I will explain how the Strauss/Kojève debate represents a microcosmic view of the tension which I hope to prove underlies the post-historical world. As we shall see, it is a tension wrought by understanding Hegel's success as the "eclipse of meaning" and by understanding his failure as the inability of man to regain for himself a sense of vision.

I would like to make one final remark in connection with the grammar of the text. As a rule, I do not use gender-neutral pronouns throughout the thesis for the following reasons. First, many of the sources which I quote and comment upon were written in a language which clearly reflects the male-oriented social conventions of their time. In order to keep a certain stylistic continuity, I maintained their linguistic conventions. Unfortunately (and this leads to my second point), I unconsciously allowed this anachronistic usage of pronouns and nouns to extend beyond the bounds demanded by the cited texts. In these instances I apologize for the bias and would like to state that it in no way reflects my sentiments concerning the equality of the sexes.
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Gilbert Germain
INVESTIGATIONS IN NOMOS AND PHYSIS:
A SOJOURN INTO MODERNITY

by

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A thesis submitted to Carleton University in fulfillment of the requirements of the course Political Science 599, as credit toward the degree of Master of Arts.

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INVESTIGATIONS IN NOMOS AND PHYSIS:
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"Investigations in *Nomos* and *Physis*: A Sojourn into Modernity" encompasses in part an exegesis of two Greek terms, respectively translated as "convention" and "nature", through the entire spectrum of Western political theory and practice.

It attempts to show how the Hegelian notion of Spirit historicizes the original sense of the term *physis*, and consequently renders it indistinguishable from *nomos*. In short, an attempt is made to define modernity as the demise of *physis* or, conversely, as the exaltation of *nomos*.

The consequences of this shift from the natural to the conventional is the topic of the second segment of the paper. Here we enter modernity proper and explore the various relations between time, technology, and liberalism.

The thesis concludes with a critique of the Hegelian hermeneutic and also highlights the irony of life in the new world by pointing to the inherent "incompleteness" of any alternative to modernity.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Professors Bela Egyed, John Alexander, and Linda Freeman for their suggestions as to the areas where this thesis was in need of clarification. As far as the original source of inspiration for this project is concerned, I have no one to credit but my advisor, Professor W.T. Darby. For the past three years he has never failed to implant within me the desire to expand my understanding and appreciation of political thought.
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INTRODUCTION

It is useless not to seek, not to want, for when you cease to seek you start to find, and when you cease to want, then life begins to ram her fish and chips down your gullet until you puke, and then the puke down your gullet until you puke the puke, and then the puked puke until you begin to like it.

from Matt
S. Beckett

According to Hegel, man will be completely free only "by surrounding himself with a world entirely created by himself". But this is precisely what he has done, and man has never been so en-chained, so much a slave as now.

from The Trouble With Being Born

E. M. Cioran
At the outset I would like to clarify as much as possible a term which is central to this text and to political philosophy in general. I speak of the word "modernity". As the title of this thesis suggests, the following pages give an account of an intellectual and political excursion into this realm called "modernity" or "the new world". Two points immediately come to mind which are in need of explanation with respect to the subject matter of this paper. First, some working definition of "modernity" is required before an investigation of the forces which lead to it can begin. Secondly, if the inquiry contained herein advances into the modern world, one must know something of the nature of the "pre-modern" era from which the sojourn begins and through which it progresses.

Leo Strauss straightforwardly states that: "... modernity is secularized biblical faith; the other-worldly biblical faith has become radically this worldly. Most simply: not to hope for life in heaven but to establish heaven on earth by purely human means". If Strauss' definition is accurate, as I will prove it is, then modernity is inextricably linked with the pre-modern or biblical era. For, as Strauss points out, "secularization" in this instance means: "... the preservation [em] of thoughts, feelings, or habits of biblical origin after the loss or atrophy of biblical faith". And because, as it will be shown, Christianity is a direct descendent of Platonism, it can be concluded that modern political philosophy is a "reversal" of its classical counterpart. The distinction which most decisively separates classicism from modernity is,
at bottom, a difference with respect to man's orientation to the being of things. For instance, classical political philosophy regards man as a being whose power is essentially limited. Plato captures this spirit when he says that men are the playthings of the gods. One lives the good life (i.e., the life lived "according to nature") when one does not exceed certain prescribed limits. As Strauss says: "This limitation shows itself in particular in the ineluctable power of chance".\(^3\) For Plato (and Aristotle), the appearance of the best political regime depends upon chance, i.e., upon the unlikely collaboration of philosophy and political power. We may call this attitude toward the possibility of the existence of certain political configurations "fatalistic" or "passivistic", and indeed it is when viewed through modern eyes. However, for classical political philosophers such a notion would be quite meaningless. This is because the very dichotomy "active/passive" is a product of modern thinking, that is, of a thinking which is at base "technological". By this I mean that the salient feature of modernism is the belief that "man is the master of all things".\(^4\) Unlike the classical and Christian situations, modern man regards himself as a being whose nature is essentially unlimited and open to self-conscious alteration. As Strauss notes, this "reversal" finds political expression for the first time in the writings of Machiavelli, especially in the metaphor where he states that fortuna (chance) is a woman who can be controlled by the use of force.\(^5\) Here Machiavelli is giving expression to a truly modern sentiment, i.e., that a desirable political order can be established through the power of human
willing and action.

The only problem with Machiavellian politics is that it neglects the whole philosophic and theological Western tradition, that is, it destroys the bond between politics and natural law (i.e., Justice). Hence, although the will to create political order may exist, the actual "content" of the desired state (i.e., the "political good") is without form. History has shown that the content of the best political order is eventually drawn from Christian theological sources. Strauss rightfully concludes that: "The Machiavellian revolution [i.e., modernity] acquired its full force when that connection [between politics and natural law] was restored".6

I maintain that Hegelian political philosophy is, if not the first, then at least the most persuasive and enduring expression of modernism precisely because it grounds politics within "the whole". The Hegelian notion of Spirit is the link which binds politics (time) with rational necessity (eternity). In other words, the modern state is the political (i.e., secular and temporal) manifestation of Christian (i.e., eternal) ethics. It falls completely in line with Strauss' original definition of modernity as secularized biblical faith. The modern state is the product of men who control fortuna in such a manner as to establish the Kingdom of God on earth.

This union of time (politics) and eternity (Christian ethics) in the earthly state marks the "end of history" for Hegel. Although the notion of the completion of history was soon to be rejected by post-Hegelian thinkers, the idea of "historical progress", per se (Hegelian "history" minus its
specific telos), remains intact. I hope to show that the very concept of "historical progress", as it is perceived within its current technological context, is dependent upon an understanding of the human condition that is congruent with the spirit of Hegel's claim that we live at the end of history. I will put forth the view that this modified theological hang-over lies at the core of the modern or "new" world and that it serves as the measuring stick by which we gauge our worth as a civilization. The overall aim of this thesis, then, is to convince the reader that Hegel ought to be read very closely.

Having made these introductory remarks, I would like to state what I take to be the defining characteristic of the modern world. I ought to preface my thoughts on this matter, however, with a note of caution. It has been and will continue to be argued that "modernity" is solely a "Western" phenomenon. To be sure, when I speak of political philosophy I am implicitly referring to our Western heritage. However, as I hope to illustrate, the Hegelian hermeneutic accounts for a political order (i.e., liberalism) and, in a more comprehensive but related sense, for a way of perceiving being (i.e., technology), that is truly universal in scope. Hence the "modern world" includes the entire earth in principle if not in fact. Difficult as it may be for some to accept, I believe that clear vision will reveal the fact that no part of the globe is left untouched by the liberal-technological gestalt. For this reason, I maintain that the terms "modernity" or the "modern world" are not vague and imprecise but are accurate labels for our collective condition.
The modern western world is experiencing a truly unique phenomenon, unparalleled in its history, for never before has a civilization been so conscious of its "satisfaction".

It is crucial that one avoid the temptation to equate satisfaction with "happiness". The satisfaction referred to here is wrought from knowing that which makes for happiness. One is satisfied to the degree that one is conscious of what constitutes the "good life". Now there are two things that are evident with respect to the vita bonum in the modern world. First, it is of this world and hence realizable in principle. Secondly, because the vita bonum is immanent, there is tremendous homogeneity among the populace concerning its content. To be sure, there are "lifestyle" to choose from, but let us not forget that even rats in a maze make "choices".

Beckett warns of the danger of the complacency brought on by knowledge of "ends". Life appears to him as an almost demonic force. Like a malignant tumor, it consumes everything it comes into contact with until its growth is checked by an opposing force of equal magnitude. Such a force for Beckett is found in the spirit of "discontent" and "desire". Without it, the self is no longer an active entity. On the contrary, the satisfied self passively accepts that which the world offers, and in the process acquires a taste for overconsumption.

The passivity of the satisfied life denotes a certain feeling of being "at home in the world". The self does not
feel alienated or estranged from its surroundings. Therefore, satisfaction presupposes that the self (subject) no longer stands opposed to the object.

Now the harmonization of subject and object takes on two forms. First, as we will see, the two are reconciled politically in the modern liberal state. Secondly, there is a reconciliation between man and nature which results in the latter being controlled by the former. In order for nature to be tamed, man must come to two realizations. On the one hand, he must regard the natural world as mere lifeless matter. And on the other, man must see himself as a being worthy of mastery. I will show that both conditions have been satisfied by the work of philosophy. Hence, in order to comprehend our present condition more fully, it is necessary that we examine how and why philosophy has played a crucial role in the development of the satisfied man.

When it is said that satisfaction is the harmonization of the subject and the object, what is really being stated is that the self feels at home in the world because he has made it in the image of himself. Thus, as E.M. Cioran says, we in the modern world have taken as our own Hegel's claim that man is truly "free", and therefore fully satisfied, only when he surrounds himself with a world of his own creation. The satisfied man is he who sees himself projected into the object -- the world. Everywhere he looks he is confronted by his reflected image. Life is lived within the confines of a "Hall of Mirrors".
Hence, as a result of the desire to overcome the indeterminateness of the human condition, man creates a technological realm of which he is the alpha and omega.

The despairing tone of Cioran's dirge "mourns the passing of the gods from the world". He voices the anguish of a man who longs to lose himself in Being, but who lives in an anthropocentric universe that admits of no transcedence. Thus, it is ironic that the eradication of human alienation brings to the satisfied man a new form of ennui, i.e., man's boredom with himself.

It is the aim of this paper, in part, to outline a phenomenology of man's ever-changing orientation to the cosmos. I start with an analysis of a pre-self-conscious period where man and cosmos formed an indivisible whole, and end with a description of the modern post-historical world which resembles, in many respects, a return to the point of departure. Because I will be talking about the various relationships between the human and the natural (or spiritual), I have structured the first half of the thesis around a historical analysis of the terms nomos and physis.

Chapter I borrows from many sources in an attempt to follow the serpentine permutations of meaning these terms have exhibited through the ages.

The second chapter covers the same ground as the first, only this time through Hegelian optics. In other words, the nomos/physis dialectic is "Hegelianised".

The emphasis in Chapter III is on a reading of the
dialectic in terms of actual historical struggles for honor and prestige. In short, we are dealing with the Master/Slave dialectic. Hence, much of the third chapter involves an analysis of Alexandre Kojève's comprehensive treatment of the subject in his Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Because, as it will be argued, the Hegelian hermeneutic is descriptive of the "modern project", the end of the dialectics in this instance is a continuation of the account given in the first two chapters. Moreover, as we shall see, the modern world represents not only the continuation of the dialectic, but its end as well. And so this chapter concludes with an exegesis of the modern state from both a Hegelian/Kojèvian perspective and from a viewpoint which incorporates what has been said about nomos and physis.

In Chapter IV, the Hegelian/Kojèvian thesis is confronted with an opposing world view. Here the historicist conception of man is contrasted against the ahistoricism of classical/Straussian thought. The Strauss/Kojève debate thus will bring into sharp resolution the repercussions that these world views bring to bear on the world of thought and politics.

In the final chapter, I will discuss the successes and the failures of Hegelianism in the new world. Therefore, I touch upon the "incompleteness" of the System on the one hand, and the significance of the coupling of technē-lokos as it relates to politics and the psychic health of man, on the other.

In the conclusion, apart from the usual summarizing,
I will explain how the Strauss/Kojève debate represents a microcosmic view of the tension which I hope to prove underlies the post-historical world. As we shall see, it is a tension wrought by understanding Hegel's success as the "eclipse of meaning" and by understanding his failure as the inability of man to regain for himself a sense of vision.

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CHAPTER ONE

NOMOS, PHYSIS, AND POLITICA

One tends, in everyday life, to be so immersed in the minutiae of existence that it is altogether too easy not to see the forest for the trees. In this instance, the greater whole is perhaps the most general and therefore the most encompassing of totalities. I speak of the relationship between man and the cosmos. If the term were not so clumsy, I would be tempted to subtitle this chapter "an anthropo-cosmic inquiry". For this is precisely what it is, an overview of the various ways this relationship has manifested itself in time.

The terms nomos and physis correspond to the two main principals of this anthropo-cosmic drama, i.e., the human and natural worlds. Not unexpectedly, the first subsection begins at the beginning with an outline of the nomos-physis continuum which is characteristic of magical society. This most immediate of configurations depicts an edenic existence. It is from this blissful pre-self-conscious state that man "falls from grace", so to speak. Because sin and knowledge are from the same tree, knowledge of the self (i.e., self-consciousness) is coincidental with the desire to abrogate this "sin". Thus, the drama of the dialectical interplay between nomos and physis begins only upon the emergence of "religious" consciousness, that is,
upon the appearance of a distinction between the "two worlds".

In subsections B and C, we will see how religious representation results in the formation of Greek science and philosophy, and how these two movements differ in their understanding of the structure of the cosmos. An account will also be given of the manner in which Christianity adopts from philosophy its basic "problematic" (i.e., the nomos/physia rift), and the nature of the former's own unique solution.

In the final subsection, there will be a discussion concerning Christianity's other major contribution to the anthropo-cosmic drama, that is, the notion of linear time or history. It will be shown how this concept forms an integral part of the Christian ethos and, indirectly, the ethos of the human community since the birth of religious consciousness.

A. ORIGINS

(1) The Pre-Religious Significance of Moira

F. M. Cornford cites the fact that the initial unit of consciousness is the human group and not the individual. Thus group consciousness precedes individual consciousness. Historically, this conjecture is given support by the fact that the most primitive forms of deities were "impersonal forces". In early Greek religion, for example, there existed daemons that possessed will and force but were nonetheless completely devoid of personality. Of course, this in
itself does not constitute evidence for the primacy of group consciousness unless there is some sort of link between the human and divine worlds. The two realms are indeed related in that the "divine", whether it be in the form of an impersonal daemon or an individualized god, is the externalization of group consciousness.

In the former instance, this consciousness is projected into a class of natural objects (a totem-species) that is vital to the welfare of a particular group. Thus the daemon binds the members of a group (totem-clan) to each other and to the non-human world. The totem-clan and the totem-species form an indivisible unit. 2

As Cornford points out, there exists from the beginning a desire to bring the non-human world within human control. This is evident in the fact that the collective function of the group (its nomos) is to influence its daemon in a manner conducive to its well-being. It must be mentioned, however, that since the clansmen are indistinguishable from their totem-species, it would be misleading to say at this stage that one "controls" the other. For example, the actions involved in a magical dance are not performed in hope of precipitating the occurrence of a future event. The clansmen do not consciously "re-present" that which they hope to influence. Rather, they merely do what it is they want done. 3

Nomos (the totem-clan) and physia (the totem-species) are fused together in magical groups. Now the only possible source of moral authority in the pre-religious cosmos is
the authority of the human group. However, this authority lies dormant so long as its reflection into the outer (natural) world is not construed as an alien force. The 'individual' willingly and unconsciously subordinates himself to the group simply because the weight of the collective consciousness embodied in everything other than the self is so much greater than that found within the self.

In conclusion, magical society can be referred to as "the primitive social fact". In other words, it is a social group (moira) defined by its collective functions (nomoi) which constitute its nature (physis) and direct the vital force proper to that group.

(iii) Religious Representation: The Genesis of the Nomos/Physis Rift

The rise of the "prohibitive" element of nomos is contemporaneous with the transition from magical to religious consciousness. With the transformation from pre-religious to religious representation, the magical continuum (the nomos-physis monad) is divided into two pools of human and non-human force. In short, the essence or physis of the group becomes disassociated from the group itself.

It must be remembered at this point that physis "is" nomos, but that it is nomos hypostatized. Physis, therefore, is the "re-presentation" of nomos to itself. Because the physis of the totem-clan is originally manifested in a natural form (as a daemon), its separation from
the group means that nature now appears to the group as alive. Conversely, the human group is "natural" to the extent that it shares with the outside world a common life-principle.

From within the non-human (natural) branch of the rift there evolves the gradual de-divinization, or de-physi- nation, of nature. The soul of the group, which was first embodied in a local natural department, begins to disestablish itself from its material base. As it loosens its ties with nature, it establishes new connections with the human realm. The end result of this process is the formation of the Olympian gods who have connections with both the natural and human worlds. But because the Olympian god is not the soul or daemon of a particular human group, he is distinctly "other" than man. As a result, the relationship of worshipper to god cannot be one of communion. Rather, their union is of a contractual nature.

Because the gods are no longer fed by human emotion, they are destined to lose sight of their original sense of duty. These asphyxiated deities compensate for this lack by becoming progressively more humanized. Their actions become more and more the product of a will that is arbitrary and is no longer bound by earthly concerns.

In contrast to the spatial framework which characterizes Olympianism, the Mystic tradition relies on a temporal understanding of the cosmos. Here the emphasis is not on the "many", on the compartmentalization of the cosmic totality, but on the "one" that is the mind or soul. As the
soul of a group, the mystery god is re-created at every celebration of the rite in the collective emotion of the congregation. This rite is sacramental in that it represents an act of communion and reunion with the daemon, one in which the many pass into the one and return back to the many. Like the changes of the seasons, there is a recurring ebb and flow of communication between the group and its soul. 8

(iii) The Philosophical Inheritance

In as much as philosophy has been called the handmaiden of science, it can be said that religious representation is the handmaiden of philosophy. What is meant by this is that the earliest philosophers did not look upon the world in an "objective" manner, untarnished by previous constructs of human consciousness. On the contrary, they were the recipients of a pre-fabricated intellectual paradigm, i.e., the imperfect disassociation of physis from nomos. We know this to be the case because the first Greek philosophers treat physis in an a priori manner. They take for granted the existence of a divine and ultimate stuff. 9

In review, the evolution of moira can be summed up thusly. Moira originally stood for the social group that was defined by its collective functions, or nomoi. However, it later comes to represent the essence of nomos as it is projected from the tribal clan into an elemental grouping of the cosmos. It is precisely because the order of
human society is supreme that moira in its hypostatized form comes to reign in nature over all the subordinate wills of men and gods.

The Olympian gods represent the personalization of moira. Their very existence as compartmental powers is dependent upon it. However, even though as we have seen, the Olympian gods perish from inanition, this does not mean that the concept of moira also disappears. On the contrary, like a phoenix it arises from the ashes in a transmuted guise, as the divine soul-substance — physis.

Whereas moira used to inform and animate the gods, this same power in the name of physis is now a synonym for "the nature of things". Physis is "the nature of things" much in the same way that moira is "the nature of supernatural things". However, the new function of moira as physis does not mean that the latter term has lost any of its suprasensible characteristics. Nothing could be further from the truth. Physis simply reinstates the notion of the supremacy of the social group (the whole), only this time within the new context of "nature".  

Because the philosophic paradigm (i.e., physis) is pre-philosophic in origin and in spirit, it is not incorrect to surmise that the work of philosophy is in reality the clarification of religious representation.

B. THE CLARIFICATION OF RELIGIOUS REPRESENTATION

(i) The Greek Scientific Tradition: The De-Divinization of Nature
Thales states that water is "the nature of things" and that it is alive and has soul in it. The fact that Thales thinks the essence of the world is animate illustrates how the first attempt to give a rational account of physis is conceived from within a pre-existent world view. It also points to the fact that the Greeks had not yet reached a level of intellectual sophistication that would enable them to think of the essence of things in purely conceptual terms.

If water exists in and forms the substratum of all things, then its "materiality" must be in some sense meta-physical. However, this leads to the apparently paradoxical conclusion that the materiality of Thales' physis is suprasensible. This contradiction is not the result of fuzzy thinking as much as it is the expression of the extreme difficulty involved in the attempt to disentangle two concepts which were previously united, i.e., physis (thought) and the natural world (substance). 11

Unlike Thales, Anaximander distinguishes the primary physis from the visible elements. This marks a step in the direction of "abstraction" in that it eliminates animate life from nature proper.

In contrast to the "limited" quality of the four elements, Anaximander's physis is "unlimited". It is the primal mixture containing portions of the elements in a chaos. Physis itself is not any particular element. Rather, it is the ground from which the elements arise. They appear as a result of being separated out of physis.
The force which instigates this separation is known as "the eternal motion". According to Anaximander, it is "divine" in that its action is circular and therefore "endless".

Anaximander's cosmology retains its association with the human realm in so far as he believes that the being of things (i.e., elemental complexes) owes its existence to an "injustice". To understand what Anaximander means by this it must be remembered that the elements are in effect physical manifestations of moira. As it restricted the Olympian gods to their respective natural departments, moira in this instance confines the elements within their own regions. Each element can be likened to a tribal group consisting of members who are united by a common blood substrata and totem-species. This pre-philosophical "moral" order is inherent in Anaximander's conception of physis. To "mix" the elements and, consequently, to produce "things", is equivalent on an anthropological level to the amalgamation of tribal groups. This "injustice" is paid for by the death or dissolution of things. It is only in this manner that moira (justice) can be restored to the natural world. 12

Given the still tenuous nature of the bond between the human and non-human worlds, it is not surprising to find out that progress toward a more distinct separation of nomos from physis is at first not at all smooth. Just as a child's first attempt to walk is highlighted by the occasional back-step or tumble, so do the earliest efforts
at philosophical discourse periodically regress. Such is the case when Anaximenes identifies *physis* with the element "air".

Although he is most often associated with the mystical tradition, Empedocles is in certain respects a transitional figure between the Milesians and the Atomists. Like Anaximander, he clears the soul-substance (*physis*) from the domain of the natural elements. But, unlike Anaximander, Empedocles clearly distinguishes between two types of material soul-substance. He calls them Love and Strife. Together, these "substances" move the four elements from without. The coming to be of individual things is no longer a "birth" as it was for Anaximander. There is no vital process of self-sustained growth here. Instead, there is the simple mixing of immutable elements effected by an external force. Empedocles is an Atomist in so far as the elements do not have, in themselves, the ability to produce things. However, his Atomism is incomplete in that the soul-substances which move the elements still retain the "life-principle".¹³

Anaxagorus takes a further step in the direction of Atomism, that is, in the separation of *physis* from the natural world. His main thesis can be summed up thusly: "What is cannot come out of what is not."¹⁴ Thus he disagrees with Empedocles' contention that all things are combinations of the four elements. According to Anaxagorus, this would mean that new things were brought into existence where they did not exist before. He also argues that
the four elements are not ultimate and irreducible. On the contrary, Anaxagorus says that each element is a collection of heterogeneous seeds. Thus, he defines chaos as "a mixture of seeds" much as Anaximander referred to physis as "the mixture of the elements".

Like the cosmologies of Anaximander and Empedocles, Anaxagorus' cosmological whole is in need of a soul-substance whose function it would be to make chaos into a cosmos. Unlike his predecessors, however, Anaxagorus' physis is neither material nor emotional. Physis is transformed into a purely "intellectual" essence which he calls nous or "Mind". Its function is "to set things in order", "to distinguish", "to separate", and "to discriminate". Anaxagorus maintains that nous is particularly well-suited to govern the cosmos because of the quality which distinguishes it from all other things, i.e. its purity and freedom from admixture. 15

The fact that Anaxagorus is primarily an adherent of the scientific tradition is evident in the significance of the limited role nous plays in his cosmology. For Anaxagorus, the more the structure and dynamics of the world can be accounted for without recourse to any notion of a soul-substance, the better. Thus he employs nous merely as a means to explain the "origin" of an otherwise mechanistic universe. 16

With Leukippus, the last vestiges of physis wither away. He understands the essence of things to consist of an infinite number of atoms, on one hand, and void on the
other. There is no soul-substance, no \textit{physis}, apart from the matter and void which comprise the Atomistic universe. The coming to be and perishing of all things is nothing but the random aggregation and dispersion of atoms moving in the emptiness of space. Leukippus gives no account of "motion", as one might be inclined to expect, since the movement or "life" of matter was the very phenomenon the early Greek philosophers attempted to explain by means of an animate, self-moving substance, i.e. \textit{physis}. \textsuperscript{17}

As it has been previously stated, the conceptual framework of Olympianism is spatial. Men and gods have their allotted boundaries, beyond which they are forbidden to pass. The passions of \textit{eros} and \textit{elpis} transgress the limits of \textit{moira}.

As an inheritor of this tradition, Ionian science is concerned with analysing the natural world. It breaks down the whole in hope of finding its most fundamental part therein. And because this science uses such rigid and atemporal methods of inquiry, it remains blind to any conception of the natural world as an animate and interrelated whole.

(ii) The Mystic Rejoinder

The mystery religion first appeared in ancient Greece in the form of the Dionysian cult. As with all such religions, the characteristic rite is sacramental in that it
represents an act of communion with the daemon.

The Orphic revival marks a time in the history of Greek religion when there was a return to Dionysus and his thiasos, or church. However, the Dionysian revival witnesses a change in the cult's basic character. Gone are the more savage orgiastic rituals which were such a part of the original cult. The Orphic religion is tame in comparison. Its main deity (Orpheus) is in reality an "Apollonized" version of Dionysus.18

Nonetheless, the essence of the new cult is not lost. The mystic maintains that the whole of nature is bound together in one society, of which the human community is a small part. Thus, according to the Orphic tradition, all living things are under the power of dike, or justice. In contradistinction to the mystical tradition, the dike of Olympianism is related solely to human affairs. Hesiod, for example, says in the Erga that Kronos gave dike to man alone.19

Perhaps the finest example of the mystical temperament can be found in the writings of Heraclitus. Rather than emphasize the autonomy of the component parts of the cosmos, Heraclitus speaks of the one continuous and homogeneous soul, or Life, in all things. The divine soul-substance is embodied in "fire" and is perpetually in the process of death and rebirth. Through it, the One retains its identity (its Oneness) while it passes into the Many.

Heraclitus says of the One, or logos, that it is that which is common to all things. In this respect, it shares
an affinity with the nomos of the temporal state, through which all citizens are bound. However, for Heraclitus, the logos is much greater than the nomos of the state, for it is in fact the nomos of the cosmos, of which the "human cosmos" is but a related part. 20

In general, the main current of the mystical tradition is represented by Pythagoreanism. Among its offshoots are the philosophies of Parmenides, Empedocles, and Plato.

Pythagoreanism was influenced from several sources. Dionysianism introduced Pythagorus to the mystical notion of the unity of all life in the cycle of death and rebirth. To Orpheus is due the shift of focus from the earth to the heavens. Pythagorus himself advanced the notion of "the fall" of the immortal soul into the body and advised that it is only by means of the passionless contemplation of unchanging truth that it can reunite itself with the region from which it fell. Thus, Pythagorus gave new meaning to the term "theoria". The mystical way of life becomes the "pursuit of unchanging truth", or philosophia. 21

It is not inaccurate to say of the mystic philosophers that their raison d'être is to draw Apollo down from the sky and change him back to Dionysus. In other words, mysticism in general and Pythagoreanism in particular, seek to re-establish a unified world view which had been effectively destroyed as a result of the efforts of Greek science. Their self-appointed task is once more to infuse the human and non-human worlds with "life".

As it has been shown, Mysticism tries to get the One
(i.e., soul, God, *physi*) to find its place within the
Many. Parmenides, however, argues that no such accommo-
dation is possible. The One cannot contain *within itself*
its opposite, i.e., the principle of the manifold. There-
fore, Parmenides concludes that the immutable things of
this world are illusory.

Plato's Socratic and Mystic dialogues represent the
last and greatest attempt to formulate the mystic faith
in rational terms. Like other mystics and at least some
of the Ionian philosophers, Plato believes in the existence
of some sort of cosmological "essence". He calls this es-
sence the "Idea". Thus, for Plato, the "idea" of the world
(the Idea) is juxtaposed against the world itself (being).
There is a dualism that underlies Platonic ontology, one
which to varying degrees underlies all ontologies since the for-
maton of the rift between *nomos* and *physi*. This stands
to reason, for the separation of these terms is synonymous
with the alienation of thought (essence) from being (exis-
tence).

Plato's unique contribution to the mystical heritage
is his earnest effort to *relate* the "truth" of the world
(the Idea) to the world itself. The "Theory of Forms" is
Plato's rational account of the nature of this relation.

The question that remains to be answered is how these
seemingly antithetical realms can be bridged. How does
a class of things in the sensible world partake of its
group-soul? Or, differently put, how can the Idea be pre-
sent in a plurality of things and yet at the same time re-
main detached in its Oneness? 22

The participation of existence in essence is referred to by Plato as *methexis*. What is most important to keep in mind is the fact that *methexis* is at bottom a mystical or non-rational relation. We have seen that the members of a mystic cult actively experience an emotional communion with the godhead. It is precisely because this experience is non-discursive that it is of *mythos* and not *logos* (reason). In short, *methexis* is a felt experience and not a reasoned discourse. It is therefore impervious to rational justification. As a result, the Platonic Idea perishes from inanition like the Olympian gods before it. In the process, the Idea loses its creative and nurturing spirit and becomes nothing more than a universal predicate. It is demoted to the status of a "contentless" concept. 23

Aristotle recognizes the fact that Plato's Idea has no real connection with the world. 24 As the Idea(s) cease to be causes, Platonism is threatened with the fate of a "systemization" which places the source of life outside and above the natural world. This system (Aristotelianism) is simply a scheme of classification or a hierarchy of kinds. 25 It is the construct of an intellect which has the power to analyze but not to create, or synthesize.

C. EFFORTS TO RE-INTEGRATE NOMOS AND PHYSIS

(1) Introduction

At this point a re-examination of sorts is in order. Up to now our analysis has focussed on the "philosophical"
relation between nomos and physis. From here on in, however, our attention will shift from an ontological to an existential level of analysis. In other words, it will be shown how the nomos/physis rift manifests itself in a socio-political context.

The separation of nomos from physis is in reality the alienation of human law from divine law. Prior to this division, nomos (temporal law) and religion (divine law) were inextricably linked. The connection between nomos and "the worship of the gods" is revealed through the public worship of the deities of the polis. At this point nomos does not bear the connotation we now associate with the term "law". It does not prescribe a certain standard of behavior but designates the natural and spontaneous morality of the polis itself. Nomos here is very similar to the nomos of the magical clan in that its inspiration is behavioristic.

In the 5th. c. B.C., nomos is written down in constitutional form for the first time. At this stage it is still considered to be the expression of the will of the deity who holds sway over the polis. However, the concept of nomos retains its most exalted form for an exceedingly brief period. In fact, the genesis of the decline of the religious concept of nomos actually begins in the 6th. c. B.C. with the gradual dissolution of the power of the Olympian gods. As it has been stated, the authority of the gods slowly crumbled as they (the gods) became progressively humanized, and as their divine will subverted into an arbitrary one. The legitimacy of nomos, being dependent upon the authority
of the gods, suffers the same fate as that which befell
the Olympian heroes. Plato recognizes the nature of the
relationship between the two perhaps more clearly than anyone
else when he says that the repudiation of the sovereignty
of the laws is equivalent to apostasy from God. 30

The break-up of nomos also can be explained, in part,
by the discovery of other nomoi in the Eastern Mediterrane-
an region. In the 5th. c. B.C., the Greek historian
Herodotus recognized the "wisdom" of the laws of other
nations and at the same time he realized that these "truths"
spelled the demise of an original wisdom. 31 It was not long
afterwards when the Sophists pronounced the fact that nomos
is merely the product of an arbitrary will. The original
understanding of nomos as the earthly manifestation of the
universal law (physis) is shattered when the universal law
itself is seen to be relative to cultural differences.

Nomos, as a variable human ordinance, acquires by the
end of the 5th. c. B.C. the debased meaning of a "contract"
or an "agreement." 32 It is no longer conceived of as a nat-
ural or divine gift. On the contrary, nomos is now the pro-
duct of "human artifice". 33 Just as the notion of physis
(i.e., Life) is eliminated from the natural world, nomos
becomes disassociated from its divine ground. The citi-
sens of the polis no longer form a coherent whole bound
together by the nomos that is the will of an absolute
deity. Instead, they are autonomous entities forcibly
constrained from without by the dictates of human legal
artificers. Hence, in political terms, social contract
theory is equivalent to the physical doctrine of Atomism.

(ii) Plato

Plato's Republic is a refutation of this political Atomism. He attempts to prove, as did Heraclitus before him, that the state is "natural" and that if it were constructed on ideal lines it would embody the same principles of justice that rules every part of the cosmos.*

Plato does this by returning to the original Greek conception of nomos, i.e., where the power of the law is synonymous with the authority of the gods. However, for reasons previously given, Plato can no longer appeal directly to the gods. So, in order to reinstate the authority of nomos, Plato associates "law" with an Absolute that is unaffected by the political reality of the times. He says that nomos is "reason's ordering". Thus, Plato elevates "reason" to a position of sovereignty. It replaces the authoritative power of the gods.

According to Plato, one comes to have knowledge of "reason's ordering" by means of nous. Nomos is therefore identified with nous (mind). Now because nous is related to the soul (or mind) and is, therefore, "of nature" (physis), nomos takes on the coloring of the former and

* For Heraclitus, nomos is an image or copy of the divine principle, i.e., the logos. Thus the state is in harmony with the greater truth of the cosmic whole.
becomes "divine". Thus, by being firmly anchored to nomos, the Greek concept of law regains an absolute validity.

The problem with Plato's thesis is not an unfamiliar one, namely, how does existent individual mind "relate to" or "participate in" Universal Mind or Reason? His explanation of the manner in which nomos is to retrieve its sovereignty hinges on the validity of methexis. However, the non discursiveness of methexis precludes the possibility of philosophically bridging the nomos/physis rift by means of nous.

(iii) Aristotle

The original identity of nomos and physis can be accounted for in terms of an identity of "form" and "content". On one hand, form is the outline or shape of moira. It is the delineation of worldly things from the chaos. Content, on the other hand, is alive as physis is alive. It represents the functional force that pervades form.

By the time of Aristotle, form and content have completely passed out of each other's domain. Granted, the two are united in the experiential world. But to explain the origin of the world-process, Aristotle had to have recourse to the notion of an "unmoved mover", i.e., contentless form.

There can be no communion between man and a radically transcendent god. Therefore, the Aristotelian "god" cannot serve as a means to unite the members of a society with each other and with itself. What it does do, however, is
provide man with a model for ethical behavior that is, like itself, autonomous and self-sufficient. In short, the virtuous man is apolitical.

(iv) The Stoics

It can be said that Plato saw the need to relate the sensible and intelligible worlds because for him these realms were already distinct. Although he makes a somewhat puzzling claim in the Timaeus that the cosmos is like "a god", we have seen that Platonic dualism in general precludes any direct identification of the cosmos with the highest being itself. 39

Stoicism does just the opposite. It identifies the universe with the divine, or Reason. The identity of the cosmos with God means that reason is immanent in the world.

The Stoics often refer to Reason as logos. The intellectual power of logos is materially based and is described as a sort of breath (pneuma) composed of fire and air. Thus, logos is the material principle of Reason (thought) working through dead matter (being). It is the physis of Stoic cosmology.

According to the Stoics, logos is also the "explanation" of a thing. It accounts not only for its being but for the purpose (telos) of its being as well. Therefore, the Stoic cosmos is not an arbitrary configuration. On the contrary, the Stoic maintains that the events of the world unfold like a plan in accordance with the logos.
Thus God (Reason, *logos*, *physis*) is synonymous with Fate and Providence. The former is a term which denotes the "certainty" of the process of growth and the latter signifies the "reason" inherent in the *logos*. 40

The Hellenistic era marks a turning point in the history of the ancient world. Alexander's political merging of "East" and "West"*, although shortlived, permitted a sustained fusion of cultures which resulted in the rise of a supra-national Hellenistic culture.** The more or less homogeneous nature of this socio-cultural entity facilitated the political unification of the area by the Romans at a later date. The effect of the establishment of the Empire was to deprive the polis' intelligensia of its constructive function. The polis was no longer a realizable entity amongst the cosmopolitan influences of the Empire. However, despite the polis' demise, the ontological principle which sustained it survived. Stoic pantheism replaced the relation between citizen (part) and polis (whole) with the relation between individual (part) and cosmos (whole). As a result of this change in perspective, the classical doctrine of the whole and parts survived the concrete social and political configuration which gave birth to it. Now the goal of ethical life is to be a citizen of the universe, a *cosmopolites*.

The Stoic veneration of the cosmos is a reverence

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* East, in this instance, means the area stretching from Egypt to India and West refers to the Greek world centered around the Aegean.
for the "whole" of which man is a "part." However, the part which is man is unlike other parts in that man's mind is identified with the "ruling principle" (Reason) of the whole. This identity enables man to approximate his existence with the essence of the cosmos itself, thereby allowing him to transcend his status as a mere part. The Stoic retreats from the world insofar as this "essence" is decidedly otherworldly.

(v) Philo and the Hellenic-Judaic Matrix

The Greek and Jewish cultures first came into serious contact during the establishment of the Hellenic Empire in the 4th. c. B.C. Prior to their meeting, both civilizations had amassed a considerable wealth of philosophic and religious literature. Despite the obvious differences in content, the two ethical systems varied in one fundamental respect. For the Jews, Mosaic law is the product of "revelation". Greek ethics, on the other hand, develops out of a self-instigated "rational inquiry" into the unifying principles of the cosmos. An interesting product of the interpenetration of these seemingly diverse ethical systems is manifested in the writings of Philo of Alexandria.

Philo's basic religious sentiments are Jewish, for he presupposes the validity of the doctrine and the demands which the Scripture presents. However, Philo's religiosity is distinctly different from that espoused in Rabbinic literature insofar as he tries to relate the Scripture to
the religious experience of "everyman". By consciously attempting to dissolve the historicity of the Scripture, Philo wished to universalize the narrative nature of the Pentateuch and thereby make it a model for the spiritual journey which every person ought to undertake. In this respect, Philo shares much in common with his "rational" Greek brothers.

Philo dehistoricizes the Scripture through the use of allegory. It is to the Stoics that scholars ascribe the development of this intellectual device. However, whereas the Stoics used it chiefly as an instrument for the adaptation of Homeric myth to philosophy, Philo uses allegory as a means to establish a congruency between his Jewish creed and his Platonizing philosophy.

Like Plato, Philo espouses the existence of "two worlds", i.e., the sensible realm (kosmos aethetikos) and the intelligible realm (kosmos noetos). Similarly, the goal of man is some kind of communion with the godhead. He who achieves spiritual perfection leaves the sensible world and enters the lofty realm of Ideas. But this intercourse cannot be direct, for Philo's conception of the Absolute is so exalted that he denies Him all qualities. His abhorrence of anthropomorphism is even more pronounced than that of Plato and Aristotle. The Philonian God is referred to simply as "being one", or To On. It is more radically transcendent than the Platonic Idea in that it stands in no relation whatsoever to the real world. Consequently, it can never be known by man in its true essence.
All that is intelligible is the "activities" or "powers" of God which reach down from the transcendent realm into the *kosmos noos*.

*Logos* is to *On* as it manifests itself in the intelligible world. *Logos* is thus the "knowable" aspect of God. And so Philo ascribes to the *logos* all that the Scripture tells us God said or did. 46

Philo solves the paradox of transcendence and immanence by replacing the classical two-tiered ontological hierarchy with a tripartite configuration. The *logos* becomes an "intermediary" between the two worlds and thus, in a sense, unites them.

Greek Jews had previously given the Pentateuch the title "the *Nomos*". However, as an inheritor of the Greek philosophic tradition, Philo is compelled to deal with both *nomos* and *physiē*. So Philo refers to the book of *Genesis*, with its narratives and absence of ordinances, as the "*nomos physēs*", or the "*nomos* of nature". In other words, the book of *Genesis* is for Philo a description of "the way things are", i.e., "the nature of things" or *physiē*. In contrast, *nomos* proper is enunciated in the commandments given by Moses in *Exodus*.

One of Philo's many contributions to Western speculative thought is his conception of *physiē* as the product of "divine" creation. As he puts it: "The law of nature is not an immanent law, but it is the law of the transcendent creator who rules his creation." 47

According to Philo, the pre-Mosaic patriarchs lived
by physig. Moses later on codified the behavior of the patriarchs in the same way that Solon had codified the spontaneous moral actions of the Athenians. Hence, the nomoi of Moses are an imitation of the divinely inspired physig. Philo unequivocably states that it is the best of possible imitations. For instance, he says that it is superior to the nomos of the Greek polis because, unlike the laws of the statesmen, the law of Moses rests upon an eternal and unalterable foundation. Therefore, the nomos of Moses is not restricted to any particular geographic location or to any specific time. Obviously what appealed to Philo was the "universality" of Judaic law. The fact that the universality of reason did not persuade Philo of its potentiality as a possible ground for nomos shows us that Philo is indeed a Hellenized Jew.

To review, it is clear that the Aristotelian Absolute shares with the Philonian To On a certain "self-sufficiency". Philo's advance is his introduction of the logos which acts as an intermediary between God and the world (and man). In more philosophical terms, logos is the eros between thought and being.

(v) Neo-Platonism

Just as the Olympian gods escaped from their functional utility in nature, the ideal for the post-classicist has been to retreat from his functional utility in society. Man's soul rises above the social group in much the same manner as the daemon rises above its natural department.
This process reaches its most radical end in neo-Platonism.

As the founder of the movement, Plotinus' dissatisfaction with classical Greek conceptions of the Ultimate is a common theme among all neo-Platonists. According to him, any definition of the One is an impossibility, for to define is to limit, and to limit is to describe the boundaries of something which is necessarily less than whole. Plotinus even denies that the One partakes of being on the grounds that what is predicated as existent is always of a definite form and therefore is limited. 18

Positively, the One can be conceived of as the eternal source of all being. All reality is considered to be a series of emanations from the One. The first emanation, or hypostasis, is the "soul" (psyche). Plotinus says that because the thought of the soul is subject to time, it is necessarily discursive and rational. The second emanation is nous (Intelligence, Mind). It represents the level of intuition where the processes of discursive thought are bypassed and the mind attains an instantaneous vision of truth. 19

The major difference between the two hypostases is that the perfect self-awareness of nous, unlike psyche, is based on the full identification of subject (thought) and object (being). Plotinus' view of the relation between thought and being is even more radical than that of his predecessors in that he makes the intelligible world the object of thought. Nous embraces the "whole" in a timeless vision because intuition relates directly to the One.
According to Plotinus, matter is an extension of Soul down below its normal level of being. In a similar manner, Soul is *nous* at its lowest possible level of being. The same relation holds for *nous*; it too is the manifestation of a higher ontological stratum, i.e., the One. Thus, the One is immanent in determinate being as *nous* and *nous* in turn forms the basis for the various levels of the events of the Soul. In this way Plotinus sought to establish the "spiritual" nature of reality, in contrast to the Stoics who had established its "material" base, i.e., the *logos* as pneuma. 50

Ethically, neo-Platonism shares with Stoicism and Philonism a common attitude toward the world. They exhibit the same basic spiritual goal, reunion with the divine. And despite differences in particulars, the virtuous life in these movements is essentially an *inward* journey of reconciliation with the divine soul.

(vii) The Mysticism of Christianity

*Philia* (love) between man and God is impossible in any radically dualistic ontological world-view. The self-sufficient Aristotelian Absolute, for instance, has no need for human compassion and love. It remains distinctly "other" despite the soul's reaching out toward it.

Voegelin states that "the experience of mutuality in the relation [of man] with God" is what differentiates Christian truth from those which preceded it. 51 The seeds of this mutual relationship between man and God lie implicit in the
thoughts of Philo. The *logos*, after all, is an extension of God, not of man. It is God who makes himself intelligible through the *logos* while remaining far more than the *logos* itself.

Henry Chadwick writes: "The history of Christian philosophy begins not with a Christian, but with a Jew, Philo of Alexandria.... Philo's statements about the *logos* were to have a notable future when adopted to the uses of Christian doctrine." 52

It is highly likely that the Philonian *logos* came into contact with Christianity through the figure of John the Apostle. His thoughts differ from those of Philo in that he did not associate the *logos* with the transcendent (i.e., the Christian God) but with an immanent incarnation of the Absolute, i.e., Christ. In the process, the Christian *logos* is identified with a specific spatio-temporal event in the world. It therefore signifies an immanentization of the *eros*. In a very real sense, God lives in the world in the personnage of Christ.

If we remember that for Philo, *physi* stands for the divinely inspired "is-ness" of the world*, then through the power of the Christian *logos*, *physi* becomes immanent in the *nomos* of the Christian world. In other words, Christ's incarnation concretizes the "truth" (the *physi* or "true" nature) of Christian ethics. Thus, the *nomos/physi* rift

* On page 31 it was said that *physi* is a euphemism for "the way things are".
is bridged in the person of Christ.

It was originally proposed that the "primitive social fact" is a group (moira) defined by its collective functions (nomoi) and that these functions together constituted its nature (physis). We have also seen that religious consciousness is born when these "collective functions" (i.e., the group soul) are projected into the non-human world. Gods are the product of this representation of the group soul to the group itself. Now a god can either be so far removed from its human emotional source that it becomes a mere lifeless concept, or it can remain in union with the society from which it arose. In the latter instance, physis (the group soul) remains in communion with nomos (the group's collective functions). Thus the mystery god is both human and divine. This being said, it can be readily surmised that Christ is the daemon of a mystery religion par excellence, i.e., Christianity.53

The Christ figure is subjected to two opposing forces. First, there is an upward pull which tends to associate him with the transcendent Father God. This influence threatens to draw the daemon away from the group and into a realm of philosophic abstraction. However, this movement toward the "Olympianization" of the daemon is counterbalanced by the downward pull of the mystical Christian rites (i.e., communion) which perpetually re-establish the emotional sense of union between man and God.54

The projected or externalized "soul" of the Christian group (i.e., God) is re-united with its congregation by
means of the θεός, Christ. Thus the division between the eternal essence, or identity, of the world on one hand, and its temporal existence on the other, is mended with the appearance of the half-human, half-divine figure of Christ. In more purely philosophical terminology, Christ can be said to be "identity in difference".

The advantage Christianity has over pagan mystery religions is that it is a "historical" religion. The Christian logos is not an abstract material essence as it is for Heraclitus and the Stoics. Nor is it simply conceptual as it is for Philo and the neo-Platonists. On the contrary, the Christian logos is rooted in verifiable historical fact. The historical-rootedness of the Christian faith was far more likely to win the appeal of the masses than the more esoteric doctrines if for no other reason than because its metaphysical message is "real" and therefore is more comprehensible to the average mind and heart.

D. TIME

(1) The Mystic View

At this point in the discussion it is necessary to digress a bit in order that the significance of the understanding of time can be related to the topic at hand.

The mystic philosophers of the Greco-Roman world upheld the notion that time is "cyclical". This is understandable insofar as we know that the conceptual framework of the mystery religion is temporal and that its temporality was originally modelled upon the cyclic revolutions of the
seasons and vegetative growth. Among such pre-Socratics as Heraclitus and Empedocles, circularity is both a metaphysical and a cosmological principle. Plato, on the other hand, says that civilization itself is subject to a cyclical process. For example, in the _Laws_ he presumes the existence of a historical past in which thousands of political regimes have exhibited similar constitutions.

This recurrence of events was never thought of as evil or banal by the ancient Greeks. In fact, Thucydides says that if history were not to be reenacted throughout all time, it would be an ephemeral event not worth recording. Thus it is the _repetition_ of events, and not their uniqueness, that lends them weight and significance.

Greek cosmology in general never takes the "creation" of the universe _ex nihilo_ to be a source of interest or controversy. What is in need of explanation, however, is the manner in which chaos becomes cosmos, how order arises from disorder. Likewise, their understanding of time as cyclical illustrates the fact that they were more concerned with the pattern of events in time than they were with the nature of time. The same predisposition toward a lack of interest in the origin of matter is paralleled in their indifference to the origin and nature of time.

Philo does not condemn the classical view of time. On the contrary, he actually manages to incorporate it into the operation of the _logos_. He states that the _logos_ permits each civilization its turn at hegemony, thereby giving the whole politico-historical universe a democratic
constitution. It is only with the coming of the Messiah that the law of Moses is established among all nations and the cycles are terminated.\textsuperscript{55}

(ii) The Augustinian Procursus: The Disengagement of \textit{Vita Contemplativa} from \textit{Vita Activa}

Eric Voegelin says: "The clash between the various types of truth in the Roman Empire ended with the victory of Christianity. The fateful result of this victory was the de-divinization of the temporal sphere of power.\textsuperscript{56} Just what Voegelin means by the expression "the de-divinization of the temporal sphere" and what significance this concept has for the politics of the Christian era will be the next topic of concern.

The origin of the "de-divinization" of which Voegelin speaks is the result of an inherent tension within the Christian faith. We see this in the life of the early Christian communities which oscillated between the eschatological expectation that would bring the Kingdom of God to earth, and the understanding of the Church as the apocalypse of Christ in history. Because over time the former did not materialize, the Church evolved from the eschatology of the realm of God in history toward the eschatology of transhistorical and supernatural perfection.\textsuperscript{57}

This transition is yet another example of the " Olympianization" of a lived experience. In other words, what was originally salvation "on earth" becomes reified into the notion of salvation "in the beyond". The \textit{nomos-physic}
monad exemplified in Christ becomes hypostatized. Thus
the Christian eschaton is transcendentalized into a world
beyond time and space.

Time for Augustine is linear (i.e., historical) in
that there is a relationship between true prophecy and
fulfillment. According to him, it is only from the vantage
point of the present that one can look back on the
past and uncover its true significance. Hence, the presence
of Christ infuses meaning into one half of history. Au-
gustine maintains that the providential design of the rest
of time will be revealed in the Second Coming, i.e., Judgement
Day. The centuries after Christ constitute the his-
tory of the Church. This history is determined by the time re-
quired for the Church's full recruitment. As Augustine
puts it, history will end when "... our full number may
be completed even to the last." 58

In order better to understand Augustine's conception
of the role of Christ and the Church in relation to the
historicity of the Christian faith, it is essential to
review the leading thoughts in his opus, Civitas Dei.

"The City of God" can be thought of as a metaphor
for the Garden of Eden. According to Augustine, "the
fall" represents man's descent from eternal life to
life in "The City of the Devil", the earthly city. Thus
the eternal City of God is juxtaposed against the fall of
man into time.

But, in reality, these two realms depict volitional
or existential states of mind. On the one hand, the earth-
ly city has its "good" in this world. Its inhabitants can see no further than their own desires and interests. They are motivated by amor sui and live according to man. The inhabitants of the City of God, on the other hand, even during their lifetimes on earth, are motivated by amor dei to the exclusion of the self. They are possessed by the divine spirit of peace as they look beyond this world to everlasting life in heaven.

Augustine says that the procurans, or "the history of men on earth", is the war between these two "cities". These worlds remain intermingled until the Judgement Day whereupon the inhabitants of the cities will be separated out. All men will be resurrected at this time. The pious will have eternal life in the beyond and the impious will be eternally punished in hell.

The providential meaning of the procurans rests with the City of God and not with the temporal sphere. Whatever perfectibility is attainable in the cosmos is found in the individual "spiritual" perfection of the elect in the civitas dei. Thus classical Christian dogma contains absolutely no conception of the perfection of the species in time. History allows only for the operation of "grace" and the growth of the civitas dei. 59

The Augustinian interpretation of the role of the Church holds effective sway to the end of the Middle Ages. As a consequence of the function of the Church as spiritual organizer, society is relegated to the status of representing the mere temporality of man. Because, as we
have seen, the Christian *scholeía* is transcendent, there can be no transfiguration of historical existence itself, no thousand year reign of the saints on earth. Instead, there is a separation of "the order of truth" from "the order of power", or, differently put, a separation of the powers of the Pope from those of the Emperor. In short, Augustinian (Christian) dogma radically disengages *vita contemplativa* from *vita activa*. 
CHAPTER TWO
THE HEGELIAN HERMENEUTIC

In the first chapter, we followed the nomos/physis dialectic from its conception to its qualified end in Christianity. Now the same ground will be covered from a Hegelian viewpoint. This shift in perspective entails assigning different terminology to the concepts nomos and physis. However, regardless of the changes in semantic "content", I wish to show that the Hegelian hermeneutic can be explained in terms of the "form" of the nomos/physis dialectic. Hopefully, therefore, this chapter will add depth to our present understanding of the dialectic as well as acquaint the reader with Hegel's thought in preparation for the extension of his thesis in chapter three.

A. THE THEOLOGICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL NEXUS

For Hegel, both religion and philosophy have the same content. As he says in the History of Philosophy, "the instinct of reason" lies at their bases.¹ What exactly does Hegel mean by this? Essentially, he means that man is a thinking being and that thinking has thought itself as the "object" of thought. When Hegel says that the instinct of reason motivates both religion and philosophy, he is in fact saying that the impulse of thought is to

¹ This is a reference to Hegel's work, "The History of Philosophy."
know itself as thought. As he puts it: "... Know thyself, the inscription over the temple of the oracle at Delphi, is the absolute command which is expressed by Mind in its essential character."  

What differentiates religion from philosophy is the form in which Mind comes to know itself. Hegel says the following of the relation between Absolute Being (Thought, Reason, God) and religious consciousness: "Absolute Being is here the object [em] of religious consciousness; and as such, it is... pre-eminently the 'other', a 'beyond'..."  

He then goes on to say that the "otherness" of the Godhead is dissolved in acts of worship in which man raises himself to the consciousness of unity with Being. Cornford basically says the same thing in his description of the role of sacramental rites in mystery religions. Nonetheless, the fact remains that for religious consciousness, Absolute Being is "re-presented" to the mind in a natural or artistic form.  

The parallel between the Hegelian conception of the nature of religion and that of Cornford's is clearly evident. Both men agree that the notion of "representation" is central to religious consciousness. In addition, the content of this representation is in both formulations some aspect of human consciousness or mind. However, what differentiates the two is the precise meaning they attach to that which is represented. For Cornford, religious consciousness is a representation of the "collective life" of a group. This evaluation of the nature of religious man is decidedly anthropocentric in contrast to the more
"metaphysical" Hegelian thesis.*

Despite the different contents of various religious representations, both Hegel and Cornford would agree that philosophy is religion in a new key. As Hegel says: "Philosophy thinks and conceives [em] of that which Religion represents as the object of consciousness, whether it is the work of imagination or as existent facts in history". 5

It is important to note that for Hegel, the stage of pure, sensuous representation is not followed immediately by the realization that Mind has itself for its object of thought. On the contrary, in between these "ends" there exists a series of intermediate stages in which sensuous manifestation (nature) is intermingled with the form of the Universal (Mind). 6 Here Hegel is expressing in his own terms what we have gathered already from the first chapter. That is, the fact that the period between Thales and Aristotle marks a time in which the life of the world (physis, content) becomes progressively disengaged from its being (form).

The philosophers of the Greek scientific tradition all have in common the desire to de-divinize the natural world. Hegel says of them that "... they brought the poetic view of nature down to the prosaic." 7 But Hegel adds

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* Although it is premature to discuss it at the moment, in one respect, Mind means for Hegel "World-Mind" or "World-Spirit". In this sense it is the most highly generalized conception of mind conceivable. It is not the "collective mind" of any particular group, tribe, or sect, but is literally the "mind" of the world.
that one ought not lament the passing of a "living" nature, for Mind comes to know itself only through opposition. It can do so only by confronting the "other", an "other" which is the negation of Mind, i.e. unconscious and lifeless matter.

B. THE OUTWARD JOURNEY

(i) The Greek Scientific Tradition

Philosophy begins with the separation of the notion of "unity in diversity" from its sensual surroundings. For Hegel, the history of philosophy is the history of the progressive conceptualization of this "unity". To be conscious of the separateness of the "essence of nature" from "nature itself" is to be aware of a force which is not natural. As a result of this awareness, subjective mind is no longer immediately confronted with the natural but is mediated with it through this "unifying force", i.e., Universal Mind.  

For Thales, "water" is the substance which is both material and universal. It is the projection of the unity (identity) of Mind into the sensuous world. The truth of Mind now intervenes and establishes itself "between" man and his perception of his environment. This is why Hegel can say that with the dawning of philosophy "... man recedes from... immediate existence."  

For Thales, water is no longer regarded solely in its sensuous reality, but is conceived as Thought (or essence) in which
everything is resolved and comprehended. *

Anaximander contributes to the history of philosophy by conceiving the Absolute in terms of that which negates the finite. Physis is no longer a simple universal but is the negation of the elemental universals. Hegel cautions that the "infinitude" of Anaximander'sphysis is not to be thought of as the "negative absence of limit". On the contrary, as we have seen, the infinite being of the physis of which he speaks is derived from the "endless" (i.e., circular) motion it exhibits in the process of separating out the elements from the chaos.

(ii) Pythagoreanism and the Liberation of Thought from Being

For Ionic philosophy in general, Thought (physis) remains closely related to substance. However, Hegel maintains that Thought liberates itself from substance in the transition from Ionian science to Pythagorean philosophy.

Hegel notes the fact that the concept "number" is the essence of things for Pythagoras. For the first time, then, the essence of existence is expressed in purely non-sensuous terms. But its non-sensuousness does not necessar-

* An important parallel can be drawn here between the Hegelian notion of Thought or Mind and the notion of physis as "the nature of things". The analogy holds insofar as both Mind and physis are synonyms for "unity in diversity". On one hand, the unity of Mind is the totality of the relation between the knower and the known. For the Milesians, on the other hand, physis is the suprasensible soul-substance which exists in all things and, therefore, unites all things.
ily mean that "number" is Thought itself. As Hegel says, the principle of number is "one". It is self-identical and therefore can be referred to as "being-for-itself". All numbers are mere repetitions or additions of this fixed "one". Consequently, Hegel concludes: "Number is... the most utterly dead, motionless continuity [identity] possible; it is an entirely external and mechanical process.... Hence number is not immediate Notion, but only the beginning of thought..."11 According to Hegel, therefore, number occupies a place somewhere between the wholly determinate (substance) and the Notion (physic).

(iii) The Eleatic School: Being as Truth

In the Eleatic philosophic school*, Thought finally grasps itself in its purity. It becomes free for itself by loosening all ties with sensuous representation.

For example, Parmenides equates Thought with Being (i.e., the "Being" of being). Now we have seen that Thought has itself for its own object of thought. Therein lies its source of identity and infinitude. If, for Parmenides, Thought is Being, then Being must also exhibit the qualities of identity and infinitude. And indeed it does. According to Parmenides, Being is one coherent whole because there can be nothing "outside" of

* Hegel includes in this group, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Melissus, and Zeno.
Being. Non-being is merely nothing at all. Because Being is all, it is eternal in its identity with itself. Therefore, Parmenides could not posit Being in the ephemeral sensuous world.

Hegel says that Parmenides begins philosophy proper in that: "A man now constitutes himself free from all ideas and opinions, denies their truth, and says necessity alone, Being, is the truth."¹² Philosophy, then, begins with the liberation of Thought from sensuous representation. But, for Parmenides, the truth of physis is static Being. Thus the original meaning of physis ("unity in diversity") is destroyed, for Parmenides' Being does not contain within itself the principle of the manifold.

(iv) Heraclitus: Becoming as Truth

The static self-identity of the Parmenidean One can be contrasted with the infinite freedom of the Hegelian Notion. However, for the time being, it will suffice to say that the Notion is an "endless forming unity". It is pure thought and as such it must be related to itself and encompass within itself all opposition. The Notion is in fact the interplay between the One of thought and the Many of being. This interplay of opposites is denoted by the Hegelian term "dialectic".

Hegel says of Heraclitus that he "... takes the dialectic itself as principle".¹³ In other words, with Heraclitus the principle of motion is reintegrated into philo-
sophic thought by means of the dialectic. Whereas for the Eleatics, Being is truth, truth is for Heraclitus the union of Being and non-Being, i.e., "becoming". In more straightforward philosophical terminology, Heraclitean truth is "the identity of identity and non-identity".

Hegel says that the Heraclitean Absolute is being-in-and-for-itself. That which "is" is the unity of potentiality (being-in-itself) and actuality (being-for-itself). More specifically, the Absolute is the unfolding process in which potentiality becomes actual. It is the process of "self-actualization".

We have seen that during the infancy of philosophic thought, physis is sensuously represented. Despite Heraclitus' advancements, he too could not entirely free his Absolute from the gravitational pull of substance. He identifies physis (i.e., Becoming) with "fire" because of all the elements it is the one that most clearly embodies the process of movement and becoming. Fire is forever negating what it is and being what it is not.

According to Hegel, the only lack in Heraclitus' notion of "becoming" is that he did not regard it as a "universal" Absolute. Heraclitus maintains that fire dies away and passes into its opposite. In other words, fire "becomes" its opposite and its opposite "becomes" or "returns to" fire. So, as Hegel says, fire in its movement does not have independent existence. As he puts it: "... the principle [fire] does not retain itself in its determinations as the universal." Put differently, it can be said that the unity of fire only exists in its
opposition to an "other". But this "other" has yet to be absorbed back into the original unity. Thus the Heraclitean Absolute is not self-sufficient in its determinations.

(v) The "Abstraction" of Atomism

Hegel brings to our attention the fact that being ought to be thought of in its necessary relation to the negation of other-being. Being is in fact the negation of negation. For example, one can say that $X$ is in so far as it is not-$Y$ (where $Y$=the negation of $X$), or not-$Z$, etc. Hegel wants to impress upon us the fact that other-being is implied when one thinks of being in 'isolation'.

Leukippus maintains that both being and non-being are simply at home in themselves. There is no dialectical interplay between them. Thus Leukippus and the Atomists in general give the "moments" of becoming (i.e., being and non-being) an independent existence. In contrast to the Heraclitean perspective, the atoms and void of the Atomist represent the height of abstraction. As Hegel puts it: "The atom may be taken materially, but it is supersensuous, purely intellectual".

Hegel warns that the "mediation" inherent in being-for-itself is "just as easily taken away". He means by this that the truth of the relatedness of being and non-being is easily overlooked. The consequence of positioning a moment of the Absolute as the Absolute itself is
a loss in the perception of the relativity of these moments. 20

For Leukippus, the One (physis) is the Many. Hence, the unity which the Atomists ascribe to nature is synthetic and devoid of Motion, for the unity of abstract moments (atoms) can be only equally abstract. 21

(vi) The Nomos/Physis Rift and the Emergence of Subjective Consciousness

During Anaxagorus' lifetime, Athens celebrated the height of its splendor. Solon had given the polis the equality of law and the unity of spirit in its constitution. But as Hegel points out, the principle of subjective freedom is at first indistinguishable from the universal principle of Greek morality as established by law. Thus the principle of subjectivity had not yet taken root in Athenian democracy. As Hegel says: "The Substance [principle] of Justice, the common weal ... is the main consideration [of democracy] ; but it is so only as Custom, in the form of Objective Will, so that morality proper so called -- i.e. Subjective conviction and intention -- has not yet manifested itself." 22 So the citizens of the polis remain unconscious of their particular interests in opposition to those of the state. The notion of the state as an abstract "other" is entirely unknown to the Athenians of this period. On the contrary, the very source of their 'individual' identity comes from the state, i.e., the Whole.
A connection must be drawn here between the *nomos* /physis rift and the birth of subjective consciousness. As it has already been stated, prior to the rift the vitality of nomos is dependent upon the authority of the gods. In other words, nomos is "the law of nature" (physis) or, more precisely, "the law of the gods". This parallel holds because we know that prior to the rift the gods and nature were indistinguishable.

Now Cornford says that the divine law of the polis is a re-presentation of physis (or "unity in diversity") and for this reason it stresses the importance of group solidarity.

Hegel, on the other hand, states that it is the unity of Mind which is projected out as a self-existent "other" and whose goal it is to know itself as Mind, i.e., to be self-conscious.

In either instance, the birth of subjective thought occurs when the self becomes conscious of physis as a distinct and separate force. Hence, the "individual" is the negation of the negation. He is insofar as he is aware that he is not his negation (the Whole). In this sense, subjective consciousness is in the same relation to the Whole (Mind, group soul) as the atom is to the cosmological Whole. Subjective consciousness is the "atom" of the anthropological universe.

As it has been noted, the development of natural philosophy is marked by a progressive de-deification of the natural world. Hegel makes an analogy between this
philosophy and the ethical life of the Athenians. He says that the "life" of the constitution dies with the birth of self-conscious thought, just as physis is eliminated from the Atomistic conception of the natural world. The reason for this is as follows. To be self-conscious is to be alienated from the immediacy of the divinely sanctioned nomos. Therefore, subjective consciousness regards the state and nomos as a "thing", as foreign and lifeless matter.

Hegel maintains that by the time of Anaxagorus the form of subjectivity is free for itself and appears in direct opposition to civil law, morality, and religion. In order to understand why Hegel comes to this conclusion we must discuss Anaxagorus' thought in further detail.

(vii) Anaxagorus' Nous

As we have seen, the Anaxagorean Universal is Reason itself, i.e., nous. Hegel says that this concept is deficient because it is merely "formal". For Hegel, nous cannot be a thinking essence which regulates the world from without because an "external thinking-principle" would be a subject (i.e., a "thing") and no longer a thought. Nous must be immanent in the world if it is to be a "self-determining activity".

Although Anaxagorus' Universal is self-related, it is still only a concept, a mere "word" as Hegel refers to it. The Anaxagorean nous is a predicate-less absolute to which everything is only a moment. Therefore, all
existence is ephemeral in relation to it. The universality of principles, customs, and laws pertains only to their form. So the universality of form is now contrasted against the particularity of content.

There is a certain ambiguity in the subjective formalism of nous which allows for such a development. For not only is nous an infinite and self-relating form, it is also capable of being recognized by consciousness as being a product of its own thought-determinations. Hegel explains it in the following manner: "... consciousness reflects that it is the thinking subject which is thus positing [the Universal]..." But the consciousness of the subject can take on two forms of expression. On the one hand, emphasis may be rested on the "I" which posits the content. On the other hand, philosophy may concentrate on that which is posited by the subject and regard it as an object existing in and for itself. The first option holds for the Sophists. In this instance, content is found in the self. For Socrates and his long list of followers, however, the content of philosophic thought is found in the "object" which the self posits.

(viii) Socrates' Debt to Anaxagorus: The Birth of Moralität

Hegel notes that Socrates adopted Anaxagorus' doctrine that thought is the ruling and self-determining universal. However, for Socrates, this universal is conceived of as an "end", i.e., as the Good or the True. Thus
Socrates tries to do what Anaxagorus did not, that is, relate *nous* to the world by making it the "end" of moral conduct.

What is most important is the fact that this "end" must be known by subjective consciousness in its truth. Therefore, Socrates is attempting to weld the notion of universal reason to individual consciousness. Socrates' principle, as Hegel calls it, "... is that man has to find from himself both the end of his actions and the end of the world, and must attain to truth through himself". 29

The term *Sittlichkeit* is used by Hegel to denote a spontaneous, natural, and unreflective virtue that rests in obedience to established custom. It applies to the political life of the polis prior to the *nomos/physis* rift. *Moralität*, on the other hand, is a Hegelian term which refers to the subjective morality of individual consciousness.

Hegel maintains that *Moralität* represents the highest point reached by the Greek political mind. For only when moral consciousness questions the validity of the laws does it turn back within itself and demand to know that the law is posited in truth. 30 In short, the Greeks demand that *nomos* have the same content as consciousness itself, i.e., universality. For Socrates, "reason" is the connecting thread which lies at the root of both *nomos* and subjective consciousness. Thus the life of reason is most amenable to the pursuit of the Good.
(ix) Plato's Attempt to Synthesize Subjective Consciousness and the Idea

According to Hegel, the Platonic Idea is simply the Universal (Thought). But it is not the formal Universal of Anaxagorus and herein lies its strength.

Hegel acknowledges that Plato was not aware of the Idea as "the dialectic". Nonetheless, he maintains that certain relevant dialogues have this concept implicit within them. The *Parmenides* is one such work. In it, Plato says the following: "... that whether the one is or is not, it, as also the many, in relation to themselves and in relation to one another -- all of them both are and are not, appear and do not appear".  

Hegel says that the above passage illustrates the fact that Plato relates the Many to the One in a dialectical manner. For example, in becoming, being and non-being are in inseparable unity. Becoming is the negation of being followed by the negation of the negation, and so on. Hence, there can be no "being" as such without its negation. The dialectical interplay between these two intellectually distinguishable moments comprises the Whole, i.e., becoming.

The unity of the One and the Many is this "being-turned-back-within-itself in its opposite". For Hegel, it is the essential reality of the world. It is Mind. As he puts it: "... Mind, the truly absolute essence, is not only the simple and the immediate, but that which reflects itself into itself, for which in its opposition
the unity of itself and of that which is opposed is...."
In other words, in order that the One be truly One, it
must reflect itself into itself, and it can do so only,
by going out into its opposite, i.e., the Many.\(^3\)\(_4\)

Hegel says that Plato misconstrues the essential
truth of the world to be a "separate reality". That is,
Plato erroneously assumes that the ultimate reality is
the Idea whose form is given "less-than-real" content
in the sensuous world. For Hegel, on the other hand,
the ultimate reality is the totality of Mind, i.e., the
identity of the One (Mind, Thought) and the Many (being).
Both moments of the dialectic are equally necessary for
him. Therefore, Hegel is able to say that the "true"
is not beyond reality but is reality. As he says: "... the
eternal world...is reality, not a world above us
or beyond, but the present world looked at in its truth".\(^3\)\(_5\)
So, paradoxically, even though the "truth" for Hegel is
immanent, he realizes that the reality of 5th. c. Athens
demanded a different philosophical response. It was Hegel
who said that no thought can overleap its time and cer-
tainly Plato's deliberations are no exception to this
rule.

In relation to what has just been said, it could be
surmised that the "true" content of Plato's Republic is
the Greek state-life of his era. Indeed, Hegel makes
the claim that the Notion or Idea of Plato's political
milieu informed him that the subjective freedom within
the state demanded a counter-force, one which would restore
the organic unity of the state. Seen from this perspective, the Republic is a reactionary political tract that aims to thwart a socially prevalent force (i.e., subjectivism) which is undermining the cohesive well-being of the state.

Against charges laid by those who belittle the Republic as "utopian", Hegel argues: "When an ideal [i.e., the Republic] has truth in itself through the Motion, it is no chimera...for truth is no chimera". Hence, the Republic exists in an eternal but nonetheless real world insofar as it depicts the "truth" of Greek city-life.

Up until the birth of subjective consciousness, the union of nomos and physia existed only for us, the modern reader. However, by the height of classical Greek civilization the identity of the One and the Many becomes an "object" of thought for them, i.e., the actual actors in the dialectical drama. For the first time in human history the nomos-physia monad becomes a conscious reality in thought. Plato responds to the call of this "reality" in the pages of the Republic. He realizes the need for a return to the original unity. But he also knows that this return must be a mediated one. Thus subjective consciousness must be reconciled with Being. In political terms, this reconciliation occurs between the "individual" and the "state". As Hegel would say, the original unity (Mind, the nomos-physia monad) must return to itself and must come to know itself as a unity. But it can do so only by going out into its opposite, i.e., existent mind. The dialectical circle closes upon itself when subjective consciousness becomes self-conscious through
its mediation with the universality of the state.

(x) Aristotle: Nomos and Physis Juxtaposed

As we have seen in the first chapter, the Aristotelian Absolute is pure form devoid of content. It is totally unrelated to either the human or non-human world. Thus there is no correspondance between nomos and physis.

It has been said that the history of Greek philosophy is the history of the gradual de-deification of nature and, conversely, the history of the hypostatization of the Idea. Aristotle's Absolute signifies the end of this process. But it marks only the half-way point of the dialectical drama because the Absolute is only the "idea" of the Idea. What Aristotle fails to do is concretize this universal by relating it to the world itself. As Hegel puts it: "... the next necessity in Philosophy is that the whole extent of what is known must appear as one organization of the Notion, that in this way the manifold reality may be related to that Idea as the universal and therefore be determined". In other words, with nomos and physis totally alienated from each other, the dialectical process now works in reverse. The new task for philosophy is to identify thought and being. When Hegel says that the "whole extent of what is known must appear as one organization of the Notion", he means that both thought (physis) and man's political and social being (nomos) must be accounted for under the Concept. It is only in this manner that the "idea" of the Idea can be
rooted in its "other" and made whole.

C. THE JOURNEY HOME: ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE ΟΝΟΜΑ AND ΦΥΣΙΣ

(1) Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Scepticism

Stoicism is the first philosophical movement that attempts to reconcile thought and being. However, as Hegel says, because it is not yet general knowledge that the particular arises out of the universal, the Stoics take the essence of the particular to be identical to that of the universal.

The poverty of this relation between the Absolute and the manifold is most evident in the ethical system of the Stoics. Here, the virtuous life is that which is lived in accordance with "the universal law of nature", i.e., right reason. But, as with Aristotle, the universal law of nature (physis) is without content. The Stoic God is pure reason or thought. It refers to no "end" to which actions can be directed. So Hegel concludes: "... Stoic doctrines of virtue are incomplete, empty, meaningless, and tedious".

Another problem concerns the antagonism that exists between the particularity of the individual, on the one hand, and the "universal" nature of the life he must lead, on the other. To live a life in harmony with universal law is to conform one's existence to consciousness of the "true", i.e., reason. But the true is decidedly "other-worldly". As Hegel puts it: "Stoic self-consciousness
has not here to deal with its individuality as such, but solely with the freedom in which it is conscious of itself only as a universal⁴⁰. Because the Stoic does not regard the particular as his essence, he retreats from it and from life itself.

Epicurean philosophy holds the opposite view. True essence is not Being, but "being" as sensation. Both Stoicism and Epicureanism are "abstract" in that for them physis is entirely determined either by the universal or by the particular.

Scepticism negates both of these moments. It negates all determinate principles, whether they involve knowledge from the senses or from pure thought itself. Hegel defines Scepticism in the following manner: "[It] is ... an incapacity for truth which can only reach certainty of self, and not of the universal, remaining merely in the negative, and in individual self-consciousness"⁴¹. In short, Scepticism signals the return of self-consciousness into itself. Hegel says that upon entering this level of infinite subjectivity, philosophy reaches a point where self-consciousness knows itself to be the Absolute. But knowledge that absolute existence is not alien to self-consciousness is not itself known. Therefore, a gap still exists between the actual (nomos) and the "real" (self-consciousness, Mind, physis).

However, this "knowledge" implicitly exists in the form of certain cultural and legal institutions. As it has been said, Stoic pantheism replaces the relation between the citizen and the polis with the relation between
the individual and the universe. The "universal" principle of justice regards the individual as an absolute value. This principle is manifest in the development of private rights in relation to the property holdings of individual persons. Now Hegel says that the universality of Roman justice is "abstract". It is "lifeless" because the bond (i.e., the law) connecting private individuals is external and formal. Like the Stoic and the Sceptic, who withdraw into the self-sufficiency of consciousness, the Roman state is essentially just a collection of autonomous "atoms" held together by an artificial and extrinsic power. It is for this reason that Hegel says: "The Roman power is...the real Scepticism".\(^2\)

At this point Mind rebounds from its subjectivity in reaction to the ungodly and immoral world of the Roman Empire. It goes forth into what Hegel calls "intellectual objectivity" or "absolute objectivity".\(^3\) In other words, there is a return to God. The Thought which had previously conceived itself subjectively now becomes objective (or "other") to itself.

Despite this reaction, the nature of the task confronting Mind remains unchanged. What is required is that knowing mind reconcile itself with the world in such a way that its "objectivity" may be at once both distinct from Mind and in some manner adequate to it. As Hegel phrases it: "The universal standpoint of the Neo-Platonic...philosophy now is from the loss of the world to produce a world which in its outwardness shall
still remain an inward world, and thus a world reconciled; and this is the world of spirituality.\footnote{44}

In conclusion, man is for Hegel a creature that has both the intelligible world (Mind, \textit{physis}) and the sensible world (\textit{nous}) within it. Man is the intersection of these two realms. Any philosophical doctrine which fails to include this "totality" is partial and therefore abstract. The Stoic eliminates that part of man which is sensuous and time-bound, the Epicurean that part which is purely intelligible, and the Sceptic negates both determinations. In contrast, neo-Platonism\footnote{* Hegel classifies Philo as a neo-Platonist.} attempts to draw Mind together with the sensuous world.

It has been said that Stoicism and Epicureanism tried to reconcile the particular with the universal. But in fact, the (abstract) reconciliation obtained was an identification. And when the Sceptic negates this identification, he necessarily withdraws into his own individual consciousness. Hence, particular consciousness becomes absolute. Out of this dead-end, consciousness again tries to reconcile \textit{nous} and \textit{physis}. However, realizing that its objective cannot be attained through immediate identification, consciousness tries to relate itself to the world (and God) in a more circuitous manner. In effect, what it seeks is a union of the One and the Many which preserves the two moments of the relation.
(ii) Philo: The "Abstract" Reconciliation of Nomos and Physis

We have seen in the first chapter that the Philonian God is pure unknowable Being. Since the divine is utterly transcendent, it is, as Hegel says, "an abstraction" and not a true God. So in order that this indeterminate Being be known, it must beget its "other", i.e., the logos. In this manner the One (God, physis) distinguishes itself into the Many. But the Many (logoi) which are distinguished from the One are not themselves the particulars of the real world. Such an identity would only lead back to a pantheistic conception of the universe. This dilemma can be circumvented if the logos, as an emanation of God, is conceived of as a mediator (an erson) between God and man, or between physis and nomos.

However, Hegel says that the neo-Platonist doctrine of the Trinity is lacking in that the logos is a mere intellectual concept. The idea of the concrete Notion is missing the moment of "actuality". Only when the logos is manifest on earth and not, as it was for Philo, in the intelligible realm, will the Absolute be real.

Before it is possible to discuss the next stage of the dialectic, it is important that we delve a little deeper into certain aspects of its origin.

The most significant of these is Hegel's thoughts on the "incompleteness" of the nomos-physis continuum. "In the ancient religions the divine is... united to the natural or the human; but this unity is no reconciliation,
but an immediate, undeveloped, and thus unspiritual unity, just because it is merely natural." This passage is of crucial significance to a proper understanding of the Hegelian Idea for it tells us that in order to be truly aware of the divine, one must first recognize oneself in opposition to it. For example, to be conscious of an "object" implies that one is conscious of not being the object of one's consciousness. The essence of consciousness is this "pulling away" from or "negation" of the non-I. In short, it is the negation of the negation.

This human capacity to negate is an inherently unnatural process. It is unnatural because it is only upon reflection, or mediation, that one can be aware of oneself in opposition to the exterior world. In contrast, an animal or a natural object is by nature what it ought to be. Its essence (thought) and existence (being) coincide. Or, as Hegel puts it: "...natural things merely remain in their implicit Notion." Thus, only the power of the mind has the ability to distinguish itself from its immediacy or mere natural existence.

According to Hegel, herein lies the spirituality of the human mind.

Hegel's unique contribution to philosophic thought is his speculation on the meaning of the initial nomos-physis continuum and its subsequent dissolution. For Hegel, the process whereby thought and being become dissociated is one in which the simple nomos-physis identity differentiates from within itself a non-identity,
i.e. the human and non-human worlds. Unlike the non-human world, man is a non-identity which has within himself the capacity to "differentiate", to become conscious of the essence of consciousness and to realize the nature of the entire process by which mind rises from immediate existence to consciousness of itself as mind. Thus, for Hegel, the dialectical "return" has self-consciousness as its end. In the following subsection we shall see in what way Christianity advances toward this goal.

(iii) The Reconciliation Objectified in Christ

Not surprisingly, Hegel maintains that Christ is the self-conscious union of nomos and physis. The "true" God is neither of these moments in themselves. In Hegel's words: "The Absolute comprehended as concretum [om], the unity of these two absolutely different determinations, is the true God". But of what does this unity actually consist? Simply this, it is the reconciliation of the finite as subject with the infinite. And what is the infinite? For Hegel, it is the consciousness of self, i.e., self-consciousness. Thus the reconciliation is the realization that the infinite exists within the finite. The "true" God is the finite being who is conscious of his infinitude. Hegel does not mince words. He says in no uncertain terms that "Man makes himself divine [om], but in a spiritual, that is to say not in an immediate way".

To repeat, man's divine nature is realized in the
re-collection of nomos and physis, of his finite and infinite self. However, this recollection (identity) at first is not immediately presented to consciousness but is reflected within consciousness as an "object". Christ, therefore, is the objectification of the nomos-physis monad. He is the Philonian logos made real.

Because the monad is an object for consciousness, it (consciousness) has yet to see itself as the concrete universal. So, if the universal is not manifest in the here and now, the reconciliation of man (thought) and God can prevail only in the "next" life beyond death.

This leads us to the rather paradoxical conclusion that the concretized nomos-physis monad is in fact a transcendent concretization. However, the transcendency of the monad cannot remain totally otherworldly for the "truth" of the monad (Christ) is the union of man and God. This truth is reintegrated into the world by means of the Church. It is through the Church that the monad is related to the world.
CHAPTER THREE

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Hegel tells us that to be fully self-conscious is to possess Absolute Knowledge. He also tells us that to know absolutely is to know what knowing is. In short, it is to have knowledge of the correspondence between the mind's conceiving (thought) and that which is conceived (being).

Now, if Absolute Knowledge is knowledge of the identity of identity (thought) and non-identity (being), then it stands to reason that this identity must exist in fact before it is possible to have knowledge of it. It is because the Christian eschaton does not meet this criterion of immanence that it falls short of Absolute Knowledge.

It could be argued that if the Concept were a mere identity of the form I=I, then knowledge of the transcendent One (i.e., God) would be total. However, as Hegel says, the Concept cannot be a motionless tautology. If it were, it would be completely unrelated to the world (being) and therefore unable of itself to account for its existence. Hence, the Concept must be engaged in a debate with being.

When viewed from the anthropological end of the identity, this debate is the phenomenology of consciousness, or what I have called the nomos/physis dialectic. So the dialectic is in fact the unfolding of the Concept in the world. The unfolding process is complete when its essence
(thought) is realized in being. Thus the end of the dialectic cannot stop short of the actual immanentization of the Concept.

If the nomos/physis dialectic is the unfolding of the Concept in the world, then like the Concept it also must have an ideal and a real aspect. In chapter two, we were concerned more with the dialectic of ideas than we were with the actual concrete political struggles that accompanied them. In this chapter the reverse will be the case.

To this end, I will begin with an overview of the most extensive account of the anthropocentric dialectic to date. I speak of Alexandre Kojève's influential work, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*. His analysis of the Master/Slave dialectic will serve as an existential counterpoint to the second chapter.

Because Kojève's analysis of the modern state is so thorough and because, as I will argue later on, it accurately portrays the "modern project", I include in this chapter what he and Hegel say about our post-historical world. Consequently, this chapter should not only augment our knowledge of the nomos/physis dialectic, it also will give an account of its extension into the modern world.

(1) Desire and the Emergence of Self-Consciousness

Since, for Hegel, consciousness is involved in a debate with being, the latter must appear to it as somehow distinct from itself. This "otherness" of the non-
ego is a fact for consciousness. Hence, there is a "gap" between consciousness of self on the one hand and consciousness of the non-self on the other.

Hegel calls this incongruity "desire". As he says: "... self-consciousness is the state of desire in general." Desire, then, is the feeling of lack, of incompleteness, which consciousness experiences in its isolation from the world. And it is desire which impels consciousness to establish a dialogue with the world in hope of finding itself therein.

At first, consciousness does not realize the true object of its desire. It attempts to acquire positive and true certainty of itself through the negation of the negation, i.e., the independent object. But as Hegel says:

Desire and the certainty of its self obtained in the gratification of desire, are conditioned by the object.... Self-consciousness is thus unable by its negative relation to the object to abolish it; because of that relation it rather produces it again, as well as the desire. The object desired is, in fact, something other than consciousness, the essence of desire....

To desire an independent object is to desire what Kojève calls "given being". As Hegel points out in the above quotation, the satisfaction derived from the 'cessation' of "animal desire" is temporary. In fact, it merely prolongs the existence of the being which, out of necessity, must continue to desire that which it is not. It is because animal desire involves the negation of given being that it perpetually re-establishes the "gap" between it and the world.

In order to break out of the karma-like chain of "desire-
satisfaction-desire (and so on ad infinitum), consciousness must free itself from its enslavement to given being. In other words, it must not direct its desire toward mere being but toward a "negating-being" or "non-being". The reason for this is that, for Hegel, self-consciousness is the unity of self in its otherness. Like the Concept, existent mind cannot be a simple tautology. Now consciousness can come to know itself only if the "other" into which it is reflected is like itself. Only then can the object of desire be simultaneously "other" and "same".

The only being like consciousness is another consciousness. Hegel tells us that: "Ego which is the object of its self-consciousness] notion is... not object.... When a self-consciousness is the object, the object is as much ego [self] as object." 4

Therefore, in order that consciousness can come to know itself as self-conscious, it must exist for another consciousness. In other words, it must know that it exists as an independent object in the eyes of another. As Hegel says: "[self-consciousness] is only by being acknowledged or 'recognized". 5

However, even though the object of desire is another non-being, it still remains an "external entity". And because it is external (an object), there remains in consciousness a desire to negate this negation as well. Consequently, "... it [self-consciousness] must cancel that externality". 6 Hegel says that death is the natural "negation" of consciousness. Hence the desire for recognition is first manifested in a life and
death struggle. Hegel comments: "They must enter into this struggle, for they must bring their certainty of themselves ... to a level of objective truth, and make this a fact both in the case of the other and in their own case as well. And it is solely by risking life that freedom is attained."  

The phenomenology of consciousness would be short indeed if the struggle for recognition resulted in the negation of both consciousnesses. However, the outcome would be just as clear if the struggle resulted in the death of just one consciousness. For in this latter instance the victor would be left without a "self" capable of recognizing him. So, paradoxically, the very action which establishes the self's independence is the same action which eradicates the "other" that is necessary for the self to reflect itself upon.

(ii) The Master/Slave Dialectic

In order to circumvent the impasse brought on by the negation of one consciousness in the struggle for recognition, Hegel says that the two moments of consciousness (i.e., life and death) must be preserved. Thus the birth of self-consciousness results in the formation of two basic modes of consciousness. First, there is the being who risks his biological life for the non-biological desire to be recognized as an independent entity -- the Master. Second, there is the being who, rather than risking life for the sake of prestige, preserves it by existing for another -- the Slave.

Self-consciousness is explicitly independent only when
it is recognized as such by another self. The Master therefore exhibits his "completeness" as an individual through the recognition he receives from the Slave. However, as we have seen, the Master's independence is dependent upon the Slave's existence. As a result, the recognition the Master has gained for himself by subjugating the Slave is valueless in that it comes from a being which has abdicated its self-hood, i.e., its being-for-itself. The Master is in fact dependent on "dependence", on the Slave's servitude to life.

Another shortcoming which afflicts the Master is that he can satisfy his desires only by consuming the products of the Slave's labor. The Master is a mere passive consumer. He simply negates the given. On the other hand, the Slave negates significantly by transforming the given. In the process he acquires that which will enable him to transcend his condition. For through active labor, the "thingness" of that which the Slave once feared (i.e., life itself) is eliminated. Hegel explains the realization of independence (freedom) for the Slave in the following manner:

For in shaping the thing [i.e., labor] it [Slave consciousness] ... becomes aware of its own proper negativity, its existence on its own account, as an object, through the fact that it cancels the actual form confronting it. But this objective negative element is precisely the alien, external reality, before which it trembled. Now, however, it destroys this extraneous alien negative, affirms and sets itself up as a negative in the element of permanence, and thereby becomes for itself [explicitly] a self-existent [autonomous, free] being.  

Slave consciousness does not become free for-itself immediately, however. In the beginning, the Slave (by his labor)
only raises himself to the abstract idea of his freedom. He at first does not succeed in "realizing" it because he does not yet dare to act with a view to its realization. In short, in the early stages the Slave still fears for his life. So prior to the realization of his independence, the Slave constructs a series of "ideologies" which attempt to justify slavery by reconciling the idea of freedom with the reality of servitude.

(iii) Slave Ideologies

The first Slave ideology is Stoicism. According to Hegel, the Stoic's freedom is: "... merely the notion of freedom, not freedom itself". Now Hegel says that the fact that Stoic ethics are abstract and contentless eventually leads to "wearisomeness". Kojève's interpretation of this passage is insightful. As he succinctly states: "... all discourse that remains discourse ends in boring Man". 11

Scepticism, the second Slave ideology, escapes this "boredom" by realizing the Stoic notion of freedom. Thus Hegel notes: "In Scepticism, the entire unessentiality and unsubstanciality of this 'other' [i.e., the sensuous world] becomes a reality for consciousness. Thought becomes thinking which wholly annihilates [negates] the being of the world". 12

However, if the Sceptic is to remain consistent in his reasoning, he must in fact negate his own being. Thus all "living" Sceptics are anomalies. And yet, ironically, it is only the living Sceptic that is of interest to Hegel.
For the living Sceptic must eventually come to an awareness of the contradictory nature of his condition, that is, he must come to know that his idea of freedom is not present in his concrete existence. Like all Slaves, he must realize that existence is the real manifestation of the antithesis of essence.

The third form of Slave consciousness is born when the self realizes the disparity between his being and thought. However, since the Slave is unwilling to risk his life, he manages to justify his condition in light of his new-found awareness by positing true being beyond the sensuous world. For Christian consciousness, then, freedom is real, but it is a transcendent reality.

Since freedom is a reality not of this world, the Christian Slave is under no compulsion to fight and be recognized by the Master. For he is already recognized by "his" Master -- God. He is free to the extent that he participates in the beyond. Hence, as Kojève rightfully points out, the Christian can maintain the Stoic attitude while circumventing its boredom because the Slave no longer remains the same. On the contrary, he is active insofar as he must go beyond himself in order to reap the rewards of the next world.¹³

We have seen that Christian consciousness identifies thought with transcendent being because it is unwilling to act in such a way as to identify thought with real being. We also know that the reason for such behavior on the part of the Slave is his fear of death. Now Kojève says that as
a result of the Slave's "terror", there arises the ideology of the "two worlds" or what has been previously referred to as the separation of the \textit{vita activa} from the \textit{vita contemplativa}. According to Kojève, the Christian overcomes his fear of death in a fraudulent manner. That is, he appeases his fear of biological death with faith in the belief of an everlasting spiritual life. This 'solution' is evasive. For Kojève notes that the Christian Slave can negate his mundane, servile nature only by freeing himself from "absolute" bondage, i.e., from God and eternal life.\textsuperscript{14}

(iv) The Dialectic Resolved

As we already know, in the \textit{History of Philosophy} Hegel explicitly states the fact that "man makes himself divine". He accomplishes this feat when he realizes that although the content of Christian consciousness is true, its form is not. Kojève puts it in the following manner: "... all that Christian theology says is absolutely true, provided it is applied not to a transcendental and imaginary God, but to Man himself, living in the world".\textsuperscript{15}

The theologian maintains that theological discourse is one in which man (subject) speaks of God (object), whereas for Hegel/Kojève, it is a discourse in which man speaks to himself through a self-posited intermediary, i.e., God. Hence, what is considered an ecumenical discourse for the religious man is an anthropological (atheistic) dialogue for the fully
self-conscious (wise) man. But it is not as if, in the process of self-realization, consciousness is "reduced" to simple finitude and mere existence. On the contrary, the divine essence of God (identity) is transposed to existent mind, thereby giving it a measure of divinity. Just what form this exalted image of man assumes will be the topic of chapter five.

However, for now we can speak of the synthesis of the human and the divine in terms of the fusion of Master and Slave. According to Hegel, this union is realized in the "individual" who represents the concrete (real) synthesis of the universal (the essence of thought -- freedom) and the particular (existence). Because the Christian fusion of the universal and the particular is effected in the "beyond", the believer can become an "individual" in that realm alone. It is not until the advent of the Napoleonic Empire that this theistic notion of individuality is made real.

The revolution that brings about this transformation is twofold. First, there is an ideal revolution. In other words, before a real struggle for freedom can begin, the Slave must be convinced that freedom is attainable on earth. He must be aware of the fact that real freedom is worth fighting for, that it is the true expression of the dignity of man. Hegel credits the intellectuals of the Enlightenment with the accomplishment of theoretically immanentizing the Christian eschaton. It is due to their efforts that man comes to know that he is the locus of pure thought and particular existence.

The only thing left to do is to act on this knowledge.
(v) The Final Act

We will now give Kojève's account of the final act of the dialectic. But first a rather brief synopsis of the history of the Master/Slave dialectic is in order.

Kojève notes that the essential character of the pagan state (i.e., the Greek polis) is that it is a Master-state. Simply put, only Masters are "citizens". Therefore the recognition afforded by this state is not universal. Moreover, the state can only recognize the "universal" element of human existence. This is so, says Kojève, because the essence of the Master is itself a universal or impersonal value. "The Man who risks his life is in no way different, by the sole act of having risked his life, from all others who have done as much". The "uniqueness" of the Master is his anonymity.

The result is what we have seen: that Greek city life lacked subjective freedom. The principle of "particularity" had not yet appeared.

The Master-state is a political entity which excludes labor. It is a human state only to the extent that it wages perpetual wars for prestige. The end result of this fighting between states is the eventual emergence of the Roman Empire.

Now as Kojève points out, the defense of the Empire requires more warriors than the mother city can possibly supply on her own. Therefore the Emperor must resort to the hiring of mercenaries. This results in a situation where the citizens of the mother city are no longer "obliged" to fight. This seemingly trivial detail has tremendous consequences
for the dialectic. For a citizen who no longer fights is no longer a Master. It is for this reason that the citizen of the Empire is transformed into a "private person", or a Slave of the state. 21 And this is why the pagan Masters come to accept the ideologies of the Slave.

Now Kojève says that the Christian is a Slave without a Master (a pseudo-Slave) because he does not work for a real Master. Conversely, the Christian is a pseudo-Master in that he no longer risks his life. This hybrid "pseudo-Slave/pseudo-Master" is what Hegel/Kojève calls the Bourgeois, the private property holder.

The Bourgeois, who in principle does not risk his life, must work just like a Slave. But since the Bourgeois has no Master he does not have to work in the service of another. So, as Kojève says, he works for himself.

If in the Bourgeois world there are no Masters, then it must be a world dominated not by the universal (as it was in the pagan state) but by the particular. This is precisely the case. For instance, the bourgeois Roman world is not a state in an organic sense but is merely the accretion of private property holders. As we have seen, there is no true "community" in such a political organization, only a legally enforced coalition of particular entities.

In the bourgeois Christian world the "true" community is transcendent. Particular man realizes for the first time that he is in essence also universal, but this synthesis of self and substance is beyond his grasp. If there is to be a
concrete fusion of the Slave (paricularity) and the Master (universality), the working Bourgeois must become a warrior. In other words, he must introduce death into his existence by consciously and voluntarily risking his life. However, as Kojève points out, because there are no Masters in the bourgeois world, the risk of life that ought to occur cannot be in the form of a "class fight". Consequently, the working Bourgeois turned revolutionary must himself create a situation that introduces the element of death. According to Kojève, it is the Terror of Robespierre that effects this synthesis.  

But this union is not final. Prior to the Revolution, substance (the universal) appeared as alien to the self. Now with the secularization of the Christian Idea, this "substance" is manifested in the world as the "general will". But for Hegel/Kojève, this general will is still an abstraction. Moreover, since it is a universal abstraction, its message is delivered in a most impersonal fashion. The universal concept (i.e., "absolute freedom"), as Hegel refers to it, 

... divides itself into extremes equally abstract, into the cold unbending bare universality, and the hard discrete absolute rigidity and stubborn atomic singleness of actual self-consciousness.... The relation... of these two, since they exist for themselves... is pure negation entirely devoid of mediation.... The sole and only work and deed accomplished by universal freedom is death.... It is... the most cold-blooded and meaningless death of all, with no more significance than cleaving a head of garbage, or swallowing a draught of water."  

Because of the abstractness of the universal concept, man has yet, as Hegel says, "... to become aware of... the
freedom and singleness of actual self-consciousness". 25

It is in the Napoleonic Empire that Hegel sees the begin-
ning of the realization of actual self-consciousness, of the
real synthesis of Master and Slave. Hegel describes its pre-
sence in the modern liberal state thusly:

The state is the actuality of concrete free-
dom. But concrete freedom consists in this,
that personal individuality and its particu-
lar interests not only achieve their complete
development and gain explicit recognition for
their right but, for one thing, they also
pass over of their own accord into the inter-
est of the universal, and for another, they
know and will the universal; they even re-
cognize it as their own substantive mind;
they take it as their end and aim and are ac-
tive in its pursuit. The result is that the
universal does not prevail or achieve com-
pletion except along with particular inter-
est and through the co-operation of parti-
cular knowing and willing; and the individ-
uals likewise do not live as private persons
for their own ends alone, but in the very act
of willing these they will the universal in
the light of the universal, and their activi-
ity is consciously [em] aimed at none but the
universal end. 26

The "individual" of which Hegel speaks is truly individ-
ual in the sense that it is only through particular being
that the universal or common cause can be realized. As we have
just seen, Hegel identifies the particular with the universal
without dissolving the one into the other. In other words,
the individual of the modern state is the identity of identity
(the universal, essence, thought) and non-identity (the par-
ticular, existence, being).

The reconciliation of thought and being which in the
Christian world was in-itself becomes for-consciousness during
the Enlightenment and finally, in the French Revolution, be-
comes consciousness' own action. Thus Napoleon's Empire completes the course of the evolution of human consciousness.

If desire is the state of tension brought on by the rift between subjectivity and objectivity, between the idea of freedom and its actual existence, then the individual in the modern state is "satisfied" in the knowledge of his concrete freedom.

There are two levels of satisfaction, however. The first is found in the figure of Napoleon who immanentizes the Christian eschaton, thereby creating the principles of the modern liberal state. In short, Napoleon politicizes Christian ethics. He is therefore the first "individual" in the Hegelian sense of the word, the original "perfect" being. But Napoleon himself was unaware of his own perfection, of his God-man being. If he were truly self-conscious, he would have known the essence (meaning) of his existence. However, it is Hegel, and not Napoleon, who gives meaning to the latter's action and who expresses it in the pages of a book -- the Phenomenology of Spirit. Thus Hegel can claim to be Napoleon's self-consciousness. And as a result Hegel is the first consciously satisfied man, or, the first "wise" man. He knows that as a member of the modern state his perfection is concrete.

As it has already been stated, for Hegel, philosophy is "the thought of the world". Because philosophy is the thought of the world (the real) it cannot outreach the existent. It can only look back and reflect on the real. As Hegel says in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, philosophy "... appears only when actuality is already there cut and dried after
its process of formation has been completed.... The owl of
Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk"."29

Philosophy, then, is in a very real sense an "after-
thought". It can only appear over against the real. It is
therefore dependent upon the real. Philosophy relies upon
the given insofar as it needs it to reflect itself upon. Con-
sequently, a "Hegel" (\textit{theoria}) can come onto the scene only
after the appearance of a "Napoleon" (\textit{praxis}).

Since the work of Napoleon resulted in the final synthesis,
between Master and Slave, Hegel's consciousness of the meaning
of this action constitutes the final thought.

In the "individual" the essence of consciousness (universal-
sality) is concretely identified with its existence (particu-
larity). It is for this reason that Hegel can say that the
state is Spirit (the Concept) on earth. Now philosophy, as
the thought of this world (i.e., the modern state), becomes
conscious of the existential aspect Spirit which is the state.
The philosopher is aware of the identity between the universal
and the particular. In other words, he becomes conscious of
the "truth" of his own consciousness. He becomes fully self-
conscious and is therefore no longer a lover of wisdom but a
possessor of wisdom. The Absolute Knowledge of the wise man
is an epistemological reflection of the perfection inherent in
his reality, i.e., the modern state. Using the Marxist termin-
ology of Kojève, one could say that the state is the base of
the Concept and wisdom its superstructure.
(vi) The State and the Nomos-Physia Monad

It has been repeatedly stated that for Hegel thought and being form an identity. At first, this identity is only implicit, or "in-itself". For reasons already cited, the telos of the Concept is to render the implicit notion explicit, or "for-itself". The world of the "for-itself" is the world of human thought and action. In contrast to the eternity of the logic of the Concept, its unfolding into the human arena means that it must be characterized by "time". Now the only way the Concept can be the Concept (i.e., circular, self-same, or eternal) within a temporal context is by having the Concept (Spirit) realize itself in time, through the thought and deeds of men. This temporal process of self-realization is what Hegel means by the term "history". It is the extent of time it takes for existence to approximate essence.

Since at first the two are non-identical*, essence eventually comes to appear as "other" than existence. It exists as an "ideal" world and therefore serves as a model for an imperfect or less-than-ideal world. What "is" is juxtaposed against what "ought to be". Thus the law of the state (nomos) strives to equate itself to the eternal and ideal verities of natural law (physia). But with the advent of the modern state, the ideal is real. In other words, the state is what

* Essence and existence are not identical because the life and death struggle for recognition resulted in the formation of two antithetical consciousnesses, i.e., Master and Slave.
it ought to be. A gap no longer exists between nomos and physis, between the man-made and the natural.

It has been stated that physis was originally associated with the "life-principle". It stood for the soul-substance which permeated all things and imbued them with the power of growth and development. Hence, physis can and has often been linked to the animate and self-generative essence that is God. We have also seen how, as a result of Greek science and the Sophistic movement, the unifying and organic quality of the life-principle within the human and non-human worlds withered away and became reified in pure thought. In the process, form came to be completely disassociated from content. Physis was now contrasted against the nomos of the human world and the vivid mechanisms of nature. The indwelling life of the divine was set against the dry political fabrications of man.

The 'life' of the social contract was injected from without much in the same way as the elements in Anaximander's cosmos were exteriorly manipulated by the soul-substances Love and Strife. Contract theory is merely the attempt by man to re-create the indwelling life-principle (physis) within the political sphere.

Hegel says that all such attempts at formulating contract theory are severely misguided for they all rest on the erroneous assumption that nomos and physis are antagonistic. To be sure, nomos and physis are identified only in the modern state. But what Hegel wants to prove is that nomos itself has never been "unnatural" and just the product of human artifice. The truth for Hegel is quite the opposite. For if, as we have seen, Spirit is "history" and Spirit is rational (i.e., it has
a telos), then history itself must be rational. As Hegel puts it in the Philosophy of Right: "What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational." 30

In addition, it can be said that Spirit is the Hegelian physis insofar as it contains within itself its own source of development or life. And, by implication, history is physis concretized. Therefore, the political deeds of men are not strictly related to nomos in that they are not simply the artificial and contingent constructs of human thought and action. On the contrary, the nomoi of men are grounded in the physis of Spirit and history. They represent the necessary (and therefore rational) moments in the unfolding of the Concept towards its telos.

Thus the Hegelian state, as Spirit on earth, represents the point of intersection between the natural and the artificial. The organic essence that is physis is made real in the form of nomos, i.e., the liberal principles of the modern state. This fusion of the natural and the artificial is evident in Hegel's comparison of the state with a self-reproducing organism. As he says in the additions to the Philosophy of Right, the state is an organism in virtue of its organization. In other words, it forms a "whole" as a result of the relation between the objective laws of the state and the public's subjective awareness of their necessity. 31

In review, it has been shown that for self-consciousness to be real, it must exist in-and-for-itself. This means that consciousness can be certain of itself only when it is recognized in its independence by another consciousness. Hence,
the "truth" of self-consciousness is socially determined.

The inherently human need for recognition cannot be satisfied by the state until two conditions are met. First, the state must be universal. As it has been shown, moral and political ideals were originally bound up with very definite social conditions. With the advent of increased trade and cultural exchange, the Sophistic enlightenment of the 5th. c. B.C. brought to the fore the notion of moral relativism and the "conventionality" of law. The statutes of the polis were regarded as products of human artifice. Against this sceptical challenge, the Socratic-Platonic rebuttal relied on rational theory, and rationalism carried with it the germ of universalism.

By the time of Alexander, the Hellenic idea of culture was such that it was possible to say that one was a Hellene not by birth but by education. Since all men could be taught to be reasonable (in principle), they all shared a common and implicit essence. It was possible for the first time to speak of "man" as such.

Now that the concept of universality had found political expression, there remained the problem of class distinction. For the Hellenic Empire did not do away with the Master/Slave dichotomy. Although reason is now an attribute of man as a species, it still remains the property of an "elite".

The French Revolution marks the end of the "class war". According to Hegel/Kojève, it is not classical reason or "virtue" which serves as a measuring stick for the highest
human good in the modern state, but the freedom afforded by universal recognition. Since all persons, by virtue of being human, desire to be recognized, all beings at least have the capacity to become fully self-conscious. It is for this reason that Kojève tells us that the modern state is universal (race-less) and homogeneous (class-less).

(vii) Spirit, Truth, and Time

For Hegel, the "real" is not a static and transcendent reality but the immanent process of the unfolding of Spirit in ever more concrete configurations. Because Christianity is an intermediate stage along the way to the realization of the end of history, its essence is necessarily beyond its horizon. Hence, the vita contemplativa and the vita activa form two distinct ways of life which correspond to the "two worlds", i.e. theoria and praxis (i.e. the vita activa or practice).

As we have seen, with the advent of the French Revolution the form of the concrete expression of Spirit (i.e. freedom) is no longer juxtaposed against its content. The implosion of the "two worlds" also signifies the fusion of the time/eternity dichotomy. We know that for the Christian the time-bound mundane world is contrasted against the eternal city of God. The "infinity" of mind, which Hegel says is the essence of the divine, is alienated from the Christian in his existence on earth. Hegel can say that the divine is immanentized in the modern world because he identifies the principle of divinity with self-conscious thought. According to
Hegel, the connection is a valid one because they both partake of a common principle, i.e., "identity". Self-conscious thought is divine (infinite) precisely because it has itself as its own object of thought. Man can "make himself divine" by realizing the essence (potentiality) which he shares with God. Now Hegel says:

Time is just the notion definitely existent, and presented to consciousness in the form of an empty intuition. Hence spirit necessarily appears in time, and it appears in time so long as it does not grasp its pure notion.... When this notion grasps itself, it supersedes its time character.... Time therefore appears as spirit's destiny and necessity, where spirit is not yet complete within itself....

In this fascinating passage Hegel tells us that time is "the notion definitely existent", or "history". He then goes on to say that time (history) appears as the Concept's destiny as long as its telos is not realized. In other words, as long as thought and being are non-identical, linear time will prevail. History is the process in which Spirit comes into being.

If Spirit realizes itself in the modern state, then history must also be fulfilled. Hegel does not say it in so many words, but the implicit consequence of the realization of Spirit is the cessation of time or the "end of history". It makes complete sense that only at the end of time is it possible to "think time" rather than to "think in time". One knows thought is historical only if one posits oneself "beyond" history. It is only from this extra-historical vantage point that a survey of time in its entirety can be made.

If Spirit is history (praxis), and if the modern world is post-historical, then we must live in a post-praxical age.
But what does this mean? Simply this, if Spirit is history, and the activity of Spirit is complete, then the work or "action" of the world is also complete. In concrete political terms this means that the principles of justice have been laid out in full. If the Hegelian/Kojèveian hermeneutic is correct, then no new or authentic alternatives to the modern liberal state are possible.

Other interesting conclusions follow from the Hegelian thesis. For instance, the Hegelian "God" is Spirit. Therefore in one respect, the god of the modern era is the state. Moreover, because Spirit denotes not only the end of the dialectic but also the dialectic itself, then what is most elevated in this world is "history", or as one would expect Kojève to say, History. Now if this is in fact true, then one must agree along with Kojève that: "... whatever is...out of the range of social and historical verification is forever relegated to the domain of opinion (dèza)." 32

This is a tremendously important point that warrants the considerable attention it will receive in the next chapter. For now, however, it will suffice to say that as a result of the identity of Spirit and time, truth itself becomes a function of time. For the Hegelian, truth is interior to history.
CHAPTER FOUR

TYRANNY AND WISDOM: THE STRAUSS/KOJÈVE DEBATE

In the previous chapter the dialectic was followed through to its completion. The nomos/physis rift, which had been the focus of discussion in the first three chapters, is now no longer a "reality" that provokes explication. Therefore, this chapter represents a fresh start in the direction of determining what specific effects the nomos-physis monad has on the relationship between politics and philosophy, or between tyranny and wisdom.

The modern (Hegelian) account does not go unchallenged, however. In this chapter the Hegelian hermeneutic is confronted with a response from classical political philosophy. For heuristic purposes, the modern/classic debate will be structured around the insightful Strauss/Kojève analysis of Xenophanes' On Tyranny. Hence, the main purpose of this chapter, apart from the further clarification of the Hegelian thesis, is to contrast what has been up to now a one-sided account of political theorizing with an opposing view. In the process, I hope at least to intimate the existence of an identity between the modern/classical dichotomy on one hand, and the "modern" existential tension between doing (praxis) and thinking (theoria) on the other.
(1) Tyranny: For Love or Recognition?

In *On Tyranny*, Leo Strauss maintains that the major difference between Hiero, the classical tyrant, and Simonides, the classical philosopher, lies in the fact that the former would like "to be loved by human beings as such", whereas the latter would be "satisfied by the admiration, the praise, and the approval of a small minority".¹

Now according to Kojève, one is recognized only by one's acts. On the other hand, one is loved on account of one's being. If Strauss/Xenophon say that the tyrant wishes to be loved, then to Kojève this means that the tyrant wishes to be loved for his being. He concludes that this is an impossibility, for a person leaves the family (the domain of love) and enters public life precisely because he wants to avoid gratuitous affection. He does not want to be loved for his being but admired for his accomplishments. Simply put, Kojève is saying that the tyrant wishes to earn respect. One cannot earn anything simply by being, therefore the tyrant must be concerned about his "actions".²

Strauss counters with the following argument: "He [the tyrant] could not devote himself to his work... without reservation if he did not attach absolute importance to... human [beings]. He must "care" for human beings as such. He is essentially attached to human beings. This attachment is, at the bottom of his desire to rule human beings..."³

He goes on to say that this attachment to human beings is "love". And he adds that love is a characteristic of all men,
the only difference being that with political man, "... the attachment enervates all private concerns; the political man is consumed by erotic desire ... for the large multitude, for the demos". Strauss concludes his defense by stating that this erotic desire craves reciprocity, that the tyrant desires to be loved by all his subjects regardless of their stature.

In order to bolster his case even further, Strauss states that the ruler loves his subjects as his own, as distinguished from the subjects of other rulers. He argues that love is not merely the attachment to another being, but the selfish attachment to one's own. As Strauss puts it: "... the mother loves her son, not because he is, but because he is her own, or because he has the quality of being her own". 5

Strauss' entire argument is based upon the presupposition that love and recognition are necessarily exclusive. For instance, with respect to the claim that love is an attachment to one's own, it is not at all clear why the tyrant cannot be attached to his subjects alone, and desire to be recognized as well. To argue otherwise, as Strauss does, implies that "recognition" and "concern for one's own" are somehow incompatible. Who would want to defend the claim, for example, that because the tyrant Alexander was concerned about the welfare of his Empire (to the exclusion of other empires), he was exempt from the desire to be recognized for his political and military achievements?

(ii) Wisdom: Public or Private?

Both Strauss and Kojève agree that the philosopher wishes
to be recognized rather than loved. However, despite this agreement, their views on this matter for the most part vary greatly.

For Strauss and all ontological dualists, the dominating passion of the philosopher is knowledge of the "eternal". As a result, the philosopher's concern with individual temporal beings can only be minimal. The philosophic relation is between man and God, and not between man and men. Consequently, Strauss contends that the philosophic desire for recognition is rather limited, extending to only "a small minority".

For Kojève, on the other hand, the "truth" is not eternal but in time, in the world of human thought and action. Hence, for ontological monists, the philosopher's domain is beyond the confines of the "Epicurean Garden". According to Kojève, to believe otherwise is to acknowledge "truth" as being the product of solipsistic revelation.6

This being said Kojève concludes that the philosopher must be a pedagogue who tries to extend his pedagogical activity without limit. As he says: "... it is only by seeing our ideas shared by others (or at least by an other) ... that we can be sure of not finding ourselves in the domain of lunacy...."7

If truth is interior to history, if Being is history, then Being creates itself or "becomes" in the course of time. Hence, if the philosopher wishes to reveal the Hegelian conception of Being, which is a "Becoming", he cannot do so by isolating himself from history or from the men who make history, i.e., the tyrants.
If he does, then as Kojève says: "... he will be "left behind by events"." 

In response to the question, "Can the philosopher govern man or participate in his government?", Kojève says that philosophers are more adept than the uninitiate in the art of the dialectic, in remaining free of prejudice, and in the ability to see "concretely", and are therefore excellent political prospects. However, the answer to the question whether or not the philosopher wants to govern is much more problematic.

The fact is that both the pursuit of wisdom and the task of governing are in themselves demanding and time-consuming activities. No person has enough time to do both competently, even if he may have the ability. Therefore, if as Hegel/Kojève maintain, the philosopher must involve himself in the world (in "history"), then he can do so only by advising the tyrant.

(iii) The Implications of Historicism Upon Theoria-Praxis

Hegel has shown us that mere "talk" of freedom eventually ends in boring man. Hence, verbal discourse (theoria) is not a sufficient condition for truth. According to Kojève, the reason for this is that man is not a Being that "is". Rather, he is a non-Being (i.e., a Nothingness) that nihilates through the negation of Being. This negation of Being is what Kojève calls "Action". It is the property which distinguishes man from the natural world. As Kojève puts it: Man can be satis-
fied only by action”. 10

Although Hegel/Kojève realize that mere dialogue in itself is an insufficient condition for truth, one would be naive to underestimate the function of dialogue (philosophy) in the formation of the real conditions of the world.

As it has been previously stated, the Hegelian Concept identifies the "two worlds". In other words, it collapses the two "realms" which constitute dualistic ontology and which have been represented at various times by the following polarities: nomos/physia, being/thought, essence/existence, form/content, the Many/the One, time/eternity, praxis/theoria, and our latest addition, tyrant/philosopher.

Now since the telos of the Concept is to reconcile the general polarity of the two worlds, it would be unreasonable to assume that this reconciliation could be had without the benefit of dialogue, or a transmission of ideas, between the philosopher and the tyrant. Kojève would probably agree with the statement that since man is a "thinking being", his history must also constitute the notions of "thinking" and "being". In other words, it must be a world in which thought and action are at least influenced by each other's presence.

History bears this supposition out. For instance, the tyrant Alexander established an Empire on the basis of what he had learned from Socratic/Platonic philosophy. It was from classical thought that the notion of a single "essence" had devel-
oped. Alexander's Hellenic civilization was the material expression of a philosophical concept, i.e., *logos* or culture. 11

The modern state has adopted not only the universality of the Hellenic Empire but also the "homogeneity" (classlessness) of Christian dogma. But before this synthesis could be concretized, Kojève argues that the intellectuals of the Enlightenment had *consciously* to transform the "ideal" monad (i.e., the Christian *eschaton*) in such a way as to make its realization possible by a tyrant. 12 Philosophy, therefore, is no mere "afterthought". For, as Kojève explains: "... if man is satisfied with philosophically understanding ... the given political reality, he will never be able to go beyond either this reality itself or the philosophical idea which corresponds to it". 13

Now if history is the progress toward the realization of Spirit and concrete freedom, then there must be a mechanism by which given reality and philosophy come to be identified with the *telos* of the Concept. And since there is no progress if man is content with what he is and with his description of the real, the essence of being human must be characterized by a persistent feeling of dissatisfaction with the given. We already know that this dissatisfaction with the real is what is meant by the term "desire". However, what has not been made explicit yet is the link between anthropological desire, negativity, and freedom.

As we have seen, the notion of desire presupposes the existence of a "difference" between subject and object. The desiring subject desires an object and is thus aware of a lack
within itself. Desire is ontologically expressed as "negativity". In order for a self to be, it must distinguish (negate) itself from that which it is not. The "lack" experienced by desire is equivalent to the "otherness" experienced by self-conscious mind.

Existentially speaking, negativity is human freedom. As Kojève puts it: "Freedom does not consist in a choice between two givens: it is the negation of the given, both of the given which is oneself... and of the given which one is not (the natural and social world)."

In short, freedom is concrete negativity, or negating Action. Hence truly "human" existence is manifested in negating Action. For it is only through negating Action that man becomes that which he is not. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that as a real negating being, man has the ability to realize that which he is not "explicitly". For as it has been shown, Hegel maintains that man becomes explicitly what he is implicitly, and implicitly man is "mind", which in turn is negativity, or self-consciousness, or freedom.

Pure negating Action is absolutely destructive. There could be no progress toward real freedom and Absolute Knowledge if negating Action involved the mere replacement of one given with another. Continuity is achieved in truly human action because it is dialectical. The essence of the meaning of the dialectic is captured in the Hegelian term, "aufgeben". It connotes a simultaneous negation, preservation, and elevation of the given. It is for this reason that
negating Action is a creative endeavour. 16

Because human action creates, it gives form to that which did not exist previously. The freedom of action ensures that its creations could not possibly have had a prior existence as an "immutable" ideal. On the contrary, Hegel/Kojève argue that man creates "without a pre-conceived idea". 17 Thus the deeds of men are "unconsciously" performed in that they are done without an ultimate end in view. Since philosophy cannot leap ahead of its age, the relationship between it and the work of the tyrant is one in which, together, the horizons of their respective worlds expand in time.

Even though, as Kojève says, man creates without a pre-conceived idea, this does not mean that there is no "logic" in his actions. It only means that the telos of history cannot be the "object" of thought until one is "other" than the object of one's thought, that is, until one is "other" than time, i.e., beyond history.

As it has been shown, Alexander's political creation was the result of philosophic input. But this philosophical influence is itself a conditioned reality. Now we know why it is that Hegel gave an account of Plato's political thought as being a "reaction" against concrete social and political conditions. According to Hegel/Kojève, the political given must be dialectically negated (transcended aufheben) through action so that a new political reality can approximate the "ideal" and in turn provide a real basis for a new philosophy, i.e., a new "ideal". This new ideal will preserve only that part of the old which has survived the test of the creative politi-
cal negation of the reality which corresponded to it.\(^8\) The real (the tyrant) and the ideal (the philosopher) must play off each other in the manner described if political and philosophical progress is a reality. Kojève explains the process in the following terms:

... if philosophers gave no political advice at all to statesmen, in the sense that it would be impossible to draw from their ideas (directly or indirectly) any political teaching whatsoever, there would be no historical progress, and hence no history in the proper sense of the word. But if the statesmen did not, by daily political action, at some time actualize this 'advice', grounded in philosophy, there would be no philosophical progress (toward Wisdom or Truth) and hence no philosophy in the precise sense of this term.\(^9\)

It is clear from the above passage that the Hegelian relationship between the tyrant and the philosopher is one of mutual dependence. Each relies on the other to realize his potential, to become explicitly what it is implicitly. For the tyrant, the explicit truth is the universal and homogeneous state. On the other hand, truth for the philosopher is "wisdom", that is, consciousness of the truth of Spirit as it is manifested in its perfection on earth.

The sympathetic relationship between tyrant and philosopher is most clearly apprehended when one understands that the appearance of the reforming tyrant is inconceivable without the pre-existing presence of the philosopher/intellectual. For example, Napoleon could not have been associated with the French Revolution unless he was inspired and guided by "practical" (read: realizable) philosophical thought. Contrarily, the emergence of the first
wise man must necessarily be preceded by the revolutionary political action of a tyrant. As we have seen, Hegel could not have written the *Phenomenology* without a "self" of which to be conscious.

(iv) Recognition vs. Virtue: A Critique

It has been said that with the establishment of the universal and homogeneous state the ideal becomes real. No thought (philosophic idea) can reflect or bring to the fore the 'contradictions' within an already ideal (perfect) real world. Hence, Spirit exists in-itself as the modern state and for-itself in the thought of the wise man. The Concept exists in-and-for-itself in the dyad, "modern state/wise man". And because the state is the product of the final tyrant, the dyad also has the form "tyrant/wise man" or "tyranny/wisdom". It is clear, then, that for Hegel/Kojève, the very idea of a completely realized Spirit involves not only the state but the wise man as well. Since the wise man's thought (Absolûte Knowledge) is dependent upon the given, and since we know he is wise only because he reflects upon a "perfect" given, his existence is in a sense derivative of the state. Hence, the state is independent of the wise man in a way that cannot be said of the opposite relation between the wise man and the state. This is an extremely critical point for it illustrates the fact that "satisfaction" (i.e., the cessation of desire) is not guaranteed with the mere appearance of the state. The modern state is a necessary but insufficient cause for true
satisfaction, which is consciousness of the truth of the state. Is this not what Hegel means when he says in the Philosophy of Right that the citizens of the state do not live as private persons for their own ends, but consciously will the universal end as their own private end?* The individual will not abnegate his personal interests nor naturally conform his will to the universal unless he is aware that his very "individuality" is sustained by and through the state. In other words, an individual's compliance with the universal is wrought from an understanding of the state which sees it in its "truth", i.e., as the concrete identity of identity (thought) and non-identity (being). The state's functioning as an integrated whole (an organism) is therefore dependent upon the Absolute Knowledge of the wise citizen.

Kojève says that Hegel supposes that every man is a potential wise man, "... that is, made so as to become conscious of what he is..." Because man is by nature a conscious being, Hegel/Kojève maintain that all men have the potential to realize fully the limit of consciousness, i.e., absolute self-consciousness or wisdom. Whether or not the citizens of the modern state are in fact wise will be discussed in detail later on. For now, it will suffice to note the fact that only upon the full realization of the state, where all its citizens are not only "perfect" (i.e., truly individual in the Hegelian sense of the word) but also wise, will the Hegelian "ideal"

* The complete passage is quoted on page 82
become a reality. Only then will tyranny as such be overcome, for only then will the conflict of interest between the ends of the citizen and those of society as a whole be overcome.

Strauss contends that the classical argument derives its strength from the assumption that the wise do not desire to rule. As a result, the classics maintain that the real political world will always fall short of the ideal and that tyranny will forever remain a danger coeval with political life. 21

But what Strauss in effect means when he says that the "wise" do not desire to rule is that the "classical wise man" or "philosopher" does not wish to do so because the business of governing is too time consuming. Kojève agrees with Strauss that the philosopher prefers philosophizing to governing for this very reason. However, Strauss fails to realize that the "wise men" of the final state are not "lovers of wisdom" but "possessors of the Truth". Of course, this lacuna on his part is due to his classicist bias. But from within the limits of Hegelian political philosophy, one would have to agree that the post-historical wise man is free from the time consuming pursuit of wisdom. Moreover, since the Hegelian state is the ideal, the wise man may very well make a model tyrant or statesman as a result of his knowledge that there is no reality apart from the state. Kojève himself realized as much and consequently devoted much of his time to the management of the practical concerns of the state.

The more the Kojève/Strauss debate is analyzed, the more it becomes apparent that the arguments on both sides are for
the most part internally consistent and that the true source
of disagreement between the two is their differing notions
as to what is "the highest good" for man. For Hegel/Kojève,
the sumnum bonum is "universal recognition" and ultimately,
"wisdom". This essentially anthropological understanding of
what it means to be truly human is juxtaposed against the
"theological" interpretation offered by the classics. For
the latter, the greatest good is not recognition but "think-
ing" or "virtue".

According to the Socratic/Platonic tradition, pure wis-
dom is the immutable and eternal perfection that is the Good
or God. Thus wisdom is pure Being (essence). That part of
man which is most like pure Being is "reason" (logos). How-
ever, because human reason exists within "being", the realm
of pure Being will be forever beyond man's grasp. In short,
man can only strive to be like God. He can reconcile but not
identify his existence with God's being. For this reason
Plato says that man resides in the metaxy. The human condi-
tion is such that man exists halfway between the pure exis-
tence of the natural world and the pure essence of the divine.22

For the classics, the metaxy is man's "given being", to
borrow Kojève's phrase. It describes the parameters of being
which delimit human existence. It informs us that the human
condition is equally alienated from both ends of the ontolo-
gical spectrum. Hence, pure Being and pure being are forever
"other" than the human reality. The birth of subjective con-
sciousness will see to it that man is never at home in the
world as are the gods and the animals.
Hegel's intellectual development began with the more "subordinate needs of man", as he puts it in a letter to his friend Schelling. In other words, his early interests centered around concerns that were related to the general ethical well-being of a people or peoples. No doubt, Hegel's interest in the spiritual and intellectual health of a community sprang from the deficiencies he witnessed in this respect in his own homeland.

At first, Hegel thought the solution to the dilemma was to be found in the establishment of a "folk-religion", based along the lines of Greek civil religion. As we are all well aware, Hegel later turns to philosophy proper for the answer. Despite the great differences between the religious content of his earlier works and the methodology of the System, the common factor in all his works is their bases in romanticism.

The romantic casts an envious eye toward those "beings" which are at home in the world. In comparison, the human condition is "deficient". As we have seen, man desires as a result of a lack he experiences in his being. He is essentially an "emptiness", a "void".

Now Strauss says that modern man finds a way to actualize the best social order because of his dissatisfaction with utopias. He adds: "In order to succeed, or rather in order to be able to believe that he could succeed, he had to lower the goal of man. One form in which this was done was to replace moral virtue [philosophy] by universal recognition [wisdom]." 23

There is perhaps more truth in the above statement than
initially meets the eye. It is a fact that at some time in Hegel's intellectual development the desired "end", which was the ideal folk-religion, became the real-ideal modern state. To be sure, "utopia" found its rightful place in the real Hegelian world. But it is a matter of speculation as to whether or not the System is a direct result of Hegel's conscious dissatisfaction with the alienated human condition. All that can be said with certainty is that in order for the ideal to be immanentized, the "highest good" must be "of man" and not "of man's relation to Being".

Even if Strauss is correct in saying that dissatisfaction with utopia led man to devise a way to realize the ideal, it would be misleading to believe that this dissatisfaction is primarily a "modern" phenomenon. Hegel tells us that from the time the Universal reached the apex of self-relatedness (with Aristotle), the history of Western religion and philosophy has involved a series of successive attempts to reconcile the real with the ideal*. What Hegel did was to show us that these attempts were not simply a series of haphazard efforts, but a dialectically determined and progressive march of Spirit towards its full realization in the concrete freedom of the modern state. History is endowed for the first time with a grand purpose. It is by means of history that Hegel was able to explain why the modern state is the ideal manifested in the real. It revealed to Hegel the fact that the course of philosophic and existential events could be interpreted in

* Albeit only the modern effort has been successful in this regard.
such a way as to show that reason pervades and structures their movement in time. Through the reason inherent in the dialectic, Hegel was able to conclude that the modern state was indeed the logical (necessary) culmination of a protracted struggle for freedom. According to Hegel, man can regain his sense of being at home in the world only if he philosophically understands the modern state in the context of the entire history of Western culture.

If the feeling of not being at home in the world is co-terminous with all varieties of dualistic ontologies, then Hegel is correct in regarding various historical ideologies as attempts to reconcile the real with the ideal. In the final analysis, however, what differentiates classical from modern political philosophy is the manner in which they interpret the "form" of these ideologies. For the latter, they represent a series of increasingly more perfect (concrete) reconciliations of nomos and physis. For the former, on the other hand, they are simply a disconnected compilation of intellectual constructs aimed at dissolving the tension between thought and being.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE NEW WORLD

In the introduction to chapter four I said that it was the partial aim of that section of the text to begin to explore the relationship between the modern/classic debate and the tension which exists in the post-historical world between thinking and doing. Essentially, the purpose of this chapter is to discuss in detail what was briefly alluded to in the end of the last.

I will begin by pointing out the fact that the modern era has unconsciously adopted the Hegelian hermeneutic as its very raison d'être. I also will argue that this "subliminal Hegelianism" operates in the world as technology. As the term suggests, technology is the coupling of "making" (teknē) and "doing" (logos), of praxis and theoria, or of nomos and physis. Technology, therefore, is the "real" nomos-physis monad.

The implications this modern age hybrid has for "meaning" will also be discussed in this chapter. It will be shown that the technological realm from within itself cannot set up and sustain standards for ethical or political behavior. Hence, all meta-physics, liberalism included, are incompatible with the nomos-physis monad and are therefore rendered meaningless.

As a result, if there is a "tension" between thought and
being in the new world (and therefore "meaning" as well), then it must come from without. For it is impossible technologically to think one's way out of the eclipse of meaning. It is for this reason that classical political philosophy has served as a beacon to guide many contemporary philosophers out of the nihilistic darkness of the modern age. It is invaluable in that it provides a ready-made alternative to modernism.

In the conclusion I will explore the interaction between the two opposing world-views. In the process I hope to bring into sharp relief the "tension" which underlies the modern age but is not of it. Therefore I admit that this tension exists in reality only for us, for those who realize that meaning can be found in the world only in light of what both Hegel and the classics have taught us. In other words, I contend that the search for meaning in the new world must take place within a theocentric-anthropocentric framework. One must remain caught in between the lure of the modern technological siren and the ancient and ever present call to turn to the transcendent.

(1) Paradise Postponed

If one accepts the Hegelian account of history and the modern state, then it is possible to envision at least two scenarios which depict the relationship between citizen and state. First, it may be that all persons have the potential for wisdom and that all persons have the capacity to realize this potential. And secondly, it could be contended that al-
though all persons have the potential for wisdom, only a few have the capacity to realize it.

The first option is most compatible with the Hegelian/Kojèveian thesis. As Strauss points out: "... if the final state is to satisfy the deepest longing of the human soul, every human being must be capable of becoming wise." But to be "capable of" attaining wisdom does not necessarily imply that its possession is imminent. Kojève confesses:

What, then, does the fact that the perfect state foreseen by Hegel is not yet realized mean for us? In these conditions Hegel's philosophy, especially the anthropology of the Phenomenology, ceases to be a truth, since it does not reveal a reality. But it is not thereby necessarily an error. It would be an error only if it could be proved that the universal and homogeneous state that he has in view is impossible. But this cannot be proved. Now, what is neither an error nor a truth is an idea, or, if you prefer, an ideal.

Kojève, in effect, is admitting that Hegel's Phenomenology is not, after all, the final description of the existent modern state but is a depiction of what history (Spirit) has shown him ought to be the perfect state. As has been previously stated, both Hegel and Kojève err in their assumption that the existence of the modern liberal state will somehow guarantee the wisdom of its citizenry.

How does Kojève propose to solve this dilemma? He says: "... one can accept the anthropology of the Phenomenology even with the knowledge that the perfect man (the Wise Man) with whom it is finally concerned is not yet realized, only on the condition that one wants to act with a view to the realization of the Hegelian State that is indispensable to the existence of
this man... "

But what exactly does Kojève mean when he says that the realization of the perfect state is dependent upon action? For the answer we turn to a remark of his elsewhere in the Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. According to Kojève, a man who has decided to read the Phenomenology proves that he loves philosophy and the fact that he understands the book means he is a wise man. Now because Kojève admits that action is necessary to ensure the existence of the perfect state, he is in truth saying that the human condition is such that the "love of philosophy" is not a universal trait. Since not all men are philosophers by nature, Kojève is aware that the realization of the modern state is dependent upon the "success" of a project to make everyone wise.* However, the futility of an endeavor of this sort is evident. For one simply cannot force someone to love philosophy, let alone make him understand the Phenomenology.

If such a project were undertaken with the blessing of the state, the official pedagogue would no doubt be the final tyrant. He would have the dubious honor of attempting to "educate" the masses in hope of producing ever increasing numbers of wise men. The totalitarian implications of such a scenario are frighteningly clear. As Strauss says: "...

the Final Tyrant presents himself as a philosopher

* Hegel himself says in the Philosophy of Right that, "...
  education is the art of making men ethical"."
[i.e. wise man], as the highest philosophic authority, as the supreme exegete of the only true philosophy, as the executor and hangman authorized by the only true philosophy. If there is no state-run pedagogical apparatus, then as implied by Kojève's statement, the "ideal" modern state will never exist in reality. But the truth of the matter is that even an "efficient" educational system is bound to be ineffectual. The final state will remain an ideal simply because not all persons love philosophy. No amount of "education" can make the unphilosophical philosophical, let alone "wise".

To substantiate this claim, one can adapt the classical Straussian notion that only a few can pursue philosophy to the Hegelian/Kojèvian understanding of wisdom. It could be said that although all persons have the capacity to be "individuals" and to be recognized by the state as such, only a relative few have the natural will that enables them to understand the true (Hegelian) meaning of the state. In other words, the final state will exist in fact for all, but only a few will understand its essence. Put differently, this means that the modern state is inhabited by many "Napoleons" and comparatively few "Hegels".

Kojève said that the anthropology of the Phenomenology would be in jeopardy if it could be proved that the state Hegel had in mind was impossible. We already know Kojève's reply. But what if the claim made in the preceding paragraphs is correct? Would the second scenario necessarily imply a refutation of the anthropology of the Phenomenology? I think not for the following reason. As it has been stated, the
wise man is dependent upon the state for his existence as a person possessing Absolute Knowledge. Since, however, the same cannot be said of the opposite relation, then it stands to reason that the truth of the anthropological underpinning of the modern state (i.e., the desire for recognition) is not dependent upon the existence of the wise man. Although the wise citizen is an absolutely necessary component in the fully realized Hegelian state, this does not mean that the state cannot exist in some modified form without its enlightened citizenry.

(ii) Life in the "Interim": Liberalism Without a Head

The task in front of us now is to describe this modified Hegelian ideal that is the real world. But first, it bears repeating to say that for Hegel: "[The State] is ethical mind [que substantive will manifest and revealed to itself...." The "substantive will" Hegel speaks of is nothing other than the universal will, the universal itself. As it has been shown, the universal can be known only by particular consciousness. And what this particular consciousness knows when it knows the universal is the infinite freedom of its own mind. If the state is the actuality of the substantive will, then it is only through the state (the real universal) that particular consciousness can come to know its universal essence and become truly self-conscious. Thus Hegel can say: "Since the state is mind objectified, it is only as one of its members that the individual himself has objectivity, genuine individ-
uality, and ethical life. 7

Absolute Knowledge (wisdom) is the awareness that one's own particular being is dependent upon its relation to the whole, i.e., the state. Only when consciousness is aware of the freedom manifested in the state will it become aware of the infinite freedom of the particular mind and see it as a microcosm of the greater whole. Thus the ideal Hegelian state is what was for Plato only an ideal in the Republic, i.e., individual mind writ large.

However, if wisdom is not a salient feature of the contemporary modern state, then the "individual" is unaware of the intrinsic link between himself and the state. The substantive and the particular no longer interpenetrate in the mind of the citizen. Hence, the individual regards himself as an autonomous entity "set against" the larger whole. Because of this, the individual's sense of right is cut off from any association it might have had with the welfare of the state. In other words, the Hegelian ideal of "concrete freedom" has been realized in contemporary society as the modern liberal concept of freedom. Freedom in the new world has come to mean freedom from constraint, freedom from all that might impede the progress of the "self". The "right" of the insular consciousness is the absolute right to remain atomized and free in-itself.

Of course, for Hegel, the individual is truly free only if it is free in-and-for-itself. This is a freedom gained through the recognition of one's self by an "other". It is therefore inherently social in nature. Now because the state
takes upon itself the responsibility to recognize its citizens, it in effect becomes the "other" which provides the self with the means to become self-conscious. Hence, the individual is free only as a political being. In other words, for Hegel, individual freedom cannot exist independently of its social context. Without this understanding (i.e., Hegelian wisdom), the state is for its citizens a "civil society", that is, a society where "... the Idea is lost in particularity...."\(^8\) Such seems to be the fate of post-historical liberalism.

(iii) The Synthesis of **Nomos-Physis** as the Primacy of the Will

It has been shown that in the **Phenomenology** Hegel attempts to reconcile thought and being. Now, this reconciliation is the result of a double movement of the descent of the infinite and the ascent of the finite. The descent of the infinite is in reality a euphemism for the "death of God".

Heidegger notes in an article entitled "The Word of Nietzsche" that the proclamation "God is dead" is not to be conceived **theologically**; that is, it cannot be correctly understood as a "formula of unbelief".\(^9\) Heidegger insists that Nietzsche's intent is much more general. According to his account, the "death of God" marks a change in the status of the supra-sensory world as a whole, and in its relation to the human essence. The demise of the transcendental realm means for Nietzsche that it has lost its obligatory and vitalizing power. Life on earth is no longer thought to be related to a higher order.

It must be stated, however, that the loss of the authorita-
tive power of God does not mean that the fundamental power
relation vanishes along with it. On the contrary, there remains a "theological" principle within the modern secular world, i.e., the notion of future salvation or perfection. All that has occurred between the pre-modern and modern eras is a re-orientation of the actual content of this principle. The other-worldly goal of ever-lasting bliss is transformed into the earthly happiness of the greatest number.

As we have seen, the Christian maintains that history allows only for the growth of the civitas Dei. Christian thought contains no conception of the perfection of the species in time. However, the immanentization of the notion of the perfection of mankind during the Enlightenment means that the flight from the world into the suprasensory realm is replaced by "historical progress".

For Hegel, the "ground" of all being (i.e., physis) is Spirit. It is the pure potentiality which becomes for itself (actual) in time. The process of self-actualization is what Hegel calls "history". Hence, for Hegel, history is physis; it is the arena in which pure Concept empties itself into its "other". However, until physis (Spirit) is completely self-actualized, there remains a disparity between that which Spirit has emptied forth into the world (i.e., existence) and that which is still to be realized (i.e., essence). History itself is a term which Hegel uses to denote this period of alienation where the telos of Spirit remains "other" than itself. In short, existence (actual concrete political configurations, or nomoi) and essence (the telos of Spirit) appear distinct to consciousness during history.

As we have seen, Hegel maintains that the laws (nomoi)
of the modern state are the manifestation of Spirit (or \textit{physis}) in its completeness. It is important to note that it is only because Hegel interprets \textit{physis} as Spirit that he is able to give an account of the process by which timeless Concept becomes temporal reality. As a result, Hegel manages to "temporalize" \textit{physis}, i.e., the timeless. In the process he makes \textit{physis} an "object" of thought for consciousness.

What this transformation in effect has done is re-locate the source of the world's meaning. The "truth of things" that was previously "given" to mankind is now a product of its own creation. But although Hegel immanentizes \textit{physis}, he does not do away with the notion of "essence" as such. He merely replaces a transcendental ideal (i.e., God) with an immanent and therefore realizable one (i.e., the modern liberal state).

Now the notion of an "ideal", regardless of its content, is what Nietzsche calls "value".\textsuperscript{10} In the \textit{Will to Power} Nietzsche says that: "The point-of-view of 'value' is the point-of-view constituting the \textit{preservation-enhancement} conditions with respect to complex forms...."\textsuperscript{11} To make sense of this definition it is necessary to break it down into its component parts. Firstly, Heidegger says that Nietzsche means by a "point-of-view", an aim that provides a perspective that is to be conformed to.\textsuperscript{12} Value is simply an aim in view. It is that which the human species posits for itself as an aim.

For Nietzsche, "value" reflects the essence of all being. More precisely, it constitutes the "\textit{preservation-enhancement conditions}" of all life and lies at the root of the meaning of the phrase "will to power".\textsuperscript{13} Nietzsche maintained that every form of life (i.e., complex forms) that restricts itself to
mere preservation is already in a state of decay. To be sure, the securing of a particular level of power is a necessary pre-requisite of life. But it is significant only as a means by which power can be augmented. Nietzsche says in the Will to Power: "To will at all is the same thing as to will to become stronger, to will to grow and, in addition, to will the means thereto."

So Nietzsche is saying that the will to power wills the conditions of power-preservation and power-enhancement. In short, the will to power posits "values" as a means to growth. The will to power is a value-positing will.

As was previously stated, Nietzsche maintains that all values are expressions of the will. What differentiates the modern will from the pre-modern one is the fact that the will to power now is recognized for what it is. As Heidegger comments: "It [the will to power] is new because for the first time it takes place consciously [em] out of the knowledge of its principle." In other words, the death of God signifies for Nietzsche the birth of an awareness which regards all values as the product of human willing. The death of God therefore marks the genesis of the will to power's self-consciousness.

In conclusion, one can draw a clear link between the physis of Hegel (i.e., history) and that of Nietzsche (i.e., the will to power). If the essence of things is taken to be "history, then meaning must be interior to history, as we have seen. Put differently, it could be said that the being who thinks historically realizes that truth is the product of its own creation. As George Grant puts it: "History is that dimension in which men
in their freedom have tried to 'create' greater and greater goodness in the morally indifferent world they inhabit.... Time is a developing history of meaning which we make".\(^{17}\)

Now this self-conscious creative force is precisely the will to power. So it becomes evident that Nietzsche thinks within the Hegelian paradigm, for there could be no "will to power" unless there was a "value-vacuum" created by the deposition of the transcendental realm. The death of God and the birth of the will to power are thus two sides of the same coin. To continue the analogy, one can say that the coin itself is called "historicism". One thereby comes to two conclusions. First, to think historically means to think in terms of the perfection of the species in time. Time itself becomes the ground of progress, i.e., of immanent salvation, of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Secondly, it is evident that the means to earthly bliss is dependent upon human willing. Hence, to think historically also means to think in terms of willing.

To bring us back to our original point, it can be said that since for Hegel the reconciliation of the ideal (the Concept or \(\text{physis}\)) with the real (the modern state or \(\text{nomos}\)) marks the origin of historical thought (i.e., historicism), the synthesis of \(\text{nomos}\) and \(\text{physis}\) is manifested in one sense in the primacy of the will.

The merging of \(\text{nomos}\) and \(\text{physis}\) in the form of the primacy of the will can be accounted for from a different angle as well.\(^{18}\) George Grant notes that Christianity carried within it a certain ambiguity that eventually allowed for the unleashing of the will. According to his argument, the two
"primals" of Christianity are "love" and "the will".* There exists, therefore, a built-in tension between the extroverted action of a commanding and willful God on the one hand, and a passive and loving God on the other.

But perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the relationship between the two Christian primal is symbiotic and not merely antagonistic. In other words, the two primal in fact form a homeostatic whole. Love is tempered by the will and the will itself is restrained in such a way as to enable it to co-exist with the Christian principles of love, charity, etc. For how else could one explain why St. Augustine's proclamation that "man is nothing but will" did not result in man's liberation from God? The truth of the matter is that in order for the will to be truly set free it must be responsible only to itself. As was stated in the previous subsection, the will becomes self-conscious (i.e., the will to power) only when the transcendental realm is no longer recognized by it as the source of values. In effect, what we see in the modern secular world is the coupling of the willing (doing, making) of Christian theology with the thinking (theoria) of Greek culture. This synthesis forms the primal of the new world, i.e., technology.

(iv) The Nomos/Physia-Technology Connection

It has just been stated that technology is the coupling

* In contrast, the Greek primal is "contemplation", i.e., theoria.
of willing and thinking. As the word itself makes evident, technology is the union of technē (making) and logos (knowing or reason). Technology, therefore, is the synthesis of nomos (being, existence) and physis (thought, essence) made "real". It is the phenomenal manifestation of the Hegelian System, of the identity of identity and non-identity.

Technology and technological man are the products of a world view where the distinction between man and God has been obliterated. This fusion of thought and being is expressed as the power of the will (by means of technē) to phenomenalize thought. Therefore, the essence of the post-historical world is a "becoming" (i.e., willing) directed toward the future in the form of the will to power. More importantly, this conjugation of thought and being means that only those thoughts that are made real can be "true". Hence, truth is success. It is that which is, i.e., that which works. The meaning (essence) of "being" is its existence. It cannot be otherwise in a world which has devalued all transcendency, which has denied the existence of the atmosphere which sustains and nourishes Truth.

Because "being" in the new world is not "other" than what it appears, it bears a marked resemblance to the semiological "sign" or "image". The "symbol", on the other hand, is other than what it shows. The symbol re-presents whereas the sign simply "presents". Consequently, the former is fitted for use
in history, and the latter for use in the post-historical world, where essence is no longer other than existence.

If technology is the phenomenal manifestation of the "truth" of the new world, then man is left only with his will. Since the seat of the will is the "moment of choice", and choice is a function of the "present", modern man continually thrusts himself out from the present toward the future. To live technologically is to view the world as an emptiness waiting to be filled (in the future) with the "realizations" of the creative will. It is to see the world as a perpetual void of new possibilities.

Because technology gathers its meaning in "willing" and "making", meaning (truth) in the new world is found in the act of "choosing" and "realizing" possibilities, and not in the realizations themselves. Meaning is given form in the activity in which a present choice is directed toward the realization of a future possibility. The realized project is of the past and therefore is of no great consequence to the will which has the present and the future as its temporal priorities.

The upshot of the entire preceding analysis is that meaning in the post-historical world cannot be found in "ends" of any sort. All notions of a final purpose or goal presuppose the existence of a transcendent (or ahistorical) reality which by definition can be approached but never attained. However, the "aimless wandering" endemic of the new world is not proof of the non-existence of such a reality as much as it is proof of a certain attitude toward being that has come
to prevail. As we have seen, this attitude assumes that the final goal has been achieved in the universal and homogeneous state and through technology. We see the evidence for this in the fact that the "death of God" has been given popular expression as the "birth of technology".

(v) Technology and Liberalism

We have seen that "meaning" in the technological era is simply that which is. But if that which is is the realization of a project of the will, then truth itself is the product of willing. Moreover, since we know that the will is not content with the realization of its projects but with willing itself, the truth of the new world is in a perpetual state of flux. The very dynamic of technē-logos commits 'truth' to constant re-positing. It is because meaning is gathered in processes and not in ends that the truth of the post-historical world is technologically determined. As a result, all notions of "value" in the classical sense of the term are mere epiphenomena of the modern technological order.

Hence, technology eviscerates liberalism as it does all other "values". As long as praxis is taken to be the "locus of meaning" in the new world, all ahistorical truths are subject to the vicissitudes of the technological dynamo. In conclusion, it could be said that the reduction of knowing and making to each other makes it impossible to give rational answers to questions about limitations of knowledge and about what it is that should or should not be made. It is this
lack of a sense of limits which pervades technology to its core. George Grant realizes the nihilistic implications of the technological imperative and thus laments:

How in modern thought can we find the positive answers to the questions; (i) what is it about human beings that makes liberty and equality their due? (ii) Why is justice what we are fitted for, when it is not convenient? Why is it our good? The inability of contractual liberals (or indeed Marxists) to answer these questions is the terrifying darkness which has fallen upon modern justice. 25

It is not only modern justice which is in need of re-evaluation. Technology itself must be realized for what it is. As we have seen, the end of history is marked by the synthesis of the Master and the Slave, of fighting and working. Therefore, the realization of the universal and homogeneous state would mean that all wars and revolutions would cease and that all work would be complete. Of course, work of a kind would still go on, but the citizens of the final state would work as little as possible because, as Kojève says: "Nature has been definitively mastered -- that is, harmonized with Man." 26

Here Kojève is saying nothing more than the fact that the citizen (subject) of the new world is no longer opposed to nature (object). In other words, nature does not appear as a threat to humanity but as a force which the human will can, through technical means, control in a way to satisfy its needs. Therefore, the coupling of techné-logos is manifested in the homeostasis of desire and need. 27

It is understandable, then, why Kojève believes that unlimited technology is not worth pursuing for its own sake.
For once an equilibrium is reached between desire and need, additional technological progress is redundant. However, what Kojève fails to realize is that technology is itself the real manifestation of the will stripped bare of all external restraints, regardless of whether or not that restraint takes the form of a Christian God or is represented by the precepts of Hegelian science. Technology simply will not work for any "principle" or toward any "end". It is not a means to an end but an end in itself.

(vi) Life Within the Hegelian Experiment

In a philosophy of action (praxis), or of history, man is defined by the fact that he acts humanly. In history, negativity rules because man is not content with what he is and therefore works at not being what he is. The end of the negating process occurs when the activity is complete, that is, when man's existence is identified with his essence. The crucial point that warrants reiteration, and one which Kojève appears to overlook, is that the identity of the identity (essence) and the non-identity (existence) occurs on two levels. First, and necessarily so, this identity is realized in concrete fact in the form of the universal and homogeneous state. Freedom is actualized in the modern state insofar as it universally recognizes the "individuality" of its citizens.

As we have seen, the freedom Hegel has in mind in the Philosophy of Right surpasses the contemporary liberal equi-
valent because only the former allows man to be once more at home in the world. But unlike the unity of the pre-Sophistic Greek polis, which is characterized by "Custom", the nomos-physia monad of the final state is conscious of the lived identity of form and content. The citizens of the perfect modern state realize that their own particular ends are inseparable from those of the whole.

It has been argued that whereas it is correct to say that the wise man (or citizen) presupposes the total success of man's negating action, this does not necessarily mean that the post-historical state cannot exist in some form without its enlightened citizenry. So if history is, as Hegel/Kojève claim, the accomplishment of works and the transmission of words endowed with meaning, then the post-historical world must be highlighted by non-action and non-meaning. The end of history, which for Hegel is the triumph of meaning, is paradoxically also the apogee of non-meaning. Moreover, because wisdom does not prevail in the post-historical world, even its non-meaning will not be a fact for consciousness.

If all action is absurd in the new world, it does not mean that human action disappears as such. It still exists, but now it is "unemployed". This analogy is an interesting one for it leads us back to what was previously said about the will. To begin with, employment means work which is performed in the service of another or toward some specified end. In the historical world, negating action is employed in the struggle to attain freedom. On the other hand, in the post-historical world action is employed to no pre-deter-
mined end. It exists only for itself. Action is for its own sake. Therefore, as it has been said, the will to action is the will to will or the will to power.

All meaning is absurd in the new world because there is nothing left to be said. Everything that is of significance to say has already been said in the science of Hegel. Consequently, all speech is reduced to insignificant or aimless chatter. This is but another way of saying that words (speech) no longer symbolize or reveal an inner reality. On the contrary, it has been shown that modern speech merely signifies the true. Modern speech is its own meaning.

We have said that the post-historical world is a return to the initial nomos-physis monad. Ideally, it represents a higher octave of the primal union in that consciousness is now aware of the nature of the monad. But since the consciousness of which we speak (i.e., self-consciousness or Absolute Knowledge) is not a "reality" but only a concept, then one ought to suspect there to be little difference between the modern and ancient worlds. Indeed there is not. The immediacy of the relationship between man and the gods (and nature) which characterized the pre-philosophic world is simply replaced by the immediacy of the relationship between man and the state (Hegel's God) on one hand, and man and nature on the other. Universal recognition and technology, respectively, are the modern means by which the nomos-physis monad is sustained. So, astonishingly enough, the completion of the dialectical circle does in fact mean a return to the "beginning", to the primeval ground from which consciousness once and yet
may again spring forth.

According to Kojève, there are two "forms of life" in the new world. They are the "re-animalization of man" exemplified in the "American way of life", and the "Japanization of man". It is not within the scope of this paper to give anything but the most brief of descriptions of these life-forms.

The re-animalized man communicates in signs, that is, in a medium of discourse that does not distinguish between the signifier and that which is signified. Therefore, the re-animalized man does not communicate symbolically, but naturally.

Meaning for the re-animalized man pertains exclusively to the realm of calculating rationality (technology), to the control of the human and non-human worlds. Because of the homeostasis of desire and need, the American way of life wants for nothing. Hence it shares in common with the animals and the gods a certain contentment. Like the Nietzschean last man, the re-animalized man says he is happy and blinks. W.T. Derby sums up this form of life in the following manner: "This is a world returned to "natural man", a realm inhabited by the soulless bodies of sacred animals." 29

In contrast to the former, the second life-form remains human by re-opposing the object to the subject. The Japanized man accomplishes this feat by detaching form from content. In other words, his life is lived according to rules which have been wholly formalized. They are totally devoid of "human" content in the historical sense of the word. Thus he lives a perfectly stylized life. As one would expect, the
language of the Japanized man reflects the emphasis of form over content. It is therefore a language of "images".

Meaning for the Japanized man pertains not to the control of the external world, as it does for the re-animalized man, but to the internal life of the self. It is found not in the world itself, not in the causal relationship between "things", but in the subject's power to unite events from the perspective of the "eternal present" of consciousness. Thus the rationality of the re-animalized last man is juxtaposed against the apparent irrationality of the Japanized nihilist.

These two forms of life are archetypes of Mastery (Japanized man) and Slavery (re-animalized man). The latter life-form exalts the principle of self-preservation over that of honor. It lays stress on the life of the body over all else. In contrast, the Japanized way of life raises the value of honor over that of self-preservation. What is most important here is respect for the feeling and opinion of others.

These two forms of life are manifestations of the unconscious psyche. Indeed, they must be if the new world exists in the "non-time" between the end of history and the coming of a new light (or consciousness). Put differently, the non-time spoken of here is simply a description of a world in which thought and being no longer exists in their separateness.

The tension between being and thought produced the ambiguity which arose out of the difference between the symbol and its intended meaning. Now man realizes he exists. But when he tries to decipher the meaning of his existence, he can express it only by means of symbols which are other than
the immediacy of mere existence. Hence, symbols have the form of time, of negativity or difference, in that they are other than the eternal self-sameness of that which they represent. To attempt, as Hegel has done, to eradicate the tension between being and thought, is equivalent to the attempt to annul time. And is this not precisely what we moderns have done? Does not the modern will will incessantly in the "eternal present" of the moment of choice, and does not the subjective "eternal present" serve as the locus of meaning for the Japanized man?
CONCLUSION

Aristotle said of natural things that each of them has in itself a source of movement and rest. In other words, natural things have an internal source of development. Nature is related to physis in that the latter term is derivative of the root word, phye, meaning "to germinate", "to sprout", or "to bring forth". Physis, therefore, is that which brings forth from within itself new determinations. It is synonymous with what may be referred to as the "organic life-principle".

Now if natural things have their own source of growth in themselves, they must contain some "power" which enables them to manifest this capacity. This power can be referred to as "pure potentiality". Analogically, we see this potentiality in the form of a seed which implicitly carries within itself the developmental process that will in time come to full fruition in the explicit form of a tree. A seed is not a tree. No matter, the tree lies implicit within it, for without the seed there would be no tree. A seed, therefore, is the potentiality of tree-being, just as physis is the potentiality of natural being in general.

According to classical ontology, natural things necessarily grow into actuality. Man-made things, on the other hand, possess no such necessity. The reason for the discrepancy is that the potentiality of the artificial thing is not within the object but outside of it, that is, it is within the
mind of the "artificer". Consequently, the image of the object in the mind of the artificer has an existence of its own independent of its realization. The independence of the mental image means that it cannot within itself become real.

What it needs to be actualized is the presence of the *will* which, on account of its contingency, may or may not transform the image (by means of *technē*) into a reality. Despite this difference, however, both the natural object and the artificial object can be said to pre-exist "potentially". Because the future is merely the outcome of the past (i.e. a potentiality), the classics assumed it to be an inauthentic tense.

Prior to philosophy, both the natural and social worlds were imbued with the life of *physis*. Nature was "alive" in the full sense of the word and man likewise lived under the spell of Spirit, i.e. *Sittlichkeit*. However, as Hegel puts it in the Philosophy of History, the sublime immediacy of such an existence was "corrupted" for various reasons. As we have seen, the most important of these are due to Ionian science on the one hand, and man's apostasy from God and the resultant birth of self-consciousness on the other.

The efforts of early Greek philosophy brought about the gradual separation of form (*physis*) from content (the natural world). The result of this process is the emergence of the pure contentless form of the Aristotelian God and a concept of nature (i.e., Atomism) which is pure formless content. Thus Greek philosophy can be regarded as a process whereby nature becomes de-divinized and *physis* becomes divinized. Through the efforts of Greek philosophy, the integrated whole (the
nomos-physia monad) is broken down into its component parts. In short, the history of Greek philosophy is for the most part a protracted act of "demythologization". 2

Any effort to "re-mythologize", to re-construct the parts into an intelligible whole, can be successful only when the analytic procedure is complete. Now the "destruction" is not total until those entities that were once indistinguishable in the mythic whole (i.e., man, God, and nature) have been completely alienated from one another and subjected to the scrutiny of consciousness. No successful reconstruction can begin before the mind has fully articulated the most basic ontological categories, i.e. being and non-being.

These basic ontological constructs, then, are the legacy of analytic (philosophic) mind. With them comes the formulation of what is commonly referred to as the "two worlds", that is, the world of pure Being as contrasted against the world of pure becoming.

The "problem" of the two worlds is essentially the dilemma surrounding the rift between Being (God, identity, physia, eternity) and non-Being (man, difference, nomos, time). As we have seen, the immediate or intuitive grasp of the nature of things which compact myth supplied, is replaced by a mediated or philosophic understanding of the world. This understanding is a force which makes itself present by negating the immediacy (identity) of the natural and divine worlds. It does this by "pulling back" or "disassociating" itself from the pure being of its surroundings. In the process, it comes to know of the difference between itself and the other. It
is for this reason that philosophy is coincidental with the birth of self-consciousness, for philosophic thought is self-conscious thought.

There are two ways in which the problem of the two worlds have been 'solved'. First, the Sophists responded by stating that "man is the measure of all things". Secondly, the idealists (or mystics) responded with the conviction that "God is the measure of all things". The reason why the problem of the two worlds gave rise to two divergent types of solutions is that each effort sought a "one-sided" reconciliation.

The Sophists find "truth" in the Many, or in nomos, which leads to the confusion of relativism. The Mystics, on the other hand, emphasize the ontological superiority of the One and attempt to find "truth" through participation (methexis) in the eternal forms -- a permanent feature of the divine physis. However, this Platonic communion with the godhead is basically a non-discursive experience as we have seen. Hence, methexis is of mythos, not logos (reason), and for this reason it is doomed to a base irrationalism which reaches an apex in the neo-Platonic movement.

The problem of the two worlds, in itself a euphemism for what we have called the nomos/physis rift, is finally resolved in the personage of Christ. So it is religion, and not philosophy, which initially solves the mystery that the latter created out of its discontent with mythos. If philosophy demythologized, it was up to religion to remythologize,
that is, **successfully to synthesize** Being (God) and non-being (man) in the religious figure of Christ, the first man-God.

Now as we have seen, Hegel says that the Christian reconciliation is not a true reconciliation (remythologization) because the synthesis which was established was not a real synthesis. In other words, unlike the reified Christ-figure, a true union of identity and non-identity would result in the formation of that which is neither pure being nor that which is pure difference. The transcendent must be immanentized and the immanent be made god-like.

There is a great deal of ambiguity in Hegel's writings about the nature of the relation between the divine and the human. Indeed, Kojève could not have made such a tour de force of his reading of Hegel had this ambiguity not been present. Kojève's particular account of the **Phenomenology** relies heavily, if not exclusively, on the **anthropocentric** dialectic. In other words, he interprets the dialectic from the perspective which depicts human history in its ascension to concrete freedom and to divinity. What Kojève fails to mention, for perhaps obvious reasons*, is that the process which transforms **human** life to approximate the divine has another side. The fact must not be overlooked that the coming to be of Absolute Spirit in the world is a **relation**. So although there is in truth only one dialectic, this dialectic can be viewed from either of its termini.³

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* *Kojève is a Marxist who is also heavily influenced by the existentialism of Heidegger.*
When viewed from the theocentric perspective, the dialectic is the process in which God (Spirit) makes himself (itself) known to man. In other words, God reveals himself in the form of the Logos of which mankind partakes and by which the human community becomes progressively more animated with his spirit. Therefore, what is an act of remythologizing from the standpoint of man is an act of demythologizing from the standpoint of God. The way "up" from the human world to the divine is the same path as the way "down" from the divine life to the human. So if one speaks of the anthropocentric dialectic, one is necessarily implying the existence of a theocentric or "meta-dialectic". It would be an "abstraction", to use a favorite Hegelian expression, to think of either moment (i.e., the phenomenal and meta-dialectic) in isolation.

The preceding argument is not made with the intent to resuscitate the notion of Spirit but to show that Kojève's reading of the Phenomenology, from within the content of the text itself, is deficient in that it misrepresents the nature of the "whole" which is so central to Hegel's basic thesis.

As it has been said, the separation of physis from nomos, of essence from existence, is the result of the power of the mind (i.e., negativity) and forms the basis of self-conscious thought. Thus the experience of "discontinuity" or "detachment" from pure Being represents the core of what it is to be human. However, if this is the "human reality", then it proves to be a reality which forever begs to be re-
solved. The very indeterminateness of self-conscious life brings forth from within itself the desire to make the uncertain certain, to bridge the abyss that is the human soul. The feeling of "separateness" experienced by those of a heightened sense of consciousness creates from within a longing to reconcile the finite with the infinite. Therefore, ironically, it is from the depth of one's humanity that one commits hubris, i.e., the attempt to be God-like.

As a result of falling prey to the all too human temptation to overcome the alienated condition of self-conscious life, Hegel planted the seeds of nihilism in fertile "historical" soil. As we have seen, he did this by identifying thinking and being in logos. Man comes to know and create the nomos-physis monad through rational discourse and free action. Because it takes time for man to think and act, the process by which the rift is resolved represents the totality of time -- history. Although the final resolution does not exist for consciousness, the circularity of the System is manifest in the primacy of the will and in its institutionalization in the form of technology.

One of the principle thrusts of this paper is to show that the modern (Hegelian) solution to the problem of the alienated human condition rests on the misguided assumption that this state of Zerrissenheit is a "problem" that demands resolution in the first place. It has been previously shown that the "modern project" is an attempt to create a world with the view that one cannot be alienated from one's own creations. Man may be "other" than nature and the transcen-
dent, but at least he is at home in a world of his own making. But the truth is that this solution precipitates a situation far more odious than the 'problem' it originally set out to correct. For in the attempt to bridge the nomos/physis rift, man loses that quality which distinguishes him from the world, i.e., self-conscious thought. Moreover, the very notion of the "conditio humana" is senseless in the post-historical world. This is so because the conjunction of being and thinking in the technological system shows us that truth is a function of the infinite becoming of the creative will and of time. Hence, the conditio humana itself is subject to the forces exerted upon it by the technological imperative. It simply cannot be once and for all.

Knowing what we know about technology, it can be concluded that the technological realm reveals the same characteristics as the Aristotelian physis minus the latter's specific telos. Like the classical notion of physis, the technological dynamic has its source of development within itself. However, whereas for Aristotle physis has a very definite biological or "natural" connotation, its modern counterpart is far more ambiguous. On one hand, the physis of the new world is similar to that of the ancients insofar as both processes possess a self-generative or cybernetic essence. On the other hand, however, physis as technē-logos "brings forth" not the natural, but the artificial. In the new world, then, the process is natural but the product is artificial. There exists here a true union of the natural and the artificial.

The classics maintained that there is a distinction be-
tween natural things and the course of human events. The former possesses the principle of the necessary development of physs. The latter, on the contrary, exhibits a certain contingency in its unfolding.

This gap between the natural (the necessary) and the artificial (the contingent) is closed by Hegel when he identifies physs (natural necessity) with history. For Hegel, the world of human action and desire pré-exists potentially in the pure ether of the Concept. Thus the Hegelian Concept is equivalent to the organic seed which we spoke of earlier. Whereas the telos of the seed is the tree, the telos of the human realm is "the end of history" or the modern liberal state. Hence the post-historical world represents the full maturation of the Concept. In this sense it is a world grown old.

Now "potentiality" is synonymous with the eternal and "actuality" with time. What exists potentially (in-itself) only has the capacity for existence. This "capacity" cannot be said to exist in any real sense. This is because potentiality is a kind of latency. It is that which is present but not active. Hence, pure potentiality is "Being" (eternity) which has the possibility of "becoming" (time) in it. So in conclusion one could say that potentiality is the source of being, if being is understood here as "existence".

If history is the process in which the Concept (pure potentiality) becomes real (actual), then the post-historical world is pure actuality. All that is is real (true) because
there is nothing "other" than what exists.

If we were to apply the Greek concept of physis and time to the Hegelian hermeneutic, then it could be said that during "historical" time the coming of the future (the end of history) is merely the outcome of the past (the Concept). In other words, during this period time was grounded in the eternal. However, in the post-historical world, all potentiality is actual. Thus there is no eternal ground from which time can arise. As a result, there is no longer any necessity in the coming-to-be of the world for the necessary already is. Now if the necessary (the rational) is real in the post-historical world, then all further coming-to-be must be radically contingent. The new world is a realm in which the gods (eternity) have left and which witnesses along with their departure the demise of all necessity. It is ironic that in giving human existence meaning by making history rational (necessity), one must posit oneself beyond history and hence beyond its rationality and necessity. It is from the vantage point of non-meaning that Hegel gives meaning to the new world.

As we have seen, human consciousness is characterized by time. Simply put, man is time. He has time within him because the essence of mind is the power of the negative. Since "truth" in the modern world is a function of time, one would expect the principle of negativity also to be firmly imbedded in the system. And indeed it is. It comes as no surprise to realize that negativity is manifested in the world as "becoming" or, more concretely, as the will to power.
It is the expression of the will that is free from all external restraint. It is free because the transcendent realm is silent in a world which thinks time as history. Therefore, man the "abandoned" cannot help but reclaim his freedom for himself.

The Concept (i.e., the modern primal) is now seated in the will and it is from the standpoint of the present that the will creates the future ex nihilo. Because the very being of the world is now the product of willful action and not simply the unfolding of a pure potentiality as it was during history, the post-historical world can find meaning only in the future. Or, put differently, because history is complete, because the "end" is realized and hence of the past, one is left only with "means". Means as "process" signifies the ability to do, to create, and to act, but without the capacity to determine to what end one's actions ought to be directed.

The metaphysical bankruptcy of the new world is clearly evident in much contemporary political theorizing. There are two texts which for the past ten years or so have received much critical attention in America and abroad. I speak of Robert Nozick's *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* and John Rawls' *A Liberal Theory of Justice*. Whether the response in the main has been favorable or not, there can be no denying that there has been a lot of it. This in itself tells us that the brands of liberalism contained within their covers are perceived by a great majority of political theorists as at least worthy of comment. However, a browse through recent pertinent periodicals will reveal the fact that most of the criticism these
books have received is "internal". By this I mean that com-
mentators by and large argue over the coherency of the logic
of their theories without questioning the premises upon which
they rest. This critical lacuna speaks for itself. It is as
much a factor (as I will show) in an understanding of our pre-
sent political circumstance as is the "content" to which their
less than thorough investigations are directed.

The fact that Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia
is thought by many to represent a sound philosophical argument
in support of modern liberalism is proof of the nihilism of
our times. For the thought does not even occur to him that
the liberalism which he so dearly cherishes and which he vain-
ly attempts to re-tailor to better suit contemporary conditions,
is meaningless in an era which thinks historically. Nozick re-
 mains blind to the significance of the effect historicism has
upon liberal justice while he stares it in the face, so to
speak.

For instance, in the beginning (of the Preface) is the
'Word': "Individuals have rights, and there are things which
no person or group may do to them (without violating those
rights)". Nozick then goes on to say that: "The entitlement
theory of justice in distribution is historical; whether a
distribution is just depends upon how it came about". In
the first pronouncement Nozick gives us the standard ahistori-
cal liberal credo. He is saying in effect, "the end of human
existence (i.e., justice) is the preservation of individual
rights". One hundred and sixty pages later this political
philosopher tells us what justice really means. Here he speaks
of justice in a social context, saying that a just distribu-
tion prevails so long as the rights of the individual are not violated in the transferral of holdings. Justice now means "correct procedure". So, in the final analysis, Nozick maintains that any distribution is justifiable so long as the means for procuring that end are legitimate. What Nozick fails to do, however, is tell us why the means (i.e., respect for individual rights) which he says are legitimate, are in fact legitimate. As Grant said, the poverty of liberal is its inability to account for the reason(s) why it is what we are fitted for. Nozick's entire thesis means absolutely nothing until he gives reasons why human beings are worthy of individual rights.

What is so intriguing about Anarchy, State, and Utopia is the manner in which the brand of liberalism it espouses is presented to the reader. For a supposedly "philosophical" text, it is a matter of great significance that the liberal creed is presented here as a simple fact. For instance, the opening sentence of Nozick's book, to which we previously referred, is uttered in a bold and arrogant fashion. The end result is that the reader feels compelled to acknowledge its reality as fact. Psychologically, he feels the onus is on him (i.e., the non-expert) to question, let alone to disprove, the validity of the already established 'fact'. He is on the defensive from the outset. And yet the truth of the matter is that the reader has a duty to retain and utilize his critical capacities, for the original 'fact' in question is entirely unsubstantiated.

Now the fact that Nozick presents the liberal credo as
fact must be understood for what it really is. As Roland
Berthes says: "If I state the fact of French impartiality
substitute "liberal justice" for French imperialism without
explaining it, I am very near to finding that it is natural
and goes without saying; I am reassured. In passing from
history time to nature eternity, myth acts economically".6

What Nozick does, then, is present us with the mythos of
liberalism. His aim is to give a specific historical event
a "natural justification" and hence to make "contingency ap-
pear eternal".7

Is this development comprehensible in the context of what
has been said of the new world? It most certainly is. For as
we have seen, philosophy, from its inception to the time of
Aristotle, is a process in which nomos and physis become pro-
gressively disengaged from one another. We have called this
process a "demythologization". Once the "two worlds" were
clearly delineated, the goal of philosophy was to re-integrate
them into a unified whole. Thus, the philosophical "journey
home" is a protracted effort to "re-mythologize". As we know,
the world is re-mythologized to the extent that nomos and physis
are concretely identified in the form of the liberal state and
technology. Hence, it stands to reason that mythos and not
logos prevails in the new world.8 In other words, if the ideal

* It was by means of the logos that God revealed himself to
man and, contrarily, that man became imbued with the spirit
of God. But because the logos is now real in the form of
the state, meaning is found in the world itself. In other
words, meaning is man-given and hence self-referential. It
is because meaning is tautological that it is insubstantiable.
And it is because meaning in a transcendental-less world is
insubstantiable, that it takes on a mythical quality.
is real, then the real is in no need of justification. One
does not "give reasons" for the existence of "justice" any
more than one gives reasons for the perfection that is a tree,
or a stone, or any other natural object. In the new world,
"individual rights" simply are. Nozick is, therefore, a true
representative of the mythic West. And those who do not see
liberal justice for what it is are the political myth-worship-
pers of the modern era.

John Rawls finds refuge from modern mythos by retreating
to the verities of a "reality" not of our time. Whereas for
Nozick, liberal justice is ultimately a function of "time"
(i.e., proper procedure), John Rawls treats the subject in his
_A Theory of Justice_ in an atemporal or spatial manner.* As
a philosophic source for the basis of his argument, Rawls makes
use of the wisdom of the last of the great Christian (i.e.,
 ahistorical) philosophers. Hence, his adoption of the Kantian
"categorical imperative" as a means to ground his thesis is
"a thought out of season", highly commendable in its own right,
but nonetheless deficient in its ability to come to terms with
the reality (i.e., the historicism) of the new world.

It is now appropriate to advance an alternate conception
to historicism and, by implication, to the liberal technocratic
state. Eric Voegelin, for one, maintains that history is a
symbolism (mythos) by which human beings express their parti-

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* Note the similarity between the space/time dichotomy in the
  methodology of Rawls and Nozick, and that dichotomy which
  exists between the early Greek philosophers (space) and the
  mystics (time). The only significant difference that separ-
  rates the two is that time is linear for the moderns and
  cyclical for the ancients.
cipation in the "mystery of being", i.e., the Platonic meta-

For the adherents of classicism, the metaxy is a
"given" which eternally circumscribes the limits of being
from which the human drama is enacted. Since the metaxy is
absolute (i.e., eternal), man (i.e., time) can never escape
its bounds. Hence, man's finite (temporal) nature is forever
alienated from the timeless infinity of Being. This is to
say that man exists "inbetween" the being of the natural world
and the Being of the gods.

In the Phenomenology, Hegel historicizes the metaxy. As
was stated in the previous chapter, he accomplishes this deed
by temporalizing physis. Hegel in effect tells us that the
modern world existentializes essence. Through the logos of
history the gap between man (time, separateness) and God
(eternity, the Whole) is bridged. History, therefore, is
the vehicle by which physis (essence) empties itself into
time (existence). The "end of history" marks the point in
time in which this self-revelation of physis is complete (real)
and is therefore in a form which is amenable to conscious un-
derstanding. As we have seen, this total emptying forth of
physis in space and time results in the de-vitalization of the
Concept itself. Once physis (the ideal) is fully immanent
(i.e., real), its authoritative power is spent. We are left
solely with the will to power, with the will to create our own
universe of meaning. Essence is existence, pure and simple.
Thus the post-historical man is no longer separate from the
Whole (i.e., physis); that is, he ceases to be defined by
his existential condition as it relates to the Whole. The no-
tion of "relation" has no ontological ground in the new world. Man simply is the Whole. His life is given meaning by it (i.e., physig) as it is manifested in time in the form of the "real" principles (nomoi) of liberalism and technology.

The classicists say that philosophy teaches us that knowledge of the Whole is impossible for him who participates in it. On this account, the eternal (Being) is transcendent. Therefore, it is by means of contemplation of the Good in the "eternal present" that values are presented to the mind.

Kojève, on the other hand, would say that knowledge of the Whole (i.e., wisdom) is possible for him who creates the Whole. Here the eternal is immanent in "becoming". Its loss accounts for the devaluation of the genuine present. Since values in the new world are products of the will, existence is necessarily committed to constant futurity.

So, basically, one is confronted with two opposing world views which are generally accounted for in the Strauss/Kojève debate. On the one hand, Hegel-Kojève uphold a historicist conception of human existence. Regardless of whether or not man is best suited to think time as history, it is an undeniable fact that this is the way we moderns conceive of time. One only has to look at the coupling of technē-logos to find concrete proof that the modern primal is "becoming", in short, the activa vita.

On the other hand, ontological dualists regard the human condition as ahistorical. One can include Strauss within this philosophic school in that he upholds the doctrine that "thinking" (philosophy) is the highest good. Because philoso-
phy is the love of wisdom (the Whole), it implies that the lover of wisdom is less than the Whole and therefore is "other" than it. The notions of time and eternity are kept distinct in this instance.

In conclusion, I maintain that much can be said of the human condition if one strictly adheres to Hegel's insights concerning the power of the understanding. Pu\$ as straightforwardly as possible, I conclude that if the essence of mind is negativity, or difference, then it stands to reason that a fully self-conscious being must know what mind is different from. If mind knows itself to be non-being, or non-identity, then it must know of the identity which it is not. Thus, knowledge of Being (identity) is a necessary prerequisite of true self-consciousness. This symbiotic relationship which exists between self-consciousness and consciousness of Being is a corollary to the one that we know exists between the phenomenal and meta-dialectics. Neither the anthropocentrism of the "self" nor the theocentrism of "Being" is sufficient, in itself, to account for the "totality" of the human condition.

My sentiments are Kojèveian insofar as I believe the modern world to be travelling down the former path. A sizeable portion of this thesis has been devoted to supplying the reader with a Hegelian interpretation of the reasons for the nihilism of our times and what the consequences of such a condition means to the well-being of the species. I believe that the value of such an intellectual investigation to be beyond reproach, for if the Hegelian interpretation of the new world is correct, then a comprehension of the hermeneutic enables one
To free oneself from the tyranny of modern mythos. But the hermeneutic itself does not supply us with a positive program for recovery. It merely "describes" the modern condition. For this reason, the enlightenment attained from a reading of the hermeneutic is purely "negative". On one hand, one comes away from the experience of having read it knowing more fully the nature of the "enemy" (i.e., modernity). On the other hand, however, even though one may be capable of mentally distancing oneself from the modern world, one is nonetheless inextricably tied to its material and ideological produce. As we have seen, this world is one in which the gods (i.e., the suprasensory realm) have fled. Hence, the second alternative (i.e., theocentrism) is no solution to the ills of the former. There cannot be a simple retreat to Platonism for we cannot "unlearn" what Hegel has taught us about history any more than we can totally ignore the technological environment which this understanding of history has precipitated. Therefore, although I maintain that knowledge of the self implies an awareness of Being, I am at a loss to explain the nature of the Being to which I allude.

The problem which confronts us can be stated in the following manners: How can knowledge of Being be regained in a world of pure becoming? How can the modern world find repose in the temporal present from within future-oriented historical time? How is it that history is to regain its symbolic sense when its role in modernity has allowed for the explosion of the technological dynamo and the satisfaction of the appetites of the last man?
Some comfort may be found in the fact that this is not a crisis peculiar to our time. On the contrary, this tension underlies man's entire self-conscious existence. Sophism, Skepticism, and Gnosticism are a few of the nihilistic intellectual movements of the past which have co-existed with classical and Christian theology. In this sense, the Strauss/Kojève debate represents a modern day continuation of the struggle over which of the "two worlds" ought to predominate. The only difference between the ancient and the contemporary situation is that now the "underdogs" are the defenders of meaning.
FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION


2 Ibid., p. 83.

3 Ibid., p. 86.

4 Ibid., p. 85.

5 Ibid., p. 84.

6 Ibid., p. 88.
FOOTNOTES

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2 Ibid., pp. 74-75.
3 Ibid., pp. 75-77.
4 Ibid., pp. 58-59, 74-75.
5 Ibid., p. 87.
6 Ibid., pp. 92-93.
7 Ibid., pp. 116-119.
8 Ibid., pp. 111-114.
9 Ibid., pp. 125-127.
10 Ibid., pp. 127-129.

B. 11 Ibid., pp. 121-122.
12 Ibid., pp. 144-147.
13 Ibid., pp. 150-152.
14 Ibid., p. 153.


16 Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy, p. 154.
17 Ibid., pp. 155-158.
18 Ibid., p. 195.
19 Ibid., pp. 177-178.

20 Ibid., pp. 184-193, also see Heraclitus frag. 91. A good overview of Heraclitus' thoughts can be found in László Versenyi's Man's Measure (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974), pp. 136-140.

21 Cornford, Religion to Philosophy, pp. 199-200.
FOOTNOTES

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22 Cornford, Religion to Philosophy, pp. 253-254.

23 Ibid., pp. 254-258.

24 See Aristotle Metaphysics A9.

25 Cornford, Religion to Philosophy pp. 261-263.


28 The original codifier of Greek (Athenian) nomos was the statesman Solon. He prided himself on the fact that he had joined bia (force) and dike (justice) "by the power of law". (frag. 24.15f. Diehl.)

29 See Aristotle Politics 3.16, p. 1287a; and Plato Laws IV 712b/c.

30 See Plato Laws IV 701b/c.

31 An interesting discussion concerning Herodotus' conception of nomos can be found in Henry R. Immerwahr's Form and Thought in Herodotus (Cleveland, Ohio: Press of Western Reserve University, 1966), pp. 319-323.

32 See Plato Protagoras, 337c.

33 See Callicles' speech in Plato's Gorgias, 483c.

34 As Plato says in Laws IX, 874e, without nomos mankind would have to lead the life of the beasts.

35 Plato states that to be subject to the law means at the same time to serve the gods, see Laws VI, 762e.

36 See Plato Laws IV, 714a.

37 See Plato Laws VI, 762e.

38 See Plato Laws X, 890d.

39 See Plato Timaeus, 30b, 34a.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I cont'd

42 Ibid., p. 248.
44 Jonas, Gnostic Religion, p. 91.
45 Sandmel, Philo, p. 25.
46 Ibid., p. 34.
47 Ibid., p. 122.
49 Ibid., p. 53.
50 R.B. Harris, The Significance of Neo-Platonism (Norfolk, Virginia: Old Dominion University, 1976), p. 9.
53 Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy, p. 12.
54 Ibid., p. 13.
55 Sandmel, Philo, p. 64.
57 Ibid., p. 108.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I cont'd


CHAPTER II


  2 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 32.
  5 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 76.
  6 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 81.
  7 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 327.

 16 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 332.
CHAPTER II cont'd


FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II cont'd

48 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 5.
49 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 4.

CHAPTER III

2 Ibid., p. 225.
4 Hegel, Phenomenology, p. 227.
5 Ibid., p. 229.
6 Ibid., p. 233.
7 Ibid., pp. 232-233.
8 See Kojève's full exegesis in Introduction to the Reading of Hegel pp. 48-50, 227-231.
9 Hegel, Phenomenology, p. 239.
10 Ibid., p. 245.
11 Kojève, Introduction, p. 53.
12 Hegel, Phenomenology, p. 246.
14 Ibid., pp. 56-57.
CHAPTER III cont'd

16 Hegel, *Phenomenology*, pp. 256-257.
31 see paragraphs 266 and 277 in the *Philosophy of Right*.

CHAPTER IV

1 Kojève, *Tyranny*, p. 165.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER IV cont'd


4 Ibid., p. 212.

5 Ibid., p. 213.

6 Kojève, Tyranny, pp. 167-168.

7 Ibid., p. 163.

8 Ibid., pp. 164-165.

9 Kojève, Introduction, p. 93-94.

10 Ibid., p. 94.

11 Kojève, Tyranny, p. 182.

12 Kojève, Introduction, p. 69.

13 Kojève, Tyranny, pp. 185-186.

14 Kojève, Introduction, p. 4.

15 Ibid., p. 222.

16 Ibid., pp. 222-223.

17 Ibid., p. 223.

18 Kojève, Tyranny, p. 186.

19 Ibid., p. 186.

20 Kojève, Introduction, p. 95.

21 Strauss, Restatement, p. 207.


23 Strauss, Restatement, p. 225.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER V

1 Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero" in On Tyranny, p. 225.

2 Kojève, Introduction, pp. 95-98.

3 Ibid., p. 98.

4 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, footnote of par. 151A, p. 260.

5 Strauss, Restatement, p. 226.

6 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, par. 257.

7 Ibid., p. 156.

8 Ibid., p. 145.


10 Ibid., p. 69.


13 Ibid., p. 74.


16 Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche", p. 75.


FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER V cont'd

20 As W.T. Darby says in The Feast, the Hegelian state is both the oneness of physia and the separateness of nomos. It is of logos (reason, thought) and techne (making, being); see p. 220 of The Feast: Meditations on Politics and Time (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982).


23 An excellent interpretation of modern technology as viewed from the means/ends perspective is contained in Hannah Arendt's The Human Condition pp. 153-159.

24 William Christian, "George Grant and the Terrifying Darkness" in George Grant in Process p. 74.


26 Kojève, Introduction, footnote p. 159.


28 Kojève, Introduction, footnotes pp. 159-162.


CONCLUSION

1 See A.E Taylor's discussion of Aristotle's conception of Matter and Form in Aristotle (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1955), pp. 47-49. Also see Aristotle, Physics II

2 My use of the terms "demythologizing" and "remythologizing" are borrowed from W.T. Darby in The Feast: Meditations on Politics and Time, pp. 131-138.
FOOTNOTES

CONCLUSION cont'd

3 see Darby, The Feast, Chapter VI, subsection "Dialectics and Metadialectics", pp. 196-205.


5 Ibid., p. 153.


7 Ibid., p. 142.

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Miscellaneous


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