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ETHNIC SUBNATIONALISMS, REGIONAL DEVOLUTION
AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

by

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
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ABSTRACT

Since the end of World War II, the growth of regional and international organizations has suggested the possibility of a new form of political unit larger than the nation-state. At the same time, the federalization of the once unitary states of West Germany and Italy, as well as increasing agitation for political decentralization in the still unitary states of Belgium, Spain, France and Great Britain have shown both the continuing appeal and the perceived necessity of political units smaller than the nation-state in the modern world. This study attempts to establish that contrary to being opposing forces, internationalism and subnationalism are instead potentially compatible and possibly even complementary phenomena.

The greatest subnational challenge to the nation-state in Western Europe today is presented by those ethnic regions – most notably in the above-named unitary states – that have become politicized on a broad range of issues: linguistic-cultural, politico-administrative and socio-economic. Concurrently, the Western European nation-states – especially those belonging to the European Community – are
facing the transnational challenge of what may be an embryonic political dimension within that Community. 'National' sovereignty and 'national' unity are no longer either facile concepts or comfortable assumptions, as the case study on France endeavors to demonstrate.

Europe will choose its first directly elected Parliament in 1979, thus effecting an initial 'dépassement' of its essentially economic and technocratic character. Virtually assured is the representation - under several forms - of regional interests within this institution. Should the European Parliament eventually acquire new powers as well, then it may provide the impetus and perhaps even the scenario for evolving political relationships between the regions and the nation-states on the one hand, and between the regions and Europe on the other.
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INTRODUCTION

A regionalised Europe was one of the dreams of the pioneers of European unity....Europe is still a far cry from that. But France, Britain and Spain should respond to their separatist forces in a way which might one day also help the European cause.1

The major thrust of the postwar European Movement was to create a political system in which the petty nationalisms that had provoked two World Wars would be contained. In that climate, the lesser-known subnational or regional proposals of certain European federalists were virtually ignored. Yet thirty years later, they have acquired a relevance that even their original framers may not have foreseen.

Writing in the mid-1960's of a phenomenon that may be termed 'the crisis of the nation-state', Denis de Rougemont asserted that "tous les Etats-Nations unites sont a la fois trop petits et trop grands." 2 For matters such as defense in a nuclear age, the development of high technology industries, and the tackling of global problems such as energy and pollution, 3 the European nation-state is woefully small. Europe, through N.A.T.O. and the three Communities especially, represents an attempt to deal with these issues on a larger scale.

At the same time, the increasingly accelerated movement of power towards the national capitals since 1945 has
made the latter the centers of industry and planning as well as of government. The growth of centralized national bureaucracies has furthermore depersonalized the administration of such services as education and welfare, alienated individuals and groups from the operations of government, and aggravated the peripheral status of those regions that are geographically remote from the capitals. The resulting need for a smaller and more responsive political unit to deal with these issues is the sine qua non behind the so-called European regional movement, which advocates, alongside the surrender of certain national prerogatives to Europe, a parallel devolving of certain other national prerogatives to the regions.

While the European Community has on the one hand begun to deal with those issues whose cross-national implications demand extra-national mechanisms for their resolution, it has on the other hand created at the European level a technocratic and economic centralization reminiscent of that of Madrid, London and especially Paris. This centralization, combined with the lack of political accountability at the European level, has led to the fostering of a center-periphery dichotomy within Europe, as well as to a popular disenchantment among the European citizenry with a 'Europe of trusts'. Thus, Europe as it presently exists represents an extension to the supranational level of values that dominate the nation-state....Its role is to optimize predetermined or politically negotiated goals and objectives, not to enter the dispute over the establishment of goals, which is what political choice is all about.
In terms of technocratic and economic centralization, as well as the lack (or at least the limited degree) of political accountability to its citizens, the French state provides an interesting parallel to the present European Community. The following critique of French technocracy echoes a critique being leveled ever more frequently at Europe:

Le Paris de Napoléon, de la République, des technocrates a fait beaucoup de choses pour le pays....Mais il ne s'est jamais préoccupé des hommes en eux-mêmes....Le technocrate ne peut pas en comprendre davantage! Le Girondin, le quarante-huitard, le communard ou le gauchiste de mai 68, lui, est infiniment moins théorique, il écoute les hommes, même dans leur patois, avant de regarder les chiffres. Mais il a toujours été vaincu.7

The general movement in favor of the return of certain economic, political and cultural powers to the grassroots level has in the 1970's elicited a response, however hesitant, from the centers of power. In Britain, the electoral successes of the Scottish Nationalist Party (S.N.P.) have prodded an unwilling Labour government to sponsor devolution legislation in the British Parliament. In Spain, the post-Franco regime has wisely chosen to diffuse regionalist militancy by cautiously resurrecting regional governments in Catalonia and the Basque country, and by devolving certain powers to Spain's other regions as well. Concomitantly at the European level, the Giscardien 'relance' of 1974 once more opened up prospects for the long-delayed direct elections to the European Parliament, which will at the very least symbolize a nascent political dimension within the Community.
But what of France? Indeed, despite certain concessions made by the French government during the 1970's, *Le Monde* could still write in mid-1978: "Au coeur de l'Europe, la résistance française au régionalisme est de plus en plus une exception. Tout autour d'elle, les exemples de structures régionales se multiplient." With direct elections to the European Parliament now scheduled for May-June 1979, it is interesting to speculate whether popular sovereignty will become a reality at the European level before it does at the regional level in France. In such a case, the French government will ironically have demonstrated a greater willingness to - allegedly - compromise its national sovereignty through a pact with Europe rather than its national unity through a pact with its own citizens.

The expression of political, cultural and economic powerlessness at the grass-roots level in Europe is most evident in the case of what will be termed Europe's 'ethnoregional minorities'. Of late, more scholarly attention is being given to this phenomenon, but some of it merely reiterates the oversimplified analyses of, and prescriptions for, ethnoregional discontent that have been made by technocrats and economists, both national and European. Too often, governments as well as scholars tend to overemphasize socio-economic causes, thereby underestimating politically-administrative concerns, and virtually ignoring linguistic-cultural factors.

This study will therefore endeavor to compensate for
what the author believes to be, the often unbalanced view of ethnoregionalism which is presented in much of the current literature. But given the limited scope of the study, the author proposes to analyze the three broad categories of issues - socio-economic, politico-administrative and linguistic-cultural in reverse proportion to the extent that each has been examined in this literature. Accordingly, the primary emphasis will be upon the linguistic-cultural aspects of ethnoregionalism and on the role of such issues within ethnoregional movements. However, since the general framework of the study hinges on the distribution of political power - at the regional and at the European levels - the secondary concentration will be upon the politico-administrative aspects of ethnoregionalism. As for the socio-economic aspects, these will be discussed only to the extent that they contribute to an overall understanding of a particular ethnoregional movement, and with a view to presenting the analyses of both national and ethnoregional elites.

Ethnoregional activists are motivated not only by what they perceive as the inadequacy of the nation-state in distributing economic and political benefits equitably. Their insistence on linguistic-cultural inequality between the dominant ethnic group(s) and themselves points up a further shortcoming of the nation-state: its inability to inspire broad cultural loyalty and a genuine sense of belonging among its citizens. Some authors consider linguistic-cultural demands as merely a means of mobilizing the ethno-
regional masses behind a program of grass-roots economic and/or political reform. While this may not be entirely untrue, it does not provide a complete picture of the role of linguistic-cultural demands. The following remarks concerning the interrelationships of economic, political and cultural factors in the Corsican movement can undoubtedly apply to other ethnoregional movements in terms of the role that it assigns to linguistic-cultural demands:

Si le dossier économique semble...quelque peu dépassé aujourd'hui par le dossier politique, il ne fait aucun doute que le dossier culturel, lui, va prendre ainsi de plus en plus d'importance. La rébellion avait besoin de l'économie pour prendre son envol, elle a maintenant besoin de la culture pour faire ses preuves.

This study hypothesizes that the advent of a political Europe — through direct elections to the European Parliament — will create a new forum for European politics, including the ethnoregional question. If ethnoregional interests are represented within this Parliament, and furthermore, if they ally themselves on the broader issues that they have in common, then an effective ethnoregional bloc may in fact emerge within this Parliament. Even in the absence of increased parliamentary powers, the very least that may result is a new kind of European pressure on the nation-state — in favor of substantive responses by the latter to the demands of its ethnoregional activists.

Just as the building of Europe requires an exercise of political will by all the national governments, so too does the resolution of the ethnoregional question demand an
effective political response from them. Without a political will, the Community will remain a 'Europe of trusts'. Without an adequate political response from the national governments, the ethnoregional problem will become all the more acute, unless an effective European intermediary can intervene. Such an eventuality suggests a possible three-tiered government within Europe of the future: regions, nation-states and the Community. This is precisely the kind of Europe that the 'pioneers of European unity' were proposing. It is also the kind of Europe that one author had in mind when he wrote:

If in the context of subnational regionalism the increasing remoteness of political man from political authority, of cultural man from control over his lifestyle, or of economic man from social justice is the problem, technocratic Europe is not his salvation; political Europe might be.12
Footnotes


6. Ibid., p. 71.


CHAPTER I

THE NEED FOR A THEORY

Introduction

"We have entered the age of ethnicity in international politics."1 To state such a sweeping generalization would have been unthinkable in sociological or political science literature a decade ago. Prior to what has been termed variously as the reemergence, resurgence or revival of ethnic politics, especially since the late 1960's, political integration theory supposedly offered convincing analyses of the past and sound prescriptions for the future. The proponents of nation-building theories, spurred on by the challenge of creating nations out of the remnants of European colonial empires in Asia and Africa, emerged as the prominent spokesmen for political integration at the nation-state level. An almost parallel development appeared at the supranational level, as early postwar efforts at uniting Europe produced a school of thought known variously as regional or international integration. Whereas theories of nation-building or so-called 'national integration' attempted to provide blueprints for the realization of relatively homogeneous national societies within the new states of the Third World, regional or international integration theories endeavored to explain
how already developed nation-states (in this case in Western Europe) would abandon a certain degree of their sovereignty in order to unite in some form into a new regional unit or grouping.

The so-called resurgence of ethnicity in the past decade or so has challenged some assumptions of national integration theories while at the same time, in combination with a reiteration of national sovereignty by the nation-states of Western Europe, has seemingly dimmed hopes of further international integration at the European level.

A. The Inadequacy of Current Theory

1. Ethnicity and National Integration

   Much of the current theoretical debate centers on whether manifestations of ethnicity in the industrial (or post-industrial) West are truly comparable with those in the predominantly agricultural Third World; in short, whether the resurgence of ethnicity is truly a global phenomenon. Central to this debate is the interpretation of the role played (or not played) by 'modernization' in relation to the resurgence of (ethnic) nationalism. This emphasis on modernization owes much of its salience to the writings of Karl Deutsch, a theorist of both national and international integration.

   Deutsch held that modernization was the key to the setting in motion of what he termed the mobilization and assimilation processes among an unmobilized and differentiated
population. Measuring the effects of what he called the rates of mobilization and assimilation, Deutsch contended that assimilation was gaining ground if, in a given territory, community was growing faster than society, i.e. if the ability to communicate was spreading faster than, or at least keeping pace with, the need to communicate. Increased communications and transactions among a hitherto heterogeneous population were thus held to result in national integration. Deutsch defined the nation as "the result of the transformation of a people or of several ethnic elements, in the process of social mobilization." Modernization therefore became the necessary condition to nation-building in the Third World.

Subsequent theories of nation-building (i.e. those formulated throughout the 1960's) gave no serious consideration to the role of ethnic diversity in modern society. Ethnicity was considered a "primordial sentiment", inherent in more parochial, ascription-oriented, 'traditional' societies, but nothing more than a temporary aberration or a passing phenomenon on the road to modernity.

Scholars associated with theories of 'nation-building' have tended either to ignore the question of ethnic diversity or to treat the matter of ethnic identity superficially as merely one of a number of minor impediments to effective state integration.

The dysfunctional nature assumed by ethnicity in this literature is explained in part by the tendency to view traditional and modern societies as clear-cut categories. But in Samuel Huntington's view, all societies are either transi-
tional or mixed, and theories of modernization have been more successful in delineating the characteristics of modernity than in depicting the process of transition between traditional and modern society. The assumed dysfunctional nature of ethnicity is also in part explained by what Walker Connor has termed the "predispositions of the analyst", which often tend to view ethnicity as inherently dysfunctional and traditional society as inherently inferior to more 'progressive' and 'developed' societies - in this case the West (at least until the resurgence of ethnicity there as well!).

The heightened visibility of ethnicity on a global scale in recent years has necessitated the modification of theories of modernization and nation-building. Deutsch, as early as 1953, recognized this possibility in relation to his theory of national integration, and was even more convinced of it in 1961:

...the stage of rapid social mobilization may be expected, therefore, to promote the consolidation of states whose peoples already share the same language, culture, and major social institutions, while the same process may tend to strain or destroy the unity of states whose population is already divided into several groups with different languages or cultures or basic ways of life.

Other authors stressed the continuity between traditional and modern societies:

...the essence of modernity may lie not in the transition from particularistic to universalistic forms, but rather in their compartmentalization...Communalism [ethnicity], in short, is an inherent aspect of social change in all culturally heterogeneous societies.
Nation-building theorists have been criticized not only for their naive and optimistic prescriptions for the Third World, but also for their inaccurate analyses of nation-building in the so-called First World:

...it is fairly obvious that the populations of a number of European states very much acted as 'ethnic groups' vis-à-vis one another during what historians still call 'the age of nationalism'. The nation-building projects in which European states engaged in the more or less distant past must themselves be viewed as exercises in the creation of mutually exclusive ethnic boundaries.14

In a comparison between nation-building in sub-Saharan Africa in the twentieth century and nation-building in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, E. K. Francis detects a parallel between the role of the postcolonial period in the former and the role of absolutism in the latter. Early nation-building in Europe was inspired by what Francis calls "demotic nationalism",15 i.e. that nationalism which aims at the homogenization of culturally heterogeneous populations which have been arbitrarily included within political units based on democratic principles. This type of nationalism, according to Francis, is precisely what government leaders in sub-Saharan Africa both understand and practice by 'nation-building'.

The building of nation-states in Western Europe has thus not surprisingly been referred to as "internal colonialism".16 Aristide Zolberg distinguishes it from Third World colonialism in this way:

...European states adopted different strategies with respect to the population of what they defined as their home territories...and the populations of their posses-
sions abroad. Whereas in the latter they tended to continue, in somewhat modified form, the imperial pattern (hence the creation of 'plural societies' in many parts of the colonial world), at home they sought to achieve some degree of societal integration by imposing on their subjects elements of common culture.17

Those who dissent from the view that modernization fosters cultural homogenization might be termed theorists of 'national disintegration' by the nation-builders. But to these dissenters, the distinction between nation and state is very clear indeed, whereas to the nation-builders it often is not. This so-called "ethnicist" school contends that what is termed 'nation-building' is in effect 'state-building'18 (or 'nation-destroying' in Walker Connor's view),19 and thus that what the nation-builders might refer to as 'national disintegration' is in effect 'state disintegration'.

But this is perhaps an oversimplification of the situation in Western Europe today. For example, France as a whole may not be a nation in the same sense as Brittany and Corsica are nations, but France certainly is a state, whereas Brittany and Corsica are not. Does that make France a nation-state? In the view of outsiders in general and of most Frenchmen whom Robert LaFont would term "les Franciens",20 it is most likely that the answer would be 'yes'. But in the view of France's ethnic minorities, the answer would be less clear. The most militant ethnic nationalists would undoubtedly say 'no'; the nonpoliticalized members of the ethnic minorities as well as those with an interest in the status quo would no doubt say 'yes'; whereas the politicized population
among the ethnic minorities would probably say 'yes', but with the qualification that their particular ethnic region is also a nation (though not a state), and therefore that they feel a dual loyalty: to France and Brittany, to France and Corsica, etc.

In short, then, although social mobilization leads to the widening of social horizons and the loosening of traditional bonds (e.g. the making of Frenchmen), this does not mean that traditional identities and institutions disintegrate (e.g. the Breton and Corsican identities). Rather a situation of dual loyalty can persist. This reflects a phenomenon that Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe call "the multiplication and compartmentalization of both communal and non-communal identities," 21 according to which "the individual's perception of the social situation determines which of his multiple identities will be most politically salient at any given moment." 22 Thus the nation-state, although it may represent a more universalistic form of social organization than those which preceded it, nevertheless has fulfilled a particularistic or 'traditional' function, at least for certain segments of its population:

...the primordial ties of most of the population of the First World have involved for some time those of citizenship in a particular state as well as religious, local, and those associated with sub- or trans-state peoples. 23
2. Ethnicity and European Integration

Whereas national integration theory postulates the nation-state as a form of social organization more universalistic than the myriad ethnic communities upon which it is founded, in international integration theory it is instead the new regional or international organization which assumes the universalistic function and the nation-state the particularistic one. Indeed, regional or international integration theory, taken as a whole, does not even operate below the level of the nation-state, in the sense that it assumes that the nation-state is the basic individual unit within the larger confederal or supranational unit - in this case Europe.

European integration theory has examined the roles of decision-makers, interest groups and public opinion within the context of European integration, but it has ignored other societal groups which do not wield political power at the national level. Implicit in European integration theory is the notion that if European-level loyalties are to become a reality, this will happen through a transferral of allegiance from the nation-state to Europe. Such a notion reflects two very naive assumptions:

1. that a situation of dual or shared loyalties is impossible;
2. that no significant loyalties (at least in the political sense) exist below the level of the nation-state.

These assumptions can perhaps be traced to the immediate postwar climate and to the earliest stage of European integration theory - that of the federalists and their utopic
visions of a United Europe. Nationalism in its classic form was viewed as nothing less than a scourge on humanity in the early postwar years, hence the great impetus towards the 'European Movement' and 'internationalism'. National loyalties were suspect, and so to profess subnational loyalties in such a climate would have been close to treason indeed.

But there was in fact a lesser known second school of European federalism which posited a united Europe based not on the nation-states but on the component regions of the latter. This was the more radical of the two schools, for it postulated a dual modification of national sovereignty—from below as well as above. Needless to say, this second school of federalism was never taken seriously enough to figure in the initiatives towards European integration made in the late 1940's and early 1950's. But whereas the first school of federalism has been discredited as a strategy of European integration by the institutional triumph of confederalism and later functionalism in Europe, the second school has instead attracted renewed attention as a result of two parallel processes: the so-called resurgence of ethnicity in Western Europe and the post-de Gaulle thaw in efforts to build a political Europe.

If at least one school of federalism is theoretically adaptable to a political conception of Europe, the two other major theories of European integration—transactionalism and neofunctionalism—are not. Transactionalism (or the commu-
nicipations school) postulates that integration is a condition in which the population of a given transnational or inter-state region has attained a sense of community. As with Deutsch's approach to national integration, the level of regional (in this case European) integration is to be measured by the numbers and kinds of transactions, and in terms of whether these transactions result in interdependence, mutual relevance and mutual responsiveness. But measurements are restricted to interstate transaction flows, thus ignoring the dynamics of interregional communications across state boundaries. A more general critique of this approach has been formulated by Michael Hodges:

Deutsch sees regional integration not as an organic growth process, with a fixed sequence of stages, but rather as an assembly-line process, in which it does not matter in what order the necessary elements are incorporated, so long as they are all included.

A further shortcoming of transactionalism is that unlike the national context, there is no European state which can foster, or at the very least attempt to influence, the integration process. In addition, the absence of pluralistic democratic controls at the European level has generated a system whose almost exclusive preoccupation is with economic integration:

Social, cultural and human factors are not ignored. But ...these goals are never clearly articulated and inevitably are subordinated to broader and more comprehensive system-level economic considerations.

As for neofunctionalism, its emphasis on the effects of so-called 'pragmatic' politics - that economic integration
will eventually 'spill over' into the political realm - has proven as inaccurate for European integration as have nationbuilding theories for national integration. If the proponents of the 'spill-over' process at the supranational level could later concede that in the absence of a political will, political integration in Europe could not be realized, how much more relevant is the lack of a similarly deep ideological or philosophical commitment among its ethnoregional minorities to the national integration of the nation-state?

The inapplicability of neofunctionalism to 'high' (versus 'low') politics results from the same limitation as that which precludes its applicability to a political conception of Europe - namely its insistence on the fact that the "advent of supranationality symbolizes the victory of economics over politics." One of the founders of the Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations has described this limitation thus:

Not only have economists been the specialists most favored by government in the appropriate sector, but it has been assumed that economists understand social as well as economic pressures. In fact their training tends to lead them to conceive of society as an inert mass as the clay which the sculptor slaps into any desired shape; however unnatural.

Put in another way, both neofunctionalism and transactionalism have proven their inadequacy because they have favored the economic and technocratic idea of Europe to the virtual exclusion of its spiritual idea. Each has postulated a political end to be achieved through nonpolitical means, and has underestimated the intrinsic importance of
both the political process and the human element involved.

3. Ethnicity and 'Mass Society'

The neofunctional school of European integration was directly influenced by the functional approach to the creation of international organizations after World War II. The functionalist theorists, perceiving a growing range of technical, politically neutral functions which governments in modern political systems had to perform, encouraged these governments to entrust the performance of such tasks to non-political, technical experts within the framework of international organization.\(^{35}\) Both functionalism and neofunctionalism are related to two theories of social change in modern society which developed almost concurrently with them: the "end of ideology" and the "post-industrial society".

The end of ideology refers not to the gradual disappearance of ideology as a political force but rather to the growth of ideological consensus. It implies the lessening importance of ideological politics in favor of pragmatic or interest-oriented politics.\(^{36}\) The post-industrial society model seeks to create a post-modern society which can be distinguished from both traditional and industrial societies by the following characteristics:\(^{37}\)

1. The predominance of the service sector over the industrial and agricultural sectors in the economy;

2. The central role in the economy and society of theoretical knowledge, technology, research and development, and there-
fore df institutions devoted to the creation and transmis-
sion of information;
3. high and widespread levels of economic well-being and af-
fluence, leading to increased leisure for the bulk of the
population;
4. higher levels of education for the bulk of the population;
5. a new 'post-bourgeois' value structure concerned with the
quality of life and humanistic values, in contrast to a
'Protestant' inner-directed work ethic.

Just as the end of ideology is very much an apoli-
tical concept, so too is the post-industrial society, in which
"the governing of men is replaced by the administration of
things."38 This is the common thread running through these
two theories and both functionalism and neofunctionalism.
But as Huntington has observed, the post-industrial society
may contain the seeds of its own destruction, for one of its
characteristics - the growth of post-bourgeois values - is
both a product of and a reaction against the trends towards
post-industrial society.39

These two theories of social change, as well as
theories of modernization and nation-building, are all pre-
dicated on a certain universalization, or at least standari-
ization, of culture. Recalling the statement of Melson and
Wolpe (see footnote 13, page 12), it is clear that if both
modernization and post-industrialism are viewed as processes
of social change, then this statement can apply to two socie-
tal transitions: from traditional to modern, and from modern
to post-industrial.

In short, then, theories that seek to explain the resurgence of ethnicity on the basis of the viability of communalism can be applied not only to modernizing societies, but to 'post-industrializing' societies as well. Such theories constitute the most general explanation of the heightened visibility of ethnicity (and related 'grass-roots' phenomena) in recent years, and have been collectively labeled the "mass-society" thesis. This thesis posits the need of the individual in the new mass society for

...some kind of identity - smaller than the State, larger than the family, something akin to a 'familistic allegiance'. Accordingly, on the basis of the remaining fragments of the primordial identities, new ethnic identities are constructed.40

It should be noted that the mass-society thesis does not deal exclusively or even specifically with the persistence of ethnicity per se, but instead with what may be termed "neoethnicism":

...a popular radicalism, a neoethnic response to the depersonalization and rationalization of the post-industrial society and certain changes in the traditional function of the nation-state, has diffused into political and cultural sensibilities that assume many forms of expression.41

Neoethnicism is thus defined as:

...an articulation of the crisis in the expectation and promise of national institutions. It confutes the viability of state institutions to respond to the social-psychological needs of community...42

With particular reference to ethnicity in the 'First World', Milton Esman has advanced seven hypotheses that seek to explain its heightened visibility there.43
1. The greatly expanded role of modern government, which now claims from one-third to one-half of national income. Although the state has become society's universal problem-solver, the benefits of its multifarious activities are distributed differentially among classes and among regions.

2. The increasingly impersonal and remote technocratic and bureaucratic structures of government and industry, and the ensuing loss of community, reduced opportunity for participation, and general sense of alienation and anomie.

3. The rapid process of industrial rationalization since World War II, which has tended to centralize economic control, a process reinforced by the expansion of public sector enterprises.

4. The communications revolution, which has greatly enhanced regional and ethnic perceptions of grievances. The uniformity of messages tend to reflect conditions, culture and life styles of the increasingly affluent center, and the reduced cost of travel makes possible the observation of differences first-hand.

5. The declining legitimacy and effectiveness of the post-imperial centers. The centralized state, its symbols and its apparatus are increasingly judged by pragmatic criteria of performance, and have accordingly been in large measure demystified.

6. The reduced prospect of war in the First World, particularly the declining perception of the Soviet threat.

7. The demonstration effect of both the recently independent
small European nations (e.g. Iceland, Ireland, Norway) which seem to be doing well on their own, and of the gaining of independence of scores of ex-colonial states during the past two decades, many of them smaller and much poorer than the European ethnoregional groups.

Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 reflect the social changes of post-industrialism, whereas Hypothesis 4 reflects a social change begun with modernization and expanded by the post-industrial society. Together these hypotheses point to a center-periphery dichotomy, around which a theory of the politicization of ethnicity in the First World is gradually crystallizing. In relation to the mass-society thesis, it is not at all incongruous that Hypothesis 4 should be associated first with the process of modernization rather than with that of 'post-industrialization', for although the peripheries may be surrounded by a society in the later stages of modernity, they may themselves be only in the early stages of it. This accords with Huntington's earlier observation that all societies are either transitional or mixed (see footnote 8, pages 11-12). Besides, the social changes described under the first three Hypotheses were surely in embryonic form before the advent of post-industrialism, and, as previously stated, that described by Hypothesis 4 would certainly be perpetuated in a more intensive form in the post-industrial society.

Hypotheses 5, 6 and 7 describe both social and historical change, with Hypothesis 5 also contributing to the
center-periphery dichotomy. The social changes described by Hypotheses 6 and 7 are the relationship between technology and security, on the one hand, and between nationalism and modernization (see subsection 1, page 10), on the other.

Concerning the former, two authors have noted the

...changing sensibilities in an age of maximum weaponry where the utility of the state as a territorial instrument for preservation has lost its cogency, and where security has become a function of technology, not of geopolitics. This reorganization of security has acted as a catalyst in the reexamination of other state institutions and functions and has revealed an extraordinary degree of weariness with the institutions of the nation-state.44

The social and historical changes described in Hypotheses 1-5 are reflected not only at the nation-state level in Western Europe, but also at the level of the European Community. It was precisely the declining legitimacy and effectiveness of the national political centers which paved the way for the European integration movement. The present institutions of the Community, however, constitute primarily a technocratic bureaucracy which has tended towards the creation of a new industrial core in Western Europe,45 in many cases heightening the peripheral status of already peripheral areas. In the words of Lawrence Scheinman:

...the European Communities are administrations without the state - a 'pragmatic synthesis' of organized and established interests....the purpose appears to be a rationalization within the existing system to prevent regional disequilibria from undermining the progressive development of the common market.46

The 'mass society' is thus found at the level of the nation-state but also beyond it - at the level of the multi-
national corporation and the supranational technocracy. The 'resurgence' of ethnicity in the First World is therefore not only a reaction against the institutions of the nation-state, but also a manifestation of the much more generalized reaction against the immensity of scale of modern (or post-industrial) society. It represents a search for alternatives on a more human scale - for an identity which is more immediate and a community which is more responsive. But it also goes beyond the mass society theory in its questioning of the concentration of economic prosperity, political power and cultural influence in certain core areas at the expense of the peripheries. For this reason, the 'resurgence' of ethnicity must also be viewed within the spectrum of theories of nationalism, but not necessarily with the formation of a new nation-state as its end result. It is to this 'new' nationalism that the next section addresses itself.

B. Towards a Theory of Ethnoregional Politics

Has there in fact been a 'resurgence' of ethnicity in recent years? And is the phenomenon of ethnicity in Western Europe particular to that geographic area alone, related to similar phenomena in other post-industrial societies, or even part of a global trend encompassing both traditional and modernizing societies?

Zolberg states that it is misleading to speak either of a reemergence, resurgence, or revival of ethnicity. Furthermore, it is "not only premature to strive for a 'theory
of ethnicity'...but fundamentally wrong-headed to do so."48

Instead, he prefers to disaggregate the concept of ethnicity into the three variables of culture, territory and class, and affirms that if conceived of as sets for the purpose of formal representation, these variables "intersect to form more complex segmentations which cannot be simply reduced to one or the other of their elements."49

But attempts to disaggregate the concept of ethnicity all too often result instead in either:

1. the failure to grasp that the whole is somehow greater than the sum of its parts - "Thus, what may be a manifestation of ethnic nationalism is explained as a linguistic or religious problem or a manifestation of economic grievances";50 or

2. the tendency to ignore the cultural variable completely and to therefore view ethnicity as merely a means of pursuing more interest-oriented ends - Pierre Van den Berghe, for example, interprets the Fleming-Walloon controversy in Belgium as a class conflict in disguise, and the regionalist movement in France as nothing more than a territorial claim for decentralization and autonomy.51

When the cultural variable is not ignored, however, a frequent conclusion is that movements which are heavily cultural in content cannot properly be termed 'nationalist' because they do not necessarily assert nation-statehood as their ultimate goal. But although the level of politicization determines whether a movement can be termed 'nationalist' or not, can one rigidly claim that such movements are
not at all nationalist?

Prudence may dictate the temporary playing down of the overt political implications of the 'independence ideal' in favour of a limited cultural autonomy, such as was favoured by the 'personalist' schemes of the Austro-Marxists... But, as Lenin and Stalin, as well as the Hapsburg rulers, were quick to realise, the 'right' to have one's own language taught in one's own schools, courts manned by one's own judges, newspapers produced by one's conationalists and for them, an indigenous literature and art, one's own local institutions such as churches, and one's own customs, has immediate political consequences. For they only made sense within the overall context of a doctrine that links politics intimately to culture...52

A nationalist movement need not then aspire to the creation of that ultimate expression of national self-determination in the modern world - the nation-state. Furthermore, subnational regional movements, especially in highly centralized states (e.g. France, Spain and Great Britain), more realistically pursue the ends of political decentralization (or devolution) in favor of the ethnic region. This is so even in the case of the Basques, whose long-range goal, as articulated in the political platform of the E.T.A. (Euskadi Ta Azkatasuna - Basque Nation and Freedom), is the eventual reunification of the entire Basque country (presently divided between Spain and France). But rising expectations often serve to expand short-term goals of political decentralization into long-term goals of political independence. In addition, the advocacy or non-advocacy of nation-statehood can be a tactical manoeuvre on the part of an ethnoregional movement, the particular choice of strategy based on the higher degree of mobilization which it will command. In
short, to make a distinction among ethnoregional movements on the basis of the advocacy or non-advocacy of nation-statehood is at best an arbitrary and a temporal distinction.

But pragmatic pursuit of short-range goals is not the only reason why one should insist on labeling as 'nationalist' those movements, especially the European ones, which although relatively politicized, do not actively seek nation-statehood either in theory or in practice. The other reason is of course the political experiment which is imminent in the European Community, its initial stage being the implementation of direct elections to the European Parliament. The prospect of a future three-tiered Europe, encompassing the regions (ethnic et al.), the member states and the Community, is not an entirely unlikely possibility.

It therefore is essential, contrary to what Zolberg affirms, to strive for a theory of ethnicity, and furthermore, to relate this theory to nationalism. As for the enhanced visibility of ethnicity worldwide in recent years, it becomes evident that one can make both comparisons and contrasts of the phenomenon as between developed and developing areas, different geographical regions, dominant and subordinate groups, and indigenous and immigrant groups. With particular reference to the so-called First World, however, it is somewhat misleading to speak of the reemergence, resurgence or revival of ethnicity. In relation to the ethnicity of minorities (some of whom constitute numerical majorities) in Western Europe:
...it becomes rather difficult to discover a period in recent history - the last century or so - when their claims and the counter-claims they provoked were totally absent from the political arena of their respective countries. 53

The theory that traces the aggravation of the regional problem in Western Europe back to the nineteenth century 54 has its parallel in the theory that traces the current manifestations of ethnicity in the First World back to the same period. 55 According to the former, three processes occasioned the beginning of the need for the reinforcement and extension of national integration into the hitherto neglected strata of the peripheries:

1. the generalized democratization of the period from the mid-nineteenth century to World War II;
2. the growing international conflict in the First World, marked by the emergence of what Harold Lasswell has termed the "Garrison-State"; and
3. the emergence of class solidarities cutting across state boundaries, necessitating a countervailing form of solidarity.

This analysis, which is Zolberg's, emphatically locates the origins of many of the 'ethnic problems' visible today in Western Europe in the decades immediately preceding World War II. In the exceptional case of Ireland, the result was violence and separation; but elsewhere, the state responded in the form of either repression or accommodation, and peripheral opposition took on the ideological coloration of the major regional challenge to existing regimes - the author-
itarianism of the Right. With the post-World War II ex-
tension of the industrial nexus into the isolated peripher-
ies, a rise of consciousness has taken place there similar
to that which much earlier accompanied the industrialization
of centers. That the response to the industrialization of
the periphery has been ethnic conflict (versus the class con-
ict which accompanied the industrialization of the center)
does not, for Zolberg, obscure their essential similarity.

This analysis is more valuable in tracing the deve-
lopment of some ethnoregional movements than in pinpointing
their origins. The ethnic factor is downplayed in two sig-
nificant ways:
1. the situation prior to the mid-nineteenth century is not
accounted for; and
2. peripheries industrialized well before World War II (e.g.
Catalonia and the Basque country) do not fit into the
analysis.

Modernization may be inexorably tied to the develop-
ment of nationalism, but not necessarily to the development
of a "national sentiment", itself an essential ingredient
of nationalism. Catalonia and the Basque country were indus-
trialized in the latter half of the nineteenth century (well
before the rest of Spain), whereas Brittany remains a pre-
dominantly agricultural region to this day. Yet nationalism
not only crystallized as a movement in all three areas be-
tween 1890 and World War I, but has continued as a signifi-
cant force in them throughout the twentieth century. Clearly
modernization is a necessary condition in explaining the 'resurgence' of ethnicity in the peripheries, but it is not a sufficient one in and of itself.

As for whether the mid-nineteenth century in fact marks the origins of both regional and ethnic problems in Western Europe, the case of Brittany is not unlike that of other ethnic regions. Breton nationalists contend:

1. that Brittany was a country with considerable economic and cultural riches that has been ruined by absorption into the French culture, economy and polity;
2. that this ruin was willed by France, which has systematically repressed Breton language and culture, exploited Breton resources and impoverished the province by its economic policies; and
3. that the results have been underdevelopment, unemployment, exile for Breton children and domination by the elites of the central state.57

This analysis dates the Breton 'malaise' from the 1532 incorporation of Brittany into France, and in so doing illustrates Guy Héraud's thesis that...

...c'est le nationalisme gouvernemental qui, empêchant l'effacement des frontières, 'périphérise' des territoires parfois excelsent situés...cependant que ce même nationalisme refuse aux régions l'autonomie interne qui les sauverait.58

Whether or not one agrees with such an interpretation, it must be conceded - economics and politics aside - that there did exist in pre-nineteenth century Brittany (as in the other ethnic regions) elements of a common language, cul-
ture and history, and that it was upon these tangible characteristics, influenced by subsequent social and historical circumstances, that a subjective ethnic feeling—and ultimately ethnic nationalism—emerged. And as both Esman and Suzanne Berger have observed, a distinctive ethnic identity has proven to be a necessary element in the political mobilization of European regions in the second half of the twentieth century.

The disagreement over the origins of the current manifestations of ethnicity in the First World seems to hinge on the importance that one attaches to purely 'ethnic' factors as against more interest-oriented ones. But despite this particular disagreement, there appears to be a certain consensus on the immediate factors explaining the heightened visibility of ethnicity in the First World in recent years. Most students of the phenomenon would probably agree with Esman's statement that "Ethnic particularism never died nor was it ever entirely dormant in the modern industrialized First World."

The 'predispositions of the analyst' (see page 12) which have in the past clouded the perceptions of outside observers and led to misinterpretations and distortions of the facts in regards to ethnicity are gradually being reexamined and reevaluated. Of note among these is the erroneous interpretation of the absence of ethnic strife as evidence of the presence of a single nation. This is far from being a sure indicator of integration, assimilation or interethnic
harmony, as one author explains:

...the emotional content, social salience, and political significance of cultural distinctions varies over time as well as territory....Thus, it is essential to keep in mind that the consciousness and internal cohesion of cultural groups may decline over time as well as grow.64

One of the reasons for this is that sufficiently dominant groups can impose very severe deprivations on others without necessarily provoking conflictual responses on the part of the latter.65

A related and equally erroneous tendency is to interpret the degree of threat posed by the nationalist movement to the status quo according to the level of actual nationalist violence against the status quo. In fact, this stage of a nationalist movement is often an early one; it usually represents only a short-term threat to the status quo, for its perpetrators and supporters are generally a minority among the ethnic group in question, if not within the nationalist movement as well. The terrorist activities of the E.T.A., for example, spawned a great deal of media coverage on, and scholarly interest in, Basque nationalism, while Catalan nationalism was virtually ignored. Yet it was the Catalans, through their broad-based support of Catalan nationalism and the political sophistication of the latter's spokesmen, who paved the way in obtaining regional concessions from the first democratically elected Spanish regime in almost forty years. The point to be kept in mind is twofold: that the potential for ethnic mobilization and conflict is always there, and that political violence is not necessarily a reflection of
the strength of a nationalist movement.

A frequently encountered assertion in the literature on ethnic regionalism in Western Europe is that it is somehow linked to the type of political regime in the country wherein the ethnic region is located. Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin, for example, advance the following hypotheses: 66

1. that peripheral protest is least likely to occur in cases of either (a) early centralization of culturally not too distant peripheries, or (b) early federalization, even across culturally highly distant communities; and

2. that the most marked tendencies towards territorial disequilibrium are likely to occur in cases of either (a) late and incomplete centralization, or (b) plural strategies by the political center, one for core areas and another for the peripheries.

The authors view all peripheral protest or territorial disequilibrium along what they call a centralizing-federalizing continuum; the cases in the above hypotheses represent the poles of this continuum.

Based on this notion of the salience of the type of political regime to ethnic regionalism, it is frequently asserted that ethnic conflict in the unitary, centralized states of France, Spain and Great Britain can be dissipated by a change in the type of political system in these countries. This argument can be found in scholarly studies, in popular analyses, and in the founding principles of the Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations. 67 Nevertheless, it must
be recognized that ethnic mobilization is not in any way restricted to unitary, centralized states. It does, however, appear to be especially significant in the three states cited above. This is perhaps due to a combination of two factors: 1. that because of their aggravated peripheral status, ethno-regional minorities in these countries have a wide range of grievances; and 2. that because of the reluctance of the political center to accommodate the demands of these groups, the strength of their protest movements is enhanced. ("Ethnonationalism appears to feed on adversity and denial.")

Regionalism is generally recognized as a political force in West Germany and Italy, both examples of decentralized (albeit to different degrees), federal states. But ethnic regionalism is not. Perhaps the only significant ethnic mobilization in Western Europe to occur in recent years, in addition to that which has occurred in France, Spain and Great Britain, is that of Belgium (Flemings versus Walloons), a unitary state now moving towards a federal structure, and Switzerland, with its Jura problem.

To most observers, Switzerland, already a federal state with four major language groups, and traditionally cited as the classic case of interethnic harmony, has indeed presented a puzzle. One author has distinguished the Jura case from the others which form the focus of this study, the former being interpreted as an 'old' ethnic problem (i.e. an ethnic minority left on the wrong side of national frontiers
by the vagaries of war and international decision), the latter as a 'new' ethnic problem, i.e. "regional ethnicity." 69 Others have analyzed the Jura question in terms of religion, not language. 70 (Religion, although commonly cited as one of the possible cultural bases of ethnicity, does not form the cultural basis of the type of ethnicity which is the focus of this study - namely language.) Finally, Connor feels that of the many factors contributing to the viability of the Swiss state, not the least among them is its political neutrality in international politics. 71

One of the most interesting transformations that has taken place in the regional movement in Western Europe, and in particular in many of the ethnic regional movements there, is the shift in political ideology from Right to Left. This is especially evident in the case of France, 72 where regionalism traditionally identified itself with the Right (the Left, meanwhile, espousing the ideal of the unitary, centralized state). But the trend is discernible elsewhere. The Basque movement in Spain, for example, has shifted from its middle-class, Church-oriented form of nationalism to a more radicalized Marxist-Leninist stance. 73 This is illustrated by the rise to prominence since the mid-1950's of the E.T.A., as well as by the more recent radicalization of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (P.N.V.), the traditional spokesman of Basque nationalism since its founding in 1893. Of course, it must be acknowledged that an outlawed E.T.A., as a clandestine politico-terrorist organization, could operate more readily
in Franco's Spain than could a similarly outlawed P.N.V., which by its very nature was dedicated to achieving its aims openly, through democratic political channels. But the Catalan movement in Spain offers yet another example of the phenomenon, without the existence of a Catalan counterpart of the E.T.A. Interestingly, the shift from Right to Left in the Catalan nationalist movement was an earlier development, reflected in the gradual shift in electoral support from the Iliga to the Esquerra during the Second Spanish Republic. 74

The discernible shift in ideology from Right to Left in many of the ethnic regional movements in Western Europe since World War II marks the adoption of the language of class warfare by these movements. The influence of Third World anticolonial rhetoric on the overall trend is unmistakable, constituting a link between Third World ethnicity and that of the so-called First World.

But each ethnoregional movement follows a different pattern. The coming of age of Scottish nationalism, for example, has witnessed a significant decline in support of the Labour Party in favor of the now respectable middle-class Scottish Nationalist Party (S.N.P.). The rise of the S.N.P. as a political force to be reckoned with illustrates a related political phenomenon in Western Europe in recent years - the increasing prominence of ethnically-based political parties. Many of these, like the S.N.P., are not new creations; what is new is that they have been transformed from intellec-
tual movements into genuine political forces. The emergence of Flemish and Walloon parties in Belgium is another manifestation of this phenomenon, as is the resurfacing of the P.N.V. and the Catalanist parties in the Spanish general elections of June, 1977. (Here it must be noted that the transformation of the P.N.V. and of the Catalanist parties from intellectual movements into genuine political forces was again an earlier phenomenon, dating from the Second Spanish Republic.) In short, "organizations with regional ethnic constituencies and doctrines appear to be replacing organizations based on class...," in the sense that class, as the sole basis of political organization in multiethnic societies, is an incomplete expression of social, political and economic interrelationships therein.

Esman has proposed five necessary and sufficient conditions to explain and predict the politicization of ethnoregional solidarities in the First World: 76

1. group identity based on both objective and subjective attributes;
2. grievances based on perceived political, economic or cultural deprivations or discrimination;
3. rising expectations resulting from credible prospects that the existing situation can be improved;
4. declining legitimacy and effectiveness of the political center; and
5. political organization to articulate ethnoregional goals and group interest to mobilize support and participation,
contest elections and seek political power.

Where these conditions exist, the potential for the formation of subnational (i.e. substate) political systems is already beginning to be realized. Indeed, one author believes that there is emerging in Western Europe

...a three-tiered political scenario in which sub-state systems increasingly form semi-autonomous political units interacting with the state systems and the supra-state institutions, and it is frequently in the emerging patterns of transactions and interactions between and among these three levels that the pathways of politics in Western Europe are to be found.??
Footnotes


3 Ibid.


7 Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?", World Politics, XXII, No. 3 (April, 1972), 319.


9 Ibid., p. 296.

10 Connor, World Politics, XXII, No. 3, 319.

11 Deutsch, Nationalism..., p. 126.


19 Connor, World Politics, XXII, No. 3, 319.


22 Ibid., p. 1127.


28 Ibid., p. 20.


31 Stanley Hoffman, "Obstinate or Obsolete?: The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," Daedalus, XCV, No. 3 (Summer, 1966), 882.


34 Address by H. E. Mr. Marcel Cadieux, Head of the Canadian Mission to the European Communities, Brussels, May 4, 1977.

35 Hodges, p. 21.


37 Samuel P. Huntington, "Postindustrial Politics: How Benign Will It Be?", Comparative Politics, VI, No. 2 (January, 1974), 163-164.

38 Ibid., p. 165.

39 Ibid., p. 188.

40 Nathan Glazer, "The Universalization of Ethnicity," Encounter, XLIV, No. 2 (February, 1975), 16.

41 Said and Simmons in Said and Simmons (ed.), p. 35.

42 Ibid., p. 37.


44 Said and Simmons in Said and Simmons (ed.), p. 38.


46 Scheinman in Esman (ed.), pp. 70, 72.
47 Zolberg, I.P.S.A., 1976, p. 3.
48 Ibid., p. 2.
49 Ibid., p. 21.
52 Smith, p. 172.
54 Lafont, *La Révolution*..., p. 15.
56 Smith, p. 174.


70 Cf. e.g. Stephen Hendler, "The Jura-Romand Cleavage," (Seminar paper for course on Multiculturalism, Carleton University, May 2, 1977).


76 Esman in Esman (ed.), p. 388.

CHAPTER II

ETHNICITY, REGIONALISM AND INTEGRATION
IN WESTERN EUROPE

Introduction

This chapter will focus on the dual phenomena of ethnic regionalism in Western Europe and integration in the European Community. As discussed in the previous chapter, these two processes have traditionally been viewed in isolation from one another. On the one hand, ethnic regionalism has been perceived as an internal problem of the state, as a factor mitigating against the national integration of the state. On the other hand, European integration has been interpreted (and pursued) as a process of multilateral cooperation among states, primarily in the economic sphere, institutionalized in a confederal/functional form. Thus, until very recently, there existed two separate types of transactions, those of the state and its subnational (i.e. substate) regions, and those of the state and Europe.

The former type of transaction has, in certain cases, proven moderately successful in accommodating the demands of ethnoregional activists, e.g. the creation of the new Jura canton in Switzerland, the gradual shift from a unitary to a federal political system in Belgium, and the conditional ac-
quiescence to devolution in Scotland and Wales by the British government. There is no reason to doubt that such accommodation will continue to be made in the future, albeit on a limited scale and certainly less willingly in some cases than in others.

The latter type of transaction—that between the state and Europe—has traditionally excluded any ethnoregional input, if it has not altogether ignored the ethnoregional phenomenon. But with the upcoming first direct elections to the European Parliament, there may be a change in this attitude and comportment. That, at least, is the hope of many ethnoregional activists as well as of certain partisans of the direct elections per se. In their view, such a change would be effected by the representation of regional interests within the new Parliament, ideally through the election of K.P.'s from ethnoregional parties.

This chapter thus proposes to deal with the ethnoregional phenomenon in Western Europe from two perspectives: that of the nation-state and that of the European Community. Section A discusses the 'Europe of Regions' movement, that school of European federalism which has favored the internal decentralization of the nation-state as the natural concomitant to the uniting of Europe. Section B looks at the actual status of decentralization within the member states of the European Community, concentrating on those countries wherein ethnoregional pressures have exacted some form of accommodation from the political center. Section C treats of ethnoregional...
gionalism within the general framework of the European Community institutions, while Section D focuses specifically on ethnoregionalism within the context of a directly elected European Parliament.

A. The Movement for a 'Europe of Regions'

The concept of a 'Europe of Regions' is set forth in the following excerpt from the founding statement of the Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations:

A l'heure où s'engage le débat sur la construction de l'Europe.... nous estimons que l'Europe qui se construit ne doit pas seulement se baser sur les États Européens d'aujourd'hui, qui au cours de l'histoire des derniers siècles ont conquis, annexé ou se sont partagé nos nations respectives. Ces dernières forment pourtant les réalités naturelles de notre continent. C'est sur ces réalités naturelles, et essentiellement sur elles, qu'une Europe respectueuse de la diversité et des droits de tous ses citoyens et de tous ses peuples, petits ou grands, peut solidement se construire.1

The idea of a Europe of Regions is hardly a new one. Its origins can be traced back to the Middle Ages:

For some purposes and at some periods, as for example in the Crusades, Europe or Christendom was more or less united. But with this unity went a great measure of decentralisation. Under the general prestige of Pope and Emperor the effective units of administration were quite small, comprising Duchies, Counties, Bishoprics, Free Cities...and...City States....Characteristic units were Normandy, Brittany, Bavaria, Scotland, Naples, Denmark, Catalonia and Wales.2

The nation-states of Europe were a development of modern times, from 1500 on earlier. In the view of some scholars, these nation-states were formed for the purposes of external aggression and mutual hostility:

Spain, France, Great Britain, Germany and Russia were
all so many aspects, early or late, of the expansion of Europe. The nation-state was not formed for the defence of Europe but for the invasion of Asia, America and Africa, and for quarreling over the spoils. Just as the concept of a Europe of Regions is not new, neither is the idea of a united Europe per se. The latter idea can be traced back as far as the fourteenth century, and since then, various writers have espoused the concept in some form or other. In the wake of World War I, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi founded the Pan-Europe Movement, which reached its apex with the French Premier Aristide Briand’s call before the League of Nations in 1929 for a United States of Europe. There were other pro-Europe groups in the 1920’s and 1930’s, among them the writers of L’Esprit and L’Ordre Nouveau schools. The latter espoused not only European federalism but also federalism at the national (i.e. state) level, linking the idea of a European federation to that of domestic decentralization.

The realization of the European idea which began in the waning years of World War II is a familiar story. In the early postwar years, there existed three major approaches to European integration: the confederal, the federal and the functional. Of these, only the federal was not subsequently reflected in institutional form, the only serious attempt at this being the aborted European Political Community. But certain partisans of the federal approach played key roles in the realization of the European idea; Hallstein, Spaak, de Gasperi, Adenauer and Beyen among them.
The actions of these men reflected one school of federalist thought whose priority was federation at the European level, but whose support was extended to any concrete program (including those advocated by the functionalists) designed to advance the goal of a united Europe. (In this sense, Monnet is a federalist as well as a functionalist.)

But another school (the so-called "ideological" federalists),8 which advocated a purer form of federalism (i.e. federal means as well as federal ends) was also active at the time. One current, personified by Brugmans (and hereafter called the 'European federalists'), espoused European federalism only, i.e. the idea of a European federation. The other current, personified by Marc, de Rougement and Spinelli (and hereafter called the 'regionalists'), clearly influenced by L'Esprit and L'Ordre Nouveau writers, espoused federalism at both the European and the national levels, i.e. a Europe of Regions. (Spinelli would later join the functionalist group of federalists.)

Thus reborn concomitantly with the European integration idea after World War II, the Europe of Regions concept was an ultimately attainable goal so long as the overall federal approach to European integration remained a possibility. But after the decisive victory of first the confederal and later the functional approach, neither European federalism nor a Europe of Regions has been taken very seriously as a target, much less a strategy, of European integration. But whereas the influence of the former has receded, the latter
has been encouraged by renewed ethnoregional activism in Western Europe.

The shift in emphasis from European federalism to regionalism after 1958 is described in the following passage from de Rougement:

Nous pensions tous, au lendemain de la guerre, dans l'enthousiasme des congrès qui lancèrent le mouvement européen... que l'Europe se ferait lorsque la volonté européenne l'emporterait sur les volontés nationales. Nous sommes plusieurs à penser aujourd'hui que l'Europe des États-Nations ne se fera pas ou se fera trop tard, qu'elle est une contradiction dans les termes, une utopie, et pire que cela: un objectif anachronique. L'Europe se fera - et sera fédérale - lorsque les volontés locales et régionales l'emporteront sur les mythes nationaux au nom desquels on les a brimées depuis des siècles.9

Essentially, de Rougement's concept of 'l'Europe des régions' can be compared with the idea of 'l'Europe des nations' as defined by the Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations (see page 48). Both can in turn be compared with Guy Héraud's notion of 'l'Europe des ethnies'.10 In a work entitled Contre les États; les Régions d'Europe (edited jointly with Héraud), Alexandre Marc contrasts these ideal types of Europe with that of 'l'Europe des États':

Si se déclarer partisan de l'Europe des États n'est qu'une manière élogiante de dire qu'on est contre l'Europe, en revanche - et contrairement à ce que pensent, confusément, certains européanistes - des formules telles que l'Europe des nations ou l'Europe des patries, correctement interprétées, libérées de l'hypothèque statonationale, seraient non seulement acceptables, mais doctrinalement pertinentes. Toutefois, ayant été utilisées abusivement, et dans un sens hostile au fédéralisme, elles peuvent être reprises avec profit, purifiées et résumées d'une manière suffisamment fidèle par la formule moins compromis: l'Europe des Régions.11

Marc correctly points out that the terms 'l'Europe
des nations' and 'l'Europe des patries' are ambiguous; depending on the predispositions of the analyst, they can be used synonymously with either 'l'Europe des États' (de Gaulle's interpretation) or 'l'Europe des ethnies' (the Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations' interpretation).

But is the term 'l'Europe des régions' really any less ambiguous? It appears that this term has been chosen by the regionalists because it is a more encompassing term than 'l'Europe des ethnies'. But therein lies the confusion. When Héraud speaks of 'l'Europe des régions', it is fairly clear that he is referring to 'l'Europe des ethnies'. But with other regionalists, one is not always so sure.

Many regionalists insist on distinguishing provinces from regions when speaking of a Europe of Regions. This is because the use of the term 'provinces' evokes (especially in the case of France) the rightward-leaning regionalism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, now viewed as being reactionary. This regionalism, founded as it was on the revival of regional languages and cultures, contrasts markedly with the new regionalism of today:

The former first of all glorified folklore, and in so doing, it not only created regional social archetypes of an essentially denigrating nature, but also overlooked the social, economic and political grievances which are a hallmark of the new regionalism. In the words of Héraud: "Quand manque le pouvoir politique, la vie culturelle, fatalement, dégénère en folklore." La Font agrees: "Ce folklore ne peut
Être utilisé positivement par ces peuples qu'une fois abolie
la dépendance économique et reconstituée la véritable dignité
culturelle.13

Secondly, the old regionalism glorified the historical
past of the regions to the point of idealizing it, and
in so doing, it fostered both nostalgia for a past (seen as
devoid of negative features regarding the provinces) and con-
tempt for a status quo (seen as devoid of positive features
regarding the provinces). Such a view was as ill-founded in
reality as was the glorification of the nation-state by the
ideologues of the state, and more seriously, it offered no
realistic prescription for the future of the regions.

The new regionalism, on the other hand, adds a cosmopolitain dimension to what was in the past a purely provincial
regionalism:14

Si le régionalisme est favorable à l'unité de l'Europe,
a alors il cesse d'être absurde et sort de son impasse
parce qu'il ne prétend plus à l'isolement stérile qu'on
n'a cessé de lui reprocher. Il rompt dès lors ses
amarres avec le vieux romantisme régionaliste du XIXe
siècle.15

But that is not all. The new regionalism often contains a
third dimension - that of socialism - and it is only in this
sense that Lafont defines 'revolutionary regionalism'. So,
in effect, there are two schools of the new regionalism:
1. the 'ethnic regionalists', descendants of the European
Movement; and
2. the 'socialist regionalists', prime movers in the current
ideological shift within regionalist movements (see pages
37-38). Note, however, that the irredentist Basque E.T.A. would be an obvious exclusion from this group, as its political platform includes no European dimension.

The socialist regionalists certainly share both the European and the federalist aspirations of the ethnic regionalists, if not their ethnic aspirations as well. But whereas the ethnic regionalists seek only to revolutionize a political system, the socialist regionalists aim in addition to revolutionize an economic system. Their goal is to end internal colonialism, to dismantle (in Marxist terms) the alliance between capitalism and the state which they perceive in the European context:

"...la Révolution régionaliste ne peut pas accepter cette Europe-là - elle serait sa pire ennemie, une sorte de super-État qui, malgré la décentralisation administrative et politique, malgré un statut fédéral ou confédéral, ne pourrait qu'aggraver le colonialisme."\(^{16}\)

However, the socialist regionalists are willing to concede that "...refuser toute Europe à cause de celle-là, procède d'un singulier aveuglement."\(^{17}\)

In announcing the 'naissance de l'Europe des régions', de Rougemont sought to define the regional component of this new Europe more by what it was not than by what it was:

Ce ne sont pas les provinces de l'Ancien Régime, effacées, encore moins les départements découpsés par Napoléon, ni les 'Länder' allemands, trop grands, ni les cantons suisses, trop petits, ni les nationalités de la Double-Monarchie d'antan ou de l'U.R.S.S. d'aujourd'hui, ni les "States" de l'Amérique du Nord. Ce sont vraiment des créations de notre temps, des organismes en train de naître de la combinaison de forces très diverses qu'il s'agit de capter et d'harmoniser...\(^{18}\)
Diversity is certainly the key when one seeks to define just what kind of 'régions de base' are advocated by the partisans of a Europe of Regions. Are they to be regions with one, some, or all of the following characteristics: 'natural', geographic, historical, ethnic, economic, administrative, political?

De Rougement, like Lafont and Yann Fouéré (the latter a prominent Breton nationalist and author of L'Europe aux Cent Drapeaux) advocates the creation of regions of a size conducive to their being "une base d'initiatives à l'échelle européenne."¹⁹ For both de Rougement and Fouéré, these would necessitate a minimum population of one to two million people, or a maximum population of six (for Fouéré six to eight) million people. Lafont cites the optimum size of population of these regions as three to seven million people, and adds that although "Les grandes régions que nous préconisons ne sont pas assimilables mécaniquement à des zones linguistiques,"²⁰ nevertheless, "Le sentiment ethnique doit ici jouer son rôle."²¹ Lafont offers a blueprint for the drawing of this type of region in France, stressing the following interrelated points:

1. that the division between the material and the cultural domains of human existence is an erroneous one: "Le technicien moderne se juge réaliste en condamnant comme romantique la tentative culturelle";²²

2. that the cultural alienation of ethnic minorities and the economic alienation of the regions are parallel sociologi-
cal processes,²³ and
3. that certain 'points d'accord' can be found between economic, ethnic and historical regions.²⁴

Even Guy Héraud's concept of 'l'Europe des ethnies' incorporates these assertions. It advocates neither a pan-ethnic federation, such as the U.S.S.R., nor the substitution of a Europe of sovereign ethnic groups for a Europe of sovereign states. Rather the concept designates what Héraud calls a "federation of monoethnic regions,"²⁵ which would take into account the disproportionality in numbers among the various ethnic groups in Western Europe in the following way: Ethnic regions of relatively the same size in terms of population would be created by splitting up large and medium-sized ethnic groups; the resulting ethnic regions would thus be comparable in numbers to those of the smaller ethnic groups, which would remain intact. However contrary such a notion is to the term monoethnic regions, what is noteworthy in Héraud's all-consuming preoccupation with the primacy of ethnic factors is that he is careful to include economic and historical factors in such a plan:

Le schéma proposé permet de faire place aux considérations économiques. C'est en recourant aux critères éprouvés des économistes et des planificateurs qu'on délimitera les régions monoethniques. On essaiera aussi de tenir compte le plus possible des provinces historiques.²⁶

Whereas ethnic factors would take precedence over economic ones in Héraud's scheme in cases where a conflict between the two existed, the opposite is true for Pouétro:
"il est vraisemblable que le critère économique et géographique devra en premier lieu présider à la délimitation des États-régions qui se rattacheront aux grandes ethnies."27

But Fouéré is still far from precise in the criteria that he proposes for the delineation of the regions:

Pour chacun d'eux, le critère utilisé pourra être différent, telle région-État se définissant plus particulièrement par la langue et l'éthnie, telle autre par la situation géographique, telle autre encore par les données économiques ou démographiques.28

Obviously, from the above examples, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine exactly what criterion is being advocated as the prime determinant of the regional component of a Europe of Regions. In fact, none of them is, and it is rather a combination of criteria which are being advocated. But there is evidently no hierarchy of criteria, either; instead, for each regionalist, a different criterion (or criteria) assumes greater importance than the others. This does not mean, however, that there exists no common ground among the regionalists. The following principles are basic to all of their proposals:

1. The ethnic factor will definitely play a major role in the delineation of the regions, although not necessarily the primary role.

2. At the same time, the economic factor will continue to play a major role in such delineation, although again, not necessarily the primary role.

3. Transnational regions are not only a distinct possibility - they are crucial to the very concept of a Europe of Re-
gions. At the very least, economic criteria demand the transcending of present state boundaries for the creation of the new regions. In certain cases, ethnic criteria might also demand the same, although the political interests of the nation-state would certainly be far less amenable to this possibility than to the former one.

The European Commission's 1961 proposal for the formation of 'grandes régions' is in a sense incorporated into the economic dimension of the regionalists' proposals. It will be remembered that the Commission, for purposes of analysis, originally made a distinction between two regional levels: socio-economic regions as defined by the states in the context of their respective regional policies, and macro-socio-economic regions based on the economic logic of Community territory. The latter would have included inter alia a total of nine regions for France, and only one for all of Belgium. It was rejected by France on the grounds that not only did it violate the French concept of regionalization from an economic point of view, but it also set the stage for regions large enough to contemplate initiatives at the European level. In the words of one author:

...la grande région est efficace spatialement, fonctionnellement, financièrement et politiquement...plus les régions sont grandes et peu nombreuses, plus l'on peut craindre pour l'État.

The 'grande région', on the other hand, makes no provision for the smaller ethnic groups, which is why "Les humanistes sont partisans de la petite région." But with
the powerful determining role assigned to the ethnic factor by the regionalists, coupled with the possibility of forming transnational regions, their 'grande région' would contrast with that defined by the Community, since the former would not be based solely on economic criteria.

Furthermore, most regionalists advocate in addition the creation of an intermediate territorial-political division - the 'pays' - between region and local community (commune). This would result in a five-tiered governmental structure, viz. commune/pays/région/État/Europe, envisioned by Lafont and others. Even some regionalists of the non-ethnic and non-socialist variety advocate such a scheme. Thus, despite their contentions that the scale of modern economic and social structures has made the small autonomous community obsolete, and that small political units encourage elite control and inequality, two authors writing in the Journal of Common Market Studies concede:

...these regional identities may prove too strong to be safely contained unless administrative decentralization evolves into political decentralization and some degree of community self-determination.

The existence of the smaller states, such as the Benelux and Scandinavian countries, Ireland, Switzerland and Austria, poses a dilemma in the creation of a Europe of Regions. On the one hand, their continuing existence as states (as opposed to regions) would be challenged, a prospect that would be none too easily relished by any of them. On the other hand, it is their very status as states that has greatly encouraged ethnic groups with comparable popula-
tion figures to become politicized. The Bureau of Unrepre-

sented European Nations echoes the sentiments of many stu-
dents of history when it states:

Ce n’est que par les accidents de l’Histoire que l’Als-
sace, le Pays Basque, la Bretagne et le Pays de Galles
ne sont pas représentés au Conseil de l’Europe au même
titre que l’Irlande, le Danemark et le Luxembourg. 36

The point to be kept in mind is that the state level of go-
vernment in a Europe of Regions, whether it should consti-
tute a transitional stage or not, is a state government
different from those of today, for its tasks would have
been modified by the creation of both the new European and
the new regional dimensions characteristic of a Europe of
Regions.

In fact, these dimensions already exist in embryonic
form. Europe may still be essentially an economic community,
but direct elections to the European Parliament will give it
at the very least a symbolic political character. As for the
regional dimension, this has in effect been created already
by most of the member states of the European Community with-
in their respective political boundaries. Granted that
their functions for the most part are more economic or admi-
nistrative than political, these regions nevertheless (to-
gether with the European Parliament) constitute a basis on
which a Europe of Regions could be constructed. The next
section will deal specifically with the regional dimension
within the individual member states of the European Commu-
nity.
B. Ethnoregionalism and Regionalization

Within the European Community

Within all the present member states of the European Community, except for tiny Luxembourg (population 359,000), some form of regional subdivision now exists. These territorial subdivisions may or may not coincide with geographic areas whose populations profess a particular historical and/or ethnic identity. Institutionalized as 'regions' or 'provinces', their functions may differ widely from one country to another. In West Germany, for example, they constitute the units of regional government within a federal system, whereas in France they are nothing more than a framework for economic planning, defined and implemented at the level of the central government.

Following is a numerical breakdown of regions and population figures within the member states of the European Community. A comparison of the two yields the inevitable conclusion that different criteria are used in determining different types of regions, as no across-the-board pattern is discernible between them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Number of Regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3.0 million</td>
<td>9 planning regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5.1 million</td>
<td>3 'régions de base'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>9.8 million</td>
<td>3 regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>13.7 million</td>
<td>11 provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>52.7 million</td>
<td>22 'régions de programme'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>55.8 million</td>
<td>20 'regioni'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>56.0 million</td>
<td>11 new standard regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>61.8 million</td>
<td>10 Länder (plus Berlin)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although all of the above states (with the possible.
exception of Ireland) do incorporate at least one ethnic minority within their frontiers, regional subdivisions do not always coincide with the area of geographic concentration of the ethnic minorities. In many cases, this is due to the relatively insignificant proportion of the population which such groups often represent. In others, it is due to the relative lack of ethnic politicization within the groups in question. In the case of France, it is due to a deliberate policy of the central government to assimilate its ethnic minorities, dating from the drawing of the 'départements' after 1789.

But in at least three of the above states, this coincidence does exist. Scotland and Wales are regions within the U.K., although this status does not entail a division of power between Westminster and the regions. These two regions have nonetheless traditionally enjoyed a somewhat limited special status vis-à-vis the eight English regions (the ninth region, Northern Ireland, will not be considered here). This is evidenced by their proportional overrepresentation at Westminster, and by the existence of the two Cabinet level posts of Secretary of State for Scotland and for Wales. Furthermore, the Scottish Office in Edinburgh provides a measure of administrative decentralization in Scotland. Both its senior members and the Scottish Secretary constitute a powerful political lobby in London.

In Belgium, it was only in 1970 that constitutional amendments defined the linguistic (and administrative) regions of Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels (the latter bilin-
gual French/Flemish), although their de facto status as linguistic regions had been implicitly acknowledged by language legislation dating back as far as the 1930's. The existence of two separate language communities had further been reflected in the formation of separate French and Flemish wings within the three major (noncommunal) parties.

In Italy, five of the twenty 'regioni' provided for in the Constitution of 1948 now enjoy a special status founded on ethnic particularism. In four of the five regions, where autonomist movements threatened the unity of the Italian state, regional governments were established in 1948, while the fifth was set up in 1963. (In contrast, the 'regular' regions were not institutionalized until 1972.) The first four special regions include: Sicily (where regional government dates effectively from 1946), Sardinia, Val d'Aosta and Trentino-Alto Adige (the latter incorporating the South Tyrol); the fifth is Friuli-Venezia Giulia (with its Slovene minority, involved in the dispute with Yugoslavia over Trieste). The boundaries of the latter two regions do not in fact coincide with the area of geographic concentration of their respective ethnic minorities, but rather incorporate them with a larger Italian-speaking area. Thus, for example, there is a glaring inconsistency between the French-speaking region of Val d'Aosta, whose inhabitants number only 100,000, and the region of Trentino-Alto Adige, with a population of 800,000, among them the 220,000 German-speaking South Tyroleans.
Putting aside for a moment the fact of Italy's ethnic minorities, the question of the relative ethnic homogeneity of the rest of Italian society is a controversial one. As in West Germany, the question rests primarily on the extent of regional variations in the spoken varieties of the dominant language. But ethnic politicization is not a major factor in Italian politics, at least since the creation of the 'special' regions: "Before the setting up of the regions...the movements for separatism...were strong, active and had a popular following. Now separatism is a threat used occasionally by local politicians."\(^{44}\) This is not to say that regionalism per se is not an issue in Italy. On the contrary, the best known manifestation of it is the severe economic problem of the Mezzogiorno, the underdeveloped Italian south. But there are political undercurrents as well. In a 1973 survey, for example, Sicilian public officials complained that regional legislative autonomy was operational only when the same political party was in power in both Rome and Palermo.\(^{45}\)

In each of the three above-cited member states of the European Community, then, the geographic concentration of the ethnic minorities does, for the most part, coincide with certain regional subdivisions of the country. But the functions of these regions vary from one member state to another. In the U.K., where no regional government exists, they are de jure economic planning regions, although their historical distinctiveness within the U.K. traditionally has
been acknowledged. Thus, the union with Scotland was clearly stated to be a union of two separate nations under a single Crown and Parliament, whereas Welsh nationhood also retained official dynastic recognition in the tradition of making the heir to the throne the Prince of Wales. Now, however, pending the results of referenda in Scotland and Wales, these two regions may be accorded a limited measure of administrative and political decentralization. As for Belgium, Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels are now de jure linguistic, administrative and economic regions, and are slated, according to the Egmont Pact of 1977, to become federal units within a new Belgian state structure. In Italy, the regions are de jure units of political decentralization, but the degree of self-government allotted to each of them varies greatly, not only as between 'regular' and 'special' regions, but even among the latter alone. Furthermore, since the central government reserves the right not only to veto proposed regional expenditures but also, through its prefects, to suspend mayors and regional councils, Italy's regions in fact reflect a very limited form of political decentralization.

The country which is regularly cited by regional aspirants as the 'model' for decentralization in Europe is the Federal Republic of Germany. This is because the West German political system is the most highly decentralized of all of those represented within the membership of the European Community. It is a federal system, with 'Land' parliaments at the regional level responsible for Land matters, and two
houses at the national level - a lower house (Bundestag) and an upper house (Bundesrat), the latter representing the Länder. "Manifestement, les Laender ont été définis sans aucune préoccupation économique, et avec la seule volonté d'ordonner les groupements historiques." 46

The Länder in fact differ greatly in size of population. For example, there are seventeen million inhabitants in North-Rhine-Westphalia, 1.15 million in the Saar, and 750,000 in Bremen. 47 This no doubt reflects the primacy of historical considerations in their delineation. The question of the relative ethnic homogeneity of West German society aside, it must be conceded that, as in Italy, ethnic politicization is not a major factor in West German politics. But regionalism per se is nonetheless an issue, again as in Italy. In a 1973 survey, subnational regional authorities in West Germany complained of the progressive emasculation of the Land parliaments to the benefit of the Bundestag. 48 Despite this prevalent complaint, it is generally agreed that the degree of political decentralization in West Germany is far greater than that in Italy.

The present decentralized political systems in West Germany and Italy date from the early postwar years. But efforts to decentralize the Belgian and British political systems are on the contrary quite recent, spawned by renewed ethnoregional activism in both countries.

In Belgium, ethnoregional political parties emerged during the 1960's, garnering ever-increasing electoral sup-
port throughout that decade and into the 1970's. Parallel to this development there occurred substantive institutional changes reflecting the ethnic divisions of the country: the previously cited constitutional amendments, the establishment of cultural councils for the Flemish-, French- and smaller German-speaking communities, the creation of separate ministries for the regions of Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels in certain functional areas, etc. By 1974, the Volksunie in Flanders and the Rassemblement Wallon in Wallonia had become the third largest parties in their respective regions, and the latter became the first ethnoregional party in any postwar West European country to join in a governing coalition. In the wake of the dismissal of the Rassemblement Wallon from the governing coalition in March 1977 and the subsequent April 1977 elections, two other ethnoregional parties followed suit - the Volksunie and the Front Démocratique des Francophones (the latter a party of the Brussels region) - by now the two major regional parties in Belgium.

These two parties, along with their coalition partners, drafted (prior to the formation of the new government) the Egmont Pact, which provides for a directly elected council in each of the three regions, whose executive will exercise substantial powers in the economic and social fields. Although approved in principle by the Belgian parliament in 1978, the government's decentralization plan has been recently stalled by the need to call elections for a new parliament in order to implement further constitutional changes.
In the U.K., the Scottish Nationalist Party won approximately thirty per cent of the Scottish vote in the 1974 general election, taking eleven of Scotland's seventy-one seats at Westminster. The Plaid Cymru (the Welsh Nationalist Party), winning roughly eleven per cent of the Welsh vote, took three of Wales' thirty-six Westminster seats. But although devolution bills for both regions were passed by the British Parliament in 1978, they have been made conditional upon a forty per cent affirmative vote in referenda to be held in both regions in 1979. In addition, the votes in Orkney and Shetland are to be counted separately in the Scottish referendum, so as to enable the two islands to opt out of the devolution project if they so choose.

Under the constraint of the forty per cent clause, the success of the Welsh referendum is highly unlikely, while that of the Scottish referendum is uncertain at best. Should either of the projects fail, devolution will continue to be a major issue in the U.K., with new proposals in the next parliamentary session a virtual certainty. Whatever the outcome, devolution in the rest of the U.K. is likely to become a more visible issue in the future as well.

In contrast to the issue of devolution in the U.K., decentralization has been an issue affecting all regions in France. The publication of Lafont's La Révolution régionaliste in 1967, de Gaulle's referendum on regionalization in 1969, and the inclusion of regionalization in the platform of a major political party for the first time in 1972 (that
of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's Radicals) all mark significant events in the evolution of this idea in France. This is in fact a dual issue, for the other side of it is the ethnoregional question, a matter of no small importance since there are at least seven ethnoregional movements active in France today, together claiming to represent more than one-third of the entire French population. The next chapter will deal with these issues as they particularly relate to France.

Since two of the above seven ethnoregional movements involve ethnic minorities the majority of whose populations are citizens of Spain, a brief look at the important events taking place there since the death of Franco, and especially since the general elections of June, 1977, is in order. As regards these two ethnic minorities - the Basques and the Catalans - the concessions made by the new Spanish government are particularly significant. Although it has not yet gone so far as to restore the full autonomy statutes of the Second Spanish Republic, the government nevertheless restored the Catalan 'Generalitat' (or regional autonomous government) on September 29, 1977, and granted a provisional autonomy statute to the Basque country on December 31, 1977.

The 'Generalitat' presently consists of a regional council composed of members of parliament, and headed by the man who was its president in exile in France. Pending the implementation of municipal elections (the new Spanish constitution now having been adopted by parliament and approved in a
referendum), the Generalitat is slated to be extended to include a parliament and an independent judiciary.\textsuperscript{57} As for the Basque statute, it is limited to the provision of a regional council composed of members of parliament and municipal representatives, whose powers may be revoked by Madrid in the interests of the security of the Spanish state.\textsuperscript{58}

The Spanish government is not, however, restricting decentralization to its two most politicized ethnic regions. Pre-autonomy statutes have been granted throughout 1978 to ten other regions, among them Galicia, Valencia, Aragon, the Canary Islands, Andalusia, Extremadura, Old Castille-Leon, the Balearic Islands, Murcia and Asturias.\textsuperscript{59} This thrust towards regionalization has been one of several major considerations of the Spanish government in its reform of Spain's internal political institutions and policies. Regarding its external concerns, one of the principal ones has been relations with the rest of Europe, and accordingly, formal application for membership in the European Community was made on July 28, 1977.\textsuperscript{60}

The case of Spain is interesting for many reasons, one of them being its illustration of the potential compatibility of the parallel pursuit of regionalization and European integration by the nation-state. Since ethnoregionalism in Western Europe is a phenomenon which increasingly operates beyond the boundaries of the nation-state, this European dimension of ethnoregionalism, especially as it relates to European Community institutions and direct elections to the
European Parliament, will be the focus of the next two sections.

C. The Regions and the Community Institutions

The European Community has been indirectly concerned with ethnic minorities within its member states for some time - through its regional policy. This is because of the high correlation between the ethnically self-aware areas of Western Europe and either:

1. the economically depressed older industrial zones (e.g. Wallonia, Scotland, Wales and French Flanders); or
2. the underdeveloped peripheral regions (e.g. Brittany, Corsica and southwestern France - including Occitania, French Catalonia and the French Basque country).

But true to the narrow economic focus of its conception of regional policy, the Community was not, until quite recently, explicitly concerned with political developments in these regions. That a change in this attitude is taking place is reflected in the appearance in September, 1976 of a 267-page report compiled by Riccardo Petrella at the request of the Commission and entitled Les "Régions" et l'Europe: Etude Exploratoire sur les cultures régionales dans la Communauté Européenne.

In 1961, when the Commission first mapped out a regional policy strategy, it asked for the right to communicate directly with regional personnel and local authorities in order to maximize information. This request was rejected,
largely at the insistence of France (see page 58). Despite its efforts to avoid political controversy, the Commission in July, 1974 expressed widespread sympathy for increased autonomy to the subnational regions on political, cultural and economic grounds, as well as for closer, even direct, links between regional authorities and the European Community. 64

Among the present member states of the European Community, only West Germany permits its regions to enjoy an official status within the Community. The Bundesrat maintains an office in Brussels to keep in continuous contact with the Commission, 65 and the permanent observer which the Länder collectively maintain there attends meetings of both the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Permanent Representatives. 66 Nevertheless, the activities of the Länder at the European level

...must be seen merely as pragmatic endeavors to ensure protection and promotion of their particular interests and are devoid of any ideological content or long-range pro-integrationist strategies. 67

In the case of Italy, direct contacts between Brussels and the regions are also maintained. But because Rome jealously regards this relationship, the Commission - as a political reflex - informs Rome when such contacts are made and frequently is accompanied into the field by a representative of the central bureaucracy. 68 The statement that "...the Italian governmental system remains basically unitary, despite the commitment to regional autonomy since 1948..." 69 is
certainly reflected in the procedure involving contacts between the Italian regions and the Commission.

The Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations has also had a certain impact upon Community institutions, even though it holds no official status therein. For example, Leo Tindemans, former prime minister of Belgium, sought out the opinion of the Bureau in preparing his report on European Union for the European Council. Another indication of the Bureau's influence was the celebrated cause of Yann Fouéré, which was taken up in the European Parliament. Fouéré, a prominent Breton nationalist, was arrested and detained by French police in October, 1975 on suspicion of knowledge of (and possible involvement in) a bombing which had taken place in Brittany the previous summer. Petitions demanding his release and a committee formed to work towards that end both attracted wide publicity for Fouéré's cause, but it was the direct intervention of a Welsh Labour M.P. in the European Parliament that finally secured it. The M.P. responsible for the intervention is the coordinator for the Bureau in the European Parliament. (Incidentally, the Bureau represents a transnational alliance of certain European ethno-regional political parties, among them the Welsh Plaid Cymru, the Basque P.N.V., the Breton Strollad Ar Vro and the Alsatian Elsass-Lothringen. To these founding members was added an unofficial Catalan representative in the spring of 1978.)

The September, 1976 decision of the European Council to proceed with direct elections to the European Parliament
in 1972 may indeed have foreshadowed the potential significance of a directly elected European Parliament for the ethnoregional cause. According to one author, writing in an official Community publication, it "marked the growth of sturdy insistent regionalism, as the regions played a key role in the national haggling over how many seats each state will hold." To confirm this assertion, the author recounts the following:

1. The U.K. held out for approximately doubling the total of 198 members now in the European Parliament because Scotland and Wales insisted on at least as many seats as less populated Denmark and Ireland, respectively.

2. The U.K. further pushed through an additional seat for the four biggest countries - eighty-one each for the U.K., West Germany, Italy and France - because that would allow three instead of two seats for Northern Ireland. (Two seats would not have permitted any Catholic representation from Northern Ireland.)

3. Belgium was supposed to have been allotted twenty-five seats (like the Netherlands), but willingly settled for twenty-four rather than face the prospect of dividing twenty-five seats between Flemings and Walloons.

As a postscript to item #1 above, it is significant that the proposal to give Scotland the same number of seats allotted to Denmark - sixteen - was subsequently heavily defeated in the House of Commons select committee on direct elections. Also rejected, more narrowly, was a proposal to
give Scotland ten seats and Wales five seats. Scotland and Wales have since been allotted a strictly proportional eight seats and four seats, respectively. Concerning item #3 above, the twenty-four seats allotted to Belgium have since been divided unevenly, thirteen going to Flanders and eleven to Wallonia. (The Brussels region will not be a regional constituency for the direct elections.)

Thus, equivalent representation for the ethnic regions with member states of comparable size and population will not be the case within the first directly elected European Parliament. It had been recommended by both the Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations and the Federal Union of European Nationalities. The Bureau as well as the first Convention of the Regional Authorities of Peripheral Europe (sponsored by the Council of Europe in Galway, Ireland in October, 1975) had also recommended the creation of a second European Assembly - a Senate of Regions. For the more immediate future, one author has suggested the possibility of a new bloc emerging in the directly elected European Parliament should several ethnoregional parties win seats therein and their representatives "begin to sit and caucus together in the Parliament as Socialist and Christian Democratic parties do today." There may in fact be emerging in Western Europe an intricate pattern of inter-system political relationships. Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr. has outlined these as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Transactions</strong></th>
<th><strong>Examples</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. horizontal</td>
<td>1. horizontal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. supra-state to supra-state</td>
<td>a. E.C. negotiations with COMEBON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. state to state</td>
<td>b. British/French collaboration on Concorde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. sub-state to sub-state</td>
<td>c. Basque/I.R.A. arms trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. single stage vertical</td>
<td>2. single stage vertical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. state/supra-state</td>
<td>a. renegotiation of Britain's terms of entry into E.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. state/sub-state</td>
<td>b. British/Northern Ireland negotiations on the restoration of civilian rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. vertical 'leap-frogging'</td>
<td>3. vertical 'leap-frogging'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. sub-state/supra-state</td>
<td>a. maintenance of the Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations in Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. tri-level interaction</td>
<td>4. tri-level interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. state/sub-state/supra-state</td>
<td>a. Brussels efforts to sway Scotland's vote on the British referendum on E.C. membership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rudolph predicts that "...the direct election of the European Parliament may prove to be more of a watershed in the development of sub-state systems than in the evolution of European integration."\(^5\)

Many questions are posed by the prospect of regional representation within a directly elected European Parliament. Among the more challenging of these, according to Werner Feld, are: \(^6\)

1. Should the system of liaison officials expand to include all national regions in the Community?
2. What exact functions will be involved in the links between Brussels and the regions and how extensive will they be?
3. In what way do links between Brussels and the regions affect the national governments?
4. If the national governments should establish "European De-
5. How much will regions interact with each other in developing coalitions to advance their goals?

6. Will politics for regional autonomy be linked to European politics?

7. Is there a possibility that the national governments will ally themselves with European Community institutions to fight the demands for regional autonomy?

For now, all this is hardly within the realm of speculation. The immediate concern is the actual implementation of the first direct elections. There has been a one-year delay from the originally scheduled deadline of May-June, 1978, due to the decision of the U.K. in December, 1977 to use the simple majority system, which necessitated the time-consuming task of drawing eighty-one new 'Euro-constituencies'. Yet very much within the realm of speculation at this point is a possible regional representation within the directly elected European Parliament. The next section directs itself specifically to this question.

D. The Regions and the Direct Elections

At the end of 1976, Eurobarometre public opinion surveys showed that within the European Community:

- nine out of ten persons favorable to the Common Market were also favorable to direct elections to the European Parliament; and

- four out of ten persons unfavorable to the Common Market
were nevertheless favorable to direct elections to the European Parliament. 87

In the words of the director of the Eurobaromètre: "Il y a donc un attrait propre de l'élection, en tant que procédure démocratique, indépendamment de l'attitude à l'égard de la Communauté." 88

This dichotomy may in fact reflect the common differentiation made between a Europe of technocrats and a Europe of peoples. An economic community administered by a European bureaucracy centered in Brussels is hardly evocative of the European 'idea'. Rather, this idea connotes Europe as a political expression, the latter being synonymous in the modern world with an assembly elected by direct universal suffrage, which has the power to legislate in the name of the citizens whom it represents.

This idea of Europe was in fact never overlooked in the institutionalization of Europe which began to take shape in the early 1950's. A European assembly elected by direct universal suffrage was first provided for in Article 21 of the 1951 Treaty of Paris which established the European Coal and Steel Community. This clause was reiterated in the 1958 Treaties which established Euratom (Article 108) and the European Economic Community (Article 138), respectively. The question of legislative powers did not figure in the 1958 Treaty of Rome (E.E.C.). But at the Paris Summit of December, 1974, the European Council, in addition to requesting that the Council of Ministers act on a new parliamentary
draft convention in 1976 (so that the first direct elections could take place as early as 1978), further stated: "The competence of the European Assembly will be extended, in particular by granting it certain powers in the Community's legislative process."  

For every observer who views the direct elections as a significant first step on the road to a political Europe, there is another who feels that without an increase in the Parliament's powers, these elections are nothing but political window-dressing. When considering the status of the regions within a directly elected European Parliament, an even more elusive problem presents itself for, the possibility of enhanced legislative powers aside, it is unclear whether the regions will indeed achieve even mere representation within that Parliament. Those who favor such representation and view it as a foregone conclusion never attempt to suggest how in fact it would be realized. On the other hand, those who study the mechanics of the direct elections for the most part overlook the regional question in their discussions of electoral methods and representation.

Nearly 179 million European electors (out of a total population of 258 million) will be eligible to vote in the first direct elections. To assure a more representative Parliament, the number of seats has been increased from 198 to 410. And to comply with Treaty requirements that a uniform electoral procedure be applied in all member states, 'uniformity' in the first elections has been interpreted flexibly
as the application of basic democratic principles. Indeed, no deadline was set in the Brussels Act of September 20, 1976 for the adoption of a uniform electoral system, voting age, etc. by the European Parliament, undoubtedly in recognition of the complexity of this task due to the existence of five broadly different electoral systems in operation within the Community:

1. proportional representation via party lists (Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Luxembourg);
2. single transferable vote in multi-member constituencies (Ireland);
3. simple majority in single-member constituencies (U.K.);
4. a variant of the overall majority in single-member constituencies with two polls (France); and
5. a mixed system, combining simple majority in single-member constituencies with P.R. via party lists (West Germany).

The second complication is presented by the fact that these are not necessarily the same electoral systems adopted by the respective member states for the first direct elections - France being the most obvious example of this deviation. Following is a list of the electoral systems adopted (or proposed) in each member state of the European Community for the first direct elections to the European Parliament, with member states listed in ascending order of population:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>P.R. in a single national constituency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>S.T.V. in four multi-member constituencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Member State | Electoral System
---|---
Denmark | P.R. in a single national constituency for mainland Denmark, with one seat allotted to the constituency of Greenland
Belgium | P.R. in the two regional constituencies of Flanders and Wallonia, the electors of Brussels having the right to choose between the two lists
Netherlands | P.R. in a single national constituency
France | P.R. in a single national constituency
Italy | P.R. in a mixed system of five regional constituencies with seats to be distributed on a strict national proportionality, and with a minimum of 1.2% of the vote necessary to win a seat
U.K. | 'first-past-the-post' (simple majority) in single-member constituencies, with the exception of Northern Ireland, where S.T.V. in a single three-member constituency will be used
West Germany | P.R. in a mixed system of ten regional (Land) constituencies and one national constituency, with political parties given the choice of which of the two types of list they wish to present, and with a minimum of five per cent of the vote necessary to win a seat.

Generally speaking, P.R. in a single national constituency is the least favorable of the above electoral systems to regional representation. On the other hand, the larger the constituency under P.R., the more proportional is the representation. There is obviously a great difference between P.R. in a single national constituency being applied in a country the size of Luxembourg (population 359,000) and in a country the size of France (population 52,748,000). Although this electoral system per se does not favor regional representation, the extent to which it discourages it will logically be far greater in France than in Luxembourg. The
smaller countries (Benelux, Denmark and Ireland) have a further advantage in that in terms of seats in the European Parliament, they are overrepresented in terms of population vis-à-vis the larger countries (France, Italy, the U.K. and West Germany). By opting for their respective mixed systems of regional/national lists under P.R., Italy and West Germany have in fact provided for a certain regional representation.

But the matter is not all that simple, for the size and boundaries of the regional constituencies are the prime determinants in whether in fact the regional representation is truly reflective of particular regional identities and/or interests. The size of the 'Euro-constituencies' will necessarily be far greater than that of any existing subnational constituencies used for elections to the respective national parliaments. For example, France and the U.K. are entitled to eighty-one 'Euro-M.P.'s' each, whereas the representation in their respective parliaments is on the order of 491 and 635 M.P.'s, all elected in single-member constituencies.

The debate over the choice of electoral system to be applied in the first direct elections was most protracted in the U.K. The British Parliament finally decided to apply the traditional simple majority system in single-member constituencies, which required the drawing of eighty-one new 'Euro-constituencies'. The latter are groupings of eight to ten Westminster constituencies, with roughly equal electorates. With the electorate of the U.K. at 41,000,000 (out of a total
population of 56,042,000), each Euro-K.P. will represent approximately 506,172 electors. Had the U.K. chosen instead to apply P.R. with regional lists and based its multi-member Euro-constituencies on the eleven existing economic planning regions, the number of electors per seat would have ranged from a low of 460,000 in Northern England to a high of 531,000 in the West Midlands; this excludes Northern Ireland, where the number would have been by far the lowest - at 349,000. It is noteworthy that under both systems, the number of seats allotted to Scotland and Wales remains unchanged - at eight and four respectively.

Under the electoral system chosen, Scotland will be divided into eight single-member constituencies (and Wales four). If Scottish (Welsh) nationalist sentiment is stronger in some sub-regions of Scotland (Wales) than in others (and this is most certainly the case), then, given a drawing of electoral boundaries which does not deliberately seek to subvert the political expression of such sentiment, Scottish (Welsh) nationalism should be reflected in a more representative fashion through eight (four) single-member constituencies than through one regional constituency of eight (four) members under P.R. This is the reasoning of John Fitzmaurice of the Commission's liaison division with the European Parliament when he writes:

Regional list constituencies with up to fifteen members...would extend beyond the most regionally conscious regions in France, and certainly beyond sub-regions in the U.K. Then no member would have a clear link to a region, no clear right to represent a region. All could make
that claim and could therefore speak with contradictory voices. No member would unequivocally represent the region.98

For this reason, Fitzmaurice establishes what he calls "... a hierarchy of systems in terms of their encouragement of regional representation: national list (least, hence its choice by the Gaullists); regional list; large, single-member constituencies (most)."99

But The Economist disagrees. According to its analysis, written prior to the S.N.P. slump of spring, 1978, this party would have a good chance of winning all eight of Scotland's seats under P.R. (regional lists), but with the 'first-past-the-post' system (single-member constituencies), it could win anywhere from zero to eight seats.100 The Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations also disagrees with Fitzmaurice. It favors P.R. with regional lists as the best method of assuring ethno-regional representation within the directly elected European Parliament.101

Among the present 198 indirectly elected Euro-M.P.'s, at least three can unequivocally be said to represent ethno-regional parties:102 an S.N.P. member who sits as an Independent, and two members from the Südtiroler Volkspartei who sit with the Christian Democratic group.103 There is also one member from the Partie de réforme et de liberté en Wallonie (P.R.L.W.) who officially sits with the Liberal group.104 This is not an ethno-regional party, however, as it is the break-away faction of the Rassemblement Wallon which aligned itself with the Walloon wing of the Belgian Liberal Party. Until
the March, 1977 dissolution of the Belgian government, both the Rassemblement Wallon (R.W.) and the Front Démocratique des Francophones (P.D.F.) had one representative each in the European Parliament as well.\textsuperscript{105}

Following are two predictions of the maximum number of seats in the first directly elected European Parliament that could be won either by ethnoregional parties or by parties with a heavily regionalist orientation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties/Regions</th>
<th>The Economist\textsuperscript{106}</th>
<th>Rudolph\textsuperscript{107}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volksunie</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.D.F.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.W.</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.R.L.W.</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.N.P.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaid Cymru</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sfd Tiroler Volkspartei</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{106} The Economist's predictions date from December, 1977, which explains the unrealistically high number of seats allotted to the S.N.P. Rudolph's were made in April, 1978; six months later he called his S.N.P. estimate "suspect" and added: "Now that the districting in Britain is known, the Plaid Cymru will obviously not win a seat in Wales - in 1979 or any year - unless a regional list/P.R. system is employed in Britain."\textsuperscript{108} Note that Rudolph includes the Northern Ireland representatives in his prediction while excluding the P.R.L.W. - the reverse of The Economist. In considering the possibility of a regional bloc within the first directly elected European Parliament, Rudolph emphasizes the inclusion of those system-wide parties with a heavily regionalist orienta-
tion, viz. the remaining Belgian Euro-M.P.'s, many German representatives, the Sardinian and Sicilian representatives, as well as the entire Irish delegation. 109

Concerning the adoption of a uniform electoral procedure by the directly elected European Parliament, electoral experts already consulted by the present indirectly elected Parliament have proposed three possible systems: two variants of the West German mixed system, and S.T.V. in multi-member constituencies. 110 (S.T.V. is a form of P.R. in which the voter expresses his first and subsequent preferences per candidate.) In Fitzmaurice's opinion, the most likely choice is P.R. with regional lists. 111

But there is another aspect of regional representation that has not yet been considered. Regional interests do not necessarily require the election of regional political parties to be represented in the European Parliament. The previously cited Yann Fouéré affair (see page 73) is a case in point. Of note also was the debate within the European Parliament over the increase in the number of its seats relative to the direct elections: "on avait observé dans divers pays des prises de position, parfois très marquées, touchant la représentation régionale." 112 Speaking of possible future institutional transformations within the European Community, the author of the first draft convention on direct elections (1960) stated:

Le modèle qui vient d'être esquisse pourrait se réclamer d'une meilleure inspiration démocratique encore s'il était complété par une représentation des collectivités
locales grâce à un aménagement de la seconde Chambre, les collectivités locales - ou si l'on préfère, les régions - ne pouvant plus, dans l'Europe occidentale d'aujourd'hui, être tenue à l'écart de toute participation aux décisions générales. Du reste, dans une Fédération future, il faudrait en arriver à une double représentation, celle des citoyens et celle des régions.

In fact, the phenomenon of regionalism in Western Europe is hardly a new topic of discussion within the European Parliament. Writing in 1977, one author observed:

L'analyse des débats du Parlement européen depuis deux années montre une évolution très nette à cette égard: d'une part, le Parlement européen devient chaque jour davantage une caisse de résonance des problèmes régionaux, d'autre part, il s'affirme de plus en plus comme une sorte de cour d'appel des Parlements nationaux, c'est-à-dire que les parlementaires de tous pays et de toutes affinités politiques prennent peu à peu l'habitude de transporter au niveau européen les problèmes de politique intérieure non résolus...

Will this trend be reinforced within a directly elected European Parliament? According to a European Community official:

Directly elected members may well cause debates on regional problems to become more lively than at present. There is likely to be more emphasis in the new Parliament on the political aspirations of the regions, and direct elections may add force to the argument in favour of a second chamber of the European Parliament representing regional or local authority interests. The directly elected Parliament will almost certainly press for a bigger regional fund - particularly if it includes Greek, Portuguese or Spanish members.

Given some form of regional representation (direct or indirect) within the directly elected European Parliament, there remains the question of increased powers to the Parliament. The fact that the French government's acquiescence to the implementation of direct elections is contingent upon absolutely no increase in these powers precludes any such increase in the near future (although it will certainly be an
issue). Without increased powers, how can the Parliament hope to become a more effective Community institution (vis-à-vis the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Permanent Representatives) on regional or any other matters?

The fact is that the European Parliament has been increasing its powers over the years, particularly in the budgetary area. Furthermore, it has developed certain control activities over the Commission (e.g. question time), and has obtained some political accountability from the Council (e.g. ministerial attendance at meetings of parliamentary committees and at each parliamentary session). Indeed, the European Parliament has both existing and 'latent' powers, and the ability to acquire a variety of new ones which does not necessarily entail amendments to the Treaties.

But these powers are obviously limited. That is why the direct elections alone, unaccompanied by increased powers, represent a hesitant first step on the road to a political Europe. Nevertheless, this step is a significant one, for the direct elections constitute much more than a mere gesture in favor of a political Europe. Although in and of themselves they will not change the nature of the European Parliament, they will effect the following:

...elles lui conféreront un supplément de légitimité... elles revêtiront une portée symbolique et psychologique ....À l'extérieur elles apparaîtront...du moins comme un pas important sur le chemin de l'unité politique. Elles accentueront incontestablement certaines tendances qui correspondent à des besoins ressentis en commun par l'ensemble des Européens: tendances au régionalisme, be-


soins grandissants d'une protection internationale des droits de l'homme, etc. 120

In addition to increasing the Parliament's powers, there will remain the other future task of making the elections truly European, for as presently envisaged (both for the first and subsequent elections), they are instead national elections for a common European assembly. In order to effect the change, according to one student of the European Parliament, certain controversial criteria must be accepted — among them the right of European candidates to stand for election in any member state of the Community, and "la création de circonscriptions électorales transfrontalières englobant des ethnies séparées jusqu'ici artificiellement par les frontières politiques nationales." 121

The question of regional representation within the directly elected European Parliament is thus a very abstruse one. It appears that certain ethnoregional parties will indeed achieve some representation in the first directly elected Parliament, which should serve to heighten the focus on regional matters within the Parliament. On the other hand, without increased powers, the Parliament may in fact bring very little influence to bear — regarding regional or any other matters — on either the other Community institutions or the governments of its respective member states.

But here again, the Yann Pouéral affair returns to mind. If an indirectly elected Parliament could succeed in bringing enough pressure to bear on a national government to
change a particular course of action in an ethnoregional matter, then a directly elected Parliament should certainly have no less of an impact in such matters. The Fouère affair is particularly germane to this study, for it involved the government of France, traditionally hostile to both supranationalism (European integration) and to subnationalism (internal decentralization). It is to the case of France and its recalcitrance in these two areas that the next chapter directs itself.
Footnotes


3 Ibid., p. 3.


5 de Rougemont, Bulletin du Centre Européen de la Culture, XIII, No. 1-2, 3.

6 Webb in Kolinsky and Paterson (ed.), pp. 308, 310.


8 Haas in Lindberg and Scheingold (ed.), p. 21.

9 de Rougemont, Bulletin du Centre Européen de la Culture, XII, No. 2, 43.


12 Héraud, Peuples..., p. 73.

13 Lafont, La Révolution..., p. 209.

14 Ibid., p. 246.


16 Lafont, La Révolution..., p. 238.

17 Ibid.

18 de Rougemont, Bulletin du Centre Européen de la Culture, XII, No. 2, 43.
20. Ibid., pp. 215-216.
22. Ibid., p. 195.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 201.
26. Ibid., p. 139.
28. Ibid., p. 160.
29. Scheinman im Esman (ed.), p. 73.
30. Ibid., pp. 73-74.
32. Ibid., p. 61.


40 Ibid.

41 Connor in Said and Simmons (ed.), p. 133.


43 Rudolph, The Western Political Quarterly, XXX, No. 4, 544.


46 Gravier, pp. 148-149.


48 Feld, Orbis, XVIII, No. 4, 1181.


62. Ibid.

63. Scheinman in Esmann (ed.), p. 73.


65. Scheinman in Esmann (ed.), p. 73.


67. Ibid., p. 1184.

68. Scheinman in Esmann (ed.), p. 73.

69. Feld, *Orbis*, XVIII, No. 4, 1181.


71. Interview with Mrs. Rosamme Reeves, Director of the Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations, Brussels, May 5, 1977.

72. Letter from Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr., Chairman of the Department of Political Science, University of Tulsa, Oklahoma, October 20, 1978.

74 Ibid.


76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.


81 Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations, "Adresse à M. Leo Tindemans...," p. 5.

82 Jørgensen, The Importance of Small Communities, 1976, p. 11.

83 Rudolph, The Western Political Quarterly, XXX, No. 4, 555.

84 Ibid., p. 551.

85 Ibid., p. 555.

86 Feld, Orbis, XVIII, No. 4, 1191-1192.


88 Ibid.


92 Ibid.


97 Ibid.


99 Ibid.


101 Interview with Mrs. Rosanne Reeves.

102 Letter from John Fitzmaurice, Brussels, April 17, 1978.


104 Ibid., p. 8.

105 Letter from John Fitzmaurice, Brussels, April 17, 1978.


110 Jean-Louis Burban, "La Dialectique des Elections européennes," Revue française de Science politique, XXVII, No. 3 (juin 1977), 400.


114 Burban, Revue française de Science politique, XXVII, No. 3, 405.


116 Ibid., p. 123.

117 Ibid., p. 125.

118 Ibid., p. 127.

119 Ibid., p. 130.

120 Burban, Revue française de Science politique, XXVII, No. 3, 404-405.

121 Ibid., p. 404.
CHAPTER III

THE SPECIAL CASE OF FRANCE

Introduction

An American sitting down to write a book on "Democracy in Europe" might, for example, suggest a radical decentralization of France, leading to an internal federalism similar to that which the victor powers imposed on West Germany in 1945. First of all, this would be going counter to the immense effort at unification which France pursued for centuries and which was the basis for its success....Moreover, such a suggestion fails to take account of an essential factor in our present political thinking: the striving for a European confederation. Favoring, as it does, a confederated Europe, France cannot afford to atomize its internal structure. The national unity, which was the source of France’s strength from the fifteenth century to the Empire, must be preserved if France is to play an advantageous part in a European confederation.1

The preceding statement by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing places him in a line of direct succession from the two previous presidents of the Fifth Republic. In fact, the allusions to Europe aside, the statement is a testament to the Jacobin philosophy which has guided France since 1789.

There are today three phenomena perceived by the French government as constituting a challenge to the existence of France as a nation-state: ethnic subnationalism, regionalism and European integration. Of these, ethnic subnationalism is by far the oldest challenge, predating as it does the French Revolution. Regionalism can be traced back
to the Revolutionary debates between Jacobins and Girondins, the former ideology triumphing with the abolition of the last vestiges of the provincial autonomy of the Ancien Régime in 1789. But the Girondist heritage has survived the Napoleonic reinforcement of Jacobin institutions which themselves remain relatively unchanged to this day. As for European integration, it did not become a challenge until the end of World War II, when it began to manifest itself in institutional form.

The issues common to these three phenomena fall into the three broad categories defined in the general introduction to this study: socio-economic, politico-administrative and linguistic-cultural (see page 5). As in the previous chapter, this chapter will concentrate on the latter two categories, given the overall framework of the study. It will also focus on the accommodation by the central government of the demands presented by each phenomenon, more than on an analysis of the phenomena themselves. Finally, since ethnic subnationalism, regionalism and European integration are all intimately related to the question of the distribution of political power in France - which since the time of Alexis de Tocqueville has been reputed to hinge on politico-administrative centralization - the role of the latter will figure in the discussion of each of the phenomena.

Section A treats of the manifestation and accommodation of ethnic subnationalism and regionalism through the first half of the twentieth century. The next three sections
all deal with the Fourth and Fifth Republics: Section B with politico-administrative regionalism, Section C with linguistic-cultural regionalism, and Section D with the French approach to Europe.

A. Subnationalism and Regionalism: From the Ancien Régime through the Third Republic

La France n'est devenue la France que dans la mesure où la Bourgogne, la Guyenne et les autres provinces se sont "dépersonnalisées". Il subsiste une âme bretonne, une âme alsacienne, une âme basque. Mais la plupart des vieux pays de France ont perdu leur âme pour que la France naîsse.2

Such an acknowledgement by one of France's most celebrated 'hommes de lettres' of the twentieth century of the ethnic and cultural diversity within French society is one which generations of 'hommes politiques' have been unable to make. Certainly, many of them have implicitly acknowledged it through state policies aimed at the obliteration of any non-Gallic language, culture or regional identity from within French society. But that these were indeed their goals has never been explicitly conceded by most of them.

The reasoning behind this anomaly is deceptively simple: the French nation, in the best tradition of Rousseau, is a community founded on the consent of its citizenry through a universal social contract. The nation and the collective will are thus one: in Ernest Renan's famous phrase - "une nation est...un plébiscite de tous les jours."3
It follows that the state, as the embodiment of the nation (the collective will), is also one with the nation. The inevitable result of such reasoning was the emergence of France as the first modern nation-state — "la 'nation en soi'" — the celebrated 'nation une et indivisible'.

According to Héraud, "Il n'est sans doute pas d'État en Europe et au monde où l'idée de nation soit plus puissamment ancrée dans les esprits qu'elle ne l'est en France." This is because French theoreticians of the 'nation' have always confounded the abstract concept of the nation with the nation as a concrete reality. Such a nation unites "...tous les hommes, de quelque race, de quelque langue, de quelque religion qu'ils soient, pourvu seulement qu'ils acceptent de participer au pacte et conservent le passeport de l'État..."

Accordingly, the French initiated 'direct rule' in their overseas colonies, making Arabs and black Africans alike 'Français', while at the same time relegating French-speaking minorities in other countries (e.g. Belgian Walloons, French Swiss, Québécois) to the less significant category 'de langue française'. It is only in this context that the trauma caused in France by the Algerian war and its aftermath can be fully understood. The period of decolonization witnessed the transformation of the former colonies from 'Français' into members of that entity known as 'Franco-phonie'. The implications of the philosophical justification for such a transformation were not lost on those who spear-
headed the ethnoregional 'revival' in France which began in earnest at about this time.\textsuperscript{7}

Language is a particularly apt criterion of ethnicity in France because of the importance attached to well-spoken French in the value system of that country. This fact is illustrated by the statement made to this writer by the Cultural Attaché of the French Embassy in Ottawa that in France there exist no ethnic minorities - only linguistic groups.\textsuperscript{8} The statement is all the more significant since it rejects the possibility of such groups being relegated to a minority status within the larger society. Such an attitude is perfectly in keeping with the recognition of individual as opposed to group rights.

The respective histories of French linguistic and regional policies (the latter term used here in the most general sense) are closely intertwined. This does not necessarily mean that "dissident movements that are springing up in France are [nothing] more than demands for decentralization and regional autonomy using in some cases ethnic symbolism."\textsuperscript{9} What it does mean is that

\ldots les maux dont se plaignent ces mouvements [ethniques], ce sont, dans bien des cas, les maux dont souffre la France tout entière\ldots La lutte pour les libertés régionales ne saurait être menée qu'avec le concours de toutes les régions de France, car toutes ont à y gagner.\textsuperscript{10}

The overwhelming pressure for Gallo-conformity that exists in France today is a legacy of the ideology which inspired the French Revolution and of the Jacobin policies which emanated from the first post-revolutionary regime.
But the centralized politico-administrative system that made it possible can in fact be traced back to the Ancien Régime. That the history of France has been a story of centralization from the time of Charlemagne was affirmed before the French Parliament by a leading theoretician of conservative Gaulism:

Je ferai l'éloge de la centralisation à l'Assemblée nationale. C'est elle qui a permis de faire la France.... Ce n'est pas par hasard si sept siècles de monarchie, d'empire et de république ont été centralisateurs: c'est que la France n'est pas une construction naturelle. C'est une construction politique voulue pour laquelle le pouvoir central n'a jamais désarmé.

Under the Ancien Régime, although the French monarchy was centralized more than any other in Europe, each province nevertheless had a special status based upon the terms of its union with the crown. When François Ier issued the Ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts in 1539 (which established French, or rather the 'ofl' dialect of Ile-de-France, as the official language of the realm), only Occitania ('le Midi') and Brittany of the non-'ofl'-speaking regions were territorially part of France. By the time that Louis XIV suppressed municipal elections at the end of his reign, the territorial building of France was almost complete, with the non-'ofl'-speaking regions of the French Basque country, Alsace-Lorraine, French Catalonia and French Flanders now integrated geographically into the 'hexagon'. Corsica was added in 1768, and Nice and Savoie in 1860. (The latter two regions are not considered in this study.)

As early as 1740, Montesquieu wrote to a friend:
Map 2.—The territorial distribution of the various language groups in France. Only the 'oil' area is historically French-speaking. Note the shaded areas showing the extension of the French language into Belgium, Switzerland, and Italy (the Val d'Aosta). Note also the 'intermediate' language areas of Franco-Provençal and Gallo. Source: Pierre Pougeyrollas, Pour une France fédérale: Vers l'Unité européenne par la Révolution régionale (Paris: Editions Denoël, 1969), p. 106.
"Il n'y a en France que Paris et les provinces éloignées, parce que Paris n'a pas encore eu le temps de les dévorer."\textsuperscript{12}

The politico-administrative centralization of France was in fact a two-stage process involving first, territorial acquisition (mostly completed under the Ancien Régime), and second, assimilation as a deliberate policy of state. The latter was begun by Richelieu, continued by Colbert, and greatly expanded after the Revolution. According to Tocqueville:

"Du temps de la Fronde, Paris n'est encore que la plus grande ville de France. En 1789, il est déjà la France même."\textsuperscript{13}

In 1789 the thirty-three provinces were abolished, and in their stead were created eighty-three administrative départements. The latter remain the largest administrative units in France to this day; within the 212,681 square miles of metropolitan France, they now number ninety-five. The creation of the 'départements' was a centralizing strategy designed to facilitate communication between Paris and the hinterland. It was also an assimilationist strategy intended to eradicate provincial loyalties in favor of a single 'national' allegiance. The function of the 'département' was reinforced by Napoleon's institution in 1800 of the office of the préfet (prefect) - the highest ranking official in each 'département', and in 1804 of the Napoleonic Code - a single, uniform legal system. Both institutions survive today, and the prefect continues to be not an elected official, but rather an appointed representative of the central bureaucracy in Paris.
Concerning the ethnic minorities within the French state, the French Revolution also set the tone for the repressive linguistic policies later implemented during the Third Republic. A survey commissioned by the Constituent Assembly in 1790 reported the following results to the Convention in 1793:

- that French was the language of communication in only fifteen 'départements' of the interior (an area with a population of approximately eleven million at that time);
- that out of the remaining population of fifteen million in the rest of France, only three million spoke French - six million having only a passive knowledge of the language and the remaining six million knowing no French at all.

The immediate task thus became the teaching of French to the nearly one-half of the population who lacked a working knowledge of the language. To this end, a 'Comité de l' instruction publique' was created in 1792, and French-language primary schools were mandated throughout the country in 1793. An influential member of the 'Comité de salut public' gave the following rationale for these linguistic policies:

Le fédéralisme et la superstition parlent bas-breton, le fanatisme parle basque, l'emigration et la haine de la République parlent allemand. Brisons les instruments de dommage et d'erreur.15

By 1830 a knowledge of written French was necessary to obtain a position in the public service, but it was not until the Third Republic (1870-1940) that the central government set out on a deliberate policy of linguistic suppres-
sion. Nevertheless, the following declaration to the Minister of Education in 1831 from the prefects of two ‘départements’ in Brittany indicates that such a policy was not absent from the minds of the Parisian bureaucracy even then:

Par tous les moyens possibles, il convient de favoriser l'appauvrissement, la corruption du breton, jusqu'au point que, d'une commune à l'autre, on ne puisse pas s'entendre. Car alors la nécessité des communications obligera le paysan d'apprendre le français. Il faut absolument détruire le langage breton.16

Later, in a series of decrees between 1881 and 1884, the French government banned the use of ‘patois’ (a derogatory term for ethnoregional languages) in schools, and provided for specific punishments to be meted out to pupils who dared speak a single word of ‘patois’ at any time during the school day. Among these were the wearing of the ‘symbole’ around the neck as well as licking the floor — both common in Brittany. Furthermore, the government exhorted parents directly (and indirectly through the intervention of school-teachers) to speak to their children at all times exclusively in the French language. In Brittany, signs reading "Défense de cracher et de parler breton" were placed on public buildings.

Even before the promulgation of the 1881-1884 decrees, demands were being made in favor of the teaching of regional languages and cultures. In retrospect, the most celebrated of these was the joint petition made by the Count of Charen- cy (a general councillor from the ‘département’ of Orne), H. Gaidoz (the director of the Revue Celtique), and a professor
Charles de Gaulle (grand uncle of the General and himself a writer of poetry in the Breton language). It was of course this same period that witnessed the revival of regional languages and cultures throughout Europe, including France. Initially an intellectual and literary phenomenon, this revival would eventually spill over into the political arena with the creation of the first so-called nationalist parties.

In France, Frédéric Mistral founded the Félibrige in 1854, and fifty years later he won the Nobel Prize for his novel Mireille, written in the Provençal variety of the Occitan language. Most contemporary authors date the first political agitation in Occitania over a matter that would eventually take on a nationalist coloring as the 1907 winegrowers' dispute in Languedoc, a still unresolved issue more than seventy years later. But one author writing in 1930 notes the 1892 publication by some of Mistral's disciples of a manifesto demanding for Provence a large measure of both cultural and political autonomy which "proved to be the beginning of a more radical Provençal autonomist movement..."

On the other side of the Pyrenees, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (P.N.V.) was founded in 1893, attaining its first electoral victory at the provincial level in 1898, and at the national level in 1918. In Catalonia, the first regular Catalanist ticket in the national parliamentary elections was presented in 1901, and in 1906, a broad electoral alliance of Catalanist parties won forty-one of the forty-four
Catalan seats in the Spanish Cortes (parliament).

An Union Régionaliste Bretonne was founded in 1898 in Brittany, and in 1911 the first Breton nationalist party - Strollad Broadel Breiz - appeared. In 1919 the former petitioned the Versailles peace conference to consider Brittany in its discussions relative to the granting of rights to the national minorities in (Eastern) Europe, while certain militants of Breton cultural circles addressed a similar petition to Woodrow Wilson. ²⁰

After the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France in 1918, a Heimatbund ('Ligue de la Patrie') was formed to demand autonomy for this region within the framework of the French Republic. Several 'regionalist' parties were founded, as were regionalist wings of the noncommunal parties. In April, 1928 general elections, a majority of the twenty-five candidates who won deputies' seats from Alsace-Lorraine were avowed 'regionalists'. ²² Two of them were in fact among the group of autonomists condemned for high treason at the tribunal of Colmar one month later.

In French Flanders, although a Comité flamand de France had been founded in 1853, it was not until the 1923 creation of the Ligue des Flamands that the movement became more politically activist. In the interim, however, "...the quickening of Flemish nationalism in Belgium and the pan-Netherlandish agitation in Holland produced some repercussions in French Flanders." ²¹

As for Corsica, the influence of the Occitan
bridge had extended beyond the standardization of a 'langue
d'oc' to that of a Corsican language as well. Following
World War I, a Partitu Corsu d'Azione (later the Partitu
Corsu Autonomistu) was founded, as was a more moderate home-
rule group in 1926. Both groups unsuccessfully entered
the electoral fray.

- By the end of the Third Republic, then, cultural
and political manifestations of subnationalism had already
appeared in most of those regions in France where it is most
visible today. In 1900, inspired by the founding of the
Fédération Régionaliste Française, a majority of the can-
didates elected to the Chamber of Deputies had run on a pro-
gram of regionalist reform.

But most of these subnationalisms, in contrast to
those of the post-World War II period, were rightward-lean-
ing, and for a reason that is peculiarly French. Since 1789,
any vestiges of the old provincial identities were automati-
cally labeled anti-Jacobin: to advocate anything which har-
kened back to the Ancien Régime was to be reactionary, roya-
list and clerical. In contrast, to advocate the ideal of
the unitary, secular state was to be progressive and patrio-
tic, and so the Left wing came to be more or less identified
with Jacobinism.

Subnationalism's identification with the Right was
reinforced by the scandal of collaboration during World War
II. This involved primarily certain autonomist leaders from
Brittany and Alsace, and to a lesser extent those in French
Flanders, the French Basque country and Corsica. It also involved some Breton and Alsatian troops. The hope of the collaborationist autonomist leaders was that the Nazis would grant their respective regions cultural and political autonomy but their collaboration only served to label the autonomist movements as 'fascist', thus discrediting them and making them suspect not only in France as a whole and with the French government, but in their respective regions as well. Postwar reprisals were in many cases arbitrary and unjust, for to have professed autonomist sentiments became synonymous with having collaborated with the Nazis.

Thus, at the onset of the Fourth Republic, subnationalism in France entered a temporary dormant phase, to resurface during the Fifth Republic as a phenomenon more ideologically related to socialism (and to a lesser extent liberalism) than to the conservatism of its past. In fact, precedents did exist for this new regionalism: the new left wing stance could harken back to the Paris Commune of 1871, while the new liberal trend identified with Servan-Schreiber was in many ways a revival of the ideology of Tocqueville and his posterity.

These three ideological trends of regionalism in France are not characteristic solely of subnational aspirations. In fact, the liberal and socialist trends have traditionally been the domain of other-than-ethnic regionalism, with the liberal strain historically the more predominant of
the two. Liberal regionalism's first concern was administrative. Thus, in 1852, the president of the Conseil d'Etat wrote:

...le territoire des départements est trop étroit, leur nombre est trop grand. Des circonscriptions plus larges ont été adoptées déjà pour l'administration militaire, la justice, l'instruction publique; pourquoi ne pas suivre cet exemple à l'égard de l'administration?26

Later, with the burgeoning regional problem linked to nineteenth century industrialization, economic concerns also came to the forefront. The creation of economic regions by Etienne Clémentel, Minister of Commerce, in 1919 became "la première reconnaissance officielle d'une réalité économique supra-départementale..."27

The uneven development which accompanies industrialization was aggravated in the French case by the tradition of bourgeois-state cooperation dating back to the Ancien Régime. According to one author:

À l'âge classique, en effet, la bourgeoisie se met au service de l'absolutisme monarchique...Le Colbertisme, en instaurant et en développant l'intervention de l'État dans le domaine économique, renforce le centralisme et affaiblit l'initiative privée qui est le ressort historique de la bourgeoisie.28

It mattered little that the bourgeoisie crushed the absolutist monarchist state in 1789, for although the state now became bourgeois, the bourgeoisie had in effect already become bureaucratic.29 If regional underdevelopment indeed began under the Ancien Régime, it did not, however, become "ravageur"30 until the advent of industrialization in France. As another author explains:
Certes, la centralisation industrielle...aurait de toute façon eu lieu,...Mais nulle part ailleurs en Occident, elle ne vide à ce point provinces et villes de leurs substances...au profit...d'une ventrue hypernerveuse: Paris.31

Centralization in the administrative, political, intellectual, artistic, financial, commercial and industrial spheres thus became intimately interrelated if not mutually dependent phenomena. And more and more, it is centralization that is being blamed for the overall 'malaise régional' in France as well as for the seemingly inherent instability of the French political system since 1789. Countless analysts, dismayed that participation has too often taken the route of confrontation, have ventured to question whether in fact France is a democratic country:

-En dépit d'une demi-douzaine de révolutions les Français ne sont pas encore des hommes libres; ce sont les sujets d'une administration archaïque.32

-Ce pays est gouverné pour l'essentiel par des institutions d'Ancien Régime qui n'ont pu être démocratisées réellement,...à cause du phénomène de la centralisation.33

-Voici ces Français, qu'on dit - plus que tous autres ingouvernables,...Et voici les mêmes passivement soumis à leur administration, et amoureux (toujours déçus) de l'autorité; rebelles à leur État, en même temps qu'inaptes à vivre sans ce tuteur tracassier.34

The proliferation of writings since May-June 1968 on the desirability of the redistribution of political power in France is especially significant when a Gaullist and Cabinet Minister such as Alain Peyrefitte takes up the battle cry alongside the Radical Servan-Schreiber and the socialist Robert Lafont. 'Le mal français' is a concern that has begun to ignore party affiliations and political ideologies.
When in an appendix entitled "La parole est aux minoritaires," a speech on regionalization by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing figures alongside the political platforms of regional liberation movements in Alsace, Corsica and the Basque country, the question of where in fact real political power lies in France becomes fascinating indeed.

Under the Fourth and Fifth Republics, the traditional policies of the French state have been challenged by regionalism per se on the one hand, and by subnationalism on the other. To these familiar 'revendications' has been added a new one: the challenge of supranationality in Europe. How the French state has coped with these challenges, and the prospects for a continued accommodation through its chosen policies for doing so, constitute the focus of the next three sections.

**B. Regionalism and Regionalization under the Fourth and Fifth Republics**

Je ne suis pas opposé à la régionalisation....Je suis opposé à la complication. Il existe deux collectivités territoriales importantes: la commune et le département. Il n'est pas nécessaire d'y ajouter un étage supplémentaire. Les régions, dans leur état actuel, forment un dispositif qui marche bien.

In 1947 there appeared two works that were to herald the arrival of 'la révolution régionaliste' in France. The first of these was Jean-François Gravier's *Paris et le Désert français*, an economic analysis of 'le malaise régional' in terms of the Paris-province dichotomy. The second was
Michel Debré's *La Mort de l'État républicain*, a study on administrative reform commissioned by Charles de Gaulle.

As noted in the previous section (see page 114), the uneven spread of industrialization in France had been aggravated by the politico-administrative centralization of the country, as well as by the tradition of state intervention in private enterprise and bourgeois cooperation with the state. The nineteenth century growth of railroads yielded a pattern which showed that all roads now led to Paris. Industrialization thus took root in the Paris region and also in the northeast with its deposits of iron ore and coal; it almost completely bypassed the south and west, which remained predominantly agricultural. With the gradual rationalization of agriculture in the twentieth century, the 'malaise' of the French desert was further aggravated by declining employment and the consequent need to emigrate in search of work. Those who did remain had to be content with incomes inferior to the average wage paid in the more industrialized regions.

On the politico-administrative side, bureaucratic centralization could only become more stifling with the increase in the domain of activity of the state and with the expansion in both communications networks and the scale of economic activity. The Jacobin atomization of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods was still intact: the *département* was the largest 'collectivité territoriale', administered by the prefect; its only political function was as an electoral unit for seats in the National Assembly.
Each département grouped approximately three to four arrondissements, with each arrondissement in turn grouping ten to twelve cantons, and each canton finally grouping ten to fifteen communes. There were elected conseils municipaux and conseils généraux (the latter at the level of the départements), but their functions were largely supervisory.

France remained a unitary state, with its prefects vaguely reminiscent of colonial governors or the 'intendants' of the Ancien Régime.

So a dual problem was posed. In the economic sphere, there was the industrial-agricultural dichotomy between two major sections of the country, and the concentration in the Paris region of the top management of regionally-based firms. In the administrative sphere, excessive bureaucratic power was centered in Paris, to the detriment of any bureaucratic initiative below the national level. Economic and administrative reforms were thus necessary, but the heart of the problem was political - in that no effective decision-making body existed below the level of the central government.

Although regional boundaries for various administrative purposes had existed for some time (for economic, financial, military and educational purposes), it was under the Vichy régime that the first regional prefects were created, "partly as instruments of control, partly out of nostalgia for a supposedly decentralized past." 37 After the Liberation, at least one stratum of opinion was favorable to administrative reform:
During the profound questioning of French institutions that went on under German occupation, political acti-

vists on all sides attributed part of the 'strange de-

feat' to overcentralization and the obsolescence of

traditional politico-administrative boundaries.38

Whereas some Gaullists favored regionalization as a solution, others, like Michel Debré, proposed an enlargement of the boundaries of the 'départements' so as to reduce their num-

ber to forty-five. But the postwar political climate in France was not conducive to the implementation of such re-

forms, and so,

Blocked by politics, administrative reform in France went underground; it moved out of the public arena dominated by parties to the less visible meeting rooms of interest group notables and high level civil servants.39

Bureaucratic politics in general was nothing new in France. Under the Fourth as under the Third Republic, not only was the proportion of civil servants in ministerial cabi-

nets on the average of sixty per cent,40 but furthermore,

"Dans la série de crises ministérielles... la tête de l'État pouvait demeurer vacante; par l'Administration l'État continuait à fonctionner."41 Inevitably, the administrative re-

forms initiated during the Fourth Republic by a certain stra-
				

tum of civil servants provoked strong opposition within the bureaucracy itself, particularly among the 'Grands Corps' and among officials in the various ministries.42

But there was another postwar impetus for regional reform - this one at the grass-roots.43 Small groups of lo-

cal leaders in different parts of France began to grasp their problems in a regional framework, leading them to form volun-
tary associations cutting across the boundaries of the 'départements' as well as across party lines. These were the Comités d'expansion régionale, which pressed for a regional economic plan to be used like the national plan as a framework for public and private investment.

Of the various decrees relative to administrative reform and 'l'aménagement du territoire' (regional policy) issued during the Fourth Republic, one is worthy of note here: the 1956 promulgation of the régions de programme, under which the 'départements' were grouped into twenty-two regions "whose job would be the preparation of plans evaluating the needs of their respective territories and coordinating the behavior of public and private activities at all levels." These 'régions de programme' remain today as the basic regional division in France, although their functions have been altered somewhat under the Fifth Republic.

The essence of the Fifth Republic has been termed a "'société close' des technocrates". Unlike the Fourth Republic, it is a presidential régime, and its Constitution provides for no parliamentary review of executive decrees. There has been an increase of approximately thirty per cent in the proportion of civil servants in ministerial cabinets, as compared to the Third and Fourth Republics. The following statistics are revealing in this regard:

- from 1959 to 1974, approximately fifty per cent of ministerial posts were held by civil servants;
- from 1959 to 1976, all Prime Ministers came from the ranks
Map 4.--The 22 circonscriptions d'action régionale in France superimposed upon a map of the 93 départements. Note that regional boundaries do not cross the lines of the départements. These 22 'regions' have been further grouped into 10 zones d'études et d'aménagement du territoire. Source: France, T.N.S.E.E., Annuaire Statistique de la France: Résultats de 1974, Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, 1976, p. 711.
of the civil service; and
-of the forty-three members of the government of Jacques Chirac (1974-1976), thirty-one were recruited from the civil service.

The danger of such a situation is that political issues become depoliticized. According to one author:

La Vé République a toujours fait confiance aux techniciens. Elle s'est efforcée, avec une belle ténacité, de 'dépolitisier' les problèmes, à tous les niveaux. On voit donc ce paradoxe: des maires et des conseillers généraux, souvent même des députés, affirmer qu'ils ne "font pas de politique'.48

It was during the Fifth Republic that regionalization (both administrative and economic) became a major issue in national politics. Under Charles de Gaulle, a series of important decrees were issued, among them:

-the 1959 decree which aligned administrative regions with regions used for economic affairs and planning, and revived the office of regional prefect (but with authority in the economic sphere only);

-the 1963 decree creating the D.A.T.A.R. (Délégation à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'action régionale), a regional planning body comparable to the 'Commissariat du Plan' at the national level, and F.I.A.T. (Fonds pour l'intervention à l'aménagement du territoire); and

-the 1964 decree creating the C.O.D.E.R. (Comités de développement économique régional), a consultative regional assembly composed of local notables, three-quarters of them appointed, one-quarter of them indirectly elected.
The decree creating the C.O.D.E.R. was only one of several important decrees issued in 1964, whose purpose was

...to preserve the capacity of the Jacobin state to function. Paris, and the upper reaches of the bureaucracy, had to be unburdened of the press of petty details and the lines of command from Paris into the field had to be unsnarled.... These changes constitute a kind of streamlined Jacobinism—modernization of the rule from the center through administrative deconcentration.49

Between 1964 and 1968, the regionalization issue was effectively ignored. Then, in March, 1968, de Gaulle launched a new regionalization campaign, which would reach its climax with the abortive referendum of April, 1969. The latter was initially to have dealt only with the issue of regionalization, but in the end it became the device for a virtual vote of no confidence in the de Gaulle régime.

Indeed, the results of the referendum did not reflect popular sentiment on the regionalization issue. Public opinion polls instead indicated that regionalization in the form of political decentralization (i.e. directly elected regional assemblies, a regional executive and regional budgetary powers) had widespread support among the French electorate.50 Furthermore, the regionalization proposals contained in the referendum could have been enacted by parliament, had de Gaulle chosen this route instead. The Gaullists had a majority in the National Assembly, and the Senate was favorable to regionalization as well.51

What the Senate was not favorable to was the other major provision in the referendum—the 'reform' of the Senate. The latter would have changed the composition of this
institution from one which essentially reflected political power at the local level (where Gaullism was weak), to one which included not only local representatives but regional and corporatist representatives as well. Fully one-half of the Senate would have been elected on a regional basis, and it would in essence have been transformed into an Economic and Social Council.

In short, political expediency motivated by 'les événements' of May-June 1968, rather than an overriding concern with regionalization per se, seemed the 'raison d'être' behind the referendum as it appeared in its final form. But if de Gaulle was willing to make regional concessions in the interests of political expediency, this has not been the case with his successors.

The only significant gesture toward regionalization made under the Pompidou régime - the 1972 'loi Frey' - was a project more modest than that proposed by the 1969 referendum. Like the latter, it provided for the creation of regional councils, but whereas de Gaulle's regions had been defined as 'collectivités territoriales' - the same term as applied to communes and 'départements', Pompidou's regions were termed 'établissements publics' - the label used for nationalized enterprises, universities, etc. The terminology alone denoted the decline in the proposed political character of the regions.52 Not only did the measure barely pass the Senate - 124 to 120 - but furthermore, all Socialists and Communists voted against it, as did Servan-Schreiber. The latter
was by now in the forefront of a new movement for regionalization, inspired by neither right nor left but rather by a more centrist, liberal ideology.

Servan-Schreiber had first taken up the regionalist cause in 1970 as the platform for his successful electoral campaign in Nancy. In 1971 he published Le Pouvoir régional and in 1972 his Radical party concluded a political agreement with Jean Lecanuet's Democratic Center for a joint platform on regionalization in the form of political decentralization.\textsuperscript{53} The Socialist party in their annual policy document of 1972 also took an affirmative stand on this type of regionalization,\textsuperscript{54} although the formation of the Common Front (Socialist-Communist alliance) would lead to a progressively more muted and cautious Socialist stance on the issue, as the Communists were at this time adamantly opposed to it.

The staunch Communist opposition to regionalization in the form of political decentralization has been in the best tradition of the ideology of bureaucratic centralization characteristic of Marxism-Leninism on the one hand, and of the Jacobin Left on the other. With the advent of Gaullism, Jacobinism also came to be identified with at least one element of the Right, so that there still remains a great deal of ideological confusion in France over the issue of regionalization in the form of political decentralization. Its two traditional arch-foes - the Communist Left and the Gaullist Right - have also been the staunchest opponents of European integration.
Regionalization/political decentralization has not become more of an official concern under the presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing than it was under the Pompidou régime. Since 1968, Giscard's Independent Republican party had regularly spoken out in the National Assembly in favor of the granting of genuine political powers to the regions, and the Centrists - another party member of Giscard's government coalition - had also pushed for a more extensive regional reform in 1972. Giscard himself, in public statements made between 1968 and as late as 1975, also expressed the same sentiments, viz.:

Les nouvelles priorités françaises passent par la renaissance des responsabilités locales qui supposent la reconnaissance d'une structure régionale de décision. Les régions devront donc être administrées par les élus.

But beginning with a speech in November, 1975, Giscard reversed his position, and on December 4, 1975 he stated the following over nationally broadcast television and radio:

...nous avons retenu deux conclusions: la première est qu'il n'est pas souhaitable de faire des régions des collectivités locales supplémentaires, mais qu'il convient en revanche de leur faire jouer pleinement et complètement leur rôle de coordination du développement économique; la seconde conclusion est que nous devons effectuer la décentralisation de nos pouvoirs en direction du premier échelon de notre vie démocratique, celui qui est le plus près de nous, et qui est la commune...

In fact, Giscard's 'volte-face' may be due not only to the common discrepancy between policies advocated before (versus after) attaining power. In an interview published on February 12-13, 1978, the former Gaullist cabinet minister and head of the D.A.T.A.R. Olivier Guichard, who had been
charged by Giscard with heading a study on the reform of 'collectivités locales', declared: "M. Giscard d'Estaing n'a jamais été régionaliste.... Tant que M. Giscard d'Estaing sera président on n'ira pas très loin en matière de régions." In the same interview, Guichard himself opts for the 1947 Débré plan of enlarged 'départements'.

Giscard's first Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, who later revived the waning Gaullist movement as the R.P.R. (Rassemblement pour la République), embodies the traditional Gaullist view of regionalization. While still Prime Minister, Chirac declared in a speech to leading members of the regional councils that the 'raison d'être' of the regions was economic planning, not administration. This recalled Débré's argument that "toute division administrative est aussi une conception politique." Accordingly, regionalization in France has been interpreted in official circles primarily as an economic matter (whence regional policy), and only secondarily as an administrative matter (whence administrative deconcentration). Only in the view of such Centrist/Radical politicians as Servan-Schreiber, and in the platform of the Leftist opposition (the Socialists since 1972, the Communists more recently still — despite the existence of the Common Front), has the concept of regionalization taken on a political dimension as well.

Had the Left come to power in the March, 1978 general elections, a Socialist bill before the National Assembly on regionalization in the form of political decentralization
would have become law. According to the text of this bill:

La région est constituée en collectivité territoriale.... Elle est administrée par une Assemblée élue au suffrage universel et à la représentation proportionnelle et par un exécutif élue en son sein.64

The bill would further have suppressed the institution of the prefect in favor of regional 'commissaires de la République'. The aim of François Mitterrand was to make of decentralization the "grande affaire d'un gouvernement de gauche."65 The Communists had submitted a similar bill prior to the elections,66 but by May, 1978 they were favoring a more Giscardien type of regionalization.67

The latter had in fact been announced on February 14, 1978 - the fifteenth anniversary of the creation of the D.A.T.A.R. Giscard declared at that time that "un nouvel élan" would be given to 'l'aménagement du territoire', its two objectives being the economic development of rural France and the decentralization of responsibilities.68 The second objective would be realized first and foremost at the level of the commune,69 but it would also be effected at the level of the 'département'.70 Alluding to the 'méfiance' exhibited by certain sectors of the bureaucracy vis-à-vis any change in the distribution of politico-administrative power, Le Monde commented:

Il n'est un secret pour personne que le frein le plus puissant à la réforme profonde des collectivités locales se rencontre au ministère de l'intérieur et aussi dans une bonne partie du corps préfectoral lui-même.71

But as the Senate reform clause in the 1969 referendum showed, opposition is also to be found at the level of local notables.
A study of mayoral-prefectoral interaction yielded the following conclusion in the French case:

The French mayors...were inclined to view the prefecture as something distinct from the bureaucracy, and the prefects as concerned about the protection of the prerogatives of the communes as with the representation of government policy in the provinces.72

Thus, after four years under the presidency of Giscard, "the regions remain insignificant politically and minor elements administratively."73 The prospects of the regionalist movement seem to have waned during this time, and the recent political fortunes of both the Left and of Servan-Schreiber at the national level may very well reinforce this decline (although Servan-Schreiber lost his seat in the National Assembly to a Socialist!). Public interest in regional decentralization also appears to have fallen off since Giscard's 'volte-face' of November-December, 1975, although public opinion polls as late as September, 1975 indicated that seventy-one per cent of Frenchmen favored directly elected regional assemblies with substantive powers.74

In December, 1977, Servan-Schreiber declared that "ceux qui refusent la région comme ceux qui refusent l'Europe condamnent la France au déclin."75 The refusal to acknowledge that final dimension of regionalization - the linguistic-cultural component - may also condemn France to decline - or worse still - to "falling into pieces", according to the thesis of Jean-Pierre Richardot.76 If in France in the 1970's regionalism per se has waned, so too has subnationalism in its exclusively linguistic-cultural, right wing form.
Rather, the two have merged, especially since 1968, to create the phenomenon that has been labeled 'ethnoregionalism'. The next section addresses itself to this ethnoregional phenomenon, and to the official responses made to it to date.

C. Ethnoregionalism and National Responses since 1945

Il y a autant d'intervalle entre un Auvergnat et un Basque, un Limousin et un Breton, qu'entre un Espagnol et un Slave, un Ostrogoth et un Gallois... La France n'est pas 'une' dans sa terre et dans sa race. Ce pays, hautement majeur, est fait de minorités. ??

Jean Giraudoux's observation of 1939 was made at a time of rising autonomist sentiment in France, which would shortly thereafter lead to the collaboration of certain autonomist leaders with the Nazis (see pp. 112-113). But hardly were the postwar anti-autonomist reprisals over when sub-nationalism resurfaced - first as a cultural movement, later as an explicitly political one.

Although the proliferation of ethnoregional organizations is not necessarily an indicator of the strength, much less the unity, of an ethnoregional movement, the extent of such activity in postwar France bears notice. Brittany was the most active of the ethnic regions in this regard, ?? where ten new ethnoregional organizations were created between 1945 and 1950. The Institut d'Etudes Occitanes (I.E.O.), founded in Occitania immediately after the war, was the first significant Occitan organization to appear since the Félibrige. In the French Basque country and French Catalonia, the influx
of Basque and Catalan refugees from Spain in the wake of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) would accelerate the influence of these Spanish movements on their French counterparts. In Alsace, where the teaching of German in the schools had been suppressed after 1945, annual parent-sponsored referendums that generated eighty to one hundred percent support among the population finally forced its reinstatement in 1952, albeit on a purely de jure basis. Other than this linguistic concern, Alsace was relatively quiescent; its inclusion in German territory between 1870 and 1918 and again during World War II undoubtedly influenced this situation. There was no revival of the interwar autonomist movements in Alsace, French Flanders or Corsica; in the latter, as in Alsace, only linguistic-cultural concerns seemed to have survived the war, but unlike Alsace, these were the preserve of an intellectual elite in Corsica.

Under the Fourth Republic as under the Third, petitions in favor of the teaching of the ethnoregional languages were common, and these often took the form of legislative proposals in the Parliament. In 1947, a Communist deputy from Finistère (Brittany) proposed the teaching of Breton in the schools of three Breton départements. An alternative (and more limited) proposal was made by a Socialist (S.F.I.O.) deputy from Tarn (Occitania) which later bore his name in the form of the Deixonne Law of 1951. For the first time since the decrees of 1881-1884, certain 'patois' would no longer be absolutely banned from the schools. This law
provided for the teaching of 'regional' languages - at the secondary level, for one hour per week, as an 'activité dirigée' (a type of extracurricular activity), and on a completely voluntary basis - for teachers and students alike. "Regional" languages were defined as the local languages spoken in Brittany, Occitania, French Catalonia and the French Basque country; expressly excluded from the provisions of the new law were the so-called "allogenous" languages - including the Corsican, Alsatian and Flemish dialects - defined as varieties of foreign languages. Despite its minor provisions, incomplete application, subjection to subsequent bureaucratic limitations - and the fact that French remained the only authorized language for broadcasting, official texts and public activities - the Deixonne Law was a major victory for the partisans of the ethnoregional languages.

Further efforts to extend and amplify the Deixonne Law during the Fourth Republic proved futile. Under the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, Parliament was deemed incompetent to legislate in such matters, but this has not prevented the introduction of more than twenty proposals in the National Assembly and Senate since 1958 in favor of more substantive provisions for the use of the ethnoregional languages in public life. Discussion has not been permitted on any of them "en raison de l'opposition constante du gouvernement à la mise à l'ordre du jour des travaux parlementaires de tout texte de ce genre."

Meanwhile, the proliferation of ethnoregional organi-
zations which was to accelerate greatly after 1968 had in fact already begun, again most noticeably in Brittany. Of the eighteen new organizations founded there between 1945 and 1967, the most important were the Comité d'Études et de Liaison des Intérêts Bretons (C.E.L.I.B.), founded in 1950, and destined to become the most prominent of the 'Comités d'expansion régionale' (see pages 119-120); the Mouvement pour l'Organisation de la Bretagne (M.O.B., 1957) and the Union Démocratique Bretonne (U.D.B., 1964). Indeed, four of the above-cited legislative proposals on ethnoregional languages were presented by the parliamentary group of the C.E.L.I.B. In Occitania, following the 1945 creation of the I.E.O., at least seven other new Occitan organizations were founded before 1968. La Voix d'Alsace-Lorraine appeared in 1953, the French Basque I.K.A.S. and Enbata in 1959, and two French Catalan organizations between 1960 and 1967. In Corsica, at least seven ethnoregional organizations with specifically political orientations emerged during the 1958-1968 period.

The ushering in of the Fifth Republic in 1958 marked the first turning point in the history of subnationalism in France. The Algerian conflict, which brought about the transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Republics, influenced a major ideological change in these movements, broadening their scope beyond exclusively linguistic-cultural concerns. In general, Third World liberation movements had a profound effect upon ethnic conflict in the 'First World', facilitating the adoption of Marxist analysis and rhetoric to denote what
came to be called ‘internal colonialism’. Beyond the resulting ideological shift from Right to Left in the platforms of various subnationalist movements in France and elsewhere in the First World, and the consequent new concern with socio-economic as well as linguistic-cultural matters, the Algerian conflict had two additional influences in France: 90

-it raised the question of who was French and who was not (in relation to the ‘pieds-noirs’); and

-it demonstrated that France was not really ‘une et indivisible’ after all.

This new kind of politicization of ethnicity in the First World is a postwar phenomenon, and its acceleration in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s coincides with the period of the most intensive decolonization in the Third World. In France, the first decidedly left wing ethnoregional organizations appeared after 1958. But the initial move leftward among a handful of leaders of subnational movements did not become significant until after the ‘événements’ of May–June 1968. Not only did the latter demonstrate that a small and dedicated group of revolutionaries could shake the Fifth Republic to its foundations, but furthermore, in its aftermath, it caused a certain disillusionment with the traditional parties of the Left, inducing protest against the status quo to be channeled through different outlets. 91

Between 1958 and 1968 subnationalism, unlike decolonization or European integration, was not perceived by the régime as a major threat to the national sovereignty of France.
Hence, the internal concerns of the first president of the Fifth Republic were with regionalization (see pages 122-123) rather than with subnationalism. But during this period, at least three legislative proposals favoring the amplification and extension of the Deixonne Law were placed before the National Assembly by Gaullist deputies.92

During Paris street battles of the by-now legendary 'May days' of 1968, the flags of Brittany, Corsica and Occitania were prominently displayed.93 In the vote on de Gaulle's 1969 referendum, more than half of the twenty-four 'départements' that voted affirmatively were départements populated predominantly by ethnic minorities.94 But the latter occurrence is not necessarily indicative solely of ethnonationalist support for regionalization. It can indeed be interpreted as equally indicative of support for de Gaulle, for all of the ethnic regions - with the exception of most of Occitania - have traditionally voted for the Right. This fact heralds back to the Jacobin-Left alliance formed in the wake of the Revolution and sealed by the radical Third Republic's 'Ecole coloniale' (1881-1884) and law of separation of church and state. But the decade since the 'May days' has witnessed a subtle shift in this solid ethnonational bloc of right wing voting - most notably in Brittany, Alsace and the French Basque country. Equally significant is the fact that ethnonationalist activism has increased markedly in the same period.

This is reflected first in the proliferation of ethnonational organizations in France since 1968. William Beer
has compiled the following figures.\textsuperscript{95}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Region</th>
<th>Number of Organizations Founded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1945-1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alsace</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque country (French)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brittany</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia (French)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corsica (not reported)</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanders (French)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occitania</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unfortunately, Beer was unable to provide any figures on Corsica. But his data clearly show that Brittany has been the most activist region since 1945, that Occitania and Alsace have become much more activist since 1968, and that the Flemish, Basque and Catalan movements, once concentrated in the countries (Belgium and Spain) inhabited by the majority of these populations, have since 1968 sprung up in France as well.

Héraud has also compiled a list of ethnoregional organizations in his two editions of \textit{L'Europe des Ethnies}.\textsuperscript{96} Although Héraud's figures do not begin with 1945, but rather list all currently active ethnoregional organizations regardless of when they were founded, it is still possible to roughly assess the significance of the 'May days' by comparing his 1963 and 1974 lists:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Region</th>
<th>Number of Organizations Existing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alsace-Lorraine</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque country*</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brittany</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia*</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corsica</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanders (French)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occitania</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*includes both French and Spanish organizations
Héraud's data do not distinguish the Basque and Catalan movements in France from those in Spain for two reasons:
1. Prior to the death of Franco in late 1975, these organizations were outlawed in Spain, and therefore, most of them were based instead in the French Basque country and in French Catalonia; and
2. Many of these organizations, in particular the Basque ones, were set up to serve the entire ethnic region in question, political boundaries notwithstanding.

It can be seen from these figures that there is an across-the-board increase in the number of ethnoregional organizations in France between 1963 and 1974, and that such activity in Corsica is indeed part of the general trend.

The heightened visibility of ethnoregionalism in France since 1968 is also reflected in the increase in both political activities and in some cases terrorist operations in the ethnic regions. These necessitate a more in-depth examination, which will form the focus of the next chapter. Since this chapter is concerned more with government responses to several phenomena perceived as a threat to French national sovereignty, the remainder of this section will deal primarily with the accommodation of ethnoregional demands made during the Fifth Republic since 1969.

Echoing his predecessor's notions of the 'grandeur' of France, Georges Pompidou declared in June, 1972: "Il n'y a pas de place pour les langues et cultures régionales dans une France destinée à marquer l'Europe de son sceau." 97 Never-
theless, a concession was made to the trilingual Alsatians during the 1971-1972 period. Known as the 'méthode Holde-
rithe', it was an administrative initiative permitting the teaching of German on the order of two and one-half hours weekly to children over the age of nine. Although one au-
thor claims that this teaching is done through the medium of the Alsatian dialect, Petrella makes no mention of the lat-
ter whatsoever in his exhaustive report to the European Com-
mission. Subsequently, in January, 1974 (and undoubtedly as an attempt to check the budding ethnoregionalist militan-
cy in Corsica), the first modification of the Deixonne Law was made by ministerial decree. The status of the Corsican dialect was changed from an "allogeneous" to a "regional" lan-
guage (see page 132), thus allowing it to benefit from the minimal provisions of the Deixonne Law.

During the régime of Pompidou, another type of accom-
modation of ethnoregionalist activity was initiated by the central government: the dissolution of certain organizations whose aims or activities were deemed to threaten the terri-
torial integrity of France. Thus, to counter the increasing-
ly frequent practice of Spanish Basque E.T.A. terrorists of escaping across the border into the French Basque country, and of launching their subsequent operations from there, the government in October, 1972 banned the E.T.A. from French ter-
titory, but denied that any agreement had been made with the Spanish government for the return to Spain of any suspected E.T.A. militants apprehended in France. In January, 1974
three more ethnoregional organizations were dissolved: the French Basque Enbata, the Front de Libération de la Bretagne (F.L.B.) and the Front Paysan Corse de Libération (F.P.C.L.).\textsuperscript{102} Of these, only the latter two had acknowledged the perpetration of terrorist activities in France; Enbata instead was suspected of harboring Spanish Basque E.T.A. terrorists, and its dissolution followed by one month the assassination of the Spanish Prime Minister by members of the E.T.A.

In the 1974 presidential election, there appeared for the first time a candidate of the 'national minorities' - Guy Héraud - who garnered 1.7\% of the vote in the first round; Robert Lafont had also sought a place on the ballot to run in the same capacity, but he was disqualified, allegedly for a lack of signatures in a sufficient number of départements.\textsuperscript{103} Valéry Giscard d'Estaing ascended to the presidency at the head of a new coalition of Gaullists, Centrists and Independent Republicans, which, despite its less Gaullist character, would not differ significantly from the previous régime in its policies vis-à-vis ethnoregional activism.

The first concern of the new administration in this regard was the continuing crisis in Corsica. In 1974 the island (which constituted a 'département' in itself), was divided into two départements, ostensibly to increase its representation in the National Assembly from three to four deputies.\textsuperscript{104} The proposal was passed by the National Assembly, although the Socialists and other left wing parties opposed
it. In fact, the administrative reorganization had originally been proposed in 1973 under Pompidou, who had also made Corsica the twenty-second 'région de programme' as well as one of ten new macro-economic development zones in 1970. But the Corsican crisis continued. The occupation of a wine depot near Alèria in August, 1975 by some fifty armed militants of the Action pour la Renaissance de la Corse (A.R.C.) led to the death of two policemen among the 1,000-man force mobilized to retake the depot. The latter succeeded in arresting the leader of the A.R.C. militants, and shortly thereafter, the A.R.C. was added to the list of dissolved ethnoregional organizations in France. Prior to its dissolution, the A.R.C.

...s’était même tournée vers l’O.N.U. et l’avait informée de ses revendications. C’est bien la seule région française dont un mouvement contestataire ait saisi des instances mondiales.

The action of the A.R.C. in this regard recalls the 1919 petition of Breton nationalists to the Versailles peace conference and Woodrow Wilson (see page 111).

Meanwhile, the Défense et Promotion des Langues de France (D.P.L.F.), founded in 1969, was continuing the pressure group tactics in the French Parliament that had been initiated by the Conseil National de Défense des Langues et Cultures Régionales in 1962. Under its influence, proposals continued to be submitted in favor of the amplification and extension of the Deixonne Law. Between 1959 and 1975, the largest number of these—seven—were sponsored by the So-
cialists, the final one being a joint Socialist-Left Radical bill. It was not until 1975 that a Communist deputy would again sponsor such a legislative proposal - the first since 1947; like its predecessor, it concerned only the Breton language.

The Socialist and Communist party leaders were now beginning to speak out on the ethno-regional issue. In 1974, François Mitterrand declared:

La France, il faut l'aimer, il faut défendre la communauté nationale. Mais un Français intelligent et du cœur sensible, doit toujours reconnaître l'identité culturelle d'une minorité ethnique et son droit à la différence. Et quand on reconnaît un droit, il faut reconnaître aussi les moyens de l'exercer.

For his part, Georges Marchais, although one of the most hostile critics of any autonomist ventures threatening to French unity as late as the Corsican crisis of 1975, nevertheless proclaimed at a 1976 Communist rally in Montpellier: "Volem viure al pais!", perhaps the most popular slogan of the Occitan movement.

Following the violence in Corsica in August, 1975, the French government instituted a reevaluation of its overall regional policy vis-à-vis its ethno-regional minorities, and inaugurated a massive new emphasis on economic development in the south and west, the zone wherein the more militant ethno-regional minorities are to be found. This policy was intensified with the launching of a ten-year economic development plan for the southwest in 1978. In addition, two studies were undertaken by the Ministry of Education: one on
regional languages and cultures, the other on ethnolinguistic minorities - in which a councilor of the European Commission was invited to participate.\textsuperscript{116} The latter invitation was most interesting, given the fact that in June, 1975, two French ethnoregional organizations - Strollad Ar Vro and Elsass-Lothringen - were among the four founding members of the Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations in Brussels.\textsuperscript{117}

But the Ministry of Education, for one, was not prepared to make any new concessions right away. In 1975, a new education law - 'la réforme Haby' - was submitted to the French Parliament by the then Minister of Education, to which

\textit{...un article a été en quelque sorte imposé par le Parlement au ministre de l'Education. Cet article, fait obligation à l'Etat d'organiser un enseignement, de caractère facultatif certes, mais qui doit être rendu partout possible, des langues et cultures régionales, et cela 'toujours long de la scolarité'. Or, cette prescription n'a reçu aucune application dans les différents décrets publiés...en vue de mettre en vigueur les dispositions de la nouvelle loi...}\textsuperscript{118}

The D.F.L.F. has reacted against this latest governmental inaction by appealing to the 'Conseil d'Etat' against the decrees in question, "en faisant ressortir le non-respect par le Ministre de l'Education d'une obligation légale."\textsuperscript{119}

Under the régime of Giscard to date, four initiatives have been undertaken in favor of ethnoregional languages:

1. In 1976, provisions were made for the first time for the training of teachers of these languages. But they are limited, insofar as:

a) Of the sixteen academies involved in such teaching, only
four or five have yet to have appointed the required 'conseiller pédagogique';\textsuperscript{120}

b) No training of such elementary teachers is provided in the normal schools;\textsuperscript{121}

c) No university degree programs with a concentration in any ethnoregional language are yet offered, although in certain cases where one takes a degree in a modern foreign language, one can do a minor concentration in an ethnoregional language;\textsuperscript{122}

d) The only practice teaching ('stages pédagogiques') available to such teachers, instituted in 1976, are annual workshops of two to three days for secondary teachers and five days for primary teachers.\textsuperscript{123}

2. Also in 1976, additional institutes and chairs of 'regional' languages (i.e. excluding Alsatian and Flemish - see page 132) and cultures were created in several universities.\textsuperscript{124} For the first time, it became possible to do a minor concentration in an ethnoregional language, subject to certain restrictions (see 1.c above).

3. Increased radio time was permitted to all ethnoregional languages in 1976, with Breton and Basque benefitting the most.\textsuperscript{125} The latter two also became the first ethnoregional languages allowed to be broadcast over television (fifteen to twenty minutes every two weeks); although three other ethnoregional languages were to have been accorded the same rights since 1969.\textsuperscript{126} A record 144 hours of Breton language radio programs and eleven and one-half hours
of télévision were logged in 1976. 127

4. On a two-day tour of Brittany in February, 1977, Giscard announced that in view of the wish expressed by the Breton regional council, the government was prepared to draw up a new Breton 'cultural charter', to be implemented a year hence. Stressing that Breton culture and traditions were not mere folklore, but rather a way of life, Giscard proclaimed:

L'unité française n'a aucun besoin d'étouffer ou de niveler la diversité culturelle de notre nation....l'unité française n'a aucune raison d'être l'uniformité française!....il n'y a aucune contradiction entre la volonté de vivre la culture bretonne, et la conscience d'être pleinement français. 128

Generally speaking, for a period of five years, the Charter authorizes and finances the teaching of Breton language and culture from middle school level onwards, increases the radio-televisio1 broadcasting time allotted to the Breton language, and provides for the institutionalization and financing of various Breton cultural activities. Cynics accused Giscard of electoral opportunism: the municipal elections were one month hence, and the general elections would follow the implementation of the Charter by one month as well. In the final vote on the Charter in February, 1978, all Socialist, Communist and U.D.E. (Breton Left) members of the Breton regional council voted against the measure. 129 Whether as a foreshadowing of Giscard's new decentralization policies vis-à-vis communes and 'départements' - to the detriment of the regions (see pages 126, 128) - or as an attempt to recon-
stitute the historical region of Brittany, the département of Loire-Atlantique was included in the project.\textsuperscript{130}

The Fifth Republic has been concerned with another side of the French versus other languages controversy: the intrusion of English into every aspect of French life. The 1975 Bas-Lauriol Act, implemented in the so-called 'circulaire Barre' of 1977, mandates the exclusive use of the French language in all forms of public life, commerce and the mass media, under penalty of fines and other sanctions. But although assurances were given in the National Assembly prior to the adoption of the law that the ethnoregional languages would not fall under its sway, not only is no mention of this made in the text of the 'circulaire Barre', but in fact various administrative sanctions have already been threatened against certain establishments for the use of these languages in the areas prohibited by the law.\textsuperscript{131} The D.P.L.F. has launched another appeal in the 'Conseil d'État' against the 'circulaire Barre', which is also the basis of its appeal before the U.N.'s Commission on Human Rights.\textsuperscript{132} (The latest effort of the D.P.L.F. has been an appeal to the European Security Conference in Belgrade to review the French government's non-compliance with the 1975 Final Act of Helsinki.)\textsuperscript{133}

Whereas the granting of substantive ethnoregional language rights during the Fourth and Fifth Republics may seem minimal when compared with those accorded in other Western democracies, they nevertheless constitute a significant im-
movement over the repressive language policies of the Third Republic. The concessions made by the government of the Fifth Republic may, however, be viewed as a means of defusing the new socio-economic and political demands put forth by many ethnic activist organizations within their respective regions. Pre-1945 subnationalism and its preoccupation with linguistic-cultural concerns metamorphosed into the ethnoregionalism of the 1960's and 1970's, which has wedded the linguistic-cultural issue with more interest-oriented concerns. To defuse the former issue, then, is not necessarily to dispense with the latter as well; in the absence of any significant politico-administrative or socio-economic concessions by the government, the future of ethnoregionalism in France is a very open-ended question indeed.

Meanwhile, it is interesting to note the multiplication of private efforts in the ethnic regions to foster the survival of the ethnoregional languages and cultures, as well as the popular response to their efforts. The Spanish Basques pioneered the movement for the private teaching of these languages with the founding of the first schools known as 'ikastolak' in the late 1950's. The first 'ikastolak' in the French Basque country were not founded until 1969, but by the 1977-1978 academic year, their number had grown to a total of twenty-seven. The idea began to catch on in 1977 in Brittany, where two such schools were opened, and in Corsica, where one was set up. In September, 1979, a 'kindergarten' which will operate exclusively in the Alsatian dialect is
scheduled to open in Strasbourg. All of these schools are geared to the pre-school and elementary levels, where the provisions of the Deixonne Law are sorely lacking (or inapplicable, in the case of Alsatian and Flemish).

Needless to say, other private organizations offer courses to older children as well as adults, and privately-run 'summer universities' are now in operation to train teachers of ethnoregional languages. One of these is the Escola occitana d'estiu, which had 250 students in its 1976 session, and 450 in 1977, and whose 1978 session is worthy of note for another reason: It was formally inaugurated and terminated by the mayor of Nîmes, a representative of the president of the general council of Gard, and the president of the regional council of Languedoc - all of whom, for the first time in an official ceremony, spoke exclusively in Occitan. Since this Occitan 'université d'été' is to be permanently installed at Nîmes from 1979 onwards "grâce à l'appui financier des collectivités locales..." it is possible that it (and other 'summer universities' as well) may eventually take on a certain public character.

Another post-1968 phenomenon that bears notice is the proliferation of folk singers in the ethnoregional languages. Tens of thousands flock to concerts by Alan Stivell, Gilles Servat and Glenn Mor in Brittany, while names such as Marti in Occitania and Raimon in Catalonia have become household words. Their songs are revivalist but also revolutionary: "c'est autant ce qu'ils disent que la langue
dans laquelle ils le disent.\textsuperscript{143} This phenomenon has unquestionably served as a force of popular mobilization in the ethnic regions.

A Leftist victory in March, 1978 would have resulted in two more Socialist bills becoming law\textsuperscript{144} (see pages 127-128 for the first one). The second of these concerned a broadened program for the teaching of ethnoregional languages and cultures, as well as the greater use of these languages in broadcasting, cultural activities, etc. The third provided a special statute for Corsica, and laid down a procedure by which the other ethnic regions could obtain one.

The issue of political mobilization in the ethnic regions is a most interesting question in France, where ethnoregional political parties have had very little success, in contrast to many of their counterparts in Western Europe and North America. This anomaly will be analyzed in the next chapter. It is evident that such a situation is all the more curious given the overriding concern of the ethnic regionalists, most of whom are French (e.g. Hérard, Marc, Fouqué), with the concept of a Europe of Regions and its hoped-for realization through a directly elected European Parliament.

As France's governing elite (and some of its potential governing elite) has recoiled at the prospect of instituting directly elected regional assemblies and executives, so too has it balked at the notion of recognizing the collec-
tive rights of its ethnoregional minorities. A unitary, centralized governmental structure and official unilingualism have been deemed essential to the survival of the French nation, as has the zealous safeguarding of French national sovereignty within, and vis-à-vis, Europe. This final alleged challenge to the survival of France as a nation-state is examined in the next section.

D. The French Approach to Europe and the Direct Elections

L'intégration européenne s'est bâtie sur des mensonges .....L'Assemblée européenne est un piège......Ce n'est pas contre l'Europe que nous nous battons, mais contre une conspiration qui, sous le nom fallacieux d'Europe, réduit la France à la situation d'une nation dominée, aux dépens de son âme, de son indépendance, aux dépens aussi de son unité.145

So spoke the Gaullist Michel Debré before a meeting of his Comité pour l'indépendance et l'unité de la France in November, 1977. The first Prime Minister of the Fifth Republic had founded the committee earlier in the year for the express purpose of combatting all forms of European integration, and in particular the direct elections to the European Parliament. The traditional Gaullist hostility to Europe is still alive and well in France, but it has, since 1974, been modified by other political currents.

This powerful Gaullist heritage aside, many Frenchmen have been associated with the boldest initiatives taken towards European integration: Aristide Briand's appeal for a United States of Europe before the League of Nations in 1929,
Robert Schuman's proposal for a European Coal and Steel Community in 1950, René Pleven's plan for a European Defense Community in 1951, and of course the founding genius of Jean Monnet, whose functional, pragmatic approach to European integration was the brainchild behind the creation of both the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community. Furthermore, in the early postwar years, official French government policy was certainly far more European-oriented than Great Britain's, and in spite of the French Parliament's failure to ratify the E.D.C. Treaty in 1954, it was not until the dawning of the Fifth Republic that France became the most persistently recalcitrant member of Europe.

Is it entirely fair to blame General Charles de Gaulle for this 'volte-face' on the part of France? According to the author of the European Parliament's first draft convention on direct elections, "...de Gaulle avait pris une position en flèche, et d'autres se sont abrités derrière ce paravent, trouvant que c'était pour eux très commode." It must be acknowledged that one of the motivating forces behind the European Movement was the settling of the question of Germany's political status, rearmament and participation in the Western alliance. By 1958, the German question, although still important, was not as urgent as it had been in the previous decade. Nevertheless, de Gaulle's influence on the hardening of the official French attitude towards Europe is unmistakable.

During the early 1950's, de Gaulle vigorously opposed the E.D.C., and campaigned instead in favor of a Euro-
pean referendum on the creation of a European confederation and for a Franco-German agreement as the basis of the latter. As early as 1950, he attacked both the Council of Europe and the proposed E.C.S.C. in a 1951 press conference he deplored in particular the supranational element in the latter, to which he preferred a confederal power. In the same press conference he declared: "Great Britain, by reason of her insular situation, of her Commonwealth, of her traditions, is quite disinclined to incorporate herself in our Continent." Earlier in the year he had warned that "the Atlantic alliance, as it is applied, suppresses our independence without really protecting us." Once installed as President of the Republic, de Gaulle would of course translate these attitudes respectively into his campaigns for an 'Europe des Patries' (i.e. 'Europe des États'), and against both British entry into the Common Market and American influence in Europe.

At the onset of the Fifth Republic, the E.E.C. had been in operation for six months. In 1960, de Gaulle put forth a program for a confederal-type of political organization in Europe known as the Pouchet Plan. The latter was under consideration by the other 'Five' when Great Britain submitted its first application for membership in the E.E.C., which France subsequently vetoed in January, 1963. The second British application was vetoed by France in December, 1967; in this second case, negotiations on British accession to the Common Market were not even allowed to proceed. In
the period between these two vetoes, de Gaulle made two
other major 'anti-European' initiatives: the French boycott
of all Community institutions between June, 1965 and January,
1966, and the termination of French participation in all ac-
tivities relative to the integration of its military forces

The 1965 crisis involved three issues which, had they
been accepted, would have lent a more political character to
the E.E.C.: majority voting in the Council of Ministers, di-
rect elections to the European Parliament (both, in fact,
provided for in the Treaty of Rome); and some European Parlia-
mentary control over the Community budget (the latter, accord-
ing to the Treaty of Rome, was to be gradually financed by
the Community's own resources, as opposed to the exclusive
reliance on the individual contributions of its member states).
The vehement French opposition to these issues resulted in the
Luxembourg compromise of 1966, which marked the beginning of
a period of political stagnation in the Community: "the inten-
sity of General de Gaulle's hostility to the question of prin-
ciple of national sovereignty had a durable effect on the at-
titudes or at least the expectations of the Five."\textsuperscript{152}

One of the principal themes of Georges Pompidou's
1969 campaign was that "Il faut faire l'Europe,"\textsuperscript{153} and short-
ly after his election, Pompidou declared that he would pro-
pose to the heads of state and government of the 'Five' that
they meet to decide "comment on peut relancer tout cela."\textsuperscript{154}

A year later, negotiations opened relative to the accession
of Great Britain and three other European states to membership in the Common Market, and on January 1, 1973 Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark formally entered the E.E.C. Such a radical departure from the European policy of de Gaulle, under whom he had served as Prime Minister from 1962 to 1968, certainly marked Pompidou as more of a 'Europeanist' than his predecessor; and yet, the issue of British membership aside, Pompidou's European policy did not differ significantly from that of de Gaulle. "Oui à l'Europe, mais d'abord oui à la France semble avoir été la préoccupation essentielle du second Président de la Ve République."155

Of the three issues that had provoked the 1965 crisis, all remained in abeyance except for the matter of 'ressources propres' and the related question of parliamentary control of the Community budget, which were agreed to only in principle by the 'Six' in April, 1970. No further action was taken on this issue under the presidency of Pompidou. The status of France within N.A.T.O. also remained unchanged, reflecting Pompidou's Gaullist attitude that "...l'Europe ne sera l'Europe que si elle se distingue...de l'Amérique."156 Pompidou further revived one main feature of the Fouchet Plan - the periodic European summit of the heads of state and government/foreign ministers - and in an unmistakably Gaullist style proposed in March, 1972 that there be at their disposal a European political secretariat, with headquarters in Paris. Campaigning in April, 1972 for his referendum on E.E.C. enlargement, Pompidou declared:
Nous voulons que la France entre dans l'Europe en tant que nation, et nation forte et prospère, capable d'y défendre ses intérêts et d'y mettre sa marque....La construction européenne n'est pas pour la France le début de la démission: elle affirme, au contraire, notre ambition nationale.157

Although France had by no means become conciliatory towards Europe during the presidency of Pompidou, it was no longer by 1974 the most reluctant member of the Community. With the defeat of the Conservatives in that year, Great Britain under a new Labour government reassumed its traditional suspicion of Europe and began efforts at renegotiation of the terms of British entry into the Common Market. From then until the referendum of June, 1975, the future of the Community was once more in doubt, although the new French president, during the same period, launched a new policy vis-à-vis Europe.

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing had been a member of Jean Monnet's Action Committee for the United States of Europe. Upon his election to the presidency of the French Republic in May, 1974, Monnet declared:

General de Gaulle had a policy which in his view was European; it certainly was not in mine. Pompidou took a series of measures towards building Europe, but Giscard has the conviction that Europe must be achieved and, consequently, it is not only a point of view, it is the heart that speaks.158

Giscard had criticized de Gaulle's European policy as early as 1966:

Si on ne peut envisager une Europe supranationale qui serait antinationale, on ne peut pas non plus se contenter d'une Europe des alliances, d'une Europe des États qui résisterait difficilement aux grandes secousses qui déterminent l'orientation de l'histoire.159
Speaking for the Independent Republican party at the time of the second French veto on British membership in the E.E.C., Giscard deplored de Gaulle’s anti-British and anti-European stance. Earlier in 1967, Giscard had acknowledged "...la nécessité en matière économique, d’une autorité de nature fédérale dans l’Europe économique de demain..." and in a 1972 published work, he described at length his scenario for the political development of Europe, stipulating that once certain conditions had been met,

...il sera possible d’envisager de faire adopter par l'ensemble des États membres une constitution fédérale instituant un pouvoir exécutif fédéral responsable devant le Parlement européen.

For Giscard during his presidential campaign, Europe constituted "...la priorité essentielle." But a careful reading of his campaign statements nevertheless shows a certain Gaullist affinity on his part, viz.: "Pour moi, ce qui est très important, c'est d'abord le maintien de l'indépendance et de la grandeur de la France..." Furthermore, it indicates that Giscard, like his two predecessors, is skeptical of a supranational Europe, viz.: "Mon sentiment personnel est qu'il s'agit maintenant de dépasser le domaine économique, et de s'acheminer vers une Confédération des États européens."

The Paris summit of December, 1974 began the Giscard-dien 'relance' of Europe, as the Hague summit of December, 1969 had begun Pompidou's. It is significant that the 'relances' were effected outside of Community institutions, un-
der a format originally proposed by de Gaulle:

But in fact the key to the paradox lies in the modification of French attitudes and in the stagnation of the Community. Intergovernmental meetings which were (rightly) suspected in 1960-62 of being directed against the Community, became acceptable in 1969 because they were seen as a way of giving the Community new impetus. That the summits have since 1975 become an official thrice yearly event is a testament to a tacit acceptance of a confederal dimension to the Community. But has Giscard's championing of these summits been due more to political opportunism than to ideological conviction?

Summit diplomacy is an important weapon in Giscard's domestic political arsenal. He can only hope to secure Gaullist votes for direct elections to the European Parliament by demonstrating the continued vitality of the 'Europe des États', a concept sustained by such Gaullist devices as summits and directorates.

Indeed, Giscard even suggested in February, 1976 that a 'board of directors' might manage the Community. The answer seems to lie somewhere between the two poles: Giscard has in fact espoused the Gaullist concept of a confederal (versus a supranational) Europe, while at the same time being far more of a 'Europeanist' than either de Gaulle or Pompidou.

At the Paris summit of December, 1974, the heads of state and government requested a new European Parliament draft convention on direct elections and action on the same by the Council of Ministers in 1976; they also expressed their desire that the elections take place as early as 1978 if possible. A further declaration affirmed their approval of increased powers for the Parliament as well. Within little more than a year after his election, Giscard had also lifted
the remaining Gaullist objections that had provoked the 1965 crisis. First, he proposed the reexamination of the question of majority voting in the Council of Ministers (in regards to minor issues) in order to improve the efficiency of the Community's decision-making process. Secondly, the July, 1975 Treaty of Luxembourg gave the European Parliament some control over the Community budget.

Concerning the direct elections, it is noteworthy that both in 1972\textsuperscript{169} and in his campaign for the presidency in 1974, Giscard favored an increase in the powers of the European Parliament before the direct elections should proceed. In fact, the Giscardian advocacy of direct elections per se was the condition of Jean Lecanuet's Center party's support of Giscard in the 1974 presidential election.\textsuperscript{171}

Speaking of the championing of direct elections by Giscard's Independent Republican party since 1974, one author observes:

\textit{En vérité, la pensée giscardienne, la préférence des Républicains indépendants vont plutôt à un système de compromis entre l'élection au suffrage universel direct et le mode actuel de désignation à travers les parlements nationaux.}\textsuperscript{172}

This is confirmed by a proposal made by Giscard as far back as 1966:

\textit{Je ne pense pas que nous soyons encore prêts pour une Assemblée européenne élue au suffrage universel qui consacrera le principe des décisions à la majorité. Au stade actuel, je pense que la première institution à établir serait un Sénat européen.}\textsuperscript{173}

\textit{Les sénateurs européens devraient être élus au second degré par les élus locaux, comme les sénateurs français actuels, mais dans le cadre de listes régionales...}\textsuperscript{174}
These statements are revealing in another context - that of regionalization in France itself. As the most important group in the French Senate, it was the Independent Republicans under Giscard who led the fight against de Gaulle's 1969 referendum on regionalization and Senate 'reform' (see pages 123-124).

Nevertheless, from 1974 onwards, Giscard was perceived as the champion of European elections, although his first Prime Minister, the Gaullist Jacques Chirac, did not take even a cautiously affirmative stance on the issue until the end of 1975. The replacement of Chirac in August, 1976 by Raymond Barre, a former vice-president of the E.C. Commission, enhanced Giscard's European reputation. In the first outline of his European policy before the French Parliament in October, 1976, Barre listed as one of his three priorities progress towards a confederal Europe, indicated that the government would submit legislation on direct elections to the French Parliament the following spring, and specified that the government would reject any increased powers for the European Parliament.

The following month, to counter both the constitutional challenge posed to the principle of direct elections by the conservative Gaullist faction headed by Michel Débroé, and the political threat of Chirac's newly reconstituted Gaullist movement, Giscard submitted the Brussels Act of September, 1976 for consideration to the French Constitutional Council. The latter ruled on December 30 that direct
elections did not violate the constitution of the Fifth Republic because the resulting European Parliament would still be made up of representatives of each of the member states, thereby denying a supranational character to it.\footnote{177}

Less than two weeks before this decision, Chirac had declared himself favorable to direct elections, although unfavorable to an extension of the new Parliament’s powers;\footnote{178} but by the end of March, 1977, he was opposing the elections themselves on the grounds of their incompatibility with French national sovereignty.\footnote{179} Meanwhile, the French Communists were also continuing their adamant opposition to direct elections, in spite of the traditional Socialist support of them and the existence of the Left’s electoral pact since 1972. But in April, when François Mitterrand proposed that the question of direct elections be included in the renegotiation of the Common Program, the Communists abruptly changed tack, agreeing to support direct elections on condition that there be a guarantee in the government bill against any increase in the European Parliament’s powers.\footnote{180} Accordingly, Article 2 of the government bill published in May stated that any extension of the Parliament’s powers that was not authorized and ratified according to the provisions set out in the Treaty of Rome, and that had not been subject to constitutional revision in accordance with the decision of the French Constitutional Council, would be null and void in France.

In June, only a week before the ratification debate
was scheduled in the National Assembly, Chirac proposed that ratification of the government bill be postponed until after the French general elections of March, 1978. In fact, the Gaullists were split on the issue of direct elections, with the more moderate factions led by Jacques Chaban-Delmas and Olivier Guichard in favor of them. Since the Gaullists controlled over one-third of the National Assembly, this Chirac tactic led to the government's invoking of Article 49 of the Constitution, under which a bill becomes law without a vote unless a censure motion is proposed within twenty-four hours of the end of the debate. Thus was the direct elections bill 'passed' by the French National Assembly on June 15, 1977. Nine days later it was approved by the Senate, with the Communists abstaining and the Gaullists absent; and on June 30, 1977 it was signed into law by Giscard.

The question of the principle of direct elections finally decided, there remained only the matter of choosing the electoral system to be used in the first direct elections. In fact, the Constitutional Council in its decision of December 30, 1976 had already made the choice for the government and the parliament when it ruled that "...le principe de l'indivisibilité de la République interdit tout mode de scrutin régional." But whereas the Council had sought to suppress the eventual creation of any 'régions transfrontalières' as European electoral constituencies, Debré and his cohorts interpreted the decision within a purely national framework. Since the Gaullists were also the only major party opposed
to proportional representation, the latter method via regional lists was simply not an available option for France in the first direct elections. Debré and his conservative Gaullist faction also rejected simple majority (in two rounds) in eighty-one new single-member Euro-constituencies on the grounds that such a system would threaten the cohesion of the French nation. The conservative Gaullists did not oppose a single national constituency, however, and since Socialists, Communists, Centrists and Independent Republicans all favored proportional representation, the best compromise available to the government was to propose a system of national party lists for the first direct elections. This bill was adopted by the French Parliament on July 7, 1977.

Whereas the question of the principle of direct elections in France rested on the issue of national sovereignty and independence vis-à-vis Europe, that of the method rested on the issue of national unity and integration vis-à-vis the component regions of France. In other words, unlike other contentious European issues in the past (e.g. majority voting, 'ressources propres', even parliamentary budget powers), direct elections to the European Parliament constitute as much a domestic question involving an internal matter as a European question involving the external matter of national-supranational relations. That national sovereignty and national unity are complementary issues is reflected in the fact that the most vociferous opponents and most fervent supporters of direct elections and European integration in general play the
same roles in relation to regional political decentralization in France.

The complementarity of these two issues is a legacy of Jacobinism, shared by Gaullists and Communists alike, and espoused in varying degrees by all three presidents of the Fifth Republic as well. Giscard may be not so adamant a Jacobin as were Pompidou and especially de Gaulle, but his philosophy vis-à-vis Europe and the regions is not entirely free from Jacobin influences. Furthermore, although not himself a Gaullist, Giscard is president of a Gaullist-inspired Fifth Republic, whose constitution enhanced executive power at the expense of Parliament.

Under this constitution, secondary legislation (including European Community acts which flow from treaties) falls within the sphere of executive regulation; moreover, Parliament cannot even set up a European affairs committee without a constitutional amendment. Since France is the only member of the European Community in which there is no executive accountability to Parliament whatsoever in Community affairs, it is not surprising that the executive is unwilling to reveal its negotiating position to parliamentary questions, and does not even make the annual report provided for in the accession treaty.189

Civil servants in the ministerial cabinets of the Fifth Republic, who constitute some ninety per cent of the members of these cabinets, view European Community procedures as intergovernmental, not parliamentary, matters. Their
view is confirmed by a 1973 survey of French parliamentarians, which revealed the widespread notion that foreign policy, including European Community affairs, was the prerogative of the President of the Republic. Thus, political and administrative centralization provides the scenario for the formulation of France's European policy, although from the previous discussion it is apparent that certain political parties — in particular the Gaullists — do exercise considerable influence in this regard.

Public opinion surveys on the European Community reveal that the French people are not nearly as anti-European as some of their political leaders profess to be. The following figures show the evolution of French attitudes on Europe since 1973:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who feel that E.C. membership is a good thing</th>
<th>Sept. 73/May 74/Nov. 74/May 75/Nov. 75/May 76/Nov. 76/May 77/Nov. 77</th>
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<tr>
<td>61</td>
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<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<th>Percentage who are in favor of direct elections</th>
<th>Sept. 73/ May 75/Nov. 75/May 76/Nov. 76/May 77/Nov. 77</th>
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<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>68</td>
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<td>69</td>
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<td>74</td>
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<td>74</td>
<td>70</td>
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It can be seen that since May, 1975, there are consistently higher percentages for the direct elections per se than for membership in the E.C. in general. Beginning in 1976-1977, a new series of questions on the direct elections have been posed by the Euro-Barometre. Here are the results in France as of the end of 1977:

-It is an event with important consequences which is certain to make Europe more politically unified.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Nov. 76</th>
<th>Apr.-May 77</th>
<th>Oct.-Nov. 77</th>
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<tr>
<td>46%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>49%</td>
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</table>
-Euro-M.P.'s should support things that are good for Europe as a whole, even if they are not always good for France at the time.195
-Will certainly go and vote.196

In 1972 Giscard wrote:

Tandis que les pouvoirs de la Communauté et ceux des régions se renforceront, les Etats nationaux seront sans doute appelés à s'effacer quelque peu pour permettre à l'unité de se réaliser de façon plus homogène à la fois par le sommet et par la base.197

This is in fact the position of Servan-Schreiber's Radical party on the dual issues of regional decentralization and direct elections. After 1979, when the European Parliament will have the task of deciding on a uniform electoral procedure (subject to the approval of the national parliaments), the question of the regions will undoubtedly become once more intertwined with that of Europe. This is bound to cause repercussions in other Community member states that have opted for national party lists (or a modification thereof) for the first direct elections, and is also certain to arouse opposition in the U.K. with its tradition of simple majority in single-member constituencies.

But it is France that is likely to offer the most stringent opposition (at the very least in terms of legal obstacles) to a system of proportional representation via regional party lists, especially if (as now seems probable) no significant concessions have been made domestically to either regional or ethnolinguistic grievances. The other side of the
coin is of course that any new official attention to the question of the regions, however reluctant, may provide the impetus for a renewed public interest in regionalism per se, and, in the case of the ethnic regions, can only afford yet a better focus for the increasingly persistent demands of ethnoregional activists.
Footnotes


4Héraud, Peuples..., p. 193.

5Ibid.

6Ibid., p. 194.


8Interview with the Cultural Attaché of the French Embassy, Ottawa, March 8, 1977.

9Van den Berghe, Ethnicity, III, No. 3, 248.


13Alexis de Tocqueville, quoted in Franc, p. 9.


19 Serant, p. 105.

20 Hayes, p. 286.


26 A.-P. Vivien, quoted in Gravier, p. 38.

27 Gravier, p. 47.


30 Lafont, *La Révolution...*, p. 15.

31 Richardot, p. 2.

32 Fougeyrollas, p. 10.

33 Richardot, p. 34.


35 Richardot, pp. 189-221.


38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., p. 17.
40 Richardot, p. 61.
41 Lafont, *La Révolution...*, p. 61.
43 Ibid., p. 17.
44 Ibid., p. 19.
46 Richardot, p. 61.
47 Ibid., pp. 54-55.
48 Ibid., p. 178.
50 Ibid., p. 27.
52 Ibid., p. 315.
56 Gourevitch, A.P.S.A., 1975, p. 36.
59 Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, from a radio-television broadcast of December 4, 1975, quoted in Richardot, p. 220.


63 Michel Débré, La Mort de l'État républicain (1947), quoted in Mayer, p. 157.


68 Le Monde, 16 février 1978, p. 28.


71 Ibid.

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CHAPTER IV

THE ETHNOREGIONAL PHENOMENON IN FRANCE

Introduction

The previous chapter examined the three phenomena of subnationalism, regionalism and European integration in France from the perspective of the French government. In keeping with the main focus of this study, the present chapter will analyze these three phenomena from the perspective of the respective ethnoregional movements themselves.

Of the three broad categories of issues which figure in any discussion of ethnoregionalism - socio-economic, politico-administrative and linguistic-cultural - this chapter will highlight the dual role of linguistic-cultural issues as both a means and an end of such activity. Politico-administrative, and to a lesser extent socio-economic, issues will also figure, insofar as they are essential components of ethnoregionalism.

Section A outlines the reasons for the appalling absence of statistics on ethnoregional minorities in France, and sketches a brief portrait of five of France's ethnic regions and the ethnoregional movements within each. The next two sections are devoted to more in-depth case studies of

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the other two ethnic regions of France - Brittany (Section B) and Corsica (Section C) - and to the highly visible ethnoregional politicization particular to both. All three sections touch upon the prospects for France’s ethnic regions within an enlarged European Community and within a Europe whose Parliament is directly elected.

A. The ‘One and Indivisible’ Republic

L’éclat particulier donné par l’État français à la visite du leader indépendantiste québécois appelle quelques questions de notre part. Comment peut-on défendre les droits des peuples sur le continent américain et les nier et combattre sur le sol de l’État français? Y a-t-il des ‘bons séparatistes’ qui parlent français et des ‘mauvais séparatistes’ qui parlent basque, breton, occitan ou corse?

The population of metropolitan France (including Corsica) today is approximately fifty-three million, of whom perhaps as many as twenty million, or more than thirty-five per cent, belong to ethnoregional minorities. The latter comprise at least seven distinct groups, whose demographic strength in France is roughly as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Ethnic Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12,000,000-15,000,000</td>
<td>Occitania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,400,000-3,500,000</td>
<td>Brittany (the higher figure includes the ‘département’ of Loire-Atlantique, which is not part of the ‘official’ region of Brittany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,500,000-1,850,000</td>
<td>Alsace (the higher figure includes the ‘département’ of Moselle, which is not part of the ‘official’ region of Alsace)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200,000-280,000</td>
<td>French Catalonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90,000-200,000</td>
<td>French Basque country (Euskadi-Nord)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140,000-200,000</td>
<td>Corsica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000-250,000</td>
<td>French Flanders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These are only estimates of the population of the ethnic regions of France; they do not take into consideration the phenomenon of self-identification as a member of an ethnoregional group. The figures are based on a synthesis of several sources because there do not in fact exist any official statistics on ethnoregional groups in France. Various descriptive works endeavor to provide approximate estimates of these populations, as do some of the linguistic-cultural organizations of the respective ethnic regions. But rarely do any two sets of statistics coincide, due largely to the lack of a common definition of what constitutes membership in an ethnoregional group, and undoubtedly to divergences in the statistical methods employed as well.

The French government compiles no statistics on either ethnic/linguistic origin (other than in the case of guest workers, foreign residents and immigrants), or on the use of ethnoregional languages. Furthermore, the territorial units used as the basis of its statistics are the administrative divisions of the country, which were drawn deliberately not to coincide with areas that contained self-identifying ethnic/linguistic groups (see page 106). In the case of the larger ethnoregional groups, administrative boundaries have effectively divided them, whereas the smaller ones have been merged into larger administrative units.

The other major problem in reporting accurate statistics on France's ethnoregional minorities is the phenomenon of migration, which has a dual aspect in France. Out-migra-
tion is motivated primarily by economic factors (which, according to the 'internal colonialism' thesis, are directly related to the bureaucratic and political centralization of the country). Out-migration has generally taken the form of rural depopulation, and as such has affected five of France's seven ethnic regions: Brittany, Corsica, Occitania, French Catalonia and the French Basque country. But it has also manifested itself in industrialized French Flanders, where the declining coal sector has caused rising unemployment (necessitating industrial reconversion), as well as in industrialized and prosperous Alsace. Alsatian out-migration is of the type associated with a frontier region, in which the country of residence often differs from the country of work. In this case, the daily flow is from France to Germany and Switzerland, where thousands of Alsatians have been able to find more lucrative employment than that available to them in their native region.

In-migration, on the other hand, is a phenomenon that affects all areas of France, and not just those (most notably the Paris region) to which emigrants from the less prosperous regions tend to gravitate. It is, in fact, more a product of the centralization of the state than of economics, and is reflected in the practice of government appointment of all public employees throughout France, from prefects and sub-prefects to public school teachers and university professors. Generally, these 'civil servants' find themselves living and working in areas other than their native region. This ensures
a certain 'official' migration to all regions of France, regardless of how little natural migration occurs. In addition, Corsica presents a special problem regarding in-migration and ethnoregional population statistics, due to the influx of 'pieds-noirs' from Algeria to the island in 1962.

Concerning the situation of ethnoregional languages and cultures in France, there does exist one official study - on the member countries of the European Community - but even it acknowledges the difficulties inherent in its task in the absence of official national statistics. As regards France (and certain other members of the E.C.), the study deplores the fact that it cannot provide reliable figures on the number of speakers of the respective ethnoregional languages, much less on patterns of ethnoregional language usage (including active versus passive knowledge of these languages). Listed below, in the case of France, is the range of possible numbers of speakers of its ethnoregional languages, as found in the sources on which this study was based:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnoregional Language</th>
<th>Number of Speakers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occitan</td>
<td>950,000-12,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breton</td>
<td>500,000-1,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alsatian</td>
<td>1,500,000-1,550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalan</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque</td>
<td>85,000-130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corsican</td>
<td>173,000-175,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flemish</td>
<td>100,000-200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is obvious that no accurate accounting of either the demographic or the linguistic situation of France's ethnoregional minorities can be given in view of the paucity of reliable
statistics currently available.

In geographical terms, a look at the French 'hexagon' illustrates the peripheral status of France's ethnic regions vis-à-vis the Paris region. The largest of these is Occitania, which constitutes almost the entire southern third of France. Also in southern France, on the Spanish border and contiguous with their Spanish counterparts, are found French Catalonia and the French Basque country. The former constitutes the southernmost part of the hexagon, at the eastern frontier of the Pyrenees, while the latter, situated at the western frontier of the Pyrenees, forms its southwestern point. To the south of France lies a fourth ethnic region - the island of Corsica. The remaining three ethnic regions in France are all situated in the north, each constituting a northern point of the hexagon: Brittany in the northwest, Alsace in the northeast, and French Flanders at the north central point (the latter contiguous with its Belgian counterpart).

Occitania is a widely dispersed region, comprising the old provinces of Gascogne, Guyenne, Languedoc, Auvergne, Limousin, Dauphiné and Provence, historically distinguishable from northern France by their use of the various dialects of the 'langue d'oc', as opposed to the 'langue d'oil' (the latter originally the dialect of Île-de-France, and today the French language). This is the area popularly known as the 'Midi', where the dialects of the 'langue d'oc' (or Occitan) still survive, both as separate dialects from French and in
Map 5.—The territorial distribution of ethnoregional languages in France, showing the linguistic subdivisions of Occitania and the areas of concentration of the various Breton and Alsatian dialects. (Not shown are the two linguistic subdivisions of Corsica.) Source: "Le Réveil des Langues régionales," Le Monde de l'Education, No. 20 (septembre 1976), p. 5.
the form of particular linguistic patterns in 'le français du Midi'. It is vis-à-vis Occitan, given the geographic and demographic expanse of Occitania, that the French language best illustrates the celebrated remark: "A language is the dialect of a people who possess an army and a navy." Indeed, the much denigrated 'patois' of southern France were the medium used by the medieval troubadours, whose decline began with the Albigensian Crusade of the thirteenth century and the resulting incorporation of the first Occitan territories into the kingdom of France.

Occitania constitutes the economically underdeveloped south of France, and it is thus an economic periphery vis-à-vis the prosperous north. Politically, of course, it shares its peripheral status with the other ethnic regions of France, but unlike most of them its political culture has been more Leftist — hence the term 'le Midi rouge' — and anticlerical, and thus very much in the Jacobin tradition. It is no coincidence that during the radical and anticlerical Third Republic, repressive language policies were promulgated under several presidents, premiers and ministers of education originating from southern France. Furthermore, Occitania has historically furnished the central state with a disproportionately high number of its secondary functionaries, and under the Fifth as under the Fourth Republic, Occitanians continue to be overrepresented in the prefectural and sub-prefectoral corps. In short, Occitania illustrates what Héraud calls the social aspect of ethnic alienation, i.e.
the loss of both a native bourgeoisie and of a politico-
administrative elite to the service of the central state.

The Occitan movement is certainly the least cultu-
rally specific of all the ethnoregional movements in France.
This is not surprising in view of the expanse of Occitania,
in terms of both territory and population. The *Pâlibrige*
of Mistral was indeed more a purely Provençal than an over-
all Occitan cultural initiative, and as such it was opposed
by the postwar *Institut d'Etudes Occitanes*, which sought to
standardize the Occitan dialects on the basis of 'languedo-
cien'. Other organizations such as the *Parti Nationaliste
Occitan* (1959), *Comité Occitan d'Etudes et d'Action* (1962)
- which in 1971 became *Lutte Occitane*, and *Volem Viure al
Pais* (1974) added new political and socio-economic dimen-
sions to the Occitan cause and helped to popularize its
cultural dimension as well. All of the latter organizations
fielded candidates in the first round of the 1978 general
elections. Richardot suggests a direct relationship between
the extent of economic malaise in Occitania and the parallel
cultural reawakening therein:

...plus une région, un département, sont sous-industria-
lisées, plus le nombre de volontaires à apprendre l'occi-
tan est nombreux....les cartes du chômage, du recul démo-
graphique, et des candidats au bac en 'option occitan' sont les mêmes.9

Socio-economic issues are the most visible concern of the Oc-
citan movement, reflected in the winegrowers' dispute dating
back to the Third Republic, in the confrontations at Larzac
since 1971 over the military appropriation of certain peasant
properties, and in various environmental and tourism-related matters.

Whereas almost all of the territory of the 'langue d'oc' is today part of France, most of Catalonia and the Basque country are instead part of Spain. Of more than eight million Catalans, only 200,000-280,000 are French\(^\text{10}\) (and perhaps less than one-tenth of that number Italian). There are approximately ten times as many Basques in Spain (two million) as in France (200,000).\(^\text{11}\) French Catalonia and the French Basque country share with their Spanish counterparts both linguistic-cultural traditions and a peripheral status vis-à-vis the political center - the latter more marked in the French case, given the Spanish experiments with regional autonomy in the early 1930's and late 1970's. But whereas French Catalonia and the French Basque country have traditionally formed part of the southern French economic 'desert', their Spanish counterparts have instead been the two historic industrial centers of Spain, and thus not surprisingly its two most economically prosperous regions.

The well-developed Catalan and Basque nationalist movements (dating back to the late nineteenth century) have been essentially confined to Spain. There was no ethnic mobilization in French Catalonia or the French Basque country before 1958, nor were any irredentist aspirations voiced in either movement until the creation of the Spanish Basque E.T.A. in 1959. The latter organization still presents the only active irredentist campaign in Western Europe, in its
determination to create an independent Basque state from the fusion of the Spanish and French Basque provinces. The pursuit of this goal is undoubtedly one of the factors behind E.T.A.'s continuing terrorist activities since the promulgation of the Basque pre-autonomy statute in Spain in January, 1978. Conversely, the Spanish Partido Nacionalista Vasco, the Basque member of the Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations, is a proponent of a Europe of Regions.

There is a certain overlap between Basque nationalist activities in Spain and France, but this involves mainly two types of activities - linguistic-cultural and terrorist (E.T.A.). When E.T.A. and the French Basque Enbata were banned under Georges Pompidou (see pages 138-139), the French government denied that an agreement had been concluded with the Spanish government to arrest suspected Spanish Basque terrorists who had sought refuge in the French Basque country and to turn them over to Spanish authorities. But according to one author, this practice by French authorities dates back to 1962, although it did not become routine, according to another author, until after 1969. Periodic glances at Le Monde indicate that it continues under Giscard.

The Spanish weekly Cambio 16, in a late 1977 survey in the French Basque country, found that twenty-five per cent of its respondents were in favor of Basque independence (either with or without the Spanish Basque provinces), and that fourteen per cent of its respondents approved of E.T.A. and its terrorist activities. The founding of Enbata as a po-
political party in 1963 (it had been a newspaper since 1959) marked the first political expression of French Basque nationalism, and under the influence of E.T.A., it progressively moved toward a left wing ideology. This was significant, given the traditional Catholic and conservative political culture of the French Basques, although E.T.A. had heralded a similar ideological shift in the Spanish Basque country. With the French government's dissolution of Enbata in January, 1974, a new Basque Socialist Party (E.H.A.S.) was created, whose electoral success to date, like Enbata's in the past, has been negligible. The major political demand of the French Basque nationalists is the creation of a French Basque 'département', ending the present administrative status of the French Basque country as part of the département of Pyrénées-Atlantiques. A majority of the mayors of this département have in fact given their support to this demand.

French Catalonia, on the other hand, is a more integrated administrative unit, its boundaries roughly coinciding with those of the 'département' of Pyrénées-Orientales. Like its Spanish counterpart, its politics tend to be less Catholic and more Leftist than those of the entire Basque country. This anticlerical and Leftist nature of both Spanish and French Catalonia's political culture recalls that of a large portion of Occitania, and in fact the two regions have similar linguistic-cultural traditions. Many linguists consider the Catalan language as another dialect of the 'langue
d'oc', although the two regions were effectively cut off from each other at the end of the thirteenth century, and Catalan was unified and standardized as a language long before Occitan. French Catalonia (or Roussillon) is perhaps second only to Alsace in the coincidence of population figures and the number of speakers of the ethno-regional language. At least five of the previously cited sources\textsuperscript{18} cite the latter statistic as 200,000 in French Catalonia, whereas population estimates range between 200,000 and 280,000. In 1965 it was estimated that four-fifths of the French Catalans still spoke Catalan,\textsuperscript{19} and in 1974 a survey by the Catalan review \textit{Serra d'or} found that "le catalan est encore parlé dans un tiers des familles à Perpignan et dans deux-tiers à la campagne."\textsuperscript{20} (Perpignan is the principal city of Roussillon.) Similarly high figures obtain in Spanish Catalonia: speakers of Catalan are estimated at between 5,500,000 and eight million\textsuperscript{21} out of a population of 6,700,000 to eight million.\textsuperscript{22}

The French Catalan movement is one of the least politicized of the seven ethno-regional movements in France. This may be due to a combination of four factors:

1. the small population of French Catalonia;

2. the high level of ethno-regional language retention there (and thus the relative absence of a popular perception that 'cultural genocide' has been perpetrated by the French state against the region);

3. the relative administrative cohesion of French Catalonia
within the French bureaucratic system; and

4. a possible economic transformation in French Catalonia.

The latter was certainly not in evidence in early 1975 when an organization called Collectiu catala per la Defensa dels Pobles oprimits wrote:

Nos villages se vident, nos jeunes sont condamnés à l'exil, le chômage bat tous les records, notre pays est transformé en réservoir de main-d'oeuvre et de fonctionnaires de l'Etat français,... 'La politique d'aménagement du territoire' de l'Etat français livre notre Pays au pillage et à la spéculation touristique et immobilière...23

Taken out of context, this statement could apply just as easily to Occitania, the French Basque country, Brittany or Corsica. But less than three years later, Maclean's reported that "Roussillon owes its prosperity to massive investment by Barcelona-based firms who, to the alarm of the French government, are using the provincial capital, Perpignan, as an outlet to the Common Market."24 Such a development may suggest the economic potential of a Europe of Regions.

The French Catalan ethnoregional organizations founded between 1960 and 1968 were concerned primarily with linguistic-cultural matters, while more explicitly political and socio-economic concerns seem to have motivated the creation of the post-1968 ones.25 At least one French Catalan party unsuccessfully fielded candidates in the first round of the 1978 general elections.26

In the more economically prosperous northern and eastern sections of France are situated two other ethnic regions - Alsace and French Flanders. From a linguistic standpoint,
Alsace (including Moselle) is the most interesting ethnic region of France after the Basque country, the latter whose language predates the Indo-European language (the ancestor of most European, and of many Asian, languages). In 1976, it was estimated that at least half of all Alsatians are trilingual, speaking French, German and their own Germanic dialect. According to Petrella, eighty-five per cent of the population speaks the Alsatian dialect, eighty per cent French, and sixty-two per cent German. It was further estimated that half of all Alsatian children speak only Alsatian at the time they enter primary school, that all persons aged ten to forty now know French in Alsace, and that only twenty per cent of the entire population is monolingual French.

This exceptional linguistic situation has three very obvious causes:

1. Since the French Revolution, the German language has never been entirely banned from Alsace's primary schools, with the exception of the postwar period: *de jure* 1945–1952, *de facto* 1945–1971 (and 1945–1975 *de jure* and *de facto* in Moselle);

2. German was the language of instruction in the schools during both German occupations of Alsace (1871–1918 and 1940–1945); and

3. As a frontier region, Alsace is open to regular German language influences, a situation that the European Community has certainly reinforced.
At first glance, Alsace would appear to be the least economically peripheral of all of France's ethnic regions, due to the tradition of industrialization there. Furthermore, within the context of Europe, Alsace would seem to be a beneficiary of the economic prosperity of the new European industrial core. In fact,

Il y a deux manières de raisonner en ce qui concerne l'Alsace:
- l'Alsace est une région privilégiée par rapport à la Bretagne, à l'Aquitaine, à la côte Atlantique, au Limousin, etc.;
- l'Alsace est une région sous-privilégiée et désarmée économiquement parlant dans la vaste zone internationale rhénane aujourd'hui totalement dépourvue de frontières nationales. 30

Alsatian economic grievances include: 31

1. the daily movement of some 30,000 Alsatians to jobs in Germany and Switzerland, due not only to the prospect of significantly higher wages but also to the shortage of comparable jobs in Alsace;

2. the extent of German and Swiss investment in Alsace, and the relative non-competitive nature of Alsatian-owned industry; and

3. 'foreign' exploitation of Alsatian natural resources.

It is noteworthy that the highest proportional increase since 1968 in numbers of ethnoregional organizations recorded by Beer (see page 136) was in Alsace. In the 1978 general elections, two 'autonomist' candidates garnered between three and four per cent of the first round votes in the Alsatian départements of Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin, 32 but of more significance were clear gains in Leftist (and Center)
support to the detriment of the formerly well-entrenched Gaullists - in these two 'départements' and in Moselle as well. 33

Not surprisingly, linguistic-cultural grievances are foremost in the Alsation movement. First of all, the Alsatian dialect, as an 'allogenous' language, has never benefited from the provisions of the Deixonne Law, and thus has always been banned from the public schools, the media, commerce, etc. As for the teaching of German in Alsatian primary schools, information on this is contradictory. Petrel-là, for example, states that in 1971 the 'métode Holderith' reintroduced the study of German to pupils over the age of nine for one-half hour daily, and that this 'métode' was available to 300 classes in 1973-1974 and to 900 classes in 1974-1975. 34 He makes no mention of the Alsatian dialect.

Two other authors, however, claim that the 'métode Holderith', begun in 1972, uses the Alsatian dialect as the medium of instruction for the German language on the primary level. 35 Pierre Maugué, for example, claims that this 'reform' has been restricted to thirty-two classes of nine-year-old children, and that for children aged eleven to fourteen, regular instruction in German (three hours per week) is available only to those students who will not go on to secondary school. 36 Those who do go on may only then begin the study of German as one of several available foreign language options. Whatever concessions (if any) have been made to the Alsatian dialect, they are evidently minimal, as the prospective open-
ing of the first Alsatian-language 'kindergarten' in September, 1979, as well as a mounting publicity campaign by a Comité pour le Droit au Dialecte à l’Ecole maternelle, attest. 37

As a bilingual/trilingual frontier region in the heart of the European Community, Alsace’s European vocation is assured, with or without the creation of a Europe of Regions. But such a Europe would obviously be to its advantage, as Alsatian membership in the Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations suggests.

The seventh of France’s ethnic regions is French Flanders, one of the smallest both geographically and demographically. Like French Catalonia and the French Basque country, it was formerly part of a much larger ethnic region, most of which today is located in a neighboring state - in this case Belgium.

Belgian Flanders, again like Catalonia and the Basque country in Spain, has been the center of an active nationalist movement since the end of the nineteenth century. But unlike the two Spanish regions, it had contacts earlier on with its French counterpart. These were mainly of a linguistic-cultural nature, and took place within the context of the French Flemish autonomist movement of the interwar and World War II periods; there never did exist an active irredentist movement in French Flanders. 38

In spite of the political overtones of autonomist activity, the French Flemish movement was and remains pri-
marily of a linguistic-cultural nature. But the industrial decline of recent years may yet incorporate economic grievances into its program, for unemployment has become a serious problem in French Flanders and the area surrounding it (the rest of the 'département' of Norde and the 'département' of Pas-de-Calais). For the moment, however, it maintains the lowest profile of any of France's ethnoregional movements, its activism evident only in the membership of its most prominent linguistic-cultural organization in the Défense et Promotion des Langues de France. Since Flemish remains the only ethnoregional language in France other than Alsatian which is not covered by the Deixonne Law, the primacy of this concern is understandable, as it is also given the fact that Flemish language usage there is in clear decline. Perhaps as few as 50,000-80,000 French Flemings still speak Flemish.

Four of France's seven ethnic regions - Alsace, Flanders, Catalonia and the Basque country - are frontier regions, and thus their geographic location is peripheral only vis-à-vis the Paris region. Alsace and Flanders are anything but peripheral when viewed within the present European context, nor will Catalonia and the Basque country be any longer once Spain accedes to the European Community. Spanish (and Portuguese) membership in the European Community are also certain to focus attention on the economic plight of southern France (Occitania); indeed, the economic threat to part of Occitania posed by the future unchecked influx of cheaper
Mediterranean wine and produce into the Community is one of the major stumbling blocks to the accession of Spain, Portugal and Greece into the Common Market. The two remaining ethnic regions of France - Brittany and Corsica - have, on the other hand, a European vocation which is peripheral at present and not necessarily more promising with the advent of an enlarged Community.

Before proceeding to these two case studies, a final word is in order on the extent of ethnoregional political mobilization in France's ethnic regions. As mentioned earlier, ethnoregional political parties in France have had very little success when compared with many of their counterparts in Western Europe and North America. Does this mean that "Dans l'âme, le Français reste jacobin"? Were the theorists of nation-building right after all?

This is a likely immediate conclusion, and certainly an easy one, but it does not necessarily follow from a closer examination of the French case. If ethnoregional mobilization is reflected in the proliferation of ethnoregional organizations (including regional voluntary associations), in the increased visibility of ethnoregional languages and cultures at the popular level, and finally in the inclusion of pro-ethnoregional policies in the platforms of most of the major political parties (the Gaullists a glaring exception), then the issue has indeed become politicized and has gained a popular forum. Why such mobilization has not taken the route of electoral successes by ethnoregional political par-
ties is, however, too complex a question for a comprehensive examination here. One might be tempted to suggest an all-too-obvious observation: a perceived lack of political power through parliamentary channels, and the consequent pursuit of political goals through other channels (political and non-political), including 'confrontation' politics. But if such were the case, eighty per cent of the French electorate would not, in all likelihood, regularly turn out to elect deputies and senators to the national parliament.

In the context of direct elections to the European Parliament, the matter of ethnoregional mobilization via political parties is obviously a crucial one, the parliamentary influence of interest groups notwithstanding. In France, at the national level, the best that can be said is that ethnoregional concerns are in the domain of the non-communal parties, wherein their importance is secondary. It is rather at the level of the regions and the 'départements' that ethnoregional parties are more prominent and ethnoregional concerns of greater importance, but also, unfortunately, where political power is most lacking. Both conseils régionaux (which are indirectly elected) and conseils généraux (which are directly elected) nevertheless appear to take an active interest in ethnoregional concerns, including linguistic-cultural matters. In Brittany, it will be recalled, it was in response to the request of the regional council that Giscard conceded a new cultural charter, and it was the Leftist members of the same council (including representatives of
the U.D.B. - Union Démocratique Bretonne) who voted against the charter in its final form. In Corsica in July, 1975, before the division of the island into two départements, its general council called for elections to the regional council on the principle of proportional representation and for the creation of a regional executive.\textsuperscript{43} And as far back as 1965 in the French Basque country, general councilors and deputies to the National Assembly were meeting together to discuss means of dealing with the matter of suspected Spanish Basque terrorists taking refuge in the French Basque country.\textsuperscript{44}

Commenting on Giscard’s June, 1978 visit to Corsica, Le Monde wrote:

\begin{quote}
Les échecs électoraux des ‘autonomistes’ dans les provinces les plus particularistes ne peuvent cependant faire oublier que l'idée régionaliste est diffuse dans nombre d'esprits et de partis traditionnels.\textsuperscript{45}
\end{quote}

This ‘idée régionaliste’ is expressed in France through both political and nonpolitical channels, and is most visible in the confrontation politics of mass action (strikes, demonstrations, etc.) and terrorist activity. In terms of the politics of both confrontation and participation, Brittany and Corsica would undoubtedly rank as the two most politically mobilized of France’s ethnic regions. The next two sections will analyze the ethnoregional movements in these two regions within both the French and the European contexts.
B. Brittany: "Breiz Atao"

"Il y a au moins deux choses impossibles au monde, être breton et ne pas être juif." Of all of France's ethnic regions, Brittany seems traditionally to have been singled out for a special 'mépris'. Such is the inevitable impression that arises from even a cursory glance at the literature.

Polemics against the Breton language and culture are particularly numerous: official policies of the Third Republic might have been modified (see page 109), but the official attitudes that motivated them have lingered on. President Émile Combes forbade the use of Breton in church in 1908, and in 1925 the Minister of Education Anatole de Monzie proclaimed that the Breton language had to disappear "dans l'intérêt de l'unité de la France." During the First World War, a Breton soldier was executed for refusing to obey orders; he was rehabilitated posthumously when it was determined that his lack of familiarity with the French language was the sole cause of his alleged 'intransigence'.

In 1944, the concessions made during the German Occupation - the teaching of the Breton language and of Breton history in schools, the authorization of radio broadcasts in Breton - were withdrawn, and the language once again banned. In addition, arrest warrants for suspicion of collaboration were issued for anyone connected with any Breton society or association, regardless of its political orientation (if any). In some cases, orders of arrest were issued for Breton scho-
lars who had in fact already been executed by the Germans for their Resistance activities. 52

As late as 1965, a child given a Breton name had no legal existence in France; many court challenges ensued 53 before this discriminatory government practice was halted. Bretons have been popularly denigrated as 'chouans' and 'plouks' - reactionaries and country bumpkins, respectively - and their cultural stereotype immortalized in the fictional character of Bécassine, who is still alive (though perhaps not well) in the 1970's.

David Fortier has distinguished between two types of Breton nationalism. The first of these is an 'antiquarian' nationalism which appeared in the early nineteenth century. According to Fortier, this was

...a response to the loss of Breton political and cultural liberties at the time of the formation of the Jacobin state,...a passive reaction restricted in scope to the aristocracy whose power had been stripped and whose social order was threatened by republicanism...and to the literati who sought in the romantic tradition to revive and preserve a mythic past. 54

(In fact, the 'Chouannerie' - the counterrevolutionary rebellion of aristocrats and clergy - was not restricted to Brittany.) The second type of nationalism, which Fortier calls 'modern' nationalism, and which has a dual aspect, corresponds to the ideological distinction earlier drawn (see pages 112-113, 133-134) between pre-1945 subnationalism and post-1945 ethnoregionalism. Whereas the former advocated a return to a former golden age as a response to rapid economic and social change, the latter instead prescribes a combination
of future-oriented (economic modernization) and past-oriented (political autonomy) solutions. Portier notes that the "...insistence on language revival provides the symbol of continuity linking past and future." The first Breton nationalist party Strollad Broadel Breiz, founded in 1911, was avowedly separatist. Dissolved in 1914, it was succeeded in 1919 by the non-separatist journal Breiz Atao ('Bretagne pour toujours'), which in 1927 created the second Breton nationalist party - the Parti Autonomiste Breton (P.A.B.). The latter declared at its 1928 congress:

Nous ne sommes pas séparatistes...Nous ne sommes pas rétrogrades. La vieille Bretagne de nos rois et de nos Ducs est à jamais évanouie. Nous saluons respectivement son souvenir, mais nous ne cherchons pas à la reconstituer telle....Nous ne sommes pas anti-français...

In 1931, however, dissension within the P.A.B. resulted in the formation of a new Parti National Breton (P.N.B.), some of whose members would eventually collaborate with the Nazis in the hope that the latter would set up an autonomous Breton state.

During the interwar period, three events are worthy of note:

1. The aforementioned petition to the Versailles peace conference in 1919 that comparable linguistic rights be accorded in Brittany as were being granted to the national minorities of Eastern Europe. This petition was signed by 800 'notables', including Breton deputies, senators, general councilors, bishops and even Marshal Poch.
2. The formation of a Front Breton which elected fifteen of its forty-one candidates at the 1936 general elections. Subsequently, a Comité de Défense des Intérêts bretons was set up in the national parliament. 59

3. The interwar founding of the movement Ar Brezoneg er Skol for the teaching of the Breton language. This organization obtained the support of Breton deputies, municipal councilors, newspapers and also of the national parliament's Commission de l'Enseignement. 60

The Breton movement was thus endorsed by many of the region's elites at this time.

In 1938, the two leaders of the P.N.B. were sentenced to a year in prison for having "entrepris...de porter atteinte à l'intégrité du territoire national." 61 Two years later they were sentenced to death for treason. In the interim, the P.N.B. was banned by the government, but it was resurrected during the German Occupation, albeit under more moderate leadership. In the interests of mollifying the Vichy régime, the Germans conceded only the more moderate demands of the Breton nationalists (see page 198). But these were enough to inspire an anti-Breton assassination campaign by certain members of the Resistance, a campaign which was countered by the formation of the pro-German Bezenn Perrot.

The confusion between Breton collaborators and resisters has been very great indeed. Speaking of the post-war reprisals, Patricia Mayo notes that "most members of the P.N.B. were Breton linguists, students of folklore and Celtic
experts, but heavy sentences were inflicted upon them.\textsuperscript{62} It is interesting to compare this remark with the recent statement of five groups – among them the League of Human Rights – who questioned the indiscriminate arrests of Breton activists in the wake of the Versailles bombing:

Les dernières arrestations sont une véritable rafle où l'on arrête indistinctement militants syndicalistes, culturels ou politiques... une répression policière qui tourne à la chasse aux sorcières.\textsuperscript{63}

Fully one-quarter of de Gaulle's first Resistance regiment were Breton – some of them former Breton nationalists – who upon their departure, recounts one author, "...entonnèrent successivement la Marséillaise et le chant national breton."\textsuperscript{64} In addition, two very similar prospective 'projets de statut' for Brittany were drawn up and presented – one to the Vichy government by a Comité consultatif de Bretagne, the other to de Gaulle by a group of Breton resisters.\textsuperscript{65}

As noted previously, Brittany was the most visible of France's ethnic regions in the postwar revival of subnational organizational activity. Indeed, Brittany spearheaded the movement throughout France for the creation of the 'Comités d'expansion régionale', all of which followed the example of the Comité d'Études et de Liaison des Intérêts Bretons (C.E.L.I.B.), founded in 1950. The C.E.L.I.B. was a nonpartisan, inter-'départements' group concerned with regional economic development. Its membership included elected officials (from some 900 municipal councils as well as most Breton deputies), in addition to some 200 representatives from
unions, trade and business associations and other official bodies. The C.E.L.I.B. was eventually recognized by the government as an advisory group on regional economic development, but although its 'loi-programme' for Brittany was initially accepted by the government, it was after long delays finally abandoned. According to Michel Philipponneau, former chairman of the C.E.L.I.B.:

Jusqu'en 1964, les initiatives en matière de planification régionale partaient de la base, des comités d'expansion économique,... A partir de 1964, le préfet de région avec sa mission de jeunes 'énarques' [graduates of the École Nationale d'Administration] reprend l'initiative, applique les directives parisiennes, les fait entrainer par la C.O.D.E.R. dont sont exclus les éléments contestataires des comités d'expansion.66

The year 1964 of course marks the period during which the Gaullist machinery for regional reform became functional. But in fact it was after the regional reforms of 1960 that responsibility for regional policy was given over to the then Prime Minister Michel Debré, who decided to approach the question on a purely economic basis in 'tranches opératoires' (sector by sector). In 1962, Debré set up an official body called Groupe 1985 for this purpose, and in its report entitled Réflexions pour 1985, this committee stated:

The distribution of men and employment on French territory will be the result of decisions which are bound to be tragic and which will be bitterly fought.... It is therefore inevitable that alongside regions whose population will resemble the population structure of Germany there will be deserts in France, and the disparity between the two types of zone will be bound to increase ... The conversion of these deserted regions into national parks should therefore be organized and accelerated.67

Virtually the entire west and southwest of France were desig-
nated for this purpose.

Although the C.E.L.I.B. was a body whose primary concern was with regional economic development, its structure nevertheless included a cultural commission whose aim was to win official recognition for the Breton language. Other organizations concerned with linguistic-cultural matters had been set up between 1945 and 1950, but it was not until 1957 that the Breton movement took on an explicitly political character once more with the founding of the Mouvement pour l'Organisation de la Bretagne (M.O.B.). According to Philiponneau:

Le régionalisme fonctionnel représenté par le C.E.L.I.B. a échoué. Les forces populaires, les syndicats, les partis de gauche ont quitté cet organisme composé de notables conservateurs... De cet échec naît le mouvement nationaliste breton à base historique, ethnique, culturel...68

The grounds for Philiponneau’s indictment of Breton regional elites – he alleges a virtual ‘trahison des notables’ and their subsequent collusion with the Gaullist regime69 – seem to be confirmed by the government’s pre-1969 referendum consultation in Brittany. The 181 members of the Breton regional elites queried:

- expressed little wish for political autonomy, only for a wider scope in the cultural and economic spheres;
- overwhelmingly accepted the Prime Minister’s circular dismissing the possibility of federalism as ‘having no relationship to the historic, sociological or human facts in France’. 
evinced a lack of enthusiasm for a directly elected regional assembly and contentment with the regional prefect as executive, although in both cases Left wing organizations did not take this view.70

The divergence of the Left on this issue foreshadowed a gradual disillusion with the M.O.B. as with the C.E.L.I.B., for the former like the latter endeavored to be a nonpartisan body. In 1963 the leftward-leaning members of the M.O.B. left and then set up their own organization - the Union Démocratique Bretonne (U.D.B.) in 1964. In 1967, P.H. Philipponneau and other leftward-leaning members of the C.E.L.I.B. also left that organization, although the en masse Left defection from the C.E.L.I.B. to the U.D.B. did not take place until 1972.71

During this period, various incidents bore witness to mass unrest and social discontent in Brittany:
-the demonstration by 4,000 farmers in Morlaix in 1961 whose leaders' arrest triggered almost two weeks of rural insurrection;
-the 1969 bombing of a C.R.S. (Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité) police garage at Saint-Brieuc masterminded by a network of doctors, priests, architects and other professional people in the area; and
-the 1972 strikes by workers at Le Joint Français and by dairy farmers.

At the same time, a Front de Libération de la Bretagne (F.L.B.) surfaced with a series of bombing attacks beginning in 1966;
the 1972 trial of eleven of its members provoked more demonstrations in Brittany. Also in 1972 there occurred the pioneering joint meeting of the five general councils of Brittany (only four of them being members of the Breton regional council, as the fifth Breton département - Loire-Atlantique - is not part of the official region of Brittany) to address themselves to the question of tourism and the unchecked development of the Breton coastline. 72

Despite its official dissolution by the government in January, 1974, the F.L.B. managed to continue its bombing campaign which resulted in police dragnets and subsequent trials in 1976 and 1977 in which a total of five Breton activists were sentenced; eight had been sentenced at the 1972 trial. 73 At the same time, the U.D.B. began to enjoy moderate electoral successes at the local level; by the end of 1977, it had thirty-six municipal councilors in Brittany, 74 and was a component party of the Left which now held one-quarter of the membership of the Breton regional council. 75 It was in the interim between the 1976 and 1977 F.L.B. trials that Giscard announced a new cultural charter for Brittany which, it will be recalled, was subsequently rejected by the Leftist members of this council.

The year 1978 has been especially significant for Brittany in the three spheres of culture, economics and politics. In February, the cultural charter went into operation. In March, the wreck of the oil tanker Amoco-Cádiz off the Breton coastline threatened the fisheries and tourism
sectors of an already precarious Breton economy and provoked massive demonstrations at which slogans such as "Marée noire, diarrhée du grand capital!" and "La Bretagne n'est pas une poubelle!" were brandished. At one of these demonstrations, the largest in Brest since May, 1968 (some 20,000 participants) - groups of protesters marched behind the Breton flag. Even the cultural organization Egleo Breiz, which represents Brittany in the Défense et Promotion des Langues de France, and which normally concerns itself only with linguistic-cultural matters, castigated in a letter to Le Monde "...les inconscients (toujours en place) qui, à Paris, voici une année à peine, jugeaient 'inutile de créer un organisme spécialisé contre la pollution marine accidentelle'." Incidentally, due to the constraints of bureaucratic procedure, the Breton regional council had to wait 100 days after the oil spill before it could discuss the matter.

In the political sphere, the spectacular bombing of the palace of Versailles in June by F.L.B. activists resulted in a police dragnet in Brittany (and of Bretons in the Paris region) which has to date brought about the laying of formal charges against at least twenty-seven persons, only two of whom claim responsibility for the Versailles attack. Noting that the harshest sentences ever given to any ethnonregional activists (including Corsicans) since 1972 were meted out at the July trial of fourteen previously arrested F.L.B. members accused of a series of bombings between March, 1975 and October, 1977, a journalist wonders if this was not in fact a
'political' verdict, i.e. a direct result of anti-F.L.B. sentiment which followed in the wake of the Versailles bombing. Three of these fourteen F.L.B. members had in fact condemned the Versailles attack immediately after it happened in a letter to Le Monde:

Il n' a jamais été dans le but de notre organisation de s'attaquer à des objectifs culturels. Nous avons, en tant que Bretons, suffisamment subi d' atteintes à notre propre patrimoine... pour éviter de s'attaquer à quelque autre culture que ce soit... Nous tenons à nous désolidariser de cet acte de vandalisme, injustifié politiquement, et de toutes les autres provocations qui pourraient survenir sous le couvert du mouvement breton.

One of these three subsequently received the most severe sentence - eight years in prison - while the other two received six and five years, respectively. During the trial, all the defendants complained that they had not been allowed to meet together beforehand, a right which the law permits in the case of political prisoners; in addition, two of them refused to speak in French during the proceedings.

This trial was eclipsed later in the year by that of the two alleged perpetrators of the bombing of the palace of Versailles, who refused to be present at the proceedings and whose lawyers chose silence as the only 'legitimate defense'. The two were condemned on November 30 to fifteen years' imprisonment, a sentence exceeding in its turn the harshness of those of the previous July. As with the earlier trial, public support for the accused was in evidence throughout the proceedings. Also of note was a mass meeting called on November 13 to protest the Paris police prefecture's refusal
to permit 'un gala de soutien' for all Breton political prisoners; thirty-one persons were detained by the police in the wake of that gathering, among them the Breton folk singers Glenmor, Gilles Servat and Alan Stivell. 89

Versailles and its aftermath was certainly the most visible ethnoregionally-related political activity in Brittany in 1978. But three other developments should also be mentioned. Two weeks before the general elections in March, the U.D.B. assembled some 2,000 people for a political meeting to discuss the party platform on which its seventeen candidates were running. According to Le Monde, "Deux mille personnes rassemblées pour un meeting organisé par un parti autochômite et socialiste, cela ne s'était jamais vu en Bretagne." 90 But no radio or television coverage of this meeting was permitted in Brittany, in keeping with the state-controlled media network's general policy of not allowing any broadcasting time to the U.D.B. 91 The U.D.B. subsequently garnered less than two per cent of the vote in the first round of the elections, although the Left in general significantly increased its percentage of the vote throughout Brittany and gained two seats in the National Assembly. Incidentally, the U.D.B. has on numerous occasions condemned the bombing attacks of the F.L.B. 92

A second noteworthy political development in Brittany in 1978 was the June decision of the Breton members of the Left Radicals to submit to their party "un projet de 'création d'un gouvernement régional'." 93 It should be
mentioned that the Socialists have had since 1972 in Brittany a Bureau régional d'Étude et d'Initiative socialiste, and that since that time they have also participated along with the U.D.B., the P.S.U. (Parti Socialiste Unifié) and the Left wing cultural organization Ar Falz in the Breton Front culturel progressiste. Thirdly, public support for the administrative reunification of Brittany (i.e. the inclusion of the fifth Breton 'département' of Loire-Atlantique in the official region of Brittany) appears to be growing in this very département, as evidenced by the turnout of some 4,000 demonstrators in Nantes on October 15 for the third march organized in favor of this long-standing Breton nationalist demand.

In 1962 the general assembly of the C.E.L.I.B. passed the following motion:

Le scandale du non-enseignement d'une langue parlée par un million de citoyens français doit prendre fin. Il n'est pas possible d'admettre que le breton soit, en Europe, en plein XXe siècle, l'une des quatre dernières langues [!] avec la langue d'oc, le basque et le catalan, contre lesquelles on pratique systématiquement une politique d'étouffement qui n'a d'autres fondements que des préjugés désuets.

(*This assertion is obviously based on the provisions of the Deixonne Law, which at that time excluded Corsican, Alsatian and Flemish - a fact which seems to have escaped the attention of the C.E.L.I.B.) To what extent will the new Breton cultural charter remedy this situation?

The basic provisions of the charter have already been outlined (see pages 144-145). Its most glaring inade-
quacy is that it does not provide for the teaching of Breton at either the pre-school or the primary levels - only for the teaching of Breton culture in French to this age group. Teacher training is limited to 'stages' (practicums); no university degree in Breton may yet be taken. In the area of broadcasting, the following changes in time allotments have been made:
- TV news broadcasts in Breton are extended from three to eight minutes weekly;
- other TV broadcasts in Breton are extended from twenty minutes every two weeks to twenty minutes weekly; and
- radio broadcasts in Breton are extended from two hours weekly to three and one-half hours weekly in Brest, to which has been added a five-minute daily broadcast in the Vannes area.

The second part of the charter deals with the maintenance of Breton culture and provides for the following:
- the setting up of a regional technical agency;
- technical and financial assistance to cultural organizations;
- restoration of chapels and religious monuments; and
- the setting up of a Breton cultural institute and of "maisons de pays, et des petits musées populaires." 97

*Le Monde* evaluates the charter thus:

...cette charte apparaît pourtant insuffisante en raison du passé souvent tragique (et toujours jusqu'alors étouffé) d'une culture que l'on se plait maintenant à reconnaître originale. Les associations culturelles ont déjà exprimé leur réserve, tout en réaffirmant leur
accord sur le principe même de la charte, et en souhaitant qu'elle soit autre chose que 'le linceul dans lequel on enveloppe les dieux morts'...

When Giscard visited Brittany in February, 1977 to announce the creation of the cultural charter, The Economist gave the following economic picture of this region: wages below the national average (a thirty per cent difference between Paris and Brittany for comparable work, according to one author); unemployment above the national average (by five per cent); one in five Bretons employed in industry against the national average of one in three; and no major highway west of Paris as far as Brittany.

The only positive points regarding the Breton economy that it could report were that the region had become France's number one farm production area, and that census figures were showing for the first time in sixty years that the debilitating population drain from Brittany to the rest of France - notably Paris - had stopped and even begun to reverse itself.

The cutting off of the 'département' of Loire-Atlantique (and thereby of the regional economic development pole and traditional Breton capital of Nantes) from the official region of Brittany has aggravated the Breton economic malaise. Of the remaining four Breton départements, it is the Côtes-du-Nord and Morbihan (which constitute the agricultural center) that are the most severely depressed. Finistère in the west, in the past marked by depression and the loss of 2,500
Map 6.---
The two major linguistic subdivisions of Brittany: Breton dialects in the west, Gallo dialects in the east.

young people annually, has become the scene of intense local activity, inspired initially by the Comités départementaux des jeunes Agriculteurs (C.D.J.A.). Ille-et-Vilaine, traditionally the least depressed, has been the first to recover.

The Breton economy suffers from many of those ills characteristic of regional underdevelopment, among them:
- its peripheral geographical location;
- lack of energy and mineral resources;
- poor infrastructure, especially transportation;
- excessive dependence on the primary sector (especially agriculture and fisheries), as well as an anachronistic agricultural structure (which nevertheless is in the process of rationalization);
- absence of industries of transformation of raw materials;
- insufficient development (and even regression) of the industrial sector;
- high emigration rates among the most active members of its population, due to insufficient employment; and
- lack of regional capital, and the resulting outside control over industrial development, tourist resources, setting of prices, etc.

In 1961, René Pleven, co-founder of C.E.L.I.B., and former Prime Minister under the Fourth Republic, issued the following warning: "La France va vers des déchirements qu'elle ne soupçonne pas, si elle ne donne pas à la Bretagne la possibilité de s'épanouir et de jouer son rôle dans l'essor
In 1977, the current president of C.E.L.I.B. (and of the Breton Economic and Social Committee) spoke more harshly:

Le désintérêt des responsables politiques pour la région est une évidence d'aujourd'hui...ils en arrivent à oublier la Bretagne, ses problèmes et ses espérances. L'action des responsables économiques et sociaux s'arrête là où l'organisation politique commence. Tout cela ne saurait durer.103

At the same time, the president of the Breton Regional Chamber of Commerce and Industry criticized French regional policy in Brittany thus:

Ayant décidé en 1960 d'apporter à la Bretagne l'aide nécessaire pour remédier à ses difficultés spécifiques, il ne faut pas qu'on la laisse tomber à mi-chemin sous prétexte que d'autres régions appellent à leur tour à l'aide!104

In a 1973 survey among regional elites in Brittany,105 Patricia Mayo found that such groups as architects, members of the Chambers of Agriculture and Commerce, local industrialists and Breton senators (but not Breton deputies) were more emphatically nationalist than officials of working class organizations, and that the C.D.J.A. were among the most active of all Breton protest movements. One Finistère mayor stated that eleven of the 280 mayors in his département were out-and-out nationalists, while the others desired greater autonomy for Brittany. He estimated that no more than five per cent of Bretons were active nationalists, but that less than five per cent were content with the status quo.

According to Michel Philipponneau, "...le nouveau mouvement breton met fin au 'complexe de Bécassine'."106
Bécassine, the servant girl, has become to Bretons what Little Black Sambo is to American blacks - a denigrating cultural stereotype. But Bécassine, in an underground comic strip, has left her mistress, bought a machine-gun and begun to speak Breton. Her battle cry, translated into French, reads thus:

L'émigration, le chômage, le mépris, les fausses promesses, les ruines, l'hiver de notre vieillesse, Et puis quoi encore? Tout le reste: un peuple dispersé comme un peu de cendre au vent.107

Must Bécassine brandish her machine-gun? The French government has refused to consider the Breton question in any but economic terms, and its efforts at regional economic development in Brittany are controversial at best. It has made only nominal concessions to Breton cultural aspirations, and has virtually ignored Breton political yearnings. In other words, it has refused to consider the Breton question in its entirety. What, then, are Brittany's prospects within the larger context of Europe?

The theme of the 1978 International Celtic Congress held in Wales was 'The Celtic Nations in the European Economic Community'.108 A representative of the Community was present at the Congress, and noted there that the European Regional Development Fund had to date dispensed 248 million francs in Brittany. The Congress discussed the discrepancy between the impending devolution in Scotland and Wales and the present status of Brittany within the French state. De-
ploring the fact that no 'national minorities' hold any official status within the Community institutions, the Congress decided to send a formal request for consideration of such representation to the European Community. It also expressed the hope for a greater representation of Celtic nations within the European Parliament.

These actions suggest several interesting developments:

- that the E.C., as with the Tindeman and Petrella reports (see pages 71, 73), is continuing to take note of ethnoregionalism in Western Europe by sending a representative to this Congress;

- that in addition to the Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations, other ethnoregional organizations - in this case a non-political one - are pressing for recognition by E.C. institutions; and

- that a Celtic alliance within the directly elected European Parliament is more than a possibility; indeed, an Irish Euro-M.P. has already submitted a bill to the indirectly elected European Parliament in favor of the teaching of the Breton language in Brittany - much to the chagrin of Michel Debré. 109

Brittany is of course a member of the E.U.E.N., although it is represented not by the U.D.B. but by the European federalist Strollad Ar Vro (S.A.V.), founded in 1972 and in many ways a successor to the M.O.B. The S.A.V. fielded candidates in the first round of the general elections

A peripheral region within Europe as well as within France, Brittany's economic position will not necessarily be improved by the advent of either a nascent political Europe or by an enlarged Community. But it is interesting to speculate on the possibility of a revival of that sector which contributed most to Brittany's past prosperity: maritime development. Under the Ancien Régime, Brittany's trade went outwards by sea to Great Britain and Spain especially rather than internally into France. It still costs less to transport a ton of freight from Brittany to North America than by land to Strasbourg. Patricia Mayo quotes one high-ranking Parisian civil servant as saying:

Brittany is the region which is the best placed to have a growth rate comparable to that of Japan. If the money collected from the Post Office in Brittany in the last five years had been spent on the development of Breton ports, Brittany would be well on her way to becoming another Japan.

Interestingly, the C.E.L.I.B. has recently proposed the inclusion of maritime development of the Atlantic regions within the framework of European regional policy, in keeping with its view that "L'Europe des Douze sera la première puissance maritime mondiale." If these are overly optimistic prognoses, they are no more exaggerated than the overly pessimistic conclusions of Groupe 1985 (see page 203). The answer undoubtedly lies somewhere in between.

With the attention that is bound to be given to regional issues within the directly elected European Parlia-
ment, the economic malaise of peripheral regions such as Brittany will undoubtedly be in the forefront of these discussions. The political aspects of the regional question may also be raised, given the fact that devolution is a current topic in both Great Britain and Belgium. The Breton language issue is also likely to be kept a live one by Euro-
M.P.'s from Ireland, and perhaps Scotland and Wales as well.

The following declaration of the 1929 congress of the Parti Autonomiste Breton could have been written today:

L'autonomie dont nous venons de tracer les grandes lignes est fédéraliste et ne s'oppose nullement, au con-
traire, aux intérêts de l'Etat français. La France, qui fut longtemps le foyer de la civilisation européenne est aujourd'hui, sous bien des rapports, l'un des pays les plus arriérés de l'Europe....Nous croyons que cet arrêt de croissance est dû avant tout à la centralisation na-
polonienne qu'elle subit encore et qui paralyse la vie de ses membres au profit d'un cœur hypertrophié....l'hostilité systématique des Pouvoirs publics, tant contre certaines autonomies que contre les moindres mesures de décentralisation, ne nous paraît pas servir les intérêts éréités de la communauté française....À la France de dire si nous ne pouvons demeurer Bretons qu'en cessant d'être citoyens français.

Or perhaps it will be for Europe to say that they can only remain Bretons by becoming European citizens.

C. Corsica: 'Chjama a Populu'

Face au monde, de toute notre âme, sur nos gloires, sur nos tombes, sur nos berceaux, nous jurons de vivre et de mourir Français.

Vous verrez qu'un jour ils perdront l'Algérie, l'Alsace-Lorraine et la Corse.

Since the serious disturbances of August, 1975, Corsica has been the most visibly volatile of all of France's ethnic regions. The number of terrorist acts committed in
Corsica increased sharply in that year to 226, as against eleven in 1974, forty-two in 1973, eighteen in 1972 and nine in 1971. After 1975, politically motivated attacks were distinguished from all others; in 1976, the former accounted for 140 out of a total of 298 attacks, and in 1977, for ninety-two out of a total of 258. In the first quarter of 1978, 100 terrorist acts were committed in Corsica—a twenty-five per cent increase over the first quarter of 1977—and the proportion of politically motivated attacks has been steadily increasing since the beginning of 1978.

The year 1978 also witnessed several other significant events in Corsica:

1. the defeat in the race for the newly created fourth deputy's seat of François Giacobbi (Left Radical)—senator of the 'département' of Haute-Corse, president of its general council, president of the Corsican regional council, and one of the most powerful Corsican 'chefs de clan';

2. post-electoral visits to the island by Jacques Chirac, Michel Debré, Raymond Barre and Giscard d'Estaing—the latter's first visit there since he became President of the Republic;

3. the indictment by the Cour de sûreté de l'Etat of twenty-four F.L.N.C. (Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse) activists—among them Vincent Stagnara, the leader of the legal autonomist organization Fronte Corsu—during Giscard's three-day visit; since then, at least seven more F.L.N.C. suspects have also been indicted; and
4. an unprecedented bombing blitz of thirty-three synchronized explosions in one-half hour, set off by the P.L.N.C.
on the night of the day that eight Breton nationalists had been arrested and charged with the bombing of the palace
of Versailles, and less than a month after Giscard’s visit; four more P.L.N.C. militants subsequently appeared before
the Cour de sûreté de l’État, where they were indicted for these bombings.

Following the violence of August, 1975, a survey
found that:
sixty-two per cent of Corsicans approved of the initial act
of the occupation of the wine depot at Alêria by members of
the A.R.C. (Action pour la Renaissance de la Corse);
sixty per cent of Corsicans held the government responsible
for the deaths of two policemen there because it refused to
negotiate;
three-eight per cent of Corsicans declared themselves au-
tonomists; and
only three per cent of Corsicans favored independence from
France. 120

Yet ethnoregional politics in Corsica remains confrontation
politics, whether of the moderate A.R.C. variety or of the
violent P.L.N.C. brand.

The A.R.C. did initially field candidates in municipal, cantonal and parliamentary by-elections, garnering
ten to fifteen per cent of the vote. 121 Outlawed in 1975 in
the wake of Alêria, it was more or less resurrected as the
Association des Patriotes Corses (A.P.C.) in 1976, and became the Unione di u Populu Corsu (U.P.C.) in 1977. The new organization refused to become involved in electoral politics, citing perennial electoral fraud and the omnipotence of political 'clans' in Corsica. According to one author:

...un haut fonctionnaire est allé jusqu'à dire à un journaliste de France-Soir, en février 1974, que puisque tout le monde fraudait en Corse, les autonomistes n'avaient qu'à en faire autant, et que leur incapacité à frauder témoignait de leur isolement, et les disqualifiait tout autant que s'ils étaient démasqués par un scrutin sincère.122

The A.R.C.-A.P.C.-U.P.C., as the largest ethnoregional organization in Corsica, favors a statute of internal autonomy for Corsica within the French Republic. Its first congress - in 1967 - attracted 2,000 persons,123 while its 1975 'action congress', which preceded the Alèria events, was attended by 6,000 persons.124 Fully 15,000 people attended its 1974 congress, at which its program for internal autonomy in Corsica was promulgated.125 Since its inception, its leaders have been the celebrated (or infamous) Simeoni brothers, at least one of whom - Edmond - "...peut demain faire descendre dans la rue vingt mille Corses."126 Indeed, at the call of the newly-formed A.P.C. in 1976, some 10,000-15,000 persons demonstrated in the streets of Bastia for the release of Edmond Simeoni, leader of the 'coup d'Alèria',127 and on the opening day of his trial, a general strike took place throughout Corsica.128 Simeoni was released early in 1977 after serving only seven months of a five-year sentence, and a rally of the newly-formed U.P.C., organized by him later
in the year, attracted 8,000 persons. 129

According to The Economist, many Corsicans (unlike many Bretons) "...feel at least tacit sympathy with their separatist fringe." 130 Such sympathy, as in the Basque country, appears to extend to even more militant ethnoregional activity. Thus, a twenty-four-hour strike in November, 1976 to protest the continued imprisonment on the mainland not only of Simeoni but also of the perpetrators of the destruction of an Air France Boeing 707 at Ajaccio in September, 1976 was almost totally observed in Corsica. 131 Within three days of the strike, all five of the latter group were released. 132 A forty-eight-hour strike called by ethnoregional activists in September, 1976 to protest the continued presence of the Foreign Legion training unit in Corsica was also widely observed by workers and teachers, and within less than two weeks, the training unit was transferred to the mainland. 133

Ethnoregional politicization thus appears to be more widespread in Corsica than in Brittany, whereas ethnoregional activism per se seems to be a much newer phenomenon in the former than in the latter. A Partitu Corsu d'Azione (later the Partitu Corsu Autonomistu) did exist during the interwar period, and the journal A Nuova - responsible for the founding of this party - was discredited by its association with wartime collaborationist activity. Italian hopes of annexing Corsica on the contrary fueled the pro-French sentiments of Corsicans expressed in the famous 'Oath
of Bastia' (see footnote 114, page 219). The crucial dates in the emergence of ethnoregionalism in Corsica rather reflect the analysis given earlier of the catalyzing effect of the years 1958 and 1968 in France.

In 1958-1959, a Mouvement du 29 Novembre was created in Corsica. The name of this organization alluded to November 30, 1789 - the date of voluntary Corsican adherence to the new French Republic. Its formation was instigated by the threatened suppression of the railroad in Corsica and by the proposed installation on the island of an underground nuclear experiment center. The government had earlier, in 1957, unveiled a 'Programme d'Action régionale pour la Corse', whose principal aim was the promotion of agriculture and tourism. Without the subsequent arrival of the 'pieds-noirs' (French settlers in Algeria) in Corsica, the 'Société de Mise en Valeur de la Corse' - the agricultural arm of the government's regional action program - might have functioned quite differently. One of the chief complaints of today's ethnoregional activists is that this S.O.K.I.V.A.C. has favored the enrichment of pieds-noirs at the expense of indigenous Corsicans. Yet in 1958, the accent was on solidarity with the pieds-noirs, a great many of whom were of Corsican origin. (Following the coup d'état in Algeria, a Comité de Salut public even took power in Ajaccio, seat of the Corsican prefecture, and in Bastia, seat of its sub-prefecture.)

The Algerian conflict thus had an especially important significance in Corsica, whereas the influence of the
1968 events was of a very different sort. One author has described the latter quite succinctly:

...pour la Corse, les événements ne seront qu'une cou- pure pratiquement totale avec le Continent à cause de la grève générale qui respectent les marins...en Corse, il n'y avait pas d'université à occuper ou d'usines à envahir...135

The following year, an 'université d'été' opened at Corte for the study of the Corsican language, and the A.R.C., in addition to participating in (and often leading) protests by Corsican farmers, organized with forty professional groups an 'États généraux de la Corse', "...où l'on se met pour la première fois à parler d'autonomie.136

To aid in the realization of the government's 1957 regional action program, a Centre d'Etudes Régionales Corses (C.E.R.C.), the Corsican counterpart of the Breton C.E.L.I.B., was founded. It followed the opposite route from the latter, however (see pages 204-205):

...il a passé progressivement du plan de la collabora- tion avec le pouvoir central à celui de la défense et de la revendication, puis à celui de l'opposition au régime et de la lutte pour une région corse largement autonome.137

The C.E.R.C. took the initiative in calling for abstentions in the 1965 presidential elections. In Corsica, abstentions reached forty-four per cent (against a national average of fifteen per cent - Corsica included); de Gaulle received twenty-one per cent of the vote and Mitterand fourteen per cent.138 The C.E.R.C. issued a manifesto in 1967, outlining the economic malaise of Corsica, and in 1968 it succeeded in having cancelled the bicentennial celebration of the acquisi-
tion of Corsica by France. Meanwhile, other ethnoregional activity was brewing. In 1960 an Union Corse (a journal of socialist leaning) was created, and in 1964 a Centre d'Etudes et de Défense des Intérêts Corse (C.E.D.I.C.), a more conservative body, was founded by Max Simeoni, brother of Edmond. These two groups merged in 1966 into a Front Régionaliste Corse (F.R.C.), but the union was short-lived, the C.E.D.I.C. branch seceding the following year to form the Action Régionaliste Corse (A.R.C.) - the forerunner of the Action pour la Renaissance de la Corse (A.R.C.) - under the aegis of Edmond Simeoni, and the Union Corse branch eventually founding the Parti du Peuple Corse (P.P.C.). In 1970, there appeared a Parti Corse pour le Progrès (P.C.P.) and an Unione di a Patria, and in 1973 a Parti Corse pour le Socialisme (P.C.S.); the P.P.C. and the P.C.P. merged in 1974 into the Parti Populaire pour la Corse Autonome (P.P.C.A.). Ethnoregional activity in Corsica also took a more violent turn with the appearance in 1973 of the first politico-terrorist organization - the Front Paysan Corse de Libération (F.P.C.L.).

The politicization of ethnoregionalism in Corsica which began in the late 1950's, and its radicalization dating from the late 1960's, thus contrasts markedly with the period before 1957. The relatively late cultural renaissance in Corsica might be explained by the fact that no university has existed in Corsica since the time of Pascal Paoli, i.e. before Corsica's incorporation into France. It is true that
the Breton cultural renaissance was spearheaded by Breton students in Paris, but it must be remembered that until 1974, Corsican students were restricted to attendance at universities in southern France.

On the political plane, it might be said that Corsica has had a Bonapartist complex, a far cry from the Breton cultural complex of Bé cassine. Corsican history both before and after its incorporation into France is one of rebellion against its 'foreign' rulers. The Corsicans revolted against both the French monarchy in 1774 and the First Republic in 1793, and they rebelled once more following the demise of Napoleon in 1814. But the carefully constructed myth of Napoleon has undoubtedly had a special influence on the acculturation process in Corsica to this day, a Bonapartist party regularly elects candidates on the island. It is only recently that many Corsicans have turned instead to Pascal Paoli, the hero of Corsican independence (1755-1769), as the symbol of their nation. They see in Napoleon the traitor who once wrote to Paoli:

Général, je naquis quand la patrie périssait. Trente mille Français vomis sur nos côtes noyant le trône de la liberté de fleuvs de sang, tel fut le spectacle odieux qui vint le premier frapper mes regards.

There is another Corsican particularism on the political plane that may have contributed as well to the relative absence of ethnic subnational politicization there before the late 1950's: the ubiquitous and all-powerful clan system. Although the clans are not comparable to the Breton
aristocracy (except that they are also in essence dynasties), they have functioned in much the same way as did the Breton aristocracy in alliance with the Church — to oppose all outside modernizing influences. But whereas the influence of the Breton aristocratic-clerical alliance has declined throughout the twentieth century, that of the clans in Corsica has been only recently threatened by the outburst of ethnoregional activity in Corsica in the last twenty years. It is possible that traditional clan warfare — outlawed only in 1939 — indirectly discouraged a Corsican 'prise de conscience' as well.

On the socio-economic plane, although Corsica shares with Brittany a chronically high depopulation rate, its emigrants on the mainland have traditionally become lower-level functionaries (e.g. policemen, government clerks) rather than the unskilled laborers and domestics more characteristic of Breton emigrants.

This Corsican particularism may also partially explain the traditional Corsican attachment to the Republic. So too does Corsica's precarious status during World War II and the Corsicans' consequent adulation of their liberator — de Gaulle.

In Corsica, then, it seems that economic factors — an aggravated economic malaise — catalyzed the autonomist movement there, whereas economic factors in other ethnic regions merely radicalized previously viable ethnic subnational movements. Like Brittany, Corsica exhibits many of those characteristics of regional underdevelopment (see page 214),
but with two major differences:
1. its primary sector (excluding the pieds-noirs) is characterized chiefly by livestock- and crop-raising in the mountainous interior; and
2. its peripheral location vis-à-vis Paris is accentuated by its status as an island, whereas its deficiencies in transportation and communications facilities are aggravated vis-à-vis the mainland by this same insularity and within the island itself by its mountainous terrain.

Because its eastern plain was for centuries infested with malaria (eradicated only in 1943 by the American forces), Corsicans took to raising livestock in the mountains while importing foodstuffs from the mainland to bolster an insufficient mountain agriculture. Industrialization did make modest inroads in the nineteenth century in Corsica as in Brittany, but as in the latter its noncompetitive nature forced its demise. The debilitating population drain that began in Brittany in the second half of the nineteenth century began in Corsica at about the same time, although due to a compensating high birth rate as in Brittany, its effect on total population figures for the island was not apparent until after World War I.

Thus, the population of Corsica increased from 275,000 in 1880 to 320,000 in 1914, but by 1957 it had plunged to 180,000. Of this latter number, native-born Corsicans accounted for ninety per cent, foreigners for seven per cent, and other Frenchmen for three per cent. By 1975, the to-
tal population of Corsica had risen to an estimated \textsuperscript{150} 232,000-240,000, of whom native-born Corsicans accounted for only 140,000-173,000. \textsuperscript{151} Using the lower of these two sets of figures (which are Richardot's), the rest of the population is distributed as follows: 51,000 foreigners, 25,000 other Frenchmen and 16,000 pieds-noirs.

The two sectors of the Corsican economy that have boomed in the last fifteen years - wine and tourism - have been those essentially exploited by the latter two groups. Aided by the government-created S.O.N.I.V.A.C., the pieds-noirs have turned the former sterile eastern plain into profitable vineyards. Today in Corsica, 378 winegrowers with vineyards exceeding twenty hectares produce ninety per cent of the annual harvest; the great majority of them are pieds-noirs.\textsuperscript{152} 3,922 native-born Corsican winegrowers, on the other hand, possess vineyards of under twenty hectares and contribute only ten per cent of the annual wine production.\textsuperscript{153} The other side of the agricultural picture is that the number of Corsican-owned farms decreased from 12,280 in 1957 to 8,000 in 1970, most of the decrease being borne by the mountainous interior.\textsuperscript{154} Thierry Desjardins points out that since the notion of a Corsican people is one that cannot exist in French law, "On aide 'la' Corse, mais pas 'les' Corses. Alors pourquoi aider les pieds-noirs?", he asks ironically.\textsuperscript{155}

To promote tourism in Corsica, the government's 1957 regional action program created a "Société pour l'Equipement
touristique de la Corse' (S.E.T.C.O.). Between 1965 and 1975, tourism in Corsica increased at the rate of ten per cent annually. Of 350 new hotels built during that time, some 280 are owned by Corsicans; but of some 40,000 hotel rooms in Corsica, these 280 hotels offer only 8,400. Over half of those employed by the Corsican tourist industry are from mainland France, confirming Desjardins' remark that "Pire, les Corse ne trouvent même pas d'emplois dans ces hôtels." Whereas in 1960 Corsicans held ninety per cent of all the jobs in Corsica, by 1972 they held only thirty-one per cent, even though the number of jobs in Corsica increased by over twenty per cent during the period 1962-1972.

But in the early years of the Corsican ethnoregional movement - the late 1950's and early 1960's - the full impact of the S.O.M.I.V.A.C.'s and the S.E.T.C.O.'s policies had not yet been felt. Still, there were other causes for discontent, among them:
1. the threatened termination of all rail service in Corsica, and with no compensation in the form of improved roads;
2. a cost of living thirty per cent higher than anywhere on the mainland, due in large measure to the high cost of shipping goods from there;
3. the continued massive exodus of young Corsicans to the mainland in search of employment; between 1914 and 1960, according to Petrella, "...la diaspora corse passe de 50,000 à environ 800,000..."
4. the closing of factories, lycées and primary schools; ac-
gerding to one author writing in 1965:

Dans ce pays dont la production industrielle est la 
plus faible de tous les départements français, deux 
usines ont été fermées....Les lycées de Corte et Sartène 
viennent d'être supprimés, ainsi que 19 cours d'enseign-
nement général et 290 écoles primaires...163

5. the refusal of the Minister of Education to establish a 
university at Corte on the grounds that the number of stu-
dents did not warrant it; one weekly commented in 1965:

Or, chaque année, ils sont 2,500 étudiants à être obligés 
de quitter leur petite patrie pour venir suivre des cours 
sur le continent. Soit un effectif supérieur à celui des 
facultés de Reims! Faut-il rappeler que les universités 
édifiées et entretenues aux frais des contribuables fran-
gais à Dakar ou Tananarive ne comptent guère plus de 300 
inscrits?164

6. the exclusion of the Corsican language from the provisions 
of the Deixonne Law, a bill submitted to the National As-
sembly in 1965 by a deputy from Bastia to permit the teach-
ing of Corsican was rejected by the government.165

So the ethno-regional movement burgeoned. In 1968,
when de Gaulle conducted his pre-referendum consultation of 
regional notables, Corsica's général council went much fur-
ther than its Breton counterpart in unanimously requesting 
a regional autonomy statute from the government.166 But as 
in Brittany, ethno-regional activists (including the A.R.C. 
and the C.E.R.C.) campaigned against de Gaulle's regionali-
zation proposals, as did a majority of Corsican mayors and 
general councilors.167 The Corsican electorate subsequently 
approved the referendum by only fifty-four per cent.

After de Gaulle's demise, Georges Pompidou made his
first official trip as President of the Republic to Corsica, where he announced: "Il faut à la Corse une certaine autonomie. Elle se trouvait liée au référendum. Mais ce rejet n'entraîne pas celui des légitimes revendications de la Corse..." 168 Pompidou's use of the still-tainted term 'autonomy' did not go unnoticed by the press, and a presidential aide subsequently had to clarify its meaning here as favoring the detachment of Corsica from the 'région de programme' of Provence-Côte d'Azur-Corse and its constitution as the twenty-second French economic development region.

In 1970, the D.A.T.A.R. commissioned the Hudson Institute to prepare a report on Corsica. Its conclusions were the following: 169

- that the status quo could not be prolonged indefinitely, and
- that Paris had the choice between two options:
  - to accelerate the erosion of Corsican cultural identity, such as by encouraging a massive new immigration from the mainland, a solution which the Hudson Institute judged "douloureuse, difficile et aléatoire"; or
  - to conserve and restore Corsican traditions and cultural identity by developing the island's potential in a Corsican context - through a plan based on a special statute; such a solution, according to the Hudson Institute, "...semble raisonnable, sans grand risque et pourrait être intéressante et passionnante."

This report was kept secret by the D.A.T.A.R., but in 1971, the A.R.C. managed to procure itself a copy and to make it
public. In that year, the government apparently had the first option in mind when it unveiled a new 'schéma d'aménagement' for Corse 1985, which provided for, inter alia, a population of 320,000 by 1985, the increase to be effected by immigration from the mainland. 170 All of Corsica's local elected officials opposed the plan, but the twenty-seven amendments that they attached to it were ignored by the government. 171

Vincent Stagnara has called the period from 1972 to 1975 "...la phase d'identité nationale" in Corsica. 172 In 1972, the municipal council of Corte voted unanimously to create a committee, headed by the mayor, to press for the re-opening of the university at Corte; responsibility for the committee's external relations was given to the president of the C.E.R.C. 173 In the period 1972-1973, the issue that caused the most popular agitation in Corsica was 'l'affaire des Boues Rouges' - the dumping of industrial waste matter by the Italian Montedison Company. In 1973 the A.R.C., P.P.C. and P.C.P. joined first with the leftward-leaning journal Terra Corsa to demand a statute of internal autonomy for Corsica within the French Republic, and later with the Unione di a Patria to issue the 'Proclamation of Castellare'. The F.P.C.L. surfaced with the first politically-motivated bombings in Corsica in September, 1973, and in banning the terrorist organization in January, 1974, Jacques Chirac, then Minister of the Interior, declared that "Le F.P.C.L. a des relations avec certains mouvements italiens." 174
The beginning of 1974 witnessed two significant events: the announcement by the government that a 'centre universitaire' would be set up in Corsica, and the uncovering of what would be the first in a subsequent series of wine production scandals. Then in March the Prime Minister, Pierre Messmer, made a visit to Corsica and proposed a series of socio-economic reforms. Three days before his arrival, a new politico-terrorist organization - Ghjustizia Paolina (G.P.) - destroyed a Caravelle aircraft at Bastia airport, and two hours after his departure from the Bastia sub-prefecture, a bomb exploded there, the G.P. claiming responsibility for this act as well.

Early in 1975, Paris responded to the deteriorating situation in Corsica by sending an interministerial mission to the island, whose president, Libert Bou, met for twelve hours with an A.R.C. delegation before beginning his mission. After four months of consultations in Corsica, Bou proposed four essential measures for the island:

1. a ten-year development plan for roads, ports, airports, irrigation schemes, etc.;
2. the implementation of territorial continuity, i.e. the bringing of sea ferry charges into line with those of the national railways;
3. priority of employment in the public sector for Corsicans; and
4. guarantees for the island's cultural identity.

Bou's economic development 'charter', approved in July by Corsica's regional and general councils, further pro-
posed;\textsuperscript{178}

5. the development of tourism, but within a Corsican context (e.g. Corsican participation in the tourist industry, no more large developments along the coast, promotion of the mountainous interior for tourism, etc.);

6. the development of certain types of livestock-raising and specific proposals regarding the modernization of agriculture;

7. the development of industries of transformation of raw materials, as well as the expansion of already existing industrial zones;

8. the opening of a university at Corte in 1977; and

9. various fiscal incentives and environmental safeguards.

But trouble was already brewing. At the end of July, the F.P.C.L. destroyed two military aircraft at Ajaccio. Then, at its 'action congress' in August, the A.R.C. took a decidedly more militant stance,\textsuperscript{179} demanding a total revolution for the liberation of the Corsican people and vowing to eschew no means in the fight against the centralist state. It expressed its hostility to a "foreign (i.e. French) culture"; to Marxists "who deny the existence of the Corsican people"; to the pieds-noirs, 300 of whom held "seventy per cent of the vineyards"; and to those opposed to compulsory teaching of the Corsican language. It further criticized the administration for sending Libert Bou to Corsica to solve a political problem by means of an economic and social plan. (Bou had declared in April: "La Con-
stitution n’est pas négociable, même deux cent mille Corse, fussent-ils tous autonomistes, ne pourraient la modifier. 180

Following the congress, Edmond Simeoni and fifty militants armed with hunting rifles took over a wine depot at Aléria belonging to a pied-noir who had already been implicated in the wine scandals. The following day, Minister of the Interior Michel Poniatowski sent 1,000 members of the security forces armed with machine guns and using helicopters to retake the depot. Two policemen were killed in the assault and Simeoni surrendered, his fifty followers managing to escape. The A.R.C. was banned a week later, and on that same evening, another policeman was killed during rioting in Bastia.

In the wake of the violence, Paris made the following concessions: 181

-the creation of a 'Société d'Aménagement foncier et d'Équipement rural' (S.A.F.E.R.) to purchase land for redistribution to farmers and to combat land speculation;
-the appointment of the first Corsican-born prefect in 105 years;
-the promise that territorial continuity would go into effect on April 1, 1976;
-the replacement of 'le vote par correspondance' by 'le vote par procuration'; and
-the approval of a university at Corte.

Nevertheless, sporadic violence continued throughout the year, spawning a new counter-terrorist offensive. Des-
jardins speculates that

...d'jà depuis quelque temps Paris avait décidé de contre-attaquer et les services spécialisés avaient créé — comme en Algérie aux moments du F.L.N. et de l'O.A.S. — des organisations clandestines contre-terroristes.182

Indeed, the Communist mayor of Sartène, who received Giscard during the latter's 1978 visit to Corsica, declared to the regional prefect just prior to the President's arrival that members of the principal counter-terrorist organization were "...known in high places."183

In 1976 there appeared three new ethnoregional organizations: the Fronte Corsu, the A.P.C. (which succeeded the banned A.R.C.), and the Front de Libération Nationale Corse (F.L.N.C.), which was in fact the F.P.C.L. under a new name. Two Corsicans were condemned by the Cour de sûreté de l'Etat during the year: Edmond Simeoni, as well as the man allegedly responsible for the killing of a policeman at Bastia during the August, 1975 rioting there (the latter was given ten years). One of the most spectacular events of 1976 was Max Simeoni's recreation of his brother's 'coup d'Aléria' one year after the event, after which he went into hiding in the traditional Corsican 'maquis'. Finally, showing its solidarity with the population at large, the Corte municipal council voted unanimously on October 1 in favor of the withdrawal of the Foreign Legion training unit from the town.184

The beginning of 1977 witnessed the release of Edmond Simeoni and the recall, undoubtedly reflecting popular demand, of the Corsican-born prefect at Ajaccio (both Simeoni
brothers had called for his replacement). Only one week before Simeoni's release, Corsica's three deputys and two senators met with representatives of the A.P.C., in June, Simeoni and the secretary-general of the A.P.C. were received by the new Corsican prefect, and in October, two representatives of the pieds-noirs farmers met with Simeoni and the secretary-general of the U.P.C. (the A.P.C. having changed its name to the U.P.C. in July). The Simeoni organization thus seemed to be catalyzing a new kind of political dialogue in Corsica. Later in November, the Corsican Left Radicals proposed a regional statute for Corsica, which would entail a regional assembly elected by universal suffrage and proportional representation. This proposal became the basis of the joint Socialist-Left Radical bill submitted to the National Assembly on December 15, which provided for a special Corsican statute within the context of political decentralization throughout France (see pages 128, 148).

But there was another side to Corsican ethnoregional activity in 1977. The F.L.N.C., while continuing its terrorist campaign, also held three secret press conferences during the year. In May, the Cour de sûreté de l'État condemned two Corsican militants for reconstitution of a dissolved association (the F.P.C.L., which had been banned in January, 1974) and for several bomb attacks. Then, at the August rally of the U.P.C., Max Simeoni made a daring five-minute appearance, after which he disappeared into the maquis, eluding the police once more. (He surrendered the
following month, saying that hope for peaceful progress in Corsica had increased, and was released from detention in December. 189

For his part, Edmond Simeoni made two novel proposals during the year:

- that the U.P.C. conduct a census and issue a 'Corsican identity card' to everyone who applied for it, in order to establish more reliable figures on the Corsican population; and

- that the Corsican question be discussed at the international level, if necessary.

The new Corsican prefect, in the best Jacobin tradition, later dismissed both proposals as contrary to the principle of the national unity of France. 190

In April, 1978, nearly two and one-half years after the creation of a university at Corte by government decree, the administrative council of the university, fourteen of whose eighteen members had been appointed by Paris, agreed to stop meeting to protest the fact that the university still existed on paper only. 191 Two weeks later, the government named the architects who would be responsible for the university's construction, and announced that construction would begin in three months. 192 As with other Corsican demands, it seems that only pressure tactics elicit action from the government.

Later that month (and six weeks before Giscard's visit to Corsica), Corsica's four deputies to the National Assembly (all R.P.R.) presented to Prime Minister Raymond Barre
a six-point program for Corsica.\textsuperscript{193} It called for the re-establishment of republican order and the definition of a specific cultural policy, alongside four economic proposals. Then, only three days before his arrival in Corsica, the four wrote directly to Giscard, asking that immediate measures be taken and announced by him. This time they listed a ten-point program, one of the new points being the enlargement of the regional council from fourteen to twenty-four members. (Subsequent to his visit, Giscard agreed to a twenty-member Corsican regional council.)\textsuperscript{194} Then, in an unprecedented warning, these R.P.R. deputies solemnly declared:

\begin{quote}

Si une réponse n'est pas apportée à l'espérance qui se tourne vers vous, vous n'aurez plus affaire, un jour, aux députés d'un autre parti de la majorité ou de l'opposition : une minorité pousserait la Corse vers l'aventure, qui ne serait pas seulement celle de la violence et du désordre, mais d'abord la remise en cause du lien national.\textsuperscript{195}
\end{quote}

All of Corsica's legal ethnoregional organizations, grouped together in Chjama a Popula (Appel au Peuple), called on the Corsican people to boycott the official ceremonies related to the President's visit,\textsuperscript{196} and to abstain from any street demonstrations.\textsuperscript{197} Whether as a result of this request or not, the President in fact received lukewarm receptions in Ajaccio, Calvi and Corte, where small crowds turned out to greet him\textsuperscript{198} (only in Bastia did a larger crowd appear);\textsuperscript{199} and the only street demonstrations that occurred were those called by the Socialist and Communist workers' unions.\textsuperscript{200}

At Ajaccio, Giscard announced his "nouvelle politique


1. Departmental border from 1860 to 1876.
2. Departmental border of 1876.

The historic departmental names of Golo and Llomoso were not revived in 1976 but replaced by Haute Corse (Upper Corsica) and Corse-du-Sud (Southern Corsica), their respective capitals being Bastia and Ajaccio.

(Le Monde)
pour la Corse’ — essentially an expanded economic and social plan. He did hint at the possibility of a Corsican cultural charter, but in a subsequent letter to the Prime Minister, he said that its first realizations would be the restoration of a museum at Ajaccio and the creation of a regional conservatory of music.201

While in Ajaccio, Giscard met with Corsica’s regional and general councils and its economic and social committee. At that meeting, François Giacobbi, one of Corsica’s two Left Radical senators, spoke out in favor of a regional executive to be chosen from an enlarged regional assembly elected by universal suffrage.202 But later in Bastia, Giscard affirmed that an elected regional council "ne me paraît pas nécessaire", that Corsica’s problems "sont des problèmes économiques et sociaux", and emphatically declared: "Contrairement à ce que l’on dit et écrit souvent, il n’y a pas de problème de la Corse, il y a des problèmes en Corse."203 Such an admission is clearly tantamount to inviting more confrontation, as Edmond Simeoni later observed.204

Since the 1975 implementation of Libert Bou’s economic development charter, the French state has dramatically increased its expenditures in Corsica. The amount of francs devoted to regional development alone rose according to the following pattern:205

120 million in 1974
152 million in 1975
257 million in 1976
344 million in 1977.
In addition, since late 1975 the Corsican regional council has had control over the 'Fonds d'Expansion Économique de la Corse', the national treasury account that represents more than one-half the budget of Corsica's 'Etablissement public régional'.

But as Desjardins remarks:

...au fond, le dossier économique maintenant qu'il est traité enfin par Paris n'a peut-être plus d'importance ...c'est au moment où Paris se met à faire enfin quelque chose pour la Corse que les Corses se sont mis à revendiquer, à évoquer vraiment l'autonomie...

This is the phenomenon that Milton Esman calls 'rising expectations'. In the Corsican case, the government's responses to socio-economic demands have fueled political and cultural aspirations. According to the ethnoregional activists, only a 'solution politique globale' will resolve the Corsican question. It is noteworthy that the Common Program proposed not only political decentralization throughout France, but a special statute for Corsica as well - implicitly recognizing that the Corsican problem is not unidimensional. Why no special statute was proposed for Brittany as well can only be explained by the more volatile situation in Corsica at the time and the consequent perception of a more urgent need for drastic change there than in Brittany.

The Corsican ethnoregional movement is comparable to its Breton counterpart with respect to the catalytic effect of socio-economic discontent on its politicization and radicalization. But whereas in Brittany socio-economic factors both revived and transformed a Breton cultural and poli-
tical movement with roots in the late nineteenth century, in Corsica on the contrary the first significant manifestations of any subnational politicization are essentially socio-economic in character and postdate the Second World War. Because of this, it is difficult if not impossible to analyze the Corsican situation with any kind of historical perspective. Nevertheless, as Desjardins' above statement suggests, the Corsican movement in recent years seems to be placing an ever greater stress on other-than-economic issues.

This development stems undoubtedly from the realization that politico-administrative and linguistic-cultural factors have also contributed to the present Corsican 'ma-laise'. The immigration of pieds-noirs and of Frenchmen from the mainland, for example, has contributed to the development of the Corsican economy, but at the expense of indigenous Corsicans, who neither benefitted from government aids for regional development nor received any economic incentives from this development to check their migration to the mainland. Such a situation is bound to result in the questioning of whether the central government has regional interests in view, especially when any form of effective regional decision-making authority is expressly denied to the regions. In the Corsican case, the historically overpowering influence of the clan network on election results coupled with the post-1958 implantation of the Foreign Legion on the island are two political factors particular to Corsica which
favor on the one hand a popular 'prise de conscience' and on the other a desire for a devolution of power to the region.

Linguistic-cultural factors have also played a role in the broadening of the Corsican movement. The exclusion of the Corsican language from the provisions of the Deixonne Law until 1974 as well as the persistent refusal by the government to permit the opening of a university on the island have certainly contributed to the popular analysis that what appear to be discriminatory government policies in the areas of language and culture are in fact intimately related to the government's policy of regional economic development and to its non-policy of political decentralization in the ethnic regions.

The markedly more militant character of Corsican ethnoneregionalism (versus that of Brittany) may be a function both of cultural differences between the two regions and of the relatively late politicization of the former vis-à-vis the latter. While the Breton movement in the postwar years is characterized by a gradual new politicization of socio-economic issues and a parallel (and equally gradual) repoliticization of earlier linguistic-cultural and political demands, the Corsican movement on the contrary is distinguished by a more rapid politicization of first socio-economic, then political and linguistic-cultural issues — among not only ethnoneregional activists but also elected officials and even the population at large. But whether nationalist sentiment will prove as deep-seated and enduring in Corsica as it has in
Brittany is something that only historical perspective will reveal.

According to P. Savigear,

The Corsicans have demanded from the government a fundamental rethinking of its attitude to provincial particularism in order to ensure respect both for the identity of the various peoples of France and the integrity of the Republic as a whole. It is this which is at stake in Corsica and which concerns the other regions of France, and not simply a readjustment of the departmental power structure and the introduction of more widely based and responsible local institutions.

In this interpretation, it is almost as if socio-economic and politico-administrative demands have become means rather than ends of ethnoregionalism. But so too have linguistic-cultural demands, in the sense that by meeting them the government implicitly acknowledges not only the heterogeneity of the French nation but perhaps even the intrinsic worth of such heterogeneity as well. It is only by tangibly demonstrating its commitment to equal opportunity and economic and social justice, to popular sovereignty and self-determination in the political realm, and especially to 'le droit à la différence' - all within the context of its regions - that the government can hope to respond to the ultimate aim of ethnoregional activism in France.

Returning to Corsica once more, where if at all does Europe fit into its relationship with France? First of all, although Corsica elected four R.P.R. deputies in the 1978 general elections, the strength of the Left on the once staunchly Gaullist island should not be underestimated. Corsica's two senators are Left Radicals; both its regional coun-
cil and the general council of Corse du Sud are evenly split between the Left and the presidential majority; and the general council of Haute-Corse has twenty-three Leftist members against only six of the presidential majority. 210 Before and during Giscard's visit to Corsica, Leftist spokesmen, both Corsican and non-Corsican, reiterated the need to implement the Left's program of political decentralization and a special statute for Corsica. 211

Since the Left won approximately half of the national vote in the 1978 parliamentary elections, it will undoubtedly be well represented in the French delegation to the first directly elected European Parliament in 1979. Thus, in any discussion of regionalism in France within that body, the Corsican question is bound to be in the forefront. In addition, Corsica's strategic location in the Mediterranean, coupled with the fact that the island is incontestably the most volatile ethnic region within the present European Community (Northern Ireland being a special case), one can expect Corsica to be a major topic in general discussions of regional matters in this Parliament.

In 1968, the C.E.R.C. created a Corsican section of the European Federalist Movement, and drew up an eight-point program for Corsica, which included "...la reconnaissance des régions comme circonscription territoriale pour l'élection du parlement européen au suffrage universel." 212 But although the A.R.C. appealed directly to the U.N. on behalf of Corsica in 1975, and in spite of the fact that Edmond Simeoni has been
calling for the internationalization of the Corsican question since 1977, the A.R.C.'s successor organizations do not seem to have attached much importance to the European connection specifically. Nevertheless, despite their consistent condemnation of the violence of such organizations as the F.P.C.L./P.L.N.C., the Simeoni brothers have each engaged in illegal acts to dramatize the Corsican malaise. Furthermore, each has suggested the possibility of more militant action if the central government adopts an attitude of complete intransigence on the Corsican question. One can only hope that Europe will indeed hold out some promise of alleviating ethnoregional frustrations, for otherwise, the Corsican situation is liable to degenerate into even more widespread violence.

On the occasion of his recreation of the 'coup d' Aléria', Max Simeoni declared: "Nous sommes prêts à réfaire le serment de Bastia, mais qu'on ne nous oblige pas à choisir entre la France et la Corse. Nous voulons la citoyenneté française et la nationalité corse." As in the Breton case, perhaps the ultimate reconciliation of such multiple loyalties will lie in the long run with Europe.
Footnotes


3 Petrella, Commission des Communautés Européennes, septembre 1976, pp. 100, 102.

4 Ibid., pp. 138-139.


8 Héraud, Peuples..., p. 77.


12 Serant, p. 183.


14 Cf. e.g. Le Monde, 22 avril 1978, p. 3.

15 Le Monde, 26 octobre 1977, p. 3.


22. Fougéryrollas, p. 120; Jørgensen, The Importance of Small Communities, 1976, p. 17; Serant, p. 215; and Simon, Conference on Europe of Regions, 1977, p. 126.


30. Richardot; La France en Miettes, p. 111.


34. Petrella, Commission des Communautés Européennes, septembre 1976, p. 150.

36 Nauge in Contre les Etats..., pp. 41-42.


38 Serant, p. 79.


40 Ibid.


43 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, January 9, 1976, p. 27505.

44 Serant, p. 184.


48 Ibid., p. 250.

49 Serant, p. 149.

50 Fortier in Pi-Sunyer (ed.), pp. 93-94.

51 Ibid., p. 94.

52 Mayo, p. 42.

53 Serant, pp. 87-88; and Mayo, p. 18.

54 Fortier in Pi-Sunyer (ed.), p. 102.

55 Ibid., p. 103.

56 Ibid.
57 Parti Autonomiste Breton, quoted in Richardot, *La France en Miettes*, p. 139.

58 Serant, p. 105.


60 *Ibid*.


62 Mayo, p. 42.


64 Serant, p. 124.


68 Philipponneau, in *Contre les États...*, p. 53.


70 Jack Hayward, "Institutionalized Inequality within an Indivisible Republic: Brittany and France," "A Paper prepared for the Tenth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Edinburgh, August 16-21, 1976, p. 11.

71 Berger in Esman (ed.), p. 162.


Ibid.


95 *Le Monde*, 17 octobre 1978, p. 43.

96 C.E.L.I.B., quoted in Serant, p. 150.


98 Ibid.


100 Mayo, p. 52.

101 Ibid., p. 56.

102 René Pleven, quoted in Serant, p. 139.


104 Jean Rouyer, quoted in Ibid.

105 Mayo, pp. 17, 58.

106 Philipponneau in *Contre les États...*, p. 49.


111 Ibid., p. 144.


113 *Parti Autonomiste Breton*, quoted in Serant, p. 112.

114 'Serment de Bastia', 4 décembre 1938, quoted in Desjardins, p. 83.


117. Ibid.


120. Desjardins, p. 144.


123. Desjardins, p. 111.


125. Ibid., p. 27504.

126. Desjardins, p. 25.


132. Ibid.

Desjardins, p. 94.
Ibid., pp. 97-98.
Ibid., p. 112.
Albertini in Contre les États..., p. 71.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Reece, p. 36.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, January 9, 1976, p. 27504.
Richardot, La France en Miettes, p. 164.
Napoleon Bonaparte to Pascal Paoli (1769), quoted in Albertini in Contre les États..., p. 67. Napoleon's designation of Corsica as "le trône de la liberté" is in reference to the liberal-bourgeois Corsican constitution of 1735, which was admired by both Voltaire and Rousseau.
Reece, pp. 42-44.
Serant, p. 239.
Reece, p. 48.
Desjardins, p. 178.
Ibid.

According to Serant, pp. 239-239: "Les autorités... n'ont jamais pu évaluer exactement la densité de la population dans l'île....la population officielle est une population électorale, celle qui figure sur les listes, bien que les électeurs soient domiciliés réellement dans tous les coins du monde."

Richardot, La France en Miettes, p. 166; and Keesing's Contemporary Archives, January 9, 1976, p. 27503.
Desjardins, p. 182.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 179.
155 Ibid., pp. 200, 183.
156 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, January 9, 1976, p. 27503.
157 Desjardins, p. 187.
158 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, January 9, 1976, p. 27503.
159 Desjardins, p. 188.
160 Ibid., p. 190.
161 Albertini in Contre les Etats..., p. 71.
163 Serant, p. 253.
165 Albertini in Contre les Etats..., p. 70.
166 Ibid., p. 73.
167 Ibid., p. 74; and Desjardins, p. 112.
168 Georges Pompidou, quoted in Desjardins, p. 102.
169 Desjardins, pp. 194-195.
170 Ibid., pp. 197-199.
171 Ibid., p. 118.
172 Stagnara, Les Temps Modernes, No. 357, p. 1680.
173 Albertini in Contre les Etats..., p. 74.
174 Jacques Chirac, quoted in Desjardins, p. 121.
175 A 'centre universitaire' offers only the first cycle of university studies, and so to complete one's 'licence', it is necessary to do the second cycle at an 'université'.
176 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, January 9, 1976, p. 27504.
177 Ibid., p. 27505.
182. Desjardins, pp. 163-164.
190. Ibid.

Ibid.


Desjardins, p. 21.

Ibid., p. 106.


Desjardins, pp. 206, 171.


Cf. e.g. the proposals of the Communist mayor of Sartène in Le Monde, 1 juin 1978, p. 36; and of the Breton Socialist Louis Le Pensec in Le Monde, 11-12 juin 1978, p. 6.

Albertini in Contre les Etats..., pp. 73-74.

Cf. e.g. Le Monde, 13-14 août 1978, p. 18.


Max Simeoni, quoted in Desjardins, p. 153.
CONCLUSION

The opening quotation of this study alluded to increasing ethnoregional activism in the three unitary states of Great Britain, France and Spain, and suggested that these states deal with the phenomenon with an eye to a future three-tiered Europe of regions, nation-states and Community. Otherwise, the quotation continues:

If those three countries get it wrong, the mindless mini-nationalists who may eventually emerge as the dominant voice of Europe’s regionalists will be as anti-Europe as they are anti-London, Paris and Madrid.1

These words were written in April, 1977. In the short period since then, some dramatic changes have taken place in two of the above three countries, which, whether intended or inadvertent, do hold out some promise of furthering the cause of a regionalized Europe.

Devolution bills for both Scotland and Wales were passed by the British Parliament in 1978, and referenda on the legislation in both regions will be held in 1979. Beginning in late 1977 and continuing into 1978, the newly-elected Spanish régime granted pre-autonomy statutes not only to Catalonia and the Basque country but to ten other Spanish regions as well. Some critics might judge such concessions relatively non-substantive, pointing, for example,
to continuing - if not escalated - violence in the Basque country. Others might question continuing popular support for such measures, given, for example, the drop in the percentage of S.N.P. votes in the spring, 1978 local and by-elections. Nevertheless, there remains one inescapable conclusion to be drawn from these developments: whereas Great Britain (however grudgingly it has responded to pressures for devolution) and Spain (however hastily it has promulgated pre-autonomy statutes) are not the same unitary states that they were in April, 1977, France still is.

To those who would criticize the new British and Spanish policies towards regionalism - and ethnic regionalism in particular - as hesitant at best and nominal at worst, it must be pointed out that they are first steps, as are the upcoming direct elections to the European Parliament. Europe in 1979 is only just beginning to move beyond the nation-state, and whether this movement will ultimately result in the realization of the hopes of European regionalists is still a matter of speculation at this stage. One thing which does point in this direction, however, is the increasingly wider audience which is being attracted to the concept of a Europe of Regions, an idea which has long since moved beyond the realm of intellectual musings.

Ethnoregional activists of all kinds are its partisans, from linguistic-cultural organizations such as the Federal Union of European Nationalities to more politically-oriented groups such as the Bureau of Unrepresented European
Nations. It is considered a topical matter for scholarly attention: the Danish Institute in Copenhagen, for example, holds annual conferences on the subject. For its part, the Council of Europe sponsors a yearly 'Conférence des pouvoirs locaux et régionaux de l'Europe', and in 1975 it also organized the first conventions of the regional authorities of both the border regions of Europe and of the peripheral regions of Europe. Euro-M.P.'s and European Community officials alike have supported the idea and predicted its coming to pass. The European press is giving the matter serious attention, as well as devoting more coverage to events in the ethnic regions. And while Michel Debré pursues his lonely invective against both Europe and the regions, Jacques Chirac, another Jacobin zealot, has written the preface for a book on Pompidou and Europe in which the authors issue the following prescription for Europe's future:

Il faudra éviter, lors de la mise en place des institutions politiques de l'Europe, de faire renaitre à l'échelon européenne, la tradition jacobine de centralisme statique et de permettre l'écrasement des minorités ethniques et linguistiques par le jeu du vote de la loi commune par la majorité.2

But the hopes of ethnoregional activists (and others) may be as unfounded as Michel Debré's fears, for both hinge on a radical transformation of Europe from a centralized technocracy concerned uniquely with economic affairs to a Community which is to some degree politically accountable to the European citizenry and responsive to their needs. As Esman has observed:
Even where economic growth produces widely shared material satisfactions and opportunities and thus reduces propensities for conflict, it cannot deal with such problems as language, political participation, status rewards, and similar intense but non-economic issues.

The prospects for this kind of transformation of the European Community, however, are dependent in turn on the ability of the directly elected European Parliament to increase its powers, a feat of no small magnitude given not only outright opposition by some of the Community's member states to such an eventuality, but even juridical obstacles to it such as the one that France has imposed (see pages 160-161). Until the direct elections actually do take place, though, it is impossible to predict the degree of probability of an increase in the Parliament's powers being effected. It will depend upon a host of factors, including public interest in the new institution as evinced by electoral turnout for the first and subsequent elections, as well as the first directly elected Parliament's success in dealing with matters of immediate concern, such as progress towards a consensus on a uniform European electoral system.

The role that France chooses to play vis-à-vis both subnational and supranational developments in the years to come will be crucial in determining its continued viability as a nation-state. It is doubtful that it can succeed in keeping both Europe and its ethnic regions at bay in the long term. Interregional contacts and cooperation are on the increase, both among the latter's activists and between them and other European ethnoregional activists, and a di-
rectly elected European Parliament may provide fertile breeding ground for a European ethnoregional lobby. In the long run, it may be a combination of two types of pressures - European public opinion and escalated ethnoregional militancy against Paris - that ultimately induces France to recognize and deal meaningfully with its ethnoregional problem.
Footnotes


2 Cousté and Visine, pp. 99-100.

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