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INDIA'S ARMS CONTROL AND NUCLEAR POLICY:
A QUEST FOR AN ALTERED WORLD ORDER

by

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A dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada.

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Theoretically, the literature recognises the need to draw a distinction between 'capability' defined as means of influence, and 'influence' defined as the effects of an inter-action or of an encounter between two adversaries. The recent analysis of Klaus Knorr, which is discussed in the study, appears pertinent for our purpose. Yet in studies of modern international relations and foreign policy there is an over-emphasis on the convertibility of capabilities into influence. Similarly, the classical view of international relations over-emphasises the impact of great powers in shaping the foreign policy and the security processes of lesser powers.

The study takes the view that India is neither a great power nor a lesser power and yet it is involved in the international security processes. India can conveniently be called a middle power -- if the term relates to India's military and other material capabilities which are usually noted to rank a state in the international hierarchy. This however, is not our main focus in studying India's arms control and disarmament behavior. Instead, our focus is to study India as a 'power in the middle' -- a power which has become involved in the arms control dialogue whether or not the superpowers want India to be so involved in the 1970s and whether they wanted it to be so involved in the N.P.T. issue in the 1960s. Here influence is inferred from the actual outcomes and is not inferred from the premise that great powers naturally affect the policy process more, or even decisively, just because they are great powers. It seems that the literature over-emphasises the "top to bottom" focus of control and manipulation and, either ignores or totally misses the converse perspective, that is, where there is manipulation and control from the bottom to the top.

Essentially this is a case study of at least three strands in India's foreign policy. The first strand provides a perspective to study the Indian foreign policy system. The historical detail is not exhaustive as the purpose is simply to show how one might study India's foreign policy rather than to write a history book. The historical background is therefore, meant to provide a perspective to connect India's foreign policy and India's arms control and disarmament policy.

The second strand shows a parallelism and a link between India's attitude towards nuclear disarmament and its attitude towards nuclear power. The study shows that it is a mistake to assume that India does not believe in power politics or in the balance of power, even though this is a typical impression one has about India. A content analysis
of Nehru's statements yields important qualifications about Indian rhetoric. It seems that the rhetoric is misleading if it is taken as the basis to analyse Indian images of reality. As such it is difficult, if not impossible, to link Indian images to Indian decisions. That is, the concept of the image relates in part to the public rhetoric and in part to the private and confidential view of 'reality'. In the Indian case the two do not necessarily correspond with each other. In other words, a clear distinction must be made between Indian aspirations and Indian expectations; the speeches usually reflect the former and to a limited extent the latter. Furthermore, the second strand is useful because it demonstrates that the perceived importance of nuclear power has never -- from the late 1940s -- been absent in the Indian policy perspective. The variations concerned the utility of nuclear disarmament as a strategy as contrasted with making nuclear power more visible as a strategy. The policy focus always had a dual focus: 'no nuclear weapons for India at present' and 'peaceful uses of nuclear power for India at present'.

The third strand in the study assesses the relationship, if any, between domestic politics and foreign policy. The study shows that Indian governmental thinking on nuclear matters is on balance both consistent and articulate and existed before public opinion expressed itself in the late 1960s. It is also shown that even though Indian public opinion expressed itself in favour of India moving towards nuclear weapons immediately, the Indian government has resisted effectively such pressure. This is not to say that India may never develop nuclear weapons. On the contrary, this author has argued that it may do so in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. But if it does so it may not be in response to public opinion, that is, if present projection about Indian nuclear decision-making remain firm.

Neither should the China factor be over-estimated in Indian thinking. Indian speeches at Geneva during 1965-68 show that China was not the central element in Indian thinking and the problem of superpower imperialism is crucial to Indian views about international security. In other words, Westerners may be mis-perceiving Indian behavior on three counts: in over-estimating the problem of China in Indian foreign relations and security matters; in over-estimating the inevitability of Indian nuclear weapons development under present circumstances; and in under-estimating the impact of the behavior of Western states on Indian thinking. This study is guided by a sense that it is not simply enough for scholars and practitioners to be able to read and write English. One needs to coordinate perceptions and to improve the task of intelligence acquisition, particularly about intentions, if one is to try to coordinate interests in political, military and commercial relations.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The research for this study was extended in time and space. Preliminary research started during 1967-68 when I was a research fellow at the Institute of Sino-Soviet Studies, The George Washington University, Washington D.C. During this period, and in some cases after this, I benefitted from conversations with Kurt London, Philip Talbot, Harold C. Hinton, Raymond L. Garthoff, Arthur Lall, George H. Quester, Arnold Kramish, Col. "went Parrot, Harland Moulton, R.M. Rosecrance, Thomas C. Schelling; Robert F. Osgood, Subramaniam Swamy, W.C. Clemens Jr., Ralph Powell, W.J. Barndt, George Franklin Jr., the late Lt. Gen. R.M. Kaul, Leo E. Rose, the late Wayne Wilcox, Hedley Bull, Robin Ranger, Peter Lyon, and several members of the diplomatic and press communities in Washington D.C. To all of them I owe a general 'thank you' for stimulating my interest in problems of nuclear weapons and foreign policy. It is only fair to add that none of them bear any responsibility for the ideas expressed in this study.

The study took shape at Carleton University, Ottawa, after 1968, and more so at the University of Waterloo after I joined its political science faculty in 1971. Waterloo offers a fine atmosphere to work in and I want to thank Prof. John Wilson for making my task easier. At Carleton I was fortunate
to be a research assistant to the chair of strategic studies and was privileged to have access to General Charles Foulkes, the Honorable Alastair Buchan, Professors W.T.R. and Annette Fox, the late Mr. Leonard Beaton, and Lt. General E.L.M. Burns. I doubt if any of them shared state secrets with me but this was an opportunity which no graduate student could afford to miss.

At Carleton, Dr. Harold von Riekhoff was more than helpful in the process of incarnation and the incarceration of this work as a dissertation. His patience and advice has been a source of tremendous encouragement. Lt. Gen. E.L.M. Burns offered valuable insights concerning the developments in the E.N.D.C. during the 1960s. Professor Franklyn Griffiths of the University of Toronto insisted that I pay more attention to the domestic sources of foreign policy and nuclear policy. The sections on domestic sources benefit directly from this advice. However, the study indicates that one should be cautious in attempting to transplant Western and Soviet models to societies which sit at the crossroads of the East and the West. Such societies have developed their unique, or at least substantially different, strategies and techniques of gaining influence in diplomatic-military behavior. These differences ought to be examined and one should avoid the temptation of fitting the facts to suit the model. Finally, Professor Peyton Lyon pointed out an embarrassingly large number of stylistic errors. I am grateful for this. I take the easy recourse to cast the
blame on my Irish tutors in India who tried, but failed, to teach me English Grammar and on my mentors at George Washington and at Carleton who assumed that graduates know how to communicate in simple English. Professor W.T.R. Fox once offered the advice that I try telling a good story. This advice is sound but hard to apply.

In preparing this study I have drawn on published materials relating to disarmament and these are mostly available. However, the problem is not one of locating the material but it is to analyze it and relate it to the roots of foreign policy behavior. The latter part was the hardest and here I benefitted from conversations and help from a wide variety of official sources. In Washington my friends (and their families) Allan Furman and Edward Padelford were generous with their hospitality and paved my way in the maze of the Washingtonian bureaucracy. Tom Dine, a member of Senator Frank Church's staff, offered valuable insights about American foreign policy in India. In New York, S.C. Yuter (and his family) was generous in hospitality and stimulating in defence of the American approach to peace and security. The Transport, communications and the energy division, and the Historical division, in the Canadian Department of External Affairs in Ottawa provided copies of the relevant Indo-Canadian agreements from 1956 to 1968 and some related
documentation. Indian missions in New York, Washington, Ottawa, London and Vienna provided some of the copies of Indian statements on atomic energy and the N.P.T., and from time to time arranged for me to meet experts on questions which interested me.

My aim in preparing this study was to probe some of the conventional wisdom about Indian foreign and security policies, including nuclear policy. This required intensive rounds of interviews with knowledgable officials -- Canadian, American, Soviet and Indian. Most of these officials received me courteously and discussed issues candidly. Regrettably, because many of them are still on active duty, their identities must remain unknown but I do want each and everyone of them to know how much I appreciate their help.

These interviews were conducted during several trips to the United States -- too many to be counted during 1968-73. In addition I undertook a flying trip to European capitals in May 1971 and two trips to India in May-June 1971 and December 1971. This was followed by another trip to India in July-August 1973. A special word of thanks is due to Professor Subramanian Swamy, Mr. K. Subrahmanyan, Colonel Pyara Lal, Mr. C.R.M. Rao, Dr. J.D. Sethi, and Mr. S.L. Poplai for their encouragement and help in assessing the nature of bureaucratic and party politics in India.
Finally, I should thank my parents and particularly my father, Mr. R.P. Kaur, formerly of the Indian Civil Service, who first directed me to the study of foreign policy and who has helped me in many ways. My wife, Deepika, cheerfully bore the burden of typing the drafts and demonstrated an ability to keep the peace, indicating that there is more than one way to keep the peace.

Needless to say, the opinions in this study are personal and do not necessarily represent the views of any government or any official agency.
INTRODUCTION

This is a study about a weak actor's behavior in international security relations, where the weak actor seeks to alter the behavior and attitudes of a stronger actor. The study does not treat behavior as an attribute of the position of a state in the international hierarchy. Given this approach the dominant-subordinate focus and the classical view of international relations is questioned.

1 The classical view is outlined by Harold Nicolson, as follows: "it was assumed that the Great Powers were greater than the Small Powers, since they possessed a more extended range of interests, wider responsibilities, and, above all, more money and more guns. The Small Powers were graded in importance according to their military resources, their strategic position, their value as markets or sources of raw material, and their relations to the Balance of Power". The Evolution of Diplomatic Method, Constable & Co., London, 1954, pp. 73-74.

A more 'modern' view is that of Brecher. The great power-small power focus is broadened to include super powers and middle powers but 'behavior' is seen in terms of the 'power scale'. To quote him: "In the contemporary international system states can be plotted along a continuum
Secondly, this study critically examines the concept of decision and decision-making in foreign policy analysis. Brecher’s attempt to apply the concept of decision to India’s nuclear behavior reveals the difficulty of identifying the decision(s) and the relationship between the Image and the Decision.

1 (contd.)

of capacity to influence the behavior of other actors and the dynamics of the system as a whole. There are four broad categories: superpowers, great powers, middle powers, and small powers. The place of any state in the power scale depends on a combination of four components — size, population, military capability, and economic capability, the last two, especially at the point in time of status designation”. According to Brecher the superpowers possess all four components and this gives them a “unique veto” over the survival of the system and all its members. The great powers possess any three of the four, and so on. Cf. Michael Brecher, et al, “A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume XIII, 1969, p. 90.

This point is discussed in detail later.
Text complete; leaf 3 omitted in numbering
The effort to locate a decision in a contemporary issue can be misleading unless one can refer to secret archive materials — to identify the decision-makers, to identify the prevailing images and to establish the relationship between the images and the decisions. For example, Brecher refers only to the 1964 decision to abstain from nuclear weapons production. Presumably this refers to India's decision to sign the partial test ban and to agree not to test atomic devices in the atmosphere. On the other hand however, 1964 is not the point in time for identifying the Indian decision against nuclear weapons production. In retrospect, the 1964 'decision' is preceded with a pre-1964 and a post-1964 Indian nuclear perspective. Mr. S.S. Khera, a senior Indian civil servant notes that:

"Those who knew Dr. Bhabha and worked with him were aware of his urge to work towards having everything ready for the bomb, 'for the present'. He was a good administrative strategist; and due to his influence Jawaharlal Nehru (who, besides being Prime Minister and Foreign Minister was also the Minister for the Department of Atomic Energy headed by Dr. Bhabha) seemed towards the end to equivocate a little about his own otherwise clear stand upon nuclear policy, which was, to abjure nuclear weapons and to commit the nation to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Lal Bahadur Shastri, when he was Prime Minister after Nehru, seemed inclined to maintain the
option; his attitude broadly being that India would not do anything towards making the bomb, "at present". 2

Thus, the sophisticated analyst should note that in the pre-1964 Indian nuclear perspective there were in fact at least two decisions: first, to keep the nuclear option open and to establish the technological base for a military program; second, to refrain from building a bomb "at present", and by implication, to refrain from making visible a nuclear infrastructure of a military nature. Given these, there is a danger in looking for 'the' decision or in regarding the concept of decision as a terminal condition in the policy-making process. Moreover, this kind of an analytical problem became apparent when India's disarmament strategy of 1964–67 in the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Conference at Geneva revived the issues and possibilities inherent in India's nuclear policy of the 1950's.

There are at least four principal points in the study. First, it looks at Indian nonalignment as a strategy which is distinct from that of alliance politics. An analysis of alliance is not offered but standard mis-conceptions about Indian nonalignment are challenged. Take for example the view of the late Leonard Beaton. He claims that "Her [India's] proposals took the form of protests against any notion of a power system and reinforced the emotions that had given rise to the doctrine of non-alignment. This tradition has been continued by the non-aligned powers in the Geneva disarmament committee. No doubt this activity helps to give countries which feel excluded from the central direction of world affairs a sense of participation in world order. A posture of moral superiority is available to those who find this a satisfying compensation for their lack of influence. Countries availing themselves of this option are usually those in which a reputation for being men of peace is a valuable domestic political asset to prime ministers or foreign ministers."

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Coming from a scholar who knew something about Indian security policies, this overview is over simplified. First, India's behavior was not a protest against all kinds of power system, but only the ones where there was a danger of superpower dominance or imperialism. Nehru's and Indira Gandhi's statements make this clear. Secondly, Indian nonalignment was, and still is, an attempt to shape the balance of power through diplomacy supplemented by the use, or threatened use, of conventional military power against appropriate targets. India's behavior toward China and Pakistan makes this clear. Thirdly, this was the tradition which was continued in India's behavior in the Geneva disarmament committee. Fourthly, it is not true that India felt excluded from participation in international security concerns; there are several instances of its participation in international crises such as the Korean war, the Geneva Accords of 1954, the Laotian agreement of 1961, Congo peacekeeping, the International Control Commission in Indo-China in the 1960s, and of course, in disarmament and arms control issues. Of course it is true that India has not participated in the evolution of Soviet-American military and political relations. At the same time it is hardly true that this bilateral relationship represents the dominant axis in the evolving world order or that the world is simply an extension of the Soviet-American relationship. Finally, this study
recognises that in the past there has been a problem with the Indian posture of moral superiority. However, this should not be a problem in studying India's security behavior because in-practice India usually did not treat morality as a substitute for a strategy of balancing power in its strategic environment.

The second perspective in this study sees India as a power in the middle (rather than a middle power) -- a power which gets into the middle of an act whether the other actors like it or not, so that the other stronger powers are forced to interact with the power in the middle. This view rejects the idea of a middle power -- where behavior is an attribute of capabilities and hence, of a position in the so-called international hierarchy of power. Spiegel's study reveals the difficulty with that focus. To quote him:

(1). "The gap between the most powerful and the weakest of states has been widened by technological developments which aided those already most powerful".

(2). "It is the position of each state in the international hierarchy which determines in large measures the way in which it acts and the way in which it is treated by other governments".

(3). "While medium-range nations may be able to influence countries with less power than their own, only primary powers are able to influence and even direct the policies of countries of all sizes and strengths".

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Dominance and Diversity: The International Hierarchy, Little Brown & Co., Boston, 1972, pages 10, 40 and 19 respectively.
Such statements are merely assertions. The material gap between the rich and the poor, the militarily strong and the weak, has undoubtedly grown in the past two decades. However the significance of this fact, for analyzing the distribution of influence in the international system or for analyzing the foreign policy and security behavior of states, is not self-evident. Spiegel’s last assertion is particularly suspect. It fails to trace influence where a medium power may be able to check or influence a stronger actor, and where the weaker actor may be able to secure tactical advantages for its policies and to influence the choices of the stronger actor. By contrast the notion of a ‘power in the middle’ is helpful because it refers not to the position of an actor in the international hierarchy but instead refers to the effective involvement which an actor can maintain in an issue area.

The third and the fourth perspectives are interlocked. Schelling distinguishes between ‘action’ which is meaningful and ‘talk’ which is ‘cheap’ because the latter lacks the power to hurt and may be ineffective while action signifies a commitment or even an irrevocable commitment. To quote him:

“One can still ask why the same association cannot be made verbally, providing much greater freedom of action if a greater freedom is desired. Part of the answer may be that words are cheap, not inherently credible when they emanate from an adversary, and sometimes are too intimate a mode of expression.
The action is more impersonal, cannot be 'rejected' the way a verbal message can, and does not involve the intimacy of verbal contact. Actions also prove something; significant actions usually incur cost or risk, and carry some evidence of their own credibility. And actions are less ambiguous as to their origin; verbal messages come from different parts of government, with different nuances, supplemented by 'leaks' from various sources and can be contradicted by later verbal messages, while actions tend to be irrevocable, and the fact that actions occurred proves that authority is behind it. 5

Of course, part of the problem with words is real, that is, if it relates to 'leaks' which are unidentified and/or unauthorized. But inasmuch as this is a major problem in the American policy process, the distinction which Schelling makes between a verbal strategy (or a strategy of using non-coercive norms to pursue policy goals) and a strategy of action and a strategy of military threats, is not necessarily valid. First, 'actions' may lack credibility if the actor taking action has a reputation for bluffing and for altering commitments when confronted with pressure. Secondly, words, which are authorized, which are not contradicted and which are preceded with a reputation for honesty in signalling intentions can also convey a willingness to take risks and incur costs. Such words can convey a meaningful commitment and can convey a willingness to hurt later even if the power or the ability to hurt does not exist at the time the message was conveyed.

5 Arms and Influence, Yale University Press, 1966, p.150, my emphasis.
From this difference between words and actions flows Schelling's second idea, namely, that inasmuch as words are cheap and ineffective one needs the power to hurt militarily to bargain. This study challenges the narrowness of both views and tries to show that logically one can bargain without necessarily having the power to hurt militarily; that to bargain one needs to get into the game and to make one's participation unavoidable for the other side, and that one can achieve such participation through diplomacy or a strategy of asserting non-coercive norms. In other words, Schelling's focus refers to military bargaining between known adversaries. This study examines India's bargaining behavior by concentrating on (i) negotiations between friends (e.g., India and Canada in the 1950s) and, (ii) India's strategy of injecting non-coercive norms and world order concerns into disarmament discussions between adversaries. In short, the study's focus is on the pursuit of India's world order concern through its arms control and nuclear policy. At the same time the study takes into account the bargaining aspect of India's policies towards the U.S.A. and Canada in particular -- between an adversary and a friend respectively, on the question of promoting transfers of nuclear materials and nuclear technology to India.
Background to India's Arms Control and Nuclear Behavior

For background purposes it is useful to note the main lines of Indian foreign policy and arms control thinking in the post-World War II order. This background is useful for analysing India's arms control behavior particularly with respect to the issue of international safeguards (or controlling the peaceful atom) and the issues which India raised in the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Secondly, it is useful to identify in summary form the main international events which influenced India's arms control behavior. Thirdly, it is also necessary to make a preliminary attempt to conceptualise India's foreign policy behavior. It should be noted however, that since the state of the art on the Indian foreign policy 'system' is under-developed, and culture-bound, the observations made here cannot be fully documented; hence these should be treated as this author's own interpretations.

Continuity And Change in India's Foreign Policy Behavior
(1947-1970); A General Comment

During the 1950s and the 1960's the main themes in the Indian behavior consisted of the following:

(1) A search for a global system which recognised the economic needs of the developing powers -- a system which would accelerate the flow of capital and technology into India to promote India's developmental goals.
(2) A search for a global system which recognised the need to diffuse the power of the militarily powerful states through disarmament and which improved the security of weaker states.

(3) A search for a world of non-aligned states rather than a world of military alliances,6 of the Dullesian mold.7

However, a difference between Indian 'views of the world' and its actual behavior should also be noted. For example, while the Indian government vehemently argues (argued) against the idea of balance of power (viewing non-alignment as an alternative to power politics) as a strategy, non-alignment has functioned as a form of balance of power politics.8

6 A policy of mistrust of alliances has at least one significant historical precedent, in Kautilya's Arthasastra (about 300 B.C.). Kautilya's Arthasastra, translated by R. Shamsastry, Wesleyan Mission Press, Mysore, 1923, p.320. According to Kautilya a "double policy" of making peace with one and waging war with another is preferable to an alliance policy because "an allied king has to help his ally at his own expense".


8 Since there is no agreement in the literature about the precise meaning of 'balance of power' it is best to provide a working definition here. It refers to a policy which seeks to balance the opponent's influence through military and/or diplomatic means. With reference to India's behavior the idea of a 'balancer' is not applicable. Instead, India's approach was (is) to seek the growth of a number of interlocking balances, that is, a balance within the Indo-Soviet,
India's foreign and military policies indicate elements of continuity and change. The continuity refers to the constant attention which Indian elites have given to foreign developments, if these appear to affect India's political, economic and security environment. First, the attention

1 (contd.)
Indo-U.S. and India-China pairs, and secondly, a balance between these pairs; that is, in India's strategy, Soviet support for Indian aims is encouraged to offset American pressure on India, just as American support for India or China's support for India is aimed to offset Soviet pressure on India. The point about India's behavior is not simply that such external centers of support exist but that policy issue(s) need to be defined and developed to encourage institutionalisation of external support for India. It is in this sense that the notion of balance of power is pursued via diplomatic means. Secondly, the use of military power against Pakistan and China also suggests that the balance of power idea is relevant in the study of Indian behavior. For a general discussion of the idea of balance of power in India's behavior see A.P. Rana, - "Indian Non-alignment And the Balance of Power", and Arthur Lall, "Evolution and Permanence", in Paul F. Power ed., India's Nonalignment Policy, D.C. Heath & Co., Boston, 1967. For a discussion of relations among India, Pakistan, China and the U.S.S.R. see Gupta, B.S., The Fulcrum of Asia, Pegasus, New York, 1970;

relates to India's immediate strategic environment.
Secondly, India has given considerable attention to the
behavior of the industrialised nations, the superpowers,
and international organisations, all of whom are in a
position to aid its developmental effort. Thirdly, the
involvement of foreign powers was recognised as a 'foreign
interference' in India's developmental and security
processes.

The changes in the Indian foreign policy behavior
are hard to discern, but are worth noting. First, Indian
spokesman insist on the continued relevance of non-alignment

9 Gupta, op.cit., and Kavic, L.J., India's Quest for

10 Kothari, op.cit., chapter 10.

11 Nehru's harsh treatment of Indian communists is
well known. Arthur Stein, India and the Soviet Union: The
Nehru Era, University of Chicago Press, 1969, discusses
Indo-Soviet relations from an Indian perspective. S.N.
Mullik, The Chinese Betrayal, Allied Publishers, New Delhi,
1971, discusses Nehru's view about the role of the Chinese
threat. LT. Gen. B.M. Kaul, Confrontation with Pakistan,
Vikas Publications, Delhi, 1971 (chapters 21-22), questions
Mullik's portrayal of Nehru's views about Chinese intentions.
Mohm Ram, Maoism in India, Vikas Publications, Delhi,
1971 discusses the impact of Maoism in India.
and peaceful co-existence, but the application of these principles has altered over time. Taking the 1954-62-71 time frame, the theory of peaceful co-existence has remained relevant in Indo-Soviet relations but not so (except theoretically) in India-China relations. By contrast the idea of peaceful co-existence has never been applied to Indo-U.S. and Indo-Canadian relations and this indicates that this theory is meant essentially for structuring a relationship with India's two principle communist neighbours.


Secondly, while Indian spokesmen insist on the continued utility of the idea of non-alignment, the relationship between military policy and diplomacy in the 1954-62-71 time frame has changed over time. In the 1950s the Indian defence mechanism was modest in scope and geared to the threat from Pakistan and to the danger of communist subversion within India. China's takeover of Tibet in 1950 aroused Indian suspicions about Chinese intentions. If the former Indian intelligence chief is to be believed, this represented a point of departure in India's security planning. India's poor military performance during the 1962 crisis with China revealed serious deficiencies in the quality of intelligence, training and equipment of the Indian defence services. Subsequently, India embarked on an intensive plan to modernise its defence machinery and even though the Indian Air Force failed to achieve air superiority over Pakistan during the 1965

14 The relevant figures are in Military Balance, IISS, London, annual.

15 Mullik, op.cit.

Kavic, op.cit.
Ministry of Defence, New Delhi, annual reports, provide the general details of deficiencies and efforts to remove them.
war, the overall Indian military performance was creditable. Therefore, in the aftermath of the 1962 crisis, two changes in India's security behavior were noteworthy. First, the idea of 'peace' and non-alignment in the Indian foreign policy rhetoric was not moderated but the theory of peaceful co-existence came to be applied primarily to India's Soviet policy and not India's China policy. Secondly, while the idea of peace as the ultimate goal of Indian policy remained constant, in practice the Indian foreign policy establishment recognised that available military force was a vital pre-condition for the achievement of peace.

Events which influenced India's arms control and nuclear diplomacy in the 1950s and the 1960s.

Substantial American military aid to Pakistan in the mid-1950s, the Chinese takeover of Tibet in 1950 and the


subsequent problems in India-China relations, the willingness of the Soviet Union to invest in Indian economic development in the mid-1950s and after, were the three events which shaped India's political and military responses in the 1950s. American policy of keeping India off balance through a strategy of supplying military equipment on a grant or concessional basis to Pakistan evoked strong Indian protests. Apart from the danger which the Pakistan military posed to India's position in Kashmir and its lines of communications in India's northwest, the American strategy from the Indian perspective appeared to have broader implications. The broader focus was felt to reflect American hostility for India's position.

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as a non-aligned force in world politics. This focus became a contextual feature in the arms control and disarmament negotiations, that is whenever India and the United States faced each other in arms control and disarmament negotiations. For example, India’s attitude against President Eisenhower’s ‘atoms of peace’ proposal of 1953-54 appeared to be shaped by general Indian perceptions about the nature of American foreign policy in the Indian sub-continent.

China’s behavior on the Tibet issue during the early 1950s had implications for the future of Tibet itself, the future of Tibet as a buffer between India and China, and the future of India-China relations. From 1949 (when the People’s Republic of China was established) to 1961 (when the Zorin-McCloy Principles on collateral arms control were defined) China did not seem to be a central factor in India’s

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Acheson, D.G., Present At the Creation: My Years at the State Department, Norton & Co., New York, 1969, pp. 336, 416. Chester Bowles, Ambassador’s Report, Harper & Row, New York, 1954, p.3, notes that President Truman was "puzzled" by Nehru and some Washington officials wondered whether Nehru was a Communist sympathiser. In another study Bowles notes the following: "Of particular concern was the report that secretary of State Dulles, exasperated by Nehru’s refusal to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty which he (Dulles) had negotiated or to 'modify' India's non-aligned foreign policies, was in favour of the proposed build-up of the Pakistan Military". This was in 1953. Cf. Bowles, Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969, Harper & Row, New York, 1971, p.478.
arms control and disarmament diplomacy. Yet, during 1961-63 India veered toward the Soviet-American view about the desirability of 'arms control' if total 'disarmament' was not practical. Nehru's statements on disarmament recognised the difference between balanced arms control which is controlled and total disarmament which was desired but was not readily available. India's enthusiasm for the partial test ban agreement symbolised India's acceptance of the idea of Soviet-American detente as a basis of arms control. This enthusiasm in part recognised the importance of moderating the superpower rivalry. In part it also recognised the importance of shaping an agreement which excluded China and was therefore, political in nature; that is, it had an implication which was more than that of reducing superpower rivalry.

24 Of course, one can argue that since Nehru first mooted the idea of a test ban in 1954, it was then that India sought to isolate China in the disarmament arena. The Chinese argued in 1963 that as early as 1956 "the Soviet leaders divorced the cessation of nuclear tests from the question of disarmament". Cited in Clemens, W.C. Jr., The Arms Race & Sino-Soviet Relations, Hoover Institute Publications, 1958, p.35. This idea may also explain India's disarmament behavior although Nehru could not have decided that the India-China relationship was irreparable in 1954 because it was only in 1959-61 that Chinese and Indian diplomatic positions started to freeze, although they had started to harden during 1954-59.
Of the three external factors, if American policy in the Indian sub-continent caused India to suspect American intentions generally, and China's behavior during 1954-59 caused India to find comfort in its relationship with the Soviet Union, the Soviet willingness to invest substantially in India's economic and political future after 1954-55 encouraged India to structure its arms control and disarmament policy in terms of its general political relationship with Moscow. Two events -- Soviet opposition to the Baruch Plan, and the American plan for establishing an International Atomic Energy Agency to control and to encourage the peaceful uses of atomic energy -- encouraged Indo-Soviet cooperation in the field of disarmament. This cooperation reflected a similarity of Indo-Soviet arguments, that is, between Soviet arguments vis-a-vis the United States on the Baruch Plan and Indian arguments vis-a-vis the United States on the Safeguards issue in the International Atomic Energy Agency deliberations. This cooperation did not actually entail sharing of Soviet atomic technology with India. In other words, the effect of the two events noted above deepened Indo-Soviet cooperation internationally, but not bilaterally.  

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In March 1960, Moscow offered atomic energy assistance to India on terms similar to those of its other aid projects. "Russia to build Indian Atom Plant", The New York Times, March 8, 1960; and Arnold Kramish, The Peaceful Atom in Foreign Policy, Harper & Row, New York, 1963, pp.194-5. This assistance involved the establishment of a power plant. However, the October 1961, Indo-Soviet agreement referred to research, not to a power plant.
Despite the shifts in India's relations with the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and China, India's nuclear policy has remained constant -- from the 1950s to the 1960s. In the 1950s Canada was the principal supplier of atomic fuel and reactor technology to India. At this time India's opposition to the idea of control over the peaceful uses of atomic energy applied principally to American proposals in the I.A.E.A. The opposition related to the American view that peaceful rather than military uses needed to be safeguarded. The opposition did not relate to the principle of having a Safeguards system, only that the system should be universal, not discriminatory.

In retrospect one can argue that India's willingness to sign the partial test ban contrasts with its refusal to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and that this suggests a shift in India's behavior. This difference may be superficial rather than real because India has been

27 Actually Nehru's belief in atomic energy goes back to 1946. According to Kavic, "Nehru stated his hope that India would develop atomic power for peaceful uses but warned that, so long as the world was constituted as it was, every country would have to develop and use the latest scientific devices for its protection". Cf. Kavic, India's Quest for Security, p.28.
consistent all along, during the 1950s and the 1960s in asserting the need for a security system which provided security for all and secondly, which recognised the principle of national sovereignty.

Proposals for stabilising the international security machinery recognise theoretically the virtue of these ideas for third parties and formally implement these ideas in agreement between the two superpowers. Thus, the fifth principle of the Zorin-McCloy agreement notes that,

"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any state or group of states gain military advantage and that security is ensured equality for all". 28

Similarly, Article IV of the partial test ban treaty and Article X of the N.P.T. recognise the reliance on the principle of national sovereignty in national decision-making; that is, withdrawal is permissible if continued adherence to a treaty hurts national security and, therefore, by implication, hurts national sovereignty. Admittedly, the idea of 'equal security' is unclear. As Beaton notes it can mean that all will have security or that all will have equal security, whether this is more or less. 29 Nonetheless the idea exists both in treaty language and in Indian speeches but in its application it is partial to


29 Ibid., p.82.
the policies of the super-powers rather than those of the lesser powers.

Conceptualising India’s behavior in the 1950s and the 1960s.

Conceptualising India’s foreign policy and security behavior is hard because non-Indian models are only partially applicable to the study of Indian foreign policy. As a noted Indian scholar points out, the Indian model of decision making is directed from above with a “widening base of political consultation and persuasion”. To quote him:

“In a variety of ways, political decision-making determines priorities on allocation of resources, statuses, and goals... While the substance of politics has no doubt to be perceived beneath formal institutions of authority in terms of patterns of elite socialisation and coalition-making, it is also the fact that the political-institutional forms assume a primacy and a dynamism of their own; define society’s goals and means, and bring more and more of social reality under their area of control.”

This observation about the general conceptual scheme of Indian policy making is helpful also in conceptualising about India’s foreign policy mechanism. While Indian foreign policies are characterised by elements of continuity and change, and conflicting tendencies may appear in response to shifts in elite views, the shifts are responses to external developments, or are best explained as such. The role of domestic politics in foreign policy making is

marginal. In other words, even though Indian external strategies move in different directions (as is the case with its arms control and disarmament policies) the strategies respond to conflicting views among the policy elites and to ambiguous international developments, rather than to electoral or party politics.

An application of Brecher’s research design to the Indian policy framework reveals the ambitiousness of that design in relation to India’s foreign policy but parts of his design are useful.

31 The Foreign Policy System of Israel, Yale University Press, 1972, pp. 3-4. Brecher discusses the idea of decision and the influence of interest groups with regard to domestic issues, (succession politics, food and language issues) in India, in Succession in India: A study in Decision-Making, Oxford University Press, London, 1966; this book appears also with a different title, as Nehru’s Mantle: The Politics of Succession in India, Praeger, New York, 1966 but the content is the same. Likewise, his Political Leadership in India: An Analysis of State Attitudes, Praeger Special Studies in International Politics & Public Affairs, 1969, deals with decisions relating to election politics.

32 In India’s arms control and disarmament strategies, the conceptual focus in India’s behavior refers entirely to the potentially dominating features of the external environment. Excluded from our analysis of India’s disarmament speeches is the question of conventional disarmament or arms control, vis-a-vis Pakistan or China.
Some of Brecher's sub-categories of the operational environment, (e.g., subordinate, dominant) are inapplicable to the study of Indian foreign policy behavior. The notions of dominance and subordination require a statement of fact, and the available literature does not convincingly show that India's behavior is that of a subordinate actor in world politics.

Likewise, Brecher's internal operational environment (military capability, economic capability, political structure, interest groups and competing elites) is mostly inapplicable to a study of India's arms control and disarmament behavior in particular, and foreign policy in general. Two reasons justify this statement.

First, information about India's military and economic capabilities and its organisational apparatus for policy making is available and reliable, but the role of competing elites and interest groups is hard to hypothesise.

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33 The defence figures are in the Military Balance, IISS, London, annual. Indian economic data is published by the Indian Planning Commission, Ministry of Commerce and Trade, the Reserve Bank of India and is also analysed in reports of international organisations (U.N. and its agencies) and regional organisations. The organisation of the Ministry of External Affairs is discussed in Appadorai, A., Essays in Indian Politics and Foreign Policy, Vikas Publications, Delhi, 1971, chapter 10. The title of this book is misleading because it does not hypothesise a relationship between Indian politics and its foreign policy.
in Indian foreign policy analysis. Issues are undoubtedly staffed out within the governmental bureaucracies but the Indian foreign policy and security establishment is small and elitist and the influence of the non-governmental elites is at best marginal, and even that is hard to quantify.

Several writers have noted the limited influence of interest groups on Indian foreign policy making. Richard L.

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A careful distinction should be made between (1) a relationship between the condition of domestic economic weakness and its effect on the substance of Indian foreign policy, and (2) the articulation and implementation of strategies already developed and the influence of non-governmental domestic elites upon such strategies. The first kind of a relationship is a given one in any 'developing' foreign policy system. The observations in this section relate to the second aspect.

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The total number of Indian foreign service officers (serving in India and abroad) is about 300 and annual recruitment is small. This figure excludes supporting staff.

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Handyopadhya, The Making of India's Foreign Policy, Allied Publishers, Bombay, 1970, chapter 3, reveals the limited, almost non-existing influence of societal pressures in foreign policy making in India.
Park, an American expert on India notes that:

"Nehru articulated a policy based on his view of the present and the future, bearing in mind the strengths and weaknesses of his country and people, and that policy was affirmed by all but rather small sectors of Indian political opinion. After the Sino-Indian dispute over the Himalayan border in 1962, there was a sharp increase in public criticism of foreign policy, criticism which brought into focus the bureaucratic and legislative apparatus that supports the voice of the Prime Minister on matters of foreign policy."

Park goes on to make the telling point that

"For the most part, interest groups do not have much influence in shaping India's foreign policy. Tradition excludes them from indirect involvement as informal advisers, and the law bars them from direct pressures."

He also suggests that the Indian media "on the whole"

"supports the government's conclusion on foreign affairs and such criticism as does appear is usually minor. The exceptions have been Sino-Indian disputes and the old Kashmir question. In these two cases, India's territorial integrity is at stake, and critics, including many journalists and editors, have been outspoken -- and perhaps, thereby, somewhat influential."

Similar assessments are found in the works of other Indian foreign policy analysts. Peter Lyon, a noted British expert on India cites from a private memorandum which Nehru wrote to K.P.S. Menon (Indian Ambassador in Moscow) about


the nuances of India's foreign policy. In this memorandum Nehru noted that India's foreign policy "will ultimately be governed by our internal policy". Appadorai also notes the need to examine the impact of domestic developments on foreign policy, to demonstrate the basis connection between the two. He cites Nehru to the effect that

"Any attempt on our part i.e., the Government of the day here, to go too far in one direction would create difficulties in our own country".40

These assessments imply the need to examine the effect of domestic politics on foreign policy making. Yet the connection is never convincingly established and the link either remains a given or something worth exploring -- and guidelines in this direction are not provided. Furthermore, these analysts themselves indicate that in effect domestic influences on foreign policy are marginal even if the sources of such influence exist. Thus Peter Lyon noted in 1968:

"Until recently the domestic opposition, or rather oppositions within India to foreign policy as actually practiced by the government was (were) notable in general only for its (their) weakness and ineffectiveness. This era may now be coming to an end in foreign policy just as it has most certainly in domestic politics.41

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Appadorai, op.cit., p.115.

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Leo E. Rose makes the point even strongly. According to him, no political party could pressure Nehru to reconsider his policy and

"it was only Nehru, supported by a small coterie of advisors both within and outside MEA /Ministry of External Affairs/ that had a sophisticated foreign policy. Few Indians could challenge the Prime Ministers foreign policy expertise".42

This point applied also to the role of the Indian press. Richard Park notes that even though Indian English language papers such as The Hindu (Madras), The Times of India, (Bombay and New Delhi) The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) and The Statesman (New Delhi and Calcutta) along with organs of political parties, were widely read by the Indian leaders and elites, the influence of these papers was an indirect one. This view is confirmed by Appadorai.

The second reason for modifying Brecher's model to study India's external behavior is also important. India's foreign policy is not simply an effort to combine the 'means' (capabilities), to the 'ends' (goals) in arms control and disarmament policy. The 'means-end' syndrome suggests that the operational, as distinct from the declaratory, part of the policy, is the more important in analysing foreign


43 Park, op.cit., p.349.

44 Appadorai, op.cit., p.128.
policy behavior. But what is the operational environment? Is the distinction between the declaratory and the operational environment valid? Undoubtedly, the relationship between means and ends is central in India's defence planning, that is, in planning and implementing military campaigns against its military adversaries. This however, is not necessarily the case in India's arms control and disarmament strategies. In these areas the strategy to oppose superpower directed international security processes, as for instance in the case of the N.P.T., is only partially supported with a strategy to develop a nuclear option to deter non-military superpower intervention. In this case, for India the means of superpower intervention are 'verbal' and non-military ones rather than military ones; that is, the danger which India has faced or thought it faced from the superpowers consisted of two kinds: (1) Denial of resources to India to service its needs if India failed to comply with superpower demands; here the Indian perception was about potential loss of resources. (2) Introduction of concepts and policies which serviced superpowers needs rather than Indian needs; here the problem is verbal.

For India, during 1954-65, the second kind of danger was as real as the first kind. Consequently, its arms control and disarmament interests required a verbal challenge to superpower's concept and policies and not a challenge of increasing Indian nuclear capabilities. The former
was preferred to the latter because it was needed, because it was financially cheaper and finally, because the latter approach was, relatively speaking, irrevocable in view of the long lead time involved in making and reversing decisions about nuclear weapons.

Just because societal pressures on foreign policy making are hard to quantify does not necessarily mean that there is no conflict in the policy process within the Indian governmental bureaucracies. All that is suggested is that non-governmental pressures so far have not determined or shaped policies dealing with arms control, disarmament and defence.

Frank Cooper who has studied the debate of Indian political parties makes the point convincingly that

"Thus, while many factors have been involved in an ever-changing equation, the result has remained the same: a consistent self-denial of nuclear weapons by the government -- in the face of considerable pressure from within its own rank and party and from the opposition parties to abandon this policy. Though prediction of future policy is risky business, the weight of the evidence supports proponents of the status quo. This conclusion is, of course, dependent on certain crucial internal and external events. A new Chinese border invasion, for instance, may help to tip the balance in favour of the bomb; ... Failure in the quest for disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation, to which India has contributed an element of idealism, may produce disillusionment with the ideal ... Finally, changes in the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, such as a radical withdrawal resulting from a new isolationism, could force India into nuclear self-reliance. Whatever the external variables in the
the complex equation which determines India's nuclear policy, the position of India's major political parties will be one of the most important internal variables, constantly forcing the government to defend and reassess its position on this important issue.\textsuperscript{45}

As such, the perspective which emerges in this study is as follows: Because the decision-making mechanism of India is elitist and official comment is either officially leaked or presented as a diplomatic communication, the role of competing elites within the governmental bureaucracies is subordinate to authorised official communications. These communications represent an instrumental strategy whose aims are diverse: (1) To secure intelligence about adversary's intentions by inducing a verbal response to one's statements; (2) To provide a conceptual apparatus which accompanies India's behavior, whose aim is to justify that behavior or to create a legal-psychological foundation for future behavior. The communications may be explicit or these may be ambiguous. Some of the explicit communications suggest causality, for example, if India is attacked it will defend itself against aggression. The ambiguous communications do not necessarily suggest causality or the ambiguity may refer to two different kinds of relationships. For example, in refusing to sign the N.P.T., India announced

two types of intentions: (a) A willingness to go nuclear if China's nuclear threat became real and immediate; (b) An unwillingness to establish a nuclear weapons programme because China was not a threat at present, but to keep open the nuclear option and the technology for 'peaceful uses' in readiness 'at present'.

Overall the study refers to the attitudes of competing Indian elites and the view of competing political parties. These elitist views supply a societal perspective on Indian foreign policy behavior, and these views are drawn from published sources. These are presented with the qualification that in the opinion of this author, extra governmental elites have a marginal effect on foreign and defence policies and this is not likely to change until the Government becomes weak in Parliament. Unfortunately, the attitudes which really deserve analysis cannot be documented. These refer to what Brecher calls, the internal bureaucratic reports and ideas exchanged in face to face contact. The latter medium of decision-making ought not to be ignored in the Indian context, bearing in mind that the 'core' of the Indian foreign policy mechanism (excluding Indian Cabinet members and officials from other Ministries) consists of about 300 officials only. These officials man the headquarters of the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi as well as Indian missions abroad.
In accordance with Brecher's research design, the role of communications in the operational environment is recognised but the focus is as follows: Reports about 'in house' activities are not discussed since such reports are classified and hence hard to document. The role of the Indian press in policy making is not discussed in detail since the Indian media has the tradition of cooperating with the Foreign Office -- of acting as a transmission belt rather than a major influence in policy making. As such, the focus is primarily on the content of communications which emerged from official Indian sources on arms control issues.

The study attends to what Brecher calls the 'attitudinal prism'. But the discussion is general and is limited to ideology. India's pre-1947 historical legacy and personality pre-dispositions (which are a part of Brecher's research design) are not analysed as this would require a book length survey of the existing Indian and foreign materials on the subject. Moreover, studies on Indian personalities are

Suggestive but not conclusive. Such studies over-estimate the role of a single political personality while neglecting

Brecher's Nehru: A Political Biography, (1959) is useful in offering some insight about Nehru, but his biography of Krishna Menon, (India & World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World, 1968), is misleading because several of Brecher's opinions about Menon's views are questionable. As a retired diplomat pointed out to this author in a confidential interview (New York, December 1970) it is doubtful if Mr. Menon was totally candid with Professor Brecher in explaining the reasoning in Menon's or India's policies. Brecher's analysis about Indian political life suffers from the danger of making value-laden judgements in academic analysis. For example, he contends that Nehru's successors moved to a strategy of "equal proximity to the super-powers" - a change from Nehru's policy of "equidistance from the super-powers". Brecher, "Elite Images & Foreign Policy Choices", Pacific Affairs, vol. XL, no's. 1 & 2, Spring & Summer 1967, p. 84. In retrospect, this judgment is obviously wrong. In the 1950s there is a case for arguing that Nehru pursued a strategy of economic proximity to both super-powers (Khrushchev and Eisenhower eras) and political equidistance. In the 1960s, particularly after 1964 when Indo-U.S. relations started to cool, and Indo-Soviet relations started to develop, the ideas, "equal proximity" and "equidistance" are misleading. This is particularly true in the 1970s when the Soviet Union has become India's principal economic, military and political supporter. Brecher notes in this article that "despite appearance to the contrary, the views and acts of these two leaders [Nehru and Menon] were something less than the totality of India's foreign policy".(p.61). This is an important qualification which suggests the need to explore all primary influences in Indian foreign policy. Secondly, it suggests a need to examine the verbal strategies of Indian spokesman; here the analyst would look for effects of an Indian statement, not its logical consistency in terms of an analyst's own logic, particularly if the analyst is trained in the 'Western tradition'. 
to note the relationship between a political spokesman and the hidden decision-makers and staff members of the Indian bureaucracy. In the Indian context one would need to relate say, the position of Nehru and Krishna Menon -- who were Indian spokesmen before foreign audiences, and the views of other Indian politicians say, Sardar Patel, Maulana Azad, G.B. Pant, Morarji Desai and of course, members of the Indian diplomatic service.

In the present work primary attention is given to Nehru's and to some extent, Krishna Menon's images of the psychological environment. These two were the prime Indian spokesmen on Indian foreign and defence policies in the period under review, and were recognised as such by foreign audiences. But at the same time it is worth noting that usually major proposals were 'staffed out', given India's legalistic and bureaucratic tradition -- a tradition which preceded Indian independence. Generally speaking, with the wisdom of hindsight, one can say that the process of staffing out foreign policy problems improved in the Ministry of External Affairs in the latter part of Nehru's prime ministership (and after that) than in the earlier phases of Indian foreign policy (1947-54). Generally speaking, one can also suggest that competing pressures were particularly strong in matters dealing with the budgetary requests of the Ministry of Defence; in the 1950s the
tension between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Finance is a well known fact in India. However, as an overview, one can say with confidence, that, given Nehru’s dominant position in Indian politics during 1947-61, and given his dominant position in the foreign policy establishment, the Foreign Ministry was mostly insulated from pressures of competing elites outside the Ministry. At the same time one should note that during the 1960s and the 1970s the dialogue within the Foreign Ministry and between the Foreign Ministry and other Ministries has grown. But this clearly is an area of investigation which is beyond the scope of the present study; its relevance lies to Indian policy making in the contemporary era rather than the past.

The present study does not describe the formulation of India’s arms control and disarmament policy in particular or its foreign policy and defence policy in general. Existing studies are not helpful in explaining the 'in house' definitions of national interests; and archive materials are not available to the scholarly community. Therefore, what the study describes is the process of implementation of India’s strategy or strategies insofar as the process is documented and visible. A clear conceptual distinction needs to be drawn between decision-making and its implementation. Brecher implies in his research design that a

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48 Kavic, op.cit., chapter 9.
decision is made and then, sequentially, it is implemented. Rationally this is appealing but is it necessarily true? Assuming that this may not be true, the challenge is to take note of a visible strategy and, if possible, to infer a decision from that. In other words, in the Indian context it may be hard to identify all policy commitments, and to specify the relationships between them. Moreover, there is a doubt about the reliability of a foreign scholar's opinion about an alien foreign policy system's decisions, particularly when that system is elitist and has a record of little or no leakage of unauthorised comment. Finally, there is a doubt about a policy analysis which contains more than a single commitment and contains ambiguities because of ambiguities in external developments. In other words, given such problems with the decision concept, is it better analytically to examine visible foreign policy strategies -- the words and deeds of governments -- rather than so-called decisions made in secret chambers?

Finally, two objections about the focus of the study should be faced squarely. First, given the nature of the nuclear issue and the economic cost of nuclear weapons development, what has been the role of the economic elite in policy making? Was there any specific economic group arguing against the idea of an Indian nuclear weapons programme on the ground that India could not afford it or that if India pursued that course there could be a
'retaliation' by India's foreign donors? Secondly, is it fair to assume that India speaks with a single voice; that its policies are totally consistent and, as such, move only in a single direction?

A later chapter notes the argument about costs. However, a clear distinction ought to be made about the existence of a single economic elite making that argument. Unlike American society where particular elites play particular roles which fit their backgrounds, in the Indian policy mechanism, role playing is not a finely defined art. For example, the argument about the economic cost was made by individuals within the Ministry of External Affairs who were foreign policy experts rather than economic experts. Secondly, the argument in favour of a crash bomb programme or a programme to lay the infrastructure for a weapons programme was made either by economic experts (e.g., Raj Krishna and Subramanian Swamy) or by experts in the Indian Atomic Energy Commission who were familiar with the technological-scientific-economic problems of a nuclear programme, (Bhabha and Sarabhai) or the argument was made by individuals with experience in defence budgeting (K. Subrahmanyan). Even so, the Planning Commission of India -- the planning body responsible for recommending targets for Indian economic development -- has been involved in looking at the priorities of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Such an involvement is a routine one.

Overall then, it is fair to summarise the position as follows: The argument about economic cost was (is) made at the highest level of policy making and in the bureaucratic process of 'staffing out' allocations for different government agencies. But the focus of the argument is not simply 'defence or development', and it includes the view that India needs both 'defence and development'. Indians view the question of nuclear policy in political and security terms and the issue is essentially not an economic one; that is, if the government were to conclude that China's nuclear threat to India existed in the immediate future, the budgetary allocations would be forthcoming. This point is of course a speculative one.

It is inferred from the fact that the economic argument which is now made about India's nuclear programme parallels an argument which was being made about budgetary allocations for the Ministry of Defence in the 1950s. Yet, once China became a military problem, the Defence Ministry started to receive a priority in the budgetary process. In short, the economic aspect of the Indian nuclear programme appears to depend on the rationale which is used to justify its development.

The second objection is whether India speaks with a single voice on the nuclear issue, whether its policies are
totally consistent and whether they move in a single
direction. The point is well taken if it refers to India's
general behavior, viz., its claims about being against
power politics while actually pursuing a strategy which is
power politics through diplomatic and military means. The
present study however, does not deal with those kinds of
inconsistencies although they are noted to provide the context
for analysing India's nuclear policy. In the case of India's
arms control and nuclear policy it is fair to assume that
India speaks with a single voice if that means that Indian
communications on the nuclear issue are authorised and closely
orchestrated. In that sense it does not matter if the speaker
is the Indian Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
the Minister of Defence, a senior Indian diplomat or the head
of the Atomic Energy Commission. Given the nature of the
Indian foreign policy mechanism one can assume safely that
all such comments are authorised.

However, the question of consistency can be approached
from two other angles. First, since the bulk of this study
deals essentially with the period up to 1968 (although
references after that time are included to show the momentum)
the personalities involved in the shaping of India's nuclear
policy included mainly the late Mr. Nehru, the late Dr. Bhabha,
the late Dr. Sarabhai and Ambassador Trivedi. One can study their views, look for differences in nuances in their speeches and deduce differences in Indian voices.

Several differences of an abstract nature can be readily noted by studying their speeches. Thus, while Bhabha appeared to favour the Bomb, Nehru seemed to be equivocal about it without being equivocal about keeping the nuclear option open. Similarly, while Sarabhai in 1965-66 appeared to be against the Bomb and appeared to say so in his appearances before Pugwash groups, around 1967-68, he appeared to move closer to the Trivedi view that it was desirable to keep the option open. This was reflected in the plan he prepared for future development of Indian atomic energy programme. The 'later' Sarabhai therefore,

49 Because the focus is on the evolution of India's nuclear policies during the 1950s and into the 1960s rather than the evolution policies after the N.P.T., Mrs. Indira Gandhi appears to be a non-person in India's nuclear debates. This impression is correct. It may be recalled that after Prime Minister Shastri's death, Mrs. Gandhi's position in the Congress Party and in the Parliament was weak. Even though Mrs. Gandhi took a firm stand against signing the N.P.T. it can be surmised that Cabinet Ministers Morarji Desai and Y.B. Chavan took a hard line against the nuclear treaty. Confidential Interviews, New Delhi, June 1971.

50 For a discussion of the relationship between Nehru, Bhabha, Sarabhai and Trivedi, see my article, "India's Nuclear Policy", Science Today, Times of India, Bombay, vol.6, no.10, April 1972. Confidential Interviews, New Delhi, June 1971.

51 This was publicised in the summer of 1970 and projected a profile of a 10 years development programme to establish a nuclear infra-structure and a modest space programme. The programme was approved by the Government in 1971.
appeared to be closer to Ambassador Trivedi who also wanted to keep the option alive without pre-judging the security need to start a crash bomb programme. All this however, is based on the author's judgement based on confidential interviews. The minutes of these officials are not available for inspection and the actual differences between these Indian 'voices' and the relevance of such differences, if any, are hard to discern.

There is however, one other way to demonstrate that in fact India does not speak with a single voice. Here the difference in voices concerns the different policies or the different policy rationale which are communicated by India to the world community. A close inspection of Indian speeches reveal two directions in which India's nuclear policy is moving. The first one is not to establish a military programme at present but not to forgo the nuclear option either at present, here the rationale is that the military aspect of India's nuclear policy is related to the developments in China's nuclear programme. The second direction in India's nuclear policy is to link India's nuclear behavior to the behavior of the super-powers, particularly with regard to the political and commercial aspects of nuclear policy. This aspect relates to superpowers' activities on the question of Safeguards and the role of the industrialised world in promoting the economic and
technological well being of countries like India. At present both directions are indicated in India's nuclear policy and these directions appear to be complementary rather than mutually exclusive.

Overall, with regard to India's nuclear policy, the study makes four points. First, China is not the sole element or even the primary element in India's nuclear policy of the 1950s and the 1960s. It is doubtful if it is even central in India's nuclear planning in the 1970s. The latter observation is speculative but worth noting as a test of this analyst's ability to predict India-China relations by doing a crude content analysis of Indian argumentation in the N.P.T. discussions. This study does not examine the relationship between India's nuclear policy and its China policy. Such an examination is worth while but beyond the scope of the study. However, the study reveals that India's nuclear policy is not simply a response to the problem of China in Indian perceptions.

There is a need to distinguish between India's nuclear policy as a military response and as a political response to China. Starting a nuclear weapons programme would clearly represent a military response. Yet short of this, it is proper to argue that India's nuclear policy represents a political response to China's challenge to Indian security. As a 'political' (non-military) response,
India's nuclear behavior represents two 'if-then' propositions: (1) If China deploys nuclear missiles against India, India may choose the path of self-reliance by establishing a nuclear deterrent, (2) If China test fires an ICBM missile over the Indian sub-continent and into the Indian Ocean that would represent a demonstration of a potential Chinese nuclear threat to India -- a contingency which would require an Indian response. The political quality of India's nuclear policy toward Chinese therefore, lies in India's threat definition. As stated in the E.N.D.C. during 1947-67, China was seen to be a problem but not an immediate one. As such one cannot agree with the assessment of Sullivan who argues that

"The principal reason that India's arms control policy has become more overtly nationalistic in its approach to the management of weapons of mass destruction appears to be a reassessment of the Chinese threat to its national security". 52

Secondly, the study shows that India has a serious argument with the superpowers (particularly the United States) and Canada on the question of instituting international controls on the nuclear programmes of developing countries. This argument goes back to the 1950s even though it became highly visible and attracted attention of

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the world community in the N.P.T. debate during 1964-67.
The argument against international controls on nuclear
energy of developing countries was made in the mid-1950s.
It was made in the context of Indo-Canadian negotiations
dealing with Canadian atomic energy assistance to India
during the 1950s and 1960s. It was also made in the
context of India's relations with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) in the mid-1950s and after. As Sullivan
shows, India had the support of the Soviet Union in the
argument against the application of I.A.E.A. controls but
the reasoning of the two countries was different. To quote:

"Indian and Soviet opposition to an expansion of IAEA
activities were based on totally different grounds.
The U.S.S.R. saw the IAEA merely as useless and irre-
levant and an annoying contrivance of the West. There
was never any genuine fear that its controls might be
applied within the borders of the Soviet Union. India,
on the other hand viewed international controls in
atomic energy as downright dangerous and discriminatory,
and as a form of economic and technological colonialism.
The only possible reason India could see for IAEA
safeguards was to subject the poorer countries of the
world to indirect discrimination by the more powerful
nations supplying the nuclear materials". 54

This appraisal of the Indian argument is noteworthy
for several reasons: (1) It supplies the context in which
India has negotiated its atomic energy agreements with Canada
and the United States. (2) It poses a contrast between the

53 Confidential Interviews, Ottawa, 1968-70.
China argument in India's nuclear policy of the 1960s -- which usually looms large in Western perceptions about India's concern -- and the Indian argument against the discriminatory aspect of the Safeguards doctrine -- which Western observers fail to take into account as the central and the more persisting feature of India's arms control and nuclear policy. To emphasise the first rather than the second aspect may be 'good politics' and an effective way to sell a security angle to those who sympathise with India's problems. But at the same time this would be an untrue representation of the official Indian viewpoint; and over a period of time it would simply confirm a Western mis-perception about the nature of India's actual argument. As such it is useful to re-iterate Sullivan's observation. To quote:

"the foregoing analysis indicates that there exists in India a significant opposition to the very concept of outside inspection by an international authority which neither security guarantees nor concessions regarding the benefits of peaceful explosion will overcome".55

Finally, (3) the Indian argument suggests that while negotiations is possible over resource-transfers between India and Canada and India and the United States (to take two examples), India is not willing to compromise the the principle underlying its opposition to international

55 Ibid., p. 369.
controls over all nuclear activities of a developing country. The study shows that India has been consistent in its opposition to international controls; that it still managed to obtain valuable foreign assistance from countries which claimed to adhere to the safeguards doctrine; but that India has been willing to sacrifice the gain of foreign assistance if the price involves a stringent application of the safeguards doctrine on all Indian nuclear facilities.

Thirdly, the study offers insights about India's foreign policy behavior. The weight of evidence about India's arms control and nuclear behavior is that the Indian policy mechanism is essentially elitist. Couper shows the intensity of the nuclear debate in India. A later chapter indicates the spectrum of governmental and non-governmental opinion on the nuclear issues in India. As noted earlier, various Western observers suggest that political parties and non-governmental groups voice opinions but the impact is marginal at best. For instance, Brecher discusses the role of opposition parties in India and takes note of the opposition in Nehru's party and his government. But his overall judgement is that despite the existence of divergent views, these did not count for much. Erdman's analysis however, indicates that the existence of opposing views

should be taken into account to locate future patterns of interactions and new sources of influence within Indian policy making. The present study proceeds on the premise that there has been considerable articulation by Indians on the Indian nuclear issue but articulation does not necessarily mean the existence of new sources of influence in Indian foreign policy making. However, the arguments articulated should be classified to determine which of these, if any, influences, or may influence the behavior of the Indian government in the future.

Lastly, the study suggests a need to examine the role of verbal strategy(strategies) in the strategic behavior of political actors in international relations -- whether the actors are states, bureaucracies or individuals. A preliminary analysis in this direction shows how the verbal strategy of one state affects that of another. A verbal strategy is the conceptual apparatus accompanying the act.

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57 "Foreign Policy Views of the Indian Right", Pacific Affairs, Summer, 1966.


59 Ibid., p.126.
However, the relationship between a verbal strategy -- where the verbalisation exceeds the capacity to hurt -- and an 'act' is fuzzier than is apparent. Schelling defines an act as something which conveys a commitment and which appears to be enforceable. Military threats and budgetary commitments to nuclear programmes of a peaceful and a military nature fall in the category of an act. But Schelling also notes that most acts (commitments) are revocable. This raises an important logical problem. If commitments are revocable, one needs to differentiate between those commitments which are irrevocable and those which are not. Logically only the irrevocable commitments ought to be treated as 'acts' since the quality of enforceability, and hence the credibility, apparently depends on the irrevocable commitments. One can argue that if acts are revocable they are not always credible just as talk is cheap because it is not enforceable and hence is not credible. In this case it is a proper question whether talk (like a revocable commitment), which is supported by some capabilities, has any role in conveying a commitment or a potential commitment? India's nuclear behavior shows that 'talk' or verbal strategy is a part of its psychological and operational

environment. The relationship between a verbal strategy and capability merits attention in the study of foreign policy and strategic studies, that is, if there is no total congruence between the two. Obviously much work is needed to establish this relationship and this is beyond the scope of the present work. It is noted here as an area of further research.

'Talk' means 'Communication' and 'Instrumental Communications'. See Brecher, The Foreign Policy Systems of Israel, p. 3, and Alexander George, Propaganda Analysis, Row, Peterson & Co., Illinois, 1959, pp. 4-5, respectively.
Chapter One

STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE

The late Leonard Beaton noted that

"Virtually the entire American literature of arms control and most of the best contemporary work on strategy dismiss the rest of the world as peripheral".1

In viewing some of the literature on international relations this chapter suggests that the problem is not restricted to arms control studies. Several points can be argued; the best Western studies are concerned with seeking global and regional stability through superpower controlled conflict management; such a focus is policy oriented.2 There is no problem with the notion of 'stability in world politics' but there is a problem with the view which seeks stability solely or primarily through superpower arrangements; there is a lesser power view which insists that conflict, including military conflict, can have integrative and transformative functions, and this view is under-represented in the best arms control studies published in the West; that the behavior of countries like India shows resentment about the

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1 The Reform of Power, p. 233.
The undesirability of superpower oriented solutions of arms control problems but the reasoning underlying such resentment is not properly analysed in contemporary Western studies on arms control and international relations; that the aim of international security policy is, to use Beaton’s analysis, to define the world security interest and the national security interests of states, which have emerged or are emerging; that the aim of arms control is to secure security for all, as noted in point five of the McCoy-Zorin principles of September 1964; and finally, that the aims of international security ought to be achieved by a strategy of securing consensus among major powers involved in arms control discussions and those powers which face major conflicts, rather than simply on the basis of a superpower consensus.

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3 Beaton, op. cit., distinguishes between the two (pages 204, 234, 172), and suggests that the consensus must be widened to be effective (p.231).

4 Bull, Hedley, The Control of the Arms Race, Praeger, New York, 1961, 1965, (Introduction, XXXII, XXXIII), 2nd edition, notes the importance of coordinating the security interests of the major powers rather than only the superpowers. According to him, “If actual negotiations have been marked by the assumption that all problems of arms control arise out of Soviet-American relations and are soluble only in terms of them, this has also been true of theoretical writing on the subject. At the heart of the idea of arms
The neglect of revisionist views has several implications. First, the priority assigned since World War II to Soviet-American policy interaction tends to discourage production of systematic studies of political processes of other international systems, such as that of China and India. Secondly, analyses of the Soviet-American strategic balance during the 1950-1970 period seem to underestimate the constraints upon the use of strategic capabilities, particularly nuclear capabilities, and the effect of such a constraint upon the behavior and influence of the superpowers. Arthur Andrew, a knowledgable Canadian diplomat, invites attention to the semantic inflation of the concept of 'superpowers' but the theoretical study of such an inflation

4 (contd.)
control is the notion that states may have cause to cooperate in the pursuit of common interests in the military field even when they are competing in the pursuit of conflicting ones. Clearly, however, there are more than two states in the international arena; and when any two of them discover an area of common interest in the military field, this is not necessarily shared by the remaining states in the arena, or necessarily by any of them. Theoretical writing about contemporary arms control problems, however, has either proceeded simply upon the basis of a two-person model of international conflict, taking no account of the existence of other actors, or it has assumed that the only possible occasion of cooperation between the two leading actors has been to promote interests common not only to them but to all actors in the international system, ignoring the case of cooperation without prejudice to the remaining actors and the case of conspiracy against them.

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has been ignored. Thirdly, when studies such as Brecher's
The New States of Asia are made of the political processes
in the 'third world', one finds that the assumption of
superpower's 'dominance' and the small state's 'subordination'
creeps into the argument and appears in the conclusion. Yet
no systematic attempt on a comparative basis has been made
to investigate the factual basis of this assumption.

Like Brecher's analysis, strategic studies are also
inhibited by a conceptual jail of the dominant-subordinate
model. In arms control studies the notion of superpower
dominance insists that the nuclear superpowers have instru-
ments of mass destruction, and they have special obligations
and hence special responsibilities in achieving stability
on a unilateral or bilateral basis. The fashionable approach
is one of seeking international security through superpower
bilateral agreement and this approach is seen as an inevi-
table outcome of the Soviet-American rivalry -- a rivalry
which predates the discovery of the atom. This approach
regards international security as a problem of controlling
the arms race. Secondly, it is seen as a problem of inser-
ting superpower's presence into local conflict either to
support client-states or to restore stability.

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7 Bloomfield, L.P., and A. Leiss, Controlling Small
Wars: A Strategy for the 1970s, Alfred A. Knopf, New York,
1969, is a typical example of a U.S. Policy-centric approach
which relies on superpower management of local conflict.
In the sense that the Cold War replaced the classical idea of balance of power as it functioned in European and colonial politics in 18th and 19th century, the nearly global dimension of the superpowers' rivalry provided a justification for emphasising the role of the superpowers. The 'old' balance meant that even though ideology was an important domestic factor in foreign policy, the role of national ideology in the international arena was subordinate to one paramount goal, namely, to prevent preponderance of an external threat. Balance of power was as much a method of diplomatic manoeuvre as it was a method to neutralise the effect of ideology outside a nation's territorial boundary.

By contrast, the Cold War, and subsequently the system of Soviet-American military bipolarity, revitalized the role of national ideology. In this new kind of balance, which in theory was one step removed from the notion of empire, Washington and Moscow, through their actions, claimed for themselves the right to be self-appointed guardians of the world order. It was no coincidence that the descriptions

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8 American writers have mostly failed to explicate the ideological content of U.S. 'National security' goals, and secondly, there is a failure to assess the nature and consequences of American efforts to internationalise their national policy norms. These observations also are relevant in the study of Soviet behavior by Soviet analysts.
in the literature about the conditions and symmetries which were likely to produce a stable world order, tended to mirror superpowers' policy views. According to these arguments the stability of the Soviet-American military and political relationship became the cornerstone, the structural pillar, of global security. Instead of neutralising the effect of national ideology in foreign policy, the post-war theoretical models, such as the bipolar and multi-polar models, tended to exaggerate the effects of Soviet and American ideologies and capabilities. With this focus, in theory the Global Balance or the Dominant Bloc system was a function, a product of, the East-West struggle. In this struggle one was either 'for' or 'against' the other side and there could be no third way. Mistrust of neutralism and non-alignment appeared as a logical corollary of the view that ideological and military conflict between the two superpowers took priority over the ideologies and security concerns of the lesser powers. The linkage between national power and national ideology of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. thus became the basis of the 'new' global balance of power.

With this orientation Western analysts tended to be content with examining superpower solutions of international
security problems, provided these require a definition of the pre-condition and the technological-military symmetries or asymmetries in the Soviet-American framework. But this approach by-passes security problems, bargaining strategies, and world order concerns of the lesser powers in the international system.

As such there are several objections to the dominant focus. First, it is not naive to suggest that superpower strategies and ideologues ought to take a lesser power view of international relations (in addition to taking a superpower view of things), because the world is not run simply by the superpowers and because other policy centers have emerged. Secondly, obviously, the scholars whose work is discussed here and in later chapters, were relating in part to policy audiences and were not concerned solely with academic analyses. It is not necessarily wrong for a scholar to relate to a policy audience, but it may be wrong to present policy prescriptions of the superpowers in the guise of academic analyses which do not help to explain all kinds of realities in international relations. Thirdly, there is an academic problem if conceptualisation about the international system and about foreign policy behavior is drawn essentially from the experiences of the superpowers and if such conceptualisation fails to fit and explain the behavior of other major or lesser policy centers in the international system. Fourthly, in the superpowers'
oriented analyses there is the problem of treating 'power' in quantitative rather than behavioral, situational or relational terms. The quantitative indicators such as GNP, size of military force, the percentage of defence spending, industrial indicators etc., are static elements which are not sensitive to situational attributes such as the number of parties involved in a dispute, the effect of the dispute on the 'rules of the game', the effect of the dispute on Soviet-American relations, the willingness of parties to take risks and suffer costs, the kinds of norms (values) which underline inter-state behavior etc. In other words, the problem in part is to differentiate between the concepts of 'power' and 'influence' rather than to infer the influence of 'strong'-powers simply on the basis of the organisation and distribution of material capabilities such as military power and economic power. This point is discussed later.

The Dominant-subordinate Model

In Alliances and Small Powers, Rothstein emphasises that there is a difference of degree and kind between a great and a small power. A discussion of this difference is beyond the scope of this study, but it is useful to investigate if there is a similar distinction between a great and a 'middle power' or if a 'middle power', willing

to engage a superpower, falls into a slot which is different in kind in contrast to the slot of a 'small power'? In other words, if 'influence' is a product of situational factors, and if a 'middle power' is willing and able to establish a viable (i.e., manageable) conflictual relationship with a nuclear superpower, is there a substantive difference between small and middle powers?

Brecher's analysis fills this gap by focussing on the existence of 'potential great powers'. By moving away from an exclusive pre-occupation with the U.S.-Soviet model, he focusses attention on the relationship between the regional sub-systems and the dominance system. According to him, the international system consists at least of the Global, the Dominant and the subordinate systems. He suggests that "there is a need to link a model of the Dominant System with those of the subordinate systems". He provides two conditions to define the boundary and the link between the dominant 11 and the subordinate systems, namely: (1) "the units of power in the subordinate system are relatively inferior to units in the Dominant System (using a sliding scale of power in both)." (2) and that "changes in the Dominant System have greater effect on the Subordinate System than the reverse". 12

12 ibid., p.95.
Brecher's model appears to be ready for conceptual reform because reliance on the quantitative component of power appears to be an insufficient device for explaining and predicting the behavioral characteristics of the modern international system. Nuclear power is an important element in the calculation of quantitative power but its non-use in the 1950-70 time-frame indicates that the attempt to distinguish between a dominant and a subordinate system on the basis of a "sliding scale of power" does not make much sense. As the superpowers' rivalry becomes diffused and as the Soviet-American nuclear balance is becoming decoupled from local or regional rivalries, the existence of strategic power appears to have a limited use in a 'limited war' or a 'limited conflict'. The sorry history of America's ineffective military involvement in the Indo-China conflict illustrates this point. Hence, Brecher's statement of fact about the relative inferiority of the units of power in a subordinate system vis-a-vis a dominant system is an assertion which is grounded in a shaky conceptual framework.

Brecher's model has another unfortunate implication. It suggests a 'greater effect' upon the subordinate system, of 'changes' in the dominant system, and the reverse possibility is excluded. He contends that the lesser powers have a marginal effect on the outcome of the Soviet-American bloc
and that the security of the new states and the lesser powers "rests ultimately with Great Powers". Two points are involved in this respect. First, whether in fact the security of lesser powers depends on behavior of great powers or superpowers; secondly, whether the lesser powers can influence superpower behavior. It may be easier to argue that third parties have a marginal influence in say, the S.A.L.T. arrangements, than it is to say that great power actions necessarily determine or decisively influence the behavior of lesser powers or determine the 'great power-lesser power' outcomes. The point here is not that lesser powers determine great power actions but that great power actions do not necessarily have an effect, let alone a 'greater effect' simply because the great powers have superior capabilities or superior instruments of coercion. Moreover, the focus on the flow of power and influence from the superpowers to the subordinate powers inhibits an analysis of those situations where the opposite may be true. With such an exclusion, the comparative basis of analysis is lost and the logic of Brecher's argument is that a subordinate system is subordinate because there is a dominant system, and a system is dominant because the distribution of world's

13 Ibid., p.157.

14 Ibid., p.156. Also see p.104.
economic and military power at present favours the superpowers. Clearly the framework of inquiry is circular.

Therefore, a deficiency in Brecher's model is that the model of relationship between a dominant and a subordinate power is static. If the power to dominate is a natural attribute of a great power which has superior economic and military goods, this kind of dominance is insensitive to evidence which may show that distribution of 'influence' is the outcome of inter-state bargaining and that the outcome of such bargaining may not necessarily correspond to the organisation and distribution of material capabilities.

In summary form, there are three kinds of objections in Brecher's analysis of the subordinate system of Southern Asia. These relate to Brecher's conceptual design and the statements of fact. The first objection concerns the relevance of conceptualising the existence of a Southern Asian system -- as a geographical and a political system -- irrespective of whether or not it is a subordinate system. Even assuming for the purpose of discussion that Brecher is correct in his description of the low level of power, the low level of integration, the instability of the system, Brecher's attempt to apply the concept of regionalism to South and Southeast Asia is to apply the wrong concept or

\[15\] Ibid., pp.109-110.
a wrong model. Historically, given the colonial tradition and backgrounds of several South and Southeast Asian societies, the patterns of relations were oriented toward the metropolis rather than towards regional entities. For example, India gives 'more' attention to British, American and Soviet behavior rather than to Japanese or Indonesian behavior, just as Thailand may be more conscious about American behavior rather than Australian behavior in the region. The trend toward regionalism is not absent but it is not necessarily a dominant theme in the behavior of units in South and Southeast Asia.

The second objection concerns the danger of conceptualising the existence of a subordinate system in Southern Asia. The problem here is conceptual and methodological. If 'power' means capabilities or the instruments of influence, and 'influence' means the effect or the outcome of an application of capabilities to a concrete policy situation, Brecher is referring to the 'power' and 'influence' of the weaker units in Southern Asia without differentiating between the two. That is, it may be a fact that the capabilities of these units are weaker in comparison to those of the great powers. But it does not necessarily follow that the influence of the weaker units is also less so; in other

words, there is a danger of conceptualising 'weakness' of the subordinate system unless the assessment of weakness is derived from an analysis of the effects (outcomes) of power (capabilities) applied to concrete policy situations.

The third objection is that there is a danger of conceptualising the strength of the dominant actors unless 'power' (means, capabilities) are related to 'influence' (effects, outcomes) in concrete situations.

If these objections are valid, Brecher's assessment of the relationship between a dominant and a subordinate system is suspect. It is best to examine in some detail the problematic assertions made by Brecher about the Southern Asian subordinate system and secondly, its relationship with the dominant system. Here are some examples.

First, Brecher claims that

"All units in the subordinate system of Southern Asia are characterised by an arrested economy, a low standard of living, a stagnant agriculture, a shortage of capital and skills, little heavy industry, and (most states) a disturbing rate of population growth". 17

The ability of any unit to make nuclear weapons or missiles is discounted.

Secondly, Brecher contends that "general weakness also invites intervention by super-powers", to fill the

17 Ibid., p. 97.
18 Ibid.
Thirdly, Brecher claims that there is a "diffusion of power in Southern Asia" and neither China nor India -- the "potential great powers" -- can dominate the system "because of technological under-development".

Fourthly, Brecher compares the hierarchy of power in Southern Asia with the hierarchy in the Dominant System and notes that

"The general level of power in the Dominant System is infinitely higher. And the power margin of the super-powers in the Dominant System is greater both quantitatively and qualitatively. This, in turn, has two vital consequences: it makes each a hegemonial state within each bloc, to a much greater degree than India in South Asia, and it enables both to exert a life-and-death influence on all actors in the Dominant System, which neither India's nor China's power margin permits in the Subordinate System. The substantive differences, then, are very great indeed".21

Fifthly, Brecher notes the lack of integration -- organisationally and in the security field -- but notes the effort towards economic unity. The lack of integration is contrasted with "the high degree of integration" in the blocs in the "current Dominant System". It is asserted that there is an "extreme contrast" between Southern Asia and American system (OAS).

19 Ibid., p.98.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., p.99.
22 Ibid., pp.101-102.
Sixthly, Brecher asserts that there is "the constant penetration by the Dominant System" of the subordinate system. This point is heavily qualified and hence merits a long quotation:

"The Western bloc penetrates through a security instrument (SEATO), an economic organisation (Colombo Plan), a multi-purpose association (commonwealth), bilateral aid, and propaganda. The Soviet bloc penetrates through a security instrument (Communist military bloc), bilateral aid from Moscow and Peking, subversion (Chinese minority), a political organisation (Communist party), and propaganda. Both blocs court the uncommitted states in Southern Asia, notably India and Indonesia. Both blocs also intrude in the problems of the area -- directly in Laos and Vietnam, indirectly in Kashmir and West New Guinea (West Irian). This intervention is facilitated by three conditions: the dire need of Southern Asia for economic aid, which can be provided only by extra-area Powers; ideological disunity; and the lack of integration and the political instability of most units within the system.

Among all members of the Subordinate System only India reciprocates actively. Indeed, it penetrates the Dominant System effectively and continuously, through a conscious mediatory role at the United Nations and elsewhere, in regard to the Middle East, the Congo, Laos, disarmament, and Berlin. For all states but India, and China, the Subordinate System is the primary, if not exclusive framework for their foreign policy."  

If units like China and India can and do penetrate the Dominant System it seems that the qualities of dominance and subordination are relevant only to situations dealing with great powers and small powers, of the type of the Concert of Europe. By injecting the notion of 'potential great powers' (China and India) Brecher hypothesises the

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upward mobility of medium powers in the 'power scale' and in the 'international hierarchy'. In doing so, Brecher however, by-passes the problem of conceptualising the relationship between a dominant power and a medium power. There are three problems involved here: first, one needs case studies which permit comparative analysis of the 'influence' (effect, outcome) of behavior of weaker, medium power units vis-a-vis stronger, great power units in modern international relations. Brecher does not tell us how China and India, for example, penetrate the Dominant System. Secondly, Brecher does not show how the dominant units penetrate and shape the behavior of the weaker actors; this assumption is built into Brecher's conceptual design but it is not a proven fact. Finally, no allowance is made for a deterioration of the dominant system member's power and influence and the downward mobility of that member; that is, in Brecher's model it is inconceivable that the erosion of the Soviet and American position in international security and international economic affairs may reach a point that their dominance is challenged and eroded. Neither does Brecher examine a related question. What for instance is the effect of a subordinate unit's entry into the dominant system as far as distribution of the power in the system is concerned? Will power have to be shared so that the share of the original dominant members decline? Or will the
amount of power and influence to be distributed increase so that the share of the original members does not decline? Or will the original members be able to develop a super-dominant system based on exclusiveness among the founding members of the club so that the 'distance' between the subordinate-dominant (or the 'emerging-dominant' and the 'super-dominant') units is kept intact?

Transformation of the Post-War International System

The failure to account for the situational and the comparative attributes of 'power' and influence is a failure of existing models which over-emphasise the impact of the superpowers on the behavior of the lesser powers and secondly, over-state the impact of modern technology, military and economic power as vehicles of penetration in the modern state system.

Existing models presume a link between the notion of superpower dominance and the penetrability of the quantitative components of power into the state system. The point at stake is not that quantitative elements of power have no effect in the international system but that the effect is overstated. The point at stake is that power (means, capabilities) is really 'abstract' power unless it is shown that such power is effective in shaping the outcomes in interactions between
units in the international system.

Analytically, there are three trends which underline the transformation of the international system. The first trend concerns that part of the international system where superpower bargaining based on military power and military threats has produced a superpower detente system. Here one can speak of inter-penetration or inter-dependency between the superpowers. The second trend deals with situations where the means of intervention of the superpowers (namely, air power, nuclear power, economic and military and technological transfers into sensitive sectors of a state) exist, and are used to achieve superpower penetrability from the 'top to the bottom' of the international system. Here it is useful to

According to Klausn Knorr: "The phenomenon of power lends itself to two sharply different conceptions... Since coercive influence limits the conduct of an actor subjected to it, power can be seen to reside in the capabilities that permit the power-wielder to make effective threats. But it can also be seen as identical with, and limited to, the influence on the actually achieved behavior of the threatened actor. On the first view, power is something that powerful states have and can accumulate; power is a means. On the second view, power is an effect, that is the influence actually enjoyed. It is generated in an interaction which is an encounter. On the first view, power is something that an actor can hope to bring into play in a range of future situations. On the second, power comes into being, is shaped, and enjoyed only in a specific situation; its measure is the amount of influence actually achieved". Cf. Knorr, Power and Wealth, pp.13-14.
study how useful 'power' (means) have in fact been as agents of superpowers' policies toward the middle and small powers.

Finally, there is a need to specify a trend in a situation where attempts to penetrate have failed, but continue to be tried and where any such attempts have stimulated nationalistic resolve and where nationalism has become a source of counter-interference and counter-penetration.

It is readily seen that most arguments in the existing international relations literature, as for instance the analysis of John Herz, Kenneth Waltz, Henry Kissinger, Morton Kaplan, Arthur Lee Burns and Thomas Schelling, tend to focus on only the first two trends described above and there is no consideration in any systematic fashion of the third trend.

It appears that prominent analysts of the international system have tended to focus mostly on the capacity of superpowers to penetrate the modern state system. In doing so they have neglected, conceptually and empirically, to reverse their perspective and study instances of penetrability from the 'bottom to the top', that is, instances where the lesser

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Penetration is loosely defined as behavior which alters or seeks to alter, the distribution of goods and the rules of the game, between the 'controller' and the 'controlled' units.
powers have been able to alter the 'rules of the game' and/or to alter the distribution of resources (capabilities) with or without altering the game rules.

Trends in Post-1945 Studies on International Relations.

These trends merit analysis. The first emphasises the patterns of superpower behavior and the focus is on bilateral superpower problems. This is a dominant theme in contemporary studies in international relations. This theme started with analysis of the Cold War and are now extended to discussions of Soviet-American problems in political, military, commercial, scientific and technological issues. The discussions range from right-wing, hard line, anti-communist analyses of Strauss-Hupe on the one hand, to Sakharov's, and the Huntington-Brzezinski analyses of the convergence theory on the other hand. The second kind of studies deal with the problem of stability in Soviet-American relations but in addition regard this relationship as central to global stability. The argument of Waltz, in particular, specifies this bias. Two kinds of argument exist in this kind of approach. First, given the material under-development of the lesser powers, and given the superior military, economic and technological capabilities of the superpowers, the superpowers can penetrate the weaker units in the international system. Secondly, in this style of
thinking, the 'third world' is either simply an object of the Soviet-American struggle or it is irrelevant to the superpower competition; the balance which counts is the superpower balance. In both arguments, the Soviet-American relationship is said to be central to global stability because, if there is a nuclear war, the international (global) system will break down. Given this life and death capabilities of the nuclear superpowers, it is necessary to have superpower cooperation to achieve peace.

The third trend in the existing literature refers to the view that 'the global system' is fragmented and un-integrated and that attention should be given to the discontinuities in the system. This viewpoint has had a marginal influence in contemporary research in international relations. There is no book length study, for instance, which assesses the centrality of the Sino-Soviet conflict on Asian and international political processes (or in carefully delineated issue-areas dealing with military security) in comparison and contrast with the presumed centrality of the Soviet-American relationship. In other words, it is our


27 There are of course, studies on the Sino-Soviet conflict but none which assess its impact on the so-called central balance.
contention that to view the Soviet-American balance as 'the central balance' is to avoid specifying the boundaries (the limits) of that balance. In other words, there is a need to distinguish between the centrality of the U.S.A. in Soviet policy and visa versa, and to ask whether or not third parties think that the Soviet-American relationship is necessarily central to their foreign policy behavior. In some instances, it may well be, for example, Soviet-American behavior on the N.P.T. may well be central to India's arms control diplomacy and nuclear policy, just as American attitudes towards the Soviet military presence on the Sino-Soviet border may well be central to Chinese diplomacy. But at the same time 'the central balance' may not be central to Chinese diplomacy in say, Indo-China, just as India's policy towards Australia today and to China today may be developing in the framework of the centrality of the Sino-Soviet relationship and to a lesser extent in terms of the centrality of the Soviet-American framework. These illustrations are not to be taken as definitive assessments but are intended to show that the "focus on the super-powers rests on the premise, rarely stated, that the Dominant System is synonymous with the International System".

28 For example, Buchan, Alastair, War in Modern Society, the New Thinker's Library, C.A. Watts & Co., London, 1966, pp.34-49, and chapter IV, argues in terms of the so-called central balance but fails to define its boundaries.

How the superpowers are central in fact requires case studies and comparative studies in geographical and issue-areas.

To elaborate: The thrust of the first trend in contemporary studies is unobjectionable inasmuch as the focus is to analyse the policy problems as these are viewed by the superpowers themselves. The pattern of behavior which is emerging is one of exclusiveness between the two nuclear superpowers. There are several characteristics in the security behavior of the Soviet-American pair. First, and foremost, there is the search to develop and maintain a stable nuclear deterrent. Whether or not this has been achieved in the eyes of Soviet and American decision-makers is problematic, but to a layman at least, the danger of a nuclear war between the superpowers seems remote. Secondly, both sides have tried over a number of years to improve the means of communications to avoid accidental war in a crisis. The 'hot line' agreement was a step in this direction. Undoubtedly the means of communications have existed but it is an open question whether these are sufficient or whether these need to be enlarged and whether it is the nature of expectations and the quality of perceptions

This pattern started to emerge with the discussions leading up to the agreement on a partial test ban and the pattern of exclusiveness was continued in the N.P.T. and of course, in S.A.L.T. This practice has been legitimised by the theory that this kind of exclusiveness is desirable and necessary. President Nixon's annual 'state of the world' messages, beginning in 1970, provides ample articulation of this theory.
which really counts. The third characteristic concerns the need to insulate the Soviet-American nuclear balance from the danger that a local conflict may place the superpowers on a path of military confrontation. It may be premature to argue that this has been achieved but the trend appears to be in that direction. The non-use of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts such as the Korean war, the Indo-China wars, the Arab-Israeli wars, and the India-Pakistan wars, shows that these are important precedents. These precedents show the advantage of non-use of nuclear weapons and secondly, reveal the disadvantage of superpower military involvement in a local crisis. The disadvantages may derive from a lack of familiarity with local conditions or may emerge from a military over-involvement and an over-involvement of superpower prestige. Fourthly, a characteristic of superpower behavior is to urge the need to avoid the use of violence in a local conflict unless the conflict is sanctioned by a superpower. The tradition against the use of force is drawn from international law and it is usually selectively applied by the great powers when they themselves are not involved in a military conflict or do not want to be involved. In the contemporary era the idea of a non-use of violence was explicitly articulated by President Nixon vis-a-vis the Soviet leaders in the crises in Indo-China, South Asia and the Middle East. The American policy prescriptions was
two fold: that local parties should not start a military conflict and the superpowers should restrain their clients. The idea has not had much success because the superpowers lack the ability to restrain their clients and more importantly, the superpowers themselves fuel the regional rivalries by supplying military arms and technology to their clients, for commercial and political reasons.

Overall, one can summarise the emerging trend in the Soviet-American relationship as follows: Both superpowers feel the need to reinforce the bilateral superpower relationship and to do so by creating constituencies and interdependencies favoring such a relationship. There is nothing unique in this type of a relationship. However, in the context of extreme hostility of the Cold War period (1945-53) the uniqueness lies in the principle of a superpower-led concert as the basis of international stability. Undoubtedly, this principle is still offset by zero sum activity, as is clear from the differences of positions and bargaining strategies of the superpowers in S.A.L.T., European security issues, and issues of regional stability in the Middle East, South Asia, and Indo-China. The uniqueness lies in the fact that a military relationship -- itself a product of a globalised ideological rivalry -- has become a source and a manifestation of a trend toward bilateral cooperation despite persisting rivalry and conflict. More importantly,
while the principle of great power cooperation is not unique in history -- the idea was prominent in the Concert of Europe -- it is the first time in recorded history that an attempt is being made by nuclear superpowers to create a world order based primarily on their respective deterrence and bargaining strategies. Condominium may be uncertain but its danger is not.

Compared to the first trend, the thrust of the second trend is partly true but partly it is objectionable on normative or ideological grounds. It is true that without cooperation between the superpowers global stability is problematic. It is also true, of course, that the superpowers enjoy a superiority in material or in the means of influence. Undoubtedly, this means that superpowers can penetrate the weaker units. The penetrability of nuclear power or missile power is obvious -- a technological fact. Penetrability by conventional military means is also obvious in the sense that superpowers can deploy military forces in practically any part of the globe. The superpowers can also penetrate through non-military means. Thus, there can be economic penetration if a transfer of resources is accompanied by conditions concerning their use; military aid or transfer of military resources, training concepts, advanced military technology are also methods of penetration. In these instances, penetrability occurs if the resources
which are transferred and the terms under which the transfers occur, tend to reinforce the 'rules of the superpower game' or the rules of the game of the giver rather than the receiver. Some examples of such penetrability are as follows. For example, the World Bank's loan philosophy is alleged to mirror U.S. aid policy and both are alleged to favour capitalist theories which are further alleged to discourage 'socialist' economic development; the criticism is that indigenous models of development may become distorted because of the conditions attached to aid. Similar allegations can be made about Soviet aid transfers even though the point can be made that the terms of Soviet aid appear to be generous (at least with reference to India's experience) and, Soviet aid is more responsive to local needs as compared to say, Western aid, (again referring to India's experience). Another example of penetration


Indo-Soviet trade the rate of exchange is Indian Rupees 8.33 to a Russian Rouble, compared to Rs.7.50 to a U.S. dollar. The Indo-Soviet exchange is not favourable to India.
is through military aid at concessional terms to favored military leaders in favored countries. Taking the case of American military aid to Pakistan, the massive military aid strengthened the hand of the Pakistan military in Pakistan's decision-making, it discouraged the concept of civilian rule, and it strengthened the argument of those who wanted a military solution of the Kashmir problem. Yet another example of penetration is when one 'stronger' unit is able to insist on its definition of a threat or a problem -- when that particular definition favours its policy -- whereas a weaker actor (unit) is unable to do so. A clear example of such penetration is that of the Safeguards doctrine which favours international policing of peaceful rather than nuclear programmes of a military nature.

However, there are also two objections against the foregoing view of penetration. First, while the dominating units in the bipolar system (the central balance) can theoretically, penetrate other parts of the international system, the capacity to do so does not necessarily mean that the superpowers have successfully done so in the post-1945 system. John Herz's analysis (discussed below) shows the difficulties. Secondly, because the superpowers can and do penetrate each other and viable inter-dependencies are emerging, to hypothesise a 'balance' in the Soviet-American

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relationship is not necessarily to hypothesise a 'balance' in the international system as a whole, as is done by Waltz. In other words, it is one thing to argue that without superpower cooperation there cannot be peace, but it is quite another thing to say that even if there is a viable superpower balance, this is a necessary and a sufficient condition for global peace, and cooperation. In other words, if the inability of the superpowers to effectively penetrate the lower regions of the international system (that is, to convert their 'power' into 'influence') is demonstrated, one can only show that stability in the Soviet-American 'system' is central to the problem of controlling nuclear war between the two and stability is central to promoting Soviet-U.S. co-operation, just as the stability of the Sino-Soviet 'system' is central to the problem of controlling war between those two actors and it may be central to promoting Sino-Soviet co-operation. Similar examples of the central role of other actors arise with regard to other problems of security.

Overall, it appears that most American writers have failed to specify and critically analyse the assumptions in the two aforesaid types of analyses, and a sampling of the literature makes this clear. In 1957 Herz argued that airpower and nuclear power "affected the territoriality of nations most radically" and that this factor foreshadowed
"the end of the frontier -- that is, the demise of the traditional impermeability of even the militarily powerful states". In 1968 however, he backed away from this position and laid out the basis for a "new territoriality". Here the emphasis was on the persistence of nationalism, on the unavailability of nuclear power, on the availability of airpower for forcing national decision, and finally, on the role of guerrilla technique based on self-help. The term "new territoriality", according to Herz, suggested that the territorial state would exist in a modified global environment, that is, with a decline of empires, reduction in the role of penetrating force, but an environment of (possible) nuclear penetrability and rapidly increasing technological, economic and general inter-relationship of a shrinking world. Because of this shrinkage and penetrability Herz concludes that the "indirect penetration" is "the most serious threat in the new territoriality".

Herz tells us about the impact of modern technology upon the modern state system and the picture he paints is one of the fall and rise of the territorial state. But the

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34 Ibid., 2nd edition, p. 77.

35 Ibid., pages 82, 84.
picture which many other writers have painted is quite one-sided in the sense that the problem of change in the international system appears, advertently or inadvertently, in their analyses as essentially a problem of stability in the Soviet-American relationship. The following summaries reflect the orientation of these writers.

Kenneth Waltz

Waltz is the chief exponent of the view that the international system functions around a superpower’s balance and that there ought to be stability in this balance if there is to be stability in the international system. Thus, in asserting the view that stability can and should be achieved through a bipolar system, Waltz adapts the balance of power concept by applying it to two rather than three or more units. He questions the relevance of the classical balance of power idea for the modern state system, and emphasises that the notion of balance is valid primarily if it is applied to the framework of superpower bipolarity. In his description of the transformation of the international system, Waltz emphasises that "if the balance of power game is really played hard it eventuates in two

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participants". A corollary idea according to Waltz is that the old balance of power idea is not relevant for defining the structure of international system because the old system required a minimum of three or more participating units. Both these definitions thus focus on the size principle in the 'new' international balance, that is, the number of participating actors lessen if the game is played "really hard".

The second focus in Waltz analysis derives from his definition of bipolarity as a system where two powers have global interests and where these powers can pursue these interests mostly unaided if national power is used "as a means of control" and national effort is used "as a way of compensating incipient disequilibria of power". From these quotes it is readily seen that the focus in Waltz's analysis is on the pervasiveness of the superpower balance in all parts of the international system, and the assumption is strongly asserted that the superpowers necessarily have global interests which can be satisfied through self-help. In saying this Waltz has actually made several statements of


38 Ibid., p.304.

39 Ibid., p.306.
facts which may not be true. First, that the superpowers have global interests. One can argue that this is so, if the superpowers think that they have global interests. These interests, however, are not defined and it is not clear if these relate to military policy, international economic questions, outer space, etc. Secondly, he states that the superpowers can mostly protect these interests through self-help although "help may often be desirable".

Without specifying what the global interests are, it is not possible to verify if the superpowers can in fact protect these interests. And in as much as Waltz is admitting to the need for outside help, there is difficulty in explaining the relationship between those interests which can be achieved through self-help as contrasted with those interests which require outside help. These objections point to the need to demonstrate empirically what the global interests of a bipolar actor are and how these interests are being pursued. Without such evidence Waltz's descriptions of the transformation of the international system into a bipolar system of two principal constituencies remains at best a hypothesis.

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40 In The Strategy of World Order, p.193.
Morton Kaplan

Compared to Waltz, Kaplan is less categorical about the direction the modern international system is taking. His inquiry takes two directions, which apparently appear to be mutually exclusive but which also can be linked. The first direction relates to Kaplan’s earlier work in which he concludes that the balance of power system is likely to transform into a bipolar system, that is, when the coalitions and alignments of the balance of power become rigid enough to be called bipolar. A modification of this analysis becomes clear in his subsequent writing where he suggests a movement from loose bipolarity to a very loose bipolar and a detente system. It is a significant bias in Kaplan’s orientation that nowhere does he predict or say that the international system will transform (or has transformed) from say, a loose bipolar-detente system into a balance of power system if certain conditions are met; that is, provided alliances and conventional controlled force become the instruments of foreign policy, and provided nuclear weapons become frozen assets in the detente system.


42 “Variants on Six Models of the International System”, in J.N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, pp. 300-301.
It is true that American scholars, whose work is discussed here, were not predicting the end of bipolarity and the emergence of a global balance of power in the late 1950s. Henry Kissinger pointed out in 1968 that there was an "urgent need to analyse just what is understood by power -- as well as by balance of power -- in the nuclear age".  

It is only after 1970 that the transformation of the international system -- from the end of bipolarity to the emergence of a balance of power system consisting of the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., China, Japan and Western Europe -- was outlined in President Nixon's 'state of the world' messages. However, at the same time one must note that non-American statesmen were predicting the end of bipolarity and the emergence of new centers of influence and policy making in world politics in the mid-1950s.  

43 Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, Norton & Co., 1969, p.61.  

44 For instance, Indian Prime Minister Nehru pointed out in a speech to the Indian Parliament on September 30, 1954, that in addition to the United States and the Soviet Union, China and India were emerging as additional centers of power in world politics. Cf. Nehru, Indian Foreign Policy, Select Speeches, September 1946-April 1961, (Hereafter cited as Select Speeches), Government of India, 1961, p.305.  

Similarly, Yugoslav President Tito noted the changes in the power relations in the world, the impact of the emerging nations and the breakdown of the colonial system. His observations were made in October 1954 and January 1955, Cf. Tito: Select Speeches and Articles, 1941-1961, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1963, pages 155 and 168-69.
Likewise, Kaplan does not consider even theoretically the situation where the superpower's detente and nuclear deterrent system becomes a closed and stable two-party system -- a system which cannot be used as a vehicle to penetrate a 'conventional' balance of power system because of non-availability of nuclear power for limited conflict situation.

But unlike Waltz, Kaplan does not discard the 'old' balance of power idea completely. In his earlier work he outlines a balance of power system and here it is interesting to note that his Rules three, four, five and six are similar to the rules of the 'old' balance of power idea. But the similarity ends here because Rule One in particular appears as a prescription either for an arms race or for a situation of hegomony. As Rule One read along with Rule Two stands, the emphasis is on 'increasing capabilities'. The constraints on the growth of capabilities are not specified and it is not clear if Kaplan's Rule One is a means to an end or the end itself. Without this clarification it may be that Kaplan's Rule One is guided by a criterion of superiority rather than sufficiency. In the context of the 'superiority-sufficiency' debate in the United States in recent years, the policy of improving capabilities according to a prescription of superiority can easily become a prescription for an arms

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In Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, pp. 292-293.
race if an adversary chooses not to acquiesce in the growth of capabilities of the other side. Kaplan's Rule One can mean either a policy of achieving a balance through a posture of preponderance rather than achieving a balance by shifting alignments and using limited force. He therefore, leaves himself open to the criticism that Rule One can produce an over-reaction, and the prescription to improve capabilities may also be a prescription to invest and to make budgetary decisions in a manifest way before a threat actually takes place. And, in as much as improved capabilities may appear as preponderant capabilities to an adversary, Rule One can become a source of a threat rather than becoming a method to avert a threat, which is what a balance of power system is expected to do.

To summarise this point: If the increase in capabilities is the characteristic behavior of a balance of power system as Kaplan claims is the case, this definition may be prone to de-stabilise the international system; that is, if the growth of capabilities is unrestrained by internationally accepted norms, and if the opposing side is equally adament about using Rule One to its advantage. Thus joint use and unrestrained use of Rule One by two or more adversaries can itself become a threat to the stability of the international system because the only restraint could come from those very parties who are disturbing the
international system by engaging in a process of proliferating national capabilities. Kaplan suggests that the decision to fight or negotiate depends on whether either course will advance the aim of 'increasing capabilities'. But here he puts the cart before the horse, since the function of capabilities is to pursue national aims, which presumably include international stability. In over-emphasising the need to improve capabilities, Kaplan's Rule One in effect means that, given the joint use of this rule by two equally powerful adversaries, "action-reaction" and proliferation of capabilities must become an inevitable characteristic of his balance of power model. The cynical reader, thinking that an arms race, based on an 'action-reaction' cycle, which may in turn be based on fear and misperception, is a natural phenomena in contemporary Soviet-American relations, may argue that there is nothing surprising about Kaplan's over-emphasis on Rule One. But at the same time one must consider that if Rule One is applied unilaterally, without referring to a need to achieve a consensus approach in international relations, Kaplan's Rule One limits the choices before an adversary to two basic options: It can

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either decline to respond to the adversary's improved capabilities and thus concede to it the right to have preponderant power; or it can decide to engage the adversary in an arms race by improving its own capabilities.

There is, however, another direction in Kaplan's appraisal of the possibilities of transformation of the international system. This lies in the fact that he foresees the possible existence of a balance of power system, in an ideal form. This model is particularly remarkable because it does not give any special treatment to nuclear weapons as a systemic factor, as is done in models of bipolarity, multipolarity and bi-multipolarity by writers such as Waltz, Kissinger, Karl Deutsch, J. David Singer, Richard Rosecrance, etc. Kaplan thus implicitly outlines a model of transformation of the international system in which the nuclear deterrent system acquires a life of its own and yet it is insulated from balance of power politics of the 'old' or the conventional kind.

Henry Kissinger

Kissinger's appraisal of the changes in the international system focusses on two factors: first, that the

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47 Morton Kaplan, in James E. Dougherty, and R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., editors, Contending Theories of International Relations, J.B. Lippincott Co., New York, pp.126-127. This was outlined in 1966.
"number of participants in the international order has increased", and secondly, that the nature of power has changed because of decline of territoriality, because of growth of national purposes of nation-states, and because of globalisation of the international political processes. Because of these changes he foresees the end of the age of the superpowers and suggests that there are changes in the values or legitimate rules of international behavior as new states enter the international system and as the influence of the traditional units declines.

Yet, there is some ambiguity in Kissinger's study of the balance of power and the extent, and the relevance, of superpower decline is not assessed. On one hand he says that the 'new' balance is different from the 'old' balance but in another instance he uses the term 'multipolarity' interchangeably with the term 'balance'. The problem however, is not merely about language but more seriously, about the meaning. Kissinger is aware of the "urgent need to analyse just what is understood by power -- as well as balance of power -- in the nuclear age. Kissinger is

48 Kissinger, H., American Foreign Policy, p. 53.
49 Ibid., pages 52, 54.
50 Ibid., pages 50 and 65 respectively.
51 Ibid., p. 61.
 aware of the tension between military bipolarity and political multipolarity but the problem of stability is seen as a problem of asserting a concept of stability in the international system as it is likely to be visualised by the militarily bipolar and the politically multipolar units in the international system. Here the point is implicit in Kissinger's analysis that states become eligible to participate in problem-definition and elucidation of concepts of order and stability if the states are able to demonstrate an upward mobility towards the militarily bipolar units. In other words, Kissinger acknowledges the decline in the influence of the superpowers; he recognises the limits of bipolarity but he does not discard the concept of bipolarity. This leaves an unanswered question. What is the relevance of the notion of limited bipolarity if nuclear power is unavailable for actual use or for threat-making in policy-interactions between the superpowers and the middle powers, or between the nuclear states and the non-nuclear states, or between the holders of nuclear weapons and the holders of 'peaceful' nuclear technology?

This question is relevant in the context of two statements of fact which Kissinger asserts. First, that "Few countries have the interest and only the super-powers have the resources to become informed about global issues". Secondly, that a "new international order is inconceivable
without a significant American contribution. Both statements appear to be over-done. The League experience suggested the need for U.S. participation in international security affairs, but the post-1945 experience shows that peace cannot be guaranteed in spite of U.S. participation. Kissinger's first observation is inaccurate on two accounts: (1) the interest and ability of a state to be informed about global issues is not the exclusive domain of the superpowers and there is nothing in history or logic which proves that the superpowers are necessarily well informed about issues, problems and prospects which relate to questions of world order. Uncertainty in foreign policy decision-making, either because of mis-perception or as a result of a communicative overload, may be a significant constraint on the international behavior of a superpower. In this regard it is useful to differentiate between 'developed' economic systems and 'developing' foreign-policy decision systems which have in-built uncertainties because of possible distorted orientation of its decision-makers, or because the other side's behavior cannot be anticipated. A similar differentiation ought to be made between 'developed' military capabilities systems which have technically perfect missiles.

52 Ibid., p. 57.

53 In the 1973 Middle East crisis, Dr. Kissinger admitted that U.S. intelligence suggested that "there was no possibility of the outbreak of a war". Official State
and computers but which are nevertheless not fully 'developed' because of uncertainties in foreign policy decision-systems. Kissinger's focus is insensitive to this fundamental problem in foreign policy making; that is, it is not always possible for a decision-maker of a 'developed' system to have his political antennas finely tuned into external disturbances at all times and with a record of reliability.

Kissinger's second observation is less susceptible to empirical observation but one should be alert about assuming as a given that American participation is crucial to the evolution of the international order. The point here is not that U.S.A. will not play a role in world affairs in the 1970s. Rather it entails a need to describe the areas in which it is likely to do so, as compared and contrasted with areas where it might not be able to do so. Kissinger is careful to recognise that in view of the emergence of the new states and the trend toward political multipolarity it is no longer feasible to impose an American design on the international system. He also recognises that the problem of equilibrium in the international system is psychological and not merely physical, and that the problem of defining an international order is also a problem of identifying the

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Department transcripts of Kissinger's October 25, 1973 news conference, USIS text, Ottawa. This example suggests the need to examine the general quality of U.S. intelligence — hard intelligence as well as reporting and assessment of intentions.
changed rules of the game or the changed criteria of legitimacy in international politics. As such it is necessary to make statements of facts about the kinds of conditions under which American participation is predetermined and significant, and the kind of revisionist challenge to America's international position which cast a doubt on the nature, scope and effectiveness of America's contribution to the stability of the international system.

Nuclear Deterrence & World Politics: The Nature of the Connection and the Nature of the Game.

The international relations literature (as discussed in this chapter) refers to the problem of defining power and balance of power (Kissinger) but the idea of 'balance' is cast in terms of the superpower balance (Waltz) or in terms of some theoretical models (Kaplan) or in terms of the ability to penetrate (Hertz and Brecher) and the ability to dominate (Brecher). This tradition finds a sharper focus in the American arms control literature where the emphasis is mostly on Soviet-U.S. arms control strategies. Moreover, third party views about world order concerns are not systematically examined. The focus is on the superpower game,

54 op.cit., pp.78-79 and 54.
where it is held that the superpower balance underlines the global balance. It is useful therefore, to refer to the main points of a theory which examines superpower directed solutions of the problem of global stability. A survey of the main orientation in the work of Arthur Lee Burns and Thomas Schelling makes the point clear.

These two writers, like many other Western scholars, overestimate the effects of nuclear weapons and military technology on the structure and processes of world politics. Implicitly both writers ratify several views: that the supergame of nuclear deterrence is a closed one; that the game is indifferent to third party influences; that its study is sufficient and necessary for study of international bargaining; that nuclear weapons and superpowers' perception of the role of nuclear weapons is what counts in the nuclear deterrent system; that the nuclear deterrent system is insulated from political processes related to, say, economic relations, alliance politics and conventional armaments.

55 Schelling in *Arms & Influence* (p. 187) takes note of China as a strategic adversary, but claims that it is "a different strategic problem altogether". In the preface to *The Strategy of Conflict*, Schelling claims that bargaining in a deterrent situation is similar to bargaining in other types of situations.


56 This refers particularly to A.J. Burns' views.
that a study of the diplomacy of violence can be insulated from the effects of Laws and Morality; that military strategy, and particularly nuclear strategy wins the day in international politics; and finally, that deterrence and compellance in world politics are products of military strategy and particularly, nuclear strategy. No conscious effort is made to anticipate the opposite view that these assertions are relevant primarily with respect to Soviet-American arms control and nuclear deterrence behavior, and that what may be true about Soviet-American behavior is not, and does not necessarily have to be, true with respect to international security processes in general, and with respect to behavior of revisionist states such as China, France and India in particular.

A.L. Burns' statements of facts about the nature of the nuclear deterrent system, the difference between this system and other parts of the international system, and the effect of the nuclear deterrent system upon the international system, are quite explicit as compared with Schelling's statements. Burns' generalisations however, are

57 This thrust is inferred from Schelling's The Strategy of Conflict, (1960), and Arms & Influence (1966).
are sweeping. To quote him:

New Weapons, and the new strategies and tactics which they make possible, alter the conduct of war. But they may also induce changes in the conduct -- war-like or peaceful -- of international affairs. This happens for either or both of two quite different kinds of reasons. First, and least importantly, a new weapon may tilt the balance in favour of those nations pre-eminent in the skill to use or the resources to produce it. Second, and more profoundly, it may cause the major contending Powers to adopt new or radically extended strategies calling in their turn for a complete reassessment of national interests, and of the value of resources, alliances and conventional armaments. 58

Burns' focus on the effects of modern nuclear technology raises several issues: First, it suggests that new weaponry has produced new strategies and tactics. Secondly, Burns implies that nuclear technology has altered the conduct of war, that is, nuclear weapons have superceded conventional military strategies. Thirdly, Burns asserts that nuclear weapons have changed the national interests of those states which possess these weapons; that is, nuclear weapons as products of conflicting national interests of the bipolar actors, have become the sources of a re-appraisal of the very national interests which produced these weapons in the first instance.

Another line of assertion in Burns' analysis is that military technology has a strongly deterministic role in current international affairs where as the same is not necessarily true of economic relations. In his approach 'economics' are part of 'relations' while the nuclear deterrent is a 'system'. Given this differentiation Burns contends that "the deterrent state thus constitutes a more rigid and in some ways a crude international system than do situations embodying the balance of power", and secondly, that there is only a remote possibility of the revival of classical military policy in which one seeks out and destroys enemy forces. In Burns' scheme therefore, the deterrence effect of nuclear weapons is so complete that it has changed the nature of the international game in so far as there is only a remote chance that a state will use conventional force to achieve foreign policy goals despite the possession of nuclear weapons. Secondly, and this point is more important, Burns posits a transformation of the international system -- from a balance of power system to a deterrent system -- where the development of military technology makes (1) the physical destruction of all of an opponent's forces impossible.

59 Ibid., pp.183-84.
60 Ibid., p.205.
61 Ibid., p.191.
and (ii) the physical destruction of his economy very easy".

In Burns' scheme there is only one exception to the emergence of a deterrent system, namely:

Further innovations in military technology would re-introduce into the deterrent system certain features of the power-balancing system, if and only if, they should enable an alliance, consisting of all but one of powers in the system to destroy so much of the excluded Power's deterrent force as to leave that power without the means of effective retaliation against the alliance.63

Burns' analysis overstates the role of nuclear weapons in world politics and it understates the relationship between the superpowers nuclear deterrent game and the effect which superpower bilateralism and bipolarity, real or imagined, has had on the perceptions and interests of third parties such as China, France and India. Similarly, the effect of disputes such as the Sino-Soviet dispute is overlooked. These perceptions have invigorated the tendency toward nuclear proliferation and this development has paralleled the growth of a stable Soviet-American deterrence relationship. But Burns missed entirely several perspectives; does the growth of an exclusive two member nuclear club accelerate the sense of discrimination among third parties?

62 Ibid., p. 211.
63 Ibid., p. 212.
Secondly, does the stabilisation of the nuclear deterrent system release the conflictual processes in world politics provided the nuclear umbrella is not threatened? In other words, do unstable or insecure nuclear forces freeze political and conventional military conflict, and conversely, do stable and secure second-strike nuclear forces revive the uses of alliances and conventional military armaments as instruments of foreign and security policy? Thirdly, how new is the notion of deterrence in a world of nuclear weapons? This question directs attention to the pre-nuclear use of deterrence through use of airpower. Furthermore, the question requires a re-appraisal of the deterrence concept in a stable two power (Soviet-American) nuclear system assuming that one or both of the nuclear powers are under pressure from China; assuming that the exclusive two-persons club may continue to preserve technological asymmetries vis-a-vis third parties; and assuming that these asymmetries may no longer be relevant as sources of influence because of the unavailability of nuclear power for political or military uses, except as a deterrent. Fourthly, Burns' focus requires a re-appraisal of the systemic influence of nuclear weapons, that is, in comparing the uses of nuclear weapons in a nuclear deterrent system and in a balance of power system in the nuclear age.

George Quester's *Deterrence Before Hiroshima*. John Wiley, 1966, provides a useful study in this regard.
Burns' focus has three unfortunate implications:

An over-reliance on the deterministic influence of nuclear weapons and modern military technology tends to inflate the influence of the superpowers. Secondly, this inflation is invariably extended to descriptions of the international system; for instance, Burns' approach carries a tendency to see world politics as a two-person supergame, rather than as a N person game. The point here is not that nuclear weapons have no influence in world politics, but that empirical analysis is required to prove how and why nuclear weapons are important instruments of national security policy. Thirdly, it is important to investigate the scope of the Soviet-American nuclear deterrent system to test whether it is really the structured basis of international security and stability or whether it is only a facet, albeit an important one, of Soviet-American relations. Writing in 1970 Burns admits the need to "reintegrate the conventional and the nuclear instruments under a common strategic and moral principle". He suggests that "a re-thought ethics of deterrence may bring unrecognised strategic possibilities to light". Here his concern is with the working of deterrence in the American-Soviet-Chinese framework. But if conventional and nuclear instruments are re-integrated under a common principle, and one assumes that a 'sub-game' is becoming linked with the

'supergame', then surely it is important to examine the evolving interplay between the bargaining strategies and world order concerns of third parties or even the Nth parties. In other words, if the supergame can be kept distinctly separate from the subgame only with respect to issues of purely bilateral concern to the two super-powers (i.e. to avoid accidental war, and to avoid an unnecessary or an unproductive race which does not improve national security), does it necessarily follow that the two games can avoid impinging on each other? Or, if 'peaceful' nuclear proliferation and conventional military forces are becoming agents of the lesser powers to change superpower behavior, and these activities increase the strategic uncertainties of the superpowers, do these factors increase the upward mobility and penetrability of the lesser power vis-a-vis the superpowers, that is from the peripheries into the center? Without pretending to be definitive, the following chapters try to examine this perspective with reference to India's behavior in arms control and nuclear policy.

In conclusion this chapter demonstrates Beaton's point that the American arms control literature is superpower oriented and as such fails to take into account the policy preference of third parties which are involved in international security policies. Consequently, predictions about the evolution of the international system and about the evolution of international security policies suffer from
this serious deficiency. The problem is compounded on a wider scale in post-1945 studies on international relations. Both strategic studies and international relations studies suffer from a common defect: the asymmetrical distribution of capabilities (among the developed and the developing states, and particularly between the nuclear superpowers on one hand and the lesser powers on the other hand) is taken to mean that some are 'dominant' while the others are 'subordinate'. Yet the relationship between 'dominant' and 'subordinate' systems is circular and false. The fallacy exists because the difference between 'power' (defined as capabilities) and 'influence' (defined as effects of interactions) is not fully recognised. As such the concepts 'Dominant System' and 'Subordinate System' are imprecise and the relationship between the two is circular. To overcome this analytical problem it is argued in this chapter that the relationship between 'power' and 'influence', and between 'dominant' and 'subordinate' systems, requires a statement of fact based on a study of the distribution of influence in specific policy issue-areas. A message of this chapter is to urge the use of case studies of specific foreign policy interactions as a basis of hypothesising the structure (pattern) of influence in international strategic relations.
Chapter Two

SOURCES OF INDIAN INSECURITY AND INDIA'S APPROACH TO SECURITY

There are two qualities in Indian foreign policies and strategies. The first expresses a sensitivity to world order concerns -- with an emphasis to alter the gap between the 'developed' and the 'developing' nations and to reduce the danger of great power imperialism. The second quality expresses a sensitivity about the need to promote Indian security -- to participate in the South Asian and the Asian balance of power, to participate in the evolution of arms control and nuclear policies, to pursue Indian foreign policy goals through a strategy of non-alignments and peaceful co-existence, and to develop a balance between the Indo-Soviet, India-China and the Indo-U.S. dyads.

India's security behavior itself has a dual focus. The first one describes the impact of geo-politics on India's approach to national security. Here one needs to examine the politics of India as a power (actor) in the middle of four sources of insecurity, viz., the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Pakistan. The second focus describes the impact of international security policies (particularly of
arms control and disarmament policies of the superpowers), on Indian perceptions and policies. Here one needs to assess the impact on the conventional military balance between India and Pakistan and between India and China. One also needs to assess the impact of superpowers' attitudes and policies on the control of nuclear proliferation, or of the potential sources of nuclear proliferation. This chapter is concerned with the first aspect of security policy, viz., the impact of geo-politics on Indian national security policy. The subsequent chapters deal with the relationship between Indian arms control and nuclear policies and the superpowers' attitudes and policies relating to the control of 'peaceful' atomic (nuclear) technology by third parties who are not responsive to superpowers' control.

Indian non-alignment contained (contains) a quest to alter the world order. Nehru's view of the world provides the attitudinal prism for assessing the normative, the ideological content of Indian non-alignment. This chapter examines the concept of non-alignment as this is discussed in the literature. Since much of the contemporary thinking (particularly during the 1950s) about Indian non-alignment is heavy-handed and over-simplified, an effort is made here to examine the reasoning behind Indian non-alignment and its application in Indian balance of power strategies.
and Diplomacy is noted. Nehru's speeches reflected on the danger of a bipolar system and argued about the danger of great power domination. This chapter shows how Nehru reacted to this danger and went about creating a strategy which paralleled that of Kautilya's 'Circle of States', where the 'enemy of one's enemy was one's friend'.

The point is made that Nehru was guided more by balance of power considerations rather than those of ideology, as these related to the virtues of democracy, and as these virtues were emphasised by American idealogues. The second point is that Nehru articulated a crude definition of the Indian 'Monroe Doctrine' in the 1950s and this was supported by a policy. This implied a relationship between two concerns: to safeguard Indian security against 'foreign interventions' -- a concern to stabilise the South Asian balance of power; and a concern to build the India-China connection -- a concern to strengthen the India-China connection vis-a-vis the superpowers.

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1 Kautilya's Arthasastra, pp.313-314. In post-1947 India, references to Kautilya's work are scant. In his speeches, Nehru did not refer to Kautilya's prescriptions about statecraft but one cannot infer from this that Nehru did not recognise its validity in a 'pure' or a modified form. Moreover, at least one senior Indian diplomat, Mr. K.P.S. Menon, noted in 1947 that the "realism of Kautilya is a useful corrective to our idealism in international politics". Cited in Hindi-Cheeni (in collaboration with D. Amba Bai), "Indian view of China Before the Communist Revolution", Center for International Studies, MIT, Cambridge, monograph, May 18, 1955.
The central themes which emerge in this chapter are as follows: India talked about the undesirability of power politics during the 1950s, but in practice it did not try to exempt itself from the opportunities and obligations of power politics. Indian non-alignment is nothing but a strategy of being engaged in power politics, but of doing so preferably through diplomacy, given India's military and economic weaknesses. India's aim to achieve security in the 1950s was pursued through a strategy of peaceful coexistence with its stronger communist neighbours, and the key aim of this strategy was to create a balance against U.S. involvement in the sub-continent. Nehru felt in 1928 that the United States was "too far away for effective action", but this assumption was modified in post-1947 Indian foreign policy, given Indian fears about the meaning of U.S. arms aid to Pakistan.

Two questions are raised by the foregoing statements. What was the role of military force in Indian perceptions, before China's military threat started to loom large in

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2 Nehru made a distinction between peaceful coexistence and Panchashila. He pointed out that the Indian rhetoric referred to the former and not the latter in the 1954 India-China agreement. See R.H. Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945-1958, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1958, pp. 510-511. This point is discussed later.

3 Cited in Kavic, India's Quest for Security. p23.
Indian security planning? Secondly, what was the result of the modification of Nehru's 1928 perception that the United States was too far away for effective involvement in Indian subcontinental affairs? Both questions relate to Indian policy assessment during the late 1940s.

1947 appears to be a point in time when the Kashmir dispute loomed large in the Indian security framework. It is not our intent to examine this dispute in detail but simply to note its effects on Indian thinking. In 1947 Nehru noted the importance of Kashmir in India's security position, as follows:

"Kashmir, because of its geographical position, with its frontiers with three countries, namely, the Soviet Union, China and Afganistan, is intimately connected with the security and international contacts of India. The caravan trade routes from Central Asia to India pass through the Kashmir state". 4

In other words, in the Indian perception dating back to 1947, Kashmir was viewed as an issue which had a security focus and which had a geo-political and an international focus. Nehru's statement indicated that Kashmir was a nexus in India's security policy.

The parameters of Nehru's arguments on Kashmir had a scope wider than a concern to protect the Indian position in Kashmir. Our concern therefore is not to detail the Indian position on Kashmir but to analyse the point made

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4 Nehru, Select Speeches, p.443.
by Krishna Menon, that the Kashmir problem was a part of the Cold War and a part of the balance of power problem. Two perspectives are involved in this assessment. First, the Kashmir dispute was a part of the balance of power strategies of the great powers and the global strategies of the great powers shaped their attitudes towards India. A recent American analysis supports this view generally, and one can infer that Soviet India policy was also guided by the priorities of Soviet-American relations. According to the second perspective, India thought of the Kashmir dispute as a part of India's balance of power strategy -- as a part of India's response to the balance of power activities of the major powers involved in the Indian strategic environment. Our interest therefore, is in the broader Indian approach to security, viz., India's Kashmir policy, India's Pakistan policy, India's China policy, and Indian policies towards

5 This perception is clear in Brecher, *India and World Politics*, pp. 109-201.

6 John Hohenberg, *Between Two Worlds*, Praeger, New York, 1967, page 341, notes that the "cold war here was being fought with different purposes. The Americans and Russians sought advantage over each other with the Indians." This comment refers to the 1960s when there was speculation about the detente between the superpowers in South Asia. In the 1950s of course, the Soviet-American rivalry was intense, in the sub-continent and globally.
the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. India's Kashmir and Pakistan policies included the use of force for the purpose of influence-building whereas India's China policy sought to secure influence through a strategy of peaceful co-existence. Furthermore, India's Soviet policy after the death of Stalin sought influence through a peaceful co-existence strategy. But by contrast, India's strategy toward the United States did not envision a strategy of peaceful co-existence but instead developed a policy of political and military confrontation of the American position in Pakistan. In other words, India's security behavior of the 1947-54 period can be divided into two broad categories: the politics of confrontation with Pakistan and the United States, and secondly, the politics of peaceful engagement with China and the Soviet Union. It is not our concern here to describe the evolution of Indian foreign relations with these actors. Instead, it is useful to note the parameters of India's concept of influence-building in Indian statecraft, to note Indian perceptions of the sources of influence in world politics and the sources of India's influence -- actual and potential, given its material weaknesses.
The foregoing statements indicate a division between two different strategies in India's foreign policy behavior. This division is analytical and may be arbitrary, and it does not indicate a sequential evolution; that is, there is no implication that there are stages in the growth of Indian foreign policies. India’s strategy of confrontation with Pakistan and the United States during the 1950s contrasted with India's strategy of peaceful co-existence with China during the 1950s and with the Soviet-Union during the 1950s through the present. This duality can mean a contradiction between the two strategies; or it can mean that the two strategies complement each other. The former view implies that foreign policy necessarily moves in a single or a particular direction. The latter view implies that foreign policies move in more than a single direction; that this is the case with India's foreign policy behavior; and that one ought to tap the sources of Indian insecurity before one can properly investigate Indian security responses to its strategic environment. The following contrast between India's politics of confrontation and its politics of peaceful co-existence is illustrative rather than exhaustive.

Brecher has made a preliminary attempt to conceptualise India's foreign policy behavior. Even if the attempt is...

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This section deals with Brecher's Nehru: A Political Biography, Oxford University Press, 1959, (subsequently referred to as Brecher's Nehru), and his India and World
not definitive it is a useful starting point for our analysis. He notes the impact of geography in India's policies towards its communist neighbours. This point can hardly be ignored. Secondly, Brecher stresses the importance of the 'war-peace' issue. He declares that "peace or war is an issue of paramount importance for India", and asserts

"It is only in these terms that Nehru's efforts to mediate in international disputes and to localise conflict, as in Korea and Indo-China, can be properly understood".9

As the following sections show, there may be exaggeration in Brecher's analysis on this point. This may be a part of a larger over-reaction by Brecher. The pillars of India's foreign policy are defined as follows: (1) anti-colonialism; (2) non-alignment; (3) recognition of Asia as a new and vital force in world politics; (4) mediation to relax international tensions and to create an "atmosphere conducive to Indian economic development"; (5) creating a third force under Indian leadership; and (6) non-violence as the preferred means to settle international disputes, "that is to say, the application of Gandhi's principles to the conduct of

7 (contd.)

8 Brecher's Nehru, p.557.

9 Ibid., p.558.
international relations". These, according to Brecher, are the "core elements". Finally, Brecher notes the logic behind India's China policy. To quote him:

(1) "Nehru is genuinely convinced that Chinese nationalism is a far more potent force in Chinese policy than Communism....."

(2) "Closely related is the belief that China is not inextricably tied to the Soviet Union, that the Western policy of 'containing' the Peking regime is forcing it to complete dependence on Moscow....."

(3) Although it is never officially stated as such, this would seem to be the raison d'etre of Nehru's role as champion of Peking's claims".

(4) "Nehru is strengthened in this course of action by the conviction that Peking does not represent a threat to Indian interests in the foreseeable future, certainly not for a generation".

(5) "Nor is he oblivious to the inevitable long-run rivalry between Democratic India and Communist China for the leadership of Asia".11

Brecher may be mistaken in his selection of the pillars of Indian foreign policies but his description of India's China policy offers insights about the 'realpolitik' orientation in Nehru's approach to Indian security. However, there is a need for a good deal of elaboration.

Brecher's over-emphasises war-avoidance and the mediatory aspect of Indian non-alignment. Both these foci imply a need, or a priority to bridge the bloc struggle.

10 Ibid., p.563.

11 Ibid., pp.590-591.
to ameliorate the Cold War and to reduce superpowers' differences between the superpowers. Brecher says that Nehru sought a reduction of the Cold War with the purpose of keeping India out of war and with the purpose of giving itself a chance to pursue its priority toward economic development. This perspective may well be true but does it tell the whole story? One needs to recognize an opposite premise, namely, that India's behavior was -- as Brecher notes -- to shape the India-China axis. Brecher does not say that, logically speaking, given this premise, India was using the peaceful co-existence theme to create a no-war community between India and China, and by the same token, a no-war community between India and the Soviet Union, without of course, seeking a no-war community between India and Pakistan or between India and the United States.

The latter aspect is not usually understood by American and Canadian writers and it requires elaboration. Inasmuch as American strategy towards India was structured after 1954 to intervene through transfers of American arms to Pakistan rather than through actual intervention by American military forces in the Indian sub-continent, India's policy of confronting Pakistan on the Kashmir issue was extended to Indo-American relations. Brecher does not ignore the fact that the Kashmir issue spilled into Indo-American
relations. But he does not analyse the relationship between India's strategy of confrontation and its strategy of peaceful co-existence; that is, he does not analyse the difference between India reacting to the problem of war or peace between the bloc leaders on the one hand, and on the other hand, India seeking to create a set of dyadic relations with the major powers in the Indian sub-continent with the aim of encouraging the zero sum activity between the Soviet-American and the Sino-Soviet dyads. If the latter perspective is valid, it suggests an elaboration and a modification of the conventional wisdom that India was simply reacting to the Cold War struggle by seeking a reduction of superpowers' rivalry, by seeking a disarmament of superpowers' arms, and by seeking war-avoidance as prime conditions (goals) of Indian security. Krishna Menon hit the nail on the head when he pointed that there was little justification for thinking (during 1964-68, when Brecher interviewed him) that the Soviet-American relationship had moved into a stage of 12 detente. Menon's detailed articulation on this point merits attention.

According to him: (1) "American policy has basically changed very little towards us, towards the Soviet Union, towards anybody". (2) "the contribution of the late

President Kennedy will be found, historically, to have been much exaggerated". (3) "There has been no agreement, not even an approach to an agreement, on Korea, on Germany, on colonialism, on disarmament as a whole, on world policy". (4) "You say the world has changed. How? According to you there is a detente between the United States and the Soviet Union. This is of a limited character. In fact there was a possibility of a detente which has not flowered".13

These are strong observations which go much against the contemporary assumption that the detente has occurred, that it is real. Yet, if Menon was operating in terms of the policy premises of Nehru -- and Brecher admits that Nehru made the strategic decisions while Menon had a strong impact on the tactical level and as policy executor -- one can infer that the salient Indian policy premise during the late 1940s through 1966 was based on the possibility of a detente and not on its actual emergence or its probable emergence. Assuming this as a given, it follows that Indian foreign policy activity implied an encouragement of the zero sum activity of the superpowers in Indian sub-continental affairs, viz., an encouragement to increase or retain the level of superpower polarity in the sub-continent. Secondly, as Brecher implies in his comments

13 Ibid., pages 180, 182-183, and 188, my emphasis.

14 Brecher's Nehru, pp. 574-575.
on India's China policy, a similar policy premise guided India's approach towards Peking and Moscow. These are discussed below.

(a) The Politics of Confrontation and the Premise of 'No Detente'.
India's involvement in the Kashmir dispute in 1948 marks the beginning of India's politics of confrontation with Pakistan. Discussions between the United States and Pakistan led to a military pact which was signed in 1954; hence 1954 marks the beginning of India's politics of confrontation with the United States. Indian reactions to Pakistan's military pact with the United States clearly indicated a suspicion about Pakistan's and America's justification of the pact in terms of anti-communism. There is also circumstantial evidence about Indian suspicions of American motives toward India before 1954. U.S. Ambassador to India, Chester Bowles, reported in his memoirs that President Truman was "puzzled" by Nehru and did not appreciate his neutralism or non-aligned stance. Dean Acheson reported in his memoirs, that the two personalities failed to get along well in 1949. And of course, Dulles outspoken views about neutralism, implying that neutrals

15 Brecher notes: "The outstanding example of Kashmir's impact on Indian foreign policy is to be found in the realm of Indo-U.S. relations". Ibid., p. 579.
were pro-communists, are well known. Indians were aware of the implication of such remarks.

The evidence suggests that the United States adopted a policy of keeping India "off balance," and the American strategy was to arm Pakistan and to keep India on edge by fostering an artificial Indo-Pakistan military balance. American involvement in Pakistan was motivated by a concern to make Pakistan a military base against the communist powers on Pakistan’s north; but in part it was geared to make Pakistan a military nuisance in Nehru’s backyard. It is the first kind of activity which properly related to the Indian charge that the United States brought the Cold War into the Indian subcontinent. Yet, India’s security concern was with the second kind of activity. Hence, on this question it is useful to examine our contention that India itself brought the Cold War into the subcontinent when it encouraged Chinese and Soviet involvement to balance the effect of American involvement in Pakistan. The strategy India chose was diplomatic rather than military in the early and mid-1950s but the activity was guided by balance of power considerations. It was not simply an effort to bridge the Cold War barriers or to secure war-avoidance between the bloc leaders. If the focus is valid, it suggests that India’s behavior was guided by geopolitics inasmuch as the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan
started the Indian search for Chinese and Soviet involvement to balance the American involvement in Pakistan.

Indian and American statements issued during the 1950s and the 1960s make the foregoing focus clear. When the U.S.-Pakistan military alliance was announced in 1954 and the formation of the Baghdad Pact (subsequently CENTO) was announced in 1955, Nehru challenged the American view that "the Pakistan Government entered into this Pact because it expected imminent or distant invasion or aggression from the Soviet Union. The Pakistan newspapers and the statement of responsible people in Pakistan make perfectly clear that they have joined this Pact because of India".

Yet with a straight face American spokesmen continued to insist that the sole purpose of the military alliance was to meet the threat of communist aggression. Thus, on February 24, 1954 President Eisenhower offered his personal assurance to Nehru against possible misuse of American arms by Pakistan against India. Similar declarations were made by Secretary of State Dulles in 1956 and American Ambassador Ellesworth Bunker in Delhi in 1957.

The American decision to arm Pakistan against Indian objections had several effects. Pakistan, a weak actor and a small state in comparison to India, became a stronger

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16 Text of these statements are in "Documents on India's Attitude to Military Aid", The Information Service of India, Indian Embassy, Washington D.C., October 1966.
actor through its alliance with a superpower. For the United States, Pakistan in effect became an instrument to contain Nehru's India and Nehru's ambition to act as a mediator (and as a potential divisor) in an already polarised world. Selig Harrison, a sharp observer of the Indo-American political scene, captured the essence of American reasoning on this point. To quote him:

"Off the record, Vice President Nixon defined the objectives of some elements in Washington more candidly in briefings with newsman. Pakistan's readiness to enter into a military pact offered an opportunity, the Vice President felt, to build a counterforce to Nehru's neutralism in the Indian leader's backyard. India had been offered comparable military aid and had turned it down, absolving the U.S. from any charges of partiality".17

This policy was apparently continued by President Kennedy.

His response to a question by Selig Harrison is worth quoting at length:

"I can tell you that there is nothing that has occupied our attention more over the last nine months. The fact, of course, is we want to sustain India, which may be attacked this fall by China... of course, if that country becomes fragmented and defeated... that would be a disastrous blow to the balance of power. On the other hand everything we give to India adversely affects the balance of power with Pakistan...

So we are trying to balance off what is one of our most difficult problems....."18


18 For the full text see The Washington Post, September 13, 1963.
Yet there is no clear evidence that during early 1950s the U.S.A. brought the Cold War into South Asia; that is, if the Cold War is narrowly defined as a response "to certain international acts of force involving the extension of Soviet military power, or of other potentially hostile power, in places deemed to be of strategic importance to the United States". 19

During 1949-1953 the danger of Soviet or Chinese military aggression into the Indian subcontinent was at best potential, compared to U.S. threat perception about Soviet activities in Europe. In another sense, however, if the Cold War is seen as a pattern of great power manoeuvres in all important parts of the world, the involvement of South Asia in the Cold War can be hypothesised. As a knowledgeable observer points out "It is neither necessary nor possible to answer with precision the question of whether the Indian subcontinent is as critical a focus of world politics as other areas of great-power confrontation. The powers demonstrate their foreign policy interests in the subcontinent and regard it as an important area of manoeuvre. That has been the case historically, and it continues so today". 20


This judgment implies zero sum great powers' activity in the sub-continent from the very beginning after 1945. That is not true with respect to Soviet or U.S. activities in the area until 1952. Moreover, Mr. Harms' judgement seems excessive if one recognises India's role in inducing Chinese and Soviet involvement on behalf of Indian security after Mao's rise to power and after Stalin's death. In other words, the thesis that the superpowers sought to globalise the Cold War is not relevant in assessing the sources of superpower activity in the subcontinent.

(b) The Politics of Peaceful Co-existence.

As a subsequent discussion of the dialogue between Nehru and Chester Bowles will show, in 1950-1951 Nehru sensed that there was a significant underlying tension in the Sino-Soviet bloc. In 1954 India and China signed an agreement reiterating the importance of the five principles of peaceful co-existence. In 1955 these principles were reiterated in Indo-Soviet relations, following the death of Stalin and in the course of the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to India. In 1957 the United Nations passed a resolution accepting

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Select Speeches, p. 52. Nehru noted on December 7, 1950, "It would be interesting to know whether or not her [China's] type of communism is the same as Russia's, how she will develop and how close the association between China and Russia will be."
the idea of peaceful co-existence. In 1972 the spirit of peaceful co-existence seemed to underlie the summity between President Nixon and the Chinese leaders, and between the American and the Soviet leaders. In other words, the usage of the idea has evolved over time even though the meanings and the strategies vary from actor to actor.

This study does not chart the evolution of this idea in India-China or Indo-Soviet relations; as such it is not important to discuss its precise meanings. In Nehru's statements the meanings varied: It meant a rejection of the military approach to world affairs. It meant that states ought to avoid war. And finally, it meant a search for peace. These themes are sufficiently ambiguous to be almost meaningless, particularly since Nehru's views did not exclude the use of military power and nuclear power in influence-building. The following section describes these views and examines Nehru's perception of India's weaknesses, the sources of India's influence, the sources of influence of the great powers, the sources of external insecurity for India, the sources of security for India and the sources of influence in international relations. The discussion is general but it is sufficient to show that despite Nehru's protest against power politics, his view of peaceful

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For a sampling of these different meanings see Ibid., pages 40, 58, 66, 93, 39, 41, 47, 48, 95, 96, 99, 100.
coexistence, war-avoidance and peace was instrumental in orientation. Even though it was ideological or appeared as such -- the peaceful co-existence strategy was not simply an exercise in idealism. It was based on national interest and opportunism and in retrospect, it appeared to relate to a transitional phase in Indian foreign relations; that is, until India's economic and military strength was sufficient to defend Indian interests. The theme which emerges from a crude content analysis of Nehru's speeches is that there was a mistrust of negotiating from strength -- where strength implied absolute levels of military power and a belief in the functionality of relative power and the functionality of a diplomatic strategy until India could defend itself through material means. This section therefore, identifies the parameters of Nehru's approach to security without attempting to trace the exact influence -- or exact relationships -- between these factors, either by categorising them into phases or by defining stages of growth.

Peaceful Co-existence as an ethical principle

As an ethical principle the idea of peaceful co-existence derives its legitimacy as an alternative to the military approach to stability and national security.

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23 Ibid., p. 31.

24 Ibid., pp. 66-68.
However, it is difficult to assess if peaceful co-existence idea was entirely based on an ethical concern in India's strategy towards Moscow and Peking. Assessment of this aspect is difficult because in fact Nehru argued against the military approach -- the approach of negotiating from a position of military strength, but at the same time he rejected the Gandhian approach of non-violence in foreign relations and in matters of territorial defence. In fact, even Gandhi himself was not unequivocally against the use of force. As Werner Levi notes, Gandhi "held that when the choice is between cowardice and violence, violence should be preferred". He "tolerated violent defence" which produced "just ends". He knew that "a modern state could not resist external aggression by nonviolent means". And, as is well known, Gandhi "admired the bravery of the Indian army in Kashmir". In view of this, it appears that the peaceful co-existence idea was an ethical principle inasmuch as it appeared to be a substitute for war; that is, inasmuch as diplomacy was an instrument to gain agreement and to gain influence for India through the doctrine of non-interference and tolerance between diverse social and political systems. But at the same time the peaceful co-existence idea was a

rule of expediency inasmuch as its articulation was accom-
panied by efforts to increase India’s economic and military
power.

To elaborate, while Nehru preferred that security
policies be pursued through the development of proper policies
and diplomatic means, a connection between diplomacy and
military force was also made. Thus, the use of force as a
last resort was deemed to be permissible particularly if
force was used to alter the discrimination against the have
nots. To rectify discriminatory elements in international
relations through peaceful means was Nehru’s first preference
but if force was required as a last resort to protect Indian
interests, this was also permissible in Nehru’s approach. In
this connection the difference between Nehru’s and Gandhi’s
thinking was carefully explained. To quote Nehru:

We were moved by these arguments, but for us and for
the National Congress as a whole the non-violent
method was not, and could not be a religion or an
unchallengeable creed or dogma. It could only be a
policy and a method promising certain results, and by
these results it would have to be finally judged.27

26
Select Speeches, p. 79.

27
Cited in Qas, M.N., The Political Philosophy of
In other words, it was not because of its righteousness that the use of non-violence could be justified but rather the justification centered on the utility of a particular method in relations to national policy goals.

Despite the skepticism about relying exclusively on non-violence as a method of satisfying national goals, however, Nehru also made a distinction between the danger of joining a military pact, but on the other hand, reserving the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, and accepting foreign military assistance for self-defence. Nehru rejected the use of military pacts because these invigorated the psychology of negotiating from a position of military strength -- which prejudiced the position of weaker states like India -- and which tended to "serve the particular interests of the big powers". No doubt the U.S.S.R. was hostile during 1945-53 at least to negotiations from a position of strength. In this respect India has followed the Soviet diplomatic strategy. Yet there are substantial differences between the Indian and the Soviet approaches. While Moscow argued against 'negotiation by strength', it actually went on to do precisely that. By contrast, during 1947-62 India failed to do so with Pakistan or China, or with the superpowers. Secondly, India's

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28 Select Speeches, pp.277-278.
argument was (is) against medium or small powers serving big power interests. The Soviets can hardly be expected to argue that, or to accept Indian criticisms on this point, particularly if these are obtuse.

**Peaceful Co-existence as Expediency**

The aforesaid perspective indicates that peaceful co-existence was a strategy which appealed to India for two reasons. India was economically and militarily weak and peaceful co-existence gave it valuable time to find security through diplomacy with two communist giants who were involved in zero sum activity with the United States and who would, logically speaking, have reacted strongly against India if it joined the Dullesian scheme of military containment. Secondly, since Nehru held in 1950-51 that there was significant tension within the Sino-Soviet bloc, peaceful co-existence helped India to dissassociate the one from the other, to reduce Indian dependence on one or the other, and finally, to induce Chinese and Soviet involvement on India's behalf against American intervention in subcontinental affairs. Nehru's image of India's influence -- actual and potential -- and his view of the international power structure indicated that peaceful co-existence was not an alternative to the need to strengthen India's economically and militarily. Instead, peaceful co-existence was a tactical device to structure India's political relations
with the communist states and secondly, it was a device to gain time for India's developmental efforts. The strategy of peaceful co-existence was based on policy premises which differed from Western premises. It included an assessment of the role of military power in the nuclear age and the limited utility of military alliances between small states and the great powers. These points are expanded below.

The picture which Nehru painted about national and international security was somewhat as follows: (1) India could not avoid being involved in world politics because of its geographical and political position and given its material resources and size. (2) India had some actual influence and even more potential influence. (3) The influence of the great powers ought not to be over-estimated because the foreign policies of the major powers had not been successful. (4) India need not be frightened by the military might of the military blocs. (5) Of course, strength was needed for interference to be effective. (6) India needed to

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29 
Ibid., pages 8, 22.

30 
Ibid., pages 30, 36, 41, 43.

31 
Ibid., p. 29.

32 
Ibid., p. 32.

33 
Ibid., p. 33.
strengthen itself economically and militarily to defend itself against external attack but not with a view to become an imperialist power. (7) The idea that security was obtained by military power was only partly true: "it is equally true that security is protected by policies. A deliberate policy of friendship with other countries goes farther in gaining security than almost anything else". (8) Possession of great economic and military power did not necessarily imply that policies of the great powers were correct.

In his far ranging speech to the Indian Parliament on February 25, 1955, Nehru reflected on the international power structure, indicating a familiarity with Western deterrence theory and the limitations of military alliance politics. He made several points, as follows. (1) The need for India's economic and military strength. To quote

34
Ibid., p.35.

35
Ibid., p.79, my emphasis.

36
Ibid., p.80.
him.

"I am a little afraid that this House in its enthusiasm might perhaps imagine that we are doing more than we are really doing. I am referring particularly to the international sphere, because some hon. Members in their speeches seemed to make out that India was playing a very important role, almost a dominating role, in regard to some world problems. Let us have a more correct perspective.

I believe that we have helped, occasionally, in regard to the solution of some problems, and in the relaxation or lessening of tension. We might take due credit for that, but let us not go beyond that. After all a country's capacity to influence events is determined by various factors. You will find that India is lacking in most of those factors. If we have been successful in some measures, the success has been due not obviously to any kind of military strength or financial power, but because we took a correct view of events. If I may say so in all modesty, we understood them more correctly than others, because we were more in tune with the spirit of the age. We do not have the strength to threaten anybody; nor do we want to.

we feel, in so far as international policy is concerned, that right or wrong counts. But it is not the rightness of a proposition that makes it listened to but rather the person or the country which says so and the strength behind that country."37

(2) The disadvantages of military alliances between great powers and small powers.

To quote him:

"I can understand, although I would not approve, military alliances between great powers. That would have some meaning. But I do not understand military pacts and alliances between a huge giant of a power and a little pigmy of a country. It has no meaning in a military

37 Select Speeches, p. 65.
sense to me. In this nuclear age the only countries that count, from the point of view of nuclear war, are those countries which are, unfortunately, in a position to use these bombs. But to attach small countries to themselves in alliance really means -- and I say so with all respect to those countries -- that they are becoming very much dependent on these countries. Such associates do not add to their defensive power, for they have little or no military value. 38

(3) The dysfunctionality of over-kill nuclear capacity.

To quote Nehru:

"War, today, will bring ruin to every country involved, not only one. All the great countries appear to be clear about it and are absolutely certain that there is no country in the world which wants war. To talk about warmongers and the rest is completely wrong. There may be some individuals who might want war, but no country wants it. If that is so, what is the value of this policy of military alliances and armaments? It does not logically follow from the first assumption. The development of the thermonuclear bomb has changed the whole picture of fighting today. What might have been good a few years ago is no longer good.

The fact that one country has a few more bombs than the other is of no great relevance. The point is that even the country that has less has reached the saturation point, that is, it has enough to cause infinite damage to the other country. There is no real defence against nuclear weapons; you can at best damage or ruin the other country. When you have arrived at the saturation point, you have arrived at the stage of mutual extermination. Then the only way out is to prevent war, to avoid it. There is no other way." 39

38 Ibid., p.66.
39 Ibid.
(4) The Instability of the existing global balance and the
danger of altering it by War.

To quote Nehru:

"As things are today, we have reached a certain
balance -- it may be a very unstable balance, but it
is still some kind of balance -- when any kind of major
aggression is likely to lead to a world war. That
itself is a restraining factor. Whether aggression
takes place in a small country or a big one, it tends
to upset the unstable balance in the world and is,
therefore, likely to lead to war.

..."

If you extend the argument, you will see that the
only way to avoid conflicts is to accept things more
or less as they are. No doubt, many things require to
be changed, but you must not think of changing them
by war. War does not do what you want to do; it does
seem something much worse. Further, by enlarging the area of
peace, that is, of countries which are not aligned to
this group or that, but which are friendly to both,
you reduce the chance of war".40

(5) The futility of military threats between holders of power.

To quote Nehru:

"Among the many schools of thought and action in
international affairs today is the school of strong
action, as it calls itself. I suppose it is a relic
of the old days when a warship or cruiser was sent
down to frighten into submission any small country
which misbehaved. Strong action might bring results
when a very big country shows the mailed fist to a
small country, but strong action does not go very far
when the other country has also got a big fist. Then
there is the school which talks about negotiation
through strength. It is true that nobody will listen
to you if you are weak. But, as you develop your
strength to negotiate, unfortunately the other party

40: Ibid., p.67.
also goes on developing its strength. Then there is the school of -- shall I say -- learned confusion. It talks very learnedly about international affairs, delivers speeches, writes articles, but never gets out of a confused state of mind. There is a fourth school, equally prominent, of ignorant confusion. So that, between all these various schools it is a little difficult to get to know where we are and what we are, more especially when the problem relates to Asia, because most of the currents of thought today in international affairs come from Europe and America. They are great countries, to be respected, but the greatness of a country does not necessarily endow it with greater understanding of some other country; and the fact that Asia has changed and is changing has not wholly been grasped by many people in other continents. Therefore, their confusion is the greater when thinking of Asia".41

Non-alignment Concept Re-appraised.

Most Western analyses of Indian non-alignment examine it in relation to a bipolarised world, with non-alignment being treated as an effort to mediate superpower rivalries or as an attempt to prevent global war. There is no doubt that such a focus exists in the arguments of the non-aligned states. However, to view non-alignment solely in terms of this focus is to miss other salient, even central foci in non-alignment. That is, it is a strategy to become involved in global politics rather than to stay away from bloc conflicts. Secondly, non-alignment is a strategy to gain influence

41 Ibid., p.68.
despite the condition of material weakness, and to gain influence through diplomatic means, if this is feasible, or through military means, if that is necessary. In other words, non-alignment is a strategy to gain influence on the cheap; it is a low-risk strategy.

Thirdly, Indian non-alignment is not simply a response to the atom bomb and the Cold War, as is usually asserted. While there is a response to these issues, in addition, there is a response to the Sino-Soviet conflict and a response against the U.S.-Pakistan military alliance. In other words, India's reactions to U.S. behavior needs to be emphasised more than is usually done by Canadian and American writers.

Fourthly, it is only partially true that neutralism "describes the ambition of men or states to seek by political means and, if successful, to maintain by any means, an international position equidistant in political and military terms from the great powers". The idea of equidistance seems to apply to India's rejection of all military alliances; hence the equidistance from military alliances. But it does

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44 Power, Paul F., ed., Neutralism and Disengagement, p.4, my emphasis.
not seem to relate to India's political-economic and cultural-intellectual relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and China. Neither during the 1950s nor during the 1960s does the notion of equidistance seem entirely relevant to actual interactions between India and the major foreign powers.

Fifthly and finally, it is not true that "the development of new power centers, especially in Paris and Peking, complicates the neutralist ambition". On the contrary one can argue that alternative power centers (in addition to Moscow and Washington) provide an opportunity for India to offset the dependence on bipolar activity.

In other words, the security aspect of Indian non-alignment is misunderstood. Brecher sees non-alignment as "the passive, first stage of neutralism". He contrasts the ideas of non-alignment and neutralism and defines the latter as follows:

"Neutralism has in common with non-alignment an expressed desire to remain aloof from bloc conflict. But neutralism goes much further, for it involves a positive attitude towards bloc conflicts. A neutralist state assumes an obligation to help reduce

\[\text{45}\]
\[\text{Ibid.}\]

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There are some important exceptions. For instance, see Paul F. Power's excellent volume of readings, India's Non-alignment Policy, D.C. Heath & Co., Boston, 1967, particularly his introduction.

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tensions between blocs with a view to maintaining peace or bringing about peace, and more particularly to prevent the outbreak of war. In other words, non-alignment is the policy guide of the neutralist state, but neutralism represents an attitude and a policy which are much more activist than non-alignment as such. India is the outstanding example of the neutralist state. Sweden is a good example of the non-aligned state. And... Austria and Laos are neutralised states.48

Brecher then goes on to distinguish between neutralism and neutrality. To quote him:

"It is in this sense that neutralism emerges as a policy version of the classic status of neutrality. There are basic differences, of course. Neutrality is isolationist and neutralism is interventionist. The neutral contends that one can best stay out of war by being impartial towards all the belligerents, claiming certain rights and performing certain duties. The neutralist claims that one can best remain out of war by preventing war. This is the heart of the case for neutralism. For, argues the neutralist, in the changed character of war -- the development of nuclear weapons, bi-polarity, and ideological conflict -- even if one could stay out of war, as the neutral did, it wouldn't be particularly desirable, because one could not neutralise oneself against the adverse consequences of thermonuclear war. Therefore, the only way to remain out of global war is to do everything possible to prevent the outbreak of war.49"

Brecher applies his ideas about neutralism and non-alignment to the Indian case and suggests the following:

"These sources of Indian non-alignment fall into two logical categories, material and non-material. The two key material mainsprings are geo-political and economic in character. The geo-political pressures on India are obvious. Indian statesmen are aware of the over-powering pressure of the Sino-Soviet axis

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48 ibid., p.112, my emphasis.
49 ibid., p.113, my emphasis.
on the Indian sub-continent. This does not mean that they are constantly conscious of hostility, but they are aware of the geo-political facts of life for an India which is essentially weak, which has rarely known unity, which is economically underdeveloped, and which finds itself strikingly inferior, both in economic and military terms, to a Moscow-Peking bloc. In other words, the geo-political condition leads to a simple policy of non-alienation of two very powerful neighbours, particularly when those neighbours are allied to each other.

... ... ... ... ...

"Among the non-material factors, one may mention the legacies of history and philosophy. The legacy of history is twofold, but the two are so closely related that they constitute one driving force in the foreign policy of all neutralist (and most non-aligned) states: 'anti-colonialism' and 'anti-racialism'. These have strong policy implications and overtones". 50

With these definitions Brecher classifies India's foreign policy behavior as follows:

"It is interesting to note in this connection the policy evolution of the leading neutralist state. From 1947 to 1950 Delhi's posture was strikingly similar to classic neutrality, with the frequent expression of hope that India could remain outside a war, should it occur. After the Korean War, however, there was a realisation that non-belligerency or neutrality were not sufficient. And so India moved to the second stage -- an open rejection of the leadership of both blocs but still passive in its orientation: that is, non-alignment. In the early fifties India moved to the third stage -- a positive role in world politics and attempts to alleviate tensions with the ultimate purpose of avoiding a global conflict, in the belief that this was the sine qua non of India remaining free from war. Mr. Nehru most recently has gone beyond neutrality because of its verbal associations and called this a 'Positive Policy for Peace'". 51

50 Ibid., pp. 114-115.
51 Ibid., pp. 113-114.
Overall, Brecher's approach to 'Indian neutralism' centers on the following ideas: (1) The aim of India was to stay away from military alliances. (2) India's aim was to stay away from bloc conflict. (3) Indian neutralism is an 'attitude and a policy' which seeks peace. (4) Indian neutralism sought to stay out of war by preventing war through its mediation. (5) Neutralism is effective if there is a bi-polar superpower stalemate. (6) Finally, to avoid the rigidity of a bipolar world, the non-aligned and neutralist 'third world' represents an arena for superpower manoeuvres -- "a zone of competition and ultimately cooperation, for this zone, the neutralist zone, offers a tolerable alternative to military warfare".

Brecher's focus on war-avoidance in 'Indian neutralism' and non-involvement in bloc conflicts (points 2 through 4) are over-drawn but his discussion of the sources of Indian behavior gives us some material to work with. Brecher does not differentiate between the relative importance of the material sources of Indian behavior (economic and geo-political) and the non-material sources (history and philosophy). One needs to examine the material sources of India's behavior

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52 Ibid., p.111.

53 Ibid., p.120.

54 Ibid., p.122.
to show that war-avoidance and non-involvement in bloc conflicts were not central themes in India's behavior during the 1950s; that "neither anti-communism nor anti-colonialism have been the major objectives of Indian non-alignment". That is, even though war-avoidance was articulated as a theme in Indian speeches, the theme obscures rather than explains the real nature of Indian policy assumptions about the balance of power. Consequently, the inferences made by some Western commentators (to be discussed in a later section) are wrong and require modification.

It is easy to show that the non-material sources of Indian neutralism (Brecher's definition) appeared to be central in Indian behavior but in fact were not so. For example, Nehru made a distinction between the 'old' imperialism -- which was dying or had vanished, and the 'new' imperialism which required attention. Thus, he noted at the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947 that the "old imperialism are fading away". On June 12, 1952 he


noted in the Indian Parliament, as follows:

"It is necessary for us to function as a mature nation. It is very easy to talk against imperialism as some Honourable Members did. I do not deny that imperialism exists but... is hardly what it was in the past. Let Honourable Members understand what it is. Let them also understand that there are other imperialisms that are growing... British imperialism does flourish in Malaya, in Africa... But... today... it is an exhausted thing. I hope this House has respect for the way England has tackled her problems since the war and the courage with which she has faced them...

There are still colonies that belong to certain Powers. I have no doubt that an end should be put to them all... let us by all means put an end to what remains of colonialism in Asia, in Africa and wherever else it exists, but let us understand what the real conflict is about". 57

Again, at the Belgrade non-aligned conference in 1961, Nehru noted that "the era of classic colonialism is gone and is dead, though, of course, it survives and gives a lot of trouble... yet, but essentially it is over". 58

The connection between, and the relative importance of, the material and the non-material concerns in Indian foreign policy behavior can be assessed from another perspective: namely, whether India's behavior centered on a dichotomy between imperialism and anti-imperialism in India's relationship with the West, and secondly, whether there was a

57 'Nehru, Select Speeches, op. cit., p. 57.

dichotomy between 'democracy' and 'communism' in India's relationship with the communist powers. Were such dichotomies to underline Indian behavior, the role of ideology would be established.

Role of the Non-material factors assessed

Richard L. Park notes that "Indians have been concerned -- one might almost say obsessed -- during the past half-century with the imperial or colonial question". He goes on to argue as follows:

"However, the geographic and economic facts affecting India's international position are of relatively minor significance to Congress leaders when these facts are compared with the influence of political ideas. The first major ideological influence was that of liberalism; the second, closely following on the first in historical sequence, was socialism. The most far-reaching legacy of the period of British rule in India was the infusion of a liberal philosophy of Government in the mental frame of India's educated hierarchy of leadership."

"The second major ideological influence in twentieth-century India has been socialism. For many, socialism was seen as a combination of utopian propositions and Fabian interpretations of social democracy. These ideas equated rather easily with the main tenets of liberalism as they had been developed in India. For others, Marxism and Marxian socialism were more influential, although organised political parties favoring Marxian socialism did not gain prominence until the 1930s."

"The Congress, of course, did not have a foreign policy, in any formal sense, until it was the party conducting the government of the Republic of India. But as a strategy in the nationalist movement, the Congress adopted a policy of expressing itself by resolutions on foreign affairs at its annual sessions, or through statements by its officers at other times".

"By the mid-1920s, the Congress turned its attention more regularly to international politics".

"Jawaharlal Nehru, a London-trained lawyer educated at Harrow and Cambridge, began to make his influence felt in circles of the Congress by the mid-1920s. Although he was interested in domestic politics, his special contribution to the nationalist movement was the education of several generations of Indians in the facts of international life. Nehru believed that India was inevitably to play an important role in international affairs, and that the Indian National Congress had the responsibility of preparing the people for the years ahead. An examination of the resolutions of the Congress, from 1926 to 1947 reveals an acute awareness of the dangers in the growth of fascism, a sympathetic approach to the aspirations of the Soviet Union, a consistent criticism of the continuation or expansion of Western imperial power anywhere in the world and a sensitive exposure of all forms of racial, social, or economic discrimination. Such an examination of the record reveals the growth of the view that international disputes require peaceful means of solution, and that peaceful means for resolving disputes would be encouraged by a world organised to enforce the exclusive use of such means. The influence of Gandhi in the growth of this policy of non-violent methods in international affairs is obvious. Jawaharlal Nehru, as General Secretary of the Indian National Congress, re-established, in 1936, a Foreign Department (originally formed in 1925) to study world affairs and to disseminate literature on the subject throughout India. Although it is unfair to credit Prime Minister Nehru for the whole construction of India's foreign policy, it can be said that he was the architect and the guide who prepared the way from 1926, for policies that, by 1947, were acceptable to and taken for granted by the vast bulk of the citizens of India".

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Ibid., pp. 344-46.
Park, like Brecher, is arguing that non-material factors significantly affected perceptions of Indian leaders and also affected India's post-1947 behavior in foreign policy and security policy. Yet Park somehow contradicts himself by noting Nehru's far reaching foreign policy statements of September 26, 1946, which Park thinks is "still applicable". (Park's article appeared in 1967). To quote:

"In the sphere of foreign affairs India will follow an independent policy, keeping away from the power politics of groups aligned one against another. She will uphold the principles of freedom for dependent peoples and will oppose racial discrimination wherever it may occur. She will work with other peace-loving nations for international cooperation and goodwill without exploitation of one nation by another.

It is necessary that with the attainment of her full international status, India should establish contact with all the great nations of the world and that her relations with neighboring countries in Asia should become still closer...

Towards the United Nations Organisation India's attitude is that of whole-hearted cooperation and unreserved adherence, in both spirit and letter, to the Charter governing it. To that end, India will participate fully in its varied activities and endeavor to play that role in its Councils to which her geographical position, population and contribution toward peaceful progress entitle her. In particular, the Indian delegate will make it clear that India stands for the independence of all colonial and dependent people and their full right to self-determination". 61

It is readily seen from this statement that the goals of anti-colonialism and anti-racialism were moderated or balanced by other Indian concerns: (1) to stay away from the "power politics of groups aligned one against another".

61 ibid., p. 350.
This concern referred to power politics of military alliances and presumably, this did not necessarily include all power politics. (2) To seek international cooperation and to work with peace loving nations. (3) To establish relations with the great powers. (4) To work with neighbouring countries. Finally, (5) to work with the United Nations. Park describes the "circle of interest" in Indian policies. According to him, this circle revolved essentially around the problems of Pakistan, China, smaller Indian neighbouring states and included India's economic connections with the United States and the Soviet Union. The description of the 'circle of interest' outlines the geo-political focus of Indian foreign policy but it does not sufficiently emphasise the depth of Indian interest and involvement with the superpowers in the non-ideological spheres. Moreover, Park's conclusion suggests that the 'imperialism-anti-imperialism' dichotomy is subordinate to the geo-political focus in Indian foreign policies, whereas his opening statements (noted earlier) suggest otherwise.

If the 'imperialism-anti-imperialism' dichotomy was one non-material source of Indian non-alignment, the second non-material (ideological) source of Indian foreign policy behavior stems from the view that India's behavior was a

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Ibid., see in particular pages 354-357 in Park's analysis.
search for a 'democratic' response to the problem of communism in China. Hans Morgenthau says that "as India sees it, in Asia, the issue between Communism and democracy has been joined and will be decided on the plane of social reform". Sisir Gupta, an Indian scholar, notes that "in the Indian conception of the Communist problem, the military aspects of the challenge were relatively unimportant, what is important... is to establish the superiority of the democratic system even for Asian and other backward countries". Norman Palmer, an American scholar specialising in Indian politics and foreign policy, notes that "there is, in spite of all the protestations in India to the contrary, a fundamental rivalry between democratic India and Communist China, with very high stakes at issue". Chester Bowles, writing in 1954 suggested that Nehru accepted this competition between India and China and his subsequent writings emphasised that America's India policy was, or ought to be, structured

63 Cited in Gupta, Sisir, India and Regional Integration in Asia, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1965, pp.12-13

64 Ibid., p.14. See also Kundra, J.C., India's Foreign Policy: A Study of Relations with the Western Bloc, J.B. Walters: Groningen, Netherlands, 1955, p.58.

in terms of the communist-anti-communist dichotomy between India and China.

The emphasis on the non-material (i.e., anti-colonialism and anti-communist) sources of Indian foreign policy appear to be a symptom of a larger over-reaction among Western scholars involved in Indian studies. The view that Nehru perceived the India-China relationship in ideological rather than strategic terms carries the implication that the strategic (military) aspects were either ignored or were not properly understood. However, it is an open question if this is necessarily so and an investigation of the 'material' (geo-political and security) dimensions of Nehru's policy is warranted. The following sections examine some Western views about Indian non-alignment and this is done to expand the points raised by Brecher. This is followed by an assessment of the balance of power idea in India's foreign policy behavior before after 1947, focussing on the nature of the military problem which India faced and the nature of the protection which India enjoyed. Finally, there is an assessment of the relationship between Diplomacy and Force in Indian statecraft after 1947.

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During his visit to Asia in 1953 John Foster Dulles noted that "There is occurring between these two countries a competition" between freedom and police state methods for achieving social progress, and "In the long run, the outcome will affect all of humanity, including ourselves". Cf. Bowles, ibid., p. 229.
Western Views About Indian Non-alignment:

Most Western observers have a mistaken view of nonalignment. It is seen either as reactive diplomacy or as a consequence, a symptom of a larger global conflict. It is asserted that nonalignment is not tenable as a doctrine. It is also seen as a repudiation of the traditional machinery of power politics. Finally, nonalignment is said to be relevant only in so far as it relates to the central balance.

The assumptions and perceptions about nonalignment need to be clarified if the literature is to be purged of mistaken views. Western scholarly objections to, and

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69 Ibid., pages 77, 119, 150-51. This condition is seen as a result of dependence on foreign sources of assistance of different kinds. Vital suggests that the untenability exists because of material and technical reasons, not political ones.


71 Ibid.
statements of fact about, nonalignment essentially fit into
the following categories.

(1) That nonalignment seeks to avoid entanglement in
    great power disputes.
(2) That nonalignment seeks to avoid war and to
    achieve peace.
(3) That nonalignment is a posture of independence and
    unavailability.
(4) That nonalignment represents or appears to represent
    a posture of moral superiority.
(5) That nonalignment is reactive rather than innovative
    diplomacy.
(6) That nonalignment is a substitute for balance of
    power.

72 Rothstein, op.cit., p.32.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid., p.33.
75 Ibid.
76 Lyon, op.cit.,
77 Coral Bell notes that the repudiation in theory of
    balance of power is not matched in practice. The observations
    about the practical aspect of nonalignment seems to be a
    correct interpretation. While Nehru's speeches spoke against
One can readily concede the criticism that whether or not it is intended, statements made by nonaligned nations have tended to convey a sense of morality -- a tone which has invited resentment about self-righteousness of the weaker states. Critics of nonalignment are also correct in suggesting that as a doctrine, nonalignment has the best chance of success if unavailability of a nonaligned state were to be matched by actual power.

However, the other criticisms need to be examined carefully. The observations which follow are based essentially on India's past and present experiences with nonalignment. These experiences may or may not coincide with those of great and small states which are formally aligned in alliances but who have, from time to time, adopted a posture of nonalignment, strategically or tactically, if such a stance suited their purposes. U.S.A.'s pre-1945 faith in neutralism and its recent (1970-) posture of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute attests to the utility of nonalignment in 20th century international relations.

77 (contd.)
The evils of power politics, the thrust of his argument was against big Power Politics. The difference between Great Power Politics, and power politics has not been taken into account by critics of Indian nonalignment in particular and nonalignment in general. Cf. Bell, op.cit., p.69.

In other words, when one considers the phenomenon of non-alignment and neutralism one must think of it not only in the formal sense of Swiss and Austrian neutrality or Sweden's armed neutrality but also as strategic and tactical processes which are frequently used by states, outside and within formal alliances. In other words, even though formal neutrality exists in Switzerland, Austria and Laos, in the sense that neutralisation is the result of formal great power agreement or of self-abnegation, the phenomenon of neutral policy and nonalignment is more pervasive than these cases suggest.

Definitions and assumptions about the behavior of nonaligned states, particularly those in the 'third world', have been dealt with differently by different writers. Rothstein sees the issues in terms of 'alignment and alliances versus nonalignment'. Peter Lyon sees it in terms of reactive diplomacy versus innovative diplomacy; presumably the implication is that the reactive diplomacy of the non-aligned states contrasts with the innovative diplomacy of the great powers. If this is the case there is need for clarity about the statements of fact one is making. Coral Bell sees nonalignment in part as a rejection of the 'traditional' power politics approach. This of course is not the case and here one must distinguish between the

rhetoric and the practice. The doctrine and practice of nonalignment suggests that it is a form of power politics -- albeit a form which is suitable for a weaker state which either by inclination or by compulsion must be externally involved if it is to shape its immediate external environment and is to direct internal economic and social change through peaceful means.

Three points need to be emphasised in the light of the foregoing discussion. Firstly, the point is not that a nonaligned state seeks to avoid entanglement in great power disputes but that it avoids entanglement in a formal alliance structure while remaining free to be informally involved in great power disputes, say, in Korea, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Congo. Secondly, on the point of availability, one needs to differentiate between the following possibilities: the nonaligned actor may not be available exclusively to one side; or it may not be available at all; or it may be available sometimes, for some problems, that is, if its interests are not hurt.

The third point is crucial. Coral Bell, writing in 1963, emphasises that "the viability of non-alignment as a policy has been and is related to particular phases of the power-balance". In itself this statement does not say very much: all policy -- alliance policy and nonalignment policy -- is based on particular phases of the power balance or on the perceptions of the power balance. But then Bell
goes on to ask two important questions: (a) how has the position of the nonaligned states affected the central balance, and (b) how has the changing central balance affected the viability of nonalignment.

The two questions are separate and ought to be dealt with as such. The first conceives a theoretical possibility that a nonaligned state may affect the central balance; the second looks at the effect of the central balance on nonalignment. Dr. Bell, rashly or prematurely, asserts that "of course" the relationship between "the central balance" and "non-alignment" is a "two-way affair". She does not offer proof to support the assertion.

Thus, the focus on the effect of the 'central balance' or the changing central balance begs a statement of fact. For whom, how and with respect to what, does 'the central balance' affect the nonaligned state's behavior and attitudes? How relevant is the idea of 'the' central balance. In the specific context of change in the last two decades one must insist that there are different ways of identifying the central balance; one could argue that 'the central balance' is not even central since there are at least three kinds of prevailing balances in the 1970s: the Soviet-American military balance; the Sino-Soviet military balance; and the Soviet-American-Chinese 'triangle' functioning as a balance.

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80 Bell, op. cit., p. 68.

81 Ibid.
Thus, one needs to define the nature, scope and impact of change in the global environment. While the Cold War perspective insists that the Soviet-American struggle and military balance represents the central balance, the Sino-Soviet split urges one to regard this conflict as another central conflict which consequently diminishes the importance and centrality of the Soviet-American conflict. The recognition of the permanence of the Sino-Soviet conflict in the foreign policy statements of President Nixon in recent years attest to the credibility of the aforesaid argument. Of course, one cannot blame Coral Bell for not anticipating the drama and the re-orientation in American foreign policy as a result of the Sino-Soviet split. However, it is useful to reiterate the point that academicians are not always innovators and that, at times, they follow rather than lead official pronouncements. The framework outlined by Coral Bell and Peter Lyon should thus be modified as follows: Has the policy of nonalignment in any way manipulated and contributed to the changing nature of the global balance? If the answer is affirmative, as the following pages will show, then it becomes easy to discredit the view that nonalignment is simply reactive rather than innovative and that nonalignment is "opting out" of the big power struggle.

To react is (i) to act reciprocally, (ii) to act in opposition, (iii) to go back to a former condition, stage, etc., and (iv) to respond to a stimulus. Cf. Webster's
In reappraising the relevance of the nonaligned concept and approach to world affairs it is true that the concept has not been given systematic shape either by the decision-makers or by scholars. While several Western assertions about nonalignment are of a polemical nature, these assertions nevertheless raise several pertinent issues. Statements to the effect that nonalignment cherished the illusion that the use of force was undesirable in international relations and that nonalignment rejected the notion of balance of power, are not too helpful. But nevertheless such assertions need to be examined if only to show what is and what is not relevant for the study of nonalignment.

As was shown earlier, most Western analysts have discussed nonalignment in the context of a dichotomy between great and small powers and between aligned and nonaligned states. The problem here is not with the ranking of power but with the implication of initiative and influence which is attributed to the notion of a great power. In other words, the structure and process of the international system as it deals with nonalignment, is perceived and conceived as if only the great powers have an effect on the behavior of others.

82 (contd.)
New World Dictionary, College edition, p.1209:
It is in the last sense (iv) that we are saying that nonalignment is more than a response to an external stimulus. It is true of course, that even a reaction can produce change.

83
Levi, W., The Challenge of World Politics in South and Southeast Asia, p.113-116.
of the lesser powers. The implication of one-sided casualty requires a closer look. The following statement by a reputable writer is an example of the kind of problem under consideration:

Asian statements did not admit that nonalignment was applicable only in a given context or that their policy might have been successful for the wrong reasons. The theory was considered of general, universal validity, and was stubbornly applied, though it lacked clarity and specificity as a plan for action -- as was bound to be true because its essence was reaction to the initiative of others.*

The question here is whether the quality of initiative and change was absent in the behavior of nonaligned states, whether the effects of initiatives were one-sided because the initiatives were one-sided and whether there is a strong bias in Levi's assertions because of a misunderstanding of foreign policies on nonaligned states. A related question of some importance is whether culture bound concepts of scholars have shaped perceptions or misperceptions about nonalignment.

The second problem concerns the range of choice which a nonaligned actor has. The prevailing assertion in the literature is that the range of choice is limited and that the framework of choice for a nonaligned actor is set by superpower or great power behavior. Once again it is useful

* Ibid., p.11.
to quote Levi:

In reality their freedom of manoeuvre was rather limited, certainly as long as bipolarity between the two major powers remained a feature of world politics. The paradox of the situation was that the tighter the bipolarity became, the more limited was the choice of policies for the nonaligned statesmen, yet the more justified became nonalignment. Theoretically this did not hold true. Non-alignment made the statesmen free to choose policies paralleling those of any 'camp' and any nation, or deviating from all. In practice, however the chosen policies tended to avoid too much coincidence with any one side lest this provoke charges of alignment. The result was a perennial trend towards the 'middle of the road' (to the point where nonalignment was so defined by some officials e.g. Nehru in Lok Sabha debates, March 17, 1953) with 'the middle' determined by the positions of other nations.85

Here it seems appropriate to inquire if the third parties were (and are) restricted to behaving only in a manner which parallels superpower behavior in the Cold War or whether there are significant instances where the outcome of superpower behavior was shaped by a nonaligned state. In other words, is a nonaligned third party capable of innovative behavior in International Relations, that is, by defining choices which do not correspond with superpower choices?

The third line of argument against nonalignment is that there seems to be a contradiction between the nonaligned goal of detente between the cold warriors and the goal of

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Ibid., pp. 24-25.
limiting 'foreign interference' by a great power in the affairs of a nonaligned state. Levi states this point cogently:

There was some tragic irony for the non-aligned states in the changing nature of the international system and its effects upon their region. At the very time when the long-cherished detente in world politics occurred, tensions increased within the region, and between the region and some outside powers. This prevented attainment of one of non-alignment's goals, the creation of an area of peace in South and Southeast Asia. This goal seemed realistic when Nehru and others first established it. The United States and the Soviet Union were rather oblivious of the region, and the colonial powers were in retreat. But it turned out that the international competition for power potential did not tolerate the 'vacuum' South and Southeast Asia represented. The new states were in no position to enforce their isolation from the Cold War, nor were the powerful nations willing to leave them alone for long.

There are several objections to this formulation. As noted earlier, Krishna Menon referred to the possibility of a detente but did not think that there was a detente or a reduction of zero sum activity between the superpowers. Secondly, India's peaceful co-existence strategy in 1954-55 towards China and the Soviet Union suggested that India did not want to avoid the opportunity to interact with the major powers in Asia. Rejecting the Cold War meant rejecting bipolar activity, and not necessarily rejecting balance of power activity. Finally, articulation of aspirations by

\[\text{Ibid.}, \text{p.106, my emphasis.}\]
the nonaligned states did not necessarily mean that these states believed that the aspirations could be achieved. Thus, the desire to create a zone of peace did not necessarily mean that the nonaligned leaders felt that such a goal could be realised. Neither did this mean that foreign policy, as distinct from the rhetoric of nonalignment, was based on an expectation that peace was round the corner. Thus, before one examines the possible contradiction between the 'goals' of nonalignment, one needs to make a statement of fact about the relative importance of these goals in the policy perceptions of the nonaligned leaders and their foreign offices.

Fourthly, Levi asserts that aid-acquisition was one of the aims of nonalignment and that "the interests of the donors were decisive." Levi's assertion is based on Khrushchev's statement that in Soviet foreign policy, aid and trade were political instruments. This may well be true and the generalisation can be extended to American foreign aid behavior also. But from this generalisation it does not follow that the donor's interests were decisive. Here again one needs to differentiate between aspirations, expectations and achievements. Uri Ra'anan's case study of Soviet arms aid policy to Egypt and Indonesia shows that even if a superpower sought to promote its policies through aid, "Moscow's leverage over Afro-Asian recipients

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is actually extremely limited”.

Fifthly, nonalignment is seen to be tied to bipolarity and the Cold War. Levi asserts that nonalignment had an "almost exclusive Cold War focus" and that up to 1962 discussions of nonalignment (particularly the Indian version of it)

had proceeded essentially on the assumption of bipolarity. More important, the non-aligned states, India included, based their policies on that assumption. When China found it possible to attack outside the bipolar system, the ideal conditions under which nonalignment was born and supposed to function were shown to be nonexistent. For the states outside the bipolar system, the world had always been multipolar. Or perhaps more accurately, below the level of the bipolar atomic world, there remained another "old fashioned" world in which international conflict could be fought out with traditional methods and weapons, including the balance of power, and seemingly over such anachronistic objectives as a small piece of territory. Non-aligned policy did not provide for such a reality and a price had to be paid for the failure of its chief protagonist, India, to see the world as it was.89

This formulation requires modification. Levi recognises that the bipolar system was obviously not global in scope. This is an important point. Another important point which Levi makes is that sub-atomic violence was possible below the nuclear threshold. However, the significance of these statements is unclear and the statements

89 Levi, op.cit., p.116, my emphasis.
seem to rest on the premise that India's non-alignment and peaceful co-existence strategy existed only in a bipolar framework. Yet, as our earlier analysis shows, this is hardly true. The fact that India had a military encounter with China in 1962 does not prove that India viewed the international system in terms of military and political bipolarity. On the contrary, as Levi notes, the 1962 encounter confirmed earlier Indian views that the international system was permeated with bipolar activity at the nuclear level and balance of power activity in the sub-atomic level. Actually, Nehru and Levi would seem to say the same thing if one recognises that Nehru's focus was not simply a bipolar one. Levi simply needs to note that Indian non-alignment and peaceful co-existence strategy assumed that there were more than two policy centers in the world, and the policy prescription was that there ought to be more than two policy centers and Asian responses to bipolarised activity ought to be developed. It would seem though, the concern was to reduce bipolar activity, not zero sum activity. Western scholars have systematically failed to distinguish between these two separate ideas.

Yet, Levi's observation has some merit. The 1962 India-China military encounter invalidated Nehru's assumption that India was protected by a balance of power and that there was no immediate military danger to India from China.
but this of course, did not invalidate Nehru's policy
premises, namely, the need to encourage zero sum activity
within and between the Soviet-American and the Sino-Soviet
dyads because this was to India's advantage. The price
India paid in the 1962 crisis was to alter its public
view about China's sincerity and friendship. In addition
the price included the cost of modernising India's defence
machinery and then there was the economic and political
cost involved in structuring the Indo-Soviet relationship
on an anti-China rationale. The tangible cost was high
but this was compensated by the access which India gained
to sophisticated Soviet military equipment and by the claim
India could make for Soviet support against China. Taking
this set of factors it is difficult to argue convincingly
that India really paid a price for the 1962 crisis, other
than in terms of a bruised ego. Moreover, there is no
evidence that India's premise about the need to encourage
zero sum activity between the Soviet-American and the
Sino-Soviet dyads has altered after 1962. In other words,
the price was in terms of India-China relations and not
in terms of Indo-Soviet and Indo-American relations.

Finally, in the existing literature nonalignment
is seen in terms of the problem of third party mediation
and third party intervention. Oran Young for instance,
distinguishes between the theoretical function of mediation
and the function of balancing. Kissinger sees a problem in terms of the relationship between the ability and right of third parties to intervene in the great issues which face the great powers. According to him:

"As for the uncommitted, they cannot eat their cake and have it too. They cannot remain uncommitted and seek to act as arbiters of all disputes at the same time."  

Any commitment to one party to a dispute is crucial for purpose of intervention and mediation has not been explained by Kissinger. Neither is it clear that nonalignment implies noncommitment.

In addition to the foregoing, other arguments about nonalignment can be noted in passing. (1) Nonaligned states are not necessarily wise, capable and knowledgeable about superpower attitudes and priorities; (2) They are not impartial; (3) They are not immune from external pressure in their domestic politics and presumably they cannot be free from external influence in their third party role:


ibid., p. 346.


Liska in Martin, ibid., pp. 211-221.
(4) that they have a self-interest to profit from the Cold War; (5) that they are 'divisors' rather than stabilisers in world politics because they are generally anti-status quo. The last argument is important because it invites attention to the issues of motivation rather than competence which Kissinger seems to think is a prerogative of the great powers.

Non-alignment and Security

From Brecher's analysis and from the survey of the literature on Indian non-alignment, two concerns are evident and dominant in Western views about Indian policies. First, it is held that India was operating in a bipolar environment in the 1950s and hence Indian non-alignment policies could be, or should be, understood solely, or primarily, in terms of the Soviet-American bloc struggle. Secondly, and this follows logically from the first premise, it is held that given the dangers of zero sum activity in a bipolar world, India's strategy was to seek war-avoidance through third party mediation. The theme is strong in both premises that bipolarity provided the main context for the proper functioning of Indian non-alignment.

The following survey of Indian views on the balance of power shows that the roots of Indian balance of power thinking go at least into the early 1950s, if not earlier.

This examination shows that even if the ideological content or tone of India's foreign policy behavior appeared to be dominant in contrast to the 'realpolitik' considerations in Indian policy making, India was (is) a balance of power actor, and steeped in the Anglo-American tradition. However, there are important differences which set India apart from the Western actors. During the 1950s India sought to focus attention on Asian problems, arguing that European and superpower oriented solutions were inadequate; that one needed political rather than military solutions; that one needed to avoid the dangers of strategies of military preponderance; that one needed the growth of genuine balance of power activity rather than bipolarity. These themes are investigated below.

Analysing official Indian views about national and international security is a complex activity. First, there is an over-emphasis, a vehemence in the rejection of the notion of 'power politics' in Indian speeches, but a precise formulation underlying the contemporary meaning of 'power politics' in the official Indian perspective is not outlined in any systematic fashion, or with the same vehemence. Secondly, as the Indian scholar-diplomat K. M. Panikkar noted, there is no systematic or codified Indian defence doctrine which can help guide analyses of the balance of power or the global co-relations of military-political
forces from an Indian perspective. To quote Panikkar:

"Thus, India had till independence lacked an effective military tradition. She had developed no doctrines of warfare with a corpus of theory, no effective inherited organisation, no knowledge of the progress of warfare in other countries. India in fact did not have an effective system of defence. The human material was superb. From the point of view of courage, endurance, ability to act with discipline and self-control, the Indian armies trained by Britain have proved themselves to be second to none. But neither under the British, nor under Indian rule was there developed in India a proper military tradition based upon experience of warfare in the countries or with a coherent and effective doctrine of its own." 96

Yet, even though Indian views on defence and foreign policies are not explicitly analysed or presented in a comparative fashion, the existence of such views cannot be denied and a scholar is to blame for not looking closely for them. A preliminary investigation shows that from time to time Indian officials did share some of their perceptions candidly with American audiences. Some of the highlights are examined below and these relate to Indian perceptions -- from unofficial ones before 1947 and official ones after 1947.

11) Pre-1947 views

Kavir notes Nehru's assessment in 1923 that India was protected by a balance of power; that the United States was "too far away for effective action"; that the European states
were too involved in mutual rivalries and could not "trouble us at all". That Japan was inhibited by the European powers and the United States; that the danger from Soviet Russia was "largely imaginary". Subsequently in 1931 Nehru reiterated his conviction that

"It may be that some will covet her, but the master desire will be to prevent any other nation from possessing India. No country will tolerate the idea of another acquiring the commanding position which England occupied for so long. If any power was covetous enough to make the attempt, all the others would combine to trounce the intruder. This mutual rivalry would in itself be the surest guarantee against an attack on India".77

(II) Indo-American Relations, 1941-47

Yet there is evidence of an effort to build a India-U.S. policy connection after 1941, and particularly after 1947. Immediately after 1947, the search for a bilateral focus was independent of the Cold War focus from the Indian point of view, but this was not necessarily the case in the American point of view. In the Indian focus the search for an American connection was not simply a response to the bipolar character of the international system of the late 1940s and the early 1950s; it was a response to the geopolitical and the balance of power activity surrounding the Kashmir dispute.

For these views see Vavic, India's Quest for Security, pp. 22-23.
To understand the post-1947 India-U.S. interactions it is necessary to refer briefly to the overall scope of Indo-American relations during 1941-47. As Gary Hess notes:

"From the time of Pearl Harbor until the French withdrawal from Indochina in 1954, the United States continually faced the challenge of responding to Asian nationalist movements directed against its European allies. In its first test with India, the United States substantially failed, because of its equivocation the nation appeared uncertain of its espoused ideals, and, indeed, seemed to be a partner in imperialism." 98

As Hess has shown, during 1941-1947 President Roosevelt favoured Indian independence from Britain but his concern for Prime Minister Churchill's position as an American ally prevented him from pressuring Britain to grant independence to India. India's disappointment with the United States was thus a part of the background in which India sought American assistance for its developmental effort, and for its position on the Kashmir issue and towards Pakistan.

After 1947 Indo-American interaction broadly dealt with two types of policy issues -- economic and strategic -- and on both issues there was a fundamental divergence of opinion between the two countries. As Rosinger, a knowledgeable observer of the Indo-American scene, noted, from the

point of view of the U.S. Departments of Defence and State. India was "important" but not "vital" to American security and it was not a "sensitive" zone in the Cold War. According to him, Indian foreign policy appeared to be "somewhere in between the positions of the two great power blocs". As early as August 1947, U.S. Ambassador Grady in India sharply criticised Indian critics of American policies and sought to change the Indian climate for American economic investments, to align India publicly with the U.S. in the Cold War, and to keep India on the American side of the "world's struggle". Before Grady, John Foster Dulles, a member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N., stated that "In India, Soviet Communism exercises a strong influence through the interim Hindu government". Nehru reacted by expressing his "surprise and regret" at these remarks and Madame Pandit, Nehru's sister and the head of the Indian delegation to the U.N., termed Mr. Dulles' remarks as "gratuitous" and based on a "complete misapprehension".


100 ibid., p. 72.

101 ibid., pp. 50-51.

102 ibid., pp. 102-103.
The rudeness of American and Indian speeches in part reflected a lack of knowledge in the U.S. about the true nature of Indian nationalism and in part it reflected the strategic aspect of American interest in the sub-continent. As Rosinger noted, "It is the United States, and not Britain, which has assumed the foremost position among the powers in the public handling of the Kashmir dispute", and secondly, the "appearance of the names of General Walter Bedell Smith and Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz suggests that American interest in Kashmir has a strategic aspect". In American public commentaries however, it appeared that the strategic aspect had a wider focus, reflecting a need to utilise India in American foreign relations. Thus, Walter Lippmann, the noted American columnist urged that the U.S. ought to consult with Nehru about America's policies on China, Indo-China and the Middle East. In the Far Eastern context, Lippmann asked whether the United States ought to rely merely on Japan (as the Pentagon advised) or whether India and Indonesia also needed to be given a larger policy focus in American thinking.

Overall, it seemed that even though Indo-U.S. economic relations, particularly trade relations, involved Indian transfers of items deemed to be strategic or critical by the

103 Ibid., p. 111.
104 Ibid., pp. 125-126.
the political-military focus of the U.S. government underlined the economic relations. It was in the context of the confrontation between two internationalist powers -- one of them materially strong and the other materially weak -- that India sought alternative sources of external support to pursue its political, security and economic goals.

**Views of 1947-54**

Views during this period offer an interesting commentary about India's attentiveness to external developments. Two events affected Indian perceptions and policies. American hostility to India's role in the Korean War was extended into the Indian sub-continent when the United States started a major military aid program in Pakistan. Nehru's criticism of America's Pakistan policy was a part of an earlier view -- which he outlined to Ambassador Chester Bowles in 1951 -- criticising the American over-response to the fear of communist expansionism. The second event

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106 This was in December 1953. Nehru's reaction is described in Chester Bowles, *Promises to Keep*, p.479.

was the emergence of a communist China in 1949. According to Bowles, Nehru was aware of the seriousness of the new regime in China and its implications for India. As Bowles describes it, in 1951

"Nehru expressed concern over the long-term problem Communist China posed for India... He staked his hopes for a peaceful relationship, not on Chinese goodwill, but on the assumption that the Chinese leaders needed a period of peace in which to solidify their revolution". 108

During 1947-54, official Indian views suggest an awareness about the zero sum focus and the geo-political focus in India's strategic environment. In January 1947, Nehru's instructions to Indian Ambassadors to Washington and Peking included the following:

"The two leading groups today are the Russian bloc and the Anglo-American bloc. We must be friendly to both and yet not join either. Both America and Russia are extraordinarily suspicious of each other as well as of other countries. This makes our path difficult and we may well be suspected by each of leaning towards the other. This cannot be helped".

"There is much goodwill for America and expectation of help from her in many fields, especially technical. There is also a great deal of sympathy for the work of the Soviet Union and the remarkable change that this has brought among the people. The Soviet Union being our neighbour, we shall inevitably develop closer relations with it. We cannot afford to antagonise Russia merely because we think that this may irritate someone else. Nor indeed can we antagonise the USA".

108 Ibid., n. 400.
"Our Ambassador in China, while maintaining close and friendly relations with Chiang Kai-shek's Government, should not allow himself to become a partisan in the civil conflict. Nor should we say anything disparaging to either side". 100

These instructions recognised the bipolar orientation of the international system, but subsequently, in 1949, two Indian foreign policy statements moderated the war-avoidance quality of Indian policy. Furthermore, these statements showed that the notion of bipolarity was not entirely the guiding premise in Indian policy. In the first statement to the Indian Constituent Assembly, Nehru stated categorically that

"there has been a great deal of talk about the possibilities of war -- world war, I mean. So far as I can judge, such possibilities as there were have receded. I don't think there is any great chance of any war on a big scale, on a world scale in the near future." 110

The second article appeared in the authoritative Foreign Affairs in 1943 and this article by an "Indian Official" elaborated the contours and policy premises underlying India's behavior after independence. Written after the euphoria of independence, this article recognised India's potential power potentialities -- its manpower and its

100 Senon, K. F. S., Many Worlds, pp. 229-230, my emphasis.

110 In 1955 Nehru told the Indian Parliament: "As things are today, we have reached a certain kind of balance -- it may be very unstable balance, but it is still some kind of balance -- when any kind of major aggression is likely to lead to a world war. That itself is a restraining factor". Both these statements are cited in Rahman, op. cit., p. 52.
latent military and industrial power. It noted India's Gandhian tradition but emphasised that under certain circumstances India would be forced to defend its freedom through military means. It protested against the problem of power politics but defined the problem as one of seeking military preponderance and military solutions to world issues. It noted that India had no traditional enemies and that India was "midway" between the East and the West, which facilitated its peaceful involvement in foreign affairs and in superpower disputes. Overall, the article emphasised India's non-material (ideological) focus against racialism and colonialism. It insisted on the need to develop an Asian focus in world politics, based on the growth of nationalism which freed "the countries concerned from implicit adherence to the decisions of a foreign Power". India's approach to foreign affairs was described and Indian perceptions were outlined, as follows:

1) "Where international disputes are concerned, India, therefore, can do no other endeavour to view them without fear or prejudice or passion; ... strive for a settlement by conciliation and agreement. This she has sought to do, notably in the cases of Korea, Palestine and the problem of atomic control".

2) "India, at any rate, is too conscious of her responsibilities, and of the need to preserve and develop the innate strength and self-reliance of her people, to participate in any arrangement that might induce a sense of dependence or compromise her freedom of action".
"It is time for a wider recognition in the west that we have come to the end of an historical epoch. The eclipse of India in the eighteenth century was not an isolated phenomenon; it was part of the world movement by which the science and technology of Europe captured Asia and turned it, under different forms, into an appendage of the west. India's re-emergence is likewise related to the revival of the entire continent. Its ultimate result must necessarily be to transform the politico-economic map of the world, and establish a new relationship between east and west". 111

In 1950 -- with China's military takeover of Tibet -- the relationship between India's verbal strategy and its security policy became somewhat visible, but not entirely so. As U.S. Ambassador to India Chester Bowles noted, India reacted to the Chinese move by improving its security ties with Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim -- the three Himalayan kingdoms which were geographical and political buffers between India and the Chinese Tibet. In contrast, the verbal strategy emphasised India's ethical stand on world issues.

The latter theme was portrayed by the Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Mr. G.S. Bajpai. In a newspaper article he noted that Indian foreign policy "should be a balanced blend of idealism and enlightened self-interest"; that India could not afford to get involved in a major war -- she needed time; that if her freedom was

111 "India as a World Power", Foreign Affairs, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 540-550, my emphasis.

threatened it must defend itself; that by aligning herself with a major power India could not eliminate the danger of war; that a drift towards war could be "stopped only by the major powers". The "balance of power fallacy" was exposed by questioning the "assumption that physical force is the arbiter of man's destiny". Finally, the article went on to examine the causes of modern war. These were described as follows:

(1) "there is domination or the attempt to dominate, viz., imperialism... there is no doubt that imperialism is an abiding threat to peace".

(2) "Secondly, connected in many ways with the first, is the problem of racial relations.... The world cannot long maintain peace if half of it is enslaved and despised".

(3) "A third reason for war and revolution is the misery and want of millions of persons in many countries, again particularly in Asia and Africa". 113

In 1950-1951 the Indian policy assumption was that Sino-Soviet rivalry was probable and this assessment carried the implication that a Sino-Soviet balance could emerge which would protect India. Chester Bowles' notes in the Ambassador's Report that Nehru was the only Asian leader to sense the

existence of Sino-Soviet rivalry in 1951, and Bowles also recognises that Indian political reporting was good even at that time. Thus, according to Bowles:

"Since the late 1940s, Nehru said, American foreign policy had been based on a series of assumptions which were, in his view, at best questionable and at worst dangerously wrong. Of these the most worrisome was the conviction of many informed Americans that the primary threat to their security was a world-wide Communist conspiracy, in which the Soviet Union and China were closely cooperating. The primary world-wide political force, in his view, was not Communism but an intense nationalism.

The Chinese-Soviet association, he said, was unlikely to last for more than a few years. Not only did the Chinese traditionally look down on the Russians as semibarbarians, but the Russians were the only imperial power that had retained control over what for centuries had been Chinese territory. In dealing with China, he said, the Soviets feel a sense of cultural inferiority; in addition, they are concerned about the vast and rapidly expanding population of China pressing against their eastern and southern borders. It was only a matter of time, he said, before a confrontation of some kind would occur."

Even though India had few illusions about the nature of the regime in Communist China, the strategy it chose to pursue was one of seeking a peaceful and friendly relationship with China. This strategy was outlined in the Indian

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115 Bowles, Promises to Keep, p. 480.

Parliament by the Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Mr. R.V. Keskar. According to him:

"The Government is not unmindful of the protection of our frontiers adjoining Tibet. I may go further and say that the Government feels that the best way of protecting that frontier is to have a friendly Tibet and a friendly China. It is obvious that such a complicated and big frontier cannot be well protected if we have a border country which becomes hostile to us. Therefore, we feel that in tackling the question of Tibet and China, we should always keep in mind that a friendly China and a friendly Tibet are the best guarantee of the defence of our country". 117

What sort of conclusions can one draw from this statement and the previous one? Was India pursuing a strategy of negotiating with China, despite India's position of military weakness? Was it trying to be friendly toward China as Keskar noted, even though India had a realistic view of the nature of the Chinese regime, as Bowles remarks indicated or was it India's perception that it was a 'potentially great power' which was protected by the existing balance of power, as Rajkui seemed to suggest? Or was India's policy best understood in terms of its long term strategy or long term aspiration to transform the international system by shaping the India-China axis -- a possibility which is inferred from Bowles assessment of Panikkar's role as India's Ambassador to Beijing from 1950 to 1952? Cumulatively,

117 Kavic, India's Quest for Security, p.44, my emphasis.

118 Ambassador's Report, pp.222-223.
Indian official statements support each of these differing assessments and the right answer may be hard to establish.

But one thing is clear. Whether India chose to follow a strategy of peace because it felt itself adequately protected by the existing balance of power, or whether it pursued this strategy because it had no other alternative -- except to join the American alliance system and the Cold War -- India's strategy was a balance of power strategy. Obviously, the search for a balance was through diplomatic rather than military means, but the search was there. And the search was carried on the basis of a significant difference of opinion between Nehru's India and Truman's and Dulles' and Acheson's America on two questions: the premise that the Communists were united and seeking global domination; and the view that the strategy of containment -- military and political -- was the best way to frustrate the communists.

The difference between the American and the Indian balance of power strategies toward China and the Soviet Union were indeed wide and were reflected in the gulf between India and the United States -- a gulf which became apparent during Nehru's first official visit to the United States in 1949. Nehru's statements do not make this clear but comments

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In a speech to the Indian Constituent Assembly on November 28, 1949, Nehru expressed "complete satisfaction" with his visit to Canada and the U.S.A. Cf. Rahman, op.cit., p. 32. Compare this with Bowles assessment which shows the points of disappointments during the 1949 visit. Cf. Ambassador's Report, pp. 112-113.
by Dean Acheson and Chester Bowles (which have been noted elsewhere) make the difference clear. For instance, Bowles complains that India ignored its strategic flanks in Indo-China and the Middle East during the 1950s. Mr. Bowles shows that in the American perspective the reasons for India's behavior were understandable but not appreciated in terms of American policy needs. Bowles was critical of India's refusal to join the American containment policy and instead to try to establish a policy of peaceful co-existence with China. Writing in the *Foreign Affairs* in 1954, he argued:

> "agreement between Nehru and Chou-En-lai, instead of promoting closer Chinese-Indian relationships, may prove to do the opposite. In any case, it provides a clear test of Chinese intentions." 121

According to Bowles, Nehru was aware of this argument; he had this article reproduced and circulated to Indian embassies abroad.

This is an interesting insight. If Nehru was aware in 1954 of American speculation at a high policy level about the danger of Sino-Indian confrontation, and if this idea was widely circulated among Indian officials, one can safely

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121 Bowles, *Promises to Keep*, p.493.

122 *ibid.*, p.494.
assume that India's peaceful co-existence strategy toward China sought to diffuse or transform the condition of bipolarity in world politics by shaping the India-China axis. This of course, was not the sole basis of India's balance of power strategy at that time. India's peaceful co-existence strategy towards China was accompanied by an idea voiced in 1952, suggesting that India refused to enter into a military alliance but was willing to enter into a treaty of friendship "with every country in the world". Obviously, the idea of a friendship treaty became real in 1971 when the Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship, cooperation and peace was signed, but in an informal sense, the idea became real when, after Stalin's death, the Bulganin-Khrushchev team visited India and expressed a willingness to follow a peaceful co-existence strategy with India, along the lines laid down in the India-China Agreements of 1954. This is not the place to speculate about the differences in motives behind Indian, Chinese and Soviet usages of the strategy of peaceful co-existence but this is a question for future.

123 Cited in Rahman, op.cit., p.35.

Thirdly and finally, India's balance of power strategy called for an Indian attempt to find a 'middle ground' between the two bloc leaders. This aspect was outlined in

Syatau, J.J.G., Some Newly Established Asian States and the Development of International Law, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1961 offers penetrating insights about the differences between the Soviet and Asian approaches to peaceful co-existence. Three differences are noteworthy: (1) the Asian views of peaceful co-existence are detached from the Soviet view (p.214); (2) The Asian views suggest that peaceful co-existence is meant to be a permanent solution to the problem of war and stability as compared to the Soviet view of peaceful co-existence as a transitory phenomena or transitory strategy. (p.216). (3) Peaceful co-existence of the Asian brand rejects the bipolar view of the international system. (p.216).

While the differences between Soviet and Asian approaches to peaceful co-existence are easily identified, it is difficult to establish a typology of Chinese and Indian views or approaches or assumptions relating to peaceful co-existence. Our analysis so far has only tried to argue that peaceful co-existence idea in Indian foreign relations towards China and the Soviet Union was not simply an ethical idea; it also contained an element of expediency, given Nehru's premise about the difficulty of Soviet-American detente and secondly, given the premise that there was tension within the Sino-Soviet bloc. In other words, India's choice of peaceful co-existence was instrumental in many ways. It paved the way for structuring India-China relations. Secondly, it encouraged zero-sum activity in Sino-Soviet relations. Thirdly, it encouraged zero sum activity in Sino-American relations. Our purpose is not to prove the success or failure of these activities but it is only to suggest the quality of expediency in India's behavior, bearing in mind the conventional Western wisdom that India was engaged in war-avoidance or in reducing Cold War tensions. Moreover, the assumptions behind Indian and Chinese approach to peaceful co-existence, are not discussed in this chapter and this question belongs to a separate study.
the article by "I" who was subsequently identified as M.A. Panikkar, the former Indian Ambassador to Peking. His outline of India's foreign policy premises and India's policy problems indicated that if India's immediate concern was to find a middle ground -- an area of compromise and consensus through peaceful means, that is, through a strategy of peaceful co-existence rather than a strategy of military containment -- India's long range problem, or long range policy premise, or the long range definition of Indian security, was to secure the growth of a viable India-China axis. This was to counter the superpower view which called for bipolarity as the pillar of an international security system. The key points in Mr. Panikkar's analysis are noted below.

First, the article noted the Indian perception that "large and influence groups in the United States suspect Indian motives and declare her to be pro-communist". Secondly, the United States was "deliberately opposing India at every stage" and was trying to reduce Asian countries to "a condition of political dependence". The three issues which separated India and the United States were the attitudes towards Communist expansion, attitudes towards colonialism, and the attitudes towards China. The article noted that India had taken a firm line against communism within India but took a different view of communism externally. Panikkar insisted that American views on the
nature of expansionist communism were based on expediency and "calculation of their own interests" rather than fundamental ideology since the democracies had apparently found it fit to cooperate with the Soviet regime during the Second World War despite the ideological differences. Recognising that the China question was the principal point of difference between India and the United States, Panikkar noted that there was a competition between India and China -- between democracy and communism -- but this competition "has to be fought and settled in the internal structure of each state" and not externally.

Overall, Panikkar's arguments pointed to two existing features in India's balance of power diplomacy. First, India had sought and had, to some extent, achieved a middle ground between America and Russia as for example in India's participation in the Korean war. Here India's approach sought peaceful, non-military, solutions to Cold War issues. But moderating the superpower rivalry was not the sole focus of Indian statecraft. Building the India-China axis -- which Nehru and Panikkar argued could and would affect or alter the global balance of power -- was another, albeit less visible (but not a hidden) dimension of India's security

policy at that time.

A comparison between the policy premises and arguments of Nehru and Chester Bowles is useful for two reasons: it outlines the similarities and differences between India and American approaches to international security affairs, during the 1947-54 period which is reviewed above. These demonstrate that despite the differences in premises and strategies, the focus of the two countries was to seek a stable balance of power. Secondly, since Bowles was twice

Bowles summarises Panikkar’s view in Ambassador’s Report, p.222.

However, a qualification should be added to show a possible difference between Panikkar’s and Nehru’s views on the role of an India-China axis in transforming the global balance of power. Both Nehru and Panikkar agreed on the desirability of improving India-China relations. Panikkar also felt, as Bowles notes, that this would alter the global balance of power. There is no categorical statement by Nehru to the effect that an India-China axis would alter global relations. Yet Nehru did emphasise the need for a global system based on four rather than two major powers. To quote Nehru: “China, which is a great power and which is powerful today, is potentially still more powerful. Leaving these three big countries, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and China, aside for the moment, look at the world. There are many advanced, highly cultured countries. But if you peep into the future and if nothing goes wrong, wars and like -- the obvious fourth country in the world is India”. Cf. Nehru, Select Speeches, p.305.

Even if this statement does not demonstrate the relationship — real or potential — between the India-China axis and the bipolar system, it does demonstrate convincingly that Nehru’s view of the world consisted of four major actors but definitely not two bipolar actors.
the American Ambassador to India, his views provide us with a sense of the continuity and change in American policy perspective on India. Although this chapter is not primarily concerned with a discussion of Indo-American relations, the kinds of arguments which were exchanged between these two countries helps identify India's attitudes towards the major powers.

Essentially there are five points of comparison. First, Indo-American attitudes on the role of, and the desirability of, bipolarity in world politics help identify Indian and American perceptions of the nature of the international system. In other words, did India share the American view of the early 1950s that the East-West, Soviet-American focus was necessary and sufficient to explain the policy framework for achieving international security?

Secondly, how much importance did the two countries attach to military power as an instrument for keeping the peace and for stabilising the Soviet-American balance? India's preference for a strategy of 'peace through negotiations' needs to be contrasted with the obvious American strategy of peace through a strategy of confrontation—even though both were apparently guided by a common consideration, viz., to develop a secure world. Thirdly, differing assumptions about the nature of the Sino-Soviet relationship during 1949-54, or the future prospects of that relationship, help
explain the difference in the preferred strategies of India and the United States towards China. The U.S. strategy chose to argue that the policy target was a monolithic communist bloc which was also expansionist by nature, whereas Nehru's strategy argued that the policy target was a bloc which was potentially divided and which was not necessarily expansive by nature despite the totalitarian nature of the communist regimes. Fourthly, given the difference of opinion on the third point, what were the differing attitudes between India and the United States concerning the need for, and the strategy for, achieving a stable balance of power in Asia? Several points are involved here: whether the two sides agreed on the need for a balance? Whether there was agreement on the mechanism for achieving this? Whether China was seen as an implacable foe -- and hence an inevitable target for containment through military and/or political means -- or whether the policy assumption accounted for the possibility or probability of China becoming a potential partner of the non-communist nations in Asia, given the possibility of a Sino-Soviet conflict in the early 1950s? Fifthly, and finally, how salient was the difference between the American preference for an Asian Monroe Doctrine centering on containment of China, and an Indian preference for an Indian Monroe Doctrine centering on exclusion of foreign powers from India's security environment? To
anticipate our argument, it appears that irrespective of what one thinks of the similarities and differences between India and America on these questions, and whether or not the respective Indians and Americans were talking about such questions in the early 1950s and the 1960s, the balance of power considerations existed on both sides.

(a) Role of bipolarity in world politics

The most obvious difference between Nehru's and Bowles' approach to stabilising the Asian and the global balance of power lay in the policy framework which the two had about Soviet-American relations. Bowles, like his contemporaries in the policy and the academic worlds, insisted on the primacy of the East-West struggle. He noted that

"It is in the broader area of communism in world politics and the Cold War that the differences between Nehru and his American critics become sharpest. Unlike his clear understanding of the threat of domestic communism to democracy in India, I think he does not yet fully appreciate the menace of aggressive Soviet and Chinese communism to peace in the world".

Somewhat paradoxically Bowles noted that in fact Nehru knew "more in detail about China than the vast majority of Americans because he has many more sources of information". Yet Bowles was amazed that Nehru had "not yet drawn the conclusion" that the "whole world must finally choose up sides". As noted Earlier, Nehru and Panikkar felt that

there was no need to take sides on a moral basis because
the Cold War divisions were based on expediency and calcu-
lations of national interests, and, as C.S. Mahpali noted,
Indian national interests did not require alignment with the
American or the Soviet side.

(b) Military containment as a policy instrument
A difference between Indian and American views on the
strategy needed to stabilise the Asian balance centered on
the nature of the India-China competition. Bowles was
suggesting that the competition ought to be seen as a global
one, requiring an external Indian response to China and Soviet
Russia based on a philosophy of anti-communism. Indian
officials like Fanikkar however, argued that there was a
competition between two different social and political
systems but the competitions was internal and could be
resolved by altering the internal social-economic dynamics
which encouraged or discouraged communism. In other words,
the Bowles thesis was based on a premise that the India-China
competition would result in a military confrontation and
that the proper Indian strategy was to adhere to the American
containment doctrine. Bowles spoke in terms of an 'either-or'
proposition. In the 1950s he felt that there was a danger of
Soviet Russian imperialism against India and that if the
Indian system of democracy collapsed this would alter the
global balance of power. According to him,

"But if India fails, it will have a profound effect upon the future of every American and indeed of the world.

If that happens, the balance of world power will shift fatally toward Moscow without a shot being fired".127

An earlier judgement by Bowles however, seemed to qualify the aforesaid fear. To quote him again:

"we may be certain of two things at least: her foreign policy will remain 'independent', and it will not be pro-communist, so long as the present government or any of its democratic opposition parties are in power. India will not sell her soul for a bowl of rice. She is no more willing to accept Chinese or Soviet domination of herself or of her neighbours than she is willing to accept the return of Western colonial rulers. On the scale of history their fierce independence may turn out to be decisive in stopping the Communist expansion in Asia".130

It was obvious that the guiding policy premise in India's balance of power diplomacy towards its communist neighbours was closer to Bowles' second rather than the first judgement noted above. Given this, the rejection in India's policy was of the doctrine of containment of communism through military means rather than the idea of containing them through diplomatic or peaceful means.1

127 Ibid., p. 301.
130 Ibid., p. 258, my emphasis.
(c) Assumptions about Sino-Soviet relations

Earlier we noted a difference of opinion between Nehru -- who argued that the Sino-Soviet bloc was not as close as the West thought it was -- and Bowles who argued that it was closer than Nehru recognised. In retrospect, it was this difference in policy premise between India and the United States which underlined the difference in the military strategy of the two countries towards the principal communist states. Furthermore, assuming that Nehru believed in 1950-1951 that the communist bloc was not actually a monolith, as it appeared to be, the Indian approach to balance of power in Asia was by definition, not based on the idea of bipolarity.

(d) Differing attitudes about the Asian balance of power

The key point which emerged in Bowles' analysis was that China was the central problem and a 'new' Asian balance of power ought to be created in response to this problem. The now familiar 'domino theory' appeared as a strong theme in Bowles' view of Asian politics. Given the centrality of the Chinese threat, Bowles recommended that the United States should even try to involve the Russians to contain...

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131 Promises to Keep, pp.611-612.

132 Ibid., p.612.
China; of course, this idea was expressed by Bowles in the 1960s and not in the 1950s. Another technique to solve the China problem which he recommended was to establish a coalition of India, Indonesia and Japan, or of India and Japan, rather than to rely simply on a network of small American military allies in Asia — most of whom were supported by American military power and themselves did not enjoy a sound democratic base. Overall, Bowles recommended the creation of an Asian Monroe Doctrine and to involve India in the Asian policy processes in such a manner that it strengthened the democratic forces. India's place in the Asian balance was therefore, two fold: (1) to deny India as a possible gain for the communist camp, i.e., to avoid the Leninist prediction that the way to Paris was via Calcutta; and (2) to bring India to the side of the democratic, the anti-communist camp.

133 Ibid., p.616.
134 Ibid., pp.457-458.
135 Ibid., p.612.
136 Ambassador's Report, p.397.
137 Ibid., p.391.
The survey of Nehru's and Bowles' arguments -- or Indian and American arguments -- shows that the difference of opinion centered on two propositions. First, the American viewpoint articulated by Bowles assumed that China was the main threat to the Asian balance of power and that the free world's Asia policy ought to be structured on that rationale. Whether this was a genuine belief or a strategy is not clear; it could be both or it could be either one or the other. By comparison the Indian viewpoint as articulated by Nehru stressed the importance of exploiting Sino-Soviet tensions (which Nehru recognised in 1951) and of structuring an India-China relationship to counter the danger of bipolarity in Asian politics. In other words, Nehru appeared to argue that if China could be disassociated from the Soviet Union -- that is, if a split occurred, it could demonstrate the limits of association between the two communist giants. Given this, the 'free world' ought not to react militarily to a monolithic bloc -- to seek a military balance of power between the free world and the communist bloc, but rather it ought to seek a balance, a split, between Soviet and Chinese power. Engineering a Sino-Soviet split, or encouraging a split, therefore, appeared to Indians as a viable and alternative strategy, compared to a strategy of balancing communist power through military containment.
Similarly, the second difference was either a difference of belief and strategies, or it could be one or the other. This concerned the nature of the India-China competition, its importance for Asia and the best strategy for winning the competition between democracy and communism as social and political systems. As noted earlier, Bowles was arguing that there was a serious competition, India was important for the future of Asia and for the future of the American position in Asia, and the strategy for winning it was two fold: India ought to perform militarily and diplomatically in South east Asia (one can argue that the emphasis varied from joining the American alliance system if possible to promoting American aims through diplomatic means); secondly, he suggested that American economic and military assistance was needed to aid India's developmental process. By contrast, the Indian position seemed to be somewhat as follows: As Panikkar noted in 1954, there was a serious competition, but the competition was an internal one; the best strategy to pursue to adopt was to structure a peaceful diplomatic relationship between India and China, to secure 'peaceful co-existence' (which meant that the military option would be a chewed), and to avoid military containment of China since this meant that China would be forced to rely on Soviet assistance, given China's military weakness.
(e) Ideas about Asian and Indian Monroe Doctrine contrasted

A salient variance between the Indian and the American approaches to security centered on strategies the two sides advocated vis-a-vis China, and this also accounted for a difference between the Indian emphasis on developing a Monroe Doctrine for the Indian sub-continent as contrasted with the American emphasis towards the development of a Monroe Doctrine for Asia. On July 26, 1955 Nehru had declared as follows:

"Any attempt by a foreign Power to interfere in any way with India is a thing which India cannot tolerate and which, subject to her strength, she will oppose. That is the doctrine I lay down".138

Although a formal announcement of an Indian Monroe Doctrine was made only in 1955, India's policy along that line appeared in December 1953 when the possibility of a U.S.-Pakistan military agreement became imminent. As Bowles notes, "Nehru made a speech strongly opposing U.S. military assistance to Pakistan on the grounds that it would bring the Cold War to India's own borders".139 Nehru's approach was to argue against an American strategy which sought to strengthen Pakistan in India's backyard and thereby fostered a local India-Pakistan military balance. Such a balance had the clear implication, to the Indian style of thinking at least,


139 Bowles, Promises to Keep, p.479.
that Indian leadership in the sub-continent had to be challenged. At the same time however, Bowles suggested the creation of an *India and Pakistan sponsored Monroe Doctrine* for South and Southeast Asia. The theory behind this suggestion was to secure a settlement of India-Pakistan problems over Kashmir and other bilateral issues; this was the price required by Pakistan for its cooperation with India. Another element in Bowles' approach was that there ought to be a defence scheme against the danger of communist penetration into these regions. Needless to say, Nehru's focus was different from Bowles focus since the premises were different. Bowles' argument was that India needed to participate in the South and Southeastern Asian security processes because of the danger of falling dominoes, from Indo-China to Burma, which would bring communism to the Indian borders on the Burmese side. Bowles had earlier argued that if India went communist this would shift the global balance of power in favour of Moscow. While Indians had implicitly recognised the validity of this proposition (given Nehru's harsh treatment of Indian communists), the thrust of the Indian approach, it seems, was that if India went under, the domino effect would be the reverse; that is, falling dominoes in Southeast Asia were less likely to alter the South Asian balance of

power but a shift in the latter was more likely to influence the balance of power in Southeast Asia. This seemed to be the implication of Nehru's argument that the United States needed to buttress, through foreign aid, the democratic and the developmental infrastructure of India rather than to invest heavily in a program of military containment of China and through an alliance network of un-democratic and weak small Asian states.

Geo-politics and Indian national security: Politics of a power in the middle

The preceding survey of the differences between India and American arguments about security in the Indian sub-continent and security in Asia makes several points. First, India's behavior during 1947-50 was not one of classic neutrality (as Brecher contends) because in 1948 India found itself involved in the Kashmir dispute and its reaction to the role of the United States, among others, indicated that Kashmir was not simply a local dispute but rather it was a cockpit (or so the Indians thought), a symbol of American and British mistrust and reaction against Indian non-alignment.

Secondly, India did not move from the first stage of 'classic neutrality' into the second stage of open rejection of the bloc leaders after the Korean war. Instead, Indian fears and apprehensions about the over-emphasis in the American strategy of containment of communism through
military means were reinforced during 1950-53. That is, during this period, Indian perceptions of the dangers of American support for Pakistan -- and its effect on Indian security, became linked with its perception about the danger of the American global strategy of military containment of communism. The danger of war was seen to lie in the American over-response to the communist bloc, whereas in Nehru's calculation, in 1950-1951, the communist bloc contained the seeds of a split which needed to be exploited.

Partly in response to China's military takeover of Tibet, despite its profession to integrate Tibet into China peacefully; (b) partly in response to India's known military weakness vis-a-vis China; (c) partly in response to the demand which the Kashmir issue placed on limited Indian military resources; (d) and partly in response to the Indian view that the world needed peaceful rather than military solutions, Nehru sought to establish a viable India-China axis in Asia with the hope that this could alter the global balance of power. In other words, during 1950-54, Nehru's strategy was based on the 'balance of power' model rather than the 'bipolarity' model. Given this, Brecher is right in maintaining that India rejected the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union. However, he is wrong in saying that this occurred after the Korean war. He is right if 'after' refers to after the Korean war started.
he is wrong if 'after' refers to the end of the Korean war. Thirdly, Brecher is right in saying that in the early 1950s India played a constructive role in alleviating international tensions in the Korean war. Brecher attributes this to a wish on India’s part to alleviate international tension, to avoid global conflict and to keep India out of a war. This is not necessarily correct. One can of course, argue that the effect of India’s behavior was to help reduce superpowers’ conflict in Korea inasmuch as Indian mediation helped shape the final outcome. But it is one thing to argue that this is what happened and quite another thing to say that this is what India ‘really’ wanted. To ‘avoid global conflict’ can be inferred from the outcome of Indian mediation in Korea. It does not describe Indian intentions or policy motives. It does not describe Indian perceptions about the dangers of war. Surely, one must note Nehru’s view that in his opinion a global war was not likely, given the balance of military power between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. Nehru’s explicit statement on this point suggests that there may be a gap between what Westerners think India is saying or doing and what India actually is saying and doing. The proposition that Nehru wanted to keep India out of war is a non sequitur because Nehru did not believe that a general war was likely in the first place.

The central point of the preceding section is that
one cannot properly understand the evolution of Indian non-alignment or Indian statecraft simply by focussing the argument on India's concern to moderate superpowers conflict or to reduce the danger of war. The framework of Indian foreign policy making during 1947-54 was geo-political, that is, with reference to Indian sub-continental security politics. As such, it took into account the interactions between the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Pakistan in relation to India. This was the primary source of Indian non-alignment. The 'peace' theme in Indian foreign policy was not simply an ideological expression. Rather it was a strategy to create the India-China axis in world politics -- as a counter, as a balance, to the perceived dominance of the bipolar Soviet-American axis. In other words, 'peace' was not simply an ideal goal, an ideal end-condition but it was also a mode, a medium of strategic behavior until such time that India could interact with its geographical and political neighbours on the basis of military strength. One can therefore, argue that India's foreign policy behavior during 1947-54 was based on a strategy of peace -- not as an alternative to a strategy of war or a strategy of military threats -- but as a transitional phenomena or strategy which could be utilised to gain time for the growth of India's material capabilities. This can be inferred from Nehru's statements and the statement of Mr. G.S. Bajpai (noted earlier) makes it absolutely clear.
Given the geo-political focus in India's external behavior, how relevant is the concept of India 'in the middle' for conceptualising India's behavior? Specifically, what is the difference between the concept of a middle power and a power in the middle?

India as a Power in the Middle

Generally speaking, there are two ways to focus on India as an international actor. The first way is to see it as a medium sized power in terms of its military, industrial and other such capabilities. This notion defines power in terms of the material capabilities of a state. As noted earlier, this definition of power is unsatisfying because it fails to specify 'influence' of an actor in specific issues.

This view of a middle power is open to the criticisms one makes of the great power-small power dichotomy. Briefly the works of David Vital and Robert Rothstein may be noted in this regard. Vital defines a small power as one which is unable to pursue its interests unaided. Rothstein says that in defining a small power one should note that

"Small Powers are not simply weaker Great Powers and that they must be defined in terms of something other than their relative power status. Any new definition should also take account of the fact that there is a psychological, as well as a material, distinction between Great and Small Powers. The

141 Vital, D., op. cit., pp. 55, 87."
latter earn their titles not only by being weak but by recognising the implications of that condition. Thus, a Small Power is a state which recognises that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the Small Power’s belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognised by the other states involved in international politics." 142

Actually, Rothstein’s focus is on relational rather than quantitative power and this is helpful in supporting the line of argument of this study. But unfortunately, the definition which he provides lacks an operational value, that is, it cannot be compared across time and space in the international system; and if it is compared the meaning and relevance of the definition collapses. Rothstein’s approach is not to rank every power in the international system; neither does he seem to want to rank it according to indices of statistical power. A relational view of power is derived from two sources: first, the self-image of the small state which finds itself unable to protect its interests unaided; secondly, the other side’s perception of the small state’s weakness. But Rothstein cannot escape from the problem of circularity in his definition: if a great power is an

142 Rothstein, R.L., op. cit., p.29. Rothstein’s emphasis.

143 In discussing the impact of nuclear weapons Rothstein seems to rely partially on an inventory view of power, but this aspect is not discussed here.
exclusive category he does not tell us how this is the case; there is no definition of a great power which is independent of his definition of small power. Yet if Rothstein were to suggest that a great power is antithetical, an opposite, of what a small power is, then he runs into an empirical problem, namely, that there is no great power in the contemporary international system which can pursue its interests unaided. Thus, the relational view of power—which is crucial to prove a difference in kind between a great and a small power—cannot be proved on the basis of the self-image and perceptions of the other side of a state’s smallness. The self-image and other side’s perceptions may change over time; the self-image of a state may vary from the other side’s perceptions because the criteria for appraising greatness and smallness may be different between the appraisers. Rothstein’s position is firm ground only when he argues that one difference between a great power and a small power is that the former has a "systemic interest" which the latter does not have. But here again there is a problem of definition and description about the nature and extent of such an interest.

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144 Thus Henry Kissinger conceded in 1961 in The Reporter: "Not even the most powerful country is capable by itself of maintaining security or of realising the aspirations of its people".

145 Ibid., p.6.
Rothstein's treatment of the middle power concept is superficial. A great power is defined in terms of its systemic interests and in terms of the weakness of a small state. The middle power notion is not dealt with for two interesting reasons: first, "it would complicate an already complicated situation". The second reason is more serious and merits a long quote:

"It is worth noting that the category itself is of relatively recent derivation. It did not exist before 1919, and the record since then has been ambiguous. Where such states -- usually self styled -- do seem to exist, it is normally the result not of their own achievements but of the weakness, disappearance, or disinterestedness of neighbouring Great Powers (e.g., note Poland's situation after 1919); or because the Great Powers use their power superiority effectively and seek the political/support of the most prominent uncommitted states (e.g., India in the Cold War period). A "middle-range" status implies a degree of external recognition.... However, tangible proof of significant difference between Small Powers and the middle-range Powers would have to rest on evidence that, when threatened, middle-range Powers do in fact possess a wider range of choice than Small Powers. That evidence does not yet exist. Until it does, the assumption that the distinction is formal and peripheral, not substantive and central, will prevail".146

The serious part of the objection is not that the middle powers are self-styled. In the Concert of Europe, and in modern international relations, for example, the great powers are self-styled and yet in theory and in practice there does not seem to be a problem with their assertiveness.

146 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
Rather, a serious point in Rothstein's view is that the range of choice of a middle power is not significantly different from that of a small power. Another serious point is that a power is great because of its own achievement and not because of the weakness or disinterest of the other side. These are useful ideas and it seems the inference is that if a middle power is able to develop a range of choice which is sufficient to engage a great power's attention, and if a great power cannot avoid interacting with a middle power because of its achievements, then a middle power can be treated as a great power or a potential great power.

This brings us to the second way of studying the concept of India as a middle power. While the first perspective visualises a middle power in the context of the classical great power-small power model, the second perspective is not concerned with the ranking of power. Instead, it looks upon India as a 'power in the middle' -- a power which has manoeuvered itself or placed itself in such a political and strategic position that, even though the superpowers would not necessarily like to interact with it, they would have no choice but have to do so. It is in this sense that India's strategic behavior is examined in this chapter. The premise is not that the Cold War came to the Indian subcontinent, but that India itself encouraged the injection of the Cold War into subcontinental politics because
this was the only strategy it could pursue to interact with the superpowers and to establish viable interdependencies between India and these powers.

To elaborate. For India, 'being in the middle' had several meanings. First, India sought a middle ground between the United States and the Soviet Union, recognising the expediency of the Cold War disputes and recognising India's need to structure a political and economic (or a non-alliance) relationship with the superpowers in the 1950s. K.N. Panikkar's views in the 1954 article in *Foreign Affairs* articulated the Indian strategy and Indian expectations. In this strategic view, the framework of policy was to find a middle ground between the two superpowers, viz., the premise of bipolarity was central in an approach which sought to become involved in superpowers' politics by fostering, for example, Indian mediation in Korea and Indo-China during 1950-54.

The second way to look at India as a power in the middle is to see it as an object in the superpowers' competition. Here the premise is that the 'third world' was (is) a zone of non-nuclear, but not necessarily non-violent, superpower competition. This premise refers to the zero sum quality of the Soviet-American competition, during and after the Cold War, and it includes the strategies of competing arms transfers of the superpowers to their clients in the
third world. This perspective is outlined by Brecher as follows:

"That is to say, instead of carrying them up, the two blocs can reduce the likelihood of direct conflict by diverting their energies into a very time-consuming and very beneficial competition in the form of economic development and aid among the states of Asia and Africa." 147

According to Brecher, this approach has a dual advantage. It offers an opportunity for the developing countries to receive foreign aid. Secondly, it enables the superpowers to pursue their competition without the danger of a nuclear confrontation or war. In either case the third parties appear as objects of superpower confrontation. The function of creating a zone of non-violent competition is to reduce the danger of a bipolar confrontation, with a side gain of economic assistance to the developing countries. In this approach therefore, the premise of bipolarity is central. Implicitly, influence is traced by assessing the effects of superpowers' involvement in the developing countries on the bilateral relations between the superpowers. In other words, in this perspective the focus is not on a study of say, Indo-U.S. or Indo-Soviet relations but the effects of Soviet and American involvement in India on Soviet-American relations.

The third perspective on the question of India as a 'power in the middle' inverts the second focus. Instead of treating a third party as an object of bipolar activity or zero sum activity of the superpowers -- as an arena of superpowers' competition and as an alternative to a military (and particularly a nuclear) confrontation -- in the third perspective the third party is examined as a source of influence in international relations, and as such, it is seen as a challenge to bipolar activity in world politics. It is an open question if the challenge is to the idea of a bipolarised world (or a world managed by two superpowers), or whether the challenge is broader, viz., whether it rejects both bipolarity and zero sum activity. The two kinds of activities are distinct and not necessarily related. India's strategic behavior, which has been discussed, suggests that the challenge relates to bipolar activity, not to zero sum activity. From this it is possible to say that a third party divisor aims to fragment rather than centralise superpower control over key issue-areas in strategic affairs. In other words, in this perspective, the source of influence derives from a strategy of intervention rather than that of mediation.

It is the third sense which is usually not noted in the literature and because it seems most relevant it is highlighted in this study. On the basis of evidence presented
so far, during 1947-54, Indian foreign policy statements and behavior revealed a focus which looked somewhat as follows.

The arrows symbolised a search for a balance along two lines. (1) Tying Indo-Soviet and Indo-American activities to third party actions, viz., Indo-Soviet activity was tied to American activity and visa versa. (2) Following the same style of behavior in India-China and Sino-Soviet relations. Two premises underlined this style of behavior: First, that all the major actors in India's strategic environment were (are) involved to some extent in zero sum activity and this quality could (can) be exploited. Secondly, none of these actors had (have) preponderent power in the region and hence no single actor, or no single coalition of actors was (is) able to function as a balancer.

The focus in the analysis of Indian foreign policy is therefore as follows: Indian non-alignment is a bargaining strategy which outlines the third way in the practice of international relations; the two-camp struggle (e.g., Zhadhanov's and John Foster Dulles' two camp theses) and
classical neutrality of the Swiss kind being the other alternatives. The dominant thesis of Indian nonalignment is not a framework of "neutralism and disengagement" as one author suggests. Instead, it is a rejection of military alignment with one superpower, and acceptance of the need to engage politically all major powers which have influence in India's strategic environment.

In this focus one needs to understand India's need to exploit zero sum activity in Soviet-American and Sino-Soviet relations, in particular the latter. As noted earlier, during 1950–51, Nehru encouraged Chester Bowles to avoid military containment — which pushed China towards the Soviet Union — and instead to encourage Chinese disengagement from the Soviet alliance system. There are no official Indian statements on record which say in so many words that a Sino-Soviet conflict aids Indian security. But such an preference can be inferred from the Nehru-Bowles dialogue. That is, Nehru's effort to persuade Bowles to help revise American assessment's of China and to exploit Sino-Soviet tension must be seen as a purposive activity which was thought to favour Indian security. As Eldridge notes, "It can

148 Power, P.F., editor, Neutralism and Disengagement. Our criticism refers to the title, and not the content of this volume. In fact, this volume provides a useful survey of a wide spectrum of official statements and unofficial comments on different kinds of neutralisms."
reasonably be argued that India's present definition of non-alignment is made possible by the Sino-Soviet rift and the thaw in the Cold War between East and West". Eldridge also notes that "although the concept of non-alignment in the Indian case has changed markedly in quality given the pursuit of independent military power much of the substance remains". Without belabouring the point it seems that this judgement applies not only to India's post 1962 policy but also to its post-1950 policy. This observation can be justified by assessing the Nehru-Bowles dialogue but one needs to add a qualification. Much work needs to be done to examine the origins of Indo-Soviet and India-China relations during 1947-53, that is, during the Stalin period, and to examine the inter-relations between various Indian policies and premises. The contemporary state of the art is not revealing. According to Arthur Stein, "from 1947 to 1952 Soviet hostility toward India made it very difficult for a measure of rapport to develop". A similar observation can be made about India-China relations. Yet there is a need to identify and

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150 India and the Soviet Union, preface, xi.
assess Indian policy premises towards China, the Soviet Union and the United States during this period. This is needed to show if there was a change in the Indian policy premise during the Korean War, how this related to earlier premise(s), and the subsequent evolution, if any, of the premises framed during 1950-53.

While the idea of equidistance has not appeared in Indian policy rhetoric, this idea can be used to refer to India having a policy which tries to balance India's relations with the major powers in India's strategic environment. The aim is to achieve a balance in India's relations with the major powers so that India's position in the middle remains viable, and so that India retains access to material and political support of these powers without compromising its freedom of action in world politics. In this perspective Indian policies were, and still are, guided by the sense that an Indian strategist was required to establish workable vertical dyadic interdependencies between India and the major powers. The aim in creating such vertical interdependencies was to offset the danger of horizontal interdependencies hurting the interests of the lesser powers like India. During 1947-54 the Indian focus centered on a creation of vertical interdependencies, even though the danger of a superpower concert was only a possibility because of zero sum activity between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and between China and the Soviet Union. But the point was
implicit that the viability of India's negotiating position — and its ability to stay as a power in the middle — depended on its ability to ensure that the principal actors in India's strategic environment remained on opposite sides in subcontinental affairs.

To perform as an actor in the middle, a weak state should be able to satisfy several conditions. It should be able to mediate and to intervene. First, it should enjoy external recognition in terms of (a) its diplomatic talent and its ability to anticipate external problems, and (b) its ability to inject itself on behalf of a great power, to shape an international consensus which helps a great power.

Secondly, a militarily weak actor in the middle should appear to reflect the voice of the world community and its views should be testable and credible. Thirdly, it should be able, if called upon, to perform in peace-keeping type of situations, i.e., to act as a diplomatic and military proxy for a universal actor such as the United Nations. These conditions relate to the kinds of activities which are known as 'third party' mediation, i.e., mediation being defined as help, as an ability to act as a transmission best, as articulation of other state's interests. India's help to the great powers in resolving the disputes in Korea (1954), the Geneva Accords (1954), the Agreement on neutralisation of Laos (1962) and the partial test ban (1964) are
examples of Indian contributions of this kind. Here India's role was that of a helper to the great powers, and not as a participant or as a determinant of the conflictual setting or the strategic context.

After 1962, however, India's strategic behavior revealed a re-orientation of India's strategic (diplomatic and military) behavior. During this period one notes a transition from an interest in mediation of superpower disputes to an interest to give more visibility to India's strategic problems, to sharpen the focus on the adversary relations and to seek the growth of viable adversary relations rather than a growth of 'friendly' relations. The accent in this revised orientation was not on creating friendships but in creating viable, visible interdependencies between India and its neighbours and between India and the superpowers. The new orientation was more toward 'intervention' and less toward mediation.

A Swiss authority suggests that intervention has several conditions: (1) it seeks to uphold or advance an established rule of behavior or some higher morality; (2) there is disparity of power in favour of the intervenor; (3) there is a sharp departure in the intervenor's behavior in contrast with his previous behavior; (4) the intervention is limited in time and scope; (5) the intervening act is directed against the fundamental structure of the state or society; and finally, (6) it is irrelevant
if the intervention is invited or not. This checklist is useful for defining the characteristics of Indian intervention. (Whether India's arguments were offered simply to justify its interventionist behavior or whether in fact the situations merited interventions is an open question which involves a value judgement. This is not discussed here; only the nature of India's interventionism is noted).

In comparison and contrast with these conditions, Indian interventions have had the following characteristics: First, the military-political behavior is justified according to some higher principle of law or morality. Thus, interventions in Kashmir was justified because of the lack of secularism in Pakistan's two nation theory. The intervention in Goa was justified because it meant the removal of a colonial situation. According to India's argument, because 'Goa' represented Portuguese 'aggression' on Indian territory, the use of force under these circumstances was not Indian aggression. The U.S.A. did not accept this interpretation but it was unable to challenge India's position in the General Assembly. Similarly, to take a more recent example, the use of force in the Bangladesh

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crisis was described as self-defence because in fact Pakistan fired the first shot against Indian territory in the December War. These examples suggest that Urs Schwarz’s first condition is relevant for the study of India’s interventionist behavior, i.e., India’s behavior appears to justify some higher morality rather than to uphold an established rule of behavior, particularly Western behavior.

The second condition is partly confirmed in India’s interventionist behavior vis-a-vis Pakistan and Portugal but the condition is not met if one examines India’s strategic behavior toward China during 1959-62. If one assumes, for the purpose of an argument, that India behaved aggressively toward China in the 1962 crisis and this behavior was essentially a tactical ploy to help improve its relations with the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., one simply needs to note that it is not necessary to have disparity of military power in favour of the intervenor if (a) there is already a diffusion of power in the system; (b) there is a latent commitment of a superior power on one’s side in a crisis (e.g., Indian assumption about the probable availability of American power for India if India were threatened by China); and (c) if the military alignments are still developing and hence the disparity of power and influence, if any, cannot be identified. It is in such a systemic setting that a shrewd bargainer can intervene even if it is strategically weak in comparison to its adversary.
Similarly, with regard to the third condition, India's behavior has elements of departure from previous practice, and at the same time, an element of continuity. There is a parallel or dual track of continuity and change, depending on how one wants to appraise the evidence. Thus, Indian military intervention during the Bangladesh crisis can be taken as evidence of departure, considering India's earlier preference of agreement with superpower and U.N. organised conflict settlement in Kashmir and the Rann of Kutch disputes (up to late 1965). Similarly, India's refusal to sign the N.P.T. can be taken as evidence of departure considering that India's previous behavior in arms control was to support nuclear disarmament, including the partial test ban of 1964. But on the other hand, the revisionist acts can be shown to be manifestations of latent revisionism in Indian behavior. Thus, taking the above examples, the existence of Indian military force and military threats against Pakistan during the 1950s and 1960s was evidence of an Indian intent to secure a military solution as a last resort. Similarly, the objections which India raised with regard to N.P.T. were precisely the kind of objections which were outlined in detail in Indian statements on the question of international control of atomic energy through Safeguards. In view of such evidence it is difficult to operationalise the definition of interventions as a 'departure' from previous practice.
Mr. Schwarz's fourth condition about intervention is that it is limited in time and scope. This raises a question about how one defines 'limited'? If by limitation is meant a single shot military action which is unique in conception and execution, then it is easy to specify 'limited' in terms of time and scope of the activity of intervention. Put on the other hand if intervention is directed against the fundamental structure of state and society (Mr. Schwarz's condition 5), there is no logical reason why intervention is time bound. Indian strategic behavior is interventionist not only because of specific time bound military operations such as the December war of 1971 but also because of a stretched out nuclear and disarmament strategy (in terms of time) to alter the other side's behavior, its values, its choices and possibly the setting in which choices are made. It is in the latter sense that Indian nonalignment is a strategy of intervention, a method of pursuing choices and making revocable commitments for the purpose of exploiting the other side's uncertainties and for the purpose of minimising one's own uncertainties. Because of this quality Indian nonalignment should be seen as a challenge to the superpowers and not simply as a deterministic response of a weaker power towards the Cold War.
Conclusion

This review of India's strategic behavior -- or the reasoning behind its speeches during 1947-54, shows that its activities were not simply motivated by a need to reduce the superpowers' competition or to achieve world peace by eliminating the danger of war. Peace was the ideal but the strategy was to engage the major powers through non-violent means -- to structure independent India's relations with the major actors in India's strategic environment.

The hypothesis that India sought war-avoidance is partially falsified because Nehru's speeches indicate that, in his opinion, the danger of a world war was not real and that there was an unstable balance of power already 'in being'. In other words, Nehru recognised the existence of a military balance of power.

Yet, Nehru's approach seemed to differ from the prevailing American nuclear strategies in the 1950s. Unlike the Herman Kahns, the Schellings and the Wohlstetters, Nehru was not concerned with the sophisticated debates about counter-city and counter-force targeting doctrine. Neither was he concerned with the difference between massive retaliation and limited response strategies. In his View of the World -- and his view of the sources of influence -- he did not over-emphasise the importance of nuclear weapons in world politics. This was understandable. India's approach to security related more to the geo-political sources of insecurity for India.
Nehru recognised the ideological, the expedient and the military sources of the zero sum activity in Soviet-American relations. The Asian international system was seen as something more than an extension of, or a representation of, bipolar activity. Early in 1950-51 he noted the competitive quality in Sino-Soviet relations and this was done at a time when most Asian and the Western leaders and scholars were definitely committed to pursuing policies and research strategies in an exclusively bipolar focus. Former U.S. Ambassador Chester Bowles' memoirs recognise in retrospect the merit of Nehru's perceptiveness in this regard.

Nehru's insights indicated that two premises guided Indian statecraft during the 1950s. First, as Krishna Menon noted, a superpower détente was possible but it was not probable and it certainly was not a reality. Secondly, as Nehru noted, the Sino-Soviet relationship had a zero sum quality and this needed to be brought out into the open through manipulation by third parties, viz., the United States and India. Therefore, from India's point of view, building China's diplomatic position internationally was a strategy defined by a need to build China as a counter-weight against the Soviet Union. Furthermore, building the India-China connection was a strategy defined by a need to diffuse bipolar activity (and not necessarily the superpowers' zero sum activity) of the Cold War leaders. Both these strategies sought influence building by negotiation between India and
China, by speech-making by India vis-a-vis all its strategic neighbours, and not by military force in the 1950s except that military force was an element in India's policy towards Pakistan.

Our discussion has shown that Nehru was not ignorant about the importance of the role of military force in world politics. Even if Nehru's observations suffered from brevity and imprecision, he had a view about the role of military power. His view was not based on an over-drawn image of the penetrative influence of nuclear weapons (along the lines first argued by John Herz). It emphasised the need for relative power and rejected the utility of over-kill capacity or of the absolute levels of nuclear power beyond the saturation point. The point which emerges from an analysis of Nehru's view about military power is that his policy focus was structured, in terms of Western jargon, not on the theme of bipolarity or multipolarity, but in terms of the classical or the 'old' balance of power in which global nuclear war was possible but not likely.

For the purpose of scholarly accuracy it is of course, necessary to note that Nehru spoke of the dangers of a world war, even if he did not seem to believe that war was inevitable. In 1946 for example, he anticipated the growth of bipolarity and argued that in the post-war era the Soviet Union and the
United States would emerge as "two dominating world powers". He saw a connection between superpowers' ideologies and their arms and asserted that the choice for third parties was either to cooperate or to fight and that there was no middle way. He emphasised that the choice was between world war or world peace; that the supreme question was to avoid world war; that world problems could not be solved by military threats and military means; and that great power groupings ought to stop interfering with other countries' affairs.

The two dimensional framework in Nehru's thinking viz., 'world war or world peace but no third way' was a deliberate exaggeration. It was instrumental in promoting peaceful co-existence as an Indian alternative to American and Soviet policies on security and economic concerns. This was meant to be an alternative for India as well as for the newly emerging states. Of course, the Soviets had for years been saying 'either peaceful co-existence or a nuclear war with all its consequences'. In this sense one could argue that there was little novelty in India's peaceful

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153 Speeches, p. 11.

154 Ibid., p. 40.

155 Ibid., p. 86.

156 Ibid., p. 40 and 102.
co-existence strategy. Such an argument however betrays a total misunderstanding about one point. Despite the Leninist background of the peaceful co-existence idea, and despite its use by the Soviet Union in disarmament debates, the meanings and the context in which Indians used this idea differed fundamentally from Soviet usage. Moreover, as noted earlier, the Soviet enthusiasm for peaceful co-existence in the Asian context appeared after India and China had sanctioned the idea in the 1954 India-China agreements.

In short, the differing premises behind Indian and Soviet approaches to peaceful co-existence merit some attention. India used the peaceful co-existence strategy with China in 1954 with three aims. First, to structure an India-China relationship. Secondly, to induce post-Stalinist Russia's involvement in India's behalf after the U.S.-Pakistan military alliance established a situation of confrontation between India and the United States and Pakistan. India's behavior was therefore guided by balance of power activity over the Kashmir issue. Here one can argue that if the aim of the first activity was to encourage Sino-Soviet zero sum activity and to develop an India-China connection as a counterweight to bipolar activity, the aim of the second

157 There is some evidence that Stalin started to re-think Soviet policy toward India, but the actual change occurred in 1955 when Bulganin and Khrushchev visited India.
activity was to encourage Soviet-American zero sum activity in sub-continental affairs so that India's diplomatic position on Kashmir could be safeguarded against threats from Pakistan and the United States. The challenge before an Indian strategist was to ensure a continuation of such zero sum activities so that India always retained access to the political and material resources of two of three major powers.

There was a third point of contrast between Indian and Soviet approaches to peaceful co-existence. In the post-war period, Soviet spokesmen talked about peaceful co-existence but in fact pursued a strategy of negotiating from a position of strength -- while continually conducting a war of arguments against the American strategy of negotiating from strength. This was true after 1945, when the U.S.S.R. enjoyed massive superiority in conventional arms in Europe, and after 1957 when the U.S.S.R. started to bridge the gap in strategic arms.

By contrast, Nehru's strategy avoided a contest of an arms race even with Pakistan in the 1950s. He argued against the build up of influence on the basis of a military build up. Thus, while the Soviet Union sought influence by

158 The suspicious reader should consult The Military Balance, IISS, London, annual for the figures.
negotiating from a position of military strength towards the United States, India structured its strategy by seeking influence by negotiating with China, with the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent with the United States, from a position of military and economic weakness. (This observation relates to the 1950s and not to the 1960s when India clearly sought to negotiate with China by first creating a stable military stand-off in the Himalayas).

Overall, two points in this chapter need to be emphasised. India's peaceful co-existence strategy tried to by-pass temporarily the need to make military power as the basis for participating in the re-organisation of influence in world affairs. India's strategy was a quest for an altered world order based on negotiated outcomes between the great powers and the militarily less powerful states. The revisions in the world order were expected to center on questions of right and wrong and not on the superior capabilities of the militarily powerful states. As Nehru noted, the existence of great power did not guarantee that the policy prescriptions of these states were also great. In the aftermath of India's military encounter with China and Pakistan one can argue that India's faith in negotiating from a position of material weakness was misplaced. However, it is an open question if the negotiating process requires absolute over-kill military or nuclear capacities or whether
superpower rivalry in the Indian subcontinent, a formal alignment with the West would have increased India’s security problems with its communist neighbours in the north. In other words, a visible formal Indo-U.S. military alignment would have decreased India’s diplomatic options with the U.S.S.R. and China and the 'loss' would have been more than the 'gain' of Western aid and political commitment to India’s diplomatic and material objectives.

**Nehru on military power, nuclear weapons, disarmament and nuclear power.**

There is an ambiguity in Nehru’s thinking on nuclear matters. He profoundly mistrusted American strategy of military containment of the communist powers and the American strategy of controlling the peaceful atom. On the other hand however, he recognised the importance of relative military power and also recognised the importance of building India’s nuclear power. The ambiguity centered on two points. The rejection of the idea of absolute power and the acceptance of the idea of relative power left unanswered the meaning, the nature of the idea of relative power. It indicated that Nehru was not a peacenik as is sometimes imagined, but yet no precise definition of the mix of nuclear and conventional military ingredients of 'relative power' is indicated clearly. Secondly, there is an ambiguity between Nehru's mistrust of
Chapter Three

TRADITIONAL ASPECTS OF INDIA’S ARMS CONTROL AND NUCLEAR POLICY

In the preceding chapter the geopolitical sources of insecurity were noted. Indian diplomacy was seen to be an attempt to secure strategic partners from among the actual or potential adversaries. The geopolitical focus dealt with a concern to secure territorial defence against Pakistan in particular. India’s strategy of confrontation with the United States was based on this focus. The strategy of peaceful co-existence with China and the Soviet Union were balance of power activities geared to exploit the zero sum qualities in Soviet-American and Sino-Soviet relations. This was one aspect of Indian security.

The second aspect of Indian security dealt with the challenge which the Baruch Plan posed to Indian security. The challenge was both doctrinal and material. The Indian response to the American strategy to control the peaceful uses of atomic energy was to regard it as a dangerous precedent—an exercise in imperialism—where the superpowers or atleast one superpower, gained the right to decide on questions of international security policy simply because they (it) had
the military power.

This chapter assesses India's interest in arms control in the context of its early interest in the growth of India's nuclear power by developing its peaceful applications. It shows that India's mistrust of the 'big power' orientation of American strategy in the Cold War (as discussed in the preceding chapter) was reinforced by India's fear of the philosophy of control of the Baruch Plan. Both these aspects were further reinforced by Indian perceptions of the militaristic nature of American involvement in the Indian sub-continent when the U.S.-Pakistan alliance was created in 1953-54. The origins and the early development of India's nuclear policy during 1947-54 was obscure, and, during this period, India's View of the World articulated a strong preference for disarmament.

As such this chapter does not focus directly on Indian responses to the U.S.-British-Canadian declaration of November 1945 on the future of atomic energy. Neither is there any evidence of a direct response to the Acheson-Lilienthal Report of 1946 and the Baruch Plan of the same year. At this time India was still a British Dominion and an 'Indian' response could hardly be expected. Therefore, this chapter is concerned with Indian reactions after President Eisenhower's atoms for peace plan was outlined. Two purposes are served by referring to the 1950s. First, it demonstrates
that India's objections to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty of 1968 referred to objections made during the 1950s -- in international forums and in bilateral Indo-Canadian negotiations. This focus suggests that there is continuity -- maybe even an evolution -- in India's nuclear policy to gain security via arms control and disarmament. Secondly, whereas in the preceding chapter we found that India's search for strategic partners was restricted to actual or potential adversaries, in the nuclear field, India found a strategic partner in Canada. It is difficult to explain clearly why Canada chose to help India in a tangible manner -- given the geographical distance, and the ethnic, economic and political differences between the two countries. It is clear however, that the two countries were (are) not strategic adversaries. The Indo-Canadian atomic energy arrangements of the 1950s were unique in the history of any kind of foreign aid to India and were probably also unique in comparison to U.S. and Soviet atomic energy assistance to its allies. The aid terms were extremely favourable to India, even though Canada also gained politically and commercially from the relationship. Despite the inequality of functions -- with Canada as the donor and India as the receiver -- there was no inequality in the conditions of the aid. This point merits emphasis because the Indo-Canadian relationship was shaped in the context of American opposition to Indian political and
strategic efforts in general, and secondly, in the context of the Baruch Plan. This chapter outlines a contrast between Indo-Canadian and Indo-American atomic energy arrangements. Secondly, it outlines India’s main objections to the Baruch Plan philosophy during the 1950s and the 1960s.

The international setting in which India’s nuclear policy developed was one of a war of arguments between the superpowers. The superpower controversy and the Indo-U.S. controversy concerned the merits of the philosophy of control of the Baruch Plan. The November 15, 1945 declaration by the United States, Great Britain and Canada made two points, and these underlined the Baruch Plan. First, that there could be “no adequate military defence” against the atomic weapons. Secondly, that the powers favoured exchange and transmission of basic scientific information but not information relating to practical industrial applications of atomic energy.

To quote:

“The military exploitation of atomic energy depends, in large part, upon the same methods and processes as would be required for industrial uses. We are not convinced that the spreading of the specialised information regarding the practical application of atomic energy, before it is possible to devise effective, reciprocal and enforceable safeguards acceptable to all nations, would contribute to a constructive solution of the problems of the atomic bomb. On the contrary we think it might have the opposite effect”.

Overall, there were two major 'ifs' in the Baruch Plan approach to control the atom. The first 'if' was to share information about practical applications of atomic technology "just as soon as effective safeguards against its use for destructive purposes can be devised". This itself was problematic. The second 'if' was even more problematic. This stated that no safeguards system which could be devised would "of itself provide an effective guarantee against production of atomic weapons by a nation bent on aggression". That is, even with safeguards there was no guarantee against division from peaceful to military uses of the atom. The solution for this problem was to consolidate and extend the authority of the United Nations. In other words, the proposal was so ambitious that it required a stringent safeguards system and a radical reform of the states' system, which would make the United Nations the source of political legitimacy and military power in world politics.

Generally speaking, the setting and the style of India's nuclear behavior in the Cold War was markedly different from that of a medium power such as Great Britain.

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2 This paragraph is based mostly on ibid., p.68.
As George Quester points out

"Rather than bargaining closely on the exchange of uranium for nuclear technology the British chose instead to acknowledge a 'public interest' for the West that the American stockpile be augmented as expeditiously as possible for the protection of all the Western powers. By assuming such a posture, the British not only fortified their own claim to an ultimate nuclear capability, but reinforced the sense that the United States was already reciprocally committed to the defence of British and Western Europe". 3

By contrast the Indian behavior differed on several counts. The response to the problem of nuclear war was seen to lie in disarmament and not in alliance politics. Secondly, India chose not to define the 'public interest' in terms of the security needs of the Western States but instead chose to define the public interest as a problem of lessening the danger of a hot war, of achieving balanced disarmament, and of avoiding the growth of international security regimes led by the superpowers. This approach to defining the public interest of the World community appeared to be an equitable one inasmuch as it appeared to take into account the security interests of the superpowers as well as the world order concerns of third-parties.

Thirdly, rather than bargain closely on the exchange of

Indian thorium (of which India has a near monopoly of the world supply) for advanced nuclear technology, India chose instead to structure its atomic energy program on the platform of increasing the peaceful uses of atomic energy. A corollary of this policy was to insist on the need to apply safeguards to the military uses of atomic energy rather than its peaceful uses.

Finally, in sharp contrast with British diplomacy on the issue, India did not, and could not, argue about the need for a reciprocal Western commitment on India's behalf. One reason for this was the obvious fact that such a visible commitment would appear to be a technical violation of India's nonaligned stance. Another reason, as noted earlier, lay in Nehru's confidence (during the early and mid-1950s) that India's geo-political and military position could be protected by a policy of peaceful co-existence or 'defence through friendship'. Consequently the need for alignment with one side of the Cold War was not recognised. According to this reasoning, formal alignment would not have improved Indian security. In view of the zero sum nature of the

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Such a bargain was possible because the Acheson-Lilienthal report and the Baruch Plan required international control of thorium and uranium deposits, among other things.
superpower rivalry in the Indian subcontinent, a formal alignment with the West would have increased India's security problems with its communist neighbours in the north. In other words, a visible formal Indo-U.S. military alignment would have decreased India's diplomatic options with the U.S.S.R. and China and the 'loss' would have been more than the 'gain' of Western aid and political commitment to India's diplomatic and material objectives.

Nehru on military power, nuclear weapons, disarmament and nuclear power.

There is an ambiguity in Nehru's thinking on nuclear matters. He profoundly mistrusted American strategy of military containment of the communist powers and the American strategy of controlling the peaceful atom. On the other hand however, he recognised the importance of relative military power and also recognised the importance of building India's nuclear power. The ambiguity centered on two points. The rejection of the idea of absolute power and the acceptance of the idea of relative power left unanswered the meaning, the nature of the idea of relative power. It indicated that Nehru was not a peacemaker as is sometimes imagined, but yet no precise definition of the mix of nuclear and conventional military ingredients of 'relative power' is indicated clearly. Secondly, there is an ambiguity between Nehru's mistrust of
nuclear weapons and his policy of promoting the peaceful applications of atomic energy. What in Nehru's thinking was the boundary, the discontinuity between peaceful uses and military uses? Did 'sophisticated' peaceful uses mesh into the realm of military uses, as Western critics of India's "peaceful use only" doctrine claim? Or was there really a definite political-psychological, if not a technological-scientific, difference between the two?

Overall, Nehru favoured the growth of nuclear power which added to India's economic and technological-scientific position. The principal justification of India's nuclear reactors program all along has been to generate more electricity for India's growing needs, given its declining oil and coal resources. In addition, he favoured a policy of opposing the growth of a superpower directed Safeguards doctrine -- whether this dealt with bilateral American safeguards or with multilateral safeguards policed by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The opposition dealt with the danger of atomic colonialism -- by the militarily powerful and the industrially-technologically advanced states. Yet there was a substantial difference in his view about nuclear weapons and civilian nuclear power. This was expressed in relation to America's international strategy and India's national strategy. A Western reader, familiar with his countrymen's culture bound analyses, is cautioned against assuming as a given that civilian nuclear power, which Nehru
favoured explicitly, meant that he favoured Indian nuclear weapons implicitly. This may be the case, or may become the case, but not necessarily so.

To probe the ambiguities in Nehru's strategies in security matters it is useful to explore three types of relationships in his Views of the World: the first is between nuclear weapons and the balance of power; the second is between military power and the ability to negotiate; and finally, the third is between India's disarmament policy and its nuclear policy. At best Nehru's views on these points are sketchy. It lacks the sophistication of several articulate Western strategic writers. Despite the failure to verbalise, Nehru offered a glimpse of a strategy which questioned the superpowers' approach, and particularly American approach to influence building and conflict management through a position of 'strength'. To quote him:

"Then there is the School which talks about negotiations through strength. It is true that nobody will listen to you if you are weak. But, as you develop your strength to negotiate, unfortunately the other party also goes on developing its strength".6

5 There is no attempt in this study to define strength, either with reference to Indian policy or the policies of the superpowers. Coral Bell has prepared a useful study which probes the idea and the policy (policies) in American behavior. Cf. Negotiation from Strength, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1963.

6 Select Speeches, p.68.
The meaning is not absolutely clear but one can infer that, according to Nehru, what mattered most was not the absolute level of arms but the relative power. It is not clear if Nehru meant that differences in absolute power did not matter or whether he meant that small differences in relative power did not matter. It is obvious though, that he established a distinction between the weak actor's inability to negotiate and influence convincingly, compared to a militarily strong actor's ability to do so.

Overall, it is hard to be definitive about Nehru's meaning of 'relative power' in the Indian policy context. Whatever it meant, one can be certain of two points. He rejected the view that absolute military power counted, and this seemed to underline his view of India's position -- actual and potential -- vis-a-vis the superpowers and China. He never took the view that the superpowers could perform better, to satisfy their foreign policy and security interests, just because of their superior strategic capabilities. The balance of power seemed to be a function of the policies of states and not simply their nuclear capabilities. His Views of the World focussed on at least four major powers, viz., the United States, the Soviet Union, China and India.

However, at the same time, he did not regard influence building activity as simply a product of 'talk' -- of expressing moral concerns, unless this was accompanied by material strength. This point is explicit in his statement that
"nobody will listen to you if you are weak". On March 8, 1948 he noted that India was "not, frankly speaking, influential enough to affect international events very much". But then he prefaced his remarks by stating that the other powers had not succeeded in satisfying their interests.

So far, our discussion shows that Nehru was attentive to the need to have strength to negotiate, to be listened to. He did not believe that over-kill nuclear capacity was needed to negotiate. This point was apparently directed against the superpowers' arms race, but it also had a meaning for India's security policy. On the one hand he seemed to think that India was protected by the balance of power, given the zero-sum activities in the Soviet-American and the Sino-Soviet dyads. His speeches confirm this view. Furthermore, he thought that India was a pivot in Western, Southern and South Asia and was convinced that it would inevitably play a role because of its potential resources and its geographical location. Yet, thirdly, he felt that India needed at least "15 years of peace in order to be able to develop its resources".

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7 Ibid., p.29.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., pages 3, 8, 22, and 32, my emphasis.
10 Ibid., p.48, my emphasis.
The domestic sources of foreign policy were emphasised; foreign policy was seen as an outcome of economic policy; external affairs was seen to follow internal affairs; Indian nonaligned policy was defined as a "part of a policy" whose objective was to promote Indian national interest. Finally, a dual method for analysing world problems was indicated: first one had to analyse a particular issue in terms of Indian interests and then in terms of its merits.

The views that an Indian strategist needed to give priority to Indian national interests (and secondly to 'merit'), and the suggestion that nonalignment was only a 'part' of a policy, are pregnant with meaning in the context of yet another statement. Although Nehru tried to ameliorate the role of military power in resolving political disputes, he was concerned more with the need to transform the nature of the international system. According to him, "The status quo has to go throughout the world before war goes and the causes of war". In other words, eliminating discrimination between the Haves and the Have-nots had priority over the

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11 Ibid., p.24.
12 Ibid., p.34.
13 Ibid., p.79.
14 Ibid., p.33.
question of restraining the use of military force in international relations. Here lies one of the fundamental differences between Indian and American policy views on the question of controlling use of force. Nehru argued that democracy was both political and economic and suggested that the need was to maximise economic and political security of many rather than a few nations. This approach seemed to be a key political value in Nehru's thinking. His argument about internationalism was an argument against 'narrow' economic and military nationalism and imperialism of the great powers.

The anti-status quo and anti-superpower orientation in Nehru's policy suggests convincingly that Nehru's prime consideration was not to disarm India; rather the role of force was not excluded from the policy framework. This point is obvious in India's strategy of military intervention towards Pakistan and its strategy of military confrontation with China after 1962. It remains however, for us to assess the relationship between India's disarmament policy and its nuclear policy during the 1950s.

India's early interest in nuclear policy is not

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16 Cited in Das, *op.cit.*, p.46.


18 As was noted in the preceding chapter, Nehru wanted to develop nuclear energy for "peaceful uses" and for India's "protection*. Cf. Kavic, *op.cit.*, p.28.
Text complete; leaf 245 omitted in numbering
usually emphasised by Indians because Nehru, like many other statesmen, spoke the language of disarmament. Beaton makes the point that disarmament negotiators frequently use the language of disarmament, "rather than security". During the 1950s, Nehru and his disarmament representatives seemed to take this route. But Beaton also states that disarmament negotiators "have no particular knowledge either of security problems or of security policy in the main powers", and that "they have had no incentive to gain such knowledge". This generalisation seems excessive and at least it does not apply always to the experience or behavior of Indian disarmament negotiators -- from Ambassador Arthur Lall to Ambassador V.C. Trivedi. In the latter case in particular, it is plainly evident that the Indian language was that of disarmament and security and the disarmament negotiators had detailed knowledge about security matters. Indian arguments on the safeguards doctrine, like earlier Soviet arguments on the Baruch Plan, had obvious security


20 Ibid.

21 It is hardly a secret that Mr. Trivedi had served as the Chairman of the Indian intelligence board in the Ministry of External Affairs before going to Switzerland as Ambassador to that country and as the head of the Indian delegation to the S.N.D.C.
motives, even though the security aspects were developed by a 'hard line' civilian diplomat rather than a military general.

Apparently the security motives related to three Indian policy issues in the 1950s. First, to oppose the growth of a legal precedent which allowed a superpower to decide the rules, the norms of an evolving international nuclear law. This argument concerned the right of great powers to decide. It had been made in 1815, then again a hundred years later at the Paris Peace conference, against Woodrow Wilson and the great powers. As such it was based on a history of tension between the great powers and the weaker powers. The reservation by countries like India dealt with the style of superpower decision-making, viz., decision-making by concert between the superpowers rather than a concert which took into account the security of all countries, as noted in principle 5 of the Zorin-McCloy Principles. This objection dealt with the 1950s and the 1960s on the question of international safeguards.

The second issue was to keep India's nuclear option open, that is, free of restrictive and irrevocable safeguards. Clearly this option was future directed and based on international developments (e.g., China's future behavior towards India and the Indian Ocean littoral) which the disarmament speakers of the 1950s or the makers of the N.P.T. could hardly predict with any precision beyond a year or two.
Clearly also, the option related to possible military activities in the nuclear field and not simply to a continuation of civilian activities. It is trite to mention that India does not need a civilian nuclear option; it already is a civilian nuclear power, considering that it has a small but sophisticated nuclear power program. In this context the term "peaceful uses only" does not seem to carry much meaning. Even 'aggressive' states claim to act in the name of world peace and the terms 'peace' and 'aggression' are policy oriented phrases which are devoid of an uncontro- versial meaning. Since no state readily admits to being aggressive, and India is no exception, the peaceful uses "only" clause simply means that Indians think that they are peaceful by definition, that is, since they are not aggressive by definition.

Beyond the semantics of the term peaceful uses, however, lies a key point in India's disarmament behavior and its nuclear behavior. The Indian nuclear option was implicit in

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22 On July 24, 1957 Nehru declared: "India will in no event use atomic energy for destructive purposes but only for peaceful purposes. I am confident that this would be the policy of all future governments in the country". Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents, 1947-64, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1966, p.243. The term 'destructive' is not defined. To destroy, according to a dictionary definition, means to annihilate. In the context of deterrence, viz., the utility in the nonuse of nuclear weapons, such weapons need never be used for destructive purposes.
India's peaceful nuclear program of the 1950s and also in India's disarmament strategy, and it was explicit in India's opposition to international safeguards. It was not to deceive the world community that India talked about peaceful uses of atomic energy. Rather the fact was that India did not know (and still does not know) when China would become an 'immediate' nuclear threat for India and what sort of a nuclear response this contingency might require. That is, opposition to international safeguards was not a signal that India would produce the bomb. It was a signal that India reserved the right to do so if China developed a missile program and targeting doctrine which threatened India directly.

The link between India's disarmament strategy and its nuclear policy appears to be explicit at least from 1960 on, if not earlier. In a speech titled "Point of No Return", to the Indian Parliament on November 22, 1960 Nehru stated that

"If nothing effective is done in regard to disarmament in the course of the next three or four years, it may perhaps become too late to deal with it; it may become almost impossible to control the situation".24

Since the Chinese started testing in 1964, that is, four years after Nehru's speech, one can infer that Nehru was referring to the Chinese nuclear program and Indian atomic intelligence


24 Select Speeches, p.235.
was accurate in predicting that the genie would be outside the bottle by 1964. One can also speculate that since the Indian atomic program was headed by Dr. Bhabha, a scientist with an international reputation, Indians had a fairly precise idea of the nature and orientation of the Chinese reactor and missile program. From this set of facts it is easier to argue that even in the mid-1950s Nehru's disarmament diplomacy was not guided simply by altruistic concern to save humanity from war. Rather the concern was to secure a purposive disarmament agreement which could contain the Chinese program, and failing that, to retain India's nuclear option.

The third policy issue on the Indian side was to create an Indo-Canadian 'North American-South Asian' focus which by-passed U.S. opposition to India's nuclear program and India's general effort to reform the international system. Thus, in the war of arguments between India and the United States, even though India's verbal strategy was borrowed from Moscow's opposition to the Baruch Plan, this identity did not necessarily represent an Indian tilt towards Moscow in the nuclear field. During the 1950s there was little or no activity between India and the communist bloc. On October 6, 1961 India and the


26 Ibid.
U.S.S.R. signed an "Agreement on Peaceful Utilisation of Atomic Energy". This stipulated cooperation in research connected with reactors using natural uranium (like the Canadian reactors) and for breeder reactors using plutonium as well as the thorium-uranium-233 cycle. Even this agreement however, seems to have remained inactive at least until 1968.

Given these security and political motives, there did not seem to be a tilt in India's policies towards Moscow but a superficial similarity between Indian and Soviet disarmament strategies. Given India's material weakness in the 1950s, this was an important diplomatic choice because it allowed India to use Soviet jargon against the Baruch Plan, even though Indian and Soviet interests did not necessarily or always, coincide. The verbal strategy nevertheless dealt with security issues. India's opposition to the U.S. approach to controlling the peaceful uses of atomic energy through the institution of stringent safeguards helped India to negotiate atomic energy deals on favourable conditions with Canada. As Beaton notes, "the Indian undertakings to Canada about peaceful uses were "weak". However, did this mean that Indians deceived Canada by agreeing to the peaceful uses

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28 *Confidential Interview, New Delhi, December, 1971.*

only clause? Preliminary evidence, based on confidential interviews with officials in Ottawa indicate that this is not so. Indian reservations about the Safeguards concept, particularly I.A.E.A. safeguards, were publically known at the time the Indo-Canadian agreements were negotiated. Moreover, several Canadian attempts to strengthen the bilateral safeguards arrangements were firmly rejected by Indian officials from the time Mr. Chester Ronning was Canada’s High Commissioner in New Delhi to the time of writing this section in December 1973. Moreover, inasmuch as nuclear power stations are not necessarily economical -- Beaton argued that they were not but the Canadian authorities thought they were -- an intelligent observer can guess the existence of security and political motives in a poor nation’s search for participating in an activity which is internationally visible.

30 Confidential Interviews, Ottawa and New Delhi, 1969-73.
31 Beaton, op.cit., p.50.
32 Thus, External Affairs, Ottawa, March 1964, pp.116-117 notes as follows: (1) "India will no longer be solely dependent on its coal and oil reserves as sources of energy. This is all the more important in view of the fact that these reserves are limited and not readily accessible". (2) These agreements with India "represent a significant step toward the recognition abroad of Canadian progress in the achievement of the economic production of nuclear power. The station to be built at Rajasthan will be the first Canadian power reactor to be built outside Canada". From these remarks it should not be inferred that the economic motive is absent or negligible but only that the economic motive may not be as central as it is made out to be and that other motives may exist. One can also argue that the economic motive may have greater appeal for the donor than for the recipient.
Setting and Premises of India's disarmament policy and nuclear policy.

The foregoing suggests that there was some connection, albeit not an explicit one, between India's nuclear policy and its disarmament policy, during the 1950s. Briefly one should refer to Nehru's and Krishna Menon's views on disarmament and to trace the evolution of India's disarmament strategy. India's traditional disarmament diplomacy, as articulated by Krishna Menon, in the 1950s, regarded disarmament as a realistic rather than a utopian possibility. In this focus, there was a need to eliminate superpowers' arms rather than merely to reduce or limit them. In other words, according to this view, arms reduction and limitation could be a first step toward disarmament but unless there was disarmament war could not be outlawed. On the other hand, as Nehru cautiously emphasised, disarmament was important as a strategy if it did not de-stabilise the global environment, that is, if it was balanced in its implementation. The premise in Nehru's disarmament thinking was that in fact there was such a balance between the cold warriors.

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Given the framework, India's disarmament and arms control diplomacy, since it was conceived, has had two faces. In the 1950s, before the arms control/detente became real, India's role in part was that of a great power helper. This face was symbolised by India's call for nuclear disarmament. One can note that Nehru called for a test ban in 1954 and such a ban was in fact concluded in 1963.

The second Indian face was less visible but equally, if not more, salient. It was symbolised by India's leading opposition to American and subsequently, Soviet sponsored proposals for international control of atomic energy and control of the peaceful rather than the military uses of atomic energy.


To comprehend this dual focus one needs to recapitulate the difference between mediation and intervention. In the former, the third party enjoys the confidence of the principals; it is able to identify a consensus and work toward it; and finally the mediator is not trying to inject his presence to obstruct, but rather the injection is supposed to be constructive in terms of the values and policies of the principals. By contrast, intervention is necessarily divisive. The willingness to shape a consensus for the principals is absent in the third party's approach and there is little incentive to adopt superpowers' values and policies; on the contrary there is a specific challenge to those values and policies. Of course, a mediator injects third party values into the bargaining process, but it does so with the aim of being helpful. On the other hand a third party seeking to intervene wants to manipulate and is willing to inject its normative preferences into the bargaining process irrespective of whether or not it is regarded as constructive by the disputing parties.

India's anti-American strategy on international control of peaceful uses through international safeguards

"Safeguards" are defined as "those measures designed to guard against the diversion of material, such as source and special nuclear material, from uses permitted by law or international agreement, and to give timely indication of possible diversion or assurance that diversion has not Occurred". Allan D. McKnight, IAEA Safeguards: A Summary Account, mimeographed, prepared for the J.D. Bernal's Peace
falls in the latter category. It originated as a response to the American challenge but became a challenge to American power and right to decide security policies for the 'free world'. It is frequently asserted that Soviet arms control policies are a part of its fundamental interests. Western criticisms of Soviet disarmament behavior have not usually impressed Indian disarmament negotiators for two reasons: Indian negotiators find that American arms control policies are also a part of American fundamental interests. Secondly, Indian arms control problems with the superpowers are rooted more in Indo-American relations rather than in Indo-Soviet relations. This is the case because American commitment to prevent diversion of atomic energy from 'peaceful' to 'military' uses is more entrenched than the Soviet commitment on that issue. A comparison between American and Soviet proposals on this point, from the Baruch Plan to the various plans on general and complete disarmament, makes this clear.

37 (contd.)


Briefly the foregoing shows that in the 1950s, Indian attitudes about the international control of atomic energy and nuclear disarmament were permeated with the suspicion about American attitudes and behavior in the disarmament field. Such a suspicion was fuelled by a contrast which Indians noted between Canadian and American approaches to atomic energy and the safeguards issue. The contrast related not so much to general Canadian attitudes towards East-West negotiations but it related to the specific attitude which induced Canada to look toward India sympathetically. The nature of Canada's political and economic involvement in Indian subcontinental affairs during the 1950s was substantially different, in comparison to American attitudes and behavior vis-à-vis India during the Truman-Acheson-Dulles period. In American behavior the demand to internationally control atomic energy exceeded the offer of gain to the other side and there was no identity of political values. Furthermore, the foreign policy context in which these demands were made differed in Indo-U.S. and Indo-Canadian relations. Because of this difference, the effect of the demands on India was also different.

The fundamental difference in the attitudes and behavior of the two North American actors towards South Asian problems during the 1950s was that Canadian disarmament and arms control diplomacy, like American diplomacy, was used to support Canadian diplomatic objectives, but unlike American
policy, Canada has not been preoccupied with the problem of developing its margin of military safety against potential adversaries.

A historical overview of Canada's atomic diplomacy since the 1940s provides a sharp contrast between Canadian and American approaches to the problem of controlling atomic energy in India. The Quebec Agreement of 1943 between the U.S.A., Britain and Canada provided the original framework of atomic energy cooperation between these pioneers of atomic weapons. According to Eayrs, in this agreement, the three parties agreed not to use atomic weapons against each other, or against third parties without the other's consent; also they agreed not to communicate information about it to third parties without other's consent and to reserve for negotiations the question of post-war industrial and commercial applications of atomic energy.

The difficulties which Britain and Canada experienced in the post-war period with regard to this cooperative agreement have been attributed to the security consciousness of America's post-war managers of atomic energy such as General Leslie Groves. The 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal Report

40 The full text is in New York Times, April 6, 1954.

41 Eayrs, J., In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence, University of Toronto Press, 1972, p.271.

42 Ibid., chapter 5 and Acheson, Dean, Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department, Norton, New York, 1969, chapter 35.
on the problem and need for international control was based on the view that American atomic monopoly was a temporary one. The Baruch Plan (1946) was formulated as a mechanism for translating the Acheson-Lilienthal recommendations into a proposal. The American approach to this problem has been adequately discussed in the literature. Less noted in American literature is Canada's contribution — as reflected in Mr. Lester Pearson's (then Ambassador) contribution of a draft dated November 8, 1945. As James Eayrs rightly emphasises, this must surely be one of the most significant documents of the century which preceded the Acheson-Lilienthal report. The principal premises in the Pearson proposal to control the atom were as follows:

(1) The atom bomb was not the last word in the development of military technology;

(2) American monopoly of the atom bomb was not eternal;

(3) International rather than national solution to control the atom was necessary and desirable; and

(4) "The knowledge now possessed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada could be traded advantageously for a system of international control under the United Nations". 44

43 Bechoeffer, B.G., op.cit., chapters III and IV discusses the public arms control diplomacy of the U.S.A. during this period. Acheson's memoirs outline the kinds of attitudes which prevailed during the Truman era. David E. Lilienthal, Change, Hope, and the Bomb, Princeton, 1963 states that the basic assumptions about nuclear weapons since 1945 were challenged by him but the assumptions were not seriously evaluated. See particularly chapters II-IV of his book.

44 Eayrs, op.cit., pp.277-279.
The joint Declaration on Atomic Energy produced by President Truman, British Prime Minister Atlee and Canadian Prime Minister King on November 11, 1945 to which the Pearson draft proposal apparently contributed ideas, outlined two main ideas: (1) that there ought to be exchange of information for peaceful ends on a reciprocal basis; and (2) that there ought to be effective and enforceable safeguards against the use of specialised atomic energy information for destructive purposes. While Mackenzie King thought of the problem as a political one his instruction to the Canadian delegate to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission in 1946 was based on two contradictory ideas: (1) that Canada would not "slavishly follow" the American line; and (2) since U.S.A. was the most powerful industrial nation and the sole possessor of the atom bomb, it "will call the tune".

Despite the admonition to General McNaughton against slavishly following the American line, when Gromyko and Baruch appeared to be heading toward a deadlock, King leaned heavily toward the American view, not because these were the right views but because Canada was not inclined

46 Ibid., p.282.
47 Ibid., p.284.
to help the Soviets. General McNaughton, Canada's negotiator at that time, privately felt that the Baruch Plan was insincere from the beginning to the end -- an idea which seemed to prevail in many non-American circles. Furthermore, even though Mackenzie King described the problem of the atom as a political problem, Canada's approach on the issue was functional rather than political. It was an effort to seek scientific and technical methods of safeguards rather than to investigate the purpose of safeguards as one would need to do if the approach were to be political rather than functional.

At this time, Canadian arms control and disarmament diplomacy was based on two ideas. First, irrespective of the difference of opinion between the U.S.A. and Canada with regard to Canada's position in the atomic business, Canada's diplomatic objective was not to aid the communist adversary. This was central in Mackenzie King's diplomacy. Secondly, Canada sought to restrain American Cold War diplomacy during the 1950s and particularly sought to moderate the harsh military overtone of the containment doctrine. This was a mark of St. Laurant's diplomacy and underlined External Affairs Minister Lester Pearson's open

48 Ibid., p. 295.
49 Ibid., p. 294.
disagreement with Dulles' notion of massive retaliation.

It was in this general setting that Indo-Canadian relations developed into a unique model of East-West, middle powers and North American-South Asian collaboration in the age of Truman's and Dulles' America and Stalinist Russia. The Canadian premises with regard to Asia in general and India in particular were different from dominant American premises at that time. First, as Mr. Pearson pointed out, "the main avenue of approach for Canada to the problems of Asia has been by way of the Indian sub-continent. This remarkably candid statement provided an enormous contrast with American strategy which was not to work either through New Delhi or any other Asian capital but rather it was to pursue military solutions against the communist states through unilateral threats or through U.S. sponsored alliances among small and authoritarian states in Asia. The underlying Canadian and Indian premise was that the Cold War needed to be moderated, that one needed to establish intercontinental bridges between the East and the West, and, in the words of

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Vincent Massey, that one needed to develop a "grouping of friendly nations making widely differing responses to the Cold War, thus cutting across the frozen configuration of international politics." In other words, the common Canadian and Indian approach to foreign policy was meant not only to be a method of building an intercontinental and multiracial commonwealth of nations but secondly, in a more fundamental sense, as an alternative method for arresting the danger of a globalised or overextended Cold War in Asia.

The third major premise in Canadian diplomacy at that time was that nothing should be done to upset the stability of the Indian subcontinent and that India needed to be helped in its economic development so that its democratic framework could be strengthened. Thus with regard to at least three major issues the Canadian position appeared to be compatible with Indian aspirations. The views that the Cold War ought not to be globalised, that East-West competition ought not be resolved through military means, and that there ought to be local or regional solutions to local and regional problems, represented points of departure between American views and Indo-Canadian views on the other hand.


53 Confidential Interview, Ottawa, April 1971.
hand. It was in the context of this kind of thinking that Canada declined to mediate the Kashmir dispute and failed to support the S.E.A.T.O. system of security in South East Asia.

Even more interesting that the global aspects of Canadian diplomacy -- or rather Canadian opinions about global affairs -- was the nature of Canadian involvement in the Indian subcontinent. Canadian interest in fostering a bilateral Indo-Canadian relationship in part moderated American policy views about Indian nonalignment and in part provided an alternative mechanism for paving the way for a North American-South Asian relationship. The nature of Canadian political assumptions and the kinds of activities which Canada promoted in India rather than the extent of Canadian commitments are the salient elements in the relationship. There are two ways of studying this relationship. The first way is simply to regard Canadian material involvement as a price which Canada paid for sharing India as an important listening post in Asia, as an avenue for structuring Canada's Asia policy and as an avenue for advancing Canada's commercial interests, in the field of atomic energy. The second way to analyse this relationship is to keep the focus on the dyadic aspect, to treat the dyad as a unique alternative for India and Canada, given the difficulties which Nehru experienced vis-a-vis the U.S.A. during his visit in 1949,
and given St. Laurant's mistrust of some U.S. assumptions and strategies in the Cold War. The two premises are not mutually exclusive and it is in both senses that the following analysis focuses on the Indo-Canadian and Indo-U.S. atomic arrangements.

**Indo-Canadian and Indo-U.S. Atomic Energy Arrangements**

The foundation of India's atomic program was laid in 1944 when the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research was established under the guidance of Dr. Homi Bhabha, subsequently the first head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission. India entered the 'peaceful' atomic club in 1956 when the first experimental research reactor became critical in August, 1956. APSARA was the first research reactor in Asia and was indigenously built. The enriched fuel element came from Britain and a bilateral agreement ensured its peaceful use. The second research reactor (CIRUS) as well as subsequent Canadian reactors were introduced into India under a Canadian version of the atoms for peace concept. The Indo-Canadian agreements, signed between 1956 and 1968, centered on the principle of peaceful uses.

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54 Some of the relevant documents are as follows: Agreement of the Canada-India Colombo Plan Atomic Reactor Project dated 28th April, 1956, signed by Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru and Canadian High Commissioner, Escott Reid; Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of India relating to the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station and the Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station dated 16th December, 1963, signed by H.J. Bhabha and Chester
But there was no agreement between India and Canada about the specific meaning of the term 'peaceful uses' even though both sides reiterated from time to time the need to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Specific disagreements between the two sides were papered over in bilateral negotiations and it was around 1966 that the disagreement became an issue in Indo-Canadian relations.

India's atomic energy relationship with Canada developed in a political framework of bilateralism and in the context of India's concern to establish a viable basis for scientific cooperation with the West. During 1954-58 the interesting and personal relationship between Indian Prime Minister Nehru and the Canadian Premier St. Laurent enabled the two sides to seek bilateral methods for solving problems which often had a multilateral angle. The pattern of political relations in South Asia and the problems of

54 (contd.)
A. Rohning, Agreement between Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. and the President of India, December 16, 1963; Supplementary Agreement amending the December 16, 1963 Agreement, dated 16th December, 1966; Letter from Vikram A. Sarabhai to Canadian High Commissioner Mr. Ronald Michener, dated December 16, 1966; Letter from Vikram A. Sarabhai to Canadian High Commissioner Mr. James George, dated July 26, 1968.

55 Confidential Interview, Ottawa, April 1971.

56 The comments in this paragraph are based on Confidential Interviews, Ottawa, 1970-71.
disarmament were two such issues where the utility of the bilateral method appealed to the Indian and the Canadian leaders. Both countries wanted to depolarise the Cold War and in the 1950s the bilateral method of conflict-resolution became a cornerstone of Canadian and Indian foreign policies. In this context, Canada adopted the position that nothing should be done to disturb the Indian subcontinent and that cooperation in atomic energy was a type of exchange which helped strengthen the Indian economy. At the time that the principles of Indo-Canadian cooperation in atomic energy were under consideration, President Eisenhower announced the Atoms for Peace concept and Britain had launched itself into a nuclear energy program. These developments, as well as the mutual respect which existed between Canadian and Indian leaders and officials, facilitated the development of favored nation treatment by Canada vis-a-vis India. In the context of American and British objections about India's nuclear intentions and the need to have rigid inspection procedures, in retrospect it seems that the Canadian terms for setting up India's atomic energy program were quite favourable to India and unique in the history of atomic energy.

Two policy concerns seemed to be dominant in India's attitudes on atomic energy and arms control during the 1950s. The most obvious was the need to harness atomic energy for India's industrial requirements. In 1948
Madame Pandit, Nehru's sister pointed out to the United Nations General Assembly that

"Atomic energy could be of enormous importance in raising living standards to some reasonable parity with those in the West. The underdeveloped countries cannot, therefore, forego an opportunity to develop atomic energy for industrial purposes; nor can they allow any international organisation dominated by the industrially advanced countries to control their activities in regard to the development of atomic energy." 57

Subsequently, Dr. Bhabha elaborated that India's energy needs could not be met through use of coal and hydroelectric resources. In 1958 he explained the need for atomic energy in under-developed countries (particularly India) and the comparative utility of atomic energy. According to him, the decisive factor was "not the relative cost of power stations, but the relative total cost to the economy as a whole of providing progressively larger amounts of new power". 58

The other concern was less obvious but nevertheless salient and this reflected the desire to avoid international


safeguards against India, so that India's military option could be developed if the need arose to start a weapons-oriented program. This concern underlined Nehru's and Bhabha's approach to arms control and atomic energy, and this showed a loose link between the 'peace' and 'security' uses of disarmament and atomic energy. Bhabha's primary interest in the 1950s was to use atomic energy to modernise India, but his commitment to 'peaceful uses' and his enthusiasm for disarmament was restricted to a point; neither Nehru nor Bhabha lost sight of the potential military uses of atomic power. From the very beginning India's nuclear program was more broadband than China's program. Though there was no specific coupling between the peaceful and military uses of atomic energy, nevertheless there was a built-in scope for such a linkage. As Arthur Lall, former Indian Ambassador in Geneva and New York, points out, "Nehru's willingness to keep the option open did not mean that he favoured development of the bomb by India. He was against it. But he knew the political value of keeping the option open".

Nehru's strong reaction in the Indian Parliament against President Eisenhower's December 1953 atoms for


peace proposal provided a glimpse of the nature of Nehru's commitment to disarmament. It may be useful to quote him at length to show that although he wanted a peaceful world, he was not interested in promoting those disarmament proposals which tied India's hands, as foreign inspection in the peaceful uses clause seemed to do. Neither was he interested in supporting those proposals which helped strengthen superpower elitism in international security affairs. Moreover, even though Nehru called for global disarmament, and particularly of strategic weapons -- which would have lessened the importance of the military powers in world politics, he was willing to support partial arms control measures such as the partial test ban. This was significant because in about 1956 Moscow expressed a willingness to consider decoupling between general and partial disarmament -- a move which signalled Soviet interest in a détente with the West even though this hurt China's interests.

Three nuances underlined India's interests in nuclear disarmament and atomic energy and these are outlined in Nehru's statements made during 1954-60. First, Nehru was against international control of atomic energy. In a landmark statement to the Indian Parliament (May 10, 1954)

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he responded negatively to Eisenhower's atoms for peace proposal. Which are the nations that are going to control atomic energy internationally, he asked. To quote him:

"Either you make the body of control as big as the United Nations with all the countries represented, or it will be some relatively small body with the great powers sitting in it and lording it over...... We are prepared in this, as in any other matter, even to limit, in common with other countries, our independence of action for the common good of the world. We are prepared to do that, provided we are assured that it is for the common good of the world and not exercised in a partial way, and not dominated over by certain countries, however, good their motives".62

Secondly, Nehru focussed on the essentially political nature of disarmament and the American proposal to control the peaceful uses of atomic energy. For instance, in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly on October 5, 1960, he emphasised that "Most of the people sitting here have practically nothing to disarm although we are greatly interested in the disarmament of others so that war may not break out and destroy the world". But he was against Big Powers' management of international relations and he argued that it was right for these powers to discuss world affairs but he would not agree to "finalisation" of world affairs by a select group of states. Thus he linked the need for nuclear disarmament with the need to solve the political problem of discrimination between the militarily powerful states and the lesser states. But at the same time he

62 "Control of Nuclear Energy", op.cit., my emphasis.

63 Ibid., p.230.
decoupled the need to disarm the nuclear superpowers from the need to disarm the weaker or the unarmed states.

Thirdly, Nehru's interest in nuclear disarmament seemed to be closely guided by his appreciation of technological changes in the field of atomic energy. Thus, in a speech made to the Indian Parliament on November 22, 1960, he emphasised that:

"A situation has arisen or is arising, when perhaps an even greater urgency comes into the picture for a variety of reasons. If nothing effective is done in regard to disarmament in the course of the next three or four years, that is, about the time China exploded its first atomic device, it may perhaps become too late to deal with it, it may become impossible to control the situation. So far as nuclear weapons are concerned, some kind of advance is being made almost from day to day, from month to month, making these weapons more powerful, more dangerous and, what is more important relatively easier to make. Once this spreads to many countries, it will become exceedingly difficult to have any effective disarmament or any effective machinery of control. Therefore, something has got to be done in regard to disarmament before we pass this point of no return".64

*These attitudes were reflected in India's strenuous objections to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency but once the Agency was formed India found it useful and necessary to fight from within against the development of an extensive safeguards system. Prior to 1963 the U.S.S.R. had also viewed the I.A.E.A. with suspicion and India found

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support for its positions from the U.S.S.R. In 1963 the U.S.S.R. moved toward American position, viz., that transfer of fissile materials to any country ought to be accompanied with I.A.E.A. inspection. The shift in the Soviet position admitted to the need for I.A.E.A. inspection of non-nuclear weapons states but of course, the principal nuclear powers were exempt from such inspection. India however, continued to adhere to the principle that inspection of the atomic 'have nots' represented a form of atomic colonialism.

It was in this policy setting that Canada supported India's atomic energy plans, and despite India's resistance to international safeguards of the types envisaged in the I.A.E.A. Statute, Canada, generally speaking, continued to have faith in India's atomic program. However, Canadian agreements with India from 1956 to 1968 indicated that Canadians were tightening the restrictions to ensure peaceful use of atomic energy. Two points were significant in these agreements. First, India accepted bilateral Canadian inspection of first-generation nuclear fuels but rejected the same for all Indian nuclear equipment. Second, even though the 'peaceful uses only' clause was inserted in every Indo-Canadian agreement the definition of the term was left unexplained. For instance Article III of the 1956

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For a discussion see Stoessinger, J.G., op.cit., chapter 8.
agreement specified only that the "Government of India will ensure that the reactor and any products resulting from its use will be employed for peaceful purposes only". In subsequent agreements, in response to American, British and Pakistan pressure, India and Canada recognised the need to reiterate their "common interest" to use fissionable materials for peaceful uses only, and this entailed mutual inspection of India's Rajasthan reactor and Canada's Douglas Point reactor. But the common usage of the term 'peaceful uses' camouflaged the difference of opinion between India and Canada. Various attempts by Canadian officials in New Delhi from the mid-1950s onward to tighten the scope of inspection were rejected by Indians because India was more interested in controlling the military rather than the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Moreover, in the context of Indian declarations that India proposed to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and in the absence of an international agreement to control the military uses of atomic energy, the question of preventing diversion from peaceful to military uses seemed in the 1950s to be academic from India's point of view. The policy premises on both sides were diverse but there seemed to be no particular reason to force the issue other than to make statements for the record in private conversations and in international conferences.
At this point it is useful to note that the 'peaceful uses only' clause became controversial in Indo-Canadian relations after India's performance in the N.P.T. debate during 1965-68. The difference of opinion between the two governments came to a head during this period and the issue also involved a difference of opinion within the Canadian government. The atomic energy agency of Canada did not want arrangements for assisting India with CANDU type reactor interfered with because of India's resistance to IAEA inspection. There was a conflict of policy in this matter between External (Department of External Affairs) and AEC. This disagreement did not arise for the first time during the N.P.T. negotiations but had existed from the mid-1950s on. All along, the Indian authorities

66 I am greatly indebted to Lt. General E.L.M. Burns for this comment.

67 Confidential Interviews, Ottawa and New York, 1969-72. Officially, neither Canadians nor Indians admit to the existence of a difference of opinion, but privately this is recognised as a major problem in Indo-Canadian relations. By the time Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited Canada in May-June 1973, the lines between Department of External Affairs and the atomic energy community in Ottawa, and between India and Canada, seem to have become rigidly drawn into inflexible positions. The Canadian atomic energy scientists have argued that India cannot yet develop a nuclear program of a military nature, but the Department of External Affairs seems to think that India may be, or is, launched in that direction. Interestingly enough, on a technical matter viz., whether or not India has the capacity to 'go nuclear' -- as distinct from a question of intent -- the political expertise in External Affairs seems to prevail.
permitted Canadian inspection of the first generation use of nuclear fuel provided by Canada and furthermore, the inspection dealt with items supplied by Canada to India and not to all Indian nuclear facilities. This point should be noted because India refused to accept I.A.E.A. inspection precisely because the latter dealt with all types of nuclear facilities -- even those where foreign assistance had not been given. In other words, Indians have insisted on accepting at best an extension of a propriety right to inspect those items which are 'given' (as aid) or 'sold' (at below commercial prices). Excluded from this formula is inspection of items not supplied by a foreign donor. For example, it is clear from a reading of Indo-Canadian agreements that the inspection clause, for instance, does not refer to India's plutonium separation plant. Therefore, one needs to take a closer look at some of the important Canadian official statements and to probe their ambiguities.

On November 2, 1964, Mr. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs noted the following in the House of Commons. To quote:

"Prior to the Chinese explosion, and subsequently in the face of the event, the prime minister of India stated that India is maintaining its policy of not manufacturing atomic weapons. I regard this declaration as a positive contribution to world peace."
In so far as the Canada-India reactor is concerned, under an agreement concluded with India in April, 1956 and tabled in this house on May 9, 1956, the government of India gave an unconditional undertaking to use it (the reactor) for peaceful uses only.68

There is a major problem with the second part of the statement. It is true that India gave an undertaking that it would use the CANDU reactor for peaceful uses only. However, the undertaking was not unconditional. It related to the items supplied by Canada and inasmuch as there could only be effective control over the first generation use of the atomic materials, there was room for diversion into, say, the plutonium separation plant where the irradiated material could be re-processed. Hypothetically speaking, the end use of reprocessed material could also be justified from the Indian point of view as "peaceful uses". This kind of use could become problematic because there was no legal definition of the meaning of the term "peaceful uses".

There was another reason why the Indian agreement to the peaceful uses clause was not unconditional. The Indo-Canadian agreement of 1956 was signed in the context of the previous history of Indian opposition to the idea, the very philosophy of international safeguards. This was public knowledge since the Indian government had taken a position on that issue in the discussions on the formation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Moreover, in 1954

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House of Commons, Debates, November 2, 1964, p.9655.
Nehru quite pointedly questioned the elitist basis of President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace proposal. In other words, the impression which Mr. Paul Martin was creating failed to convey the exact sense of the setting in which the Indo-Canadian relationship had evolved up to that time.

A subsequent statement, by Secretary of State Mitchell Sharp, seemed to be closer to the Indian understanding and the Indian understanding of the nature of the Indo-Canadian agreement, but even this statement was not free of ambiguity.

On December 4, 1968 he made the following points.

(1) "Canada is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and therefore subscribes to the principles of the statute of the organization. The IAEA has not established a convention on the safeguarding of fissionable materials. However, the sale of plutonium to France has been made in accordance with the Canadian government's long standing policy on 'peaceful uses' of atomic energy which is wholly consistent with the principles underlying the IAEA'.

(2) "The agreement between Canada and India providing for Canadian assistance in the construction of the Canada-India reactor was signed on April 28, 1956 before the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Under this agreement India accepted the 'peaceful uses only' clause'.

(3) "The agreements between Canada and India dated December 16, 1963, December 16, 1966 providing for Canadian assistance in the construction of the two reactors of the Rajasthan atomic power project (RAPP) stipulates that bilateral safeguards will be applied on the Rajasthan atomic power station and on the Douglas Point nuclear generating station in Canada, of which RAPP is a copy. The two governments have further agreed that the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be asked to administer the safeguards responsibilities of the agreement......" 69

69 House of Commons, Debates, December 4, 1968, p. 3477, my emphasis.
Essentially there are three problems with Mr. Sharp's formulations. First, what is the meaning of the statement that Canada's policy on peaceful uses of atomic energy was "wholly consistent" with I.A.E.A. principles when Mr. Sharp himself admitted that I.A.E.A. did not have a safeguards convention? A comparison between the N.P.T. Safeguards and the I.A.E.A. Statute shows that there is a substantial difference between the two. In one sense the N.P.T. Safeguards are narrower in scope than the I.A.E.A. Statute. In another sense the N.P.T. focus is broader. Paul Szasz, an authority on the I.A.E.A. points out the differences. To quote him:

(1) "The principal prohibition of the Treaty [N.P.T.] is generally much narrower than that expressed in the Statute, since the former relates explicitly only to 'nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices' and not to the other potential military uses of atomic energy. The Agency might thus be required to observe, without being able to object, that safeguarded nuclear items are 'diverted' from peaceful pursuits to military ones not prohibited by the Treaty".

(2) "In at least one significant way the prohibitions of the Treaty reach beyond those of the Statute, since they ban, for non-nuclear-weapon States, the acquisition in any way of even non-weapon nuclear explosive devices -- i.e., including those designed solely for civil purposes. Thus the Agency will be obliged to use its control system to prevent an activity legitimate under its Statute, indeed one that it might otherwise further as an Agency project".70

In other words, there is a substantial difference between the scope, the philosophy of the I.A.E.A. Statute and the N.P.T. Safeguards systems. As such, to say that Canada's policy on peaceful uses was "wholly consistent" with I.A.E.A. statute is essentially to make the issue fuzzy. Secondly, in view of the differences between the I.A.E.A. Statute and the N.P.T. Safeguards, it is not clear if Mr. Sharp's statement about Canada's "long standing policy" referred to one or the other or both the I.A.E.A. Statute and the N.P.T. Safeguards. In at least the case of Indo-Canadian negotiations, the justification for Canada's insistence on Safeguards stems from its adherence to the N.P.T. In this case, the I.A.E.A. is an agency to administer the N.P.T. Safeguards and it is not an agency which administers all the principles of the I.A.E.A. Statute. In the Canadian-Indian case, Canada does not have a long standing policy which has a fixed, unchanging meaning. This chapter itself describes the evolution of that policy during 1956-68. Although this is beyond the scope of this study, there are significant variations between Canadian atomic energy agreements with India -- where the terms were most favourable -- and other countries, for example, with Pakistan where the terms were less favourable. Overall, there are variations in two directions. First, there has been a variation in the evolving meanings of the term 'peaceful uses' and the history of Indo-Canadian arrangements show clearly the evolution; that is, there has been variation
within the Indo-Canadian relationship on atomic energy. Secondly, there has been a variation between Canada's atomic aid relationship with India and its relationship in the same field with the other countries -- both developed and developing.

The third part of Mr. Sharp's statement is of course, correct. It shows that Indo-Canadian agreements provided for the transfer of bilateral safeguards obligations to the I.A.E.A. One should be careful however, in assessing the meaning of this transfer. Theoretically, a transfer could mean two things. First, instead of the "weak" Indo-Canadian bilateral safeguards, India would accept the N.P.T. Safeguards or the I.A.E.A. Statute principles. This would imply a change in the nature of the obligations. This change would be substantive. The second type of change is essentially procedural. In this case the nature of the Indian obligation remains unchanged, but, instead of being administered by Canada on a bilateral basis (that is, Canada and India had a reciprocal right to inspect each other's facilities), the inspecting agency is the I.A.E.A. Mr. Sharp's statement referred to the second rather than the first type of change. In other words, the "safeguards responsibilities of the agreement" which the I.A.E.A. was asked to "administer" does not mean that these responsibilities conformed entirely to I.A.E.A. Statute or the requirements of the N.P.T. They did not. The 1956 India-Canada agreement was made prior to the enunciation of the I.A.E.A. Statute or the N.P.T. safeguards and in effect the Indian commitment to accept
partially the safeguards concept by-passed the stringent requirements of subsequent arrangements.

Without trying to belabour the point, it is useful to note one final example of ambiguity in the Canadian stance on the 'peaceful uses only' idea. On January 20, 1971 the following question was posed to Mr. Sharp in the House of Commons.

"Is he now in a position to reply to my question of last Thursday, January 14, when I asked for an assurance that India has not produced weapon-grade plutonium since the Canada-India reactor was supplied in 1960?"

The response by Mr. Sharp was as follows:

"Yes, Mr. Speaker. In the 1956 Canada-India agreement for the provision of a nuclear research reactor the Indian government pledged that the reactor and the products resulting from its use would be used for peaceful purposes only. We have no evidence to suggest that the Indian government is not standing firm on the assurance it has given to Canada". 71

This response by-passed the thrust of the inquiry and it missed the point about the nature of the Indian undertaking. As this author understands it on the basis of confidential interviews, the substance of the Indian commitment was that the reactors supplied by Canada would not be used for anything but peaceful purposes. Canadian officials -- in External Affairs and in Atomic Energy department -- know that this pledge has not been broken, and through the available

inspection machinery they are, and have always been, in a
position to verify this. Yet the real issue is that if India
has produced weapons grade material, or if it produces such
material in the future, it would do so by processing irradiated
materials in its plutonium separation plant. This plant is
outside the Safeguards system. Secondly, if India produced
weapons grade material in the future it would do so in reactors
which are currently under construction, which use CANDU
technology or which are based on the thorium-uranium 233 cycle
based on breeder technology. It goes without saying that
there is no clause which forbids the use of CANDU technology
or other technology for weapons-use provided the reactors
supplied by Canada are not used:

India's nuclear behavior is interesting because on
one hand it reveals its willingness to make a concession if
it suits its purposes, but on the other hand it shows how it
is also willing to suffer economic and technological costs
to protect the political basis of its foreign policy
interests. For instance, a concession was made in the 1963
Indo-American agreement for the 'Civil Uses' of atomic
energy. (This led to the establishment of an enriched
uranium fuelled reactor at Tarapur near Bombay, and the

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This is the only Indo-U.S. agreement on atomic
energy which outlines the principles of the relationship.
For its text, see Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents,
1947-64, pp. 229-240.
access to enriched Uranium technology provided valuable experience for Indian scientists). Article VI emphasised that the common interest of the two countries was to use "any material, equipment or devise made available to the Government of India" for the Tarapur station "solely for peaceful purposes". In addition, Article VII stipulated that the material, equipment or device provided by United States would not be "used for atomic weapons or for research or development of atomic weapons or for any other military purpose". Provision was made for the transfer of American safeguard arrangements to I.A.E.A.

While the differences in Indo-Canadian views on peaceful uses were papered over, the Indo-American agreement through Article VI stipulated that there existed a "contrast" between the Indian and American positions on Safeguards. The Government of India reiterated that acceptance of American safeguards was "in consideration of the fact that... the Tarapur Atomic Power Station will be operated on no other special nuclear material" (that is enriched uranium) which U.S.A. was to provide. Given the differences of opinions between Indian and American negotiators about peaceful uses the 'contrast' explicitly outlined India's objections to American approach to Safeguards.

In 1964 Dr. Bhabha emphasised that "Since everything
in this world can be used both for good or for ill", the question of motive applied to both the nuclear and the non-nuclear weapons states. The Western reaction to India’s positions resulted in a toughening of the Canadian stance in the negotiations which produced the 1966 Agreement between India and Canada. But despite the pressures in bilateral negotiations, Indians continued to emphasise in disarmament forums that the need was to regulate nuclear facilities of a military nature and not those which were meant for peaceful purposes.

Indian interventions of these kinds outlined the nature of Indian objections against institutionalisation of rules which discriminated between the nuclear superpowers and the non-nuclear weapons states, and which sought inspection of 'peaceful' rather than 'military' activities. The impact of India's argumentation however, came with the appointment of Ambassador V.C. Trivedi to the Geneva based Eighteen-Nations Disarmament Committee. Unlike many Indian envoys in Geneva, Trivedi was an expert on nuclear energy, security, and disarmament matters. During his tenure in Geneva he escalated the Indian arguments in a manner which was logically and politically relevant, and the points he developed clarified the reasoning of India's political and nuclear strategy.

For instance, during 1964-68 the U.S.A. stressed the urgent need to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, (viz., to prevent a growth of the number of nuclear weapons states), and sought universal application of I.A.E.A. safeguards for peaceful (not military) nuclear activities. During and after 1965, in the E.N.D.C. Canada maintained its reputation of rarely deviating from the policy premises of the U.S.A: on the N.P.T. question, and supported the importance of I.A.E.A. safeguards, that is on activities relating to possible diversion from 'peaceful' to 'military' activities. By comparison, in bilateral Indo-Canadian negotiations Canada had a more flexible approach to the subject and it is conceivable that Canada's disarmament negotiators in Geneva were not fully briefed about the political and legal nuances of bilateral Indo-Canadian relations.

In contrast to American and Canadian positions in Geneva, Ambassador Trivedi insisted that there must be corresponding obligation toward nuclear disarmament by the existing nuclear powers; that the security of the non-nuclear weapons states lay not in security guarantees

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Here the reference is to General Assembly resolution 2028.
but in nuclear disarmament, and that I.A.E.A. Safeguards

There is confusion in the Western literature on this point. Ambassador Chakravarthy, India's representative at the U.N., in outlining India's views on nuclear nonproliferation, suggested the need for security guarantees for countries "which may be threatened by powers having a nuclear weapons capability, or about to have a nuclear weapons capability". It is presumably because of India's problems with China and India's effort to secure security guarantees that Lt. Gen. E.L.M. Burns for instance, states: "The security problem was a particular concern to the Indian Government". He also contends: "But as India wanted the guarantee without any corresponding undertakings or obligations on its part, it is not surprising that no satisfactory answers were received". See, Burns, A Seat at the Table, Clarke Irwin, Toronto, 1972, pp.215-215.

On both points it is essential to differ from General Burns' views because the facts were somewhat more complicated. After Indian Ambassador L.K. Jha started to explore the possibilities of Joint Soviet-American security assurances, it was found that the idea of a security guarantee against China was untenable because Soviet and American policy premises were different on the issue. Thus the problem was not that India was unwilling to undertake obligations as General Burns contends -- a point which is disproven by Indian undertakings in the 1971 treaty of friendship and cooperation between India and the U.S.S.R. -- but that India found it difficult to persuade the U.S.A. to join with the U.S.S.R. in providing a joint security assurance outside the Security Council framework where China's veto would apply. Parenthetically it may also be added that Indo-Soviet discussions on this issue reached a point where drafts of an agreement were being discussed but the Soviets were unwilling to approach the White House on India's behalf but left India free to persuade the U.S.A. to join the Soviet effort to strengthen Indian security. Secondly, General Burns is not correct in insisting that India's concern is with the military uses of Chinese nuclear weapons. Rather the concern has been all along primarily with the political uses of nuclear weapons -- with the utility of its non-use (to borrow a phrase from Bernard Brodie), in the context of China's permanent seat at the Security Council. Confidential Interviews, Washington D.C., 1972. The question of the military uses of Chinese nuclear weapons was not an 'immediate' problem for India during 1965-68. This point is discussed in the next chapter.
Text complete; leaf 288 omitted in numbering
were acceptable if these applied to all countries and all reactors. In other words, during 1965-68 Trivedi focussed on the need to achieve universal and comprehensive nuclear disarmament as a sine qua non of a peaceful world. The fear of China was not a dominant factor in India’s nuclear policy-making although China figured as an argument in India’s security debate. The nature of India’s international posture on the N.P.T., whether Ambassador Trivedi’s arguments were seriously intended, and whether his disarmament strategy represented a strategy of manoeuvre are questions which are examined in the following chapters.

In conclusion, this chapter has assessed the traditional aspects of India’s arms control and disarmament diplomacy in relation to its nuclear policy during the 1950s. It suggests that Nehru’s approach, generally speaking, reflected a mistrust of absolute power based on nuclear weapons, and yet, Nehru felt that it was important for India to have access to modern nuclear technology. While there appears to be an ambiguity in Nehru’s view about relative power, one point is certain. ‘Power’ was an important basis for seeking influence. Furthermore, and this point needs to be underlined, Nehru recognised the importance of using force as a weapon of last resort to alter the discriminatory status quo; that is, the peaceful approach to problem-solving was preferable but the need to reform the global system justified the use of violence to change the status quo.
Nehru's remark that an Indian diplomat was charged first to protect Indian interests and only secondly to examine an issue on, its merits is revealing.

This focus -- the need to use military force, if necessary, to change the status quo, has a bearing on India's disarmament diplomacy and its nuclear policy. The mistrust of 'atomic colonialism' in the Indian case does not appear to be simply a matter of rhetoric, as some Westerners think mistakenly. It appears to be a belief widely held by Indians. This belief was strongly expressed in the Indian approach to the Safeguards doctrine, whether this related to bilateral or international safeguards. The Indian argument was not against safeguards per se (as the following chapter will show) but it was against the idea of discriminatory or non-universal safeguards which are applied by the great powers against the militarily weaker, or the poorer states. This attitude formed a part of the traditional Indian approach to nuclear policy during the 1950s. And this attitude was expressed clearly in Indo-Canadian negotiations and in other international commitments which India undertook.

This chapter has explored a salient difference between Indo-Canadian and Indo-U.S. atomic aid arrangements, for two reasons. First, it demonstrates a contrast between Canadian and American approaches to the problem of Indian development and security during the 1950s. It is clear that the political context -- or the political relations between Canada and India
during the St. Laurent-Nehru era -- shaped the atomic relationship, just as the internationalism of the Achesonian-Dullesian America and Nehru's India inhibited the growth of a stable political understanding. Secondly, it demonstrates a shift in Canada's approach to the 'peaceful uses'only' clause in Indo-Canadian agreements. Given the history of the I.A.E.A. Statute and the N.P.T., and given the key differences between the two, this chapter notes the controversy over the ambiguity of the term 'peaceful uses'. Needless to say, the terms 'peaceful' and 'military' uses are not antonymous and the controversy is both legal and philosophical, as in the case of the phrase 'aggression'.

Finally, this chapter does not assess the future direction of India's nuclear policy. This clearly is a matter for speculation. However, it makes one point. Given Nehru's admonition that the use of force was permissible, as a last resort, to alter dependency relations -- to alter the status quo, there is nothing to exclude the use of India's nuclear program for purposes of self-defence. Nehru said that he was against the use of nuclear energy for "destructive purposes" and he favoured peaceful uses. Yet at the same time students of politics, and particularly students of behavior of politicians, know (or should know) that in the modern age there are only ministeries of defence, not ministries of war or destruction. Moreover, to deter one need not destroy, and as Bernard Brodie points out, it is the utility of the nonuse
of nuclear weapons which counts.

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Chapter Four

INDIA AND THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

This chapter examines Indian diplomacy on the N.P.T. The external setting of Indian diplomacy on the nuclear treaty dealt specifically with the anti-proliferation strategy of the superpowers and the security problem of China. The internal setting of Indian diplomacy dealt with the challenge posed to the Indian government by the pro-bomb argument and secondly, it dealt with the relationship between the Indian negotiators in the E.N.D.C. and their political masters in New Delhi. This chapter summarises the main Indian arguments against the nuclear treaty, bearing in mind the external and the internal setting of the Indian diplomacy. The official arguments are broken into two analytical types. The first type indicates that some of the arguments were not open to change, i.e., change as a result of bureaucratic or societal pressures within India. This type included India's attitude towards international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities, and, to a lesser extent, the need to obtain security through nuclear disarmament. The second type dealt with issues in India's nuclear policy which figured in the arena of bureaucratic politics. This type included issues dealing with questions raised by the unofficial pro-bomb
lobby in India and with questions related to the official search for great power guarantees for India against a possible nuclear attack or a nuclear threat.

Shelton L. Williams, a protege of Robert E. Osgood, has assessed Indian attitudes on the N.P.T. follows:

"Mrs. Gandhi's announcement of this policy position on the N.P.T. was neither unexpected nor unpopular -- a rarity in recent Indian politics. Indeed, the decision not only gained unanimous support from the foreign affairs body of the cabinet but was also greeted with resounding cheers" in the Parliament and with wide editorial approval in the press. Mrs. Gandhi announced that only Mr. M.R. Masani and his Swatantra Party took exception to her government's posture. The government's position and its political consensus should not come as a surprise to western observers since they merely reflect the evolving negotiating stance India has taken in recent arms control discussions in Geneva."1

As such, this chapter does not probe the nature of Indian bureaucratic politics on the question of signing the N.P.T. Instead, in this chapter, the focus is on issues related to the N.P.T. which emerged when the N.P.T. was under consideration, viz., between 1964-68. The purpose of this discussion is to lay the groundwork to assess the nature of Indian bureaucratic politics on the nuclear weapons issue and to assess the societal sources of support and controversy in the post-1968 period. An attempt is made to identify the issues which


emerged during the N.P.T. discussions, to assess the relationship among these issues, and finally, to assess those issues which remained controversial during 1964-68, and after 1968 as compared to those issues which became politically inactive. The role of the official and unofficial Indian elites is discussed in relation to the controversial issues.

There are two ways of analysing the Indian nuclear debates. The first perspective sees the nuclear issue essentially as a power play among the various Indian elites, within and outside the Indian Government, here the internal dynamics are emphasised. The second perspective sees the nuclear issue as a power play, a strategy, by India to enter into the calculations of the superpowers. Even if India's contribution to the superpower game is marginal, according to this perspective there is value in 'staying in the game'. In this focus the external dynamics of strategic interactions between India and the superpowers are emphasised. The China problem appears in both perspectives but it is not central in the total picture of either perspective. That is, the nuclear option applies partly to the Chinese threat, partly to India's aspiration to change the character of the international system and partly to differing loyalties to pro-U.S., pro-Soviet and pro-China lobbies in India. Overall, the first perspective examines the effects of the nuclear issue in Indian bureaucratic politics and party politics and the
second perspective examines the effect of the nuclear issue on India's external strategy or strategies. This chapter examines the latter perspective.

The internal setting for India's behavior on N.P.T.

Two preliminary observations should be made before one examines the contours of India's external nuclear strategy. First, the Indian nuclear debate did not start with the explosion of China's nuclear device in 1964. On the contrary there has been an on-going nuclear debate within India's foreign policy and atomic energy establishments since the mid-1950s at least. The debate was undoubtedly at the official level and not public. It centered on the official relationship and the personal friendship between Indian Prime Minister Nehru and the distinguished scientist, and subsequently the first chief of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Homi Bhabha. These two personalities symbolised the two facets of India's disarmament and security policies. The dual orientation of India's security strategies was reflected in the concerns which these men portrayed in international forums dealing with disarmament and atomic energy: In his speeches Nehru reflected openly his mistrust of superpower directed international security regimes while espousing the aim of balanced and controlled nuclear disarmament. Here Krishna Menon seemed to influence Nehru's disarmament thinking to an extent.
Dr. Bhabha however, extended his mistrust of the superpowers into a mistrust also of disarmament as a strategy. His pioneering work toward the creation of a modest and sophisticated atomic energy program was based on this premise. But both recognised the political value of nuclear weapons. Even in the 1950s the Indian nuclear program was structured in such a manner that it could be converted into a weapons program provided the Government of India was willing to take the decision and to provide the necessary resources. In other words, even though Nehru was against atomic weapons and in favour of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, he was alert about the political basis of nuclear disarmament and the political effects of nuclear power. Consequently, it was not true that India's nuclear policy during the 1950s was irrevocably committed against the future use of atomic energy for military purposes. This was a premise which permeated India's post-1964 diplomacy in the E.N.D.C. This focus on the internal policy aspect during the 1950s is intended to show that a discussion of international nuclear politics was carried on within the Indian government during the 1950s but on grounds of secrecy and the lack of a policy need at that time.

4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
time, the debate did not become public in India.

The second element in the internal setting which influenced India's diplomatic strategy in the E.N.D.C. concerned Western speculation about the possibility of India 'going nuclear'. It also concerned the emergence of a pro-bomb lobby in India urging the Indian government that it ought to sanction a nuclear weapons program. India's nuclear program gained wider public recognition -- although the technical information about India's nuclear program was known to select scientific circles -- as a result of the work of Leonard Beaton and John Maddox. Their assessment was that India at that time was against the bomb. In the context of the Western fear of nuclear proliferation the Beaton-Maddox assessment was reassuring. Nonetheless it can be said that the work of the late Mr. Beaton provided free publicity for India's nuclear program just as Secretary of Defence MacNamara's estimates of China's missile program gave free publicity to that country's progress.

As Sisir Gupta points out, it was in the context of India's on-going reappraisal of its China policies that China's first atomic explosion occurred. Prior to this,


Indians had talked about the need to strengthen the Indian military establishment with a view to meet the Chinese military threat in the Himalayas. With the explosion, the Indian security debate acquired a fresh issue, namely, to secure a nuclear response to the Chinese threat.

Dr. Raj Krishna, an Indian economist with an international reputation, was the main exponent of the pro-bomb lobby. His arguments during 1965 were posed essentially to secure an Indian nuclear response against the Chinese missile threat. There were several premises and arguments, as follows: (1) the situation India faced was a result of the expansionist nature of the Chinese regime; (2) China had won much international respect because of its determination to organise power in defiance of the great powers; (3) India needed to establish a viable India-China balance and to attend to the needs of an Asian balance of power; this was defined as India's central aim; (4) An independent strategic nuclear deterrent was obviously beyond India's

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8 "India and the Bomb," India Quarterly, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, April-June, 1965.

9 Ibid., p. 119.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., p. 120.
capacity. (5) India needed to achieve a division of labour in deterrence, with the superpowers jointly providing strategic deterrence and India providing tactical deterrence; it was contended that there was harmony of interests in this regard between India and the superpowers. (6) Indians needed to differentiate between the question of strategic abstention and tactical abstention, between short term dependence on the West and long term dependence; (7) Economic cost was not a real constraint in India's nuclear policy and one needed to view national security as a combination of defence and development and not defence or development; (8) Disarmament and proliferation were not necessarily mutually exclusive strategies but rather India needed to pursue the goal of disarmament as a long term prospect, utilising nuclear arms acquisition as an intermediate strategy; (9) It was not in India's interest to sign a partial test ban treaty unless China had done the same; (10) Having made the mistake of signing the test ban, 

12 Ibid., p. 127.
13 Ibid., p. 128.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 131.
16 Ibid., p. 134.
17 Ibid., p. 135.
in view of China's non-adherence, India had a case for withdrawal. And finally, the "only" short range choice for India was to secure "some" nuclear capability and "some" guarantees from friendly nations.

At this time many other Indian elite arguments were against the policy advice of Raj Krishna. The opposing arguments raised the questions of economic cost of a weapons program, and its foreign policy and military effects, if India changed its basic strategy of seeking world peace through disarmament. Thus Mr. R.K. Nehru, formerly Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and a member of Jawaharlal Nehru's clan argued that

"A country which when exposed to a threat refuses in the interests of world community to develop nuclear weapons has the right to demand that some progress should be made in the direction of arms control and disarmament." 20

Another former Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs, M.J. Desai, raised the question of economic cost and the credibility of an Indian weapons program. To quote him:

"India will be playing straight into the hands of China if because of fear of emotional reaction or prestige considerations, it enters into a nuclear race with China. The enormous diversion of resources... will retard India's economic and social development

18 Ibid., p.136.
19 Ibid.
programmes indefinitely and ... not only weaken India internally but eliminate it as a political factor in Asia and Africa."21

Having noted the possible negative political effects on India's position in Asia and Africa, Desai then went on to state his professional opinion that

"... if India cannot maintain its superiority regarding carriers and nuclear weapons vis-a-vis China, anything less will only tempt China to use nuclear weapons against India in a so-called defensive or pre-emptive strike."22

Finally, on one extreme side of the political spectrum was the lonely voice of former Defence Minister and Nehru's confidante on disarmament, Krishna Menon. He urged Indians to pursue with vigour the strategies of disarmament, and peaceful co-existence. To quote him:

"In the field of foreign policy India should not remain inhibited by the shock of Chinese invasion. Her concern about nuclear parity about disarmament and coexistence must be reactivated. It is not in our interest to permit doubts to be engendered to our declared policy and integrity in respect of the nuclear weapons."23

The thrust of Mr. Menon's remarks remained unclear even though his preference for nuclear disarmament had not changed in the 1960s. In his far-reaching interview with

21 "India and Nuclear Weapons." Disarmament and Arms Control, Autumn, 1965, my emphasis.

22 Ibid., my emphasis.

23 In Seminar, New Delhi, November 1965, my emphasis.
Michael Brecher he had insisted on the undesirability of "talking" about the destructive uses of nuclear weapons in India, that is, with reference to India's policy, because no "new factor" has arisen. Menon had dismissed Brecher's suggestion that the Chinese offensive nuclear capability was a new factor. He felt that China's bomb making plans were known to the Indian authorities and secondly, the danger of the Chinese offensive capability against India was not immediate. Taking an overview of these statements, it was unclear whether Mr. Menon's admonition applied only to the public talk until Chinese capabilities posed an immediate threat to India; or whether his admonition was broader in scope and excluded a re-appraisal of the evolving global alignments in the 1960s and the effect of such changes on Indian strategies interests. Seemingly it was the latter as he consistently opposed an Indian nuclear weapons program and he favoured India's adherence to the N.P.T.

By 1965-66 it became clear that India's public security policy debate had developed outlines of two different perspectives on the question of nuclear weapons. The first School of thought repeats India's traditional world order concern. In this view

nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament on a universal and comprehensive basis, was required to make the world safe against nuclear world war. In the 1950s this had been the vehicle for India's participation in the international disarmament debate. Indian speeches -- voicing Soviet concerns mostly, and to some extent American concerns, as for instance, with regard to partial or collateral measures -- had enabled it to stay in the game as a great power helper.

This of course, was not the sole basis for Indian participation in the international security forums. India had a vital stake in the composition (i.e., who decides?) of the International Atomic Energy Agency and secondly, it had an interest in the principles concerning I.A.E.A. operations with regard to Safeguards and the flow of technology from an international organisation to a developing state (i.e., the rules of the game).

Overall the strategy of seeking universal and comprehensive disarmament sought to pursue India's strategy of defence through friendship in the 1950s. Indian disarmament delegates such as Ambassador Arthur Lall usually had wide latitude in formulating their proposals. The imperfections in India's communication facilities did not help fast, top secret consultations between India's negotiators abroad and the political high command in New Delhi. Moreover,

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because of the obvious success which Nehru's peaceful co-existence policy produced vis-a-vis China in 1954 and Soviet Russia in 1955-56, it seemed unnecessary to shape Indian military power in support of its diplomatic aims. In this setting, there was some coordination between foreign policy and atomic energy policy as a result of the close personal and official relationship between Nehru and Homi Bhabha. There was a relationship between Nehru's disarmament speeches and Indian disarmament behavior in international forums, but there was no necessary relationship between (1) foreign policy and subatomic defence policy, and (2) atomic energy and security policy.

The second school advocated a need to revise the old approach. This school advocated a need to seek a deterrent role for India. It sought to revise non-alignment by asking for formal security ties with the superpowers, even if this was only to be a temporary measure. It emphasised the need for rapid Indian effort to 'go nuclear' and to establish an India-China nuclear balance in addition to an India-China conventional military balance. This school therefore, sought a radical reappraisal of India's foreign and security policies and the premise was that China's threat was a central problem in Indian foreign relations.

The Third Response: 1961-64

A deeper examination of India's N.P.T. diplomacy suggests the existence of a third approach. This approach
modified India's security policy by adopting a part of the traditional 'nuclear disarmament' school and a part of the radically revisionist 'Indian bomb' school. The focus in the third school was to strengthen, or at least to maintain, the Indian opposition to the Safeguards concept and to moderate the Indian commitment to a strategy of seeking peace and security through nuclear disarmament. This moderation can be inferred from India's insistence that it welcomed non-proliferation if this was both universal and comprehensive -- a demand which clearly the superpowers could not meet. The second point in this school of thought was that it emphasized India's security problem, and it sought to probe the nature and scope of superpowers' commitment to Indian security.

The third school of thought originated after 1962 and evolved during 1964-68. The history of superpower attempts to secure a non-dissemination and a non-proliferation arrangement should be identified to specify the superpower focus and the Indian response, and to specify the innovation implied in the Indian response to the superpowers' behavior. The hardening of Indian opposition to the Safeguards concept appeared with regard to Article III of the N.P.T. The moderation of Indian faith in nuclear disarmament appeared after 1968 -- when it became clear that Indian demand for a universal and a comprehensive nuclear disarmament arrangement -- covering both horizontal and vertical proliferation -- could not be met. The essence of the third school was that it
expanded the structure of India's disarmament strategy. In the 1950s India was talking only about nuclear disarmament, while it was obviously benefitting from Canada's policy of disseminating vitally needed and sophisticated CANDU technology to India. After 1964 India started to talk about non-proliferation -- both horizontal and vertical -- and security, just when the superpowers appeared to be ready to secure international restrictions on dissemination, and just when they appeared to be unable to agree on the need to contain China via India, that is, by offering India a joint superpower guarantee against China. In 1950s India sought peace and security through nuclear disarmament and an Indian conventional military force; in 1964-68 Indians sought to contain horizontal and vertical proliferation, found that the target was impossible to meet, started to move away from the target of nuclear disarmament and started to find alternative substitutes for its security.

The source of this change in India's security policy was both internal and external. It was internal inasmuch as the third school was forced to deal with the challenge posed by the pro-bomb lobby in India. This however, was only one part of the story. The third school also reacted to the pattern of Soviet-American diplomacy which started with arms control but was seen by the superpowers -- and hence by Indian diplomats -- as a pattern of superpower concert in international relations. A brief review of the developments during 1963-64 makes this clear.
After the Baruch Plan, the first nonproliferation proposal as a part of the partial disarmament plan submitted by the United States, United Kingdom, France and Canada in 1957 to the five nations sub-committee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission. This plan included the cut-off, transfer, test ban and conventional disarmament ideas, as well as a ban on the transfer of acceptance of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapons states, "except under arrangements to assure their use for defensive purposes only." In other words, this was a non-dissemination proposal. Similarly, in 1961 the Irish resolution on non-dissemination was unanimously accepted by the U.N. General Assembly. This called for an agreement

"under which the nuclear states would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons."27

According to a U.S. government study "by 1962 the two nations (The U.S. and the U.S.S.R.) had begun private


discussions on nonproliferation as a collateral measure."  
Arnold Kramish, an extremely knowledgable observer of the nuclear scene notes the beginning of the practice of Soviet-American agreement as the basis of shaping the arms control consensus. According to him:

"The Irish Resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 December 1961 produced the first international initiative towards a treaty which would freeze the nuclear status quo. Most of the significant agreement on the wording and terms of such a treaty has been reached on a secret tete-a-tete basis between the United States and the USSR -- a circumstance not whole-heartedly appreciated by other nations who would be most profoundly affected by such a treaty. Some ephemeral insights into the early nature of these contacts can be found in various documents, such as the 1963 Sino-Soviet exchanges."  

The external setting in India's attitude on nuclear weapons during 1964-68 was shaped by superpowers' diplomatic activity to understand and to agree on the political and military basis of arms control. During 1963-64 two themes appeared in Soviet-American arms control relations. The first theme was overt and dealt with the problem of inspection. The second theme was covert. It dealt with the superpower view that an arms control agreement required, as a sine qua non, the agreement between the two superpowers; and that this was necessary and sufficient to achieve international security.

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28 International Negotiations, op. cit., p. ix.

In effect, given the zero sum nature of the Sino-Soviet conflict at the time the partial test ban was signed in Moscow, this implied the exclusion of China from superpower led international security arrangements. This implication was drawn from the superpowers' view that the actual holders of nuclear weapons held the power to destroy and hence held the authority to negotiate arms control arrangements to stabilise the Soviet-American balance. The following section notes the essentials, the common interest, underlying Soviet-American strategy on arms control. It notes China's opposition to the superpowers' strategy. During 1963 India did not voice concerns similar to those of China and yet it is worth noting that, during 1964-68 and after 1968, even though India posed its arguments against the N.P.T., in part, with reference to the security problem posed by China, the Indian strategy paralleled that of China vis-a-vis the superpowers. The following deals with two contextual features in the international setting for arms control during 1963-64. The first feature related to efforts to shape the Soviet-American detente as the basis of arms control. The second feature related to efforts to shape a non-dissemination agreement to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.

1963 seems to be an important turning point in Soviet-American arms control diplomacy. Following the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchanges during 1962 there were further

exchanges during January 14–31, 1963. In an address by
Premier Khrushchev at the Sixth Congress of the Socialist
Unity Party of Germany on January 16, 1963 the Soviet
leader declared the following:

"As far as the socialist world system is concerned, we have always been and still are in favour of
strengthening peaceful coexistence, of peaceful
economic competition between the two systems, of
settling disputed issues by negotiations."

On January 31, 1963 ACDA Director Foster noted that there
had been "private exploratory talks" between the superpowers
and noted that the "Soviet Union has proposed that the
negotiations now be returned to the 18-Nation Disarmament
Committee in Geneva." On February 1, 1963 Secretary of
State Rusk thought that there were "other factors in the
situation," i.e., other than the question of inspection or
international verification of a test ban.

In a news conference on February 21, 1963 President
Kennedy disclosed the rationale behind the test ban nego-
tiations. To quote him:

"Well, in my judgement, the major argument for the
test ban treaty is the limiting effect it might have
on proliferation...."

32 Ibid., p.11, my emphasis.
33 Ibid., p. 28.
34 Ibid.
Now, on the question of France, France has been recognised as a nuclear power by the Soviet Union. It would be up to the Soviet Union to make a judgement as to what action they would take on the treaty, if France continued to test. This is a matter which we will have to discuss with the Soviet Union. In addition, we are concerned about other countries testing... There is no guarantee, if we sign a nuclear test ban, that it will end proliferation. It is, however, our feeling that the Soviet Union would not accept a test ban unless they shared our view that proliferation was undesirable, and it might be a weight in the scale against proliferation, and I so regard it. 35

The link between the test ban and nuclear proliferation was elaborated by other senior U.S. officials. Secretary Rusk argued as follows:

"Among the dangers to the United States from continued testing by both sides I would consider the danger of the further spread of nuclear weapons to other countries of perhaps primary importance. Unlimited testing by both the United States and the Soviet Union would substantially increase the likelihood that more and more nations would seek the dubious, but what some might consider prestigious, distinction of membership in the nuclear club....

A test ban would not of its own solve the problems of proliferation of nuclear weapons. It should be recognised that at least one present nuclear power and one power apparently bent on developing nuclear weapons might not be persuaded to subscribe to the test ban treaty from the outset. However, many potential nuclear powers might at this stage be induced to accede to the treaty.

Moreover, a nuclear test ban could lead to further steps which would deal more directly with the proliferation problem. I am referring here to the possibility of an agreement on the one hand by the nuclear powers not to transfer control of weapons or to give assistance in weapons development to countries not already possessing them and, on the other, by the nonnuclear powers not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons of their own.\textsuperscript{36}

The bilateral and the superpower basis of the test ban, and the third party orientation in the superpowers' effort to secure a test ban, became explicit in President Kennedy's news conference on May 8, 1963. Here he pointed out that "If we don't get it now, I would think perhaps the genie is out of the bottle and we'll never get it back in again."\textsuperscript{37} In a radio-television address on July 26, 1963 Kennedy expanded his reasoning against further proliferation. To quote him:

"During the next several years, in addition to the four current nuclear powers, a small but significant number of nations will have the intellectual, physical and financial resources to produce both nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them.....

I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament. There would only be the increased chance of accidental war and an increased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 109.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 183.
We have a great obligation -- all four nuclear powers have a great obligation -- to use whatever time remains to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons." 38

Earlier however, in his far-ranging speech on Soviet-American relations before an American University audience in Washington D.C. on June 10, 1963, President Kennedy had underlined the bilateral basis of arms control. He pointedly identified the "common interest" of the two superpowers in questions relating to war and peace. He stated categorically that the "two strongest powers" bore the heaviest burdens. 39 Premier Khrushchev expressed "satisfaction" with the "call for better relations" between the two countries and emphasised his willingness "to find a solution to outstanding problems, to establish good relations between our great powers." With these exchanges the point was made that world peace depended on the cooperation of the two greatest nuclear powers.

The French and the Chinese reactions to superpower activity outlined third party suspicions about the detente as the basis for international security. President de Gaulle responded on January 14, 1963 by saying that "alliances have no absolute virtues" irrespective of the sentiments on which

38 Ibid., pp. 254-55, my emphasis.


40 Ibid., p. 228.
they were based and France intended to "have its national defence." On July 29, 1963 he elaborated on the international implications of the test ban. To quote him:

"the empire of China, its [Soviet Russia's] neighbour for 6,000 miles, inhabited by 700 million men, an empire that is indescribable, ambitious and deprived of everything -- all that can, in effect, introduce some new elements into the concerns of the Kremlin and lead it to insert a note of sincerity in the couplets that it devotes to peaceful coexistence. And, thus, the United States which, since Yalta and Potsdam, has nothing, after all, to ask from the Soviets, the United States sees tempting prospects opening up before it. Hence, for instance, all the separate negotiations between the Anglo-Saxons and the Soviets, which, starting with the limited agreement on nuclear testing, seem likely to be extended to other questions."

The Chinese reaction to the detente as the basis of arms control was even harsher than the French one. The Chinese criticism of Soviet and American arms control diplomacy based on a superpower detente appeared in several categories: First, that the U.S.S.R. had sold out Chinese interests. Secondly, that the U.S.S.R. was colluding with American imperialism with the aim of menacing China. Thirdly, that the U.S.S.R., like the U.S., did not really believe in nuclear disarmament since 1956. And finally, that the U.S.S.R. was aiding the "Indian reactionaries" rather than China. The following quotations describe the

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41 Ibid., p. 4.

42 Ibid., p. 264.
Chinese reasoning.

(1) "Thus, the interests of the Soviet people have been sold out, the interests of the people of the countries in the socialist camp, including the people of China, have been sold out, and the interests of all the peace-loving people of the world have been sold out." 43

(2) "The object of U.S. imperialism in advocating the prevention of nuclear proliferation is not at all to manacle itself but to manacle socialist countries other than the Soviet Union. The United States is trying to achieve this object by consolidating the nuclear monopoly position of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders are fully supporting this plot and playing an active part in carrying it out." 44

"It is not only at present that the Soviet leaders have begun to collude with U.S. imperialism and attempt to manacle China. As far back as 20 June 1959, when there was not yet the slightest sign of a treaty on stopping nuclear tests, the Soviet Government unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology for national defence concluded between China and the Soviet Union on 15 October 1957, and refused to provide China with a sample of an atom bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture. This was done as a presentation gift at the time the Soviet leader went to the United States for talks with Eisenhower in September." 45

(3) "From 1946 to 1956, the Soviet Government insisted on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. They were correct then and we firmly supported them. In their summary report to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, the Soviet leaders divorced the cessation of nuclear tests from the question of disarmament." 46

43 Ibid., p. 270.
44 Ibid., p. 358.
46 Ibid., p. 365.
(4) "Not only have you perfidiously and unilaterally scrapped the agreement on providing China with nuclear technical data, but you have blatantly given more and more military aid to the Indian reactionaries, who are hostile to China." 47

The 1964 witnessed an elaboration of the trend of bilateralism in superpower diplomacy on arms control. In a letter to Premier Khrushchev the American President outlined the need to develop new proposals to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. In a message to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, on January 21, 1964 President Johnson said the following:

"to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now controlling them, let us agree:

(A) That nuclear weapons not be transferred into the national control of states which do not now control them, and that all transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes take place under effective international safeguards." 49

The Soviet memorandum of January 28, 1964 to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee accepted the principle of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and reasoned as follows:

"A widening of the circle of States possessing nuclear weapons would increase many times over the danger of the outbreak of a thermonuclear war. At the same time a widening of the circle of nuclear States would also make it much more difficult to solve the problem of disarmament." 50

48 Documents, 1964, p. 5.
49 Ibid., p. 8.
50 Ibid., p. 15.
On April 3, 1964, in a new conference, Secretary Rusk pointedly outlined the anti-China rationale in Soviet-American non-dissemination strategy. To quote him:

"Now, on our side we have a very substantial interest in the nondissemination idea as it applies to Peiping, but there is no evidence whatever that Peiping would engage in the kind of agreement that we have been talking with other governments about, and so at least some of our sense of urgency diminishes if it is clear that Peiping will not take part.

But I would like to add this further note. The fact that it might be difficult to bring this question to a formal agreement is not the whole story. It is my impression that Moscow, Paris, London, Washington have a certain coincidence of policy on this matter." 51

On July 2, 1964, before the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, ACDA Director Foster clarified the thrust of the American strategy on Safeguards on peaceful uses of atomic energy. To quote him:

"We continue to support the idea that all transfers of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes should take place under effective international safeguards. This proposal is intended to fill a gap left by the IAEA Statute to which I referred earlier. Whenever that Agency participates in some way in assistance to nations in their peaceful nuclear programmes, the Agency system of international safeguards applies. However, this is not necessarily the case for transfers between States outside the IAEA framework. Our proposal is that international safeguards should apply to such transfers as well." 52

51 Ibid., pp. 140-141.

52 Ibid., p. 253, my emphasis.
Two events added to the complexity surrounding the efforts to create a detente between the superpowers. The fall from power of Khrushchev was accompanied by the announcement of China's first nuclear test on October 16, 1964. On September 29 Secretary Rusk had anticipated this test. On October 17 the statements by President Johnson and Rusk regretted the Chinese entry into the nuclear club. On October 18 Rusk noted the persisting usefulness of a policy of anti-proliferation. To quote him:

"But on the other hand, even though Peiping has exploded such a weapon or device, it still is important that these weapons not be distributed generally around the world. The capacity to make them is now in the hands of at least 15 or 20 countries. The cost of making them is continually coming down as technology advances, and, as has been pointed out many times, the problems of handling nuclear weapons will go up geometrically as more countries get them.

So there would still be some point in trying to work out arrangements for limiting the further proliferation of these weapons."

Rusk also noted that "the nuclear detonation and the removal of Mr. Khrushchev added to the prestige of Peiping to a degree and that Peiping will make the most of this." On October 18 in a radio-television address President Johnson noted that the Chinese test and the fall of Khrushchev did


54 Documents, 1964, p. 461, 463, respectively, my emphasis.
"not change our basic policy. They just reinforce it," and "nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that, if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it."  

India's responses after 1963

Generally speaking, this was the international setting in which India's diplomatic strategy evolved after it had signed the partial test ban treaty. Essentially, India reacted to three themes in the diplomacies of the superpowers. First, India rejected the U.S. aim to institute international safeguards on peaceful atomic activities to control states with nuclear programs outside the I.A.E.A. safeguards system. As noted in the preceding chapter, India's traditional policy rejected the idea of international control over atomic energy.

Secondly, however, the goal of nuclear disarmament -- which the two superpowers articulated -- appealed to India because, if it could be implemented, it would have favoured countries which were militarily and economically weak. During 1963-64 therefore, India supported several General Assembly resolutions on this topic. For example, it supported the resolution 1908 (XVIII), November 27, 1963 which sought general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It supported resolution 1909 (XVIII) of the same

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Ibid., p. 468.
date and this sought to prohibit the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. On the same date it supported resolution 1910 (XVIII) which called for an urgent need to suspend nuclear tests. It favoured resolution 1911 (XVII) of the same date on the Denuclearisation of Latin America. Finally, it favoured resolution 1931 (XVIII) of December 11, 1963 which dealt with the conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament. This theme conformed to India's traditional disarmament diplomacy. It reflected a fundamentalist Indian position which sought to transform the world order through total disarmament. Even though this theme was the sole focus of Indian disarmament diplomacy during the 1950s, it found expression in Indian statements during the 1960s. Thus, on March 24, 1964, Ambassador V.C. Trivedi noted in the E.N.D.C. as follows: "disarmament is not an end in itself but a means to an end," and "the objective of a peaceful, progressive and just world is impossible of realisation unless the world is first disarmed." On this theme there was no controversy between India and the superpowers.

It was the third aspect of India's diplomacy which became the object of controversy between India and the superpowers. The superpowers tried to utilise arms control to create and to stabilise the detente; Indian

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56 Ibid., p. 107.
diplomacy had no such commitment. This aspect laid the
foundation for the third school of thought in Indian arms
control policy -- the first school being the one seeking
peace through nuclear disarmament, and the second school
being the one seeking peace through military power. (This
refers to our previous discussion about the three schools of
thought in India). The third school did not create a radical
shift. It borrowed from both the first and the second schools
and yet substantially was different from each. Thus, it
borrowed from the first school by insisting on the need for
nuclear disarmament as the basis of international security,
i.e., the security or stability of the international system.

In as much as the first school talked only about the need
for nuclear disarmament without speculating about other
possibilities if nuclear disarmament did not occur, the third
school of thought cast a doubt on India's long term adherence
to the first school.

The first school expressed essentially a strategy of
'talk' rather than 'negotiations'. It tried to understand
superpower behavior without trying to agree with it or
without trying to accommodate Indian interests to those of
the superpowers. The basic premise in the third school was
that there could be no real negotiations between the non-
nuclear weapons states and the nuclear states, particularly
the two superpowers, because the policy premise of the
superpowers was so diverse from those of the non-nuclear
weapons states. Apparently this premise became central to India's N.P.T. diplomacy around 1965, that is, after the Soviet-American conversations on arms control during 1963-64.

Overall, the third approach to Indian security -- as expressed in the E.U.D.C. after 1964 -- seemed to borrow its strategy from different sources -- internal and external. One internal source was that it referred to the traditional Indian concern for nuclear disarmament. Another internal source was that it referred to the public sentiments within India to secure a military response to China after the 1962 crisis. The third source was external and it reflected a borrowing of Soviet arguments -- of Soviet verbal strategy -- against the Baruch plan. India's fight against international control over atomic energy seemed to be structured on earlier Soviet arguments. Finally, after 1963 India borrowed its arguments from another external, albeit an unlikely, source; it adopted China's arguments of 1963 against partial nuclear disarmament.

In other words, during 1963-64, a contrast between the first and the third schools of thought to security and disarmament seemed to become publically visible in Indian strategies. During 1963, the U.N. resolutions which India supported expressed the approach of the first school of

57 Confidential interviews, New Delhi, July-August, 1973.
thought. Ambassador Trivedi's March 24, 1964 statement also expressed the view of this school. By August 27, 1964, in the E. I. D. C., the complexities and the changes in India's disarmament diplomacy started to take shape. According to Ambassador Nehru, India had "no intention of producing or acquiring nuclear weapons," but "if a convention is to be effective it will require the active support of all States, and more particularly of States which possess such weapons." 58 The Indian delegate favoured a non-dissemination agreement and this approach supported ACDA Director Foster's view that there was an over-lapping interest between the nuclear powers and the non-nuclear powers on the question of non-dissemination. 59 Yet, in the August 27 statement by India it also became clear that the over-lapping interests dealt with the need for horizontal and vertical non-proliferation, that is, non-proliferation which was universal and comprehensive, which was signed by all states including China. Moreover, from the Indian viewpoint, there was no over-lapping between Foster's call for a system which instituted international controls over all peaceful nuclear activities and India's traditional resistance to that idea. Thus, in the memorandum submitted by Eight nations to the E. I. D. C. on


59 Ibid., p. 251.
September 14, 1964, the Indian delegation stated categorically, as follows:

"We also agree that the use of nuclear energy for production of weapons should be prohibited under international control and supervision. However, we cannot agree to any measures which might have the effect of restricting the peaceful utilisation of nuclear energy, or establishing some form of control which would be detrimental to the interests of the less developed countries, or would discriminate against them. The control should be restricted to plants which produce fissile material so as to prevent any country, whether developed or less developed, from making nuclear weapons in any significant manner. The present system of IAEA Safeguards should not be extended to equipment and devices serving a peaceful purpose as this would widen the gap between the developed and the developing countries.

We would welcome the transfer of fissionable material stocks, in increasing quantities, to peaceful use." 60

Overall, in 1964, India's disarmament diplomacy was to encourage discussions of the proliferation issue (rather than only non-dissemination) in international forums, to criticise the Chinese for their nuclear testing in violation of world opinion, to remind the Chinese about the principles of peaceful coexistence, to encourage the Chinese to sign the partial test ban treaty and to score

60  
Ibid., p. 410.

61  
Letter of the Indian Representative to the U.N. Secretary General proposing Agenda item on non-proliferation, Ibid., pp. 442-43.
propaganda points vis-a-vis China. The tone and style of India's disarmament diplomacy after China's first nuclear test continued to reflect earlier world order concerns. Secondly, it reiterated the policy concern to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy for the developing countries. In short, during 1964, despite the serious concern about China's nuclear intentions in the public media within and outside India, the official response was to move the U.N. to focus on all aspects of the problem of nuclear proliferation.

It is because of such concerns that one must examine the approach of India's disarmament strategy in Geneva during and after 1964. Here the debate was not between politicians and scholars in the highly volatile political setting of New Delhi. Rather the debate was between India and the superpowers and between India and the shadow of China. China was unrepresented in the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Conference, but it was alert in noticing the signals emerging from Geneva.

India's post-1964 nuclear responses to the challenges of the superpowers and China fall into two categories. During 1964-65 one sees a continued hangover of the traditional disarmament jargon about 'world peace through disarmament.'

although at this time India's policy had started to shift. After 1965 one sees the emergence of a low key profile of India's emerging security strategy. The speeches of three Indian Ambassadors deserve notice since these symbolise the sense of change and transition between the 'old' and the 'new' components of India's atomic strategy. Ambassador Nehru voiced the old Indian concerns about the need for disarmament; Ambassador Chakravarty reflected the transitional phase which finally culminated in the bold and imaginative interventions of Ambassador Trivedi after 1965.

Shaping a Strategy: 1965-67

Indian speeches in the disarmament debate during 1965 revealed a reorientation in India's foreign policy and strategy. The arrival of Ambassador V.C. Trivedi, an expert in disarmament and atomic energy questions, as India's representative to the E.N.D.C., provided a fresh spark to Indian intervention and it also signalled a change in India's security strategy. While several of the old world concerns were reiterated by Mr. Trivedi, the selective focus of his arguments, the timing and the context in which the arguments were made, suggested to the Western and Soviet delegations that this was no mere repetition of an old story.

63 Confidential Interviews, New Delhi, July-August, 1973.
A contrast between Mr. Trivedi's strategy in the E.N.D.C. and that of Mr. Chakraverty is useful for showing the evolution of India's disarmament strategy. Mr. Trivedi was in the headquarters of the Ministry of External Affairs when Mr. Chakraverty's statement was made. Without being totally definite, one can speculate that Mr. Trivedi had an important input in preparing the Indian position. In Mr. Chakraverty's statement of May 4, 1965 the conditions of a viable non-proliferation agreement were stipulated as follows:

1. An undertaking by the nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons technology to others.

2. An undertaking through the U.N. to safeguard the security of countries which may be threatened by powers having nuclear weapons capability or about to have such capability.

3. An undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against countries which do not possess them.

4. Tangible progress toward disarmament, including a comprehensive test ban treaty, a complete freeze on the production of nuclear weapons and means of delivery as well as a substantial reduction in the existing stocks.

5. Finally, an undertaking by non-nuclear powers not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons.

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64 Documents, 1965, p. 148, my emphasis.
It was emphasised by Mr. Chakraverty that the proposal had to be integrated and that

For example, it is no use telling countries, some of which may be even more advanced in nuclear technology than China, that they should enter into a treaty which would stipulate only that they must not acquire or produce these weapons.65

Finally, there was a signal that India would be willing to accept credible superpowers' guarantees. To quote him:

"Again it is no use telling them that their security will be safeguarded by one or other of the existing nuclear powers. Such an assurance has to be really dependable."66

In unfolding India's position Mr. Trivedi was not averse to criticising the Chinese for defying world opinion but the substance of his strategy was to firm up India's nuclear option, to create an internationally viable political foundation for India's nuclear strategy, and to create a framework for India's nuclear policy and foreign policy, bearing in mind the lack of coordination which had marked India's foreign policy and security policies and strategies during the 1950s.

65 Ibid., my emphasis.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., p. 169.
68 Confidential Interviews, New Delhi, July-August, 1973.
His hard hitting statement of August 12, 1965 laid the foundation for his subsequent interventions and revealed the reorientation of India's security attitudes. First, it was emphasised that one needed to make a "clear and unambiguous distinction between the national decisions of countries on the one hand and the obligations to be assumed by them as signatories to an international instrument on the other." Secondly, it was emphasised that the crux of the proliferation problem concerned the attitudes and behavior of the existing nuclear powers, not those of future or the potential proliferators. Thirdly, it was noted that "the question of an undertaking through the United Nations to safeguard the security of non-nuclear nations" was inadequate and "not a correct or complete reading of our proposal."

The question of security guarantees was described as "peripheral" and not central to the issue of nuclear disarmament, that is, even if the problem of credibility in a guarantee could be solved. A suggestion was made that a credible plan for non-proliferation should first include a plan to create obligations toward nuclear disarmament by the existing nuclear powers and secondly, a plan calling for obligations by the non-nuclear powers against acquiring or manufacturing nuclear

69 Ibid., p. 334.

70 Ibid., p. 335, my emphasis.

71 Ibid., p. 336, my emphasis.
The analogy of international development was thought to be relevant inasmuch as the aim of the developing countries was to use atomic energy to become 'haves' in the development of fields whereas the aim of nuclear disarmament was to make the atomic weapons states into atomic have-nots so that the problem of international stability could be managed. Finally, the point was made that:

"Institutions of international controls on peaceful reactors and power stations is like an attempt to maintain law and order in a society by placing all its law-abiding citizens in custody while leaving its law-breaking elements free to roam the streets."

The second major Indian contribution to the non-proliferation debate came in Ambassador Trivedi's statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly on October 26, 1965. This statement advertised India's modest but sophisticated atomic energy program with the implications that India compared favourably with China although the national decision by India was different from that of China's. Secondly, this statement represented a frontal challenge to the Western approach to the nuclear treaty. Three approaches to the issue were outlined, the first, called

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72 Ibid., p. 338.
73 Ibid., pages 338 and 340.
74 Ibid., p. 339.
75 Ibid., p. 402.
the 'nonaligned, non-nuclear approach', was the approach of the nonaligned states and called for eventual elimination of nuclear arms from world politics and for nuclear abstention by the non-nuclear states. The second approach called for a moratorium on future proliferation for a short period of time during which the existing nuclear powers would cease further production and start a program of reduction of existing stockpiles. The third approach was the one which the superpowers adhered to, and this dealt with the premise of preserving security through military alliance and seeking to erect barriers to future proliferation. Ambassador Trivedi questioned the validity of this approach and wondered about the validity of "the concept of nuclear monopoly and of a privileged and exclusive club of nuclear weapon powers." He emphasised that he was not questioning the motives of the superpowers but was rather concerned with the effects of the third approach. The point was made that an international treaty to be valid required the support of the entire international community. Finally, the point was made that:

"future proliferation is a consequence of existing proliferation and that one cannot deal effectively with the consequence without dealing with the cause." 78

76 Ibid., pp. 492-96.
77 Ibid., p. 498.
78 Ibid., p. 493.
The groundwork for India's nuclear stance was laid during 1965 and during 1966-67 a sharper focus was given to some of the salient aspects. The statement of February 15, 1965 made several key points: (1) No prestige ought to accrue to states which possessed nuclear weapons. (2) India's approach to the issue of security of non-nuclear states was clearly defined to mean that "security is not synonymous with protection, no matter how powerful the protector or how sincere." (3) There was a reiteration of the view that the danger of future (horizontal) proliferation was a "consequence" of the existing proliferation (vertical) which was the "cause". Finally, the political context and the political effect of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty were spelled out. To quote him:

"The problem of negotiating a treaty on non-proliferation has implications far beyond the realm of proliferation of nuclear weapons or even of general and complete disarmament. The attitudes that we take and the approaches we adopt on this will reflect our attitudes and approaches on international relations in general. It is therefore imperative that we take a global approach on this issue, take into account the needs and requirements of all members of the international community and follow an approach which reflects our firm adherence to the

79 Documents, 1966, p. 17.

80 Ibid., my emphasis.

81 Ibid., p. 18.
sovereign equality of all nations and to the principles of equality and mutual benefit. Otherwise we shall be repeating the failures of the League of Nations.82

From the more philosophic concerns of this statement, the May 10 statement focussed directly on the specific aspects of the drafts of the proposed nuclear treaty. Here one could see how the world order concerns were translated into specifics in India's negotiating strategy. The point was made that to stop proliferation one needed to erect barriers against the transfer of nuclear technology not only by a nuclear power to a non-nuclear power but also by one nuclear power to another nuclear power. Specifically, a reference was made to the fact that this concerned China, "an incipient nuclear weapon Power, a Power which does not as yet have either a stockpile of nuclear weapons or a developed system of delivery." The obvious Indian focus was against the prohibition of vertical proliferation by those nuclear powers which were self-sufficient in their technological advancement. In addition, one can speculate that the Indian concern also focussed on the possibility of future transfers of nuclear technology or missile technology to China by states (e.g., the U.S.) interested

82 Ibid., p. 22, my emphasis.
83 Ibid., p. 283.
in managing the global balance of power and the Sino-Soviet military balance.

In a manner reminiscent of Soviet disarmament diplomacy vis-a-vis the United States in the 1940s and the 1950s, the Indian delegation, starting with the principle of simultaneous disarmament and control and of comprehensive and universal disarmament which was not discriminatory, proposed three features in the proposed Nuclear treaty; that is, the first article of the treaty should cover the problem of dissemination; and the third article should provide an obligation for reduction of existing stockpiles. This was seen as a substantive rather than preambular concern.

Ambassador Trivedi's statement of October 31 did not add much to his formidable array of arguments made elsewhere and the points were repeated that India was against vertical and horizontal proliferation and it was against dissemination and that India favoured proliferation of peaceful nuclear technology.

The statement of November 7, 1966 however deserves mention. On the crucial issue of security it offered several insights about India's approach to political-military problems in world politics. It was suggested

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84 Ibid., p. 284.
85 Ibid., p. 678-683.
that nuclear weapons did not provide security or "stable security" that security was not a question of seeking protection from nuclear weapons powers; that security questions could not be discussed in large and open forums such as the Geneva Non-Nuclear Weapons Countries conference; that national security ought to be examined in the context of international security; and finally, that the issue of peaceful uses of nuclear energy was separate from the issue of proliferation. The message was clear that if the security question was discussed it ought to be done through bilateral and secret channels and not by open diplomacy.

Secondly, the message was also clear that India would not tolerate any constraint on its peaceful atomic energy program, as a matter of principle, and as a safeguard of India's nuclear option.

During 1967 the position laid out by Ambassador Trivedi evolved further. The arguments he had voiced as a civil servant, with a relatively free hand in shaping the view of the Indian disarmament delegation, were supported at the political level in statements by the Indian political leadership. Thus, Foreign Minister Chagla's statement of March 27, 1967 summarised the central concerns which Trivedi had already stated in Geneva and added one further point: that is, he noted India's "special problem of security

86 Ibid., pp. 702-703.
against nuclear attack and blackmail" and he emphasised that this had to be "taken into full account before our final attitude to a non-proliferation treaty is determined." At this stage therefore, it was clear that even though the weight of the political stance favoured the line which Ambassador Trivedi had outlined, this was by no means the final position of the Indian Government. Under these circumstances one can well understand why some of Ambassador Trivedi's statements were hedged to provide for the growth of India's policy in the direction of a weapons program or a continuation of the policy of proliferation of peaceful nuclear technology.

Foreign Minister Chagla's statement of April 27, 1967, in contrast with his previous statement, was more refined and comprehensive. It noted India's peculiar circumstances and linked India's signature on N.P.T. to the availability of a security guarantee, but it noted that other aspects of the problem were involved. The security issue was said to be apart from the question whether the N.P.T. provisions were consistent with General Assembly resolution 2028 of 1965. Finally, it was explicitly stated that India's signature on the N.P.T. was not linked to that of China's, for two reasons. First, China's signature was

87 Documents, 1967, pp. 177-78.
a "utopian dream" and secondly even if China signed it would 88
do so as a nuclear power in terms of the treaty. The point
was clear that signature of the N.P.T. by a nuclear weapons
state was not meaningful since the N.P.T. did not impose any
restraint on that power and it was permitted to proliferate.

With a stronger political mandate, Ambassador Trivedi
was able to focus on the contradictory and discriminatory
features of the superpowers' non-proliferation treaty drafts.
In his statement of May 23, 1967 he stressed the danger of
atomic apartheid. He recognised that there were several
common features between peaceful and military explosive
deVICES but felt that this was not the central issue:
technology itself was not evil but the use which was made
of it. Then he went on to make two telling points. Firstly,

"No real or effective effort is being made to deny
prestige to possession of nuclear weapons. On the
contrary, reports indicate that the nuclear-weapon
Powers are being given an overwhelmingly privileged
position in the propositions which are being
elaborated these days. As time goes on, the nuclear-
weapon Powers are apparently contemplating ever-
increasing provisions of discrimination. . . . . The
nuclear weapon powers want comprehensive controls
over the peaceful activities of civil nuclear Powers.
They even want to prohibit the civil nuclear Powers from
undertaking peaceful explosions purely for their
economic development even if such peaceful pursuits
take place under international supervision.

All these projects will, however, have just the
opposite effect. A discriminatory treaty which gives

Ibid., pp. 204–206.
a privileged licence to the existing nuclear-weapons Powers to proliferate at will and which heaps ever-increasing prohibitions on non-nuclear Powers will in itself be the strongest incentive to new country to embark on a nuclear weapons programme."

Secondly, the contradiction in the superpower's case about increasing their security through non-proliferation was noted. To quote again:

"these powerful nuclear-weapon nations say that the non-nuclear nations would safeguard their security by forsaking nuclear weapons forever in the midst of mushrooming proliferation by the nuclear weapon Powers themselves.

This is, however, not the precept which they have themselves followed, and in fact they rejected it for themselves when it was time for them to decide."89

Finally, in his statement of September 28, 1967 Ambassador Trivedi linked India's position to the history of the disarmament negotiations. He reminded the superpowers that the Baruch Plan had failed because it sought to restrict research and development in national atomic energy programmes and secondly, that the 1961 Joint Principles enunciated by the two superpowers had emphasised the importance of the principles of balance and security for all.

Such a perspective had been utilised by the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the U.S.A. in the Baruch Plan debates. Ambassador Trivedi's detailed knowledge of the history and nuances of the disarmament negotiations was therefore

89 Both quotes are in Ibid., pp. 236-37, my emphasis.
embarrassing for the superpowers. Furthermore, the proposed amendments by Trivedi were simple but startling for the superpowers because these would have undermined the basis of their anti-proliferation strategy. In his detailed critique of the proposed treaty he urged the superpowers to separate the dissemination and the anti-proliferation objectives and to control both kinds of activities by all states. Secondly, the point was repeated that India favoured regulation of proliferation or military technology for all states. The idea of controlling peaceful explosive activities was rejected and the Indian delegation proposed deletion of all references to the terms "or nuclear devices" in Article I of the draft treaty. Finally, it was urged that Article III be amended to exclude the terms "non-nuclear weapon States" so that the treaty could be non-discriminatory and universal in its scope.

Following the departure of Mr. Trivedi from Geneva in 1967, India's disarmament and atomic energy diplomacy slipped into a low gear. Nevertheless, as a result of his


91 For the relevant statements see Ambassador Hussain's statement to the E.N.D.C. on February 27, 1968 and his statement to the First Committee at the U.N. General Assembly on May 14, 1968; Ambassador Parthasarathi's statement to the security Council on June 14, 1968 on the question of security assurances is useful; Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's statement
interventions, two points had emerged clearly in the articulation of India's political and security position. First, the question of security guarantee from the superpower(s) to India was quite apart from the question of N.P.T. since the credibility of the security assurances depended on the specific international context in which a security guarantee was applied to a military crisis. In view of the poor historical record of security guarantees, little credence could be given to formal resolution in the United Nations, particularly when the veto was available to the major powers, including those against which India needed security assurances. Thus, whether or not India signed the N.P.T. it became clear after 1966 (after Johnson and Kosygin had offered their views on this question) that the idea of obtaining a security guarantee from the superpowers or a single superpower was untenable and unrealistic to start with, and the N.P.T. could hardly have provided security of an irrevocable nature. The availability of credible and lasting guarantee, and the need for such a guarantee were two related aspects of the same question but these however, had little to do with

91 (contd.) of October 14, 1968 discussed some of the general issues concerning the balance of power and the arms race; the concern about the balance of power and 'spheres of influence' aspects of international politics were outlined in Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh's statement at the General Assembly on October 2, 1969 and in his statement to the Indian Parliament on April 8, 1970.
the question of signing the N.P.T.

The second point which became clear was that the utilisation of the peaceful uses of atomic energy was also seen by India to be separate from the question of signing the N.P.T. As noted earlier, a traditional element in India's disarmament diplomacy was to regard maximisation of the peaceful uses of atomic energy as a key aspect of India's modernisation. However, in the context of the N.P.T., India's claim about the need to maximise the proliferation of the peaceful atom took on a strategic dimension for two reasons.

First, as Mr. Trivedi had pointedly noted, superpowers efforts to control the peaceful atom appeared to be a part of a superpower philosophy to neglect third party interests. According to him, if horizontal proliferation occurred beyond the existing number of nuclear proliferators, this phenomena would be a consequence of vertical proliferation -- a link between the 'cause' and 'consequence'. This implied that not only was India's behavior with regard to the peaceful atom related to its modernisation needs but it was also related to Indian perceptions of the political implications of superpower behavior in arms control arrangements. Since India had signed the partial test ban treaty this argument was new in India's diplomatic behavior.

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Confidential Interviews, Washington D.C., 1967-1968. This point is discussed in a later section.
and naturally raised questions about India's nuclear intentions.

Secondly, one can infer from Mr. Trivedi's arguments that whether or not India decided to manufacture nuclear weapons, the choice would be a national one and not something which could be legislated by an international agreement. The amendments he proposed to Article I and III of the superpowers draft sought to remove international control on 'peaceful' nuclear explosive devices of the non-nuclear weapons Powers such as India. These proposed amendments, given superpower policies to the contrary, suggested that India's explicit preference for proliferation of peaceful nuclear technology created a gray zone of horizontal proliferation in terms of superpower values i.e., in terms of Article I of the N.P.T., even if the potential horizontal proliferator (India) did not claim a desire to manufacture or test nuclear weapons. The innovation in India's disarmament diplomacy during Mr. Trivedi's tenure in Geneva was therefore in the creation of this gray zone of nuclear proliferation in terms of the superpower's values. It meant that the letter and spirit of N.P.T. would be violated not only if India actually manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapons device but even if it exploded a peaceful underground nuclear device.

This innovation however, could not hide a paradox, or possibly a contradiction, in India's nuclear positions.
It was in terms of this fundamental discrepancy that Indians debated the issue of nuclear weapons during 1966-70. The contradiction centered on two fundamental propositions which Indian officials and political leaders articulated in the period under review. On the one hand there was the statement that India believed in principle in national peaceful atomic technology proliferation including that of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes. But on the other hand Indian government representatives took the categorical view that India continued to decide against the bomb and would not go in for ‘destructive purposes’ in the foreseeable future. Admittedly such views could change since the constraints were political and moral, not legal. These positions had the effect, in theory and practice, of bringing India to the threshold of a weapons program, leaving India pitched delicately on the brink -- diplomatically and in terms of weapons technology. Furthermore, an Indian official could always argue that the 'contradiction' was really an evolution, or that the contradiction was necessary to the growth of India's nuclear policy and foreign policies.

The Nature of Bureaucratic Politics: 1964-68

During this period the Indian arguments in the E.N.D.C. fell into two broad categories: first, that international controls on Indian nuclear activities were not acceptable; second, that India's signature on the N.P.T. depended on the
achievement of genuine, non-discriminatory disarmament, viz., disarmament which promoted international security and Indian security. In terms of the Indian arguments in Geneva, the nature of the bureaucratic process within the Indian government appeared to deal essentially with three issues: Whether or not India should sign the N.P.T.? Whether or not India should accept weak Soviet-American security assurances through the U.N. Security Council? And finally, whether or not India should establish a crash plutonium bomb program? The first aspect surfaced during November 1967-February 1968, that is, after the negotiating process was completed in the E.N.D.C. and agreement was reached between the superpowers about Article III. The issue of security guarantees was

93 For the legislative history of Article III see Arnold Kramish, "The Watched and the Unwatched," op.cit., Also see International Negotiations. On August 24, 1967 the superpowers agreed on a draft treaty except for Article III. On December 7, 1967 the E.N.D.C. reported substantial progress to the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission. Mr. Foster noted (ibid., p. 92), that the "public record did not give a full picture of the progress that had been made." The U.S. appeared to believe that a treaty would emerge and prove "widely acceptable to other countries." In confidential interviews conducted in early November, 1967, in Washington D.C., this author gained the distinct impression that some senior U.S. officials felt that India would sign the N.P.T. because of its dependence on U.S. foreign aid. Thus, it appears that by late November at the latest knowledgable Indians had concluded that fundamental changes in the Soviet-American drafts of the proposed nuclear treaty were not feasible. As such, at this time, the issue came to a crunch, i.e., to sign or not to sign the treaty. Agreement on Article III was reached on January 18, 1968.
formally present throughout 1965-68 and it appeared in Indian arguments in Geneva as well as outside the E.N.D.C. format. The evolution of this idea in the E.N.D.C. has been noted and it only remains for us to provide an overview of its evolution outside the E.N.D.C. format.

Our assessment of the third aspect is admittedly speculative since Indian archive material is not in the public domain. An assessment of the nature of Indian bureaucratic politics on this question is however useful. It shows a major shift in India's nuclear policy in the context of an earlier shift on India's military policy after 1962. Ambassador Trivedi had noted in the E.N.D.C. that there were three approaches to international security. The first one sought security through non-alignment and non-weapon stance; the second sought security through a moratorium on further spread of nuclear weapons, i.e., on preventing horizontal rather than vertical proliferation. The third approach sought security through military alliances.

To assess the significance of Trivedi's description of these three approaches one should note the difference between India's N.P.T. stance and the three approaches. Two factors

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94 These approaches are identified in Trivedi's speech of October 26, 1965, Documents, 1965, pp. 492-495.
merit attention. First, as this author noted elsewhere, "the process of a high level international debate on international nuclear policy has resulted in the development of an Indian nuclear option which publicly, prior to 1965, did not even exist." To create such an option, and to give it visibility, was one main aim of Trivedi's N.P.T. diplomacy. To note its visibility, one needs to assess its impact on the international community as well as the Indian bureaucratic community -- where the decision-making power lies, and the Indian public -- where decisions may be legitimised through the electoral process.

A strategy which gave visibility to the option, that is, its potential military connotation, and a strategy which rejected a plan to establish a crash bomb program, was seemingly contradictory and yet novel. It was contradictory because one could either be against nuclear weapons or for them. It was novel because the contradiction was necessary, because India, according to the official declaration during 1964-68 and even thereafter was against the bomb or nuclear weapons 'at present'. Furthermore, it was novel inasmuch as Trivedi's speeches conveyed the impression that post-1968 India did not really seem to fit completely into either of

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96 Confidential interviews, New Delhi, July-August 1973.
the three approaches to security. The existence of an Indian nuclear option, with a potential military application, meant that India no longer fitted into the 'pure' non-nuclear approach, viz., in the absence of a categorical and legal renunciation of nuclear weapons forever. In fact Indian statements at the highest level moved away from the possibility of a categorical renunciation of nuclear weapons for India. In 1961 Nehru had stated categorically publically that India would not produce nuclear weapons "whatever may happen." But on May 10, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told the Indian Parliament: "India is making every effort to develop nuclear know-how and capacity. The belief that China can attack any country with nuclear bombs is misconceived." Similarly she told the Parliament on April 24, 1968 that there was no substitute for military preparedness, even though at that time she rejected the suggestion for a change in India's peaceful nuclear policy.

Neither did Trivedi's speeches suggest that India's behavior during 1964–68 and after 1968 fitted the second approach. This approach sought international security by preventing the future spread of nuclear weapons. This approach assumed that horizontal nuclear proliferation was imminent and it assumed that there would be nuclear dominoes. Both premises were questionable. Knowledgable Indians argued

that the danger was exaggerated by the superpowers, and if it was true, there was little the nuclear superpowers could do about it. Instances of French and Chinese deviance from superpower-led non-proliferation policies prior to the formalisation of this theme in 1961 in the Irish Resolution had revealed the impotence of superpowers in this regard. Moreover, before the Irish Resolution, India had managed to stay outside the I.A.E.A. safeguards system, viz:., which required international inspection of all peaceful nuclear activities of the non-nuclear weapon States. As such the superpower anti-proliferation strategy was really like closing the door after the horse had bolted.

The third approach sought security through alliance politics and through the stability of the superpower deterrents. It required vertical proliferation, given the superpower premise that to negotiate with each other, and to protect their allies and clients, they needed strategic power. By contrast, the Indian foreign policy premise from the 1950s on, was that absolute levels of strategic power did not matter and that alliances did not necessarily promote the security of the weaker alliance members. Accordingly this approach was also rejected in India’s N.P.T. strategy.

The novelty of the Indian behavior on the N.P.T. during 1964–68 therefore rested in the context of an on-going reappraisal of the military factor in Indian foreign policy.
It rested on firstly, the nature of the strategic threats in the Indian security environment and secondly, on the sufficiency of the Indian diplomatic and military means to fight or deflect the threats. In this sense, to make the Indian nuclear weapons option visible was not necessarily to take a step towards an Indian weapons program. It was an insurance -- by keeping abreast of modern nuclear technology -- in that direction should China become a nuclear threat to India. But clearly the option meant that the non-nuclear approach of the 1950s was irrevocably modified. And this message was grasped by audiences within and outside India. In other words, the nuclear option approach to Indian security complemented India's strategy to seek security through a modern military machine to defend and to deter conventional military threats from Pakistan and China. It did not of course, imply a renunciation of the non-alignment or the non-alliance approach to Indian security. On the contrary the non-alliance approach was reinforced since India did not seek a formal bilateral or multilateral alignment with the superpowers. But it was a different kind of non-alignment. Unlike non-alignment of the 1950s, the non-alignment of the 1960s referred to its military basis.

Seeking security guarantees from foreign powers or developing an Indian Bomb on a crash basis were the two most controversial issues in the Indian nuclear debate -- within the Indian foreign policy and the defence bureaucracies, and in the
public debate, during 1964-68. The public debate is discussed in the next chapter and here one needs to refer only to the bureaucratic debate on these two questions. It is obvious that both questions dealt with the China problem. Ideally, given the military aspect of the China issue in the light of what happened in 1962, the Indian military should have been involved intensively with the two foregoing questions. But, unlike American and Soviet military elites, the role of the Indian military was different. George Quester, a perceptive observer of the Indian nuclear and political scene pointed out: "Happily for the tradition of democratic civilian rule in India, these opinions [military ones] are far from decisive, and are not very openly expressed." He notes however, as follows:

"Yet, there is little evidence of any enthusiasm for nuclear weapons in the Indian Army, or even in the Indian Air Force, on the simple fear that a nuclear weapons program would mushroom into something very costly, drawing funds from conventional weapons which for the moment seem more urgent." 98

This observation directs attention to the priority which the Indian defence people assigned during 1964-68 and subsequently, to conventional defence means against Pakistan and China. It also points to a deliberateness in Indian assessments of the threat-potential. Otherwise, considering

that the Indian Army would clearly benefit from a decision to adopt tactical weapons, and the Indian Air Force would clearly benefit from a strategic weapons program, the lack of enthusiasm for nuclear weapons by the Indian Army and Air Force is hard to explain. Our analysis therefore, invites attention to the nature of the threat perception by the Indian foreign policy and defence elites with regard to China.

Actors and Influences in the Conventional Debate (1964-68)

On the N.P.T. questions -- to sign or to reject the treaty, to security guarantees or to build Indian Bomb, there were three types of actors. Ambassador Trivedi and the Indian delegation to the E.N.D.C. constituted the first type. Those in the Ministry of External Affairs and in the Indian government who wanted India to sign the N.P.T. and to accept the 'weak' security assurances offered by President Johnson, Premier Kosygin and eventually by the two

99 The opinion of the Indian Navy is interesting. Thus Admiral A.K. Chatterji on January 9, 1972 noted as follows: "Thus, there is likely to be the start of a rapid growth of nuclear power towards the end of the decade. We may also willy nilly become one of them. In the course of time, the navy will thus acquire an additional strategic role of ability to deliver the nuclear bomb." Cited in J.V. Schall, "India Joins the Human Race," Worldview, New York, August 1972, p. 34.

100 October 18, 1964.

101 February 1, 1966 the U.S.S.R. offered to prohibit "the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons in their territory." International Negotiations, p. 32.
in the United Nations represented the second type.

Finally, the political leaders -- Prime Minister Shastri and his successor, Indira Gandhi represented the third type. The justification for distinguishing between the first and the second types is a straightforward one, viz., they represented differences of opinion on the substantive issues. These differences related to assessments about the problem of China, prescriptions about the responses needed and the effects of India's N.P.T. stand on India's relationship with the superpowers. The justification for differentiating between the third type and the other two types is of a different kind. The difference between the first two types is over policy. The difference between the third type and the other two concerns 'politics' of policy-making. These will become clear in the following discussion.

In tracing the lines of 'decision-making' and the

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The Tripartite Draft Security Council Resolution on Security Assurances, (submitted to the E.N.D.C. on March 7, 1968 and approved by the Security Council on June 19, 1968 with vote of 10 for, none against, and five abstentions, including India) offered assistance to non-nuclear weapons states who signed the N.P.T. Such assistance was to be "in accordance with the Charter." Here the emphasis was also on the "obligations" of the "permanent members" of the Security Council.

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The reader is reminded here that this study casts doubt on the utility of identifying a decision, or the decision since there may be several decisions -- as distinct from overt strategies. The latter is easy to
sources of influence with respect to the foregoing issues during 1964-68 the following section concentrates on three aspects in the Indian domestic setting. First, there is the problem of weakness of the Indian Prime Ministers during 1964-68. There is a corollary problem of identifying the role of political personalities and political parties. This problem is one of identifying the 'politics' of policy-making—where politicians and political parties, for reasons unconnected with the merits of a particular issue, tend to show difference(s) between their policies and those of their opponents. Finally, there is the problem of separating the professional arguments within the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and between different bureaucracies during this period. It is not argued that the professional arguments are not-political in nature or in effect, only that the professionals claim that by definition their views are meant to serve the 'national interest'—whatever that may mean.

In view of the lack of Indian archive material and in view of lack of conceptual tools to analyse the relationship

103 (contd.)
specify but the former is much harder, unless archive materials are released. The reader should note that the Indian Official Secrets Act is most restrictive and the Indian government has no arrangements or policy governing the release of classified materials even after 25-30 years. This system, has its virtue inasmuch as the Indian Foreign Office, unlike its French, Canadian and the British counterparts, does not appear to have had a security scandal since 1947. And if there has been a scandal of this nature it has been a closely guarded secret.
between individual civil servants and individual politicians, this section does not probe such relations. Similarly, the relationship between the Indian defence services and the Indian External Affairs Ministry, on questions related to the N.P.T., are not discussed in this section. There are two reasons for this. In strategic questions, except those dealing with territorial defence, the Defence Ministry cannot initiate the process of consultation with the External Affairs Ministry or the Prime Minister’s Secretariat (which came into being in July 1964). The Defence Ministry however, can be consulted by the political agencies, but even then its opinions relate to the 'military' implications of a particular issue. In other words, there is no real two way dialogue between the military and political staffs in India in matters involving long term strategic planning. The 'rules of the game' underlying the principle of civilian control of the military are such in India that the services lack the authority or the political clout to initiate analyses or to make representations, except when their views are requested or if the views relate to specific budgetary requests. In questions relating to atomic energy and the N.P.T. the consultative process touched defence services only marginally. The budgetary process revolved around the Indian Atomic Energy Commission. Since Nehru’s times, this Commission

104 Confidential Interviews, New Delhi, June 1971.
has been under the political direction of the Prime Minister and its headquarters are in the same building as the Ministry of External Affairs. Secondly, even though retired Indian generals, colonels and a Field Marshal have offered their opinions about the Chinese military threat, the issues relating to the N.P.T. have been treated by the Prime Minister and the External Affairs Ministry as matters falling in the political domain (i.e., with reference to the political and legal aspects of the N.P.T.), in the domain of 'science and technology,' and finally, in the domain of India's energy needs. Military comments have naturally focussed on the military uses of nuclear powers whereas in official attitudes towards nuclear energy, from the mid-1940s to the present, the military focus has never been central in Indian thinking.


Brecher presents a controversial view of nuclear decision-making during the Shastri era. According to him, the domestic political setting appeared somewhat as follows. The new Prime Minister had stepped into the shoes of the late Jawaharlal Nehru and was unsure of his political strength.

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105 Ibid.

The problems of food and language "dominated" the Indian government, and the Cabinet and its Emergency Committee emerged as the decision organs in foreign affairs. According to Brecher:

"The most important structural innovation of Nehru's last years, the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet, remains pre-eminent in foreign and security matters, virtually replacing the Defence Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee as the key organ of deliberation and decision in this sphere." 108

The membership of this Committee consisted of the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Home Affairs, Finance, Information and Broadcasting (Indira Gandhi), External Affairs and Defence. Brecher states that Shastri denied the External portfolio to Indira Gandhi, and that Defence Minister Chaván exerted considerable influence in decision-making. More importantly, he noted the growth of the position of the Prime Minister's Secretariat -- an organ which was set up in July 1964 to aid the Prime Minister

107 Ibid., p. 106.
108 Ibid., p. 110.
109 Ibid., p. 112.
110 Ibid., p. 107.
111 Ibid., p. 113.
but which actually reflected the "re-emergence of the Civil Service as a powerful pressure group on policy" in economic and foreign affairs. It is useful to quote Brecher's remarks at length.

"In foreign policy, too, L.K. Jha has made his influence felt -- despite his inexperience in this field, apart from attending economic conferences and negotiating loans. The first notable example concerns Shastri's maiden appearance before an international forum, at the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Cairo in October 1964. The Ministry of External Affairs prepared a draft for his speech; unknown to them, the Prime Minister's Secretary did the same; the latter was accepted. A more conspicuous role was played by Jha during the lengthy negotiations over the Rann of Kutch dispute with Pakistan in the spring and summer of 1965; C.S. Jha, the Foreign Secretary, was also involved; but the more frequent, almost daily, press references to discussions between the Prime Minister's Secretary and the British High Commissioner in Delhi led many to wonder who was the principal Indian official in foreign affairs.

This doubt became more pointed as a result of L.K. Jha's successful penetration of the Foreign Office proper, in the spring of 1965. Largely at his urging, but with the backing of other Secretaries, a high-powered Committee of Secretaries was appointed 'to deal with foreign affairs'; the slight to the professionals of the Ministry of External Affairs was too obvious to be ignored; nor was the Minister, Swaran Singh, spared. And this was accentuated by the composition of the Committee -- two of the six members came from economics Ministries; the other four were the Cabinet and Defence Secretaries, L.K. Jha himself, and C.S. Jha, the Foreign Secretary. The other two Secretaries in the Foreign Office were conspicuously absent, as was the Home Secretary, L.P. Singh, the most sophisticated and urbane civil servant in Delhi. The result was deep resentment among Jha's fellow bureaucrats, a predictable reaction to unabashed raiding of their domains. The taste of power appears to have overcome his initial caution.

112 Ibid., p. 115.
113 Ibid., p. 118.
about offending colleagues. Long before the end of Shastri's first year, then, the Prime Minister's Secretariat had become not just an 'information pipeline' to the Prime Minister or even merely a channel for the reverse flow of decisions; it was also a formidable influence in the making of decisions.114

From this Brecher hypothesised that the "pyramids of decision in foreign and domestic policy have changed" after the Nehru succession. The institutional framework appeared somewhat as follows.

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<th>DECISIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER NEHRU</th>
<th>DECISIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER SHASTRI</th>
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<td>Nehru</td>
<td>Emergency Committee of Cabinet</td>
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<td>Menon</td>
<td>Prime Minister and Prime Minister's Secretary</td>
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<td>Foreign Affairs Committee of Cabinet (until 1962)</td>
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<td>Emergency Committee of Cabinet (after 1962)</td>
<td>Committee of Secretaries</td>
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<td>External Affairs Ministry</td>
<td>External Affairs Ministry</td>
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114 Ibid., p. 120, my emphasis. Brecher's footnotes are deleted in this quote.

115 Ibid., p. 126.
To Brecher the impact of the change in the realm of foreign policy was as follows. To quote:

"The contrast in the realm of foreign policy is the most striking of all. From 1947 until the Sino-Indian border war, Nehru had carte blanche and took full advantage of it, not only in shaping the broad guidelines of policy but also in making day-to-day decisions. Krishna Menon shared this power, by virtue of his unique relationship to Nehru, and translated many of these decisions into action, at the U.N. and elsewhere. From about 1959 onwards the Foreign Affairs Committee acquired some importance, especially on China policy, though it had existed as early as 1950. In effect, however, foreign policy decisions until October 1962 were the monopoly of Nehru, assisted by Menon and the professionals of the Foreign Office. In the last eighteen months, the Emergency Committee became the principal forum for decisions though Nehru’s primacy was never challenged.

This pyramid changed drastically after the succession. As before, Cabinet had no role, but its Emergency Committee became the supreme organ of decision, as revealed in the tense Rann of Kutch dispute in 1965. Yet the Prime Minister himself has also taken the initiative in foreign policy, as with the decision not to produce the Bomb -- which, by his own admission, was never brought to Cabinet. So too with his proposal for a nuclear shield in his discussions with Prime Minister Wilson in October 1964 -- which was unknown to his colleagues or staff. A new variable, as noted earlier, is the Prime Minister’s Secretary. Also new, is a separation of function between Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, but the latter incumbent, Swaran Singh, has displayed neither forcefulness nor power during the first year. Apart from institutions and persons mentioned above, the Prime Minister’s freedom of action is also limited by the new Committee of Secretaries. All this has tended to denigrate the influence of the External Affairs officials, for Nehru regarded himself, and was accepted, as a professional civil servant outside the Ministry have acquired influence -- at their expense. But the lines of decision authority had not fully crystallized in the first year after the succession." 116

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116 Ibid., p. 127, my emphasis. Brecher’s footnotes have been deleted in this quote.
Finally, Brecher noted the shift in the overall orientation of Indian foreign relations. To quote him again:

"De-Nehruization is most evident in the sphere of foreign policy, notably in the withdrawal of India from intense involvement in the outer perimeter -- the global system -- to the inner perimeter -- India's neighbours... the thrust of India's foreign policy changed drastically -- to a preoccupation with its neighbours. This had already begun in the last year of Nehru's life; now it assumed new dimensions. It will become more marked in the future. Non-alignment remains the formal basis of India's policy, but this has been transformed, in practice, into bi-alignment with the super-powers; equidistance from the United States and the Soviet Union has been replaced by equal proximity; such was the impact of the China debacle and India's lesser prestige in the world." 117

Indian nuclear decision-making in the Shastri era: The second cut

Many of the generalisations -- about the domestic sources of Indian foreign policy, and about India's external involvements -- seem excessive in Brecher's aforesaid analysis. This is particularly true with respect to his analysis of India's nuclear policy at that time. There are several inconsistencies in Brecher's focus and this results in several overlapping and blurred images about Indian foreign relations. Shastri is shown to be

117 Ibid., p. 188, my emphasis.
independent and strong, because Brecher claims that he decided "not to produce the Bomb" -- a question which Brecher says was not brought before the Indian Cabinet. Shastri's 'decision' to seek a nuclear shield is similarly assessed, that is, as evidence of strength of the Indian Prime Minister. Yet, at the same time, Brecher maintains that the Prime Minister's Secretariat (L.K. Jha) had "successfully penetrated" the Foreign Office and had acquired a "formidable influence" in decision-making. If that is the case, what was the nature and extent, comparatively speaking, of the influence of the Prime Minister and his Secretary? Must one assume that the two of them were working hand in hand, or can one assume that the two were working independently of each other from time to time, as in the case of Shastri's attempt to discuss the possibility of a nuclear shield?

This sort of confusion is compounded further. Brecher maintains that the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet as well as the Cabinet (where Defence Minister Chavan was

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The fact that the matter was not brought before the Indian Cabinet suggests another explanation, viz., the issue at that time was not important to merit a decision and that the 'decision' not to produce a Bomb in 1965 was simply a re-affirmation of the earlier decision not to produce nuclear weapons 'at present'. Presumably, a 'decision' implies a shift, and there was no shift in 1965.
influential, according to Brecher) had replaced the Defence Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee in decision-making relating to foreign policy and security issues. This of course, begs a question. Brecher himself notes that except in the last year of Nehru's life, Nehru himself was the maker of Indian foreign policy and security policy. In this case it is highly debatable if the Defence Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee ever played a decisive role in decision-making, other than the role of a rubber stamp and as a transmission belt for conveying decisions -- and the reasoning of decisions, to Indian Parliamentarians. In other words, how can the Cabinet or its Emergency Committee "replace" the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees when those Committees did not play much of a role in the first place.

Finally, Brecher suggests that the Civil Service had emerged as a powerful pressure group in economic and foreign affairs. This was true insofar as it referred to the growing influence of L.K. Jha in the Prime Minister's Secretariat. But Brecher also notes that this produced jealousies among the civil servants. This raises a question: whether the influence of the Indian Foreign Office really slipped during the Shastri era as Brecher maintains.

Our analysis of India's nuclear policy during the Shastri era, given the previous history of India's arms control and nuclear policies, differs significantly from Brecher's
analysis. It challenges two streams in Brecher's perceptions. The first set of perceptions deal with the general orientation of Indian foreign relations after Nehru. The second set of perceptions deal with the role of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. Brecher's analysis is not intended to be a convenient whipping boy but it is meant to give us a starting point -- a point of departure -- for our view of Indian decision-making on the N.P.T. The point which we will make is that the position of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs did not decline -- as Brecher thinks it did -- and if anything, during 1964-68 the position of the Ministry was consolidated and strengthened. The role of Ambassador Trivedi in the E.N.D.C. is a case in point.

110 Most of Brecher's interviews (in this particular study) were with politicians, P. M. Secretariat officials, some Indian academics, at least one Indian General, some members of the Indian press and some foreign correspondents. There is little evidence that Brecher was able to meet with senior members of the Ministry of External Affairs, other than to make a few courtesy calls. There is little or no evidence that Brecher was able to discuss India's nuclear policy with officials in the Atomic Energy Department or with Foreign Ministry officials -- in India and abroad -- who had the responsibility for atomic energy. Moreover, in view of the distortions which appeared in Brecher's analysis of his interviews with Krishna Menon, it is an open question if the pro-Moscow diplomats in the Ministry of External Affairs felt the need to discuss matters candidly with Brecher. Brecher's interest in India's attitudes in Middle Eastern politics and particularly towards Israel is well known and such a sentimental slant does not appear to endear him to the Delhi bureaucracy. These observations are based on Confidential interviews, New Delhi, June 1971, and in Ottawa during 1968-69.
As the preceding chapters have shown, Indian interventions in the R.N.D.C. hardly revealed a "withdrawal of India from intense involvement in the outer perimter -- the global system." If anything it demonstrated the exact opposite, viz., intense Indian involvement in the debate on nuclear proliferation which caused India to be noticed in Foreign Offices in major capitals, including those of the superpowers.

In a single paragraph Brecher reveals a lack of clarity of focus. On the one hand he argues that India withdrew from intense involvement in global politics and instead concentrated on sub-continental politics. On the other hand he argues that Indian non-alignment became transformed into a bi-alignment -- with equidistance being replaced by equal proximity to the superpowers. Three problems exist in these views. If India was pursuing a strategy of equal proximity rather than equidistance, given the zero sum nature of superpower activities in the sub-continent, this would necessarily require intense involvement in superpower politics. Secondly, bi-alignment with the superpowers implies that détente is an established element in sub-continental politics. The history of Indo-U.S. and Indo-Soviet relations after 1965 however, does not support this premise. Moreover, Mrs. Indira Gandhi's pointed rejections of the Tashkant method of crisis management in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan crisis
over Bangladesh invalidates Brecher's premise and inference. Thirdly, it is true that after 1964, or really after 1962, India started to give more attention to its immediate neighbours, particularly Nepal and Ceylon -- Burma and Pakistan had always received much attention. However, it does not necessarily follow that giving more attention to its neighbours meant giving less attention to the "outer perimeter."

The problem with Brecher's analysis -- particularly as it relates to India's security policies -- concern his conceptualisation and his assessments. He predicts that the withdrawal from intense involvement in global politics "will become more marked in the future." India's N-P-T diplomacy during 1964-68 suggests otherwise. To correct the errors of assessment one first needs to correct the error in conceptualisation.

The following model of Indian nuclear decision-making takes a step in this direction. It points to the growth of the influence of the Prime Minister's Secretariat (which is Brecher's point) and it also points to the growth of influence of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (which is clearly not Brecher's point). Our model points to an emerging coalition of civil servants of the Ministry of External Affairs, the Indian Atomic Energy Department and the Prime Minister's Secretariat with a Prime Minister (weak or strong
does not matter) who is receptive to expert advice so long as the civil servant does not try to obtain credit for the advice rendered. This models suggests that during 1964-67 the effective initiative was in the hands of the civil servants and particularly Ambassador V.C. Trivedi. It shows some lack of coordination between the Prime Minister and the Indian delegation to the E.N.D.C. on the security guarantee issue. It shows that the formal right to make a 'decision' (to sign or not to sign the nuclear treaty) was in the hands of the Prime Minister and particularly the strong men in the Indian Cabinet, viz., Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai and Defence Minister Chavan.

The model suggests that there were essentially five 'decisions' involved. Whether or not India should sign the N.P.T., whether or not India should accept weak security guarantees from the United States and the Soviet Union? Whether China's missile program represented an "immediate" threat to Indian security? Whether India ought to try to resume its diplomatic dialogue with China -- a dialogue which was temporarily arrested by the events of 1962? And finally, whether India should go ahead with a plutonium bomb program on a crash basis or instead, continue to develop its nuclear technology? On all points the formal decisions -- not to sign the N.P.T., not to accept security guarantees and not to go in for a crash plutonium bomb program -- were inherent in the statements made by Ambassador Trivedi in Geneva.
The central premise in these decisions was that China did not represent an immediate threat to India; this premise was also implicit in Trivedi's statements in Geneva and in other official statements by Indian leaders. The decision that India ought to try to resume its diplomatic dialogue with China was not outlined by Ambassador Trivedi in Geneva. It was outlined by the Indian government, but its stance was a low key one. It was inherent in the frequently repeated statements by the Indian officials that they sought to normalise relations with Peking.

Despite the overt hostility between India and China there were several straws in the wind which provided hints about the Indian assessment of the nature of the threat from China. First, despite the 1962 war and the sense of betrayal in India, the diplomatic relationship between the two countries was never broken off. Even if normalisation was not a promising prospect after 1962 the two sides kept their doors ajar. Secondly, in a widely advertised news conference in London on December 4, 1964 Prime Minister Shastri stated the following:

"BCC External Services: Do you regard the atom bomb as a political weapon, Sir, or as a military weapon?"

Prime Minister: "Well, it is a weapon to destroy mankind; having exploded one atom bomb, China might consider it to be a political weapon." 120

120 Documents, 1964, p. 476, my emphasis.
(2). "The Sun: Mr. Prime Minister, how can a non-nuclear, non-aligned country -- I emphasise non-aligned -- defend itself against any attack by a nuclear country?

Prime Minister: We will devise our own ways and means to help defend us. When I talk of the elimination of nuclear bombs, I need not be afraid of any nuclear attack. This world is big enough, to tackle this problem of the nuclear threat."121

(3). "Karachi Morning News: You have been described in today’s papers as a person having 450 million problems. Why don’t you reduce some of your 450 million problems by coming to some sort of arrangement with the Western powers that if you are really attacked from the North, they will come to your rescue as they did last time; and the resources and energies you save could be diverted to productive channels? In other words, whether you will accept any offer of Western powers to come to your aid, and if so, the wasteful energy in arming India cannot be utilised?"

Prime Minister: Every country has got its own prestige and dignity and honour. A country like India cannot afford to keep its defences weak. It is true that we do not want to race with China in the matter of military preparations, but yet we are trying to strengthen our defence forces and will continue to do so."122

Thirdly, without explicitly referring to India-China relations the Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh told the General Assembly of the U.N. on December 14, 1964 that the "medium of negotiations was the only valid basis for settling differences, however, fundamental and acute these might be."123

121 Ibid., p. 408.
122 Ibid., p. 409.
123 Ibid., p. 528.
Overall then, during the Shastri era, the sources of influence and the flow of influences bearing on India's nuclear policy appeared to be somewhat as follows. Our concern is to specify the analytical characteristics of the model rather than only to identify the individual personalities involved in decision-making. The model is broken into two parts. The first part, which is also the most obvious, the most visible part, concerns the role played by Ambassador Trivedi. This part identifies three types of targets: (1) the superpowers against whom the Indians were arguing in the E.N.D.C. in Geneva; (2) the Chinese, who were not participating in the E.N.D.C. but who represented a potential military threat to Indian security; and finally, (3) the 'soft' Indians who favoured India's adherence to the N.P.T. and who favoured acceptance of weak security guarantees.

The second part of the model specifies the efforts by the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister's Secretariat to explore the possibility of obtaining iron clad security guarantees. In this part of the model two hypotheses may be noted: the first suggests that Ambassador Trivedi and Mr. L.K. Jha were working at cross purposes, given the elaborate effort by the latter to secure viable guarantees and given the former's limited attention to this question in the E.N.D.C. The second hypothesis suggests the exact opposite, viz., that Ambassador Trivedi favoured the insertion of the idea of security assurances by the superpowers in the five points memorandum presented by Ambassador Chakravarty to the U.N.
on May 4, 1965 (as described earlier) but both sought to explore the nature and extent of the commitments of the superpowers against China; the second hypothesis therefore, suggests complementarity rather than competitiveness.

This model has many nuances. Since this is a study about India's arms control and nuclear policies rather than about the different aspects of Indian foreign relations, the framework for assessing the trends of India's nuclear policy is sketchy and is meant mainly to provide a focus for our argument. (Therefore, the reader is asked specifically to resist the temptation of asking the author to analyse the history of the framework). The framework identifies three pillars in India's external policies. These pillars are landmarks to assess the evolution of the attitudes of Indian political leaders, Indian diplomats and the heads of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission on India's arms control and nuclear policies during 1947-68. The three pillars -- or reference points -- are the idea of deterrence, the idea of territorial defence and finally the idea of giving priority to Indian economic development. The spectrum of opinions within the Indian government during 1947-68 fits into these three attitudinal reference points. Chart I provides a crude typology of these opinions. The heading 'consensus' describes the elements which existed in India's nuclear and arms control policies during 1947-1968, that is, upto the point of India's refusal to sign the N.P.T. The other headings in Chart I
describes the attitudes of the main actors and the arrows indicate the shifts over time.

The framework in which India's arms control and nuclear policy emerged after 1947 can be identified partially in the words of Warren F. Ilchman of the University of California. In his thinking there were essentially two sources of Indian foreign relations, viz., foreign political policy and foreign economic policy. To quote him:

"Before proceeding to the question of Indian foreign policy formulation, it is necessary to make a distinction. There were throughout the Nehru period two foreign policies: the policy of non-alignment, which was essentially a political policy, and the policy of economic development which contained a foreign economic policy. The first was based on the series of theoretical assumptions already mentioned, assumptions born of the exclusion from participation during the colonial period. (This is not to say that these could only have occurred through this experience, only that colonialism gave them their peculiar cast.) The foreign economic policy, on the other hand, responded to the exigencies of the development process. Its bases were not ideological, but highly pragmatic. The chief concern was the provision of resources to fill the gap between domestic savings and the needs of planned development. The foreign political policy talked in terms of the abolition of colonialism and racism, the need for peace, and so on. In general it was difficult to tie these to domestic interests except in terms of the ideological view. The foreign economic policy talked in terms of import licences, exchange controls, foodgrain policies, collaborations, the rights of foreign capital in association with Indian capital, foreign economic and technical assistance. The two policies, furthermore, were made by different people. The political policy was made essentially by Nehru and, in that it was geared essentially to the issues in the United Nations, by Krishna Menon as well. The foreign economic policy was made by members and staff of the Planning Commission (including Nehru), officials in almost every central..."
government ministry, especially the Ministry of Finance and its Department of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry but excluding the Ministry of External Affairs, and the various interests in Indian society, especially business interests.

The two policies cannot be said to be the same. Though one can look at the foreign economic policy as shoring up the foreign political policy and perhaps vice versa, the two often conflicted. The attempts of the foreign political policy to maintain close and increasing relations with low-income countries contradicted the foreign economic policy's need to secure as much foreign assistance as possible in a highly competitive economic assistance environment. Indeed, spokesmen for India's foreign economic policy, such as B.K. Nehru, especially when Commissioner-General for Economic Affairs in Washington, by advocating publicly 'absorptive capacity' as the criterion for financial assistance, could only undermine what the foreign political policy sought to do. Likewise, India's vigorous position in the United Nations on colonialism and disarmament or the Government's stance on Pakistan could only vitiate the foreign economic policy. This conflict can best be seen in the appointment of the Commissioner-General for Economic Affairs in Washington and London and in the frequent exclusion of the External Affairs Ministry's officials from co-ordinating committees on foreign economic policy.

Without developing the point here, it appears likely that during the Nehru period a substantial sophistication on the side of foreign economic policy-making did develop. Official and other personnel were soon capable of analysing the international system's potential for India's economic needs and relating domestic interests to the international economic scene. Also, if one can judge from the success of certain negotiations and the comments of foreign as well as Indian observers, considerable skill was developed in the field of economic negotiations. 124

"Political Development and Foreign Policy: The Case of India," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, vol. 4, no. 3, 1966, pp. 220-221. Ilchman's footnotes have been deleted from this quote.
This assessment by Ilchman directs attention to two imperatives in Indian foreign relations, one of which seeks economic development while the other seeks political involvement or an ideological involvement. It implies that as of 1966 (when Ilchman's article was published) India's political or ideological involvement, unlike the economic aspect, lacked pragmatism. Undoubtedly it is useful to note the conflicting elements in Indian foreign policies. However, Ilchman's effort requires some modification. Our analysis has identified the pragmatic quality of India's arms control and nuclear policies. Ilchman has failed to note the growth of the idea of security in Indian foreign relations. This idea competes with the idea of economic development. Prior to the 1962 crisis it was possible for an exponent of the developmental school to define pragmatism solely, or primarily, in developmental terms. After 1962 however, an Indian decision-maker needed to emphasise security in terms of territorial defence and development, i.e., both military and economic security.

Thus, the choice of the criteria of relevance for assessing Indian foreign policies is not simply between 'pragmatic' developmental politics and 'unpragmatic' ideological-political external involvement as suggested by Ilchman. The framework of India's arms control and nuclear policy appears to be broader, but still complex,
in orientation. Our framework (Chart 1) has three dimensions: (1) The idea of development as a source of Indian foreign policy; (2) The idea of security -- defined as territorial defence -- as a source of Indian foreign policy; and finally, (3) The idea of deterrence as a source of Indian foreign policy. Read in isolation of the second idea, the first idea means that the argument centers on a framework of development versus defence; this seemed to be the policy framework of the 1750s vis-a-vis China but not vis-a-vis Pakistan. After 1962 however, there is no controversy in saying that the Indian foreign policy mechanism had adopted the idea of development and territorial defence. The third idea has to date (1973) not been accepted by the Indian government. It is inserted in our model because Dr. Homi Bhabha (the head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission during Nehru’s time and in Shastri’s time) and Mr. Morarji Desai, a member of Nehru’s Cabinet and subsequently the Deputy Prime Minister in Mrs. Gandhi’s cabinet, have both expressed themselves in favour of nuclear weapons under certain circumstances. Moreover, the Jan Sangh

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On October 25, 1964, Dr. Bhabha broadcast the following statement over the All India Radio: "One must remember that it is not any object that is intrinsically good or bad, but the use that is made of it. A minimum supply of nuclear weapons coupled with an adequate delivery system confers on a State the capacity to destroy more or
party and the unofficial pro-bomb lobby in India has advocated the adoption of deterrence strategy by the Indian government. These pressures within and outside the government indicate the domestic-political context of Indian nuclear decision-making. Furthermore, given the shift over time from the 'pragmatism' of the development versus defence theme which prevailed in the 1950s with respect to China, to the 'pragmatism' of the development and defence theme which emerged after 1962, the notion of deterrence reflects a possibility of a future shift. If such a shift occurs it would mean a change from a strategy of defence as territorial defence to defence as defence by conventional means.

125 (contd.)
less totally the important cities and industrial centres in another State. There appears to be no means of totally intercepting such an attack, and if even a small fraction of it gets through, entire cities and regions may be totally devastated. The only defence against such an attack appears to be a capability and threat of retaliation. Capability of retaliation appears to be the most powerful deterrence. Cited in A.G. Noorani, "India's Quest for a Nuclear Guarantee," Asian Survey, vol. VII, no. 7, July 1967, p. 490.
Mr. Morarji Desai's views were as follows: "I have often said that nuclear weapons are not weapons of defence; and it is not necessary to have nuclear weapons or a nuclear umbrella for us to get our territory vacated by China. Vacating of territory can be effected by relying on the strength of our conventional army.

I do not believe in nuclear weapons or nuclear umbrella of any sort. If, however, I were to make a choice, I would rather have my own nuclear weapons than to seek the nuclear umbrella of any outside Power. To ask for such umbrella would merely make us dependent on others, and our independence would be diluted." Chatterjee, B., The Mind of Morarji Desai, Orient Longmans, Bombay, 1967, pp. 90-91.

126 See the next chapter.
and nuclear means. For the purpose of this study, the latter shift is assumed to be possible, and not necessarily probable. The arrows in the following chart therefore mean the following. The straight lines reflect shifts in the attitudes and policies which have already occurred. The dotted lines reflect shifts which are possible in the future.

**Attitudinal Prisms in Indian nuclear decision-making (1947-68)**

As we noted in the introduction of the study, our analysis questions the link between Image and Decision hypothesised by Brecher. On this point he relies on the views of Kenneth Boulding and David Finlay et al. According to Boulding

"a decision involves the selection of the most preferred position in a contemplated field of choice. Both the field of choice and the ordering of this field by which the preferred position is identified lie in the image of the decision-maker." 127

The other view is less categorical in hypothesising a link between Image and Decision. According to them "every decision-maker is in part a prisoner of beliefs and expectations which inevitably shape his definition of reality."


In comparison to these views, Brecher makes the following points. (1) Decision-makers chose alternative paths in accordance with their perceptions of the world. (2) "The content of that which they perceive is the Image." (3) "The link between Image and Decision is indeed the master key to a valuable framework of foreign policy analysis."

Finally, "the choice among policy options derive from decision-makers' perceptions of their State's environment and its desirable roles in international politics. It follows from this hypothesis that a key, if not the master key, to understanding the Foreign Policy System is the World View of the small coterie of men within each State who make foreign-policy decisions." 132

A key assumption in hypothesising a link between Image and Decision is that the subject's public views reflect his private beliefs. Images of decision-makers are inferred from the public views of decision-makers just as these public views are taken to represent the decision-maker's perceptions. Brecher's assessment of the View of the World of Krishna Menon was based on an assumed linkage between his public

127 The Foreign Policy System of Israel, p. 22.
130 Ibid.
131 The Foreign Policy System of Israel, pp. 4-5.
views and his private beliefs and perceptions. Yet, this assumption is questionable.

It is true that decision-makers make choices in terms of their perceptions. But, identifying the real perceptions in the case of Indian decision-makers is hard, if not impossible, because the assessments on which policies are based are not in the public domain. In other words, the speeches of Indian politicians and diplomats cannot be regarded as assessments; these statements usually suggest what ought to be done. Such statements usually do not indicate what the private views of the Indian decision-makers are. They are purposive, that is, they indicate the kinds of activities which ought to be discouraged and the kind of activities which ought to be encouraged. It is a challenge to the analytical skill of a researcher outside the government to infer the decision-maker's image or the decision-maker's perception of the situation from the statement of 'ought' which are made publicly.

Secondly, it is true, as Boulding and Pinlay suggest, that images influence or determine the preferences of decision-makers. But a qualification should be added to the Boulding formula, as follows: Ideally speaking, a decision

133 This point was repeatedly made in my confidential interviews with Indian sources.
involves the selection of the most preferred position, that is, if the power (the capability or the means) to carry out the choice(s) exists. That is, if the preferences exceed the capacity to change the situation or the system, preferences may be of two kinds. The first, where the preferred position or the preferred choice is relative to what the decision-maker thinks can be achieved; the second, where the preferred choice is relative to what the decision-maker thinks cannot be achieved but ought to be sought in the future.

Our model therefore, does not assume that the public views of Indian decision-makers represent necessarily their images or their perceptions of the strategic environment. Instead, it is assumed that the images and perceptions which guide their actions are confidential. Hence it is only assumed that their public statements are purposive, that is, inasmuch as there may be a variance between their perception of the threats to India (and their preferred solutions) on one hand, and their perception of what India can do on the other hand. This formulation indicates that as the power (the capability and the means to change the environment) of India changes, there are likely to be shifts in public statements about preferred outcomes. In other words, two sets of Indian images can be noted. The first express preferred position(s) in terms of Indian perceptions of their power to change the environment. The second express
preferred positions in terms of Indian perceptions of their inability to change the environment. Yet, beyond these two sets, lies a third set of perceptions and images. These express that part of Indian foreign policy which is totally secret, totally beyond the public domain. And it is with respect to this totally secret domain that a non-governmental analyst is unable to specify the operational image(s) and the decision(s) which flow(s) from them. In other words, our model does not presume that overt activity or public activity in India's foreign policies in general or nuclear policy in particular is simply a linear projection of its images and its decisions. The overt activities can change as Indian capacities change. Neither should the analyst be rash to try to identify Indian images and decisions simply by assessing the overt activities.

Overall then, there is a justification for emphasising the difficulties in identifying the perceptions and images of decision makers, viz., those assessments which underlie decision-making. It is hard even to identify the decision-makers, let alone the images and perceptions underlying decisions. As such, our model is structured on a set of assumptions rather than categorical statements of fact. For the purpose of our model a 'decision-maker' is defined as a person who actually wields influence, and not necessarily the head of a government or agency. Our emphasis is on
actual process rather than formal institutions. The assumptions are as follows.

First, in India the influence of pressure groups in policy-making so far is negligible. Secondly, disciplined civil servants tend to toe the line of the Prime Minister, and it is their duty to do so, particularly if the Prime Minister is strong. Thirdly, theoretically, Article 246 of the Indian Constitution empowers the parliament to legislate on all aspects of foreign policy, but in fact the theoretical function remains unfulfilled. Fourthly, with some exceptions the Consultative Committee of the Parliament for External Affairs has not been able to play an advisory role in foreign policy making. Fifthly, the Standing

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Bandyopadhyaya, _The Making of India's Foreign Policy_, p. 123.

384

Ibid., p. 125.

385

Ibid., pp. 131-32, and 137.

386

One such exception was on February 10, 1970 when the Foreign Minister was forced to examine the possible costs of an Indian nuclear weapons program. Similarly, the Consultative Committee for the Department of Atomic Energy was asked on March 31, 1970 to examine these costs. See ibid., pp. 135-136.

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Bandyopadhyaya, _op.cit._, p. 134.
Committee of Cabinet on foreign affairs has not been influential in foreign policy making. Sixthly, the Indian Cabinet has not functioned, with some exceptions, as the highest collective decision-making body in foreign policy. Sevethly, the position of the Ministry of External Affairs has not declined in the post-Nehru era. Eighthly, in recent years the control of this Ministry over Indian foreign economic relations has grown and there is greater coordination and cooperation between this Ministry and other economic oriented Ministries. Ninethly and finally, despite the lack of formal coordination between the External Affairs and the Defence Ministries regarding strategic policies and even though the Policy Planning and Review Division which was set up in 1966, does not have military specialists on its staff it does not follow...

130 Ibid., p. 140.

140 The decision not to sign the N.P.T. was formally a Cabinet decision. Confidential interviews, New Delhi, June 1971.

141 Landyopadhyaya, op.cit., p. 147.

142 Ibid., p. 171.

143 Ibid., p. 176.

144 Ibid., p. 170.

145 Ibid.
that India's arms control and nuclear policy has not been based on an evaluation of the military and technological implications for India. Our model therefore, challenges the contention in the literature which suggests that India's arms control and nuclear policy was based only on ideological and ethical grounds and that pragmatic and security considerations were ignored.

The master key to understand the strategic function which is carried out by the Ministry of External Affairs, and the strategic aspect of India's arms control and nuclear policy as managed by this Ministry, lies in the analysis of a knowledgeable Indian Professor who was previously in the Indian Foreign Service. His analysis is partly ambiguous and partly suggestive. He maintains on the one hand that

"Indian representatives participating in discussions on arms control or disarmament at the United Nations have generally suffered from a lamentable lack of technical competence and been constrained as a result (like the Foreign Office itself) to speak mainly in political and ethical terms. The UN and Conference Division of the Ministry of External Affairs, which deals with such problems, has got a Disarmament Cell, but has not so far developed any specialised talent." 147

146 Ibid., pp. 179-80.

147 Ibid., p. 180.
but at the same time he notes that

"In conformity with standard international practice in this respect, the personnel connected with intelligence activities operate both independently and through some of our missions abroad. The information collected through the missions is forwarded to the Ministry of Home Affairs through the head of the mission, and copies of the reports are made available to the Ministry of External Affairs. The Service Attachés send, in conformity with generally accepted international practice, their reports on military developments to the Defence Ministry through the heads of missions; and copies of these reports are also made available to the Ministries of Home and External Affairs." 148

The latter quote indicates clearly that there is ample circulation of information acquired through official channels but that, at best, there may be a lack of coordination or lack of assessment of such information by senior Indian officials. This may well be the case in many instances, but it does not appear to be the problem in the behavior of actors such as Dr. Homi Bhabha and Mr. V.C. Trivedi. Their interventions in international forums could not be effective unless they knew what they were talking about. Therefore, for the purpose of our model it is assumed that Indian negotiators involved in the N.P.T. had access to intelligence information of a high quality -- indicating the status of the Chinese missile program and indicating further the nature of the intentions and the

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Ibid., p. 197. For a discussion of other intelligence organs of the Indian Government see pp. 197-198.
mandates of American and Soviet negotiators in Geneva. The latter type of assessment probably included information about the priority which residents Johnson and Nixon --- and their close advisors --- really attached to the N.P.T. The probable effects on Indo-U.S. and Indo-Soviet relations, if India refused to sign the nuclear treaty, were similarly assessed.

Our model specifies the range of arguments which appeared in the process of decision-making at the official level. The focus is entirely on the arguments presented by the senior civil servants and their political masters. The types of arguments are broadly divided into three categories: those which emphasise India's developmental needs; those which emphasise India's need for territorial defence, and finally, those which seek to introduce the concept of strategic deterrence in Indian foreign relations. The last type must be analysed with care because the sources of the deterrence concept, as it is related to Indian conditions, are mostly unofficial (i.e., the pro-bomb lobby outside the government and the Jan Sanch party) and if there is a pro-bomb lobby within the Ministry of External Affairs, the existence of

The observations in this paragraph are confirmed in practically all the interviews with Indian and foreign sources.

A prominent exception within the Indian Government of course, was Dr. Homi Shabha.
such a lobby is at best implicitly symbolised by the arguments of Nehru, Shabha and Trivedi. But this statement must be heavily qualified. To date the deterrence concept has not been formally recognised in Indian military planning and the concept is inherent, at least potentially, in a policy of keeping the nuclear option open.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DETERRENCE</th>
<th>TERRITORIAL DEFENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Shabha</td>
<td>Mr. Trivedi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Sangh and the pro-bomb lobby. This includes those who are against a crash bomb program but favour peaceful nuclear explosions and/or nuclear weapons, land-based or sea-based.</td>
<td>His position was upheld by Morarji Desai and Chavan and eventually approved by the Cabinet of Indira Gandhi in 1968. At that time Mrs. Gandhi was not a prime backer of Mr. Trivedi for reasons related to factional politics or lack of expertise in atomic energy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nehru &amp; the consensus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. India's territorial defence is the prime goal of security;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Keep the nuclear option open;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Option has political uses;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Nuclear weapons should be abolished for all;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. India should not seek nuclear weapons 'at present';</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. India should avoid military alliances;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Collective security through the U.N. is desirable (i.e., Article 51 of the Charter is relevant for India);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. China is not an immediate nuclear threat to India;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Indian sovereignty requires national means of defence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Chart II**

OVERT ARGUMENTS OF INDIAN DECISION MAKERS IN NUCLEAR POLICY: 1964-68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TERRITORIAL DEFENCE</th>
<th>Indira Gandhi</th>
<th>Sarabhai</th>
<th>I.P. Jha</th>
<th>DEVELOPMENTAL GOALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Consensus -- as in Chart I.</td>
<td>1. India will not sign the N.P.T.</td>
<td>1. India should rely on collective security;</td>
<td>1. Give preference to India's developmental needs and need for foreign aid;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. India will keep the option open;</td>
<td>2. India should rely on nuclear disarmament;</td>
<td>2. Sign the N.P.T. if security assurances are available;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. India will not produce nuclear weapons.</td>
<td>3. Nuclear weapons are beyond India’s means;</td>
<td>3. The cost of an Indian nuclear weapons program is too high.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. India should continue to utilise nuclear energy for peaceful uses;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. India should keep the option open;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Security is a prime goal for India.*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The late Dr. Sarabhai was the only Indian at the policy level who seems to have changed his views or the emphasis in his views. Originally, he appeared to conform to the Pugwash and the Gandhian approach to nuclear disarmament. His public statements emphasised the importance of collective security. Point 6, which he emphasised in an interview to this author in June 1971 seemed to reflect a reassessment by the Government of India of nuclear policy in 1970. In short, there is a definite discrepancy between his private views and his public views -- depending on his audience.
In this cluster of views 'at the top' of the policy pyramid, the trends seem to be diverse -- or are open to different interpretations. One interpretation is that the policy of not deciding in favour of the bomb or nuclear weapons is irrevocable and hence a barrier to the nuclear option. The other interpretation is that the two ideas, viz., no bomb at present and no renunciation of the option at present, are contradictory but the contradiction is necessary; that is, it is related to the evolution of the Chinese missile program and India's scientific and material progress. Chart III below explains the flow of decision-making during 1964-68 and Chart IV speculates about the movement inherent in the cluster of attitudes 'at the top' of the policy pyramid.
Chart III

TARGETS OF INDIAN DIPLOMACY ON N.F.T.

International Targets

US USSR China

International Targets on question of security assurances

US USSR UN China

Prime Minister and his Secretariat

Anti-bomb, economic lobby

TRIVEH STRATEGY IN GENEVA

National Targets

Ministry of External Affairs

pro-nit, economic pro-bomb
lobbies lobby

Atomic Energy Dept.

anti-bomb pro-bomb
lobby lobby

Process

1. ________ expresses instructions from Delhi to Geneva, i.e., the formal line of authority in Indian nuclear decision-making.

2. ________ expresses the external (international) targets of Indian diplomacy.

3. ________ expresses the internal (national) targets of Indian diplomacy, i.e., the internal Indian audience of Indian statements/positions in the P.N.D.C.
Chart IV

MOVEMENT INHERENT IN THE CLUSTER OF ATTITUDES IN THE POLICY PYRAMID

EXTERNAL DETERRENCE
PROBLEMS
AFFECTING
NUCLEAR
POLICY

TERITORIAL
DEFENCE

DEVELOPMENTAL
GOALS

--- refers to possible evolution (or modification) of decision-makers' stance.

--- refers to public views of decision-makers.

Bhabha / Trivedi / NEHRU / AND THE
CONSSENSUS

Shastri / Mrs. Gandhi / Sarabhai / L.K. Jha
In conclusion, this chapter has analysed the exact focus in India's arguments on the N.F.T. It is worth noting that the primary emphasis in India's arguments is not on the problem of security from China. It has been shown that some of the arguments are irrevocable, namely, the absolute refusal to accept international safeguards on all Indian nuclear facilities. This policy was a continuation of an earlier policy, framed during the 1950s. At the same time there are other arguments which are open to negotiation in the arena of bureaucratic politics, within and outside India. Thus, whether or not India should opt for a plutonium bomb program on a crash basis and whether or not India should keep the option open by staying abreast of modern atomic technology, are issues which are currently under review.

This chapter has analysed three approaches in discussions on India's nuclear policy. The first approach represents a regurgitation of traditional world order concerns, that is, to make the world safe through nuclear disarmament. The second approach is more recent and it represents the influence of the late Dr. Bhabha and the unofficial pro-bomb lobby in India. This approach seeks a radical revision, even repudiation, of the traditional approach to peace through disarmament. This approach asks for an adoption of a strategy of nuclear deterrence for India. It goes beyond the official view which argues that
the threats to Indian security are primarily of a conventional kind.

India's behavior towards the N.P.T. has yielded a third approach to Indian security in the nuclear arena. This approach emphasizes that it is sufficient to have a nuclear option against the contingency of a Chinese nuclear threat to India. The assessment on which this strategy is based has not been made public.

However, three assumptions seem to be crucial in the third approach. (1) India has the technological capability to launch a crude plutonium bomb program as a last resort, at any time. (2) There is little military value in possessing nuclear weapons but there is political value in possession of nuclear power; that is, there is a political value in the nonuse of nuclear weapons -- as is evident from the behavior of the superpowers, but China does not yet have the nuclear capacity to threaten India. In other words, even if Indians perceive that China gains some political and military value from its nuclear testing program, Indians who are familiar with their country's small but sophisticated program argue that there is also a political value in India's refusal to sign the N.P.T. which is matched with an Indian ability to produce a peaceful underground nuclear test; moreover, there is also some political value in India's restraint in not producing nuclear weapons. Finally, (3) it is assumed that China is not an immediate nuclear threat.
to India. In this connection Indians are watching with great interest Chinese behavior with respect to its forthcoming ICBM test. Despite some Western speculation about the possibility of a Chinese ICBM test in the Indian Ocean, Peking so far has not carried out a test in that region. The reason for this may be purely technical, i.e., Peking may not be ready for an ICBM test. Yet, political scientists ought not to ignore a possible political reason, namely, Peking's wish not to add to Indian insecurity, not to push India towards a nuclear weapons program, and not to push India more into the arms of the Soviet Union. Thus, two points are implicit in Indian views on China's nuclear behavior. First, there is the expectation that the India-China 'dialogue' will continue to gain momentum and hence the danger of Chinese military activities against India is likely to decline. Secondly, there is the expectation that the Soviet Union will continue to aid Indian security against China. (Excluded is any expectation of substantial U.S. military aid to India against China; this feeling existed after 1965 and was reinforced by American behavior in 1971 crisis).

For example, Alastair Buchan and Harry Gelber have speculated about the Indian Ocean being a likely testing area for the Chinese ICBM test, rather than the Pacific Ocean.

U.S. aid to the Himalayan 'communications' network was resumed after 1971 but overall, the U.S. military aid program to India is small, compared to many other countries.
This chapter notes the paradox or contradiction in the third approach to security. On the one hand there is the rejection of nuclear weapons for the present; on the other hand there is the retention of the nuclear option at present. There are two ways of analysing this paradox or contradiction in Indian policy. The first way is to argue that India's present stance is a step towards a nuclear weapons capability, with the rate of growth or transformation depending on several factors: (1) the rate of India's technological progress; (2) the rate of progress of China's missile capacity; and (3) the vulnerability of Indian politicians to persistent professional advice. The second way to analyse India's present nuclear stance is to argue that India's refusal to authorise the manufacture of nuclear weapons is, in fact (according to this argument), a barrier against the nuclear option. According to this view, keeping the option open is a sop to the pro-bomb lobby in India and nothing else. The first type of argument emphasises the quality of 'drift' in India's nuclear decision-making and the effect of external developments on Indian strategic perceptions. The second kind of argument emphasises the quality of deliberation in Indian policy planning. It notes the cautious quality which Indian negotiators on the N.P.T. and Indian decision-makers in New Delhi have displayed so far in their attitudes towards defence planning against China and in their attitudes towards foreign and military
relations with the Soviet Union and China.

This chapter directs attention to the quality of Indian perceptions about the behavior of the superpowers on the N.F.T. during 1964-68. It indicates that Ambassador Trivedi and his colleagues were well informed about the political intentions of the American and the Soviet leaders, and about the limited mandates held by American and Soviet N.F.T. negotiators. This point is significant for the light it sheds on the quality of Indian intelligence. Also, it implies that despite the fuss made about the N.F.T. in American, British and Canadian policy and academic circles, the nuclear treaty was an exercise in achieving something for nothing and doing so when the genie was put of the bottle.

Finally, this chapter highlights the dual thrust in Ambassador Trivedi's strategy. One aspect of the strategy was to appear to be willing to negotiate if certain conditions were met. The Indian memorandum of May 4, 1965 expressed the five points in terms of which negotiations were possible. Even though Canadian and American observers tend to argue that India did not appear to be ready to negotiate, in fact there is evidence which suggests that Indians were ready to negotiate seriously before the Fastore resolution in 1966 shifted the focus and the thrust of the N.F.T. deliberations. After this, many of the Indian arguments were directed against the American position, and to an extent against the Soviet attitudes. Arnold Kramish, has noted that Soviet
thinking on the nuclear treaty, except with reference to their concern about a nuclear West Germany, was more permissive as compared to American thinking. The latter (U.S.) was rhetorical and universalistic and as such, not geared to satisfy the security interests of countries like India. Therefore, one can sympathise with American perceptions about the lack of sincerity in India's negotiating stance on the NPT. At the same time one should be able to sympathise with the Indian view that once the Pugwash resolution became the basis of American NPT negotiating position, the basis for an Indo-U.S. agreement vanished.

Secondly however, taking an overview of Indian and U.S. behavior on the NPT, both actors seemed to indulge in 'talk' rather than 'negotiation' with each other. (This observation of course, does not apply to Soviet-American negotiations on the treaty). As such, the concept of 'talk' seems to apply to India's arms control behavior and the behavior of the superpowers toward India, inasmuch as the demands by the parties involved in the deliberations were so high that these could not be met by the other side, and the parties knew this. Therefore, this chapter offers insight about the utility and disutility of 'talk' -- as an instrument for a negotiating strategy or as a substitute for a negotiating strategy. This idea is relevant for the study of India's behavior, the behavior of the superpowers, and for the study of the techniques of influence in international
relations. Morton Kaplan suggests in his rules on the balance of power that one negotiates and/or one fights. Thomas Schelling suggests that 'talk' is cheap and what matters is 'action'. India's behavior in the N.F.T. reveals a novelty in approach and style, and it offers a third alternative. The choice is not between negotiating and/or fighting but in neither negotiating nor fighting and yet in becoming involved, or staying involved, in the policy process. In a sense therefore, 'talk' has some virtue -- in a policy sense and in a theoretical sense, if it adds to the complexity of the policy process.
Chapter Five

SOCIETAL SOURCES IN INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY

So far we have shown that India's arms control and nuclear policy was essentially an elitist exercise -- from its conception in the late 1940s to its evolution during the 1950s and the 1960s in India's relations on atomic energy with Canada, the I.A.E.A. and the United States. The thrust of our remarks is that societal sources of influence in foreign policy-making in general, and nuclear policy-making in particular, have so far been unimportant. Yet, to satisfy one's intellectual curiosity, it is natural to probe the potential sources of societal influence in these issues. Such an investigation is supported by the fact, as noted earlier, that during February and March 1970, the Consultative Committees on Foreign Affairs and Atomic Energy were able to insist that the Government of India ought to re-examine the costs of nuclear weapons development and production.

Even though this incident was an isolated one it was significant for two reasons. First, from time to time, such Committees have proliferated, merged or dissolved in the Indian political system since 1947 but usually such
committees have had no real influence in the policy-making process. Secondly, the costs of nuclear weapons had already been discussed in the report sponsored by the U.N. Secretary-General in October 1967 and this Report had highlighted the theme of high or prohibitive economic costs of nuclear weapons. India's atomic chief Dr. Vikram Sarabhai was a member of the committee which discussed the issues in the Report. Secretary-General U Thant made much of the fact that the report was unanimous. However, according to U.N. diplomatic sources, it was drafted by Britain's Sir Solly Zuckerman, while the reservations of Sarabhai were papered over for the sake of unanimity. The demand for a new set of figures by the Consultative Committees could mean either or both of the following: (1) that it was a response to pressure of the pro-bomb lobby and the new report was meant as a sop to the lobby; and/or, (2) that it was an effort

1 The attitude to policy-making by the non-governmental organs is discussed below.


3 Confidential Interview, New York, June 1970.
to adopt another set of independent figures, taking into account Sarabhai's reservations against the 1967 U.N. report. It is known that a new set of figures were prepared by the Prime Minister's Secretariat but whether or not these differ from those of the U.N. report is hard to speculate. However, in retrospect, this incident so far has not altered the official Indian position on either the N.P.T. or on the possibility of abandoning India's refusal to produce a plutonium Bomb or a more sophisticated nuclear weapons system.

This incident shows that prior to 1970 there was an intense debate in the Indian press and in Indian journals to revise the Indian nuclear policy but this debate did not have an impact on the Government. However, because the 1970 party pressures forced the Government to investigate the cost of weapons production, this chapter suggests that even if the non-official and non-executive sources in the Indian foreign policy system have failed to shift the nuclear policy of the Government of India from its present stance (viz., no nuclear weapons at present and continuation of the weapons option), these sources may become influential in the future if the Government's style of decision-making changes; that is if it becomes less elitist. This perspective

4 Confidential Interviews, New Delhi, June, 1971.
is meant to investigate the potential sources of societal influence in foreign policy and nuclear policy making. It is not intended to suggest that India's present nuclear stance may change only because of the growth of the societal sources of potential influence. It is inherent in the arguments of the Indian government that change in its nuclear stance may occur if China becomes an 'immediate' nuclear threat to India. As such, change in India's nuclear policy may occur for a number of reasons: (1) If the Prime Minister's position is weakened and if the pro-bomb lobby in the Ministry of External Affairs and the Atomic Energy Department becomes dominant; (2) If the strategic situation changes; (3) If the perceptions of Indian politicians change and they veer towards the concept of deterrence and defence rather than only defence; and finally, (4) If the non-official and non-executive sources of influence become dominant, that is, if sources of influence in Indian party politics outside the Government become dominant.

This chapter identifies the role of four potential, but not necessarily probable, sources of influence in Indian nuclear decision-making. The first type concerns the role of the intellectuals and the communications elites. This refers to the role of elites which transmit and analyse the information provided by the governmental sources. The second type of source of influence is that of Indian public opinion. The third type of source of influence is that of party politics -- of parties other than the ruling Congress party.
The fourth type of sources of influence is also of party politics -- of organs in the Congress party but outside the Indian Government.

(a) The Role of Intellectuals and Communication Elites

Two features stand out prominently in the role of the non-official but intellectual sources of influence in the Indian nuclear debate after 1964. First, until 1964 there was little public debate of the nuclear issue, either because of India’s Gandhian tradition or because of India’s firm adherence to a policy of peace through nuclear disarmament or because there was no real opportunity to discuss the issue in a practical sense. After 1964 the issues related to the N.P.T. became a matter of intense public debate. Secondly, despite the intensity of the debate in India after 1964, the framework of the debate was essentially the same as that of the debate within the Indian government, viz., in terms of deterrence -- which formed one extreme spectrum of the argument, or in terms of territorial defence -- which formed the middle of the spectrum, or in terms of the priority of Indian development -- which meant that there was no need to change the strategy of seeking peace through nuclear disarmament.

Before 1964 the quantity of Indian literature on the question of disarmament and nuclear policy was limited and the quality was uneven, depending on whether the focus
of the writer was on policy and security concerns of the Indian government or whether the concern was with ethical and legal aspects of control of nuclear weapons.

A sampling of the Indian book and periodical literature on nuclear policy and disarmament reveals that, prior to 1964, Indian views were sketchy in some cases and non-existent in the other. For example, *International Studies*, the quarterly journal of the prestigious Indian School of International Studies (now a part of the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi) did not publish a single article on nuclear policy during 1960-64. *The Indian Journal of International Law*, a prominent organ, published a comment on the test ban treaty, an article on nuclear weapons and International Law and on the illusions and reality of seeking international control of atomic weapons. The book literature was similarly sketchy. One study dealt with the economic consequences of disarmament. Another dealt with nuclear weapons and

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5 See volume 3 (1963) and 4 (1964). Interestingly enough the article on nuclear weapons and international law was by M.C. Setalvad, India's Attorney-General. It referred to the need to prevent nuclear proliferation and to disarm by stages by all states. Cf. "Nuclear Weapons and International Law," vol. 3, p. 395. None of these articles offered any insight about India's nuclear policy.

international law. Another dealt with the politics of Outer Space. None of these dealt with the strategic implications of atomic weapons for India.

The inattentiveness of the 'attentive publics' before 1964, contrasted with a somewhat greater attentiveness of the Indian officials to the problems posed by nuclear weapons to Indian security: K. M. Panikkar, an influential scholar-diplomat opened the discussion on the 'New Patterns of Defence' and referred briefly to nuclear weapons. He noted that there was no real defence against nuclear weapons but the "disappearance of monopoly in nuclear weapons is undoubtedly an effective deterrent." In his view the Indian defence perspective consisted of the following: India "does not desire to arm herself with nuclear weapons"; "in India's case it is clear that her defence has to be in terms of her geographical situation, leaving the possibility of nuclear attack by a great power out of consideration." According to him, India only needed to fear a conventional attack on her frontier.

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9 Problems of Indian Defence, pp. 61-62.
Other official opinions however, indicated that the Government of India, to some extent, thought of security in terms other than that of conventional defence alone. Thus, V.C. Trivedi voiced India’s concern to obtain international security through nuclear disarmament. These views reflected traditional concerns in Indian diplomacy and these did not disclose Indian policy perceptions as these related to security policy.

However, before the Chinese test in 1964, the Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Bhabha, gave a glimpse of the inside thinking of the Indian government. In a presentation to the 12th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs held in India in January 27-February 1, 1964 he made the following points. First, to achieve absolute deterrence it was essential to have nuclear weapons and in this case the other side’s overkill capacity did not matter. Secondly, with conventional weapons it was only possible to “acquire a position of relative deterrence.”

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For example see his comments in Indian and Foreign Review, New Delhi, April 15, 1961, pp. 24–25 and in May 1, 1964, pp. 17–19. This organ usually reflects India’s ‘message’ to the world community even though it contains a disclaimer that opinions are personal and not necessarily those of the Indian government.
Thirdly, if a state was asked to renounce nuclear weapons its security ought to be guaranteed by both major nuclear powers. Fourthly, one needed to distinguish between the short term effects (covering ten years) and the long term effects of nuclear proliferation. Fifthly, in the next 5 to 10 years the expenditure involved in nuclear weapons production "would be small compared with the military budgets of many small industrialised countries." Sixthly, the relationship between foreign policy alignment and weapons-use was noted. To quote:

"Delivery against another country is easier, the less industrially-developed that country, and the less modern its air defence. If two countries, one possessing nuclear weapons and the other without them, were to be permitted to fight out a war by themselves, without any intervention by third parties, the possession of nuclear weapons might perhaps be decisive. One has to consider, however whether such a situation is ever likely to arise, and whether either or both of the major nuclear powers could look on passively on a war between two countries in which nuclear weapons are used by either, or their use threatened. If the country using nuclear weapons were aligned with one of the two major nuclear powers and the nuclear weapons were used with the knowledge or approval of that major power, the use of a nuclear weapon would have much the same effect as if it had been used by the major power concerned. The spread of nuclear weapons does not in this case present us with a new problem. If, on the other hand, nuclear weapons were used by a country without the knowledge or against the wish of both the major nuclear powers, it seems clear that it would be in the interests of both nuclear powers to stop the spread of their use. It is not unlikely that in such an event the two major powers would combine to take action against the country which had threatened to use or used nuclear weapons and to stop their further use."
To summarize, we appear to be led to the conclusions that the spread of nuclear weapons during the next ten years or so will not place any country possessing them in the position of having a deterrent force against either of the two major powers, that the use of such weapons by a third country would not catalyse a nuclear war between the two major powers, and finally that the use of nuclear weapons against any other country would probably lead to joint action by the two major powers to stop its further use."

In these statements Dr. Bhabha hypothesised the following: (1) Nuclear weapons could be decisive if one party had them and the other did not, and the nuclear powers did not intervene. (2) If nuclear weapons were used by an ally of a major nuclear power, under those circumstances the spread of nuclear weapons powers was not a new problem. Such weapons-use was tantamount to weapons-use by a major nuclear power. (3) If however, nuclear weapons were used by a nuclear power without the consent of the two nuclear powers, then these powers were likely to intervene. Bhabha seemed to argue that the short term contingency seemed to be managable. His concern therefore dealt with the long term effects. To quote him:

"The position would, however, be entirely different, if countries were free several decades from now, as at present, to develop nuclear weapons on their own. At least a few countries would then have a deterrent nuclear force against any other. The situation would be a very complicated one, and it seems not unlikely that it would be much less stable than at present. It would appear, therefore, to be in the interests of
everyone to see that nuclear weapons are abolished within a period of a decade or so, before a third country has the time to develop into a major nuclear power.\footnote{11}

This article in particular revealed the Indian government's attentiveness to the long term implications of China's nuclear program: the possibility that China may not necessarily act in conformity with superpower wishes; the possibility that the superpowers may act jointly against third party behavior unless the behavior is sanctioned by the superpowers; and the possibility that once China acquired the power to independently develop nuclear weapons it would also have the power to deter the nuclear superpowers. In other words, Bhabha indicated that during 1964-74 no third party was likely to affect the deterrents of the superpowers but that this was not likely to be the case after that; that is, if a third party acquired the ability to develop nuclear weapons independently and thereby acquired the power to deter the superpowers. It was clear from his statement that nuclear disarmament appeared as a valid alternative for a "period of a decade or so, before a third country has the time to develop into a major nuclear power."

\footnote{11 All the quotes are from "Safeguards and the Dissemination of Military Power," \textit{Disarmament and Arms Control}, vol. 2, 1964, pp. 433-440.}
Arguments of this type were discussed in Indian policy circles and in Western and Communist arms control policy and academic establishments. Curiously, the Indian non-official 'attentive publics' remained outside the debate before 1964. Several reasons explained this state of affairs. First, according to a note which Nehru sent to the Indian Congress Party President on July 15, 1947:

"Nehru informed his colleagues that, once the transfer of power took place, the government would be faced with many important decisions, and, in such matters as finance, economics, and defence, the issues could not easily be discussed in the Working Committee. Papers dealing with these affairs would be secret. Unimpeded day-to-day decisions would have to be made, and the government would require the latitude to shape policies and act freely within the ambit of the general policy laid down by the Congress. Nehru observed, the Prime Minister had a special role to play in giving direction and coordination to the activities of the government. In sum, the role of the party would have to be limited."12

To date this rule has not been changed.

The second reason for the inattentiveness of India's 'attentive publics' before 1964 was to be found in the inertia and the lack of specialised knowledge of the Indian

intellectuals, the opinion-makers in the media, and opinion-makers in Indian political parties. Nirad Chaudhuri, a widely respected Indian intellectual, laments the decline of Indian intellectual life and the deficiencies in India's educational system. 13 Edward Shils invites attention to the "depressed and anti-political attitudes of the Indian intellectuals outside the Government."

According to him:

"the contribution they make to Indian public discussion shows neither the diversity nor the factuality necessary for an informed and effective public opinion." 14

He indicates that Indian officials

"do not learn to benefit from criticism emanating from the universities; instead, they maintain a secretiveness and touchiness which is injurious to efficiency in economic life and to political democracy."

According to him neither officialdom nor parliamentary organs benefit from intellectual stimulation because neither


the intellectuals nor the press can provide thoughtful and factually sustained critiques and analyses on policy issues. According to him, "Indian editors seldom expect their reporters to dig for facts," and the "Indian press contributes little to the improvement of the quality of discussion in educated circles."

The other reason for the inattentiveness of India's 'attentive publics' to questions of nuclear strategy before 1964 are straightforward ones and easier to appreciate. The nature of the Chinese threat became apparent publicly only after China had exploded its first atomic device in October 1964. The inertia of the Indian intellectuals and the Indian press, and the habit of governmental secrecy, did not favour an open discussion or speculation in the public media about the implications of a nuclear China. The

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Shils, op.cit., pp. 110-111. For similar judgements about the quality of the contribution, or the lack of it, see Lent, J.A., editor, The Asian Newspapers' Reluctant Revolution, Iowa State University Press, 1971, chapters 17 and 18; and Noorani, A.G., editor, Freedom of the Press in India, Nachiketa Publications, Bombay, 1971. The complaints usually fall into the following categories: (1) the reporting is polemical rather than factual; (2) the press is anti-intellectual; (3) It tends to be propagandist; (4) It lacks research facilities and a research orientation; (5) The Indian press is neglected by the Government and by its control over newsprint it intimidates the press, its editorial policies, and its reporting function; (6) The Indian Constitution empowers the government to impose reasonable restrictions on the press "in the interest of security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality," etc.
opportunity to do so existed in the aftermath of the military crisis of 1962 between India and China. But given the nature of the Indian foreign policy system, the initiative to do so had to come from the Indian government and not from the societal sources of influence in policy-making. It was only after Indian objections to the N.P.T. started to crystallise in the E.N.D.C. after 1964 that Indian 'opinion-makers' also became visible in the Indian media.

The spectrum of attitudes after 1964 outside the Indian government on the nuclear and security issues generally fell into two categories. The first one related to two questions: whether or not India ought to sign the N.P.T. and whether or not superpower security guarantees were credible and desirable in terms of India's security and diplomatic interests. The second category of issues were broader in scope; these related to the fundamental policy premises and projections about the Asian and the international security environments during the late 1970s and the early 1980s.

The first category was easier to identify and the national consensus on these issues was also clearer. The only Indian party of significance which advocated an Indian signature on the N.P.T. and a nuclear umbrella from the U.S.A. (and the U.S.S.R. if possible) was the pro-West, capital
oriented, Swatantra Party. For different reasons the other political parties were either against security guarantees and particularly American guarantees, or against signing the N.P.T. and securing guarantees. Thus, the Communist Party of India (Moscow wing) in December 1964 argued against the American nuclear umbrella proposal but did not advocate an Indian weapons program because it did not feel that China was a real nuclear threat to India.

Likewise, the Peking wing of the Communist Party of India felt that the Chinese nuclear capability was not meant for India and that India ought not to become dependent on the 'imperialist' guarantees. Only the nationalist Jan Sangh party, as early as 1962, advocated that India ought to go nuclear against China and it criticised the Government of

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17 For example see M.R. Masani (the General Secretary of the party) speech on October 16, 1964 to the Indian Parliament, in Lok Sabha debates, (Government of India), November 23, 1964, columns 1238-40.

18 Shah, A.B., editor, India's Defence and Foreign Policies, Manakta,as Bombay, 1968, p. 166.

India for raising the false issue of economic cost of a weapons program. Unlike other political parties this party was firm in its opposition to the N.P.T. Its position was rooted in a nationalist reaction to the behavior of the superpowers and China, and unlike the Communist parties and the Swatantra party, its views did not imply an identification with foreign views.

The suspicion about superpowers guarantees for Indian security and the undesirability of signing the N.P.T., were dominant themes in the views of various Indian elites -- that is, intellectual, bureaucratic and the military elites. Among the intellectual who opposed the desirability and the feasibility of superpower guarantees in return for India's adherence to the N.P.T. were Raj Krishna, Sisir Gupta, M.L. Sondhi, Major General Palit, R.L.M. Patil, A. Kapur, S.L. Poplai, Maharaj Chopra, V.P. Dutt, J.C. Kundra, G.D. Deshinger, Colonel R.D. Palsokar, among others. Among individuals with previous government experience those who favoured the retention of India's nuclear option included Major General Som Dutt, K. Subramanyam, Sampooran Singh, LT. General P.S. Gyani, and General J.N. Chaudhuri, formerly

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the Chief of the General Staff of the Indian Army and a former Indian High Commissioner to Canada.

The second category of issues in the Indian nuclear debates are the more interesting because of the complexities of Indian security thinking and because of the implications of the choices. Essentially three kinds of questions were raised. (1) The relationship between India's conventional military strategy and atomic strategy and the timing and scale of resources allocation of each of these two. (2) The political and military needs which the subatomic and the atomic strategies would serve. (3) If a decision to launch a weapons program is taken, whether the decision should favour a crash program for the production of a plutonium bomb oriented nuclear capability during the 1970s or whether India should aim for a fusion oriented, SLBM-oriented and Uranium-233/thorium oriented program during the 1980s.

For reasons of space limitation, it is not possible to list all the arguments, pro and con, on these questions as these were (are) argued in India. A general classification of the range of arguments and options outlined by the different elites in India will provide a flavour of the public debate.
OPTIMAL SECURITY STRATEGIES OF SOME INDIAN ELITES FOR THE
1970s AND THE 1980s*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gandhian elite</th>
<th>Military elite</th>
<th>Strategic-Political elite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Advocates nuclear abstention and abstention in the use of force.</td>
<td>1. Generally against an immediate nuclear weapons program.</td>
<td>1. India ought to help shape the balance of power in Asia by participating in the military balance. (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Advocates the Gandhian approach of non-violence as an active form of struggle.</td>
<td>2. Possession of nuclear weapons will not provide any security against threats from China and Pakistan which are conventional. (1) (Cariappa)</td>
<td>2. India ought to reject the reliance on the West for stabilising the Asian military balance. (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Advocates intensified effort for disarmament.</td>
<td>3. If there is money to spare it should be spent on improving India's conventional military strength (2) (Paranjape)</td>
<td>3. India ought to go nuclear because it is a potential great power which should be able to participate in international agreement as an equal of other great powers. (6) (D. Deshingkar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Give highest priority to conventional weapons but improve technological capability to manufacture nuclear system. (3) (Gyan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The view of civil servants in External Affairs have already been discussed.

(2) In G.C. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma, Popular Book Service, 1968, p. 100.
(5) Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gandhian elite</th>
<th>Military elite</th>
<th>Strategic-Political elite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

4. The question of nuclear weapons must be coordinated closely with India's foreign policy problems and the nuclear issue should be used to help improve India's bargaining relations with the super-powers until nuclear weapons have some political-military utility (7) (Ashok Kapur)

5. India must participate in the nuclear game to break the trend toward superpower imperialism in world politics and to buy security against China as a by-product. (8) (Subramaniam Swamy)

6. India should go nuclear to develop its internal strength and to become independent of the big powers. (9) (V.P. Dutt)

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(8) "India's Nuclear Strategy in the 1970s," lecture at the University of California, May 26, 1969.
Gandhian elite          Military elite          Strategic-Political elite

7. Need to abandon non-alignment in favour of a working partnership in security matters among the free Asian powers. (10)
(Som Dutt)

8. A defence partnership between say, India and Japan is not feasible because Japan is unlikely to sacrifice its trading interest with China in favour of a defence partnership with India. India needs to (i) avoid security guarantees because these are not reliable, (ii) to avoid an immediate nuclear weapons decision but to prepare for one immediately, and (iii) to improve India's decision making machinery in security matters. (11)
(K. Subramanyam)

Several tentative conclusions can be drawn from this discussion. The thinking within the Indian government before 1964 was ahead of public thinking on the issues relating to nuclear weapons after 1964, and the framework of the public debate was substantially similar to the one within the government. The lesson of the N.P.T. debate during 1964-68 was that it had helped educate the Indian opinion-makers about strategic problems rather than to help these opinion-makers to offer advice to the Indian government or to help educate the Indian people. As A.D. Gorwala, formerly a member of the Indian Civil Service, pointed out

"The record of the press regarding our nuclear defence is another instance of falling down on its responsibility to educate. By and large it swallowed the Governmental view, hook, line and sinker. It ridiculed the idea of our making nuclear weapons in competition with China too high cost, others would come to our rescue, economic growth would be jeopardised."21

Similarly, M.R. Masani, the Swantantra Party leader, pointed out

"Our tradition has been one of conformism, of bowing to authority... This does not make for a free press.... This has been very noticeable in the field of foreign policy....."22

21 in Noorani, Freedom of the Press in India, p. 44.

22 Ibid., p. 73.
Whether or not the public debate changed the policy of the Indian government is unclear because the evidence is mixed. On the one hand it is clear that the Government so far has not publicly announced a decision to start nuclear weapons production or testing. On the other hand, however, the decision not to publicly announce a decision to prepare for a strategy of nuclear weapon testing or nuclear weapons production does not necessarily mean that a decision to do so has not been taken. As one knowledgeable Indian scientist working for the government pointed out:

"In view of this [the leadtime involved in nuclear testing and production] the decision to go nuclear has to be taken quietly and must not be declared." 23

However, the arguments of intellectuals and the communication elites were intense, and during 1965-70 the traditional party loyalties broke down. In September 1965 eighty-six Indian M.P.s from all political parties asked Prime Minister Shastri to produce nuclear bombs. In

23 Singh, S., India and the Nuclear Bomb, p. 120. Dr. Singh (M.Sc., Ph.D., D.Sc.) heads the Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory in Chandigarh, India. This book contains an excellent review of the nuclear debate after 1964 and it is supported by a strong bibliography of press materials. His book was prepared with the encouragement of Admiral S.N. Kohli of the Indian Navy.

24 Cited in ibid., p. 93.
February 1968 the Indian Institute of Public Opinion, a Gallup affiliate, estimated that over 75% of the Indian public favoured the decision to produce nuclear weapons. As noted earlier, the Consultative Committees on Foreign Affairs and Atomic Energy asked the government to examine the costs of nuclear weapons production in February-March 1970. Earlier, in 1968, the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, which is funded by the government, emphasised the need "to develop the nuclear option further." The Indian Parliamentary and Scientific Committee organised a seminar on "Nuclear Options and Their Implications for India" on May 9-10, 1970, and it favoured the Bomb on military, political, technological and economic grounds. A similar feeling was expressed in the joint discussions organised by the Indian Council for World Affairs and the Institute for Defence Analyses on May 10, 1970. At this time the pro-bomb argument gained sympathetic responses from former

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Overall, it is fair to summarise the role of the Indian intellectuals and the communication elites as follows: Prior to 1964, for reasons noted earlier, Indians had little to say about the economic, strategic and diplomatic aspects of nuclear weapons in Indian foreign relations. The few scattered comments which existed in the Indian literature either outlined India's diplomatic positions on disarmament, or these discussed the legal aspects of nuclear weapons, or they reflected a concern to control the nuclear arms race and to divert savings from disarmament of superpower arms into economic development of the developing sector. After 1964, there was an intense public debate in India on the questions raised by the N.P.T. Since the Indian media does

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Ibid., p. 103. As Singh points out these opinions were not universally held. Mr. P.V.R. Rao, a former Secretary of the Defence Ministry opposed nuclear weapons, as did former Army Chief General K.M. Cariappa, who argued that India ought to seek a nuclear umbrella from the superpowers. Similarly, M.J. Desai, formerly a Secretary-General of the External Affairs Ministry raised the question of Economic costs. Cf. Ibid., p. 107.
not have any high calibre military or diplomatic commentators who command the respect of Indian officials and decision-makers, it is unlikely that the media was a source of influence in policy-making. It is true that the media offered space for a public discussion of the controversy, pro and con. More important than the press was the role of several Institutes and the individuals connected with them. However, it is doubtful if these Institutes have had a major impact or any impact on the thinking of the Indian government on the nuclear issue. If the public stance of the Government is the decision, then it is obvious that the public debate has not any impact. If on the other hand the decision is to strengthen the nuclear option, as suggested by the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, and not to talk about it, one can argue that the public debate may have had an effect on the government's thinking. But in saying this one should also recognise that keeping the option open, or to strengthen the option further, were decisions taken by Nehru and Bhabha in the 1950s, and these were re-inforced by Trivedi in the post-Nehru eras. In other words, it is an open question if the Indian government has all along been preparing the nuclear option -- as some suggest it ought to, or whether India has not been doing this and hence ought to.
(b) The Role of Public Opinion (1964-71)

In democracies public opinion is supposed to be a source of influence in national policy. In foreign policy and defence policy the precise nature of the influence of public opinion is unclear; that is, whether public opinion passes judgement on the government's behavior during elections or whether public opinion can actually shape the policy making process. Inasmuch as public opinion shapes, through elections, the mandate of the government, it seems to be a source of influence. Usually however, it is viewed as an influence in shaping the general nature of the government rather than the government's specific policies.

The case of Indian public opinion on nuclear weapons is interesting for several reasons. First, because of the low level of formal literacy, one would probably think that the Indian public is not likely to pay much attention to foreign and defence issues when the dominant issue is one of economic survival. However, Indian opinion polls indicate that the public, despite the low level of formal literacy, and despite the dominance of economic issues, has an opinion on sophisticated issues relating to nuclear weapons. In saying this however, one cannot assume that Indian public opinion is actually influencing decision-making on foreign and defence policies. All that is being said is that public
opinion exists on such issues in India. Whether the Indian Government is 'ahead' of public opinion in its unpublicised assessments of international developments, or whether Indian public opinion is 'ahead' of the government in its demand for a nuclear weapons program, are open questions. It is not our task to identifying the exact dynamics between public opinion and foreign policy since this would require an examination of the interplay between the classified assessments of the Government and public opinion. Rather our task is essentially to identify the 'message' of public opinion on the question of nuclear weapons without passing judgement about its real effect on decision-making.

In sum, several surveys based on random samples indicate unequivocally that a majority of the Indian public wanted India to produce the Bomb. Thus, Gerard Braunthal, an American researcher who conducted surveys in India during February-March and May 1966, (after India had fought a war with Pakistan in fall 1965 and when India was facing a food crisis) reports as follows:

"Indeed, 7 out of 10 believed India should produce her own atomic weapons, while only 2 out of 10 were opposed. Thus quite surprisingly, the great majority, including much of the Bolpur mass public, especially its illiterate and primary education segment was not in accord with the government's policy of opposing for the time being any atomic capability for India. Those who answered positively argued that atomic weapons were needed for defence against China and
Pakistan to withhold any blackmail and to maintain a balance of power, that national prestige would be enhanced, and that India no longer would need to rely militarily on American and Russian nuclear umbrellas.

Those who opposed an Indian nuclear capability, including some pro-Moscow Communists, argued that it ran counter to the nation's peaceful policy, that it was too expensive, or too destructive.

Conceptions about foreign policy matters are shaped to some extent by popular attitudes toward the great powers which have an impact on Indian foreign policy. Survey respondents of all parties and ages had mixed feelings about Great Britain, especially about her policy toward India. The less-educated population was more favorably inclined than the academic elite. One college lecturer gave a typical negative reply. "England based her policy on the principle of keeping India weak and if possible disintegrated -- a policy of divide and rule." Others criticized Great Britain for having sided with Pakistan against India in the 1965 outbreak of hostilities over Kashmir.

Feelings were more positive toward the United States, with 3 out of 5 in support, and only 1 in 5 in opposition (Table 2). Members of opposition parties demonstrated more hostility than members of Congress, but nevertheless 50 per cent of the Communists voiced moderate approval."30

This survey also showed that the Indian public had a positive or a favorable attitude towards the superpowers (Table I). This is significant because, despite a favourable view of the superpowers, the Indian public favoured an independent atomic capacity in lieu of reliance on superpowers for protection.

Table I
Attitudes Toward Major Powers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>Great Britain (N) (%)</th>
<th>U.S.A. (N) (%)</th>
<th>U.S.S.R. (N) (%)</th>
<th>Communist China (N) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very positive</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>11 8</td>
<td>29 20</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>27 19</td>
<td>76 53</td>
<td>89 62</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifferent</td>
<td>14 10</td>
<td>10 7</td>
<td>6 4</td>
<td>2 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>74 51</td>
<td>28 19</td>
<td>7 5</td>
<td>44 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>very Negative</td>
<td>10 7</td>
<td>5 3</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>87 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.O.</td>
<td>17 12</td>
<td>12 8</td>
<td>8 6</td>
<td>6 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>2 1</td>
<td>4 3</td>
<td>4 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>144 101</td>
<td>144 99</td>
<td>144 101</td>
<td>144 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another survey conducted in 1968 -- after India had decided categorically against signing the N.P.T. -- revealed that a broad mass of Indian public opinion in the major cities favoured atomic capability for India. These results are in Table II. The results may surprise a Western audience because differences in age, income and formal education do not seem to make a substantial difference in the response. Similarly, on a cross-city basis, according to a survey conducted in December 1971, the structure of Indian public opinion appeared as follows (Table III).
Table II
The Structure of Opinion on India's Going Nuclear.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you wish India to make an Atom Bomb?</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No of Respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 to 35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 to 50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>above 50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary or less</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some secondary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary completed or some university.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University degree or more</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOME (Monthly in Rs)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upto 150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151 to 300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301 to 600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>601 to 1000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 1000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calcutta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jana Sangh Souvenir, Bombay, Jana Sangh Publication, April 1968, p. 73. For original, see Monthly Public Opinion Surveys: Indian Institute of Public Opinion (October 1968).
## Table III

The Structure of Opinion on India's Going Nuclear

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delhi.</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calcutta</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombay.</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras.</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>69</strong></td>
<td><strong>63</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
<td><strong>47</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) The Role of Political Parties other than the Congress Party

On the issue of nuclear weapons, there was strong inter-play between those who favoured an Indian Bomb -- non-officials and officials. In at least one instance, in 1965, the party alignments among the opposition parties broke down. But overall, the nationalist Jan Sangh party was the strongest voice in urging a bomb program for India. Their call found support from some Congress rank and file but the other political parties disagreed with the Jan Sangh approach. As noted earlier, neither the Swatantra Party nor the two wings of the Communist Party (the pro-Moscow and the pro-Peking wings) supported the Jan Sangh on the nuclear issue.

Broadly speaking, the Jan Sangh has been consistent since the 1950s in its demand to strengthen the defence mechanism of India. The main premise in its foreign policy -- which has always loomed large in its party resolutions -- was that Pakistan and China were India's natural enemies. It questioned the "pseudo-pacifist inhibitions" of Nehru's approach to foreign affairs.


32 Ibid., p. 131.
As far back as 1950 the Jan Sangh warned the Indian Government about the threat from China. It accused the Indian Government of misleading the Indian public about the "neighbourly and friendly relations" with China in 1957 when the Government knew in 1956 that the Chinese had intruded into the Aksai Chin area in Ladakh. In the 1950s it urged the Indian Government to engage less in talk and more in defence preparations against Pakistan and China. It emphasised that it "is alright (sic) to talk of peace. But peace cannot come by asking for it..... Strength is needed to win peace as much as it is needed to win a war." It pointedly noted that even though China talked of peace, its peace talk was supported by military arms and such arms gave China's talk an edge. It noted that this was true in American and Soviet strategies also.

In opposing the Panch Shila policy of Nehru towards China the Jan Sangh advocated that India strengthen its conventional defence mechanism and go in for an independent atomic deterrent against China. On October 20, 1964:

34 Ibid., p. 64.
35 Ibid., p. 69.
36 Ibid.
immediately after the first Chinese test, this Party welcomed President Johnson's offer of a security guarantee for non-nuclear weapons powers but added the need for India to develop independent nuclear capability. It questioned the government's argument that the Indian economy could not bear the cost of nuclear weapons development. It questioned the utility of asking China to stop nuclear testing. It questioned the credibility of Indian statements that India could make the Bomb, arguing that it is not sufficient to say that India could make the Bomb; to carry conviction India had to demonstrate to the world its capacity to do so. It agreed that the American nuclear umbrella would be better than one or two bombs. It felt that this umbrella was available just for asking and India did not need to enter into a military alliance for that purpose. But despite this, it felt the need to have independent national control over nuclear weapons of its own. 37

During 1962-67 there seemed to be an interesting parallel between India's arguments in the E.N.D.C. and the foreign policy and defence views of the Jan Sangh leadership. It is worth speculating if the foreign policy premises of the Indian Government and the Jan Sangh were fundamentally 37

These observations are drawn from Kishore, op.cit., pp. 132-134.
similar, even though there was a difference in strategies recommended by the Jan Sangh and the one presently used by the Indian Government.

For example, immediately after the Chinese attack on India in 1962, the United States and Great Britain offered to help modernise the Indian defence machinery. But the offer was conditional on Nehru agreeing to negotiate with Pakistan over Kashmir. Since the Jan Sangh did not favour a soft line towards Pakistan it was sceptical about the basis of the American-British offer. Negotiations along these lines were held between December 1962 and May 1963 but nothing new developed. It is an open question if the Indians were negotiating or simply talking. There is evidence that Nehru did not frankly like the idea of Western defence aid being tied to a condition to resolve the Kashmir issue.


During the 1966-67 period Indian officials were privately concerned about the issues which made the Jan Sangh agitate publicly. Both the Government and the Jan Sangh were concerned with the threat posed by the China-Pakistan axis. Both of them were concerned with the danger of the Communists and the Muslim League "coming together" in India. Finally, there was concern about the implications of the Pakistan-Iran-Turkey regional economic and defence arrangements for Indian politics and security. These concerns became manifest in Jan Sangh's statements in 1966-67 but one can speculate that these concerns entered their thinking, as well as the thinking of Indian officials, before then.

The speech by Jan Sangh President Balraj Madhok reflected these concerns. He recommended a radical change in India's foreign strategies. He emphasised the need for a greater effort towards self-reliance in defence and for the development of atomic weapons. He urged an improvement in Indo-Israel relations, suggesting thereby that India rely less on Arab support, since the Arab world, by and large, had not supported India against China in the 1962 crisis.


For a summary of the speech see Baxter, op.cit., pp. 256-257.
But the point which clearly seemed to indicate a parallel between Jan Sangh arguments, and Indian arguments in the E.N.D.C., concerned the assessment of the superpower attitudes towards India. Mr. Madhok's address pointed out the shift in the lessening of Soviet support for India's Kashmir policy. He noted Moscow's strategy of even-handedness between India and Pakistan. He implied that there was a parallel between Washington's traditional even-handedness and Moscow's post-1964 strategy of even-handedness -- strategies which equated India with Pakistan and thereby implied a reduction in the primacy of India in sub-continental politics. He noted however, an identity of views between India and the Soviet Union with regard to the strategy of containing China. But apart from this it appeared clear from the Jan Sangh statement that there was a definite mistrust of the intentions of the superpowers on matters concerning Pakistan and India.

The implication was clear that the two superpowers were trying to utilise the principle of detente -- of parallel or joint superpower coordination, to manage regional conflict in South Asia. The implication was also clear that India's influence had to be localised and the principle of superpower management of regional conflict had to be reinforced. The Indian Government accepted the Tashkant Agreement of January 10, 1966; this reinforced the principle of superpower management of areas of regional
tension on the basis of a superpower detente. However, the Jan Sangh opposed the Tashkant Agreement on the ground that the territory acquired by the Indian defence forces was legally Indian. In the 1971 War the Indian Government rejected the Tashkant precedent as a basis of conflict management and instead it insisted on the principle of India-Pakistan bilateralism as the basis of normalisation of relations. Moreover, Indian spokesmen insisted that India had the right to liberate the Pakistan held Kashmir if it so chose to do so. Thus, in a nutshell, one can see that the Jan Sangh, even though it has never been in control of the Center -- the Federal government, it has nevertheless been ahead of the Indian Government in its statements and in its prescriptions about national defence strategy. This however, is not to say that the Congress Party leaders have ever admitted that the Jan Sangh's ideas were the right ones, particularly in the field of defence policy. Similarly, it does not necessarily follow that the Indian Government will follow the Jan Sangh's advice -- as reiterated in its 1967 election manifesto -- to produce nuclear weapons against China.

If a parallelism seemed apparent between the nationalistic responses of the Jan Sangh and the Indian Government on the approach to security (even though there were differences between the two) during 1965-68, this most
certainly was not the case with respect to the attitudes of the right-wing Swatantra Party. Although this Party was formed in 1959, many of its leaders in the early 1950s shared the Jan Sangh’s fear of China and had misgivings about Nehru’s China policy. It was critical of Nehru’s policy of peaceful co-existence with China. It was critical of the pro-communist neutralism in Indian foreign relations. It criticised the "Krishna Menon pattern of politics." It favoured a detente policy rather than a policy of military confrontation with Pakistan. And finally, it favoured efforts to develop an Asian balance of power -- based on cooperation between India and Japan, among others -- to contain China. Overall, it rejected Indian non-alignment and favoured an alliance system based on cooperation with the West.

Swatantra’s impact on Indian foreign and defence decision-making during the 1960s however, appeared to be non-existent because its ideology challenged the very fundamentals of Indian foreign policy. Its rejection of non-alignment, and its preference for Indian participation in the Western alliance system, ignored the problem of

42

India's relationship with the Soviet Union. The suggestion that India join with Japan in developing the Asian balance of power seemed to be based on two premises: that Japan was willing to join with India in such a venture, and that China was really expansionist and that limited India-China cooperation was not feasible. These premises seemed to be questionable. The idea of detente with Pakistan ignored the mistrust in the Indian body politic about Pakistan's intentions and the intentions of the superpowers towards India and Pakistan. Even if the critics of Krishna Menon agreed with Swatantra on the over-emphasis (in the "Krishna Menon pattern of politics") on Pakistan in Indian foreign relations, the critics argued that Pakistan was a problem but not the central problem in Indian foreign relations -- this criticism hardly meant that the critics would share Swatantra's advice that India seek a detente with Pakistan. Leaving aside the view that an Indo-Pakistan detente would partially destroy the raison d'être of the Indian Ministries of Defence and External Affairs, there was a serious question about the proper strategy for moving towards a detente. Why, the critics of Swatantra argued, did India have to seek a detente with Pakistan? Why not, these critics argued, let Pakistan seek a detente with India? In other words, during the 1960s (these observations do not necessarily relate to the 1950s) there appeared to be a difference of degree rather than a kind between the views of the Jan Sangh and the
Indian Government on defence and foreign policy questions whereas there were differences in kind between the Swatantra Party and the Indian Government.

This generalisation is sweeping and requires qualification. On at least one issue there is a fundamental difference between the Jan Sangh and the Indian Government. The latter -- in the aftermath of the 1962 crisis with China, talked about the "Great Betrayal" by China and China as an expansionist power. Yet, at the same time, once the dust of the crisis settled down, the Indian Government started to say that China was not an immediate threat to India, that is, the China problem was manageable. This was probably based on the confidence which the Indian military and political authorities gained in handling the problem of Chinese and Pakistani supported insurgency activities in India's northeastern provinces after 1965. The breakup of the Communist movement into at least three groups also revealed the problems which communists faced in a large country like India. Moreover, after 1965 the Indian military was able to hold its own against Chinese forces in the Himalayas. In at least one major encounter in 1967 -- involving heavy artillery duels in terrain over 16,000 feet, the Indian military not only held its own ground but even managed to gain a few hundred yards of enemy held ground, gaining access to a valuable high ground which helped Indian visual observations of Chinese activities in the Chumbi valley. Such incidents were followed by the establishment of tacit rules of conduct and communication between Indian and Chinese forward military posts. For example, there is speculation that Indian and Chinese military commanders, from time to time, engage in pleasantries and tea-breaks in the Himalayas; the use of loudspeakers for propaganda purposes has also been discontinued. Such incidents are undoubtedly carefully analysed by China experts in India and it is probable that Indian propaganda about expansionist China, which appears in the press, may not entirely match the in-house assessment of China's threat.
(d) The Indian Congress Party and the Nuclear Debate

Broadly speaking, the role and impact of the Congress Party in matters relating to defence and foreign policies depends on the position or influence of the Prime Minister. Until the 1962 crisis between India and China the position of Nehru was paramount in the Indian foreign policy system and neither his subordinates in the government nor his associates in the Congress Party could effectively challenge his expertise in foreign affairs. Nehru’s rule of secrecy about defence and foreign policy (as noted earlier) in 1947 made clear that he wanted a free hand in the making and implementation of policy. This was particularly true in the case of atomic energy. The importance of this field was obvious from the time India became independent. The portfolio of atomic energy was held by the Prime Minister personally and this tradition has been continued by Nehru’s successors. The importance of this field was also apparent in another way. The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948 listed atomic energy as one of the three fields which required public ownership -- the other two being munitions and railways. During Nehru’s prime ministership, the words of the Congress Party President eloquently described

44 Kochanek, op.cit., pp. 7-8.
the relationship between the party and the government. To quote him:

"The Congress is really the Philosopher while the Government is the Politician. The latter has power and the former influence. Sometimes the influence which is moral overcomes power which is physical. Or shall we say, the Congress is like a benevolent and elderly mother-in-law and the Government is like a tactful and young daughter-in-law. All the power is in reality vested in the latter through the husband. Yet she attempts -- not merely affects -- to obey her parents-in-Law, while ultimately carrying out her own will."

The confrontation with China — undermined Nehru’s China policy and furthermore, undermined his influence within the Congress Party and within the Government. It vitalised two sources of influence — both of which had been latent during the 1950s. On the one hand it increased the influence of the vocal factions within the Party, as was evident when the Party insisted on the resignation of Krishna Menon or the resignation of Nehru himself if he insisted on supporting Menon. More importantly, it increased the influence of those in the Ministries of Defence and External Affairs who had earlier argued in favour of a stronger Indian defence posture. As Kochanek notes, the period from 1963 to 1967 "was characterised by a weakening of centralised power and by the development of factionism within the Congress elite." But he also notes that in

46 Ibid., p. 23.

47 Ibid., p. 102.
foreign policy the Congress elite depended on the briefings provided by its ministerial members. During 1960-64 domestic issues rather than foreign policy issues dominated the proceedings of the Congress elite. While the Party was "kept informed on foreign policy, however, they were not subject to debate." According to him, "since Nehru's death, foreign policy seems to have remained in the hands of the Prime Minister and the External Affairs Minister." The evidence indicates that since 1963 the Party members became "more vocal" in discussing policy issues, as for instance, in pressuring the government to change its stance on the renunciation of nuclear weapons in the party debates in 1970. Being more vocal however, does not mean being more effective in defence and foreign policy. Since the Congress Party has adhered to the rule that it was for the Government to 'decide' on foreign and defence matters, while keeping the Party briefed about

48 Ibid., p. 135.
49 Ibid., pp. 146-147.
50 Ibid., p. 150.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., p. 435.
about international developments, the barrier against decision-making by the Party, or even influencing the process of decision-making, has remained from Nehru’s time to that of his successors. Moreover, since the External Affairs Minister has usually been asked to brief the Party members about foreign policy, it follows logically that -- assuming the External Affairs Minister acts with the aid and advice of his senior civil servants -- the right to brief the Party increased the influence of those in the Ministries of Defence and External Affairs who had access to their Ministers.

In summing up, two questions are relevant for the study of the influence of domestic politics in India’s nuclear debate. First, what, if any, has been and is the influence of the unofficial Indian groups -- intellectuals, the press, and the political parties including the Congress Party -- in shaping India’s nuclear policy in particular, and in shaping foreign and defence policies in general? Secondly, even if such groups so far have been unable to exercise much influence on the policy process, what is the role, or is likely to be the role, of domestic politics in the perceptions of the Indian foreign policy and security managers?

Lester W. Milbrath attempts to conceptualise the process whereby interest groups can influence foreign
policy. He suggests that the "influence process is a subcategory of the communication process." He hypothesizes that it "is more likely that officials use lobbies as tools than that officials follow the bidding of such groups." He concludes that the "ability of interest groups specializing in foreign policy to affect broad public opinion on foreign policy is severely limited." According to him, "interest group influence on foreign policy is slight."

The evidence in this chapter confirms all these observations. It demonstrates the free flow of communication, a free flow of arguments in favour of change of India's traditional renunciation of nuclear weapons. But such evidence of more vocal speeches and seminars does not necessarily mean that such groups also wield influence. On the contrary there is evidence that India's nuclear policy shifted during 1964-65 but this was not in response to the Indian debate; this debate really became vocal.


54 Ibid., p. 250.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid., p. 251.
after 1966, and particularly in 1970. Thus, it is easy to demonstrate 'change' in the Government's thinking but it is highly problematic that this change occurred because of public opinion, or because of pressure from interest groups. As noted earlier, the Indian press functioned as a transmission belt for the debate. By itself it lacked the specialist talent to provide independent judgements on India's policy premises. This confirms Milbrath's view that the interest groups, rather than becoming sources of influence, may in fact function essentially as agents of the Government. The Indian press clearly seemed to be cast in that role. For various reasons -- some of which are a result of the Government's policy (e.g., newsprint control, rules of secrecy, etc.), and some of which are a result of the laziness of Indian reporters and editors in specialising in defence and foreign policy matters -- it is likely to remain in that role in the foreseeable future.

More important is the role of the Jan Sangh and of factions in the Congress Party. As noted earlier, the Jan Sangh and the Indian Government share a common approach to security concerns. There are undoubtedly some differences, as for example, in Jan Sangh's unwillingness to seek a détente with Pakistan and in its premise that China is expansionist. But at the same time there appears to be a similarity in the general approach. Of all oposition
parties the Jan Sangh has been the most vocal and the most consistent in its approach to foreign relations. Moreover, its interest in foreign developments goes back to the 1950s. Furthermore, some individuals in the Ministries of Defence, External Affairs and Atomic Energy share the real politik approach of the Jan Sangh in foreign affairs but dare not join the party for various reasons: overt political activity by civil servants in India is frowned upon; and in many instances, supporters of the Jan Sangh's foreign and defence policies do not necessarily share its views on domestic issues, such as language policy. (Similarly, in the Indian bureaucracies one can find sympathisers of the West, of the Soviets and the Chinese). In other words, the lines of communication, and of influence, are based on personal ties between party sympathisers in the Government and the political parties. Just because the ruling Congress Party does not accept formally the views of the opposition parties it does not necessarily mean that these parties lack access to the locus of power in the Government. But proving such access and influence however, is quite another matter.

57 This requires qualification. Indian images of the West are usually broken into preferences between say, Canada rather than the United States, France and Britain rather than West Germany, etc.
Similarly, the factions within the Congress Party represent important sources of influence in the Government's decision-making. Unfortunately, it is impossible to catalogue or to trace the process of communication and influence within the Party or within the Government. There are two reasons for this. First, because of the fear of security leaks it is probable that many important decisions are made orally and communicated orally rather than being put in writing. Nehru's decision to send Sheikh Abdullah to negotiate a Kashmir settlement in 1964 (just before Nehru died) was one such example of oral decision-making. The decision of the Indian Cabinet not to sign the N.P.T. was another example where decisions were based on a 'nod of the head' rather than on the basis of a formal report about the issues at stake. Here again it must be remembered that politically conscious Delhi is sensitive about the danger of foreign agents getting access to secret documents. In such cases, oral decision-making seems to be a challenge even to the best CIA space satellites!

The second reason for the difficulty in tracing influence of the factions in the Congress Party is that the bright and vocal younger members of the Party are taken into the Government as junior ministers of parliamentary secretaries. Thus, it is useful to speculate that some of the more vocal junior parliamentarians -- who have sympathised with India's defence needs -- are now holding
ministries (as Ministers of State) in fields dealing with science and technology. In such cases of promotion it is reasonable to argue that these individuals are likely to shape the policy process in accordance with their previous convictions. This point however, should not be pressed too far because individuals have been known to change their views to retain power. Yet, there is a clear argument that some prefer to be silent and influential in the system with the hope of changing it from within while others prefer to be vocal and yet ineffective in the long run. Assessing the influence of the silent ones is a challenge for the researcher.

The other question concerns the overall impact of domestic politics on nuclear policy-making. Here one needs to assess, and to speculate about, the influence of domestic politics as perceived by the Indian decision-makers as distinct from the use of the domestic aspect, as a rationalisation, by the decision-makers. The circumstances in which domestic politics can shape or alter India's policy, that is, to alter India's present renunciation against nuclear weapons production, are varied. The Indian Prime Minister may be pressured into changing India's nuclear policy either in response to public opinion or in response to the advice of senior advisers. Or the Prime Minister may be facing internal problems and may want to do something dramatic -- such as carrying out a peaceful underground nuclear explosion -- to divert public opinion. The first
hypothesis suggests that the Prime Minister may be politically weak or strong, that is, in terms of the Congress Party majority in Parliament, but may be influenced by the senior advisers if the ruling coalition is based on shared power between the politicians and the civil servants. The second hypothesis suggests that the Prime Minister may be in serious political trouble domestically, is faced with a loss of prestige nationally and internationally, and hence finds it attractive to have a demonstration effect. The first hypothesis is argued privately by Indians and the second one is discussed by Michael Edwardes.

Edwardes has a fascinating thesis. He claims that any "Indian decision to go nuclear will be made for domestic reasons." He assumes that India already had an explodable nuclear device and has had it since 1964. He maintains that India is now engaged in a "limited programme of weapons research" -- a point which is supported by Dr. Singh's book India and the Nuclear Bomb. Edwardes notes the reasons for the delay in India's nuclear explosion, for example, India's dependence on food aid from the United States and the fear of aiding nuclear proliferation in Pakistan. But he also

notes that Indians felt that "American and Russian diplomatic pressure against nuclear proliferation is only a gesture." He is convinced that even a joint Soviet-American nuclear commitment could not "divert the present trend in Indian policy."

His argument shows considerable insight about India's thinking on nuclear matters and it merits a long quote.

"It is my opinion that India has been in a position to explode a nuclear device since late in 1964 and has only been deterred from doing so by the vigorously, though privately, expressed disapproval of the United States and the Soviet Union. The original intention was to use the device for 'peaceful' purposes, i.e., to excavate an irrigation area or something similar. It seems that progress towards sophistication and, of course, miniaturisation has been severely hampered by the political decision not to hold tests even under the guise of an 'operation ploughshare'. But how long will this inhibition last?

It has been suggested that India would forgo nuclear armament in return for a formal joint guarantee of nuclear protection by the United States and the Soviet Union. This has always seemed to me to be unrealistic, even though at one time the Indian Government gave credence to such a plan. Putting aside the question of whether such a guarantee is even remotely feasible, the idea of a 'nuclear umbrella' as a defence against China is not really relevant to India's reasons for wanting to go nuclear.

Some Indian theorists may consider that India could achieve a nuclear balance of power with China, which, even if the odds are heavily against it, is at least rational. But nuclear armament is first
and foremost a political weapon. Military logic, even military value, is not the major criterion. Britain and France do not follow a nuclear policy for strategic reasons. There is no rational purpose in their possession of nuclear weapons. As a defence they are worthless and, indeed, they cannot be used in any foreseeable circumstance. Why should India be any more rational than Britain or France? There can be a tolerably satisfactory argument for the Indian use of atomic devices for earth-moving in the interests of the rapid expansion of irrigation complexes -- which is more than can be said for Britain and France. The advantages to India of going nuclear, however, are not much concerned with technological benefit. The attitude of the Indian Government is the same as that of Britain and France. The possession of nuclear weapons changes a nation's status, though in the case of Britain and France it would be difficult to say how. But these two countries are not India's exemplar."61

His thesis is tantalising but there is one flaw in it. His article appeared in October 1967. This was in the aftermath of an Indo-Pakistan diplomatic and military stalemate. The stalemate was ratified by British mediation in the Rann of Kutch dispute and by Soviet mediation leading to the Tashkant Declaration in January 1966. The position of the Indian Prime Minister and the Congress Party was weak in domestic politics and Indian initiative in foreign policy was lacking. In this setting a dramatic nuclear explosion could have provided a dramatic push to Indian diplomacy, as a follow up to Indian interventions on the N.P.T. debate. But if this was the psychological imperative underlying

61 Ibid., pp. 658-659.
Indian decision-making at that time, India's military initiative against Pakistan in 1971 crisis seems to have provided the dynamic push needed to revitalise India's image abroad and to revitalise Indian diplomacy. In these circumstances, it is an open question if India in the 1970s still needs a demonstration effect simply to aid Indian image-making abroad. Edwardes maintains that the Chinese threat is essentially a bogey -- a convenient alibi, "waiting to be used." To some extent this allegation is true. Inasmuch as security managers exaggerate threats to 'sell' their policies to their constituents, it is likely that the behavior of Indian policy-makers and image-makers is similar to that of American, Soviet and Chinese policy-makers and image-makers. In another sense however, the Chinese threat is not a bogey in the Indian foreign policy system because Indians in responsible positions keep on arguing that China is a potential, not an immediate nuclear threat to India; that is, the China bogey is less usable today as it was in say, 1968. Therefore, unless one argues that American and Soviet statements expressing concern about the Chinese missiles are totally untrue and irrelevant, the Chinese threat is more than a bogey.

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Overall, separating the domestic motives from the external motives remains a complex activity. It is safe to conclude that under certain circumstances domestic motives may influence Indian nuclear decision-making. To date however, it is necessary to conclude on the basis of evidence presented so far, that the role of external developments overall has been a major determinant in Indian nuclear policy-making. Atomic Energy and defence industry are Government controlled and in the public sector. A researcher writing on India is denied the luxury of arguing the role of a 'military-industrial complex' in defence and foreign policy-making. Moreover, if the argument, pro and con, on nuclear weapons for India rests entirely on the definitions of the public interest rather than on the private gain of individuals, it is hardly legitimate for the individual to assert his right to know the public interest or to define it as would the politician and the civil servant. The latter have the right to know and to decide and this is true in the case of nuclear weapons and foreign policy in India.
CONCLUSIONS

This study has focussed on at least five perspectives. The first one deals with the domestic sources of Indian foreign policy and nuclear policy, and the relationship between ideological and security concerns in Indian foreign relations since 1947. The second deals with the shift in India’s arms control and nuclear policy -- from the 1950s when the emphasis was on nuclear disarmament and international security, to the mid-1960s when the emphasis was to preserve and to develop the nuclear option, and to promote national security. The third perspective contrasts this shift with a persisting element, in India's nuclear policy, namely, the opposition to international control over all Indian nuclear activities. The fourth perspective is theoretical and it concerns the deficiency or the in-applicability of the concept 'decision' in the study of Indian foreign and security policies. The fifth perspective deals with the nature of the international system and the problem of conceptualising its transformation after 1945.

This study proves beyond doubt that there has been a substantial transformation in the nature and style of India's arms control diplomacy. This change became noticeable.
during 1964-68 over the question of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. The effect of this change seems to be a lasting one and it is noteworthy in the post-1968 Indian arms control diplomacy. India has declined to sign the sea-bed treaty (1971), it delayed signing bacteriological weapons treaty (1972) and it seems to have lost interest in collateral arms control measures. As one reputable analyst notes, after 1968 India has become nationalist; it projects a reduced sense of urgency on disarmament matters; it does not care for collateral measures as it used to before 1964; it is not interested in active involvement in disarmament; it is not interested in performing as a mediator or as a superpower helper; instead, it has become more insistent in projecting its reservations; overall, it is taking a fundamentalist position on the question of 'balance', 'equity' and 'discrimination' between the nuclear weapons Powers and the non-nuclear weapons Powers.

It is obvious that the post-1968 changes became manifest after 1964. Less obvious and more controversial however, are the roots of these changes. This study has

drawn on two obvious hypotheses from the Western literature on this subject. The first one considers the nationalism in Indian arms control policy in terms of the challenges to Indian security posed by Pakistan and China, particularly after 1962. The second one considers India's nuclear policy and arms control policy in relation to Indian domestic politics. The first type of hypothesis directs attention to the role of external developments in India's regional security environment. The second type of hypothesis directs attention to the role of domestic politics and to the influence of domestic groups in foreign policy and defence policy making.

This study explores in depth the second hypothesis to show that it is essentially a null hypothesis. The first hypothesis seems more relevant for the study of India's nuclear policy but our analysis points to a need to revise, to modify and to amplify that hypothesis.

There are reasons for doing this. The Indian foreign policy and arms control focus does not rest entirely on the security problems posed by Pakistan and China. Our overview

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This statement is subject to the qualification noted in chapter 5. That is, the direct influence of the unofficial Indian publics -- the intellectuals and political parties -- on the foreign and defence policy process seems slight but there are covert channels of access to the policy circles and there are opportunities to influence existing policy. But providing this is quite another matter.
of the early history of Indian foreign relations is sufficient to show that the Indian attitudinal framework has been, and still is, concerned more with the problem of the superpowers -- the need to get their attention and to channel it in directions which support Indian aims -- rather than only with threats from Pakistan and China. There is a measure of truth in Krishna Menon's view (in his lengthy interview with Michael Brecher) that the problem was not a local one; that is, it was not merely an India-Pakistan problem but rather it was an international one; that is, it was a problem of intensive American involvement on Pakistan's behalf which inevitably hurt Indian political and security interests, in the sub-continent and globally.

Similarly, too much should not be made of Indian propaganda statements about the dangers of an expansionist China. On this point there seems to be a gap between Indian 'talk' and India's actual behavior vis-a-vis China. Moreover, there is a gap between Indian 'talk' in Geneva and the talk in New Delhi. The New Delhi signals -- particularly the unofficial ones -- refer to the dangers of Chinese expansionism; the official New Delhi signals are however, more restrained; and finally, the Indian signals which emerged from Geneva in 1965-68 emphasised that China was a problem but not an immediate military problem. Assuming that decision-makers usually enjoy some leeway in exaggerating security
threats, it would have been easy for Indian spokesmen (or spokespersons!) to over-emphasise the China problem. Yet, it is ironical that Western writers refer to the centrality of the China problem in India's nuclear policy whereas Indians do not give China the same prominence.

In assessing the 'roots of change' in India's behavior during 1964-68 it is important therefore, to clearly distinguish between two questions: Did the change refer only to India's overt behavior, its overt strategy? Or was the change more fundamental -- a change in the policy premise -- from the 1940s and 1950s to the 1960s? Admittedly this author's ability to raise questions far exceeds his ability to answer them, but it is important to face these questions squarely.

Several tentative conclusions can be drawn from the argument and evidence presented in this study. One major root of India's foreign policy is the problem of establishing a viable connection with the two superpowers. This root goes into the late 1940s and the early 1950s. India's approach to disarmament during the 1950s was based on a need to strengthen this type of a relationship; that is, a relationship within the India-U.S. and Indo-Soviet dyads where the partners were materially unequal. The mediatory style of India's arms control policy reflected a concern to strengthen Indian political and symbolic ties with the superpowers.
The change in the N.P.T. debate was a change in style, a change in strategy, rather than a change in the policy premise. The policy premise reflected a continuity in its application, during the 1950s and the 1960s. The premise dealt with India's need to become a nuclear power without international controls on its activities. The policy premise was to secure the aid of the superpowers.

During the 1950s Canada provided sophisticated technology, sophisticated nuclear equipment and materials to India. It performed the role of a superpower vis-a-vis India, i.e., as a helper to a developing country. Yet Canada could not perform completely as a superpower, that is, it could not make or alter the 'rules' about international control of atomic energy. In the 1960s India's interest in Canada did not decline because it continued to offer material assistance to India. But in the 1950s and the 1960s India's interest in the U.S. declined once the expectation of receiving U.S. aid, negatively and positively, failed to materialise. When this expectation changed, the need to be diplomatically nice to the U.S. also changed. On the other hand, there could be a pay-off with the U.S.S.R.; if India

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Negatively means the absence of American barriers to India's security policies. Positive means active American assistance to further Indian political and security aims.
was rude towards the U.S. and failed to support its arms control aims. This strategy was based on the premise that Soviet-American relations involved some zero sum activity in arms control and military policy.

Tracing the roots of change in the policy premise and/or strategy in arms control is a complex activity. Relating India’s arms control and nuclear policies to the problems in India’s regional strategic environment e.g., problems with Pakistan and China, is necessary but not sufficient and one therefore, needs to analyse the roots of change in Indo-U.S. and Indo-Soviet relations. To do this comprehensively one needs to trace the history of Indo-U.S., Indo-Soviet, India-China and India-Pakistan relations and relate each change to the evolution of arms control and nuclear policy. This task is clearly beyond the scope of the present study. However, this is a direction which one might take if the focus of the present study is valid.

This problem of conceptualisation is raised because the validity of the linkage between Image and Decision as described by Brecher, depends on the conceptual focus. The problem here is not merely one of hypothesising the existence of decisions if the images are known. Rather this study points to a problem of specifying the Image itself, i.e., the Image held by the decision-makers. If one thinks of Indian nuclear policy in terms of Indian images of China, then clearly the decision-making imperatives are likely
to be based on Indian fears, perceptions and mis-perceptions of a nuclear armed China. In this case the focus is likely to center on an effort to secure a military response to a military problem. If on the other hand, one thinks of India's nuclear policy in terms of its perceptions, fears and mis-perceptions of the superpowers, then the responses by India are likely to be political rather than military ones. Clearly, in the evolving Indian nuclear policy both types of responses are inherent. In its origins and its evolution during the 1940s and the 1950s, Indian attitudes on atomic energy were guided by concerns to make India a nuclear power, to utilise atomic power to modernise India, and to use Indian diplomacy as a barrier against American attempts to secure international control of atomic energy of countries like India. As such the Indian approach to atomic energy was rooted in its developmental needs and its political needs towards the superpowers. In the 1960s however, we see the emergence of an additional policy focus, viz., to promote Indian security.

Admittedly there are differences in India's attitude towards arms control and atomic energy towards the superpowers. These have been noted in preceding chapters. In particular one aspect requires emphasis. After 1963, one finds that Indian responses against the United States were relevant also against the Soviet Union, even though there has been cooperation between India and the Soviet Union in the field of space and communications technology and cooperation between India and the United States in the field of reactor technology using enriched uranium.
Some argue that the change in India's behavior after 1964 -- from its mediatory style before 1964 and its revisionist style after 1964 -- is an 'evolution' while other argue that this is a basic shift, a basic re-orientation, a basic transformation of India's nuclear strategy. Both ideas are correct. India's nuclear behavior after 1964 represents an evolution; its behavior on the question of international control over nuclear energy projects of developing countries after 1964 has been traced to pre-1964 Indian behavior. But at the same time in another respect, there is a shift, a transformation, from the pre-1964 strategy seeking a world order based on nuclear disarmament. Clearly, after 1964 and particularly after 1968, Indians have lost interest in the probability that there will be a disarmed world order, in the foreseeable future. The Soviet-American relationship is clouded with complexities and uncertainties which do not permit rapid disarmament. Therefore, the question arises if Indians are now trying to structure their contribution to the world order by strengthening their ability to act unilaterally -- as was done in 1971 -- to alter the setting.

The pre-1964 approach was based on the willingness and ability of the superpowers to act constructively on behalf of the world community. The post-1964 approach questions the ability and the right of the superpowers to
achieve security for all rather than their own security. In the latter approach there seems to be sharper perception of the zero sum quality of India’s relationship with the United States in particular, and to a lesser extent with the Soviet Union, because the interdependencies with the Soviet Union are wider and deeper, extending into economic, military and political areas.

This complexity or duality in the lines of continuity and shift in India’s arms control and nuclear policies points to a need for caution in predicting the future direction of India’s nuclear option or even in making statements of fact about the past. The views of two extremely knowledgeable Western commentators provide a useful basis for conceptualising India’s nuclear behavior. Richard N. Rosecrance notes convincingly, that the ability to produce a Bomb is not necessarily an Nth country problem, that is, there are significant gaps between capacity to build a bomb, capacity to mount a delivery system and to marry capacity to intent to go nuclear. This study shows that Indians have demonstrated considerable caution, a considerable deliberation in their nuclear strategy. Statements that the N.P.T. offered a “final opportunity to reconsider the problem of nuclear proliferation before a world of nuclear irresponsibility

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is upon us," are either rash or premature at least in the case of India. Such statements reflect a psychology of dominoes and such speculations - of chain reactions between the 6th to the 16th nuclear power, -- either represent policy-oriented propaganda or naïvety, or a misreading of the actual policy process of the potential horizontal proliferators.

In other words, the theory of gate-crashing by the 6th nuclear power, just because there are five other nuclear powers, is false and the premise of nuclear dominoes is not helpful in assessing the intentions of a country like India.

However, on the other hand, the Indian nuclear option is hardly a dead thing. Leonard Beaton noted in 1962 that the question of credibility of superpower help was a "putative father of any new nuclear weapons programme." By 1964-1967 this question had been asked by India and no convincing answer was received, whatever the reasons may be. Moreover, the Indian nuclear option is relatively free of legal and binding constraints. In fact, India is, comparatively speaking, outside the I.A.E.A. system. It has accepted a transfer of

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7 Beaton and Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 149.
its contractual obligations with Canada to the I.A.E.A. but this refers to controls on nuclear fuels and not to all Indian nuclear activities. Thirdly, China has yet to test its ICBM and if this test is carried into the Indian Ocean it may radicalise the Indian nuclear debate and create pressure for a weapons decision.

Our analysis has two major theoretical implications. The decision concept is hard to apply to the case of India's nuclear policy. Brecher's contention that Prime Minister Shastri decided against the Bomb in 1964 does not say much because the preceding history of India's nuclear policy suggests that Nehru and Bhabha decided on the one hand to press for nuclear disarmament, and, on the other hand to give India an option to develop nuclear weapons. In other words, there were at least two decisions made during the 1950s. To argue that Shastri decided against nuclear weapons raises a question whether the 1964 'decision' was really a new decision, a reiteration of the old decisions or a modification of the old decisions. This study indicates that nothing.

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8 See the comment by Arnold Kramish, in Rosecrance, op.cit., p. 269.

9 Beaton and Maddox, op.cit., p. 141 note that India had an option to produce a nuclear device in 1963 "in case this should become politically or militarily necessary."
really changed after 1964 so far as the Nehru-Bhabha decisions of the 1950s were concerned. This inference is based on confidential interviews with officials familiar with or involved in Indian nuclear policy making. In other words, the application of the concept of decision is highly problematic unless the researcher can confidentially make statements of fact.

The second major implication of this study concerns the relationship between nuclear weapons and foreign policy and the effect of nuclear weapons on the international system. Much of the discussion against the further spread of nuclear weapons (horizontal proliferation) is based on the premise that new centers of nuclear power are likely to alter the existing pattern(s) of stability. This premise itself depends on another premise, that is, the existing global balance depends on the two superpowers and their deterrent power. Both premises suggest that international stability depends on the strategic power of the nuclear superpowers. These premises are questionable because a world of five nuclear powers -- including China which at times was cited as an example of an irresponsible power, seems to be just as stable as a world of two superpowers. In other words, does it really make a difference if there are two or five nuclear powers? Does international stability really depend on the cooperation of the superpowers?
It is true, as Schelling maintains, that to bargain one needs the power to hurt. In view of the precedents supporting the non-use of nuclear weapons in the Korean War, the Indo-China wars, the Middle Eastern conflicts, over Berlin and Cuba, the barriers against the use of nuclear weapons are formidable ones. At the same time however, there is an argument that even if nuclear weapons are militarily useless, there is a political value in their nonuse. However, it is an open question whether nuclear weapons transformed the international system -- as Arthur Lee Burns argued, or whether there is an on-going and a subtle transformation of the international system because of the emergence of new policy centers -- which highlight the uses of conventional military and economic instruments of influence. In either case one needs to note Klaus Knorr's admonition that "power is an effect"; it is "influence actually enjoyed"; it is an outcome of interaction and an encounter. If this is so, it is doubtful if the categories 'superpowers', 'great powers', 'middle powers' or 'small powers' carry much meaning in the study of international relations of the 1970s.
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