-consolidation and re-orientation of Communist relations. From this reasoning, he instituted the break in party relations symbolized by the boycott of the Yugoslav Congress. Even this Khrushchev hoped could be overcome and he was resolved to avoid allowing ideological dispute to affect inter-state
relations with Yugoslavia. Thus, the Kommunist article concluded, "... comradely party criticism should not be an obstacle to the further development of friendly relations between our parties and countries." And, subsequently, speaking in Poland, Madame Furtseva of the Soviet Praesidium stated, "We have been and we will be friends with Yugoslavia—always."¹ Thus, in short, as one Western observer has put it, Khrushchev,

... wished to keep the campaign against Yugoslavia within limits because he considered Tito still useful for a number of his diplomatic purposes, he knew that to bring pressure on a Communist neutral country might alienate non-Communist neutral countries and he did not want to weaken the détente elements of his diplomacy.²

And, of course, since the Kommunist article appeared in advance of the Yugoslav Congress, Khrushchev could not be certain of Tito's ultimate stance and he had not abandoned his hope of enticing Tito into some form of viable association with the bloc.

The final adoption of Tito's programme, however, called forth an oriental response which, much like Mao's actions at the Moscow conference in November, struck harshly at Tito's position. The Chinese reaction to the Yugoslav document appeared in the Chinese press on May 5.³

¹ Quoted, Zagoria, op. cit., 180. Anastas Mikoyan made a similar statement in Bonn. See Lowenthal, op. cit., 146.
² Zagoria, op. cit., 184.
This Chinese article condemned the Yugoslavs for elucidating "an anti-Marxist-Leninist, out-and-out revisionist programme." Echoing Kommunist, the Chinese scored the Yugoslav Communists for contradicting the conclusions of the 1957 Moscow conference and for failing to differentiate between the socialist and capitalist worlds. The Yugoslav programme, to the Chinese, was especially threatening to Communist unity since it represented "a systematic and comprehensive revisionist programme" which was "aimed at splitting the international Communist movement and undermining the solidarity of the socialist countries . . . ".

The Chinese verdict on Tito's objectives, however, was even more inflammatory. Tito was accused of advocating that the international proletariat "take the road of surrender to capitalism." And, in doing this, Peking suggested, Tito was abetting the Western imperialists. All of this led the Chinese to resurrect and pronounce the soundness of the 1948 Cominform judgement against Yugoslavia. Nor could Peking resist recalling the disruptive effects of Tito's anti-Stalinist crusading in 1956 and his equivocation upon the suppression of Hungarian revolt. Indeed, the Chinese asserted that Yugoslavia had "supported the renegade Nagy clique."

Peking's attack on Titoist theory was perceptibly more extreme than that of Moscow. A number of reasons account for this dissimilarity. After the Soviet advances in rocketry
in the fall of 1957 and the success of the November conference in reconstituting Communist discipline, Khrushchev's self-confidence was considerably augmented. In turn, the annoyance which Tito represented as a potentially divisive force within the Communist bloc was proportionately reduced. And, in this atmosphere, by early 1958, Khrushchev had determined upon a more active, but moderate, Soviet policy vis-a-vis the West within a context of international détente. Thus, while Titoism had to be contained, this must not be allowed to mar Khrushchev's broader horizons.

From the same 1957 sources, Mao concluded that, on the international front, "the east wind was prevailing over the west wind" — a metaphor repeated in the May 5 derogation of the Yugoslav party programme — and that the moment was propitious for launching a militant Communist assault on the imperialist world. For this purpose, rigid intra-bloc discipline was a prerequisite. Tito's persistent refusal throughout 1956 and 1957 to accept such a standard dictated, to Mao, the necessity of exorcising Titoism both as an encouragement to Communist insubordination and neutrality and as a hypothetical testing ground for a flexible Communist détente policy. Hence derives the uncompromising tone of the May 5 Chinese polemic directed at Tito. In fact, Peking's denunciation of Tito may have been designed as a practical demonstration to Khrushchev of China's thinking on the proper
strategy for international Communist policy rather than a simple reflection of that assessment.1

In May 1958, this Sino-Soviet divergence concerning the premises upon which Communist international policy should be based was not yet acute. By the time that the Chinese May 5 polemic was published, however, the Yugoslav party congress had ended and had granted official authorization to the Titoist programme. Thus, the hopes Khrushchev had still entertained, at the time of the publication of the Kommunist critique, that Tito might reconsider were dissipated. With Tito's final promulgation of a theoretical revisionist alternative to Soviet ideological pronouncements, stronger Soviet censure became expedient.

Peking's May 5 rebuttal of Titoist analysis, which appeared on the eve of a session of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, was immediately reproduced by Moscow. The Soviet party conclave resulted in no resolution on the Yugoslav situation and, at the time, Khrushchev conveyed his congratulations to Tito upon the latter's re-election as President of Yugoslavia. Khrushchev, it seems, was still inclined to observe normal diplomatic amenities despite the Soviet-Yugoslav ideological disagreements.

Nevertheless, the Yugoslav party's acceptance of the Titoist programme was a substantial deviation from even minimal Communist discipline and Khrushchev could not be content merely to reprint the Chinese reprimand.

On May 9, the Soviet reactions to the results of the Yugoslav party congress were set forth in Pravda. This statement began with a reference to the unity and cohesive qualities of international Communism. And Pravda approbatively noted that adverse comments on the Yugoslav programme had been published by all the major Communist parties. A comprehensive listing of the questions at issue was given and the continuing theme that Yugoslav theories ran counter to the 1957 Moscow declaration was once more reiterated. As with Kommunist, Pravda was critical of Yugoslav hesitance in portraying the contradictions between the socialist and imperialist worlds and the failure to contrast the policies of the two. This oversight, to Pravda, meant "to play into the hands of the imperialists." Moreover, Yugoslav allusions to inequities in socialist inter-state relations prompted Pravda to caution the Yugoslavs that these could readily be removed; Soviet economic aid could be terminated and, quite bluntly, Pravda observed:

It would be an odd state of affairs if relations between socialist states were to become stronger and better while relations between the political parties which lead them and share Marxist-Leninist ideology, should grow worse.

The Soviet Union, Pravda indicated, had made sincere efforts to improve Soviet-Yugoslav relations on both a state and party level but Yugoslavia had, on occasion, committed mistakes "of a nationalist character" and departed from Marxism-Leninism. It was the ideological differences, however, which Pravda regarded as the major irritant in relations between the two countries.

Noting that, "Only the principles of Marxism-Leninism can serve as a firm foundation for the establishment of friendly relations between the two parties", Pravda proceeded to assign the preponderant share of the blame for Soviet-Yugoslav frictions to the Yugoslav party. Pravda was particularly distressed by the ideological "pretensions" of the Yugoslav Communists. This implicitly confirms the significance which Khrushchev assigned to ideological conformity for a system of Communist discipline founded on inter-party contacts and guaranteeing Soviet primacy on the basis of ideological pre-eminence, which had been his objective from the beginnings of his emergence in the Soviet hierarchy and his first approaches to Tito. The existence of such a conception explains Khrushchev's impatience with
Tito's constant propagation of Titoist ideological formulations which challenged Soviet doctrinal leadership and, simultaneously, stressed diversity. In this light, a concise manual of Titoism such as the 1958 Yugoslav programme was highly disturbing to Khrushchev, particularly since the 1957 Moscow conference and declaration symbolized a first, but not necessarily conclusive, precedent for Khrushchev's blueprint for his own pattern of Communist international discipline.

With an eye to insulating the other Communist parties from Titoist influence, Pravda concluded by underlining the absolutely inviolable need for Communist unity and solidarity based on fidelity to Marxism-Leninism and reminded all that any deviation "inevitably leads to the quagmire of revisionism." Khrushchev was therefore set on preserving ideological discipline and, of course, Soviet doctrinal primacy.

The Yugoslav replies to the May 5 Chinese polemic and the May 9 Pravda article appeared in Borba on May 10 and May 17 respectively.¹

Borba charged the Chinese with unprincipled criticism which had nothing in common with proper ideological debate. Such an approach, Borba warned, would be sterile:

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. . . if anyone thinks that socialist Yugoslavia could, either by being subjected to pressure or to empty tactical manoeuvres, be induced to abandon its principled positions which . . . deeply coincide with the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, he is mistaken.

Directing its remarks toward the Chinese reassertion of the 1948 Cominform resolution, Borba drew an elaborate parallel between Chinese tactics and the earlier Stalinist ones and concluded that this coincidence was an attempt to coerce the Yugoslavs into renouncing,

. . . every independent clarification of Marxist thinking, every independent view of the problems of the international labour movement and socialism, every independent policy in the struggle for peace and the defense of socialism and, in the final analysis, every independent solution of the problems and forms of socialist construction in our own country.

Accordingly, Yugoslavia would brook no interference with its independence or its individual principles and Borba upheld the right to do this.

In a largely correct assessment, Borba decided that the Chinese sought a "mechanical formal unity" within the Communist sphere. In a conciliatory tone which betrayed Yugoslav recognition of one of the fundamental motives for Chinese, and Soviet, ire Borba explained:

Everybody in the world knows that socialist Yugoslavia neither threatens anyone nor has pretensions to play a directive role of any kind, nor is she capable of taking on such a role even if she wanted to.
Whether this statement was wholly candid is questionable and, of course, verbal disavowal could not allay deep-seated Chinese, and Soviet, suspicions that it was not, or their own estimates that the Yugoslav programme did, in fact, pose a direct threat to Communist discipline. In addition, Borba still maintained that Yugoslav views benefitted the socialist cause and that it was criticism of these views, rather than the views themselves, which aided the imperialists. Despite ideological controversy, however, Borba conveyed Yugoslavia's desire to "continue in the future also to develop the most fruitful co-operation with all socialist countries and Communist parties" but only, the paper added, according to "principles of equality, voluntariness, nonimposition of views, as well as true socialist internationalism which is not deformed by any monopoly."

Borba's reply to Pravda's May 9 comments was even more illustrative of the specific matters in contention between Moscow and Belgrade than the Yugoslav response to the Chinese indictment. Borba began by noting the Soviet charges that Yugoslav theories were revisionist and suited to imperialist designs. The paper, then, not incorrectly, depicted the choice offered them by the Soviet solutions to the dispute as surrendering or being subject to more compulsive measures on an economic and political level. In this the Yugoslavs perceived hints of strictures reminiscent of the post-1948 Stalinist blockade.
Borba stoutly defended Yugoslavia's acceptance of American economic aid and recalled that this had not prevented them from tendering broad support to Soviet foreign policy in 1957. The Yugoslav organ also felt constrained to remind the Soviets of their 1956 October 30 declaration on relations between socialist states, which offered negotiation on any problems, and the November 1 Chinese ratification with its reference to equality and the "errors" of "chauvinism". Having surveyed the past and effectively cautioned the Soviets against a repetition of old faults, Borba turned to an analysis of existing problems.

Yugoslavia, it was stated, supported Communist unity but not a mere "formal unity". The current claim that Yugoslavia was splitting socialist solidarity was really a façade concealing a different meaning:

Actually, this accusation means that we, Yugoslav Communists, are being asked to keep quiet in the name of unity while those who criticize us, again in the name of unity, appropriate the exclusive right to speak . . . .

Borba also wondered whether the general improvement of Soviet-Yugoslav relations from 1955 had perhaps harboured ulterior Soviet motives which had been frustrated and, subsequently, given vent to the recent polemics. In this, the Yugoslav party organ came very near the heart of the matter; for throughout the general rapprochement of 1955, 1956 and 1957 the maximum objectives of Tito and Khrushchev
had been largely irreconcilable and, in many ways, the various issues now in contention between the two accurately reflected this contradiction.

Despite this, Borba described an identity of Soviet and Yugoslav objectives regarding the over-riding cause of socialism and endeavoured to minimize the proportions of Soviet-Yugoslav disagreements and to confine them to the ideological field. Further exacerbation or extension of the controversy, Borba felt, would,

... make the continuation of Soviet-Yugoslav co-operation directly dependent on whether existing ideological and tactical differences are eliminated; and by elimination it means that Yugoslavia should renounce views which are based on fundamental principles.

Such a situation, to Borba, was tantamount to asking Yugoslavia to "abandon its independent policy" and "to give up its independence". Yet Borba felt that the dispute was intensifying after the post-1948 model and this, to the Yugoslavs, was unacceptable and harmful to socialism. Borba once more pledged Yugoslavia to seek good relations with the USSR and the other socialist countries on a basis of equality. Borba, however, closed with the observation that:

... it is necessary to warn that it would be sheer illusion to think that the unprincipled attacks on Yugoslavia could in any way cause the Yugoslav Communists and the peoples of Yugoslavia to waver.
By the time of this warning, however, this new Soviet-Yugoslav conflict had attained a certain internal momentum. Anti-Yugoslav ideological polemics, spurred on by the uncompromising Chinese stand with its resurrection of the spectre of the bitter Cominform split, had steadily gained in intensity throughout the Communist bloc. Conversely, Yugoslav resistance had stiffened. And, even at best, ideological censure is a passive form of disapproval.

Moreover, the intimate interconnection between Communist inter-party and inter-state relations exaggerated the difficulty of confining the controversy to a theoretical level. As a result, true to Soviet implications, the ideological debate spilled over into inter-state matters and, on May 27, the Soviets effectively postponed 285 million dollars worth of the credits promised to Tito in 1956.1

Even this chastisement did not satisfy the Chinese and on June 1 they launched a furious onslaught against Yugoslav positions.2 To Ch'en Po-ta, the author, the quarrel with Tito represented a major conflict. For this, Tito and his "leading group" were responsible for having attacked

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1. Excerpts from the diplomatic correspondence surrounding this Soviet action are in Goldwin, (ed.), with Stourzh and Zetterbaum, op. cit., 552-558. The Yugoslav public statement announcing the Soviet action is in Bass and Marbury, (eds.), op. cit., 190.

Marxism-Leninism and "the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union" with the express intention of weakening and dividing the Communist movement. Tito and his cohorts had done this, according to the Chinese interpretation, because they had been "bribed" by aid from the American imperialists. Ch'en obviously implied by his references to Tito's "leading group" that this group should be removed by the Yugoslav party, a tactic carried over from Stalinist methods which Borba had previously noted in the Chinese May 5 article.

Ch'en proceeded with a point by point denunciation of the Yugoslav programme. The catalogue of revisionist heresy included failure to acknowledge the dichotomic nature of international politics; a "bourgeois nationalist" insistence on remaining outside "the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union"; a general critique of international blocs which failed to distinguish between socialist and imperialist policies; improper exposition of the logic of socialist development, the socialist state and the nature of capitalism; diminution of the role of Communist parties in constructing socialism; an incorrect understanding of the evolution of Marxist-Leninist ideology; and, of course, a wrong attitude toward Communist relations and unity as illustrated by Yugoslav allusions to "ideological monopoly" and "political hegemony".
In compressed form, the Chinese were angered by Tito's refusal to observe ideological discipline, to adhere unconditionally to a solidly united Communist phalanx and, at the same time, to grant unqualified support for aggressive Communist international initiatives which the Chinese hoped to successfully urge upon Khrushchev. China's advocacy of this latter type of policy was characterized by the meteorological metaphor of "the east wind prevailing over the west wind" which Ch'en repeated. Since by early 1958 Khrushchev had decided upon a foreign policy of détente and summit diplomacy, Chinese condemnation of Yugoslavia might conceivably have served indirectly as a means to weaken Khrushchev's resolve on this score. At any rate, in Yugoslav revisionism, the Chinese saw an enemy whose presence could be exploited to reinforce unity and discipline within the remainder of the Communist movement. A common enemy always promotes cohesion; thus, Ch'en indicated, the Yugoslav programme, . . . will serve as an example in reverse to educate the Yugoslav people [as distinct from the 'leading group'] and the Communists of the world and enable people to distinguish still more clearly between Marxism-Leninism and anti-Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism has always grown and developed by combating opportunism . . . So long as Marxist-Leninists wage clear-cut, uncompromising struggle against modern revisionism, the international Communist movement is bound to benefit.
In the wake of Ch'ên Po-ta's tirade, Khrushchev personally entered the fray in a speech delivered on June 3 to a Bulgarian party congress. Deriding Yugoslav theories critical of the Soviet system, Khrushchev indicated that Yugoslavia herself subsisted on "alms" and "leftovers" from the imperialists. And Yugoslav precepts definitely served imperialism and weakened the unity and effectiveness of socialism. In this regard, Khrushchev enjoined the Yugoslavs to recall the maxim of the old socialist August Bebel: "If you are praised by your enemy, think what stupidity you have committed." Khrushchev pressed on to apply the unflattering pseudonym "imperialist lackeys" to the Yugoslavs and to equate Yugoslavia to a "Trojan horse" in the Communist camp.

With evident purpose considering his notions on Communist discipline, Khrushchev recollected the significance of the November 1957 Communist conference as a demonstration of unanimity and of true Marxist-Leninist ideological rapport. Khrushchev reminded his audience that that conference had pronounced revisionism the "main danger" to Communism and, he added, especially when proferred by wolves in sheep's clothing or, in his own parlance, "agents of the class enemy" masquerading as Marxist-Leninists.

1. The relevant portion of this speech is in Bass and Marbury, (eds.), op. cit., 190-200. A more abbreviated version is in Goldwin, (ed.), with Stourzh and Zetterbaum, op. cit., 559-563.
At this point, Khrushchev undertook an extensive review of Soviet-Yugoslav post-war relations. The notorious 1948 Cominform resolution, Khrushchev decided, was "a just criticism of the activity of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on a number of questions of principle." Revealing the essence of his strategy following the 1955 Belgrade visit, Khrushchev noted that he had sought unity with Tito through a common loyalty to a fundamental core of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Khrushchev attributed the failure of this plan to Tito's incapacity to renounce wrong opinions. Indeed, Tito had even become a detractor of the USSR, the Communist bloc and the fraternal parties especially during the "counter-revolutionary rebellion in Budapest" when "the Yugoslav embassy became in substance a center for those who started the war against the people's democratic regime in Hungary."

1. Apparently, even at the time of Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade in 1955, the Soviets had never repudiated the original 1948 Cominform resolution but only the second, more vituperative, 1949 version which had allegedly been based on forgeries by Beria and Abakumov. This fact was confirmed by the French Communist Fajon and the former Polish Communist Seweryn Bialer. See Zagoria, op. cit., 181. Thus, the Chinese and then Khrushchev's reassertion of the 1948 Cominform verdict were not technically cases of double-dealing. In a speech cited later in this chapter Khrushchev himself confirmed that, in 1955, the Yugoslavs had been advised that the 1948 resolution had not been rejected. The Yugoslavs never contested the essential truth of this. Brzezinski discusses this whole question, op. cit., 175 and 183.
Also, Tito's Pula speech had been anti-socialist and anti-Soviet and had "contained direct appeals to certain forces in other socialist countries to follow a so-called Yugoslav course."

Despite all this, Khrushchev maintained that he had tried again to co-operate with Tito after their August 1957 confrontation in Bucharest. But the Yugoslavs had dissented from the November 1957 declaration and, perhaps most importantly to Khrushchev,

... the Yugoslav leaders decided to come out with their platform, a Draft Programme of the League of Yugoslav Communists opposed to the co-ordinated views of the Marxist-Leninist Parties and pretending to be a programme of the international Communist and workers' movement.

This being his judgement, Khrushchev associated himself unreservedly with the hard line of the Chinese and, accepting Chi'en Po-ta's idea of a Communist discipline buttressed by common opposition to Titoism, pointed out that:

The forces of socialism, the unity of the Communist and workers' Parties, can be strengthened only in the struggle against revisionism and in the struggle for the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory.

Khrushchev intoned a desire to rebuild Soviet-Yugoslav inter-party relations but, in any event, he was, he said, set upon maintaining good state relations. However, on no account would he make ideological concessions. Khrushchev concluded with the soldier-company analogy cited previously. To restore
harmony, Tito would have to get in step; in the meantime, Khrushchev was convinced that the other Communist parties would remain united, especially in stalwart opposition to "contemporary revisionism".

Khrushchev's personal assumption of a share in the prosecution of Yugoslavia propelled the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute a step farther and called forth a rebuttal by the primary defendant, Tito. It came at Labin on June 15.¹

Tito perceptively explained that the current Soviet-Yugoslav quarrel found its origins far in advance of the convention of the Yugoslav party congress. He cited Yugoslavia's non-endorsement of the November 1957 declaration and her persistent non-adherence to the socialist camp as the dominant factors. In fact, the ancestry of the conflict was even more complex but, for the moment, Tito's own observations merit additional scrutiny.

Tito defended Yugoslav non-alignment as a forthright answer to the tensions inherent in international polarity and an asset to the cause of socialism. He reprimanded both the Soviets and the Chinese for unjustly representing Yugoslav opinions but he was also irked by the insufficient publicity extended to Yugoslav ideological postulates. Understandably,

Tito was hostile to Chinese ideological interpretations which he termed the "freakish" results of "would-be Marxists" which would cause Marx, Engels and Lenin to "turn in their graves". Furthermore, he identified the Chinese with "the Stalinist position in regard to relations among socialist countries." Then, striking the Chinese on a vulnerable, and not invalid, point, Tito accused them of opposing the relaxation of international tensions and equated this position to that of "the most reactionary warmongering elements in the West". To clinch his case, Tito recalled that the Chinese liked to point out that 300 million of them would survive a nuclear war. In all, Tito recognized the oriental influence in the assault upon Yugoslavia and he struck back at what he calculated to be the most exposed Chinese flanks.

Tito knew, however, that the Chinese were not alone and that he was under fire from all sides. He suspected, correctly, that certain Soviet expressions of good will were dictated only by their international public relations' value and the lessons of suspended Soviet economic aid and the cancellation of various visits, including early in May, that of Soviet President Voroshilov, were not lost on him. But he decried the notion that Yugoslavia was a "Trojan horse" in the Communist camp and defended acceptance of American economic aid noting that:
Comrade Khrushchev often repeats that socialism cannot be built on American wheat. I think that he who knows how, can do it; and he who does not know how, cannot build socialism even on his own wheat.

In this remark, Tito again counterposed his own ideas on Communist policy to those of Khrushchev and, naturally, found his own superior.

Once again, Tito rejected the re-introduction of the 1948 Cominform resolution and pledged that the tactics which it symbolized would again prove unproductive. Tito followed with a stark, but applicable, characterization of the objective of renewed Soviet anti-Titoism, "... the aim of this entire campaign is to silence our principles on proper and just relations among socialist countries." Then, Tito reverted to the very attitude which had inflamed Khrushchev:

> It looks as if history had ordered us to take this hard path so that the development of socialism may be preserved from degeneration, so that socialism may come out of the present reign of chaos into the world with a moral strength that will assure its victory.

Even more clearly Tito exhibited what Khrushchev considered intolerable arrogance in the Yugoslav leader, "... morally we stand higher than they do, because we know that we are right ...". Nonetheless, Tito still held out hope for another reconciliation with the Soviets.

By this point, the Communist case for the prosecution of Tito and the latter's defense in a kind of pseudo-trial
for treason had largely run its course. The outcome was never in doubt but satisfactory restitution could not be exacted from Tito nor the ultimate penalty enforced. Nevertheless, in a sense, the trial was re-enacted, the verdict pronounced and the sentence carried out.

On June 16, Hungary announced the trial and execution of Imre Nagy. The communiqué noted that Nagy had "sought refuge where support had previously been granted" — in the Yugoslav embassy.¹ It was also alleged that from his sanctuary Nagy had continued to direct the Hungarian resistance. Two days later, the Chinese explicitly connected the Yugoslavs and Nagy indicating the similarities between Nagy's and Tito's viewpoints and depicting Titoism as a major provocation in the Hungarian violence.² To the Chinese, the collapse of the Hungarian revolt had been a rebuff to revisionism; nevertheless, the incident had confirmed that revisionism was the gravest danger to Communism and, therefore, that, "There is not the slightest ground for compromise between Marxism and revisionism."

¹ The entire text of the Hungarian communiqué is in Benes, Byrnes, and Spulber, (eds.), *op. cit.*, 181-189. The relevant segment is also in Bass and Marbury, (eds.), *op. cit.*, 214-219.

Yugoslavia strenuously protested the Nagy execution recalling that Hungary had violated the safe conduct pledge Nagy prior to his departure from the Yugoslav embassy and, now, the guarantee of his personal welfare. However, the Yugoslav protest reserved first priority for branding the allegations of Yugoslav complicity in Nagy's actions as fabrications comparable to the admitted falsification of evidence in the 1949 Rajk trial. Thus, Tito once more perceived a reversion to Stalinist anti-Titoist methods and he realized that, in effect, Nagy had been condemned not only for his own misdemeanors but also, implicitly at least, as a human sacrifice for the execution of an anti-Titoist expurgation.

The anti-Titoist barrage continued throughout the balance of June with the Chinese still loosing the most devastating salvos. Now, even Gomulka, who had remained hesitant at the outset of conflict, joined the anti-Titoist chorus. Though he stated that he still harboured hope that

the Yugoslavs would recant, he argued that their views were incorrect, detrimental to Communist unity and, as such, pleasing to the imperialists. Thus, Tito once more found himself repudiated by the entire Communist bloc.

The final major episode in the renewed Soviet-Yugoslav feud was staged by Khrushchev on July 11 when he addressed an East German party congress.¹ Khrushchev again played heavily upon the theme of Communist unity. He repeated that the original 1948 Cominform decision on Yugoslavia had been basically correct and stated that Tito had been advised of this in 1955. But he rejected the Yugoslav contention that the current quarrel was merely a reactivation of the earlier one, citing the relative tranquility of 1955 and 1956 as evidence of this. He blamed Yugoslavia for the recent deterioration of relations and noted that, even after Yugoslavia's non-signature of the 1957 Moscow declaration, he would have been content to minimize ideological disagreements in favour of common principles. His policy, he said, was "for the complete consolidation of the ranks of the Communist movement." Therefore, revisionism had to be thwarted; and Tito had revealed his own intractability at Labin. Significantly, Khrushchev noted of the Yugoslavs that,

¹. Ibid., 202-216. Brief excerpts are in Goldwin, (ed.), with Stourzh and Zetterbaum, op. cit., 567-570.
They assert that we are somehow distorting Marxist-Leninist doctrine and that they themselves are the genuine preservers of Marxism-Leninism.

Khrushchev spiritedly defended the Soviet system against Yugoslav criticisms. In this, he particularly singled out the successful orbiting of the Soviet sputniks in 1957 thereby implicitly confirming the growing self-confidence with which he regarded his foreign policy and his diplomatic opportunities. At the same time, Khrushchev derided the condition of the Yugoslav economy and its reliance on American "handouts".

As always, Khrushchev asserted that Yugoslavia received American aid because its policies tended to weaken socialist unity and the whole cause of socialism. From this, Khrushchev developed the necessity of "monolithic unity" and, employing the stratagem of cohesion against revisionism, he pointed out that Yugoslavia did not criticize only the Soviet Union. Expanding upon the theme of unity, Khrushchev denied that the USSR sought any hegemony and he reminded his audience that it was not the Soviet Union which had insisted on the formula of Soviet leadership included in the 1957 declaration. Despite this disavowal, Khrushchev upheld the concept of a "special role" for the Soviet Union and referred to the Soviet Communist party as the "vanguard of the international Communist movement".
On the whole, Khrushchev's speech contained all the standard anti-Titoist jibes. The Yugoslavs were accused of pursuing a schismatic, revisionist line beneficial to imperialism. In sum, they were a "Trojan horse" in the Communist camp. However, Khrushchev also displayed a buoyant optimism with respect to his own leadership and the general cohesion and vitality of the Communist movement itself. Thus, despite its perils, the Yugoslav "Trojan horse" was less dangerous than that of the Greeks. On this basis, Khrushchev suggested that Communists "should not devote greater attention to the Yugoslav revisionists than they actually deserve" lest their heretical theories receive undue publicity and prominence. And, although Khrushchev seemingly considered an eventual reconciliation feasible, for the moment, he was apparently confident that he had forged a stable Communist unity under his leadership to which Yugoslav dissidence had ceased to pose any substantive threat:

In general, comrades, it should be said that no matter how unpleasant may be the consequences of the revisionist dislocations of the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, they still do not constitute an earthquake which could shatter our socialist structure. On the contrary, we have strengthened our building even more of late through our mutual efforts. An unshakeable foundation for the construction of Communism has already been laid.

With this newly found morale, Khrushchev was preparing for advances on other fronts and Tito and company could safely
be relegated to the role of idle bystanders to be ignored and "to find other allies for themselves".

Despite the risk of repetition, the foregoing extensive discussion of the 1958 Soviet-Yugoslav conflict is instructive for a number of reasons. The dispute exhibits a certain innate dynamic propensity towards step by step escalation beyond the bounds that the principal participants would have preferred to establish. In addition, the episode is illustrative of a multitude of individual issues which beset Soviet-Yugoslav relations and which the various parties were unusually frank in elucidating. There were, of course, esoteric factors also involved but both these and the points actually debated comprised questions upon which, even in their most amicable moments, Khrushchev and Tito had never achieved a conclusive modus vivendi.

The nature of proletarian internationalism and the question of doctrinal legitimacy, or, conversely, ideological monopoly, were prime topics in the 1958 disagreement. In proletarian internationalism, Tito saw hints of quasi-Stalinist Soviet "political hegemony" within the Communist bloc; and, to him, Soviet insistence upon a degree of theoretical orthodoxy represented a further attempt at ensuring Soviet primacy within international Communism. Tito rejected both since he was committed to a substantial Yugoslav sphere of
independence in both domestic and foreign policy. Moreover, Tito also demanded ideological heterodoxy in order to augment his own influence within the Communist movement and, coincidentally, to promote the adoption of policies which he considered capable of facilitating the cause of international socialism. Much of the 1958 friction, then, was inspired by differing Soviet, Yugoslav, and Chinese, assessments of the quality of alternative socialist internationalist policies. And accordingly, each stressed different imperatives as essential prerequisites.

To Khrushchev, Tito's stubborn independence was a decisive irritant. Tito refused to join the Warsaw Pact and the Yugoslav party programme codified a system of doctrinal diversity which threatened the pattern of Communist discipline based upon ideological conformity which Khrushchev had sought to fashion, especially through the 1957 Moscow conference. Tito thus challenged Communist unity, Soviet doctrinal authority and intra-Communist Soviet primacy, all of which Khrushchev wished to consolidate before turning to more far-reaching international policy. For this, Tito had had to be rebuked and his influence repelled.

The sanctions Khrushchev applied, for reasons noted earlier, became increasingly stringent. In this, the effect of Chinese influence was considerable. This has been summarized by a Western observer in a passage worth quoting at length:
It is not accidental that Yugoslavia became the major target of Peking's venom. In periods of international calm, when the strategy of the Right allows co-operation with socialists, neutralists, and moderates, bloc relations with Yugoslavia tend to improve. At such times, there is no great need for iron discipline within the ranks. Conversely, in periods of international tension, when Left foreign policy is in the ascendant and co-operation with socialists, neutralists, and moderates yields to revolutionary and direct action tactics, the errant Yugoslavs are the first to feel the burden of the change. At such times, it is necessary for the bloc to close ranks and unify policy-making. Hence, in the spring of 1958, the beginning of the Sino-Soviet conflict manifested itself in divergent attitudes toward Yugoslavia. The Russians wanted to increase pressure on Tito, but not to the point where the strategy of the right would be jeopardized. The Chinese, on the other hand, were calling for an abandonment of the strategy of the Right and, consistent with this, for an all-out assault on Yugoslav revisionism.¹

Indeed, Khrushchev did adopt the theme of unity versus revisionism for tactical advantage in the quarrel with Yugoslavia. By the time of his speech in East Germany, however, Khrushchev deemed the latest manifestation of Tito's insubordination to have been effectively countered and his main attentions were shifting to other areas.²

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CHAPTER V

CO-EXISTENCE, POLYCENTRISM AND RENEWED RAPPROCHEMENT

Beginning in 1955, Khrushchev had embarked upon a plan to re-orient international Communism, and particularly the Communist bloc, according to a more liberal and, consequently, more dynamic design. Within this general blueprint, Khrushchev hoped to obtain the reintegration of Yugoslavia into the Communist orbit. Khrushchev's purpose was to popularize and stabilize Communism in Eastern Europe and to increase the appeal of socialism in the non-aligned nations of the world. For both these ends, Tito's aid was desirable and Tito himself was favourably disposed towards Khrushchev's initial experiments.

Khrushchev, however, sought controlled experiments and, at all times, the maintenance of effective Soviet primacy within the international Communist movement. Thus, the upheavals of 1956 were especially disconcerting to the Soviet leader. As a result, in 1957, Khrushchev's efforts concentrated upon reconstituting Communist discipline and reinforcing Soviet authority. In this, the CPSU First Secretary relied, in large measure, upon Marxist-Leninist ideological solidarity and Soviet doctrinal pre-eminence.
This explains the significance of the 1957 Moscow Communist party conference and the resultant declaration and the subsequent universal condemnation of ideological revisionism.

In the meantime, Tito's prickly independence had proven incompatible with Khrushchev's notion of Communist discipline and his commitment to Soviet leadership of international Communism. Tito's faults had included his equivocation concerning Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt, his non-signature of the 1957 declaration, and his promulgation, in 1958, of a comprehensive manifesto of revisionist concepts which clashed with Soviet ideological formulations on any number of issues thus challenging Soviet ideological supremacy and, therefore, Soviet leadership of the Communist world. In general, Tito had persistently opposed even minimal Communist discipline under Soviet authority and, simultaneously, exhibited definite ambitions to expand his own influence, which could only have been at Moscow's expense.

The repeated examples of dissention between Moscow and Belgrade reflected basic disparities in the objectives of Khrushchev and Tito in their relations with each other. This divergence reached a climax in 1958 and gave rise to the intense public debate and denunciation which surrounded the publication of the Yugoslav party programme.
By the time of this dispute, however, Khrushchev was satisfied with the degree of disciplined Communist unity which he had achieved. In addition, Soviet predominance had been unambiguously acknowledged, with the enthusiastic aid of Peking, by all the Communist regimes but Tito's. Thus, for Khrushchev, the 1958 onslaught against Yugoslavia was primarily a holding action designed to protect the renewed solidarity of the Communist bloc. Satisfied with the latter, optimistic as to the opportunities for extra-bloc Soviet political successes, and confident of his ability to achieve such, Khrushchev was impatient to apply his talents to this end free from the encumbrances raised by jousts with Tito. This logic dictated Khrushchev's suggestion, in his speech in East Germany on July 11, that the Communist campaign against Yugoslavia be de-escalated and Tito allowed to slip unobtrusively into the background of Communist affairs. Consequently, Khrushchev abandoned his attempts to convert Tito into a pliable ally. Instead, there evolved a Soviet policy of attrition,

... aimed not only at driving Tito into a permanently defensive position and forestalling the impact of Titoism on the bloc, but also at utilizing the influence of a Communist, but unattached, Yugoslavia among the uncommitted countries in order to move them farther away from the West. The aim was, thus, to end Titoism as a liability in the Communist world and turn it into
an asset in the cold war against the West, and in the meantime patiently waiting for Tito to pass from the scene, when the chances of Yugoslavia's reintegration into the socialist bloc would be greatly enhanced.

In addition, Khrushchev's attentions were diverted in 1958 by the Middle Eastern crisis of July, the bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu by the Chinese Communists in August and September and his own attempts to convene a summit conference to deal with the division of Europe and the questions of Berlin and Germany.

Without the publicity of ideological debate with the Soviet party patriarch, Tito could not mount the rostrum to advertize his own brand of Communist theory and policy. The Yugoslav press continued to print firm but restrained replies to the critiques of Titoist ideas emanating from the various other Communist party journals but, for the most part, Tito had to content himself with the mundane diplomatic tasks of various cultural and economic agreements. At the same time, Gomulka, who had moved away from Tito following the outbreak of the Soviet-Yugoslav ideological quarrel earlier in the year, had decided to improve his relations with Khrushchev. Thus, during a prolonged visit to Moscow in October and November, Gomulka's attitude towards Tito was highly critical. This elicited a sharp Yugoslav rebuttal

which virtually terminated any chances for an effective Warsaw-Belgrade collaboration in intra-Communist affairs.\footnote{See Bromke and Drachkovitch, "Poland and Yugoslavia: The Abortive Alliance", Problems of Communism, vol. X, no. 2, March-April 1961, \textit{30-31}.} Tito's ideological eclipse was perfectly agreeable to Khrushchev. The Soviet leader remained, however, amenable to minimal diplomatic contacts with Yugoslavia. Thus, on November 11, during Gomulka's visit, Khrushchev noted, "We will strive to develop friendly relations with Yugoslavia along state lines and encourage trade and cultural ties."\footnote{Quoted, \textit{ibid.}, 31 and Drachkovitch, in Kertesz, (ed.), \textit{op. cit.}, \textit{304}.} But, at the same time, "As for our disagreement on ideological questions, we have waged and will continue to wage an irreconcilable struggle against distortions of Marxism-Leninism."\footnote{Quoted, \textit{ibid.}, 31 and Drachkovitch, in Kertesz, (ed.), \textit{op. cit.}, \textit{304}.} Briefly, then, correct state relations with Yugoslavia, no compromise with Tito's ideological deviations and public indifference to the latter were the three facets of Khrushchev's policy towards Tito by late in 1958.\footnote{Concise discussions of this policy are in Bromke and Drachkovitch, \textit{loc. cit.}, 31 and Milorad Drachkovitch, "The Emerging Pattern of Yugoslav-Soviet Relations", \textit{Orbis}, vol. 5, no. 1, Winter 1962, 444-5.}

Tito summarized his position in a speech at Novo Mesto on November 23.\footnote{The relevant extract is in Goldwin, (ed.), with Stouzh and Zetterbaum, \textit{Readings in Russian Foreign Policy}, 571-573.} Tito repeated his claim to be a true
internationalist who shared the common interest of all Communists in building socialism. As always, however, he held to the principle of Communist equality: "... relations between socialist countries should have proper and firm foundations, and should not be based on camps or on the domination of one party or country by another." Nevertheless, in view of the general aim of socialism, Tito promised cooperation with anyone if ideological criticisms would give way to negotiation of differences. He denied being at odds with Marxism-Leninism but, in fact, adhered to revisionism by implicitly claiming the propriety of his own theories, which, he suggested, were valid illuminations of Marxist-Leninist thought.

Despite Tito's conciliatory tone, the main obstacles to close collaboration remained. First, Tito noted:

We did not agree with the Stalinist practice in the relations between socialist countries, and it is exactly this question, the question of relations between socialist countries, which is the core of this dispute. However, we cannot depart from our policy in this.

Second, Tito still stubbornly remained independently minded and self-righteous:

... I think the time will come when they will realize that we are right, and that they will therefore give up their futile efforts to make us change our opinions by force ... .

Tito could not wait indefinitely, however, and, as he had
done during his estrangement from the USSR in the early 1950's he turned to the other facets of the triangular pattern of diplomatic relations which formed an integral feature of the concept of "active co-existence" so recently defined by the 1958 Yugoslav party programme. At year's end, Tito embarked upon an extensive tour of the non-aligned areas of Asia.

This tour represented a major effort by Tito to refurbish his image among the uncommitted nations of the world and to ply his notions of non-alignment and active co-existence there. The objective was to emphasize the identity between the policies and interests of these nations and Yugoslavia in order to supply Tito with an alternative source of international influence and support to that dissipated by the renewed rift with Khrushchev and the latter's subsequent coolness. While Tito was courting the non-aligned and restoring some of the rapport with the United States sacrificed between 1956 and 1958, Khrushchev's policy of ideological quarantine and diplomatic propriety continued to govern Soviet-Yugoslav relations during 1959.

The Communist press continued its anti-revisionist forays and, at the CPSU Congress in January, Khrushchev himself dutifully upheld Soviet doctrinal orthodoxy and warned against the hazards of Yugoslav revisionism. The Congress's final declaration reaffirmed the incorrectness of
revisionist doctrine but stated that, "... the Soviet Union will continue to work for co-operation with Yugoslavia in all questions of the struggle against imperialism for peace in which our positions will coincide."¹ And, indeed, normal economic and diplomatic relations continued. Even ideological criticism subsided, especially in September and October when first Khrushchev and then Tito visited the United States and the "Spirit of Camp David" pervaded the international scene. By the end of the year, Soviet and Yugoslav foreign policy were in overall harmony and trade between Yugoslavia and the bloc was expanding.

At the same time, Khrushchev had no reason to be dissatisfied with Tito's courting of the non-aligned nations of Asia. By his own admission, Tito was out to promote acceptance of the socialist system amongst these nations and this was in line with Khrushchev's own aspirations to expand Soviet influence in the same areas of the world. In this respect, Tito's "active co-existence" could be a boon to Soviet policy and this was one of the reasons Khrushchev had attempted to restrain the 1958 feud. Only when the anti-bloc element of Tito's foreign policy came to the fore did that policy run against the Soviet grain. After the collapse of

¹ Quoted, Drachkovitch, "Yugoslavia", in Bromke, (ed.), The Communist States at the Crossroads, 187.
the May 1960 summit conference, though Tito condemned the American U-2 flight, he also attributed a share of the responsibility to Soviet policies. This ruffled Khrushchev's composure and Tito was again chastised for underestimating the differences between socialism and capitalism, for indirectly aiding imperialism and harming the international socialist movement.¹

Tito's promotion of "active co-existence" in Asia, however, was much more unpopular in Peking. Tito's idea of a non-bloc bloc of neutrals exercising an independent and moderating influence on international politics contrasted sharply with the Chinese line of a militant anti-imperialist front in Asia which would augment her own significance there. Thus, "Communist Chinese has been especially aroused against Tito because of the conflicting aims Communist China and Yugoslavia have among the uncommitted nations."² And, since Khrushchev was not unsympathetic to Tito's activities in Asia, "... the relationships of the Soviet Union and Communist China to Yugoslavia reflect the struggle for the uncommitted nations."³ The motives for Moscow's moderation towards Tito after 1958 and Peking's continuing hostility, however, have somewhat deeper roots.

². Ibid., 183.
³. Ibid., 183.
Ever since Khrushchev's destruction of the myth of Stalin in 1956 and the disastrous after-effects, the Chinese had harboured suspicions of Khrushchev's ability to lead international Communism along the correct avenues. At the same time, Peking believed that its own merits as an experienced and loyal Communist state with great potential for international power made it deserving of a larger share in the formulation of international Communist doctrine and policy. After Hungary and its own brief but unpleasant experiment with liberalization, China adopted a more radical attitude toward Communist affairs. This was reinforced, in international strategy, by the Soviet successes in rocketry in the fall of 1957.

To Peking, Tito was the arch liberal in the Communist camp whose presence had encouraged the dislocations of 1956. And, as noted previously China's interpretation of the appropriate international Communist strategy for prevailing circumstances called for a strict Communist discipline to be imposed at the November 1957 conference. Tito's opposition to such regimentation, his aloofness from the Communist bloc and his advocacy of an international Communist policy diametrically opposite to that of Peking all contributed to the ardour of China's anti-Titoism in 1958 and after. In short, Peking denounced Tito to accelerate the convalescence
of the bloc after the malaise of 1956 and to prepare the bloc for a militant approach to the West.

But, though Khrushchev assailed Tito in 1958 for challenging Soviet ideological leadership and scorning Communist unity, the Soviet leader exhibited certain "revisionist" tendencies of his own towards limited intrabloc diversity and a policy of détente vis-a-vis the West. These were, in essence, parallel to Titoist precepts and, as a result, Khrushchev's stance with respect to Yugoslavia was somewhat more restrained than that of the Chinese. The Khrushchevian penchant for quasi-Titoist, revisionist concepts resulted in the Chinese coming to view Yugoslavia,

... as a terrible preview of what Soviet Russia might become: a Communist regime which has lost its ideological and missionary fervor, retaining the ideology because there is nothing to take its place but attending mainly and prudently to its own national interests.¹

The divergent Soviet and Chinese attitudes to Yugoslavia thus reflected different concepts of global Communist strategy with respect to the West. The Chinese were the radical, militant revolutionaries and Khrushchev the moderate, flexible diplomat. Tito, therefore, was only an intermediary in a drama which masked a latent Sino-Soviet conflict.²

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2. The only concise, but not comprehensive, discussion of the divergent Soviet and Chinese attitudes to Yugoslavia is Byrnes, in London, (ed.), op. cit., 159-184. Reference should be made to sources cited elsewhere in footnotes.
In April, 1960, this conflict broke into the open with the Chinese publication of a long ideological tract entitled "Long Live Leninism". This article provided a doctrinal defense of the Chinese plea for radical Communist militancy. And, although the author attacked only the "Tito clique" directly, his perview was broad enough to include "modern revisionists" and, even more portentively, "modern revisionists represented by Tito". Thus, despite the deference paid to Soviet leadership of the Communist camp, "Long Live Leninism" constituted an ideological indictment of the international détente policies of Khrushchev. From this public début, the Sino-Soviet dispute rapidly began to grow in intensity.

Since 1958, the Chinese had led the anti-Titoist front because of their divergent international strategy and their concomittant conception of the appropriate organizational and ideological discipline for the Communist bloc. The assumption of greater significance by the Sino-Soviet dispute therefore naturally served to clarify the essential similarities between the foreign policies of Khrushchev and Tito, "peaceful co-existence" and "active co-existence", both of which emphasized international détente. This was exemplified in August by the publication in Borba of a series of articles

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1. This article and other documents bearing upon the course of the Sino-Soviet dispute in 1960 are available in Hudson, Lowenthal, and MacFarquhar, (eds.), The Sino-Soviet Dispute.
written by Kardelj and subsequently reproduced as a book Socialism and War.\footnote{Extracts are in Jacobs, (ed.), The New Communist Manifesto and Related Documents, 183-214.} Kardelj assailed the "pseudo-revolutionary ultra-radicalism" which characterized the attitude of Peking. He upheld the theory of the non-inevitability of war in the prevailing international climate, which formed the theoretical foundation for both Yugoslav and Khrushchevian foreign policy. Kardelj's logic clearly identified the Yugoslav preference for Khrushchev's case in the infant Sino-Soviet quarrel. On September 2, Pravda restated this case conferring provisional acceptance upon Kardelj's arguments though the Soviet organ maintained a critical stance toward Yugoslav revisionism which had again directed its criticism at a Communist state, China, rather than at the Western imperialists.

This hint of Soviet-Yugoslav sympathy on certain internal Communist matters was succeeded by an indication of cordiality on international affairs. In September, major figures from all the Communist states except China attended the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. There, Tito displayed considerable initiative in organizing a loose grouping of uncommitted nations to formulate independent proposals concerning the various items on the agenda. Stressing non-alignment and "active co-existence", Tito was obviously out to raise his international stature,
particularly among the Afro-Asians. But Tito's support for the major features of Soviet policy was also conspicuous. Khrushchev's greeting to Tito at the opening of the General Assembly session was demonstratively warm; and the Soviet Premier could hardly have been indifferent to Tito's overall performance but, on the whole, considering the United Nations' setting, Khrushchev's cordiality towards the "non-aligned Communist" was more likely derived from the fact that Tito was "non-aligned" rather than that he was Communist.

The most important event for all Communists in 1960, however, began in November with the convention, in Moscow, of a conference of eighty-one individual parties.¹ This meeting may have been conceived by Khrushchev as a forum for the repetition, on a grander scale, of the 1957 pattern which would assert Soviet — and his own personal — doctrinal authority over the worldwide Communist movement as the 1957 conclave had done with the Communist bloc. Unlike 1957, however, Khrushchev now faced an ideological challenge from Peking. What took place in Moscow, then, was an extensive and intense debate between Moscow and Peking especially on the issue of international Communist strategy in the nuclear era. The resultant statement represented an ambiguous

¹. An excellent and indispensable reconstruction of the deliberations at this meeting, which was held in camera, is provided by William E. Griffith, "Albania - The November 1960 Moscow Meeting: A Preliminary Reconstruction", in Laqueur and Labedz, (eds.), Polycentrism, 107-126.
compromise between the Soviet and Chinese formulations which each side could interpret in its own way but with specific Soviet attitudes predominating.¹ Since Tito shared many of the latter, he could be satisfied but he had not, of course, had any role in drafting the Moscow statement. Also, the direct Sino-Soviet confrontation on international Communist policy removed this aspect from the question of Communist relations with Yugoslavia. This last subject itself did produce debate at Moscow but this was subordinate to the other issues which had now been detached from the camouflage which "Yugoslav revisionism" had previously provided. Nevertheless, the Moscow statement did deal with the Communist attitude towards Yugoslavia.

Essentially, the Moscow statement² summarized the main issues which had divided Khrushchev and Tito since the 1957 Moscow declaration; and Titoist revisionism still remained anathema:

The Communist Parties have unanimously condemned the Yugoslav variety of international opportunism, a variety of modern revisionist 'theories' in concentrated form. After betraying Marxism-Leninism, which they termed obsolete, the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia opposed their anti-Leninist revisionist programme to the Declaration of 1957; they set the LCY against the international


². The whole text is in Hudson, Lowenthal, and MacFarquhar, (eds.), op. cit., 174-205.
Communist movement as a whole, severed their country from the socialist camp, made it dependent on so-called 'aid' from U.S. and other imperialists, and thereby exposed the Yugoslav people to the danger of losing the revolutionary gains achieved through a heroic struggle. The Yugoslav revisionists carry on subversive work against the socialist camp and the world Communist movement. Under the pretext of being outside blocs, they engage in activities which prejudice the unity of all peace-loving forces and countries. Further exposure of the leaders of Yugoslav revisionists and active struggle to safeguard the Communist movement and the working-class movement from the anti-Leninist ideas of the Yugoslav revisionists, remain an essential task of the Marxist-Leninist Parties.

In this paragraph, the 1960 statement rendered a neat synopsis of the division between Moscow and Belgrade.

In addition, the Moscow statement recognized the necessity to take note of "national peculiarities" in constructing socialism in order to retain the popularity and vigour of Marxism-Leninism. Thus, the "different roads to socialism" upon which Tito had always insisted were still open. As always, however, the statement reaffirmed the existence of a fundamental core of common, and therefore binding, doctrine. The statement called for the creation of a "spirit of socialist internationalism" and neatly balanced the priorities of eliminating "bourgeois nationalism" and "chauvinism". None of this was new and the theme of Communist unity too remained a cardinal point: "It is the supreme internationalist duty of every Marxist-Leninist Party to work continuously for greater unity in the world Communist movement."
In this, opposition to revisionism "which remains [as in 1957] the main danger" and fidelity to the precepts of Marxism-Leninism and the concept of "proletarian internationalism" continued to be the operative criteria for proper Communist demeanour. Equality of Communist parties and the validity of multilateral party conferences were reiterated. Despite the relevance of all the foregoing to Soviet primacy, even with the reaffirmation of the pacifying and established limitations, the role of the CPSU was conservatively characterized by the title "vanguard" rather than "leader" of the Communist movement.

Though little that bore on the separation of Khrushchev and Tito had been altered in theoretical terms by the Moscow statement, the last mentioned designation of the CPSU's relation to international Communism contains some significance for the Khrushchev-Tito relationship. The extent of Khrushchev's disaffection with Tito's revisionism was reduced by the relative increase in the former's distaste for Peking's belligerent dogmatism, and the Moscow statement reflected this. At the same time, Peking was a much more serious threat to Khrushchev's position than was Belgrade. And, the directness of the Sino-Soviet clash terminated Tito's symbolic inter-position between the two sides whose fire now bypassed the intermediary. In addition, the Sino-Soviet debate revealed and reinforced the growth of polycentrism. A wide range of Communist viewpoints was expressed on a number of issues. On this Communist spectrum, with the extremes more sharply defined,
Tito's position, while still distinct, tended to contrast vividly with Peking's and thus to blend with Khrushchev's. This was still more noteworthy for the fact that, at the 1960 meeting, Peking and its only staunch ally, Albania, the two leading anti-Titoists, represented an isolated minority. The Moscow-Peking falling-out and the strengthening of polycentrism were both contained in the designation of the CPSU only as the "vanguard" of international Communist—a formula that Khrushchev would have accepted in 1957 except for Chinese intervention.

The Sino-Soviet ideological quarrel at the November 1960 Moscow meeting, then, served to encourage polycentrism in both Communist theory and practice. Thus, the fact that Titoist revisionism was beginning to yield to oriental dogmatism as the main Marxist-Leninist heresy did not give adequate grounds for a Soviet-Yugoslav ideological rapprochement; but it did facilitate improved inter-state relations. In view of Khrushchev's search for international détente and, more especially, influence among the non-aligned states of Asia and Africa, the value of co-operation with Tito was increased by the deviation of the centre of Asian Communism—Peking. And, shortly after the Moscow conference adjourned, the Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, publicly noted the similarities of Soviet and Yugoslav foreign policies and
expressed hope for greater co-operation on this level between the two countries.¹

This was acceptable to Tito but only as a facet, and not the determinant, of his external policy. With polycentrism in the ascendant and his own prestige amongst the uncommitted nations growing, Tito had no inclination to prejudice the independence of his international actions. If these coincided with Moscow's, so much the better, but if not, Tito still retained international influence. On the ideological front, Tito's associate, Veljko Vlahovic, replied without concessions to the Moscow statement early in 1961. This was, of course, of little significance; for on ideology Khrushchev and Tito had reached an impasse. With inter-state relations to the fore, the important point was Tito's contacts with the Afro-Asians. April saw Tito off on a goodwill mission to northern Africa.

This tour was a preparatory prelude to the first "summit" conference of non-aligned states which Tito was to host in September. In the meantime, Gromyko's feelers towards Tito had been followed by a number of major trade agreements between Yugoslavia, the USSR and other bloc members. In July, Gromyko and Popovic, his Yugoslav counterpart, met in Moscow and reaffirmed the essential concordiality of the foreign policies of their respective governments.²

² See ibid., 83.
On September 1, delegates from twenty-five Afro-Asian and Latin American states gathered for the non-aligned summit conference in Belgrade. For Tito's policy of "active co-existence", this was a major success. Since the final collapse of Tito's attempts to inculcate Titoist theories into the general body of Communist ideology and policy in late 1957, Tito had devoted substantial effort both politically, through diplomatic contact and support for anti-colonialism, and economically, through trade and aid, to courting the uncommitted members of the international community. Amongst these, Tito sought a receptive response to Titoism. In this way, he hoped to achieve an international significance independent of Moscow and, if necessary, support against Soviet pressure. But Titoism was essentially socialism and, given Khrushchev's own international objectives and policies, the Soviet leader, if not the Chinese, was not averse to Tito's initiatives among the uncommitted nations. This was reflected in the improved Soviet-Yugoslav relations of early 1961. And, at the Belgrade conference, Tito performed well. He was critical of the West and took a pro-Soviet stance on most issues discussed. Most particularly, he was moderately sympathetic to the resumption of Soviet nuclear tests which coincided with the opening of the Belgrade consultations. As a result, the final communiqué omitted this subject to the benefit, at least officially, of the global Soviet image.
and the irritation of the United States where a review of policy towards Yugoslavia was undertaken.

From matters of foreign policy, the focal point of Soviet-Yugoslav relations reverted again to ideological issues and intra-Communist affairs with the convention of the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU in October.

In his opening speech to this Congress, Khrushchev enunciated a severe attack upon the Albanian Communist regime. Soviet-Albanian relations had been deteriorating since 1959 and especially from the time of the public eruption of the Sino-Soviet dispute. This deterioration had been accelerated by heated Soviet-Albanian exchanges at the November 1960 Communist party conference in Moscow;\(^1\) and, throughout 1961, the quarrel had continued to expand and gain in intensity. The relevance of the Soviet-Albanian feud to Soviet-Yugoslav relations is one of both cause and effect.

From 1948, the Albanians had been among the most devout Stalinist and anti-Titoist regimes in the Communist bloc. At every sign of Soviet-Yugoslav friction, Hoxha, the Albanian Communist party leader, had been hypercritical of Tito and Titoism. The roots of this attitude are historical; for, to Hoxha, Tito and Titoism had been a permanent threat not only to his personal position but also to Albania's

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independence. In the 1940's, Tito had sponsored the infant Albanian Communist party and later had aspired to both dominate his protégé and even to annex the whole of Albania. These objectives had been foiled by Stalin and, when the Soviet-Yugoslav break occurred in 1948, Hoxha had consolidated his own position and Albania's territorial integrity by a bloody anti-Titoist purge. From that time, Tito and Hoxha had remained sworn enemies.

The post-1955 Khrushchev-Tito rapprochement renewed the threat of Titoist domination of Albania. In addition, the de-Stalinization of 1956 was particularly ominous to Hoxha as an arch-Stalinist who became a principal target of Tito's anti-Stalinism. The Hungarian convulsion thus came as a relief to Hoxha who immediately directed a venomous tirade at Tito mentioned previously. Again in 1958, the Albanian Communists had been in the forefront of the anti-revisionist polemicists. The dominant factor in Albanian thinking, however, was always the potential threat that Tito posed to the survival of the Albanian regime. Thus,

Whereas China's hostility to Yugoslavia sprang from her approach to a wide range of ideological and political problems, Albania's approach to a wide range of ideological and political problems sprang from her hatred of Yugoslavia.

By 1959, Hoxha recognized that, despite the public differences of Khrushchev and Tito, there was an underlying similarity between the two which might emerge to his detriment. As a result, when the Sino-Soviet dispute developed, Hoxha recognized an opportunity to enlist an oriental guardian of his position and he rapidly adjusted his views to those of Peking. The Khrushchev-Tito relationship, then, was a compelling factor in the Soviet-Albanian split. At the same time, Khrushchev's denunciation of Albania and his subsequent suspension of diplomatic relations with Tirana widened the Sino-Soviet breach and further obscured that between Khrushchev and Tito.\(^1\)

The direct effect of the CPSU Congress on Soviet-Yugoslav relations was also salutary.\(^2\) In his opening address, as always, Khrushchev stressed Communist unity and stamped the Yugoslavs as revisionists noting that:

The Yugoslav leaders responded to the 1957 Declaration of the fraternal parties, which resounded throughout the world as a charter of Communist unity and solidarity, with a revisionist, anti-Leninist program that all the Marxist-Leninist parties criticized decisively and justly.\(^3\)

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1. For a full analysis and documentation on Yugoslav-Albanian relations and their influence on Sino-Soviet-Yugoslav relations, see Griffith, \textit{op. cit.}.

2. Various documentary compilations on the Soviet XXII Party Congress and its aftermath are available. The most selective and concise, which this author has used, is Alexander Dallin, (ed.), with Jonathan Harris and Grey Hodnett, \textit{Diversity in International Communism} (New York: 1963).

On the whole, however, Khrushchev's tone was moderate and conciliatory and the new CPSU programme adopted by the Soviet Congress described Yugoslavia as a socialist country.\(^1\) Thus, despite the programme's notation that, "... the Yugoslav leaders by their revisionist policy counterposed Yugoslavia to the socialist camp and the international Communist movement ...", a basic identity was established between Yugoslavia and the Communist bloc. Expanding this idea and echoing Khrushchev, the programme portrayed revisionism as potentially harmful to Yugoslavia's national interests by "threatening the loss of the revolutionary gains of the Yugoslav people" rather than solely as a loophole in Communist unity. Tito's socialist nature notwithstanding, however, Khrushchev had apparently abandoned the idea of imposing an ideological discipline on Tito but he wished to remain on good terms especially w.

\[\ldots\] we have fought and will fight against the revisionist positions of the leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia; at the same time, we have stood and we stand for the utmost development and strengthening of relations with Yugoslavia along state lines. On questions of the struggle for peace, our position and that of Yugoslavia coincide in many ways. The Soviet Union stands for the rapprochement and consolidation of all forces fighting against the imperialist warmongers, for peace and friendship among peoples.\(^2\)

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In general, the Soviet Party Twenty-second Congress illustrated a measure of continuity in Khrushchev's policies which boded well for Soviet-Yugoslav cordiality. This was appropriately symbolized by the ignominious removal of Stalin's corpse from Lenin's mausoleum and has been aptly summarized by a Western commentator:

The adoption of Khrushchev of a policy of de-Stalinization at the XX Congress in 1956 was greeted by the Yugoslavs as the turning of a new leaf both within the USSR and in relations with other Communist countries. Yugoslavia tended to sympathize with Khrushchev's course and to regard him as a main bulwark against a restoration of Stalinism. Their interpretation of Soviet policies assumed a continuing struggle within the Soviet Union and other bloc countries between unrepentant Stalinists, such as Molotov, Chervenkov, and Hoxha, and the progressive forces seeking to carry through a more thorough reform of the system. In this light, the renewed assault on Stalin by Khrushchev in 1961 was considered a necessary further step in this struggle. The attack on Albania... was, therefore, also welcomed, as a sign of removal of Stalinist methods and elements from other neighbouring Communist countries. ¹

The validity of the preceding summation was reflected in Tito's public reaction to the Soviet Congress in a speech in Skopje on November 13.² Though he alluded to his regret at the continuance of anti-Yugoslav ideological statements, Tito exhibited sympathetic optimism towards the Congress's outcome:

¹. Skilling, *Communism National and International*, 79.
². See the excerpt in Dallin, (ed.), with Harris and Hodnett, *op. cit.*, 584-587.
... we also saw in the work of the Congress a positive course, which has already begun to be reflected in the further development, not only of the Soviet Union, but of other socialist countries, too. So I think that this Congress has had and will have great significance in the further advance toward a really progressive and democratic movement, not only in the Soviet Union, but in the rest of the world in general.

Thus, Tito welcomed further de-Stalinization. And, his speech and other contemporary Yugoslav statements demonstrated unequivocal opposition to Stalinist-like Chinese and Albanian theses, whose invective, the Yugoslavs recognized, was not only anti-Yugoslav but also anti-Soviet. To the Yugoslavs, renewed de-Stalinization signified the possibility of more flexible and acceptable intra-Communist relations and freer ideological exchange devoid of arbitrary unity or symptoms of Soviet doctrinal monopoly or disciplinary primacy. In short, de-Stalinization signified polycentrism and the Yugoslavs were in favour.

By the close of 1961, then, a number of broad factors conducive to a renewed Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement were in evidence. The intensification of the Sino-Soviet dispute and Khrushchev's condemnation of Albania meant that Sino-Albanian dogmatism had replaced Yugoslav revisionism as the principal Communist deviation. At the same time, Yugoslavia had ceased to serve as a symbol upon which all Communist controversy was vented. Khrushchev's resumption of de-Stalinization both derived from and contributed to

1. See the excerpt in Dallin, (ed.), with Harris and Hodnett, op. cit., 587-604.
Sino-Albanian-Soviet discord. As an ally in the latter, and a proponent of the former, Tito could be valuable to Khrushchev even beyond Yugoslavia's contacts among the non-aligned nations. For Tito, all these intra-Communist developments heralded increased polycentrism which might allow him to augment his own influence on Khrushchev, and Communist affairs generally, without sacrificing his essential independence of action.¹

There were other factors, too, which heightened Tito's interest in rapprochement. By late 1961, the Yugoslav economy was beginning to experience major difficulties both internally and externally. At the same time, the continuation of American aid was uncertain because of the dissatisfaction generated in the United States by Tito's performance at the September non-aligned conference. Tito had expressed distress on this point in his speech in Skopje² discussed previously. Even more important economically, however, was the potential damage to Yugoslav trade implicit in the progressive integration of the European Economic Community (EEC). Apprehensions on this score had appeared in Yugoslav sources with growing frequency including Tito's Skopje speech.

². See Meier, loc. cit., 63.
The majority of Yugoslavia's foreign trade was done with Western Europe. Thus, discriminatory effects resulting from the EEC's common tariff structure could prove extremely detrimental to Yugoslavia's economic position. And, because of Tito's foreign policy, especially since his recognition of East Germany, he could not expect a sympathetic hearing from his Western European trading partners. In addition, from 1959, Khrushchev had been pressing Communist economic integration through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON or Comecon) as a counterweight to the EEC. Now, since Yugoslavia's bid for observer status in Comecon had been rejected as an adjunct to the anti-revisionist campaign of 1958, Tito was faced with the possibility of being excluded from both Comecon and the EEC and suffering an economic pincer movement. Since he was ill-disposed to accept the political implications of affiliation with the EEC even if the latter was offered, Tito's prospects focused upon Comecon. Although Comecon, like the Warsaw Pact, represented an institutional framework which might serve as a forum for the application of a Soviet-dominated Communist discipline, in the context of the polycentric trends operating within the Communist bloc, Tito could be less apprehensive on this score. For his part, Khrushchev could, on the other hand, hope that Yugoslav participation in Comecon would improve his disciplinary control but, even without this, it would
strengthen the organization and perhaps add to its external appeal.1

Numerous factors, then, favoured deliberate efforts toward a new Tito-Khrushchev rapprochement. In February, 1962, a trade agreement was signed and in April, when Gromyko was in Belgrade returning Popovic's Soviet visit of the previous July, the emphasis was upon the accord in Soviet and Yugoslav foreign policies. In May, in a speech at Varna, Bulgaria, Khrushchev's attitude was the same and he hinted at further co-operation in the economic sphere and other areas.2 In the meantime, Tito undertook an alteration in his domestic policies.

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1. "From its beginning the gradual Moscow-Belgrade improvement of state relations had characterized, in part arisen from, and intensified the Sino-Soviet dispute. By the spring of 1962, another factor became increasingly important in accentuating the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement: a common interest in combatting the discriminatory features of the Common Market. Khrushchev probably hoped that he could increase his influence with all anti-Common Market neutralist countries through a rapprochement with one of them, Yugoslavia, which is nearest to Moscow ideologically and is most threatened by Western European integration. For Yugoslavia, caught in the economic squeeze between the Common Market and CMEA and ideologically and politically opposed to the political concessions which association with the Common Market would inevitably require, a rapprochement with CMEA and therefore with the Soviet Union seemed less dangerous." Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, 147. See also Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, 44-45, and John C. Campbell, "Yugoslavia: Crisis and Choice", Foreign Affairs, vol. 41, no. 2, January 1963. This article in slightly revised form is also Chapter V in John C. Campbell, American Policy Toward Communist Eastern Europe (Minneapolis: 1965). These last two sources are also valuable with respect to American relations with Yugoslavia.

2. The relevant excerpt from Khrushchev's speech is quoted in Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, 148-149.
Up to this time, liberalization and decentralization had been the dominant trends in internal Yugoslav economic and social policies. Now, besides drought to aggravate an already troubled agricultural situation, the uncertainty of American aid, inflationary pressures and balance of payments difficulties, Tito was also faced with division among his colleagues on policy matters which also reflected national differences within the country.¹ The economic problems might be eased by rapprochement with the USSR and the conservative wing of the leadership favoured this and a more centralized internal control of the economy closer to the Soviet pattern. This same group sought a reassertion of the role and discipline of the Communist party.² In a speech at Split, in May, Tito came down in support of this conservative, centralist faction

1. One wing of the leadership comprised the political and ideological liberals and the economic de-centralists, who were mostly Slovenes and Croats, grouped around Kardelj. The other wing, mainly Serbs, led by Rankovic, included the ideological and political conservatives and the economic centralists. This group consequently was more pro-Soviet. See Meier, loc. cit., 66-77.

2. "The 'socialist commonwealth' to which Tito could return [in 1962] was a far cry from Stalin's 'socialist camp'. For Tito and his associates, particularly the more dogmatic Serb Communists around Rankovic, the terms for rejoining the 'socialist commonwealth' seemed favourable: it would not seriously impinge on their internal affairs; it would at least partially compensate, through Soviet trade and aid, for the damage the EEC threatened to bring to Yugoslavia; it would give the more orthodox Communists a renewed sense of ideological assurance and 'fraternal solidarity'; and for Rankovic and the Serb Communists it would provide a source of possible support in the event of Tito's death, which would probably trigger increased hostility in Croatia and Slovenia toward Serb Communist hegemony." Griffith in Brzezinski, (ed.), op. cit., 138-139.
and, though this retreat was almost certainly not intended as a substantial alteration of the distinctive features of domestic Titoism, it brought Tito's internal policies more in line with Soviet practices and reduced the visible ideological divergences from Soviet theory.

This reversion in Titoism announced at Split further improved the climate of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. In May, too, the Soviets issued an invitation to Tito to "vacation" in USSR and, in June, a Yugoslav parliamentary delegation travelled to Moscow. The negative manifestation of Soviet-Yugoslav cordiality was provided by another Albanian anti-Titoist tirade, which Peking immediately endorsed, but the effect of this was, not unpredictably, nil. On July 6, a major Soviet-Yugoslav trade protocol to the February agreement was concluded in Moscow. And, on July 11, Borba announced that Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Chief-of-State, would return Tito's 1956 visit to the USSR in September. This was clearly to be the final prelude to a recreated Khrushchev-Tito entente. During July, too, the second conference of non-aligned states took place in Cairo. This was, of course, noteworthy for the general outline of the Soviet approach to Yugoslavia, but at this conference Yugoslav influence was much less in evidence.

1. For other discussions of the Yugoslav internal situation, see Campbell, loc. cit.; Skilling, op. cit., 33-34; Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, 44-47; and Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, 147-148

than at Belgrade in 1961 and, for Tito, pre-occupied with economic calculations, his connection with the non-aligned was of little consolation.¹

The joint communiqué issued at the end of the Brezhnev visit² produced nothing novel, but it did illustrate certain considerations which governed Soviet-Yugoslav relations. The 1955 Belgrade declaration was re-affirmed as an obvious concession to Tito's sensitivities. Both sides stated their commitment to "peaceful co-existence" and their determination to preserve peace through negotiation of international problems. Agreement was expressed on the need for disarmament, a ban on nuclear testing, and support for anti-colonialism and the United Nations. For Soviet benefit, Tito assented to the idea of a German peace treaty which would recognize the existence of two German states. More revealingly, the communiqué expressed opposition to economic discrimination "as in the case of the Common Market". On their own relations, the two delegations noted recent improvements and called for greater co-operation in all areas. But, trade and economic collaboration were singled out. To this end, a further trade agreement was concluded. Most importantly, however, it was

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¹ "But the conference of unaligned states at Cairo in July 1962 demonstrated, if any demonstration was necessary, that from the economic standpoint, the non-aligned countries could provide neither a substitute for ties with the nations in the Common Market nor a serious means of bringing them to terms." Campbell, loc. cit., 390.

announced that Tito would "vacation" in the USSR in December. Once again, Tito and Khrushchev were about to attempt an entente.

Predictably, Peking and Tirana damned the Tito-Brezhnev accords,¹ the former because of its international militancy, the latter because of its nationalistic anti-Titoism. Meanwhile, the rest of the world's attention was monopolized in October and November by the Soviet-American confrontation over Cuba and the Sino-Indian border conflict. None of this, however, interfered with Tito's "holiday" plans and, in December, he repeated his 1956 trek to Moscow.

Once again, Tito received a most cordial welcome and was extended the honour of attending and addressing a session of the Soviet parliament, the Supreme Soviet. Khrushchev, however, took the podium first.² Reviewing the post-1948 Soviet-Yugoslav rupture, Khrushchev placed the principal blame upon Stalin but a share was also extended to the Yugoslavs. Now, however, Khrushchev noted with satisfaction the similarity in Soviet and Yugoslav foreign policies and he anticipated further co-operation. From this, Khrushchev turned to inter-party relations which was the next logical step in rapprochement.

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On inter-party contacts, Khrushchev's themes were familiar. His policy, he said, "aims at strengthening the unity between the CPSU and all the fraternal parties . . .". Khrushchev noted that ideological differences with Tito persisted, but he felt that these could be overcome by mutual efforts. And, he offered:

We are convinced that the restoration and strengthening of unity on ideological questions between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and all the fraternal parties on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism would be in the interests of both our parties and of the entire international Communist movement.

Despite the implications of Communist discipline and Soviet authority inherent in this conviction, Khrushchev firmly upheld the notion of "different roads to socialism" and rejected any attempt to impose a "stereotype" pattern. Still, he was explicit concerning the beneficial effect that Tito's recent internal, and conservative, reforms had had on Soviet-Yugoslav relations. He was also encouraged by improved inter-state relations as a prelude to further bilateral party intercourse and he specifically alluded to the "reinforcement of the Common Market" as an important factor with respect to inter-state relations. Khrushchev was chiefly concerned at this point, however, with inter-party matters and that meant with ideology. Thus, Khrushchev observed,
... if one proceeds from objective laws, from the teaching of Marxism-Leninism, it is impossible to deny that Yugoslavia is a socialist country. It is from this that we proceed in our policy and on this that we build our relations with Yugoslavia as a socialist country.

This was diametrically opposed to Chinese assertions that Yugoslavia was a capitalist state. And, in implicit relation to this, Khrushchev concluded with various thrusts against the "whole present fallacious line of the Albanian leaders".

Once again, Tito had good reason to be satisfied with his Soviet comrade. The fundamental soundness of Titoist ideological tenets had been upheld and the dogmatic, Stalinist anti-Titoists denounced. In response,¹ Tito was highly complimentary of Soviet internal development and Khrushchev personally for his handling of the Cuban crisis. In addition, he expressed satisfaction with improved Soviet-Yugoslav relations, both bilaterally and on questions of foreign policy; emphasized the broad common interests of the USSR and Yugoslavia in promoting peace and socialism; and intoned a willingness to pursue further the elimination of differences in Yugoslav and Soviet views. Tito skirted inter-party relations but he hinted at flexibility in this sphere.

Tito's departure from the USSR was a warm leave-taking.²

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2. See portions of Khrushchev's and Tito's speeches, ibid., 10.
The Soviet "holiday" had obviously been a success. In his departing speech, and in confirmation of some of his most recent preoccupations, Tito paid special note to opportunities for further Soviet-Yugoslav economic exchange. But the results of the sojourn with Khrushchev went beyond this. The entente between the two had been rekindled, primarily in their capacities as heads of government of like-minded nations, but also as socialist comrades. This camaradrie prompted Tito to invite Khrushchev to take his next "holiday" in Yugoslavia, and the latter accepted.

The December Khrushchev-Tito tête-à-tête was following in January by the appearance of a Yugoslav party delegation at a Congress of the East German Communist party. This was the first time since 1948 that Yugoslav representatives had attended a national Communist party congress within the bloc. This attests to the increasing significance being attached to Soviet-Yugoslav party contacts. In addition, the Chinese delegate to this Congress was rudely shouted down when he rose to speak and Khrushchev was pointedly absent for this incident.

The growing inter-party cordiality indicated by the East German Congress and other exchanges between the Yugoslav and other bloc parties was repeated on the state level. In March, Popovic observed that:

1. For a discussion of the visit, see Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, Chapter 8.
the main foreign policy interests of Yugoslavia must be co-operation with the other socialist countries and that 'similar views concerning the questions of co-existence and foreign policy in general are among the most important forms of expression of the 'common ideology'."

However, Tito was not ignoring the triangular pattern of international relations which underlay his "active co-existence". While Tito was in Moscow in December, Kardelj had been visiting the non-aligned while Rankovic, the most pro-Soviet of Tito's intimates, accompanied Tito. Factors external and internal had, of course, reduced the significance of Tito's connections with the non-aligned, but the importance of this association had not been eliminated. On his return from Moscow, Tito himself had indicated that:

"... Yugoslavia 'could not change its foreign policy', and that the 'closest co-operation with socialist countries' did not 'encroach on our independent policy or involve the abandonment of friendship with all, including Western, countries'."

And, in May, the Western apex of the "active co-existence" triangle was refurbished when the American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, visited Belgrade. In all, Tito was not prepared for any exclusive entente with Khrushchev but, thanks to the polycentric circumstances prevailing within the Communist world, exclusivity was not a sine qua non.

1. Quoted, Meier, loc. cit., 61.
2. Skilling, op. cit., 22.
Tito's next move towards Khrushchev came at a meeting of the Yugoslav party's Central Committee in May.\(^1\) Tito denounced the Chinese without quarter for their dogmatism and militancy which, he indicated, distorted socialism and socialist international relations and threatened the principles of peaceful co-existence, particularly among the non-aligned nations, which, of course, was highly significant given Tito's own policies. This rigidly anti-Chinese stance obviously suited Khrushchev's point of view and Tito's remarks were reprinted, though in a more restrained form, by *Pravda*. More directly, Tito lauded Khrushchev and the improvement in Soviet-Yugoslav party relations. To Tito, the 1960 Moscow statement's anti-Titoist passages were "a thing of the past". Consequently, he told his party:

> We must be especially interested in the developments in the international revolutionary workers' movement. We must be aware that we make up a part of this movement and do not stand outside it.\(^2\)

The Yugoslav meeting gave some evidence that elements of the leadership remained hesitant towards the rapprochement with Khrushchev but this group had apparently been over-ruled. Various references were also made to further economic links with the members of the CMEA, but not to the extent of full association with that organization.

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1. This meeting is discussed in Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift*, 131-134.

2. See ibid., 133. This statement is also quoted in Meier, *loc. cit.*, 61 and Skilling, *op. cit.*, 22.
Despite Tito's adjuration, quoted above, to his colleagues reminding them that they were "part of the international revolutionary workers' movement", by May 1963, Tito had clearly not returned outright to the Soviet bloc. As one author has put it:

Even this statement, and the presence of a Yugoslav delegation at the congress of the [East German Communist Party] in Berlin [in January], did not indicate the return of Yugoslavia to the Soviet bloc. She remained outside both the Warsaw alliance and Comecon, and was not committed to obey the leading member, the USSR, still less to take military or economic actions resulting from bloc decisions, except by her own free choice.¹

Of course, given his own independent nature and the requirements of his non-Communist political and economic relations, Tito was never likely to return to the Communist bloc in this sense. In reality, however, by mid-1963, Khrushchev's standards for Tito's association with the bloc had undergone a diminutive metamorphosis. Under the pressure of extensive polycentric forces and the Sino-Soviet dispute and in view of his own flexible international and intra-bloc policies, Khrushchev was relatively content with Tito's general allegiance to the cause of socialism. Thus, as in his speech during Tito's visit to Moscow in December 1962, the socialist nature of Yugoslavia was reaffirmed in a Soviet letter to the Chinese at the end of March² and again in the customary May-day

¹. Skilling, op. cit., 23.
². See Document 1 in Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, 256.
greetings to foreign Communist parties. ¹ This was, naturally, pleasing to Tito and unacceptable to the Chinese who had branded Yugoslavia as a capitalist state and an imperialist sympathizer. By this time, however, the rift between Khrushchev and the Chinese was virtually irreparable and this was further assured, in June, when Peking produced a comprehensive alternative to Khrushchev's programme for international Communism ² and, in July, when the nuclear test ban treaty was concluded, to the utter fury of the Chinese.

With Tito's oriental antithesis adamant in its attitude, Khrushchev embarked upon his previously arranged journey to Yugoslavia late in August. ³ This meeting created no new bonds between Khrushchev and Tito but it did illustrate some that already existed. The two leaders emphasized their desire to aid the developing nations, thus signifying the main point of intersection in their foreign policies. In their own relations, the cohesive element remained the intangible common adherence to the ideology and practice of socialism. This socialist comradeship, in their view, precluded the possibility of any insoluble differences arising between them. Despite an approbative indication by Khrushchev

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² The entire text is Document 2 in Griffith, *ibid.*, 259-288.
³ This "vacation" is discussed in Griffith, *ibid.*, 166-167.
that he wished to study Tito's domestic economic apparatus, no consequential forms of inter-party association were apparently agreed upon. The over-riding themes of the Khrushchev visit, then, were agreement on basic principles, continued de-emphasis of ideological differences and, of course, concurrence in foreign policies. On the whole, Khrushchev apparently sanctioned Tito's socialist independence and also, undoubtedly to Tito's pleasure, agreed to limited participation by Yugoslavia in some activities of the CMEA whose integration had been progressing steadily through late 1962 and early 1963.

The fraternal socialist coziness between Tito and Khrushchev exemplified by Khrushchev's Yugoslav junket, inevitably, infuriated Peking. The resulting Chinese polemic, appropriately titled "Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?," condemned the Tito-Khrushchev cordiality. On the other hand, the Chinese perceptively recognized valid grounds for this in the anti-Peking orientation of both Tito and Khrushchev. Peking, of course, characterized this, rather unflatteringly, as an anti-Marxist-Leninist duet which gave rise to a lengthy list of sacrilegious deviations common to both its members. With the Sino-Soviet conflict extreme however, these Chinese fulminations were quite futile.

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Meanwhile, with Khrushchev's approval for his activities fresh, Tito took advantage of the pacific international climate which followed the test-ban treaty to shore up his other diplomatic interests. He departed for visits to the United States and Latin America. In the course of this tour, Tito addressed the United Nations' General Assembly. His emphasis was on the congruency between non-alignment and the promotion of peace. The appeal this had for the unaligned nations had a definite public relations' value for Tito and Khrushchev probably hoped that some of this would rub off on him.

By the latter months of 1963, however, the emphasis in Soviet-Yugoslav relations was once more fixed upon intra-Communist affairs. To Khrushchev, the intransigent oriental crusade against his policies was becoming intolerable. Moreover, the Sino-Soviet conflict contained major implications for all the Communist regimes. For Tito, any possible Sino-Soviet reconciliation represented a grave peril for it could only be at his expense. Such an accommodation would subject him anew to ideological vilification and to exclusion from the Communist bloc, where the Sino-Soviet malevolence was the main encouragement to the polycentrism upon which his appeal and influence depended. In late 1963, however, the possibility of a Moscow-Peking détente was remote in the extreme. And, in fact, Khrushchev was beginning to consider
the idea of another all-Communist conference, which, under the circumstances, could only have ended with a condemnation of dogmatism and the expulsion of the Chinese from the Communist orbit.

Though Tito's views were unrelentingly anti-Chinese, this last exigency was not completely satisfactory from his standpoint. Excommunication of the Chinese would obviously formalize a Communist schism of incalculable proportions. Even beyond considerations of Communist unity, and the fact that ostracism of Peking would revive a principle from which Tito himself had suffered however, was the apprehension that a final Sino-Soviet rupture would reverse polycentrism in Eastern Europe, by eliminating its principal cause, through the reassertion of strict Communist discipline under Soviet authority. This, as with a Sino-Soviet reconciliation, would be most detrimental to Tito's position in Eastern Europe and his entente with Khrushchev. To Tito, then, his interests would probably be best served by a continued and indecisive Sino-Soviet debate within a single, but increasingly polycentric, body of international Communism.

While the idea of an all-Communist conference continued to simmer, Khrushchev's favourable disposition towards Belgrade and the continued growth of polycentrism steadily brought Tito into closer relations with the rest of the bloc. Late in 1963, Yugoslav observers appeared for the first time at
meetings of some subsidiary organs of Comecon and, in the following months, Tito's direct contacts with the other Eastern European regimes multiplied noticeably. In November, Rumania's Gheorghiu-Dej visited Belgrade for the first time in seven years; on Yugoslavia's National Day, Czechoslovakia's Novotny telegraphed congratulations to Tito, addressing him, for the first time since 1948, as "esteemed comrade", and, in response, Popovic paid an amicable visit to Prague in December; in January, Rankovic led a delegation to Hungary for the first official high level exchange with Hungary since 1958; in May, Kardelj journeyed to Czechoslovakia and East Germany and the Czech Foreign Minister returned Popovic's visit and arranged for Novotny to accept Kardelj's invitation to see Tito in September; and, in June, Tito was off to Poland for eight days. These and other personal exchanges were supplemented by various bilateral cultural, scientific and economic agreements. Khrushchev's cordiality towards Tito was apparently contagious and Tito was willing to avail himself of the epidemic. The decisive factor, however, was the new spirit of polycentrism abroad in Eastern Europe. In this, the Tito-Gheorghiu-Dej relationship merits special attention.

In the joint communiqué issued at the end of Gheorghiu-Dej's November visit to Belgrade, reference was made to "the fact that every socialist country makes its own contribution to the enrichment of the joint experience of socialist
development . . .".¹ This was clearly a Titoist precept, but as 1964 wore on it became evident that Gheorghiuc-Dej's acceptance of this notion was more than merely formal. Thus, not only did Yugoslav-Rumanian economic and diplomatic co-operation increase in early 1964 but the attitudes of Gheorghiuc-Dej towards ideology and Communist relations converged with those of Tito. The Rumanian leader had apparently decided to pursue his own socialist road, both internally and externally, more independently of Moscow. As a result, Rumania began to hesitate on those features of Comecon's integration which did not serve its national interest and to rethink the validity of absolute coincidence between her external policy and that of Moscow. Both these inclinations were confirmed during discussions between Rumania's Premier Maurer and France's De Gaulle in Paris in July. On Comecon, Maurer stated:

We feel that such forms of co-operation are incompatible with essential principles, namely, the observance of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of countries, principles which underlie relations between socialist countries.²

On Rumania's foreign policy:

We have close links of friendship with the other socialist countries. This is a fundamental element of our foreign policy. At the same time,

². Quoted, *East Europe*, vol. 13, no. 9, September 1964, 43.
we develop our relations with other countries and have set ourselves the policy of developing relations with them . . . Peaceful co-existence is not, in our opinion, a reciprocal tolerance, an indifferent and passive juxtaposition. We give this notion an essentially active meaning . . . . . . . This implies the use of all resources, and all the possibilities available to states to understand each other and to co-operate.¹

The similarity of these statements to Tito's positions, especially regarding "active co-existence", is striking. Gheorghiou-Dej had apparently chosen the Titoist model for the creation of a new Rumanian external orientation and a more fluid relationship with the Communist bloc. Gheorghiou-Dej's opportunity in this respect derived from the Sino-Soviet dispute. Like Tito, then, Gheorghiou-Dej was benefitting from the Sino-Soviet division; but, whereas for Tito the latter helped reconcile Khrushchev to Yugoslav independence, for Gheorghiou-Dej it helped to assert Rumanian independence from Khrushchev. Thus, while Tito moved towards Khrushchev under the influence of the Sino-Soviet controversy, Gheorghiou-Dej moved away towards a neutral position in order to play both ends against the middle. Like Tito, then, Gheorghiou-Dej had a vested interest in the continuation of an inconclusive Sino-Soviet struggle and he therefore opposed the idea of an all-Communist conference which might expel Peking.

¹ Quoted, East Europe, vol. 13, no. 9, September 1964, 43.
The concurrent interests which Gheorghiu-Dej and Tito had in further polycentrism within the Communist bloc and, hence, in keeping the Sino-Soviet controversy alive dictated their reticence towards an all-Communist conference which might end the Moscow-Peking split by completing it. These Yugoslav-Rumanian interests were also shared by other parties for similar reasons, i.e., not because they favoured Chinese views but because they favoured polycentrism. Thus, in a press conference after visiting Tito in January, Togliatti expressed agreement between the Italians and the Yugoslavs on the validity of "various roads to socialism" and on the undesirability of an all-Communist conference.\(^1\) Despite these opinions, however, Khrushchev was apparently bent on a showdown with the Chinese because of the disruptive effect the continued conflict was having. Consequently, it soon became clear that the Soviets under Khrushchev's leadership had begun to work on the Communist regimes, not only by means of ideological argumentation but also by all kinds of 'moral' as well as political and economic incentives, in the direction of a general mobilization for the ideas and political goals of Moscow in its conflict with Peking.\(^2\)

The results of this campaign reflected both the interest in and the effects of polycentrism. At a French party congress in May, the Soviet delegate, Mikhail Suslov,

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1. See Meier, loc. cit., 81.
2. Ibid., 82.
asserted that an all-Communist conference was "necessary for the international Communist movement." This was supported by the delegations from Bulgaria, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and France. The Rumanians, the Poles and the Italians generally skirted the issue, the latter calling for unity "in diversity and autonomy", and the Yugoslav spokesman, while joining the others, except the Rumanians, in anti-Chinese criticisms, conveyed predictable hesitance. The officially stated Chinese view at this time was that any conference would require lengthy preparations covering four or five years. Characteristically, the Albanians held that any conference must include representatives of all pro-Chinese Communist factions.

With the conference issue in doubt, and his control of the Communist movement obviously greatly weakened, Khrushchev invited Tito to stop in Leningrad on the latter's return trip from a visit to Finland in early June.

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1. Reports on this congress are in *East Europe*, vol. 13, no. 7, July 1964, 1 and 25-26.

2. This reflected a Yugoslav statement, published in April, to the effect that: "Dogmatism of the Chinese . . . can be overcome only by means of anti-dogmatic practice, only through a persistent and tireless struggle for the democratic, the great ideals of socialist relationships among peoples and nations . . . certainly this is far more important than any kind of articles and meetings." Quoted, *East Europe*, vol. 13, no. 5, May 1964, 33.

3. The reports on this meeting are in *East Europe*, vol. 13, no. 7, July 1964, 25 and 57.
Not surprisingly, the discussions concerned "problems of the international Communist and workers' movement". Though the final communiqué made a perfunctory reference to the need for Communist unity, no mention of the conference question was made. Tito, therefore, must have remained true to his own position. On the other hand, in the interests of elemental Communist unity, Tito must have agreed to attempt to restrain the centrifugal forces in Eastern Europe in return for Khrushchev's word that these would still be allowed to develop at a reasonable pace. Evidence that this was the case is provided by Tito's consultations with Gheorghiu-Dej shortly after his meeting with Khrushchev. During these discussions, which were arranged on Tito's initiative, Tito apparently asked Gheorghiu-Dej to de-emphasize his aspirations to independence. In return for political support, Tito indicated, Khrushchev was prepared to permit Rumania to follow her own economic course.¹ Tito was, of course, highly satisfied with Gheorghiu-Dej's policies but he probably assumed a mediatory role in order to maintain his rapport with Khrushchev and to preclude any dramatic erosion of Communist unity, which was now fluid enough not to interfere with his own interests.²

¹ See East Europe, vol. 13, no. 8, August 1964, 1 and 44.
Tito's intercession with Gheorghiu-Dej was only partially successful. Soviet-Rumanian relations improved somewhat with a meeting between Khrushchev and Gheorghiu-Dej in Moscow early in July; but the effect was short-lived. In June, just prior to Tito's arrival, Gomulka had finally endorsed the convention of a Communist conference and, by late July, Khrushchev felt confident enough to schedule a preparatory meeting for December. Gheorghiu-Dej, however, declined to attend and, in August, Soviet, Chinese, Yugoslav and Albanian delegates were all present at a Rumanian party congress.

Tito himself was not invited to the December pre-conference. Various reasons may account for this. On the surface, it appears as a concession to the Chinese but Khrushchev may have looked upon Tito's presence as likely only to further exacerbate proceedings that already promised to be difficult. In addition, Khrushchev was seeking reinforced Communist solidarity behind his leadership and given Tito's reticence towards multilateral Communist conferences in general, and this one in particular, his attendance was not notably desirable; nor, for that matter, was he likely to attend in any event. This non-invitation, however, did not react to the detriment of Tito's relations with the bloc. In September, Novotny and East Germany's Ulbricht visited Belgrade and Tito paid his first official
visit to Hungary since 1947. And, in mid-month, it was announced by Belgrade that Yugoslavia would associate with Comecon. By the end of September, then, Tito was in more intimate accord with the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe than at any time during Khrushchev's stewardship. Now, suddenly, in October, that stewardship came to an end; Khrushchev was relieved of power.

It was ironic that Tito's intimacy with the Communist bloc should reach its zenith when Khrushchev's fortunes reached their nadir. Throughout their association, both had sought to achieve an amicable alliance for the promotion of similar goals. Both had sought a liberalization and stabilization of the Communist regimes and a restoration of a dynamic appeal to international Communism. In this, however, their respective national interests were not always compatible. Khrushchev desired a degree of Communist discipline and ideological orthodoxy and, above all, the maintenance of effective Soviet authority within the Communist world. Tito, on the other hand, desired independence, ideological and political diversity and definite influence upon Communist affairs. There were, then, both cohesive and divisive elements within the Tito-Khrushchev relationship and its course during any period depended upon which predominated. In fact, the relationship formed a barometer of sorts for Khrushchev's intra-Communist and international
policies. If the relationship was cordial, he favoured relaxation of Communist discipline and a flexible international policy; if it was not, he favoured tighter discipline and a more rigid international line.

From 1960, however, the outstanding determinants of the Tito-Khrushchev relationship were the Sino-Soviet conflict and the accelerated emergence of polycentrism which it engendered. In the end, then, the relations between Tito and Khrushchev were influenced by a factor which they themselves had encouraged. This situation has been aptly summarized by a Western analyst of Communist affairs:

It was both the policy and the predicament of Khrushchev which enabled the Yugoslavs to draw closer to the Eastern European bloc without giving up the essential aspects of their independence. The Soviet leader was never averse to Yugoslav independence as such. What he objected to was Tito's proselytising and his independent role in foreign policy. One of his first moves when it became obvious that the point of no return with China had been reached was to affect yet another reconciliation with Tito. This was completed in 1962, and it implied tacit concessions on both sides. Tito stopped proselytising which he was no longer in any position to carry out, while Khrushchev refrained from insisting on a full obedience in foreign or intra-bloc policy which he would never have been able to enforce. No one can say that both sides were satisfied, but the unwritten agreement was acceptable because both sides realized that they were less strong than before.1

Thus, the common general objective which they had sought largely through individual efforts ultimately brought Khrushchev and Tito into close accord. This coincidence, of course, had not always prevailed and the Tito-Khrushchev relationship had been a turbulent one; it had been one of both harmony and discord.

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