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THE STRUCTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ONTARIO'S MICHIGAN ATTACKS
A THEORETICAL EXAMINATION

University — Université
CARLETON UNIVERSITY

Degree for which thesis was presented — Grade pour lequel cette thèse fut présentée
MASTER OF ARTS

Year this degree conferred — Année d'obtention de ce grade
1984

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The Structure of Local Government in Ontario's Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Examination

By

Taras Myhal

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Department of Political Science
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September 1984
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"THE STRUCTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ONTARIO'S
METROPOLITAN AREAS: A THEORETICAL EXAMINATION"

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ABSTRACT

Local governments are said to fulfill the three primary political values of liberty (local autonomy), participation and efficiency. The thesis analyzes the lack of an equilibrium among the three stated values in the traditional structure of local government in metropolitan areas of Ontario, and in the two-tier regional governments which were recently implemented by the province. A preferred approach is offered emphasizing restructuring through the adjustment of municipal boundaries and functions, suggesting a better equilibrium of values and regard for emerging demographic trends affecting the urban form of Ontario's metropolitan centres. The disbandment of the regional governments is proposed; and replacement by a single-tier of moderately-sized municipal units in metropolitan areas. Continued urbanization would be handled by the technique of annexations and amalgamations, while metropolitan co-ordination would be effected by a regional co-ordinating body as well as through special purpose bodies.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The completion of this thesis has been greatly assisted by my supervisor, Professor Caroline Andrew of the Department of Political Science at the University of Ottawa, to whom I owe my deepest thanks and appreciation. Also, I would like to thank Professor Donald Rowat of Carleton University for his advice and assistance. I owe thanks as well to my parents, Boris and Helen Myhal, for their support and encouragement, and to my sister Natalie for her suggestions and inspiration. In addition, I would like to thank Michèle Méranger for her diligent effort in typing the final copy of this thesis.
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CHAPTER ONE
This initial section of the thesis will outline those theoretical political issues which surround the question of emergent local government structures and organization. The purpose of the discussion is to show that local government restructuring cannot be viewed merely as a sensible attempt by central governments at solving the many difficulties related to the urbanization process, although this certainly is a consideration. Instead, local government must be seen as being a component subsystem of the national political system and therefore is home to a host of political factors which influence the process of local government restructuring.

What then are these political factors which impact on the local government restructuring process? To answer this enquiry, it is necessary to begin by restating the premise that local governments are not merely administrative bodies that discharge public goods, but are political units with a wide array of powers which can be used to allocate resources in a society. But these local political units vary in territorial size and in their number of powers, and do not naturally correspond to socio-economically integrated urban regions.

Initially, a case will be presented that this arrangement is not without a sensible basis seeing that national, and provincial or state political forces have precluded an 'urban region' -based local government system from emerging. Further, it will be pointed out that to more deeply understand the rationale behind a non-urban region-based local government arrangement, one must also delve back into the basic raison d'etre for which local governments exist. That being, to be an integral component in the division of governmental power and
help discharge basic political values of liberty, participation and efficiency. These values will return time and again throughout this thesis as the political foundation of local government restructuring.

Once singled out these three values can serve as the essential building blocks upon which theories of optimum local government structure can be constructed. For while the non-unified traditional local government structure is not necessarily inadequate in the discharge of the above political values, it may not perform this role in the best possible manner. But it must also be remembered that with respect to our values, the socio-economically urban region may not be the optimum political unit either. Thus, local government theorists have arrived at three separate models of restructured local government arrangements, each one emphasizing different values. These theorists have also made use of a host of restructuring techniques which may be employed to see the local government models into fruition.

While these 'optimum' arrangements then would appear to provide the answer to the local government structural problem, in fact there exist a variety of forces which prevent the models from being implemented. On the one hand, these include the powerful forces which benefit from the continuation of the traditional local government system. On the other hand, there are the obvious problems of local government, which despite the ideal model format, the new models have inherent in them.

Let us initially begin our discussion by examining the national forces which prevent a natural emergence of political regions based on larger metropolitan areas.
Regions and the National Political System:

This initial section on the definition of a political "region" is intended to show that there is no natural condition which joins a socio-economic urban region with a form of political status. There are both national and sub-metropolitan factors that have worked to impede the emergence of a regional political community based on socio-economic urban territory. It is necessary to understand this historically evolved situation so that there is no confusion over why metropolitan political boundaries did not suddenly emerge with a perceived need. Subsequently, the discussion will show that the perceived need for a metropolitan political community is based only on a superficial analysis, and does not address all of the political factors that should be considered. There is a need to balance political values through the use of local government structure and this takes away from the immediate tendency to enclose a metropolitan area with a political boundary. These issues, however, will be addressed later.

The concept of a political region is complex and can be seen by way of a wide spectrum of classifications. In Canada, many provinces grouped together, such as the Prairies, have been called a region; a single province like Quebec, or a part of a province as the lower mainland of British Columbia, have alternately been called regions. A useful division has been suggested by Sharpe, who has equated the idea of a political region with three main decentralist trends in Western democracies: neighbourhood councils, local government reorganization, and regional ethnic nationalism, progressing areally from the smallest to the largest.
Hence a political region within a national polity can take on a variety of different appearances. Sharpe's second category, that relating to metropolitan areas, represents but one of a number of possible sub-national political regions. Yet, since these urban regions do not have a historically-rooted political expression, it is extremely difficult for this form of region to become accepted into the larger political system.

More concretely stated, the nature of the existing global political system may prevent the expression of 'other-based' interests -- interests which are based on geographic boundaries other than those of the existing political units, such as in the case of metropolitan regions. In this regard, Hodgetts has made reference to the detrimental effect of the Canadian parliamentary system of government where the strictness of party discipline prevents the expression of regionally based communities of interest from developing, which in the Canadian case can be seen at the sub-provincial political level. It is the existence of a legitimate global system at the provincial level and its stabilizing effect that led Kaplan to conclude that the survival of larger urban areas is not in doubt even without the existence of political integration at a regional urban level.

In addition to this political competition from larger regional sub-systems, there are a number of centralizing societal trends which prevent a metropolitan regional orientation from emerging. These trends include the geographical mobility of the
population, the nationalization of politics, the emergence of a national communications system, the growth of disposable incomes, and so on, which have all served to homogenize popular culture at a national level.

Alternately, at the sub-metropolitan level, there is also competition with the larger urban region for political subsystem status. In this case, the traditional evolution of metropolitan regions as politically fragmented areas, has impeded a regional urban orientation from developing from below. The historical division of a central city from a cluster of independent suburban and ex-urban municipalities created local orientations based on neighbourhoods, wards or subdivisions rather than on entire urban areas. These sub-metropolitan interests have sought political expression at an extremely localized level without paying much attention to the development of a political subsystem at the regional urban level.

The lack of an institutionalized regional urban subsystem on political lines then stems from two directions: from above because of national societal trends and the immobility of the existing political order, and from below through the development of politically fragmented metropolitan areas. Therefore, since it does not appear that urban political regions will come about naturally, it serves our interests at this point to ask whether political urban regions are in fact at all necessary. The way to ascertain this is to search back into the theory of local government, by looking at the values for which ends local government exists, inasmuch as urban regions with political status would be seen as a form of local government. Once
the question of what delineates the essence of a political community is answered, then the query of what represents the optimum structural arrangement for a metropolitan area can be addressed.

Values in a Political Community:

Therefore, we can now ask: what are the political values which local governments help to promote? In answering this question, we will truly determine what constitutes a political community so that later these criteria may be used as the foundation for an optimum model of local government structural organization. When responding, it must be noted that local governments, intrinsically in that they are separate from central government, represent a means of dividing power; and the division of powers is important seeing that governments are empowered to make decisions, as Lasswell noted, as to "who gets what, when and how". Government is responsible for allocating resources; in fact, it can be viewed as the master system in this regard, as there are virtually no limits on what government can allocate. Since government has this degree of power, Friedrich noted that the "division of power is the basis of civilized government. It is what is meant by constitutionalism".

From a different perspective, the division of powers, according to Maass, helps implement the community values of liberty, equality and welfare.

"Local government promotes liberty in the sense, following Montesquieu, that it is a division of powers on an area basis which mitigates the power of the sovereign. It promotes equality in the political sense that it provides broad opportunities for citizens to participate in public policy. Finally, it promotes welfare in the sense that it provides agents that are apt for meeting the needs of society."
The second and third values have been brought into more contemporary usage by Dupre with the support of Sharpe, as 'participation' and 'efficiency'. These new terms more accurately convey the current sense of the values which local government serves to promote.

Prior to discussing liberty, participation and efficiency in greater detail, let us remember that there are other means in existence for promoting these political values. While the major focus of this paper is on local government or an areal division of powers (adp) between central and component governments, an alternative approach at least in principle also exists. That view, which if taken to the extreme could mean the abolition of all local governments, holds the view that the political values which local government helps to promote can be achieved through other means: namely, by a capital division of powers (cdp) which represents the division of powers between governmental officials and bodies of officials at the centre. Practically speaking though, at least in the case of most Western countries, both an adp and cdp are used to achieve an optimum realization of community values; hence the existence of local governments.

There is also a role played by actors outside of the formal structure of government: the non-governmental division of powers (NdP), which consists of groups associated with the social structure and the economy. The NdP helps to maintain the balance of community values insofar as the three categories of dividing power are highly interrelated. Consequently, if a government has evolved a combination, "that results in a very high, let us say optimum,
realization of community values, and a proposal is made to increase significantly the areal division of powers, non-governmental factor remaining the same...then it will be necessary for that government to reduce its division at the capital if it is to continue to enjoy a high fulfillment of its basic values. ⁸ Hence, the Ndp is a crucial component in the maintenance of a balance of values between the three ways of dividing power.

Let us now return to a closer examination of the three desired values of liberty, participation and efficiency. Ylvisaker has formulated three conclusions about these values: that there can be no argument over the importance of any of them, although no attempt has been made at ordering them; that all the values are compatible but only if tempered not maximized; and that adp helps realize the above values but that this occurs immeasurably and incrementally with the reinforcement of both cdp and Ndp. ⁹

But, variation in the significance placed on each of these stated values occurs amongst the Western industrial democracies. Let us first examine the case of liberty. Sharpe notes that even in the case of the two countries which have most influenced the structure of Canadian local government, the United States and United Kingdom there is a wide discrepancy as to the value of liberty. In the United States, local government serves, "to soften the impact of arbitrary State and National laws and regulations", while "in the British context...it is the central government that is cast in the role of softening arbitrariness...against the depredations of local authorities". ¹⁰ Liberty, then, as a value enhanced by local
government is very significant in the United States while it does not play such an important role in Britain.

In the United States, contingent upon the level of government, certain political values are being maximized while others are being neglected. Willbern maintains that in the case of state governments, liberty has been maximized at the expense of welfare (efficiency), while Woods looking at metropolitan areas sees the opposite taking place, welfare being given priority over liberty. Maass notes that both these authors' views can be supported. In the United Kingdom, participation and efficiency are viewed as most important, and especially the latter inasmuch as there is no intermediate level of government providing services. It is evident then that the mix of values varies from one polity to the next, as demonstrated above with the case of liberty.

In Canada, liberty as a salient value lies somewhere in between the American and British cases, as both of these polities have influenced Canadian local government. In order to better understand the particular mix of values in Canada, let us look at the broader influences which these two countries have had on the local government situation in Canada. It was in 1929 that Munro, with the original American reform movement in mind, remarked that,

"of all the branches of government in Canada, the government of the cities has proved the most susceptible to American influence. In the form and spirit of their government, Canadian cities
have been moving away from English standards and veering toward the organization and methods of municipalities in the United States.\textsuperscript{12}

It is for this reason that attempts at restructuring local government in the United States provide the main comparative focus to Canada in this thesis.

The one area where the British tradition remains strong in Canada is in the sphere of central-local relations: the closeness of the relationship between provincial governments and their component municipalities. In this area, the Canadian political culture varies from that of the American, having a history based in the British parliamentary tradition. As Lipset noted in his comparative analysis of Canada and the United States, "Canadian respect for authority may encourage provincial ministers and bureaucrats to act with greater decision and speed than do American state officials" on such matters as the restructuring of local governments.\textsuperscript{13} In addition, the legal and constitutional framework of central-local relations differs from the American case. Therefore, the 19th century 'home rule' crusade did not materialize in Canada as it did in the United States, where municipalities in some states were granted control over their own local constitution or form of government.\textsuperscript{14} To take a more modern example:

"Americans frequently blame their constitutional system of federalism and separation of powers for the difficulties of reorganizing local governments, and some look with envy on parliamentary systems
where metropolitan governments have been 'easily'
established, as in Toronto, elsewhere in Ontario,
and in Winnipeg, or in London and the rest of
Great Britain. 15

In general, Canadian provinces continue to exert a tighter and more
pervasive control over local governments than is the case with the
state governments in the United States.

What of the balance of values then in Canada viz-a-viz the
United States? To be sure, this is a very difficult question to
answer insofar as the values are troublesome to define much less
measure. It may be said though that to a large degree because of the
effect of the parliamentary tradition as explained above, the liberty
value in Canada has been de-emphasized. As a result, most studies of
local government in Canada now speak of its role as comprising just
two elements, those of service (efficiency) and access
(participation). 16

In the Western democracies, a commitment has been made to the
institution of local government in order to fulfill the requirements
of community values; hence an areal division of powers as well as a
division at the capital. But in Canada, local governments must share
in the adp not only with the central government but also with the ten
provinces. In fact, the constitutional arrangement is such that local
governments are legally subordinate to the provincial governments,
although as will be pointed out shortly, local governments have gained
a measure of autonomy. Nonetheless, it is unclear whether the
sought-after political values are being met by this form of legal
arrangement. Dupre has observed that while the relationship between the federal government and the provinces is based on constitutional law and hierarchical equality, the arrangement between provinces and their municipalities is couched in statutory law, an comprised of a superior body— the province—and subordinate bodies—the municipalities. It is therefore questionable whether the liberty value is truly being upheld in the Canadian case. Local autonomy may only be a myth if the provinces are the only true representatives of an adp in Canada. Furthermore, it would be incumbent upon the provinces to take the steps towards the fulfillment of the other values of participation and efficiency, since local governments have no constitutional role to do so.

As with the national government, the provincial governments would realize the political values through a division of powers of both a cdp and adp in process, functions and constituency. A cdp could involve the creation of an assortment of autonomous boards, agencies and commissions. The adp could take the form of regional administrative districts of various provincial departments, or more functionally diversified yet wholly dependent local governments.

While the constitutional arrangement in Canada would appear to suggest that local governments are wholly dependent on the provinces, in fact, the situation is not so clear-cut. Local governments do perform a greater role than the legal arrangement would imply. As Sharpe has noted, "...for it is precisely because local authorities are elected, and have independent sources of revenue that makes them different political animals to decentralized agents of a
central department." Yet the local government situation in Canada is not one of complete independence either. Their true status lies somewhere in between the constitutional reality of complete subjugation to the centre and total independence. Dupre has characterized provincial-municipal relations in Canada as, "...a pattern of super-fractionalized quasi-subordination." While, to be certain, the above relationship is an awkward one, it is nonetheless not necessarily detrimental to the values of the community. There is evidence that the three values of liberty, participation and efficiency are satisfied more fully in an intricate intergovernmental setting than in one where local government finds itself in isolation. For instance, in the case of the value of 'efficiency', "a public good can be conceived as appropriately 'packaged' if the boundaries of the unit of government providing the good are such that the externalities of the good are internalized to the public served." Similarly, the value of 'participation' requires a comprehensive intergovernmental structure; as Tocqueville noted - a town requires power and independence, yet with the effect of such an arrangement on the efficiency value always kept in mind. 'Liberty' too is enhanced when there are many levels of government in the sense that freedom from arbitrariness is realized, although on the negative side, the resultant complexity of government may serve to paralyze the process. In sum, though, the intergovernmental distribution of authority tends to help support the three values that local government is seeking to advance.
As quasi-independent bodies, local governments also strive, and are obliged by the province, to carry out the values of a community through a distribution of powers. Through the consent and action of the provincial governments, power is divided at the local level by way of an adp and cdp in process, functions and constituency.

The cdp involves the division of powers between various bodies of officials at the political and administrative levels. At the local level, attempts at instituting divisions of power at the capital could include political ones such as through boards of control, indirect or direct elections of councillors, and so on. Administrative divisions of power at the capital potentially include the creation of new, umbrella departments; or the shift of policy units from one department to the next. At the level of the political-administrative interface, the division of powers could be shifted by the inclusion of new institutions such as committees of department heads, or chief administrative officers.

As for the areal division of powers, traditionally, the greatest division occurred through the provincially-sanctioned formation and incorporation of independent suburban municipalities, which divided power in metropolitan areas. Provinces have also rearranged boundaries between municipalities and created, in some instances, supra-local, amalgamated or federated governments all serving to effect a change in the local adp. Further, local governments have instituted ward systems or special purpose boards that have reflected territorially distinct community interest.
In the above section, there has been an attempt at describing the values of a political community, and in delineating the institutions whereby these values are executed in a governmental system. Particular emphasis was placed on the local level of government in metropolitan areas, since for the purposes of this paper it has been accepted as necessary in the diffusion of the desired community values. It remains now to be seen whether the traditional structure of local government in metropolitan areas can be improved upon, given the theoretical basis for local government which has just been presented.

The Paradigms of Restructuring:

The matter which must now be addressed is concerned with the operationalization of the concepts of local government restructuring in metropolitan areas. The discussion will take the following course: it will begin with an account of the theoretical context for restructuring from the socio-economic and political value perspectives from which will emerge the pre-requisites for reform. These pre-requisites will then be translated into concrete, structural indicators of local governmental structural organization - a proper areal distribution of powers and jurisdictional unit size. These indicators will be the fundamental blocks upon which the discussion of the three main approaches or paradigms of restructured local government will proceed. As will be seen, the three major paradigms of restructuring are the consolidationist, two-tier, and polycentric approaches respectively.
Let us begin by briefly restating the most relevant facts which have led to an interest in local government restructuring. In Chapter Two, the need to alter the traditional political arrangement of metropolitan regions will be fully developed from a socio-economic perspective. Issues range from broader national problems such as the loss of agricultural lands, to localized issues such as that of value conflicts between urban and rural residents in the fringes of larger cities. All of these difficulties could be seen as stemming from the rapid growth of urban regions.

Yet, there is also a specific class of metropolitan problems which emerges from the structural framework of local government. This set of problems stems directly from the fragmented political arrangement of metropolitan communities. There are three basic types of rationalization required to solve these administrative problems: 23 efficiency — to promote economies of scale, avoid duplicating services, and the co-ordination of public resources on an area-wide basis; equity — which is involved in matching capacity of local jurisdictions with need, such as equalizing the burden of taxes and levels of basic services between central cities and suburbs; and administrative — acknowledging the need for logistical reasons to decrease the staggering number of local governments in existence. Other reasons cited for desired change because of the traditional local governmental structural arrangement include the inadequacy of citizen involvement and political accountability; and the difficulty in taking on new projects such as public housing and economic development in a fragmented governmental structure.
Having enumerated these problems, one must also not lose sight of the political perspective; the goal of satisfying the values of a political community: liberty, participation and efficiency. It was suggested that these values could be realized by a government either through an adp or cdp. Yet, as was just mentioned above, there are certain practical reasons for restructuring based on the problems associated with the structure of local government in itself. These problems require an emphasis to be placed on restructuring, or on the areal division of powers, rather than on reorganization or the division of powers at the capital.

Let us now turn our attention to a theoretically proper areal distribution of powers, and the proper size of a local government - two indicators which directly correspond to functions and areal structure. Honey has called these indicators the systemic and scale requirements of the spatial organization of local government:

"Collectively, the multiple objectives which the local government structure is expected to fulfill form extremum problems: local government large enough to be effective, small enough to be accessible, enough levels to allow the performance of functions at appropriate levels, few enough to permit coordination and establish priorities, jurisdictions wide enough for area-wide control close enough for community control."24

It must be understood though that while some activities can better be handled locally, while others are best done on an area-wide basis, this does not in itself suggest a disposition to any particular paradigm of metropolitan governance. While there is clearly a multiplicity of services each with its own optimum service area, should the requirement of the service needing the largest unit
dictate the size of new authorities at the cost of possibly creating unnecessarily large authorities for other services? In fact, there are four variables which can be manipulated under the two general indicators of the proper areal distribution of powers and jurisdictional size. These are: 1) the number of levels of service; 2) the number of authorities at each level; 3) the assigned jurisdiction (area) of each authority; and 4) the distribution of functions among levels.

Taking into account the values which a local government aids in promoting, the United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (A.C.I.R.) has arrived at six criteria of local government structural organization which it believes would be applicable for urban-type functions in a metropolitan area. They include: first, a governmental jurisdiction should be large enough to allow the benefits from that service to be consumed primarily within that jurisdiction. Second, a unit of government should be large enough to achieve economies of scale. Third, a local government should have a geographic area of jurisdiction adequate for effective performance. Fourth, the unit should have the legal and administrative ability to perform the services assigned to it. Fifth, the jurisdictional area should be given a sufficient number of functions so that it provides a forum for the resolution of conflicting interests, with significant responsibility for balancing governmental needs and resources. Sixth, the performance of functions by a unit of government should be assigned to that level of government.
which maximizes the conditions and opportunities for active citizen participation but still permits adequate performance.

Since 1963 when the A.C.I.R. initially published these criteria, several new considerations have emerged; including such issues as public sector equity, public service competition, public sector differentiation, increased regulation and discretionary assignments. The Smith Commission in Ontario published similar criteria to those of the A.C.I.R., but these were meant to serve specifically as the basis for a two-tier, regional government scheme in Ontario. These criteria will be examined separately in Chapter 3 when the two-tier program in the province will come under scrutiny.

Hence, in the present day framework, criteria for the areal distribution of powers can be divided into two flanks: first, those favouring the provincial/state or regional level, and second, those favouring the local level. The A.C.I.R. has concluded that apropos of the distribution of powers, criteria favouring the provincial/state or regional level include: economies of scale, fiscal equalization, economic externalities and geographic adequacy; while criteria favouring the local level consist of service competition, citizen access and control, and citizen participation.28 Let us now see how these criteria translate into specific functions.

Honey's idea of 'system organization' is applicable to the proper distribution of functions on an areal basis. The key systemic questions are those of distributional and jointness efficiency; the former referring to 'efficiency for a collective as a whole -- how
closely does the provision of a service match the demand for the service over the collectivity, and how cost effective is the provision of the service and the latter to, "the correspondence between an individual's demand and supply curves and the actual costs and benefits generated by the service." Using these concepts, Honey concludes that those services that are labour-intensive, which depend on face-to-face contact such as police, welfare, education and recreation should be handled locally. Alternately, capital-intensive services such as traffic flow, water supply and disposal, and airports, can be handled best on a regional basis. A more complete distribution, showing activities which can or cannot be handled on a local basis, has been recently developed by Hallman, and has been reproduced in Appendix 1.

Let us now turn our attention over to the question of size. Naturally, in our discussion of the proper distribution of functions, the question of size was implicitly taken into consideration. Now, it will be examined in itself.

According to Dearlove, an orthodoxy exists among local government observers which equates 'efficiency' with large jurisdictional size. The orthodoxy of opinion stems from the belief that larger units can attract 'men of calibre', take advantage of economies of scale, and from benefits of specialization such as with the division of labour. However, the issue of size is much more complex than that. Let us focus on the question of scale. Using Honey's framework, there
are two main concepts which are relevant to the discussion: threshold, which states that minimum jurisdictional size is necessary to permit effective use of resources; and accessibility, which suggests that the ease of obtaining services or contacting representatives depends on small jurisdictions. Threshold and accessibility arguments are really subsets of economies of scale problems: threshold, as unit cost is the key, stresses increasing economies of scale; while accessibility, because the focus is on individual differences in demand, emphasizes decreasing economies of scale.

As Honey found with systemic efficiency in the distribution of functions, Hawkins came to a similar conclusion in the case of jurisdictional size: namely, that economies of scale are usually realized in those services that are capital-intensive but are negligible in those functions that are labour-intensive. In the case of these labour-intensive services such as schools, fire and police protection, larger machines cannot be substituted for labour and it is very difficult to achieve managerial scale economies.

The question of scale or size encompasses two separate dimensions, those of territory and population. The distance factor associated with local government in rural areas can be downplayed since the discussion in this paper is only interested in local government in metropolitan regions. This permits a concentration on population.

It must now be asked: what is the optimum population size of a multifunctional local unit of government. While Woolf found,
"...that population size, on its own, accounted for only a small proportion of the difference between local authorities . provision of services", numerous authors have nevertheless attempted to arrive at a possible figure.³⁴ Dahl has surveyed this literature and has come to,

"the conclusion that the all-round optimum size for a contemporary American city is probably somewhere between 50,000 and 200,000, which even taking the larger figure, may be within the threshold for wide citizen participation ... (and) there is, for example, no worthwhile evidence that there are any significant economies of scale in city governments for cities over about 50,000".³⁵

The two indicators, first the division of power by functions on an areal basis; and second, the size of jurisdictional communities, should be seen as the building blocks upon which paradigms of optimum local government structural organization in metropolitan areas may be built. It must be remembered too that underlying these two indicators are the basic values of a community: specifically, liberty, participation and efficiency, which should be included as part of any restructuring equation.

Three main paradigms of local government structural organization emerge along a continuum from most centralized to least centralized: namely, the consolidationist, the two-tier, and polycentric approaches.³⁶ Each one will now be examined individually.

Consolidationist

The first paradigm of local government restructuring has alternately been called the unification approach, consolidationist or single-tier metropolitan government. Structurally, it is the most
simple of the three approaches: all governmental functions are consolidated into one large governmental unit with one large administration operating on a region-wide basis.

The size of the consolidated unit is large. Suburban municipalities, and in most cases special districts, cease to exist, which effectively results in the central city expanding to become the government of the entire area. Some local service districts at the sub-metropolitan level may be formed, with each district having its own taxation rate. However, these bodies are strictly controlled by the single, region-wide authority.

The rationale for the consolidationist position stems from Woodrow Wilson's turn of the century precept that, "the more power is divided, the more irresponsible it becomes". In more contemporary terms, consolidation would allow the local authorities to: 1) even out fiscal and service inequities by drawing on the resources of the entire metropolitan area; 2) co-ordinate policy for the entire region so that one community would not create externalities for nearby communities through its self-serving policies; and 3) plan intelligently for region-wide development optimizing land-use decisions, co-ordinating policies to reduce the brunt of decay, and manage growth at the periphery. Moreover, a single authority would be more accountable: with clear lines of responsibility citizens would be able to hold public officials directly responsible for their actions. Hence, a metropolitan-wide political process would be likely to emerge.
In summary, the consolidationist position can be stated in this fashion. First, that metropolitan areas represent a single, unified community linked by social and economic ties, but they are carved into fragmented sections. Second, the joint action of the fragmented units cannot deal with the needs of such a community. Hence, the welfare of this community can be successfully realized only through the creation of an integrated governmental structure in which all decision-making authority is located within one single, hierarchical jurisdiction.

Two-Tier

The two-tier approach to local government structural reorganization has also been known by an assortment of names: federative, confederal, district, metropolitan or regional government to name a few. However, in the case of two-tier structures, each name has a somewhat different meaning attached to it.

Essentially though, in each of the two-tier approaches, the structures are similar to each other. There are two (and in rare instances three) tiers of general purpose or multi-functional special purpose government. An upper-tier usually covers the entire metropolitan area, and sometimes may extend into the rural commuting zone. The lower-tier units usually vary in size. Often, under the two-tier model, these smaller units are envisioned to remain the same territorially as they were before the creation of a second tier; while at other times, they are restructured to be more similar amongst themselves in area and population.
It is in the distribution of powers that the differences between the various two-tier approaches begins to emerge. Two basic directions are followed: the federal and the confederal. In the federal approach, the two tiers of local government are considered to be equal, with both units having their own revenue source. In the confederal approach, the lower-tier level emerges as dominant, and the upper-tier is restricted mainly to performing a multi-purpose special district role. In the confederal case, some form of regional council will nevertheless be created, although its functions are usually small. In both the federal and confederal cases, single function special districts are discouraged.

The functions which were earlier enumerated as being optimum at the area-wide level, either at the provincial/state or regional levels (see Appendix 1) will belong to the upper-tier level in the two-tier approach. In addition, the upper-tier will have a co-ordinating role. Hence, in all two-tier structures, the upper-tier unit will assume functions that involve regulations, redistribution, and economies of scale, mediate inter-local functional conflicts, and co-ordinate local decisions with an area-wide impact.39

The rationale for two-tier organization also speaks of taking advantage of both centralization and decentralization, such as "...adapting metropolitan governmental structures to allow the solution of regional concerns and at the same time encouraging local communities to retain their individual identities."40 In terms of jurisdictions then, the United States Committee on Economic
Development has noted that, "some functions should be assigned in their entirety to the area-wide government, others to the local level, but most will be assigned in part to each level." The two-tier system then is not as rational as at first glance it may appear to be.

In summary, two-tier proponents claim that the system: 1) will encourage and provide citizens with greater access to the decision-making process; 2) ensure political rather than administrative solutions for area-wide problems; 3) create less tolerance for local policy decisions that have unfavourable metropolitan ramifications; and for area-wide policies that are highly detrimental to local communities; 4) provide systematic and co-ordinated rather than ad hoc solutions to metropolitan problems; and 5) encourage a planned division of labour among the three levels of government.42

Polycentric

The polycentric paradigm to a large degree represents the traditional evolution of metropolitan local government structure. The difference lies in the effectiveness of the arrangement. In the paradigm the various techniques associated with it work effectively; but, traditionally, this has not always been the case.

The polycentric approach has come to be known by an assortment of different names, including the following: public economy, public choice, ecumenical and cafeteria approaches. As implied in these titles, protagonists of this paradigm advocate a
local government structure with a large number of general-purpose governments existing in a metropolitan region, each with its own package of private goods and public services.

Yet, not all of the services could be efficiently provided by some of the smaller general-purpose authorities, and some region-wide functions could not be supplied by the central city. Therefore, the public choice school believes that multiple agencies should be created, usually single-function of both large and small size, with overlapping jurisdictions; so that, "...a governmental system of multiple, overlapping jurisdictions can take advantage of diverse economies of scale for different public services." The different size requisites of labour and capital intensive goods is thereby acknowledged.

The proponents of the paradigm rationalize their structure by noting that all individuals are motivated by self-interest, but have different preferences for services. These citizen demands then, are more precisely indicated in smaller, not larger, political units, and in units undertaking fewer, not a greater number of governmental functions. Consequently,

"to satisfy these varying preferences, the theory advocates a polycentric method of assigning governmental functions and advances the advantages of an ad hoc bargained approach in understanding a governmental system." In summary, the advantages of a polycentric system are:

1) the protection of jurisdictional and individual independence in the performance of urban functions; 2) its responsiveness to the diverse public goods demands of a metropolitan community; 3) its emphasis on bargained and co-operative co-ordination of functional activity;
and 4) its creation of an open system of multiple access to area-wide local jurisdictions.46

The three approaches outlined above demarcate theoretical positions on the optimum arrangement of local government in urban regions. But to realize these formulations, changes must be made to the existing local government structure. These changes, which can be wholesale or piecemeal, are carried out by central governments through an assortment of restructuring techniques. These restructuring techniques represent the direct means through which the goals of restructuring theories can be realized. Yet, restructuring devices inasmuch as they are applied in the real world not in a hypothesized model, do not always correspond directly with the roles envisioned for them in terms of the three models. Hence, it is important to look at the techniques individually, apart from any roles which they may have in the hypothetical models, in order to garner a truer understanding of their applicability in the reform of local government structure.

Restructuring Techniques:

The discussion now turns to an examination of the techniques, instruments or devices of local government restructuring; all names which characterize the procedures of effecting structural change. The techniques have applicability to one or more of the paradigms described above. It must be re-emphasized that this analysis deals primarily with the areal division of powers and the jurisdictional distribution of functions. Hence, an important device in rationalizing the local government situation such as the fiscal tool will be
dealt with in lesser detail than the structural techniques. The emphasis on structural techniques only serves to reinforce the focus of the analysis on the areal distribution of powers; it does not in any way take away from the significance of other methods of rationalizing local government such as the fiscal instrument. It will be in the final, subsequent section of this chapter, that an attempt will be made at integrating, and explaining the salience of the various paradigms and their component techniques, in the context of the sought-after values of local government and in terms of the other means of dividing power.

In our overview in the first chapter, the evolution of local government structures in metropolitan areas was retraced as it developed into a system which was lacking in rationality. Both for Canada, and even more so the United States, Danielson noted that, "accommodation rather than revolution is the normal pattern of adjustment to urban growth and change." It was an incremental, ad hoc approach then, which characterized the evolution of local government in metropolitan areas. This piecemeal development brought with it the use of a diverse assortment of restructuring devices.

In the United States, a chronological examination of these techniques would show that: 1) annexations and amalgamations were employed initially as cities expanded outwards; 2) metropolitan special districts were then formed for independent activities; 3) metropolitan planning bodies emerged, although they were lacking in
significant powers; and 4) in the past twenty years, councils of
governments or confederations have been formed. In Canada,
the process progressed further with the creation of two-tier
general-purpose governments in some provinces, and even the creation
of a restructured, one-tier metropolitan government in Winnipeg,
Manitoba.

But the chronological emergence of new devices in no way
precluded the utilization of existing techniques, such as annexations,
from further use. Hence, a plethora of structural devices are used in
present-day restructuring efforts. Also, a number of procedural and
fiscal devices are used, such as intergovernmental transfers of
functions, the use of extraterritorial powers, grants and so on. This
latter group represents changes which do not affect the areal
alignment of local government structures, but does affect the juris-
dictional distribution of powers.

The ensuing discussion will analyze the structural,
procedural and fiscal devices separately, with reference made to which
paradigm of restructuring they have the greatest applicability.

Structural

The structural instruments are presented first, beginning
with the ones most suitable to a centralized structure of local
government; then followed by devices which are more appropriate to a
decentralized pattern of local government structure. Structural
techniques may include either the realignment of certain local
government boundaries or the creation of new jurisdictions, councils
or bodies.
Annexations - Annexations, and the closely associated counterpart, amalgamations, are instruments of expansion. They involve the addition of adjoining territory, at least in most cases, to a given 'annexing' municipality. The term annexation is used when the territory that is being annexed exists in an unincorporated form, or if the territory to be annexed constitutes only a portion of another incorporated municipality. The term amalgamation is applied when two or more municipalities join together to become a single municipality. Annexations are not used to effect a transfer of jurisdictional authority from one body to another, but the newly annexed territory will fall under the entire jurisdiction of the annexing municipality.

The use of annexations dates back to the previous century, and continued to be a popular means of restructuring both in Canada and the United States. Nadwodny states that: "annexation has become the most commonly employed technique in Canada to promote the orderly growth of urban fringes and providing a balanced assessment to maintain a proper level of urban services." Other reasons for annexation in metropolitan areas include: the consolidation of responsibility, the achievement of economies of scale, the correlation of city service benefits with taxing jurisdiction, the expansion of a city's tax base, the simplification of the governmental structure, and the desire to increase the size, and hence, prestige of a city.

Annexations are widely seen as a centralizing tool; they are the prime technique of effecting the consolidationist paradigm, but
they may also be used in the rationalization of local governments in some of the more centralist two-tier approaches.

**City-county Consolidation** - The city-county consolidation instrument is very closely related to that of annexations. But, there is an important distinction. In this case, the territorial expansion of the city instead of being contingent upon a number of variables, follows traditional county lines. Therefore, the city is united with its rural surroundings. In a complete consolidation, "a new government is formed by the county and municipal governments." It is a consolidation functionally as well as territorially since all activities which belonged to two levels of governments are merged into one.

City-county consolidations date back to the nineteenth century in the United States; however, their recent use has been extremely limited. The instrument's popularity in Canada has always been extremely marginal as compared to the United States because of the more limited role of the county unit in this country. The benefits of the technique are similar to those of annexations and amalgamations; centering on questions of proper territorial management, economies of scale, and so on. City-county consolidations are a centralizing device used with the consolidationist paradigm, although a partial consolidation involving the transfer of functions with the retention of a county level is appropriate to some decentralized two-tier approaches.

**County Restructuring** - The county restructuring device is primarily functional rather than territorial. It is used to update the
relevance of county units so that geographic adequacy is matched by functional, fiscal and co-ordinating competence. Traditionally, counties were used as units responsible for providing central government services (state or provincial) at the local level. The aim of restructuring is to attach regional urban responsibilities to them, such as mass transit, pollution control and water supply.

County restructuring is partially a territorial technique too. In other words, some territorial changes are formulated. In this case, an areal change would mean that the county could serve as the dominant urban service provider in unincorporated areas.

The county restructuring device is of little significance in the United States; counties have certain constitutional provisions which make them difficult units to alter. Furthermore, in many parts of the United States, urban areas now encompass multi-county territories thereby rendering the county unit inappropriate for restructuring. In Canada, counties are found only in a few provinces, and in these areas, they do not have either the functional authority nor the importance (re: since they exclude cities) of their American counterparts. Traditionally, they have not been viewed as important municipal building blocks, although in Ontario in the early 1970's, and most recently in Quebec, they have been considered in restructuring plans. The county restructuring technique fits into the two-tier model of local government restructuring inasmuch as the county would act as the upper-tier unit of local government.
Metropolitan Government - The instrument for instituting metropolitan, district or regional governments very closely resembles that of county restructuring. The basic difference would be the greater willingness to experiment, such as with the alteration of existing local government boundaries or with the distribution of functional responsibilities between units. It requires more wholesale changes than simply the modernization of an existing county unit. Metropolitan governments are implemented to provide some form of orderly planning, area-wide servicing and financing.

Metropolitan governments have become an important technique in Canadian provinces with larger urban areas: Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia. Elsewhere in North America, and especially in the United States, they have been used sparingly. Metropolitan governments can be applied either to the consolidationist or the two-tier, federative paradigms of local government restructuring. Winnipeg would represent an instance of the former, and Toronto of the latter.

Councils of Governments - The council of governments (COG) device delineates the shift of focus from a centralist to a more decentralized type of restructuring. A COG is a voluntary, non-statutory, regional association of elected local officials usually directly representing existing local governments. When a COG is implemented, there is no change in territorial units and very little, if any, jurisdictional alteration. However, a new type of structure is created.
The COG exists in order to, "facilitate communication and co-operation between local urban governmental entities and (to) introduce a regional perspective into local policy making." COG's powers are usually limited to a planning role, in direct contrast to implementation, although a handful have assumed operational responsibilities for public services and programs. The more powerful COG's are similar in structure to ACIR's proposed Umbrella Multijurisdictional Organization (UMJO) technique. This device would have a greater regulatory role over component local governments, in addition to a notable policy implementation function.

The COG instrument has grown rapidly in importance in the United States; whereas in 1965 only 10 COG's existed, in 1970, there were over 300. It has become the primary method of metropolitan co-ordination in the United States. The COG device has not been employed in Canada where metropolitan governments are easier to institute. COG's are considered to be applicable to both the confederal two-tier and ecumenical approaches. In the first case, a certain number of area-wide services may be provided, or at the minimum an upper-tier perspective initiated. In the second example, the COG is seen as a co-ordinating actor in a diverse local government landscape.

Special Purpose Boards -- Special purpose boards (SPB's) or special districts as they are termed in the United States, have been defined as, "limited purpose governmental units which exist as corporate
entities and which have substantial fiscal and administrative independence from general purpose local government. Each SPB is a separate territorial device which is superimposed on the existing municipal structure, and can be smaller or larger than any particular municipality. It is also a jurisdictional instrument seeing that it performs either a single or a number of local government services. Special districts are operated by appointed or separately elected boards with a large degree of autonomy.

Among the reasons cited for the use of special districts are: 1) a claim to expertise; 2) lack of councillor time in the municipalities; 3) some functions should be run as businesses; 4) certain functions should be protected from 'politics'; 5) a need for agencies to plan and administer services in more than one municipality may exist; 6) it ensures common operating standards through appointments; 7) the structure ensures intergovernmental representation through appointments.

The special district is the fastest growing form of local government in the United States; and despite a few attempts at consolidating or eliminating them in some Canadian provinces, they remain an extremely popular form of Canadian local government structure as well. Larger metropolitan areas may have literally hundreds of special purpose bodies operating in their territorial sphere. Even in Canada, where they are not as prevalent, Del Guidice and Zacks counted 94 of them operating in the Toronto area in 1968. The special district device is applied best to the
polycentric model of local government structural organization. It is the technique, as claimed by protagonists of the public choice paradigm, which obviates the need for any form of general-purpose metropolitan structure. Neither the two-tier nor consolidationist approaches favours the use of special districts. However, their limited use may continue in these approaches, such as in the case of independently elected school boards.

Procedural and Fiscal

Procedural and fiscal techniques are also directed towards either a centralized or decentralized structure of power distribution in local government. These devices do not involve changes in the structure of local government and hence are not given much attention here; but they do include the redistribution of functions, or the implicit realignment of power such as through fiscal control over functions.

Procedural - Let us initially examine the main procedural instruments that can be used in a very centralized structure of local government service provision. This type of procedural technique would see the central government (provincial or state) assume the functions associated with area-wide servicing requirements, rather than have regional governments or many special purpose boards at the metropolitan level carry them out. These are services which are normally attached to local government. In this type of procedural technique, no structural changes would occur at the local government level. The central government would simply administer the particular functions through one of its departments or agencies, or it could implement a regional service district of some type.
However, a difficulty develops with this technique insofar as the district, if this is the method used, is a central agency and hence, the pre-requisite of an adp is not being met. This problem may be overcome if some form of autonomy is granted to the regional body. Another means by which the adp requirement can be fulfilled, irrespective of the type of central control, is through the division of a particular function between the central and existing local governments. Hence, in Canada in the case of education, the province will set the curricula, prescribe texts, train teachers while the local government or school board provides the building, employs the teachers, provides school supplies and so forth.57

The central control procedural technique is extremely significant inasmuch as all central governments are implicated in local government functions to some measure. However, most state and provincial governments have generally stayed clear of the extreme type of interventionist approach such as that implemented by the New Brunswick government in 1967 where the county level of government was abolished and the central government took control of the provision of previous local government services.58

The central control instrument may be used with all three of the paradigms of local government restructuring. It is an easy technique to use; a central government may simply step in and take over a certain function. The device seems to be most appropriate to the polycentric model seeing that central control over area-wide functions obviates the need for a region-wide government or council.
From the extremely centralist model outlined above, which involved the transfer of local government functions to the central government, the discussion now turns to more decentralist procedural techniques. Among these are the intergovernmental or vertical transfers of functions or service agreements, from lower-tier units to counties or special districts. A particularly popular agreement of this type was developed in California and is known as the Lakewood Plan, wherein an unorganized urban or suburban area incorporates but contracts its services from the county thereby permitting it to share in the economies of scale which are associated with certain county services.59

There are also a variety of horizontal co-ordinating devices which Lindblom called, "co-ordination through mutual adjustment."60 There are two basic types of co-ordination: consultation between municipal officials and the use of contractual arrangements. These may include the sharing of facilities, the granting of extraterritorial powers and contracting for services supplied by another community.

Both the vertical and horizontal procedural arrangements are utilized widely in Canada and the United States; however, they are more extensively developed in the United States. The consolidationist and two-tier paradigms of local government structural organization do not incorporate these types of arrangements into their structures, but the polycentric approach views them in a very positive light.
Fiscal - As was the case with the procedural techniques, there are many fiscal instruments available which may serve to either centralize or decentralize the structure of power distribution as it relates to local government. The fiscal tool is particularly easy to administer as there is no transfer of governmental jurisdiction, nor is there any change in the form of local government structure.

Fiscal devices can take either an intergovernmental or local, area-wide appearance. Intergovernmental fiscal devices include federal and state or provincial grants of either a conditional or unconditional type. Conditional grants from central governments tend to centralize power by giving the granting governments control over the manner in which monies are being spent. Unconditional grants, inasmuch as they provide local governments with a greater degree of spending autonomy, can be seen as representing somewhat of a more decentralist local government system, yet the central government may still impose mandatory standards on how granted funds are used. Apart from the direct grant technique, fiscal responsibility for a particular service may be shifted from one level to the next without a concomitant transfer of operational responsibility. An assortment of fiscal devices are used liberally by federal and state or provincial governments in Canada and the United States.

All three paradigms of local government restructuring must make use of intergovernmental fiscal devices since local spending costs will generally be higher than any local government's ability to raise sufficient revenues in any of the three approaches. Central-local fiscal reorganization tends to be conducted separately from
local government restructuring thus adding to the need for some form of intergovernmental transfer mechanism.

Fiscal devices are also used in horizontal, inter-local arrangements. These devices include area-wide taxes, cost-sharing between municipalities, area-wide revenue sharing such as with the taxation on commercial and industrial properties. These local techniques are used widely in both Canada and the United States. Unlike the intergovernmental fiscal devices, they are less applicable to the three paradigms of local government restructuring. In the case of the consolidationist paradigm, because of its one-tier geographic structure, it takes away from the need to use inter-local financing since all local monies are controlled at one source. The two-tier approach would make use of many area-wide tax-sharing arrangements. The polycentric paradigm would entail fiscal co-operation between municipal units and certain area-wide special purpose boards, or between individual suburban units over certain services.

The structural, procedural and fiscal devices implicated in the restructuring of local governments in metropolitan areas have been presented as specific instruments which may be used to secure a workable local government structure along the lines of the three paradigms presented in the previous section of this chapter. It now remains to be seen how these three approaches and the accompanying techniques of restructuring stand up in the face of an examination of the values of local government which were enumerated earlier.
The Limits of Restructuring:

The question which demands an answer at this point in the analysis concerns the feasibility of the proposals of restructuring outlined above. Clearly, numerous scholars of local government organization and structure have given the issue of the proper alignment of functions and areal distribution of local government units in a metropolitan area a great deal of their attention. As noted by Feldman,

"...if the significance attached to the structure of local government in Canada is in any way related to the attention lavished on it by official enquiries, royal commissions, task forces and so forth, then structure must be the sine qua non of government at this level."62

As previous discussion showed, theorists have worked on adapting well-worn techniques and have created new devices to arrive at three basic paradigms of local government structure in metropolitan areas: the consolidationist, two-tier and polycentric.

However, significant limits impede the ability of central governments, where full jurisdictional authority lies, to restructure local governments. As was noted in an earlier section of this chapter, the division of governmental power is necessary to ensure that the principal allocator of resources in society is controlled. Yet, while it is true that government can, "...be viewed as the 'master' allocative system in a society because it is empowered to control the functioning of the other allocative systems", at the same time governments "...are constrained by the distribution of economic power, the prevailing value system of the society, and by the values and beliefs of the decision-makers themselves."63
The checks on governmental authority serve as the foundation of the constraints which prevent the realization of a so-called rational system of local government structure as represented by the three paradigms. The constraints come from two separate directions. From the one side, there lies the limitation brought about by inertia which exists at the central, intergovernmental and local levels. The traditional arrangement of local government structure has become inbred in the value system of society, and is perceived to be beneficial to certain groups who thereby have a vested interest in supporting it and resisting any sort of change. From the other direction, there are the constraints stemming from the inadequacy of the sought-after paradigms of restructuring. All three of the paradigms, either through showing their shortcomings in locales where they have been put in place, or through obvious flaws in their theoretical rationale, have their critics which do their utmost to prevent them from being implemented.

There is yet a further source of constraint on local government restructuring. Earlier reference was made to the delicate balance by which the dispersion of local governmental authority maintained the basic values of the community: liberty, participation and efficiency. The balance existed even if it appeared in many instances that one value was being emphasized more than another. Hence, when changes are suggested in the structures of local government, such as in the case of the sought-after paradigms of local government structure, the division of power of the combination of adp and functions is directly affected. In turn, this change, because of
the many interrelationships which exist in the manner of dividing power, affects the other elements of the balance of values equation: the combinations of cdp, adp and Ndp.

Yet all of these expected changes should not be lost on any proposal or actual instance of restructuring. Either adjustments must be made in the cdp, adp or Ndp, or else the balance of values will necessarily suffer. When the latter situation occurs, or is feared to occur, the restructuring proposal may be re-evaluated. To a large degree, such a re-evaluation depends on the ability of groups which have a vested interest in the existing arrangement, which have been affected detrimentally by change, or which are able to criticize it on theoretical grounds, to present a good case against the restructuring. In this way, the need to retain a balance of values as represented by the division of powers, acts as a constraint on the restructuring process.

Let us now examine these constraints on the restructuring process in more detail. First, the limitations associated with the benefits of the traditional system to various actors at the central, intergovernmental and local government levels will be demarcated. Second, the flaws associated with the proposed paradigms of restructuring will be studied. In both cases, the analysis will make use of evidence which could be used by advocates of the traditional system of local government; evidence dealing mainly with a change in the cdp, adp, or Ndp and the corresponding effect on the balance of community values.
Limits—Benefits of the Traditional System

Intergovernmental (Central-Local) - The system of local government is to a large degree maintained in a steady state because of the intricate relationship which it has attained with the central level of government. Even if it is a force in the central government which initiates a restructuring proposal, any such attempt faces barriers erected by the many opposing actors which are also in place at the central and intergovernmental levels.

These opposing actors exist because of the structure of the distribution of powers. How does this division appear in the sphere of local government affairs in Canada?

In terms of the areal division of powers, there is local government control over numerous local questions of administration and legislation, while the adjudication process remains at the central level. The division by functions is extensive; it represents the focus of most restructuring efforts and of this paper, and as such an elaborate distribution has been reproduced in Appendix 1.

Opposition to local government restructuring efforts may come from an assortment of different sources within and outside the central government, in the intergovernmental setting. Competing specialized interests maneuver for an advantageous position, or at least attempt to retain the authority which they already possess. While all of the sources of power are salient, there are specific powers which are particularly special for certain interests. For instance, office-seekers must gauge the restructuring proposals in ideological terms;
whether the restructuring concept can be accommodated in their political party's philosophy. More importantly though, there are the concrete political considerations: whether restructuring would erode the government's or party's power base through rivalry in new institutions and actors for support, or through voter aversion to the new structure. For administrators, the main concern is not political, rather, it is a question of protecting their claim, or gaining a competitive advantage over specific policy spheres or functions. Any change in the local government structural status quo may meet with strong resistance.

Politicians are able to handily deflect calls for serious local government restructuring in that final authority over such important matters ultimately rests with them. The office-holder can make use of various devices to help sustain the traditional system and to avoid major restructuring including technical aid, conditional grants, mandatory directives, special districts, and so on. The ACIR has made note of this central government trend of avoiding wholesale restructuring, but at the same time, has revealed that these piecemeal techniques create structural changes by themselves which in turn affects the balance of values:

"primary reliance on aid programs for dealing with state and local fiscal dilemmas reveals a fundamental unawareness of the inextricable linkages among governmental finances, functions, structure and jurisdictional area and a concomitant tendency to avoid, for obvious political reasons, the pivotal structural and area issues, which after all are primary determinants of fiscal and servicing capacity."
Meanwhile, these same devices are also used by administrators or more accurately what Dupre has called "specialized bureaucratic interests...born of common professional background, marked by membership that transcends governmental levels, and strengthened by alliances with sympathetic publics." These specialists at all levels of government interact fully with others in their own policy sphere usually represented by a specific department, but avoid contact with specialists from other areas, generalist policy-makers and with private citizens.67 Administrators too maneuver to protect their interests. The structural changes which they create are also documented. Dupre notes that:

"(T)he devices become part and parcel of the governmental structure...(and) manage to co-exist with the very units of government whose dominant interests they are designed to overcome because they tend to underwrite the viability of these units. Their very effectiveness reduces the need for more far-reaching reform."68

The question to ask now: what effect do these piecemeal reforms have on the values of local government? Certainly, the structural changes which have been documented produce a change in the values of local government. However, as Dupre admits:

"there is a very strong case for saying that these values are far from forgotten. There is a measure of efficiency tailored to standards developed in relative isolation by specialized interests. There is participation too -- albeit a fractionalized kind of participation in political arenas that are anything but comprehensive. And as for liberty -- well, if this value is fulfilled by the mere absence of monolithic government -- it is achieved in abund- ance.69
That is not to say that the balance of values is optimized with these piecemeal devices or even that, as Dupre more readily suggested, the balance has not been altered. However, it does signify that the balance of values remains constant enough to obviate any major efforts at local government restructuring.

Local - The structure of local government is also maintained in a state of inertia by various actors at the local level of government who benefit from the traditional arrangement. These groups are spread over a number of different locales. While local government is intricately tied to the central level, there nonetheless exists a division of powers at this level as well. Some of the actors at the local level support restructuring, but many others oppose it. It is the latter grouping which acts as a limitation on the restructuring process.

There may be an areal division of powers by functions if territorially specific special purpose boards exist or by territory if some form of ward system is in place. The greatest division of powers occurs through the multiplicity of local governments, each one with its own exclusive power to govern. It is not really a division at the capital, nor on an areal basis because there is no upper-tier, yet it is a division when looked at from the point of view of the entire metropolitan area.

As with the case of the intergovernmental level, opposition to restructuring may come from a number of sources. Again, the main concern for politicians, this time at the local level, is with factors
such as the location of electoral boundaries; the location of racial, ethnic, religious and class minorities all adding up to a fear of the dilution of their power base, especially if there are local parties involved. However, politicians, administrators and non-governmental groups share an interest at the local level. The interest evolves out of the fear of centralized restructuring proposals which have as a goal the elimination of some units of government altogether, or the drastic non-incremental curtailment of their level of functions. To prevent this restructuring from occurring, many ostensibly disparate groups join together to block major restructuring efforts. These include suburban and ex-urban citizens interests, central city minority groups such as inner city Blacks, and professional groups such as suburban newspaper interests. They are joined by their respective political and administrative representatives. Various reasons are cited for their concerns: to protect lifestyles, occupations, lower taxation levels or simply because of uncertainty over what restructuring on a massive scale will bring.70

A number of devices are employed by political and bureaucratic interests at the local level which help to maintain the steady state in the face of new demands for restructuring. As was the case at the intergovernmental level, these primarily highlight changes which focus on functions, such as: special purpose boards, adjustments in responsibilities, co-operative agreements, contractual services, joint planning efforts and the like.
While these incremental structural changes affect a parallel alteration in the capital division of powers, again it seems that the balance of values is not adversely affected. It is not sufficient, however, to rationalize that the balance of values has been sustained solely on the assertion that the changes instituted are usually minor; in fact, as in the creation of a city manager, the changes may be significant indeed. However, in the case of the local level of government, the key lies in the subordination of the local level to the centre, and the reliance on the central level for the maintenance of the sought-after set of values. This was touched upon earlier in the discussion of how community values are best optimized, and it was suggested by Dupre that this in fact occurs in an intergovernmental setting.

Therefore, the piecemeal structural devices which are available forestall the need for more widespread reform. The changes do not noticeably hurt the desired balance of values, and the new quasi-institutions which are set in place make it even more difficult to carry out wholesale change. Apparently, then, the traditional structure's proponents are able to erect effective barriers in the face of major proposals for change. Let us now examine how their theoretically-oriented counterparts can aid their cause by making note of the obvious shortcomings of the major reform proposals.

**Limits - Inadequacy of Paradigm**

It is now necessary to examine the other set of reasons which serve to inhibit restructuring efforts, namely the theoretical.
shortcomings of the models. At an earlier point in this chapter, three paradigms of local government structure were described in detail: the consolidationist, two-tier and polycentric.

The task now is to go beyond description and to evaluate these proposals with regards to their effect on the balance of values in a community. The consolidationist and two-tier approaches will be assessed first in unison, then on an individual basis showing where the balance of values has been violated. The united discussion of these two approaches is presented seeing that both of the paradigms represent dramatic, non-incremental structural changes from the traditional model of local government. The polycentric approach basically depicts a fine tuning of the traditional evolutionary approach to local government structure. In this sense, then, it portrays an incremental approach to structural change. Yet, while it does not feature some of the more obvious shortcomings of the two non-incremental approaches apropos of the balance of values, it nonetheless has other limitations associated with it.

Common Limitations of Consolidationist and Two-Tier - While the evidence used to show the limitations of the two centralizing approaches will rightfully focus on their effects on the balance of values in a community, there are often simplistic, almost common-sensical arguments against a proposal which should not be overlooked. Such reasons exist both in the case of the consolidationist and two-tier paradigms.
The first such limitation on restructuring, perhaps holding true more so for the United States than for Canada, would have to be the fundamental belief as related to cultural norms held by a majority of the electorate that there is no need for an area-wide governmental structure in the metropolis. As Bollens has so lucidly explained:

"Experienced observers of the metropolitan scene may be acutely aware of the defects and political dangers that lie in the present system, but the average citizen has little such consciousness. He may be dissatisfied with the performance of certain functions, he may desire better or additional services, he may wonder at times where all this explosive growth is leading and what it means in terms of his daily living, but he is not deeply troubled. He feels no impelling need, no urgency, for any major restructuring of the governmental pattern of the area."71

Reform values are those of knowledgeable local government observers, not of the community as a whole. Major, non-incremental restructuring provides only abstract and long-range benefits.

The second "obvious" limitation on major restructuring as represented by the consolidationist or two-tier paradigm comes from a different direction. More abstractly, it deals with the psychological element of the various actors in the local metropolitan community. It brings up these questions: is there a willingness to accept a new system? Is the new system as comprehensible as it appears on paper? Jones and O'Donnell caution,

"...it should be remembered that reorganization will be productive of the values sought by the organizers only if people and organizations act positively and intelligently within the new system of constraints and freedom provided by the reorganization to deal with substantive problems."72
Finally, an overlooked restriction dealing with the dynamics of change. An often overlooked fact connected with restructuring is that cities continue to grow in both population and spatial requirements even after they are restructured. Also, macro-changes in the nation, and micro-changes in the peripheries of cities create changed circumstances, hence, "in this sense, Merriam's goal of an adequate organization of modern metropolitan areas will never be realized."73

But these expansive, almost ethereal arguments are not sufficient to explain away the need for major restructuring if the paradigms prove to fulfill the sought after balance of values. Hence, let us now pursue that very point and deal with each paradigm on an individual basis.

Consolidationist. - The consolidationist approach demarcates the least complex approach to local government structure. All local government units, processes and functions are unified into one large jurisdictional unit with a single administration. Unification occurs by way of the devices of annexation and city-county consolidation.

Critics of the consolidationist position focus on the drastic change which it produces in local government structure viz-a-viz the traditional arrangement, and its ostensible abrogation of the overriding principle of the distribution of powers. Whereas in the traditional arrangement of local units, the division of powers was upheld through the existence of separate general and special purpose governments, in the consolidationist approach, they are unified into
one governmental level. To be sure, a division of powers still occurs because of the existence of the central-local relationship; however, even in the case of this affiliation, the division of powers is lessened insofar as consolidation obviates the need for the assignment of functions to the central level since the areal jurisdiction of the local unit is sufficiently large. Hence, more powers are concentrated in one governmental unit than in any other paradigm.

Consequently, the effect of consolidating local government in metropolitan areas on the balance of community values is large and detrimental. Golden has noted that in the case of consolidated governments: 1) liberty, in its appearance as local autonomy is harmed because of an erosion in local community (neighbourhood) power and over-bureaucratization impedes the development of a metropolitan political process; 2) participation is gravely affected because of the increased distance between the citizen and the local government including an increased councillor/constituent ratio; and 3) efficiency is not necessarily optimized because of potential 'diseconomies of scale'. 74

Granted, some disagreement exists over the last point. The strength of consolidationist arguments lies in the claim to efficiency. Yet, there is evidence that effective 'down the line' co-ordination in a large bureaucracy is difficult to achieve which helps to undermine efficiency. 75 Therefore, inasmuch as there is a great change in the balance of values, theorists are able to mount effective arguments countering any proposals which support the consolidationist paradigm.
Two-Tier - The two-tier approach to restructuring local government may take many forms, but basically involves one of two possible directions, either federal or confederal. In the case of the former, a second upper-tier level of general purpose government is created; in the case of the latter, the adoption of a multi-functional planning authority would be a more accurate description. As was mentioned earlier, the main devices used to bring about a two-tier paradigm include county restructuring and legislated metropolitan government in the case of the federative approach; and councils of governments in the case of the confederal.

In light of their differences, the federative and confederal approaches will be dealt with separately. The effect on the balance of values will be dealt with individually at the conclusion of each discussion. Of the two approaches, the federal one is more centralist and further removed from the traditional local government arrangement. In this approach, lower-tier general-purpose governments continue to exist, however, many of their functions are removed and given to a new upper-tier government. This upper-tier government normally would also assume the duties which could also be theoretically performed by a central government in the metropolitan area. In general, many powers are divided between the two governmental levels at the local level thus helping to fulfill the objective of dividing powers.

In the consolidationist paradigm, over-bureaucratization was deemed to be a hindrance to the development of a rational metropolitan political process. A similar development may occur at the two-tier
federative level. It occurs by way of a rather roundabout method; namely, the general practice of appointments or election of the upper-tier council (may not be an issue with restructured counties). Hence, if it is only an indirect type of political control that citizens have, or if regional councillors work in the local lower-tier self-interest, then a metropolitan political process cannot emerge. Yet, functional authority is transferred in large measure to the upper-tier level. Hence, as was the case with the consolidationist approach, the administrative process wins out over the legislative one.

But what of the remaining divisions of power? Surely, the division by functions would be beneficial to our goal of dividing powers. On the surface, the reply to this question must be yes, yet many further queries arise. For instance: 1) how extensive should the top tier’s powers be and how small should the lower tier be; 2) what about the integration of local aspects of regional functions and regional aspects of local functions; 3) how are practical work assignments delegated and which level of government pays for what assignments? As Sharpe noted for the British Case:

"...experience in London has amply shown, and experience in the rest of the country is beginning to confirm, whatever the intentions of its architects, a new two-tier system has a built-in tendency to interstitial squabbling, duplication and delay."78

What of the effect on values of this sort of arrangement? Wood has clearly stated that the balance of values would be affected. The political values of liberty and participation have been muted in favour of operating efficiency. In what way has liberty
been affected? First, creating a buffer between the lower-tier and central government obscures accountability and hence liberty. Second, greater bureaucratization and non-elected regional councils, prevent the development of a metropolitan political process which undermines the principle of local democracy. As for participation, it is hard in the federative two-tier approach to pinpoint accountability which restricts access to decision-makers to certain knowledgeable groups. However, the greatest surprise may rest in the fragility of the value of efficiency. While the two-tier system is intended to prevent "overspill" in functional terms, there is evidence that overlapping jurisdictions continue to exist. Furthermore, efficiency is thwarted by the relationship of the regional government to the central authorities. Insofar as municipal (lower-tier) and educational authorities still exist as separate entities in the two-tier approach, the regional government must compete with these other subsystems for scarce resources in the same metropolitan area.\textsuperscript{80}

Let us now turn to the confederal approach as represented by councils of governments or Umbrella Multijurisdictional Organizations (COG's and UMJO's). COG's represent a direction that is two-tier seeing that a second, upper-tier council exists with an administration of service boards that have program planning authority. With the proposed UMJO's one would have to add an implementation and regulatory function. Yet, the powers would be noticeably less than with a federative approach, and the central government would likely continue to provide many metropolitan services.
The structural changes which this device creates differ extensively from the federative approach. A change in the division of powers is circumvented as there is no government per se created at the upper-tier level. Hence, there would be no cdp or adp from an upper-tier level, although the lower-tier units would continue to perform this role. There would be an adp and cdp in functions, however, at the local level inasmuch as regional service boards would be present. While bureaucratization of the COG occurs, it is not deemed to be as much of a problem as in the consolidationist or two-tier, federative approaches because final decision-making authority continues to be at the lower-tier level where a political process exists.

What effect does the confederal structure have on the balance of values? Liberty is not directly affected in an adverse fashion; however, indirectly the competition and lack of co-operation which often characterize a COG leads to a stronger role for the central government under the pretext of the need to co-ordinate. This hinders local autonomy. Participation remains relatively unscathed because the lower-tier political process, where decisions are made, remains fully operational. Efficiency is probably affected the most detrimentally, especially in the case of the COG's, not so much with the UMJO's. COG's lack the power to implement programs, or direct their executive, or to assume operational responsibility over area-wide functions. In addition, they rely on central and lower-tier governments for finances, as they do not have their own taxing authority. The proposed ACIR technique, the UMJO, would eliminate many of these problems of efficiency, but at the expense of the other values of liberty and participation.
Polycentric - In a sense, the polycentric approach does not represent a new approach to local government structure at all; it is simply an adaptation of the traditional structure of local government. In this sense, the critique below serves as a review of not only the public choice paradigm but also of the traditional pattern of local government structure.

The polycentric approach favours an incremental type of change in metropolitan areas to deal with problems as they arise. Thus, the polycentric paradigm has the advantage of being familiar to the public at large, unlike the consolidationist and two-tier paradigms which have fundamental difficulties of acceptability. The cultural norms and values of the community are not violated in the public choice method and there is no basic public incomprehension of the system.

The main devices used by the ecumenical school are special districts, procedural and fiscal tools, and central government assumption of certain services; all within the framework of a gamut of different-sized general purpose governments within a single metropolitan area. Although not really necessary, the COG technique may be an acceptable type of co-ordinating body seeing that it does not take any real powers away from the lower-tier units.

If it is accepted that the distribution of powers in a traditional system of local government is in relative balance, then there are no real difficulties over the adequate distribution of powers with the public choice method. All changes tend to be small and incremental.
Yet, there are a constant group of structural changes which
do serve to affect the division of powers. These have to do with the
frequent addition of new special districts, new agreements, contracts,
grants and so on. While the changes wrought by these devices is by no
way comparable to the more centralist techniques such as annexations
or metropolitan government associated with the other two paradigms,
they do tend to create quasi-institutions in themselves and lead to a
bureaucratization of the metropolitan political process.

What effect then does the public choice method have on the
balance of community values? If liberty is seen as the existence of
local autonomy, then the public choice method makes a considerable
contribution to the fulfillment of this value. But this does not take
place without some serious reservations. Liberty is weakened by the
existence of special purpose boards which are predominantly
independent from public control. The sheer complexity of numerous
special districts, inter-local agreements, and general purpose govern-
ments creates voter apathy and alienation which could have a detri-
mental effect on liberty. The greater role played by the central
government in the public paradigm, and the necessity to co-ordinate
area-wide concerns at some level may undermine local autonomy.
Furthermore, smaller local government units would have a less powerful
bargaining position viz-a-viz the centre than larger units of local
government. All these factors could be construed as impediments to
the value of liberty.
As for the value of participation, Golden has declared that it is maximized under the polycentric method. Yet, this is true only in the case of the general purpose governments, not with the many special purpose boards which exist. Moreover, smaller, suburban municipalities may offer their citizens more 'real' choice, inasmuch as they are smaller and thus presumably more accessible than the larger, bureaucratically-dominated municipalities. In the United States, this may be especially a problem for minorities and the poor where they are more often than not trapped in the central cities, and are given a 'public choice' only in terms of what is open to them in the metropolitan area - the central city. In this way, participation loses some of its superiority under the polycentric method.

The efficiency value as well may be acceptable in the polycentric approach, especially if some sort of co-ordinating body such as a COG comes into being. However, the co-ordination difficulty remains the centre of the controversy over whether the public choice method is efficient. There is a strong opinion that, "the prospects for success becomes an inverse function of the number of players." Even if co-ordination is sufficient, efficiency depends upon the rational distribution of functions and areal boundaries amongst districts and municipalities which is extremely problematical for historical, technical, political and other reasons. Hence, there may be duplication of services. Finally, it is important to note that with the polycentric paradigm quality suffers in the
poorest areas, where among other problems tax inequities are highest. This is certainly an inefficient arrangement.

The above discussion has plainly shown that the polycentric approach is also laden with problems in its attempt at discharging the values of a community. All three of the approaches then, including the consolidationist and two-tier methods, provide the theorist with enough evidence to discourage the restructuring of metropolitan areas. This, when coupled with the perceived benefits of the traditional system which were enumerated in the preceding section, should be reason enough to reconsider any efforts at major restructuring. Yet, as in any seemingly hopeless situation, there are fragments which can be salvaged. These fragments, in the case of the local government discussion, exist in all three paradigms and in a number of techniques. They will form the basis of a new approach to restructuring which will be enumerated in the Ontario context later on.

What can now be stated by way of conclusion? Let us first re-state what was discussed in this chapter. At the outset, it was shown that metropolitan areas, while constituting single socio-economic units, did not represent unitarily governed political regions. The values of a political community were said to be reflected by a division of powers in a metropolitan area; a complex intergovernmental arrangement which includes both a capital and areal division of powers, with an acknowledged need for some form of local government. The political values which the division of powers helped to realize were liberty, participation and efficiency.
While the division of powers kept the balance of values in a traditional system of local government in an acceptable state, local government structural theorists have as their goal the optimization of these values, while recognizing their somewhat contradictory character. The most popular means of tampering with the division of powers is through an adp in functions. The two criteria of the proper theoretical areal division of powers and the jurisdictional size of units delineate the basis for reform as shown by the three paradigms of restructuring: the consolidationist, two-tier and polycentric.

Numerous devices of restructuring are implicated in the three paradigms ranging from centralist devices such as city-county consolidations, to decentralist instruments such as special districts. The difficulty with the use of these techniques in new paradigms of local government structure lies in the effect which they have on the division of powers and on the values of local government. The former is intricately related to the latter; liberty, participation and efficiency are intricately connected to the balance of powers which respond to structural changes. These detrimental changes act as limitations on the restructuring process.

Yet, metropolitan regions must develop a political process which is sensitive to the question of who benefits from the allocation of resources, which in turn divides power accordingly, features channels for public accountability, citizen accessibility, and provides services in an efficient manner. While none of the three paradigms, nor the traditional system, discharges these requirements
completely, fragments of the approaches may be used to create a political system that is sensitive to these requirements. The present theoretical discussion of a political nature now moves to one based on socio-economic considerations. It is presently necessary to examine the state of the modern metropolitan area viz-a-viz its form of urban development. The presence of urbanization and the manner in which it relates to regions, forms the basis of the discussion in Chapter 2.
In this thesis, 'restructuring' will refer to an areal alteration such as with a change in boundaries and functions; while 'reorganization' will refer to an alteration in the internal administration of local government. This distinction was made by the Local Government Management Project, Government of Ontario, Queen's University, et al., Local Government Management Project, Kingston, 1977.


3) Quesnel-Ouellet, L., "Canada: Quebec", in ibid., p. 31


7) ibid., p. 30

8) Maass, A., in A. Maass, op. cit., pp. 17-18

9) Ylvisaker, P., "Some Criteria for a 'Proper' Areal Division of Powers" in A. Maass, op. cit., p. 33


11) Maass, A. in A. Maass, op. cit., p. 21


14) Rowat, D.C., in D.C. Rowat, op. cit., p. 601


20) Dupre, J.S., "Intergovernmental Relations and the Metropolitan Area" in Feldman 1981, op. cit., p. 153

21) ibid., pp. 153-155

22) Ontario Ministry of Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs, Queen's University, et. al., The LOME Experience: Guidelines for Organizational Change in Local Government, Kingston, 1977, p. 37

23) Jones, V., and P.O. O'Donnell, op. cit., p. 544


26) Honey, R., op. cit., p. 47


28) ibid., pp. 115-116

29) Honey, R., op. cit., pp. 52-53

30) Dearlove, J., op. cit., pp. 60-64

31) Honey, R., op. cit., p. 48


33) Dearlove, J., op. cit., p. 69

34) ibid., p. 69


39) *ACIR, Improving Urban America*, pp. 120-130

40) Kosny, M.E., *A Tale of Two Cities*, p. 60

41) Kosny, M.E., *Local Government Reorganization*, p. 8

42) ibid., p. 8


44) ibid., p. 61

45) Kosny, M.E., *A Tale of Two Cities*, p. 72

46) Kosny, M.E., *Local Government Reorganization*, p. 15


48) Hallman, H.W., op. cit., p. 173


50) Zimmerman, J.F., "United States" in D.C. Rowat, op. cit., p. 46

51) ibid., pp. 47-48


53) *ACIR, Improving Urban America*, p. 107

54) Hallman, H.W., op. cit., p. 36


59) Zimmerman, J., op. cit., pp. 50-51

60) Wikstrom, N., op. cit., p. 3

61) Hallman, H., op. cit., p. 207


63) Van Loon, R., and M. Whittington, op. cit., pp. 6-7


69) ibid., p. 161

70) ACIR, Improving Urban America, pp. 156-157

71) Wikstrom, N., op. cit., pp. 5-10

72) Jones, V.J., and P.O. O'Donnell, in D.C. Rowat, op. cit., p. 542
73) ibid., p. 542


76) Wood, R.C., "A Division of Powers in Metropolitan Areas", in Maass, A., op. cit., p. 64

77) Kosny, *Local Government Reorganization*, p. 8

78) Sharpe, L. in Feldman 1981, op. cit., p. 342

79) Wood, R. in Maass, A., op. cit., p. 64

80) Quesnel-Ouellet, L., in D.C. Rowat, op. cit., p. 31


82) Hallman, op. cit., p. 62

This chapter of the thesis will be concerned with putting the subject of local government re-structuring into its proper socio-economic context. The most pervasive socio-economic phenomenon affecting local government structure is that of urbanization. It has turned out to be a sweeping, global process which has led to a changed spatial arrangement of people within increasingly concentrated territorial units. Consequently, urbanization has given rise to questions concerning the adequacy of local political units that are superimposed onto changed demographic realities.

There are at least two spatial levels at which urbanization can be studied: the interregional and the intraregional. With regards to the former, the urbanization process can be examined at the level of the national polity, usually indicating substantive, nationally-recognized territorial areas where a major city or system of cities constitute the focus of the larger territorial unit. These city-regions comprise a national system of urban regions. Alternately, at the intraregional level, the focus is on one single urban area and the different levels of urbanization which occur within it. Initially, then, the paper will examine urbanization in a comparative and a Canadian context, at both the interregional and intraregional levels.

The connection between changed demographic realities, that is, the fluidity and dynamism of total population levels, density, habitation trends, and the overlying macro- and micro-regional political structure will be examined.
Subsequently, it will be shown how this generally fluid process of urbanization, in spatial and temporal terms, is accompanied by a wide array of problems. These 'urban problems' are defined as being indigenous to the urbanization process, and in fact are simply components of that process. Their occurrence gives rise to the need for mechanisms to cope with urbanization, and it is at this stage that the question of political systems comes into question.

Over time, a standard form of local government structure, with some variations, emerged in the Anglo-American democracies. This structure, which will be described in this second chapter, has proven to be inadequate for the needs of modern urban societies, and moreover, it has given rise to further urban problems because of its form. In addition to its initial inadequacy for an urban society, the traditional local government structure has proven to be rigid and difficult to change. For various reasons, mainly political, the traditional structure was able to persist in its form; changing only in an incremental, ad hoc fashion which did not correspond to the fluid patterns of urbanization which were simultaneously occurring. It is from this paradox that new problems emanated, problems which are considered below as urban problems of the traditional local government structure.

The chapter concludes with a review in microcosm of the previous discussion for the study area of the thesis, Ontario. Initially, the province's urbanization patterns are elucidated, then its problems are described.
General Urbanization Trends

In this first section, an examination of urbanization trends will constitute the focus of discussion. A knowledge of these trends provides the local government researcher with the necessary socio-economic framework within which political and administrative questions can later be considered. First, an explanation of the term 'urbanization' for the purposes of this study will be offered. Then, inasmuch as it will be shown that urbanization implicates a multi-faceted subject area, the successive discussion will be ordered by way of spatial and temporal units of analysis. The spatial focus will be in two parts, that of the nation-wide urban pattern and that of the regional urban form. The time focus will be divided into different periods of urbanization. Specifically, the order which this analysis will take is as follows; initially, there will be an examination of nation-wide urbanization trends in a comparative focus up to the late 1960's, which will be followed by a look at the shifts which occurred at this same territorial level through the 1970's. The above territorial discussion, for the two time periods, will then be repeated for Canada. From the nation-wide, interregional perspective, the analysis will proceed to the local level of the individual urban region, with an examination of localized urbanization trends from a comparative perspective up to the 1960's, and then since that time up to the current period. This analysis at the intraregional level will subsequently be repeated for Canada's urban regions. A brief look at
the probable future urban pattern in Canada on both the interregional and intraregional scale will conclude the discussion.

Urbanization should be seen as representing more than just the measurement of population growth and concentration; it should also be viewed as being inextricably a part and parcel of the processes of industrialization, increasing income, personal mobility and so on. As noted by Bourne, "urban growth could be measured in several ways — through changes in employment, land area, income, interaction and the quality of urban life, for example — as well as population". Plainly, such an extensive definition of urbanization requires us to link population growth with several other factors: with increases or decreases in levels of industrialization; with personal mobility which fluctuates with the cost of energy, and so forth.

Without forgetting this broader perspective, the main interest at this point is to chronicle the principal population changes in the growth of cities, and to show how urbanization has resulted in proportionately smaller rural populations and greater urban populations. Long-term demographic indicators can be seen as an easily quantifiable measure which can be used to explain urban growth over time. Economic indicators based on industrial changes or social indicators, based on income, education, or occupation, could have been used to chronicle urbanization, but have not been used because they would be much more difficult to quantify.

Although only the demographic approach is taken, it is nonetheless salient to keep in mind the broader implications of the
urbanization process such as its relationship to employment, land use, socio-economic indicators, and so on, for it is the inter-relationship of these variables with population growth which leads to the emergence of urban problems, and hence, to the emergence of administrative questions and subsequently questions pertaining to the structure of local government. However, these matters will be the focus of a later part of this chapter.

**Inter-Regional Focus**

*Comparative* - From primarily a demographic perspective, then, the continued growth of urban areas depends on national factors such as the rate of national population growth, changing characteristics of the structure of the population, such as in the age structure and regional shifts. For most of the twentieth century, these trends were favourable to the wide-scale growth of large metropolitan regions. For instance, in the United States in every decade of the twentieth century up to 1970, the rate of metropolitan growth exceeded the growth rate of non-metropolitan areas. The proportion of the urbanized population as a whole also continued to rise.

However, beginning in the 1960's and becoming more apparent in the 1970's, national demographic trends in Western politics began experiencing a shift, thereby having a pronounced effect on the process of urbanization and the growth of urban areas. The most important cause of the shift was a declining birth rate, which in turn resulted in a declining rate of overall population growth, thereby having considerable consequences on the rate of growth of metropolitan
populations. By the late 1970's, this trend, combined with other non-demographic factors, had become quite extreme, so that, "zero population growth is now a reality in several European countries and in many other parts of the world. Moreover, this decline has been most apparent in the metropolitan areas. Almost all major capitals and urban centres in Europe now have stable or declining populations". In the United States, after 1970, the non-metropolitan growth rate began to exceed that of the metropolitan. Between 1970 and 1980, the largest fifty American metropolitan areas grew by only 6.7%, while the nation as a whole grew by 11%.

Yet, not all of the metropolitan areas in the Western world are affected by these newer trends. The trends are emphasized here not so much for their current paramountcy, but rather for their potentially strong impact, and therefore have been given wide prominence in this thesis. Indeed, in the United States, where metropolitan growth as a whole declined markedly between 1970 and 1980, of the fifty metropolitan areas just mentioned, a majority of thirty-nine continued to gain population while only eleven suffered an actual population decline.

Inter-regional population shifts played a major role in the pattern of metropolitan population change. Nearly all of the rapidly growing metropolitan regions in the United States through the 1970's could be found in the American "Sunbelt" states of the south and west, while the declining or slow growth regions appeared nearly exclusively in the northeast and midwest.
Canada - Until recently, as the trend towards slowing or declining growth of metropolitan areas progressed in the United States and Western Europe, major metropolitan centres in Canada, those with over 100,000 people, continued to experience sustained growth. For instance, Canada's urbanization rate for the 1951-1961 period stood at 4% annually, this in contrast to about 2.5% in the United States, and less than 1% for the United Kingdom during the same period.6 Regionally, up to the 1960's, the greatest levels of urbanization could be found in the heartland provinces of Ontario and Quebec: "within Canada, the major region comprised of Ontario and Quebec, containing 64 per cent of the country's population, is even more highly urbanized; over half of the population here lies in cities larger than 100,000 and four-fifths of the population is defined as urban by the Census".7 However, results of the 1976 mini-census, and 1981 census, indicate changing population trends in Canada similar to other Western countries.

In Canada though, the trends of Western, industrialized polities in the 1970's which were described earlier, seem to have been tempered by the continuation of past trends. Metropolitan areas in Canada continue to grow, albeit at slower rates than in previous decades. Bourne suggests that while structural and spatial changes are occurring in the demographic structure, there is little evidence of Western European and American counter-urbanization.8 The reason for this, according to Robinson, is not so much any real difference in demographic characteristics between Canada and other
Western industrialized countries, but rather is based mainly on structural dissimilarities in the national economies. In the United States, a "relative decline in manufacturing and the obsolescence resulting from a lack of investment in the urban physical plant have been major factors in the decline of metro areas in the Northeast and North Central States". Canada though, does not have such a large component of its employment base involved in secondary industry. But Robinson, on the other hand, also observes that while until recently there has been no evidence of American-style de-industrialization in Canada; in the 1980's, some of these trends are starting to emerge: "...there is good reason to believe that the trends now pervasive in the United States are basic, underlying features of a post-industrial society and, thus, that Canada will not be immune to their impacts". 9

Hence, in terms of demographic characteristics, Canada's national population trends are beginning to take on some of the characteristics of other Western, industrialized countries. These are highlighted by a declining rate of national population growth due to lower fertility rates and slower foreign immigration; changing demographic characteristics such as an aging population and smaller household size; and regional population shifts, which until very recently, saw people migrating from the industrial heartland of Ontario and Quebec to the Western provinces.

These broader trends have significant ramifications on the country's urbanization process. Bourne has commented that, "no doubt
the proportion of Canada's population which is urbanized will continue to increase in the foreseeable future (assuming continually revised census boundaries) but at a rapidly diminishing rate. This trend has in fact been borne out in the last two quinquennial census periods. In the 1971-76 period, the 1976 census showed that there was no increase in the concentration of the Canadian population in all of the nation's metropolitan regions taken as whole. In the subsequent 1976-81 time span, a similar result was evident; while the country's twenty-three metropolitan centres experienced 5.8% growth, the nation as a whole grew slightly faster at 5.9%. Moreover, the rate of growth for the nation's three largest metropolitan areas was only 4.8%.12

As in the United States, there are prevalent inter-regional variations in the growth rate across Canada. A shift westward has meant increasingly differentiated growth rates across the country. Western Canadian metropolitan regions grew fantastically between 1976-81; Calgary by 26%, Edmonton by 18%, Saskatoon by 15% during the five year period. Most recent evidence suggests that these rates may now have slowed considerably. On the other hand, many central and eastern Canadian cities grew very slowly or experienced absolute declines. Hence, Montreal's metropolitan growth rate was less than one per cent, as was that of St. Catharines-Niagara. Windsor and Sudbury actually lost some of their population, in the case of the latter by a rate of 4.5% in the five year span.
Of course, these national urbanization trends at the inter-regional level have an impact on the processes which are occurring at the narrower spatial level, that of the regional urban level, or intra-regional level. For instance, slower overall population growth nationally necessarily implies changes in the territorial expansion, rate and magnitude, of the city and its immediate hinterland. It is these smaller, micro-level changes to which the paper now addresses itself.

**Intra-Regional Focus**

Ultimately, the purpose of the discussion in this chapter is to delve into the problems of local government, and hence into the administrative/political questions of the structures which urban areas require. Urbanization patterns have an impact on future local government arrangements, and these political structures are not only created as a result of national urbanization trends, but as a consequence of local ones as well. Therefore, it is important to examine population changes over time, and witness their spatial ramifications at the level of the regional urban form.

**Comparative** - Contemporary urban regions are not homogeneous entities; they vary internally in land use patterns, densities, types of activities, and so on. However, before the Second World War, there was less distinction to be made between what are now considered to be inner city and suburban sections of metropolitan regions: growth was incremental and was based mainly on the addition of residential or
other activity districts onto an existing grid-iron or similar pattern of city streets. Densities would not vary significantly between one section of a city and any other. In the post-war era though, a boom in residential housing in the Western industrial countries occurred in suburbs, new towns, satellite communities, exclusive subdivisions, and the like. These new types of residential developments, which were caused mainly by widespread access to the automobile, became home to increasingly large segments of urban population growth which was occurring in the post-war period.

By the early 1960's, the attractiveness of these low-density type communities became too great even for large segments of residents that were already settled in the central city. These central city inhabitants began to vacate the inner city area and move into peripheral parts of the metropolitan region, causing a depopulation of the central city to occur.

The contemporary spatial pattern then requires a breakdown of the metropolitan region into components. Mathewson suggests the extent of what a metropolitan region encompasses:

"Geographically, it is a central city and its surrounding suburban ring. Psychologically and sociologically, it is that collection of local communities in which the citizens are interdependent in their employment, residence, health and medical care, education, recreation and culture, shopping and religious experience."

While there are problems with defining the extent of urban regions, Bourne suggests that what we define as urban is perhaps best represented by the concept of the 'urban field':
"The urban field is a spatially extensive and multi-modal region, which includes the bulk of the life-space or activity area of urban residents. It extends well beyond the built-up area into recreational zones and areas of ex-urban residences within 100 miles or more of the urban core.\textsuperscript{14}

This idea has been presented graphically by Bryggle and Kruger for a city of about 250,000 people (see Figure 1).

In the 1970's and 80's, the most peripheral areas of urban regions, the ex-urban zone, is becoming the most quickly developed zone of population concentration. Some of the reasons for this trend according to Russvrum include the high level of transportation and communications facilities available to people settling there, the almost unrestricted competition for land which lies in these areas, which is connected to a lack of planning controls over lands in the urban fringe.\textsuperscript{15} Other reasons include less expensive housing, new employment opportunities and the zone's attractiveness to retirees.\textsuperscript{16} The suburban zone is continuing to grow very quickly as well, with the greatest amount of growth in absolute terms, but slower than the ex-urban areas speaking relatively. The suburban area's growth rate is also slower compared to its own level in the 1950's and 1960's. As for the central areas of metropolitan regions, the central cities, their growth continues to be extremely slow or negative, continuing on the trend which began in the late 1950's and early 1960's.

These trends are clearly evident in the United States. Between 1970 and 1980, while the nation as a whole grew by 11\%, the population of all central cities in 264 metropolitan areas declined by .6\%, while suburban areas increased by 17.4\%.\textsuperscript{17} Much of this
latter figure however includes both suburban as well as ex-urban growth. While the distinction is often difficult to delineate to be sure, it is known that the United States census includes large county areas in their definition of suburban sections of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's) - areas which more appropriately would be considered as ex-urban. This high rate of ex-urban growth can also be witnessed in the spectacular growth of the rural non-farm population, in large measure located not too far outside of larger cities, certainly within the area known as the 'urban field'. As the U.S. Bureau of the Census noted in 1981, for the 1970-80 time frame, "non-metropolitan counties with the closest commuting ties to metropolitan areas had higher growth rates than the more remote rural counties". Thus, we see a further expansion of the regional urban form occurring in the most recent time span, often covering territory of 100 or more miles away from the boundary of the core city.

Canada - Canadian metropolitan regions have essentially experienced the same trends at the regional urban level as their counterparts in other Western industrial countries. The main difference lies not in the pervasive trend of economic and demographic flow away from the central core, but rather in its time of occurrence.

In Canadian urban centres, the widespread de-population of core areas of major metropolitan regions did not become evident until the early 1970's. A little earlier, in the 1960's it became evident
that suburban areas had become the prime location of absolute urban growth in metropolitan regions, while ex-urban regions only experienced their relative lead in intra-metropolitan growth rates since the mid-1970's. Thus, all the trends of the United States and other Western politics have occurred, but simply at a later time.

While the trend outwards from the centre is recent, its current strength is large. It can be seen, in the statistic that over the 1970's, the rural non-farm population in Canada doubled its rate of population growth. Robinson suggests that among the reasons for this rapid rise are the suburbanizing effects of metropolitan development, which has accounted for the rapid growth of many small communities within the daily commuting range of Canada's Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs).

Let us turn briefly to a discussion of the future pattern of urbanization in Canada, at both the national and urban regional levels. Naturally, at the outset, it must be cautioned that in any type of forecasting, it is difficult indeed to be sure about future trends.

However, whatever the risks, it may still be suggested that at the national level, it appears that present trends will continue chiefly because of the continuation of low birth rates which will result in much lower rates of natural population increase, and hence, a slower increase in the size of cities.
At the urban regional level, there seem to be two opposing possibilities on a future urban pattern which depend first on the attitudes and underlying values of Canadians, and secondly, on the dominant effect of the energy situation. These factors could either reverse the present trend towards population decentralization from core areas, or enhance it depending on the way individuals and governments respond. To take an example, it is not yet apparent whether large segments of the Canadian middle class will accept the increased density of suburban development or whether their collective desire for large-lot single family homes will drive them even further into the ex-urban area. The response will either lead to a more compact urban form or a more spread out one. It is this type of issue which will decide the future urban pattern. While knowledge of the eventual urban pattern necessarily will remain elusive, the understanding of the many possibilities, stands as an important concern for the planning of an adequate or optimum local government structure.

Problems Associated With Urbanization:

Earlier, it was posited that demographic trends represented one means of monitoring ongoing urbanization patterns. At that time, mention was also made of other criteria which could be used to define the urbanization process such as industrial mix, socio-economic levels and so on. Further, if it is accepted that all of these considerations can be viewed as representations of the urbanization process, then it can be said that urbanization is linked to numerous
consequent problems involving land uses, social and economic concerns. In effect, these problems are an integral by-product of the urbanization process.

In this, the thematically second major section of the chapter, the focus of the discussion shifts to an examination of the detrimental effects of the urbanization process as it has occurred in the Western politics, with an emphasis on Canada. In large measure, it is the existence of these problems of urbanization which has led local government scholars to re-examine the question of local government structure, since there is a belief that if the structure of local government can be altered, then many of the problems of urbanization can be solved. It can be stated then that these problems provide the argumentative link between urbanization as a physical force, which has been the case in the discussion up to this point; and the local political structure which can be seen as the, administrative technique used to cope with urban growth, and which was initiated in the discussion of Chapter 1.

But before we can make an attempt at finding administrative solutions to problems of urbanization, there are two significant background matters which must be introduced. First, the problems of urbanization must be fully described. For the purposes of this paper, an admittedly hazy division has been made between those problems which are considered to be weakly connected to the structure of local government and therefore would not be significantly reduced by changes to the structure of local government; and those problems which are considered
to be directly related to the local government structure and thus could potentially be solved by changes to the structure. Because such a division is made at this point, it should not be construed as a comment suggesting that the two types of problems are mutually exclusive. In fact, it would be very difficult to separate the 'political structure' element from any urbanization problem. The above-noted division has only been attempted for the sake of a clearer understanding of the argument showing how the structure of local government is linked to problems of urbanization.

Urbanization Problems Lacking an Administrative Component

There are many categorizations which have been formulated to categorize urban problems. Not all of these classifications, however, are useful in dealing with problems which have been caused by the urbanization process. Hence, the use which can be derived in this discussion from Lithwick's now legendary division of urban problems into 'problems of the city' and 'problems in the city' is at best only peripheral. For it is only the former category -- those problems which have been caused by the urbanization process, which are of interest to us here. The latter category, the 'problems in the city' encompass problems such as poverty, poor housing, and so on; problems which would occur in the population irrespective of urbanization.

Insofar as our interest is specifically related to the geographical trend of urbanization, we now may ask: what of the division of the single category 'problems of the city' which
deals distinctly with the problems of urbanization? It is most appropriate to examine the question in spatial terms. It is a question of the dynamic of the urbanization process, or the "inexorable logic of demographic and economic movements". It is an issue which has both intraregional and interregional considerations, as for instance, "suburbanization denudes the central city of its people and productive capacity, and the rise of the 'sunbelt' aggravates problems in older northern cities". However, because of our focus at this time on the structure of local government, the concentration herein will be on the former, problems of an intraregional variety.

An overview of the spatial appearance of the problems of urbanization has been provided by Banfield:

"...if the population of a city increases, the city must expand in one direction or another - up, down, or from the center outward...if it is feasible to transport large numbers of people outward (by train, bus and automobile) but not upward or downward (by elevator), the city must expand outward...if the distribution of wealth and income is such that some can afford new housing and the time and money to commute considerable distances to work while others cannot, the expanding periphery of the city must be occupied by the first group (the 'well off') while the older, inner parts of the city, where most of the jobs are, must be occupied by the second group (the 'not well off')."

From the above quotation, then, we can surmise that there are two territorial zones or 'frontiers' where urban problems are most pervasive in metropolitan areas. These are: the frontier of deterioration in the inner city, and the frontier of growth on the
outskirts of the built-up metropolitan area. It is in these two zones that urbanization problems are most readily noticed. Again, it should be stressed that these problematical conditions evolve in a situation when there is minimal political intrusion. The problem zones may be more apparent in the United States than Canada for instance, because of fewer government programs, policies, and regulations that tend to lessen the effects of natural economic market processes. Furthermore, it may be more applicable to the immediate post-war period than to the 1970's and 1980's because of value changes in the population which have made the central city an attractive place to live again, and thereby has helped to revitalize the inner city deterioration zone.

Notwithstanding recent trends, the greatest problems in metropolitan areas continue to be found in a ring zone surrounding the downtown core, where large sections of inexpensive, poor quality housing, industry and commerce co-exist. This zone is characterized by a flight of capital which results in a further deterioration of the area. Especially in the United States, lending institutions frequently 'redline' particular areas, or prevent loans to businesses and individuals from being made there. This procedure still further reduces the viability of the zone as a living, shopping or working area. The process of deterioration includes the abandonment of part of the housing stock which in some American cities has meant the abandonment of entire neighbourhoods; which in turn leads to demographic changes which result in a high proportion of dependents such as the elderly, the poor and minorities with social problems.
The community develops a psychology of decline which is extremely difficult to turn around, and both businesses and larger industries begin to suffer as well.

Meanwhile, at the periphery of the urban region, another process is taking place; one which is quite different from that of the inner city, namely that of rapid growth. Russwurm has demarcated eight problems of the 'urban fringe' which result from the outward extension of the metropolitan area.26 Four of these problems relate directly to the land: including 1) land use activity conflicts in the ex-urban area as between farming and industry; 2) land conversion difficulties including land speculation and increasing land fragmentation; 3) the impact on the environment such as with pollution, a destruction of the landscape and its amenities; and 4) the impact on agricultural land involving land conversion, growth or part-time farming resulting in idle farmland, and so on. The four other problems relate indirectly to the land; rather, they focus on the activities of people in the fringe zone. These concerns include: social issues such as the attitudes of new residents to the landscape, or the inclusion of exclusionary zoning in exclusive subdivisions; and the impact of growth on surrounding settlements. The other two issues which Russwurm touches on in this discussion, the equity of services versus taxation and governing and planning difficulties, concern the local political structure and therefore will be described in the next section.
Some problems of urbanization occur throughout the metropolitan region; and really cannot be pinned down as occurring more strongly in any specific location or zone. Included among these sorts of problems are traffic congestion, the need to expand physical and social services, and so forth.

Depending on the location of the metropolitan region in the national economic landscape, urban problems may appear as being more or less acute. In the case of rapidly growing metropolitan regions, inner city problems are usually tempered by the growth of the entire metropolitan community; while urban fringe problems may be worse than the norm because of the strong pressure to parcel out more land for development. The reverse situation exists in stagnant or slow growth regions. In this case, a flight of capital may be occurring more quickly in the centre, but slow overall growth results in few problems in the urban fringe zone.

Thus far, the analysis has centered only on one set of problems created by the process of urbanization. These difficulties occur mainly by way of free market forces in land development and have been noted without considering the impact of government. There are, however, another quantity of problems which are related to the urbanization process; problems which are intrinsically tied in with the political structure of local government in an urban area. These problems are particularly associated with the local political structure which was set down in a rural society, and then developed incrementally as a response to urban growth.
Urbanization Problems With an Administrative Component

When the traditional structure of local government is considered in conjunction with the problems of urbanization which were described earlier, new, more complex, difficulties emerge. When the perspective of the regional urban form is taken, then it can be recalled that urban problems are concentrated in two zones — the frontiers associated with a flight of capital in the inner city, and with rapid urban growth and its concomitant problems in the urban fringe. When the traditionally evolved local government structure is superimposed onto this pattern, then it can be seen that the first problem, that of a loss of investment and so on, occurs in a central city municipality, while the difficulties associated with rapid growth on outlying lands are spread out over a host of suburban, ex-urban and rural political units.

Let us initially examine the question of the problem frontier in the central cities. The problems associated with this frontier vary between polities. Differences stem from a collection of factors: of the socio-economic variety, one can cite the level of de-urbanization from the urban core, which is connected to the rate of population growth of the entire metropolitan area, which in turn depends on the part of a polity in which the urban region finds itself; of the political sort, one can cite differences in the structure of local government between countries; and finally, one should also take into consideration local factors such as the physical setting, cultural characteristics of the population and so on.
As a result of a particularly negative mix of the above factors, the problems of many American cities have emerged as being considerably worse than those of their Western European or Canadian counterparts. In fact, the problem zone of disinvestment in American cities has in many cases spread, so that often the zone can be equated with the area of the entire central city.

From a political and policy perspective, the American central city finds itself overloaded with service demands such as for welfare, health care, legal assistance, and public protection. There is more crime, poverty, unemployment; a greater number of aged persons, substandard housing units, traffic counts, all requiring greater service expenditures. Moreover, a declining population in the central city does not correspond with a proportionate decrease in the level of the aforementioned service needs. An asymmetry exists in the relationship between population decreases and expenditures on certain services, while contemporaneously, revenues decline. Of those that are remaining in the central city, the per capita tax burden must necessarily increase, yet those metropolitan residents -- the poor, minorities, and the elderly -- which remain have the least ability to pay for these services. While other Western, industrial countries have not experienced these problems to the same degree as the Americans, they do exist there as well. Possible explanations for fewer hardships in these other countries include fewer racial or cultural cleavages, slower long-term urban growth, different values as to homeownership or private property and so on. There are also local
government structural issues such as the existence of fewer special
districts than in the United States, which serve to harm the financial
viability of the central city.

A different set of issues exists at the outer limits of the
metropolitan area in the zone of the urban fringe. Again for the same
reasons essentially as those stated for the central cities, such as
differential growth rates, levels of suburbanization, etc., Western
polities exhibit differences in the extent to which ex-urban problems
occur. The variance between polities seems to be lesser though than
in the case of the central cities. As was described earlier on in
this chapter, regional urban forms in all Western polities are
spreading out territorially increasingly further into an urban
region's hinterland.

Politically-related problems occur within the individual
municipalities which exist in the urban fringe. For instance, in
ex-urban areas, former city residents who may have just moved there
may begin to receive more services than they actually pay for through
taxation, while farmers, the original occupants of the zone, may find
themselves paying for more services in taxes than they receive.29
Despite these taxation policies favouring urban-
type service provision, many suburban or ex-urban local governements
may find themselves too small to economically provide normally
expected urban services such as water supply and sewage disposal, or
what emerges is a lack of 'fiscal equivalence'.30
Many small, geographically contiguous municipalities may find themselves attempting to provide urban services individually, while these services could be discharged more economically over larger areas. So the "proliferation of government units has created parochialism and resulted in wasteful duplication". Occasion- ally, special districts are created to discharge specific functions over the territory of a number of municipalities, but this does not necessarily help solve the inefficiency problem. For other difficulties are created, including:

"...money used in uncoordinated ways by special purpose districts, the loss of public control over the direction of their public services, and the irony of a structure established to fill servicing gaps which in turn produce management gaps and coordination problems."32

Not all of the individual surburban and ex-urban units in the urban fringe are the same though. Individual units show social, ethnic, and income differentiations between themselves, often self-created through zoning and building codes, taxation and servicing policies. This results in a dramatic fiscal disparity between rich and poor suburban and ex-urban communities.33 Richer suburban municipalities tend to become even richer, seeing that the discrepancy between revenues and expenditures required for new growth is relatively higher in small municipalities than in larger ones. Since small communities predominate in the fringe, the poorer suburban communities are unable to bear the cost of attracting new development.34

Even more problematical than the differences between the individual suburban and ex-urban units is the question of social and
fiscal inequities between the central city and the numerous outer municipalities. Thus, instead of simply looking at the problems of urbanization in the context of the two problem frontiers, it becomes a question of examining the situation in the perspective of the whole metropolitan area. For while there are significant differences between individual suburban municipalities, these cleavages pale in contrast to the serious dislocations which exist between the central city and outer units in a traditional local government system. One may begin with the division of the metropolitan areas along social and cultural characteristics of the population relating to race, ethnicity and age so that the central city is left with a large share of those groups which are dependent on the political system for support, while the suburban communities benefit from residency of groups which are better able to pay for the services which they seek. This point leads into the next one, that being the serious fiscal disparity between the central city and outer communities. The central city, over the past few decades, has witnessed a rapid depletion of its economic base to the suburbs, while the need for public services in the centre has continued to rise. Hence, a wide gap has emerged in the ability to finance much needed public services.

Also, just as the fractured governmental division between suburban units left each one with hardships in attempting to economically provide services to its residents, the division between central city and outer units leads to the same type of problems. When combined with the fiscal gap between revenues and expenditures, it is
evident that municipal "boundaries are too confining to permit economy of scale in administering certain functions, and often, they separate segments of the community that generate high public expenditures from areas where abundant taxable resources are located".36

Another dimension to problems of urbanization can be witnessed in the lack of coordination and planning of the growth of the entire metropolitan area. Instead of a single local government being in place which would be responsible for this coordinating task, the traditional local government system is highlighted by a chaotic polycentric governmental pattern. None of the local governments existing in a metropolitan region is able to deal with large scale problems such as air pollution, the direction of urban growth, and so on. Each jurisdiction follows its own tack, and urban sprawl ensues.

Sprawl brings with it:

"...spreading blight, cheap commercial developments along major highways, inadequate parks, congested schools, mediocre administration, smog, traffic jams, recurrent crises in mass transportation, and the one hundred and one irritations of undirected growth".37

To avoid these hardships, as reformers suggest, there is a need to create some sort of planning at the metropolitan level, and a chance for citizens to be heard via some form of metropolitan institution that would be accountable for regional actions. The polycentric, traditional structure of local government does not allow this type of unitary planning to occur.

In this section, the problems of urbanization have constituted the focus of discussion. Initially, those problems of
urbanization related to growth and decay as created by the operation of free market forces in the land development economy and without political interference were described. Subsequently, the political/administrative structure was added, and the effect which it has on the problems of urban growth was expressed in the latter part of the analysis.

It is important to place these problems in the context of the developing pattern of urbanization which was discussed in the first part of the chapter. Leaving aside larger regional variations within polities for the moment, at the level of the regional urban form, it is clear that central city difficulties will continue to increase because of slower total national population growth and urban deconcentration; and fringe problems too will continue as a consequence of the further lateral spread of the urban form. Value changes in society may exacerbate or diminish the impact of these demographic changes.

However, large regional shifts within polities are also significant. These trends serve to alter the shape of the regional urban form too. In this study, one larger region in Canada, Ontario has been selected as the study area. The remainder of the space in this chapter will be taken up by a discussion of the urbanization trends which are occurring in this province, and the consequent problems which are taking place there as a result of its pattern of urbanization.
The discussion on Ontario will mirror the pattern set forth in the first two major sections of this chapter. Thus, initially a description of urbanization trends in the province will be examined from a broader perspective, and then from the view of the regional urban form. Brief speculation on the possible shape of the future pattern of Ontario's urban growth will follow.

After this section, a progression will be made to the problems of urbanization which have specific application to Ontario. Some general urban problems resulting from growth will be initially put forth, but the discussion will mainly focus on the urban problems which stem from the traditional pattern of local government which evolved in Ontario.

Urbanization in the Province

Over the course of the twentieth century, Ontario and Quebec have come to be considered as comprising Canada's industrial heartland. With industrialization comes the complementary trend of urbanization, and because of Ontario's strategic location near the centre of industrial America, population growth in cities for most of the twentieth century was rapid. By 1971, Ontario was 93 per cent urbanized, the highest level of any province in Canada. The province was thoroughly metropolitanized by this point as well, containing ten of the twenty-two enumerated Census Metropolitan Areas in the country, and 93 of the 246 Canadian municipalities of over 10,000 population in 1971. The country's largest
metropolitan centre, Toronto, alone contained 3 million people in 1981. The area surrounding Toronto especially to the southwest has become the most heavily urbanized area of the country.

During the 1970's, the province's overall population growth rate began to slow as industrial growth sectors experiencing rapid growth in the country began to shift from Ontario to other parts of Canada. Ontario was concentrated in non-growth sectors such as manufacturing, while the western provinces had energy and other resources that were experiencing rapid growth. Many of Ontario's metropolitan centres began to witness a relative or even absolute population decline in comparison to metropolitan regions in other Canadian provinces. Therefore, while Calgary, Edmonton or Saskatoon in the Western provinces all experienced fifteen or greater per cent growth in the five year period between 1976 and 1981, the growth in metropolitan regions in Ontario was considerably slower. In the same time frame, the Toronto CMA grew by 7%, the Ontario portion of the Ottawa-Hull CMA grew by 5.1%, the Hamilton CMA grew by 2.4%, while both the Sudbury and Windsor CMA's suffered absolute population declines.

Earlier, it was noted that the Toronto CMA currently makes up approximately one-third of the provincial population. Moreover, it is bordered on the west flank by the Hamilton CMA and on the east side by the Oshawa CMA, so that when these three contiguous CMA's are considered together, they represent 43% of the total provincial population. In contrast, the second largest CMA in the province, the
Ontario portion of the Ottawa-Hull CMA, comprises less than one-fifth of this total, and has no other larger urban region surrounding it. Consequently, when one speaks of the regional urban form in Ontario, it is primarily in terms of the Toronto-Hamilton-Oshawa urban complex.

However, this present-day unified urban region could not always be considered as a single entity. Up to the Second World War urban growth was much more concentrated, and centered on the original settlements in the region be they the cities of Toronto, Hamilton or Oshawa. But the Toronto central city was built up by 1945 and was ready for its 'take-off' period of predominately suburban growth by that year. During the ensuing three decades, from the 1950's through the 1970's, regional integration through the merging of suburbs occurred from Hamilton through Oshawa. It was in this latter period also that Ontario's other urban centres witnessed the suburbanization of their urban forms too -- in Ottawa, St-Catharines-Niagara, Kitchener-Waterloo, London, Windsor, and so on.

As of the 1970's, however, another pattern based on the regional urban form emerged. While suburbanization, or the spread of contiguous subdivisions attached to the urban form was not broken, two other trends came to light: widespread central city population decline and rapid ex-urban population growth.

The most prominent example of the first trend is seen by the city of Toronto's population decline from 1971 to 1981, from 713,000 to 593,000 residents, a decrease of 20.2% in ten years. Other centres
of metropolitan regions saw declines too, Hamilton from 309,000 to 304,000, a drop of 1.6% in the decade; and Ottawa from 302,000 to 299,000, a ten year fall of 4.1%.40

As for the second trend of ex-urban growth, the highest rates can be seen in areas bordering the metropolitan regions. Again, the Hamilton-Toronto-Oshawa urban region provides the best examples. The areas between Toronto and Hamilton witnessed extremely rapid suburban and ex-urban growth. The Halton region saw a 31.5% rise, while the Peel region's growth rate was even more spectacular at 66.5% between 1970 and 1980.41 Even in areas where there was almost no suburban, but nearly all ex-urban growth, rates of increase were high: Dufferin County at 9.2%, and Simcoe County at 6.8% in the five year period between 1976 and 1981.42 Rapid ex-urban growth was not limited only to the greater Toronto area. Russell County outside Ottawa experienced a quick 13.6% rate of growth between 1976 and 1981.

Counties experiencing a rate of growth greater than the provincial average of 4.4% for the 1976-81 period are demarcated on Figure 2. What is clearly evident from the map is the wide arc of rapid growth in the counties surrounding Toronto and Hamilton, while excluding the regions within which these central cities are actually located. In other words, slower or declining urban growth, but rapid rates of fringe, ex-urban development.

What of the future pattern of urbanization in Ontario? The one near certainty seems to be that growth will be slower in general,
and that the existing urban pattern will consequently not experience major changes from its present form. In terms of the spatial pattern, as was stated earlier for Canada as a whole, the direction of growth will depend largely on evolving people's attitudes and underlying values, the effect of the energy situation, as well as structural and technological shifts as they relate to the economy. These trends, according to Robinson, could shift the population either way: to a more concentrated form of settlement, which can already partially be seen with the rebirth of the core areas in Ontario's larger cities, or alternatively, to a more areally diffuse pattern. In fact, both trends may co-exist, but one swing may be larger than the other thus resulting in a net shift in one direction.

As recently as eight years ago, prior to the 1976 mini-census the Ontario government in its statements was suggesting that while,

"In 1971, the six major Census Metropolitan Areas held about 50% of the total provincial population...they are expected to gain about 75%...and 80%...of the total growth in the province during the next 30 years."\(^{43}\)

The results of the 1976 and 1981 Census however, seem to suggest that at least for the first part of the future period, this prediction of concentrating growth was substantially off the mark. A continuation of present trends would signal more large urban de-population and rural growth. One projection of this type has been made by the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department which has forecasted a drop of 2% of the population of the entire Metropolitan Municipality of Toronto in the 1981-1986 period.\(^{44}\) It would seem that this latter type of development is the more likely case, at least in the near future.
Ontario's Problems with Urbanization

Ontario, then, has been home to more or less the same type of urbanization processes as other parts of the Western industrialized world with the beginnings of central city de-population and with what is now considered a well-imbued period of ex-urban growth. These trends have been more noteworthy in the central Ontario region along the lakeshore surrounding the urban area around Toronto.

Yet, when it comes to the question of urban problems associated with this form of development, the province has at least ostensibly managed to avoid the serious socio-economic dislocations which have become common to urban areas in many other regions, particularly in the United States.

One can speculate on the reasons for this relative lack of difficulties. First, the central government which in this case is the province of Ontario, has taken a more direct, interventionist role in guiding urban development than in other areas. Second, the province's local government system was restructured early, as early as 1954 in the case of the most populated and rapidly growing area around Toronto. Restructuring resulted in the creation of a local government unit which was spatially more capable of coping with urban growth in the fringe, as well as keeping the central area relatively free of the problems of a massive outflow of people and capital.

In order to ascertain whether this positive description can be truly demonstrated in fact, let us again make the division of problems relating to the urbanization process in general, and those
which are more prone to have been created by the administrative structure which was in place while urbanization was occurring. First, those problems inherent in the land development market. These are the problems which because of demographic and economic shifts manifest themselves most significantly in the frontier zones of the inner city and the sprawl zone of ex-urbia.

In the case of the former, the inner city, the problems which evolved in Ontario's cities were of a much less invidious nature than in centres in other regions. A flight of capital did not occur to such a large degree, yet in rapidly growing centres such as Toronto, other central city issues did come up such as the social dislocation of neighbourhoods, skyrocketing urban land costs with resultant land use implications, problems of expressways cutting through residential areas, and so on. In some of the slower growing larger cities such as Hamilton and Windsor, elements of disinvestment did occur but not to the same magnitude as in other regions of North America.

As for the ex-urban fringe zone, greater problems are evident in Ontario. Again, these occur especially strongly in the area around the Toronto-Hamilton-Oshawa urban complex. During the 1960's and 1970's, suburban and ex-urban growth concentrated in this so-called 'Golden Horseshoe' region with a tendency towards unstructured sprawl and otherwise unwise use of the physical setting as in the waste of prime farmland in the Niagara Peninsula, open pit mining, and pollution of lands and the environment. Since these
ex-urban difficulties continued well into the 1970's, it is clear that local government restructuring had little impact on the occurrence of these hardships.

Let us now turn to the problems associated with Ontario's traditional system of local government. While it is true that the Ontario local government system has been largely restructured, as was shown above in the case of ex-urbia, restructuring is no panacea for local government problems. Furthermore, it is important to gain a knowledge of the problems of Ontario's traditional system of local government seeing that the restructured system continues to function within the framework of the traditional system. Furthermore, not all of the province's urban areas actually experienced reform, and these parts of the province continue to be home to problems linked to the unreformed local government structure.

When urbanization trends in Ontario are looked at in historical perspective, the greatest period of wide-scale suburban and ex-urban growth which is most closely linked to growth related difficulties, did not take place until after the Second World War. However, problems relating to the structure of local government had already been evident for over a decade. These problems of the 1930's related to the inability of local governments to keep up with their servicing requirements brought on by urbanization during the Depression years. Local governments collapsed financially, being dependent solely on the property tax base for revenues in this province. According to Pearson, local governments at this time were
already characterized by antiquated management systems, physical boundaries that no longer corresponded to the realities of community life, and a proliferation of separate local boards and commissions.48

Yet, it really was not until the post-war period that problems of urbanization based on the local government structure began to loom as significant. With the start of rapid suburban growth, independent municipalities began to emerge in the fringe areas of larger cities, especially in the case of Toronto. In 1944, the city of Toronto's per capita taxation was 37% higher than the average in the twelve suburban municipalities that surrounded it. Meanwhile, the suburban municipalities were not able to provide essential local services for their populations, and had to rely on numerous inter-local agreements with the city or between various suburban municipalities:

"the 13 municipalities were able to function primarily because they had more than 100 formal inter-municipal agreements which made the services available within the City of Toronto also available to the relatively small populations outside its boundaries."49

The city though was not in any financial position to meet these suburban needs. By 1945, assessments on land, buildings, and business in the central city were already 7.5% lower than they were in 1935. The city though faced increased costs for capital expenditures on housing, service installations and public transit, as well as on the indirect needs of the suburban areas.50 By 1950, the city...
of Toronto was discovering that it could no longer supply the requirements of the rapidly expanding suburban population.

The 1950's and 1960's were characterized by rapid urbanization and suburbanization; and municipalities struggled amongst themselves for the lucrative tax base which new growth brought with it. Often, a municipality's ability or inability to provide the conditions for new growth affected the location of new housing, industry, and so on. Hence, the direction in which the city would spread within the regional urban form would be directed by practical concerns of the firm rather than on any principles of urban planning.

As late as 1978, the Ontario Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs was outlining the problems of urbanization in the province with a distinctly familiar ring to them: a) there were new shopping malls rising in the suburbs while downtowns were decaying; b) industrial development was stalled for lack of servicing; c) intermunicipal agreements exist which encourage random growth; d) designated growth areas are not growing because of other areas that are highlighted by indiscriminate growth; and e) so-called rural areas are competing vigorously for industrial, commercial and residential development.51 Obviously, many of the longstanding problems caused by the traditional pattern of local government continued to exist in the province.

In this chapter, the focus has been on urbanization primarily as a demographic force, and on the way in which the problems associated with this force have manifested themselves within the
existing administrative structures. Global urbanization trends of the Western industrial polities were described initially, with their concomitant difficulties; and then Ontario's specific experiences with urbanization and its respective problems were enumerated.

The discussion in this chapter has shown how urbanization has taken on many different forms over the past few decades, while the future pattern will certainly depend on broader social and economic questions. Hence, if the recent Canadian growth situation is examined, a rapidly growing urban region such as Calgary, Alberta, will have specific needs due to its particular blend of hardships which growth is causing there. These will be significantly different from those of a declining urban region such as Sudbury, Ontario. At the level of the regional urban form, differences in spatial growth patterns have occurred as well. For instance, variable rates of population and economic growth, personal preferences for living environments, local legal and political conditions and so on will all help to govern how expansive ex-urban growth, and how serious central city de-population will be.

Therefore, when questions of local government structure are raised, it is noteworthy that a structure which seems ideal in theory may only be optimal for a particular set of conditions based on time and location.

Nevertheless, because of the continuation of urban problems, it is still necessary to try to formulate a local government structure which is more ideal than the traditional one with all its related difficulties.
Let us now turn to our case study of Ontario and examine how the province has dealt with its urbanization difficulties in the past with an emphasis on the most recent reform period beginning in the 1960's.


5) ibid., p. 73


8) Bourne, L.S., *Emergent Realities*, p. 5


10) Bourne, L.S., *Some Myths*, p. 5

11) Robinson, I.M., op.cit., p. 36


13) Hallman, H.W., op. cit., p. 173


18) United States. Population Profile, p. 7
19) Robinson, I.M., op. cit., pp. 36-40
20) ibid., p. 39
21) ibid., p. 55-56
24) ibid., p. 353
25) ibid., p. 364
28) Robinson, I.M., op. cit., p. 83
31) Hallman, H.W., op. cit., p. 12
34) Robinson, I.M., op. cit., p. 83
35) Harrigan, J.J. and W.C. Johnson, op. cit., p. 6


40) The Citizen, Ottawa, January 16, 1982, pp. 1-12


46) Plunkett, T.J., in Rowat, D.C., op. cit., pp. 9-10


50) Rose, A., Governing Metropolitan Toronto., pp. 14-16

Province of Ontario

CHAPTER THREE
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a full description of the local government system of our study area, the province of Ontario. To this end, the chapter first deals with an historical overview of local government in the province focusing on local government values, the evolving role of the provincial government, the evolution of the municipal role in relation to the province, and the municipal structural system. The urban growth process is emphasized because of its role as a causal agent of local government structural change. In the second section of the chapter, the period since the mid-1960's is stressed with a full account of the circumstances leading up to major provincial reform efforts and then a detailed description of the reforms. This chapter serves to redefine the most salient concepts of the first two chapters in their Ontario context. This is done initially by examining political and socio-economic influences on the Ontario local government system.

The latter section of the chapter examines the provincial programme of regional government restructuring in terms of the factors which were introduced earlier in the chapter: the push for a balance of political values at the local level, action on the perceived outdated form of local government structure as caused by urbanization, other political pressures from the provincial interest group arena, the distribution of provincial-municipal powers and so on.

The direction taken in this primarily descriptive picture places an emphasis on describing provincial ideas, structures and processes through time in the public policy sphere related to local
government restructuring. The chapter provides the necessary linkage for the subsequent analysis of the shortcomings of the reformed Ontario local government system and resultant provincial initiatives in the sphere of municipalities after the reform programme which comprises the subject matter of Chapter Four.

The Traditional System of Local Government in Ontario

This section of the chapter will examine the historically-rooted context of local government in the province of Ontario, and its relationship to the urbanization process. It presents a fuller explanation of the Ontario local government tradition including longstanding political values, and constitutional and legal considerations; as well as traditional patterns in the evolution of provincial-municipal relations and of the province’s municipal system. This provides the framework upon which an understanding of the provincial government’s attempts to boldly restructure local government, as described later in the chapter, can be built. Secondly, by introducing the discussion of the traditional local government ideas in the province, this section serves to form part of the basis of understanding for the discussion in subsequent chapters; first, concerning shortcomings of the Ontario structural reforms, and secondly, with regard to creating the possibility of a more ideal local government system for the province.

Values of Local Government in the Province

In the first chapter of this thesis, it was posited that the three political values which have traditionally played the most
significant role in local government systems within Western democracies are those of liberty, participation and efficiency. All three of these values have also played an important role in the development of the municipal political culture in Ontario. The first question which is of interest at this point, then, is that of describing the traditional political values affecting local government as they have developed in Ontario. These values have proven to be extremely resilient to change and therefore should be considered even now as a potent component in efforts at restructuring and reorganizing local government.

The roots of these political values of liberty, participation and efficiency, date back to before Confederation. Ontario's first settlers, unlike their French compatriots in Lower Canada for instance, were used to and expected local government institutions - a linkage with both the liberty and participation values. 1 Already at the first provincial assembly in Niagara in 1791, Governor Simcoe enacted a degree of local self-government. This, however, did not come without a measure of trepidation on the part of the colonial governing authorities. Indeed, ruling Tory loyalists feared that self-government at the local level could lead to the creation of "little republics" which could potentially harbour anti-monarchist feelings. 2 By 1817, however, budding urban centres in the province were given a degree of independence in the form of self-government through special charters of incorporation.

Yet, these measures were not far reaching enough for many of the residents of Upper Canada. One of the main demands of the rebels
leading up to the period of the 1837 Rebellion was for local self-government. To this end Robert Baldwin himself, not a rebel but rather a prominent Reformer, was able to introduce the foundation for local government legislation. In 1841, a District Councils Act was passed which created a rural form of municipal government of a restricted kind. However, it was not until 1849 when legislation bearing Baldwin's name was implemented that the practices which had been evolving since early settlement days were rationalized and codified.

The Baldwin Act encoded the underlying philosophy and values of the more reform-oriented segments of the public viz-a-viz local government in the period immediately preceding the adoption of the legislation. Keeping in mind its intent for a mainly agrarian society, the philosophy which was encapsulated in the Baldwin Act basically stated that, "...the community was the best judge of its own needs and more capable than anyone else of seeing to them."

In more concrete terms, the self-government value with its links to both liberty and participation was recognized through the implementation of a two-tier (county and local) arrangement for the province, as well as a clearer elaboration of the powers and responsibilities which municipal units would be able to hold.

Municipal autonomy did not come easily however. Many provincial legislators, while acknowledging the need for greater local autonomy, believed that municipal government could be kept close to the people through legislative supremacy at the provincial level. At
the municipal level, these same legislators believed proximity would be ensured through a pattern of local elections and through policy-making activity vested in the entire municipal council.

Traditionally, local government units had few real powers; municipalities were envisioned to carry out an essentially "housekeeping" role associated predominantly with the service provision or efficiency value. In the words of Plunkett:

"The traditional role of local government was confined mainly to the provision of a limited range of what might be termed essential community housekeeping services. The principal concern of municipal councils was to ensure the prudent administration of these activities without placing what was considered an undue burden on the property tax. This concept of local government predominated until almost the end of the first half of this century, and it was a role suited to a period characterized by both a limited view of the responsibilities considered appropriate for governments and relatively little use of the automobile in comparison to the post World War I period."

The emphasis was not to be on political debate at the local level but rather on consensual politics. Hence, the emphasis given to service provision as a value. Partisan or ideological discussion that may have arisen with greater municipal autonomy would have implied a greater recognition of the liberty and participation values through greater local input in the resource allocation process.

To exemplify, in terms of structures, non-partisan administrative boards were used when necessary to ensure an absence of conflict at the local level. Kaplan noted that, "Ontario values on local government combine the nineteenth century British liberal's
faith in municipal government as a training ground for democracy with the nineteenth-century American Progressive's faith in non-political boards. Consequently, in Ontario, there was a blend of all three local government values from the days of earliest settlement: those of liberty, participation as well as service.

The Central Role of the Province

Constitutional - Whereas the values of local government can be seen to represent the ideas upon which municipal institutions were built, then the political and legal arrangement constituted the structure within which these ideas could be realized in an orderly and rational manner. In the period prior to 1848, Upper Canada's governing authorities were appointed directly from England, and the small amounts of independence that the local units could attain from these colonial governors was embodied in the Baldwin Act. The minimal importance of their powers is best illustrated by the fact that the colonial authorities had no self-governing powers themselves.

With Confederation and the passing of the British North America Act, it was foreseen that real powers were to be transferred from England to the newly formed Dominion both at the federal level and at the level of the provincial units. Municipalities, on the other hand, were not acknowledged in the constitution with any entrenched powers of their own. The provinces were given complete control over 'municipal institutions' under Section 92(8) of the above-noted BNA Act. Therefore, a much different relationship emerged between provinces and municipalities than between the provinces and the federal government.
The constitution gives the federal government an extremely restricted role in the municipal sphere and an equally constrained mandate in terms of urban growth. Over the years since Confederation, the federal level has managed to acquire a limited yet multifaceted position. According to David Cameron, the federal role with regard to municipalities is currently limited to the analysis of the impact of federal activities in cities and interpreting provincial and municipal urban policies to federal agencies; as well as activity in its own policy spheres such as public works, some crown agencies and the execution of fiscal, transportation and immigration policies. The federal presence in municipal affairs has also been felt through its sheer physical size as an employer, landowner and developer; in addition to its practice of making direct financial payments to municipalities. In terms of land development and urban growth, the federal role is restricted yet necessary to note because of its top position in the principle of the "hierarchy of responsibility". This principle notably states that each governmental level has a right and duty to plan within its own legitimate area of jurisdiction while respecting the plans of other administrative levels.

It remains obvious though that it is the provincial level of government which has gained from the distribution of constitutional powers with regard to both urban growth and power over municipalities. Through the powers granted in the constitution, the provinces not only gained control of municipalities as units, but they also began to control the urban growth process by means of Section 92(13) of the BNA
Act, the clause which deals with property and civil rights. In unison, these two clauses of the constitution ensured the provinces the central role in being responsible for the growth of municipalities. Let us now trace the means by which this control has become established through to the implementation period of the regional government programme.

The Nature of Provincial Control - Why is it that the province plays such a critical role in determining the structure and operation of the province's municipal system? The most significant feature is Section 92(b) of the BNA Act, giving the province responsibility for ensuring that a viable local government system exists. This clause placed the onus of control not only on the province viz-a-viz the federal government, but it also failed to entrust municipalities with the responsibility of being their own masters. Hence, provincial control became strong from the time of Confederation, although in practice a form of local autonomy as previously described, continued to exist.

Price has noted that:

"The Baldwin Act appeared to represent a victory for local self-government... this was tempered by the fact that the framework was established by the centre and any extension or modification of the local government function required provincial authorization."  

Yet, the reasons extend beyond mere constitutional arguments. With greater urbanization in the 20th century, the effects of the strengths or weaknesses of the local government system on the provincial administration itself became increasingly significant. The province felt a greater need to survey and manage the local government
arena for its own health to be maintained. This situation had become well illustrated by the 1930's when the pre-Depression municipal structure suffered a financial collapse. At that time, local governments over-extended themselves because of a high dependence on the property tax for finances and were not able to provide services at a fast enough rate. Consequently, the provincial government was forced to rectify the situation and concurrently used the opportunity to make strong inroads with respect to policy matters into the municipal system.

The Liberal administration of the time not only bailed out the financially strapped municipal governments but also saw fit to establish a Department of Municipal Affairs (DMA) in 1935. Thus began the direct, day to day, departmental administrative involvement of the province in municipal affairs.

In addition to the newly created regulatory role, the provincial administration began to take a direct interest in providing services through its other departments, boards and commissions, services which had previously been of a municipal nature. The provincial government began to take the political values of equity and redistribution into consideration. Generally, the province only attempted to become directly implicated in service provision when there were large variations in the kind and level of services provided by municipalities, when the local authority could not provide a service at standard levels, and when province-wide planning and development policies required close control over the service
function. A further means of provincial involvement came through the establishment of grants to municipalities through the Municipal Affairs Department, funds which were often tied to reflect the provincial administration's wishes. Control through the financial device increased in importance over time.

Provincial control over municipalities also became evident in the sphere of legislation. The chief legal document pertaining to municipalities in Ontario, The Municipal Act (which replaced the original Baldwin Act), "...set(s) out the conditions under which certain forms of provincial financial assistance will be made available or establish(es) the degree of regulatory control that departments and agencies of the province may exercise over particular activities." While the Municipal Act is applicable to all municipalities, differences exist according to whether a locality is urban or rural, large or small, upper or lower tier. Specific territorial acts exist which were passed to create legislation for specific municipalities. Even more minutely, provincial legislation was established in the form of acts which regulate personnel appointments of municipalities, building code requirements and so on. Similarly, individual province-wide acts in various policy spheres such as libraries, children's aid societies, and so forth were instituted to give power over local special purpose boards and commissions.

In fact over the past number of decades, what has been occurring can be described as a methodical transfer of functions to
the provincial level, albeit via a gradual and complex process. Occasionally, it has taken the form of a clear-cut functional shift such as with the administration of justice moving into the provincial domain in 1968. More often than not, however, it has taken the form of partial provincial assumption of responsibility so that dual powers have resulted at both the local and provincial levels.

Although the judicial system is formally almost totally separated from the provincial government in power, and its administration, there is in addition a prominent provincial act, the Ontario Municipal Board Act of 1932, which has given the province notable quasi-judicial, issue by issue control over municipal matters. It sets out, "...to require or forbid the doing of any act which any municipality was required to do or not to do under any Act or order of the Board or under any agreement to which the municipality was a part." Ontario Municipal Board members are appointed by the provincial Cabinet, hold office for unfixed and often lengthy periods, and have acquired significant independence in the decision-making process. Although the Board is supposed to reflect government policy, the body is essentially independent in its selection of criteria which it applies in reaching decisions. A Board's decision is only subject to appeal to the courts or the Ontario Cabinet. In sum, it has helped to centralize authority at the provincial level, thereby undermining the previous independence of municipal units.
To conclude the discussion on the provincial control over municipalities, it should be noted that assumption of powers by the centre has grown mainly since the 1920's. Up to that point, municipalities more or less, "...acted on their own initiative and with their own resources." However, it should also be recalled that municipalities, given their small size at that time, did not perform nearly the same number of functions as they currently discharge. Hence, by 1934, the OMB had gained prominence ensuring that municipalities did not incur debts beyond their revenue capabilities. Its power also extended over municipal boundary changes. A provincial Department of Municipal Affairs was established in 1935. At the local level, the creation of inter and intra-municipal special purpose bodies under provincial legislation inhibited municipal control and co-ordination of activities hinting at a greater provincial role.

It is not coincidental that the above-noted provincial moves into municipal affairs directly paralleled the rapid urbanization of the province. Adopted power over municipal change in areas such as annexations, amalgamations, and special purpose boards gave the provincial government a dominant voice in the all-important sphere of the administration of urban growth. Let us now turn to an examination of the development of this aspect of control over municipal matters.

Although a crucial connection exists between municipalities and urban growth processes, it is also possible to trace a provincial interest in urban growth which provincial authorities only
peripherally tied in to the municipal system. This period can be said
to have started in the 1940's. For the 1943-53 period, Ontario
geographer E.G. Pleva noted seventy local regions in the province,
which however did not come to have much practical significance. In
1953 the federal government's ten economic regions in Ontario were
provincialized through the establishment of Regional Development
Associations in each of them. These entities which existed between
1953 and 1973 served as a "...forum in which citizens, local
governments and agencies, industry, commerce, agriculture, and
universities could study matters and make reports." In the
1955-65 period, each provincial department in addition to the
aforementioned ten economic regions, created 'service regions' for its
own purposes. In 1965, the Ontario government convened a major
international conference on regional development and economic change,
in Toronto. From it emerged the idea of regionalism requiring social
and physical as well as economic considerations, and the need for a
complex administrative machinery.

It was not until after this conference that the significant
link between regional land use and economic planning came to the fore.
In this period, provincial authorities felt that they should be
responsible for ensuring that all development take place as a result
of good regional planning, that governmental expenditures must be
coordinated in relation to provincial and regional planning
objectives, that the government should encourage and develop the
special potentials of each economic region and smooth out conspicuous
regional economic inequalities. Other provincial interests in urban
growth are less clearly regionally-defined as in the case of pollution
control and in the provision of social services. Since these sectors
involved the establishment of governmental departments and agencies
that were not directly linked to regional development programs, they
will not form a part of this discussion. An important administrative
development came about in 1973 when the Ministry of Housing was
created taking over the provincial end of responsibility over local
planning.23

In the legislative sphere with regards to urban growth, the
most significant piece of legislation passed was the Planning Act in
1946. It was preceded by an act establishing provincial control over
conservation authorities in both 1937, that was amended in 1945. The
Planning Act gave the province control over long range development
policies through Official Plans, as well as incremental growth
controls via subdivision approvals, zoning and building controls, and
so on. A number of pieces of legislation supplemented these initial
acts, including the Planning and Development Act, an act dealing with
the Niagara Escarpment and others stemming from the early 1970's.
Through legislation then, the province was able to incrementally gain
ground in the area of urban growth.

The quasi-judicial linkage in urban growth, as with power
over municipal institutions, can again be connected to the Ontario
Municipal Board. Through this body, the province has been able to
control urban growth matters by approving municipal Official Plan
amendments and deliberating on changes to zoning by-laws, just to cite a few examples. It is also necessary to mention the connection of the OMB to approving annexations as they relate to the urban growth process. The province has through this means been able to control urban growth through the annexation mechanism at the OMB. The above discussion has shown that along with complete constitutional control over municipal institutions which was established at Confederation, various other pieces of legislation, governmental departments and agencies were established to cope with the needs of increased urbanization over the course of the twentieth century.

**Provincial Recognition of Municipalities**

The provincial-municipal relationship initially evolved with an agenda incorporating basic service functions, finance, and the mechanisms whereby provincial governments and their agencies exert control over the municipalities. The dominant position of the provincial government, in each of these areas has already been extensively discussed in the previous section. In bargaining with the province, municipalities have been forced to act within the framework of the provincial legislation, and the province has been able to change the bargaining positions and rules and even impose solutions.

Yet, the province has also had to keep other considerations in mind as well, including: local concerns, accountability to the electorate over local government as a system, and certain locally-based service responsibilities which have necessitated a formal provincial-municipal linkage. Therefore, a more institutionalized
if not necessarily more equal relationship between the two levels began to emerge in the 1960's, with the appearance of conferences, consultations, and joint committees at the political, administrative, and technical levels.24

The 1960's also saw the beginning of greater use of municipal associations by local governments. Up to 1969, individual municipal associations representing various groups of municipalities be they upper-tier, rural or urban would bargain individually with Cabinet Ministers for benefits on behalf of their clientele. In 1969, however, the Municipal Liaison Committee (MLC) was formed representing all of the province's municipal units through the component municipal groupings. A formal consultative mechanism, the Provincial-Municipal Liaison Committee (PMLC) was established in 1970, incorporating provincial Cabinet ministers as well as municipal representatives. The PMLC became responsible for consultations on varied topics such as shared jurisdiction, shared resources, provincial standards versus municipal decision-making, and the shape of municipal institutions. However, it should be made clear that the PMLC was not an evenly balanced body from its inception. The province controlled it, exemplified by the executive secretarial services provided to the body by the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs.

In the sector of urban growth as a process, municipalities have had no formal link at the policy-formulating level with the direction taken by the provincial government and its agencies. Richardson has concluded that, "...the municipal advisory committees
in Northern Ontario are the only direct formal link between the provincial planning program and any of the municipalities of the province that has ever existed. Before 1972 in Southern Ontario, municipalities could join regional development councils which were offshoots of the ten provincial economic regions first created by the province in 1953. These bodies were poorly funded however, and were viewed by municipalities with suspicion, and hence met with an early demise.

While municipalities have managed to secure themselves a place in the evolution of the municipal system, and of urban growth in the province, their position remains clearly subordinate to the provincial level of government. Urbanization has led municipalities to adopt a bargaining position with the province which does not necessarily give them more formal power, but does provide them with a clearer, more defined, institutionalized voice.

The provincial-municipal institutional environment since the early 1970’s has been summarized by Feldman and Graham in this fashion:

"...beginning with the regional development councils, and continuing with the Provincial-Municipal Liaison Committee and the COLUC task force, formal intergovernmental mechanisms and negotiations have occurred on provincial ground, been subject to provincial financial and staff support and have had provincial chairmanship."

The Impact of Urbanization on the Structure of the Ontario Municipal System

Now that the values of Ontario's local government system, and its evolved provincial-municipal relationship have been discussed, let
us look at how urbanization has influenced the design of the province's local government system. Since this thesis focusses on restructuring techniques, the devices of annexations and special purpose boards will be given special attention.

In the first chapter of this thesis, it was shown that local governments undertake roles more important than simply that of 'housekeeping' or service provision. Local governments were also seen to exist for the discharge of political values other than that of service, such as the promotion of liberty and public participation. Therefore, as well as qualitative and quantitative increases in the demand for municipal services because of urbanization, new considerations such as the emergence of citizen groups in larger urban areas came into prominence.²⁸

Let us approach the discussion from the socio-economic point of view. Traditionally, it was not unusual to see large, sparsely populated tracts of land administered by local special purpose boards or directly by provincial government departments. In the early part of this century, however, this practice began to lose favour with general provincial population growth and especially with increased urbanization. Concurrently, newly incorporated cities and towns, that were not satisfied with being dominated by an upper, county-tier of government demanded and were granted separate, independent status by the province. While cities expanded through annexations, in the larger urban areas, the procedure was slow and difficult, and consequently many communities in the fringe of the growing urban areas
incorporated into separate municipal entities. Yet on the whole, the two-tier structure persisted through the twentieth century, and with increased urbanization in the post-World War II period, certain adaptive mechanisms began to emerge in response to the need for accommodating change.

The original two-tier system began to break up into a more dispersed one responding to the pressures of urbanization. County units traditionally were able to link urban and rural areas institutionally, provide a vehicle for services demanding a larger administrative area, and furnish larger financial resources in addition to economies of scale. Nevertheless, they were weak politically because they were confederations comprised of township reeves, deputy reeves and representatives of towns and villages.29 And despite the fact that counties began acquiring functions more quickly by 1950, and in 1960 became the most rapidly growing part of the local government system, they remained plagued with difficulties such as the political separation of larger centres as soon as these units reached a population of 15,000, and indifference to their smooth functioning shown by their rural populations.30

However, perhaps the greatest adaptive mechanism of the traditional Ontario two-tier system, especially relevant to urban growth, consisted of the parallel processes of special purpose board implementation and the use of annexations and amalgamations. Referring back to Chapter One for the moment, we recall the various
techniques that central governments use to cope with urban growth. With a basic two-tier structure, and the widespread use of annexations and amalgamations in addition to special purpose boards, it can be seen that Ontario managed with a hybrid of all three models of local government structural organization: the consolidationist, two-tier and polycentric approaches. Moreover, procedural and fiscal techniques became increasingly popular.

By the 1960's, Ontario had developed the most fragmented local government system in Canada, which included the greatest use of special purpose boards. Their origin in the province stems from the early century reform movement, and by the late 1960's there were at least two thousand boards operating in the province with over one hundred in existence in Metropolitan Toronto alone.

According to their definition in the province's legislation, most special purpose bodies are characterized by: 1) being public bodies in that they are either elected by general vote or appointed by municipal councils, the provincial government or other special purpose bodies; 2) they operate at the local or regional level but outside the normal municipal structure; 3) they have a single or limited range of functions; and 4) they receive at least part of their revenue from either or both municipal governments and the provincial government or from user charges.

In Ontario, special purpose boards began to serve various functions: of a business-oriented nature, or as regulatory, management, promotional, or advisory authorities. Examples that could
be cited are school boards, health units, suburban road commissions, conservation authorities, police commissions, and so on.

Ontario special purpose boards acquired various degrees of independence. In general, their strength has been noted by Del Guidice and Zacks:

"...within the ambit of its jurisdiction, a special body is supreme, and the courts will restrain invasion by one board of legislative authority assigned to another. Where the powers are expressed by statute, they cannot be taken away or limited by council, even if the board in question is only an agent." 34

Hence, within their jurisdiction, special purpose bodies reigned supreme and not subordinate to municipal councils.

The second major means by which urban growth was traditionally included into the Ontario municipal structure was through annexations and amalgamations. In Ontario, this occurred through a quasi-judicial procedure, administered by the Ontario Municipal Board. Initiation of an application for annexation would be done by a municipality, by the Municipal Affairs Minister authorized by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council or by the electors in a municipality. The OMB would hold public hearings on annexation requests and have final approval over them. If an appeal of an OMB decision was made, Cabinet would be able to order another hearing, but could not overrule the Board's decision. The system in Ontario has resulted in an average amount of land annexed of 491 acres per request, with an average length of time to complete an application being one and a half years at a cost of twelve dollars an acre. 35
It should be noted that along with annexations and amalgamations as traditional structural techniques, complementary devices exist in the province's dealings with the municipal system such as fiscal ones: provincial grants, or financial arrangements between municipalities in a metropolitan area. Similarly, procedural techniques involving the provincial assumption of service provision, or servicing agreements between municipalities are in existence.

Thus far, the chapter has noted the traditional values of local governments, the provincial-municipal relationship, and the means by which the local government system in Ontario evolved as a consequence of the urbanization process. No mention has yet been made of Ontario's widespread efforts at reform through the institution of regional and metropolitan governments in the 1950's through 1970's. The chief two-tier reforms were occurring in this period while the traditional processes of change continued to operate. The continued proliferation of special purpose boards and use of the annexation process, albeit in a more limited way, continued to accompany the reform period. In many parts of the province, the larger reforms conflicted with, or overshadowed, the minor, incremental techniques. For instance, a significant case would be the implementation of metropolitan government in Toronto in the 1950's, which eliminated certain special purpose boards, ended the city of Toronto's annexation efforts, and put an end to inter-municipal suburban servicing agreements. Yet, there was no single break with the old developed pattern of municipal structural evolution; it continued to function in
spite of the advent of new reforms. We will now delineate the nature of the principal reforms including their need, origin and characteristics.

The Ontario Government's Local Government Restructuring Programme

There is no question that the key period of the Ontario provincial government's restructuring programme was the five year span between 1969 and 1974 when the implementation of two-tier regional governments in Ontario occurred. This period was preceded by significant reform events which had a significant impact on the regional government programme. A full understanding of the Ontario approach requires a discussion which begins prior to the introduction of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto in the early 1950's. These events can be seen as being complementary to the traditional pattern of municipal structural change that has already been discussed in this chapter.

It is important also to note that, since the two-tier regional government approach to change was selected as the means for structural change, events surrounding the provincial government's regional economic development, and regional planning programmes impacted greatly on the municipal structure initiative. Hence, these initiatives will receive considerable attention in the ensuing discussion.

It is possible to examine the background of the regional government programme from both practical and theoretical perspectives. The practical or socio-economic considerations which were introduced
in Chapter 2 included the inability of existing local governments to cope with urban overspill, the incapacity of existing change mechanisms to deal with the problem and so on. Political reasons of a theoretical nature which were introduced in Chapter 1 stemmed from the question of the values of local government: liberty, participation and service. Regionalization was seen as a means of ending the confusion over what represented provincial versus local tasks in the province. The province felt that the existing local government structure, being complex and highly fragmented, needed a change in order to increase meaningful citizen access. The provincial authorities saw this as being on the increase with little or no decrease in the need for efficiency in service production and delivery. The two-tier structure would allow citizen access to continue at the local level, while introducing regional services that required a wider service area for the value of efficiency to be met.

The province had further reasons though, largely of a political nature, aimed at bringing forth significant structural change in local government. Pearson has remarked that beginning in the 1950's, various interest groups began lobbying the provincial government to take action on local government reorganization and restructuring beyond traditional incremental change. These groups represented diverse interests including citizens, business, municipal and environmental associations. Furthermore, with the programme of significant change, the provincial administration would have its own interests in mind as well: it would create the conditions for a much
needed overhaul of the machinery of local government, it would assist
in the study of the field of comprehensive regional planning, and it
would introduce measures which would aid in the development of non-
metropolitan regions.\textsuperscript{36} In addition, the pressure would be
reduced on the province for direct intervention and expenditures in
various policy spheres.

The immediate pre-restructuring period is replete with a
gamut of research activity including special studies, committee work,
regional councils, task forces, policy statements and the like.
Moreover, Fyfe counts the recommendations of the mid-1960's reports of
the Smith and Beckett Committees as a crucial push in the direction of
change, along with the lack of a political backlash after the creation
of Metropolitan Toronto in the 1950's.\textsuperscript{37} While these factors
may have been most critical in influencing the province towards full-
scale change, our review must begin at an even earlier point in time.

\textbf{The Pre-Reform Period}

The first efforts at wholesale reform were attempted by the
Henry Ministry in 1931, which failed in its attempt at implementing
metropolitan government in Toronto.\textsuperscript{38} Four years later,
coinciding with the establishment of a Department of Municipal Affairs
in the province, the Windsor area was selected for a trial run for
metropolitan government; however, it was of a one-tier not two-tier
variety.\textsuperscript{39} This effort saw a forced consolidation of various
small municipalities.
However, the initial serious attempt at significant structural change in local government was the implementation of a two-tier metropolitan structure in the Toronto area in January, 1954. This can really be considered as the turning point which began the reform era and therefore it is important to study this period in detail. It was in 1950 that the city of Toronto initiated a request to the Ontario Municipal Board for the amalgamation of all of the municipalities within the broader metropolitan area of that time. The suburban communities, on the contrary, favoured the status quo. In making his ruling on the Toronto annexation application in 1953, OMB Chairman Lorne Cumming suggested a compromise solution which would have far-reaching repercussions: a two-tier federated structure. In his ruling, Cumming accepted the following arguments:

"...a federal, rather than a unitary approach to the solution of political, social and economic problems is more democratic and is consistent with the Canadian pattern; in any event the City of Toronto has a poor record as far as planning is concerned and the local municipalities should not be entrusted to an administration with a long history of neglect of some of its most profound problems; finally, every effort should be made to preserve local interest and citizen participation in the affairs of our municipalities and this will be less likely if a huge city is created." 40

The metropolitan level took over some area-wide functions such as sewage disposal, public transportation, the courthouse, metropolitan official plan, and so on, while the local level was left with responsibility for the collection of sewage and garbage, maintenance of local streets and sidewalks, collection of taxes, etc.
Design for Development - A Combination of Regional Concerns

After the Toronto reforms, significant occurrences did not happen until the mid-1960's. It was at this time that the province begins to express concerns over regional issues involving economic development and land use planning.

The most salient of the events of the 1960's concerned the announcement of the 1960's policy of 'Design for Development' through a White Paper in 1966. In the 1960's, Queen's Park was becoming more interventionist in the provincial economy under Premier John Robarts. At the same time, the civil service was increasing in sophistication with policy-oriented people in middle and senior positions acting on the need to 'rationalize' the province's regional urban structure.

Hence, DFD I (1966) showed that the province was becoming more concerned with 'good regional planning' and with the co-ordination of provincial programmes and expenditures, towards smoothing out regional economic inequities.\textsuperscript{41} While local government was not a significant element of the 1966 DFD announcement, the Premier, in explaining the programme, did note that it was "...inaugurating the provincial regional planning and development programme and the parallel process of reorganizing local government..."\textsuperscript{42}

The DFD programme was comprised of an elaborate decision-making and implementation structure which had ramifications on the entire provincial public service. In addition to a special committee of Cabinet, the administrative framework consisted of an Advisory Committee on regional development comprised of deputy ministers, ten
regional advisory boards composed of senior civil servants, and ten regional development councils of business and municipal representatives.

The regional development councils emerged in 1966 out of the province's economic regions which were first created in 1953-54, and in 1969 published formal master plans which encouraged public acceptance of regional economic activities, regional social problems, and regional planning. Changes were also taking place at the departmental level of the civil service. In 1966, a Regional Development Branch was created within the Department of Economics and Development, which would later form part of Treasury and Economics, and which was responsible for co-ordinating all government departments with respect to regional growth. Other major departmental actors at the time included Municipal Affairs (vis. land use planning and provincial-municipal fiscal arrangements) and Treasury (vis. general fiscal arrangements). Furthermore, the Ontario Development Corporation also came into existence.

Another noteworthy trend of the 1960's period consisted of the provincial inquiries into various policy sectors over which it has responsibility. Most notable was the creation of the Ontario Water Resources Commission which suggested a strong provincial role was needed in the provision of water supply and sewage treatment facilities, which served as a warning to municipalities that their traditional powers were not sacrosanct. The provincial government was taking a strong interest in equalizing service provision across Ontario for the sake of promoting its own political
values of equity, redistribution and efficiency. Other studies looked at the logic of regional arrangements: in transportation, the Metropolitan Toronto and Region Transportation Study which was established in 1962 and reported with "Choices for a Growing Region" in 1967; in education, which led to the consolidation of school districts from a total of 3600 to 200; in planning, with the creation of joint planning boards; in public health and so on.\textsuperscript{47}

The Smith and Beckett Committee Reports

Provincial efforts at municipal structural reform reached their apex in the 1960's. The early period was characterized by reviews and studies; while in the latter time frame implementation was beginning to occur. Two important province-wide studies that were a precursor to change were those of 'The Select Committee on the Municipal and Related Acts' which reported in 1965; and of 'The Ontario Committee on Taxation' which was completed in 1967.

The former inquiry was headed by Hollis Beckett, and appointed in 1961 to look at the broader question of municipal government functioning including that of structural organization. Reporting in 1965, the Committee's main recommendation was to create larger municipal units, "...in order to restore responsibility to the elected representatives and increase the possibility of economical and efficient administration of municipal services."\textsuperscript{48} Among its most notable recommendations, the Committee mentioned that larger units would "...eliminate the justification for some special purpose bodies which have been created to deal primarily with problems extending beyond the limited area of local municipalities."\textsuperscript{49}
In 1967, the report of 'The Ontario Committee on Taxation' or Smith Committee, "...drew attention to the link between municipal financial problems and the fragmentation of local government." Appointed in 1963, and chaired by Lawrence Smith, the Committee was instituted to examine the larger questions of provincial expenditures and taxation. In the process of addressing problems relating to the local government revenue system, the Committee found that it would be necessary to develop larger administrative units which would reduce the imbalance in local tax bases. The Smith Committee proposed a system of twenty-two, two-tier regions for Southern Ontario to reflect the 'service' and 'access' values of local government. Each region would have defining characteristics such as: 1) being a 'natural' entity; 2) having a substantial commercial and industrial tax base; 3) having a heterogeneous mix of interests; 4) providing economies of scale; 5) aiding in inter-regional co-operation; 6) seeking community participation; 7) delivering provincial services; and 8) having at least 8000 people at each unit of the lower tier. The upper-tier should have a minimum population of 150,000 to 200,000.

The Beckett Committee favoured the retention of the county unit in its two-tier regional structure. Alternatively, the Smith Committee viewed the county unit as a perpetual obstacle to balancing the necessary service and access values of local government. As we shall see, the provincial Cabinet ultimately accepted the Beckett approach in its regional implementation scheme, but with the Smith Committee's other criteria.
The Local Government Reviews

The earliest local government reviews ran conjointly with the Smith and Beckett Committees in the mid-1960's, and continued on through the late 1960's in other areas of the province. These reviews were geographically limited to county or bi-county areas, and were initiated by the municipalities in the area albeit with provincial suasion and funding. A commission would be appointed by the province with a sweeping mandate, although the central concern seemed to be with the problems of decision-making in political and administrative terms. Unlike the Smith Committee, finance was not an important consideration. The central, tangible concerns were with service inequalities and the limited local capacity to meet growth problems.

Along with the local government reviews, there were other administrative reviews and studies by co-operating groups of municipalities taking place. Pearson suggests that one can count twelve local government reviews per se: Niagara, Ottawa-Carleton, Lakehead, York, Muskoka, Sudbury, Waterloo, Peel-Halton, Brant, Hamilton-Wentworth, Haldimand-Norfolk, and Metropolitan Toronto. The accompanying chart, Table 1, provides further information on each of these studies.

The dominant structural recommendations of most of the reviews suggested the need for a two-tier form of local government organization with a concentration of area-wide services at the upper-tier level; not unlike the Metropolitan Toronto experience.
Also, lower-tier municipalities would be substantially amalgamated to create larger, and hence purportedly more efficient units. In Metropolitan Toronto, the report of review Chairman Carl Goldenberg called for an increased concentration of services than was already present at the upper-tier level, and a further amalgamation and reduction in the number of lower-tier municipalities.

On the question of local special purpose boards, the review commissioners were also decidedly frank in their call for reform. For instance, the Jones report for Ottawa-Carleton noted that:

"...with the exception of hospital and school boards, all existing local boards and commissions should be abolished and the services and staff under their jurisdiction made the responsibility of the regional government administrative departments."

The local reviews, according to Price, set a precedent of an approach to local government restructuring from a piecemeal perspective rather than a province-wide one; and hence comprised an important local thrust in the province's eventual regional government implementation programme. The reviews also opened up the question of whether a government is able to balance regional interests through significant changes to the political structure by reducing the complexity of metropolitan regions and consolidating local governments into a smaller number of units.

Finally, the description of the pre-reform period should be concluded with a brief account of the changes which transpired in Metropolitan Toronto in 1967, after the recommendations of the Goldenberg Report. Most significantly, the number of lower-tier
municipalities within the Metro federation was reduced from thirteen to six. Second, there was a reorganization of the composition of the Metropolitan Council in order that it be more illustrative of the population distribution of the lower-tier units. Third, there was a centralization of services through the attrition of local government responsibility to the metropolitan level as, for example, in the case of the library board and welfare expenditures. The Metropolitan Toronto Act, however, respected the traditional local government value of legislative supremacy at the local (lower-tier) level, as well as the retention of non-political boards: "...Bill 80 also continued the tradition of vesting important responsibilities like housing, planning, public transit, and education, in agencies more or less free of legislative control." These latter occurrences in Toronto set the precedent for the implementation of regional governments in the two-tier mold, which were soon to follow.

The Widespread Reforms (1968-1974)

After the reports of the two province-wide commissions of the mid-1960's, and of the individual local government review commissions, the foundation was laid for the commencement of the implementation stage of reform. The highlight of the reform era, which stretched for approximately six years between 1968 and 1974, was the establishment of eleven two-tier, regional governments. This five year time frame was preceded by salient events which must also be included with the major reform thrust. These occurrences began with the policy announcement of Design for Development - Phase II in 1968.
Provincial Directions Surrounding the Programme - The Design for Development programme which as earlier mentioned was begun in 1966, was intended to place, "...faith in rational policy-making and forward planning...and it was assumed that local government must be transformed to become an effective partner in this future."\textsuperscript{58} PD II, announced in 1968, depicted the concrete manifestation of an organizational framework intended to tie together provincial and local government functions; and to link the notion of regional economic development with the structure of local government in Ontario. It also set the basis for the subsequent attempts at rationalizing the provincial-municipal system of taxation. Regional governments were central to the 1968 policy announcement: "...a network of urban-centred regional governments were to become a basic instrument in carrying through regional economic development."\textsuperscript{59}

The third stage of the Design for Development programme came out in 1970 as a general and rather vague concept for the Toronto area known as the Toronto-Centred Region Plan. The 1970 announcement established broad provincial guidelines for urban growth including three identifiable territorial belts: an urban growth belt, an agriculturally-oriented green belt, and an external rural commuting belt. The TCR Concept was not a statutory document, however, and in its inter-municipal orientation it contradicted approved Official Plans under the Planning Act in many parts of the province; and was not capable of being implemented except by piecemeal reform measures or by provincial control over local finances.\textsuperscript{60}
The Design for Development programme's next stage appeared in 1972 with the pronouncement of Phase III. This new phase highlighted provincial-municipal fiscal reform; and a greater attempt at identifying specific development opportunities and exploiting them through public funding.61 Accompanying the fiscal end stood a reassessment of provincial-regional social and economic planning which was characterized by a realignment of the ten economic regions into five administrative ones; and in addition, the announcement of the desirability for continuing local government reform via the regional government programme.

There was a further Design for Development proclamation in 1976 after the reform period had come to an end for the most part. This announcement will be discussed in the next chapter on the post-reform period. In the intervening period of the early to mid-1970's, a task force was formed for the greater Toronto area known by its acronym of COLUC, or in its entirety as the Central Ontario Lakeshore Urban Complex. It had provincial and municipal representation including the six regional municipalities which had already been formed in the inner part of the Toronto-Centred Region. COLUC studied the TCR proposals of a few years earlier, and in its 1974 report, set out the key elements of an implementation programme. However, the report was unenthusiastically received by the province and buried.62

Accompanying the broad policy proclamations made at the provincial level were concrete legislative and administrative
occurrences in urban growth-related sectors. These are changes which are in addition to those associated with the actual implementation of regional governments to be described shortly.

Administratively, the real protagonists within the provincial civil service which lay behind the implementation of regional government, and parts of regional planning and development, were personnel of the Regional Development Branch which at the start of the reform period in 1966 lay within the Department of Economics and Development. Soon afterwards, this branch became part of the newly created Department of Treasury and Economics, and after the Committee on Government Productivity's report for the greater co-ordination of government activities in 1969, was integrated into the newly formed super-Ministry of Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs in 1972. In 1973, some of its planned administration activity was shifted over to the just created Ministry of Housing. In 1974, the branch was renamed as the Regional Planning Branch and became responsible for the development of comprehensive physical, social, economic and environmental planning policies for the province. The early 1970's, running parallel to the establishment of regional governments in the province, represented the heyday of the branch's activity viz-a-viz its political/administrative competitors in other provincial government departments, cabinet ministers or private business interests.53

In the legislative sphere, the early 1970's defined the greatest attempts at bold action to control urban growth. There was
Parkway Belt legislation in the Mississauga conurbation which set population limits and confiscated property; and new legislation on land speculation; and in 1973, the passage of the Ontario Planning and Development Act which gave broad powers to the Minister of Housing to confiscate land, establish arbitrary planning areas, and so on.64

All of the above developments set the stage for, and accompanied the creation of the eleven regional governments across the province beginning in 1969. It can be seen that it was a period of strong provincial interest in urban growth and municipal structural reform, and although the regional government programme was the most important reform of all, it really only depicted the high point of all the other changes which were taking place at the provincial level.

The Regional Government Programme - Current opinion about the link between the regional government programme and regional planning ranges from minimal to moderate coalescence. Richardson declared that the connection was weak:

"...in practice its (regional government's) relationship to the original Design for Development program was entirely nominal; the only common element was the word 'regional', and that proved to be the source of endless confusion."65

Jacek saw a greater connection: as the theory of linkage between the two programmes goes, slow growth centres in the province required a stronger form of regional organization to attract economic development, and accordingly urban services were extended into the rural areas surrounding urban regions through the implementation
of regional governments. Certainly, the Design for Development II statement in 1968 tried to link regional development with regional government as two related themes of a broader provincial policy.

In this 1968 statement, taking advantage of a political consensus at the time, the then, Premier, the Hon. John Robarts outlined the basic aim of the regional government programme, being careful to include the influences that it had from basic traditions and values of local government in the province. He stated that:

"The basic aim of the government in arriving at the policy of establishing regional governments is to make local government as strong and meaningful as possible. As our society becomes more complex, the people of Ontario to whom governments are responsible must be able to participate in the decisions and directives of their government. If our municipal partners are unable to cope with the problems they face because of their small size, limited financial resources and inability to provide the services which all residents of Ontario should expect, participation becomes meaningless."66

It can be seen from the above statement that the provincial government's exhortations contained a major philosophical concern to balance the service and access values of local government. To this end, there was an emphasis on the Smith Committee's criteria for the development of regions, although the Beckett Committee's proposal of using the county unit as the territorial basis for regions was adopted. A weighty financial component was included in the reform programme as a consequence of the Smith's Committee's orientation, and which was later incorporated in 1969 with the release of Budget Paper B of the Ontario budget of that year. This document delineated four areas of action to be taken on local government reform, in the area of
the provincial tax system; provincial aid to local government; local taxation; and local government structure, through the creation of regional governments, the reorganization of education administration, and municipal consolidation.

In 1968, the province's commitment to the programme was extremely strong. Then Minister of Municipal Affairs, Darcy McKeough noted that, "...this province is embarking on a programme which will recast and reform our entire municipal system in a way more fundamental than any ever attempted since the present system was organized" and "I think future observers will look back and say that local government in Ontario was established in 1849 and re-established in 1968". In the late 1960's, seventy regional municipalities were envisioned that would be, "...above and eventually supplant the approximately nine hundred local municipalities that existed in the early 1960's." However, there was no real statement issued by the province of what the reform would look like upon its completion.

Between 1969 and 1974, a total of eleven regional governments were created. In temporal order of appearance, they are: Ottawa-Carleton (1969); Niagara (1970); York and Muskoka (1971); Waterloo and Sudbury (1973); and Peel, Halton, Durham, Hamilton-Wentworth, and Haldimand-Norfolk (1974). For information on their areas and population, see enclosed Table 2. In addition to these eleven reformed two-tier counties, some authors have included others as possible additions to the regional government programme.
These additional reformed territories are Metropolitan Toronto (1954); Thunder Bay (1974) and Timmins (1973), both of which are one-tier amalgamations; and Oxford County (1975). However, apart from Metropolitan Toronto which constituted a two-tier initiative, these reformed areas cannot be considered to be part of the central two-tier reform programme. For the regional governments with regards to size, a minimum population size of 8000 to 10,000 was set for lower-tier units and 150,000-200,000 for the upper-tier. The latter criterion was not met though in the case of the District Municipality of Muskoka, nor with the Regional Municipality of Haldimand-Norfolk.

Perhaps the most noteworthy element of the programme had to do with changes in municipal boundaries and the consolidation of jurisdictions. These changes were effectuated with the objective of creating a broader and more equitable financing base, promoting more effective local autonomy and accountability. Municipal alterations included the amalgamation of 201 local municipalities into seventy-nine larger lower-tier units thereby also serving to reduce the number of local elected officials; the dissolution of many local boards and commissions; and the re-integration of cities that had been previously separated from the county unit into the two-tier system of local government.

Constituting a special interest in this study was the effect of the regional government programme on the annexation and amalgamation technique of local boundary change as well as the status of special purpose boards. In both cases, the changes were immense.
It has already been mentioned that the two-tier reform programme created frequent lower-tier consolidation, but only under provincial prerogative. All proposed municipally-initiated amalgamations or annexations were referred to the Minister of Municipal Affairs for study, which "...in effect (constituted) a moratorium on municipally initiated change." To further illustrate the centralization of municipal boundary adjustments, it can be noted that the province created a Municipal Organization Branch in the Municipal Affairs Department to deal specifically with municipal boundary adjustments.

The second area of interest concerned the status of special purpose boards. The provincial government made use of the regional government programme to effectuate a transfer of responsibilities including the elimination of the duties of special purpose boards, transferring their powers to local and regional councils. The Hon. D. McKeeough remarked in 1972 that, "...there are too many special purpose boards and commissions. They obscure the accountability of councils, and impede comprehensive priority setting." Consequently, during the course of the programme, the quantity of major boards and commissions in the regionalized areas of the province decreased from 343 to ninety-two, a decline of 251 units.

The transfer of responsibilities went much further, implicating the provincial, regional and municipal levels. The most salient transfer occurred from the local to regional level, in order to provide an altered balance of responsibility between the two
municipal levels, to create a more co-ordinated approach to planning, and to bring about increased effectiveness and efficiency in the provision of services. These major inter-municipal changes may be seen on the attached Table 3. In addition, there was some transfer of responsibility from the province to local government (mainly regional) in the sphere of police services and planning. Yet, according to Jacek, and as has been seen since implementation, this type of transfer was the exception and virtually non-existent.

These changes in boundaries and responsibilities resulted in a reduction in the number of local elected officials as municipalities were eliminated in their entirety, while regional councils almost exclusively were established as confederations of members from lower-tier councils. The exception was for the position of Regional Chairman, who in each case was to be selected by the province and subsequently by the regional council.

Aside from boundary changes, the consolidation of jurisdictions, and the transfer of responsibilities, there are two further aspects of reform which should be included as direct components of the regional government programme. Both are financially-related, and stem from the Smith Committee's strong financial orientation.

The first facet of financial reform involves cost-sharing among municipalities. The regional government was set up to not act as a tax collector, but rather to be responsible for the establishment of a levy:
...the regional levy, the annual funds that must be raised to support regional responsibilities in addition to support provided through grants and subsidies from the province. The regional levy, a uniform percentage of the local property tax, is based on the equalized property assessment of all municipalities in the region, so that each municipality is required to raise an amount proportionate to its share of the regional property tax assessment within that region. 77

This pooling means a more equitable sharing of the costs of local government between have and have not municipalities, reduces the need for lower-tier municipalities to compete for commercial and industrial assessment, and permits an improvement in the level of services in the region as a whole without drastic fluctuations in local tax levels. 78

A second financial element of the regional government programme involved cost sharing with the province. The provincial administration initiated special assistance payments to regions in order to assist in the transition period to regional government, especially in light of the sudden shifts in property taxes which the programme created. Unconditional per capita grants to regional municipalities were instituted at a higher rate than those available for other municipalities under the Regional Municipalities Grants Act which was introduced in 1970. 79

During the same period as the regional government reform programme, there were complementary changes which were implemented by the province for all local governments. These included the consolidation of school boards from 1400 to 182, to provide more
equalized educational opportunities across the province. The objectives of this reform were similar to the objectives of municipal reorganization in structural matters. Secondly, there were increased and reformed grant programmes, both of an unconditional and a conditional type, in order to equalize local government financial capabilities across the province. Thirdly, there was an increased provincial assumption of services from the municipal level, which included the administration of justice, assessment of real property, family benefits payments, and greater involvement in inter-regional public transit. Lastly, a Property Tax Credit Plan was introduced to correct the regressive nature of the property tax. This was linked to the income tax system and the question of one's ability to pay.80

Although the final five of the total of eleven regional governments were not put into place until 1974, the entire reform programme was beginning to come to a conclusion by 1972-73. In 1972, the original proposal of seventy regional governments across the province was clearly put in jeopardy when Premier W. Davis announced that, "...it is unlikely that the establishment of regional municipalities is necessary throughout the province. Consolidation may be a very suitable alternative in some areas."81 The DFD III statement of 1972 called into question the suitability of using counties as basic units for upper-tier regional governments, and suggested that any future regions would have such boundaries as any local study in each area would recommend.
The following year, in 1973, then provincial Treasurer, the Hon. J. White, reported for the government that, "...we have no specific plans for local government reform in any part of Ontario not already covered by our published proposals." However, with the entrenchment of five, two-tier regional governments in 1974, these entities were firmly established in most major urban areas of the province with the two exceptions of London and Windsor.

In the above discussion, there has been very little analysis of the reforms as they have been described, since this task will constitute the subject matter of Chapter Four. The purpose there will be to show how the reforms have substantially failed to meet the goals of urban reform both in terms of the nature of the socio-economic process of urban growth with respect to the values of local government.

The chapter has focussed on two key facets in the development of the Ontario local government system. The initial section offered a historical review of the development of the local government system in the province, emphasizing the emergence of local government values, the development of the central role of the province in municipal affairs, including urban growth, the emergence of a more significant municipal role in terms of service responsibilities and urban growth, and a description of the traditionally evolved municipal system. The purpose of the discussion was to acquaint the reader with the ideas and structures of the political/administrative environment which developed in the province of Ontario prior to the reform period.

The second large division of the chapter discussed the provincial government's reform programme in the restructuring of local
government. The account provided a description of the early reforms up to 1966, and a look at the widespread reforms in their various stages from 1966 through to 1974. This latter year was chosen as an appropriate concluding date to the province's main reform era as the last of the regional governments was implemented in that year.

This chapter has been predominantly descriptive in its approach to the topic whereas the subsequent chapter will make use of the information provided here on the Ontario local government system in order to analyze the shortcomings of the provincial programme, both in terms of the values of local government and in terms of the characteristics of the Ontario urban growth process.
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER III

1) Price, Trevor, "The Philosophy of Local Government Reform in Ontario", Papers of the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference, June 1981, Ottawa, p. 3

2) ibid., p. 3


5) ibid., p. 60


11) Price, op. cit., p. 8


13) Higgins, op. cit., p. 55


16) Association of Municipalities of Ontario, AMO Reports 9 - Special Purpose Boards and Commissions, Toronto, AMO, 1980 (entire)


18) Higgins, op. cit., p. 73

19) Price, op. cit., pp. 9-10

20) Plunkett and Betts, op. cit., p. 97

21) Pearson, op. cit., p. 178


24) Fyfe, Stewart, Provincial-Municipal Relations, p. 21


26) ibid., p. 81


29) Plunkett and Betts, op. cit., p. 54

30) Fyfe, Local Government Reform, p. 18

31) Plunkett, Canadian City Government, p. 93

33) Ontario. Ministry of Municipal Affairs, Local Special Purpose Bodies, pp. 1-2

34) Del Guidice and Zacks, op. cit., p. 287


36) Pearson, op. cit., pp. 175-190

37) Pyfe, Local Government Reform, pp. 21-25

38) Pearson, op. cit., p. 176

39) Price, op. cit., p. 12


41) Richardson, op. cit., p. 18


43) Rose, Governing Metropolitan Toronto, pp. 20-21

44) Bureau of Municipal Research, Reorganizing Local Government - A Brief Look at Four Provinces, Toronto, 1972, pp. 19-20

45) Feldman and Graham, op. cit., p. 81

46) Price, op. cit., pp. 18-19

47) ibid., pp. 19-20

48) ibid., p. 15

49) Ontario. The Fourth and Final Reports of the Select Committee on the Municipal and Related Acts, Queen's Printer, Toronto, 1965, p. 169


52) Bureau of Municipal Research, *Reorganizing Local Government*, pp. 19-20

53) Jacek, op. cit., p. 152

54) Fyfe, *Local Government Reform*, p. 25

55) Ontario. Ministry of Municipal Affairs, *Local Special Purpose Bodies*, p. 21

56) Price, op. cit., p. 18


58) Price, op. cit., pp. 13-14


60) Pearson, op. cit., p. 188

61) Richardson, op. cit., p. 566

62) *ibid.*, pp. 570-572

63) Price, op. cit., pp. 13-14

64) Pearson, op. cit., pp. 190-191

65) Richardson, op. cit., p. 572

66) Plunkett, *Canada: Ontario*, p. 11


68) Jacek, op. cit., p. 146

69) For instance see *ibid*.


71) Pearson, op. cit., p. 187

72) Fyfe, *Local Government Reform*, p. 17
73) Ontario. Office of the Premier. Design for Development Phase
III, Statement by the Hon. William G. Davis, Premier of Ontario to
the Legislature, June 16, 1972, pp. 5-6

74) Ontario. Ministry of Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental
Affairs, Regional Government in Perspective, pp. 8-9

75) Jacek, op. cit., p. 156

76) ibid., p. 155

77) Plunkett, Canada: Ontario, p. 15

78) Ontario. Ministry of Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental
Affairs, Regional Government in Perspective, p. 9

79) Bureau of Municipal Research, Reorganizing Local Government,
p. 20

80) Ontario. Ministry of Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental
Affairs, Regional Government in Perspective, pp. 10-11

81) Price, op. cit., p. 29

82) ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Review and Year Study Instituted and Report Received</th>
<th>Basic Study Area (1971 municipal population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. (a) Metropolitan Toronto (1950-53) Implemented 1954</td>
<td>2,045,000 population; 240 square miles; 13 municipalities plus Metro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Revision 1963-65 Implemented 1967</td>
<td>6 municipalities plus Metro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Ottawa-Carleton (1963-1965) Implemented 1969</td>
<td>460,000 population; 1,100 square miles; 16 municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Niagara (1964-66) Implemented 1970</td>
<td>338,000 population; 720 square miles; 26 municipalities reduced to 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Peel-Halton (1965-66) Implemented 1973 as two separate regions</td>
<td>463,000 population; 989 square miles; Peel - 10 municipalities reduced to 3; Halton - 7 municipalities reduced to 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Lakehead (1965-68) Partial implementation 1971</td>
<td>106,000 population; 120 square miles; 20 municipalities of which 2 cities and parts of 3 suburbs were amalgamated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Brant-Brantford (1966) Only the data book has been completed. Reinstated 1972</td>
<td>87,000 population; 347 square miles; 7 municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Waterloo Area (1966-70) Implemented 1973</td>
<td>250,000 population; 506 square miles; 15 municipalities reduced to 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Muskoka District (1967-69) Implemented 1970</td>
<td>30,000 population; 1,688 square miles; 25 municipalities reduced to 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Hamilton-Wentworth (1967-69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Sudbury (1968-70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>York-Study by county</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Haldimand-Norfolk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 2

**REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS IN ONTARIO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>name</th>
<th>date of operation</th>
<th>area (sq. miles)</th>
<th>population 1971</th>
<th>units before unit after return</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa-Carleton</td>
<td>January, 1969</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>447,720</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niagara (St. Catharines)</td>
<td>January, 1970</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>345,220</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>York</td>
<td>January, 1971</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>173,700</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muskoka</td>
<td>January, 1971</td>
<td>1,688</td>
<td>31,120</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welland</td>
<td>January, 1973</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>156,000</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudbury</td>
<td>January, 1973</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>167,820</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peel (Mississauga)</td>
<td>January, 1974</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>302,700</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halton (Burlington)</td>
<td>January, 1974</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>202,300</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham (Beacham)</td>
<td>January, 1974</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>220,200</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton-Wentworth</td>
<td>January, 1974</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>299,200</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haldimand-Norfolk</td>
<td>April, 1974</td>
<td>1,117</td>
<td>69,900</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3

**MAJOR CHANGES IN RESPONSIBILITIES INTRODUCED WITH REGIONAL GOVERNMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Local/Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>Local/County</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Services</td>
<td>Local/County</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roadways</td>
<td>Local/County</td>
<td>Local/Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supply</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Distribution</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Local/Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewer Treatment</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewer System</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Local/Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garbage Collection</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garbage Disposal</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Local/Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks and Recreation</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borrowing</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Ontario: TRECA, *Regional Government in Perspective*, Toronto, Queen's Printer, 1976*
The discussion in this chapter turns to an in-depth analysis of the failings of the regional government programme introduced in Chapter 3. The first part of the chapter represents a chronological continuation of the earlier chapter's discussion, of the reform initiatives which accompanied the regional government programme, in this case for the period from 1974 to 1978. The first year was selected as an important demarcating date as it depicts the conclusion of the implementation of regional governments; the second year was chosen as it delineates the beginnings of the province's new initiatives which will be examined in the final chapter. The second part of the chapter turns to a larger critique of regional government. This will be divided into a number of different parts dealing with such ideas as political values, accountability, structure and finance. The concluding section discusses a specific initiative to have regional government significantly altered by a group of municipal politicians in the early 1980's. It depicts yet another form of proof that the regional government programme can be seen as constituting a significant failure.

The chapter criticizes the Ontario restructuring effort in terms of its violation of the values of local government: liberty, participation and efficiency. While it is acknowledged that the efficiency value has been best handled by the regional government programme, it is nonetheless shown that it too suffers in certain circumstances as for instance in the case of land use planning, a policy area that is given individual attention in this chapter. The
denigration of the liberty and participation values are given prominent attention. As a consequence, this chapter shows the need for a different approach to local government structure, a subject that will form the basis of the discussion in the final chapter.

After Regional Reform - Before New Initiatives: The Intervening Period 1974-1978

This section of the chapter discusses the perceived void which is widely believed to have occurred between the time of the completion of the regional government programme in 1974 and the commencement of new, provincial initiatives in municipal restructuring in 1978. Few perceived significant events in this period should not suggest that there was no activity in the provincial-municipal arena taking place. In fact, this section introduces the following provincial initiatives of the period; it featured the county restructuring programme, the mid-1970's review commissions, the conclusion of the Design for Development programme and accompanying changes in the provincial administration. The section concludes with a discussion of political occurrences in the provincial arena which led to the downgrading of the regional government programme. The net result of this section is to provide the context in which a discussion of the shortcomings of the regional government programme can be presented.

County Restructuring

The County Restructuring Studies Programme represents a significant occurrence in this period in that it took off from the
concluding period of the two-tier, regional government programme. The shortcomings of the regional government programme to be discussed later led to this alternative technique being attempted. It was locally initiated rather than administered from the top down, and commenced a new phase of municipal reform in unstructured areas of the province in 1974.

Prior to the commencement of a county area study, separated towns, cities and the county would agree upon the need for a study (with the Minister having the option of opening discussion about a study with any dissenting municipalities), and a resolution of all councils in the area normally would have to be passed before the study was to begin. The study, to which the province would provide 50% funding, would examine such issues as the role of special purpose boards, municipal boundaries, the division of responsibilities, representation and so on.¹

While not using direct action, the province instituted fiscal incentives and an assurance for a minimum level of powers for the upper-tier of a restructured county, in order to ensure that the new units would involve real reform and not just municipal tinkering. Price has noted that inducements via higher grants from the province were not enough to convince municipalities to go ahead with this type of restructuring.²

Among the minimum functions that a restructured county was to perform, the following activities were included: planning, water supply, sewage treatment and collection, operation of the arterial...
road system, provision of health services, a welfare programme, and capital borrowing.

A large number of studies were undertaken with the CRSP Programme, however, only one restructured county was ever implemented, that of Oxford County in 1975. Higgins described it as an ill-fated programme that was expected to lead to reorganization but failed to do so. Tindal described the programme as attempting to create, "...essentially a regional government with a less controversial and politically damaging name." A map (Figure 3) of the implicated counties in the province from 1976 is attached. While the County Restructuring Studies Programme depicted an attempt at an alternative to regional government in unstructured areas of the province, some areas that were restructured would become the subject of an intensive review on their success. These reviews form the subject for discussion in the subsequent section.

The Review Commissions

The mid-1970's saw a proliferation of other local government reviews to go along with the county restructuring studies, mainly to examine the status of regional governments as they had existed for the previous number of years that they had been in place. These regional reviews, in chronological order, took place in Ottawa-Carleton, Toronto, Niagara, Hamilton-Wentworth and Waterloo, and the reports stemming from these reviews were known by the names of their chief commissioners: Mayo, Robarts, Archer, Stewart and Palmer. On the whole, the reviews offered general support for the continuation of
two-tier, regional governments except in the case of Hamilton-Wentworth where a one-tier consolidation was proposed.5

Higgins has suggested that the commissions, in that they were set up by the province, were laden with a clearly political agenda and would plainly favour the two-tier system. Speaking for the case of the Robarts Report for Metropolitan Toronto, and its predecessor the Goldenberg Report, Higgins has noted that, "...it would have been inconceivable for those two to have done other than recommend both retention and strengthening of two-tier metropolitan government in Toronto."6 Generally, the review commissions favoured the continuation of the idea of regional government but wanted to make it more politically palatable.

Therefore, while the five mid-1970's reviews generally endorsed the existing two-tier system, a number of changes were proposed. Most important to this study were the suggested lower-tier, internal municipality boundary changes. However, while some minor changes to boundaries were conducted in Ottawa-Carleton, in 1978 TEIGA Minister D. McKeough stated that he would refuse to consider boundary changes in Metro Toronto or Niagara.7 On the whole, the review commissions proposals for change in this area were left untouched. The review commission process now appears to have come to a halt. In 1981, Gary Lacey, the Mayor of Nickel Centre, stated that Inter-governmental Affairs Minister T. Wells was refusing to review any more regional governments, and that his successor in the policy sphere, Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Claude Bennett, would probably do the same.8
Provincial Political Occurrences

Before we move into our critique of the regional government programme, let us first look at the 1974-78 period in terms of broader provincial political trends which have had a significant impact on the slowdown of the province's regional government initiatives. It is not possible to truly understand the province's two-tier innovations without first examining the broader political context, and this section will provide us with the necessary insight required in understanding why the regional government programme was phased out beginning in the early 1970's.

While the period of reform can be said to have progressed onwards to 1974 when the implementation of the most recent regional governments occurred, it was back in 1972 that the regional government slowdown began. In that year, a traditional Tory seat, Huron, was lost in a by-election to the Liberals and widespread public dislike of regional government was widely perceived as a significant factor in this defeat. Many interest groups and the public in general were clearly set against regional government. The political reaction was not long in being felt. That same year, speaking against the grain of earlier statements which envisioned a system of regional governments across the entire southern half of the province, Premier W. Davis announced in the DFD III statement that, "...it is unlikely that the establishment of regional municipalities is necessary throughout the province. Consolidation may be a very suitable alternative in some areas."9 The following year, 1973, Provincial Treasurer J. White
announced to the Association of Counties and Regions of Ontario that, "we have no specific plans for local government reform in any part of Ontario not already covered by our published proposals."10

It can now be asked: what led to these above-noted pronouncements? Price has outlined four main political reasons for the province's retreat from their regional government initiative. First, the importance of the constitutional question on the public agenda as opposed to urban and regional issues, which began with restlessness in Quebec prior to the election of the Parti Québécois in 1976. Secondly, the temporary absence of a major provincial actor, Darcy McKeough, who was prominently associated with the regional government initiative. Thirdly, the slowdown in the growth of the provincial economy and the beginnings of budgetary restraint. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, was the 1975 election which placed the Conservatives in a minority government situation, and the 1977 vote which kept them in that position.11 For the Tories, the results were especially discouraging in Southwestern Ontario.

These two electoral incidents left the government asking two principal questions: how the provincial electorate will react at the next provincial election, and how powerful individuals and groups will react between elections?12 The Tories did not want to take on the lobbies, such as groups who were affiliated with special purpose boards. These groups liked their independence and did not wish to be phased into regional administrations. Moreover, they had the support of functional provincial Ministers who did not want to sever
connections with their local client agencies. An alignment of professionals occurred between different governmental levels to act as a counterforce to the government's regionalization efforts. Furthermore, the public's and interest group disapproval of regional government began to make its way back to the chief decision-makers of the government and party through quiet feedback from Tory backbenchers.

The Provincial Administration and Design for Development

The 1974-78 period witnessed the effective termination of the province's Design for Development initiative. The critical year in this regard was 1976 when the final DFD report was released. The document was only a watered-down discussion paper, and did not constitute an official policy statement. It represented an unsuccessful attempt by provincial planners to extract a political commitment for the regional planning programme from the provincial government. In a similar comment outlining the bureaucracy's intent, Richardson has stated retrospectively that, "...in practice Design for Development never amounted to much more than an attempt to co-ordinate, at the regional level, provincial programmes relating to economic development and land use, by exercising a rather uncertain influence on a few 'hardware' Ministries and an even more tenuous influence on a few others." The 1976 statement dealt mainly with economic development, and in no place was municipal structural reform strongly noted.

With the downplaying of the land use elements of regional programmes, policy and administrative changes began to also occur at
Queen's Park to reflect the new concentration on economic development. A super-ministry known as Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs (TEIGA) was created in the early 1970's with a commitment to combine regional with economic initiatives. By 1976, however, the Regional Planning Branch within TEIGA which existed for a three or four year period, was renamed the Economic Development Branch and was moved from the Urban and Regional Affairs wing to the Office of Economic Policy. Moreover, all land use elements within TEIGA were transferred over to the Ministry of Housing including Official Plans matters, and local planning. From 1976 on, there was no longer a single locus within the provincial administration for regional planning and development. It was evident that the grand schemes of the 1960's, and specifically the DFD statement of 1968 linking regional economic development with municipal restructuring were no longer in existence.

Several reasons have been suggested for the lack of the DFD programme's success. These range from the socio-economic, to the administrative, to the political. On the first note, DFD's initial stated was to contain growth not stimulate it, which became the need in the latter part of the 1970's as population growth began to slow. Secondly, there was resentment among other provincial government personnel over the dominant role that TEIGA was playing, and coupled with the creation of the Ministry of Housing in 1973, this led to an internal administrative counterforce to the promoters of the DFD programme. Finally, many politicians believed that provincial...
planners were over-stepping their role with a programme such as DFD, and this especially came to light as a significant obstacle to the programme only after a minority Progressive Conservative government was elected in 1975.

The problems that DFD was plagued with in terms of its connection with the regional government question can be well-exemplified by its lack of success in the Toronto-Centred Region concept which emerged in 1970. While the programme called for decentralization via a lakeshore greenbelt system, and structuring growth within the TCR by promoting growth of Durham region for example, these ideas certainly did not attain fruition. The booming regions of Peel and York to the west and north of Metro continued to grow rapidly. Meanwhile, the provincial government was not willing to move beyond a general commitment to a well-defined programme of action.\(^{17}\) The government continued to react to pressures such as the public's demand for housing on large lots, and builders' and developers' pressures to construct them in an unrestrained manner. Furthermore, local planning jealousies ignored regional needs.\(^{18}\)

The DFD programme was also subject to influences from pressure groups such as the anti-hydro lobby, the lobby involved in saving agricultural land, the anti-Pickering airport group, in addition to the earlier mentioned builders' and citizens' groups. The perception among these groups was that the regional government programme was connected to the DFD programme. This idea stemmed from the observation that the province wanted to control the pace and
location of urban development. This connection from regional development through to regional government was witnessed in the Durham region. While the public was given a chance to come up with a proposal for the political structure through the Oshawa Area Planning and Development Study (OAPADS), the final formulation of the Regional Municipality of Durham Act occurred within the confines of the provincial government, notwithstanding the consultative process that was undertaken. The recommendations of the study went unheeded in the eventual reform. Hence, an example of how the regional government programme became associated with the DFD programme which was strongly controlled by the province. DFD's demise after the 1976 pronouncement did not alter the damage that was already done to the perception by various interests of regional government when it was at least partially under the rubric of the DFD programme.

Let us now move from the provincial orientation to more localized and specific reasons for dissatisfaction with the regional government programme.

The Shortcomings of the Regional Government Programme

In order to outline the shortcomings of the regional government programme, a number of concepts which were introduced in the first two chapters will now weigh heavily on the present discussion. The most important idea from the first chapter pertains to the notion of local government as being in existence for the purpose of discharging certain political values. It was shown that three main political values constituted the foundation upon which local government was built: liberty, participation and efficiency. The
3 3 OF/DE
"harmonious balance" of these values, it was suggested, would constitute the goal that would make for a healthy local government system, and one important means for achieving the balance would be for central governments to engage in the process of municipal restructuring. It was further discussed that municipal restructuring would be concerned specifically with two main facets of structure — the distribution of functions and size. The ensuing discussion will utilize the concepts of political values and of municipal structure as represented by functions and size to effectuate a critique of the two-tier, regional government programme.

The second chapter of the thesis underscored the fact that problems associated with urbanization have a local government structure component. Initially, it was suggested that if an urban area had no local government structure, certain problems would 'naturally' occur, especially in the frontier zones of deterioration and growth, (on the edge of the central core and at the outer edge of suburban development respectively). When a traditional local government structure was added, then the following problems of urbanization emerged: in the inner city, service needs would increase while revenues declined; and in the suburban zone, taxation problems would ensue as "new" urban land uses conflicted with "old" rural uses. In general, a fiscal disparity would exist between the inner city and the outer suburbs.

The Ontario two-tier programme attempted to broach the issue of balancing political values and solving urbanization problems. It
is the contention here, however, that success was not achieved in this endeavour. The discussion below structured into various subject areas attempts to explain why the programme can be seen as a failure.

The sub-sections that will deal with regional government shortcomings have been divided into: a) regional integration and value conflicts; b) the deficiencies of the two-tier paradigm; c) accountability at the regional political level; d) accountability at the regional administrative level; and e) financial shortcomings.

Regional Integration and Value Conflicts

The first subject to be broached in our discussion of the shortcomings of the Ontario two-tier approach deals with two closely related and chiefly theoretical means of analyzing the provincial initiative. The initial issue which this section touches upon concerns the subject of "normative integration", as per the concept pioneered for the Ontario situation by Harold Kaplan. It is an approach that focusses upon a governmental unit's ability to integrate within itself through a consensus on goals, values and norms. The second analytical direction of this section deals with the conflicts between and within the three recognized local government values: liberty, participation and efficiency in the two-tier programme. Problems with values will also emerge throughout the critique in relation to specific subject areas such as accountability, finance, and so on.

The first major theoretical issue addressed in this section is that of the low level of normative integration of the two-tier
regional political units as found by political scientist Harold Kaplan. It has been previously mentioned in this thesis that a metropolitan entity does not necessarily represent a natural political entity. Kaplan addresses this issue further by postulating that Metropolitan Toronto as a political entity did not become normatively integrated as it did not develop a minimum consensus on goals, values and norms. The author suggests that these functions are performed for the Metro community by other segments of Canadian society: the structural requirements are provided for by senior governments, and the provincial law provides for the procedural methodology of Metro. Kaplan further suggests that the social forces present in the Metro community could have been created after the Metro structure was put into place, but the political actors at the Metro level did not develop a "metro-mindedness", and refused to submerge their municipal interests in order to promote regional unity.20 Although Kaplan's original work was written quite a while ago in 1967 after only fifteen years of Metro government, the writer reiterates his earlier views in 1982 by noting a continuing inability to establish an agreed upon Metro identity, a lack of system loyalty, and no agreed upon protective Metro boundaries.21 The intent for Kaplan was to show that the upper-tier or regional level has no natural socio-political foundation upon which a political system can readily be constructed.

Let us now address the theoretical subject area of value conflicts. The first problem operating against a harmonious balance
of the three recognized values in the regional governments lies within
the efficiency value itself and between participation and efficiency.
There is general agreement among the critics of Metro and regional
governments that wide far-reaching successes have been achieved in the
provision of the so-called hard services in the two-tier political
units. Plunkett has stated that the imposition of a two-tier, Metro
government in Toronto in 1954 provided the means for financing and
constructing essential facilities such as water supply, sewers, sewage
treatment facilities, and so forth. These successes have
been very difficult under the traditional local government structure
because of fiscal disparities and political disunity between municipali-
ties which existed. However, while the hard services have met with
general success, the political and administrative agreements which
lead to this success are less evident in the case of soft or social
services. Danielson has noted that, "Toronto's metropolitan
government has been far less effective when it has dealt with social
problems like housing or issues such as transit which involve unequal
costs and benefits", and further that, "Metro is likely to falter...
when it faces the issues that divide the many interests of the
typically unstructured metropolis." The success of Metro in
dealing with the hard services, according to Plunkett, delayed the
demand for the imposition of a political structure which would be
capable of resolving metropolitan issues involving conflicts in
ideology or in social goals and objectives. These issues
include subjects such as public housing, downtown redevelopment,
public welfare, and so forth. Plunkett has further suggested that the post-Metro regional governments are plagued with new but similar problems: skyrocketing land prices, protection of neighbourhoods, public housing dislocations, etc. Generally then, the two-tier structure assists in the provision of hard services but falters in the efficiency value when soft services and some other major decisions involving political ideology need to be considered by the upper-tier government.

The participation value is generally de-emphasized in the upper-tier of the two-tier structures, and hence it loses its balance with the efficiency value. The emphasis that emerged out of the introduction of regional governments was on the efficient discharge of services, and access to political and administrative decision-makers (i.e., participation) consequently suffered.

Another major conflict of values entails the area of liberty, both with respect to the programme's violation of the value in itself, and when placed against the efficiency value. The regional government programme transgressed the liberty value by initially imposing a local government structure when the majority of people appeared to be against it, and by continuing provincial controls in specific policy areas and through financial limitations. The regional reform initiated has been described by Price as a modest, conservative reform which strengthened counties to become area-wide governments for trunk services. The intent of the provincial programme was to consolidate the number of local governments and establish regions
through which to "speak to them". There was also a desire to delegate more power to local governments by relaxing administrative supervision, diminishing the number of conditional grant programs and abolishing special purpose boards. These proposed occurrences to a large measure, failed to materialize thereby undermining the liberty value. In addition, because these changes did not come about, the result was a continuing provincial burden in delivering various municipal programmes, establishing equalization payments and other administrative problems, so hence the efficiency value also suffered.

The above two theoretical considerations were presented as an introduction to this critique of regional government. The discussion which follows at this point addresses individual issues where it is believed that the regional government programme has faltered. The areas of concern are: specific problems of the, two-tier structure, political accountability, bureaucratization and finance.

Deficiencies of the Two-Tier Paradigm

The present discussion will delve into the question of how specifically a local government structure consisting of two separate tiers creates problems in and of itself. The discussion will focus on the questions of regional political integration, questions of representation as they are affected by a two-tier structure, as well as service and financial difficulties. This general discussion will be followed by an example of extant problems in a single policy sphere - that of land use planning. While the question of values is not discussed directly, it nevertheless looms significant in the
discussion. It should be kept in mind that the issue of regional political integration brings forth predominantly the problem of transgressing the liberty value; financial and service concerns are primarily in the purview of efficiency; while the representation problem brings into serious question the issue of participation as well as liberty.

The process of securing regional integration is negatively affected by the two-tier structure at both the level of the politician, or regional councillor, and at the level of the municipality. Since the individual regional councillor is first directly elected locally, and only later through indirect electoral means becomes a member of regional council, the member's feeling of loyalty rests primarily with the lower-tier level. Regional councillors may find themselves being harangued by the second working alderman in a local ward (assuming a two aldermen per ward system) for not paying enough attention to ward concerns, or may see the regional political system generally as a burden not assisting in their re-election. 27 This individual feeling of distance from the regional system is in turn translated to the level of the municipality viz-a-viz the regional body. The regional councillor acts in the regional system strictly on behalf of his or her municipality's interests. It would be expected that regional councillors would only vote for assistance to another lower-tier municipality within a region if there were a built-in quid pro quo, and there would be no upper-tier interference in local decision-making. 28 Price recently stated that:
"...the politics of the region still tends to be dominated by parochial contests about which community gets what. The chairman typically exercises influence by gaining and maintaining the support of a dominant coalition of municipalities which have a majority."

A regional way of thinking has not emerged, as the councillors in their role as representatives of the component municipalities are too preoccupied looking out for their own lower-tier interests.

The analysis now turns to the democratic question of representation. In short, the principle of representation by population is sacrificed to overcompensate rural areas in relation to urban ones, so that there is no urban-centred dominance of regions. For instance, in the Region of Peel, the city of Mississauga has sixty per cent of the population but only forty-eight per cent of the seats. While rural areas generally are over-represented, the application of regional governments did, on the other hand, result in the total loss of representation of some small rural municipalities because of the mergers that took place.

In some regions, where there is a single dominant municipality, the representation issue could mean conflict between the dominant municipality and all the others. For example, in the Region of Ottawa-Carleton, the city of Ottawa has more than half of the population but was about to lose its majority on Regional Council in 1980, when Ottawa Mayor Marion Dewar reacted to the proposal by saying, "I hate to think of what regional council will be like. In the last year and a half I haven't seen regional government acting as badly as it has...the situation would get worse."
A further question to be addressed with regards to the two-tier structure pertains to the overwhelming strength of the bureaucracy. The strength of the regional administration has led to the creation of strong parallel local staffs. Consequently, conflicts emerged between the two local levels of government. Kaplan has documented a destructive rivalry between Metro and lower-tier staffs in the Toronto area as a result of the powerful position which the Metro administration found itself in.\textsuperscript{31} It was precisely these types of issues -- skewed representation on regional council and the growth of the bureaucracy that led Brownstone and Plunkett to conclude that the two-tier arrangement substantially weakened citizen access at the upper-tier level.\textsuperscript{32}

A further problem which the two-tier system has created concerns the high costs associated with maintaining two separate tiers of government tagged with the responsibility of providing local services. In the urban sector of the regions or in Metro, each municipality expects tangible benefits from the system to have a relation to the tax collected within its boundaries.\textsuperscript{33} Yet clearly this is not always a feasible approach in operating a single regional urban unit. Even more pronounced are the differences between urban and rural municipalities. In rural areas, since the imposition of regional government, tax bills have tripled. The result has been an increase in the availability of many services such as libraries, roads, pollution controls, and so on, that were previously only provided in a limited way.\textsuperscript{34} However, Plunkett has suggested
that the rural resident has had no immediate need and consequent benefit from these types of services. The Liberal Party Task Force was more categorically condemnatory in its critique:

"In our view, the mistaken belief that urban and non-urban areas have enough interests in common to justify their integration into the same two-tier system lies at the heart of many of the problems of regional governments." Alternatively, from the point of view of the regional government, a mandate was established to provide services to the rural areas, yet at times this cannot practically be done because of cost. D. Johns, the Regional Municipality of Durham's Commissioner of Social Services, has commented that,

"...the region's only chance to provide the services its residents need is through low-cost local programs supervised by professional staff but administered largely by community volunteers."

In a related area of concern, regional government has led to a condition where there is an unnecessary duplication of services that could be provided at only one of the two local levels. In the words of Mississauga Mayor Hazel McCallion,

"...the city is not going to leave its future to someone in the regional office...so we do the work and then afterwards what can the regional staff do? Reject it? They just duplicate what we do?"

The Planning Policy Sphere - The planning policy area is significant as an indicator of the problems that the two-tier structure has had in coping with specific spheres of local government jurisdiction. This is not only because planning, from the theoretical end, deals with the idea of the efficiency value, but also for the reason that it, among
all of the local government functions, is most concerned with dealing with urbanization -- the socio-economic process which has constituted the alternate concern to theoretical questions of political values in this thesis' discussion of creating political structures for metropolitan areas. Hence, improvements in the sphere of planning constituted one of the main reasons for the establishment of regional governments.

The Liberal Party Task Force found that the planning policy sphere was plagued by considerable internal problems of co-ordination in the two-tier structural arrangement. The regional government structure resulted in the duplication of planning activity at the regional and lower-tier levels, became an excuse for hiring consultants, and was ineffective from the point of view that the province had to rule on controversies. These were problems that were province-wide in scope where regional governments existed.

The greater Toronto area can show us the problems which the planning function acquired from the viewpoint of external boundaries of the Metro area under the two-tier programme. These constraints are related to the Metro boundaries that were imposed on the outer growth of Toronto in 1953, and the creation of three regional governments surrounding Metro-Durham, York and Peel from the east, north and west in the early 1970's. The geographical territory is significant inasmuch as it represents three of the eleven restructured areas of the regional government programme in addition to Metro Toronto. By population, it represents an even greater proportion of the
restructuring programme as a whole. Moreover, some of the issues enumerated for this area are also applicable to other parts of the province where regional governments meet, such as Halton/Peel, Halton/Hamilton-Wentworth and so on.

In 1953, Metro Toronto was given planning authority over 720 square miles while being only 240 square miles in size.\textsuperscript{40} This power allowed the upper-tier municipality wide authority up until 1971 to set development in such a manner that would be orderly without having to concern itself inordinately with the interests of surrounding municipalities. At that time, the planning function was curtailed to Metro's own boundaries, which the upper-tier municipality fought against because of the perceived loss of a chance for its own expansion which accompanied the decision.\textsuperscript{41}

The creation of the three regional governments surrounding Metro by the early 1970's led to a distressing situation in the planning policy sphere. Keating has noted that:

"...some municipal planners have compared the present lack of co-ordination among the regional governments to the situation of Toronto and its bedroom suburbs before the Metro federation was formed in 1953."\textsuperscript{42}

In other words, the sheer growth of the Toronto urban area from the time of its creation to the 1980's, meant that the existing political structural arrangements no longer made any sense in terms of the practical, socio-economic considerations of the extension of the urban unit.

For instance, in the area of planning new subdivisions in the greater urban area, there was an intent starting in the early 1970's
And stemming from the TCR Plan to redirect growth east and north of Toronto from the west where rapid growth was occurring. But all municipalities wanted growth to take place in their jurisdictions and lobbied the provincial government in that regard. In the words of Housing Minister Claude Bennett,

"...the whole thing became a nightmare... while Darcy and I said 'Let's move east', Mississauga and Peel pushed forward with development. People say, 'Why didn't the Cabinet stop it?' There were huge pressures to open this and that subdivision around Toronto now because we need homes. There was a constant daily badgering of the Government. The easiest way was to get on with it."\textsuperscript{43}

A similar situation occurred with planning over transit systems. The responsibility for transit was turned over to each individual regional government. But there was no co-ordination between systems: 

"...the people in regional governments didn't worry about transit and the province didn't contrast these views."\textsuperscript{44}

Consequently, orderly rational planning in land development, transit, and so on, did not occur because of the internal problems of a two-tier structure, and the external problems associated with boundaries of the socio-economic metropolitan unit.

**Accountability at the Regional Political Level**

Another area where regional governments have failed lies in the sphere of, accountability at the regional political level. Accountability is defined in this section in terms of, first, its being affected by the distribution of powers amongst provincial, regional and local levels; second, citizen access and knowledge of the
regional level of government; and third, the representative aspect shown through the method of election to the regional level.

To begin, regional government's accountability to the public is hindered by its close, perceived and real, association with the provincial level of government. After the implementation period of 1969-74, Jacek has noted that the main transfer of power (functions) has occurred from the local municipality to the region, while the predicted shift from the provincial level to the region did not materialize. Consequently, the public views regional government as an attack on the local autonomy of sub-provincial levels of government in general, as well as constituting a limit on the lower-tier level of municipalities in regions specifically. With the advent of regional government, the province began to play a more direct role in determining an acceptable service level for health, welfare, roads, planning, etc., through conditional grants, subsidies and regulatory controls thereby reducing the scope of local decision-making. Furthermore, even while regional reviews in the 1970's have, on the whole, recommended an augmentation of second-tier power, the province has consistently decided against a power shift in that direction. Aiden Baker, a veteran municipal analyst for the Globe and Mail expressed the sentiment of many citizens when he noted:

"(t)osome, Metro Council is little more than a sub-committee of the Ontario Legislature. There is a great deal of back and forward communication between the Metro Chairman's office and Queen's Park, and as a creature of the province under the British North America Act, Metro Council does not have autonomy."
When translated to our earlier concern about the values of local
government, it can be seen that it is the liberty value which has been
violated by the minimization of local autonomy.

The second area in which political accountability is being
debased is in the area of citizen knowledge and because of percep-
tions about its effectiveness. Downey has shown that in the Regional-
Municipality of Waterloo:

"...the less knowledgeable a person was about
government at the local level, the more likely
he or she was to be cynical and critical and to
say government was unresponsive or ineffective."48

Downey has further stated that democracy is imperilled at the local
level because citizens are almost totally ignorant about the
structures and functions of their local governments.49

Although the public is confused even outside the regional government
areas over which level of government provides any given service, the
problem is augmented in the regional government areas because of the
added level of government. Again, the liberty, and to a certain
degree, participation values of local government are detrimentally
affected by this situation.

The final area of regional political accountability to be
discussed is that of the means of election to regional council. The
means by which regional councillors are elected is "indirect", that
is, they are selected to sit on regional council after being elected
to the lower-tier level of government.

One problem lies in the area of perceived distance between
the appointed regional political level and the public. Oakville Mayor
Harry Barrett stated in 1981 that, "the regional council is just 'too remote' ...the public does not relate to it. The region has never been accepted."\(^{50}\) A second shortcoming lies in the sphere of "passing the buck" on responsibility for problems. In that case, either the provincial or lower-tier level is blamed, where voters can directly influence political events. A final problem rests in the dearth of a regional political forum as a consequence of 'indirect' elections. The 'indirect' election of councillors has meant that there has been a difficulty in having locally-based councillors adopt ideologically-based, adversarial roles in the discussion of policy questions.\(^{51}\) Magnusson has described this phenomenon for the British Columbia regional government case but it can equally well be applied for the Ontario situation. The reality of indirect elections consciously places limits on the activities of pressure groups and media representatives at the regional level.\(^{52}\)

The question of direct elections has come up frequently both in terms of regional councillors or for the regional chairman position specifically. Direct elections were proposed for Metro Toronto by the Goldenberg Report in 1965, by the Robarts Commission of 1977, and a special White Paper released by Darcy McKeough in 1978. However, the provincial government sees a very real concern, pertaining to the potential power of a directly elected Metro or Regional Chairman viz-a-viz the provincial level of government. At the very least, it would lead to less provincial control over the regional level.\(^{53}\) The Hon. T. Wells, Minister of Intergovernmental
Affairs in 1980 therefore suggested that the public does not seem to want the direct election of regional councillors, while in 1981, the Hon. Claude Bennett, Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, stated that regional chairmen should not be directly elected because of the danger that powerful groups would back candidates and others would not be able to run.

As shown, the issue of direct elections impacts negatively on the values of participation and liberty. There is a restricted ability for the general public to affect decisions at the regional level. The regional level is hindered in its ability to establish power by not gaining strength apropos of the province because of the means by which its councillors are elected. The next section will deal with a different focus-shifting from the level of the regional council to that of the regional bureaucracy.

**Accountability at the Regional Administrative Level**

While a lack of accountability at the regional political level has hindered the traditional local government values of liberty and participation, the lack of accountability at the level of the bureaucracy has mostly had a negative impact on the value of participation, in addition to liberty to some degree. The lack of accountability at both administrative and political levels are accentuated by each other. The issues which are of significance in this subject area are the size of the bureaucracy, the inaccessibility and confusion surrounding the regional administration, and the power which regional civil servants seem to have in relation to their political counterparts.
The rationale for a large bureaucracy at the regional level of government lies in the explanation that this level of government is providing an improved range of services. Plunkett has noted that while there has been an acknowledged increase in the level of services, it has been accompanied by the implementation of another large level of bureaucracy.\(^{54}\) This increase in the size of the bureaucracy is unacceptable to the public. Downey has remarked that, "...even those politicians who are members of regional council, are quick to agree with the taxpayer that indeed, bureaucracy at the 'region' is a problem."\(^{55}\)

The second issue pertaining to the question of the success of the regional bureaucratic level, and which is closely related to size, involves inaccessibility of the public to regional bureaucrats and the increased confusion over which administrative level, the regional or local, is responsible for any given service. Plunkett has made the generalization that the province has created a level of government with an institutional limitation: it has created excessive remoteness from citizens in favour of 'administrative efficiency'. "The major decisions are made...by a more remote regional government over which the citizen has little, if any direct influence."\(^{56}\) In the case of Metro, Kaplan called it "technocratic decision-making". He noted that, "local politicians really were content with a division of labour that maintained close links between voters and municipal councils and that minimized interaction between the aggrieved citizen and the metro administration."\(^{57}\) The problem of remoteness and lack of accountability is compounded by the increased confusion
which regional government has generated. Much of this can be attributed to the addition of a second-tier of local government without the elimination of special purpose boards, and other traditional forms of local government. Consequently, the participation value is significantly downgraded by this inaccessibility.

The final area where accountability to the public has been transgressed concerns the evolved power of the regional bureaucracy in relation to the regional politicians. In this context, it is auspicious to return to the question of regional political dialogue that was earlier broached. Issues which usually are political in their content in large urban areas, such as transportation, land use development and controls, etc. have not evolved at regional councils. Instead, the bureaucracy has had to fill in on these issues: "...because a genuinely political role has been ignored in favour of a purely administrative one, there has been a failure to provide it (regional government) with the tools necessary for this task." In Metro, Kaplan has documented that in the 1950's and 1960's, overwhelming instances of policy initiatives came from the 'cabinet' which he terms the administration's department heads. Metro councillors would be extremely reluctant to play politics with the 'cabinet's' technical opinions. The participation and liberty values of local government are negatively affected by the above state of affairs.

**Financial Shortcomings of Regional Government**

The financial problems associated with the regional government programme would have to be considered as being one of the
most critical areas of concern. The sphere of finance has been associated primarily with the efficiency value, and it generally has been touted by scholars as one area where the two-tier programme has met with considerable success. This point cannot be seriously questioned and was discussed in the earlier section on regional conflicts and value integration in terms of the successful implementation of 'hard' services in Metro Toronto and the regions. Yet, in spite of the obvious benefits of regionalization apropos of the efficiency value, there are some financial concerns which regional government has brought about. These have been categorized into three separate units: 1) the high costs of service standardization and expansion which resulted in rising property taxes; 2) the complexity of the new financial structures and the question of equity; 3) the large rise in provincial grants and subsidies.

The first financial issue to be analyzed is that of property tax increases which came about as a consequence of standardization and expansion of service levels. The imposition of the regional structure has meant higher taxes in restructured areas as service levels have increased. After the adoption of the second tier, the regional taxpayer typically would have started paying more for two reasons: first, since the regional level commenced expanding public services by upgrading them in urbanizing regions, and secondly, by work initiated that had been postponed from before on account of anticipated reorganization. The expansion of services at both upper and lower tiers would be particularly salient as a cause of high
spending. The Liberal Party's Task Force on Regional Government which reported in 1978 has found that there were excessive costs associated with the emergence of regional facilities and staff, with duplication (shared upper and lower-tier functions), and with standardizing service levels in areas where historically a lesser service level was accepted. The expansion of municipal bureaucracies was not accompanied by a comparable decrease in local administrations. Moreover, the costs of local government increased significantly because of the high percentage of salary costs with respect to the entire budget. As the Ontario TEIGA Ministry stated in a government review of regional government in 1976, "...if both levels of municipal government seek to expand their services at the same time, the tax increases upon their mutual taxpayers would become excessive." 

Furthermore, the lower-tier unit of government generally controls only 40% of the local government tax bill. Consequently, taxpayers are confused as to who is accountable for the spending of their tax dollars, and also are largely left out of the decision-making process when funds are spent at the regional level. As Downey has indicated, "...under these conditions, we can be forgiven for asking who is guarding the till and deciding for us which needs of the community will be met and which will have to wait until we can afford them. The answer appears to be 'Nobody'."

The second issue of significance is that of the financial system's complexity and whether equity exists under the regional
system. Equity is defined as equal taxes for equal market value within a given property class -- i.e. categories of residential, commercial, industrial, etc. In connection to the complexity of the financial system, Downey has remarked that the lower-tier municipality collects the money for the region and special purpose boards, and then sets out its own budget and sends out the tax bill.

In light of the complicated structure, the upper-tier level must deal with questions of equity. At the aggregate level, there is the issue of richer, lower-tier municipalities not wanting to share their wealth, while poorer units balk at taking on greater responsibilities, such as in their 'share' of regional public housing as an example. At the level of the individual household unit, one of the main financial functions of regions is to assimilate property tax shifts among taxpayers that have come about as a result of amalgamation and taxpayer criticisms. However, the region does not always have the funds to conduct this task adequately, and therefore what really is needed is an overhaul of the local revenue system which has not occurred. For instance, in terms of residential assessment, there is a revision of equalization factors yearly to place lower-tier assessments on a comparable basis; however, this can produce significant changes from one year to another. Also, owners of comparable homes in different lower-tier municipalities within a region pay differing amounts for upper-tier services. In addition, although the region establishes the rate for commercial/industrial
assessment, it continues to benefit the municipality in which it is located. The resultant confusion and lack of equity impacts negatively on the efficiency value.

The final financial issue that is to be dealt with pertains to the question of provincial subsidies and grants. The province grants hundreds of millions of dollars to the regions, yet it is still not enough to adequately maintain the structures which have been created. This widespread subsidization of regional governments constitutes substantial violation of the efficiency value. For instance, in 1970, the province introduced the Regional Municipal Grants Act that was intended to encourage municipal reform and the acceptance of the proposed regional structures. And, "... as late as 1980, the grant and apportionment systems still contained several special features to assist with the start-up costs of the regional governments." Grants are provided for organizational expenses, the development of services on a regional basis, and to act as a buffer to phase in property tax shifts both among and within reorganized municipalities. While the intent here is not to suggest that the efficiency value has been seriously transgressed by the two-tier programme, the inefficient elements of the programme should nevertheless be noted.

Criticism of Regional Government by Municipal Politicians

The final larger subject area that will now be addressed concerns the efforts of a group of municipal politicians that led an
enthusiastic, albeit short-lived, and ineffective movement against the regional government programme in the early 1980's. So great was the dissatisfaction with the province's regional government programme that this group of dissatisfied municipal politicians decided to fight for widespread reform for the two-tier system despite the lack of clear or official channels for expressing their concerns. Many of the arguments used by this group are very similar to those described in earlier sections of this chapter. A description of the events is useful as it reinforces our understanding of the persistent nature of many of the earlier expressed arguments.

The efforts of this group of politicians to have regional governments across the province either significantly altered or disbanded altogether began in earnest in the summer of 1981, soon after the provincial government quashed the restructuring hopes of Sudbury regional council which voted to have itself dissolved. The birthplace of the movement was in the city of St. Catharines, and was headed up by Mrs. Denise Taylor. The municipality initiated a secession resolution before the Regional Municipality of Niagara's council, which stated that:

"...regional government in Niagara has resulted in a duplication of effort, that administrative costs have increased substantially and that the regional level lacks direct financial accountability to the taxpayers."70

The St. Catharines resolution was brought forth at that time in light of a debate that was raging over the need for the construction of a new regional headquarters. The fear of this happening, according to Stan Brickell of the St. Catharines Group, was that, "...once that
happens, there will be no chance of getting rid of regional government. It will establish firm roots and bureaucracy will just grow and grow."

Consequently, in the summer of 1981, the St. Catharines initiative led to a meeting of seventy-two municipalities within the regions and Metro to discuss the creation of an organization that would lobby the provincial government for change. As a result, a group comprised of ninety municipal politicians from ten Ontario regions was formed. The mayor of Nickel Centre, Gerry Lacey, claimed that 50% of municipal representatives from across the province were ready to support the dismantling of regional governments.

The group asked to meet with provincial Housing and Municipal Affairs Minister Claude Bennett to discuss their plans. However, Mr. Bennett indicated that he would not meet with every municipal 'splinter group' that comes along and would only continue working through the municipalities' formal body, the Association of Municipalities of Ontario.

Mr. Bennett also noted that he would not entertain any motions from any regions who want to disband or municipalities who want to secede from regions. He remarked that it would be foolish, "after the time and money we (the province) spent on it to make regional government work."

The statement also reinforced the provincial government's continuous political commitment to the two-tier programme, and their determination to make it work well. In response, former Liberal Party leader R. Nixon accused Mr. Bennett of ignoring the views of many taxpayers, and not considering moving to a less bureaucratized and remote form of government.
Subsequently, Alderman Denise Taylor of St. Catharines was able to recognize the group as an ad hoc committee of AMO, in spite of the fact that earlier the Municipal Affairs Minister had refused to meet with them. While the committee continues to exist, it has not been taken on any new initiatives since its lack of success in 1981.

Paralleling the efforts at the political level, a number of municipalities carried out research efforts in the early 1980's which continued to demonstrate the shortcomings of regional government in specific areas. A brief was prepared by the municipality of Flamborough in the Hamilton-Wentworth region outlining how in 1980 its taxpayers paid between $660,000 and $1.3 million "more than they received under regional government. In January, 1981, the Region of York released a critical study of regional government entitled "Local and Regional Government in the Region of York", while in February, 1982, the Region of Peel issued the "Report of the Planning Function Review Committee". Both papers spoke of some of the continuous, practical problems of regional government.  

The above review was intended to demonstrate the persistence in the 1980's of some of the problems which began to appear with the implementation of the two-tier programme in the late 1960's and early 1970's. The comments mentioned by the dissatisfied municipal politicians viz-a-viz over-bureaucratization, heavy financial expenditures, duplication, etc. brings readily to mind the discussion in earlier sections of this chapter. The two-tier programme in its current format then, clearly continues to violate our stated values of local government. Specifically, it continues to give emphasis to the
efficiency value at the expense of the liberty and participation values.

The chapter has primarily dealt with the shortcomings of the Ontario government's two-tier programme which was introduced to the province in the late 1960's. Initially, there was a review of the occurrences which paralleled the development of the regional government programme in the 1974-78 period: the county restructuring programme, the report of the regional review commissions, changes in the provincial administration and in provincial-municipal relations. This section was followed by the main body of the chapter: the critique of the regional government programme, including sections on deficiencies in terms of regional integration and value conflicts, the two-tier problem, political accountability, administrative accountability and financial concerns. To conclude, a discussion was included on the initiative of a group of municipal politicians who attempted to have major changes occur or total disbandment take place of the regional government programme.

The main thrust of the chapter was to show the deficiencies of the two-tier paradigm as defined by the Ontario experience. Stemming out of a by-election victory of a traditional Tory seat and increased support in the polls, the Ontario Liberal Party released a position paper on regional government in 1978, seeing an opportunity to take advantage of a politically unpopular provincial programme.

The Liberal Party's Task Force on regional government came up with the conclusion that the regional government programme constituted
a significant error in judgement for the following reasons: 1) an absence of a community interest necessary for the combination of urban and rural areas; 2) more costly but less efficient services because of added bureaucracy and over-servicing; 3) distorted representation on regional councils; 4) remoteness of government and loss of accountability to the public; and 5) ineffective land use planning.77 The above points have all been broached at one point or another in this chapter's discussion. They indicate the widely-based transgression of local government values which has occurred.

A few years later, a group of municipal politicians also began expressing dissatisfaction with the provincial programme. In conclusion, it can be seen that:

"all the regional governments have been in place for at least nine years -- some for over a decade -- and yet they are still viewed with suspicion and even hostility by many citizens and municipal politicians alike."78

The analysis in the next chapter then, deals with possible options for the future. Downey recently stated that:

"...the Conservative Government must be prepared to admit the shortcomings of its original local government reform policy and to move quickly on any suggestions made by local governments to reform defective structures, confusing methods of election, and overly centralized funding arrangements."79

As will be seen in the final chapter, the province has already initiated many, chiefly piecemeal, reforms in its post-regional government period initiatives of 1978-84. These will be fully
described and analyzed. However, there will also be a discussion of
the new reforms that are needed, based on a more practical approach of
recognizing current socio-economic realities pertaining to the
territoriality of the modern urban unit, as well as a greater attempt
at recognizing the need to uphold the traditionally-stated values of
local government. It is to these subjects that the final chapter will
primarily address itself.
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28) Kaplan, Reform-Planning, p. 687

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54) Plunkett, Lessons from Regional Government, p. 3
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70) The Globe and Mail, Toronto, July 18, 1981, p. 4
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75) ibid., p. 4
76) Interview with Bev Allen of the Association of Municipalities of Ontario, September 29, 1983

77) Liberal Party Task Force, op. cit., pp. 1, 2

78) Downey, Once Bitten, Twice Shy, p. 311

79) Downey, Ontario's Local Governments, p. 161
Pattern of Local Government Reform

Source: Ontario, Ministry of Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs. County Restructuring Studies Programme, Number Four, Toronto, Queen's Printer, 1976, p. V.
CHAPTER FIVE
The final chapter of this thesis brings together all of the ideas set out in the previous chapters by elaborating a proposed model of local government for urban areas in Ontario. The new model is based on several principles. It is to uphold the values of local government as represented by liberty, participation and efficiency. It is to account for the spread effects of the regional urban form. Finally, it should depict a local government structure that would neither encompass the shortcomings of the traditional approach nor the limitations of the current regional government model.

The chapter begins with a description of the Ontario government's initiatives in municipal reform during the 1978-84 period. It is suggested that the province has begun to emphasize the local autonomy value (liberty), as opposed to the efficiency value which underlay the orientation to the regional government programme. Subsequently, the values which the new model incorporates are presented. The model itself is then offered, highlighting its structural composition (jurisdictional and boundaries) and component techniques. The new model defines an approach which is preferable for Ontario's urban areas given the issues outlined in earlier chapters of the thesis.

New Initiatives (1978-84)

This section of the chapter will outline the changes which have been occurring in the provincial administration in the most recent period, 1978-84, with a spotlight being placed on the province's downplaying of the regional government programme including its linkage with the tail ends of the Design for Development.
programme. It then discusses the concomitant changes which have taken place in the sphere of provincial-municipal relations, and finally, the initiatives which have occurred at the local level.

**Provincial Changes**

As was mentioned earlier, provincial planning at the regional level as represented by the Design for Development programme, concluded with the final statement of the series in 1976. The period since that final statement has been described by Richardson as one of a lack of progress and programme disbandment:

"...on balance the cause of provincial planning during the five years has been of retreat, not of advance, to the point that in actuality provincial planning in Ontario has ceased to have any real substance."\(^1\)

As evidence for his assessment, Richardson notes the government's passing over of the COLUC Task Force's recommendations, the lack of adoption of agricultural protection measures, the disbandment of provincial machinery such as TEIGA, and the Advisory Committee on Regional Development, and especially the abandonment of the original intentions of the regional government programme as exemplified by the territorial incompleteness of the programme.\(^2\)

It is the latter point pertaining to the abandonment of the original intentions of the regional government programme (i.e. very strong upper-tier units, the broad consolidation of lower-tier units, a programme that is cross-provincial in scope, etc.) which is one of most interest to this study. On the one hand, blatant political considerations of the ruling provincial Progressive Conservative Party, which was in a minority position from 1975 to 1981, led to a
downgrading of the original intentions of the programme. Although the 1981 election saw the return of a Progressive Conservative majority government at Queen's Park, it proved to be no longer adventuresome in the sphere of regional government. Yet other events were also unfolding at the level of the provincial administration, that were of course inspired by the government's minority position, which contributed to, and at the same time reflected, the regional government programme's slowdown. The local government section of the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs was transferred to a redefined Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing in 1981. This signalled a further continuation of the trend which saw a progressive de-emphasis of the province's regional initiatives stemming from the unravelling of the TEIGA super-ministry in 1978. T. Downey noted in 1982 that the province had abandoned its once aggressive leadership stance, and "has reneged on its obligation to foster the development of its progeny."

Provincial-Municipal Relations and Local Reforms

Paralleling the change of emphasis towards regions at the provincial level was a restructuring of the formal provincial-municipal relationship. In 1979, the Association of Municipalities of Ontario pulled out of the Provincial-Municipal Liaison Committee, citing among its reasons, the difficulty that existed in identifying a "municipal consensus" with regional governments, rural municipalities etc. Without AMO, the PMLC process folded in 1980, and subsequently, ad hoc consultation has been the rule.
A new AMO was formed in 1981 consisting of all of the province's previous municipal associations including those of the regional governments. However, the formal consultative process with the provincial government was not re-established. In a 1982 speech, the Housing Minister, Mr. Bennett, spoke of the possibility of establishing a "conference discussion group" consisting of the construction and finance industries as well as the province and municipalities. However, a formal body such as that of the PMLC has not been reborn. Instead, since 1980, the province interacts with all municipalities, including regional governments through AMO, their single representative entity.

The breakdown of the PMLC process and the emergence of a single AMO with an important lower-tier membership component underscores the considerable relevance that lower-tier municipalities have come to acquire vis-à-vis the province since the downplaying of the regional government programme began, and especially in the 1978-84 period. In 1981, with the proclamation of the new AMO, the Hon. Claude Bennett announced that, "we will endeavour to treat municipalities and regions on their own merits and terms."

Concrete changes can be noted in the past number of years that have stemmed from the province, but which have incorporated a considerable lower-tier initiative, and that are intended to lead to a strengthening of the local level of government. On the political level, the early 1980's have seen changes to conflict of interest legislation, the introduction of three year terms for councils, and
most recently, an action to open up local council and standing committee meetings to further enhance the democratic element of the local level.

At the financial level, Downey sees a leading role for a renewed AMO in promoting municipal change on such issues as tax and grant reform, fiscal policy, and arbitration in labour contracts. Many of these issues involve a resurgence of the local level viz-a-viz the province and the regional governments. The critical area of the three listed in the financial sphere, is the one dealing with tax and grant reform. The major issue in tax reform is comprised of the equalization of assessment on real property. There has been a move towards a more equitable local tax structure, denoting that the province is attempting to ensure that taxes are becoming equally distributed as a proportion of market value. A start came through changes to Section 86 of the Assessment Act, which equalized variations within a given property class (i.e. residential, commercial, etc.). That initiative was paired with an attempt at achieving greater equality in the regional-municipal cost sharing arrangement.

The second area of concern in finance involves the area of provincial grants to municipalities which in 1978 comprised 40.3% of total local sector revenues. On a province-wide level, municipalities' primary problem is with the paramountcy that conditional grants have over unconditional grants. Downey has suggested that, "this 'Puppet on a Shoestring' situation means that the
province, almost on a whim, can lay waste the best made plans of even the most responsible and prudent municipality."9 The above problem is being dealt with slowly. A secondary concern which is being dealt with involves the equity of the system of how provincial unconditional grants are apportioned. On this issue, more progress has been made. In 1978, the Minister of Revenue unfroze equalization factors for grants and cost apportionments which had existed since 1970, and thereby brought the grant allocation structure closer to market value assessment.10 The preferential treatment of regional governments in relation to lower-tier municipalities in the grant structure, is also a subject that is being looked at, although a discrepancy continues to exist in favour of the regions as AMO has recently pointed out.11

**Structural Reforms**

The move towards re-emphasizing the lower-tier, municipal level as described in the above instances for provincial and provincial-municipal initiatives in the 1978-84 period carried over as well into structural reforms. A pamphlet issued by the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs in 1978 announced that, "...we have moved into a period in which there will be a new emphasis upon local initiative in the evolution of municipal structure", and further, "...we are beyond the point where the Provincial government should come along with schemes from on high which involve large-scale municipal restructuring."12
Although the province began issuing the necessary exhortations which allowed municipalities to take on their own restructuring initiatives in the late 1970's and into the 1980's, there were never any statements to suggest that the regional governments would be significantly altered. While the Hon. Claude Bennett, Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing suggested in 1981 that municipalities should take the lead in recommending changes to municipal structures if desired, it was clear that these changes would have to be within the confines of the regional system: "...there is absolutely no hope of any municipality being allowed to get out of an existing regional government structure."  

Since the provincial government has decided to maintain the essential lines of the regional government programme as it exists in the late 1970's and into the 1980's, alternative approaches have begun to be utilized in the municipal structural arena to rectify situations where problems of a structural nature are perceived to exist. The technique which has been most rekindled in significance is that of annexations and amalgamations: this is a device that was described previously in a theoretical fashion in Chapter One. The second technique which has been receiving some attention lately is that of special purpose boards; in this case a move is afoot that would lead to their reduction and possible elimination. Let us now examine the measures which have occurred in the provincial-municipal arena in greater detail.

**Annexations and Amalgamations**

The question of annexations and amalgamations represents the
most significant direction in local government structural reform that the province has taken since the downplaying of the regional government programme began. By no means, however, does it define a new approach for Ontario as the origins of this approach stem from the Baldwin Act of 1849. Annexations and amalgamations came under the purview of the Ontario Municipal Board in 1932, and this continued to be the case up to the period of reform in the early 1980's when a special arbitration panel was established to become the decision-maker in inter-boundary cases. Therefore, it was the procedures and not the principles of annexations and amalgamations which came into question. The principle of using the technique has not been the subject of recent public debate, and has become well-established in Ontario. In the late 1970's the OMB method of decision-making was seriously questioned, especially by municipal interests, because it inevitably led to hearings that were characterized by a legalistic, adversarial confrontation between two parties where only one side could emerge as the winner. The result was one of dividing communities, excluding local elected officials from the process, and mounting expenses.

As a result of the above deficiencies, and because regional government still constituted an alternative, many towns and cities deferred their plans for annexations in the mid to late 1970's. Hence, a large backlog of applications was accumulated; a Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs paper suggested that one hundred boundary adjustments may be sought in the 1980 to 1985 period.
Concurrently, this period re-emphasized the need for local initiatives. As a pamphlet from the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs stated:

"the system within which they (municipalities) are required to operate has serious defects when viewed in the context of an era when emphasis is being placed upon more responsible local government and local leadership in resolving mutual problems."16

Consequently, in the autumn of 1978, fifteen urban municipalities presented a brief to the provincial government asking for a simple and less expensive method of dealing with boundary adjustments. A Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs position paper in 1980 stated that:

"the process will be more political than legal. Elected representatives will be directly involved in representing the interests of their own jurisdiction and in considering larger community interests as they seek to resolve basic local public policy issues."17

More specifically, the new process for resolving annexation and amalgamation issues and disputes was modelled on labour-management negotiating procedures. The process involved the use of four major stages on the way to issue resolution: a) fact finding, b) negotiation, c) mediation, and d) arbitration by a Review Panel or the GMBA.18 The process was passed into law through Bill 147, "An Act to facilitate the Negotiation and Resolution of Municipal Boundary and Boundary-related Issues", and was given third reading in the House on December 17, 1981. A Municipal Boundaries Secretariat was established within the new Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing in order to monitor the nascent annexation and amalgamation procedure.19
The new procedure was pilot-tested in Brant-Brantford, and also applied later in the City of Barrie/Township of Innisfil dispute. Brantford Mayor Des Newman called the new process a breakthrough procedure after fifteen years of inter-municipal disputes. The experiment was able to arrive at a multi-faceted solution without the need for creating a regional government: "...municipalities reached an agreement which provided for boundary adjustments, co-ordinated planning and sharing of costs of transportation and health and welfare programs -- issues which in other areas are handled by a regional government." In the Barrie case, a dispute which dated back to 1976 came to a successful resolution in 1981.

Hence, the Ontario government introduced a new process which could solve growth-related boundary and other issues in urban areas where regional governments had not been established. A joint municipal association report in 1979 suggested that the new procedure was intended for municipalities which had pinned their hopes on either the OMB or county restructuring, or both. Urban areas such as those including the cities of Sarnia, Barrie and Kingston were mentioned as likely candidates for the process. The new procedure could produce co-ordinating results for an urban area, not unlike those made possible by way of a two-tier regional government.

**Special Purpose Boards**

The second structural area where the provincial government is beginning to act, from a post-regional perspective, is in the area of special purpose boards. Both the Robarts Commission on Metropolitan
Toronto (1977) and the Mayo Commission on Ottawa-Carleton (1976) expressed dissatisfaction with the status which boards held at that time, mainly from the standpoint of accountability. Moreover, with the realization of the regional government scheme in Ontario as it eventually evolved, the accountability quagmire became even more unbearable: "the fragmentation, incoherence and general lack of accountability that is characteristic of the local government scene is simply further enhanced with the establishment of regional government." The situation was also inconsistent with the beginnings of the late 1970's thrust of establishing more power in the hands of municipal councils. Plunkett and Betts note, "...since they have been for the most part appointed or indirectly elected, they have further plundered the process of elected representatives."

Given the background described above, the province slowly began to act in the late 1970's. In 1977, Treasurer Darcy McKeough announced that the Government has been trying, "to strengthen elected municipal councils by encouraging the transfer to them of responsibilities now in the hands of independent boards and commissions." Other such statements of a general nature have been made. In 1981, the Hon. Claude Bennett announced that the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing would be considering closer budgetary procedures of linking boards with municipal councils as well as the development of a greater accountability to the public.

However, the above statements are primarily exhortations of a very general kind and real progress on reforming boards has only been
made in some policy sector areas. A spokesman for the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing indicated in 1983 that any overall position on special purpose boards is still under internal consideration within the Ministry and does not constitute a high priority item. However, in certain spheres such as library boards, police commissions, and regional health units, reforms are being contemplated or are occurring.25 Also, in the case of planning boards, the new Planning Act incorporated certain amendments which made the boards more accountable to the municipal council. As a statement of further provincial intentions in this respect, the Hon. Claude Bennett noted in 1981 that, "other groups relating to other existing boards will see the value in closer and more locally flexible relationships with the municipal council."26

In general, the reform process in the area of special purpose boards has been extremely slow moving. However, the provincial government has on numerous occasions expressed an intent to act in this area, and it can be considered second only to the question of annexations and amalgamations in importance as a reform technique in post-1975 Ontario.

The first major section of this chapter has served to describe the events which have already taken place at the level of the provincial administration, and at the provincial-municipal and local levels, in the area of reforms to encourage a greater amount of local autonomy. This move in the direction of shifting powers and reforms to the lower-tier level of Ontario’s municipalities has paralleled the
decline of the regional government programme, and secondarily of the County Restructuring Studies Programme; and thereby represents a new initiative of placing the most local level of government in a more significant light viz-a-viz the upper-tier level of local government or the provincial level. The question which now remains to be asked involves the direction which reform should take in the future. The subsequent section of this chapter will strive to answer whether the direction which has been started in the 1978-84 period is positive in nature, and whether the progress with which it is occurring is satisfactory.

A Preferred Approach

Values in the Context of the Future

In the first chapter of this thesis, it was shown how local government could be seen as realizing three key political values: liberty, participation and efficiency. The purpose of structural reform in local government, it was concluded, would be to strive to attain a "workable balance" amongst these recognized political values. According to Brownstone and Plunkett, most attempts at reforming Canadian local government have sought structural or boundary changes to further the administrative objective of efficiency. Furthermore, the authors cite that, "rarely have reforms or reorganization proposals actually sought a more politically conscious role for local government, or proposed structures and processes to further it." Earlier in this chapter, it was shown how the Ontario government since about 1978, has moved towards the goal of furthering
the liberty, or local autonomy, value of local government. This is considered to be a positive trend in the context of the discussion which has evolved thus far in this thesis. It is hereby suggested that the liberty value should continue to be promoted, even if it implies the downgrading or even the disregarding of both the participation and efficiency values.

As a general rule, the participation value can prove very difficult to institutionalize as was proven by the Winnipeg Unicity reforms. Brownstone and Plunkett cite the following reasons for its lack of success: 1) lack of support from local and provincial government to reach out into the community; 2) a basic community satisfaction over basic services, and a lack of general interest in abstract issues; and 3) the monopolization of citizens groups by activist-minded citizens and developer/builder groups. The efficiency value has been given constant and overwhelming attention in previous reforms, such as in the Ontario regional government programme, which in the context of this thesis has been shown not to have been a large success. Consequently, a shift towards the liberty value is now deemed to be necessary.

The advancement of the liberty value should not have an undue negative effect on either participation or efficiency values. The demands for direct participation can be reduced if certain reforms are implemented. There are ways of realizing the participation value based on the promotion of other than direct citizen input into governing. For instance, the province has already implemented a three
year term for councils, and instituted conflict of interest legislation. Both are steps in a direction towards greater citizen input through the representative democracy process. There is also a possibility for the implementation of a party system in the future. In 1977, the Robarts report stated that, "...the structure of local government can influence the development of party politics. It can encourage, inhibit or be neutral." The proposed structure which is to be outlined may in fact be conducive to this form of 'parliamentary style' democracy. However, this type of radical occurrence in Ontario must be left to the long-term future; it is a proposal that represents a time horizon which is beyond the scope of this paper.

Likewise, efficiency can be maintained in local government through financial reforms that would accompany proposed structural reforms that are to be discussed later. For the long-term, Plunkett and Betts have recommended the following three points as possible areas for improving municipal fiscal problems: 1) the provincial take-over of some service functions from the municipalities; 2) additional sources of revenue, such as through greater federal/provincial unconditional grants; and 3) increased taxation through present sources i.e., the property tax. The goal of all of these proposals would be to ensure that each municipality would have sufficient financial resources to carry out a distinct and meaningful resource allocation process.

In the short term, financial reforms which have already been started by the provincial government should be continued. The property
tax was the first area for reform. It is suggested that property taxes should be linked further to market value assessment, but not completely uniformly. It is also suggested that further equity be achieved although some municipal financial analysts suggest that this can only be done through a rationalization of taxation levels within certain property classes (i.e.: different categories of residential, commercial, industrial, etc.) and not completely across the classes. Some variations in taxation levels have to be maintained because of: 1) differences between market value and taxpayers ability to pay; 2) user charges which are included in property taxes and therefore account for some deviations between assessments and market value; and 3) the negative economic effects which may be induced by significant tax changes. The area of grant reform represents the second sphere of change. A further deconditionalization of provincial grants to municipalities is required, and more clarity in the distributional arrangement. Furthermore, the system should be structured so that poorer municipalities can benefit from the grant system more than the affluent ones in order to meet the redistributional objective of government. Through the financial sphere then, the efficiency value can continue to be realized, without undue emphasis on the structure of local government except as it relates to finance.

A greater emphasis on liberty as represented by local autonomy is needed. The level of local autonomy must grow for lower-tier municipalities viz-a-viz both the regional governments and the province. The 1970's regional reviews made mention of the fact that
the province should discontinue the 'Father Knows Best' method of dealing with its municipalities. Denny has indicated that the level of autonomy is low in Ontario as contrasted with the United States. \(^{32}\) Downey notes that, "...if local governments are to respond to the wishes and needs of the local populace, they must be given more legal and financial power by the province."\(^{33}\) Furthermore, the province should be willing to respond to this desired direction: "in the final analysis, most provincial governments and legislators are probably believers in the desirability of local autonomy and would prefer to see a minimum of provincial interference and control of the municipalities."\(^{34}\)

Hence, while recognizing the need to maintain a balance of the three essential values of liberty, participation and efficiency, it is towards the value of liberty, as expressed through local autonomy, which the current shift in structural reform must move. Let us now examine this whole area of reform for the future by drawing up a proposed model and indicating the related techniques needed for its implementation.

The Proposed Model

Separating Structure From the Regional Urban Unit

In Chapter One, it was noted that the term "region" could imply different levels of spatial understanding. Furthermore, a region, when imbued with a political component, could define an area ranging from the level of a neighbourhood to that of a greater urban or economic area. Consequently, it was suggested at that point, that
there exists no perfect match of a political unit with a socio-economic one. The creation of sub-national political units was deemed to be somewhat arbitrary reflecting an emphasis on different values depending on the size and jurisdictional authority of the selected units.

In the second chapter of this thesis, emphasis was placed on the socio-economic evolution of the regional urban unit. Ontario's urban areas were described as growing very slowly in the 1980's, with the bulk of growth presently occurring in ex-urban areas, with a concomitant slowdown of growth in inner city and suburban areas. This 'spread' effect of the Ontario city which was found to be now occurring, mitigates against the integration of a regional urban unit as a political entity not only because of the increasingly nebulous boundary which exists between 'city' and 'country' but also because there is an increasing problem of creating Kaplan's type of 'normative integration' as defined earlier in Chapter Four. The spread effect of the city has resulted in a still wider range of living environments, and hence value differences, within the larger urban area. Because the requisite political unit would have to be so much larger, the possibility of obtaining a consensus on basic locally-oriented political values and beliefs that define integration would be so much the more difficult to achieve. Fyfe expressed this point of view towards future structural reform and the inadvisability of using the entire socio-economic area:

"...if it is central to the idea of local government that it is to allow for the uniqueness of the ideas of localities, it follows that as part of the framework of
public legislation within which local government evolves unique solutions to local problems, there must be provision for allowing local government boundaries where they no longer correspond to the realities of the social and economic community and the physical expression thereof through the use of land.\textsuperscript{35}

There is also the matter of the province expanding its sphere of influence through the past few decades, which has resulted in the redefinition of many of the problems of the 1950's and 1960's that led to the need for regional government. For instance, the creation of the Ontario Water Resources Commission resulted in provincially-administered schemes for sewer and water services; also, the possibility of charging impost fees by suburban municipalities through the Planning Act reduced the cost of development for these municipal entities; cheaper borrowing was made possible for small municipalities; County Boards of Education led to the pooling of costs of this service; the OPP provided a raised level of policing; and fire protection could be achieved through volunteer departments and mutual aid agreements.\textsuperscript{36} All of these above occurrences shifted the need in urban areas away from the solution of regionalization.

If the models that were presented in Chapter One are now recalled, then it can be seen that the consolidationist and two-tier approaches both proposed a political unit that would encompass an entire urban region. In Chapter Four, many of the problems of the Ontario two-tier approach were enumerated including the loss of accountability at the regional and administrative levels, financial shortcomings, and value conflicts between residents of urban areas and rural areas, the central city, smaller municipalities, and so on. At
the same time, complete amalgamation would also pose many difficulties. The early 1970's amalgamation of Fort William with Port Arthur and some rural territory provides a case in point. After ten years of amalgamation, the rivalry between the two former cities continues to exist, and urban/rural conflict has not disappeared between Fort William/Port Arthur and the former rural municipalities of Neebing and McIntyre.\(^{37}\) Similarly, in Winnipeg, the major effect of amalgamation of outlying communities was a decline in the influence of lower-income and ethnic groups who traditionally settled in the core.\(^{38}\) The discussion of consolidation in Metropolitan Toronto has provoked a number of negative reactions. On this subject, Toronto Mayor Art Eggleton has remarked that, "...bigger government is more remote government...the bigger it gets, the further from the people it gets. People feel alienated in that kind of situation."\(^{39}\) Furthermore, it was suggested that a Metro amalgamation would result in an expanded bureaucracy with a larger budget, and the need for equalized services which could push service costs upwards.

**The Mechanics of a New Political Structure**

The model which is suggested in this paper for Ontario's urban regions is based on a hybrid of the polycentric and two-tier approaches as described in Chapter One. It is not fully a polycentric model since rationalization of lower-tier units, and a less than naturally evolved dependence on special purpose boards, is being promoted. Likewise, it is not really a two-tier model either, insofar
as the proposal does not call for an upper-tier or regional level of government, but rather a regional co-ordinating body modelled on the Council of Governments (COG) approach. This device and the others which comprise the model will be described in detail after a general description is given.

It should be noted that it is outside of the purview of this thesis to examine questions which are not directly related to the structure of local government as defined by functions and boundaries. Hence, questions not addressed in this discussion include such political changes as those related to the incorporation of party politics, methods of election, and other similar issues. Likewise, such issues as the relationship of local politicians to local administrators, or internal administrative occurrences such as lines of accountability are not dealt with. These questions, while being important in cases of municipal reorganization, will have to constitute the subject area of a separate study.

The Roberts Commission report on Metropolitan Toronto outlined five major areas of concern for democratic government at the local level. These are clarity, accountability, representation, responsiveness, and economy. Additionally, Tindal has defined two prerequisites for an optimum local government structure: there should be a minimum of overlap between provincial and municipal responsibilities; and there should be such boundaries and financial resources that are appropriate for carrying out assigned responsibilities.
The model which is proposed at this time holds to the principles outlined both by Robarts and by Tindal. It is a proposal that firstly, differentiates strongly, between the provincial and municipal levels of government in terms of responsibilities. Furthermore, the approach does not incorporate a regional level of government. As well, it is assumed that as much financial independence as feasible accompanied by an equitable tax structure would be linked to the jurisdictional domain of the local units. The earlier discussion of financial questions brought out the incremental and difficult road to reform that is needed in that sphere, and therefore no further discussion is necessary.

In the desired approach, each urban area in the province, whether or not it presently is covered by a regional government, would take on the form of a number of legally constituted urban and suburban units of a moderate size. The actual number and size would vary between urban regions. For instance, in an area such as Kingston there may be a need for only one municipality, that of Kingston itself with the surrounding suburban territory being included. The surrounding rural municipalities around Kingston would continue to exist as they presently do. They would not be connected to the single urban and suburban municipality. Kingston would, however, be able to annex parts of the rural municipalities as the need for land arose, in exchange for other considerations.

At the other extreme, in the largest municipality of Toronto, many urban and suburban municipalities would co-exist. The city of
Toronto with a population of approximately 600,000 would continue to exist as well as most of the other present lower-tier units. Some amalgamation would be required as with the municipalities of York and East York for instance. The Robarts Commission suggested lower-tier amalgamations in 1977 but this was rejected by the province. More recently, in 1983, Alderman Mike Colle of the Borough of York proposed the annexation of East York with parts of North York and Toronto. No concrete lower-tier action has yet taken place in this regard, however. The municipalities surrounding the present Metro boundaries would continue to exist, but the regional governments would not. In other words, lower-tier municipalities such as Mississauga, Brampton, Etobicoke, North York, etc. which presently comprise the broader Toronto area would all co-exist without a formal upper-tier level of government.

The critical element in all cases would be to minimize the number of municipalities without creating an outright consolidation of the entire urban area. The unit sizes would be moderate, and would avoid the pitfalls associated with the consolidationist approach.

The county level of government would persist in areas that were not defined through the municipal structure as being urban or suburban and hence part of the scheme of moderately-sized units that comprise the socio-economic area. This would be true in areas that are presently part of a regional government as well. For instance, a county would exist in Ottawa-Carleton but only towns, villages and rural areas would belong to it. Urban and suburban municipalities that
are part of the socio-economic sphere as defined here, would not belong to it. Moreover, it could be noted that small urban municipalities such as Vanier and Rockcliffe Park would be eliminated under the proposal. On this note, it can be said that in 1978, the provincial government's response to the Mayo Commission report stated that, "there is some sympathy...for an ultimate adjustment in the two-tier system that would result in area municipalities that are more equal in size and resources in the developed portion of Ottawa-Carleton than is presently the case."43

The suggestion here is that this proposed local government structure would provide the optimal combination of the three sought-after values of liberty, participation and efficiency. An assumption made here is that it is not possible to maximize all three of these values. The Radcliffe-Maud report in Great Britain felt that:

"the ideal government solution would be created if each service was provided by a unit that was large enough to achieve the greatest possible economy of scale, and because the scale would vary for each public service, production and distribution would be carried out within a number of autonomous localized units of government, each overlapping in their geographic distribution."44

However, while efficiency may be maximized, the above form of local government would have little respect for either the liberty (local autonomy) or participation values. And, according to the argument of this thesis, it is the liberty value that must be emphasized.

The proposed model would give a positive force to local autonomy. The proposal suggests that small municipalities be amalgamated into larger ones, simultaneously with the elimination of the regional level of government. Sharpe has commented that:
...enlarging very small local units will tend to diminish their dependence on central government for expertise and advice since they will have the resources to employ their own experts. Enlargement thus automatically enhances local autonomy where local authorities have previously been very small.*45

Local autonomy would also be enhanced through the eradication of the regional level of government. While some functions that are presently area-wide would be moved to the provincial level, and others would constitute the domain of regional commissions, a greater number of functions would be moved down to the local level. Most of the local 'resource allocation' process would be concentrated at a single level. The exact distribution of functions is not offered here; it should only be noted that the thrust will be one of movement down to the local level. Appendix One provides an indication of what functions theoretically can be handled at the local level.

Concentration of activity at one level of government will also enhance the value of participation. Presently, participation at the regional level is impeded through a shortage of political and bureaucratic accountability. This phenomenon would change with a single-level democratically elected local political process.

Golden has offered her position on how basic values would be affected by the dissolution of Metropolitan Toronto. In her opinion, participation would be maximized as a consequence of the promotion of both access and accountability. Efficiency would be adequately served so long as an overall co-ordinating body existed that retained power over land-use, transit and major physical services. As an aside, this proposal suggests a Council of Governments approach with individual inter-municipal special purpose bodies carrying out the above-noted
tasks. With regards to local autonomy, Golden envisioned a mixed level of success, noting the danger of provincial centralization through financial means, and through provincial arbitration of disputes between local municipalities. These problems should not exist however, if financial reforms take place and if an annexations and amalgamations arbitration body is implemented.

All factors considered, it is felt that the above-described approach represents the best model for local government in Ontario's urban areas. The next section of this chapter will outline the process by which this structural reform of local government can be implemented, and the techniques necessary to establish and maintain it through time.

Process and Techniques of the Model

It is somewhat ironic in a period characterized by a push towards local autonomy, that in 1981, the Premier of Ontario, William Davis, would declare that, "ultimately, it is the province that must decide and take responsibility for policy in local government reform." As was stated in Chapter Three, the provincial government does have the constitutional authority to change the form of municipal structures. Hence, it will have to be the province that will decide whether the regional governments can be disbanded, and whether a new form of local government structure can be implemented. After this initial decision, there would have to be a means for the structure to evolve through time and to reflect the dynamic spatial nature of urban regions.
Essentially, the method of change in local government structure, assuming that the province would decide to act forcefully to disband the regional governments, can take on three different forms: the bureaucratic/technical (internal to the provincial administration or external consultants); quasi-judicial/independent committees (such as royal commissions); or political (either senior or local level).\textsuperscript{48}

But Higgins has concluded that many of these processes have partisan and other political considerations:

"It is not only royal commissions that may be expected to make recommendations consistent with a hidden agenda or on official general policy that must be taken as a given from the provincial government. Temporary commissions such as those that were created after Ontario's 1968 'Design for Development: Phase Two' and its 1974 'County Restructuring Studies Program: Guidelines' policy statements virtually had to recommend certain things if any actual reorganization was to result. The internal bureaucratic/technical process is similarly constrained, and external consultants are likely to be sensitive to their client's preferences. Only the remaining two of the six primary processes — permanent quasi-judicial boards, particularly those with legal authority to impose decisions, and locally initiated political processes — can be expected to feel unconstrained. But the latter of those two has no authority to implement structural reorganization..."\textsuperscript{49}

Consequently, the restructuring process as described here, after the disbandment of regional governments and consolidation of municipal units, would be piecemeal and incremental as represented by a quasi-judicial board. The restructuring technique of amalgamation and annexations would be central to the process, but special purpose
bodies and the Council of Governments devices would also play a very significant role. The discussion now turns to these devices which help to give substance to the model.

Councils of Government

The upper-tier or regional level of government in urban areas would be disbanded under the proposal. However, the need for an inter-municipal co-ordinating body would remain. Unlike the present regional governments, the COG would cover only the area of urban and suburban municipalities and would not include rural areas. However, in contiguous urban areas such as in the greater Toronto region, it would cover the entire urban area and not be divided by arbitrary regional government boundaries. The COG would only expand to take into account any future annexations and amalgamations.

This body would not be a full-fledged government: it would predominantly serve in an advisory capacity, and would also have some provincially-legislated regulatory powers in the sphere of land-use planning, and also may perform certain administrative functions. It would be comprised of municipal councillors from the statutorily designated urban and suburban municipalities that comprise the urban regions as well as members of remaining inter-municipal special purpose boards. The COG would have standing committees that would examine inter-municipal questions in different policy areas, with representatives of the various municipalities and the special purpose boards in question.

Naturally, not all of Ontario’s urban regions may require a Council of Governments. The larger urban regions such as those
surrounding Toronto, Hamilton and Ottawa certainly will. For example, the COG in Toronto would cover a much larger area than the present Metro and three surrounding regional governments do on an individual basis. Mississauga Mayor Hazel McCallion has cited the need for an inter-regional agency based on the interconnectedness of issues in the entire socio-economic urban area:

"Mrs. McCallion said both Metro and Mississauga are making planning decisions in a vacuum. She said her city's planning relationship is not with Caledon or Brampton, the other municipalities in Peel Region, but with Oakville and Metro Toronto."50

Smaller urban regions in Ontario should be able to make do, with only the amalgamations and annexations legislation to be described later.

The newly created body would also act as a co-ordinating mechanism between the province and the local units. Anne Golden has noted the possibility of an approach where a co-ordinating body of much the same type as the one in this proposal, would act in the same capacity as the PMLC used to act at the provincial scale. However, in the case of this proposal, the co-ordinating role would be limited to a single urban area.

The COG would not have an implementation function. That role would be performed by either the province, the municipalities or special purpose boards. The COG would have no statutory authority over any inter-municipal special purpose bodies which may territorially parallel the, advisory body. While the COG would represent a co-ordinating mechanism, the following two mechanisms -- annexations and amalgamations as well as special purpose boards -- would represent the more powerful instruments in terms of process and jurisdiction.
Special Purpose Boards

As already stated, the present proposal calls for an emphasis to be placed on the local autonomy value. Therefore, the proposal suggests a large reduction in the number of special purpose boards. Such boards as committees of adjustments, land decision committees, and suburban roads commissions can be made committees of council or phased out. Other boards with a well in-grained tradition such as school boards, or an inter-municipal function such as transit commissions, can be retained. Where special purpose boards are to be retained, they will be made politically and financially accountable. While it may be preferable to have a given board accountable to local politicians, this may not be easily workable since most retained boards will mainly be inter-municipal in nature and an upper-tier local level of government will no longer exist. Consequently, ultimate accountability would have to be to the provincial government, although the day-to-day operation of the board could be voluntarily co-ordinated through the Council of Governments.

For the purposes of this paper, it is not wholly necessary to enumerate all of the policy areas where special purpose boards would exist. Downey has suggested that only school boards and conservation authorities need to be retained from the present grouping of boards. Alden Baker, a long-time critic of Metro Toronto politics recently suggested that Metro-level functions should be restricted to transit, social services, police, ambulance and public health, but without actually stating whether they would be performed by a full-fledged upper-tier government or through boards.
The discussion of inter-municipal boards also raises the question of the use of procedural techniques such as inter-municipal agreements. Under this proposal, if a number of municipalities can agree to provide a service together and be accountable to their own councils, this is to be encouraged. For instance, the cities of Vanier and Ottawa recently agreed to merge firefighting services. On a larger scale, the city of North York has proposed the amalgamation of some services among all of the lower-tier municipalities of Metropolitan Toronto, such as public health for example, but without an accompanying political amalgamation.53

The central tenet here is that inter-municipal special purpose boards and agreements should be used where there is a clear need to plan and administer services in more than one municipality. However, to support the principle of local autonomy it is clear that, "...persons elected to municipal office should be responsible for the establishment of policy and spending of funds, and thereby (it is necessary to) strengthen the municipal council as the principal decision-making administration."54 Hence, most local special purpose boards should be eliminated, and regional ones as well, where the functions can be performed adequately by local councils.

Annexations and Amalgamations

There is no doubt that the primary instrument of the proposed model is annexations and amalgamations. Given that under the proposal most power would be concentrated within the individual units of local government, through their council and administration, it is a
continuation of the system already begun by the Ontario government that will form the most utilized change mechanism.

As the Honourable Tom Wells said in 1980, "...it is a system which holds great promise for saving money for municipalities, reducing tensions between municipalities, and increasing the control of elected people over their municipal destinies."55

The process, as it has been carried out in the province, has worked well in the case of Barrie-Innisfil and Brantford-Brant and is currently being employed in the Sarnia area.56 There is every reason to believe that the system can also work well in other urban areas of the province including those areas which presently are under the confines of a regional government. Naturally, there is also room for improvement in the approach. As an example of a possible modification, Nadwoody has proposed that the arbitration panel used for bargaining be a special, quasi-judicial panel that is a branch off the regular quasi-judicial board, the Ontario Municipal Board. He also cited the need to incorporate a public hearing into the process.57 The need for alterations such as these would, however, only be felt after the process were in effect for a lengthier period of time. The one area where development would have to occur however, is in the scale and scope of change. Since regional governments would be terminated, the arbitration panel would have to expand to include a considerable number of individuals, and the secretariat within the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing would also have to be greatly enlarged.
Many recent inter-municipal boundary disputes in the Toronto area serve to illustrate the benefits of the annexations and amalgamations approach. To cite an example, in 1980, a border war loomed between Mississauga in Peel Region and Etobicoke in Metro Toronto over the validity of the present boundary which existed between them. Both parties sought to annex land from the other. The types of issues which led to the dispute were a proposed shopping centre that Etobicoke was proposing to build which would affect Mississauga centres nearby, and also an extension to a major arterial road into Mississauga from Etobicoke that would affect residential communities in Mississauga. During the course of the acrimony, Mississauga informed Etobicoke that it would not re-establish the Etobicoke-Mississauga liaison committee for 1980.\(^5\)\(^8\) The rigidity of the Peel/Metro regional boundary prevented negotiations based on boundary adjustments from taking place. Similarly, in 1981, the Borough of York wanted to annex land from both the city of Toronto and North York. At that time, "York Controller Alan Tonks said Ontario should provide a team of fact-finders as they did in the Brantford-Brant County boundary negotiation and provide a chairman for negotiations between municipalities."\(^5\)\(^9\)

The present legislation on annexations and amalgamations in Ontario provides opportunities for agreements between municipalities that can be quite complex. In the Brantford-Brant case, for example, it can be seen that, "agreement was also reached on sharing the costs of suburban roads, a planning board, a radio fire alarm system,
emergency measures, and several health and welfare programs normally supported by a regional government. Clearly, then, the legislation can be expanded into areas that are even peripherally related to boundaries in order to take care of jurisdictional issues which may arise. With a properly staffed and functioning arbitration panel and secretariat, the process should prove effective in dealing with the dynamics of urban growth, as well as furthering the value of local autonomy.

In this chapter, a proposal has been brought forth which provides an alternative to the present two-tier local government structure which is presently in place in Ontario's urban regions. The present proposal is built on the process of change which has been used by the provincial government since about 1978. This process has resulted in the increased democratization of the local political process stemming from the provincial realization that there exists a need for greater local autonomy for Ontario's municipalities. The proposed system would consist of:

1) a rationalization of lower-tier boundaries through the use of annexations and amalgamations;

2) a selective use of inter-municipal special purpose boards and agreements;

3) a co-ordinating umbrella body in the larger urban regions known as a Council of Governments; and

4) an annexation and amalgamation process that would deal with the dynamic aspect of continuing growth.
The combination of all of the above-noted techniques should prove to be an effective combination and should result in a total system of local government that is in no way inferior to the regional government system which currently exists. This proposal is not entirely based on the polycentric approach, since it involves system rationalization from the traditional local government pattern, but neither does it represent a two-tier approach since the COG would only act as a very loose structural device. The proposal is a combination of the above two models.

The thesis has attempted to establish that the need for a changed municipal structural system is now very clear. This has been done from the perspective of political values -- an analysis was provided concerning the need of achieving the best balance amongst the three values of liberty, participation and efficiency. It has also been done from the perspective of the evolving make-up of the urban form. The analysis suggested that the persistent, albeit slow, growth of the urban unit and resultant spillage of development between regional governments in some areas has resulted in a less than appropriate structure for a metropolitan area and its immediate hinterland. This is especially true in light of the dissatisfaction with regional government that has been expressed by varied groups in urban regions across the province; conflicts have emerged between urban and rural dwellers, central city versus all of the others, urban versus suburban. The present two-tier system does not permit the realization of the values of local government, and many local voices have expressed their discontent.
The present push for change has been well summarized by Downey. He states that:

"...there is every reason to believe that the public is becoming increasingly critical of the system and of those who work within it and the pressure for change is becoming ever more pronounced. As we move further into the economically troubled 1980's, there is little question that demands for more efficient, responsive and accountable local governments will accelerate in all regions."\(^{61}\)

It is felt that the changes proposed in this chapter would prove to be of significant assistance in meeting these demands.

As the implementation of the regional government system along with other major provincial interventions in the municipal sphere showed, a precedent does exist for large scale, non-incremental provincial action in the municipal sphere. The regional government system could be abolished and replaced with a looser, somewhat polycentric system that could respond to change incrementally. Undoubtedly, this would be a daring step for the province, as there is much time, money and effort invested in the present system, but it would not be impractical nor illogical:

"...while there is little question that the Government is unlikely to modify its cautious approach to change...it is reasonable to suggest that the Conservative Party has not remained in power in Ontario since 1943 by consistently rejecting changes that are obviously required."\(^{62}\)

Reform is already underway with the province's pronouncements of a need for increased local autonomy. The present proposal would address this need without in any way taking away from the other two primary local government values. The resulting structure would prove to represent a far better balance of values than the regional system presently in place.
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7) Remarks by the Honourable Claude F. Bennett, Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing to The Founding Convention of a New Association of Municipalities in Ontario, August 24, 1981
### APPENDIX 1

#### Activities Which Can and Cannot Be Handled Locally

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Activities Which Can be Handled by a Locality of 25,000 or more</th>
<th>Areawide Activities Which Cannot be Handled Locally</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Functions</strong></td>
<td><strong>Parks</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
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<td>Routine investigation</td>
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<td>Traffic control</td>
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<td>Same</td>
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<td>Fire</td>
<td>Fire company</td>
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<td>Streets and Highways</td>
<td>Local streets, sidewalks, alleys</td>
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<td>Repairs, cleaning, snow removal, lighting, trees</td>
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<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Same</td>
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<td>Refuse</td>
<td>Collection</td>
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<td>Water and Sewer</td>
<td>Local</td>
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<td>Parks and Recreation</td>
<td>Local parks</td>
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<td>Play, sports</td>
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<td>Recreation centers</td>
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<td>Swimming pool (25 m.)</td>
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<td>Libraries</td>
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<td>Land Use and Development</td>
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<td>Air pollution control</td>
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<td>Large parks, zoos</td>
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<td>Museum</td>
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