Reading Europe Against the Grain: A Genealogy of Agricultural Governance

by

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**Abstract**

Utilizing insights from historical and political sociology, this dissertation explores the multitude of ways food, agriculture and rural economy have been governed in Western Europe. As a genealogy of agricultural governance, the project operates on two distinct analytical levels. The first level is analogous to what Charles Tilly labels ‘macro’ political history. The point here is to interrogate the ways agro-food power has been imbricated with historical processes such as statemaking, geopolitics, postwar reconstruction, welfarism and the neoliberalization of economic life. Second, the dissertation aims to make intelligible how agriculture has been created and recreated as a space of government. This will be done by deconstructing its various problems, strategies, objects and mechanisms over time.

The project covers a wide swath of history: from the ancien régime to the EU. Nonetheless, the bulk of the empirical investigation will be centered on configurations of ‘European’ agricultural governance over the postwar era. The dissertation ultimately draws two important conclusions from its examination of agro-food power. First, the production and supply of food has always been a central space through which populations have been managed by centralized political authorities – a fact equally true at the national and European levels. Second, the strategies and practices of agricultural governance have been formative in building postwar ‘European government’.
Acknowledgements

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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy</td>
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<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe</td>
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<td>CEEC</td>
<td>Committee of European Economic Co-ordination</td>
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<td>CEECs</td>
<td>Central and Eastern European Countries</td>
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<td>COPA</td>
<td>Committee of Agricultural Organizations</td>
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<td>CPE</td>
<td>The European Farmers Co-ordination</td>
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<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union</td>
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<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christian Social Union</td>
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<td>DBV</td>
<td>German Association of Farmers</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Communities</td>
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<td>EAGGF</td>
<td>European Agriculture Guidance and Guaranteed Funds</td>
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<td>ECA</td>
<td>European Cooperation Administration</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>European Currency Union</td>
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<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EFSA</td>
<td>European Food Safety Authority</td>
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<td>ERP</td>
<td>European Recovery Program</td>
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<td>EMS</td>
<td>European Monetary System</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Economic and Social Committee</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organization (of the UN)</td>
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<td>FAC</td>
<td>Food and Agricultural Committee (of the OEEC)</td>
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<td>FNSEA</td>
<td>National Federation of Farmers Union</td>
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<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal German Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
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<td>IR</td>
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<td>LEADER</td>
<td>Links Between the Rural Economy and Development Actions</td>
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<td>LIFDC</td>
<td>Low Income Food Deficit Country</td>
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<td>NSDAP</td>
<td>National Socialist German Workers Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organisation for European Economic Co-operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSE</td>
<td>Producer Subsidy Equivalent</td>
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<td>SPS</td>
<td>Single Payment System (of the CAP)</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNRRA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration</td>
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<td>USDA</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Introduction

Assemblage #1 Nutritional Recovery in Postwar Europe
‘Food is basic to production’… with the termination of American aid drawing nearer and nearer, the problem of feeding the population is becoming increasingly urgent’
- Organisation for European Economic Co-Operation, 1949b: 1

Assemblage #2 Securing Family Farms & Governing Rural Europe
‘Farm incomes are higher today than they were fifteen years ago, and there has been a considerable improvement in the social situation of the farming community. But the main worry is that the gap between agriculture and other sectors of the economy has widened and there seems to be less and less hope of farmers coming to share in the general improvement in social and economic conditions’
– The European Commission, 1968

Assemblage #3 Markets, Budget Crises & CAP Reform
‘A support regime characterized by production-distorting incentives that encourage farmers to use the most intensive methods possible and smothered in red tape, with production dictated by the straitjacket of subsidies rather than market demand, is one that risks losing the support of European taxpayers’
– Franz Fischler, EU Agricultural Commissioner, 2002

Assemblage #4 A New Rural Imaginary for the CAP
‘Farming is not just about food. It is about rural communities and the people who live in them. It is about our countryside and its precious natural resources’
- European Commission, 2012

Socrates stated long ago that ‘no man qualifies as a statesman who is entirely ignorant of the problems of wheat’ (cited in Morgan 2000: 3). What was true in the Greco-Roman world remains so today. While the problems and contexts have certainly changed, governing the supply, production and producers of food remains a core task of political authorities. In fact, agriculture is connected to the most fundamental questions around how populations are governed, and how modern economies are organized. In trying to prove this assertion, my dissertation resists seeing food supply and agricultural
production as specialized fields of political inquiry. In contrast, the aim is to make these central elements in a story about Europe’s political development.

As a ‘genealogy’ of agro-food power in Western Europe, a historicist ethos pervades the study. In this way, the dissertation builds upon the work of scholars who have been able to demonstrate certain foundational relations bridging agriculture and modern politics. In his landmark study Tilly (1975), for example, looked at how control of the food supply was a prerequisite for statemaking. Offer (1989) and Collingham (2011) have explored the significant agrarian components of the two world wars. Koning (1994) and Knudsen (2009) have respectively explored how regulation of the agrarian sector became a key dimension in governing national and ‘European’ economies. This scholarship has provided the conditions of possibility for my dissertation. But unlike the approach of these authors, this project does not examine a single theme or time period, but instead focuses on the ways agricultural governance has comprised a multitude of problem-spaces.

This project interrogates the relations between food, populations and political authorities in two political contexts, or institutional formations. The first is relative to the history of the state in Western Europe. From a period that lasted from absolutism through the Second World War, the state would develop machineries to extract, police, and securitize the relations between the food supply and population. Chapters One and Two will explore this foundational and dynamic history of ‘state power’.

While the relations between the state and agriculture provide an important context for this genealogy, they do not comprise the bulk of its empirical content. The more
intensive case studies (Chapters 3-6) focus on how the food supply becomes a ‘space of Europeanization’ (Jones & Clark 2010: 19). This begins with an exploration on the role of the Organization for European Economic Co-Operation (OEEC) in ‘pacifying’ agricultural policy and initiating cooperation between states over common food and farming problems. The last three chapters directly concern the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU). This portion of the dissertation explores the forms of economic government and social rationalities that have circulated through this important regional policy.

This dissertation ultimately pursues a twofold research question. The first part asks how the production and supply of food has formed an important line of political strategy in Western Europe. What is the relationship between agriculture and projects such as state formation, industrialization, imperialism, postwar reconstruction and European integration? The second part of the research question asks how such strategies were executed at the level of political planning, administrative management, and economic regulation. This dimension of the project seeks to elucidate the anthropological, sociological and technical aspects of agricultural governance. Exploring both the strategic and practical dimensions of agricultural governance provides the basis of this historical study.

Before I move on to discuss the theoretical framework, research contributions, and progression of the dissertation, the remainder of this Introduction will be used to provide an overview of the political transformation that first inspired this project. I discuss this key rupture for two reasons. First, it allows the reader to travel the same path as I did; that is, in using the reform of the CAP as a moment to open up and investigate
the history of agro-food power in Western Europe. Second, it presents an opportunity to give a précis on the development of postwar European agriculture, eliminating the need to provide such context further along.

**Discontinuity in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)**

The third passage (page 1) is from a speech given by Franz Fischler to the European Parliament. Fischler was the highly influential EU Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries from 1995-2004. Fischler’s tenure was notable for the enactment of two comprehensive reforms of the EU’s CAP (see Commission 2004a). The reforms impacted how farming was imagined as an economic sector, and how it functioned as a system of political economy. The second of these two reforms – the Mid-Term Review (MTR) (Commission 2002) – is the one being referenced by Fischler in the highlighted passage. The MTR was notable because it effectively eliminated the practices of price-fixing and market intervention which had been used to govern the European farming sector since 1962. In the ‘original CAP’ farmer subsidies were directly linked to production, providing the foundations of a comprehensive rural welfare state based on high-output. In a ‘reformed CAP’, argues Fischler, farmer support would be made to co-exist with a European agrarian order founded on the logics of marketization and competition.

By 2007, the Commission saw the completion of this trajectory as the greatest success of CAP reform: ‘Producer support is now to a large extent decoupled from production decisions, allowing EU farmers to make their choices in response to market signals…improving the competitiveness of the agricultural sector’ (Commission 2007: 2).
The evidence for this transformed political economy would come in the form of a new subsidy apparatus called the Single Payment Scheme (SPS). The SPS provides farmers standardized, annual, payments that are completely ‘decoupled’ from production levels. Importantly, on-farm decisions around what to produce are now based on prevailing prices and other market factors (for a discussion see Atkin 2011; Daugbjerg 2009; Roeder-Rynning 2010).\(^1\)

The final passage is from an EU promotional document called *A Partnership Between Europe and Farmers* (2012). The publication was ostensibly meant to demonstrate the value of a reformed CAP to European citizens. The propagandist intent notwithstanding, the document correctly alludes to the normalization of a second CAP reform strategy, one first articulated in a Commission paper titled *The Future of Rural Society* (1988; see also Chapter 6). The practical embodiment of this strategy will emerge ten years later in the form of a ‘second pillar’ for agricultural policy which targets the competitiveness and market viability of depressed rural areas (Commission 1998a; 1998b). The new EU rural policy does not view the countryside as a homogenized space of productivist farming. Rather, it is made intelligible as a space economic heterogeneity; a repository of many risks that requires an array of solutions.

*Regionalizing and Europeanizing Postwar Agriculture*

When the problems of food supply and agriculture were first Europeanized, no priority was given to forging competitive markets, or diversifying rural economic life. Similar to

\(^1\) Farmers, in fact, are no longer required to produce *anything* in order to receive the annual payments. The only conditionality placed on the SPS subventions is that producers (or landowners) adhere to environmental regulations and proper land-management practices – what is commonly called ‘cross-conditionality’ (see also Bianchi 2007; Garzon 2006)
other fields of public policy created or expanded in the postwar era – health, education and public utilities, for example – food and farming were understood as sectors to be managed through high levels of regulation and sometimes *de-facto* nationalization. The liberal market was not viewed as an appropriate mechanism for governing a sector so closely intertwined with the public good (Bowler 1985; Knudsen 2006; 2009; Milward 1992; Rieger 2000). Agricultural governance was put to the task of achieving a number of objectives in the postwar period, including restoring the nutritional health of war-torn populations (Chapter 3) and providing economic security of impoverished farmers (Chapter 4).

The origins of a ‘European’ food and farm policy are located in the labors of the OEEC (Chapter 3). In a broader context of postwar social reconstruction, this organization would address the problem of restoring caloric and nutritional health among suffering national populations. Coupled with a concomitant desire to raise agricultural production levels, the OEEC would prove instrumental in forging cooperation across an economic sector and space of political rule that had, for the previous five decades, constituted a space of intense geopolitical stratagem (Offer 1989; Koning 1994; Tracy 1989; see also Chapter 2). Within the OEEC, and in particular the Food and Agricultural Committee (FAC), Europe’s common ‘food and farm’ problems are transformed into a space of ‘functional’ cooperation\(^2\). States would aggregate and share relevant data, coordinate limited resources, and proliferate expertise in areas such as dietary surevellience, nutritional health, and farm modernization. It was within such a

\(^{2}\) At the international level, attempts at coordinating food and agricultural policies first appeared in the interwar period. In particular, during the 1930s, the League of Nations and International Labour Organization (ILO) were heavily involved in researching and reporting on the nutritional status of populations, agricultural production levels, and class barriers to the procurement of food (Cullather 2007; Mittrany 1933; Boyd Orr 1937; Trentmann 2007).
‘technocratic’ paradigm that the problems of food and agriculture are first made into a regional concern.

When the CAP begins to operate in 1962, it builds on the cooperative practices initiated in the OEEC, as well as those of other postwar organizations (Griffiths 1997; Knudsen 2010). But at the same time it also moved beyond the ‘low-politics’ that defined the work of these more technocratic organizations. The uniqueness of the CAP was to push agricultural integration into the zone of regional political economy; towards a ‘European’ regulation of agrarian commodity markets and redistribution of wealth to farming classes. The CAP, in short, was a supranational public policy constructed on welfarist and territorial principles (Grey 2000; 2009; Knudsen 2006; 2009; Milward 1992; Rieger 2000). In this original form, the CAP becomes a policy machinery for guarantying food security, generating rural prosperity, and stabilizing the overall agricultural situation.

The CAP was also political oddity in many respects. As a policy that targeted the food supply, farmers, and rural families, the CAP seemed anachronistic within an emergent Community that viewed ‘integration’ primarily through the lens of industrialization and urbanization (Hass 1958; Loriaux 2008; Monnet 1978). And while the CAP was similar to the common market in terms of being predicated on a form of market integration, the model of political economy it utilized was very distinct. The CAP extensively managed the price and supply of agricultural commodities from an administrative center (EC 1979; Heidhues et al. 1978). The EC never seriously

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3 Such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), The Council of Europe, and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (UN). The work of these organizations is briefly discussed in Chapters One and Three.
considered governing its agrarian and industrial sectors through a single policy model.

Moreover, as indicated by Walter Hallstein, there was also never any genuine consideration of omitting agriculture from the budding European project:

In 1957, when we negotiated the EEC treaty, we all knew that to achieve a common market in agriculture was vital to the future of the Community…To leave it out of the processes of economic integration would not only be grossly unfair, but would also be fatal to the balanced and comprehensive development of our economic union, and hence any real prospect of building political unity (Hallstein 1962: 55)

The CAP: A Success Not Celebrated?

From a certain vantage point, the CAP was a success of historic proportions. As previously noted, the political implications of agriculture pre-1945 were decidedly geopolitical. The food supply was not a site of cooperation, and certainly not a field of joint policymaking. Moreover, the agreement to create the CAP in 1955 came immediately on the heels of a failure to achieve something similar in the ‘Green Pool’ Round (1950-54). The Green Pool was an effort sponsored by the Council of Europe to forge agricultural market integration based on alternative proposals offered by Sicco Mansholt and Pierre Pflimlin (Griffiths 1995; Griffiths & Girvin 1995). In short, while there were historical precedents for constructing a customs unions in Europe, nothing similar had been attempted with agriculture. Nothing, that is, outside the brutal agro-imperial ‘integration’ practiced by the Third Reich through its Lebensraum project (Collingham 2011; Mazower 1998; Evans 2005).

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4 The Green Pool was a smaller piece of a larger effort to create a European Defence Community (EDC) and European Political Community (EPC) (Griffiths 2005). When these failed, the Green Pool stood little chance of succeeding. It had lost its political architecture.

5 For example, the German Zollverien (1818), Nazi ‘New Order’ (1941) and Benelux Union (1948).
The CAP was unique for being a regional *social policy* that eschewed nationalist logics. The policy was an overt attempt to integrate agrarian markets, redistribute wealth to rural Europe, and neutralize the food supply as a site of zero-sum geopolitics. In this context, the rationalization of the original CAP was truly exceptional: ‘The new Community was little more than half a year old and yet it was already tackling the issue of a supranational agricultural policy. This was both a leap in the dark and a continuation of the search for such a policy which had eluded policy-makers since the end of World War II’ (Fennel 1997: 21). Over its duration, the CAP has also constituted the most centralized and administratively cumbersome of Community policies; a clear reflection of how it was organized as a form of economic government (Bowler 1985; Hix 2005: 281; Nugent 2006: 455-56).6

The CAP has been an amazingly successful policy *when measured against its original aims*. First, it played an important role in increasing and stabilizing the aggregate food supply. When the EC-6 committed themselves to a ‘relaunch’ of the European project in 1955, shortages of oils, fats and meats still persisted. Rationing, in fact, would last until the early-1950s for most Western European states (Collingham 2011; Milward 1977). Fast forward to the 1970s and these chronic wartime shortages had been replaced by ‘structural surpluses’ of staple commodities (see especially Grant 1997). Furthermore, during the twenty-five years of postwar growth the incomes of family farms in the EC grew substantially (both in absolute and relative terms) compared with their prewar

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6 Consider the facts: (1) The CAP required thousands of civil servants to operate on a daily basis; substantially more than any other policy (2) The Agricultural Council is the most active ministerial council in the EU (3) CAP regulations account for more than half of the *aquis communautaire* – the 80,000 page corpus of obligatory EU law (4) The Agricultural and Rural Development DG has more working groups than all other Directorate-Generals. In short, the CAP has perpetually consumed the bulk of infrastructural and bureaucratic energies of the EC/EU.
averages (Brusse 2000). This new rural prosperity was integral in forging postwar Europe into a ‘social complex’ based on mass consumption (Roche 2010; Stråth 2000). Lastly, while food prices in the EC/EU became slightly elevated due to CAP subsidies, this proved a small price to pay for the abundant supply and wide consumer choice the policy helped make available.7 From a purely ‘objective’ standpoint, the original objectives articulated for the CAP in the Rome Treaty had been mostly realized.8

Success or not, the old CAP was anything but celebrated forty years after its creation. In fact, it became the most heavily criticized Community policy from the 1980s until it was reformed (Chapter 5). Critical voices not only came from within the Commission, but included agricultural economists, academics, and an assortment of NGOs. The CAP came to be viewed as excessive in every way. It spent too much money. It used cumbersome and complex subsidy instruments that encouraged corruption. The CAP was overly generous with large farmers, and too neglectful of smaller ones. It was an antiquated policy that rejected ‘free’ markets and the logics of competition. At the extreme end, some authors even portrayed the CAP as a virus that was infecting and sickening the entire integration project (see especially Cottrell 1987; Kapteyn 1996). By the late 1990s, the CAP was clearly at a critical juncture.

The CAP, in other words, was considered to be in a ‘crisis’ phase. In this context, the Commission reflected on ways to discipline, responsibilize and reconfigure the

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7 We should also consider that over the postwar period food prices have progressively and sometimes dramatically fallen as a percentage of total household spending (Paarlberg 2010; Shaw 2007).
8 The explicit principles of the future policy were detailed in the Spaak Report (1956) and later enshrined in the Treaty of Rome (1957). They are found in Article 39.1 of the original Rome Treaty and can be summarized as follows: (1) increasing agricultural productivity through ‘technical progress’ in farming (2) providing a fair standard of living to the agricultural community by raising the incomes of farmers (3) stabilizing agricultural markets and guaranteeing sufficient foodstuffs for consumers at reasonable prices.
policy. How could the CAP use its subsidy instruments to promote economic security for producers and markets? Could a policy that for thirty years homogenized rural space as *productive farming* be reengineered to promote a more general economic viability across rural Europe? From my interviews with the Commission and DG officials who worked on the reform of the CAP, a common theme was that the EU had to ‘equip’ or ‘adapt’ an agricultural policy ‘built for a different age’. In other words, more than piecemeal reform was required. The dynamics of the agricultural sector were changing at the same time the escalating costs of ‘protectionism’ were bloating the budget. A clear sense of urgency thus pervaded discussions on CAP reform (Chapter 5; Garzon 2006: 121-139).

*CAP Reform as a Window for Historicizing the Spaces of Food & Agriculture*

This moment of CAP reform opens up a field of comparisons when juxtaposed with the set of concerns that confronted Mansholt, Spaak and others who formulated the original CAP: How can an adequate and affordable food supply be ensured? Which market arrangements would most effectively secure the incomes of farmers? The postwar rationalization of agricultural policy, particularly the problem of farmer welfare, was based on the pervasive notion agriculture constituted an ‘exceptional’ space of government (Coleman 1998; Griffiths 1997).

This discourse will appear with far less frequency beginning in the early 1980s, as a more neoliberalized political environment emerges in the wake of the Single European Act (1986) and the intensification of market integration. With equal parts optimism and

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9 This particular statement comes from Notis Lebessis, a high-ranking CAP civil servant in the DG Agriculture and Rural Development DG (Lebessis interview, 2007)
exasperation, Commissioner Fischler notes the manifold pressures and expectations that confront CAP policymakers in a neoliberal EU:

Today farmers cannot limit themselves any more on the production of commodities as it was in the days when markets were supply driven… What is true on the farm level is equally true on an overall political level. …It was Jean Monnet, one of the founders of the European Union, who said ‘we cannot stand still if the world around us is moving’. Our agricultural policy has to follow this motto. European farmers have to please almost everybody: they are competing in a demand oriented market. Therefore, they need more flexibility for their management decisions (Fischler 2002b).

Fischler’s statement raises a number of questions around the reform of agricultural governance. What role should markets forces have in the regulation of Europe’s agrarian economy? How might the EU foster a more diversified and ‘competitive’ agricultural sector? Could such marketization be achieved while simultaneously protecting farmers from the impoverishing effects of low commodity prices? The conundrum, therefore, concerned how to introduce reforms in a tactical way that would not lead to a repeat of the agrarian depressions and rural populism of the 1930s, but that would also not epitomize the worst of centralized governance and policymaking insularity (Kay 2003; Roeder-Rynning 2003).

The vision of agricultural governance proffered by Fischler, which more or less becomes the blueprint for CAP reform, was quite novel when first introduced. Never before had the politics of food and farming become so explicitly framed around questions of austerity, marketization, competiveness, and the need to diversify rural economies. The discrepancy between the ‘embedded liberal’ and ‘neoliberal’ diagrams of agricultural governance comprises a key line of inquiry in this project. An explicit comparison of these two diagrams based on their logics and practices cannot be found in the existing
literature. This dissertation fills this lacuna by exploring the distinct ways European agricultural governance has been rationalized, organized and practiced over the postwar period.

*Political Modernity From the Agrarian Perspective: A Path Less Traveled*

This project also uses the CAP as a window to elaborate on the relationship between agriculture and political modernity more generally. Within the canon of Western political thought, the predominant tendency has been to view agriculture, and rural space more generally, in terms of social and material ‘backwardness’. Karl Marx (1869/1994) understood the ‘small-holding peasantry’ to be a production unit based in economic self-sufficiency, and therefore lacking the prerequisites – such as ‘mutual intercourse’ and ‘science’ – necessary to forge a revolutionary consciousness (199-200). Marx goes so far as to blame the peasants (‘sacks of potatoes’) for blunting the revolutionary potential of 1848 (200). For Marx, industrial capitalism is a process of simultaneously debasing and liberating humankind. Yet the peasantry, the clear majority of the European population during the time he wrote, seems to play no important role in his dialectic, outside of slightly stalling the move towards a fuller stage of capitalism.

Adam Smith understood agriculture to provide the foundation of a nation’s productive capacity. He was also much less derisive in his descriptions of the peasantry compared to Marx. Similar to other *oeconomists*, Smith viewed agriculture as the original source of wealth, and thus the basis of all commercial exchange (Tribe 1978). At the same time, Smith also possessed an ‘evolutionary’ view of history (Heilbroner 1986). This meant he envisioned a natural diminution of the place of the agrarian in the
commercial fabric of a nation over time (e.g. the enclosures). For Smith (1776/1986), ‘progressive’ nations should possess a sophisticated division of labor and develop specializations in the arts, sciences and manufacturing. Therefore, while he acknowledges the countryside ‘supplies the inhabitants of the town both with the materials of their work, and the means of their subsistence’ (250), he is equally clear that the ‘natural course of things’ is to improve agriculture so that a nation can turn its efforts to manufacturing and trade in the towns (251).

This dissertation attempts to reverse the urban/industrial bias so prevalent in Europe’s political historiography. It rejects this pronounced tendency to view the spaces of agriculture as somehow in the rear-view mirror of an unceasing drive towards ‘progress’. My project moves in the opposite direction. The assumption is that the production and supply of food has always been – and shall remain – constitutive of what we perceive as ‘modernity’. In short, I intend to flip the normalized biases of social science on their head and ask: What happens when European politics is made visible from the perspectives of food, farming, and rurality?

**Contributions of Research**

The following analysis is ‘problem-driven’ rather than ‘method-driven’. It draws upon ideas and concepts from across a number of subdisciplines and their associated literatures. These include political sociology, historical sociology, critical political economy, and ‘non-foundational’ geography (amongst others). The particular combination of literature has been selected for its usefulness in interrogating the ways populations, food supply and political power have been configured in Western Europe. I
have little interest in building theory or advancing disciplinary agendas with this project. Rather, I aim to explore a ‘space’ and ‘theme’ of political power. With this in mind, the Introduction now discusses three specific contributions I aim to make with this project.

*Food, Authority and Political Ontology*

The first contribution is in demonstrating the different ways the exercise of centralized political authority has been dependent on governing the production and supply of food. The assumption here is that our most naturalized political ontologies, such as the state and EU, have no true essence or core. Ultimately these entities amount to political composites or ‘structural effects’ that are a consequence of the various projects and practices carried out in their name (Mitchell 1991). At the discursive and symbolic level, we unify and naturalize these ontologies within our political imagination. At a practical level, though, they embody significant complexity and differentiation. A governmentality analysis therefore focuses on how particular functions, tasks and discourses have made possible the exercise and organization of authority from the center (rather than on how the political center creates and diffuses power).

Valverde (2007) notes how this understanding of ‘governmentalization’ has been significantly pushed forward with the recent publication of Foucault’s lectures given at the *Collège de France* in the late-1970s. The lectures provide a provocative, albeit incomplete, sketch of the ‘modern practices of power-knowledge’ that have been integral for the development of state power (160). This same principle – that practices, knowledge and discourse logically prefigure the entities that enroll them – should likewise apply when we examine the construction of political and governmental spaces above the state.
In our case, this means when trying to understand the construction of ‘European’ and ‘regional’ politics (Larner & Walters 2002; Sparke 2001; Walters 2004). For both the state and Europe, the food supply has been a crucial space through which ‘political power’ has been established and circulated.

Agriculture was important in making possible state formation in two respects (Chapter 2). First, because food production was the origin of most wealth in the preindustrial age, the control of agrarian production systems simultaneously implied the ability to finance wars, create forms of specialized administration, and maintain the splendor of royal courts. Second, successful states under absolutism were ones that could guarantee the sustenance of nodal cities. In these dense urban spaces, ‘crowds’ would quickly gather together, riot, and rebel when their sustenance was put into jeopardy. For this reason, the ‘policing’ of bread becomes a foundational competency of early states.

During industrialization the food supply takes on a new importance. ‘Agricultural policies’ are created as formalized and public spaces of governmental intervention during the latter half of the nineteenth century. One catalyst for this was the emergence of a more competitive international environment in which food self-sufficiency becomes prioritized as a national objective. A second goal informing the creation of agricultural policies was the belief a state must ensure balanced ‘national economic development’, which included addressing the plights of farmers and rural society. The practices upon which agricultural policies were based were numerous and included ways of regulating the ‘economic frontier’ and extending social infrastructure across the countryside.
Chapters 3-6 examine the complex relations between agriculture and European government. How was the food supply a space for imagining and making tangible ‘European’ politics? The first case explores the OEEC’s rejection of a militaristic agricultural ethic, and how it comes to rationalize the food supply as a site of functional and interstate cooperation. Whereas in the OEEC agricultural governance embodies a type of technocratic politics, in the CAP it becomes a comprehensive system of European political economy. Chapter Four will examine this important transition. Following this, the two subsequent chapters will interrogate the two important trajectories of policy reform; what can be called, respectively, the ‘marketization’ and ‘ruralization’ of the CAP.

_Governing Agriculture as a ‘Practical’ Endeavor_

The second contribution of this research is to elucidate specifically how food and agriculture have been governed by political authorities in Western Europe. This contribution is premised on an understanding that ‘practice’ is where political scholars should look to understand how populations are governed, and how political authority is exercised (see especially Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992; Veyne 1997). Accordingly, this project devotes significant attention to exploring the ‘active’ dimensions of agricultural governance. The benefit of this emphasis is on making tangible the links between populations, the food supply and the exercise of political authority.

Historians and historical sociologists have done the best job elaborating on the practical dimension of agro-food power. This is evident in studies that have explored how states have organized the food supply to meet wartime needs (Collingham 2011, Offer...
1989, Tilly 1975). The authors have explored practices that range from the use of grain storehouses placed along battle routes to feed soldiers, to the rationing of essential foodstuffs within civilian populations. At the same time, an intensive and purposeful look at the practices of agricultural governance has been the exception. Peacetime agricultural policies are normally studied from the vantage point of their interests, institutions and paradigms – rather than through the specific techniques, materials, programs and organizational forms upon which they operate.

One exception to this tendency worth mentioning is an insightful article written by Murdoch and Ward (1997). In this piece, the authors explore how ‘statistics’ – as a practice of enumeration and a technology of economic visibility – made it possible to calculate and therefore objectify the postwar British ‘national farm’. This, in turn, makes possible the introduction of new categories within agricultural policymaking discourse such as farm size, household income and predictable aggregate yields. Moreover, this new agro-statistical imaginary provides the basis upon which deficiency payments are allocated to British farmers. Ultimately these statistical practices made it possible to ‘think in national terms’ about agriculture as an economic sector that could be the basis of long-term planning and intervention (321).

Another example that focuses on practices of agricultural governance is found in the edited collection of Higgins and Lawrence (2005). The authors in this collection give special attention to the ‘de-politicizing’ practices that have been important in carrying out agricultural governance under neoliberal regimes. The practices have included standard setting, the use of new calculative technologies, the deployment of public-private partnerships, and the enrollment of NGO within policymaking networks (3-13). In short,
the contributors demonstrate that the ‘how’ of neoliberal policy reform is just as important as the ‘why’.

To focus on practices also means providing analytical significance to the materials that form the technical precondition of governing. ‘Materials’ include all the instruments, devices and other tangible entities used to translate abstract plans into concrete spaces of political rule (Barry 2001; Law 1994; Latour 2005). For our purposes, materials have been crucial in forging connections between population and agriculture.10 Materials often comprise the very micro-foundations of government, drawing our attention to the impact of even the most seemingly banal administrative devices and inscriptions. This dissertation explores a range of materials of agricultural governance – including placards, balance sheets, texts and promotional magazines.

As a way to summarize this second contribution, my project makes intelligible how agricultural governance has been produced at the level of its practices and materialities. A focus on ‘how’ governing actually occurs has long been a deficiency of traditional political science (Bevir 2010; Brass 2000). My minor contribution here is to demonstrate how practices have been central in the operation of one particular field of political and governmental power.

As a style of political inquiry, genealogy is not dependant on the researcher deploying just one or two different methods (see also Chapter One). This is also reflected

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10 A wonderful example of how an agrarian material can have important implications for governing populations is found in Netz’s work on barbed wire (2004). Netz demonstrates that the original function of barbed wire, developed in the 1870s, was to enclosure pastureland by way of ‘educating’ and ‘manipulating’ animals through the violent memory of barbs penetrating their flesh (38). This simple configuration of wood, metal and violence would make possible an agricultural revolution on the American plains – i.e. a transition from open-ranges to ‘settled’ grazing. But its success in enclosing and controlling space would also lead to barbed wire being used for interning, channeling and eliminating human movement (In this vein, Netz considers the blockhouse, trench and concentration camp).
in this thesis, where the methods utilized are primarily driven by the problem being analyzed. This ultimately means that a variety of methods must be utilized, including: a review and synthesis of secondary literature; archival research carried out in the European University Institute (EUI); and a round of interviews with European Commission officials, NGOs, and farmer associations. Lastly, I will also regularly engage in an intensive discursive reading of key government documents from which I was able to discern the key rationalities and practices that animated a particular strategy of agricultural governance.

*Food and Agriculture as a Space of European Government*

The third contribution is to demonstrate the ways agriculture has been a crucial site from which postwar regional cooperation and integration was built. This includes showing how, through the CAP, agricultural policy became a comprehensive space of European rule. Walters & Haahr (2005) encourage us to look at how certain political and economic zones were opened up to ‘European’ solutions in the postwar era:

Put very schematically, European integration implies a mutation in the logic of power. As with the governmentalization of the state, one sees questions of power and rule reformulated in terms of the governance of social and economic processes. Power is transformed by the recognition, institutionalisation and actualization of spaces irreducible, and transversal to the formal system of states or international organizations…this field of European governmentality will be built in successive layers as various social and economic spaces are created/discovered…European government orients itself to the creation, maintenance and regulation of these spaces (Walters & Haahr 2005: 11).

This insight raises a number of questions with particular relevance to the Europeanization of food and agriculture: Under what conditions was agricultural governance reinvented as a space of European government? How was it reimagined away from its previous
national discursive bearings? How was agricultural governance made intelligible as a set of ‘social and economic processes’ that necessitated particular forms of European intervention.

Entwining the second and third contributions previously discussed, the dissertation likewise focuses on the practices that have made it possible to visualize, organize, and govern agriculture as a distinctly regional concern. To ‘govern Europe’ requires making problems and objects intelligible and actionable in new ways (Barry 1993; Barry 2001; Barry & Walters 2003; Walters 2002; Walters 2004). Particular to the construction of European government, we must closely examine the fields of creation, translation, combination, and hybridity from which new forms of regional politics are engineered. It is just such a line of inquiry – opened up by scholars such as Barry, Walters, and Kauppi – that I aim to apply to the spaces of food and agriculture.¹¹

Progression of Chapters

The dissertation will unfold as follows. Chapter One elaborates on ‘genealogy’ as the style of inquiry that structures this project. Genealogy is ‘a crooked rather than straight method’ that views the political field as one constituted by discontinuity, fragmentation and rupture (Dean 2003: 181). While genealogy should be considered a form of historicist political inquiry, it is not the type of historicism that merely seeks to produce a taxonomy of our various political configurations, and then link these through some underlying logic. As Walters (2012) claims, a genealogy is interested in treating every object, every practice, as a ‘a site of historical emergence in its own right’ (17). For our

¹¹ See also: Delanty & Rumford (2005), McNamara (2010) and Rumford (2002).
purposes, this means tracing the numerous thread of agricultural governance, trying to elucidate a diverse patchwork of strategies and practices across time.

My discussion of genealogy has two components. The first is historical in nature. Instead of beginning with an explicit discussion on genealogy as method, Chapter One begins with outlining the long relationship between bread and political order in Western Europe. Discussing these configurations helps reveal the political saliency of my general topic while also previewing, in a topical way, what is involved in conducting a genealogical style of inquiry. The next section then explicitly discusses how genealogy is operationalized in this study, elaborating on the concepts and heuristics that will be frequently utilized in the remaining chapters.

Chapter Two is a historical chapter. It is used to track the transformation from ‘sovereignty’ to ‘security’ in the spaces of food supply. First I examine the ways state formation was predicated on accumulating wealth and maintaining internal order – two strategies that were themselves dependent on controlling the production and circulation of food. The second part of this chapter explores the invention of ‘agricultural policy’ as a new way of ‘seeing’ and governing the food supply that would have been unrecognizable in the Absolutist state. Chapter Two concludes by examining the ways the Second World War produces a deepening and intensification of agricultural policy as an apparatus for securing the wartime needs of soldiers and civilians alike.

Chapter Three looks at the crucial postwar transformation whereupon the problems of food and farming first emerge as spaces of European cooperation and management. This chapter deliberately contests the myth that European agricultural
governance begins with the CAP. Instead, it draws attention to the role played by an earlier organization, the OEEC, during the pivotal years of reconstruction from 1947-1952. Through its technical subcommittee – The Food and Agricultural Committee (FAC) – the OEEC was the first postwar regional organization to make intelligible and coordinate action around the food shortages and agricultural ‘backwardness’ that plagued its member states. The OEEC is also an interesting moment in our genealogy because it presents the full erasure of geopolitical logics within the spaces of food supply.

Chapter Four examines how the EC consolidates this new cooperative diagram, and forges divergent national agricultural sectors into a site of European political economy. This chapter sees the original CAP as a way of rationalizing agricultural governance around the need to create a comprehensive rural welfare state. Furthermore, as an economically vulnerable entity that produced a vital public good, the ‘family farm’ would comprise the target of this welfare state. In the early years, the CAP was the only European public policy explicitly governed from a social and territorial perspective. It was a policy that deliberately sought to increase and stabilize the incomes of farmers through a centralized regulation of commodity markets and supply.

Chapter Five discusses the first of the two cases which constitute the ‘policy reform’ of the CAP. By the late-1980s, the CAP had come to be seen in terms of waste, inefficiency, bureaucratic ineptitude and even corruption. The political consensus settled on the notion the policy required comprehensive change. Farmers would have to be governed as ‘business managers’ and entrepreneurs, rather than as creatures of an over-generous subsidy system. While the CAP would continue providing financial support to producers, this support would now come in the form of a standardized income floor that
was provided annually. Chapter Five interprets this reassembling of CAP political economy from the perspective of its *ordoliberal* logics. An Ordoliberal CAP will strive to institutionalize competition and entrepreneurialism across Europe’s agrarian spaces. But it will not do so in a way that completely abandons farmers to the vagaries of the market. As a social policy and form of economic redistribution, the CAP now encourages rather than thwarts competition.

Chapter Six looks at the development of rural policy as a novel creation within the spaces of European agricultural policy. In the first place, rural policy is unique because it imagines the countryside as economically ‘diversified’ in the sense it comprises activities beyond intensive agriculture (to which all programming had been hitherto tethered in the machinery of agricultural policymaking). A second, related, shift will involve the re-imagination and re-territorialization of rural space in the image of ‘economic heterogeneity’. In a tangible way, this will come through the creation of a ‘second pillar’ for the CAP. The idea here was to translate the general strategy of ‘rural development’ into a set of programs, partnership models, and even a political architecture for promoting ‘indigenous’ rural economic capacity (which might include activities such as agro-tourism, organic farming, landscape preservation and recreation opportunities). No longer conflated with the family farm, ‘rurality’ comes to embody a diversified set of risks, actors and potential opportunities.

The Conclusion to this project will serve two purposes. First, it is used to review the key genealogical questions that guided the study. How has the dynamic relationship between food, populations and political authorities unfolded since the period of absolutism? What are the different ways it has been assembled? Specific to its
manifestation as a space of European government, what forms of political thought and technical practice did this emergence require? The second role of the Conclusion is to speculate on the future trajectories of agricultural governance. My ‘hypothesis’ is that the CAP will increasingly take on a more ‘polyfunctional’ governing character. In other words, the problems, strategies and practices of agricultural policy will continue to proliferate alongside the identification and articulation of new risks at the level of food supply and agricultural production.
Chapter One

Agrarian Europe & Genealogy

‘Commonsense discourse, habits of speech and thought, cramp and confine reflection and leave undiscovered representations of European space that could prove more powerfully mobilizing. To recover the worlds of political possibility that European Union opens up, one must therefore free discourse from the constraints of habit’
- Michael Loriaux 2008: 2

‘What issues could be more burningly political than those of agriculture?’
- Walter Hallstein 1962: 65-6

Introduction

At the broadest level, this project is a political and historical sociology study on the relationship between agriculture and political rule in Western Europe. The project utilizes a ‘problem’ driven approach that makes visible the different ways that food, farming, and rural life have constituted pivotal sites of political thought and practice. The guiding assumption of this dissertation is that food and agriculture have constituted a dynamic and contingent space of government. For this reason, the methodological bias is always toward empiricism and induction. No attempt is made to deduce or locate singular ‘causes’ at the level of structure, process or interest. In short, this project is not ‘disciplined’ by any single theoretical approach.

The analytical framework of the dissertation has been influenced by the work of thinkers who have shown a particular sensitivity to questions of time, space and practice. This is a type of inquiry that has been pioneered, in different ways, by scholars such as Weber, Tilly, Bourdieu and Foucault.¹ Inspired by these thinkers, the goal of this project,

¹ The influence of Foucaultian political sociology on the project will be overt. At the same time, there is also a more understated influence that comes from Weberian historical sociology. Weber’s project was not
methodologically speaking, has been to construct an eclectic and interdisciplinary approach that makes it possible to name, describe, and elucidate the networks of political power which have circulated through the agrarian spaces of Western Europe. In short, my sources and concepts have been chosen based on their diagnostic value, not their disciplinary fidelity.

The project certainly devotes ample space to analyzing the CAP and Europe’s rural policies. Nonetheless, it does not find a home in EU studies, whose authors have traditionally adopted rationalist pedagogies (for a description see Rosamond 2006). Considering the questions it asks and the methods it utilizes, the project fits more comfortably within the multidisciplinary and critical remit of ‘European studies’. The authors within this approach, while spanning a range of disciplines and orientations, coalesce around the conviction that sociological, historical, and spatial perspectives need greater incorporation within our study of Europe as both a regional polity and way of life (Rumford 2009).

My goal is not to establish law-like truths on the relationship between agriculture and European unification. Likewise, I do not filter all my empirical evidence through a select number of hegemonic concepts. For example, this dissertation does not give special significance to ‘integration’ as an immutable logic of postwar European politics. Rather, the assumption is that Europe has embodied a range of transnational and regional forms,

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that different from Foucault, at least that of his later years. The overlap comes in terms of developing an empiricist, non-evolutionary and interpretative historical sociology that could elucidate situated forms of economic and political rationality (Holton 2003). The dual emphasis on ‘historicity’ and ‘embeddedness’ is also shared by a host of other scholars that have influenced the project.

2 The innovative products of disciplinary and epistemological boundary-crossing in research on Europe can be seen in volumes such as Engaging Europe: Rethinking a Changing Continent (Gould & Sheridan 2005) and Reflections on Europe: Defining a Political Order in Time and Space (Persson & Stråth 2007)
many of which do not conform to the inexorable and teleological logics associated with a budding Europe super-state (Griffiths 1995; Hurrelmann 2011; Parsons 2003). The value here is in not being bound by a set of rigid concepts, and thus being able to more accurately and honestly assesses the variegated relations between agriculture, populations and political authorities that I confront.

An interdisciplinary approach allows us to pose new questions around the CAP. Such questions are rarely raised in the more specialized literature on European agriculture. How does the CAP fit into the broader economic and social orders constructed by Europe? Borrowing a phrase from Knudsen (2006), this project is predicated on the notion that the CAP – and the regimes of agricultural governance preceding it – need to be viewed relative to ‘the political purpose’ they have served (182).

Knudsen’s thinking is useful on this point because she is able to demonstrate how the political rationalities and strategies informing European agricultural governance have mutated over time. This approach also usefully contests the tendency of the mainstream literature to understand the EU as an ‘omnipresent transformation’ in which a few universal logics transcend all of its policy spaces (Jones & Clark 2010: 2). As Jones and Clark go on to argue, a more productive mode for studying Europe is in making visible

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3 A fact that historical sociologists seem more aware of than political sociologists. For example, McNamara (2010) argues that the EU is one political-organizational form of ‘Europe’ in a longer historical lineage that has included empires, trading leagues, and numerous state configurations.
4 A few traditional CAP scholars echo the sentiment. Fennel (1997) argues the CAP has been over-analyzed by economists and lawyers, and therefore would benefit from the disciplinary insights of historians, sociologists and international politics scholars. Bowler (1985) notes that given its wide ranging importance for postwar Europe, scholars should take ‘a broad view of the CAP’ (xiii). The lack of disciplinary crossover, argues Bowler, is what has led to so much of the ‘misunderstanding and misinterpretation’ surrounding the CAP (xiii).
5 In a separate piece, Knudsen (2010) argues the ‘pre-CAP’ history of agricultural cooperation is also necessary to understanding this regional policy. From a genealogical perspective, I certainly agree, and develop such an argument in my discussion of the OEEC.
the unique intersections of ‘power, governance and territory’ that have manifested around ‘particular aspects’ of the European project (17). Similar to other spaces of European government, food and agriculture can thus be mapped out around a field of ‘multiplicity’ (Biebuyck & Rumford 2012).

The chapter has two primary goals. The first is to ‘step back’ (so to speak) and examine how political order has been imagined around, and practiced through, controlling the circulation of ‘bread’. The point is to demonstrate that the exercise of centralized political authority has always been dependent on an ability to control the supply of essential foodstuffs, especially regarding the client populations upon which sovereign power depends. The second goal is explore genealogy as a style of inquiry that frames this project. Genealogy is committed to an interrogating political life in terms of emergence, rupture, discontinuity and hybridity. For our purposes, this means opening up a broader spatial and historical gaze around the ways populations have been ‘conducted’ relative to the supply and production of food. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the heuristics or diagnostics that are frequently used throughout this project. Many (though not all) of these are drawn from the literature on ‘governmentality’ and include concepts such as problematization, assemblage, strategy, mechanism, and object.

Bread and Order

Cities have rioted, revolutions fomented, and empires crumbled – all because of bread. Fagan called bread the ‘merciless tyrant’ of preindustrial Europe because of the

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6 Which for our purposes can also serve as a general category for essential foodstuffs. But in most of our examples, it does actually mean bread.

7 As Walters (2012) argues, genealogy is ‘not one thing but itself a dynamic multiplicity’ (110). For this reason, we can think in terms of genealogical styles rather than a single axiomatic methodology.
unrelenting grip it had over individual and collective life (2000: 154). In preindustrial urban Europe bread shortages, as well as sudden spikes in the cost of grain and flour, provided the quickest route to social unrest. If the preindustrial city was understood as a space of rebellion and danger by political authorities (see Lees & Lees 2007), the image was in large measure informed by the willingness of urban masses to aggregate and defend their sustenance ‘rights’ with violence, when necessary. In this context, it is not surprising the prevention and mitigation of urban dearth became one of the earliest (and longest standing) responsibilities of centralized political authority in Western Europe.8

In the case of Imperial Rome, the onerous task of feeding a city of one million was a decisive impetus for territorial expansion. As Steel (2009) argues, it was this ‘need for grain, not political gain [that] often drove its empire onward’ (73). The military and administrative machineries of Rome were designed with this food security objective in mind. One particular strategy that connected agricultural supply with imperial aggrandizement involved the imposition of farmer settler-colonies9 across the Southern Mediterranean and North Africa (Fraser & Rimas 2010; Mazoyer & Roudart 2006; Steel 2009). For generations, the nutrient-rich muds of the Nile would provide the metropole a ‘boundless supply of wheat and barley’ (Fraser & Rimas 2010: 53). Rome’s ability to

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8 The causes of dearth and how it should be managed has been ruminated over by numerous philosophers in the ‘canon’ of European thought. The list includes Cicero, Socrates, Aristotle, Augustine, Smith, Rousseau, Diderot, and Voltaire (For a contemporary figure see the work of Amartya Sen). This persistence demonstrates the significant impact the politics of famine has had for the development of philosophy and natural law in the Western tradition.

9 Steel (2009) likens Roman agricultural colonies to British settler states, but notably those in the Americas, that made possible ‘cheap-food’ for the British industrial workforce. ‘Two military conquests, over Carthage in 146 BC and Egypt in 30 BC, were crucial victories, securing access to coastal North Africa, territory as vital to Rome’s survival as the American Midwest would be to London’s almost 2,000 years later’ (73).
exploit the food and farmland of its periphery made possible its complex form of urban life.

Unlike the shoddy tenements and city squalor viewed with indifference by Roman elites, problems with food supply were always taken seriously: ‘Nobody close to the elite in Rome could be in any doubt that food and political power were closely linked, or that failing to feed the people was the surest path to political ruin’ (Steel 2009: 208). To provide relief to Rome’s poorest citizens in times of dearth, a semi-formalized philanthropic system called euergetism was used (Garnsey 1988). It functioned by having wealthy Romans act as public benefactors. During times of acute shortage, these patricians would take grain and flour directly from their storehouses and distribute it amongst the plebs (but never slaves). Euergetism was very often ‘the main safeguard of the common people of the towns against hunger and starvation in a subsistence crisis’ (Garnsey 1988: 82). This practice of caring for the sustenance needs of the poor was something more than just charity. It comprised a set of practices and obligations that merged the fates of Rome’s upper and lower classes around the general availability of bread. Euergetism worked alongside a supplementary public ‘grain dole’ that provided regularized – but also fairly meager – rations to around 200,000 of Rome’s poorest citizens (Africa 1971: 6).

At the other end of the spectrum, citizens with hereditary privilege were also entitled to a ration. The annona was exclusive to patrician families that could prove they descended from ‘the Romans who conquered the world and were entitled to its tribute’ (Africa 1971: 6). The most generous of all provisioning mechanisms, the annona worked through the distribution of wooden chits that could be redeemed for five modi of grain
per month (just over a bushel) (5). Similar to the poor of Rome, elites were also willing to spill blood in order to defend this privilege. An attempt by Julius Caesar to reduce the number of persons eligible under the *annona* provoked severe civil unrest and violence that only abated with his assassination (Steel 2009: 77). Furthermore, in addition to these schemes of public provision, Roman authorities also managed the food supply through the regulation of trade. The ‘wheat distribution laws’, to use one example, comprised an elaborate system of control over the circulation of grain that was mobilized to combat regional shortages, and smooth out supply-fluctuations over the vast imperial territory (Mazoyer & Roudart 2006: 253-55).

In the end, neither Rome’s agricultural colonies or sophisticated provisioning mechanisms could prevent what came to be, in large part, a food-induced civilizational demise. A multifaceted agrarian crisis would take root during the last phase of the empire. It was a crisis characterized by strained supply-lines, climatic shifts, exhausted soils, slave revolts, and the oppressive taxation of farmers (Fraser & Rimas 2010; Mazoyer & Roudart 2006; Steel 2009). The combination of such problems would lead to a reduction in agricultural yields, as well as a decrease in the amount of farmland under Roman control. As the situation worsened, city authorities could not guarantee the sustenance of the people. A telling moment arrives in 383, when Rome is unable to withstand even a brief military siege from marauding Visigoths. The city was forced to open its gates, there was simply no food. ‘Bread, or the lack of it, had finally destroyed the Western Empire (Fraser & Rimas 2010: 64).

Therefore, contrary to popular mythology, barbarian hordes did not destroy Rome. It was something far more mundane – lack of bread and serviceable farmland –
that generated its fatal vulnerability: ‘Like modern capitals, Rome depended on imported food, and a delay in the arrival of the grain fleet could reduce the city to famine and bread riots’ (Africa 1971: 5). At Rome’s zenith, the imperial authorities organized and operated a complex array of granaries, food depots, and trade routes (overland and sea) that connected the metropole with producers and merchants across Western Europe (Fraser & Rimas 2010: 41-68; Steel 2009: 72-78). The ingenuity of Roman engineering was also reflected in the first standardized model for a cool, properly ventilated, and rodent-free granary. The ground floor of a typical horreum (storage-house) held enough grain to feed 15,000 citizens (Fraser & Rimas 2010: 59). When at its most effective, this system for managing agricultural production and the circulation of foodstuffs was truly unrivaled.10

But even the most disciplined and extensive food supply systems of ancient times were dependent on the amount of cultivatable land that could be effectively controlled from the center. On this front, Rome would face insurmountable challenges. In the first place, over the course of its agrarian decline, Rome lost significant amounts of fertile farmland due to soil exhaustion and high levels of soil salinity. Furthermore, Roman military might waned alongside its ability to control it agricultural hinterlands. The effect of this environmental degradation and loss of centralized territorial control was to reduce the productive agricultural land under imperial control. The urban food supply would then correspondingly suffer, as Rome became the site of frequent bread riots pitting authorities against citizens, and poor against wealthy.11

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10 Steel (2009) depicts the density of these networks with a cartographic rendering of ‘Roman food miles’ (74).
11 Bread riots were tricky events for Roman paramilitary forces to manage. The authorities were at a distinct disadvantage when taking on rioters who could use the winding and narrow alleyways for attack and flight (Africa 1971: 5). Medieval streets, because of this spatial layout, have always been a problem.
Assassinations of hapless political officials by hungry mobs, and the massacres of riotous commoners by Roman paramilitary forces, became common in these dearth conditions (Africa 1971; Fraser & Rimas 2010; Steel 2009). Mazoyer and Roudart (2006) provide a succinct summary on how agrarian problems not only ruptured the internal peace of Rome, but also diminished it ability to project power externally: ‘the Roman Empire could no longer expand and conquer cheaply the wealth, new lands and new people upon which the Roman state and economy continually lived…there followed a dramatic fall in production, population, and fiscal receipts, while the state needed supplementary resources to repulse the barbarians and attempt to maintain internal order’ (254-55). The agrarian nature of Rome’s collapse would become an important lesson for later statemakers who would be forced to confront anew the relationship between bread and order.

**The ‘Crowd’ and its Bread**

‘The subsistence of the people is the most essential object that must occupy the administration’
- Jacques Necker

From the patchwork of overlapping powers left in in the wake of Rome’s collapse, centralized political authority next emerges in Western Europe in the form of royal or ‘absolutist states’. States proved successful over their competitors – noble dominions, bishoprics, dukedoms, city-states, and trading leagues – because of their pronounced ability to enroll, subdue, or simply destroy these other power-holders (Andersen 1974; for Europe’s incipient political centralizers. This was one reason that large, straight and symmetrical boulevards were incorporated into the ‘Haussmann Plan’ – the nineteenth century plan to ‘modernize’ Paris. This organization of urban space made it easier for authorities to isolate and ‘face-down’ protesting crowds and rioting mobs (Mumford 1962).

12 Cited in Kaplan 1984: 23.
13 Absolutism provided the prototype for our modern state – the naturalized political ‘reality’ that has come to colonize our political maps, imaginaries and epistemologies (Agnew 2002; Ashley 1986; Migdal 2001).
Elias 1994; Loriaux 2008; Poggi 1978; Tilly 1990). At the practical level, states ‘won-out’ because they created more efficient machineries for war, taxation and specialized administration. Elias (1994) labels these institutions ‘monopoly mechanisms’ (340-50) because they were integral in establishing unified territorial and economic control under a single sovereign.

Managing the food supply was also an important monopoly mechanism for the consolidation of state power (Tilly 1975). A degree\textsuperscript{14} of control over agricultural production and the circulation of food was necessary to extract feudal wealth, feed restive cities, and provision standing armies. Food provided the raw material of state formation.

Chapter Two examines this relationship between statemaking and agriculture in closer detail. But here, building on the \textit{problématique} introduced with the Roman case, I am more narrowly concerned with the question of how urban order was posed within absolutism around the politics of the ‘crowd’ and its daily bread.

Joly de Fleury, Controller-General of the \textit{ancien régime} from 1781-83, once noted that: ‘everyone is \textit{people} when they lack bread’ (emphasis in original, cited in Kaplan 1976: 432). What did he mean? As both a statesman and provincial administrator, Joly de Fleury would have been witness to a series of devastating dearths, including localized famine, that occurred across the French kingdom during the 1760s, 1770s, and early 1780s (Aftalion 1990; Darnton 1999; Fagan 2000).\textsuperscript{15} From this experience, he would have also gained firsthand knowledge on the collective reaction of subjects who believed

\textsuperscript{14} As we see in Chapter Two, this should not be confused with ‘complete’ control. Absolutist states were still operating in a context of limited infrastructural capability, and had to confront extensive ‘private’ authority distributed across the (neo-feudal) countryside.

\textsuperscript{15} Shortages were not isolated to Paris and other French cities. They also appeared, during this particularly brutal period of the ‘little ice age’, in cities including London, Geneva and Amsterdam (Aftalion 1990: 40; Fagan 2000)
their regular supply of affordable and quality bread was being placed into jeopardy. In short, Joly de Fleury knew a violable mob percolated amongst unmet sustenance needs, and he knew how quickly these crowds could threaten political authority.

The ‘crowd’ is a useful term for illustrating the collective form in which mass politics most frequently appeared in Absolutist Europe (Kaplan 1982; Rudé 1959; Thompson 1971; L. Tilly 1971). The crowd was essentially an aggregation of urban subjects who joined together to protest or actively resist royal policies they believed worked against their immediate economic interests (Aftalion 1990; James 1988; Rudé 1959). Taxes on salt or matches might generate a crowd. But the most frequent catalyst, by a wide margin, was the availability and cost of bread. Tilly describes the regulation of urban bread supply as ‘the political program of survival for the little man’ (Tilly 1975: 387).

Despite popular representations, crowds did not act out ‘spasmodically’ whenever deprivation occurred (Thompson 1971; see also Tilly 1975). In fact, riots would often occur when there was plenty of bread, but no consensus between subjects and authorities on a ‘just price’. The most important factor for generating a crowd, therefore, was just the perception that customary rights and entitlements rights to food had been violated (see also Kaplan 1982; L. Tilly 1983). For the crowd, royal authorities had a sacrosanct duty to uphold the ‘moral economy’ of policing that ensured a transparent and well-regulated bread supply. If this sovereign obligation to the masses was not respected, the crowd then believed it had a ‘right’ to take action: ‘the men and women in the crowd were informed
by the belief that they were defending traditional rights and customs…the consensus was so strong that it overrode motives of fear or deference’ (Thompson 1971: 78).

The backbone of a crowd, while always working class, also included professionals, artisans and the assorted lumpenproletariat (Kaplan 1982; Rudé 1959). This diverse membership was a reflection of the preindustrial city itself. The crowd had to be urban. Only within cities could people organize quickly and effectively enough to intimidate bakers, force changes to marketplace regulation, and raise the legitimate specter of disorder. The peasantry raised no equivalent fears in the absolutist imagination. While far more numerous, peasants were too distant from the capital cities to threaten officialdom. They were also too isolated in the countryside for disrupting circuits of regional commerce. Only crowds presented an omnipresent and threatening specter to royal authorities, police agents, and others involved in governing the grain trade. It was the proximity of crowds made them into an object of great concern: ‘Urban food riots, especially those in capital cities, were quite another matter… Conflict over food became exquisitely political – and a dangerous threat to public order – when it was urban’ (L. Tilly 1971). Lastly, the relative spatial isolation between peasantries also made coordinated resistance against state officials improbable.

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16 Tilly (1975) also argues: ‘the work of the crowd embodied a critique of the authorities, was often directed consciously at the authorities, and commonly consisted of the crowd’s taking precisely those measures its members thought the authorities had failed their own responsibility to take’ (386).
17 Even the much discussed ‘jacquerie’ – a local peasant uprising targeting feudal overlords – has been exaggerated relative to its actual occurrences and impact (James 1988; Moore 1966).
18 Kaplan discusses this in the context of the uniquely combustible Parisian crowd: ‘They [Parisians] were more likely to act collectively and violently to threats to their subsistence…A Parisian uprising, it was believed, could overthrow the government’ (Kaplan 1984: 24).
19 We might also add to this the significant cultural autonomy of peasant communities historically across Western Europe. Unlike the rather homogenizing mentality of the crowd, peasants from different communities were normally quite suspicious and hostile towards one other (Clapham 1968; Darnton 1999; Weber 1976).
Pacifying the crowd meant that the grain trade, in addition to the physical marketplaces for bread and flour, had to be governed in the ‘moral’ or ‘public’ interest. This would involve royal authorities exhaustively regulating, supervising and ‘making public’ every integral step of the absolutist bread chain: trading grain, milling grain, selling flour, baking bread, marketing foodstuffs, and so on (see especially Foucault 2007; Kaplan 1984; Usher 1913). These machineries of ‘bread police’ were ultimately supposed to protect an adequate urban supply, in addition to maintain a ‘just’ price for this most vital foodstuff. It was ultimately the minor practices of the bread police – setting prices, checking weights, and setting orders of sale – that would make it possible to feed large cities in an era before modern agriculture.

Bread was sustenance in preindustrial Europe. Therefore ensuring it was the first and only route to keeping cities happy and productive. Similar to the Roman masses, Parisian working classes did not thrive from bread alone, but they survive. For preindustrial European urbanites, bread comprised roughly 75% of the family budget, and around 80% of overall caloric intake (Price 1983: 23; Rudé 1959: 44). It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that the Encyclopedist Diderot saw bread as an ‘element’ of life similar to air or water, and thus not to be managed like ‘any other’ commodity (Kaplan 1976: 608-09). More than other political spaces of absolutism, the bread supply would come to ‘define relations between governors and governed’ (Kaplan 1984: 24). Sustenance was the lynchpin for pacifying royal subjects, and guarantying their submission to paternal kingship.
To borrow a term from Foucault (2007), crowds engaged in a range of semi-formalized ‘counter-conducts’ as a way to defend this complex ecology of sustenance rights. In this context, these amounted to specific practices and artifacts used by the crowd to ‘make material’ their strategies and threats. For example, one narrative based technique involved the circulation of stories based on what Kaplan (1982) calls a ‘famine plot persuasion’. Famine plots were conspiratorial and accusatorial stories that inevitably arose in the midst of dearth. The stories were all variations on a consistent trope: shortages and high prices are not ‘authentic’, but instead reflected ‘a criminal conspiracy afoot against the people’ (2).

The cast of famine plot villains was a fairly standard and somewhat interchangeable assortment of elites: merchants, tax-famers, royal administrators, police agents, bakers, and sometimes even the monarch. From this list, a specific configuration of nefarious plotters would be accused of hoarding supply and withholding grain from market. By inducing an acute shortage, so the stories went, maximum profit could be had. Famine plots saw the quest for private enrichment – and never crop failure or poor weather – as what undermined a bountiful and affordable bread supply. As a dearth worsened, and the popular sense of indignation and victimization grew, so to would the depth of the popular belief in a contrived crisis.

Foucault (2007) differentiates these ‘revolts of conduct’ from traditional revolutionary practice (196-97). Unlike the latter, counter-conduct is ‘specific’ in its ‘form and objective’ and the primary aim is not to overthrow powerful economic structures or political systems. Rather, it is to contest how specific pastoral functions are ‘taken up in the exercise of governmentality’ (197). In short, counter-conduct is about demanding to be governed better though existing administrative apparatuses and policy mechanisms.

Kaplan (1982) is able to put together an entire monograph on this practice; a truly insightful ‘minor history’ of urban life in the old-regime!

One dearth in 1725-26 saw stories circulate in Paris and Normandy that high prices were caused by a ‘cabal of speculators’ led by the Pâris Brothers – prominent financiers and military suppliers to Louis XV. A government co-conspirator was said to be the duc de Bourbon. People rumored him to think France was
Famine plots and other grievances could easily morph into more threatening forms of counter-conduct. Here we must consider the infamous ‘bread riot’. These heavily ritualized and organized disturbances were the most potent mode of popular resistance among preindustrial Europeans, and also the most frequent. By one useful measure, bread riots occurred more often than the wage ‘strike’ (Rudé 1959: 22). A range of specific grievances would trigger the event itself. These included: (1) the violation of a ‘just price’ for bread (It should be appropriately indexed to prevailing wages) (2) a belief merchants or highly placed political officials were hoarding grain (3) a suspicion bakers were adulterating bread with cheap ‘filler’ such as chestnut flour or, worse, sawdust (4) extended periods of shortage (5) an excess of wheat or rye bread in the marketplace, and not enough white bread (the coveted bis-blanc).

In addition to there being many causes of bread riots, their modes of materialization were also heterogeneous. The ‘bread riot’ was therefore not a monolithic event but, rather, should be seen as an umbrella term that covers a range of practices and disturbance-forms (L. Tilly 1971; Thompson 1971; Tilly 1975; Rudé 1959). One of the overpopulated and therefore he wanted to ‘make the poor people of Paris die of hunger’ (14). During this plot, police reports noted ‘abusive, threatening, and seditious’ posters claiming the cost of grain had quadrupled, and that royal agents were engaging in duplicitous ‘maneuvers’ by dark (8-12). The crowd was actually witnessing nighttime relief efforts.

Intensified provisioning efforts were often catalysts for new famine plots. During a quite serious dearth in Bordeaux in 1747, the Controller-General took direct charge of relief efforts, only to be eventually accused of running an ‘odious monopoly’ for the purposes of manipulating prices, hoarding supply, and off-loading ‘bad grain’ to the people (47). Sometimes conspiracies targeted the highest officials, and were circulated by lower ones. During the dearth period of 1765-1770, the Rouen and Parisian parlements publically accused Louis XV of orchestrating a grain monopoly under the guise of liberalization (Kaplan 1982: 52-56).

Tilly (1975) states: ‘They characterize the most frequent form of collective violence setting ordinary people against governmental authorities in most of Europe for at least a century of the modern era. One variety or another of the food riot prevailed in most European countries until well into the nineteenth century’ (38).

This summary list was informed by the work of the following authors: Aftalion 1990; Clark 2006; Fagan 2000; Kaplan 1976; 1984; Moore 1966; Price 1983; Persson 1999; Rudé 1959; L. Tilly 1971; 1983; Tilly 1975; Thompson 1971.
more coercive examples would be the ‘retributive action’ in which the crowd took direct action against bakers, merchants, political authorities, police agents, and others accused of withholding grain from the market or otherwise deceiving the public. Bakers were probably the most frequent targets. Their shops were often pillaged by crowds seeking justice, or in-kind amends, for the (perceived) sins of excessive profiteering, or selling inferior bread. ‘Market riots’ included all direct actions taken by the crowd to forcibly lower prices; that is, to ‘re-moralize’ the marketplace. The most common variant, the taxation populaire, began with crowds seizing grain or flour directly from merchants or wholesalers. With the foodstuffs under their control, the crowd would then agree on a ‘just price’, sell at that specified price, and, with that complete, to finally turn the proceeds over to the original proprietor (Rose 1959; Rudé 1959; Thompson 1971).

The taxation populaire thus saw the crowd take over the marketing and sale of food. Yet it was not a strategy for plundering the food supply, but rather a means to restore ‘fairness’ to the system that governed it. Market riots were particularly threatening to political authority because they challenged the very exercise of this authority, practically and symbolically. The symbolic dimension was evident in the forms of ‘guerrilla theater’ that savagely mocked political elites, and provided a discursive backdrop for most of the market riots (L. Tilly 1971: 54). More broadly, this family of bread riots cumulatively demonstrated how the mobilization for violence, and its periodic

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25 Additionally, the ‘blockage’ was a third form of the bread riot in which the crowd would restrict the movement of food between localities. The blockage was more likely to occur in medium-sized towns that surrounded larger cities, such as Paris or Berlin. The event normally occurred when the populaces of such towns rebelled against their local supply being used as emergency grain to feed these larger cities in periods of shortage.
actualization, provided the crowd a popular ‘check’ on political authorities it held responsible for a guarantying a transparent and plentiful supply of food.

In terms of material instruments, the ‘placard’ was a common accompaniment to famine plots and riots (Kaplan 1976; 1982; Rudé 1959; Price 1983; Steel 2009). Placards were essentially politicized signs and posters that depicted a message in opposition to royal policy. While diverse in their characteristics, such as physical size and degree of literacy, placards were united in denouncements of elites as incompetent or complicit in the suffering of the poor. One crayoned placard from a protest in Nancy depicted local politicians hanging in the gallows (Price 1983: 132). Another placard from a Parisian crowd accused the Controller-General of being a grain speculator, and threatened to burn down his house if bread price increases did not abate (Kaplan 1982: 32-33). Among the semi-literate working classes of preindustrial Europe, placards were understood by police agents to present the most accurate indicator of the level of latent violence lurking in the background of a subsistence crisis. As a ‘mobile’ technology of protest, placards had the benefit of being easily replicated and circulated through a crowd.

The historical record confirms that the anxieties and fears of royal authorities around the food supply were, for the most part, justified. The most obvious case for consideration here is the French Revolution. Unfortunately, we normally filter our understandings of this event through concepts such as liberalism, republicanism, and capitalism. Yet it was the mundane problem of daily survival that provoked the actions of the crowd at that time, provoking them to violence that eventually brought down the ancien régime.
The storming of the Bastille on 14 July 1789 begins with a small girl beating a drum and protesting the high cost of bread (Rudé 1959: 74). The drumbeat was followed by a crowd of women chanting two successive demands: bread first, arms second. Some of this was unfortunately caused by poor timing. A physiocratic-inspired grain liberalization programme in 1774 had coincided with a series of three successive poor harvests in the Kingdom (Kaplan 1976: 664). At the exact same time there was less supply, and therefore ample reason to regulate price and police provisioning, the Bourbons were departing from the traditional regulatory model and unleashing market forces across an agrarian economy that did not possess the infrastructure, transport facilities or surplus supplies of grain necessary to complete territorial market integration (Persson 1999; Price 1983; Weber 1976) .

The predictable problems with supply and price, a consequence of both Physiocratic reforms and inclement weather, led to the infamous ‘flour wars’ that greatly increased urban tensions. With liberalization in place, the ‘market-price’ of bread spiked and the working classes became unable to afford their daily allotment. At the same time it produced conflict in the city, limited supply also exacerbated urban-rural tensions. This became evident in rural localities where merchants moved precious grain out of peasant villages in the name of ‘free circulation’. This amalgamation of discontented peasants, workers and radical intellectuals – soon to become one of the most potent revolutionary forces in history – forged early linkages in collective opposition to these Physiocratic reforms (see also Aftalion 1990: 40-55; James 1988). In the end, high food prices and the
general economic hardships of the 1770s were far more pivotal in germinating the Revolution than was any single ideology or economic relation.26

The Women’s March on Versailles (5 October 1789) – one of the more pivotal events of the French Revolution – was an attempt to force the King to return to Paris in the midst of chronic bread shortages and high prices. It was believed that Louis XVI ‘by his very presence among his subjects’ would ‘ensure a plentiful supply of bread’ (Rudé 1959: 78).27 Furthermore, bread prices not only sparked this initial foment, but also thoroughly radicalized the sans-culottes throughout the course of the Revolution. For example, when the demands of the menu people went unfulfilled by the transitional Convention, this provided the working class support that made possible the later Jacobin usurpation of power (Aftalion 1990; Price 1983; Rudé 1959). The placards of protestors at the time were quite clear: ‘bread and a constitution in 1793’ (Rudé 1959: 152). The Jacobins, though, were ultimately no more successful in meeting the demands of the crowd. The sans-culottes ended up disavowing and protesting against the same policies of price-fixing and rationing they had earlier forced the Maximum to implement (L. Tilly 1971: 31). The crowd, in the end, was not fundamentally radical, conservative, or liberal. It was hungry, and supremely anxious about its ability to procure food.

26 Rudé (1959) argues the Revolution was mostly a ‘bread and butter question’ (157). Aftalion (1990) convincingly correlates pivotal Revolutionary events with spikes in bread prices and other essential foodstuffs.

27 Women were quite often the protagonists of sustenance riots, and normally the most combustible and emotive elements of the crowd (Price 1983: 155).
Food and Embedded Liberalism

‘Food will win the war and write the peace’
- Postwar slogan of the USDA

The political ecology of crowds, police, riots and placards will more or less disappear by the 1850s. This occurs in large measure because of the ‘transportation revolution’ that makes possible the territorial integration of not only national markets, but regional and global ones as well (Coclanis 2003; Federico 2005; Persson 1999; Trebilcock 1981). The effect was especially pronounced with the rapid circulation of grains and feed across oceans and vast tracts of inland Europe (see also Friedmann & McMichael 1989; O’Rourke 1997; Tracy 1989). The proliferation of numerous transport infrastructures proved crucial in making possible these national and international agrarian economies; with railways, secondary road networks, and the use of steam power on water (oceans and navigable rivers) being the most important.

It was therefore not free market ideology, but rather the late 19th century ‘transportation revolution’ that makes it possible to circulate foodstuffs at unprecedented new speeds and, as a result, integrate commodity markets. This merging of agriculture and industry would present the end of many of the subsistence practices and

\[28\] cited in Collingham 2011: 476
\[29\] It was also one example of a more comprehensive ‘dromocratic revolution’ – based in an absolute increase in speed – that has shaped the development of modern economies and militaries across the nineteenth century (Virilio 1977/2006).

\[30\] Around the same time, the telegraph makes it possible to transmit information instantaneously about market conditions. The information included different regional price-levels, and the location of food shortages. The relationship between efficient trade and accurate market knowledge was never fully considered by the Physiocrats and other eighteenth century économistes in their premature attempts to liberalize the grain trade.
forms of ‘localism’ that had long defined agrarian life in Western Europe. It would now be possible to govern through markets, however these might be organized.31 Territorial market integration, in this sense, brought an end to the notorious ‘event-scourge’ described by Foucault (2007: 41).

While the problem of preindustrial dearth had been solved, this did not simultaneously mean the disappearance of the bread-order problématique at the level of European history. So we might consider a later instance – this one involving the constitutive relationship between food and post-World War Two international society. It is also a configuration that resembles what Ruggie (1998) calls ‘embedded liberalism’; a particular way of rationalizing and practicing international politics that was based in multilateralism, functional coordination, anti-communism and the promotion of liberal trade within a system of regulated capitalism.

The point here is that food supply emerged as an immediate postwar problem that could be partly governed within this new diagram of international politics (see also Chapter 3). Already by 1943, postwar planners had become anxious about the potential effects prolonged hunger would have on war-ravaged populations, especially in a newly liberated Europe. The German and Russian experiences from the First World War had vividly demonstrated that prolonged food shortages, during and after a conflict, induced widespread demoralization among a population, and also proved a breeding ground for

31 Of course, a longstanding trade in foodstuffs preceded this. But when great distances were involved – for example, crossing oceans by sail, or long overland treks involving animal-powered carts – perishable goods could not be included. Therefore, this constituted mostly an ‘elite’ trade in sugars, spices, preserved foods, alcohol, and narcotics (Braudel 1982; Wolf 1982).
political radicalism (Offer 1989; Wasserstein 2007).\(^{32}\) In this unstable postwar environment, the Americans feared that a resurgent Fascist movement or, as was more likely, a socialist-communist alliance, could be produced from the grievances of hungry populations.\(^{33}\)

The embedded liberal framework, as constructed over 1943-47, would attempt to find solutions to some of these problems. The history of the United Nations (UN) speaks to the role of this organization in contributing to such a trajectory. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was the institutional forerunner to the UN. It was created in 1943 by allied states to provide immediate relief to Europeans living in conditions of deprivation.\(^{34}\) The bulk of UNRAA resources and manpower went to coordinating and delivering food relief. (The supply was drawn from large American and Canadian surpluses.) Food aid provided by the UNRAA saved millions of Europeans from starvation during the brutal years of 1946-47 (Collingham 2011: 478-481; Judt 2005: 86). Led by its activist Director-General Fiorello La Guardia, the UNRAA was a pioneer in international humanitarian government.

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\(^{32}\) We are reminded of the chant in the streets during the February Revolution in 1917: ‘We want bread! Down with war! Down with Autocracy!’ (Wasserstein 2007: 82).

\(^{33}\) By 1945, per-capita food availability had declined 12% from its prewar average. Devastated agrarian sectors, acute food shortages, and malnutrition appeared everywhere outside of North America. One-third of the world’s population was on the brink of starvation, with millions of Europeans ‘living on the edge’ (Collingham 2011: 467-469; see also Judt 2005: 63-99; Shaw 2007; Tracy 1989).

\(^{34}\) The UNRRA though was not the first American-led program to alleviate starvation (and pending famine) in Europe. It had a precursor in the American Relief Administration (ARA). Led by Herbert Hoover, the ERA delivered aid to millions of hungry Europeans (especially children) in post WWI Europe (PBS 2011). This organization later turned to its efforts to feeding millions of starving Russians in the Ural Mountain region in the early 1920s. At the time, this famine was the most severe in history, and the ARA project was the largest relief effort ever coordinated. While it is ironic considering his later association with an incompetent and indifferent response to the Great Depression, Herbert Hoover gained a reputation as something of a master-technocrat as a result of the ARA’s successes in Western Europe and Eastern Russia (PBS 2011). We would normally not think of his monikers as including ‘the master of emergencies’ and ‘the great humanitarian’.
The convergence between food, agriculture and embedded liberalism became even more permanent in the creation of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the UN. Compared to other prominent organizations in the postwar global governance architecture, the work of the FAO, similar to that of the World Health Organization (WHO), has been non-controversial and generally laudable. The FAO has done tremendous good with limited resources in providing emergency food aid; combating nutritional deficiency; maintaining a famine-sentinel apparatus; and researching food-price volatility across vulnerable markets (Paarlberg 2010; Shaw 2007). In addition to this range of technical operations, the FAO has also comprised the institutional home of an evolving food security discourse that has progressively articulated the ‘right to food’ as a human right and, therefore, a necessary component of international law (see also Mechlem 2004).

At the same time we note its achievements, the creation of the FAO also presented a failure of sorts. This organization was originally designed to exercise robust competencies over commodity markets and agrarian modernization. The FAO was supposed to have been given authority and resources equal to that of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. (Collingham 2011; FAO 1943; Orr 1943; Shaw 2007; Trentmann 2007). In, fact such powers were agreed to at the 1943 Hot Springs Conference that brought together experts in nutrition, farming, public administration and agricultural economics from the forty-four allied countries. The FAO was seen as the organization to create a set of integrated and scientific policies that would link agricultural production to food policy; that is, to merge the spaces of farming with those
of nutrition and dietary health at a global level (Collingham 2011: 482; see also Shaw 2007; Yates 1960).

The genuine commitment for the creation a powerful FAO could be seen in the selection of John Boyd Orr as the first General-Director. Boyd Orr was a not only an ‘expert’ on the relations between food, agriculture and health, but was likewise a vocal advocate of global government based on scientific principles. Boyd Orr’s most ambitious and controversial proposal was to create a global institution that would purchase, store, and selectively release surplus commodities, especially wheat and rice (FAO 1946). Boyd Orr did not demur when articulating his ambitions for a Global Food Board, which he described as the ‘great world scheme’ of the FAO (Shaw 2007: 4).

The Food Board would function in a similar way to interwar and wartime purchasing boards, guarantying commodity prices and purchasing surplus. A key distinction, of course, was the fact the FAO would undertake these efforts to feed a global citizenry, its actions would not be circumscribed by national boundaries. During periods when production was deficient in a given region, the Food Board would ‘smooth out’ the fluctuations by moving commodities from areas of surplus to those in deficiency. This would have the impact of providing immediate nutritional aid, as well as relieving local market pressures on food prices. The Food Board would not only be reactive, but would also make proactive investments in order to improve the conditions of agrarian production; regions that were continually in ‘deficit’ positions would become targets of agricultural modernization programs. In the end, the Food Board would operate based on realizing the twin strategies of global food security and regional food self-sufficiency.
The Food Board had the imprint of ‘functionalist’ and world government schemes that originated in the political optimism of the 1920s (Chapter 3). During the interwar period, many statesman and scientists argued that knowledge on agriculture and nutrition – and the imbrications between them – was sufficiently advanced enough to provide a ‘rational’ basis for making a food and farm policy in an integrated way at a global level (Mitrany 1933; Orr 1937; see discussion in Trentmann 2007). It is worth recalling that the proposal for a Food Board was directly informed by Roosevelt’s ‘four freedoms’ speech. It was to be the practical embodiment of the ‘freedom from want’. The Food Board would be an important instrument in realizing the FAO’s commitment to ‘secure, an adequate, and a suitable supply of food for every man’ (FAO 1943). If the world was going to be remade in the image of democracy and liberalism, populations would need adequate sustenance.

Sadly, the proposal for a Food Board was killed by the US, and to a lesser extent the UK (Collingham 2011; Shaw 2007; Trentmann 2007). The FAO would not become an ‘institutional machinery’ for bringing about ‘economic and social advancement’; the goal for UN sub-agencies articulated in the 1945 Charter. President Truman was not as committed to Roosevelt’s vision of internationalism. He certainly did not share his belief that global organizations could be as efficient as their national counterparts. Furthermore, despite the support of the USDA, the US State Department was unwilling to surrender its food and farm policies to an international authority; certainly not in a context in which agricultural surpluses presented economic and diplomatic strength in the conduct of foreign policy.
The failure to create a Global Food Board, coupled with the Americanization of postwar agro-food power, foreclosed the chance of any international coordination of food surpluses, or any *systemic* planning of agrarian reform or modernization in the Global South. It was a tragic lost opportunity for constructing a more egalitarian postwar food order. It was also a missed opportunity to move embedded liberalism in a decidedly ‘functionalist’ direction. Had more interventionist schemes of this sort had been placed into operation after 1945, perhaps the politics of social welfare would not have been unnecessarily circumscribed within national boundaries.

With the FAO constrained by this more narrow remit of relief and research, the US becomes the clear hegemonic actor in the organization of global food and agriculture. At this point, global food aid will find a primary home in US foreign policy. Over the 1950s and 60s, the American government will draw upon its surpluses, mostly wheat, to blunt revolutionary social movements and enroll political clients across the Global South (Clapp 2012a; Friedmann 1993; Patel 2007). Sometimes the US would provide the food aid directly as a form of humanitarian relief – with USAID and the World Food Program (WFP) providing the main conduits for distribution (see also Shaw 2007). Sometimes the aid would also arrive by way of the indirect ‘dumping’ of surplus commodities below cost in local markets. Whether it came through foreign policy or

35 The functionalist saw ‘concrete’ and ‘universal’ needs – such as diet, housing, sanitation, medicine, electrification, and so on – as the logical building blocks of a peaceful and social democratic global order. Functionalists worked for the replacement of politicized IOs with technocratic ones. That is, organizations exclusively dedicated to using science and ‘expertise’ to solve common problems (Haas 1964; Mitrany 1933; 1975). Boyd Orr was not only a committed functionalist, but one who stridently adhered to the doctrine of world government.

36 The US will first deploy its agro-food power in the European Recovery Program (ERP) (see Chapter 3). Of a total $13 billion in Marshall aid that was provided to Europe over 1947-1952, one third was used on food, feed and fertilizer (Shaw 2007: 13). (In contemporary dollars this is about $150 billion – or $500 billion as an equivalent percentage of North American GDP.) If the amount spent on agricultural machinery and farm modernization within the national plans was also included, the proportion would be much higher, perhaps even one half (Griffith et al. 1997; Landes 1969; Schain et al. 2001).
economic government, US agrarian surpluses supported the urbanization and industrialization efforts of allied food-deficit countries, much at the expense of their internal agricultural development.\textsuperscript{37}

For US political authorities, similar to their Roman and French counterparts, food and agriculture was essential to an ‘ordering the political’. But unlike with the French, for the Americans, managing the circulation and supply of food was about constructing global order. And for the Americans, unlike the Romans, the bread-order \textit{problématique} was not about expanding an empire in search of victuals. Rather, it was about using victuals as an inducement, weapon, and reward for client states it desired to enroll within the Western bloc, its \textit{global Rome}.

\textbf{Food & Agricultural Politics: Definition and Scope}

The dynamic relationship between bread and order not only represents great political drama, as we have just seen, but also crystallizes a significant claim of this project: the belief that food supply and agriculture have always been \textit{constitutive} of centralized political rule in Western Europe. Why study the politics of food and agriculture? We now have one answer: because the supply of food has been a determinant site in ‘ordering’ populations, territories and economies; a fact with equal relevance at the imperial, national and global levels. This project, as already noted, will focus on agro-food strategies beyond those of political order, yet the broader point remains the same. That is,

\textsuperscript{37} The infamous Public Law 480 provided a way for the US to realize both geopolitical and neo-mercantile interests through its blending of agricultural policy and foreign policy. The law specifically mandated that all US food aid had to come from American farmers, and be carried on US vessels. The US ‘food aid complex’ put into operation logics of relief and development, but in a way that mediated these through Cold War geopolitics. While the food aid did provide critical relief in some instances, its most lasting effects were to perpetuate the underdevelopment of agrarian sectors across the Global South, and perpetuate food dependence among urban populations by forcing the national political elites to accept ‘cheap food’ policies.
food, farming and rurality have *necessarily* helped define modern government – a fact mostly ignored by political scientists.

This dissertation hopes to fill this lacuna, at least in the context of Western Europe. It does so by focusing on the *strategic and material configurations through which political authorities have managed the production and supply of food, and for what purposes*. The project is predicated on a belief that agro-food power has always been at the center of the ‘big’ questions that should interest scholars of politics.\(^3\) It might strike the reader as odd that the production and circulation of food could bring down (or conversely, make) a state or empire.\(^4\) But, as previously discussed, maintaining the food supply has historically been one of the most pivotal tasks of a statesman (see Socrates epigraph). What so obsessed political authorities in the Roman Empire, *ancien régime,* and FAO has been mostly forgotten by consumer-citizens of the global North during this era of ‘peak agriculture’. Perhaps it is time we recall.\(^5\)

*Food Surpluses and the Possibility of Politics*

The salience of this topic can also be gleaned from exploring the relationship between food surpluses and the development of politics itself. The origins of agri-*culture* as a

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\(^3\) I say ‘should’ because most contemporary political scientists shy away from examining how populations are imagined and governed around specific problems and spaces. Instead, they tend to focus on the role of institutions and political behavior (Brass 2000). The more dense empirical analysis has thus been left to historians, sociologists, geographers, and political economists.

\(^4\) But perhaps it should not be so unthinkable. For example, some observers have noted the catalysts for the recent ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings were grievances over bread prices, and cuts made to consumer subsidies for other essential foodstuffs. Moreover, governments from the Caribbean to Far East have recently been weakened by massive rioting and political disturbances attributable to the extreme price-volatility in grain markets, notably in 2008 and 2011 (Clapp 2012b; Rieff 2011.).

\(^5\) Similar to our current levels of oil extraction, we are likewise close to realizing the productive limits of our mechanized and high-input agriculture. This is a paradigm characterized by unsustainable levels of irrigation, soil exhaustion, monocropping, fossil fuel dependence and toxic ‘pesticide’ usage (Ponting 2007; Weis 2007).
system of production and mode of human organization is especially important to consider here. What we label the ‘agricultural revolution’ essentially amounted to the deliberate manipulation of ecosystems in order to produce surplus food. As Ponting (2007) points out, the food surpluses generated by these first agrarian systems allowed humanity to ‘break-out’ from the hunter-gatherer complexes that had defined social existence for the previous 190,000 years (see also Mazoyer & Roudart 2006):

This more intensive system of food production was adopted not once but on a number of occasions across the world... The extra food that was produced made possible the evolution of settled, complex and hierarchal societies and everything we call ‘civilisation’ (Ponting 2007: 36)

‘Politics’ thus first amounted to a struggle among competing cliques to establish rule over land, labour, and the food surpluses that were produced at their intersection. Political authority, in turn, arose to organize these agrarian systems, and to control and distribute the food surpluses. These new authorities would also become the agents tasked with repressing and enslaving the labour-power required to reproduce these systems. Moreover, their work would become be sanctified and legitimated through religious, mystical and kin-based belief systems (Wolf 1982). The ability to centralize political authority was thus initially about controlling the circulation of foodstuffs, and a few other vital resources. This makes it possible to ‘fix’ populations onto territories, and subsequently develop all the trappings of urban civilization (such as the ‘arts’, formal education, artisanal trades, and so on).

_Agriculture, Private Property, and ‘Liberty’_

Does agriculture have a similarly constitutive relationship with private property and capitalism? Within the liberal philosophical tradition, the answer is yes. Locke, to take
the clearest example, provides one of the foundational myths of liberal capitalism in arguing that ‘property’ only emerges as an effect of applying labour to the land and producing something of value from this application. In other words, between simple physical territory and the private ‘ownership’ of land is found labour. In its initial configuration – that of landed property – such a relational effect could only materialize through the practice of farming. Locke argues that it was therefore labour, in the form of agriculture, that ‘gave a right to property, wherever any one pleased to employ it upon what was common’ (1690/1980: 27, emphasis mine).

When Locke talks about what was ‘common’ he, of course, means land. But we should not confuse common with ‘unused’ in this instance. For example, the indigenous populations of North America, whereupon Locke’s ideas became the basis for violent settler colonization, had been subsisting for thousands of years on the fertile soils and abundant wildlife of what we call the United States and Canada. But for an agrarian liberal like Locke, European settlers did not ‘steal’ this land from the indigenous peoples. This is because, for Locke, any production system that was not based on settled farming was considered primitive and subordinate. If it could not generate surplus food, accumulatable wealth or ‘domesticity’, then it could not produce ‘property’ either. Settled farming, and the patterns of landownership it depended on, were the only ‘natural’ underpinnings of a commonwealth for Locke. Again, at the root of all of this was agriculture, to which ‘we owe the greatest part of all its useful products, for all that straw, bran, bread, of that acre of wheat’ (26-27).

41 The translation of Locke’s ideas would not only do violence to indigenous populations. They also became convenient justifications for ‘enclosing’ the remaining commons of the British peasantry over the 18th and early 19th centuries (Mingay 1994; Moore 1966).
Locke’s imagination of the polity was based on a collection of free-holding, white, protestant, males with neatly demarcated farmsteads who primarily utilized household labour.\(^{42}\) It was a gendered, racialized and pastoral existence that, for Locke, was also the well-spring of human liberty. The reason for this had to do with the fact that property – or more specifically, the collection of landowners who created ‘compacts’ to protect their property – was the only basis, within natural law, for establishing commonwealths and states in the first place. Only private property could generate the ‘liberties’ a polity would need to protect from arbitrary usurpations by populist mobs or marauding armies. For Locke, this is essentially the basis of ‘constitutional’ government. It is from the compacts forged among landowners – farmers, really – that we have the ascendency of ‘established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent’ (66).

Locke’s argument is that agriculture begets property, which then requires constitutional government to ensure its protection. But he is also making a claim that property provides the outer limit on how far the powers of the commonwealth might extend. In doing so, Locke articulates one of the core questions at the heart of liberal government.\(^{43}\) For Locke, the limit appears at the point where the ‘natural’ right to

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\(^{42}\) Perhaps if Locke would have explored the plantation – a quasi-militarized and slave dependent agricultural operation – he would have reached different conclusions on the nature of property (see especially Mintz 1959; Wolf 1982). Plantations were crucial conduits of imperial power. Not only did they function as sites of capital accumulation, but they also produced the specific commodities – such as tobacco, coffee, tea, and cocoa – that provided the primary ingredients for the ‘proletarian hunger killers’ (coffee, refined sugar, tea, cigarettes) that quite literally ‘fueled’ industrial workforces in Europe (Mintz 2008).

\(^{43}\) This is captured by Gordon (1991) who argues that early liberal thinkers – including Steuart and Smith - wrestled with ‘the conundrum of how to establish a viable political boundary between the objects of necessary state action and those of necessary state inaction’ (18). Gordon goes on to argue that a central tenant of political liberalism is the commitment to liberty as ‘the circumbent medium of governmental action: disrespect of liberty is not simply an illegitimate violation of rights, but an ignorance of how to govern’ (20).
property – i.e. freeholding agricultural plots – becomes transgressed. Berlin (1997) would describe Locke’s system as one based on ‘negative’ liberty. This is because while the state is empowered to act in certain instances – namely to protect property rights and enforce related contracts – it is ultimately *freedom from state interference* that defines its mode of operation. In Locke’s version of agrarian constitutionalism we have a version of the ‘night-watchman’ state: a polity that finds it ‘natural’ and exclusive function in the defense of landownership and its ‘civil society’ of yeoman farmers.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau provides us a comprehensive critique of Locke’s liberal and propertied vision of politics and law (1755/1987). He sees very different normative implications for a polity and society based on the acquirement of private property. Interestingly, Rousseau shares the empirical-historical starting point of Locke in so far he also locates the original formation of private property, and the law that sustains it, in the development of settled agriculture. Also similar to Locke, Rousseau believed private property and acquired wealth impact the moral character of a polity. For Rousseau, though, in contrast, the ‘morality’ that results is entirely of the corrupt and debased sort:

They all ran to chain themselves [to property] in the belief that they secured their liberty, for although they had enough sense to realize the advantages of a political establishment, they did not have enough experience to foresee its dangers. Those most capable of anticipating the abuses were precisely those who counted on profiting from them’ (70)

Landownership, from this perspective, does not produce natural liberty. Rather, it restricts the liberties found in our natural state because it produces quite unnatural social hierarchies, cultural distinctions and political privileges. Rousseau argues that when property and wealth become so normalized across the body politic, the result is inevitably a collective expression of *amour-propre;* i.e. self-love and the unrelenting desire for
social acceptance. Over time, this ‘social man’ wears away at the intuitive empathy of ‘savage man’ (a hunter-gatherer rather than agriculturalist). In the process, this propertied and social man degrades the constitutional structures of the polity as the perpetual search for wealth and social prestige begins to supersede all other more noble pursuits. For Rousseau, settled agriculture and landownership are thus the original sins that put into motion a train of evils:

The first person, having enclosed a plot of land, took it into his head to say *this is mine* and found people simple enough to believe him was the true founder of civil society. What crimes, wars, murders, what miseries and horrors would have been spared, had someone pulled up the stakes or filled the ditch and cried out to his fellow men: ‘Do not listen to this imposter. You are lost if you forget that the fruits of the belong to all and the earth to no one (1754: 60, emphasis in original).

Agriculture is therefore the first step to various forms of centralized tyranny. Rousseau clearly does not share Locke’s belief that farming will introduce equality and liberty into human relations. Whereas Locke romanticizes a form of agrarian pastoralism, Rousseau’s founding myth reaches back to Paleolithic hunter-gatherer tribes, and the ‘rough equality’ which dictated their social organization. According to Rousseau, it was the breakdown of this subsistence mode that made possible the introduction of the stark inequalities and ‘legalized’ theft of common property that defines centralized power. This is why, for Rousseau, constitutional government will always manifest as the tyranny of landownership, inheritable wealth and the legal-economic domination of the masses. Rousseau, in the end, saw only corruption, violence and political mendacity as the lasting impacts of farming on humanity.

We have now surveyed some additional sites of convergence between agriculture and modern politics. In addition to being at the foundation of strategies for political order,
agriculture has been the lynchpin for creating complex, differentiated and capitalistic forms of human organization. However you might evaluate these developments – the flowering of individual liberty and civilisation (Locke), or the birth of structural inequalities and violence (Rousseau) – what is clear is that the food supply has been foundational to realizing what we understand as ‘civilization’ and ‘modernity’.

A Political Sociological Approach to ‘Government’

This project interprets agro-food politics from the perspective of ‘government’. In this study, government does not amount to just the study of institutions, actors and interests. It has a more active and sociological meaning than this. Gordon (1991) provides a useful definition of government as: ‘a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons’ (2). Moreover, ‘to govern’ (as a verb) always involves forces and processes that are unique to the spatio-temporal context in which they operate, or are deployed (Dean 2007: 82). In this sense, we should not understand government as having ‘universal’ properties. In contrast, there is always a certain amount of novelty at work. This is especially apparent when we consider that governing always includes a set of ‘arts’ for combining (and recombining) narratives, practices and material forms in ways that make it possible to guide, manage, and shape people in certain ways, and towards certain ends (Collier 2009; Deleuze 1988; Rabinow 2003).

As is likely now evident, this rendering of government assumes that political power is always embodied in ‘activity or practice’ (Gordon 1991: 3). To see political life

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44 This corresponds with one of Foucault’s (1976/1980) pivotal insights: power does not radiate outward from an all-powerful center. Because of this fact, ‘one must rather conduct an ascending analysis of power, starting, that is, from its infinitesimal mechanisms, which each have their own techniques and tactics, and then see how these mechanisms of power have been – and continue to be – invested, colonised, utilised, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended etc.’ (99).
in terms of practice is to also simultaneously reject the idea power can ever be exercised *generically*; i.e. that political power can manifest *as* culture, structure, interest, rationality (etc.). Political power will always be more tactical and inventive than such concepts allow. ‘To refer to the art of government is to suggest that governing is an activity which requires craft, imagination, shrewd fashioning, the use of tacit skills and practical knowledge, the employment of intuition and so on’ (Dean 1999: 19). Government, in this way, is not only practice, but practice marked by invention, hybridity, practicality and situational reasoning.

This project sees government in both ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ dimensions. The former are defined as large-scale processes of significant temporal duration and spatial breadth; such as building states, forging markets, and imposing violence across a territory (Elias 1994; Poggi 1978; Tilly 1990). Though not as common to the governmentality literature, this project does pursue such an explicit historical sociological dimension. This will become especially evident in Chapters Two and Three, whereupon the relations between agro-food power and what Tilly (1983) calls ‘big structures and large processes’ are canvassed.

A second and equally important aspect of government – and one that necessarily underpins the macro transformation discussed above – include all of the exceedingly mundane and administrative ways through which bureaucracies, public policies, markets, and other regulatory systems organize and direct the lives, labour and subjectivities of populations (see especially Barry 2001; Foucault 2007; 2008; Rose 1999; Rose & Miller 1992). Here we are talking about government in terms of the little practices and materialities that bind together populations and political authorities in specific
configurations of rule. It is around this dimension of political power the governmentality literature has been especially illuminating – and conventional political science exceedingly limited (Brass 2000). Likewise, it were precisely the micro-sociological and anthropological aspects of political life that grounded much of Foucault’s writings on government:

In this way, the study of government, in Foucault’s sense of the term, opens up a much broader field of politics to inspection. The political need not be associated the control of political institutions, the activities of states or the formation of social movements. Instead…the political [can] refer to the ways in which artefacts, activities or practices become objects of contestation… Nor should we assume that a clear line can be drawn between zones of rational administration and sites of political invention (Barry 2001: 6).

Drawing out this passage from Barry, we see that when Foucault uses the term ‘governmentality’ he intends to capture the ‘ensemble’ of ‘institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics’ that allow for the exercise of a ‘specific’ albeit ‘complex’ forms of political power. (Foucault 2008: 108). Furthermore, in applying the concept of governmentality, we have to also consider how various modes of political thought configure with different material elements and make intelligible a particular object or problem-space. For this reason, we might also consider this project an interrogation of Agrarian Europe from the perspective of its governmentalities.

Governing takes place over a range of problem-spaces and objects: ‘governing does not just act on a pre-existing thought world with its natural divisions…to govern is to cut experience in certain ways…It is also a matter of space, of the making up of

45 Brass goes a step further and argues that political science is partly at fault for the fact ‘we have been unaware of the kind of society we live in, the ways in which our lives are organized, structured and disciplined…the discipline of political science has virtually ignored these facts and instead become implicated – indeed, has been implicated since its foundation – in fostering the governing myths of our political lives, our political selves’ (2000: 311).
governable spaces’ (Rose 1999: 31). In terms of this project, we certainly inquire as to how the spaces of agro-food power have been made, divided and categorized. But with equal vigour, we also examine how this space has connected with, and been partially constitutive of, other governing spaces (such as war, welfarism and neoliberalism).

In order to understand the construction of political spaces, as well as to gauge their various intersections, we must pose *nominal* or inductive questions. As Dean claims, this is why governmentality research is based on ‘a detailed description and analysis of the rationalities, techniques, goals and identities formed in the practices that seek to guide the conduct of oneself or others’ (Dean 2007: 82-83). To carry this out requires one to conduct a political anthropology of objects, problems and spaces – not pursue a deductive science of politics (see also Deleuze 1988; Rabinow 2003).

To conclude, examining the spaces of food and agriculture using the combined insights of governmentality and genealogy offers a number of advantages. First, it has the potential to disrupt conventional knowledge around *how* populations (including peasants and farmers) have been managed relative to the food supply. Second, it helps make visible the specific ways food, farming, and rurality have been politicized – and through what narrative and discursive practices this as occurred. Third, it draws attention to the varied strategic roles of agro-food power in Western Europe, from the Absolutist State to the EU.

**Genealogy as a Style of Analysis**

As previously noted, this project does not profess fidelity to an existing theoretical framework from EU studies, European integration theory, or the political economy of
food.⁴⁶ In contrast, the dissertation is cast in an interdisciplinary mold has more in common with an eclectic batch of scholars who have productively explored the uneven strategic and discursive political terrain around agriculture, and its relationship to the governing of populations (see especially Collingham 2011; Grey 2000; Offer 1989; Tilly 1975; Foucault 2007). Similar to these authors, my aim is not to explicitly build or advance theory. Rather, the goal is to use a range of concepts and literatures that possess the historical and sociological sensitivity necessary for exploring how the relations between political authorities, food, and populations have been configured in Western Europe.

⁴⁶ The project certainly does not conform to a large body of CAP research that utilizes rational choice or institutionalist theory (for a discussion of the literatures, see Daugbjerg & Swinbank 2009; Garzon 2006). Applying an argument developed by Hindess (1986), the typical CAP literature suffers from the fact it reifies ‘interests’. It takes essentially contextual political elements and creates from these ‘variables’ that become supposedly fixed in nature, and frozen in time. This positivist bias in CAP studies, which represents the mainstream, has significantly narrowed the range of questions asked about the policy. The CAP is reduced to a domain of self-interested actors – member states, the Commission, farmer lobbies, the WTO (etc.) – who constantly maneuver around each other for advantage, in both institutions and public debate. This literature has been rightly criticized for ignoring context of all sorts (Fennel 1997; Higgins & Lawrence 2005). But, perhaps in a more damning way, the research also suffers from the fact it under-specifies and under-explores its own independent/causal variable: ‘interests’. As Hindess argues, to claim an agent (or association) pursues their own ‘self-interest’ at the expense of others does not reveal much. A more penetrating analysis would concern how the interests are formulated and assessed in the first place. ‘The point is simply that they [interests] are the result of some definitive process employing particular conceptual means of specifying the actor’s situation and possible changes within it. Interests are the product of assessment. They do not appear arbitrarily, out of nowhere, they are not structurally determined and they cannot be regarded as fixed or given properties of actors’ (Hindess 1986: 120). This project follows Hindess in being less concerned with how ‘interests’ configure and produce certain win-sets or outcomes. This project is more concerned with the conditions of possibility that allow agricultural policy to be made visible and assessed relative to specific ‘interests’ at specific times.

More insightful than such rationalist-positivist approaches to the CAP have been a number of historical studies on why the policy changes over time. Historical institutionalist approaches, for example, have somewhat overcome this interest bias in CAP scholarship. Kay (2003) has argued that the CAP is an appropriate policy to look at from the perspective of ‘path-dependency’ due to its immunity to radical reform and seeming rhetorical consistency in adhering to the objectives first laid out with the Treaty of Rome (408). In order for the CAP to reform, as it finally did in 1998 and 2003, there had to be significant ‘shocks that would create a ‘critical juncture’; in others an opportunity for substantial policy change. These ‘shocks’ could arrive by way of international trade negotiations, or new ‘polity ideas’ (Linder & Rittberger 2003). While historical institutionalism remains a rationalist and ‘sequential’ approach, it nevertheless overcomes the ‘static’ nature of most other approaches. That is, it takes elements of time and change seriously. To paraphrase, Roederer-Rynning (2003), historical approaches allow us to see how the CAP has been embedded in a variety of political environments.
That said, this project is not theoretically unmoored either. In particular, its analytical framework has been heavily influenced by the insights of ‘genealogy’ (Foucault 1977; 1980). Genealogy is not a ‘method’ in the strict sense of the term because it rejects the positivism, reductionism, and temporal stasis of mainstream social scientific approaches (Foucault 1980: 80-87). In eschewing a set of analytical axioms, genealogy is best understood as a style of inquiry that ‘breaks-up’ and historicizes the political ideas, events, problems and social forms that dominate our present.47

Genealogies substitute timeless accounts of political life with contingent ones. But at the same time, genealogies do not err in the opposite direction of imagining politics as being created ex nvo with every new set of contexts and problems that appear on the political landscape. Between the past and present there is a field of relays, ruptures, and nodal points that make up our political and social existence. Within the zones of emergence, displacement and multiplicity is where the genealogist toils (Deleuze 1988; Rajchman 2000).

At the level of research praxis, genealogy is certainly more inductive than deductive. While it uses concepts as heuristics, it never isolates variables for the purpose of deriving of penultimate causes, or ascribing universal meaning to a political event. For the genealogist, there is always an assumption of ‘rarity’ relative to the operation of government (see Veyne 1997). Working with this methodological assumption, the task of the genealogist becomes one of tracing a multitude of messy empirical lines that connect the past to the present:

47 In addition to the writings of Foucault, the following authors have proven indispensable in helping me understand the contours of the genealogical style (Bevir 2010; Brown 2001; Colwell 1997; Dean 2003; Deleuze 1988; Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983; Hacking 2002; Veyne 1997; Walters 2012)
Genealogy is thus a crooked rather than straight method. It starts from a problematization of present truths to assemble different and incomplete paths: lines of descent, lineages, trajectories of discourse, practices, events without determinative beginning or necessary end…it discovers and names singular events…and decomposes them into their constitutive elements formed through multiple processes (Dean 2003: 181).

Genealogy is also a deliberately provocative style of inquiry in the sense it disorders the tidy narratives we hold about the world. It is written against progressive and evolutionary histories – instead concentrating on the ‘events’ and ‘assemblages’ that demonstrates clearly how no politics is ever permanent, but at best a provisional stabilization. The genealogist is also naturally curious; seeking out novelty, difference and emergent hybrid forms – all the while never imputing artificial consistency on the ‘entangled and confused parchment’ of history (Foucault 1977: 139).

Because genealogy strives to elucidate conditions of emergence rather than establish causes, it utilizes methods that are ‘patiently documentary’ and that strive to ‘record the singularity of events outside the any monotonous finality’ (139). The genealogist will mobilize all manner of evidence: archives, government documents, speeches, memoirs, interviews, ‘minor’ histories, and so on. It is an eclectic and exhaustive methodological style that advocates its practitioners ‘read absolutely everything, ignore nothing that might reveal the lines that connect your object of study with every other thought or practice of its time’ (Brass 2000: 312).

The actor-network approach has a similar disposition to conducting social science research (see especially Law 1994; Latour 1986; 2005). As Latour argues, empirical research should be ‘be as slow as the multiplicity of objections and objects it has to

48 Colwell (1997) conveys a similar sentiment in stating that genealogy ‘counter-actualizes events, returns to the virtual structure of events, in order to re-actualize them in another manner’ (2). Here we can see how genealogy is deliberately written against ‘grand theory’.
register in its path’ (Latour 2005: 121). To the best of my abilities I have tried to incorporate this exhaustive and eclectic methodological style into this study. This means I have tried to honestly follow the history and politics of agro-food power where it has led me: into its policing regimes, peasant brutalities, rationing programs, caloric maps, bureaucratic reports, and numerous market interventions.

Genealogies have been written on a range of social problems, political spaces and intellectual concepts (see Dean 1994; Walters 2012). How might this one be classified? Perhaps it fits a category identified by Bevir (2010) that includes genealogies written on ‘public policies and their effects’ (2010: 424). There is certainly some resonance here. But I also imagine this study to be about more than a single policy. For example, I will often use a specific program or mechanism of the CAP as a window for understanding politics more generally. The CAP is thus approached as a site of ‘analytic decomposition’ where we can view the intersections of the food supply with the exercise of political power (Dean 1994).

The dissertation does not represent typical ‘CAP studies’ because it lacks the requisite obsession with internal policymaking machinations and institutional deliberations that tends to preoccupy this literature. My project does not conduct an insular reading of agricultural policy but, rather, is interested in making visible how such policies have forged indivisible links with projects around governing populations (including farmers as a specific group within the population). In short, this dissertation is an attempt to ‘center’ Europe’s agrarian spaces in stories about its political modernity.49

49 In attempting to situate a contemporary space of European government in a longer field of historical rupture, I have taken some guidance from Loriaux’s (2008) masterful study on European Union and the
Two additional methodological points should be addressed before moving on from this section. The first concerns the role of ‘institutions’ in a genealogical inquiry. Organizations such as the OEEC, EC and EU have a prominent place in this study. At the same time, this is not an institution-centric analysis. This is because institutions will be approached as laboratories, incubators and conduits of government, but never their cause or site of genesis. In this study, for example, institutions are not seen to have independence from the knowledges, experts and narratives upon which they intimately depend, and through which their ‘realness’ as an institution is ultimately constituted. As Foucault (2007) argues, political struggles and governing are not of the institution but rather ‘find their theater in the institution’ (120) Foucault is pointing out that while institutions give us a useful locale for isolating political relations, they should not center our political analysis.

The second point of clarification concerns ‘agricultural policy’. Agricultural policies, quite naturally, have a prominent place in this study. After all, they have

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*Deconstruction of the Rhineland Frontier* Loriaux provides a convincing narrative on European political modernity from the perspective of its industrial and trading corridor along the Rhine. He points to how a capitalist, cosmopolitan, and liberal ethos first emerges from within this space (running, in contemporary terms, from Northern Italy to the Low Countries). But Loriaux also discusses how the trajectory arises before, and will be violently eclipsed by, a politics of statemaking and nationalism that parcels out and ‘borders’ this territory. The relatively unobstructed flow of ideas and commerce had thus become ‘delimited by those frontiers [that] were unified and coherent’ (184). Belying the geopolitical and territorial significance of the Rhine across Europe’s history, Loriaux makes the provocative claim that postwar unification was about the ‘deconstruction’ and pacification of this crucial, and now industrialized, frontier in the name of a new ontology – ‘Europe’. The EC was thus a project of ‘re-presenting Europe as the place of a teleological union, wherein frontiers dissolve and energies are directed toward political and moral improvement. ‘Europe’ as ontology legitimates agreements that generate not merely international cooperation, a commonplace in postwar politics, but that deconstruct frontiers by creating a common policy space’ (299, emphasis his). My genealogy is obviously not concentrated on Europe’s industrial spaces, but rather its agrarian ones. But Loriaux’s style of historical inquiry is as equally relevant here. I thank William Walters clarifying this relationship to me.

50 For example, Chapter 3 examines the work of the OEEC on the problems of nutritional health and agricultural modernization. These interventions required the enrollment of new statistical, dietary, and farming knowledges into the subcommittees of the OEEC. But at the same time the OEEC did not create this expertise, but rather mobilized it for specific ends.
comprised the primary institutional and infrastructural matrixes through which food, farmers and rural society have been governed in Western Europe. At the same time, agricultural policy is only one political architecture through agrarian spaces have been organized and managed in Western Europe. The uniqueness of agricultural policy – which does not emerge until the latter half of the nineteenth century – will be in how it operates (using techniques of political economy) and who it targets (the entire population). The point here is that, its importance notwithstanding, agricultural policy has only been one way of diagramming the expression of agro-food power.

**Genealogy as Practice**

‘We need to substitute a philosophy of relation, then, for a philosophy of objects taken as an end or cause; and we need to grasp the problem at its center, by way of practice or discourse’
- Paul Veyne 1997: 162

Veyne’s passage prompts us to consider, at the level of methodological practice, how to conduct a genealogical study. He suggests that we first turn our analytical gaze towards relations, and away from fixed objects, and their static theoretical categories. Starting with the relation – ‘the problem at its center’ – we should then move backwards to decipher how these relations were put together in the first place. As an inductive and relational approach, genealogy starts from a very different angle compared to the rationalist, behavioral, and structural approaches that predominate across the social sciences. In such accounts, the ‘ends and causes’ are already given in advance, normally as part of a fairly rigid theoretical framework. In contrast, Veyne and other Foucaultians have us place relations and problems at the crux of the analysis, and explore how these are already embedded in configurations of thought and practice (see also Brown 2001; Dean 1994).
As stated earlier, this project is not a ‘total history’ on the development of food and agricultural policies.\(^{52}\) Rather, following in the genealogical style, it is about deconstructing different configurations of agro-food power, and elaborating on how each speaks to a particular way of imagining and practicing government. Genealogy, as a style of inquiry, will also encourage a certain historical and sociological sensitivity. For this reason, it does not utilize abstract or structural concepts, but encourages us to develop or adapt ‘critical concepts’ which make it possible to speak to our historical materials in novel ways (Dean 2003: 180). The critical or interrogative concepts that will ground this study are the focus of the remainder of this chapter.

**Problematizations**

‘Government is a problematizing activity: it poses the obligations of rulers in terms of the problems they seek to address…It is around these difficulties and failures that programs of government have been elaborated’

- Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller 1992: 81

Problematizations are those moments and situations when some aspect of government is ‘called into question’ (Dean 1999: 27). At an everyday level, we are all familiar with problematizations. They comprise those instances when a particular program, policy or act of political authorities has been deemed inefficient, wasteful, immoral, corrupt, or an outright failure. Foucault sees problematizations as covering that entire ‘domain of acts, practices and thoughts’ that ‘pose problems for politics’ (Foucault 1984/1997: 114). In many ways, government itself could be read as a progressive unfolding of problematizations, and the changes they produce. As experts, legislators, media, NGOs

\(^{52}\) This history has not yet been written. While there have been fairly exhaustive studies on the development of modern agricultural policy (see especially Federico 2005) – as well as on different agrarian systems since Antiquity (see especially Mazoyer & Roudart 2006) – but there have been no studies, to my knowledge, that weave together the two around the explicit themes of power or government.
(etc.) or other interlocutors begin to attack a particular policy or rationale of government in a public way, the initial groundwork has been laid to re-think and alter that space of government. This is the core importance of a problematization.

Problematizations, for this reason, provide a way to isolate key moments of politicization. This is because during moments of problematization existing strategies of government are abandoned, reconfigured, or retrenched. These are the moments when new programs are first conceived, and older ones manufactured into a site of reform: ‘During periods of problematization, governments [are] forced to either adapt their programs or launch justifications for what they [are] doing. It is at such times we often gain greatest insight into the mechanism of government and the means used to resist them’ (Legg 2005: 140).

Problematizations appear in many forms: bureaucratic publications, political speeches, newspaper articles, NGO reports, and in any array of visual forms – such as with charts and graphs that depict a social or political crisis in numerical terms. But whatever the textual or visual medium in which they appear, problematizations are linked through their intensive focus on the mismanagement, inefficiencies, contradictions and negative effects of existing programs of rule (see especially Rabinow 2003: 18-20). Rose and Miller (1992) provocatively claim ‘the history of government might well be written as a history of problematizations’; whereby various authorities ‘measured the real against the ideal and found in wanting’ (Rose & Miller 1992: 181). Looking across the history of agricultural governance, we will see that the intensity of its problematizations has been one of its defining, consistent, features.
There is always something exceptional about a problematization. This is because a problematization is produced at a specific time, within a specific context, and is articulated through specific modes of thought: ‘Problematizations are something relatively rare. They have particular dates and places, and occur at particular locales or within specific institutions or organizations’ (Dean 1999: 27). Problematizations are also quite obvious. The deliberate goal, after all, is to instigate a public debates or create a controversy.

This feature of a problematization – i.e. the way it aims to be public and provocative – also makes these useful guideposts in carrying out a genealogy. In a sense, a problematization selects cases for us because they automatically ‘gravitate towards the occasions of controversy and situations when the established ways of conducting affairs are called into question’ (Walters 2012: 57). It is when a problematization is identified that a series of diagnostic queries then opens up: How is this problem being imagined? What are the perceived effects of continuing the status quo? What new strategies might be required to rectify, reform or control this situation?

Assemblage

‘A topological analysis, by contrast, brings to light a heterogeneous space, constituted through multiple determinations, and not reducible to a give form of knowledge-power. It is better suited to analyzing the dynamic process through which existing elements, such as techniques, schemas of analysis, and material forms, are taken up and redeployed, and through which new combinations of elements are shaped’ - Stephen Collier 2009: 99.

The ‘assemblage’ has been mobilized by various authors to make the point that governing is a constant interplay of creative, destructive, and adaptive forces. As a heuristic, the assemblage disrupts our tendency to see political life as embodied in stable
and static forms, but rather encourages us to see the political field as composed of temporary, transient, and mutable configurations. The concept points to the fact that governing, in a variety of ways, is always be a heterogeneous affair.

At the material or empirical level, an assemblage includes all of those ‘relations between thinking and life’ that come together at particular times, that sediment in particular ways, and make it possible to govern (Rajchman 2000: 51; Rabinow 2003). An assemblage is about how regimes of political life are put together as ‘a constellation of singularities and traits deducted from the flow’, but then become ‘selected, organized, stratified – in such a way as to converge (consistency) artificially and naturally; an assemblage, in this sense, is a *veritable invention*’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 406, emphasis mine). An assemblage is thus both an original creation and a forgery; while always novel in its emergent form, it is nonetheless a product of rearranging existing elements towards new ends.

The concept is utilized in two ways throughout this project. First, assemblage allows us to locate and name specific configurations of agricultural governance that have achieved a degree of provisional stabilization and importance. This is to use assemblage as a noun; i.e. ‘an assemblage’ as a political reality or object of study. This dissertation, for example, examines governing assemblages based on the *securitization of the family farm* (Chapter 4), and the *ordoliberalization of CAP political economy* (Chapter 5). Used in this way, the concept clearly helps divide cases based on how various elements coalesce around a specific problem. But, I would argue, it also allows the concept to
function as a comparative tool.\textsuperscript{53} Once multiple assemblages have been identified, fruitful contrasts can then be generated based on their different logics and practices.

Assemblage will also be used as a verb; i.e. ‘to assemble’. This usage points us to the fact that governing always involves processes of active construction. How have a heterogeneity of elements been brought together, in a certain time and space, to make possible the exercise of political rule? Here the ‘assemblage’ appears as a dynamic configurative bricolage (Dean 1999: 29). To view assemblage-as-verb also pushes us towards what Collier (2009) describes as ‘a topological analysis’ – a form of methodological inquiry he finds in Foucault’s lectures on governmentality (2007; 2008). In a topological analysis approach, argues Collier, emphasis is placed on the ‘broad configurational principles through which new formations of government are assembled, without implying that they arise from some inner necessity or coherence’ (80).\textsuperscript{54}

My project examines a number of agro-food assemblages at the state level. These are organized around the problems such as policing the bread supply, rationing foodstuffs, and ‘protecting’ national agrarian economies. This dissertation also makes occasional references to global agro-food assemblages, as we have already seen with the FAO. Nonetheless, the bulk of analysis is spent on analyzing assemblages that have been organized as European ‘fields of action’ (Jones & Clark 2010). The dissertation looks at

\textsuperscript{53} Political comparison is more common with structural and institutional approaches than political sociological ones. There is no necessary reason for this (Holton 2003). The real difference should appear around what is being compared. For example, governmentality approaches would be more likely to compare, in a non-determinist way, configurations of knowledge, practice and political economy (Bevir 2010; McNamara 2010).

\textsuperscript{54} This lack of completeness or telos in an assemblage is one reason pointed to by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) for not seeing the idea as representing something completely historical or novel, but rather as something always in the making.
four different assemblages of European agro-food government, cobbled together around a range of problem-spaces.

*Strategies*

‘…government continually seeks to give itself a form of truth – establish a kind of ethical basis for its action…’
- Nikolas Rose 1999: 27

A ‘strategy’ captures the plan for action, the organizing rationale, embedded at the core of any governing assemblage. To paraphrase Gordon (1991), a strategy includes all of the ways a problem (regime) is made ‘thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it was practiced’ (3). In a sense, a strategy amounts to a plan for combating a problematization. It results from a process in which a collection of ideas, beliefs, ethical dispositions, discourses and knowledges are aggregated together around a problem, and then *translated* into a basis for coherent political action. A strategy should be seen to include not only the final blueprint for action but, additionally, all the forms of political thought that went into its making.

Strategies, though, are not are not created *ex novo*. They are not pulled from the political ether, but are themselves a composite. In particular, a strategy is constructed from three elements: mentalities, expertise (knowledge), and objects.

A strategy always has a relationship to a ‘mentality’. A mentality is a ‘macro’ way of imagining and organizing political life. Its assumptions are broader and more normalized than a strategy – they are ‘explicit and embedded in language and other

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55 Rose reminds us that governing does not occur on a ‘pre-existing thought world with its natural divisions’ (1999: 31). Rather, ‘to govern is to cut experience in certain ways…It is also a matter of space, of the making up of governable spaces’. Strategies have certainly been important factors in carving out the modern spaces of government.
technical instruments…relatively taken for granted, i.e. it is not usually open to questioning by its practitioners’ (Dean 2010: 25). Mentalities are also more conceptually elastic than strategies – fairly broad mental maps that can be used to justify and give meaning to a range of discourses and practices. Mentalities of importance to this project include those of sovereign right, national development, social modernization, welfarism, policy reform, and neoliberal marketization.\(^{56}\)

A strategy is also necessarily and intimately dependent on regimes of expertise/knowledge. Here we must consider the fact that in order to govern risks spread out over an entire populations, political authorities need to be able to isolate, identity and know these risks (Elden 2007). This is true whether we are talking about risks to economic growth, social morality, public order and so on. The role of experts is to provide the scientific pedagogies, assessments, classificatorial schema and other instruments of visibility that make it possible to ‘understand’ a problem, and thus to govern it. Rose and Miller (1992) draw attention to the particular importance of expertise within forms of liberal government that aim to avoid the use of abject forms of control, domination or repression:

‘Expertise emerges as a possible solution that confronted liberal mentalities of government. How might one reconcile the principle that the domain of the political must be restricted, with the recognition of the vital political implications of formally private activities? The complex of actors, powers, institutions, and bodies of knowledge that that comprise expertise have come to play a crucial role in establishing the possibility and legitimacy of government. Experts hold out the hope that problems of regulation can remove themselves from the disputed terrain of politics and relocate onto the tranquil yet seductive territory of truth’

\(^{56}\) It would be tempting to imagine that there is a relationship of reducibility between a strategy and mentality. I do not envision it this way. A mentality does not explain or over-determine a strategy simply because it possesses a broader imaginary. After all, it is only a collection of strategies that give a tangible or material face to a mentality. For this reason, it would be more reasonable to talk in terms of a co-constitutive or recursive relationship between strategy and mentality.
Echoing an earlier point, organizations rarely generate this expertise, but instead specialize in enrolling it into their own programs and apparatuses (Bevir 2010; Brass 2000). In terms of agricultural governance, this expertise has emerged from think-tanks, universities, professional associations and NGOs. The important thing to consider is that, once enrolled, this expertise subsequently becomes the basis for creating new programs, and/or reforming existing ones. This dissertation will examine a variety of expert regimes that have constituted the *epistemic terrain* for thinking about and engineering agricultural governance.

Finally, there is no political strategy outside something to be governed. Here we are talking about the objects and subjects of government – a topic on which many ‘minor’ histories might still be written (Rose 1999: 41). The important point being stressed by Rose, Hacking, Veyne and others on this point is that governing always act on things, and in the name of things. Quite often, these things are usually categories or sub-categories of the population. Moreover, as Veyne points out, it are specific practices that go into producing and ‘objectivizing’ them in the political mind:

‘For the governed is neither a unity nor a multiplicity…for the simple reason that there is no such thing as ‘the governed’. There are only multiple objectivizations (“population,” “fauna,” “subjects under law”), correlatives of heterogeneous practices. There are numerous objectivizations, and that is all…*What is made*, the object, is explained by what went into its making at each moment of history’ (Veyne 1997: 161).

Objectivizations of government are thus contingent effects – ‘forms’ of the population produced and manufactured in specific ways. As will become evident, the food supply
has been imagined and made visible around a number of objectivizations that include peasants, crowds, nations, populations, rural society, and tax-paying citizenries.

Mechanisms

‘Practice is not some mysterious agency, some substratum of history, some hidden engine; it is what people do (the word says just what it means)’ (Veyne, 1997: 153)

As discussed earlier, a central goal of my dissertation is to explore the political practices which have made it possible to govern the production and supply of food. As Veyne pithily states, practice is simply what people do. It is not a ‘mysterious agency’ or ‘substratum of history’ (Veyne 1997: 153). Following this logic, practices of government can be understood as the actions taken by political authorities in managing their territories or populations. As Dean (2010) argues, the governmentality approach is centered on elucidating the ‘regimes of practice’ through which we are governed (Dean, 2010: 40).

I use the term ‘mechanisms’ to refer to a constellation of practices that coalesce around the governing of a particular problem. Mechanisms thus embody the ways practice is coordinated and systematized towards a particular end. For example, Chapter Four explores how the individual practices of price-setting, frontier protection and export refunding collectively constituted the CMO mechanism that was the original basis for CAP economic government. The point is that single practices alone do not make it possible to govern entire populations. For this, a collection of practices must be refined, coordinated and systematized.

The CMO case brings to light two additional features about a mechanism worth keeping in mind. The first concerns the fact that mechanisms are often composed of quite
mundane or routine administrative practices. Liberal government is particularly dependent on governing through indirect mechanisms because they do not ‘shatter the formally autonomous character’ of the individual (Rose and Miller 2008: 39). A common joke about the complexity of the CMO stated that only a handful of people understood how the system actually worked. But no matter how obscure or arcane its technical-economic infrastructure may have appeared, it provided the technical underpinnings of an expansive rural welfare state. As Grant (2010) has astutely noted, there is no CAP outside the array of policy instruments it has used to manage farmers and rural economies over time.

Second, the CMO case also illustrates the particular importance of mechanisms of economic government as the basis of agricultural policy. Governing mechanisms, of course, come in a range of forms or types, and carry out a diversity of functions. Nonetheless, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, agro-food power has been most often exercised as a form of economic government, working through markets, prices and the regulation of trade.

57 In this last category, for example, this dissertation looks at how *mechanisms of political inscription* have been central to the expression of agro-food power. Mechanisms of inscription include those ‘discursive mechanisms that represent the domain to be governed as an intelligible field with specifiable limits and particular characteristics, and whose component parts are linked together in some more or less systematic manner’ (Rose 1999: 33). Walters (2002), particularly, has argued that inscription has played an important role for instantiating European government because it has provided ‘the humble and mundane technical procedures through which Europe… is constituted as a knowable and regulatable space’. At the level of materiality, inscriptive practices are all those that ‘make distant events and processes visible, mobile and calculable in terms of documents, charts, forms, reports, signs and graphs’ (84). In this dissertation, an important inscriptive technology that will be explored are the ‘food balance sheets’ used by the OEEC (Chapter 3). These technologies of visibility gave postwar hunger a numerical face, making it possible to imagine the food supply as an object of regulation.
Conclusion

Nietzsche said that naïve historians are those who measure past deeds by the opinions and controversies of the present. They make every important past event fit ‘the triviality of their time’ (Nietzsche 1874/1980: 34). This is precisely the type of presentism I aim to avoid in my genealogy of agro-food power. An important analytical benefit of viewing history in terms of discontinuity and rupture is that it encourages us to assess every historical configuration on its own terms; relative to the contexts, narratives and practices that informed it. For my project, this involves making visible the fluid relations between political authorities, the food supply and governing of populations.

Together the Introduction and Chapter One have now canvassed the histories, problems, and concepts maps that will orient the following study. Chapter Two now moves the reader backward in time and inquires about historical emergences. How was state formation predicated on control of the food supply? Under what conditions did the food supply emerge as a site of securitization in the nation-state? How did the two World Wars intensify the state’s control of the food supply, while simultaneously making possible its eventual pacification, de-nationalization, and emergence as a regional space of government?
Chapter Two

From Extractions to Rations: Situating the Emergence of Securitized Agriculture

‘The key agricultural problem was how to get grain to the classes that ate bread but did not grow wheat’
- Barrington Moore, 1966

‘I therefore drink with you to the fertile union of agriculture and industry, to their fraternal equality, to the permanence of this happy accord’
- Marc de Haut, leading member of Société des agriculteurs, 1888

‘It is a battle for food, a battle for the basis of life, for the raw materials the earth offers, the natural resources that lie under the soil and the fruits that it offers’
- Adolf Hitler’s rationale for Lebensraum, 1942

Introduction

This chapter explores the complex relations between agriculture, the state and political authority. First, it demonstrates how the control of the food supply was a ‘monopoly mechanism’ which made possible state formation. Second, it elucidate the conditions under which modern ‘agricultural policies’ were created as apparatuses for securing the needs of populations (farmers and citizens alike). Lastly, the chapter examines how national agricultural policies were intensified during the course of the World Wars. Ultimately, the chapter demonstrates that the food supply has always been an important dimension of ‘state power’. Lastly, providing such a history will help illuminate what is novel and exceptional abut the Europeanization of agro-food power after the Second World War.

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1 Cited in Golob (1968: 161).
2 Cited in Collingham (2011: 30).
Sovereignty vs. Security in the Spaces of the Agrarian

The arguments in this chapter are predicated on the distinction between ‘sovereignty’ and ‘security’ as diagrams of political power (Foucault 2003; 2007; see also Elden 2007; Valverde 2007). Sovereign power is predicated on managing the relations between bodies, resources, and treating these as a source of immanent wealth and military advantage for the ruling classes. Within this mentality of rule, the proper ‘householding’ of these relationships is key to ensuring the ‘strength, greatness, and well-being’ of the state (Dean 1999: 86).

Sovereign power under the royal regimes of absolutist Europe included governing ‘subjects’ within a hierarchical organization of the polity that included the privileged estates – nobles, clerics, burghers – as well as that mass of humanity, the peasantry, which provided its foundation. The ultimate authority was always the monarch. Informed by the pedagogies of Cameralism, the sovereign imagined ‘himself as the manager of a large-scale household’ (Tribe 1988: 27). In this nascent configuration of centralized power, the administrators and agents of the royal state were made responsible for ensuring a prosperous, well-ordered and obedient policy that governed according to these principles of subordination and inequality. Sovereign power, as it circulated through the spaces of absolutism, ultimately codified relations between unequal subjects and spaces; including those between peasant-lord, and countryside-city (see also Foucault 2003).

As the father of the political household, the chief problem of the political sovereign was to establish control and maintain order (Hindess 1996; Poggi 1978). Not surprisingly, techniques of violence, intimidation and domination were crucial to keeping
subjects in line. For example, public spectacles of torture and killing were used to symbolize the awesome violence of sovereign authority, and to deter criminals and subversives (Brown 2011; Foucault 1995). Furthermore, sovereign power generally also draws upon coercive practices as a means to carry out functional tasks such as levying taxes, conscripting soldiers, or requisitioning food. Force has now become tangled with territorial administration.

Security, in contrast, is not based on logics of control, hierarchy and exploitation (Foucault 2007; see also Rose 1999). It has a different telos. Whereas sovereign power aims to configure men and things across a territory in ways that reproduce the authority and wealth of the ruling classes – which is synonymous with the ‘state interest’ – security is about preserving and improving the prosperity and health of the population (the new embodiment of the state interest). Security is thus the point at which the needs, aspirations and potential of populations begins to determine the flow of political power through the state.

Security is about knowing and governing populations in ‘positive’ ways. In practical terms, as Valverde (2007) has noted, the logic has manifested in a set of governing mechanisms predicated on the ‘future-oriented management of risks’ across populations (Valverde 2007: 172). Moreover, security does not seek to construct the spaces in which it governs – a feature endemic to absolutist rule – but rather seeks to manage collectivities in the conditions in which they already live and labour. That is, it targets already existing socioeconomic realities and human milieus. This is why Foucault (2007) talks about logics of security as being based in viewing the population as a ‘thick natural phenomenon’ rather than as a product of the ‘sovereign’s legalistic voluntarism’
Managing the population in their ‘natural condition’ will also require new forms of government which operate over the entire population, as we encounter with forms of biopolitical regulation and political economy (see also Fassin 2009; Terranova 2009).

Utilizing this distinction between sovereignty and security just outlined, this chapter begins our ‘strategic reading’ on the relationship between states, populations and agriculture. The initial goal of this chapter is to demonstrate how agro-food power was first organized around the problems of state formation. Following this the chapter explores the political rupture through which agriculture comes to be constituted as a ‘space of security’ in the European state over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

**State Formation and Food Supply**

To excavate the relations between agriculture and state formation we must first look to the workings of absolutist Europe – a roughly three hundred year period spanning the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries during which the process of statemaking was carried out (Anderson 1974; Poggi 1978). This was also the era when ‘the problem of the monarch and monarchy’ was posed most forcefully’ (Foucault 2003: 34). The two processes were related in the sense it was royal power that ultimately ‘made states’. But in order to do this monarchs – through a corpus of financiers, soldiers and administrators – had to first centralize a new set of functions and powers.

The most decisive practice/functions of early states – the ones that gave them statehood in the Weberian sense – are described by Elias (1994) as ‘monopoly mechanisms’ (345-46). These included apparatuses for deploying violence, ordering social complexity, waging war and coordinating specialized functions across the territory
(see also Anderson 1974; Giddens 1985; Poggi 1978; Tilly 1990). Most of these functions were are developed or co-opted from other authorities, such as from bishoprics or city-states. In any event, over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the mechanisms were intensified and standardized in hands of monarchical administrators.

Tilly (1975) convincingly argues that centralizing control over the food supply was also a monopoly mechanism in a similar way as the others. In short, it was as equally foundational in consolidating sovereign power. Standing armies had to be fed (Lynn 1993; Tilly 1975). Bread and flour markets had to be properly regulated in order to ensure political order (Foucault 2007; Kaplan 1984; L. Tilly 1971). Furthermore, ‘taxation’ at this point was essentially an agrarian power, as these extractive systems were based on pulling wealth from the countryside and requisitioning food from the peasantry (Anderson 1974; Moore 1966). In short, whatever dimensions of state formation we might consider, the food supply comes into full view: ‘During that time, one of the principle activities of European political officials was control of the food supply’ (Tilly 1975: 395). For the rulers of newly centralized states, agriculture presented a multiplicity of problems and potentialities. While not free of its deficiencies, Tilly’s

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3 Related to this was a need to ‘de-militarize’ the landowning nobility (Elias 1994: 340-50). The dualistic power structure of the ‘Ständestaat’ – a liminal state between feudalism and absolutism in which nobles and royals ‘shared’ centralized authority (Poggi 1978) – had become an obstacle to realizing ‘absolute’ sovereignty. Monarchs would thus undertake a successful campaign to coerce, bribe, or otherwise enroll the high nobility. Despite its tactical losses, and continued resentments, the nobility often staffed these new royal administrations, and continued to maintain order in the countryside. The key change, therefore, was not the lessened importance of the nobility, but how this former warrior-caste was civilized into a social form that would work with, rather than violently against, the apparatuses of the absolutist state. (Anderson 1974: 48-9; Elias 1994: 381-4; Moore 1966: 417; Poggi 1978: 68-71).

4 He often exaggerates the extent to which royal authorities were able to control the landowning nobility. He also accords far too much significance to the effects of ‘national markets’ in a period when none really existed. In terms of agrarian trade, it were regional markets and specific urban supply networks that mattered most.
article remains a landmark study on how the countryside provided the ‘raw materials’ for state formation.

Before elaborating on this further, a few notes on ‘the peasant’ within the absolutist imaginary must be discussed. The peasantry comprised that mass of subjugated bodies and alienated labor at the very bottom of the hierarchical distribution of absolutist power. But moreover, as we will see, this subjected-mass also provided the ‘groundwork’ (i.e. the material edifice) that would make possible the new material reality of states

*Imagining the Peasant within Absolutism*

Absolutism mapped entitlement, privilege and exclusion throughout the social body. The food chain was no different. Forming the vast majority of the population in preindustrial Europe, we must first consider the peasantry. The peasantry was the most ‘dominated’ group within absolutism. Domination implies a specific asymmetrical power-relation in which the subordinate has very little room for maneuver *vis-a-vie* political authority. This was the condition of the peasantry, enmeshed, as they universally were, in a ‘stable and hierarchal’ power configuration in which the nobility and state authorities comprised their legal superiors and economic overlords (Hindess 1996: 97-103).

The peasantry had no formal political or representational standing. Generally exploited in their labor, they were often subject to arbitrary violence. At the same time, this is not too imply peasants were ‘powerless’. If power is understood not as a

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5 Hugget (1975) notes around 70% of the working population of Western Europe worked in agriculture in the mid-sixteenth century (9). Braudel’s (1982) less conservative estimate is that ‘between 80% and 90% of people in preindustrial Europe lived from the land and nothing else’ (49).

6 Still during the Second Empire in France, peasants were referred to as troglodytes, clodhoppers, and bumpkins (Weber 1978: 7).
possession, but rather as comprising a chain that involves all the actors of a given network (Foucault 1976/1980), then peasants were certainly ‘powerful’. That is, they provided the laboring bodies and grain that made possible the concentration of wealth and the realization of territorial order associated with the absolutist period. The peasantry did not lack ‘power’ in the Foucaultian sense. What they lacked was social status, legal rights and a little capital.

Absolutism did not present a ‘collective’ rendering of the governed, but rather viewed the latter as a fragmented and asymmetrical space of relationships ‘between subjects’ (Foucault 2003: 43). After all, the ‘moral purpose’ of the Absolutist State was to preserve the ‘divinely ordered, rigidly hierarchical social order’ and fuse it with centralized forms of rule (Rues-Smit 1999: 94). All of this meant that subjects would be governed relative to their ‘estate’ or position within natural law. The notion of ‘equality under the law’ was simply unimaginable. The nobility, burghers, and clergy, were governed through an economy of rights, privileges and obligations. The rural peasantry, however, was subject to configurations of force, obedience and extraction.

Violence against the peasantry was one way royal authority established the ‘truth’ of sovereign law. Resistance among lower orders had to be met with force because ‘disobedience was an act of hostility, the first sign of rebellion’ (Foucault 1977/1995: 57). Absolutism was a world of two normative orders when involving the deployment of force. There were ‘those who could wield violence and those who could not, perpetrators and victims. The victims of violence comprised all the peasants who worked the land and who fed everyone else’ (Brown 2011: 100). Peasants were also often pawns in aristocratic struggles. It was not uncommon for the landed nobility to punish each other
via proxy by wasting the fields and villages of their enemy’s peasantry (126). In short, the norms established around the use of violence did not protect the peasantry, but rather encouraged their physical vulnerability.

In terms of socioeconomic relations, the Western European peasantry was not a monolith but comprised a patchwork of arrangements: tenant farmers, sharecroppers, enserfed labourers, ‘free’ landholding peasants, and casual labourers paid in-kind (Clapham 1968; Clark 2006; Jones 1988; Moore 1966). But no matter the particular economic assemblage in which they were located, all peasants shared a universal place in the ‘natural’ order of things: at the bottom. In this pyramidal distribution of power, the monarch was at the top. He was a divinely ordained ruler with untrammeled authority. In the middle of the pyramid were those various estates – nobility, clergy, and burghers. Invert the pyramid and the peasant masses come into full view. Outside of the rouges and criminals who violated the King’s law, peasants comprised the universally lowest order.

This universal ‘peasant effect’ of domination and subjugation was a product of feudal machineries that persisted, and sometimes were intensified, under absolutism. It is important to note that royal monarchies did not dismantle all of the privileges and rights they ‘shared’ with the landowning aristocracy during late medievalism. Rather, the most

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7 The nobility had a blanket right ‘to command and exploit the working mass’ (Duby 1972: 202). Moreover, in practice, the difference between ‘free’ and ‘bonded’ peasants meant very little. There were a set of ‘everyday obligations’ – such as tithing and working the lords demense – that ‘applied to everyone, free or not’ (Mazoyer & Roudart 2006: 292).

8 It is interesting to note the West European peasantry did have a brief socio-economic resurgence in the aftermath of the black death of the fourteenth century. The plague generally killed off between 25% and 80% of the population in afflicted areas (Fagan 2000: 82; Mazoyer & Roudart 2006: 305). The upshot for survivors was an easing in demand for land and an increase in the demand for labor. These circumstances forced the nobility to ease dues and other obligations because peasants could now take jobs in towns, or simply occupy abandoned farms (Duby 1972: 214-5). This relative freedom and prosperity ended with the re-population of Europe during the sixteenth century; at which point dearth, famine, rising rents and plot divisioning accompany new demographic pressures.
productive of such relations were enrolled within the new state apparatuses, at the same
time their military significance was eliminated (Poggi 1978: 66, 76). This hybrid
constitution is what leads Anderson (1974) to call absolutism ‘a redeployed and
recharged of apparatuses of feudal domination, designed to clamp the peasant masses
back into their traditional social position’ (Anderson 1974: 18).

Moore, likewise, argues that at the core of these ‘agrarian bureaucracies’ (a telling
phrase to describe early states!) was the extraction of agricultural surpluses – the oldest
mode of capital accumulation in Western Europe (Wolf 1982). But as redeployed and
recharged apparatuses, feudal machineries had to be made to work with the political
centralizing logics of absolutism. The problem was how to graft an economic system
based on noble autonomy – the longstanding seigniorial system – onto a nascent state
apparatus founded to abolish, restrict, or co-opt many of these same freedoms.

Thus, under absolutism, feudal relations persisted because they were useful. From
the perspective of the state authorities, the pacified nobility was a conduit for ‘drawing
in’ the wealth of the countryside and relaying it to the center. Ironically, it was the
persistence of feudal economies thus helped realize sovereignty as a unitary, abstract and
immanently potential force (Poggi 1978: 74). This was made possible through the
creation of mechanisms that would ‘eat into the wealth and power of the nobles’. In this
context, the latter had no choice but to cooperate with the increasingly powerful
statemakers (Foucault 2003: 132; see also Poggi 1978: 67). There was a clear benefit for

9 Feudal economies were generated amongst the patchwork of parcelized, layered, authority across
medieval Europe (Ruggie 1998). It is hard to overstate the difference between this and the geography of
modern politics, which based on precise borders, clearly demarcated space, and undifferentiated authority
(Agnew 1998). As Murphy (2005) argues, the modern spatialization of power ‘would have been
fundamentally at odds with a medieval political-social order characterized by multiple, overlapping
territorial arrangements and loyalties’ (82).
royal authorities in governing *through* pre-existing feudal machineries. It allowed the state to channel the ‘wealth-effects’ of peasant production into state coffers while, for the most part, leaving undisturbed the content of these relations at the local level.\(^{10}\)

Peasants provided the labour-power for the mode of accumulation that drove both feudalism and absolutism. But at the same time, they were perceived as ‘baser’ form of human life – the ‘internal savage’. La Bruyère noted of the peasantry of the *ancien régime*: ‘a species of wild beast scarcely recognizable as human, surviving on black bread, roots, and water so that other men could be spared the toil to feed themselves’ (cited in Grantham 1989: 187). His irony was intentional. These ‘beasts’ provided the material foundations for the flowering of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, and La Bruyère knew this. Nonetheless, until the nineteenth peasants were ‘objects of rule’ whole daily toils and deprivations concerned political authorities very little. Similar to the grains they produced and the taxes they paid, peasants were a *resource*; an object to be exploited, alienated and abused as necessary.

**Extracting & Policing**

Let us refer back to the Barrington Moore epigraph. Here Moore is discussing the political primacy of feeding cities in preindustrial Europe. The care shown for the sustenance of those who lived in cities was very different from the indifference shown to the food needs of those residing in the countryside (the peasants). The aim of the next

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\(^{10}\) The persistence of feudal relations in the countryside also meant that all manner of peasant ‘obligations’ were continued. This included tithing the lord, making in-kind payments, working the lord’s demense, providing occasional military service, and paying fees for the provision of justice (Duby 1972; Mazoyer & Roudart 2006: 291-2). Peasants were also taxed for using the mill, bakery and presses of the lord. In exchange, the seignior provided small plants for peasant cultivation; allowed the use of common land; and gave protection to peasants from other lords and assorted marauders.
few sections is to demonstrate how this differential governance played out at the practical and organizational level. This will be done by juxtaposing the strategies of extraction and policing, elucidating the starkly different ways peasants and crowds came under the purview of state authorities.

‘Taxation’ and Peasants

‘Taxation’ under absolutism should not be confused with the progressive and rationalized regimes of contemporary states. Modern taxation is based on the premise that some percentage of both accumulated and earned wealth must be re-circulated in order to ensure economic growth and stability. Keynesians would also add that the tax code should be used to stimulate economic demand, and ensure full employment. In any event, modern taxation is about redistributing wealth in the name of social cohesion, economic growth and capitalizing the public good. It is the primary conduit through which we have funded the warfare and welfare machines of the modern state (Neocleous 2008).

By way of contrast, extraction is a form of ‘proto’ or ‘crypto’ taxation that aims to take or ‘pull’ wealth from the population as a way to increase ‘state forces’. These practices are used to field standing armies, pay administrators, fund imperial expeditions, and extol the splendor of royal courts. Extraction is that part of ‘householding’ the polity that involves expanding its revenue base. But where should the new finances come from? And how might they be collected?

One option would have been to tax the wealth of ‘nodal’ cities. This tax-base might have included the capital held by the burgers, artisans, financiers and others with ‘corporate’ status in the medieval urban economy. But the taxation of urban commerce
was rare because royal authorities mostly benefited from allowing bourgeoisie wealth to accumulate, as it was an important source of credit (Poggi 1978: 81).

Moreover, this strategy of facilitating urban commerce, while generally exploiting agriculture, was informed by Cameralist doctrine that viewed agrarian economies as essentially ‘static’. Agrarian life, it was argued, produced no additional wealth beyond what was already there, in the soil, with its predictable yields. On the flip side, mercantilists and oeconomist viewed manufacturing, trade and finance as ‘productive employments’ with a near infinite capacity for generating wealth (Foucault 1970: 179-80; Tribe 1978: 90-2).11 The view was based on the understanding that wealth grew in line with the intensity of circulation; more intense commerce therefore meant wealthier cities. Royal authorities, drawing upon such rationalities, generally accommodated the burghers and artisans with limited regulation, scant taxation, and the maintenance of longstanding corporatist privileges (see also Braudel 1982).

From this angle, the bifurcated economic imaginary of absolutism comes more into view. The countryside, in contrast to the city, was seen in terms of stagnating wealth and rudimentary circuits of exchange. To take or ‘extract’ from agricultural production would not hinder future financing for wars, negatively effect the intensity of commercial exchange, or disrupt the monarch’s relationship with an imperial merchant class (Tribe 1978: 87). For this reason, it would be the peasant masses that assumed the primary

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11 For Cameralists, wealth remained primarily a function of circulation; i.e. moving goods and capital, not producing them. In fact, the pivotal contribution of Adam Smith was to privilege production and labour in the generation of wealth (McNulty 1973; Tribe 1978).
burden of funding the Absolutist State (Anderson 1974: 96-7). This confirms Foucault’s claim that the peasants were the ‘foundations of the edifice, in the ground, under the ground, unseen but ensuring the solidity of the whole’ (13). Not completely dissimilar to role of slaves and indentured servants within colonial networks and spaces (see Wolf 1982), the battered Western European peasantry would subsidize and propel the same state violent state apparatuses that brought them only misery and subjugation: ‘wars and arming for wars demanded increased income…Oppressive, bloodsucking tribute was the order of the day’ (Wunderli 1992: 80).

*Tailles and Hide Taxes: State Wealth and the European Peasant*

Now let us examine a few of the extractive practices that made it possible for the peasantry to ensure – through its labor and social reproduction – the ‘solidity of the whole’. We begin this story in France with the first regularized and territory-wide tax: the *taille royal* instituted in 1439 (Andersen 1974: 32, 87). As it was further standardized and intensified over the seventeenth century, this tax became known simply as the *taille*.13

The *taille* was essentially a direct land tax on the landholding peasantry. Serfdom was never practiced widely in France. As a result, there were millions of smallholding peasants that each had eligible land to be taxed. Not surprisingly, as the oldest and most onerous tax in the *ancien régime*, a seigniorial exemption was built into the operation of the *taille* (Aftalion 1990: 12). In fact, it was an exemption to this particular tax that defined ‘noble heredity’ within the *ancien régime* (Anderson 1974: 87). In its operation, taxes were also applied to the urban poor, mainly through consumption taxes; such as on salt, sugar and ‘dwellings’. The salt tax, the most loathed of them all, was called the *gabelle* and provided up to 10% of total state revenue (Aftalion 1990: 14).

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12 Taxes were also applied to the urban poor, mainly through consumption taxes; such as on salt, sugar and ‘dwellings’. The salt tax, the most loathed of them all, was called the *gabelle* and provided up to 10% of total state revenue (Aftalion 1990: 14).

13 The root verb *tallage* means ‘to take part of the whole’.
the *taille* functioned as a type of centralized feudal rent in which peasant wealth was assessed and collected through the *intendant* system. It presented a fairly sophisticated way of enforcing tax-collection through geographic-administrative rationalization (Anderson 1974: 35; Aftalion 1990: 12-13).

If required, intendants could draw upon a ‘formidable apparatus of repression’ that included sending bailiffs and other (armed) state agents to collect dues at harvest or fair times (Jones 1988: 40). Combining extraction with coercion, the state was able to ‘batten mercilessly’ on the rural masses through a ‘centralized pumping’ of peasant surplus (Anderson 1974: 97; see also Jones 1988: 42-3). The *taille* hit the middling peasantry especially hard. These were ‘people too poor to rise through the purchase of an office but rich enough to pay a contribution’ (Aftalion 1990: 13). For example, due to the costs incurred in fighting the Thirty Years War led there was a tripling of the *taille* from 1630-1640. Moreover, this intensified financial burden fell predominantly on the peasantry (Anderson 1974: 98; Jones 1973: 219).

In addition to the *taille*, a highly centralized mechanism of extraction, the peasantry was still obligated to pay local feudal rents (or *terriers*) to their seignior annually (Anderson 1974: 35). On top of this, charges were also applied to the purchase or transfer of land, which was in addition to the punitive ‘harvest dues’ that were normally given over to the seigneur in the form of in-kind payments (Jones 1988: 44-5).\(^4\)

The Prussian case differed from the French one because it exhibited a noble class that was relatively autonomous in their role as tax-collecting agents of the state. Whereas

\(^4\) Unlike their British or Prussian counterparts, the French nobility were mostly absentee landlords. By the time of Louis XVI’s reign, the nobility had become a mostly parasitic class that lived off the rents and surpluses of their tenant farmers (Moore 1966: 53-5).
French administrators organized the intricate taille system from above, the Prussian ‘Junkers’ utilized indigenous extractive and repressive practices, and funneled the proceeds upwards toward the state. To reward Junker cooperation in raising revenue for a new standing army (the true basis of the Prussian state) the young Elector Fredrick William I reinstated serfdom. In other words, he re-legalized noble control over peasant mobility, land purchases, and labor (Anderson 1974: 240-1; Clark 2006: 160-4). In this case we encounter a fusion of ruling classes that makes possible a permanent source of state financing based the production of a peasantry – a people newly stripped of legal rights and ‘tied to the land’ in a labor-repressive agrarian system (Clark 2006: 85; Clapham 1968: 35-41). But it certainly was, in the end, an efficient system of revenue collection and militarization.15

In the Prussian system taxes were based on standardized classifications such as soil quality, plot size, and animal headage (the so-called ‘General Hide Tax’) (Clark 2006: 91). Because the Junkers were such reliable partners, Prussian state officials rarely even had to supervise the collection of taxes on manorial estates. The nobility regularly delivered its agreed upon 2/5 of peasant income without incidents or trouble (Anderson 1974: 264). Of course, it was also common practice for Junker overlords to inflate their own official wealth to minimize their tax-burdens. Here we encounter the reoccurring theme – peasant wealth was the actual target of the state’s extractive regimes:

‘But since the tax-collecting agencies of the administration were still largely in the hands of the corporate nobility, the authorities tended to turn a blind eye when landowners understated their taxable landholdings. The returns of peasant households by contrast were subject to the most pedantic scrutiny, so that not a

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15 Over the period 1640-1688, the Great Elector was able to raise enough revenue to maintain a permanent army of 30,000 troops; with an officer corps largely drawn from the Junker nobility (Anderson 1974: 244).
single hide was missed’ (Clark 2006: 90)

Despite its structural disadvantages relative to the Austrian, Bavarian and Saxonian monarchies, it was the ‘backwater’ Brandenburg House that was able to unify German lands under a single state apparatus. There were no doubt multiple reasons for this. But at the top of this list was certainly the efficient organization and execution of the financial repression of the peasantry. It made possible the formidable military apparatus upon which Prussian territorial consolidation was based. Whereas the French over-spent on imperial adventures and decadent royal courts, the Prussians were far more disciplined and tactical in using the revenue they collected, channeling it nearly exclusively toward war (Clark 2006: 86).\(^\text{16}\)

Moore (1966) argues that taming the agrarian sector was the first step in building modern society. No case provides better confirmation of this than the Prussian one. Here the smooth networking of peasant extraction and control at the noble/manorial level, combined with an effective military apparatus at the state level, propels the early unification of German states by one of the more unlikely candidates for doing so.

‘Country Buying’: Systematized and Extra-Legal Extractions from the Countryside

Not all extractions were monetized. The most abjectly exploitative came in the form of the outright appropriation of foodstuffs, and the secret night-time buying of peasant stocks during times of dearth. This occurred due the primacy political authorities gave to feeding cities, even when at the expense of famine in the countryside:

\(^{16}\) It should also be mentioned that the Junkers were also professionally vested in the Prussian army, they provided the bulk of its officer corps (Trebilcock 1981: 22-8).
‘The element of selfishness in the policy of large towns was important historically. They were interested in supplying the cities their own wants. They were not concerned with the necessities of the producing regions…In times of dearth, the large towns might secure supplies at the expense of the small towns and villages of producing regions’ (Usher 1913: 5)

In the ancien régime, ‘selfishness’ took the practice of covertly sending merchants into rural areas and having them purchase directly from manors or peasants. The technique was called ‘country buying’ (Usher 1913: 21-2). While technically illegal – grain trade regulations stipulated that all transactions had to occur in the marketplace, in full view of authorities – the practice was openly tolerated as a way to feed cities when supplies were low and prices were high. The consumer ‘pull’ of big cities, such as Paris and Lyon, was always the decisive factor (Moore 1966: 45). Country-buying had merchants and state purchasers scour the countryside in order to buy directly from peasants or chateaux granaries. They went anywhere in an ‘attempt to hunt out the whole supply’ (Usher 1913: 22; see also Moore 1966: 45). As Kaplan (1984) shows, the ‘supply crowns’ of eighteenth century Paris, where much of the country buying occurred, stretched from Auvergne in the south to Flandres in the North (90-91; 96-97).

As country buying became more regularized, its legality became subject to increased scrutiny by local officials. For example, an intendant from Poitiers (1709) demanded to know how an edict giving permission to export specified quantities of grain became a blanket right to purchase wholesale in the countryside, and completely subvert the police regulations that banned ‘off-market’ purchases. He rhetorically asks: ‘Does it (the edict) allow permit them to sell at wholesale to other merchants at Marans? Does it permit them to ship ten, twenty, thirty tons of grain…under the pretext of selling them at retail’ (cited in Usher 1913: 27). While there seems to have been occasional official
inquiries into the practice, country buying was generally tolerated in those moments it mattered most, periods of dearth. Ultimately, feeding restive crowds was the preeminent concern of political authorities. It comprised a politics of immediacy and necessity.

The effect of country buying on local markets was disastrous, and often fatal. Rural markets were sometimes left completely bare (Usher 1913: 21). A series of bad dearths led to a spate of country buying in France during the years 1693, 1699, and 1709. It decimated the countryside. A local administrator from Thouars recounts (in 1693) that merchants went ‘day and night through the country districts, with valets and other men, buying grain. They form extensive granaries and raise prices on the markets; so that the poor cannot get a bushel whatsoever’ (cited in Usher 1913: 25). The operations became so sophisticated that merchants began forecasting bread prices and buying with future profits in mind (27). Country buying was neither fair nor just from the perspective of most the peasantry. Using contemporary terminology, we might say it resembled a merchant-based economic cartel – and one fairly invisible to police. There were no regulations governing this covert trade that moved thousands of tons of grain from the countryside to cities in times of dearth (Usher 1913: 39, 42).

There would eventually become such a de-facto toleration of these illegal practices that blatiers17 quit lying about the practice in their official logbooks (40-2). Accused, one blatier simply stated: ‘This…is the practice of most Parisian merchants’ (cited in Usher 1913: 41-2). The monarchy certainly did not view these extra-legal practices as needing to be stopped. Rather, it were the local and regional officials –

17 Grain agents who sampled and purchased in the countryside. They did so on behalf of larger Parisian merchants, who tended to keep themselves completely from public view.
village magistrates, provincial *parlements* and sometimes *intendants* – that publicized the shadowy dealings and resisted the informal networks that were used to feed cities at the expense of small towns (see numerous examples in Kaplan 1976).

Ostensibly, the *ancien régime* was committed to the ‘social accountability’ of policing over the ‘selfishness’ of the market (Kaplan 1984: 25). But in the case of country buying, authorities were keen on using whatever means necessary to secure an unimpeded flow of grain into cities during dearth, whatever the human and economic cost in the countryside. Seen from the perspective of its *effects*, it was a form of violent domination over the peasantry. The practice might be one reason Meuvert describes seventeenth century cities as ‘parasites’ on the countryside (L. Tilly 1971: 36). Or perhaps country buying is also a perfect example of what Agamben (2005) notes to be the defining feature of sovereign power: the right to transgress internal law in the name of the ‘exception’.

A similarly abusive practice that operated outside (and alongside) the provisioning police involved bakers and merchants who arranged deliveries of flour at pre-specified prices outside of the marketplace (Kaplan 1984: 600). The agent who arranged and facilitated the transactions were the so-called ‘mealman’. Similar to the *blatiers*, the mealmen operated within the extra-legal or ‘grey’ spaces of the food supply and its circulation. Likewise, the work of the mealman was tolerated because what ultimately mattered most to political authorities was the supply of urban markets:

The supply flows into the town in anticipation of a metropolitan demand, and the anticipation is so keen that practically all available supply comes to market without any special canvassing…no pretence is made of controlling the trade from the point of view
of local inerests…There was no legal basis for the system…The practical efficiency of
the idea, however, commended it, and allowed it to survive’ (Usher 1913: 43).

Sovereign Power and Feeding Armies

Extractions also took non-economic forms. The most exploitive of these involved the
coercive requisitioning of peasant foodstuffs in order to feed standing armies. At this
juncture in the statemaking enterprise, the relationship between food supply and war is
defined by a need to sustain armies on the ‘march’. How might such victuals be obtained
from the countryside? This presented an important mutation in the history of wartime
mobilization because the state was now willing to take on the responsibility of feeding
thousands of hungry and armed young men.

Moreover, soldiers eat more when covering long distances on foot; that is, in their
movement to the theater of battle. Horses, when in transit, also eat a lot. All of this
presented a logistical challenge for a new state. Where was all the food and fodder to be
found? How would these men and horses be provisioned? In this preindustrial context,
war planners had essentially only two options. First, supplies could be brought on the
march. But unless the engagement was a small one, and the distance covered not very
great, this was a daunting prospect in an era before railroads, or reliable road networks.

The second option was to find a way to ‘live off the country’, or to forage (Lynn
1993). This is one of the oldest methods for feeding armies. It meant sending search
parties (or soldiers themselves) into the countryside to find food and fodder. An
improvement on this rather crude method was the étapes system, developed by the
French in the sixteenth century (Lynn 1993: 17-19). It involved setting up a number of
commissaries that provisioned soldiers at different points on the march. The commissaries would be constructed a few days before the arrival of a regimen. The étapes system thus ultimately amounted to a set of impromptu feeding sites positioned along common marching routes. The goal was to eliminate the problem of food shortages presenting a barrier to soldier mobility.

As the scope of warfare increased over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, storehouses and grain magazines emerged as the most streamlined methods for provisioning soldiers. Magazine systems had two important elements: fixed depots for holding grain/fodder and hundreds of ovens for baking bread. The system had many advantages compared to both foraging and the étapes method. Grain magazines were a particularly efficient way to feed horses because the animals would no longer have to burn energy foraging for their own food. Second, magazines ‘fixed’ military installations in the sense that supplies of grain, and the ovens for baking bread, now had a semi-permanent location (allowing for semi-permanent warfare). At war with the Spanish in 1675, the French constructed elaborate grain magazines in Maastricht and Liège, turning this formerly peaceable trading area into a site of violent conflict between incipient statemakers (see also Loriaux 2008).

Grain magazines increased the scope and frequency of preindustrial war because they made it possible, for example, to feed an army of 60,000 marching 100,000 miles over 10 days. Such a feat required milling of 600 tons of flour and baking 900,000 bread rations (Creveld 1977: 3). Without the convenience of railways, this required complex

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18 My understanding of grain magazines is based on a synthesis of the work of Clark (2005), Creveld (1977) and Lynn (1993).
logistical planning for storing, moving, milling, baking and distributing an immense amount of bread: ‘Stores of food gathered in magazines and shipped forward by convoy were consequently a fixture of late seventeenth century warfare. A shuttle system of magazines, bakeries and wagons was a recognized necessity of field warfare’ (Lynn 1993b: 140).

Sufficed to say, local residents were not fairly compensated (if at all) when their supplies were taken in forage, or requisitioned for a magazine system. In France, such requisitions exacerbated already severe dearths in 1693-94 and 1709 (Tilly 1975b: 411). In Burgundy, in 1709, peasants armed themselves to keep vital supplies from being moved to Lyon and Paris to feed soldiers (L. Tilly 1971: 52). The local priest recorded: ‘There was an open war with the peasants to get their grain’ (52). The use of ‘fortresses’ also became important for controlling the food supply under conditions in which both opposing armies and local populations could be enemy forces. First, a fortress was a fortified locale where food could be stored (i.e. protecting the grain magazines). Second, it was also tactical locale from which raids of the countryside could be based.

The magazine system was crucial to Prussian success in wartime. The Prussian food strategy was based on building up ‘stores and supply systems for a big standing army, and assuring the free movement of grain into those provinces where the army was concentrated’ (Tilly 1975b: 453). Operating the magazines constituted one of the most dimensions of state activity. The system was originally devised under the Great Elector in the seventeenth century (Clark 2006: 92). The original and exclusive purpose was to feed the growing army. In the 1720s, Frederick William expanded the magazine system as a way to stabilize urban markets in Berlin, Wesel, Stettin and Minden (93). Due to its
success as a mechanism of military provisioning, the magazine system would be
subsequently turned to civilian purposes.19

Specifically urban (i.e. non-military) grain magazines worked by stockpiling
during periods of abundance and low price, and then releasing grain in times of shortage
and high price (sometimes public baking was also involved). In Prussia, the system
proved crucially important in 1771 and 1772 when the supplies held in magazines
prevented the spread of famine (Clark 2006: 213-4). Clark sees this as evidence the
system was predicated on the use of ‘massive subsidies’ to carry out a huge ‘exercise in
social welfare policy’ (214). While the magazines were certainly important for feeding
cities and other client groups, Clark’s ‘welfarist’ interpretation is a stretch. After all, the
people being fed were still a distinct minority of the total population, and each possessed
a direct link to the territorial power of the state.

Before concluding this section, it is important to note that the peasantry was not
simply a passive recipient of practices of domination. The relations between peasants and
the authorities governing them (both feudal and royal) was defined by a ‘reciprocal
interplay of illegalities’ (Foucault 1995: 85). A sovereign could punish with absolute
force, but peasants wielded their own forms of collective and tactical resistance. Consider
the ‘blockage’ (Tilly 1975b: 387). The blockage was predominantly a rural disturbance in
which a group of aggrieved villagers stopped food from leaving a given locality (386). It
was a way of resisting the practice of feeding soldiers and crowds before peasants. For
the latter, procuring food in this way was a clear violation of the (rural) moral economy

19 The Prussian case can be usefully contrasted with the French one. Outside the isolated instance of Lyon
and its Chambre de d’ Abondance – a public grain storehouse used to feed the poor (L. Tilly 1971: 35) – the
French relied nearly exclusively on policing mechanisms to feed crowds, while Prussia blended the two
provisioning mechanisms (magazines/policing).
principle that locals should be fed first, especially when the locals produced the food (Thompson 1971; L. Tilly 1971).

Blockages could often turn riotous when ‘wagons or barges loaded with grain were forcibly prevented from leaving a locality’ (L. Tilly 1971: 23; see also Price 1983: 147). Blocking practices were particularly common in the more productive rural areas where significant pull came from the military or cities (26). Sometimes it was simply the appearance of Parisian merchants or military suppliers that would set off an anxious peasantry. Given a lack of formal rights to protect their own food supply, the sentiment made sense: ‘The peasants and villagers had no means of protecting their interests except open violence…The comparative security of the town made the officials indifferent’ (Usher 1913: 98).

We have now examined the importance of peasant extraction in absolutist Europe. At the strategic level, extractions were about ‘pulling’ food and wealth from the countryside and using this to fuel state formation. Extractions did not target the ‘population’ as a collective, but instead operated through dividing the people into groups that were either givers (the peasants) or takers (crowds, armies and nobles). As we see further along, a collective objectivization of the governed within the spaces of the food supply only becomes possible with the emergence of a new configuration of state and industrial power.

Policing the Crowd’s Bread

We were introduced to the pre-industrial ‘crowd’ in Chapter One. Unlike the peasantry, the crowd was not viewed an amalgamation of bodies and resources to be utilized and
brutalized as required. The crowd, rather, was a social form to be ordered, pacified and ultimately appeased. They were governed in this way because their bread supply was the lynchpin of urban order, and their sustenance was the overriding precondition of maintaining a productive city. For this reason, sovereign-crowd relations would be constituted very differently than sovereign-peasant relations.

Having already discussed the politics of the crowd in Chapter One, the emphasis of this subsection is on the bread police as the mechanism that was used to govern urban sustenance networks. Policing was similar to extraction in the sense both were strategies born within a sovereign mentality of rule that viewed the food supply as a foundational space of state formation. But outside of this general feature, the two configurations are otherwise quite distinct. Logics of extraction embodied an inherently antagonistic relationship between the rulers and the ruled. Policing, however, demonstrated a heightened commitment to ensuring the sustenance and ‘happiness’ of the governed.

What is police? At its broadest level, it constituted a state science ‘focused on techniques and objects of administration’ (Tribe 1995: 18; see also Foucault 2007). Police was the science and practice of administering people in their various relations, notably in the dense confines of the city. As the internal face of Cameralism, police targeted ‘the general condition of order prevailing in the state’ (Tribe 1995: 11). At the level of practice, police was focused on organizing human complexity through exhaustive forms of prescription, regulation, and the disciplining of urban space(s) (Tribe 1995: 23-32).

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20 Tribe (1995) summarizes the relationship this way: ‘Cameralism assembles the objects which Polizei then orders for the good of the state and its subjects’ (20).
Policing was rationalized on the belief a wise regulation of the polity was positively correlated to a strong state (Tribe 1988: 30). Pasquino (1991) notes how police manifested in those programs where ‘the science of happiness’ conjoined with the ‘science of government’ (108). No element interconnected the two pedagogies more than bread (Foucault 2007: 327). At the same time, we should recall that ‘caring’ for the needs of the bread consuming crowd was really only an indirect strategy of the bread police, whose primary objective remained with the reproduction of sovereign power. Police, as Foucault (2007) reminds us, was not a variant of pastoralism, but rather a ‘direct governmentality of the sovereign’ (339).

Police viewed ‘order’ as something that never occurred naturally or spontaneously. As a practical endeavor, the apparatuses of police were meant to manufacture this order through utilizing a bewildering array of rules, regulations and forms of spatial organization that gave all important economic and social relations a basis in law (with sustenance problems being paramount). As a pedagogical and programmatic orientation to administering of all the elements of commerce, mobility, and consumption, police presented ‘a kind of utopia’ based on the possibility of a completely administered polity (Pasquino 1991: 112).

An ordinary person might look out over a city and view a scene of bustling markets, busy ports, and constant commerce. From the perspective of the police agent, the same scene appears as a bricolage of theft, hunger, accident, disease and unpaid tolls. In other words, it is a landscape of social chaos that needs to be marked out and controlled. This ordering will be done by locating the ‘critical points’ and making these into a ‘work of formation’ at the administrative level (Pasquino 1991: 111). Aiming to
prevent the emergence of risk, rather than govern its consequences after the fact, police utilized a range of edicts, decrees, rules and protocols that attempted to ‘define the conditions of good government in advance’ (Pasquino 1991: 111; Tribe 1995: 21).

Commerce and circulation were especially targeted by police. Moreover, both were realized in the ‘marketplace’ – the urban space that was most intensively policed. The marketplace was regulated in a truly holistic fashion. This included rules about what could ‘put on sale, at what price, how and when’ (Foucault 2007: 335). Within this policing of the marketplace, it were the ‘necessities of life’ that received the most stringent regulation (Tribe 1988: 32). Furthermore, among these life necessities, food was the ‘basic need’ to which all others were made subordinate (Foucault 2007: 324; see also Kaplan 1984; L. Tilly 1971). Clapham (1968) argues it was the ‘the food problems’ of the ‘great towns’ that inspired the robust policing regimes we have come to associate with Absolutist Europe (10).

In the *Police Regulations of the City of Nuremberg*, for example, the regulation of foodstuffs is listed only after the problems of security and commerce in their importance (cited in Pasquino 1991: 110). In the French case, we have as evidence Delamare’s (1729) famous *Traité de la police*: an exhaustive four-volume study on all dimensions of policing in old-regime France. Telling, more than two of the volumes were given over to detailing how the grain trade and provisioning of bread should be governed. This included impressively detailed discussions on the milling, baking, storage, pricing, retailing, and sale of bread. In Absolutist Europe, bread and flour were quite literally the stuff of ‘political science’.
Unlike the ‘extra-legal’ spaces that manifested with the regulation of the grain trade, the policing of flour and bread in the marketplace was normally enforced and adhered to in the strictest terms. Again, the overriding imperative of the bread police was to prevent the emergence of dearth by combating speculation and high prices before these elements would appear and disrupt provisioning in the city (Foucault 2007: 31). Urban bread police was not built to adjudicate legality after the fact, but to exercise a constant preemptive vigilance against hoarding, fraudulent measures, and off-market sales. Merchants were viewed as particularly unscrupulous subjects who required constant oversight. One Controller-General argued that merchants were the group most willing to undermine the objective of police as ‘a public service, a subsistence service’ (Kaplan 1976: 569).

The cardinal rule of the Parisian policing machinery was the (oddly-named) ‘mandatory market clause’ that stated the public had a right to stand witness to all commercial transactions of a sustenance nature (569). Not only did this measure soothe the anxious crowd, it was almost the foremost regulatory weapon to prevent hoarding, speculation and unfair profits (L. Tilly 1971: 27). Furthermore, there was also an interesting assortment of additional rules and prohibitions: (1) the price of bread had to be fixed relative to its weight and quality (2) grain could only sit in the marketplace for three days before its price had to be lowered (3) the composition of bread had to be free of potential adulterants (4) no contaminated water could be used in the baking process, and (5) rotten or overly-moist bread must not be sold (Kaplan 1984; L. Tilly 1971). The Parisian bread police regularly conducted spot checks and had people register complaints
about ‘non-delicious’ bread. These practices were not seen as throttling commerce, but instead a means to ‘domesticate and moralize it’ (31).

Through the mechanisms of bread police, statemakers governed the crowd in a way very different from the peasantry. As we have now seen, the city and countryside constituted distinct spaces of political thought and action. Tribe notes that Cameralists saw ‘good householding’ as differing between ‘land and town’ (Tribe 1988: 45). In comparing the mechanisms of extraction and policing, we have now borne out this observation in the spaces of agro-food power.

**Food, Population and Security**

‘Agricultural policy’ implies the displacement of extractions and policing. Agricultural policies are not engineered to control, exploit, and pacify. Rather, these apparatuses are created to secure collective risks that were not at all intelligible under absolutism. These included problems such as the national food supply and economic modernization of the countryside. Agricultural policies will also emerge in a specific historical context in which imperialism and industrialization were the primarily filters through which political life was understood. As will be discussed, agricultural policies solidify a new relationship between populations, the food supply and political authority.

Whereas extractions and policing demonstrated a clear spatial differentiation on the operation of agro-food power under absolutism, agricultural policies will be based on *unifying* problems around the production, marketing, and circulation of food within a single apparatus (Federico 2005; Tracy 1989). Agricultural policies will seek to govern these realities in a holistic and integrative manner. As one within a set of administratively
cumbersome ‘public policies’ developed across the nineteenth century, agricultural policies will play an important role in ‘governmentalizing’ the state.

Geopolitics, ‘Balanced’ Economies, and National Agriculture

One problematization that informed the creation of agricultural policy was the belief a nation should not allow its food supply to dwindle to the point of becoming militarily vulnerable. By the late nineteenth century, the food supply would come to embody a new geopolitical significance. Tilly’s (1975) claim that ‘the life the state’ was decided by ‘the battle for food’ (392) becomes an even more complex reality during this turbulent period.

The era between 1870-1914 was defined by inter-state political and economic competition in Europe (Halperin 2004; Hobsbawm 1968). The weakening power of the Ottoman Empire had left a vacuum of central authority in the Balkans (Wasserstein 2007). Moreover, the unification of Germany had realized the penultimate fear of all other European powers. There was now a true continental hegemon with territorial ambitions not only in Central Europe, but potentially Asia and the Middle East as well (see also Heffernan 1998; Kennedy 1987). The resource base of the new state was also impressive. By the time of its unification (1871), Germany had become the industrial powerhouse on the continent, with Britain was its only European rival (Craig 1978; Henderson 1975). Moreover, because of Germany’s early adoption of artificial fertilizers and improved foddering techniques, it also found itself at ‘the efficiency frontier of European agriculture’ (Koning 1994: 122).

In any event, a combination of factors (or effects) related to industrialization, nationalization, and the ‘German problem’ had produced an ethereal sense of anxiety and
paranoia among European powers. Nugent (1989) talks about the ‘frontier’ and ‘imperial’ impulses as dominating European inter-state relations of the late nineteenth century (394). In this sense, it is worth recalling that the very knowledges, cartographies and practices that would become the science of ‘geopolitics’ were either a direct and indirect consequence of late nineteenth century European struggles (Heffernan 1998).

Agriculture becomes important to this new geopolitical reality around the problem of the national food supply. Unlike the British who utilized massive levels of food imports to cheaply feed their factory workers and fuel their industrialization (Mintz 1985; Wolf 1982), continental powers such as France and Germany placed a far greater emphasis on food self-sufficiency. Relative to the British, these states lacked the territorial insularity and overseas supply networks that would make a ‘cheap food’ policy successful. In this context, most states sought to maximize domestic production: ‘food security…required that this dependence [on imports] did not exceed certain safety lines. This is why governments often reached for protectionist measures to prevent low farm prices from hampering the growth of domestic farm output’ (Koning 1994: 34).

Clapham argues that national agricultural policies were in part imagined as ‘war insurance policies’ in so far one central goal was to increase domestic production in order to lessen food vulnerability in a future military conflict (Clapham 1968: 213). The proven success of the siege or blockade was the origin of these fears. Political authorities were forced to ask themselves if they could feed their soldiers, factory workers and citizens when cut off from food imports. Whereas the British had an empire to feed it, and a Royal Navy to protect its victual supply lines, France and Germany saw vital food imports arriving through vulnerable ports as a form of geopolitical insecurity. The first
French Agricultural Minister Jules Méline queried: ‘Is there a greater danger for a nation than to have its food supplies in the hands of foreign countries and their mercy?’ (1912: 247).

Germany is the indicative case here. Though it was a budding European hegemon, Germany was not self-sufficient in foodstuffs. Industrialization had turned the country into a net importer of food. Moreover, it was generally assumed the British would take advantage of this vulnerability during a conflict by using the Royal Navy to control the important shipping routes and strategic ports in the Baltic and North seas (Offer 1989). Therefore, from about 1890 onward, German war planners began ruminating over the question of how long food supplies would last under a hypothetical British siege. As these fears intensified, the bureaucratic officialdom conducted a study in 1906 which concluded that internal grain supplies, if properly utilized, would keep the country fed for 9-10 months. The conclusion was met with skepticism by many outside military experts (Offer 1989: 337).

As far back as the late-1870s, Bismarck was promoting protectionism out of a fear that a food blockade would disorder civilian life and disrupt war preparation in a new and unsteady Empire (Tirrell 1951). ‘Unlike the United Kingdom, Germany could not hope to maintain large food imports when attacked by more than one nation. If Germany had to preserve in such a war, its agriculture had to be capable of producing a large part of the country’s basic food requirement’ (Koning 1994: 100).

If a powerful state must ensure its farmers are producing enough food for the nation then it, by necessity, must also ensure its producers are prosperous enough to stay
on the land in order to do so. This, in turn, meant utilizing techniques of economic
government in order to ensure a level of prosperity necessary to keep farmers farming, and
rural areas populated (Golob 1944; Koning 1994; Tribe 1983; Tracy 1989). Bismarck
explicitly used political economy to intertwine the food producing classes with the
project of national unification. Much has been made of the way Bismarck forged a
coalition of ‘iron and rye’ in order to give the German state a power-base in the East and
West. What goes less remarked upon is that Bismarck also similarly had to patch together
an agrarian coalition of large Prussian landowners in the East (producing predominately
cereals) and small farmers in the south and west (who often practiced animal husbandry).
Webb (1982) labels it the alliance of ‘pork and rye’ and argues it presented an ‘economic
reality’ as equally important for German state unification (Webb 1982: 324).

The concern about rural exodus was exacerbated by the ‘pull’ factors of higher
wages and shorter working hours that had begun to appear in cities. The process was
already believed to be emptying the countryside at a dizzying rate (Koning 1994: 21-
25). For Bismarck, there was also a crudely racialized logic in keeping German
peasants and farmers on the land, notably in the East. It would inhibit a further
‘Polinisation’ of the Prussian countryside (Koning 1994: 105; Tribe 1983). In this way,
and not for the last time, German agrarian settlement presented a possible solution to the
‘national question’ of how populations might be properly linked to their territories
(Lucassen 2005).

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21 In the end, the dramatic expansion of the German economy would mean a population that was 2/3 rural
in 1871 (the year of German unification) would be 2/3 rural by the start of the First World War
(Wasserstein 2007: 17).
Another discourse that informed the creation of agricultural policies was that of anti-urbanism (and its concomitant narratives extolling the virtues of rural-life). Méline was a great representative of this trajectory, arguing that the countryside was ‘the nursemaid of humanity, fertile and everlasting’ (Méline 1912: 97). Political authorities saw urban life, especially among the lower-middle classes, as associated with malnourishment, stunted growth, over-stimulation and a marked deficiency of physical stamina. Famously, British authorities came to the conclusion well after their domestic social reformers had; it appeared to them when forced to go into the urban slums to recruit for the Boer War (Burnett 1994; Coveney 2000). But this fear was equally widespread on the continent. The robustness of ‘city-men’ as soldiers and wartime labourers was now being openly questioned by imperialists and nationalists. In the extreme cases, those who advocated a ‘return to the land’ saw it as a way to instill a Spartan-like military ethic among the fighting-age men of the nation.

Another problematization that directly informed the making of agricultural policy was the argument a state must actively ‘balance’ the roles of farming and industry in the broader ‘national economy’ (see especially Barkin 1970; Golob 1944; Koning 1994; Tracy 1989.) The problem of ‘balanced national economies’ was posed forcefully in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. This was understood as more than just a need to treat all special interests equally. Rather, it was a comprehensive discourse that argued that in order to realize a strong nation, internally and externally, then all dimensions of a state’s productive capacity must be equally developed. The grinding poverty of the peasantry was a state of affairs treated with indifference by absolutist authorities. But this

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22 Jules Méline becomes Minister of Agriculture in 1883. The hallmark French treaty of the nineteenth century bears his name.
was no longer the case with the political authorities of the nation-state. The problems of ignorance, ill-health and economic isolation in the countryside would have to be combated through new types of planning and intervention (Price 1983; Weber 1976).

It was as a means to govern these problems that the spaces of political economy merge with those of the civilian food supply. For agriculture, as Barkin notes (1970), ‘the age of the political economist had dawned’ (11). In this sense, agricultural policy is a geoeconomic as well as geopolitical reality. Moreover, these new realities require new practices of political economy so that a nation not only produces metals and chemicals, but also grains and butter. Furthermore, the migration of farmers into cities must be controlled so that dependence on food imports is not exacerbated.

In France, it is social Catholicism that becomes ‘a practical, active force’ in imagining agricultural policy as an ‘anti-individualistic’ mechanism for rural socioeconomic uplift (Golob 1944: 100-101). Hostile to laisssez-faire policy generally, social Catholics viewed the small farmer as a sociocultural institution that underpinned family, tradition and obedience in the countryside. A sudden and radical penetration of markets and trade should not be allowed to undermine the existing rural social order. But since it already had – the agrarian depressions of the 1880s were cited as evidence of this – the role of the state was now to remedy the situation, and ameliorate the worst of its effects. Here we see agricultural policy being imagined as a form of ‘social economy’ for combating the pauperization of rural life (Procacci 1991).

The predominant agricultural association, the Société des agriculteurs, likewise viewed agricultural governance in terms of the need for rural modernization and a set of
programs to increase the profitability of the small and medium-sized farmer. Agriculturalists were not asking for *special* treatment, or so they claimed, but rather *equal* treatment compared to that allotted to industry. A deputy of the *Société* conveyed this sentiment at a meeting in 1879: ‘if some French industries obtain protective duties in any form whatsoever, justice demands that agriculture, which too is an industry, share equally in this protection’ (cited in Golob 1944: 53). France was a country that remained predominantly rural and agricultural at the turn of the century. Not surprisingly, therefore, the arguments of Méline, *Société*, and the social Catholics were met with wide acceptance in the country.

In Germany, the question of ‘agriculture or industry’ was more contentious and politicized than in France. After the ‘socialist law’ it was the most hotly contested issue in the 1890 election (Tirrell 1951: 11-33). On one side, in favor of free trade, were the Socialists, Radicals, and many Liberals. This coalition viewed grain tariffs as an indirect food tax on workers. During a *Reichstag* debate in January 1891, they used this logic to articulate a ‘violent attack upon the protective tariff system’ (Tirrell 1951: 101). On the opposing side were Conservatives, Centrists and Imperialists. This coalition saw the system as a means to support farmers, guarantee the food supply, and provide agriculture the same economic privileges as ‘big business’.

The corrosive effects of industrialization on the German nation also came to dominate intellectual debates in forums such as the Protestant Social Congress (Barkin 1970: 4).

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23 But even Caprivi, the free trading and anti-protectionist Chancellor who replaced Bismarck – and a man who once boasted that he possessed ‘kein Ar und Halm’ (no acre and blade of straw) – nonetheless was still forced to grasped the nature of farming and food supply to the success of the imperial state. With keen foresight, he argued in 1891 that ‘in a future war feeding the army and the country would play a decisive role’. With this conversion imposed upon him by both economic and military considerations, Caprivi backed down from his initial desire to dismantle the protectionist core of German economic government.
Agrarian supporters, in response to pro-industrial figures such as Max Weber\textsuperscript{24}, churned out books and pamphlets, and organized conferences to extol the value of a nation centered in the earth and soil, rather than in smoke and metals. The professors, many of whom were notable agriculturalists and public intellectuals, argued that city life was ‘alienated, unethical, subversive’ whereas life in the countryside was ‘organic, hierarchal, traditional and healthy’ (Offer 1989: 332). Farmers and peasants not only produced food for the nation, but also provided the nation a moral and Christian backbone that was lacking in cities (spaces of knavery, vice and filth). As Koning (1994) argues, it was a collection of pro-rural and pro-farming narratives that crystallized to create the discourse he gives the apt-label ‘agrarian fundamentalism’:

According to this ideology, the farm population was the truly fertile class, a preserve of soundly conservative values and community spirit, and a breeding ground of hard soldiers. In contrast, the cities were places of cultural flowering, but also of alienation, rapid degeneration and demographic decline...Furthermore, as such a flight from the land would normally involve disequilibrium between agricultural and industrial growth, it would entail dangerous international dependencies. A wise state, therefore, would foster its national agriculture, and it shield it against the negative effects of free market forces. It would encourage farm structures geared to sustaining sufficient people on the land rather than maximum profitability. If needed, it would support farm incomes to secure adequate agricultural growth (Koning 1994: 152)

In Germany, Adolf Wagner was the most notable agrarian fundamentalist and prominent intellectual that argued for a nation guided by the principles of Agrarpolitik (Clark 1940; Salter 1944). He was among a new breed of thinkers, which included Gustav Schmoller and Lujo Bretano, that viewed political economy not just as a theoretical science but as

\textsuperscript{24} Max Weber was a significant interlocutor in these debates. Moreover, he argued ‘decisively’ for industrialization as ‘the only path which could make possible a greater Germany’ (Tribe 1983: 187). Of course, his position did not necessarily reflect admiration for the rationalization, urbanization and bureaucratization of social life; rather, it reflected his belief such processes were inevitable in the European context.
‘an inductive discipline based on an assessment of all aspects of man’s life in society’ (Craig 1978: 197). This is political economy imagined as a pedagogy for knowing and intervening upon the lives of populations.

Similar to other pro-agrarian socialists, Wagner used the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* (Social Policy Association) as a forum to voice his ideas. While the association did not comprise a single intellectual stream, the majority of its thinkers did coalesce around a strong critique of ‘Manchesterian economics’ as detrimental to the harmony and prosperity of the polity. They readily pointed to the ‘cheap food’ policy of the British, and its effects on the British working classes, as exhibit A for witnessing the consequences of an unrestrained laissez-faire policy on social order.

Among rural social scientists of the time, Wagner was the most ‘autarchistic’ and ‘convinced of the primary importance of agriculture’ (Craig 1978: 197). He was also a popular figure who gave speeches that drew thousands of listeners, including bureaucrats, generals and members of the Reichstag (Barkin 1970: 10). In his famous work *Agrar-oder Industrietaat* (1902) Wagner critiques industrial capitalism on the grounds it promotes food insecurity and leads to morally degenerate cities. A state which chooses to become dependent on imported food and willingly destroys the ‘natural unity’ of its peasantry for the sake of easy profits has already capitulated to the soul-wrecking processes of industrialization (Barkin 1970: 158; Tracy 1989: 24). Wagner (1902) thus advocated a system of ‘ethicalized’ political economy for governing farmers and the rural economy, and thus reclaiming the future the German nation (Barkin 1969: 147).

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25 To a political opponent he once declared himself proud to be labeled an ‘agrarian reactionary’ (Barkin 1970: 7).
The first attempt to govern agriculture through political economy occurred in France in the 1760s. This was the exhaustive physiocratic-inspired program to completely and suddenly liberalize the grain trade (Aftalion 1990; Kaplan 1976; Tribe 1978). For a brief period, the ancien régime would dismantle the policing machinery which had been used to govern grain, flour and bread for centuries. This project failed for a number of reasons. One of these was the fact the technical preconditions for territorial market integration, especially for perishable goods, did not yet exist in the 1760s.

The incontrovertible problem was that grain had to circulate faster than it would rot. After all, while there might be surplus grain in one region during a shortage, this meant little if that surplus grain could not be moved fast enough into the deficient region; fast enough, that is, to prevent the emergence of high prices, hunger and dearth. Moreover, this need for ‘mobile grain’ was at the very core of the physiocratic program. Without it, there could not be market integration, price convergence or intensified trade across the myriad of disparate local economies that constituted the ancien régime.

According to Virilio (1977/2006) it was ‘speed’ – the intensified velocity at which bodies and commodities moved – which made possible the military and capitalist advancements we have come to associate with modernity. Particularly, it were developments in transportation that made possible the ‘geo-strategic revolution of the nineteenth century’ and led to the compression of social and economic time in ways that profoundly changed the relations of living, laboring and dying (74). But most important
for our purposes, it was the newfound mobility of perishable commodities (e.g. foodstuffs) over the last quarter of the nineteenth century that proved decisive.

The importance of speed can be seen in the decisive role of rail networks in forging truly national and regional agrarian markets in Europe. The new railways made it possible to move surplus grain between states. But the effect was not only inter-national. At the same time, and perhaps more importantly, the rail networks also made possible the consolidation of intra-national markets for the first time (see especially Persson 1999). France witnessed an 11.2 annual increase in rail capacity over the last few decades of the nineteenth century (Price 1983: 207). By 1885 the most important rail corridors in the North – the pivotal Paris-Lyon-Marseille line, for example – moved goods at 34 kilometers an hour. This figure had risen to 45 km an hour by 1913 (233-34). The average load could now reach its destination 56 hours faster than it could with carts driven by animal power, the previous modality of transport. By 1914, Germany had 61,749 kilometers of railway, while France possessed 37,400 (Wasserstein 2007: 13).

Improved and expanded roadways were also important. In France, road networks were twice as large as those for rail and linked every major settlement in a region (Price 1983). Roads could also be used in all seasons. A study conducted by the French minister of public works concluded that great savings in commerce would come through making major investments being made in the *routes nationales*. A law passed in 1868 provided 100 million francs over a ten year period for projects that linked rural communes to urban areas (the *chemins d’intérêt commun* – or roads that link communes). Ultimately, it was the expansion and improvement of both the arterial and peripheral roadways that ended the autarkic and isolated existence of the village peasantry, and made it possible to
diffuse markets and modernity across their daily relations and interactions (see also Weber 1978).

Perhaps most importantly it was on the open seas, with the use of steam-power, that cheap grain from the ‘virgin soils’ of European settler colonies would enter the established markets on the continent (Coclantis 2003; Ingersent & Rayner 1999; Koning 1994). From 1870-1910, the amount of arable land in North America, Argentina, Uruguay, and Australia increased from 82 million to 185 million hectares (Koning 1994: 20-1). By the 1870s, the Great Plains had been opened up by rail in the US. At the same time, Russian rail networks made it possible to move rye and wheat grown in the black soils of the Ukraine through ports on the Baltic. Across the 1870s/1880s, the cost of shipping wheat from New York to Liverpool fell by half (Tracy 1989: 17). Over the last quarter of the nineteenth century, ocean freight rates across the Atlantic fell by 80%. During this period, it would also become possible to ship perishable articles, such as meat and dairy, because of the use of refrigeration on both railroads and ocean-liners (Tirrell 1951: 22-23). 26

After 1870: ‘wheat came from Kansas and Minnesota, from South Australia, from the Punjab, from Odessa, and the Danube. It challenged established growers everywhere’ (Offer 1989: 95). 27 We now confront what the European farmer most feared: cheap imports of grain. It would be hard to overstate the effects of this sudden influx of foreign grain on rural economies. In a matter of only a few decades, rural Europe went from

26 Another factor to consider is the effect the telegraph had for the instantaneous movement of price signals to merchants on both sides of the Atlantic (Clapham 1968; Landes 1969). Here, the speed of information makes possible the consolidation of an Atlantic capitalism.
27 Shipping bulk commodities also became cheaper and more efficient after 1850 because steamships began to be constructed from metal, rather than wood (Harley 1988).
being defined by economic localism to being fully intermeshed in regional and global markets for grains, feed, and meat (Coclanis 2003; Friedmann & McMichael 1989; Persson 1999). In fact, the agrarian supply from settler states alone increased international trade in foodstuffs by a factor of ten over the period 1870-1914.

Farmers now sold into commodity markets where ‘the law of one price’ prevailed. Moreover, after 1880, price levels saw a precipitous decline, to the obvious disadvantage of producers (Coclanis 2003: 73). While price convergence may have lowered food costs for workers and urban consumers, they worked against the interests of farmers and peasants alike (Persson 1999). The low prices were also the prime catalyst for a series of agrarian depressions that occurred in Western Europe during the 1880s (Ingersent & Rayner 1999; Tracy 1989). Even relatively prosperous medium-sized producers witnessed their debt loads explode and their incomes plummet. Koning (1994) makes clear that political authorities became alarmed by the different effects this international economic agrarian competition was having on farmers and the nation alike:

There was a fear that agricultural stagnation would affect the domestic market, the trade balance or food security, or that agrarian distress would precipitate a rural exodus which could exacerbate tensions in urban society …such threats could only be countered by far-reaching government intervention. Part of the response was government sponsoring of farm research and education. In addition, agricultural price support was necessary in many countries to cushion the drop of agrarian buying power or to curb the exodus of farm labour (5)

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28 On the persistence of village autonomy, economic localism and self-subsistence in preindustrial Europe see especially (Darnton 1999; Fagan 2000; Ponting 2007; Weber 1976; Wunderli 1992)
29 There are also a series of improvements in farming practice and agricultural technique that lead to greater productivity and supply in Western Europe. These will not be discussed in any detail here.
In the end, it was not liberal political economy that informed the economic techniques of new agricultural policies. Rather, the agrarian economic government of the nineteenth century would assume logics of what Friedrich List called a system of ‘national political economy’ (1946).

For List, ‘national economy’ is an economic doctrine for governing trade and public investment in an environment of intense geoeconomic competition between states. It advocates that states at the wrong end of an asymmetrical international economy take measures to protect their vulnerable and ‘infant’ industries (Tribe 1995). List embodied these ideas on market intervention and public investment in his own political practice. This included advocating for state led industrialization, the building of extensive rail networks, and customs/market integration through the Zollverein (Henderson 1983; Szporluk 1998).

Writing in the 1840s, it was the future of Germany as an industrial and European power that most concerned List. His arguments and theoretical insights were posed directly against Adam Smith’s political economy, or what he derisively called ‘cosmopolitical economy’ (List 1840s/1904). List viewed the doctrine of free trade as hegemonic power masquerading as human truth. His primary target in this critique was the British who dictated the terms upon which the free trading system was carried out. For List, it made no sense for governments to neglect their own trenchant poverty, or fail to plan out their industrial development, out of allegiance to an abstracted economic

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30 That said, there was a brief period of free trade in agriculture from 1850-1870 (Federico 2005; Tracy 1989). The growth in demand for food – fueled by an explosive growth in the urban population – meant rising incomes for Europe’s farmers. This would not last, and there has not been a genuine period of free trade in European agriculture since.
system (treated as political theology) that served almost entirely the commercial interests of a single hegemonic power (List 1904: 221).

Compared to the classical political economists, the national economist did not make appeals to universal or natural laws, but mostly engaged in economic problem-solving. It was a thoroughly practical economic paradigm. List believed all nations were different in their conditions and constitutions, and therefore needed to take particular measures to suit their unique conditions, and address their unique problems. This could mean mobilizing any number of practical interventions at the level of trade, market integration, or the building of public infrastructure (Tribe 1995). Economic government for the national economist was always used to generate positive and tangible outcomes for the citizenry (see also Tribe 1995).

While not inclined to support industry at the expense of agriculture in his own time, List nonetheless viewed the balancing act between manufacturing and agriculture as the most difficult one for the state to manage. He called it ‘the balance or the harmony of the production powers’ (List 1946: 130; see also Henderson 1983: 147). And given the plight of national agricultural sectors in the 1880s, as already discussed, the sudden popularity of List’s ideas for the agrarian sector makes perfect sense.

The pragmatism and flexibility of national political economy would make it adaptable to different national contexts. In France the Méline Tariff – the protectionist omnibus measure of 1889 – was directly influenced by a Listian body of knowledge called ‘nationalist economic theory’ (Golob 1944: 116-46). The most influential proponent was the professor Paul-Louis Cauwés, an intellectual credited with
contributing ‘the systematic theoretical background for the Méline Tariff’ (Golob 1944: 117). While Cauwés drew upon and modified the ideas of List, he also incorporated French mercantilist thought in his argument it was ‘the duty of government to stimulate and guide endeavors beneficial to the nation, and to discourage and prevent practices considered harmful’ (Golob 1944: 119). Using the metaphor of a living human organism, Cauwés deduced that:

> Normal nations (in the sense in which List employs this term), are complete organizations; their economic system resembles the physiology of the most perfect living being; the various parts of which they are composed, agriculture, factories and commerce, are intimately related and subject to a law of internal growth; like the members of the same body, they languish or grow strong simultaneously (cited in Golob 1944: 134)

Cauwés will go on to argue that farming is an especially important sector because it is related to ‘the general welfare of a nation, in providing diversity…independence, and in supplying military materials’ (139). Golob (1944) concludes the impact of nationalist economic thinking was neither ‘incidental or fortuitous’ in creating the highly interventionist Méline Tariff. That is, it was pivotal in giving French agrarian protection a ‘degree of coherence and an explicit rationale’ (Golob 1944: 215).

Not surprisingly, List’s ideas were also impactful in the turn to agrarian protection in Germany. Tracy (1989) states that: ‘The protectionist movement, especially in Germany, was able to draw inspiration and justification from Friedrich List’s school of nationalist economics, with its stress on economic development through protection’ (20). Wagner, a thinker previously discussed, drew extensively upon List, notably his idea that it was the state’s responsibility to use economic government to promote development and social cohesion. To this he would add his (non-Listian) idea that *Agrarpolitik* and not an
‘industrial state’ held the promise of a healthy, moral and prosperous future for the German nation.

*Techniques of Economic Government*

At the outset, agricultural policy governed foremost through techniques of economic government that worked at the ‘frontier’. These mechanisms worked primarily towards the goal of insulating national farmers from low prices on international commodity markets. Tariff walls, it was argued, would preserve the small farmer by increasing his income, and ensuring national food self-sufficiency through an incentivization of domestic production.

From the late-1870s onward tariffs, as a way of taxing imports, become the primary means of shielding European farmers from the sudden and intense competition in grain markets that has been previously discussed. In France, the use of tariffs begins in 1881, and were raised again in 1885 and 1887. The heavily protectionist Méline Tariff subsequently becomes law in 1892. It placed duties on a number of imported commodities that ranged between 10%-25% of their global market price (Tracy 1989: 68). For example, in 1897, this meant about a seven franc tax on a bushel of wheat (Clapham 1968: 182).

In Germany, tariffs become a core instrument of agricultural policy starting in 1879. The initial tariff was quite moderate: 1 mark per 100 kilograms of wheat, rye, and oats, and only .5 mark on equivalent amounts of barley and maize (Tirrell 1951: 74). The grain duties were significantly raised in 1885 and 1887. A more liberal policy is briefly

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31 Protectionism would begin in Italy in 1878 and Belgium in 1887,
adopted after Bismarck’s fall in 1890 under the new Chancellor Caprivi (Tirrell 1951). But this open economic moment is transitory, and in 1902 Germany ‘intensifies’ the protectionist regime that was originally begun under Bismarck (91).

As a technology of economic government, the tariff operates at the physical point of commodity importation. (i.e. a ‘frontier measure’). But it was not the only such frontier measure, and we might consider a few others. For example, the Germans also used a system of ‘import certificates’ (Koning 1994: 84; Tracy 1989: 97). The certificates provided (select) German merchants the ability to import specific quantities of higher-quality Russian wheat at domestic prices. After this, the Russian grain was mixed with inferior German grain and then (re)exported for a higher price. While this had been a longstanding practice of Prussian grain merchants, it became systematized as a type of ‘export subsidy’ that helped Junker landowners cope with the heightened competition in international cereals markets.

A final technique to consider, also German in derivation, involved placing regulations and prohibitions placed on the importation of livestock for safety/sanitary reasons. These measures were given the force of law with the German Livestock Disease Act of 1880 (Tracy 1989: 91). Socialists and Radicals viewed the measures as a poorly disguised attempt to prop-up prices for farmers. Conservatives and farmers saw it as a legitimate step to take in response to the dangers posed by trichina and hoof-and-mouth disease (Tirrell 1951: 77-78). By 1889, various health and sanitary regulations were being used to stop the importation of 90% of all live animals.32 While these were not the same

32 The sanitary measures speak to the broader development of national legislation around ‘food safety’ and ‘food purity’ that will begin to appear in Western Europe in the late nineteenth century (Freidberg 2004).
as taxes levied at the border, they still ‘resembled tariffs in their economic effect and were bones of contention in tariff debates and international trade negotiations’ (Webb 1982: 318).

In conclusion, there were a number of tariff and regulatory techniques used to ‘modify’ the grain trade between countries (Ingersent & Rayner 1998: 48). The point of this section was not to provide an exhaustive taxonomy of all the different practices, but simply to establish the fact that these mechanisms of economic government were the primary means through which states governed the farming sector as a segment of the national economy.

*Agricultural Policy as Social Infrastructure*

As an apparatus of security, agricultural policies not only regulated the farm sector through forms of economic government, but also devised programs to target the living and laboring conditions of the agrarian classes. In this way, agricultural policies also aimed for a broader governmentalization of rural society.

I prefer Federico’s (2005) definition of agricultural policy precisely because he captures this sociological-infrastructure dimension of agricultural governance as it first developed (187). Federico demonstrates that agricultural policy included programs for modernizing the farming sector, educating rural children, making credit available to small farmers, and extensifying transportation networks across the countryside. The common thrust of the interventions was to imagine agricultural policy as a set of tangible interventions in the lives of rural populations and the workings of rural economy (see also Koning 1994; Tracy 1989).
Promoting modern farming practice was one dimension of this trajectory. Koning (1994) notes that ‘the sponsoring of farm research and education’ was an important technique used to address the problem of international competitiveness (5). Previously farming knowledge was generally spread through aristocratic agricultural networks or within specific groups engaged in agricultural experimentation, such as the Benedictine Monks (Fraser & Rimis 2011; Tribe 1978). By the late-nineteenth century, though, agrarian pedagogy had become a domain of state practices. This occurred as agricultural ministries began to create programs for ‘the sharing of agricultural information’ and ‘exhibitions of farm machinery’ (Clapham 1968: 51-2).

In Germany, previously dispersed and independent agricultural schools were folded into public universities (Clapham 1968: 216-221).33 Small farmers came to be targeted by extension agents in the guise of ‘travelling teachers’ who moved across the countryside and taught the latest advancement in crop breeding and animal husbandry. Additionally, there were ‘winter schools’ where farmers went in the dead season and ‘agricultural continuation schools’ that targeted the sons and daughters of peasants. There were 2,000 of these continuation schools set up between 1900-1910. Clapham (1968) summarizes the effect of this pedagogical dimension of German agricultural policy: ‘So, between 1870 and 1900, the channels were provided through which agricultural knowledge could flow to the lowest ranks of the independent cultivators’ (Clapham 1968: 216).

33 It is also interesting to note the regional variation in what constituted agrarian knowledge. For example, in the Netherlands, agrarian education had a strong business component in that, in addition to instructing on advanced agronomic principles, it also sought to educate on ‘innovative entrepreneurship in farming itself’ (Koning 1994: 61).
Across Europe, ‘public’ agricultural institutes worked to improve the productivity of the small and medium-sized farmer (Koning 1994: 35).\textsuperscript{34} Clapham (1968) claims that the ‘educational influence’ of these programs on farmers was ‘beyond dispute’ (189). Moreover, states began to support (or set up themselves) a variety of syndicates, associations, credit facilities and rural banks that would, for the first time, make credit available to small producers. In France, the state funded cooperative insurance schemes that provided small farmers indemnity against harvest loss. The schemes worked through pre-existing agricultural associations, but were financed through the Bank of France (Clapham 1968: 188).

In France, agricultural syndicats were integral in making loans available, providing insurance, and popularizing new agricultural technique (Golob 1944; Tracy 1989). The loans particularly made possible ‘the purchase of agricultural machinery which would otherwise have been unavailable to small farmers’ (Golob 1944: 89). In 1884, the Minister of the Interior instructed all prefects to have their local officials help to ‘popularize’ the new associations and syndicats (Golob 1944: 84). In Germany, in 1894, the Prussian Agricultural Chambers Act was created (Koning 1994: 89). This new organization, amongst its other duties, would be responsible for folding all pre-existing private agricultural associations into a public entity that would provide support to farmers through standardized programs and funding schemes.

Lastly, agricultural policy involved the enrollment of producers themselves within the legislative machinery of the state (Tracy 1989; Sheingate 1998). Often these efforts

\textsuperscript{34} This included efforts to promote a three-year crop rotation cycle; the use of nitrogen fixing cover-crops; and proper methods of animal husbandry. In their attempt to set up these new extension services, national agricultural ministries were usually assisted (and sometimes led by) agricultural societies long involved in compiling the ‘best practices’ of (indigenous) farming.
were undertaken by newly constituted ‘departments’ and ‘ministries’ of agriculture
(which are created across Western Europe in the 1880s). Koning refers to this growing
influence of farmers within the policymaking machinery as ‘agrarian corporatism…the
development of formal relations of negotiations and co-operation between government
and agrarian organizations’ (Koning 1994: 89). Farmers, in short, had become privileged
partners and sources of authoritative knowledge in the functioning of new agricultural
bureaucracies

This agrarian corporatism appears as quite exceptional when juxtaposed with the
brute exploitation meted out to the peasant under absolutism. One hundred years
following the French Revolution, peasants had become ‘farmers’ and were now to be
governed as economic agents rather than as resources or subjects of the sovereign.
Moreover, as farmers aligned themselves within newly legalized agricultural
associations, they simultaneously became active participants in arranging the very
apparatuses through which they were governed.

Crowds, Peasants, Populations

Under absolutism, there was no single objectivization of the governed. This was a
political landscape defined by fracture, division and hierarchy. Nowhere was this more
evident than with the peasantry. This mass of humanity found its place ‘in the ground’, as
those whose sole function was to produce the raw materials of state formation. And while

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35 The French Revolution eliminated feudalism in France. In terms of the Germanic peasantry, this was
accomplished with a set of reform over the period 1807-1848. While peasants were more commonly of the
independent and landholding variety in western and southern Germanic areas (Osmond 2003), in Prussia it
took until the mid-nineteenth century until the ‘heritable subjection’ and bodily servitude’ of the serfs
ended (Clapham 1968: 43).

36 The case of France is indicative here. The Waldek-Rousseau law of 1884 legalized farmers associations
in France. By 1890, there were 648 such syndicates, with 234,000 members (Tracy 1989). By 1910,
membership numbers would reach 750,000 (Clapham 1968: 186)
the sustenance of the crowd mattered to political authorities, it meant something only because these authorities feared the accusations, riots, and potential violence that could result from disruptions to the moral economy of provisioning:

To the mob, bread mattered most. In all countries during the eighteenth century, food riots predominated in popular disturbances. The Parisian artisan spent half his wage on bread; if its price rose, starvation threatened …Consumption, rather than production, provided popular community -centered mobilization (Mann 1993: 201).

Absolutist authorities did not see a ‘population’ in the sense Foucault intended – as a social reality and statistical aggregate understood and governed in its totality. Rather, and drawing upon a distinction articulated by Curtis, it makes sense to think about absolutist authorities as having worked with a vision of ‘populousness’ rather than ‘population’ (Curtis 2002). Curtis uses the distinction to highlight how, before the rise of liberal governmentalities, the ‘governed’ was not imagined as a collective reality but a ‘hierarchical differentiation of orders of the people’ (508). This stratified rendering of the governed has been on display with our discussion of ‘peasants’ and ‘crowds’.

This ‘populousness’(as opposed to ‘population’) of rural/urban was most vividly on display in the paradox embedded at the core of the ‘dearth event’. We must recall that as soon as famine conditions emerged, the normal regulatory framework for governing the grain trade was suspended in the countryside; networks of illegality and extra-legality proliferated in order to feed the urban crowd at all costs, and through all available channels (Grantham 1989; Kaplan 1984; L. Tilly 1971). Concomitant to this, in the urban marketplaces where grain and flour were sold, regulations were enforced to the letter during periods of dearth. In other words, the scarcity-event saw a privileging of the
sustenance needs of urban consumers while simultaneously jeopardizing the interests of the peasantry.

From this perspective, the bread police had no resemblance to the national ‘agricultural policies’ also discussed in this chapter. The movement from *police* to *policy* was about the integration of rural and urban agrarian problems into a single governing apparatus, not their continued differentiation and hierarchicalization relative to geography or social caste. Moreover, agricultural policy was also different because it was a creature of the new practices and discourses of national integration. Similar to other new public policies in this period, agricultural policies sought to ‘regulate the nitty-gritty of social relations’ (Migdal 2001: 115).

We have now traversed a crucial site in our genealogy. We have examined the conditions that allowed for the emergence of national agricultural policies as a unified apparatus of security at the end of the nineteenth century.

**Wartime Mobilization and a Securitized Food Supply**

‘…agriculture and war are two species belonging to the same genus’  

Agricultural policies, as we have now seen, were born in an era of geoeconomic and geopolitical competition. With the two World Wars came new and intensive forms of state control. The First World War was the initial *laboratory* for governing the food supply in wartime. The Second World War saw the *full optimization* of these wartime agro-food machineries. These cases have a twofold importance for our genealogy. First, it was during wartime that national agricultural policies were at their most robust. This deserves consideration on its own grounds. Second, the policies adopted in the Second
World War foreshadow the ‘social’ turn in postwar agricultural governance that is eventually refracted through questions of nutrition, agrarian productivity and farmer income that become central to the postwar welfare state (Chapter 3 & 4).

*Germany & Siege Politics*

Blockades of food have been a longstanding and successful tactic of European warfare. Modern conditions did not change this. The defeat of the Paris Commune was a particularly potent example of the effects this tactic could have on a nineteenth century population (Horne 1971). Carr (1939/2001) noted that, even in the first quarter of the twentieth century, the fear of a siege was so great as to often convince military planners of ‘the political desirability of autarky’ (113) At the operational level, a siege was meant to ‘provoke a prolonged desperation in the enemy, to inflict permanent moral and material sufferings that diminish him and *melt* him away…without recourse to bloodshed’ (Virilio 2007: 63). More to the point, this suffering would come through disrupting the forward mobility of things – especially food and other vital necessities.

Laribé and Pinot (1927) note that of all the logistical problems at the beginning of the First World War none ‘presented itself with greater acuteness or on a larger scale than that of food supply’ (155). As the conflict prolonged national authorities created systems for supplying and distributing food that ‘had never before been contemplated’ (155). The French state took measures to requisition grain to feed civilian populations and fix prices for all ‘essential commodities’, while also taking a direct role in the regulation, production, possession, and consumption of basic foodstuffs (159-169). This included
setting up a rationing program to cover the entire population, for the first time in Europe’s history (Laribé and Pinot 1927: 171).

But the most illuminating case for seeing the strategic importance of the siege is Germany. Many military historians credit the economic blockade conducted by the British as having (quite literally) starved the Germans into suing for peace in 1919. The Germans were certainly aware of their agrarian vulnerabilities heading into the war. The Eltz Commission had conducted a study a few years prior to the war and concluded that existing internal food reserves could support the population for around nine months, a conclusion greeted with skepticism by outside experts (Offer 1989: 25).

When the economic blockade of the Royal Navy did inevitably arrive, the German response was belated and ineffective. The Germans waited until 1916 to create a War Food Office to coordinate rationing. Moreover, with the ad-hoc implementation of rationing by the Food Office, coupled with an near complete inability to raise domestic production, success was not forthcoming. The riots, strikes and antigovernment propaganda among German workers, especially in critical ports and factories in the last three years of the war, was a testament to the deprivations felt by the civilian population. From the British perspective, this strategy of terrorizing the domestic German workforce worked amazingly well. The population suffered drastic weight loss, there were significant declines in birth-rate, and around 600,000 premature civilian deaths can be attributed to the economic blockade (Offer 1989: 31-40).

Britain was likewise heavily dependent on imported food. In relative terms, actually more so than the Germans. The difference, of course, was that Britain had a
powerful Royal Navy to defend its shipping lanes (Wasserstein 2007). The UK also had a
global colonial network from which to feed itself. Germany had no equivalent overseas
breadbasket. Additionally, because of the blockade, Germany lost access to 4/5 of its
imports and domestic production declined by 30-40%. As a result, there were also serious
shortages of raw materials, such as phosphorous and nitrogen, that needed to be
economized in the wartime economy and were thus lost to agriculture.

The food shortages had become so severe that by 1918 German soldiers were
being sent into the countryside to forage for grain and potatoes (Offer 1989: 66-70). Of
course it was not only the soldiers that were hungry, as just noted. There were also two
nationwide general strikes during the war in Germany, both of which were largely
attributable to the severity of food shortages (Halperin 2004: 185). Unfortunately for the
German populace, the misery did not end with the war, as the British elected to continue
the economic blockade for five months in the armistice (Offer 1989: Chapter 26).

Observers at the time argued this was a clear violation on the laws of war, and that it was
morally repugnant to continue punishing a population well into the peacetime.

Nonetheless, the British and French used the peacetime blockade to exact the most
financial concessions from the Germans (to pay back their American creditors).37

Disgusted by these everyday humiliations and the military capitulation, but as equally
inspired by it, Hitler would not forget the importance of national food security in
designing his plans for imperial aggression.38

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37 The experience of Imperial Germany would convince other European powers to create autarkic and
imperial blocs during the interwar period. They wanted to be sure to control their flow of raw materials

38 Scholars have pointed out that Germany, in a material sense, could have kept fighting. It is also what
many German nationalists thought at the time. In fact, it was the political surrender rather than military
Hitler and the NSDAP leadership were determined from their earliest plans onward that the Third Reich would not suffer an agricultural-induced demise along the lines of Wilhemian Germany. The food supply of the German nation would need to be secured on a permanent basis, to be accomplished through a dual strategy of agricultural colonization and outright plunder (Collingham 2011: 26; Evans 2005). In terms of tactical war aims, Hitler placed the highest priority on expanding the Aryan farmscape and securing the food supplies of Western and Central Europe for the German people.

The project of agricultural colonization became a foundational pillar of *Lebensraum*: the broader strategy of seeking ‘living space’ for the Aryan people through a violent ‘Germanization’ of Central and Eastern Europe (Collingham 2011; Evans 2005). The two countries that most figured into Nazi designs were Ukraine and Poland. Hitler was determined that the black and fertile soils of Ukraine would become Germany’s ‘California’ in the east (Mazower 1998: 149). For this reason, Ukraine was the most pivotal territory to be appropriated; a project that, in effect, was a form of agricultural colonization.

Though its soils were not as fertile as those of Ukraine, Poland also had an important role the agro-imperial schemes of Germany. Most importantly, Poland was to be a source for agricultural labor (Bramwell 1985: Chapter 7). The first Nazi Agricultural Minister Walter Darré viewed Poland in the image of a (pre-independence) Ireland under British rule. Poland would be remade as a German agricultural colony in which resettled Aryan landowners would rule over an enslaved Slavic workforce. Any

provided that fertile terrain upon which Fascism take root and grow: ‘this frustration – to repulse the enemy for four years and then to surrender – was the principle motive animating Hitler and his close followers’ (Netz 2004: 125).
superfluous population would be simply ‘transferred’ out (Bramwell 1985: 153-55). The ultimate goal was to colonize the Polish countryside with up to 3 million German farmers (Farquharson 1976: 141).

Darré is an interesting figure to ponder as he was the original author of Lebensraum’s agricultural dimension. Trained as an agronomist, Darré’s rural imaginary was more romantic than scientific. He viewed a class of Nordic peasants, long in history and pedigree, as providing the ‘cultural and racial core’ of German society (Bramwell 1985: 55). At the same time he believed this peasantry was under threat from industrialization, which Nordic peasant culture ‘could not survive’ without assistance (Bramwell 1985: 57).

As the first NSDAP Agricultural Minister, Darré’s most important policy creation to help the peasantry were the ‘Reich Food Estates’ (for an overview see Tracy 1989: 181-204). These extensive commodity arrangements essentially nationalized the purchase of all core foodstuffs, and guaranteed high prices for everything that was produced (Evans 2005: 346; Farquharson 1976). The high prices solidified Darré’s status in the countryside and made small farmers into a core Nazi constituency (Evans 2005; Farquharson 1976; Tilton 1975). Darré also passed legislation that cleared farmer debt, solidified peasant land title, simplified inheritance law, and set up an agricultural university (Evans 2005). As late as the mid-1980s, German farmers still praised Darré as

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39 By the summer of 1941, the NSDAP had settled 200,000 Germans on expropriated Polish farms and removed 400,000 local Poles (Bramwell 1985: 167; Mazower 1998: 162).
40 He also believed Nordic peasant culture was threatened by Christianity, and thus favored pagan religious practice. Darré was also an early proponent of ‘organic’ foods, which he believed help establish ‘the harmony between the body of our people and geo-political space’ (Bramwell 1985: 64). Darré was not your typical Nazi.
41 His political economy, it should be noted, drew generously from the ideas of List (Bramwell 1985: 114).
the ‘last peasant leader’ for the tangible improvements he brought to their lives (Bramwell 1985: 5).

Darré’s ‘blood and soil’ rhetoric and public support for de-industrialization eventually irritated Hitler (Bramwell 1985; Evans 2005) 42 As a result, the important powers he wielded would eventually be handed over to Herbert Backe, a bookish bureaucrat who was considered to be a more ‘efficient and loyal technocrat’ (Bramwell 1985: 91-2). Backe did though share Darré’s vision of a continually eastward expanding Aryan farmscape. Upon assuming his post, he immediately drew up plans to enslave or ‘remove’ the Slavic and Jewish populations on the lands in the east. The NSDAP administrators had come to understand these populations as a ‘quasi-ecological burden’ that had to either be made useful or removed (Collingham 2011: 41).

What resulted was called the ‘Hunger Plan’ (Collingham 2011: 180-218). The plan was actually a sub-strategy of Lebensraum in which the ‘scientific starvation’ of inferior populations was used as a way to secure food supplies for German soldiers, civilians, and factory workers. Detailed plans were drawn up to optimize the nutrition of 9.5 million Germans by denying proper nutrition to another 30 million of what the Germans called ‘useless eaters’ – essentially, superfluous Slavic and Jewish populations who did not labor and therefore, in the racialized biopolitics of the Nazi state, placed an unnecessary burden on the food supply (Collingham 2011: 180).

42 After all, German fascism was also highly preoccupied with the modern and industrial. Realistically, Germany was not going to build its 1000 year Reich on the backs of the peasantry – which was precisely the vision of Darré, who argued that the ‘essential qualities’ of the German people originated with the medieval peasantry (Evans 2005: 421).
Though rarely considered from this angle, the creation of the industrial death machine to carry out the ‘final solution’ was in large measure ‘solving’ a problem at the level of the food supply. With Operation Barbarossa going so poorly, and Ukrainian agrarian production falling below (the unrealistic) expectations the Germans had for it, NSDAP leadership concluded that they needed to eliminate, and quickly, millions of additional Eastern Europe Jews that were ‘unnecessarily’ consuming limited foodstuffs. The genocide thus becomes a strategy of population eugenics organized around a set of practical questions about how to most efficiently eliminate inferior resource-consuming populations (Collingham 2011: 205-207).

Of course, it was not only the Germans who mobilized agro-imperial networks during the Second World War. Due to its extensive wartime food needs, the British created networks to secure production from across its Commonwealth. One example was the The Middle East Supply Center (MESC) (Collingham 2011: 126-31). The MECS was an organization, based in Cairo, that was created to increase farm productivity and rationalize food supplies across North Africa and the Arabian peninsula. Led by the Australian Robert Jackson, it undertook a number of successful endeavors: collecting harvests, creating purchasing boards for grains, sugar, fats and oils, and introducing irrigation schemes in Syria, Lebanon, and Iran (128-131). The MECS was the rarest of wartime phenomena – mostly successful: ‘it maintained an important military region and sustained the military effort, while at the same time cutting down demands on shipping

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43 Collingham notes that this included six sovereign states, four British colonies, and four League of Nations mandates; moreover, it stretched from Turkey in the north, to the sheikdoms in the Persian Gulf. It covered areas in the Mediterranean, such as Cyprus and Malta, as well as the contemporary borders of Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia (Collingham 2011: 126).
and cushioning the indigenous population from the impact of war’ (Collingham 2011: 131)

In Southern Africa, especially Rhodesia, British procurement policies were not as successful. But they were far more brutal. Here, as well as in parts of East Africa, permission was given to white settlers farmers to use conscription and forms of physical repression to keep the indigenous black labor force toiling on the land (Collingham 2011: 131-34). Other problems also resulted from British wartime food policies. From Bengal to Bechuanaland, the British would swoop in and make large purchases of food on local markets in order to feed allied soldiers, at whatever cost was necessary. This large buying presence would then quickly induce severe inflation in local markets, often with fatal consequences for local populations (Ó Gráda 2009; Sen 1995). While the Nazis were by far the more exploitative and ruthless in their wartime agricultural imperialism, allied states also used practices of hierarchy, domination and exploitation in keeping their populations fed during this truly global conflict.

Rationing: Food, Physiology and Total War

It was arguably in wartime, notably the Second World War, that the body politic becomes most fully realized as a biological polity. The economic blockade of Germany had demonstrated one important lesson to everyone: hungry and demoralized populations do not win wars. This meant that a high priority had to be placed on keeping populations fed during war, as well as on economizing and standardizing the distribution of all essential foodstuffs as an insurance against nutritional deprivation in any prolonged conflict. The
circulation of food would (again) need to be taken out of the marketplace and placed into the hands of public authorities.

On a national scale, rationing was first used in WWI. The French developed a standardized ‘food card’ to oversee the distribution of commodities such as sugar and bread across the civilian population (Laribé and Pinot 1927: 171-74). The cards eventually come to include photos for personal verification as a way to reduce fraud. In September 1917, the French government set up a Centralized Food Department (175). Amongst its other duties, the Food Department supervised the purchase of grain, kept millers and bakers supplied, and even regulated the baking and sale of bread. Not since the bread police of preindustrial Europe had the production and movement of grain been regulated in such minutia.

Germany used practices of both rationing and ‘public feeding’ (Allen 2003; Offer 1989) A War Food Office was established in 1916 and given extensive powers over food provisioning and distribution. This included carrying out the aforementioned public feeding in ‘municipal kitchens’. In Berlin, citizens could also trade in their potato and meat rations to receive a ‘meal pass’ which afforded them one hot meal a day (Allen 2004). Wartime administrators believed that this hot meal, taken inside and in the company of fellows, would have the additional benefit of producing a sense of ‘domesticity’ among those eating in the municipal kitchens.
It is with the Second World War that rationing becomes standard political practice among all belligerent states (Collingham 2011; Mazower 1998: Milward 1977). In the British instance, the rationing system built upon the principles of universalism and equality, foreshadowing their approach to the postwar welfare state. Rationing was introduced in 1940 explicitly against the desires of Churchill (Collingham 2011: 361). Reflecting an egalitarian ethos, every citizen was entitled to the same amount of eggs, bacon, sugar, oil and so on. ‘Top-ups’ and extra food was made available to miners and factory workers in specified ‘work canteens’. (Collingham 2011: 361). Within the British system, citizens were also provided a certain number of ‘points’ that could be used for non-rationed goods, such as biscuits or sardines.

The Germans created the most scientific and physiologically exacting approach to rationing, often based in their own rigorous nutritional research. The German ration system was based on a set of ‘scientifically’ derived allotments were derived from categories such as gender, age, race, occupation and energy expended per labour hour.\footnote{This ‘physiological approach’ to constructing ration categories actually began with the German system during the First World War (Offer 1989: 181-185; see also ). At this point, planners were drawing on the knowledges of ‘food science’ that had just appeared, and were able to break down foodstuffs into categories around nutrition and micronutrients (Coveney 2000; Lupton 1996). In the German case, this would be used to construct ration categories that broke down around age (adult/child), sex (male/female) and work status (‘active laborer’ or not).} In it is worth recalling that the Nazi state was also a highly efficient and highly racialized biopolitical state (Foucault 2003; Mazower 1998). An elaborate food and nutrition infrastructure was part of this biopolitical state apparatus; a mechanism to guarantee the...
health of national populations while simultaneously denying adequate nutrition to other ‘inferior’ populations.

Germany began rationing in 1939, and the system clearly reflected the hierarchies of Aryan eugenics and race science (Collingham 2011: 359-60). At the broadest level, there was one system for Aryans and a second-tier system for non-Aryans. Within the second tier, severe restrictions were placed on the daily food intake and retail purchases of Jewish populations. But it was not only Jews that were targeted as nutritional inferiors. A particularly loathsome program called the ‘Falthauser Diet’ was developed to starve the mentally ill through a progressive elimination of protein from their diets (Collingham 2011: 360).

Rationing was instituted in occupied France in 1940 (Mouré & Schwartz 2007). Ration tickets were based on broad socioeconomic categories that included age and type of employment. The tickets provided access to allottings of bread (daily), meats and fish (weekly) and sugar (monthly). Rations given to working adults provided only 1,500 calories per day, a figure that dwindled to 1,000 calories in 1944 (Mouré & Schwartz 2007: 263). The system was not designed to be comprehensive and, as the Académie de Medicine demonstrated, it was not possible to live on the rations alone without developing at least one lung infection, skin disorder or deficiency disease (266).

Regardless, the system did keep French citizens (somewhat) nourished during a period in
which the state itself was divided between an occupation zone, around Paris, and a Vichy puppet-regime in the south.\textsuperscript{45}

Rationing had decisive impacts on the organization of postwar politics, and for agricultural governance specifically. First, as a comprehensive and successful program of administrative intervention in civilian life, it helped normalize the belief that activist forms of social policy could produce the forms of equality long desired. And rationing \textit{did} markedly improve the health of the working classes, a fact noted by planners who included food and nutritional policies among the institutions of the postwar welfare state: ‘The state is required to decide what level of expenditure on food is desirable and even what diet is desirable. At this point, government decisions pass from what it technically feasible in the present to what is socially desirable’ (Milward 1977: 284).

Rationing was thus a crucial catalyst for postwar welfarism because it demonstrated the state could be successful in carrying out a large-scale social policy in the midst of total war conditions. It provided a legitimation of biopolitical regulation as a core feature of postwar power:

Rationing demonstrated that government planning could be used for egalitarian ends and was as a result surprisingly popular. Hence the war itself, with the new roles assumed by government in managing the economy and society, demonstrated the truth of the reformer’s arguments: democracy was indeed compatible with an interventionist state (Mazower 1998: 185)

The ‘social’ does not emerge as a preeminent space of postwar politics \textit{ex novo}. It was born from wartime plans and programs such as rationing; programs articulated around collective struggle and the discovery of solidarity in material equality. The ration cards,

\textsuperscript{45} In addition to the three cases examined here, the Belgian, Dutch, Italian and Swedish governing authorities (or what was left of them) all imposed forms of rationing, with daily provisions that ranged fairly dramatically (Milward 1977: 228)
bread queues, and collective meals in basements were the little things made it possible to imagine agro-food power from the perspective of the social. Moreover, the success of rationing reminded people that it was the state that had ultimately kept people fed during the war, while formal markets had mostly encouraged hucksterism and profiteering.

Wartime agro-food policies would constitute the fullest expression of national agricultural policies as apparatuses of state power. But there was also an important transitional or hybrid nature to such policies as well. Wartime policies were about fulfilling the needs of the nation. But in imagining how this could be done, the state adopted what could be understood as a ‘social gaze’ over its population. This social gaze would only fully blossom in the mixed economies and welfare states of postwar Western Europe, as we will now see in our discussion of postwar agricultural governance.

**Conclusion**

This chapter went from a Europe of peasants, crowds and police, to one of farmers, tariffs and rations. It began with exploring the imbrications between state formation and food supply. Here we saw that a certain ‘monopoly’ control over the food supply was necessary in order to make centralized states. Practices around extracting agricultural surplus, such as those involved pulling food from the countryside to feed soldiers and pacify restive crowds, clearly implicated agrarian life in the rise of centralized state power. Moreover, as was also explored, this involved enacting regimes of differential governance across the city and countryside.

Beginning in the later quarter of the nineteenth century, ‘agricultural policy’ would displace these absolutist configurations. Agricultural policies were oriented
towards problems of security, originally those that concerned the national food supply
and the economic fates of farmers and rural economies under conditions of intense
international competition. Agricultural policies would introduce changes at the level of
how food, agriculture and rurality were governed in Western Europe. This was evident in
the development of new techniques of economic government – based on tariffs, sanitary
measures, and import certificates – in addition to a host of new programs for
‘governmentalizing’ the farming sector and rural society. Finally, the national and
collective elements of agricultural governance are further intensified in the two World
Wars, at which point the nationalization of agrarian production and the public
provisioning of food become new ‘social’ realities of state power.
Chapter Three

Calories, Tractors and Food Balance Sheets: The Birth of European Agriculture

‘Food will win the war and write the peace’
- US Department of Agriculture (cited in Collingham 2011: 476)

‘Regional organizations and regional spaces are assembled in ways that seem to depend far less on the exercise of brute force’
- William Walters 2012: 129

Introduction

This chapter provides a revisionist interpretation on the origins of European agricultural policy. Despite its central role in combating food shortages and agricultural ‘backwardness’ in postwar Europe, the work of the OEEC has rarely been explored as formative in developing a space of regional agro-food government. This chapter elucidates this pivotal ‘minor’ history of postwar European cooperation and shows how it concretely linked together the problems of food supply and postwar recovery. Moreover, it demonstrates how strategies and practices of functionalism and technocracy were integral to this development.

Beginning in 1947, the OEEC will begin to make visible the problems of food and farming as common European problems. The bulk of the work was done in a specialized committee called the ‘Food and Agricultural Committee’ (FAC). The programs of the FAC were important for two reasons. First, its technical committees developed mechanisms to make intelligible the problems of nutritional health in the context of substantial postwar food deficiencies. Second, the FAC consolidated knowledge around ‘technical farming’ and disseminated this production paradigm among its member-states. The OEEC was operating within a postwar mindset that viewed food plentitude as
entirely possible. At the same time, this belief was predicated on the need to spread a new material ecology of fertilizers, tractors, hybrid seeds, and agrarian practices across Europe’s farmscapes.

The chapter brings into sharper focus the problems and discourses through which food and agriculture were first ‘mapped-out’ as a European space of government in the OEEC. It will also demonstrate that these first strategies of agro-food cooperation were predicated on making nutritional health and ‘technical farming’ central to postwar recovery. I hope to contest standard histories of agricultural integration that view the CAP as *sui generis*. The history of European agricultural policy does not begin with quibblings over the market price of wheat, or a supposed German-Franco *quid pro quo* that necessitated industrial integration have an agrarian counterpart. In fact, the history of agricultural cooperation begins a full decade before the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957. Rather, it was born in the crisis-mitigation policies of the OEEC.

The chapter progresses in five sections. The first section discusses the food shortages and depressed agricultural productivity that provided the context in which the OEEC conducted its work. The following section then provides a relevant history of the OEEC, and outlines the specific mandate given to FAC. The fourth section describes the strategy of the OEEC to promote ‘technical farming’ as the universal solution to Europe’s food and farm problems. The final section asks how this ignored moment in agro-food politics speaks to the established historiography of ‘agricultural integration’. In particular, I propose we interpret the work of the OEEC through the prism of a ‘learning machine’.
Postwar Food Shortages and the ‘Functional’ Solution

‘A hungry man is not a free man’
- Adlai Stevenson in 1952

Food shortages were the wartime problem that did not disappear with the peace. After the war, the immediate concern throughout Western Europe was to raise agricultural production. Besides the problem of food shortages, there was a general need to save foreign exchange by keeping imports as low as possible’ (Tracy 1989: 216). Unlike industry, postwar agriculture was unable to raise production levels over the late-1940s. As a result, shortages, rationing, and black market activity continued to govern the daily struggle for bread and other essentials, even after the war (Collingham 2011; Eichengreen 2007; Milward 1977). Collingham (2011) notes that postwar Europe was a space of ‘food misery’ where the ‘fortunate’ consumed 1,900 calories a day. The millions ‘living on the edge’ subsisted on less than 1,000 calories a day and commonly succumbed to diseases encouraged by malnutrition, including tuberculosis (468-69). Polling of French citizens over 1946 routinely found that ‘food’ ‘bread’ and ‘meat’ were far and away ‘the public’s number one preoccupation’ (Judt 2005: 86).

For postwar Europe, ‘the end of hostilities did not bring an end to the misery and starvation which the war had engendered’ (Collingham 2011: 467). The Dutch, the most efficient agricultural producers in prewar Europe, saw their weekly caloric ration fell below the daily ration of the liberation forces during the ferocious Hungerwinter of 1945 (Judt 2005; 21). Between sixteen and twenty thousand Dutch perished in the worst hit

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3 Farm yields were lower in 1951 than in 1938 (Griffiths 1997b: 352).
western regions (see Ó Gráda 2009: 113). The average weight loss ranged from 15 to percent 20 percent, and half the female population stopped menstruating (113).

In sections of Western Germany, cut off from their traditional bread-basket in Eastern Prussia, the situation became acute as local farming had become ‘seriously depleted’ after the war (Tracy 1989: 216).⁴ In Hamburg, the cost of one black market egg equaled the wages for eight hours of manual labour (Eichengreen 2007: 62). Over the winter of 1946-47, populations in allied zones were consuming between 1,000 and 1,400 calories per day (Collingham 2011: 467-68; Tracy 1989: 223). Nor were food shortages and inadequate provisioning limited to Germany. The food supply was a pan-European social crisis in the immediate postwar years:

Food shortages were endemic everywhere except Sweden and Switzerland. Only UNRRA supplies kept Austrians from starving in the twelve months that followed…provision in the British zone of Germany fell from 1,500 calories a day per adult to in mid-1946 to 1,050 in early 1947. Italians, who suffered two consecutive years of hunger in 1945 and 1946, had the lowest average food levels of all the west European populations in the spring of 1947 (Judt 2005: 86).

For many Europeans, the worst came with a disastrous harvest in 1947. This resulted from a brutally cold winter, followed by spring flooding, which culminated in summer drought. The dastardly climatic combination reduced yields by over a third and further compromised the food availability for many already malnourished Europeans (Judt 2005: 86-7; Eichengreen 2007: 56-8).

Weather was not the only blockage on the way to realizing food security. The availability of US dollars for the importation of food was also a problem (Coppock 1963: 35-38; Milward 1992; Griffiths 1997a: 352-55; Judt 2005: 87-98; Eichengreen 2007: 58-74).

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⁴ For most Germans, their first experiences with food shortage came only after the war (Collingham 2011: 467)
The ‘dollar area’ (the US and Canada) was the only region that was producing large grain surpluses after the war. Because of unstable (or worthless) national currencies, European governments had to finance their imports of cereals and feed using precious dollar reserves. The problem was that these dollars had to also be rationed for necessities such as fuel and machinery. This came to be called the ‘dollar problem’, and it remained an important rationale for increasing domestic production well into the 1950s (Griffiths 1995).

At the production level, the problems of postwar European agriculture were many. The wartime emphasis on armaments production decreased investment in agricultural sectors (Milward 1977; Tracy 1989: 215-19). Over the course of the war, land utilised for arable farming fell 1.4 million hectares, and the agricultural sector lost 400,000 labourers. A combination of destroyed transportation infrastructures, low commodity prices, and inflated currencies discouraged farmers from bringing food to market (Eichengreen 2007: 52-64; Judt 2005: 21-22;). Farmers were sometimes reduced to survival strategies such as self-sufficiency or bartering. Two years into the peace, food markets were basically not working.

Considering the ample needs of reconstruction, this agrarian situation was considered severe. The US Secretary of State George Marshall would describe this context in his pivotal Harvard speech that launched the ERP recovery program:

The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of life...Raw materials and food are in short supply. Machinery is lacking or worn out. The farmer or peasant cannot find the goods for sale which he desires to purchase...He, therefore, has withdrawn many fields from crop cultivation and is using them for grazing. He feeds more grain to stock and finds for himself and his family an ample supply of food,
however short he may be on clothing and the other ordinary gadgets of civilisation. Meanwhile people in the cities are short of food and fuel’ (Marshall 1947, 5 June).

*Foreign Affairs* editor Stanley Fish toured Western Europe in 1947 and described foodstuff shortages of all kinds; ‘too little flour to make bread...seeds for planting...fertilizer to nourish it...sugar for jam, fats for frying, milk for babies’ (cited in Judt 2005: 89). The widespread lack of everyday goods convinced Secretary Marshall that a psychology of ‘suffering’ was taking hold among Europeans, foreclosing on the chance for successful social rehabilitation and reconstruction. Furthermore, the generalized nature of the suffering convinced him that American aid could not favour ‘any country or doctrine’, but had to be directed against the ‘hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos’ that prevailed all across Europe (5 June 1947). George Kennan, diplomat and occupation advisor, echoed the sentiment in concluding that communism was only a secondary threat compared to the depletion of Europe’s ‘spiritual vigour’ that would result from sustained deficiencies of consumer goods (Kennan 1968).

For the European masses, a consistent supply of food was the most tangible proof that wartime deprivations were in the past. For many, the ‘social time’ of war had not been marked by fighting, but by the availability of food. One revealing and popular saying in wartime Berlin went: ‘The fighting won’t stop until Göring fits into Goebbels’ trousers’ (cited in Collingham 2011: 347). The identification of war with struggles for and over food was especially pronounced in France. Within the area of Nazi occupation, French citizens struggled to supplement official per-day rations of between 1,200 and 1,700 with black market purchases, meals in municipal soup kitchens, and the use *colis familiaux* – care packages from the countryside (Mouré & Schwartz 2007). Only
occupation German soldiers were well-fed, as they commandeered and consumed the best of French agriculture (Milward 1977: 268). Mouré and Schwartz (2007) describe the culture of ‘food penury’ that dominated the social landscape of wartime France:

The all-consuming obsession with food ‘occupied’ minds and bodies, in both senses of the word. The boundaries between public and private life, imprecise especially in time of war, now seemed to disappear. Family food concerns dominated public policy and public spaces more than ever, while the intensely personal experience of hunger brought the world of haute politique home to the kitchen table. The scarcity of food came to shape the thought, perceptions and habits of the French population in an unprecedented way. The theme of food – getting it, preparing it, living without it – is everywhere’ (273).5

Widespread food availability was the symbolic threshold that signaled a return to ‘normal life’. When Adenauer assumed leadership of the new Federal Republic in 1949, he quickly declared food shortages and high consumer prices the biggest social problem confronting the new state. For this reason, all across Western Europe, the rationing of foodstuffs continued well into the reconstruction phase (Yates 1960: 57). In France, wartime measures were finally lifted in 1949 (Mouré and Schwartz 2007: 289). For the British, the rationing of some basic food stuffs continued until 1954 (Collingham 2011: 495). Germany was the odd case in this regard. To the (irritated) surprise of American occupation authorities, Erhard suddenly lifted most price controls and rationing measures in 1948 (Eichengreen 2007). But this did not entail a complete return to market-mechanisms in the new West Germany. Consumer food subsidies would be provided until the mid-1950s.

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5 Monnet (1978) also understood the symbolic power of food. He had members of the planning committee member meet in a common dining room and take their simple meals together as a way to foster a spirit of cooperation. He believed that having meals together ‘encouraged progress and mutual understanding’ (241).
The ‘Marriage’ of Public Health and Agricultural Policy

Food security was explicitly translated into postwar national agricultural policies through strategies of ‘self-sufficiency’. Unlike their nationalist predecessors, these policies were absent significant geopolitical underpinnings. At their core was a new expressed relationship between agriculture and public health. In other words, diet and nutrition were a direct reflection of the type of food grown, which itself reflected the priorities of agricultural policy. An effect of this conclusion was that the lines between food and agricultural policies would become somewhat blurred in the postwar period.

The linkages between food, population health and farming were first articulated during the 1930s. Of particular influence was the League of Nations publication *The Relation of Nutrition to Health, Agriculture, and Economic Policy* (1937). This report imagined the spaces of food supply to constitute a site of holistic economic planning and social security. But it was only after the Second World War that ‘the marriage of health and agriculture would [be] consummated’ in national policies (Yates 1960: 55). Griffiths argues that national agricultural policies came to so privilege the goals of self-sufficiency and increasing the production of healthful foodstuffs that they would embody a veritable ‘cult of food’. Tracy argues that all countries had the same essential goal – ‘to expand agricultural production by all possible means’ (Tracy 1989: 219).6

The insistence on food security was an important reason agriculture became ‘the equivalent of a large nationalized industry, managed by interventionist policies that sought to impose macroeconomic objectives in return for exemption from the forces of

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6 The goal of self-sufficiency was not unique to Western Europe, but common among all postwar industrialized states (Coleman 1998; Ingersent & Rayner 1999; Federico 2005).
open economic competition’ (Milward 1992: 229). To an even greater degree than in the interwar period, agricultural governance was becoming a machinery of securitization shaped by ‘the double stimulus’ of wartime shortages and dollar deficits (Federico 2005: 198). This interweaving of agricultural governance with the problems of food security and public health was a thread that ran from wartime to peacetime:

The aims of all post-war agrarian policies can be summed up in one word – self-sufficiency, or as near self-sufficiency as possible. First, the war had confirmed that the success of agriculture was vital to national survival – vital in the sense of ‘necessary for life’. Had it not been for the dramatic reorganizations in European agriculture, the chances for survival for a large sector of the population would have deteriorated. These achievements lifted agriculture from the position that it occupied in the 1930s – a sectoral interest, albeit an important one – to the status where it became a scarcely veiled, and scarcely questioned, truly national interest’ (Griffiths 1997b: 352)

Bowler (1985) argues the wartime ‘siege mentality’ around food supply was still in place during CAP negotiations (1955-1957) (Bowler 1985: 10). While the fact is often marginalized by CAP scholars today, increasing and stabilizing the food supply was a point of consensus among the existing national schemes; therefore it was one of the early common problem to be given a ‘regional’ solution (see especially Bowler 1985; Fennel 1997; Knudsen 2006). At this time, the belief in using public policy to manipulate food production levels was driven by necessity rather than ideology. As becomes clearer in the following section, a genuine ‘neo-Malthusian’ fear had appeared on the international political landscape. Could the food supply keep up with growing population levels?

7 Absolute shortages of meats, fats and sugar persisted up to the signing of the Rome Treaty in 1957 (Gardner 1996: 15). Ackrill (2000) argues the CAP had ‘clear antecedents’ in postwar national agricultural policies. At both levels, the objective was to ‘provide consumers with more food to eat and improve nutrition, as well as to relieve the balance of payments constrain’ (25-6).

8 Of the five priorities outlined for the future CAP in the Spaak Report (1955), three of them directly concerned the conditions of food availability. Objective (a) sets the first objective of the CAP as ‘to increase agricultural productivity. Objectives (d) and (e) declare the CAP will have to ‘assure the availability of supplies’, and make sure consumers have food available at ‘reasonable prices’. 
Political authorities and reconstruction planners viewed adequate food provisions as the most acute problem facing postwar populations, and the one most difficult to ameliorate. The problem was not just that hungry populations had a propensity to riot and loot. It was also the case that over the course of the war, it had become a normalized assumption that an ‘adequate’ and ‘balanced’ diet was a prerequisite for healthy, productive, and fecund populations (Yates 1960: 51-75). Under the aegis of postwar welfarism, and catalyzed by the political experiences and ‘food knowledge’ of the 30s and 40s, including a new awareness of the nutritional divides between classes, agriculture would comprise a core site of postwar welfarism.

According to Ruggie, multilateral regimes were crucial actors in the recovery, rehabilitation, and stabilization of a war-ravaged Europe (1998: 109-12). Food constituted a primary site of this transnational cooperation. Precedents had already been set in the form of wartime programs. These first began first with the Anglo-American Canadian Combined Food Board which coordinated the distribution of food between the allied states, drawing on North American surplus. Milward (1977) cites this as the first in a string of cooperative food and agricultural endeavors that would ‘last unbroken from the Second World War through the Marshall Plan and the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization’ (252).

In Chapter One I discussed the importance of the UNRRA and FAO for their role in ‘internationalizing’ and ‘regionalizing’ food relief. The bulk of this chapter is focused
on work of the OEEC. But what also deserves some brief mention here is how a nascent international civil society – now embodied in a vast global NGO complex – was likewise born at this juncture of food relief and insecure populations.

To take one prominent example, the prominent global-NGO Oxfam (Oxford Committee for Famine Relief) began as a fund-raising drive to combat starvation in wartime Greece (Ó Gráda 2009: 219; Collingham 2011: 167). The food aid was gathered by citizens alarmed at Churchill’s willingness to let Greek civilians starve rather than risk having German soldiers consume allied food relief. CARE International is the second example of an NGO originating with wartime food relief efforts. Created in 1945, the organization provided a channel for Americans to send individual relief packages to suffering Europeans – which they did by the millions. Oxfam and CARE not only contributed to internationalizing postwar food-relief but, in a unique way, sought to ‘democratize’ it as well. Their work was based on the logic that the suffering of disadvantaged populations was the responsibility of all global citizens that were in a position to help.

Food and Functionalism

As stated earlier, the FAO was unique for consolidating a new interdisciplinary knowledge structure around the problems of food and agriculture. Despite its inability to implement a cosmopolitan global food order, the FAO was quite successful in forging the

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9 CARE stands for: Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe

10 Efforts were also undertaken by statesman to bring the problems to attention of the public. One notable attempt was the ‘famine tour’ conducted by Herbert Hoover in 1946. Upon visiting thirty countries in two months, the former head of the ARA became an incessant critic of allied reconstruction efforts (Collingham 2011: 167, 480). He argued that Americans were not sacrificing enough – for example, by reducing meat consumption to free up vital grains for human consumption on the continent – in order to help suffering Europeans.
problems of food, nutrition and agriculture into sites of research, technical collaboration and programmatic action between states. In this way, it was a truly visionary organization. It imagined the ‘global food system’ as an entity that linked together producers, citizens, and markets. As such, this system needed to governed in a holistic fashion. ‘Hunger ceased to be a foreign country…The new internationalist vision wove together social democracy, nutrition, trade stabilization and global citizenship’ (Trentmann 2007).

Political programs are rarely adopted in full. This was also the case with functionalism in the postwar period. David Mitrany, its leading proponent, would never see his apolitical vision of world government based on science and the ‘expert management’ of social problems come to fruition. Similarly, John Boyd-Orr was scuttled in his attempt to forge the FAO into a site of international planning and redistribution. But to dismiss functionalism because it was not adopted in full elides the practical and substantive contributions it did make. No political program, including those of liberalism and capitalism, ever manifests in a ‘pure’ form. Therefore, we must give attention to the partial and unique ways that political strategies come to effect and imprint the political landscape. This will be the case with agriculture and functionalism.

In their work on food and agriculture, the UNRRA, FAO and OEEC all put into operation certain ‘functional’ logics. Functionalism is a theory of international cooperation based on the belief certain social problems are best managed through apolitical coordination and the ‘expertise’ held by multiple states. In its ideal expression, experts would generate the various studies, reports, commissions that would provide the basis for governing social problems at a global level. Functionalism assumes certain
'needs’ should be governed in pragmatic ways, without being subject to political meddling and ideological interferences. In other words, regimes of technocratic coordination have the advantage of being specific to the exact contexts, knowledges and relations that define the social ecology of a given problem:

Here we discover a cardinal virtue of the functional pattern, what one might call the virtue of technical self-determination. The functional dimensions, as we have seen, determine themselves. In a manner the function determines the its appropriate organs. It also reveals through practice the nature of the action required under given conditions and in that way the powers needed by the respective authority. The function, one might say, determines the political instrument suitable for its proper activity (Mitrany 1941/1975: 118, emphasis in original)

Early IR ‘realists’ dismissed Mitrany’s belief in functionalism as a vehicle for world peace and prosperity as hopelessly utopian. The usual accusation was that he ignored the lasting practical and symbolic importance of national politics (Carr 1944). In any event, the critique ignores an entire field of functional logics, practices, and modes of organization that did have a significant impact on multilateralizing postwar politics. To say functionalism was ineffectual because it eschewed the tenants of great power politics ignores the obvious impact it had in areas such as health, agriculture and combating infectious disease; the domains of so-called ‘low politics’.

Writing for the British Foreign Office during the war, Mitrany accurately predicted that many social and economic problems would be multilateralized at the end of the conflict. He argued that the decisive ‘task of our time is rather to develop and coordinate the social scope of authority…Internationally it is no longer a question of defining relations between states, but of merging them’ (Mitrany 1941/1975: 107).
Relevant for our purposes here, Mitrany understood the food supply as one of the integral dimensions of a global order based on functionalist principles.

In one of his forgotten works, *Food and Freedom* (1954), Mitrany argues that securing food availability for all national populations was a prerequisite for achieving the more historically minded political projects of the postwar era; such as spreading democracy, ending class antagonisms, and modernizing economies. Mitrany also foreshadows the later work of Amartya Sen (1995) in arguing that individual ‘entitlements’ to food were more often caused by political and economic blockages than deficiencies in aggregate supply (hence the need for international coordination to ‘smooth’ out supply discrepancies). There was also an logic of welfare liberalism apparent in Mitrany’s system. This was evident in the argument that ‘individual autonomy’ could only be possible through a rational management of food supplies at a global level; the realization of liberalism would depend on a competent global technocracy.

Boyd-Orr similarly professed that neither democracy, modernization or economic development could be built on the backs of malnourished populations. In *Food and the People* (1943), he argues that nutrition was an imperative site of interstate cooperation because it ‘will bring about a great advance in human well-being and an expanding world economy’ (6) Furthermore, in carrying out such a policy, Boyd-Orr argues that ‘nations will…evolve a technique of international co-operation which can be used for the solution of other world problems’ (6). The strategies of Mitrany, Boyd-Orr and other functionalists came to be embodied in the work of thousands of nutritionists and agronomists in the FAO. The intent was to depoliticize the ‘living’ needs of populations,
such as nutrition, by handing these competencies over to practitioners, scientists, and other ‘experts’ adequately trained in the field.\footnote{Mitrany hoped the functional blueprint would also be utilized by European statesman in their quest towards integration. He believed a ‘practical’ solution – and not the constitutional designs of Euro-federalists – should guide reconstruction: ‘His main aim was to ensure that the new peace process would not be based on a constitutional approach…but on the practical and pragmatic requirements of recovery in Europe’ (Anderson 1998: 580).}

It is common to imagine that postwar politics was colonized by ‘grand’ visions of economic modernization and the universalization of social insurance. While there is truth to this narrative, it does a better job of capturing the political tenor of the 1950s and 60s. In the subsequent years immediately following the war it were more ‘immediate’ and ‘vital’ needs such as food, agriculture, housing and vaccines that mattered most. To understand how these problems were managed, we need to approach postwar history from a slightly different vantage point. That is, we need to view it through its minor cases and forgotten strategies, such as those found in the OEEC.

**The Agro-Food Politics of the OEEC**

Following the Second World War, the political field became constituted by new assemblages of transnational and global government (Larner and Walters 2002: 392). Most of these were not based on diminishing the sovereign power of states, but finding ways to bolster their governing capacity (see also Milward 1992). A common strategy was to have states network their forms of expertise and administrative power to tackle the problems of reconstruction that were understood to be beyond the capacity of individual states to manage. The OEEC was an important venue for this new modality of cooperation.
Founded in 1947, the OEEC was the earliest, largest and most successful of the postwar regional organizations that would assist in rehabilitating postwar Europe. The OEEC is best known for its foundational task: i.e. its role as the organization that would facilitate the distribution of ERP funds to war-battered European states. This was the ‘Marshall Plan’: a comprehensive, US-funded, economic recovery program meant to initiate recovery across Europe (Griffiths et al. 1997a; Judt 2005; Landes 1969; Schain et al. 2001). The ERP provided $12.5 billion in cash and goods that proved essential to clearing up key bottlenecks – such as those for tractors, fertilizer and feedingstuffs – that were pivotal to ‘jumpstarting’ European recovery.

In terms of the contribution the ERP made to European recovery, Landes (1969) states: ‘At this point [late 1940s] Marshall Plan aid played a decisive role in shifting the economies of Europe from a rut of dislocation and crisis to that path of independently sustained growth they have followed ever since’ (495). Additionally, there was also an important, albeit unquantifiable, psychological balm that came from Europeans knowing the US was pumping billions into their social and economic recovery: ‘Indeed, one might

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12 There were at least fifteen such regional European organizations in this period (Ruggie 1998: 103).
13 It is common to stress that American ‘interests’ motivated the ERP. Wishing to consolidate a liberal and capitalist Western Europe that would serve as a trading partner and geopolitical ally, the US certainly made a ‘political investment’ in the region. The most lasting aspect of that investment has proven to be the US demand that Europeans cooperate in putting together their four-year economic programs (which are then approved by the US through the ECA). As a condition for receiving aid, Americans thus foisted multilateralism on (often reluctant) Europeans at an stage when the political environment was unstable. It was also believed that American aid would help ensure that a ‘capitalist’ path of economic reconstruction was more or less adhered to (Barbezat 1997; Cini 2001; Griffiths 1995a).
14 The ERP also contributed to a significant increase in European trade by devoting $1.5 billion of the ERP funds to creating a European Payments Union (EPU). In short, the EPU provided lines of credit to approved importers and exporters which made it possible to trade in an unstable currency environment (Griffiths 1995: 10-12; Judt 2005: 94). The OEEC also contributed to an increase in European trade through its ‘trade liberalization scheme’ (Griffiths 1995a: 13-4; Landes 1968: 505). This program resulted in a 75% reduction in the use of trade quotas – but not tariff levels – by the mid-1950s. Both the EPU and trade liberalization were regional economic assemblages that set the groundwork for the completion of the Common Market in the 1960s.
say that the Marshall Plan helped Europeans feel better about themselves. It helped them break decisively with a legacy of chauvinism, depression and authoritarian solutions. It made co-ordinated economic policy-making seem normal rather than unusual’ (Judt 2005: 97).

_The ‘Technical Committees’ of the OEEC_

The ERP was therefore central to European reconstruction, but it did not exhaust the work of the OEEC. To assume so would blind us to a host of other tasks and functions facilitated through the organization. Many of these were carried out in the OEEC’s ‘technical committees’. The committees were responsible for facilitating research and coordinating policy on specific problems of a general economic and social concern (Archer 1994: 48; Brusse & Griffiths 1997). The committees were congruent with what Mitrany imagined to be the buildings blocks of functional government; i.e. groups staffed with experts dedicated to the ‘relief and reconstruction’ of populations. For Mitrany, the ‘ground floor for a new international structure’ would be based on proliferating these types of specialized committees to govern social needs with little regard for political ‘frontiers’ (Mitrany 1942/1975: 174-75).

The work of the OEEC’s technical committees has received little attention from historians of European integration. While lacking the financial health and public visibility of the ERP, these committees, nonetheless, constituted forums for making visible and imagining solutions for Europe’s most pressing postwar problems. Robert Marjolin, the first Secretariat-General of the OEEC, has noted that much of his time during those first

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15 Technical committees were built into the original OEEC and included ones for raw materials, machinery, balance of payments, food and agriculture, manpower and electricity, amongst others (see OECD 2010).
years was spent organizing such technical committees (Marjolin 1989: 191-205).

Moreover, it was from the administrative and organizational practices of these committees – around problems such as food, feed and manpower – that ‘inscriptions’ and ‘mappings’ of European governmental space would first appear. For scholars concerned with the birth and formations of governmental Europe, the everyday work of these committees should be of greater interest.16

This chapter is concerned with the work of the OEEC’s Food and Agricultural Committee (FAC).17 The FAC was given the task of studying and finding solutions to the problems of depressed agricultural production and insufficient nutritional health in postwar Europe. Collecting information on these problems was considered important in its own right, as well as a way to prioritize the distribution of ERP funds. This section examines the work of the committee from 1948-1953. It was during this crisis-moment when the FAC becomes a concrete institutional site wherein the politics of agriculture are imagined anew. That is, as a space of regional government visible in terms of calories, yields, statistics and tractors.

*The Work of the Food and Agricultural Committee*

The FAC was officially created in 1948, though study groups on food and agriculture were also present in the Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC).18 The

16 Furthermore, with the release of OEEC archives, it is now possible to take a more ‘problem-oriented’ and ‘international’ perspective to the work of this organization (Brusse & Griffiths 1997: 29). The archival work for this chapter was conducted at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy.
17 There were a number of separate working groups for investigating individual agricultural problems in the FAC. This proliferation of working parties was justified on the grounds ‘that in view of the importance of food and agriculture in the economies of participating countries, and as the whole field was too wide and the volume to great to be dealt with by one committee (OEEC1949a: 2).
18 The CEEC was the institutional pre-cursor to the OEEC. The name changed occurred when ERP dollars began to flow in 1948.
subcommittee was ostensibly committed to fostering trade across national agrarian sectors, but this initiative was never seriously pursued\textsuperscript{19}. The work of the FAC came to center on the ways agricultural production could ‘make the greatest contribution to European recovery’ (OEEC 1949c: 7). One of the earliest tasks of the subcommittee was to request from member-states detailed plans on how they would increase the supply and consumption of foodstuffs over a four-year period (OEEC 1948a).

The plans were a requirement for receiving ERP funds. Nonetheless, the FAC was often disappointed with the material that was submitted. The committee secretariat complained the OEEC’s work was ‘seriously handicapped’ by the lack of information forthcoming from member states. The 1948 ‘progress report’ would therefore conclude that the first step in confronting Europe’s food and farm problems was to have a better accounting of what these problems actually were. As a consequence, the FAC requested that states submit additional information on food supply levels, food consumption levels, and agricultural modernization programs (and future plans). Here begins the longstanding effort of the FAC to consolidate, standardize and otherwise improve Europe’s agricultural statistics.

It did not take the executive committee of the OEEC long to reach the conclusion that food shortages posed a greater threat to economic and social recovery than previously understood. As a result, a broader mandate for the FAC would be detailed in a subsequent document titled ‘Future Work of the Food and Agricultural Committee’

\textsuperscript{19} The original mandate of the FAC was clear that liberalization of markets is not a viable strategy for achieving ‘results of real magnitude’ in agricultural production. The OEEC mentions only two viable policy option for states to increase farm output: ‘by revisions of price policy or by guaranteed market(s)’ (OEEC 1949b:1). The CAP would eventually combine both prescriptions its use of CMO’s. In short, economic liberalization was never seriously considered, by either the OEEC or EEC, as a viable strategy for the governing the agricultural sector.
This report stated that agriculture would have an important role to play in solving the ‘present problems’ of Europe (2). One of the most immediate of such problems was the ‘dollar shortage’, which was considered to be primarily agricultural in nature: ‘Food is the largest dollar expense, and increased food production potentially the largest dollar saver’ (2). The idea was that by increasing agricultural production quickly, precious dollars could be freed up for other necessary imports and thus ‘afford the best guarantee of maintaining standards of living’ (2). In fact, the drain on dollar reserves, due to import requirements, was an argument cited by the FAC for why the rehabilitation of the agrarian sector should take primacy over that of industry: ‘it seems questionable whether industrial development (except in certain industries) would in itself increase exports or contribute directly to improving the balance of payments. The question arises therefore whether some diversion of efforts from industry to agriculture becomes desirable’ (OEEC 1949c: 2).

While the ‘dollar problem’ presented the economic rationale for governing food shortages, it was eclipsed in its degree of severity by the problem food shortages were seen to have for the nutritional health of populations. This was evident in the first substantial report of FAC which noted a desire to determine the ‘appropriate’ levels of consumption needed for a ‘living standard consistent with viability’ (7). The report also suggests conducting ‘factual studies’ that would establish trends in dietary health and make this a marker of social recovery. The starting point would be to establish the relative caloric intake of different national populations. From this basis, more refined

20 FAC issued its first report in the late summer of 1947. The opening line stated: “Food is basic to production” (see OEEC 1949b:1).
questions could be asked on the relations between food supply and the conditions for *social progress*.

It appears necessary in the first place to study the whole agricultural economies of the participating countries, both individually and together, in order to establish the directions in which agricultural development can contribute most to the viability and well-being of Europe. Such studies should be related closely to the general economic and natural conditions in the participating countries and should be carried out against a wide perspective. They should aim at promoting the highest possible levels of production, trade and standards of living (OEEC 1949c: 8).

Studies would eventually be carried out on the topics of farm extension services, agricultural trade, food consumption levels, land utilisation, and agricultural machinery.

The FAC was similar to other OEEC technical committees in that it had no executive powers to ‘make policy’. It was not supposed to act outside the mandate provided to it by member states. The FAC was set up as ‘a planning and co-ordinating committee’ that would periodically meet with senior officials ‘who would be in position to take authoritative decisions on behalf of their countries’ (OEEC 1949b:2).

For the most ‘special’ or acute agrarian problems, ‘permanent subcommittees’ were also utilized. One such committee was the ‘Working Group on Food Consumption Levels’. The creation of the subcommittee was seen as necessary in order to understand the severity of food deficiencies in postwar Europe. The OEEC suggests the task of this subcommittee would coordinate and standardize consumption and nutritional reports, many of which were already being carried out at the national level. At the initial stage, the information would provide a basis for allocating European imports from North America, as well as assessing prospects for recovery in the European Cooperation Administration (ECA) (OEEC 1948b).
The goal outlined in the first report was to produce a statistical data set that would compare levels of food consumption across Europe. The raw data would be provided by states.\textsuperscript{21} OEEC ‘experts’ would then aggregate and standardize the figures. This would make it possible to produce figures that allowed for detailed comparisons between states. The OEEC was particularly desirous of data that could be standardizable for purposes of spatial and temporal comparisons. In order to achieve this, states would have to take seriously the creation of statistical data sets that could be made comparable to those of other states:

Certain of the participating countries have, in the past, conducted detailed food consumption surveys of the kind now contemplated. Their experience, however, has clearly shown that even the apparently simple aspects of such studies present serious difficulties if a comparison is to be drawn between consumption levels in countries having quite different economies and administrative tendencies. To be of use for the purposes for which it is intended…the inquiry would have to be planned and carried out in a fully comprehensive manner by experts possessing the highest qualifications for this specialised work. The committee, therefore, considers it necessary that before this work is attempted each member country should be requested to state whether in respect of its own territory it would be possible to furnish within a brief period sufficient data to enable a small expert working Party to rapidly arrive at reliable comparative figures in respect of consumption levels’ (OEEC 1948b: 1-2)

Making Visible ‘Hungry Europeans’

The primary task of the Working Group on Food Consumption Levels was to produce a ‘report on current and planned levels of food consumption in participating countries’ (OEEC 1949a:3). Once this initial task was complete, the remit of the Working Group could be expanded to include a ‘permanent sub-committee’ that would examine ‘wider questions of nutrition and food utilisation’ (OEEC 1949a: 3). The information would help

\textsuperscript{21} The OEEC commented that it would not otherwise put this ‘burden’ on states but for the fact such a survey was ‘essential to its operations’ (1).
the OEEC facilitate the modernization of national farming sectors. It would also point them in the direction of how to most productively spend their limited agro-food relief dollars. The basic structure and mission of the Working Group is outlined in a pivotal 1949 report (OEEC 1949a). The scale of administrative infrastructure and expertise devoted to Europe’s food and farm problems was justified on the account of ‘the importance of food and agriculture’ for recovery. Furthermore, it would be necessary to divide the tasks among subcommittees because ‘the whole field was too wide and the volume too great to be dealt with in detail by one committee’ (OEEC 1949a: 2).

The Working Group imagined itself as only one link in an institutional chain that would cumulatively work to make intelligible and ‘technologize’ consumption problems. The first links in the chain were the member-states who were responsible for providing the raw data. In reality, the smaller and poorer states with limited statistical expertise had their data ‘arranged by the Secretariat and the Working Party on the basis of official information and additional data drawn from other sources available’ (I). The Working Group would then standardize and compare the data. The final product would appear in the form of maps, charts, reports, and ‘balance sheets’ that gave visibility to both the quantitative and qualitative features of food shortages.

22 The problematization of a deficient food supply and inadequate food consumption was also evident in a report issued by the Council of Europe in 1950. The Council articulated ‘an obvious need of raising, quantitatively and especially qualitatively, the standard of consumption in certain countries and for certain classes of population’ (cited in OEEC 1950a: 1). The Council provides the same basic biopolitical rationale that will guide the programs of the Working Group; that is, the consumption/shortage problem will not be solved by simply filling bodies with calories, but requires the diversification and qualitative enhancement of European diets across the board. This will involve targeting those sub-populations (‘classes’) who lack adequate access to the fortifying and protein-rich foods now understood as necessary for physiological optimality.
Between this aggregation of raw data and the publishing of final reports, the OEEC collaborated with other organizations that were involved in surveying the nutritional health of European populations. The OEEC Secretariat stipulated the consumption studies would need to be carried out in collaboration with experts in the FAO and ECA. For example, the FAO’s experience would be useful in helping the OEEC construct ‘food balance sheets’, a technology that would come to be widely used in the subcommittee (OEEC 1949c: 12). FAO experts were also understood as useful for verifying the numbers and the statistical templates that produced them. At the time, the FAO was simultaneously undertaking ‘World Food Surveys’ that provided an analogous intelligibility to food shortages at the global level (Grigg 1981; Trentmann 2007). The Working Group ultimately formed part of a ‘networked’ model of postwar planning in which multiple organizations were involved in manufacturing and articulating this social data.

*Report on Food Consumption Levels*

The Working Group released the first ‘Report on Food Consumption Levels’ in September 1949 (OEEC 1949d). The report made consumption patterns intelligible along past, present and ‘projected future’ lines. For example, one balance sheet provided the average amount of animal protein consumed (per capita) in France in 1948-9, and compared it to a ‘projected’ level for the period 1952-3. The balance sheets thus used both spatial-national and temporal classifications. This allowed the planner to discern ‘nutritional recovery’ according to different criteria; for example, differentiating areas in need of improving aggregate food supply versus those requiring specific qualitative improvements in food consumption:
The food situation has fortunately improved since the end of the war, but it still shows quantitative and, in particular, qualitative deficiencies. These can be considered as insignificant in countries with a high pre-war nutritional standard, but in those countries whose pre-war diet was deficient may assume serious proportions…national plans and programs should aim chiefly at attaining a qualitative restoration…with a high nutritional standard (OEEC 1949d: III).

Nutritional mapping was one technology used to make visible the distribution of consumption patterns that were collated on the food balance sheets. Using the geographic landmass of Europe, national borders were drawn in solid black lines. Coded over the state borders were various bars, shadings and other indicators that made it possible to do a ‘geo-caloric’ reading of postwar populations. For example, when bordering states had similar consumption patterns, the visual effect was to minimize, sometimes even obscure, political borders in favour of nutritional-territorial groupings. For example, the borders of France and Italy would often blur together when the consumption of cereals and vegetables was depicted. A similar pattern existed with high-calorie and high-protein ‘Scandinavian’ diets. On these nutritional maps, fixed cartographic political imaginations are replaced with geo-caloric ones, demonstrating an indeterminate relationship with our traditional ‘territorial maps’.

Quantitative maps were used to measure and compare the current consumption levels of different national populations. The most basic ones looked at the total calories consumed (see below). The map below uses solid block lines to indicate consumption of more than 3,000 calories per day; solid stripes between 2,400-3,000 calories; and partially shaded stripes less than 2,400 calories. Another map compares prewar consumption levels to current ones. Here we learn, for example, that the UK has attained 97.5% of its pre-war caloric average, while the Italians remain 7% below their pre-war threshold. A third map makes intelligible 1948 consumption patterns compared to those
projected for 1950. Such ‘future-oriented’ comparisons would reveal, for example, that food supply and diet were projected to improve in the UK and occupied Germany, whereas the situation in France, Italy and Portugal would see continued deterioration.

Other maps were based on comparing the qualitative composition of national diets. For example, one map indicates the amount of energy derived from cereals and potatoes as a percentage of total calories consumed in the national diet (see left). These essentially amounted to ‘carbohydrate mappings’ of populations. The maps divided populations based on those that derived between 50%-65% of their total caloric intake from cereals and potatoes, and those whose carbohydrate intake accounted for 35%-50% of their total diet.

A similar map depicted the relative percentage of calories coming from animal proteins (see below left). Similar to the carbohydrate mapping, a north-south continental division was apparent. For Northern Europe, including Sweden and the UK, animal proteins accounted for 40-50% – and sometimes over 60% – of the respective national diets. In the case of France, the percentage drops to between 30%-40%. The map clearly indicates that as one moves further south from the Scandinavian region, the diet becomes less protein rich. In the cases of Portugal, Italy and Greece, animal protein accounted for less than 20% of
the overall caloric intake. What is today considered a ideal ‘Mediterranean diet’ was, in 1949, viewed as a poor diet due to the lack of ‘fortifying’ protein – a state of affairs considered to have long-term negative physiological impacts (Orr 1943; for a discussion see Lupton 1996).

In addition to the nutritional maps, other technologies of visibility included charts and tables that compared national diets. While the charts sacrificed the immediate legibility and visuality of nutritional maps, they had the advantage of allowing for a more precise presentation of numbers over a range of specific foodstuffs: cereals, potatoes, sugar, meat, milk and ‘visible fats’. From these technologies of visibility, it becomes evident that certain ‘nutritional families’ exist and link together different national diets. One comprehensive table, for example, provides a temporal comparison of national diets based on the grams of animal protein consumed (per day) across four time periods: pre-war, 1948-49, 1949-50, and (projected) 1952-53. Scandinavian populations were predicted to have a protein supply that would continually grow. In contrast, the French and German populations who experienced the most dramatic decreases in protein consumption in the aftermath of the war, were also predicted to see the largest gains through the early-1950s.

Today, the over-consumption of (mostly) processed food is the central nutritional challenge facing public health authorities in the West (Patel 2007). This view is in sharp contrast to the Working Group that singularly problematized the deleterious nutritional effects of under-consuming (mostly) primary foods. This imperative to improve dietary standards among populations obliterated the old distinction in agricultural policy that juxtaposed a ‘farm interest’ – the producers desiring high commodity prices – and an
‘urban interest’ – workers who favored cheap food policies. Wartime measures began the process of merging the problems of production and consumption into a single policy problématique. But it was only in the peacetime welfarist versions of agricultural policy that the distinction is rendered meaningless.\textsuperscript{23}

\textit{Eat your Veggies, Drink you Milk}

These new connections between food and agricultural policy were made evident in a ‘Working Party on Fruits and Vegetables’ that was created with the intent of increasing the consumption of these foodstuffs (OEEC 1950b). The FAC had discovered that southern European farmers were suffering from a lack of consumer demand for the fruits and vegetables that they exclusively produced. Furthermore, public marketing boards rarely subsidised fresh fruits and vegetables, instead favoring storable commodities. Yet at the same time southern producers lacked adequate demand for their products, northern Europeans were found to be deficient in the same vitamins and minerals offered by fruits and leafy greens. The grain and meat laden foodways of northern Europe, argued postwar nutritional scientists, lacked the ‘protective’ qualities of diets that included an abundance of fresh produce.

From the perspective of the Working Group, the two problems were linked and presented a mutually advantageous solution. Programs would be implemented to help southern producers improve their marketing arrangements, as northern European consumers were simultaneously targeted with nutritional campaigns encouraging their movement towards ‘modern dietary trends’ (27-9). Success here would not only improve

\textsuperscript{23} This was because high prices were seen to benefit both producers and consumers alike. They would secure both rural livelihoods and secure the nutritional health of populations by growing food supply.
public health, but also comprise a ‘helpful background to direct trade’ (29). The strategy of connecting the nutritional benefits of consuming certain foods with the economic needs of small farmers was not limited to fruits and vegetables. The linkage was also made evident in the FAC’s promotion of ‘fortifying foods’ such as eggs, cheeses and milk (OEEC 1951a). Milk, in particular, was viewed as something of a miracle food because it was plentiful, high in protein, contained vitamin D, and could be given directly to captive schoolchildren (see also Boyd-Orr 1943; Burnett 1994).

The Working Group was exhaustive in collecting and presenting information on the dietary trends of European populations. The consumption reports, food balance sheets and nutritional charts collectively constituted a ‘mechanism of intelligibility’ that would make it possible to operationalize diet as sites of classification and comparison. At the same time, the FAC was not just a reporting bureau. It saw its interventions as having political and social effects among populations. States could now track their relative success in restoring the biological and psychological vitality of damaged wartime populations through the rubric of nutritional health.24

*Balance Sheets, Biopolitics and the FAC*

The Working Group was essentially a mechanism for making intelligible the relative levels of food security across national populations. One technology that deserves further interrogation in this regard is the ‘food balance sheet’. The balance sheet was itself only a

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24 By 1954, the crisis phase of deficient food consumption had begun to recede. The Secretariat thus concludes ‘it is for consideration whether the Working Party has substantially discharged its original function of bringing about a standardization and comparability of concepts as between Member countries in the preparation and presentation of statistics on food consumption’ (OEEC1954a: 1). At this point, the emphasis shifts from the general nutritional recovery of European populations to more specific questions around how to ‘improve the consumption levels of particular classes or groups of persons’ (2). This new emphasis was also evident in the postwar welfare state, in which problems of diet and nutrition become increasingly visible around specific vulnerable groups – such as the poor, unemployed and children.
general template, a mobile instrument of political visibility, deployed across a range of projects in postwar European and international government (Walters 2004). Jean Monnet (1978) believed the balance sheet was a crucial instrument for tracking progress in areas such as economic growth and rates of industrialization. Monnet preferred balance sheets because they gave intelligibility to the ‘big picture’ through making targeted comparisons around key social and economic indicators.

The OEEC did not invent the food balance sheet, but mobilized it for specific ends. The League of Nations and International Labour Organization (ILO) were the first IOs to use the comparative template, during the 1930, to carry out programs of ‘dietary surveillance’ and nutritional reporting (for a discussion of see Coveney 2000: 119; Cullather 2007; Yates 1960: 51-75). Both the OEEC and FAO – the latter in their ‘World Food Surveys’ – explicitly traced their use of the food balance sheets to these earlier League studies (Cullather 2007: 361). The FAC also studied the work of the Combined Food Board which utilized food balance sheets to measure wartime consumption levels, thus providing it an informational basis for coordinating relief (OEEC 1950b). In a similar way, the UNRRA mobilized the technology to assess and prioritize the delivery of food relief needs across a chaotic postwar landscape. From these various successes, the OEEC would come to draw the conclusion that food balance sheets were an efficacious template for making visible and comparing the nutritional recovery of different populations.

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25 William Walters alerted me to the importance of this technology for imagining postwar governance more generally.
26 Their motivation was to make visible the effects of poverty and unemployment on diet that occurred as a result of depression conditions.
Incorporated into the work of the OEEC and FAC, the food balance sheet becomes an ‘art’ of regional government. Considered alongside the maps, charts and other visualities, it was a technology that made intelligible ‘hungry Europeans’ as a target of relief and object of social government. This occurred at the national level through the ways the knowledge produced by the OEEC was enrolled into national welfare machineries. But from a different angle, the food balance sheets also contributed to an understanding of Europe (and the ‘region’) as a domain from which the populations could be documented and compared, and potentially governed. While the intent of the OEEC was not to create a regional space of integrated social policy, it certainly did aim to facilitate and support states in creating such apparatuses at the state level. Moreover, an unintended consequences of these efforts was in the production of new knowledges and organizational techniques that would make it possible to later Europeanize this field.

The food balance sheets also demonstrated that populations can only be ‘known’ and thus manufactured into objects of ‘social improvement’ when made visible around specific categories, classifications, scales and locales (Elden 2007; Legg 2005). Such were the numbers and classifications of the balance sheets gave postwar populations a corporeal essence as a social body. While hunger may be felt viscerally at the individual level, its political saliency ultimately depends on how we choose to count, organize, and depict the human ‘reality’ of food shortages. Hacking (1990) notes that such statistical categorization is what makes it possible to know and govern populations more generally:

The printing of numbers was a surface effect. Behind it lay new technologies for classifying and enumerating, and new bureaucracies with the authority and continuity to develop this technology. There is a sense in which many of the facts presented by the bureaucracies did not even exist ahead of time. Categories had to be invented into which people could conveniently fall in order to be counted
Drawing upon this logic, we can conclude that only through naming and categorizing the food consumption trends of populations do social forms such as the ‘malnourished’ become scientifically real. Furthermore, it is based on these original classifications that it becomes possible to further divide and categorize populations based on increasingly refined demographic and biological criteria.\(^27\)

The FAC gave postwar hunger a numerical reality. Moreover, it was an imagination based not just on total calories consumed, but tracking the extensification of balanced diets across the continent. Furthermore, the severity of hunger could itself now be measured and assessed in terms of indicators that reflected European norms. It is at this juncture we will have the emergence of classifications such as the ‘well-nourished’, ‘protein-deficient’, and ‘cereal-dependent’.

Statistical reasoning was not the only knowledge used by the OEEC in drawing explicit links between food supply and population health. Also required were new forms of expertise that could elucidate the ‘vital links’ which connected formally private activities, such as eating, to a new vocabulary and set of policies that established ‘the possibility and legitimacy of government’ at the level of population (Rose & Miller 1992: 187-88). In the postwar period, there was a particular obsession with identifying the domains of ‘population-life’ most in need of management by political authorities.

The population student is interested not only in the absolute numbers of people

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\(^{27}\) Sociologist Georg Simmel (1971) makes a similar point in arguing that society is a synthetic category that depends on various divisions and enumerations for its substance. In a sense, the categories provide a way locate individual experiences on a plane in which we can make sense of them: ‘In order to know a man, we see him not in terms of his pure individuality, but carried, lifted up or lowered, by the general type which we classify him’ (101).
inhabiting a specific area, but also in their characteristics (italics in original). He learns, for example, how the population is divided into groups or statistical categories with respect to measurable attributes...characteristics of the population studied by population students are selected mainly for two reasons: first, because of their strictly demographic significance, since most of them in some way related to fertility, mortality and migration; and second, because they are of intrinsic sociological or economic importance (Wrong 1956: 6).

In this passage, Wrong indicates how populations targeted in postwar welfarist schemes were problematized around their processes of living. The objective of political authorities would be to secure these processes, and maximize their effects through systemized interventions (Foucault 2008; Rose 1999). The enumeration and classification of European hunger was about identifying the ways the vitality and health of populations might be optimized through properly managing the production and supply of food. While a logic of maintaining national strength and virility persisted in wartime rationing programs, this would end in the postwar era. Adequately feeding populations would now constitute a social good unto itself. Moreover, there would be no greater symbol of recovery than restoring caloric and nutritional health among populations subject to years of rationing and the pangs of incomplete satiation:

With the setting up of the Organisation for European Economic Co-Operation it became apparent that an examination of food consumption levels would serve several useful and important purposes. It would serve as a guide to the distribution of Marshall Aid. It would also, when continued over the period of the Marshall Plan, give precision and measurement to one of the most important indicators of recovery, namely, the raising of food consumption above the disastrously low levels to which it had fallen during the war years. An adequate consumption of food may be regarded both as a condition and as a consequence of recovery. Without sufficient food the physical difficulties of recovery would have been greater. At the same time the most overt evidence of recovery is provided by the improvements in the standard of living, a main constituent of which is the quantity and quality of food eaten...Among this material, data on food formed a considerable part’ (OEEC 1950c:1)
Configuring the problems of food supply with those of population health meant that the OEEC was engaging in a form of biopolitical regulation. Biopolitics is diagram of power that targets the ‘realities of living’. It involves the ways processes such as reproduction, health, diet and hygiene become sites of intervention for political authorities (Foucault 1978/1990). But this is not any type of intervention. A distinctive feature of biopolitics is that it targets ‘collective human vitality’ (Rabinow & Rose 2003: 10). Foucault argues that biopolitics is always concerned with the ‘multiplicity of men’ and the ways they constitute ‘a global mass’ affected by things like birth, death, hunger and illness (Foucault 2003: 242-43).

It is also the case that because biopolitical regimes target populations in their collective existence, they depends on forms of macro-visibility. ‘The mechanisms introduced by biopolitics include forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures. And their purpose is…to intervene at the level of their generality’ (Foucault 2003: 246-47). We have already explored this in terms of the food balance sheets and broader statistical architecture created by the OEEC. The point here is that the complexity of populations must be tamed and distilled into ‘readable’ and ‘mapable’ realities before a biopolitical gaze can take hold.

Because it sought to improve the health and vitality of populations, the work of the FAC presented a form of optimal biopolitics. This brings us back around to a claim made previously in the section; i.e. the work of the FAC is only fully intelligible when considered in the context of the background expertise that made these interventions

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28 This ‘biological conception of politics’ has come to permeate many spaces of government, but is especially visible in policies around health, education and sanitation (Wallenstein 2009: 10).
sensible. In this case, it means we have to consider the ways that life and ‘living’ were given a certain meaning relative to the problems of nutrition and agriculture.

As Fassin (2009) argues, ‘life’ is not valued equally in all biopolitical regimes. Therefore, we must turn our attention to the ‘concrete way(s) in which individuals and groups are treated’ in specific assemblages (57). The Third Reich, as previously discussed, put into operation a violent and dehumanizing form of biopolitics that made calculations about when to eliminate ‘useless eaters’, and how to ‘scientifically’ starve the mentally through a progressive elimination of all protein from their diets. What this example demonstrates is that ‘demonic’ impulses can often be found residing in the marginal spaces of biopolitics (Agamben 1998; Foucault 2003).

More than one biopolitical gaze has been cast over the food supply. Edkins (1996; 2000), for example, discusses another type embedded in the ‘famine relief industry’ that is practiced in organizations such as the World Food Program (WFP) and Oxfam. In such programs, argues Edkins, relief is provided to populations based on their existence as ‘metabolic machines’ that simply require a certain input of energy to sustain life. It is an approach to food security that renders invisible the political, cultural and social content of the lives that are intervened upon. In other words, food needs are not calculated on the basis of what would be needed for a worthwhile and productive life. It is the continuance of life itself that matters most.

In the biopolitics of the FAC, a nutritional state beyond mere sustenance was aimed for. Populations were seen as more than metabolic machines. This was reflected in

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29 In such cases, Edkins states that: ‘Relief is aimed at preserving the life of the biological organism and its functions, not in its distinctiveness or its discursively produced relationships. Life, not living, is all’ (2000: 39).
the incorporation of nutritional expertise that stressed the value of ‘fortifying’ and
‘protective’ foods for the contribution they could make to social and economic recovery.
The need to understand nutrition ‘beyond calories’ had become the consensus viewpoint
among nutritionists, demographers, public health officials and labour economists during
the 1930s (Boyd Orr 1943; for a discussion see especially Covney 2000; Lupton 1996).
This belief was reflected in the postwar public health consensus that a qualitatively
sufficient diet included an array of vitamins, micronutrients, and proteins for ensuring
health (see also Kærnes 1995): ‘Food is one of few commodities for which it makes sense
to talk about human ‘needs’ or requirements, rather than simply how much will be
demanded at specific prices’ (King 1969: 33).

The Working Group not only ‘made technical’ this discourse of nutritional health,
but brought its knowledge directly to bear on agricultural policymaking: ‘The study of
food consumption levels in terms of calories and nutrients are concerned with measuring
food consumption nutritionally. Supplies are expressed in terms of their nutritional
content and energy value and indications of the adequacy of the diet thus revealed are of
considerable importance in the assessment of the effectiveness of agricultural policies’
(OEEC 1953a: 5, emphasis mine). The passage reveals the necessity of merging food
policy with agricultural policy. But likewise, it also conveys the role nutritional science
can have in guiding national farming sectors to produce the correct ‘balance’ of proteins,
fats, cereals, vegetable and micro-nutrients.30

30 It is only within a context where nutritional knowledge is proliferate that it makes sense to claim ‘the
lack of fats and animal protein’ in the Italian must be ‘borne in mind’ (OEEC 1949h: 81). Contrast this to
the strategies of the bread police in which ‘enough bread’ constituted the barometer of food security.
‘Technical Farming’ and Postwar Plentitude

Hungry Europeans, as we have now seen, became a site of biopolitical intelligibility within the OEEC. But at the same time, the nutritional problem was also one that had to be managed on the output end of the equation. It also had to be governed on farms, and in the improvement of agrarian practice and science. For the OEEC, modernizing national agricultural sectors provided the only permanent solution to the crisis of food insecurity so drastically revealed by the war. It is in this context the OEEC articulates its version of what Scott (1995) has labeled ‘high modern agriculture’. High modern farming was a paradigm of agrarian reform centered on a muscular belief in the promise of science, mechanization and standardization.

Among its proponents, the argument was that by adopting this new production paradigm it would be possible to substantially grow the food supply and provide a universal solution to the coming Malthusian crisis. That said, high modern agriculture was not a monolithic project. For example, it took on a distinct form in the Global South compared to its materialization in Western Europe. \(^{31}\) In Western Europe, the emphasis was generally on increasing the use of artificial fertilizers, proliferating tractors, and improving what the FAC called ‘agricultural technique’. Across the OECD world in the 1950s and 60s, the paradigm was thus built on the twin pillars of chemicalization and moto-mechanization (Mazoyer & Roudart 2006; Clunies-Ross & Hildyard 1992). This

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\(^{31}\) Take the case of the ‘green revolution’. This was an agricultural modernization program spearheaded by agronomists, such as Norman Borlaug, across the Global South in the 1950s and 60s. The strategy was based on the use of hybrid seeds, mechanical irrigation, and the application of significant amounts of fertilizer (Easterbrook 1997). The Green Revolution has been heavily criticized for its neo-imperial intentions, and undermining local agrarian practices and traditional rights to land (see especially Ponting 2007; Shiva 1991).
would be exemplified, for example, in mono-cropped fields of fast growing and high-yielding wheat and maize – foodstuffs that could feed both humans and livestock.

The promotion of high modern agriculture was a crucial element in the American ‘productivity missions’ in postwar Europe. To take one pertinent example, the OEEC had two US plant geneticists – one from the USDA, the other from the University of Illinois – travel to Europe and discuss methods to increase oilseed production. Their particular goal was to ‘teach’ European farmers how to improve soil fertility and more efficiently process the seed into cooking oil (OEEC 1950d). The overall importance of food and agriculture for the OEEC’s project of modernizing Europe is apparent when considering that of the total $12.5 billion in Marshall aid spent over 1947-1952, one third was used on food, feed and fertilizer (Shaw 2007: 13). Furthermore, if the amount allocated to agricultural machinery and farm modernization within the national ERP plans was also included in this tabulation, the proportion becomes much higher (Griffith et al. 1997a; Landes 1969; Schain et al. 2001).

The FAC was also a locale for the diffusion of research on high modern agriculture (OEEC 1949b; OEEC 1949c). The technical committee conducted research or facilitated programs on topics such as fertilizers, farm machinery, grassland fertility, and the ‘scientific’ management of pests and crop diseases. The ‘dollar problem’, as previously discussed, was one motivation to quickly grow the food supply in Europe. Saving foreign reserves would help restore ‘balance’ and ‘equilibrium’ to national

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32 In contemporary dollar amounts this is about $150 billion – or around $500 billion as an equivalent percentage of North American GDP.
economies (OEEC 1949c: 6). But also, as the Council of Europe stressed, increased agricultural production would also lower consumer food prices and increase dietary standards across the board. It is not an understatement to argue that, during this period, raising farm output was seen as something of a universal solution to a set of interconnected socioeconomic problems:

The fact that the possibilities of soil, manpower and agricultural technique will without doubt, enable the desired level of production to be reached, and also the lowering of cost prices necessary for the marketing of products and for raising the level of consumption – that is, *if adequate steps are taken* (Council of Europe 1948, cited in OEEC 1949c, emphasis in original).

*The FAC and National Production Plans*

To begin addressing these problems, the FAC required the submission of national ‘production plans and programmes’. These plans were to explicitly detail how member-states were in the process of making farm productivity a central plank of their recovery programs (OEEC 1949f : cover page). Repeating an earlier theme, the FAC often complained about the paucity of information and statistics provided by states regarding their current production levels, and future program indicators for agrarian reform (OEEC 1948a). If an ‘avalanche of numbers’ was required to make visible agriculture as a European problem-space, the FAC believed it possessed only a minor snowfall: ‘The Committee has been seriously handicapped in its work to date by the delay in the submission of national programmes’ (OEEC 1948a: 1). A year later, in 1949, the FAC concluded that despite ‘these unavoidable limitations’ there was now enough information

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33 This same report notes that no improvement in the economic situation will occur unless dollars can be saved by reducing grain and feed imports: ‘It will be noted that in both years expenditure on cereals (bread grains and coarse grains) represents roughly half the total expenditure in the Western Hemisphere, amounting in 1952-53 to some 1.3 billion...It appears that it is in cereals that a reduction in dollar expenditure can be readily made, and indeed that no really important gains in economy can be achieved without it’ (OEEC 1949c: 6).
to conduct a ‘careful and impartial assessment’ of the ‘programmes as a whole’ (OEEC 1949e: 74).

The FAC also worked with technocrats from the FAO in order to improve the accuracy and comparability of the statistics (OEEC 1954). The FAO noted from the outset that cooperation was being hindered by the use of different classifications, even with the most basic of agrarian terms. For example, what is a horse? Does it include any horse on a farm? Or only those horses used ‘exclusively or primarily for agricultural purposes’ – such as the horses used to pull plows or sleds (4). How about horses meant exclusively for breeding or producing manure? The point being made by the FAO was that until the OEEC standardized such terms, it would be tough to govern agriculture from an international or regional locale: ‘Definitions and classifications used by different countries for agricultural statistics very greatly, making it difficult to compile internationally homogenous statistical summaries on a regional or world basis’ (OEEC 1954: 3).

The national production plans submitted in 1949 required member states to evaluate developments in important sectors such as cereal grains, coarse grains, tobacco and sugar-beet. Agricultural ministers were required to address a number of questions specific to these sectors. Will yields grow over the next two years? Are chemical and mechanical inputs being properly utilized? Will an outcome be fewer imports of feedingstuffs?

The FAC constructed numerous tables and charts that gave a spatial and comparative legibility to the different agrarian situations (OEEC 1949f: annex). In one
example, the total farmland of each country is broken down into categories that include ‘permanent grass’, ‘rough grassings’ and ‘arable land’. Other tables further delineate classifications of arable land into percentages that should ‘ideally’ be given over to the production of specific crops; such as grains, potatoes, fodder crops, sugar beet and so on. As we can now see, much of the work in the OEEC would be geared towards making visible the spaces of backwardness in European farming.

*The Diffusion of ‘Technical Farming’: The Dutch Contribution*

The OEEC would do more than make visible national production levels and interrogate the agrarian plans of member-states. It would also promote an entirely new science of farm management. Not surprisingly it was Dutch agriculture – widely considered the most advanced in Western Europe – that would provide a laboratory for the rest of Europe. The Chief Extension Officer of the Netherlands was the one to label ‘technical farming’; the Dutch variation of high modern farming that, through the FAC, would be diffused as a pan-European model (OEEC 1949g). Technical farming was based on organizing agrarian economies that would ‘manage the farm as an economic unit’ (2). Amongst the tenants of the doctrine was the need to make substantial capital investments in less modernized agrarian sectors, as well as to foster a greater specialization of high-yielding crops.

There was also an important pedagogical dimension to technical farming evident in the Dutch insistence on making available ‘farm management advisory personnel’. These were essentially extension agents who would work to spread better farming practices and knowledges across European farming. Because this model was based on a
diffusion of expertise from the ‘top-down’, special importance was placed on the qualifications held by the extension agent who would do the instructing. He (sic) should possess the right blend of scientific and business acumen:

A thorough training in *technical agriculture* is a first requisite. He must have the ability to appraise each new technology and fit it into the business of agriculture. Over and above this knowledge and practical experience he needs a good economic insight. He must be familiar with the principles of farm management and the fundamentals of economics…they have to provide the framework of his thinking and the direction of his action and advice’ (OEEC 1949g)

The extension agent thus provides a conduit through which technical agriculture was rendered into a mobile knowledge. The unstated premise here was that Europe’s remaining ‘peasants’ needed to be transformed into ‘farmers’. This required diffusing a scientific ‘farm management’ discourse across Europe’s many villages and hamlets, and nowhere more so than in the Mediterranean south where agriculture was imagined as lethargic and ‘backward’ relative to its northern counterparts. To this end, The Dutch delegation contended that ‘a flourishing agricultural science’ would require a widespread ‘application of new techniques’ beyond the few core Western European countries already using them (1).

The French agricultural ministry would set the ambitious goal of bringing one million additional acres under plow, and increasing by one quarter the production of cereals (OEEC 1950e: 2). This would require bringing additional land under plow, as well as intensifying production on farmland already being cultivated (5-6). The French delegation cited the fact that millions of holdings remained non-mechanized, dependent on manual labor, and used only organic fertilizers. These were all elements seen to exacerbate the problem of low yields. As a result, the French delegation came to
prioritize the ‘securing of conditions most favorable to agricultural expansion’ (OEEC 1950e: 7). Here the question becomes: how can the OEEC assist in eliminating the last vestiges of French peasant agriculture?

Many of the programs for disseminating new farming knowledges and practice began with the countries that were seen to excel in that particular area. We have already discussed this relative to the Dutch. The French, additionally, also provided particular expertise in spearheading the organization of ‘grassland conferences’ and other forms of tutelage on land management techniques. One suggestion pushed hard by the French was to increase the nutritional density of pasture (OEEC 1950f). If more animals could be grazed on fallow land, levels of imported feed could be reduced, a huge potential ‘dollar saver’. The French also argued that prevailing knowledge on agrarian systems could be optimized with beneficial results for productivity. For example, if the precise mineral requirements of cattle were known, soil composition could then be engineered to more effectively and efficiently meet these needs.

The Danish Ministry of Agriculture put together a refresher course on ‘grassland husbandry’ specifically intended to train national extension agents at the national level (OEEC 1950g). A point of focus was on teaching the proper relationship between crop rotation and soil fertility. One report indicated six possible rotations of cereal and clover crops, each with a corresponding regime of manure application. These rotations could be used over six, seven, eight or nine year periods to increase the nutrient/nitrogen level of soil. Another recommendation was a four-year rotation of clover, grass, oat, wheat, and sugar beet that would be interspersed with generous amounts of ‘green manure’.

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34 Another recommendation was a four-year rotation of clover, grass, oat, wheat, and sugar beet that would be interspersed with generous amounts of ‘green manure’.
problem of grassland management; hosting numerous conferences on topics such as fertilizer application and ‘enhanced’ re-sodding (OEEC 1950h). The grassland management programs reveal an interesting dimension of technical agriculture, one that was not exclusively based on promoting mechanization and irrigation. These programs were more about the codification of best farming practices. Moreover, some of these, such as proper triennial rotations, dated from the agricultural revolution of the late middle ages (Mazoyer & Roudart 2006).

The FAC also drew in the expertise of other organizations to expand its reservoir of knowledge on technical farming. One collaborative partner was the International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP). Created in 1946, the IFAP was founded on the mandate of ‘increasing the nutritional and consumptive requirements’ of populations and ‘improving the economic and social status’ of all agricultural workers.35 The IFAP issued regular warning to FAC technocrats that if Europe’s agrarian sectors were not better capitalized, farmers would be unable to ‘carry out [successful] expansion policies’ (cited in OEEC 1952a: 2).

To this end, the IFAP recommends that governments provide greater public financing of agricultural inputs, facilities and mechanization. In a tactical and discursively provocative move, the IFAP questions whether states are ‘siphoning’ money away from agricultural recovery in the interests of rearmament. The IFAP understood it was operating within a new configuration of international society that was committed to repudiating militarism and trading ‘guns for butter’. The organization therefore connected social progress to the demise of militaristic competition, and thus the ability of farmers to

35 See: www.ifap.or/about-ifap/history/it
significantly modernize their operations. In a talk given on European recovery, IFAP president J.J. van der Lee stated that ‘integration cannot be realized without the active support and collaboration of farmers organizations’ (cited in OEEC 1951b: 1). He concludes the speech, perhaps not surprisingly, by invoking the ghost of Malthus: Who will help manage the growth of the population if not for farmers? (5).36

Practicing Technical Agriculture in the OEEC

The promotion of technical agriculture in the OEEC had elements of both uniformity and diversity. In terms of uniformity, the FAC pushed all member states towards mechanization, copious fertilizer usage, and the rationalization of farming technique. These were the ‘universal’ elements that would break open the world of technical agriculture and eliminate the scourge of food insecurity. At the same time, the paradigm did not imagine farming in a completely homogenized manner either. Agriculture expansion, for example, was understood to differ in ‘special ways’ from industrial development because of ‘the very large influence natural and social factors exerted’ on the sector (6).

While there were common practices, programs and pedagogies in the technical agricultural toolkit, this was not agrarian-Fordism. There was no attempt to impose a standardizable model of production on the European countryside. Unlike how television and cars are produced in factories, farmers confront the vagaries of ecology. Farmers can never escape natural realities such as droughts, floods, pests, soil erosion and crop

36 Sen (1995) would label this an ‘optimistic’ Malthusian reading. The ‘pessimistic’ reading took Malthus’s pronouncements on the geometric inevitably of starvation as prophecy. The ‘optimists’ accepted the mathematical premise, but as only relevant to the preindustrial world. They believed the correct blend of chemicals, machines and agrarian science could exponentially increase farm production in the postwar era.
disease. Moreover, different agro-ecologies led to the uneven adoption of high modern farming practices in different regions.\textsuperscript{37}

The FAC did not understand Europe as comprising a ‘single agricultural entity’. Rather, it was viewed as a geography of varied farmscapes, each of which had to confront different obstacles in reaching its productive potential (OEEC 1953b: 15). For example, to develop a stock-breeding operation in Northern Europe would pose different challenges than running a small Mediterranean farm specializing in the production of fruits and vegetables (where 75\% of the farms were smaller than 10 hectares). Whereas stock-breeders needed to increase the density of fodder crops and introduce mechanization, small vegetable producers benefited most from devising new marketing arrangements, and building communal refrigeration facilities. This is an important dimension of technical agriculture to consider. It showed that even at the height of standardization and uniformity the spaces of European farming, in certain respects, had to be imagined around the figures of heterogeneity and diversity.

Implementing technical agriculture was also linked to the end of ERP funding that was set to occur in 1953. The OEEC noted some success here: ‘Marshall Aid… has enabled the agricultural economy to recover more quickly than it would otherwise have done’ (OEEC 1953b: 9). But absent continued US investment, European agriculture would now have to stand on its own feet (OEEC 1953b: 22). In its typical bureaucratic style, the FAC then engages in a number of ‘forecasting’ questions. Most of these inquired about the projected production levels of bread, sugar, meat and grains. As usual,

\textsuperscript{37} For example, compare the arable North/West of Europe to the ‘peasant-like’ production persisting in the more arid and hilly Mediterranean.
the OEEC expressed some doubt over some the figures provided by member-states – stating they should be viewed as ‘very tentative’ and indicating only the ‘probable intentions’ of government policy (22). But overall, the assessment was far more optimistic than the one provided in 1947. Europe had taken its initial steps towards food plentitude.

The report also offers suggestions for member-states to help them realize their original agricultural plans. Not surprisingly, the list resembles a taxonomy of high modern farming practices. The first suggestion, and the one most often reiterated, is that European farmers need to increase their number of fertilizer applications, with regular monitoring of their progress carried out in conjunction with the ‘chemical productions committee’ of the FAC (22). The report argued that while there has been a general increase in the usage of fertilizers as a whole – a classification that includes nitrogen, phosphate and potash based fertilizers – ‘expert estimation’ posited that a continued annual increase of 10% would be most beneficial (23). The report is clear that using more fertilizer would generate the single largest increase in productivity and could easily account for a 66% growth in productivity gains over 1952-57 (23). The new world of European farming would be based in chemicals, in particular soluble configurations of nitrogen.

The report also singles out techniques to help national extension agents implement programs at the local level. For this purpose, the OEEC brought into use the technology of the ‘questionnaire’ as a way to discern the ‘present difficulties’ the national extension agent faced. This information was then used to identify which of the FAC’s technical committees could provide useful expertise. The report also indicated which bits
of expertise and current practice should be ‘collated by some of the experts’ and distributed at a forthcoming conference on agricultural advisory services. This would assist national planners in guiding farmers to the most ‘necessary and suitable’ measures for applying on their farms (23).³⁸

This section has explored technical farming as a production strategy and set of governing mechanisms based in the hyper-optimistic premise that science can transform nature, and that optimized agro-ecologies held out the promise of producing food plentitude in Europe. At the level of its knowledges, materials and pedagogies, technical agriculture also represented a European fascination with American agricultural productivity – especially its high-yielding, extensive, arable farming operations which constituted something of an exemplar. It was hoped the lessons of American farming ingenuity might be ‘translated’ in ways that would work for European farmers with generally smaller holdings, and who were still recovering from the ravages of war: ‘A revolution has taken place in agricultural technique. If the new technique can be translated into farm practice the effect on the general living standards could be comparable to those of the earlier industrialization period. This is already happening in the United States…In Europe it is only beginning’ (OEEC1950i: 33).

The OEEC as an Agrarian ‘Learning Machine’

CAP historians have sufficiently detailed why the creation of the supranational CAP was a difficult and complex policy to forge within the nascent EC (see especially Bowler 1985; Knudsen 2009; Ludlow 2005; Milward 1992). But one common shortcoming of

³⁸ Three areas were singled out as most important; (1) grassland management (2) veterinary sciences, including animal vaccines and (3) structural measures such as land consolidation and on-farm investments.
these otherwise revealing texts is that they ignore a full decade of cooperation before the CAP. The standard narratives on agricultural integration, for example, rarely mention the work of the UNRAA, FAO or OEEC. The impression is given that agro-food governance was solely a national prerogative in Europe before the EC. This is a view we have shown to be mistaken.

_The OEEC-FAC: A Lacuna in Postwar Agricultural History_

Not surprisingly, the EC-bias is echoed in the internal history of the CAP published on behalf of the Commission. It states that ‘new prospects’ for agricultural cooperation only open up with the signing of the Treaty of Rome (van der Harst 2007: 317). At this point, but not before, agricultural governance is something ‘no longer thought of as being managed separately’ by different states (317). With no apparent awareness or acknowledgement of the preceding _decade_ of postwar cooperation that occurred around the problems of food shortages and farm modernization, the self-congratulatory narrative argues the EC ‘almost miraculously’ took the incompatible agricultural interests of member-states and made them ‘mutually complementary’ (336). It is highly doubtful this argument could be sustained if the extensive work of the FAC on nutritional health and technical agriculture had been considered.

Despite its voluminous output, the work of the FAC has received scant scholarly attention. For example, noted agricultural historian Michael Tracy (1989) has stated that the ‘activity of the OEEC in agriculture before 1955 was related to its general aims of promoting post-war recovery and freeing intra-Europe trade (248). But as this chapter has indicated, liberalizing farm trade was not much on the agenda. Agriculture, in fact, was
deliberately excluded from the OEEC’s trade liberalization scheme. It is actually what Tracy wants to smuggle into the phrase ‘promotion’ that was imperative to the agricultural work of the organization.

As Gordon (1956) argues it was in the early years of recovery, the point at which European economies and societies were the most battered, that the OEEC was at its most creative, dynamic and cohesive as an organization (9). And much of this practical work for rebuilding Europe took place in the work of obscure technical committees, such as the FAC. Moreover, these technical committees combated problems that were located at the intersection of population and modernization.

Milward (1992) argues the work of the FAC was so ‘permeated by the sector’s own interest groups as to blur the difference between OEEC and private sectional interest’ (287). This chapter has shown the converse to be true. The FAC was a crucial organizational venue for articulating how the problems of reconstruction were in a major sense agricultural in nature. In any event, there was simply no practical distinction between a ‘farming interest’ and a ‘public interest’ at this point. Milward is being presentist here. Farmers, consumers, politicians, and industry – all these agents had an ‘interest’ in raising food production and seeing dietary improvements made across the population (Griffiths 1997b: 353). A deep reading the FAC archives shows tremendous consensus on this point, one reason it presented such an efficacious site of functional cooperation.

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39 The trade liberalization scheme was a fairly successful effort by the OEEC to reduce quota-based restrictions on intra-European trade. Such protectionist measures were fairly common after the war and considered the largest barriers to trade.
Influential European statesman have also marginalized the work of the OEEC, usually in retrospective accountings and memoirs. It became especially common practice to ‘straw-man’ the OEEC through making comparisons with the EC. Beyond the ERP, it was common to dismiss the OEEC as a ‘talking-shop’ for self-interested states. Monnet was especially critical of what he perceived to be the inadequate intergovernmental structure of the organization: ‘When I studied it, I could not help seeing the intrinsic weakness of a system that went no further than mere cooperation between governments. One single line in Article 14 prevented any kind of joint action’ (Monnet 1978: 272).

Monnet was simply the most prominent figure to conclude the OEEC was a limited vehicle for integration due to its ‘defective’ organizational structure that required unanimity between states.40 Hallstein (1962), the first Commissioner of the EC, also argued the OEEC was constrained by its inability to forge political unity due to a decision-making structure that resembled ‘a classical intergovernmental conference in permanent session’ (7). Altiero Spinelli (1966), a prominent European federalist and later European parliamentarian, also noted that while ‘sometimes in the OEEC common decisions were reached…they had no continuity, and they created no sense of community’ (18).

Occasionally, though, there are implicit acknowledgments on the important role the OEEC had in gathering information and conducting research. Tracy (1989), for example, concedes the OEEC accumulated ‘the most thorough documentation so far produced on European agricultural policies and served to make clear the basic problems

40 Gordon (1956) usefully reminds us that within three years of coming into operation, the OEEC employed a permanent staff of over 1,000 and ‘showed quite clearly that it was no mere progress-reporting body’ (2)
of Western European agriculture at this time’ (248). This corresponds with one of compliments given to the organization by Robert Marjolin, its first Secretary-General: ‘At the Château de la Muette we monitored trends from day to day, we always had our finger on the pulse of the economy, we compiled an impressive mass of statistics for those days’ (1989: 206). For Marjolin, the OEEC’s statistical machinery would give its technocrats the ‘deep feeling’ the actions they took were ‘inevitably’ correct (206).

Monnet, as well, will convey a somewhat schizophrenic reading on the importance of the OEEC. While he critiques the organization based on its intergovernmental architecture that hinders certain independent actions, he also notes it bequeathed a knowledge infrastructure about Europe that would make possible a regional view of government. Monnet states that ‘very soon, OEEC had simply become technical machinery; but it outlived the Marshall Plan because it provided a mass of information which everyone found useful’ (Monnet 1978: 273). Clearly, a political expert himself – by 1949, he had participated with both allied wartime planning and French economic planning – Monnet understood the value of knowledge for making visible the big picture.

How can we reconcile the two views of Monnet? At the same time he recognizes the importance of the ‘technical machinery’ developed by the OEEC, he also argues it could never have given ‘concrete expression to European unity’ (273). This certainly begs the question of what Monnet understands as ‘concrete’? But at a broader level, it confirms Brass’s (2000) argument that little significance is given to the actual operation of government at a mundane and administrative level.
The OEEC-FAC was influential precisely because of the unique form of functional cooperation it embodied.\(^{41}\) The technical committees were impactful precisely because so much of their energy was singularly dedicated to making visible the social realities of postwar Europe. Gordon (1956) states the OEEC was able to overcome an ‘inauspicious background’ to have a ‘far reaching influence on major policies of the member governments and with considerable creative initiative’ (3).

In this sense, we should not evaluate the OEEC based on what it did not attempt to accomplish (i.e. create a federal Europe), but on the pivotal role it did play in governing European reconstruction during the worst years of tumult and dislocation. Brusse and Griffiths (1997) capture the sentiment in arguing that the OEEC’s lasting impact would be found in the ways Europe’s common economic and social needs were forged into spaces of international coordination:

The OEEC was a unique institution whose membership embraced all western European countries and whose existence spanned the period of Europe’s economic reconstruction and rehabilitation. It became the vehicle for the implementation of a range of policies…Most historians have so far approached aspects of the OEEC history from a purely national perspective…The national dimension is, however, suboptimal…By its very nature the OEEC’s history throws up issues which could be more usefully tackled from a problem-oriented, comparative or international perspective (29).

The FAC as a ‘Leaning Machine’

This chapter has bolstered the claims of Griffiths by documenting the role of the OEEC in making visible postwar food and farm problems. Moreover, it has done so from both an ‘international’ and ‘problem-oriented’ perspective. But is there possibly a more accurate way to conceptualize the varied tasks and functions carried out by the FAC?

\(^{41}\) As Parson’s (2009) argues, there were many ‘visions’ of European unity that contributed to its development. The supranational map was not the only one that mattered, as this chapter had demonstrated.
While the OEEC did not create a supranational policy, it did have clear success in producing knowledge and forging cooperation in ways that went far beyond that of previous international regimes. Is there a heuristic that helps capture this role and its significance?

Faludi (2008) has used the concept of a ‘learning machine’ to describe an assemblage of mechanisms explicitly created for the purpose of aggregating and generating knowledge, with the goal of informing new policy. A learning machine never seeks to make and enforce policy through a traditional hierarchal model (e.g. the Community Method). Rather, a learning machine is a ‘dynamic construct’ that aims to develop forms of transnational expertise that provide a subsequent basis for the ‘Europeanization of planning’ (1272,1481). At the regional level, this learning function is especially important because it includes the ways that economic and social flows are ‘re-mapped’ as realities that naturally traverse Europe’s political borders.

The FAC functioned as a learning machine in a number of ways. We have seen how it utilized a variety of mechanisms to understand, categorize and visualize the food and farm situation in postwar Europe. Consider, for example, the aforementioned nutritional mapping. This inscriptive technology cast a scientific and mathematical gaze over the spaces of hunger in Europe. The data was made intelligible in such a way that dietary health could be measured, tracked and compared across nations. Furthermore, the relations between agrarian productivity and population growth were assessed for all member-states based on European norms, averages and trends. At the same time the OEEC was learning about these problems with the intent of helping member-states
confront them, it was simultaneously providing the groundwork for Europeanizing this space of government.

**Conclusion**

In postwar Europe, the restoration of caloric intake and nutritional health was a primary aim of reconstruction efforts over 1945-1953. Food plentitude would represent the material embodiment of the ‘freedom from want’ promised in the Atlantic Charter. In many ways, the return to a sufficient and affordable food supply becomes the symbol for European citizens that wartime deprivations were in the past. What is often forgotten in histories of postwar Europe is that a regional space of agro-food government was not created *ex novo* at Stresa and Messina, but first emerged in the mundane, programs, plans and practices of the FAC.

This chapter gave significant space to exploring how the strategies and mechanisms of this nutritional assemblage rendered Europe’s agrarian spaces into sites of technocratic (and ideally apolitical) management. It would now become possible to imagine, inscribe and talk about the food supply and farming as realities that transcend national boundaries.

The assemblage speaks to our genealogy in three ways. First, it has revealed the conditions under which agro-food government becomes detached from geopolitics in Western Europe, and begins to emerge more fully as a space for securing social needs/problems conceived around the problem of scarcity. Second, the assemblage drew attention to the specific technologies, programs and knowledges that linked the twin problems of food shortages and farm productivity, and married these together in the
‘universal’ solution of technical farming. Lastly, the assemblage has encouraged us to interpret the strategies and practices of the FAC through the analytic of a ‘learning machine’. Rather than utilize a political architecture based on the vertical organization of power, this technical subcommittee would work primarily through aggregating knowledge and diffusing expertise among its member states.
Chapter Four

An Algeria on European Soil? Family Farms and Rurality in the Early CAP

‘For social democrats like Beneš or Spaak the cause of economic planning and social intervention was scarcely new; but it was the winning over to such ideas of conservative Europeans – and the consequent convergence of Left and Right – which provided one of the preconditions for post-war political stability’
- Mazower 1998: 191

‘The way that the farm (income) problem was perceived over time led to the framing of it in terms of agricultural exceptionalism. The idea of agricultural exceptionalism fit well into the ideational landscape of moral and solidaristic economies of the major Christian democratic and social democratic welfare models. In the context of post-1945 welfare state extension, the farm problem became framed with a strong emphasis on farm income’
- Knudsen 2009: 56

Introduction

The CAP was created as a welfare machinery for rural Europe. Agricultural integration was explicitly strategized around the need to deliver economic security to this vulnerable constituency. As a form of political economy, the CAP exemplified the ethos of ‘social intervention’ and ‘solidarism’ mentioned in the above epigraphs. At a practical level, it regulated the incomes of farmers through an administratively complex system of price-fixing and market organization. The CAP is unique for constituting the lone example of ‘positive’ integration in the EC. The policy not only redistributed wealth to a particular economic sector, but it also blunted market forces in doing so. This chapter will explicitly build on a body of literature that has examined the CAP as an ‘exceptional’ space of European economic and social policy. At the same time, it also moves beyond this literature in looking more closely at the strategies and mechanisms that informed this novel configuration of agricultural policy.
One way it accomplishes this is by moving beyond the simplistic interpretation of the CAP as protectionism writ large. The CAP was not just a mechanism for doling out subsidies to uncompetitive farmers. To fully understand the policy we must place it within its proper context. Foremost, this means acknowledging it emerged from within a political ecology where economic planning and the mixed economy were normalized blueprints for governing. This was also a context in which the ‘family farm’ became a privileged link in a chain that connected the regulation of commodity markets directly to the possibility of rural prosperity. In one sense, the CAP did ‘protect’ European farmers – it protected them from world prices. But all industrialized states did something similar with their own postwar agricultural policies (Federico 2005). As an explanatory device, therefore, the protectionist label hides more than it reveals. This chapter, in contrast, argues that it is more revealing to interrogate the CAP as an instance of ‘governing the social’.

This chapter progresses in four sections. The first section discusses the work of three scholars who have deliberately used the creation of the CAP to substantiate broader theoretical arguments made on the origins and nature of European integration. It is rare to see the CAP mobilized as a test-case for understanding integration. For this reason, it is worth examining the work of the few authors who have done exactly this. The second section uses the arguments of these authors as a point of departure for arguing that we understand the CAP as a social complex; one based on the logic of securitizing of family farms through forms of extensive economic intervention.

Sections three and four will interrogate the specific problems, objects, mechanisms that went into assembling the CAP as a machinery of welfare. This will
include dissecting the role of the family farm as the central policy imaginary and exclusive target of CAP economic government. This sections also includes an analysis of the CMO, and its various techniques, that made it possible to govern farmer incomes through centrally organized and regulated commodity markets. The fourth section reviews and emphasizes the important claims of this chapter by way of discussing the limits of ‘protectionism’ as a concept for capturing the political and social strategies embodied in the original CAP.

**Integration Theory and the CAP**

Theories of European integration have often been elaborated from the case-studies of the single market and its modes of institutionalization (Haas 1964; Majone 1996; Pierson 1996; Stone Sweet et al. 2001). Despite the fact it was also a foundational policy of the EC, the CAP is rarely mobilized to say anything ‘bigger’ about how Europe governs. To marginalize the role of agricultural governance in the building of postwar Europe is a mistake. Not only was agricultural policy the lynchpin for achieving integration, it also embodied a unique configuration of social economy carried out at the regional level.

Histories of the CAP are normally quite specialized studies. They tend to focus exclusively on the legislative developments, actors, and policymaking networks surrounding the CAP (see recently Hennis (2005) and Garzon 2006)). There is an institutional and rationalist bias within this literature that has had the effect of marginalizing the broader strategic and political importance of the CAP as a pillar of European government. For example, we often forget that without an agricultural policy
neither the Dutch or French would commit to creating a regional customs zone (Hallstein 1962; Knudsen 2009; Ludlow 2005; Spinelli 1966). It was, quite simply, that decisive.

Another fact demonstrating the importance of the CAP to the EC framework is evident in how the CAP has continually consumed the bulk of the Community’s financial and infrastructural resources (Bowler 1985: xi; Nugent 2006: 455). Ludlow (2005) sees the design as intentional. The CAP was purposively built to be a communal and interventionist policy that would permanently bind the socioeconomic fates of the EC-6 (see also Lindberg 1963). The CAP would also serve as the demonstration model for how a supranational union could be pushed forward through the work of an enterprising Commission:

The Commission’s reasons for desiring a CAP were highly political…the Commission saw itself as the vanguard for a sweeping transformation of the way in which Europe was governed, which would eventually culminate in full political federation…A major common policy…would require a degree of political and bureaucratic activism, and a common budget high enough to emphasize that the Commission was a political player and not just an international civil service (Ludlow 2005: 356).

Agree or not with all of the above points cited by Ludlow, he clearly indicates why a political sociological reading on the formation of the CAP is justified. This is particularly true regarding the relationship between the CAP and the EC’s creation as a polity. Of course, there are exceptions to this trend of ignoring the sociological dimensions of agricultural governance. These are scholars who have purposively used agricultural integration and the CAP to posit broader claims on the formation of Europe. The work of such authors will now be discussed.
In his masterful study on the origins of the European Community, Milward (1992) uses the CAP as a case-study to argue that nation-states pursued ‘integration’ foremost as a tool for their own economic and political rehabilitation. The interwar period had demonstrated to political authorities the limits of both laissez-faire and imperial models of economic government. Neither would be reactivated in the postwar period. Rather, active economic planning and coordination were seen as the only routes for producing the economic growth and low unemployment that would be required to avoid the class polarization that undermined political order in the 1930s (Halperin 2004; Mazower 1998; Wasserstein 2007).

One plank of ‘embedded liberalism’ argued that states actively pursue economic interdependence where it proves beneficial (see again Ruggie 1998). This was not a logic based on demolishing or replacing the nation state as a political unit and economic reality. The opposite was true. Integration would help states to reestablish economic growth and political legitimacy. Integration, in other words, was a necessary and pragmatic response that European states had to take in confronting new historical conditions, such as US and Soviet bipolar hegemony. At the domestic level, the conditions amounted to demands from a citizenry desperately seeking political stability and economy security.

For this reason, Milward viewed integration as a project primarily motivated by ‘realism’, rather than ideology narrowly conceived. Integration was pursued because its
practices provided the conditions that would make possible the political rehabilitation and economic reconstruction of the state:

After 1945 the European nation-state rescued itself from collapse, created a new political consensus as the basis of its legitimacy, and through changes in its response to its citizens... reasserted itself as the fundamental unit of political organization. The European Community only evolved as an aspect of that national reassertion and without it the reassertion might have well proved impossible (Milward 1992: 3).

For Milward, it was the inability of states to individually manage their food and farm problems that led to the Europeanization of agricultural policy (224-317). First, national subsidy schemes had become too costly for states with large farming sectors. Second, bilateral trade deals did not provide the long-term solution for agro-exporters such as France and Netherlands that desired the security of selling into pan-European markets.

Third, potential member-states desired Europe’s help in modernizing their farming sectors. This was especially true for the Italians, who possessed millions of ‘backward’ holdings (Chapter 2; see also Tracy 1989; 215-38). A European solution might be complicated and cumbersome – a fact demonstrated in the earlier Green Pool Round (see again Griffiths & Girvin 1995). But it was also seen as the lone viable option for solving the problems of a sector that had outgrown national frameworks:

In accepting this commitment the signatories set themselves a political task of an altogether different order from that of regulating coal, iron and steel markets or harmonizing general rules of foreign trade. To agree to shape the details of production and process which affected the incomes of millions of farmers and workers, for the most part operating extremely small enterprises, was to accept a vast political and economic task, as well as to descend much more deeply in the realm of national electoral politics. To understand why this commitment had to be accepted it is necessary to see the great extent to which the problems of Western European agriculture were already common before 1957, as well as the increasingly clear evidence that they were not easily able to be resolved within a national framework (Milward 1992: 225; emphasis mine).
Similar to the national policies that preceded it, and upon which it drew, the CAP was created as a heavily interventionist form of economic government (see also Tracy 1989: 215-227; Ingersent & Rayner 1999).

As food shortages became less severe, the primary agrarian problematization became how to raise farmer incomes to a point where widespread rural poverty would be effectively eliminated. It was this commitment which marked the consolidation of the all-important welfarist dimension of postwar agricultural governance (Coleman 1998; Knudsen 2006; 2009 Rieger 2000; Sheingate 2001).

Milward provides a convincing argument that the inclusion of farmers and rural societies within Europe’s new welfare states was a core element of the postwar settlement (27-33). Rural prosperity was, in the first instance, an insurance policy against peasants who might again gravitate to right-wing political parties and destabilize liberal politics (30). But just as important was the desire to extend mechanisms of economic security to a segment of the population that had been hitherto neglected in the more limited welfare/social insurance schemes of the 1920s and 30s (31).

By the mid-1950s, under the national schemes before the CAP, it was not uncommon that half a farmer’s income would be derived from transfer payments or commodity board price supports (Federico 2005: 196-201). This presented a significant

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1 Practices such as fixing commodity prices, organizing agrarian markets, and providing generous subsidies were all national strategies before they became European. This was even true for the UK which had, since the repeal of the Corn laws, pursued a policy of ‘cheap food’ for its industrial workforce. Building on wartime measures, postwar British policy dramatically altered this cheap food strategy with its 1947 Agricultural Act. The law clearly stated ‘the nation’s food and other agricultural produce’ were in the ‘national interest’ (cited in Tracy 1989: 221). Even the historically liberal British agriculture was now based on modalities of public intervention and regulation. (In 1973 the UK joins the EC, and thus the CAP)

2 As discussed previously, food supply anxieties also informed this interventionist model at this early stage (Bowler 1985; Knudsen 2006; see again Chapter 3). Milward states: ‘the strategic lessons of the war seemed to be that agriculture should not be allowed to shrink to the point where a country was over-dependent on foreign food supply’ (228) (see also Collingham 2011). Farming was understood as a site of
transfer of wealth from urban to rural. It was the basic template for governing a rural welfare state that appeared in every industrialized European country after the war (see also Ingersent & Rayner 1999; Tracy 1989). As Milward therefore accurately surmises, the economic securitization of the farming classes was a domestic strategy before it became ‘regionalized’ in the EC: ‘In effect, agriculture became a state-managed concern, one of whose central purposes was to raise incomes in the sector relative to those elsewhere in the economy (31)…Support for agricultural incomes was an essential support to the welfare state” (33).

Milward also cites the need of France and the Netherlands to create a regional agrarian market that would provide them a guaranteed ‘vent’ for their respective wheat and dairy surpluses (264-317). Here the CAP becomes a solution to the stunted agro-export potential of specific member-states. The French and Dutch realized their agriculture was globally uncompetitive. But they also knew it could flourish within an insulated European marketplace with high price levels; especially when considering the size of the consuming German market (see also Knudsen 2009). From the perspective of the French and Dutch, the CAP could therefore function as a site of export growth and economic revitalization.

To conclude, Milward saw the CAP contributing to the rescue of the European nation-states in three ways. First, it would help to raise and stabilize aggregate food supply levels. Second, it would guarantee market access for exporters such as France and the Netherlands. Third, and most important, the CAP would preserve the rural welfare

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3 We should recall these two states also pushed the hardest for a common agricultural market as part of the ‘Green Pool’ round sponsored by the Council of Europe from 1950-52 (Griffiths & Girvin 1995).
state that has already been initiated at the national level. It would do this by shifting the burden of subsidy payments onto European coffers.⁴

_Moravcsik: The Primacy of National ‘Interests’_

Moravcsik likewise uses the CAP to develop his broader theoretical arguments on the EC (1998; 2000a; 2000b). Similar to Milward, Moravcsik uses the state as his ontological starting point. But unlike Milward, who places the state in historical context, Moravcsik engages it through the prism of positivist social science.

Moravcsik’s ‘grand theory’ of liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) is premised on the belief ‘national interests’ are the driving force of European integration (1993; 1998). Moreover, the most important national interests are always those of a commercial and electoral nature. Moravcsik essentially reduces the state to a ‘transmission belt by which the preferences and social power’ of these groups set policy for the entire nation, including those policies related to European integration (Moravcsik 1997: 518).

Ultimately, for Moravcsik, the European project has nothing to do with building federal structures, forging common identities, or creating a solidaristic peace. Rather, the form it takes is determined by how powerful commercial and electoral interests push their positions in multilateral negotiations: ‘European integration resulted from a series of rational choices made by national leaders who consistently pursued economic interests – primarily the commercial interests of powerful economic producers’ (Moravcsik 1998:

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⁴ This would make it possible for national agricultural policies to concentrate their funds on structural measures such as land consolidation and mechanization (Fennel 1997; Ingersent & Rayner 1999; Tracy 1989).
Despite its simplicity and economic reductionism, LI has become the ‘baseline’ theory of European integration against which all others are judged (Schimmelfennig 2004: 75).

When it comes to the CAP, Moravcsik views the French national interest as paramount. Moravcsik points out that France, the largest agrarian exporter among the EC-6, had the most to gain from the CAP (Moravcsik 1998: 89). Whereas French support for a customs union was ‘cautiously supportive’, it was ‘exceptionally strong’ for an agricultural policy – and this was so across both the Fourth and Fifth Republics (Moravcsik 1998: 103). This consistent French position had to do with the desire to secure export markets for surpluses of French wheat, sugar-beet and dairy. Additionally, echoing an earlier argument of Milward, French officials also began to openly question if state finances could continue to shoulder the burden of subsidizing the large agricultural sector.  

Within this context of predictable future surpluses with no obvious export markets, French farmers lobbied intensely for a European solution. Moravcsik argues that when the policy was agreed to at Messina in 1955, it was because the Germans came to realize the Rome Treaty ‘was un-ratifiable in France without agriculture’ (Moravcsik 1998: 144). The first choice of the French was to pursue a policy based on the ‘liberalization of commodities trade within a preferential European zone with moderate  

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5 States deliberate based on their individual win sets but, additionally, realize that in order to make any joint policy requires locating a pareto-optimal position. States must therefore be both ‘rational’ and ‘strategic’ in dealing with other states. They are strategic because they will modify their individual bargaining positions to find a collective win-set that leaves them (and others) better off than the status quo.

6 Moravcsik states: ‘Wheat production increased over 800 percent, sugar and wine over 300 percent each, creating more government funded stockpiles and subsidised exports. The fiscal burden soon became acute’ (Moravcsik 1998: 111).
support prices’ (Moravcsik 1998: 161; see also Ludlow 2005). Even De Gaulle, who had little interest in agriculture before becoming President, was quickly converted to the cause of substantive agricultural protectionism when political and economic necessity demanded it (see again Moravcsik 1998; 2000a; 2000b).

Drawing extensively on Fifth Republic archives, Moravcsik details the extent to which agricultural policy and not geopolitical interests comprised the backbone of De Gaulle’s negotiating positions on the EC (2000a; 2000b). The headstrong General knew the electoral and commercial power of farmers was not to be trifled with. Farmers were 40% of the electorate and clearly willing to riot over support-prices levels. For this reason, farmers came to have an ‘utterly…overriding causal role’ in de Gaulle’s approach to the EEC (Moravcsik 2000: 6). De Gaulle also viewed the problem in terms of political order; or, more accurately, what might jeopardize rural political order: ‘At a critical cabinet meeting in August 1962, he called the stabilization of agriculture ‘the most important problem’ facing France after the Algerian civil war. If the problems are not resolved, he declared, ‘we will have another Algeria on our own soil” (Moravcsik 2000a: 19, emphasis mine).

It was therefore economic deference to farmers, bordering on a political paranoia about their disruptive potential, and not a desire to push French grandeur, that determined French policy in the EEC. Moravcsik claims all the available memoir extracts and cabinet meetings of De Gaulle support this case (Moravcsik 2000a: 23-4). Agricultural integration over-determined the French negotiating position because agricultural exports were so crucial to the postwar economy, and because politicians trembled in fear at the prospect of losing the farmer vote. It did not matter if De Gaulle was personally a
supporter of farmers (he was not). Their combined commercial and electoral significance forced him to pay attention to their needs regardless:

The promotion of agriculture, a backward sector, was hardly de Gaulle’s preferred policy. He came to it only in response to relentless pressure from particularistic domestic interests…By the early 1960s, farmers, an important electoral constituency for Gaullists and other center-right parties in France, were again growing restless, as the government tried to limit increases in government subsidies. Intermittent riots shook the country. The threat of further disorder was a constant refrain in de Gaulle’s cabinet sessions on agriculture (Moravcsik 2000a: 29).

Moravcsik, as we have now seen, views agricultural integration, and the European project more generally, through the analytical prioritization of the national economic interest. In this case, it was the French national interest that mattered most. The core theoretical claim is simplistic yet certainly provocative. Without the ‘push’ from domestic interests, primarily commercial and electoral, there would have been little momentum for either the Common Market or the CAP.

Parsons: Supranationalism and Agriculture

Parsons (2003) narrative on the CAP is a direct and highly critical response to Moravcsik’s interpretation on the primary role of national interests in shaping European integration generally, and agricultural integration specifically. Parsons is certainly hostile to the rationalist and positivist premise assumed by Moravcsik. Drawing upon a broadly constructivist approach, Parsons argues that it has been the ‘visionary maps’ of European

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7 Parsons states: ‘Embedding an argument in a highly general theory makes it valuable, even if both the particular historical argument and broader applications of the theory suffer from substantial empirical problems. Moravcsik’s highly regarded application of economic-structuralist theory to EU history is a good example. On my reading, the empirical evidence he offers is substantially incomplete at practically every step (and sometimes simply wrong)…But by embedding a poorly supported argument in a largely untested general theory, he has dominated EU studies’ (Parsons 2003: 29).
statesman which have most shaped the course of European integration. For Parsons, it has been the discursive and normative elements around region-building that have comprised the ‘animating force of the EU project’ (Parsons 2009: 195). In other words, ‘interests’ (narrowly conceived) explain very little outside the contexts that produced them.

Parsons goes on to argue that seeing Europe in terms of visionary maps means rejecting the notion that the postwar project has an underlying telos. Numerous discursive maps and diagrams for integrating Europe were in circulation during the 1950s and 60s (including federalism, functionalism and confederalism). The eventual success of supranationalism was actually a ‘fairly contingent’ outcome (Parsons 2003: 3). To understand how it came to be, we need to focus on the struggles surrounding its discursive institutionalization.

In sum, practically none of the academic literature on the EU suggests that Europe’s national political leaders have intentionally pursued European institution-building in ‘visionary ways’, without being forced by domestic interest groups or cajoled by cleverly entrepreneurial supranational agents… But a closer look at political patterns in the construction of the EU, and more serious consideration of rhetoric, leads to another analytic vision that places competing normative visions (and the institutionalization of one of them) at the heart of the story (Parsons 2009: 194).

Furthermore, for Parsons, visions of governance are most contingent, contestable, and dynamic before their moment of institutionalization. That is, before they have come to have a disciplining effect on the political landscape. The strongest arguments for a common market were given in the early-1950s, subsequent to it becoming fait accompli.

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8 Constructivism has become a widely accepted approach to integration and includes many strains of thought. If there is one assumption that bridges this diverse literature it is the idea that ideas, norms, discourse and language are constitutive features of integration.

9 With this emphasis, Parsons has overlap with the governmentality literature in sharing the belief positivist approaches elide the actual problems, struggles and sites of political generation.
Similarly, the most coherent rationalizations for agricultural integration were articulated when there existed real doubt about the chances for creating such a policy. Parsons therefore provides a useful rejoinder to Moravcsik: the discursive struggles over political visions are what make possible the ‘grand treaty moments’ so fetishized in his work.

Applying his ‘visionary’ constructivist schema to agriculture, Parsons (2003) argues the creation of the CAP was not about powerful economic interests hijacking European negotiations. Rather, it needs to assessed relative to the normative legitimacy that came to envelop supranationalism at a general level. Parsons reminds us that in the Green Pool Round both Pflimlin and Mansholt wanted agrarian markets regulated along supranational lines (83-6; and see again Griffiths & Girvin 1995). But these proposals, at the time, were heavily criticized due to suspicion and unease over the potential role of a common authority, a line of critique that also leveled at the EDC. Much of the suspicion was actually generated by French planners and farmers who saw a common authority as a drastic solution considering that domestic price supports, bilateral trade deals, and piecemeal liberalisation might just as easily achieve the same results:

_ Buoyed by widespread enthusiasm for agricultural cooperation, Pflimlin obtained Assembly support to call an agricultural conference. If French agricultural organizations liked specialization and cartels, however, they soon decided that supranationality was another thing entirely. There was no need, they argued, for major new institutions. Even the most competitive producers wanted nothing more than a series of product-to-product export contracts between agricultural organizations (Parsons 2003: 84)

For Parsons, the CAP succeeded where the Green Pool failed because a new normative legitimacy had opened up around supranationalism in the interim period. The important moment here was Monnet’s ‘re-launch’ of integration in 1955. The Green Pool negotiations, in contrast, had their fates unfortunately tied to the doomed federalist EDC/
EPC projects (Griffiths 2005). Over 1950-52, federalism, and not supranationalism, provided the vision of integration most fervently pushed by ardent Europeanists. Only when this route dead-ends does supranationalism, in the form of neofunctionalism, become a viable strategy of integration (see Griffiths 2005: 183-4).

Getting to this point also required some contingent events, notably on the part of the French. First, foreign minister Antoine Pinay had to willfully ignore his government’s instructions to the contrary and actively pursue negotiations on the EEC at Messina in 1955. Second, in 1956, a Socialist named Guy Mollet (SFIO) will become Premier. Mollet proves far more willing to support Pinay’s position than was his own government. And once the French political elites began to actively support agricultural integration, they are subsequently able to push and cajole the farm associations (including FNSEA) towards a ‘European solution’. As we see, this reverses the causal arrows drawn by Moravcsik:

Rather than being lobbied by interest groups, Mollet’s team lobbied them. In 1957, he secured ratification thanks to the reluctant agricultural support he mobilised and to his use of coalitional and party discipline, issue linkages, and side payments…The institutional agenda of such leaders led French farmers to perceive interests in a community format, not the other way around,…had these leaders not pulled France to ‘little Europe’ in the late1950s, the window of opportunity for this outcome in European bargaining would soon have closed. The EEC and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) – the direct foundations of today’s EU – arose only because Mollet opened up and leapt through the window (Parsons 2003: 92).10

10 And much convincing apparently had to be done. French farmers remained supportive of primarily bilateral deals in agriculture, as did German farmers (103). The CAP was only possible once the supranational EEC had been agreed to, and politicians such as Mollet and Robert Marjolin were able to convince farmers of its merits for agricultural markets. In fact, farmers were the first constituency that pro-Community French leadership believed they needed to convert to the European cause (108). They were successful when they were able to point to the guaranteed markets the CAP would make available for absorbing surpluses of French wheat, dairy and sugar. The Dutch and Germans were likely convinced on other grounds. For the Dutch, it was a first step towards ‘freeing’ intra-European trade in agriculture. For the Germans (and Belgians) the high price supports implied future economic security for a particularly vulnerable sector of their populations.
To conclude, Parsons claims it was the acceptance of supranationalism as the vision of integration that made it possible to sell farmers, as well as recalcitrant states, on the merits of a common agricultural market. In contrast, the contestability over federalism doomed agrarian integration in the Green Pool round. The CAP, therefore, becomes a reality not due to a particular configuration of national interests. Rather, its creation was a product of the Community Method having become accepted as a legitimate blueprint for building Europe among potential member-states, including among their agricultural ministers and farmers.

Assessing Milward, Moravcsik and Parsons

These authors are all unique for having used the CAP as a case study to develop claims about the relationship between integration and agriculture. In this way, they move well beyond what is normal in the CAP literature by singling out the political problems and sociopolitical forces that made possible a European organization of agro-food power. Milward demonstrates why the creation of the CAP has to be situated within a broader transformation of postwar politics that was increasingly committed to consolidating the welfare state, fostering international cooperation, and creating mixed economies. Where Milward succeeds wonderfully is in showing the political primacy placed on extending economic security across rural society in the postwar period.

Despite the crude reductionism and selective use of history, Moravcsik is able to capture the political salience of agriculture as a ‘national interest’. He find this salience in elements such as the electoral power of rural society, and the commercial importance of agro-exporters. In singling out the continued economic importance of agriculture,
Moravcsik not only overlaps with Milward, but also with scholars who have written on the ‘second food regime’ (1947-1973). These scholars argue that it was a common economic strategy among postwar OECD states to pry open overseas markets to absorb their growing surplus production of wheat, corn, and soy (Friedmann & McMichael 1989; Friedmann 1993).

The account of Parsons is useful for embedding the creation of the CAP in a contingent political universe of competing mental maps and ‘visions’ for how to unify Europe. Parsons makes clear that a common agricultural market becomes possible only when political elites are socialized into a ‘community’ mode of political thought. This was necessary, as Parsons argues, because the CAP governed through a logic of redistribution rather than deregulation. This made it a more challenging policy to construct than a customs union. To govern such a vital social sector, and in such an interventionist manner, required empowering a range of new ‘European’ authorities and economic practices.

Despite the contributions of these authors, there are certain omissions and shortcoming present in all of their arguments. This is especially true in the instance of Moravcsik and the causal significance he allots to the ‘national interest’, a perspective that becomes further refined around the French national interest in particular. Moravcsik was incorrect to assume that securing market access for national producers was a unique concern of French political authorities. The Dutch were equally insistent on including agrarian markets, alongside those for industry, in the nascent Community

\[11 \text{Of course, Moravcsik is not the only one to highlight the link between generous farm subsidies and powerful ‘neocorporatist’ policy-making networks (see also Hennis 2005; Sheingate 2001).}\]
structure (Griffiths 1995a; Ludlow 2005). Furthermore, as Knudsen (2009) demonstrates with exhaustive archival evidence, the Germans actually favored the highest EC prices for wheat, and thus were the most desirous of an insulted agrarian market.\footnote{In particular, the German agricultural association \textit{Bauernverband}, and their (hand-picked) national agricultural minister Edmund Rehwinkel, were so insistent on a high cereal prices level that they were willing to defy the CDU government \textit{and} scuttle negotiations on the creation of the EC if their demands were not realized.}

Moravcsik is also presentist in the way he tacitly assumes ‘economic interests’ meant the same thing in the 1950s as they do today. Farmers, in this period, were not viewed as outside influences who unfairly molded public policy to their advantage. Rather, they were embraced as privileged interlocutors, who were committed to realizing both the ‘public good’ and the ‘rural good’.\footnote{Neo-functionalism advocated enrolling sector-wide professional associations into consultation and policymaking networks (Haas 1958).} This is one reason why the creation of COPA\footnote{Committee of Agricultural Professional Associations} as an umbrella group for national farm groups was viewed as a success by the Hallstein Commission. Spinelli (1966) argues it reached a ‘high stage of organization’ so fast because the Commission realized the necessity of including farmers in all major agrarian policy decisions (126).

In the 1950s and 60s, the ‘agricultural interest’ was not an \textit{explanation} for policy outcomes but an \textit{effect} of a political logic that viewed farmers as social partners in governing the farm sector and rural economy (Griffith 1997b; Rieger 2000). Nowadays, we perceive the role of agricultural organizations as one of ‘lobbying’ and ‘pressuring’ for policy that distinctly advantages them (see Chapter 5). Farmers were not viewed this way in postwar embedded liberalism. Rather, they were perceived as ‘heroes’ for keeping the citizenry fed during the war (Collingham 2011; Yates 1960). Their contributions, in
terms of quickly expanding the food supply, provided the backbone for social recovery in the initial postwar years. Farmers provided a ‘vital’ public good (food) and farming constituted the bulk of rural economic activity. Political authorities and publics alike saw farmers as *rightful* co-partners in shaping food and agricultural policies:

> It is a false dichotomy in this period to talk of a split between government and agriculture pressure groups. In many cases the agriculture pressure groups were the executive agents of government policy…In many countries there was almost a revolving war between the agricultural lobby and agricultural ministers as they exchanged personnel and people in key areas…postwar Europe was characterized by a situation where agriculture was seen as a national priority, where it performed essential economic functions (Griffiths 1997b: 353).  

The incorporation of farmers into the apparatuses of postwar agricultural policy, including its policymaking networks, has led Rieger (2000) to conclude postwar agricultural policy was engineered as a ‘defensive’ social policy. We must recall that political elites in the 50s and 60s still imagined rural areas as spaces of incipient threat.  

The agrarian depressions of the 1920s and 30s had demonstrated that an impoverished peasantry could become a breeding ground for reactionary political movements (Mazower 1998; Evans 2005; Tilton 1975). To defend against this potential reemergence, farmers had to be protected from the commodity price fluctuations and unsustainable debt loads which devastated then during the interwar years. Here we encounter a relationship between economic security and political order that would be governed in the CAP:

> …there was a special need to integrate farmers into the newly founded democracies, and keep the countryside peopled. In the inter-war period major sections of the agrarian populations turned to radical right-wing parties to protest

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15 Why do we not talk about an amorphous ‘industrial interest’ in the same manner we discuss self-interested farmers? For example, when the close links between industry and government in the German social market economy are described it is with a much more benign concept: ‘co-determination’.

16 Gerschenken (1944) was to famously blame the rise of German fascism on the agrarian classes, notably landed Prussian elites.
against governments that had tolerated the collapse of agricultural prices. This experience created a dramatic change in agricultural policies (Rieger 2000: 186).

These arguments of Rieger have some overlap with those of Milward previously discussed. But Rieger’s analysis also conveys some of the limitations found in Milward; namely, how Milward stops short of fully developing the ‘social’ dimension of his argument. Particularly, Milward never makes explicit how the operation of agricultural policy and problematizations of rurality were linked together through the governing mechanisms of the CAP. While Rieger’s piece is short, it does point to the possibility of a fuller unpacking of the welfarist and ‘moralistic’ rationalization of early agricultural integration.

Parsons can be critiqued on the grounds he does not fully acknowledge the unique and special importance of the food supply and farming to postwar politics. Rather, he wants to explain an exceptional political by way of proxy; i.e. through a broader story on the institutionalisation of ‘supranationalism’. Parsons essentially argues that once the blockage inhibiting the acceptance of a high authority is removed, a joint agricultural policy becomes realistic or politically tenable. But is this the full story? After all, there is no consideration given to the CAP as a uniquely interventionist, redistributionist, and territorial policy.

There is no doubt that acceptance of the community method was a precondition for creating the CAP. But agriculture was not exceptional in this regard. From the Rome (1957) to Lisbon (2009) treaties, supranationalism has always been important for rationalizing spaces of European government. So the question I pose here is: What other visions, especially those around food and farming itself, made it possible to imagine and
organize agro-food power as European. As we have seen, creating an agricultural policy was a precondition for creating a political Europe. It was not a policy simply awaiting a new vision for integration.

As Hallstein reminds us, only a decade previous to this it would have been hard to imagine food and agriculture as sites of robust regional cooperation. This is why the CAP was so notable to the Commissioner: ‘What issues could be more burningly political than those of agriculture? The member states of the European Economic Community have agreed to face them together, and they have already reached unanimity on the beginnings of the common agricultural policy’ (Hallstein 1962: 66). In the end, though, it was not just the vision of a high authority that made it possible to create a regional policy with no real precedent. It would also require the vision of ‘the social’ as a plane of political thought and way of making technical the problems of economic security. A constructivist approach is also limited because it does not consider the role of non-discursive practices that were equally as pivotal for governing this regional problem-space. To these elements and others, the chapter now turns.

**The Social and the CAP**

Farmer poverty was endemic in Western Europe before 1945. In the postwar period, the longstanding condition is problematized in new ways. Moreover, beginning in the early 1960s, this problem would be assembled around the rationale of governing ‘welfare’ in the CAP; at this point, a novel space of regional government: ‘We tend to think of welfarism as a game of domestic governance, a way of thinking and managing questions of social and economic life *within* the nation. However, the case of European integration
suggests that welfarism was much more flexible and could be applied to spaces across and above the system of states’ (Walters 2004: 159). The CAP provides one opportunity to dissect the most substantial ‘welfare game’ of the EC.

The first thing to consider is that, in the postwar period, food and agricultural were governed from the ‘social point of view’. Understood from this perspective, it is not necessary to pick a single cause or source for the CAP, as each of the authors reviewed does. Seen from the vantage point of the social, postwar agricultural governance is about the complex relations between populations, food supply and farmers, and the ways these have been configured around problems of security.

**Governing the Social**

The social is a particular way of rationalizing and territorializing the problems of security. To remind ourselves, security is a general diagram of government based on the future oriented management of risk across an entire population (Valverde 2007: 172). The question of securing ‘society’ (as a particular objectivization of the population) becomes entrenched in political discourse and practice over the 1930s (Neocleous 2008; Rose 1999). During the interwar period especially, ‘society slowly began to be seen as an object *sui generis*, with its own laws, its own science, and eventually its own arts of government’ (Rabinow 1989: 11). After the Second World War, governing society was posed as a set of questions around the promotion of health, solidarity and prosperity among the citizenry. The need to manage a range of social risks becomes one of the consensus principles of postwar governance that transcends both the Christian and social democratic party traditions (Judt 2005; Mazower 1998; Sassoon 1996).
Governing the social involved a distinctive form of economic government. While Foucault (2008) notes the general importance of political economy to apparatuses of security, this will take a particular form in the ‘mixed economies’ and ‘social liberalism’ of postwar Western Europe (see especially Judt 2005; Sassoon 1996). Most notably, it appears in a set of mechanisms for economic planning, nationalization, progressive taxation, wealth redistribution, macroeconomic policy, and industrial democracy. Thompson’s (1992) concept of ‘managed economies’ is useful for encapsulating the ethos and range of practices that was involved in this new type of economic government. Rose (1999) echoes the sentiment in arguing that governing the social was a stark departure from classical liberal political economy in its privileging of ‘activist’ measures:

European political parties increasingly rejected the claims of political economy to prescribe and delimit the legitimate means to be used for the government of economic life…The political rationalities that played so great a part in our own century – socialism, social democracy, social liberalism – differed on many things, but they had one thing in common: the belief that the question of how to govern must be posed from ‘the social point of view’…Social politics were debated in terms of the rights and obligations of the state to extend itself into zones outside those marked by the rule of law…Here at least some aspects of the economy required to be politically governed in the name of the social (Rose 1999: 117-18)

*Locating the Social in European Government*

We should be careful in claiming that all EC policy was governed from the social perspective. The customs union, the other pillar of the EC, pursued a strategy of ‘negative integration’ based on removing barriers to trade, especially those that distorted the mobility of goods and people. As a logic of political unity, the Common Market was not inspired by a social *problématique*, but the wealth and productivity gains to be had from establishing liberal economic relations between states (Jabko 2006; Parker 2013). The
Common Market was a pillar of postwar Europe that imagined Europeans as primarily economic agents. But it was not the only policy imaginary of the EC. As Walters (2004) notes, the EC took a ‘variety of subjectivities as its correlates’ (Walters 2004: 13). In the case of the CAP it would be the family farm, the repository of a vulnerable rural Europe, that would territorialize and concretize its social gaze.

The social will become most fully expressed as a field of national government (Rose 1999). Nonetheless, its logics and practices would also manifest in specific European spaces of rule (Holmes 2000; Roche 2010). Of course, the forms of social government developed by the EC would never be as total as those emergent from national welfare machineries. In a sense, governing the social in Europe would always come with certain limits because its visions would have to be made complimentary with those at the national level.

As Holmes argues, Catholic Social Thought helped delimit these zones of power through its concept of ‘subsidiarity’. Subsidiarity was a way of rationalizing and distributing political authority based on considerations of efficiency and proportionality. At the crux of the concept was the following maxim: political authority should only be centralized when it needs to be; that is, where it makes possible more peaceful and prosperous forms of government. On the flip side, if these conditions are not met, political practice should be organized at the lowest level where such criteria can be fulfilled: ‘While the design of the polity is ambiguous, the nature of the society and political economy advanced by the doctrine is more certain. Centralisation is appropriate in this framework only where economies of scale or the nature of a task make it absolutely essential (Holmes 2000: 107).
Subsidiarity thus places a prefabricated limit on the scope and exercise of centralized political power. This logic becomes especially important when considering the proper place of regional or global institutions. Their legitimacy rested on the ability to more effectively execute policy than could be done at the national or subnational level. And as we have seen, problems of food supply, nutritional health, farmer income and agricultural modernization were cast in a regional frame precisely because national authorizes were seen to lack resources, competence or economies of scale to successfully govern the problems. Beginning with the UNRRA, weaving through the work of the OEEC, and culminating in the CAP, European farming and rurality will become a ‘concrete geo-social reality…objectified, publically visible, formalised and generalised’ (Gray 2000: 31).

EC sought to guarantee ‘cohesiveness’ between the economies of urban and rural Europe. Agricultural policy should no longer divide rural and urban society, as was the case in the competing strategies of cheap bread vs. high agricultural prices that dominated political discourse during industrialization (Golob 1968; Tirrell 1951; Tracy 1989). The belief now was that farmer income could be increased, the food supply stabilized, all the while lowering food prices for workers. There was certainly a utopian streak detectable in the original rationalization of the CAP:

While it has been largely determined by economic requirements, the common agricultural policy does not ignore social problems. It is not the EEC’s intention to abandon the numerous farmers who will be forced out of agriculture as a result of technical progress…In adopting the common agricultural policy, the EEC drew the logical consequences from the refutation, at least in industrial countries, of the Malthusian doctrine that population grows faster than the production of goods…Given a rational economic policy and technical progress, it should also be possible to solve the problems of an affluent society. They at least look easier to solve than the problems of an impoverished society, whose members, either
individually or collectively, can only thrive at the expense of others (EEC 1965:3) \(^{17}\)

The CAP was, and remains today, one the fullest expressions of a public policy rationalized from the social point of view. In the name of economic security for rural Europe, it created mechanisms to organize and stabilize agrarian markets, as well as to insulate farmers from ‘natural’ prices that were seen to entrench poverty and economic ‘backwardness’ across the countryside. As the next two sections discuss, the early CAP would confront these problems by placing the family farm at the center of an extensive and generous subsidy apparatus.

**Territorializing the CAP: The Family Farm as Rurality**

The object of CAP policy was the ‘family farm’. It was the target of the extensive CAP subsidy apparatus, as well as the territorial imaginary of rural space in the EC. The EC approached the family farm as both an economic and social reality: ‘the term ‘family farm’ is taken to mean an agricultural enterprise in which the productive work is mainly performed by members of the family and in which – in the case of small-scale enterprises – can provide work representing full employment for at least one or preferably two members’ (EEC 1961: 2). The importance of the family farm for grounding the strategies and mechanisms of CAP government cannot be overstated. In the first place, it constituted the social-production unit that provided Europe its food, and rural areas their employment. Second, it was also a familial-cultural form that, once fully rehabilitated, would ensure political stability across Europe’s vast countryside (see again Rieger 2000).

\(^{17}\) Perhaps this was also a way of compensating the socioeconomic loser from modernization – i.e. the countryside and farmers – so they did not disrupt socioeconomic progress.
A Space of Managed Liberalism

The economic government of the CAP was certainly based in logics of ‘planning’. But the Commission was always careful to differentiate this from the type of agrarian planning that was occurring next door, in the Eastern Bloc, at the same time. The Commission alludes in particular to the fact it would never use practices such as forced populations transfers or collectivization: ‘The migration of agricultural workers to other regions – even by virtue of free movement of manpower in the EEC – should not be other than voluntary. Any coercive measures, either direct or indirect, are to be rigorously excluded’ (EEC 1961: 12).

Within this binary political logic, abject coercion becomes the litmus test for passing over into the realm of illiberal agrarian government. By simply not crossing this threshold, Mansholt and others could still claim the CAP respected the ‘freedom’ of farmers, even while abandoning nearly all tenants of classical political economy. In many ways, the CAP was a better example of ‘social economy’ than it was political economy. That is, it was a configuration of economic government that aimed to securitize the conditions of rural poverty by finding alternatives to governing through a free market (Procacci 1991).

As Hindess (1996) makes clear, liberalism has many versions. The key difference between them often centers on the question of autonomy. The particular fault line is the question of whether autonomy is a feature of essential human-ness, or an ‘artefact of government practices’ (i.e. social liberalism) (73). The CAP was unambiguously aligned
with this latter pole. For farmers who had experienced the agrarian depressions of the 1930s, and the chaos of the war years, economic security and individual autonomy were two sides of the same coin. Neither was possible without the extensive regulation of markets and their consequences on daily life. From the 1870s onward, peasants and farmers alike came to equate unfettered market liberty with depressed commodity prices and extreme indebtedness (Federico 2005; Tracy 1989). Mansholt understood this dynamic well. He always reminded farmers that the CAP would govern prices and supply, but not manpower and property. The limits of intervention, in other words, would be set as the minimum conditions necessary to secure this economic prosperity.

The Common Market was rationalized as a ‘smooth space’ for the unimpeded circulation of goods, commerce and people. The CAP, in contrast, was a policy rationalized in distinctly social, territorial and interventionist terms (Barry 1993; Bowler 1985; Gray 2000; Knudsen 2009). The main objective was to keep the family farm more or less completely insulated from the rapid fluctuation of world commodity prices. This would, in turn, inflate farmer incomes to the point of having them be able to join the middle classes. This would make consumers out of farmers, and keep the rural economy from collapsing into a cycle of devastating debt with every bumper harvest than brought low prices.

An early *communique* on the CAP conveyed the belief that all elements of the agricultural sector might be amenable to rationalization. But this possibility was dependent on setting agricultural prices at the correct levels. The prices had to be high enough to compensate farmers for their labor time, but also provide them enough excess capital to make on-farm investments. While the political economy of the CAP was
certainly complex, it nonetheless rested in large degree upon correctly aligning agricultural prices within the internal market:

As the common agricultural policy develops and is applied, a question which has often been discussed at the national level also arises at the Community level. It concerns the relationship between the earnings obtained from agricultural produce and the prices paid for the means of production and the services required by the farmer. As the prices for basic farm products are aligned in the EEC – this is one of the main conditions for the establishment of a genuine domestic agricultural market…On the basis of statistics, calculations have now been made which will be of use fixing both the prices of farm products and of the means of production and also the level of wages in the EEC (EEC 1963a: 4).

The Strategy of Income Parity: Rural/Urban

Raising and stabilizing farmer incomes was one of the original CAP principles articulated in Article 39 (Fennel 1979: 8). At the strategic level, this general objective becomes translated into the practical goal of trying to realize ‘income parity’ between urban and rural workers (Knudsen 2006; 2009).

Around the same time the CAP’s first market organizations begin to operate, the EC hosted a conference on the ‘social aspects of the common agricultural policy’ (EEC 1961). The proceedings of the conference stated that the CAP must work ‘to protect and develop family farming in order to bring farm incomes and living conditions up the level of other sectors’ (1). This was the narrative of ‘income parity’. In other words, genuine rural prosperity could only be realized when farmers were also included in the benefits of postwar growth.\(^\text{18}\)

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\(^{18}\) While this newfound prosperity would come primarily from higher incomes, the Commission also considers extending ‘social security to workers on family farms and to the members of their families, and the equalization of benefits with those accorded to other wage earners’ (EEC 1961: 3).
Income parity was probably not a realistic goal provided the rapid economic growth of European industry over the ‘thirty glorious years’. Farmer income did increase – and significantly – but they would never reach a rough equality with that of the industrial workforce. Nonetheless, the centrality of the narrative that farmers be given economic ‘fairness’ and ‘equality’ would remain entrenched. Even the controversial proposals of *Agriculture 1980* were consistent on the objective of income parity (EEC 1968).

*Agriculture 1980* was Sicco Mansholt’s controversial proposal to introduce a structural policy into the CAP (Fennel 1997; Hennis 2005; Knudsen 2009). At its core, this was a strategy for modernizing the sector through programs such as land consolidation, early retirement, and the training of young farmers. At the time, farmers interpreted Mansholt’s proposals as a direct assault on the family farm. The fear was based on Mansholt’s own conclusion that, over the long-term, modernization would result in millions of farmers leaving the sector (Grant 2009; van der Harst 2007).

Tracy (1989) notes the proposals caused ‘violent opposition’ among farmer groups (267). The fears were mostly unfounded – at least in the sense Mansholt was not seeking to replace the family farm, but modernize it (Merrienboer 2011). Mansholt’s intention was to rearticulate the objectives of Messina to fit the economic reality of the late 1960s: ‘The first question we must ask ourselves is this: Have we in the EEC succeeded so far in achieving the major objectives of the Treaty of Rome?...particularly by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture’ (EEC 1968).

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19 In German, Mansholt was dubbed ‘Baumwölder’ (peasant killer). In Italy, the plan was referred to as ‘la bomba’ for its excepted effect on rural communities (the examples are cited in Knudsen 2009: 284).
Mansholt sought to quicken the pace of agricultural modernization as a means to empower the family farm, not displace the CAP’s welfare function relative to it. Consider the following speech, from 1967, where Mansholt ruminates on what a ‘fair income’ means in the context of the farming community. Here it is evident he remains a defender of what Rieger (2000) calls the ‘moral economy’ of the CAP. Mansholt insists that an economic climate of regularity and predictability is necessary for farmers. He does not question the strategy of a ‘fair’ and ‘comparable’ income, but rather the programs and mechanisms the EC-5 should use to get there.

A fair income…that means an income and standard of living comparable with those in other sectors of the economy. If this has not been achieved yet, we must draw our conclusions and make room in our Community programme for what has to be done next. This can also be put in simpler terms: our farmers want to know where they are going. And the question is not only being asked by those now engaged in agriculture, by farmers and their wives, but even more by young people living on the land who are faced with choosing their future careers… Average incomes in Europe [twenty years hence] will probably be twice what they are today, though the working week will be even shorter. Agriculture will be part of this society…(Mansholt 1967)

Mansholt is defending the premise that market and structural policies are both necessary to govern modern agriculture; a blended strategy he had been advocating since 1958 (Fennel 1997; Knudsen 2009). Whereas a price-policy should remain ‘the central factor in our agricultural policy’, long-term planning also had to work towards realizing modern agricultural units. The structural policies Mansholt hoped for would be ‘deliberate’ and ‘purposeful’ measures to assist family farmers in becoming more efficient producers.

In the end, in fact, family farms did prove to be efficient production units in Western Europe. When the high modern paradigm is fully consolidated across Western Europe in the 50s and 60s – producing record yields in the process – it is the family farm
that leads the way with its explosive use of tractors and fertilizers (Mazoyer & Roudart 2006: 375-440). It is also noteworthy that *Agriculture 1980* made no effort to privilege market forces or global trade in governing the sector. This consensus would not be disrupted until the early-1980s (see Chapter 5). A separate 1965 CAP position paper was clear on the point agricultural policy would not be ‘subordinated’ to ‘international discipline’ (EEC 1965: 5).

Therefore, despite the alterations he sought, Mansholt continued to imagine the CAP around intervention, planning, and income maintenance. Farming remained a sector to be governed from the social point of view: ‘Society as a whole has a duty to help the farming community achieve these objectives through a gradual process of evolution and not by introducing harsh measures. Ultimately, all this is a policy – may I stress this yet again – concerned with the future welfare of our farming families and the happiness of our children’ (Mansholt 1967/1968). For Mansholt, agricultural policy remained an apparatus for alleviating rural poverty, and thus one way of weaving the social fabric across postwar Europe.

**CMOs, Food Estates and Economic Managerialism**

Moravcsik (2000a) relays a provocative passage spoken by De Gaulle as president of the Fifth Republic (1959-69). It was mentioned previously, but will now be discussed in more detail. The context is a gathering of the French cabinet during the summer of 1962. At this critical meeting, De Gaulle alerts his cabinet ministers that, second to the Algerian crisis, stabilizing agriculture was the most important issue facing French politics. If farmer protests and discontent continue to grow, argues De Gaulle, ‘we will have another
Algeria on our own soil’ (19). Why would de Gaulle see parallels between rebellious colonial Frenchman in Algeria and French farmers? What was it about the French countryside and farmers that allowed rural society to be imagined at this level of political disorder?

The combustible agrarian scene in postwar France was the context informing De Gaulle’s statement. Farmers were perpetually upset and frequently resorted to violence over the low support prices they blamed for their reduced incomes. For French technocrats, the fear was that chronically low-prices would also diminish surplus production, and therefore harm potential agro-export revenue (Sheingate 2001; Tracy 1989). French farming had decent levels capitalization and ideal growing conditions for arable crops. But on global markets, its farmers could not compete with the large and mechanized operations in the Americas. Therefore, to allow unregulated imports into the country would undermine the economic security of domestic producers. In effect, it was the social effects of unrestrained competition that raised, in De Gaulle’s mind, the specter of rebellion across the agricultural dependent countryside.

*Economic Depression and Rural Violence*

At the crux of De Gaulle’s anxieties was a problem that had, in some version, animated agricultural policy discourse on the continent since the 1870s. This involved the determinate relationship between commodity prices and farmer income (Federico 2005; Tracy 1989). Previous agricultural depressions had demonstrated to political authorities that farmer poverty and indebtedness were primarily a consequence of low prices, price volatility, and market saturation. Even a small uptick in overseas competition could spell
doom for the small and middling European peasantry (see also Coclanis 2003; McCalla 1969). To recall from the previous chapter, this is why tariff and frontier instruments were put into use towards the end of the nineteenth century – precisely to blunt the impact of such competitive forces on agrarian price levels.

The potential of low prices leading to political foment had not completely disappeared by the 1950s. At this point, rural France was no different from rural Europe. Wherever you looked, the countryside was nearly entirely dependent on income derived from agricultural production. And as was demonstrated with their support of right-wing and fascist movements in the 1930s, farmers would deny support to liberal governments that demonstrated indifference to their economic and welfare needs (Evans 2005; Farquharson 1976; Tilton 1975).

To better understand De Gaulle’s analogy, we can make explicit comparisons between the Algeria/colonial and the French/countryside assemblages. The agent of disorder in Algeria was the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (OAS). This group of dissident army officers and ex-soldiers, mainly a product of Indochina colonial wars, viewed De Gaulle’s decision to grant Algerian independence an act of treachery ‘from above’ (Horne 2006; Kedward 2005). From the perspective of the rebels, it was an act of political violence against the 350,000 Frenchman who believed Algeria to be their colonial birthright. It was perceived as a pitiful abdication of French grandeur. The OAS, in response to the perceived capitulation, began in 1961 to complement its civil war against the FLN and directed terrorist violence against the Fifth Republic. This included carrying out operations in the heart of France: detonating bombs, conducting
assassinations, and making tactical plans to invade the mainland (Horne 2006: 480-534; Kedward 2005: 344).

*Prophylactics in Economic Government*

The threat posed by the OAS was actually minimal compared to the latent violence that lurked in the French peasantry at the same time. The French-Algerian rebels were geographically distant from the metropole, and a relatively minor slice of the overall population, even in French Algeria. The same conditions did not hold for rural France. This was an economic sector and cultural force that comprised millions of persons, and was spread over the bulk of domestic French territory. The question confronting De Gaulle therefore was: What would be the consequences if *this* population turned against the French state?

The prospects for rural discontent would have become evident to De Gaulle soon upon taking office. The General faced down a series of farmer protests and riots across the late-1950s and early-60s. The protests had widespread support in rural communities and were often organized by the FNSEA, the largest and most influential agricultural association in France (Moravcsik 2000: 18; Sheingate 2001: 167-70). De Gaulle also immediately alienated many in the countryside by describing the farming sector as ‘anachronistic’. His first proposals for the sector involved proposed price cuts, efficiency measures, and land consolidation. The rural contingent would quickly interpret these measures as De Gaulle’s underlying ‘contempt for agricultural interests’, and evidence

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20 It is interesting to see how the social threat emanating from the food supply, which had previously appeared in the form of urban riots over the *high price* of bread, now manifested as farmer/rural protests over the *low prices* on agrarian commodity markets. Achim Hurrelmann alerted me to this interesting difference.
that he ‘consistently subordinated agriculture to other economic and political interests’
(Sheingate 2001: 170).

In short course, De Gaulle reverses his agrarian strategy and accepts the pact made between the French farmers and the state which dated to the pro-tariff discourses of Jules Méline and the Société des agriculteurs (Golob 1968; Tracy 1989: 57-82). The General would also be converted to the notion that a government which does not ensure the economic security of its farmers is actively cultivating its own demise. Farmers had to be given a reason to support the democratic institutions and modernizing plans of the Fifth Republic. This support would be no doubt threatened if their livelihood as producers was placed into jeopardy.

Perhaps the managerial economic government of the CAP can be thought about in similar terms. That is, it was an economic prophylactic against potential social disorder. Similar to the rationalization of agricultural intervention in the Fifth Republic, extensive price supports and market guarantees provided a technical machinery for spreading prosperity across the countryside. This, in turn, provided the EC and its member-states a vaccine against the reemergence of rural political disorder. No one wished to see an Algerianization of the European countryside.

*The Functioning of the CMOs*

CMOs are often relegated to footnote status in discussion on the early CAP. This is unfortunate because it was the mechanism upon which the political economy was based. Through its techniques and various policy instruments, commodity prices were set, farmers were subsidized, and agrarian imports were discouraged. The logic of a CMO
was to combine generous price guarantees for staple agricultural commodities with an insulated European market (EC 1979; Fennel 1979; Heidhues et al. 1978; Marsh & Swanney 1980). The price-levels were a product of political intervention. National agricultural ministers met annually in the Council of Agricultural Ministers and set internal ‘European’ prices for each commodity that had a CMO (90% of all Community production). Essentially, this amounted to a ‘price floor’ that was guaranteed on every unit of production. In 1969, there were separate CMOs for wheat, rye, milk, pigmeat, beef, and sugar beet (amongst others).

The logic of the CMO was to give farmers a ‘fair’ price, and to protect this price from the depressing effects of global competition. A few techniques were used to insulate the internal European price and stabilize farmer income accordingly. First were price supports. If the market price of a commodity fell below the EC price, subsidies were given to the farmer, normally payable through the purchaser, that covered the difference on every unit of production (e.g. every bushel of wheat, or liter of milk). Farmers were thus incentivized to produce as much as possible, irrespective of market demand.

To protect EC prices from the lower cost imports, a technique called the ‘variable import levy’ was used. The levy set import tariff- levels for a given commodity at the point reflecting the difference between the global and European price. It thus functioned as a ‘floating’ tariff that provided the technical underpinnings for enforcing ‘community preference’ across the internal agricultural market. The variable levy essentially guaranteed that the prices of all imported commodities could never be lower than that of an equivalent foodstuff produced in the Community. Theoretically, in such a context, it
would only be rational to import a foodstuff grown in the EC when there was a shortage of that particular foodstuff in the internal market.  

Through the use of CMOs, the EC deliberately ‘incentivized’ the production of grains, meats, and dairy; in other words, the foundations of farming in Western Europe. Providing generous subsidies for the most commonly produced commodities meant that the rural welfare state could be given extensive coverage (and be welcomed by the different national agricultural sectors). Furthermore, in a case such as the dairy sector, the EC viewed these as ‘protective’ foods that public health officials were already advocating should be consumed widely across the population (see again Chapter 3). In the case of grains, surpluses could also be used as food security ‘reserves’ (Shaw 2007). The durability of the commodity meant that it could be stored, and used to hedge against a future poor harvest, or be provided as international food aid.

The CMOs and Economic Managerialism

The CMOs were the technical means through which it became possible to govern agriculture as a ‘unique’ or ‘special’ sector in Europe. The use of price supports and variable levies made it possible to displace ‘natural prices’ and ‘competition’ in Europe’s agrarian economy in favor of economic planning and managerialism. The CMOs provide fairly solid evidence that a genuinely market-liberal framework was never seriously

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21 Originally the Commission believed that import levies would more or less pay for price supports (Fennel 1997). This was only the case for a short while. When modernization efforts started to bear fruit, surpluses mounted, and there were fewer tariff proceeds to pay for the growing cost of price supports. When the market could no longer absorb the growing surpluses, new techniques would have to be used to defend the CMO price. These will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, but here I can note they included the direct purchase and storage of surplus commodities by EC authorities (Ackrill 1999; Grant 2009)
considered as a foundation for the original CAP (Fennel 1997; Griffiths 1997; Knudsen 2009; Ludlow 2005; Milward 1992; Rieger 2000).

Coppock, accordingly, has argued that the CMO regimes present an unqualified example of an ‘economically illiberal policy’ with ‘declared autarkical intentions’ (Coppock 1963: 11, 21). Despite the fact it was heavily interventionist, this interpretation must be contested. First, unlike the Commonwealth system of the 1930, or the German use of the Reichsnährstand in the same period, the goal was not to seal-off the EC markets entirely. As a configuration of embedded liberal practice, the CAP managed trade for specific social purposes, not it in the name of national power. Moreover, this was an approach common to all industrialized states at the time – and they did not accuse each other of autarky! It is worth recalling that agriculture did not figure into the agreements of either the Dillon or Kennedy GATT Rounds in the 1960s (McCalla 1969). This did not mean there was no agricultural trade. It simply meant that most trade deals were bilateral in character, or emerged as aspects of foreign policy (Friedmann 1997).

In conclusion, while the agricultural markets of the EU-6 would certainly be organized, managed, and ‘protected’ by political authorities, they were still markets, just not of the classical liberal variety. The CAP remained a configuration of internal market integration or ‘market-making’. The previous ‘autarkic’ policies of interwar and wartime Europe were rationalized in very different ways; for example, around sealing off and defending the national food supply. If the CAP is to be called ‘protectionist’ in the same

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22 The EC also made exceptions to its high tariff walls in the case of commodities from ex-colonial states. The Lomé Convention, for example, allowed for a certain quota of cane sugar and bananas to come in tariff-free from states in Africa and the Caribbean (Roederer-Rynning 2003).
vein as these agricultural assemblages designed to maximize biopolitical violence, perhaps some nuancing of terms is on order.

**The Conceptual Pitfalls of ‘Protectionism’ as Explanation**

‘Protectionism’ is often the label used to capture the tenor of postwar agricultural policies. This is unfortunate. In the first place, a quick recourse to the concept can elide the unique situation of postwar agricultural policy, notably the role economic government would be given in solving Europe’s food and farm problems.

As economic practice, protectionism has been configured a number of different ways, organized around a number of anxieties. As we saw in Chapter Two, agricultural policy was born under the sign of ‘protecting’ the nation through its farmers. But the rationalization of this space would change during wartime, and then again in the postwar period. What this variability demonstrate is that ‘protectionism’ can only be understood as a general template for economic government. To understand what protectionism really signifies, as something more than an analytical placeholder, it is necessary to deconstruct its specific assemblages.

Most analyses, unfortunately, do not do this. They ignore the very contexts and strategies that make possible ‘protectionist’ policy. Such perspectives also place too much diagnostic attention on the agents responsible for orchestrating these abrogations of liberal political economy: farmers, agricultural ministers and the like. A more nuanced understanding of protectionism would look at the different logics and practices that have informed its different styles of economic government.
John Coppock was a prominent agricultural policy expert writing in the early-1960s. Somewhat uniquely for his time, he forcefully argued the CAP ran counter to ‘normal’ postwar economic governance. By ‘normal’ Coppock intended to mean an economic sector governed through liberal markets, robust international trade, and transparent commercial practice. Using this criteria, Coppock singles out the CAP as a dangerously insular policy placed at the heart of the EC:

The really important aspect of this part of the policy is that it formalizes, in an announced policy agreement having the force of a treaty, the intention of the countries subscribing to the policy to seal off permanently and irrevocably the market for most temperate agricultural products. No other long-term proposal under the Treaty of Rome can approach this in terms of declared autarkical intentions (Coppock 1963: 5).

Organizations such as GATT and the OECD, argues Coppock, saw trade and economic interdependence as necessary for forging a peaceful global order. Coppock, in this context, finds it unusual that while committed to liberal economic projects in other areas, the EC would enshrine ‘autarky’ as the strategy for governing agricultural trade: ‘What was new about the situation was the growing intensity of protective measures for agriculture in an international situation that was moving towards some integration and international competition in non-agricultural goods’ (Coppock 1963: 5).

Critiquing managed agrarian economies at this time, in this way, Coppock’s diagnosis was rare for the 1960s. After all, planning and public regulation were generally considered the appropriate ways for governing agriculture. Today the critique would not appear exceptional. Consider a recent review essay on the CAP that was simply titled: ‘Agricultural Policy and Protectionism’ (Grant 2009). In any event, my point is about
being careful in using the term ‘protectionism’. While Coppock provides an interesting contrarian critique for his time, he does nothing to make intelligible why farming and the food supply was consistently exempted from the market-game, or how this was done. This is because Coppock becomes over-committed to an ideological reading of the policy.

Coppock singles out the variable import levy as being at the core of an ‘anti-liberal’ CAP. As discussed earlier, this technology effectively inhibited the importation of staple commodities into the EC, outside the singular case of production shortages in the Community.23 Contrary to popular assumptions, this market ‘insulation’ was not simply reflective of a French interest in institutionalizing a captive regional market for their own farmers. The truth was that all European governments feared the negative effects cheap imports would have for the prosperity and stability of their rural societies. High tariff walls were favored by all, not just the French and Dutch who would benefit most. In fact, the Belgians and Germans, net importers of food, favored the highest CMO prices (Knudsen 2009).

Coppock, therefore, actually makes seem exceptional what was quite normal. Another way of putting this is that ‘agricultural exceptionalism’ was the normal paradigm states used to manage their agrarian sectors (Coleman 1998). Nearly every other industrialized state, including the US and Japan, had marketing boards and frontier policies that similarly insured domestic markets, and protected internal prices (Federico 2005). While it might have appeared more ‘autarkic’ than other models on the surface –

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23 Exempt from this were certain animal feeds, made from soy and corn, the EC allowed in tariff-free from North America (Friedmann 1997).
perhaps because it was a regional policy, or that it used very generous price-levels – the variable import levy was simply the mechanism chosen by the EC to realize an objective pursued with equal vigor by all OECD states at the time.

_Historicizing the ‘Protectionism’ of the CAP_

Furthermore, the CAP did not introduce forms of managed political economy to Europe’s agrarian sectors. In fact, it did not even produce the original design for the CMO. Rather, the mechanism was borrowed from the West German Agricultural Act of 1955, which itself was modeled on the ‘food estates’ of the NSDAP (Tracy 1989: 223-4; Fennel 1997: 9). Furthermore, all national governments in the EC-6, prior to the CAP, utilized internal prices, variable tariffs, and other mechanisms to protect the income of farmers. In this sense, the CAP could be understood as ‘Europeanizing’ a collection of similar policies that were already being utilized at the domestic level through the 1950s: ‘In every western European country agriculture became the equivalent of a large nationalized industry, managed by interventionist policies which sought to impose macroeconomic objectives in return for exemption from the forces of open economic competition’ (Milward 1992: 229).

As a style of economic government, postwar agricultural policy fell on the ‘statist’ or ‘public’ end of the embedded liberal continuum. In this way, it was similar to policies around social insurance, public utilities or industrial democracy. That is, it was a domain considered appropriate for intervention by political authorities because it was necessary for modernization, cohesion and stability. Issues might be raised around the

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24 As Stirk (1996) and Tribe (1995) have argued, many configurations of political and economic organization developed in the EC had a history in the policies and programs the NSDAP used in the economic organization of Europe.
‘forms and depth’ of the intervention, but not the ‘legitimacy of the objective’ that was being pursued (Ruggie 1998: 73). As we have seen in the last two chapters, postwar agricultural policymaking was over-determined by sociopolitical problems. This is, in turn, lent itself quite naturally to an embedded liberal style of rule.

Polanyi (1944/2001) has discussed how the ‘protectionist’ impulse was itself born from desire to ameliorate the dislocations caused by the rapid marketization and liberalization. To preserve social order in complex societies, argues Polanyi, regulation is needed by public authorities. This is especially true in those instances when the market-mechanism becomes a force for disorder and pauperism. Mansholt understood the ‘disembedding’ effect of the market quite well. He saw it across the 1930s when low market prices pushed family farmers into poverty, or forced them to take on unsustainable debt loads. This is why Mansholt saw the role of the EC as one of ‘embedding’ agrarian economies in a regulatory and redistributive framework that worked for the public good, and prioritized the security of farmers. Mansholt often reminded his audiences that ‘equitable income’ and ‘happiness’ for European farmers should be a core mission of the EC.

To conclude, ‘protectionism’ only has political significance in particular moments, around specific problems, and when governed through specific apparatuses (Biebuyck & Meltzer 2010). The protectionism mobilised by the EEC must be seen relative to the specific role it had in normalizing economic life in Europe, and carving out a social-space for European farming. Additionally, this line of analysis encourages us not to view protectionism as simply a deviation from liberal rule but, rather, as essential to its very operation.
Conclusion

Through its work on nutritional health and agricultural modernization, the OEEC birthed a space of agro-food cooperation in Europe. The EC, in turn, consolidated this as a regional space of government and political economy through its organization of commodity markets, regulation of agricultural trade, and stabilization of farmer income. Despite its foundational importance to the EC, the CAP is rarely used as a case-study for ‘reading’ the political logics of European integration. That said, this chapter did review the work of three authors who did attempt this in some capacity. They respectively demonstrated how logics of welfare, national interest and supranationalism influenced the development of this core policy-space.

Upon discussing the limits of the aforementioned authors, I argued we should view the CAP as an assemblage for governing farming and rurality from the perspective of the social. The original CAP was engineered to provide farmers economic security and spread prosperity across the countryside. At the technical level, this was made possible by devising a form of economic government that rewarded production and minimized market forces in providing generous subsidies to producers of staple commodities. Because the income of family farms was nearly entirely derived from the production of foodstuffs, commodity prices became the primary channel for economic securitization in the CAP.

As an assemblage of ‘managerial’ political economy, the policy would govern through a set of techniques that fixed, stabilized and periodically adjusted the prices of agricultural commodities. Whereas the CMOs are often dismissed as an opaque form of
protectionism, or even ‘autarky’, this chapter moved us toward a different reading. The CMOs were actually the technical means through which the EC was able to carve out, and govern, a social space centered on family farming and rural society.
Chapter Five:

Crises and ‘Policy Reform’: Ordoliberalism and Europe’s Farmer

‘The miraculous increase in farm productivity has bequeathed a monster which threatens to destroy the vision of a settled Europe, engulf the emergent community in a series of Orwellian campaigns against rival agricultural and trading powers, and, eventually, disrupt the food supply system of the world…the CAP was doomed to become the solitary keystone of Europe, whose removal might threaten the collapse of the entire political structure’
- Cottrell 1987: 15

‘The most damaging feature of the CAP is not that it shovels ludicrous amounts of money down the throats of well-off farmers – if Europe’s hard-pressed taxpayers can stomach this that is their problem. Rather, it is that the money is fixed to production, with surpluses dumped on world markets via the payment of export subsidies’
- The Economist: 06/28/2003

Introduction

This chapter explores the first of two assemblages that constitute CAP Policy Reform. It looks at how the CAP moves away from its exclusive constitution as a machinery of productivism and welfare. European agricultural governance adapts in unique ways to the pressures of neoliberalism. While the economic securitization of rural society does remain a broadly important objective of agricultural policy, much else has changed. This includes how support is provided; the purposes for which it is intended; and the mechanisms through which it is provided.

The task of this chapter is to demonstrate how a novel set of problematizations led to the emergence of new strategies and practices that subsequently transformed the economic government of the CAP. This rupture is not defined by a complete displacement of the social, but rather the emergence of a new set of object-problems – including budgets, markets and competition – that will center a rethinking of agricultural
policy. Towards this end, the chapter tracks the demise of the CAP as a form of managerial political economy, and examines how the regulation of commodity markets and the subsidization of farmers in the EU begins to take on an \textit{ordoliberal} character. Ordoliberalism is a variant of neoliberalism that, as we will see, imagines economic government around the logics of competition, entrepreneurialism, and \textit{vitalpolitik}.

\textbf{The Erosion of a Managerial CAP}

As it was institutionalized over the 1960s, the CAP conveyed one important dimension of postwar thought: an unbounded optimism in the possibilities of politics conducted in the name of the collective good (Judt 2005; Hoover 2003). At the national, regional and global levels administrators, technocrats, scientists and planners become transformational agents in this new paradigm (Burnham 1966; Haas 1964; Mitrany 1975; Radelli 1999; Rose 1999). When it consolidated its transition from ‘war policy’ to ‘social policy’, agricultural governance embodied this belief in public policies based on administrative complexity and interventionist political economy.

This chapter explores how the managerial economic government of the CAP has been reconfigured away from this original more ambitious vision. At the same time, ‘reconfigured’ does not equate to less policy. Rather, it is about a policy that has become significantly less confident in \textit{certain} forms of intervention. The Commission has concluded the CAP can no longer function as an income producing machine. European farmers should no longer be shielded from market forces entirely, and logics of ‘competitiveness’ and ‘entrepreneurism’ should find a place in the sector.
The Disruption of CAP Economic Government

The rethinking of CAP economic government begins with a Commission Green Paper entitled *Perspectives for the Common Agricultural Policy* (1985). The main claim is that the CAP must be altered to conform to the new budgetary and ‘market realities’ facing the EEC. In particular, the CAP needs to better ‘target’ the support it provides farmers. This should happen through wearing down the direct link between production and subsidies:

> The CAP has to demonstrate that it can make the most efficient use of the economic and financial resources at its disposal…The old model of agricultural policy, in which increases in income could be obtained by increases in the volume of production at even higher guaranteed prices – and prices guaranteed, moreover, for an unlimited quantity or production – can no longer be reconciled with the economic and financial realities. It is now widely accepted that an agriculture which does not produce for the market…is an agriculture which has no long-term prospects (3)

*Perspectives* introduces the problems and objects that would occupy CAP Policy Reform for the next twenty-eight years. It was but the opening salvo in a discursive assault on one of the EU’s most successful and only ‘communal’ policy. Furthermore, *Perspectives* captures at a still formative stage how the interrelated strategies of budgetary discipline and marketization will guide the reengineering of this policy space. The disjuncture between the priorities of agricultural government in 1985, compared to those in the 50s and 60s, only continues to widen over the 1990s and 2000s.

Among the policy experts, there is near consensus that the CAP which resulted from the reforms of 1991, 1998, and 2002 is vastly different from the one constructed under Mansholt (see Daughjerg 2012; Fouilluex 2010; Garzon 2006; Kay 2003; Roederer-Rynning 2010). To put it in EU studies parlance, this collection of reforms
broke the ‘path dependence’ of the original CAP. In its place is now a policy machinery not exclusively geared to the economic securitization of the family farm. A new set of strategies, objectives and governing styles have emerged in the spaces of agricultural governance.

The ‘managerial’ economic government of the CAP has been displaced as a result of cumulative reforms over 1991-2007.¹ The common thrust of the measures has been to eliminate the incentive to overproduce, and to find ways to subsidize farmers that make possible competition across the sector. The goals were seen as related. If farmers were subsidized in their capacity as ‘market participants’ rather than as commodity producers, then a ceiling could be imposed on total CAP spending. This has been accomplished. The CMO regimes – which raised the specter of EC bankruptcy with every bumper harvest – have now been effectively eliminated with the move to income support. The direct economic incentive to overproduce has thus been removed.

The first move to curtail the reach of the CMOs came with the 1992 ‘MacSharry Reforms’.² The pivotal change involved making significant cuts to the intervention prices of major commodities, for example: 29% for cereals and 15% for beef. As a way to compensate for the income farmers lost due to intervention price cuts, ‘direct income aids’ were provided to farmers (Ackrill 2000: 65-71; Garzon 2006: chapter 6). The amount of aid given was determined through a formula that assessed a farm according to criteria such as acreage or headage levels, and the past level of receipts. Thus, while income aids would keep an indirect connection to the old price-output system, they also

² Named after then agricultural commissioner Ray MacSharry.
concretely moved the economic government of the CAP in a new direction; one that did not govern farmers through the regulation of markets.

Direct payments did not reduce the costs of the CAP in the short-term. In fact, costs actually rose (Ackrill 2000: 95). But this is not the important point. The decisive impact was in introducing a new strategy and practical template for governing the rural welfare state. The economic government of the CAP would now be rationalized around stabilizing farmer income, not providing an open-ended commitment to production. The EC, in other words, had signaled its unwillingness to continue underwriting an expensive and surplus-inducing policy. With the MacSharry Reform, the mold had been cast for the eventual dismantlement of the original CAP.

*Agenda 2000* (1998a; 1998b) pushed the reform trajectory further by making additional price-cuts to the CMOs and ‘topping-up’ direct payments (Garzon 2006: chapter 7).³ Fischler’s second pivotal reform, the 2003 *Mid-Term Review (MTR)* continued the decoupling trajectory (Commission 2002). First, it extended the use of direct payments to CMOs hitherto not covered (such as tobacco and rice). Second, it outlined a timetable to eventually replace all CMOs with a fully decoupled farm payment. This annual income payment came with no requirements to produce. In fact, the only statutory requirements were environmental in nature. This conditionality is summarized in the meta-provision that all farmland be kept in ‘good agricultural condition’ (Commission 2002: 20-3).

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³ The cereals sector saw an additional 15% cut, beef 20% and milk 15%.
Beginning in 2005, farmers began to receive a ‘single farm payment’ through the Single Payment System (SPS). This was a standardized annual income payment that completely severed the longstanding linkage between the family farm, the rural welfare state, and the unlimited production of agricultural commodities. In fact, the decoupling is so complete that under the SPS farmland can be ‘used for any activity…as long as that land is maintained’ (Frandsen & Jørgensen 2006: 38). For the Commission (2002) decoupling was a technique which brought farmers closer to market signals, and lessened their reliance on public supports. Theoretically, it put them in charge of their decisions over farm production and investment:

Producer support is now to a large extent decoupled from production decisions, allowing EU farmers to make their choices in response to market signals, to rely on their farm potential and their preferences when adapting to their economic environment, and to contribute to improving the competitiveness of the agricultural sector...As a result, CAP reform delivered what was excepted from it by shifting away from product support, widely viewed as an origin of the surplus problem of the past. EU support prices, reduced everywhere, are by now close to world markets (Commission 2007: 2).

Disciplining the CAP: thresholds, quotas, stabilizers and other technologies

A second family of reforms sought to ‘discipline’ CAP spending by directly targeting supply and production. These initial technologies were called ‘guarantee thresholds’. They were first introduced in 1982 as a way to control CMO costs by discouraging production over a specified level. When the production of a commodity exceeded the given ‘threshold’ level, intervention prices were cut the following year in accordance with the excess production, up to 5% (Ackrill 2000: 58). Thresholds were introduced for especially problematic commodities that were always in large surplus, such as oilseeds,

The next slightly more successful attempt to force down prices through controlling supply came with the use of production quotas in 1984. This ‘drastic action’ was taken in the dairy sector when the Commission found itself buying more and more surplus butter, only to have it placed in storage (Ackrill 2000: 59). The massive dairy surpluses were also the source of the infamous ‘butter mountains’ that would be sold off to Soviets at cut-rate prices (Gardner 1996: 50; Grant 2009: 266). In any event, these quotas only stemmed the hemorrhaging in the dairy sector, they could do nothing to stop the high costs of the program that had already become institutionalized.

In 1988, the EC developed a ‘co-responsibility levy’ that was meant to perform a ‘budget stabilizing’ role. The levy worked by assessing a slight financial penalty, via the CMO payment, on all production that exceeded a predetermined threshold. In the end, the effect was a modest price cut for most commodities (as reduced subventions were still provided for production over the threshold). The last technology of supply management was ‘set-aside’. It was introduced as part of the 1992 MacSharry package and worked by having farmers reduce the amount of land they had under cultivation. In order to receive direct payments, large farmers had to ‘set-aside’ (i.e. keep fallow) 15% of their arable land (Garzon 2006: 67).

The collection of these technologies – quotas, stabilizers, thresholds and set-aside – constituted a mechanism of budgetary discipline in the CAP. They were also illustrative examples of what Dean (2010) calls ‘governmentalizing government’. That is, the
technologies sought to alter and thus responsibilize the operation of government by working from the inside out; that is, through its existing apparatuses of rule. The idea here is not to create an entirely new way of governing, but to make leaner and more effective what is already there. This logic of reflexive government has been a core element of neoliberal rationalities of ‘reform’ (see also Larner 2000).

As cost-cutting technologies, the above measures were not that successful. Ackrill (2000) states that: ‘just three years after Delors had declared the CAP to be reformed, the Commission was forecasting a CAP over-spend in 1991 of about 6.5% or nearly 2 billion ECU’ (65). Mild subsidy cuts at the upper limits of production, and slight reductions in the extensification of arable farmland, could not compensate for the dramatic productivity gains made in European farming during the 1960s and 70s (see Ross and Hildyard 1992; Mazoyer & Roudart 2006).

Because costs could not be contained by targeting supply alone, the ‘budget framework’ would itself become an object of responsibilization beginning in the late 1980s. The strategy involved decreasing CAP expenditure by linking it to a broader ‘stabilization’ of the EU budget. This would be realized through the instrument of ‘agricultural guidelines’ which planned out and placed a ceiling on agricultural spending over multiyear periods.

It was under the provisions of the Delors 1 budget reform (1988) that an agricultural spending ceiling was set at 74% of the overall budget (Ackrill 2000: 89; Laffan & Linder 2010: 218). Delors knew he could reduce CAP spending by bringing the technology of EC-wide ‘multi-annual fiscal planning’ to bear on the policy. Delors saw it
as a way to both normalize Community finances and end the acrimonious political dealings and cost overruns surrounding the CAP (Ross 1995). Delors viewed the depoliticization of the budget, and the simultaneous containment of CAP costs, as one in the same process:

The year 1988 marked a turning point... the intense budgetary battles and the constant shortage of revenue could not continue....[Delors] embarked on a far-reaching political and institutional reform in the budgetary field...[the reform] introduced the multi-annual financial perspective, which balanced revenue and expenditure and constrained the ballooning CAP by dividing the budget into different headings and setting annual ceilings for spending periods across a five to seven year period...Annual decision-making lost its place in the inter-institutional spotlight and became the domain of budgetary experts (Laffan & Linder 2010: 216).

Multi-annual perspectives did eventually help bring about the change sought. In terms of the CAP, it ended the budgetary compartmentalization and political siloing of a policy that, as we have seen, was born as an insular and specialized space of government.

**Narrating a Policy Monster: The Crisis-Ridden CAP**

‘...some clumsy prehistoric mastodon, incapable of evolution into the present world’ Alan Milward describing the CAP (1992: 317).

Having now outlined some new dimensions of CAP economic government, this section explores the discursive conditions that made these changes possible. The particular focus of this section is on how narratives of waste, corruption, and mismanagement crystallized a discursive order of ‘crisis’ around the CAP. The narratives appeared in government documents, scholarly texts, speeches of political officials, and various proposals for

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4The use of multiannual fiscal planning was codified in Lisbon Treaty (2007). But, as we have seen, the technology had been in regular use since 1988. The original purpose was to control the ‘guaranteed’ section of agricultural spending (Laffan & Linder 2010: 222).

5 This is not to imply the inefficiencies and excesses of European agriculture were ‘only’ narrative realities. They were, of course, ‘real’ at the material level. The point of this section, though, is to demonstrate that material realities are always problematized in specific ways, and through specific discourses.
reform. In order to understand how the original CAP becomes so heavily politicized, we have to look at the production and composition of these critical narratives across a variety of fields.⁶

*Discourse and Political Life*

For our purposes, discourse is understood to be constitutive of political life (Berger & Luckmann 1966; Foucault 1991; Searle 1995). As a form of practice, discourse includes all of the ways we speak about, represent, and interpret the political world. A ‘discursive order’ is a collection of narratives that thematically coalesces around a particular problem-space. It is a ‘practical domain’ with its own ‘boundaries’ and ‘rules of formation’ (Foucault 1991: 61). To use other relevant policy examples, we could talk about discursive orders around immigration reform or drug enforcement. While bound by common elements, a discursive order is also a site of heterogeneity because a range of narratives are required for its production (see Foucault 1991; Taylor 2004: Sewell 1999). A single discursive order is therefore composed of multiple political narratives, each possessing interesting differences and deviations (Bevir 2010). This is precisely what we will encounter with the range of critical narratives that come together to impute a sense of ‘crisis’ over the CAP.

Over the last decade, the relationship between discursive practice and European government has been given more attention (Delanty & Rumford 2005; Jensen & Richardson 2004; Manners 2011; Persson & Stråth 2007; Walters & Haahr 2005). From this we have learned that how Europe is represented and talked about is directly related to...
how it is constituted as a political reality. And how it is constituted depends on a world of language, text, symbols and affect. Walters (2004) succinctly captures the benefits of this literature in stating it has been able to elucidate how Europe has been ‘said’ which, in turn, has revealed much about the ‘governing [of] regional and international spaces above and across the system of states’ (157).

A few ‘discursive’ interpretations of CAP reform have emerged from the traditional EU-studies literature. In these works discourse is not understood in the constitutive sense, as just described. Rather, discourse is taken as representational and causal in nature. It is a resource, or tool, to be mobilized in tactical ways by a variety of actors. As a form of measurable power, it is tabulated, coded and made into variables that represent the ‘real’ (Garzon 2006: chapter 9; Fouilloux 2004; Erjavec et al. 2008). Fouilloux (2004) captures this understanding of discourse when she states: ‘Discourses represent crucial resources that actors can mobilize for both co-ordinating and legitimating purposes...as well as to enhance their legitimacy to participate in the political exchange’.

From this positivist vantage point, discourse should be given analytical distance from the other elements of governing. But, I would argue, this approach elides the foundational importance of narrative and speech. In other words, these studies of the CAP have been unable to assess how discourse is a force that has given meaning and intelligibility to the practices and materials of agricultural governance (Murdoch & Ward 1997).
From Problematization to ‘Crisis’

Up to this point in the dissertation I have been using the term ‘problematization’ to identify the moments when agricultural governance is called into question. In this section, I argue the concept is inadequate in capturing the degree of vitriol and condemnation that was aimed at the CAP in the 80s and 90s. As a way to fully capture the spectacle that will envelop the CAP, this chapter deploys an additional heuristic, that of ‘political crisis’ (Edelman 1988). The concept provides a way to understand how a collection of narratives will sometimes coalesce into a critical discursive order that is more entrenched and transformative than is allowed for in the term ‘problematization’.

One limitation of problematization is that it does not readily differentiate between degrees or intensities of critique. The only threshold seems to be that a particular regime for ‘conducting conduct’ is called into question (Dean 1999: 27). This definition obviously has a lot of empirical coverage, but at the same time does little to differentiate critiques in terms of their intensity or scope. Consider the following: A problematization might question a specific programme and its effects. Or, conversely, it might contest the core rationalization of a policy. One ethos would be reformist, while the other is advocating for wholesale change. These are vastly different situations, yet both can be equally subsumed under the analytic of problematization. For this reason, we need additional concepts to help us further delineate categories of critical discourse. 

Edelman (1988) usefully differentiates between a ‘problem’ and a ‘crisis’.7 A problem is a state of affairs resistant to easy solutions. It is a product of entrenched

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7 Edelman does not see political problems as appearing ‘naturally’ on the political landscape. Rather, he argues they emerge from the interplay of political context, communicative technologies, and the ability to
dysfunctional dynamics (31). A problem continues if no new course of action is taken. A crisis, in contrast, results from a set of problems that collectively raise the specter of political breakdown. A crisis is a pathology of government. It always implies new forms of deprivation are forthcoming, at least until the ‘long sequence’ of problems and dysfunctions reaches its critical juncture and change occurs (31). Moving through this section, it will be useful to think about how the discursive order of CAP reform was framed as a ‘crisis’ in this way.

Problematization has a second drawback in that it always assesses change from ‘the programmer’s points of view’ (O’Malley 1996: 312). This is not so surprising considering that the governmentality literature is generally biased towards ‘official discourses, as read through government policy documents’ (Larner 2000: 14). Missed in this top-down view is how critique can emerge from numerous ‘fields’ often simultaneously. To fully explicate the connections between political thought and practice, governmentality accounts should canvas a range of critical narratives that critique governmental practices (see also Bevir 2010). Simultaneously, though, the literature should not abandon its traditional focus on ‘official’ discourse.

Problematizations of the CAP, by the 1990s, went far beyond identifying a policy in need of adjustment or simple adaptation. It had become more like a hyper-problematization of EU government tout court. It was the embodiment of what Edelman (1988) calls a ‘political crisis’.

generate affect in a receiving audience (36). Problems, therefore, do not gain traction because they meet an objective threshold for harm, injustice, or incompetence. Problems become ‘real’ because they are articulated around things people hate; violence, corruption, gross incompetence and the like.
**CAP Autosarcophagy: The Commission’s Critique**

Beginning in the early 1980s, the EU’s bureaucratic field becomes a key location for interrogating the principles, modalities and effects of the CAP. The Commission demonstrated a willingness to engage in a systematic and hostile critique of one of its core policies; a policy, moreover, that functioned as a relatively successful anti-poverty program for rural Europe. But as agricultural surpluses begin to mount over the 70s and 80s, and CAP spending explodes as a result, the Commission begins to interrogate the principles and mechanisms underlying its most ‘active’ space of economic government. This critical narrative is notable not only for its intensity, but the fact it was internally generated. Its point of origin was the Commission, the author and executioner of the CAP. For this reason, I have given this particular relation the label ‘policy autosarcophagy’.

Autosarcophagy is a state of famishment so severe the victim resorts to eating their own flesh. Accounts of autosarcophagy – or ‘auto-cannibalism’ – were recorded during the serious French dearths of the 17th century, as well as in northern Europe during the Thirty Years War (Camporesi 1989). Camporesi shockingly notes these ‘desperate forms of cannibalism were not infrequent in Western Europe of the seventeenth century’ (40). Why this macabre analogy to help us understand CAP Reform? This is because similar to how the autosarcophagic will metabolize their own cellular structure in order to stay alive, so too will the Commission ‘eat-away’ at the old economic government of the CAP – its price supports, market planning, and corporatist insularity – in order to ensure the survival of the organism.
In 1987, the Commission publishes *Perspectives for the Common Agricultural Policy*. This was the first genuinely reform-minded CAP text. *Perspectives* describes itself as a consultative document that is meant to identify the ‘principle fields’ and ‘political choices’ of the CAP that need to be revisited (i). While *Perspectives* notes the CAP was a ‘cornerstone’ EC policy that maintained the ‘social tissue’ of rural Europe, it also states farming can no longer be done ‘for public intervention – that is, for markets which do not exist’ (iii). It argues that ‘agriculture is by no means the only sector undergoing rapid mutation, with the resulting social problems of adaptation’ (iii). Agricultural policy needs to continue securing the family farm, but no longer at the expense of efficiency and marketization in the sector:

> the challenge which must now be faced is how to ensure the maintenance of a significant number of persons in agriculture by means which do not result in unacceptable waste of economic and financial resources. Agriculture, like the rest of the economy, is subject to the laws of supply and demand. A continuing accumulation of surpluses, due to the imbalance of prices and markets, is not a satisfactory option for the CAP. The agricultural export vocation of the Community cannot be served by assimilating it to an instrument of surplus disposal (Commission 1987: iii).

*Perspectives* claims that in the future farmers should be governed as ‘managers’ and ‘entrepreneurs’ operating in a market, not ‘technicians’ of a production support scheme (iv-v). The real challenge will thus be to reconcile the social objectives of the CAP with a new neoliberal consensus that argues that ‘an agriculture which does not produce for the market – that is, with a view to domestic and external outlets – is an agriculture which has no sound long term prospects’ (3). *Perspectives* argues that continuing the status quo – ‘substantial’ and ‘public’ aids based on farm production levels – is no longer a viable basis for structuring the political economy of the CAP.
Perspectives never pushes for the complete liberalization of European agricultural markets. The Commission is clear the agrarian sector will remain unique, and cannot be governed in a similar way to textiles or automobiles (8-16). The point is not to annul the ‘marriage contract’ originally made to farmers, but to eliminate the waste, surpluses and budgetary excesses that have been caused by the CMOs (iii). The Commission, in other words, is not giving ideological cover for a stealthy elimination of the agricultural welfare state. Rather, it is asking the genuine question of how ‘a better balance of markets’ be reconciled with the ‘social function of income support’ (17)?

The CAP is not a problem simply by virtue of it being ‘managed’. Nor is the Commission advocating rapid deregulation. Rather, the orientation is towards selectively and tactically deploying market strategies and practices as a means to recreate the farmer in the image of an ‘entrepreneur’:

In considering the future development of the agricultural policy, one must not forget the nature of agriculture also as an activity of enterprise, in which individual farmers have the liberty and responsibility to adjust their production in the light of the changing economic environment and the commercial realities. It cannot be the role of public authorities to substitute themselves for the independent farmer in this context, so as to eliminate the advantages and risks of the entrepreneur. On the contrary, the policy must be developed in such a way as to encourage the responsibility of farmers and to make full use – within the limits of their socio-economic situation...(emphasis mine: 48).

In the Single European Act: A New Frontier for Europe (Commission 1987) agriculture’s contribution to the EC budget is singled out as a another reason for CAP reform. Jacques Delors imagined Europe both in terms of a fully unified market and as emerging polity that could deliver efficient public policy through a revitalized and empowered bureaucratic machinery (Ross 1995; Holmes 2000; Haller 2008). Delors saw the EC as not only a force for deregulation, but also has a political entity that might work to
mitigate the harsher and more unequal effects of capitalism. Markets alone, argued Delors, would not ‘guarantee equity, a moralized social order, or full economic success’ (Ross 1995: 18).

For Delors, one of the largest obstacles in the way of realizing a European ‘moralized social order’ was the budget situation. Put simply, the Community needed additional money if it was to create new policy and assume competencies in areas where it lacked substantial authority (Ross 1995: 53). This situation was relevant to agriculture because, by the mid-80s, the CAP had become the most ‘painful EC budgetary issue’ facing the Community (Commission 1987: 25). The rural welfare state was bankrupting Europe. And resolving the dilemma was a prerequisite for deepening integration.

*Frontier* thus argues the EC must now ‘manage it its budget in the spirit of the ‘prudent citizen’ and ‘ensure the best possible use of the resources allocated to it’ (9). Citing *Perspectives*, *Frontier* argues that the ‘general economic context’ of agricultural markets has changed, and therefore it is time for ‘progressive efforts to bring about changes in agriculture in order to eliminate surpluses and check the steady increase in the budget burden to which they lead’ (11). At a practical level, this entails scaling back the reach of CMOs, and ending the open-ended guarantees and the costly storage of surplus commodities. In *Frontier*, this emerged as the real ‘budgetary truth’ of the CAP (18).

The strategy for the long-term reform of CAP political economy – i.e. its move towards income-based rather than production-linked subsidies discussed earlier – is first articulated in the influential *Development and Future of the CAP: Reflections Paper of the Commission* (1991). *Reflections* is bolder in its reformist zeal than all previous
templates. It states unambiguously that the ‘the mechanisms of the CAP as currently applied’ no longer achieve Article 39 objectives (9). Whereas Perspectives and Frontier imply CAP spending will be become unsustainable in the near future, Reflections argues the moment is now imminent.

The Commission wishes to emphasise that the status quo is the one option that it considers not to be viable. If the present policy is not changed rapidly, the situation on the markets and, as early as the current year the budget position, will become untenable. In these circumstances the choice is between fundamental reform of the present mechanisms of the CAP and a new package of restrictive measures offering no future prospects...(19)

Reflections further criticizes CMO regimes for the disproportionate support given to ‘the largest and most intensive farms’ (2). The document goes on to provide one of the more infamous statistics of CAP lore; 80% of CAP support goes to 20% of farms (2). The obvious conclusion from the perspective of the Commission is that the CAP unfairly distributes its largesse, and disadvantages the same ‘family farms’ it was designed to support. 8: ‘The existing system does not take adequate account of the incomes of the vast majority of small and medium size farms’ (2) 9

In this context, the report argues, it is ‘necessary to introduce forms of support that do not relate exclusively to price guarantees’ (12). At this point ‘direct payments’

8 The figure can also be misleading in certain ways. For example, the EC was littered with part-time and hobby farmers.
9 Reflections also continues to focus on the budgetary dimension. The Commission provides the imbalance a statistical face: 700,000 tonnes in the beef sector; 278,000 and 335,000 tonnes for butter and milk powder respectively; a tobacco CMO where payments have risen 33%; and a cereals situation that had become ‘especially worrying’ (6). Wheat production had risen by 10 million tonnes, producing a total of 28 million tonnes of intervention stock (6-7). In light of the surplus production, the Commission forecasts a budget increase by 20% relative to the already high 1990 levels (7).

The CAP had also precipitated a crisis externally with the EC’s trading partners in GATT. This occurred during the Uruguay Round’s negotiations on agricultural liberalization. The obvious problem was that EC surpluses were continuing to distort world markets (9) But, and to reiterate an earlier claim, the narrative of Reflections was not primarily based on disciplining the policy to meet the dictates of international trade (see Ackrill 2000). Rather, the effort was primarily about responsibilizing the budget.
will be introduced into the economic government of the CAP. The integration of the new subsidy technique is predicated on the slow diminishment of ‘the commodity’ as the foundation of agrarian political economy. While *Reflections* constituted the most radical reform proposal to date it did not intend, all at once, to rip out the foundations of the postwar policy model. The strategy was rather to slowly wear down the CMO apparatuses by introducing supplementary forms of support that, over time, would cumulatively make production-based subsidies far less central to the policy architecture.

*Reflections* also introduces, for the first time, the technology of ‘modulation’ (16). Modulation involved a progressive shift of subsidies from larger to smaller farms. The logic was to limit support given to ‘efficient farms’ that were already competitive on world markets (16). Modulation would help redress the ‘fairness’ problems (the 80% to 20% distribution) by providing additional support to smaller farmers whom ‘derived fewer advantages from market organisations’ (16). The strategic rationale is based on the idea the EC must do more to ensure the ‘competitiveness’ of these units.

‘After 30 years of the CAP, competitiveness can no longer be measured in function of receipts from FEOGA. It is precisely because the larger farms are now in a position to produce with reduced support that it is possible to envisage the development of the policy as suggested...The object is to make farms with the necessary capacity even more competitive. This will be reflected in somewhat less support for these farms and in a new balance between price support and direct aid...’ (Commission 1991: 17)

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10 *Reflections* closes with a suggestion on ‘agricultural guidelines’ – the fixing of yearly specified amounts on CAP spending – and argues they should be supplemented by ‘combining the new arrangements with overall pluriannual planning of the CAP’ (18). Here, again, *Reflections* provides interesting foreshadowing. Beginning with the new financial perspective in 2000, the CAP becomes subject to fairly strict budget discipline in terms of outlays being planned and capped over a 6 year period.
Agenda 2000 and the MTR: Consolidating a Reform Trajectory

Brought to fruition under the entrepreneurial leadership of agricultural Commissioner Franz Fischler (1995-2004), Agenda 2000: The Future for European Agriculture (1998) begins, familiarly, by criticizing the waste and externalities of the existing CAP. The text states that the ‘challenges facing the CAP are first and foremost internal in nature’ (1). While some externalities may have been ‘partially corrected by the 1992 reform’ (2), the core problems remain. Agenda 2000 singles out the fact that support is not targeting the most disadvantaged, and that there is a lack of flexibility in the existing subsidy architecture:

The support it provides is distributed somewhat unequally and is concentrated on regions and producers who are not among the most disadvantaged. ...diversity is one of the strengths of European agriculture...But to make best use of this diversity, we have to relate to how agricultural policy is devised and managed ...It is not suited to a Union of fifteen...It gives rise to complexity, bureaucracy and, in the end, a lack of understanding among farmers about how it works. A new, more decentralised model has therefore to be developed (2)

The implicit argument is that previous reforms have not gone far enough. But perhaps as importantly, Agenda 2000 will subtly introduce the figure of a ‘competitive agricultural sector’ as the goal of reform. To increase competition would merge two seemingly contradictory strategies of the Commission. First, encouraging competition does not necessarily negate an ‘active’ social dimension within the CAP. Second, competition becomes the means to orient agricultural policy more towards market logics, without aiming for a complete ‘marketization’ of the policy itself.

The distinction is important because the Commission differentiates this type of reform from wholesale deregulation: ‘Seeking to be competitive should not be confused
with blindly following the dictates of a market that is far from perfect. The European model is designed to safeguard the earnings of farmers, above all keeping them stable’ (5). A few paragraphs later, Agenda 2000 alludes to the obvious rub in this proposition.

How can the farmer welfare state be maintained without ‘high prices, protectionism and bureaucratic steering of production’ (5)?

Agenda 2000 sees the ideal role of the CAP as an ‘active’ force that would work with farmers and rural communities in the pursuit of economic viability. The new CAP should assist and facilitate farmers towards realizing economic security. What the CAP will no longer do is guarantee these ambitions. This new political economy will deliver what the old CMO machinery could not. That, is it will forge a competitive order out of European agriculture, and encourage European farmers find their place within this order.

When the Mid-Term Review (2002) is released it applauds the role of direct payments – in operation since 1992 – for allowing farmers to produce in ‘a more market oriented environment’. It claims that fewer farmers are now leaving the profession because of the ‘income stabilizing effect of direct payments’ (7). Given these successes, the Commission argues that income payments should become the normalized means of supporting farmers. The uneasy co-existence of CMOs and direct payments would need to be brought to an end. The complex administration involved in operating both systems had become a confusing morass for producers and member states to navigate. The time had come to streamline the subsidy apparatus in the name of competition and efficiency:

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11 Agenda 2000 proposes one answer in the form of ‘degressivity’. This technology would slowly reduce the payments given to the largest farmers, and put a €300,000 ceiling on the annual payments receivable by one farmer (see Commission 2007). Degressivity would stop the Commission from ‘handing out over-generous public subsidies to agricultural holdings’ that do not require them to stay commercially viable (4).
In Agenda 2000 and following decisions, the Commission has taken a number of steps to promote further simplification of agricultural legislation and its implementation (emphasis in original)...However, the range of mechanisms within the common market organisations continues to create many complex obligations for farmers and difficult control and monitoring responsibilities for Member States and the Commission. This complexity is a break on initiative and may discourage entry into the farming profession...Simpler conditions on payments with less market related procedures would enable farmers to spend more time making their business successful (10).

Farmers, argue the Commission, require a predictable economic and policy framework in order to make decisions on investments in machinery, land, or additional labour. Would a young farmer enter the profession knowing that regulations and subsidy programs were going to change every five years? This consistency would arrive in the form of regularized annual payments. This would have a stabilizing effect in two ways. First, farmers could plan on receiving a consistent annual payments each year – a payment that was completely independent of political decisions or prevailing world prices. Second, regularized payments would give the Commission ‘knowable’ figures to help them plan and discipline agricultural spending.

The MTR signals an intent to more or less dismantle the managerial political economy organized through the CMO. The culmination of this trajectory would eventually appear in the form of a fixed and regularized annual payments that was provided irrespective of production levels. It was through this strategy of ‘decoupling’ that a market order will be made to envelop European agriculture. Furthermore, as the payment is both standardized and regressive (for large farmers), it also becomes a tool to rectify longstanding inequities between farmers:

Such a system (the single farm payment) would integrate all existing direct payments a producer receives from various schemes into this single payment, determined on the basis of historical references. With this move, once fully
implemented, a major simplification in the support of EU producers will be achieved in a manner that is neutral with respect to payments to producers. This will improve the overall market orientation of agriculture, and will allow farmers to fully benefit from market opportunities in supplying the products that consumers demand. Furthermore, the transfer efficiency of the direct payments will increase significantly, which should lead to an improvement in the income situation of farmers (19).

The MTR states that outside a few exceptional products, the new single payment will collapse all existing direct payment schemes, effectively obliterating the old subsidy mechanism (20).

The Commission saw clear advantages to adopting the new strategy: ‘the positive impact of this process in promoting greater market orientation and competiveness, stabilising agricultural incomes’ (18) Direct payments, through providing a clear and regularised modality of support for farmers, make the subsidy apparatuses simpler in design, and more effective in its execution. It therefore combines logics of transparency and efficiency in a strategy of ‘reflexive’ government (Dean 1999). The efficiency comes from the fact the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) will reduce a myriad of overlapping payments into a single programme that can be easily administered through member states. As the Commission argues, this will lead to ‘simpler agricultural legislation and implementation mechanisms’ (12).

MTR also re-discovers the technology of modulation – this time as ‘dynamic modulation’. As a both a budgetary and fiscal technology, dynamic modulation involves moving finances from first pillar (market supports) to the second pillar (rural development). This is done by reducing farm payments ‘in arithmetic steps of 3% per year to reach 20%’ (22). In order to protect small farmers from the effects of modulation,
a ‘franchise’ of €5,000 per farm is allowed (23).\textsuperscript{12} The Commission claims that the franchise would fully exempt around three quarters of all farms in the EU, therefore concentrating the payment reduction on the largest farms in the Community (accounting for over 4/5 of all payments).\textsuperscript{13}

The new narrative, strategies and mechanisms of CAP Policy Reform should not be confused with an attempt to ‘kill the social’ within agricultural policy. Rather, the Commission was engaged in re-articulating the foundational problems of farmer income and rural poverty within a diagram of reflexive and neoliberal government. The social does not disappear from the CAP. Rather, it will now be governed differently. But this will not involve, the Commission makes clear, taking a ‘passive role of observing developments without a forward looking response’ (2).

\textit{Social Scientists & the CAP}

The social scientific field is populated by a variety of professionals that have critiqued the CAP and pushed for its reform from the ‘outside’. It has provided an important source of ‘expertise’ in problematizing the CAP from the perspective of its economic government and institutions. This influence partially represents the ‘opening’ of agricultural policymaking deliberations to members of civil society (Garzon 2006; Grant 2009;

\textsuperscript{12} For each additional employee above two that a farm employs, an additional €3,000 can be added to the franchise.
\textsuperscript{13} The money saved from modulation would then be made available to member states as ‘additional funding to reinforce their rural development programmes’ (23). The second feature of dynamic modulation amounts to a ceiling – or ‘maximum sum’ – of €300,000 payable to a single farm. Similar to the progressive 3% annual reduction of pillar one payments, payments over this amount ‘will be capped and made available for transfer to the second pillar in the Member State concerned’ (23). Again, each member state can keep the rollover savings and utilize it within their rural development programs. MTR estimates that dynamic modulation will result in a diversion of 500-600 million between the two pillars in 2005. Thereafter, it will ‘increase annually by an equivalent amount with each 3% increase in dynamic modulation’ (23).
But, as we will see, it also has to do with the increasing sophistication and influence of new technologies of economic analysis (Daughjerg & Swinbank 2009). As ‘mediators’ situated at the intersection of reams of knowledge and EU institutions, the role of social scientists has been to diffuse ideas about CAP reform and innovate policy debates.

As Dean (2007) argues, neoliberal problematizations often center on the theme of corruption (8). This is because eliminating corruption is linked to making government more efficient, accountable, and transparent to the citizen (Dean 1999: 193). Placing a story of corruption at the center of the CAP has been a prominent textual strategy of many social scientists who have written on European agricultural policy.

Grant (1997) and Gardner (1996) have argued that fraud and corruption came to pervade the CAP because of its complex administration. Both authors cite the operation of the agrimonetary (‘green money’) system as evidence of this. Beginning in the late-60s, the EC began to adjust internal commodity prices in order to compensate for the increasingly erratic exchange rate fluctuations between member-states (resulting from the breakdown in the system of fixed exchange rates). For every CMO, a price-level would be given in a common unit of account (UA). This was normally based on the high-value German Deutschmark. The UA would then serve as the basis for converting the CMO price into different national currencies (Fennel 1979; Marsh & Ritson 1971). This was the level at which farmers would be effectively subsidized – the so-called national ‘green

\[14\] Beginning with the Agenda 2000 reforms (1998b), the CAP becomes increasingly open to civil society participation. During this period peak farmer groups, such as COPA, will lose influence in policymaking as a host of new actors became ‘intensely’ involved (Garzon 2006: 111). The new ‘pressure pluralist policy network’ that consolidates at the end of the 1990s leads to ‘an unprecedented open policy debate’ over the CAP in 2003 (147).
rates’. ‘Green money’ was used to maintain a ‘common’ agricultural market in a period of volatile currencies. But it was also an overtly political instrument that tended to raise subsidy payments across the board.

Gardner (1999) argues the complexity of the green money made it ‘a very fertile grazing ground for fraudsters and manipulators’ (40). Citing the complexity of the agrimonegetic system, Grant comments argues that the old joke that ‘only six people in Europe fully understand the operation of the CAP’ must now be ‘revised downwards’ (1997: 88). Gardner and Grant provide the reader a litany of common fraudulent practices. One involved moving commodities back and forth across borders to take advantage of a higher green rates in neighboring states. For example, it was common to smuggle pigs across the Ireland/ N. Ireland border for this purpose (Grant 1997: 84).

Another scheme involved transporting lorry loads of wheat and dairy across numerous state borders, collecting multiple differential payments along the way (Gardner 1999: 45). Apparently, the border between the two Irelands, as well as that between France and Belgium, were the ‘leakiest’ (Cottrell 1987: 101-103).

Interestingly, Gardner notes that such ‘exploitive trading’ was not technically illegal under EC law and therefore not ‘fraud proper’ (1999: 46). The lucrative and shadowy carousel of agricultural trade was thus never included in the official numbers on CAP fraud – a problem estimated to account for 10% of the total agricultural budget (Grant 1997: 99; Gardner 1996: 44).

15 Other fraudulent schemes included: (1) making claims for products that did not exist (2) claiming a high-value product when a lower one was actually produced (3) importing cheap commodities and then re-exporting them as higher-value products, collecting the higher of the two export refunds (4) claiming ‘invisible goods’ in storage (5) grubbing up ‘phantom orchards’ to receive special payments under the wine CMO, and (6) forging customs documents to claim sale of a product outside Europe, collecting the export refunds, and then ‘re-selling’ the product in the single market (Grant 1997: 99-100; Gardner 1996: 46).
While the Court of Editors regularly cited CAP frauds as systemic, there were no European watchdogs/regulators policing borders, especially at the ports, where the bulk of the fraud occurred (Grant 1997: 99). While an ‘army’ of bureaucrats was in charge of running the agrimonetary system, anti-corruption officials were sparse in the EC, and national accounting books were often not well monitored (Grant 1997: 100; Gardner 1996: 49). The most sensational charges, a few substantiated, concerned the role of organized crime and paramilitary outfits that were profiting handsomely from CAP fraud (Grant 1997: 84). The criminal networks rooted in Southern Europe were singled out; with Italy accounting for 60% of CAP fraud, followed closely by Greece and Spain (Grant 1997: 100).

Kapteyn (1996) pushes the theme of CAP mismanagement and incompetence the furthest. He sees it as not just representing a technical failure, but as something embedded in the general design (and failures) of the EU as a state-building enterprise. The premise of Kapteyn’s book – Stateless Market: The European Dilemma of Integration and Civilisation (1996) – is that European integration embodies a paradox which doubles as its core weakness. Namely, it has tried to construct a ‘state order’ from a ‘market order’ – a reversal of the traditional progression (5). States such as France, Britain, and the Netherlands constructed apparatuses of military, policing, and taxation before those for market integration, trade and a common currency. The EEC, in contrast, tried to graft a market order onto an essentially intergovernmental framework (57-59). The problem is that without institutionalizing the necessary coercive mechanisms, the market order cannot be enforced. This ‘tension’ between market and state, argues Kapteyn, is especially evident in the workings of the CAP (92).
Kapteyn also finds his evidence in the problem of fraud: ‘The rules are too complicated, the subsidies too high and, in comparison, the monitoring procedures found to be wanting’ (93). But unlike the other authors, Kapteyn does not locate the cause of CAP fraud in the policy machinery. The real problem is structural. It is found in the inability of the EU to enforce its policy and ‘compel its participants to accept a collective order’ (94). It is only because the CAP is the most complex and redistributionist of Community policies that this constitutional weakness emerges in such a dramatic fashion. Positive integration does not work without sovereign enforcement powers: ‘In the absence of a central authority, the member states agricultural production and the subsidies on this production spiralled upward, while their national monitoring procedure spiralled downward’ (97).

For Kapteyn, the abuse of the CAP subsidy apparatus, and the lack of monitoring or effective sanctions relative to this abuse, became something of an open secret, a known ‘conspiracy’ (99). Member states and agricultural organizations that benefited from CAP had no reason to speak up. And the Commission, even if it so desired, did not draw attention to the problem for fear of threatening one of its core policies:

The problem of monitoring, like that of over-production, is now known to a wider circle. However, during the first fifteen years...only a small circle of interested parties was in on what can rightfully be described as a conspiracy: a conspiracy which brought the Community to life and kept it alive...The consequences were not discussed. It was a taboo which served the interests of all parties involved and, in a certain sense, even those of the Community, whose very existence would have been threatened by an open accusation. So the Commission kept quiet when it should really have spoken out (99).

Kapteyn is cynical on the idea anything will (or can) be done to stem this corruption. For example, when the EU discovered a massive olive oil fraud in Italy, it responded with
technical suggestions for improving the ‘machinery of control’ rather than with sanctions (112). The Commission also lacks the ability to force states to conduct physical checks of goods at busy ports such as Rotterdam (119-20). Similar to the others, Kapteyn narrates the CAP as a crisis-ridden and ungovernable policy-space. But unique to his thesis, he views the widespread toleration of illegal and legal fraud in the CAP as evidence of a failed state-building project in the EU.

*Numbers and Representing the CAP*

While seemingly a banal observation, numbers underpin modern regimes of governmentality (Miller 1990; Porter 1995). Numbers, and the social facts they produce, provide the knowledge-base that makes it possible to govern modern economies, polities and societies (Poovey 1998; Rose 1999). Numerical representation makes it possible to know, record, and tabulate these realities in ways that make them governable domains (see also Miller & Rose 2008). In the same ways numbers can be used to manufacture political reality, they can similarly be used to critique and reflect upon government policy.

Numbers are crucial in assemblages of political reflexivity because they provide the objectivity and transparency that allow them to function as ‘technologies of trust’ (Porter 1995: 15). We have already seen how numbers can inscribe and ‘make-up’ social realities such as hunger or rural poverty. But when incorporated into strategies of political reflexivity, they also provide a means to ‘verify’ that too much money is being spent, or that too much food is being grown. Numbers are therefore not *passive* descriptions of
political life. In this case, they are active agents in rendering agriculture a policy-space in crisis.

Statistics were often used to bolster arguments on the more egregious dimensions of CAP largesse. Here we confront a strategy of numerical ‘shock and awe’ in which attention is given to the surplus, waste and fiscal expenses of the CAP. Rare is the critical narrative on the CAP that does not reference the total costs of the policy relative to the overall spending levels in the EU budget. And normally, as we see below, this is accompanied by quantifying the costs that have been passed on to consumers:

The European Union spends over €45 billion a year on supporting farmers. Most of this money is spent on either buying up surplus, butter, milk powder, beef and wheat, storing it and eventually selling it off cheap to the Russia and the Third World, or else on paying traders to export it at cut rates. The purpose of this activity is to keep up farmers prices. At the same time, the official market-rigging forces consumers to pay at least a third more for the food they would in a free market. This aspect of the ‘common agricultural policy’ is estimated to cost the EU’s 260 million consumers more than €100 billion a year (Gardner 1996: 3).

Gardner goes on to question how this level of support can be justified for a segment of the population that represents less than 6% of the EU workforce, and no more than 2% of its economic output.

Specific oversupplied commodities are nearly always given a statistical face. For example, they show the disproportionate spending on dairy, Ackrill demonstrates that it amounted to 40% of CAP spending in 1977 – 35% of the entire EC budget! (Ackrill 2000: 55). Grant provides evidence that the ‘beef stock mountains’ were in annual surplus by 700,000 tonnes in the early 1990s (1997: 129). He also notes that the CAP oversees the annual destruction of over a million tonnes of produce (131). Furthermore,
the EU spends 1.5 billion supporting wine-makers – paying farmers 1.2 billion to grub vines – but still subsidizes millions of liters of unsellable table wine annually (138).16

Gardner seems to relish documenting the sheer food waste generated by the CAP. He shows that in 1986 the EC had to ‘borrow’ 4.5 billion from outside the CAP budget framework in order to store 1.3 million tonnes of butter, with much of it eventually dumped onto world markets (33). But one-tenth of the product was so badly destroyed it could not even be eaten by animals, and had to be burned in furnaces.

Numbers are also used to give visibility as to the ‘inequities’ generated by the CAP. We have already encountered the infamous 80%-20% figure. But many authors also broke down the skewed support levels by commodity. For example, cereal farmers received 42.1% of overall CAP subsidies in the old system. This was said to signify a ‘northern’ bias in a CAP that did not subsidize fruits and vegetables in a similarly generous manner. (Portela & Gerry 2003). Gardner (1996) uses this evidence to draw the conclusion that unless we are talking about large dairy or cereal operations, the data ‘show quite clearly that the CAP has failed in what has always been regarded as the most important of the five main objectives of EU agricultural policy – to support farmers incomes’ (Gardner 1996: 51).17

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16 Sugar used to have an internal price 47% higher than the world price, despite the yearly over-production of sugar-beet (141). Tobacco used to be the most heavily subsidised (per acre) commodity despite the fact it kills people (144).

17 Numbers were also used to show the unfairness of the CAP to consumers and taxpayers. Ackrill states that the ‘efficiency transfer’ of CAP payments benefited producers to the tune of 10.6 billion but cost consumers 8 billion, and taxpayers 4.5 billion (1999: 202). Gardner shows that the butter regime alone cost EU taxpayers more than 2 billion at its height (33). Grant cites numbers from a World Bank study to show the banana regime takes 2.3 billion annually from consumers (Grant 1997: 136). Rickard argues that by the early 1990s total transfers from consumers and taxpayers to farmers exceeded income by 50% (Rickard 2000: 28). The figure includes the increased cost of farmland, attributable to the inflation of commodity...
To re-iterate, our interest here is not in the bias or inaccuracy of the statistics mobilized by the social scientists. Rather it was to demonstrate how the obsessive citing of statistics itself provided a means to inscribe the CAP as a policy defined by excess, waste, and an unequal distribution of its subventions among farmers. Statistics, moreover, have the advantage of being ‘trustworthy’ in a way often lacking in qualitative accounts.

*Economists and Strategies of CAP Reform*

Among academics, economists have been especially influential in the design of CAP Policy Reform. As the importance of the Agricultural Council and COPA weakened in CAP policymaking networks over the 1980s and 90s, agricultural economists simultaneously emerged as interlocutors with the Commission in the effort to devise strategies for CAP reform (Swinbank & Tranter 2004; Garzon 2006; Oxfam interview 2007; Daugbjerg 2009).

In particular, the role of agricultural economists in the OECD was crucial. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the OECD became much more critical in their appraisal of domestic agricultural policies that actively hindered free trade in foodstuffs (Garzon 2006: 30). Against what they viewed as rampant protectionism, the OECD began to promote that they called ‘agricultural normalism’. This new rationality basically argued for ending many of the special protections given to the farming sector. In other worlds, it should be managed no differently from other industries and sectors. The economists at the OECD articulated this rationality through quantitative studies and models that

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prices through the CAP (33). Inflated land prices serve as a barrier for new farmers entering the sector, and make it difficult to achieve efficiency gains from land consolidation.
demonstrated liberalization would ‘improve the general well-being of human-kind’ (Daugbjerg & Swinbank 2009: 26).

It is true that similar critiques of agriculture were circulating in the 60s and 70s. But the ideological climate meant these arguments only appeared on the margins, and the limited nature of economic modeling diminished their intuitive appeal (71-5). This all changed when statistical indicators such as the producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) and consumer tax equivalent (CTE) appeared. The technologies were born from a desire of the OECD ‘to update and improve the analytical tools it uses’ (82). Since the 1980s, the models and terminology invented by agricultural economists in the OECD has become part of the ‘international policy-making landscape’ around the governing of agrarian trade (83).

The PSE was a technology of visibility used to demonstrate precisely how much the CAP cost taxpayers and consumers in a given year. The CTE, even more provocatively, detailed what the cost of food would be without the CAP and the higher internal European pricing. The figures become touchstones in debates over agricultural liberalization during the Uruguay and Doha rounds. They generated a ‘new language’ to talk about agricultural trade, and provided the ‘analytical tools to measure the magnitude of agricultural support and its economic consequences’ (179). In the postwar moment, political legitimacy was on the side of technocrats and planners. Armed with new indicators and measurements, agricultural economists would assume this mantle in the beginning in the late-1970s.
The OECD also functioned as a type of agrarian learning machine. The focus was not on making visible agricultural policy in terms of its possibilities, but demonstrating its political and economic limits as a ‘non-market’. Agricultural economists were especially attuned to levels of the waste, inefficiency and economic disincentive produced by commodity specific intervention. Quantitative modeling would be integral in ‘proving’ this, and thus injecting a sophisticated and objective dimension into CAP Policy Reform discourse.\(^\text{18}\)

Agricultural economists also forwarded concrete strategies for CAP reform. An important one was the ‘bond scheme’ (Ackrill 2000: 152-3; Daugbjerg 2003; Swinbank & Tranter 2004). While there were different variations, all bond schemes worked with the same logic. That is, they were all based on creating a securitized financial instrument as a means to mitigate the financial and market risks faced by farmers. Moreover, this new mechanism would also imply ending all other forms of intervention (see Swinbank & Tangermann 2004). One popular proposal was to operate as follows: A bond would be given to every farmer that was currently receiving CAP subsidies. The bond would have a base value, and would also provide the holder a specified number of payments over a 15 or 20 year period. The bond would be also fully transferable. In other words, the bond could be sold or traded on capital markets. In essence, the idea was to fold all current and

\(^{18}\) The continued role of the OECD in advancing a market vision of agriculture should be noted. A recent joint FAO-OECD (2009) report notes that governments should abandon production support altogether and instead ‘empower farmers to manage their own risks’ (15). The OECD argues that global agriculture requires more ‘spatial price transmission’. This is shorthand for the convergence of commodity prices across markets, with the aim of eliminating the possibility speculators might profit from arbitrage (59-60). A good agricultural policy helps farmers confront ‘catastrophic risks’, such as droughts and severe market disruptions. But it does not need to manage ‘normal risks’, such as low prices or deficient capitalization.
future payments into a single securitized monetary instrument that would give farmers a ‘knowable’ stream of income over the duration of the bond.

Those advocating the bond scheme saw many advantages for it. First, it would not completely abandon the responsibility the EU had to farmers. Rather, it aimed to provide them transitional support, therefore avoiding the shocks that would come with full marketization in one step. Second, it did not run afoul of WTO provisions because the support worked through financial markets rather than commodity markets (and provided the revenue stream completely independent of production). Third, it would lower land prices because the cost of farms would no longer be tied to inflated commodity prices. This, argued the OECD, would also help diversify the composition(s) of farming and economic activity in rural areas (Swinbank & Tangermann 2004).

Bond schemes were first proposed in the early 1990s by a specialised working group in the European Parliament. At this point, the Commission considered the ideas ‘far too radical’ (Daugbjerg 2003: 422, 428). But many of the specific arguments and technologies from the bond proposals did eventually prove consequential (Swinbank & Tangermann 2004: 74). In the midst of the most intense CAP critiques, the Commission financed a second look at the bond scheme in 1999 (Swinbank & Tangermann 2004: x). In 2005, it began formulating crisis and risk management programs based on insurance logics and futures markets (Commission 2005d). In short, the bond scheme made securitization through financialization a respectable topic in agricultural policy reform debates.
NGOs and CAP Policy Reform

Oxfam is a NGO committed to economic development through an explicit human rights and poverty-alleviation agenda. The organization is also an example of how critical social science was used to influence CAP reform. Oxfam has been a particularly pesky critic of the CAP, especially its sugar and dairy regimes, which the NGO blames for dispossessing farmers in the Global south of their livelihoods (Oxfam 2002a; Oxfam 2002b; Oxfam interview 2007).

Oxfam argues the ability of European farmers to sell below cost has hurt constituencies as diverse as Indian dairy farmers and cane sugar cultivators in Mozambique. For a rich and powerful trading bloc, notably one that professes a belief in economic ‘development’ through trade, Oxfam finds the CAP to be a hypocritical and intolerable policy:

But as representatives of one of the world’s richest and most powerful trading blocs, they also have responsibilities towards developing countries. Reforming a system that reaps big rewards for a minority in Europe, while undermining the markets and opportunities for farmers and agricultural labourers in the developing world, is an essential step towards making trade fair and making globalisation work for the poor. If European governments fail to grasp this opportunity, then the EU’s exclusive focus on domestic interests will continue to prevail, at the expense of its poverty-reduction objective (Oxfam 2002a: 1).

To rectify this situation, Oxfam recommended the EU take a number of steps to make their policy fairer to farmers in the developing world. The most important of these would involve eliminating all export subsidies, especially for products (sugar-beet, tobacco, cotton) that put European farmers at an unfair comparative advantage when competing with poorer producers of similar products. Similar to the statistical techniques of the
OECD, Oxfam proposed the use of formal ‘impact’ tests to see how specific CAP programs and regulations had consequences for poverty reduction and food security efforts in the Global South.

Particularly targeted by Oxfam was the EU’s sugar regime. Sugar had avoided reform in 1999 and 2003. Moreover, it was also historically one of the most protected commodities in the EU. The CMO price was often double the world price, and most of the profits accrued to four powerful processors that controlled over 50% of the trade (Grant 1997: 141). The generosity of the sugar regime led, quite naturally, to structural surpluses that were then exported, below cost, into the markets of the Global South. This dumping undercut the ability of Caribbean and African producers to compete in markets that would have been theirs under normal market conditions.

There is a somewhat farcical element in the notion of ‘cheap’ European sugar. This is because it is far more expensive to produce refined sugar from beet than sugarcane. This made Europe a very inefficient supplier for the rest of the world: ‘sugar production is more suited to tropical than temperate climates…sugar beet production in Europe thus ensured the continuity of a production system that, were it left to a liberalised international market, would not be able to compete with production in the more favourable conditions of the tropics’ (Ward et al. 2008: 121). European consumers were not only paying more for their own sugar. They were also subsiding its export and, as a result, the economic ruin of sugarcane growers in South America, the Caribbean, and sub-Saharan Africa.
Oxfam was well aware of all this. In an influential publication – *The Great EU Sugar Scam: How Europe’s sugar regime is devastating livelihoods in the developing world* (2002b) – Oxfam bolsters the case for seeing EU sugar production as highly inefficient. According to Oxfam, it costs Europe €673 to produce one ton of sugar, compared to €286 for more competitive countries such as Brazil, Columbia, and Zambia (5). Instead of being an exporter of sugar to the world, under normal market conditions, Europe would naturally import five million tonnes a year. As it stands, argues Oxfam, Europe is the world’s largest exporter of sugar at 7 million tonnes, or 40% of the global total (23).

Who is hurt in this sugar scam? First is the EU taxpayer and consumer, who is forced to pay a surcharge for yearly overproduction that mostly benefits processors. But Oxfam goes on to argue that ‘the real burden falls far beyond Europe’s borders’ (4). Low cost producers such as Cuba, Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia are denied markets that would be otherwise theirs (sometimes their home markets!) (23). For example, the NGO estimates that if Mozambique were allowed to develop its sugar industry free from the unfair impacts of European supply, 50,000 extra jobs would be created, generating €108 million in additional revenue for the poor Southern African country (23-5).

This moral and economic crusade against the EU’s sugar policy was a success. In a 2003 assessment, the Commission considers taking action. In 2005, it does finally take action. The resulting reforms included phasing in a price cut of 36% over 4 years. Additionally, quotas would slowly be phased out and €150 million in transitional aid would be given to refiners to adjust to the new market conditions. In his account of this successful global NGO campaign, Ward (2008) argues that Oxfam was able to ‘politicise
sugar in new ways’ (125). It was able to present the sugar regime as an instrument for punishing European consumers and farmers in the Global South, while simultaneously enriching food conglomerates. ‘Oxfam argued the whole regime was highly anachronistic, and the protectors of the status quo were engaged in special interest pleading’ (126).19

Food Sovereignty and the CAP

Critical narratives on the CAP also emerged from the ‘food sovereignty’ movement. This movement is actually a collection of networks and organizations that advocate for localizing food production, democratizing agricultural policy, and entrenching regimes of peasant/small farmer rights (Desmarais 2007; Rosset 2006).20 The European face of this movement, and one of the founding members of Vía Campesina, is the European Farmers Co-Ordination (CPE). CPE was founded in 1986 as an umbrella group for organizing small farmers and alternative producers who felt excluded from the dominant European agricultural association, COPA-COJECA, which has had official status in the EC since the early 1960s (Hennis 2001; Estrada & Catry 2005).

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19 In an interview with an Oxfam official who worked on the campaign (2007), he referenced the sugar campaign as one of the most successful endeavors that Oxfam International has ever carried out on behalf of poor farmers globally.
20 The global political arm of this movement is Vía Campesina; a transnational peasant movement that argues for agricultural and food policies based on ‘closed food chains’ (my term) (Rosset 2006; Desmarais 2007; 2008). This entails organizing the production, sale and consumption of foodstuffs at the ‘local’ level (how local is defined depends on the relative scope of economies/ecosystems in specific spaces). Because the WTO encourages and codifies changes which have accelerated the decimation of the peasantry, food sovereignists view the WTO as an organization that must be abolished, rather than reformed: ‘For the Vía Campesina, reforming the WTO is not a viable strategy, because the WTO’s very purpose, practices, and policies are so fundamentally flawed. The Vía Campesina argues that the WTO’s lack of transparency and accountability, accompanied by its blatant undemocratic practices and links to agro-industry, makes it completely unsuitable as an international structure responsible for overseeing the food trade’ (Desmarais 2007:108).
In an interview with Gerard Choplin, chief coordinator and policy specialist for CPE, he cited the regressive nature of COPA as a primary reason for the founding of CPE; ‘in 20 years I have never seen one alterative policy document coming out of COPA (Chopin interview, 2007).’  

Choplin also noted the CPE only ‘grew up’ as a true social movement after the consequence of new WTO trade rules began to full impact small farmers in Western Europe. The rationalization of food sovereignty advocated by CPE is based on re-politicizing agro-food power. It is centered on making public and democratic all of the decisions around farmer income, the level of food importation, and what types of food should be grown domestically (Choplin interview 2007).

Citing increased farm concentration and profit squeezes on the most vulnerable producers, CPE advocates an alternative policy based on: (1) supply management (2) generous commodity prices (3) restrictions on food importation and trade and (4) EU directives for breaking up the concentration of supermarket power (Estrada & Catry 2005; Choplin 2007). Whereas the COPA officials I interviewed mentioned the ‘competitiveness problem’ of European farming numerous times – in alignment with the Commission discourse – Choplin mentioned it only once in a two hour conversation.22

21 The ideational disconnect – and otherwise divergent political aims between the two groups (CPE and COPA) – is readily apparent. In a roundtable interview with four policy analysts from COPA, not one of the representatives had heard of the ‘food sovereignty’ movement. This is despite the fact it had become a standard discourse among alterative farm and food consumer groups by 2007. Upon my explaining what the food sovereignty platform involved, one COPA interlocutor commented that it sounded ‘awkward and a bit strange’; another noted that it ‘looks a bit Soviet to me’ (COPA interviews 2007).

22 CPE views ‘competition’ in agriculture as something of a chimera. Cheap food always has significant ‘costs’. These are borne by the farmer in terms of increased poverty; consumers by way of inferior and substandard foodstuffs; and the environment due to the ecological destruction that results from unchecked industrial production methods. An equitable and sustainable agriculture, argues Choplin, would place income equity, sustainability and good food at the center of the CAP. Here the CPE’s critique of CAP reform becomes apparent; CAP reform, by doing ‘just a little’ to promote an alternative model of agriculture – while simultaneously keeping the productivist system largely intact – is producing a ‘two-tier’ agriculture that has class implications. The increasing bifurcation of working class and upper-middle class diets in Europe – as Choplin correctly notes – has become even more of reality with the ‘foodie revolution’.
His position was clearly more in line with the original CAP imaginary that viewed the role of political authorities to be in ‘moralizing’ farming and agrarian economies.

Interestingly, even while the CPE critique of the CAP became more severe, the group came to have more influence on CAP policymaking (Estrada & Catry 2005; Nugent 2005). Since 1999, it has had the status of an official interlocutor in policy deliberations; a status previously only held by COPA and the large producer organizations: ‘This recognition has meant that the CPE now forms part of the official system of farm interest representation, giving rise to a more formal structure within the organization itself. In fact, some of the proposals put forward in the CAP incorporate principles upheld by the CPE, namely...the support of alternative forms of agriculture’ (Estrada & Catry 2005: 248). The CPE/EU relationship demonstrates a certain paradox of neoliberal government relative to the practice of pluralism within policymaking. At the same time political authorities attempt to depoliticize economic governance, they also strive to include and actively consult many of the same groups and social movements that desire to see it politicized in new ways.

*Social Scientists as ‘Mediators’ of CAP Reform*

To conclude, a new set of economic and social knowledges were integral to the discursive production of the CAP as ‘in-crisis’. While the narratives and suggestions offered in this ‘outside’ expertise varied, the collective impact of this social scientific field was to alter the terrain upon which agro-food government was imagined. Rose and

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*Will it be organics, quality products and other specialty foods for the urban bourgeoisie; while cheaper grains, meat and dairy for the masses?*
Miller (1992) argue that this has always been an important function of social science for liberal governmentalities:

Relations of reciprocity obtain between the social sciences and government. As government depends upon these sciences for its languages and calculations, so the social sciences thrive on the problems of government, the demand for solutions and the attraction of theories which have the plausibility of science and the promise of the rational disciplining and technologising of the social field...They make the objects of government thinkable in such a way that their ills appear susceptible to diagnosis, prescription and cure by calculating and normalizing intervention (Rose and Miller 1992: 183).

The figure of a ‘mediator’ is one way to understand the role of these new interlocutors in CAP reform (Osborne 2004). The mediator embodies a type of expertise that does not work from the top down. It does not assume the supremacy of technocrats, scientists and centralized bureaucracies. The new ‘intellectual worker’ will ‘bring ideas quickly and decisively into public focus, brokering their ideas in the context of different spheres of influence’ (435). A mediator, in other words, wields ideas tactically as ‘instruments’ in shaping public debate (435). Mediators are also ‘catalysts’ because they ‘get things moving’ through interaction and collaboration with other actors (440). Moreover, success is not generally understood as a zero-sum game. Sometimes the intent is to simply make ideas ‘mobile’ and circulate them as widely as possible (441).

We might consider the economists, academics and activists advocating CAP reform as working in this capacity. It is doubtful these groups believed their ‘expertise’ would simply be accepted as fact and then immediately incorporated into policy. A mediator knows the limits of her power. But where she often succeeds is in understanding when a policy-space is conducive for change, and then using her intellectual labour to disrupt and destabilize this status quo. As civil society becomes more impactful in the
making of agro-food policies, we should likewise expect the role of these mediators to grow.

This section has demonstrated how the CAP came to represent the roughest edges of EU government. Edelman’s concept of a ‘political crisis’ – a collection of political problems that discursively crystallize into a singular pathological political object – captures the narrative context in which CAP Policy Reform came to be seen as inevitable.

**The Ordoliberalization of CAP Economic Government**

The ‘CAP-Attack Spectacle’ was not simply a rhetorical or textual reality. It had been materializing within the policy-space since the first milk production quotas were introduced in 1984. The most important reform trajectory of CAP economic government, as discussed, was found in the ways farmers were subsidized, and the criteria for doing so. The nature of these changes will now be interrogated.

Dean (1999) argues that under neoliberalism ‘the contrivance of markets become the technical means for the reformation of all types of provision’ (172). This was also the case with the ‘ordoliberalization’ of the CAP. To review, commodity markets before 2003 were sites of constant intervention by political authorities. For neoliberals, they were therefore not seen as ‘real’ markets. When direct payments become consolidated into the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) the situation changes. At this point, agricultural commodity markets become organized around the figure of ‘competition’ – which is not to say deregulated. Rather, we want to examine how CAP Policy Reform mobilizes markets as a mechanism, or a as a pedagogy even, in responsiblizing both the EU and European farmers.
The New Rural Welfare State

Importantly, the SPS provides a way to rearticulate, while not abandoning, the social problématique that was introduced in Article 39. The CAP will no longer encourage massive production of food regardless of consumer demand. In fact, it will no longer work through ‘the commodity’ as a mode of governance. Rather, it will provide farmers an income floor in their capacity as participants in a market-game. The Single Payment Scheme (SPS) ultimately locates a way to continue the welfare dimension of the CAP, while simultaneously ending the previous commitment of the EU to fully securitize the agricultural sector through organizing markets and blunting international competition.

The new rural welfare state will be based foremost on stabilizing income (as well as the EU budget). As a genuine safety net, the CAP will no longer guarantee income. The strategy of ‘income parity’ has been stricken from political discourse. The unmaking of this aspect of the managerial CAP was a one of the most significant alterations of agricultural governance in Europe:

Today’s CAP bears little resemblance to the system of the 1960s, if only because the controversial device of price support has been largely replaced by direct payments to producers. Introduced in 1992 as a compensation for price cuts, these payments now represent the bulk of EU support in agriculture under the label of single farm payments. They are the instrument through which the demands of the non-farm world are channelled into agricultural policy (emphasis in original): whether to ‘green the CAP’, to ‘decouple’ farm support from production, or to ‘simplify the CAP’. Under these farm payments, EU expenditure related to traditional farm concerns has been stabilized while the the total EU budget has increased…(Roederer-Rynning 2010: 182).

By providing income supplements based on factors such as historical receipts and farm size, rather than by defending internal (EC) prices by way of price supports and export refunds, ‘natural’ price levels (or something close to them) would now prevail within the
CAP architecture. The profitability of farming is now only an indirect consequence of CAP subventions. The bulk of income a farmer now receives is the result of her competing with other farmers in selling products to wholesalers, retailers, or directly to consumers via local markets. As one COPA representative stated about the shift: ‘Every European farmer must now find a production strategy...We have to be pragmatic, we are in a globalized economy. There is no way to go back’ (COPA interview: 2007).

At this point, we should inquire as to the specific strategy underlying the SPS. The conventional ‘neoliberalization’ thesis does not fit. The reform was not inspired by the deregulatory impulses of the Chicago School, or other classical paradigms. Moreover, the EU will not completely abandon support for producers. As was made clear in MTR, keeping farmers economically viable remains an important objective of the CAP: ‘Support and stabilization of agricultural incomes remains an essential objective. Direct payments must therefore continue to play a role in promoting a fair standard of living for the agricultural community’ (Commission 2002: 11).

On the other hand, ‘decoupling’ has meant a significant change in the strategies and mechanisms used to govern farmers and rural economies. The truth is that CAP economic government is neither ‘free market’ or ‘anti-market’ at this point. To use either ‘container’ label fails to capture the nuance and complexity involved in the shift to income supports.

Markets/Protection: The False Dichotomy

The conventional ‘markets’ versus ‘protectionism’ dichotomy of critical political economy is largely the product of Karl Polanyi (1944/2001). In his path-breaking book
The Great Transformation, Polanyi opposes the bifurcated logics of political economy: the ‘self-regulating market’ and its antithesis, ‘social protection’. Polanyi uses the concept of the ‘double movement’ to capture how the two logics are in fact dialectically linked:

Let us return to what we have called the double movement. It can be personified as the action of two organizing principles in society, each of them setting itself specific institutional aims, having the support of definite social forces and using its own distinctive methods. The one was the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at the establishment of a self-regulating regulating market, relying on the support of the trading classes, and using largely laissez-faire and free trade as its methods; the other was the principle of social protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as productive organization, relying on the varying support of those most effected by the deleterious action of the market – primarily, but not exclusively, the working and the landed classes – and using protective legislation, restrictive associations, and other instruments of intervention (Polanyi 1944/ 2001: 138-9).

Polanyi’s insights were remarkable for capturing the key political fault line that ran through European society in the era before the mixed economy and welfare state became the consensus (1880s –1930s). He is able to illustrate the clear polarization between right and left on questions around governing the economy. By the 1930s, already severe class divisions were exacerbated with the high unemployment of the depression, leading to street clashes between communists and socialists on one side, with reactionaries and fascists on the other side (Halperin 2003; Wasserstein 2007). Polanyi was correct in arguing that during this period an unbridgeable chasm emerged between those advocating laissez-faire versus statist doctrines for the organization of the economy.

But while this dualism certainly presents a useful grid for understanding political-economic fault lines up through the mid-1930s, it is less productive in deciphering how economic government was put together in the postwar period, as it rarely lined up with
these traditional distinctions. Economic government after 1945 appeared in ‘hybrid’ forms (Barnes 2005; Thompson 1996). These were configurations such as ‘the social market economy’ and ‘Keynesianism’ that blended public/private and intervention/market – both examples of the ‘mixed economy’ model (Judt 2005; Mazower 1998). Polanyi did not have to confront these hybrid iterations when writing *The Great Transformation* in the late-30s, as none had yet been put into operation.

Nonetheless, many of Polanyi’s disciples fell into a trap he unintentionally laid. That is, they would come to assume the analytical distinction between rabid market (classical) liberalism and socialism has held up equally well as an explanatory rubric. But the uniqueness of neoliberalism has always been as a laboratory for developing assemblages which rendered inoperable the older divisions between public and private, market and the state (Rose 1999; Larner 2000).

CAP Policy Reform, a variant of neoliberalism, commits to neither side of Polanyi’s duality. This was evident in a Commission narrative that refuses to accept the terms of a debate that pits the utilization of markets versus the public provision of welfare. Rather, their new economic rationality will be an ‘ordoliberal’ one, and thus be located in merging the very categorical divisions between ‘markets’ and ‘planning’ (Tribe 1995: 215). For ordoliberals, all economies *are* planned or regulated in some fashion. The more pertinent question for ordoliberals concerns *how* this planning will operate; that is, what framework that will animate it? In particular, will it be a system organized around the logics of ‘monopoly’ or ‘competition’?

*Ordoliberalism: Organizing Competition, Governing Economies*
Ordoliberals understand economic government as the processes through which a set of ‘market game’ are put into operation over the social body (Foucault 2008; Tribe 1995; Walters & Haahr 2005). Inspired by a (Frankfurt school-esque) suspicion of centralized authority, and as a strong believer in the efficacy of markets, ordoliberalism is a variant of neoliberalism. It belies this lineage in its commitment to placing competition and entrepreneurialism at the center of economic government. But unlike the Chicago School or Hayekian approaches, ordoliberal thought understands economic order as something that has to be constructed, and maintained through a proper regulatory/legal structure (see also Lemke 2001). In this way, neither competition or entrepreneurialism are seen to occur ‘naturally’, but rather must be fostered.

Ordoliberalism is thus an ‘active governmentality’. At the same time, this activity should not be confused with an attempt to carve out and insulate specific economic sectors. Ordoliberal practice was rather about creating competitive orders from all sectors of the economy. The idea is that if organized correctly, these orders should be able to function largely on their own (and thus not require constant intervention). In this way, ordoliberalism is about using public power to extend the reach of markets across social life. But, it also tries to limit the use of this public power to the first instances, those moments when the regulatory and legal artifices that will govern a particular economic order are first constructed.

Similar to other neoliberalism(s), ordoliberalism critiques the irrationalities of economic government organized through and by the ‘social state’. Ordoliberals proffer a strong and intimate link between market participation and political freedom. Many of its earliest proponents were persecuted or harassed by German authorities during the war,
and were quick to point out the close relationship between monopoly capitalism and Nazism (Krohn 1993). Ordoliberals, though, differed as well from other neoliberals in insisting that the prevention of monopoly and maintenance of competition required a regulatory framework and legal architecture that would need to be maintained by a competent and cooperative state (see again Foucault 2008; Tribe 1995). Again, contra both Hayek and Friedman, markets were not seen as ‘natural’ or ‘spontaneous’ enough to produce socially beneficial outcomes on their own.

Hayek argued that economic intervention should be limited to a bare legal regime that secured property and contract. Hayek’s view reflected his belief that markets were spontaneous orders whose logics were not discernible to centralized authorities (Hoover 2003). Ordoliberals believed this view ‘willfully ignor[ed] the manner in which market mechanisms are formed as the outcome of a number of cross-cutting forces’ (Tribe 1995: 223). For Ordoliberals, ‘competition’ was the basis upon which economic and social life could be governed. But they also saw economic life as composed of ‘heterogeneous forces overlapping in both space and time’ (Tribe 1995: 223-224). As such, political authorities had to actively organize and maintain this complexity as *as a market order*.

Ordoliberals thus advocated a capitalist rationality centered not on emancipating markets, but constructing them in the most advantageous ways. In one sense, ordoliberalism thus belongs in a longer line of German political thought that was

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23 In reading the relationship between authoritarianism and statism, Ordoliberals discerned an unmistakable causal connection. They singled out the ‘mercantilist’ politicization of the German economy – consistent across the Bismarckian, Weimar and Nazi configurations – as the basis for the usurpation of individual freedom under the Third Reich (Tribe 1995: 211). ‘In this perspective the collapse of democracy in Germany is not caused by a functioning market economy, but rather the consequence of the fact that such an economy did not exist. From the viewpoint of the Ordoliberals, the Third Reich was the inevitable result of a series of anti-liberal policies’ (Lemke 2001: 193). For Ordoliberals, the legacies of statesman such as List and Bismarck was anything but ‘liberal’ (Foucault 2008: 110-1).
fascinated with the conditions which made possible political and economic order (Tribe 1988). In another sense, it exemplifies a decidedly secular and historicist approach to capitalism that is foremost interested in what works. For ordoliberals, capitalism was not a theoretical science, but a series of ‘institutional frameworks and positive rules’ in place to protect competition (Foucault 2008: 163).

Ordoliberals were both ‘anti-naturalistic’ and ‘constructivist’ in their approach to markets. They saw markets as the ‘foundation for liberal governance’. But they did not accord them ‘the capacity for self-regulation’ evident within classical liberal political thought (Walters & Haahr 2005: 49). Ordoliberal rationality was about the active construction of an ‘economic state’. While they rejected policy that supported specific industries or disrupted the price mechanism in any way, they did see a role for authorities in constructing the general, structural, conditions under which the market would operate. This would mean ‘intervening on the conditions of the market... in order to encourage these tendencies and somehow push them to their limit and full reality’ (Foucault 2008: 138).

Similar to the importance of commercial exchange in Smithian liberal economic theory, ‘competition’ is the structuring force for ordoliberals. In fact, ordoliberalism is very much a theory of the market imagined in terms of competition (Rose 1999: 138; Foucault 2008: 119; Dean 2010: 187). For ordoliberals, previous forms of capitalism were problematic because these did not do enough to restrain the forces of monopoly and particularistic regulation that were blockages to realizing authentic competition (Lemke 2001: 194-5). In terms of praxis, ordoliberals sought out those sites where competitive logics were being thwarted, and then use all available legal and regulatory tools to ‘free’
the market from the offending practices: ‘For this reason it might be considered as the application of the logic of liberalism to the market itself’ (Walters & Haahr 2005: 50).

If competition allows markets to function efficiently, then ensuring competition is the most important principle in ordering the economic game. But, again, competition will not simply occur. It is a relational and transactional logic that has to be mobilised, harnessed and protected within a legal and regulatory framework:

For what in fact is competition? It is absolutely not a given of nature. The games, mechanisms, and effects of competition which we identity and enhance are not at all natural phenomena; competition is not the result of a natural interplay of appetites, instincts, behaviour, and so on.... competition is an essence...Competition is a principle of formalization. Pure competition must and can only be an objective, an objective thus presupposing an indefinitely active policy. Competition is therefore an historical objective of governmental art and not a natural given that must be respected’ (Foucault 2008: 120).

Being the opposite of competition, monopoly was the boogeyman for Ordoliberals. It was ‘an archaic phenomenon’ caused by the wrong forms of intervention (Foucault 2008: 134). It presented a poor engineering of the regulatory and legal frameworks governing capitalist relations (see also Lemke 2001). Monopoly was also pernicious because it disrupted the ‘price-mechanism’, or the way the economy calculated things (Foucault 2008: 136; Tribe 1995: 213). Unlike wartime economies in which the supply of armaments and foodstuffs could be known and planned for, postwar consumer economies

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24 Ordoliberals often broke with other economists over the question of monopoly, and its necessity. For example, while Eucken agreed with Keynes on some accounts – such as the need for macroeconomic stability and the international coordination of trade – he rejected the use of commodity boards that functioned as proxy monopolies (Tribe 1995: 230-1). Notably, his specific target was the use of state monopolies for food purchase. These and other monopolies, whatever their good intentions, distorted the calculating ability of markets. For Ordoliberals, monopolies can only be efficient in the medium term; in the long-run they will inevitably produce distortions in production, prices and wages (Foucault 2008: 136).
were ‘heterogeneous by nature and therefore not predictable by a central agency’ (Tribe 1995: 225).

Ordoliberals detested ‘ad-hocery’ in economic government because it led to a maze of policies and regulations across different sectors and, moreover, it never emboldened the entrepreneur. Moreover, sound economic government does not include redistributing large sums to particular sectors or firms. Additionally, it should demur from constant minor interventions in the economy that make it less efficient and more prone to cycles over time. Describing this aspect of ordoliberalism, Foucault argues it seeks to ‘obtain a society that is not oriented towards the commodity and the uniformity of the commodity, but towards the multiplicity and differentiation of enterprises’ (2008: 149). This quote is particularly revealing when considering the transition from the old to new regimes of economic government in the CAP.

Ordoliberalism and Vitalpolitik

A key difference between ordoliberalism and other neoliberal paradigms is that the former retains an active social policy at its core (Lemke 2001: 197). Müller-Armack, a prominent ordoliberal, argued that the ‘market mechanism needed to be constrained by policies which had social objectives’ (Tribe 1995: 336). Social protection and economic security, though, should not be accessed outside the market – as we see in the more traditional decommodification based programs of the welfare state – but must be woven into the economic framework, particularly the conditions of labour (Dean 2010: 70). Rüstow called the enfolding of a social policy into a market framework ‘vitalpolitik’ (vital policy) (Dean 2010: 71-4). Competition, while the unifying principle of economic
order, still requires logics of securitization that allow for the market-game to work efficiently, and for the entrepreneurial form to take hold.

For ordoliberals, freedom was not ‘ontological’ or ‘abstract’ concept (Tribe 1995: 208; Dean 2010: 71). Similar to welfare liberals, ordoliberals believed that reducing workers to a condition of barbarism and penury rendered the notion of ‘economic freedom’ meaningless. ‘Within a Vitalpolitik designed to create a life worth living, a new set of ethical and cultural values had to be created, not least within work itself…If the powers of self-actualization were enhanced, individuals would defend freedom itself’ (Rose 1999: 138). As Rose goes on to argue, Vitalpolitik presented a particular mutation in governing the social, not an abandonment of its central ethos. It was a way of making social policy work through an economic logic, and thus in the name of properly functioning markets (Rose 1999: 141).

Vitalpolitik was thus social policy built into the economic framework and conditions of employment. It was never imagined as a ‘counterweight to unrestrained economic processes’ nor did it aim for the ‘socialisation of some elements of consumption’ (Foucault 2008: 142). Its redistributive elements worked to achieve market inclusion. Vitalpolitik would combat gross inequality and unfairness across economic life, but not thwart competition or dissuade work.25 A certain balance was being negotiated here. That is, how can a policy be designed to provide citizens a space in which they can confront risk, while not having this same policy simultaneously dissuade the expansion and multiplication of entrepreneurial forms (Foucault 2008: 144-48; Lemke 2001: 195)?

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25 Foucault (2008) states that: ‘it is not a matter of maintaining purchasing power but merely ensuring a vital minimum for those who, either permanently or temporarily, would not be able to ensure their own existence…it is absolutely not the establishment of or regulation around an average’ (143)
As an economic ‘system’ ordoliberalism will see its most complete expression in the social market economy of West Germany. But its overall impact has extended far beyond this. Walters and Haahr (2005), as well as Tribe (1995), have noted the imprint of ordoliberalism on the Common Market, particularly its emphasis on using a regulatory framework from which to build and govern a European economy. Sixty years hence, the strategies and practices of ordoliberalism have come to constitute a field of tactical deployment across OECD economies. Ordoliberalism has proven to be quite conducive with the neoliberal ethos on ‘governing better’ through markets.

*Reading Ordoliberalism in the SPS*

Having outlined the core tenants of ordoliberalism, I will now mobilize these to interpret the reforms associated with the SPS. My argument is that the move towards income support, and the move away from commodity support, resembled an ordoliberalization of CAP political economy. This is evident upon considering four particular elements of this reform: (1) the wishes of the Commission to re-make Europe’s agrarian economy into a competitive order (2) the use of the price-mechanism to govern markets, rather than using forms of political intervention to determine wages, prices and output, and (3) the need to maintain a *vitalpolitik* at the core of the policy; that is, to reengineer the subsidy mechanisms of the CAP in such a way that farmers would be supported in their role as ‘entrepreneurs’.

The strategy of making competition a central logic in the CAP becomes clear by the early-1990s (Commission 1991). *Reflections* argued that the income of a farmer can no longer be determined by the level of ‘receipts’ they derive from the CAP budget (17).
The objective, rather, is to help farmers acquire the capacity to compete on markets (17). *Agenda 2000* makes clear that a ‘competitive agriculture sector’ which can ‘face up to the world market’ is the ultimate goal of CAP Policy Reform (5).

The key question thus becomes: How can support be provided to farmers in ways that do not reproduce their dependency on subsidies, but pushes them towards commercial viability? (4). In introducing the SPS, the *MTR* stated a goal of ‘improving the overall market orientation of agriculture’ and allowing ‘farmers to fully benefit from market opportunities in supplying the products that consumers demand’ (19). A ‘competitive agricultural sector’ is the first goal outlined for the CAP in the *MTR*. In the *Health Check* (2007), the SPS is applauded for having given the CAP a market orientation. Success is seen in the fact producer support has been ‘decoupled from production decisions’ and farmers can now make ‘*their* choices in response to market signals’ (2).

To govern the CAP as a competitive order meant that the price-mechanism would have to function across agriculture markets. European prices would need to be brought closer to world prices and reflect actual demand. If this occurred, the Commission would know reform had been successfully achieved – the most tangible evidence being the elimination of surplus production (Commission 2007: 2). When recalling the hostility and disavowal of governing through world prices in the original CAP, the shift appears as significant: ‘Agriculture, like the rest of the economy, is subject to the laws of supply and demand. A continuation of surpluses, due to the imbalance of prices and markets, is not a satisfactory option for the CAP’ (1987: iii). In all of the Commission texts on CAP reform, one conclusion is clear: the policy needs to respect ‘commercial realities’.
The ‘ordoliberal farmer’ will be governed as an entrepreneur and business manager. She is no longer the artefact of a subsidy apparatuses, but the center of a competitive order. In the early phase of reform, Perspectives already made clear that farmers can no longer produce ‘for public intervention’ (1987: iii-v). The farm sector needs to be regulated as ‘an activity of enterprise’ and a site of economic/market freedom (48). Under an ordoliberal framework, the farmer would ‘benefit from positive trends on world markets’ and be ‘oriented to the products and services that the public wants’ (Commission 2002: 11).

In 2003, Franz Fischler gave a talk in which he explained that the MTR reforms were intended to ‘free’ farmers to produce for the market. The old system, he argued, ‘disconnected’ farmers from price-signals. It had them produce for ‘the value of the subsidy’ and not actual demand. Echoing ordoliberal critiques on the irrationalities of market-planning and price-fixing, Fischler argued the old CAP not only restricted the liberty of farmers, but ignored consumer preferences, and also produced expensive and counterproductive surpluses. A better policy would eliminate these externalities, and move the CAP towards enshrining economic freedom.

If we want to make our policy sustainable, a piecemeal approach is not enough. What we need is a more innovative approach. This is why we propose secondly the introduction of a support system that is decoupled from production. This major step will significantly increase the freedom to farm. So far, this freedom was limited. In the past, the support of the CAP was delivered through price support. As a consequence, farmers were increasingly disconnected from market signals. To an increasing extent, their products did not go to the market but into milk lakes and cereal mountains...It is time to remove this straitjacket. Farmers should be free to make their management decisions based on the basis of demands of the market and the expectations of society, rather than the value of the subsidy’ (Fischler: 2 July, 2003).
Viewed from an ordoliberal lens, the institutionalization of the SPS appears as a means to provide producers an income floor that would not necessitate ‘steering their production decisions’ (Commission 2007: 11). Farmers could be made secure in their market participation, but would not be insulated from the market itself.

Subsidizing income directly, rather than through market arrangements, was a site of Vitalpolitik in CAP Policy Reform. The logic was based in giving farmers enough financial support to remain viable in the marketplace, but not so much they could avoid selling into demand-driven markets. The CAP would no longer be a rural welfare state which shielded producers from market forces or provided them absolute ‘guarantees’ against world prices. But, as previously discussed, the Commission was also not going to abandon its commitment to providing economic security for farmers. The question, rather, revolved around how to provide this support in a limited and targeted way that would increase the commercial viability of small and medium-size farmers, while encouraging them to adopt market specializations that would ensure their long-term profitability.

The SPS was thus essentially a regularized income floor meant to ‘safeguard the earnings of farmers, above all keeping them stable’ (Commission 1998: 5). Because the payments were not linked to the activities of farmers in their capacity as producers, it did not stunt the growth of a competitive order. In other words, the ‘bureaucratic steering of production’ was now over (4-5). Degressivity, a technology previously discussed, contributed to this ordoliberalization by lowering, and then capping, payments for the

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26 That farmer support would not be entirely abandoned entirely was made clear early on: ‘the challenge which now must be faced is how to ensure the maintenance of a significant number of persons in agriculture by means which do not result in unacceptable waste of economic and financial resources’ (Commission 1987: iii).
most productive farms. Degressivity would thus increase market optimality by lessening the competitive gulf between farmers.

The SPS was thus imagined as a ‘safety net’ rather than as a set of extensive income guarantees. It was designed to ‘allow maximum flexibility in production decisions...while guaranteeing their (farmers) income stability (Commission 2002: 3). With this ordoliberalization of CAP economic government, the policy would be shorn of its ‘anti-market’ and ‘defensive’ elements (see Rieger 2000). But at the same time, because the Commission realized most producers could not survive in a completely liberalized sector, the EU would continue taking measures to stabilize the income of smaller farmers, and facilitate their market participation (7).

Ordoliberalism and Future CAP Reforms

Future reforms of CAP economic government are likely to be built along ordoliberal lines. This was conveyed by Notis Lebessis, a policy analyst for the DG for Agriculture and Rural Development whom I interviewed (Lebessis interview, 2007). Lebessis had been given the job of pushing agricultural governance beyond the ‘narrow terms’ it had been hitherto confined. His first insight was that the Commission should no longer think in terms of a farmer’s income. Rather, farm policy had to be approached in terms of what is required for the macro-stabilization of the sector. This meant leaving behind the mythical and homogenized ‘European farmer’. A single policy could not possibly

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27 The Commission (2002) stated: ‘Since market revenues alone are not enough to ensure an acceptable standard of living for many farm households, direct payments continue to play a central role in ensuring a fair standard of living and stability for the agricultural community’ (7).

28 It is revealing that Lebessis was assigned to agriculture in light of his previous role in strategizing EU governance around the problems of ‘complexity’ and ‘policy learning’ (Commission 2001; for a discussion see Barry & Walters 2003). He confirmed his transfer to agricultural policy was a deliberate attempt to translate the EU ‘good governance’ agenda into the CAP.
understand, much less govern, agrarian sectors that run the gamut from near-subsistence farming in the south, to high-modern cereal and dairy production in the North.29

Lebessis argued that within such a context of economic and ecological diversity, the future of the CAP was in developing policy instruments that promoted more internal competition, and a diversified circulation of foodstuffs within the Single Market. Furthermore, Lebessis provocatively claimed that agro-food government might soon be imagined as something closer to regional policy, or perhaps even competition policy. He concludes, echoing the core of ordoliberal thought, that more needs to be done to improve the ‘framework’ in which farmers operate. This would include things like improving agro-environmental practices and curbing the monopoly power of input providers and food purchasers.

*Foucault, Ordoliberalism and the CAP*

Before completing this section, I want to reflect some on Foucault’s comments on the relationship between ordoliberalism and postwar European agriculture (2007). Indeed, Foucault has also provided a discussion on the key relationship under review here: that between European agricultural policy and ordoliberalism. And while Foucault uses the occasion to provide a wonderful description of this under-analyzed body of economic knowledge, his analysis of the CAP is actually quite off the mark.

My central critique is that Foucault finds in the *original* CAP an ordoliberal design where none yet existed (Foucault 2007:140-1). Foucault begins his analysis by incorrectly stating that European agriculture had, by the early-1950s, become

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29 And that span from the tropics (e.g. Cyprus) to the arctic (e.g. Finland).
problematized around a lack of market integration and internal competition. Drawing on Eucken — who was at no point an influential figure in agrarian circles — Foucault argues that the discourse in the 1950s centered on the following critique: ‘agriculture has never been normally, fully, and exhaustively integrated within the market economy. It has not been integrated within the market economy because of protective customs that, throughout Europe have marked off, and cut off spaces of European agriculture’ (140).

Ordoliberals, according to Foucault, were thus interested in how to make European agriculture ‘function within a market economy’? (140). For Euken, particularly, this meant building an ‘agricultural framework policy that included programs for farm consolidation, machinery investments, extension services, and the simplification of legal regimes for selling and transferring land (140-1). His strategy was to no longer govern the agricultural sector through market interventions, but to increase productivity and efficiency by optimizing the relations between population, technology, training and land (140-1). But it is also important to note what Euken was completely against. This included all practices of tarrification, price-fixing, and commodity-specific regulations. These practices were why farmers did not ‘function in a market’ (141).

Perhaps as a counterfactual reading, Foucault’s thesis on the ‘ordoliberalization’ of postwar agricultural policy is intriguing. But in terms of the actual political thought and practice that constituted Mansholt’s CAP, none of this was put into operation. Consider, for example, Foucault’s untenable claim that an ‘order of competition’ was the ‘rough and ready’ for design for the future CAP:

What is more, you can see in passing that this 1952 text programs, even if in a completely rough and ready way, what will become the Common Agricultural
Market (CAP) of the next decade. The text is from 1952. The Mansholt Plan is already in Eucken, or it is in part in Eucken, in 1952. So there you are for conformable actions, for conjectural actions and organizing actions at the level of the framework. This is what they call the organization of a market order, of an order of competition. And this is actually what European agricultural policy is: How to reconstruct a competitive order that will regulate the economy (141)

For the most part Mansholt’s intentions, in both the Green Pool Round and the negotiations at Messina, were the opposite of organizing agriculture around a competitive market order. He and all the other national agricultural ministers sought to institutionalize an ‘anti-competitive’ arrangement and place it at the heart of agricultural governance. Without this, they firmly believed, neither the food supply nor farmer prosperity could be secured.

The German Finance Minister Erhard, a prominent ordoliberal, so despised the trajectory of postwar agricultural governance that he claimed it was ‘in practice a retreat from the basic principles of the market economy’ (Milward 1992: 240). In 1953, he tabled legislation to place a structural policy at the center of German agricultural policy. One element included widespread land consolidation, one consequence of which would be that hundreds of thousands of farmers would be forced to leave the sector. This proposal was rejected by the influential DBV, who had Adenauer kill the bill (Knudsen 2009: 69). The CDU/CSU party machinery was heavily dominated by agricultural interests. Adenauer, requiring the support of this contingency, came out publically in favour of income-parity though high commodity prices, rejecting the liberal proposals of his finance minister (Knudsen 2009: 67-72, 177).

Erhard, and his close advisor Müller-Armack, fared no better when the former became Chancellor in 1963. This was also the crucial period in which the future
machinery of the CAP was being deliberated. Erhard saw the discussions as heading towards ‘a maze of protectionism and EEC-level planning’. He called the design agreed to at Messina and Rome as ‘perfectionist protectionism’ – agricultural autarchy’ (Knudsen 2009: 154). The CAP, in fact, was to become a site of fraternal political warfare between Erhard and the agricultural minster, Werner Schwartz. One of Erhard’s’ first moves as Chancellor was to try and dismiss Schwartz, who he correctly viewed as very close to the ‘green wing’ of the CDU and DBV (76). The effort failed because farmers were too integral to the electoral prospects of the CDU/CSU.30

Erhard, the most prominent ordoliberal in postwar Europe, was an adamant opponent of the future CAP. He presented ‘every possible argument’ against its high prices, inevitable surpluses and inflationary implications (Milward 1992: 228). While Erhard despised the interventionist and expensive German agricultural policy, he believed a European policy would be even more destructive and move agricultural protectionism to a ‘further stage’ (Milward 1992: 306). Erhard was not the only critical voice. As Tracy demonstrates, many ‘academic’ economists were also hesitant about using high support prices and managed markets to govern agriculture, often favouring structural measures instead (Tracy 1989: 232).

It is also curious that Foucault saw in the ‘Mansholt Plan’ Eucken’s fingerprints. Sicco Mansholt may have supported limited structural reforms at the European level, as we saw with Agriculture 1980, but even this watered-down proposal was greeted with

30 Knudsen recounts how Erhard also pursued a war of ideas and statistics with Edmund Rehwinkel, the powerful head of the DBV and a personal confidant of Schwartz. Erhard told Rehwinkel that agriculture (unfairly) received more subventions than industry. He also noted that structural improvements alone should improve the efficiency of farming (248). Rehwinkel argued the numbers were misleading. He also thought Erhard was missing the point that preserving the family farm as a ‘social production unit’ was also a priority of agricultural policy (250)
hostility and rejected by the agrarian community in the end. CAP ‘structural policy’ in the end amounted to only a few rump programs for farmer retirement, disadvantaged hill producers, and young farmers (Fennel 1997: 171-94). What this showed was that any attempt to tweak the family farm model – even an indirect one pushed by a longtime supporter – would not be tolerated in the age of agricultural exceptionalism.

Foucault ultimately reads ordoliberalism in a set of strategies and programs that were never adopted. In fact, the paradigm was never even seriously considered in negotiations over the framework of the future CAP. The EC never developed an ‘agricultural framework’ that governed land, manpower, or the use of inputs. But most damning for Foucault’s interpretation is the fact that, until 1992, the CAP governed nearly exclusively through practices of price-fixing, trade suppression, and supply management. Moreover, this entire apparatus was rationalized around ‘income parity’ as a resolutely political goal. In fact, the original CAP violated nearly every important tenant of ordoliberalism.

As Foucault himself points out, ordoliberals were never ‘oriented towards the commodity and the uniform of the commodity’ (Foucault 2008: 149). Such an orientation violated the conditions of economic neutrality that should be central to governing economic competition. Acting as a monopoly purchaser, subsidizing and storing excess food when required, the Commission was functioning as a state cartel; a serious violation of ordoliberal theory. In fact, when we consider the strategies and practices from which

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31 Foucault (2008) was also handicapped by the poor job of his editors on this front (155). He never intended the lectures to be published. This is why the editors used footnotes to provide context and fill in omissions for the reader. In this instance, their work was incomplete.
the original CAP was assembled, it presented an economic tool kit of horrors from an ordoliberal perspective.

But we should not throw out the baby with the bathwater. Ordoliberalism will come to have a decisive imprint on the CAP, but not until the 1990s. With the dismantlement of the CMOs, and the consolidation of income support, the CAP is no longer ‘oriented towards the commodity and the uniform of the commodity, but towards the multiplication and differentiation of enterprises’ (149). Subsidies are no longer provided to farmers ‘against’ the market, but work to provide the conditions of possibility for realizing a competitive agricultural order. The logic of the SPS is to assist small and medium-sized farmers in confronting and adapting to market conditions, while simultaneously ending the disproportionate collection of subsidies by large and already highly-productive farmers.32

Conclusion

This chapter had two related focuses. The first was to track the emergence of a new ‘crisis’ order around CAP Policy Reform. Narratives critical of the CAP emerged from within the Commission, and from academics, economists, NGOs and progressive farm organizations. In this neoliberal moment, the policy apparatuses itself becomes the object of securitization. The logic was to responsibilize and ultimately reconfigure the internal strategies and mechanisms of the CAP.

32 Perhaps an analogy can be made with the heroin addict, who is slowly weaned from the addiction by being given smaller dose of methadone over time. In this view, the long transition from price supports to income supports (1991-2007) was like ‘financial methadone’ for the long-dependent CAP farmer (conversation with William Walters, January 2013).
Predicated on a strategy of policy autosarcophagy, the Commission would attempt to metabolize the old CAP cellular structure, and emerge with something leaner, more efficient, and better adapted to a climate of neoliberalism. The spaces of excess, waste and inefficiency targeted in the original CAP were many; with the way it governed farmer income and rural welfare coming in for the heaviest criticism. Price supports had become so expensive that, by the mid-1980s, these were being singled out as the primary cause of EU budget profligacy. The CAP had become a financial blockage to the pursuance of further integration. But perhaps as importantly, it was undermining the confidence in the Community as a competent governor. In this context, the primary mechanisms of the CAP – the expensive and production-distorting CMOs – would become a target of reform.

The new strategy for delivering CAP support was not based on shielding farmers from markets, but making them more competitive within them. It was about pushing farmers to function as ‘entrepreneurs’. A new subsidy mechanism based on standardized and regularized income supports was developed precisely for this purpose. This was how agrarian social policy (the rural welfare state) is reimagined as vitalpolitik.

A politics of austerity was also evident in CAP Policy Reform. This logics could be seen in technologies such as the ‘financial perspectives’ and ‘agricultural guidelines’. To realize the Delorsian vision of a Single Market buttressed by a Social Europe, the EC had to increase its political and budgetary legitimacy; and both were dependent on reforming the CAP. The politics of agriculture and rural economy could no longer be siloed. Rather, the CAP would have to become a tangible symbol on how Europe could take a mismanaged policy and ‘govern it better’.
As Edelman points out, the emergence of a ‘crisis’ moment provides political authorities an opportunity to re-legitimate their own right to govern: ‘The language that constructs a problem and provides an origin for it is also a rationale for vesting authority in people who claim some kind of competence’ (Edelman 1988: 20). Yes, indeed, Europe might have created a monster out of its agricultural policy, but it was also willing to claim that monster and take responsibility for its carnage (Biebuyck 2010). This helped bolster the claims of the Commission it was still the proper entity for governing the agricultural economy. The line of counter-attack also became very useful in fending off calls for re-nationalization that became prominent during the 1980s. The Commission was successfully able to brand itself as a reflexive political actor able to learn from, and remedy, its past errors.
Chapter Six

Economic Heterogeneity, Subsidiarity and a New ‘Rurality’

Introduction

CAP Policy Reform was not a monolithic process executed through a single strategy. It would comprise more than one assemblage. The assemblage to be explored in the following chapter is not about ‘reform’ in the sense of finding new strategies and mechanisms to fulfill a longstanding objective of a policy-space. Rather, this is about the opening up of a new set of problems and practices around a novel object – ‘rurality’. This assemblage will involve an ontological expansion of the very boundaries which had traditionally defined postwar agricultural policy. This will occur as rural economies come to embody, in the policy imaginary, a new reality, pedagogy and set of programs.

The birth of a rural policy in the EC/EU provides an important moment in our genealogy. When agricultural policies are first devised, ‘the rural’ was made intelligible in terms of the national food supply and the need to oversee the socioeconomic incorporation of the countryside. In postwar configurations, the rural is made visible around a deficiency of modernization, and an abundance of poverty. The element that linked the these two visions of rurality was the conflation of the rural economy with the practice of farming. For example, both held to the persistent view of the family farm as the foundation for a pacified countryside and productive rural economy.

Rural life, beginning in the late 1980s, in contrast, comes to be increasingly seen around the problem of ‘economic heterogeneity’. At the practical level, this new imaginary will entail finding local solutions to the problems of competitiveness and
economic vitality that plague particular regions and communities. The new blueprint for governing rural economies will be based on ‘subsidiarity’. This logic involves decentralizing programs and administrative competencies in ways that would responsibilize local actors and make the most of ‘indigenous’ expertise. Mansholt’s CAP was based on governing rurality according to its perceived homogenous character. CAP Policy Reform will significantly diversify and complexify this economic reality.

Rural policy reinforces the premise that economic survival for the countryside cannot come through permanent and extensive CAP commodity support. The EU, rather, will work to improve the situation of marginalized rural Europe through programs where it assumes the role of ‘enabler’ or ‘facilitator’ of development schemes that must ultimately be handed over to the regions, localities and communities themselves.

This chapter proceeds in three sections. The first section tracks the emergence of ‘rurality’ as a novel imaginary and site of economic government within the CAP. The next section probes the practices, mechanisms and organizational techniques that would make possible this new way of assembling European rurality. The third section looks closely at the mobilization of ‘community’ as an object to govern within this new policy-space. This will be done through interrogating the LEADER program – a decidedly community-led and decentralized approach to rural policy that has now been mainstreamed within the CAP.

Decentering Agriculture and Imagining a New Rurality

The discursive expansion of the rural economy is first on display in The Future of Rural Society (1988). Indicatively, the Commission states that ‘rural areas were perceived as
not only producers of agricultural commodities but also as producers of environmental and social goods’ (19). Future would also imbue ‘rural society’ with novel and unique relations and problems. The countryside was no longer homogenized as inherently familial and agricultural in its constitution. For example, the document critiqued the CMO system for its bias towards areas where intensive agriculture could flourish. From a new ‘rurality’ perspective, this was seen to substantially disadvantage southern European producers and many, smaller, non-arable farm operations (Grant 2009; Portela & Gerry 2003).

Similar to the ordoliberalization of the farmer welfare state, rural policy was assembled as a particular configuration of neoliberal government. It was not only the farm sector that was made intelligible in terms of a ‘competitive order’. So, too, were rural economies more generally being imagined as governable spaces in their own right. Each was seen to be composed of a unique sets of social, economic and human relations. The role of the EU was ultimately to foster the latent capacity of these communities by ‘partnering’ with and enabling rural actors. This presented a decisive shift in policy emphasis. The EU was now challenging a postwar model that saw farming as the terminal mode of employment in the countryside.

Problematizing Rural Economies

‘Rural Europe’ was premised on the understanding a diverse set of socioeconomic problems plagued these economies. This included admixtures of unemployment, underemployment, poverty, technological backwardness and depopulation. The original CAP, it was argued, was built for a different era of farming and rural life (Commission
By the mid-1980s, the EU was simultaneously witnessing the over-production of commodities and rapidly diverging economic fortunes between productive and non-productive rural areas. In this context, political authorities began to search out alternative policy measures to assist economic growth and reverse the trend of economic stagnation in the countryside.

The original CAP aimed to securitize rural society entirely through targeting the income of family farmers. As Gray points out, this meant conflating agriculture with rural space generally: ‘the European Community represented rurality as configuration of agriculture and rural space in which agriculture is the encompassing concept...Rural space is a function of and constituted by farming, family-based production units and a specific form of social life’ (Gray 2000: 35).

This way of seeing rural space also had distinct ‘policy effects’ in terms of the organization and functioning of the CAP (Grey 2009). Importantly, it informed the use of high price supports as a universal technique for spreading prosperity and economic stabilization across the countryside (Knudsen 2009: 165; Grey 2000: 38). As discussed, even the supposedly ‘radical’ attempts to give the CAP a structural policy did not depart from this agro-centric and familial interpretation of rural space. Mansholt’s Agriculture 1980 was not an ‘attack’ on the family farm, but a way to modernize and improve its efficiency (Bowler 1985: 54-5; Fennel 1997: 95; van der Horst 2007).¹

¹ The document states: ‘The Commission is not proposing to destroy 5 million rural lives. On the contrary. What the Commission wants is to bring some improvement to the lives of the agricultural population, which, as its leaders maintain, is lagging behind the rest of the community in the matter of income and living standards. An income similar to that earned in industry can, however, only be realized on a fully mechanized farm run along modern lines’ (Commission 1968: 19).
For Mansholt, rural space was farming space, and the rural economy was completely bounded as an agricultural economy. Moreover, this was a reality centered on the social and economic position of the family farm. By the 1980s, though, rural space was coming to be viewed as something more like a ‘territorial constellation’. It was seen to embody a variety relations, engagements, and potentialities. Pushed forward by the influential *Future* text (1988), a new model of rural governance would begin to be constructed around this vision (see also Potter & Lobley 2004; Marsden & Sonnino 2005; Böcher 2008).

The new rural imaginary directly problematized the previous conflation of rural economy and ‘productivist’ agriculture. The EU concluded that too many rural areas were unable to sustain adequate employment or economic growth on their under-capitalized farming sectors. Moreover, during this period, commodity markets were already over-supplied, and the Commission was contemplating serious price cuts to the CMOs. Pushing struggling farmers and regions further down the road of intensive agriculture was thus viewed as foolhardy. The Commission saw a clear trend:

> Generally speaking, it must be expected that fewer and fewer farms will be generating an economically and socially acceptable income from farm production alone. Furthermore, some of the land – much of it marginal – now used for agricultural production will cease to be farmed and may well be left derelict...

Similarly, some farmers and farmworkers will lose their jobs (or at any rate full-time employment). New activities and new sources of income must therefore be promoted (Commission 1988: 15-6).

The potential severity of decline across rural territory in the Community – a geography which accounts for 80% of the EC’s population – is described by the Commission as ‘a challenge without precedent’ (Commission 1988: 15). While the success of technical agriculture helped to improve the incomes of those farmers ‘who kept pace’, many others...
have been left behind (18). Furthermore, the effect of mechanization and rationalization has been to significantly lessen demand for agricultural labour and, as a result, pushed down by half the total farming population over 1965-85 (19). The Commission cites the fact that in marginal rural areas, where manpower had yet to migrate to cities en masse, part-time farming and underemployment became the norm (20-1).

For the Commission, ‘economic diversification’ became the clear answer to an agrarian centric paradigm that had failed much of rural Europe. But there were also blockages in the way of realizing this economic diversification. For example, many rural communities had ‘inferior’ employment prospects because they lacked the financial, physical, human, and infrastructural capacities of urban areas (21-22). Moreover, when public services were provided to rural areas, which was not always a guarantee, these were often ‘bottom-of-the-range’ (22).

In the early-1960s, the Commission could not have foreseen an era when a ‘diversified’ rural economy would diminish ‘the relative importance of agriculture’ (22). But if the Commission wished to remain relevant to the needs and prospects of rural economies in an era of intensified integration, it would have to help these areas in becoming competitive outside of farming. In cooperation with the regions themselves, the Commission would put forward the strategy of ‘endogenous development’ as a way for rural areas to bolster their ‘underlying fragility’ as economic realities (28).

**Decentering Agriculture in the Rural**

The ‘decentering’ of agriculture within a (still nascent) EC rural policy is a key motif of *Rural Society*. This presented a profound challenge to the earlier agro-centric reading of
the countryside. As Gray states: ‘Agriculture [now] exists within and is encompassed by rural space and society rather than the other way around, as it was in the earlier representation. This change foreshadows a major theme of the report: the decrease in the importance of agriculture in rural regions’ (Gray 2009: 29). Indeed, all other subsequent documents on the development of rural policy would re-iterate the same conclusion. The *Cork Declaration* (1996) argues that agriculture is no longer ‘predominant’ and that its ‘relative economic weight continues to decline’. Therefore, a rural development strategy for Europe must ‘address all socio-economic sectors in the countryside’ (1).

The decentering of agriculture is likewise apparent in EU texts that outline the eventual framework for the ‘second pillar’ of the CAP(Commission 1998; Council Regulation 1257 (1999). Rural policy must be ‘comprehensive’ and aim, above all else, to foster ‘vibrant and active’ rural economies that can ‘generate and maintain employment’ (Commission 1988: 3, 5). This means that many, if not most, of the new programmes should encourage ‘non-agricultural activities and services so as to reverse the trend towards the economic and social decline and depopulation of the countryside’ (1257/1999: 4). Commission texts, especially those before 1999, repeatedly circle back to this need to ‘decenter agriculture’. This would be the transformation that would make it possible to proliferate new logics of economic development.

CAP rural policy was to be ‘mapped out’ more like regional policy. That is, it would privilege logics such as fostering economic diversity, creating social synergies, forging public-private linkages (Böcher 2008; Marsden & Sonnino 2005; Potter & Lobley 2004; Rumford 2002). Instead of conflating rurality with productivist farming, the Commission imagines rurality in terms of a multitude of discrete ‘territorial’ entities
Moreover, each rural territory is imagined to comprise its own dense social and economic ecology that includes a ‘heterogeneity of activities and types of spaces’ (Gray 2000: 43).

Agricultural policy will now target economic realities beyond just the family farm.

In short, the attempt to push economic diversification in rural areas would be accompanied by a new territorial grid for making rural space (see especially Richardson 2000). The territories, most notably, would not be defined not by their similarities and common elements, but linked by their diversity and complexity:

...But the concept of rural society implies more than geographical limits ....It refers to a complex economic and social fabric made up of a wide range of activities: farming, small trades and businesses, small and medium size industries, commerce and services...For Europe, therefore, the promotion of a kind of rural development which safeguards, and in some cases restores, the essential balance of rural society has become a crucial goal (Commission 1988: 15)

Within this new rural imaginary, agriculture no longer functions as a proxy for assessing the limits and possibilities of economic viability. Rural policy will constitute a broader paradigm around governing the flows of ‘people and things’ centered in the countryside (Ray 2001: 92). The notion that rural space constitutes its own totality, rather than simply existing as an adjunct of agriculture, was a prominent theme in the *Cork Declaration* (1996). It maintained that rural was Europe ‘characterized by a unique cultural, economic and social fabric, an extraordinary patchwork of activities’ (1). The goal of rural policy

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2 While I generously utilize arguments developed by Grey (2000; 2009), my analysis also goes beyond his in key respects. This includes giving more attention to the translation of this new rural imaginary into concrete practices and programs of governing. Furthermore, Grey does not address the connections between rural policy and more general transformation in European government (for example, as this chapter does with the concept of subsidiary)
should be to address this economic complexity through a policy that is multi-disciplinary, multi-sectoral, and has ‘a clear territorial dimension’ (2).

This ‘territorial’ conceptualization of rural space was also reflected in the work of EU’s spatial planning arm; the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) (Richardson 2000). The ESDP would dismiss productivist agriculture as a universal solution for tackling the problems of ‘competitiveness’ and ‘integration’ afflicting rural Europe. Taking a holistic and contextualized view of rural economies(s) means to understand they have ‘widely divergent’ developmental histories, economic problems and prospects for prosperity (Richardson 2000: 63-4). The OECD (1990) was one of the first to take this view, arguing rural development had to constitute ‘a broad notion encompassing all important issues pertinent to the collective vitality of rural people and places’.

With rural space now proliferating into discrete territories within the policy imaginary, ‘locality’ comes to replace ‘standardization’ as the grid for governing economic relations in the countryside:

However, the diversification of the rural economies, on the basis of their indigenous potential, means that action as regards rural development must be based and devised on actual local circumstances. The basic strategies must therefore, in each case, be tailored to the particular economic and social circumstances of the relevant regions (Commission 1988: 8).

The Commission was not implying there are no general causes of ‘rural decline’. They clearly saw issues such as unemployment, under-employment, low education levels, depopulation, and rural exodus as fitting into this category. But even such general problems were understood to differ in their severity and scope across the different
regions.\textsuperscript{3} For this reason, \textit{Future} spends a multitude of pages depicting the types of problems that may emerge in specific rural regions (28-42).

Charts are used to link specific ‘problems’ to potential ‘solutions’, and ‘schemes’ for management. For example, in rural areas with a ‘low quality of life’ that effects the ability to create new industries, the solution might be found in ‘expansion of the service network’, or the ‘development of new tertiary activities where possible’ (35). The schemes for improvement might include introducing ‘preferential rates for public services’ or developing facilities for ‘rural tourism’. \textit{Future} is ultimately arguing that rural policy must focus on the myriad of economic blockages that can inhibit growth in specific territories. Moreover, these problems will now only sometimes have an agricultural dimension.

\textit{Rural Economies in the Image of Diversification and Heterogeneity}

We have now seen how the Commission decentered agriculture and introduced a territorial dimension into its vision of rurality. Moreover, this transformation had ‘effects’ at the level of policy (Grey 2009). Foremost was a broadening of what constituted the rural economy, and the concomitant introduction of new strategies for its ‘development’. The Commission did not view the potential solutions to rural decline as open-ended. Therefore, a unifying principle that linked together good rural development programs was an ability to produce employment and spread economic competitiveness across the countryside, especially outside of agriculture (Commission 1988: 8). Here rural policy becomes rationalized around an economic grid that prioritizes market dynamics.

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Future} states: ‘There is no single policy covering the variety of problems besetting those who live in the countryside’ (1988).
In order to ensure economic viability over the long-term, dependence on one or two industries should be avoided. Rather a ‘spatial distribution of economic activity’ must be encouraged (37). The Second European Conference on Rural Development re-iterates the connection between diversification and long-term economic viability: ‘the development of rural areas can no longer be based on agriculture alone, and that diversification both within and beyond the agricultural sector is indispensable in order to promote viable and sustainable rural communities’ (Salzburg Declaration 2003: 1). For the Commission, many economic problems could be solved through fostering new forms of market integration and entrepreneurialism across the countryside:

The development of this kind of rural policy is indicative of a shift away from protection and intervention towards the government of diverse rural areas, regions, and sectors...Rural areas are increasingly seen as regions with special problems...the EU has moved to both link agriculture to wider rural concerns and to apply its technologies of entrepreneurial government to greater areas. To this end rural policy incorporates strategies to enhance competitiveness and employment’ (Rumford 2002: 81).

Rural policy must address the question of how to ‘make competitive’ rural areas that have not prospered through modern agriculture. This was the conclusion reached by the first aggregation of rural ‘stakeholders’ at the Cork Conference (1996). The final product, the 

*Cork Declaration*, advocated a holistic approach to rural development. It argued that for rural areas ‘adapting to new realities and challenges’ the long-term answer cannot be permanent redistribution through the agricultural welfare state. Instead, fostering dynamic growth required finding ways of assisting communities in developing their own ‘capacity to be competitive’ (1). Unlike the vision of the rural economy as inherently

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4 The Cork Conference was a deliberative social forum sponsored by the Commission for two reasons. First, it was an important deliberative forum in the creating a blueprint for EU rural policy. Second, it was an explicit attempt to include rural civil society actors in within this new space of agricultural policy (see Garzon 2006; Grant 2009).
vulnerable and in need of assistance – an image which persevered in different forms from the period of industrialization through the postwar era – the logic articulated in *Declaration* is that rural areas already have the skills to survive and prosper, but these need to be actively brought out, or ‘empowered’.

The Cork Conference crystallized a rural development discourse (and governing strategy) that originally appeared in *Future*. Its central claim was that ‘if new life is to be breathed into’ rural territories, this would have to come through creating ‘lasting, economically justified jobs, outside the farming sector’ (Commission 1988: 8). Furthermore, these jobs cannot result from increasing farmer subsidies, or a substantial public works program in rural Europe (i.e. there was to be no ‘new deal’ for the countryside). Such a route was simply unthinkable in a period when disciplining CAP expenditure was of the highest priority. For the Commission, the path to economic viability would come in the form of mobilizing and maximizing the ‘indigenous potential’ of these local rural economies (8).

This strategy was at the crux of the new rural policy. The economic sustainability of rural communities would have to be guaranteed by local actors. The role of public authorities would be limited to ‘supporting diversification of economic and social activity…by providing the framework for self-sustaining private and community based initiatives’ (Cork 1996: 2). Ultimately, there could be no substitution for the knowledges, connections, and capacities held by actors themselves. The emphasis on generating rural economic viability from the ‘bottom-up’, would, from the very beginning, constitute an important logic of rural policy (Goodman 2004; Marsden & Sonnino 2005; Potter & Lobley 2004; Ray 2001).
Pursuing alternative sources of economic growth meant governing rural economies ‘beyond farming’. How could farmers and rural communities be re-made into ‘pluractive’ economic agents (Commission 1988; 1998)? Pluractivity was defined as undertaking more than one productive task to secure a living. For example, a farmer might have a small organic operation, while also operating a B&B that she markets to customers on the basis of her ‘traditional’ production methods. Another oft-endorsed route was to have rural areas ‘re-commodity’ their local food in ways that would appeal to consumers (e.g. through the EU sponsored origin/authenticity designations). Also readily encouraged were programs to foster ‘synergy’ between rural landscapes and various consumer markets (see especially Goodman 2004; Marsden & Sonnino 2005). For example, a good rural policy might promote rural recreation or the construction of second homes in the countryside as a way to capitalize on the beauty or unique topography of a given area.

The diversification of rural economies is also about encouraging the growth of what van der Ploeg has labeled ‘nested markets’ across the countryside (van der Ploeg 2008). Nested markets are types of ‘micro moral economies’ that configure together producers, consumers and ecologies in ways that encourage direct rather than mediated economic relations. Examples here include farm stores, CSAs, weekend markets, and agro-tourist operations. Nested markets are based on the idea these agents operate within a ‘closed loop’ that is both geographically circumscribed and environmentally sustainable. Unlike the corporate branding’ of ‘local’ or ‘environmental’ goods, nested economies resist economies of scale, and tend to be more interested in mobilizing smaller, but also more durable, ‘rural-urban’ and ‘peri-rural’ networks.
The role of the EU through the second pillar is not to ‘create’ these nested markets per se. Rather, it is to find ways to support and push forward these nested markets where they already exist. This new rurality is also based on finding and replicating successful models, most of which would have a significant non-agricultural content: ‘The move from a toothpick to a pillar in the rural development policy gave the farmers new opportunities to provide better public services and supported new activities on the countryside going beyond the farming sector’ (Fischler 2005: 11). In the next section, we open up this second pillar and its mechanisms to further inspection.

Creating a Rural Policy…and Ruralizing the CAP

The rural policy involved significant elements of political creation. The second pillar was not about taming or reconfiguring existing mechanisms of rule. There were none. Therefore, the second pillar was more about inventing a new diagram for the management of rural economies in a climate of neoliberalism. Embedded in this was also a direct critique of the ‘one-size-fits-all’ CMO system.

This strategy is given force with the Cork Declaration (1996) which openly questions the accepted postwar wisdom that the rural economy is analogous to farming. Declaration, in contrast, argues that achieving sustained prosperity will require targeting rural territories in a holistic fashion. In other words, agricultural policy needs to put into place a more general policy for promoting rural economic viability. This ‘ruralization of the CAP’ will be dependent on creating new frameworks and policies to target local problems. It will also require forms of local expertise that can generate ideas as to what type of economic diversification is possible in a given context:
Rural development policy must be multi-disciplinary in concept and multi-sectoral in application, with a clear territorial dimension...Support for diversification of economic and social activity must focus on providing the framework for self-sustaining private and community initiatives based on strengthening the role of small towns...and promoting the development of viable rural communities and renewal of villages (Cork Declaration 1996: 1).

The Second Pillar: Institutionalizing a New Site of Agro-Food Government

A rural policy is officially realized in the package of reforms associated with Agenda 2000 (Commission 1998). Rural policy will be initially allocated 10% of the CAP budget. In its first iteration, the policy operated by having member-states draw up individualized rural development plans detailing how they would target the specific problems that plaguing their rural territories (Council Regulation 1257/1999). One important logic of the second pillar was to decentralize powers over policy formulation and implementation, while simultaneously keeping all of these programs under EU supervision. As we will see further along, this will occur through the deployment of ‘subsidiarity’ as a new policy architecture.

Under the new rural development measure (1257), both farming and non-farming development schemes could be funded. Eligible programs could fall under the following headings: (1) processing and marketing of specialized foodstuffs (2) organic farming (3) afforestation efforts (4) land improvement schemes and (5) infrastructural development (6) tourist and craft markets and (7) the conservation of rural heritage (to name a few).

While member states were able to select from this wide menu of options to create their national plans, the rural policy also had elements of ‘managed devolution’. In other words, the criteria for which programs could be funded, and the ultimate approval of the

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5 For an analysis see Lowe, Buller & Ward (2002) and the contributors in Kasimis & Stathakuis (2003)
national plans, still rested with the Commission. Moreover, once in operation, all programs were subject to techniques of internal and external auditing (Council Regulation 1257/1999; CEC 2003). Another interesting feature of the second pillar concerned be its financial responsibilization of states through the ‘co-financing’. Unlike first pillar payments for commodity and income supports, which derived exclusively from the CAP budget, member-states were required to bear 50% of the costs associated with their rural development programs. By sharing the financial burden, the Commission had an insurance policy against over-spending at the domestic level.

The 2003 MTR reforms expanded rural policy by adding new measures that could be funded under the second pillar (Commission 2002). This included, most notably, animal welfare and food quality schemes. MTR also introduced the technology of ‘compulsory modulation’. As previously discussed, this involved progressively shifting funds from the first to second pillar (Commission 2003a: 12). In 2012, for example, member-states had modulated 10% of their income payments over to their rural development schemes (Commission 2007; Roederer-Rynning 2010: 192). This financial diversion will result in €78 billion being spent on encouraging competitiveness, diversification, and non-agricultural employment in rural areas over 2007-13 (Commission 2006).

Rural policy becomes further entrenched in the CAP governing structure in 2005. At this point the second pillar is streamlined around 22 measures, organized into 4 ‘axes’ to operate over the 2007-13 programming period (Commission 2006; Council Regulation 1698/2005). The first 3 axes addressed the themes of ‘competiveness’, ‘environment’ and
‘wider rural development’. The fourth axis was the LEADER program. This ‘endogenous’ rural development program had been in operation since 1991, but would now become mainstreamed (see below). The point of these changes in 2005 was to more closely integrate national development plans with common European themes. It would be possible to impose on member states a single set of programming, financing, monitoring and auditing rules.

During the current 2007-13 financial perspective, spending on rural development measures has ranged between 11.7 and 13.1 billion euros annually (Frandsen & Jørgensen 2006: 44).6 While rural spending is still ‘dwarfed’ by income supports (20% vs. 80%), even weathered CAP cynics such as Wyn Grant (2009) have acknowledged the magnitude of €78 billion being spent on non-farming pursuits over a 6 year period! Clearly there is both political will and significant political resources being put behind the new EU rural policy.

The strategic ‘axes’ for rural policy over the 2007-13 programming are centered on two problematizations: ‘employment’ and ‘competition’. Here the Commission links the logics of rural policy to those of the neoliberal ‘Lisbon strategy’ for growing employment through innovation (Commission 2005). Unlike pillar one, the Commission understands rural policy to take ‘a more strategic approach to competitiveness, job creation and innovation in rural areas...an increased focus on forward-looking investments in people, know-how and capital...and on creating more and better jobs

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through diversification’ (8). In the first axis funding is made available for measures that directly increase competitiveness; for example, programs that give start-up funds to small processors to set up ‘quality schemes’ to brand local foodstuffs. This is just one way the EU might encourage ‘dynamic entrepreneurs’ in rural communities (9-10).

Subsidiarity: Logics of Devolution and Responsibilization

Regarding its institutional architecture and organizational modalities, rural policy rejects the standard mode of policy centralization. In contrast, it conforms to the neoliberal understanding that the locales of economic government should be fragmented and dispersed across the social body. As Rose argues, this rationality is about remapping economic relations in a way that provides a fertile ground for promoting competition and entrepreneurship:

Irrespective of the accuracy with which these trends are portrayed, the economic problems of government are rethought in terms of a revised image of economic space and the means by which it can be acted upon... Government of the social in the name of the national economy gives way to government of particular zones – regions, towns, sectors, communities – in the interests of economic circuits which flow between regions and across national boundaries...This is not a politics of economic abstentionism: on the contrary, it is a politics of economic activism. Politics must intervene to create the organizational and subjective conditions for entrepreneurship’ (Rose 1999: 144)

Rural policy has utilized a specific ‘grid of intelligibility’ for parceling out economic authority and administrative competency: ‘subsidiarity’. In its general form, subsidiarity

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7 Of the four thematic axes for the 2007-13 period, only one is not linked directly to promoting economic diversity: axis 3 concerning environmental and land management.
8 Furthermore, axis three includes measures to improve the quality of life in rural areas. But its ‘overarching priority’, argues the Commission, is to create employment opportunities (11). The Commission specifically desires to support initiatives that will (1) encourage the entry of women into the rural labour force (2) develop and support micro-businesses, such as crafts and handiworks (3) encourage and support tourism and (4) upgrade local infrastructure (e.g. transport, water, energy) (11-12).
is a system of thought for devising and maintaining order based on the belief political powers should rest with the lowest-level unit who can wield those powers efficiently (Føllesdal 1998: 190). In the EU, subsidiarity is thus based on a ‘layering’ of authority across different levels as dictated by the criteria of competency and efficiency.

The Maastricht Treaty (TEU) normalized subsidiarity as the political architecture from which a quasi-federal Union could be built. Here the rationalization was that the Community can only justifiably legislate and pursue policies in areas where it has been given an exclusive competence to do so, or in those instances in which states acting alone breeds obvious inefficiencies (van Kersbergen & Verbeek 2007: 25). Subsidiarity effectively empowers the role of the EU in certain areas – such as market regulation or environmental legislation – but then places a high institutional and legal threshold to carving out additional spaces of rule. To accrue additional policy competencies, the Commission has to create a basis in law, or make strong arguments based on the inherent efficiency and proportionality of its actions (Commission 2000).

As a governing architecture, subsidiarity is not just an instrument to ‘check’ the powers of Brussels. It is also a way to visualize and ‘map-out’ political relations across a hybrid federal system that had been constitutionally mandated to respect the principles of diversity and pluralism:

The centrality of the concept was based on its suitability to serve as an axis in the struggle over the definition of power within an emerging federal polity. The effort to define subsidiarity as a political instrument discloses not merely a single concept but a range of concepts and formulations, centrally concerned with sustaining diversity. Specifically, it serves as a principle for circumscribing domains of action for public authorities, for allocating governmental powers, for defining norms of societal stewardship, and for setting the conditions of individual freedom (Holmes 2000: 105).
The articulation of subsidiarity in Catholic social thought had a major influence on postwar Christian Democratic political thought, and in turn significantly influenced the construction of EC through postwar figures such as Spinelli, Spaak and Schuman (Holmes 2000; 109; see also Ross 1995). One reason such politicians were drawn to the concept was because it provided a means to empower a supranational entity, while simultaneously avoiding the political centralization of a European ‘super-state’. From the vantage point of subsidiarity, sovereignty is never absolute. Different political authorities must ‘coordinate and secure the common purpose in symbiosis’ with different social partners and levels of government (Føllesdal 1998: 201).

The ambiguity and flexibility of the concept partly explains its adoption by the EC/EU across a range of policy domains (Van Kersbergen & Verbeek 2007). That said, its most decisive impact has been on governing economic relations. Beginning with the publication of the White Paper on European Governance (Commission 2000), the EU begins to advocate a range of solutions for increasing economic growth and competitiveness that include: (1) a less top-down approach to policy-making (2) increased dialogue with regional and local governments and (3) the wider participation of civil society in the policy-making phase.

The Commission, at one point in the White Paper, directly cites ‘proportionality and subsidiarity’ as crucial logics for executing the new model of policy-making (10). Further entrenching the principle of subsidiarity, the White Paper argues that serious reflection needs to be given to ‘the level at which action is taken (from EU to local)’.

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9 Interestingly, the Dutch Calvinists and American colonists used different logics of subsidiarity in creating their respective ‘pillar system’ and federal union of states.
Lastly, subsidiarity and governance are linked in their strong critiques of the formal top-down expertise embodied in the bureaucratized-welfare mode of government. With no central locale serving as the repository of policy-expertise, ‘the linear model of dispensing policies from above must be replaced by a virtuous circle, based on feedback, networks and involvement from policy creation to implementation at all levels’ (11).

Subsidiarity, Complexity & Locating Expertise

The problem of managing ‘complexity’ has also been crucial in the EU’s new governance agenda (Barry & Walters 2003). The postwar mentality included an extreme optimism about the role of centralized administration and the universalizability of political knowledges (Burnham 1966; Radelli 1999). A Europe of ‘complexity’ approaches expertise and governing in a more tactical and contextual way. The approach is skeptical of Weberian bureaucratic rationality and the Archimedean point from which it conducts policymaking. To govern complexity necessitates ‘pluralizing expertise’ based on practices of policy-learning and feedback (319-20). Governing complexity has natural affinities with governing through a subsidiarity architecture. The intersection is most evident in the shared belief ‘political order that is not reducible to the state, nor the market, but operates instead in terms of a space of diffuse, interacting self-organizing systems’ (Barry & Walters 2003: 319).

These imbrications would be evident in how rural policy was rationalized and designed. How can rural policy be made to address the myriad of unique and complex economic problems of the countryside? What should be the role of the CAP in devising and implementing programmes for rural territories that would allow these to be governed
as local, semi-autonomous, systems? By offering a plethora of measures, organized around four axes, the EU has explicitly rejected an exclusively agricultural solution to rural decline. If the rural has become a space of multiple interests, agent and potentialities, then rural policy must be engineered to confront and work through (not re-make) the complexity of these economic spaces.

The imprint of subsidiarity was already apparent in Future with its discussion around the need to mobilize actors below the Community level. Given the diversity of problems that afflict rural communities, Future argues, economic risk must be addressed at the ‘local’ level: ‘There is no single or specific policy covering the variety of problems besetting those who live in the countryside. Their future depends first and foremost on the country people themselves, on the local and regional authorities, and on the member states’ (31). In other words, it is necessary to govern problems from within the socioeconomic milieu that produced them. The EC, to this end, encourages the establishment of networks and ‘economic clusters’ to facilitate policy experimentation through information sharing (32, 62, 67).

Whatever programs are devised, the Community must not lead the efforts on the ground. The role of the EU should be that of an ‘enabler’; stepping in the middle of existing social and economic flows and helping push these to their productive limits. When we consider schemes such as the re-branding of local foodstuffs or the construction or tourist infrastructure in the countryside, these are not high modern solutions to universal problems. To paraphrase Barry and Walters (2003), these are ‘pragmatic’ efforts at economic re-vitalization that are foremost based on what is possible in a given territorial context:
The Commission is convinced that there is scope in many regions for further diversification of rural economies. This must be encouraged by means of coordinated and coherent action based on dialogue and partnership between all levels of public administration concerned: local, regional, national and Community...The Community has many financial instruments it can use as well as policies covering all aspects of rural society...but it must be recognised that they were sometimes badly adapted, badly coordinated and not always mutually consistent (Commission 1988: 67).

This commitment to engaging multiple political levels (states, regions and communities) is deliberately discussed as a strategy of subsidiarity in the The Cork Declaration (1996) It argues that building local capacity and sustainable community economic relations must be placed at the center of rural policy. This, in turn, will mean ‘a limitation on EU law on general rules and procedures, more subsidiarity in decisions, decentralisation of policy implementation and more flexibility overall’ (3). Furthermore, one of the oldest axioms of subsidiarity will have a direct influence on the EU’s new rural policy. This is the argument that political action must be taken at the lowest level possible in order to achieve effective results:

Whereas, given the diversity of the Community’s rural areas, rural development policy should follow the principle of subsidiarity; whereas it should therefore, be as decentralised as possible and emphasis must be on participation and a ‘bottom-up’ approach; whereas, therefore, eligibility criteria for rural development should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of rural development policy (Council Regulation 1257/1999).

The Salzburg Conference (2003) on rural development re-affirms this commitment to subsidiarity. But it also goes further and argues for realizing a fuller dialogue ‘between rural stakeholders in the drawing up and subsequent implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of programs’ (2). As Salzburg indicates, the tangible form of extending this logic will come in the mainstreaming of the LEADER program (see below).
The style of top-down expertise practiced in the postwar extension services model would no longer be the normal pedagogy in rural development. Expertise is now considered to reside within farmers and rural communities themselves. The role of the ‘expert’ is to commiserate with these local agents, and find ways to bring out their natural pluractivity. This trend, more than others, signals the rejection of the ‘narrowly conceived profit-maximizing farm’ as ‘the centre of policy debate’ (Potter & Lobley 2004: 12).

Expertise will now be constituted through practices of reflexivity and learning, rather than embody standardized technical knowledge coming from above (Ray 2001: 77). The stress is on program design and implementation at a local level, which requires active and collective policy learning and reflection between communities, regions and European institutions (Moseley 2003; Lebessis interview 2007). With the adoption of subsidiarity as a blueprint for devising rural policy, it is only logical that expertise would come to be ‘pluralised’ in the second pillar.

At a practical level, subsidiarity is apparent in how rural development programs are set-up as ‘shared competencies’ between the Commission, member-states and the regions/community targeted. For the programming period 2007-13, the structure works in the following manner (see Council Regulations 1257/1999 & 1698/2005). First, the Commission creates a menu of options from which member states can develop an overall ‘integrated’ program for rural policy. This high degree of flexibility allows member-states to tailor their programmes to address their specific problems. Co-financing might also be viewed as a technology of subsidiary, in the sense it would give states and localities a higher stake or ‘investment’ in the programs they adopted. This modality of ‘fiscal federalism’ implies that economic security becomes a joint spaces of political rule,
in terms of both its administration and budgetary outlays (on this term see, Føllesdal 1997: 205-6).

**LEADER: The Mobilization of Local Capacity**

The LEADER program presents the clearest case of subsidiarity ‘in action’ within EU rural policy. Created in 1991, LEADER was designed as a community-based, bottom-up, strategy for rural development. For the Commission, LEADER ‘marked the start of a new approach to rural development policy which is territorially based, integrative and participative’ (Commission 2000: 1). LEADER was predicated on having local communities create and implement their own development strategies. In this sense, it was not disciplined through the ‘menu’ of options for rural development plans just discussed. Furthermore, with LEADER, ‘community’ becomes the central target of programmes. LEADER, in this sense, becomes the most concrete translation of a distinctly *territorial* strategy of governing through the specific needs and capacities of rural localities.

As previously discussed, the strategy of promoting ‘indigenous’ and ‘community-based’ had, by the mid-1990s, become an established trajectory of CAP government (see also Gray 2000; Ray 2001; Moseley 2003). But, as Ray argues, LEADER pushed this logic the furthest by ‘idealizing’ the community level and focusing on small-scale or micro development projects (Ray 2001: 11, 110). As a form of ‘neo-endogenous’ rural development, LEADER was predicated on the notion that all communities possessed the ability to overcome their natural economic handicaps:

…the assumption that presently disadvantaged rural areas can take action to ameliorate their condition. Neither historical circumstances nor the revolution of globalisation need to be regarded as tyrannically consigning such areas to perpetual peripheralisation or decline...Globalisation certainly
creates ‘pressures’ for local responses but is also creates the means for local opportunism. (emphasis in original, Ray 2001: 4-5).

The Operation of Leader

The LEADER program is currently in its 4th generation (on its history see Commission 2000; 2006; Ray 2001). LEADER began in 1991 as a pilot project that operated outside the CAP architecture. The programmes were financed by a combination of EU structural monies, state and local budgets, and sometimes private philanthropy. Among practitioners of community led rural development, the first iteration of LEADER was considered a success. LEADER II was thus initiated and operated from 1994-2000. In 2000, LEADER + was born. 10 This new generation of programmes not only saw a significant expansion of LEADER’s extensivity in rural Europe, but also ‘mainstreamed’ the policy within the CAP governing structure over the 2007-13 funding period.

At an organizational level, this meant that LEADER became one of the thematic ‘axes’ of pillar two. The decision to mainstream community-led rural development was significantly influenced by the proceedings of the Salzburg Conference, which had concluded: ‘Future policy must mainstream EU support for rural areas through bottom-up local partnerships by building on lessons from the LEADER approach’ (2). With LEADER now a formal part of the CAP structure, member states are required to allocate (a minimum) of 5% of their rural policy funds to programmes run by ‘LAGS’ (Local Action Groups) (Commission 2006).

The LAG is at the center of the LEADER structure (Commission 2000; Böcher 2008; LEADER Observatory interview 2007). There are around 1000 or so community

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10 Over the 2000-06 programming period, LEADER + spent over €2.1 billion.
development projects run by LAGS. The primary responsibility of the LAG is to draw up a development strategy, often referred to as the ‘business plan’, for the particular community. A LAG must be open to participation from all citizens, with representation among political officials limited to 50%. Furthermore, the LAG is responsible for implementing its development strategy, and making all the day-to-day decisions regarding the tasks and responsibilities of the different partners.

Corresponding with the neoliberal logic of ‘competitive territoriality’\(^{11}\), the best LAGs are to be selected by the national or regional government that are in charge of managing the LEADER program.\(^{12}\) For the 2000-06 programming period, states could fund LAG schemes that corresponded to a number of ‘priority themes’, such as: (1) facilitating market access for small producers (2) deploying new technologies and in rural communities and (3) making the best use of cultural and natural resources (Commission 2000: 15). For the 2007-13 programming period, the criterion for LAGs is the same as for all other rural development projects; that is, programs must fall into one of the three aforementioned thematic axes. In this way, the post-2007 priorities of LEADER and rural policy become more indistinguishable.

*LEADER and Mobilizing Levels of Government*

LEADER mobilizes three levels of government. At the community level, the projects are devised and implemented, and the partnerships are constructed. National or regional

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\(^{11}\) In terms of rural policy specifically see Ray (2001). On competitive territoriality as a general strategy of neoliberal economics, see Harvey (2005).

\(^{12}\) Thus in centralized states such as France, the LEADER program is operated by the agricultural ministry. Whereas in Germany, the system of ‘overlapping federalism’ means the Leader program is carried out through the Länder. In the Belgian confederal political system, the Leader program was managed by the respective Flemish and Walloon regional governments.
authorities have the job of selecting LAGS, and in providing the first line of oversight in terms of how funding is spent. The Commission has the job of providing the framework for LAG eligibility, helping local actors with resources, and monitoring the costs and efficacy of the programs (see below). In mobilizing (at least) three layers of government, LEADER is an illuminating example of subsidiarity in practice in the EU: ‘In this mode, the system is structured not only by inter-local (horizontal) flows but also by centre-to-locality (vertical) flows in which the EU/European Commission and national government are important actors’ (Ray 2001: 104)

LEADER also adheres to a well-documented neoliberal logic of governing economic problems through the freedom and autonomous capacities of local actors and communities. Moreover, it does not seek to govern these problems by expanding the scope of centralized bureaucratic and administrative machineries. In its dispersion of responsibility for economic decision-making, the objectivization of ‘community’ becomes a way to break up the social plane of agro-food power and proliferate its targets of policy. Community also speaks to the neoliberal focus on localizing ‘strengths, cultures, and pathologies’ that can be made targets of economic government (Rose 1996: 331).

It is interesting that LEADER not only mobilizes pre-existing communities through the LAG, but also encourages their creation. The selection criteria of the LAG essentially requires rural territories to possess a community identity. In fact, an ability to articulate a community history is a condition for receiving funding. ‘To be a vibrant,

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13 Rose defines governing through community as follows: ‘But what begins to take shape here was a new way of demarcating a sector for government, a sector whose vectors and forces could be mobilised, enrolled, deployed in novel programmes and techniques which operated through the instrumentalization of personal allegiances and active responsibilities: government through community’ (Rose 1996: 332).
cohesive unit, the new territory needed to understand its own biography; only thus could a new territory begin to engage in affairs as a fully-functioning entity’ (Ray 2001: 115). This ‘imagining of the community’ is interesting for two reasons. First, it points to the obvious: there is no ‘community expertise’ absent a definable community. Second, it demonstrates that neoliberal rationalities are so insistent on breaking-down the social into its constituent parts that it will ‘fabricate’ these elements when necessary.

The targeting of community in LEADER is also a way to ‘download’ problems of economic risk onto the shoulders of local actors. Again, the strategy of LEADER is to provide financial and informational capital to sustain economic growth beyond the tenure of the program. Thus, the help provided to a LAG is imagined in terms of an economic catalyst, not a permanent source of income for a depressed community. In this way, LEADER is something of an anti-thesis to the sustained securitization which came through commodity support. Cheshire & Higgins (2004) note that governing ‘risk-as-local’ has become a standard feature of rural development paradigms in the Global North (see also Cheshire & Higgins 2005):

Responsible communities, one would presume, exhibit the opposite: accepting responsibility for their own problems, coordinating their efforts, visions and purposes, relying upon their own skills and resources, getting results, collaborating over resources, and learning from their mistakes’ (Cheshire & Higgins 2004: 293).

Another interesting feature of LEADER is the amount of ‘reflexive learning’ built into its governing mechanisms. The Commission never saw LEADER as just a policy to empower communities. It also doubled as a pan-European ‘laboratory’ for generating new and ‘innovative’ approaches to rural policy (Commission 2003; Salzburg Declaration 2003; see also Ray 2001; 13, 106). With a number of small-scale
experiments in operation, there would be opportunities to learn from successes and failure without investing large amounts of resources in any one given project. In this way, LEADER was also a ‘learning machine’. But as such, it was uniquely interested in learning about the pragmatic or micro ways that government could be made more austere, effective and local (Zito & Schout 2009).

Governance learning also involved the diffusion of knowledge through the LEADER Observatory. The Observatory was an arm of LEADER, privately contracted, that served as a ‘contact point’ for the LAGS. Amongst other duties, the Observatory keeps an active database of ‘best practices’ (of LAGS) with the intent to ‘disseminate experience...and hopefully learn from it’ (interview 2007). It also functions as a meeting point for LAGS that wish to engage in trans-rural cooperative programs. The development of rural ‘networks’ and ‘clusters’ has been a growing emphasis of rural policy since its original articulation in 2000.

The LEADER Observatory also publishes a Leader + magazine that is distributed to all the LAGS. This magazine is certainly intended to be a ‘symbol’ of Brussels engagement in rural affairs. But it also serves as a technology for distributing information about successful LAGS across the Community. In one issue, for example, a successful initiative for marketing ‘Casizolu’ cheese in Sardinia is described (Leader + magazine 2005a/2). In a separate issue, we learn about the positive outcomes of building new educational and recreational infrastructure in Dragsholm, Denmark (LEADER + magazine 2005b/3).

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14 The minimum for LEADER funding started as low as €1000.
15 The information about LEADER Observatory emerged from an interview with the official who ran the ‘contact point’ in Brussels. Because he/she was employed by a private company, rather than the EU, he/she asked not to be identified by name in this study (Observatory interview, 2007).
The Policy Technologies of LEADER

The LEADER program works by mobilizing communities as sites of semi-autonomous governance and ‘active’ participation among community members. In order to ensure these dynamics, LEADER utilizes two specific policy technologies. The first is the ‘contract’. For LEADER, the contract provided a way to autonomize communities, while also making them accountable for the results indicated in their original development strategies. This use of the contract in LEADER did not emerge in a political vacuum. In fact, the EU was already discussing the use of ‘tripartite contracts’ in their new governing model:

The Commission is also in favour of testing whether, while respecting the Treaty provisions, the implementation of certain EU policies could be better achieved by target-based, tripartite contracts. Such contracts should be between Member States, regions and localities designated by them for that purpose, and the Commission...The contract would provide that the designated sub-national authority in the Member States undertakes to implement identified actions in order to realize particular objectives defined in ‘primary’ legislation. (Commission 2001: 13).

LAG contracts were based on a ‘development strategy’. It detailed elements such as how the program will be carried out; where the money is spent; and who the intended beneficiaries will be. At the same time, the development strategy is also a way for the Commission to evaluate the progress of LAG (according to the criteria and goals they have devised). In this way, the contract becomes a ‘technology of accountability’ in which the LAG can be held responsible for carrying out their original mandate.

A second technology is the ‘partnership’. This is basically a political instrument to realize inclusiveness and accountability in the LAG. For example, regulations stipulate

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16 On the contract as a technology of economic government see Rose (1999: 165)
that the composition of a LAG include multiple social and economic partners, be open to all citizens, and contain (only) a few political officials with demonstrated ‘social capital’. The Commission states that a LAG should reflect ‘a balanced and representative selection of partners drawn from the different socio-economic partners in the territory concerned’ (Commission 2000: 3).

Mandating partnerships is a way to guarantee there are participatory and deliberative elements included within a LAG. Ray (2001) notes that active participation was a ‘core dynamic principle’ on which LEADER was originally founded (Ray 2001: 131). Additionally, partnerships would ensure that ‘expertise’ remained vested in local actors and strategies. LEADER, after all, was imagined as part of a rural development pedagogy that was hostile to the notion expertise was universally held by agronomists, extension agents and agricultural economists at the top of the policy food chain (Moseley 2003). The diversity of business, civil society and political interests mobilized in a LAG – indeed, that are mandated by it – provide an antithesis to the ethos of centralized planning under postwar technocracy.

Though rural policy is localized, we must not be naive about the ultimate degree of flexibility, autonomy and freedom allowed to political sub-units by the Commission. LEADER, and rural policy generally, arrive with numerous instruments of oversight, accountability and responsibilization in tow. Deans calls these ‘technologies of performance’ (Dean 1999: 168-170). For LEADER this included the use of audits, indicators, contracts, benchmarks and periodic evaluations and reports. The point here is that this ‘pluralisation’ of economic freedom also came along with new forms of
regulatory oversight (Dean 2007). Rural communities would be empowered, but also supervised.

*Hierarchy and Policy Learning in the Second Pillar*

*Agenda 2000* was clear that the ‘greater freedom granted to member states must be exercised within a framework of shared, clear and precise ground rules...based on rigorous controls’ (1998: 2). One technique used to achieve this was called ‘strategic monitoring’. It involved using a ‘common monitoring and evaluation’ to assess rural development strategies (Commission 2005: 14-5). Common ‘indicators’ were used to assess the progress of all programs. A certain obsessiveness is evident in fact reviews are conducted *ex-ante*, mid-term and *ex-post*; in other words, throughout the entire life-cycle of the program. The aggregated data on the collection of programs was published in bulky ‘synthesis reports’ (reports came out in 2003 and 2006). These reports included exhaustive breakdowns on the amount of time, money and the level of efficacy for each program that was undertaken. The Commission also gave itself the task of assessing the ‘quality’ of the data provided by national monitoring authorities (Commission 2002: 2).

There are two primary uses for this plethora of monitoring data. First, the indicators are used to reflect on how to improve rural policy for the next programming period. Second, the data is used as a basis for reducing or suspending second pillar funds based on non-compliance with financial controls (Commission 2006: 19). In the case of LEADER, the usual compliance/disciplinary mechanisms are buttressed by the use of
‘independent evaluators’ that will assess the performance of individual LAGS (Commission 2002).

As indicated by Héritier & Lehmkuhl (2011), the majority of new modes of EU governance formulated in the post-Delorsian era have been conceived ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’ (56). This means the Commission ultimately maintains the regulatory power to step in and take action when desired results fail to materialize: ‘If this should be the case, the new mode may be replaced by governmental intervention’ (Héritier & Lehmkuhl 2011: 59). In short, we should remain aware that the Commission will always discipline and responsibilize the same freedom it purports to grant in the name of ‘autonomy’.

**Conclusion**

The assembling of ‘rurality’ in the CAP takes us even further away from governing agriculture from a social perspective. Importantly, it rearticulates the relationship between rural economies, farming and agricultural policy. Similar to farmers who must now compete within an ordoliberal marketplace, rural European communities must now confront the forces of competition and place themselves on a path to sustained economic growth. Moreover, for many stagnant rural economies, this involves ending their dependence on an unprofitable agricultural sector. The Commission understands this as the new reality facing rural communities: ‘Study after study indicates that agriculture’s importance to rural development is diminishing, diminishing; in terms of income, in terms of employment, in terms of everything’ (Lebessis interview 2007).

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17 LAGs, in turn, are supposed to use the information from these reports as a basis for identifying deficiencies in their own structures, and incorporating ‘best practices’ from similar programs (see Ray 2001).
Unlike the CMO machinery that was based on providing permanent and comprehensive economic securitization, rural policy uses limited support schemes to foster the framework conditions that will sustain new markets, jobs and opportunities across depressed rural territories. In this way, the mechanisms of the second pillar are used not only to fund programs, but also to assist local actors in developing productive partnerships and mobilizing hitherto under-utilized forms of expertise (e.g. LEADER). Furthermore, financial support is only given for a limited duration of time. Local communities ultimately bear the longer-term responsibility of becoming viable in the marketplace.

Perhaps the rurality assemblage also belies the ‘fractured’ imagination of farmers and the countryside in economic discourse today. On the one hand, rural policy discourse views farmers and rural communities as ‘passive victims of external market forces’ (Potter & Lobley 2004: 10). We saw this on display in the Commission’s fatalistic insistence that most rural communities could no longer survive on farming exclusively. On the other hand, the same farmers and territories are viewed as inherently ‘adaptable’. That is, with proper doses of external assistance and internal ingenuity, even depressed economies should be able to engineer the types of economic diversification and pluractivity required for sustained economic prosperity.

Rural policy embodies a practical and architectural critique on the centralizing tendencies of postwar agro-food government. It would problematize the universalizing solutions offered in this paradigm on the account they ignored the heterogeneous nature of rural life. Moreover, the original CAP gave no effort to promote the ‘freedom’ of rural communities to take charge of their own economic futures. Similar to the ordoliberal
assemblage, the ruralization of the CAP was about banishing or refashioning the older managerial and bureaucratic techniques of agricultural policy.
Conclusion: The Histories and Futures of Agro-Food Power

Utilizing tools from historical and political sociology, this dissertation has explored the ways the food supply has constituted a foundational space of political rule in Western Europe. It did so by exploring a number of events and assemblages across a wide swath of Western Europe’s political history. In carrying out this investigation, I aimed to disrupt the commonsense around the politics of food, farming and rurality. Rather than ask specialized questions on the topic, this study demonstrated how the food supply has been imbricated with the ‘big questions’ around managing populations, regulating economies and exercising political authority.

As a genealogical study, the dissertation did not amount to a conventional history of agricultural policy. The aim was not produce yet another internalist study on CAP policymaking and the evolution of its institutions (though, admittedly, my research was dependent on such studies). Rather, this was a project was conceived as political historicism. My goal was to elucidate the sociological and practical dimensions of agricultural governance by focusing on the specific problems, strategies, objects and mechanisms of agro-food power over time.

Europe’s political modernity is normally made visible from the perspective of its industrial and urban spaces. One goal here was to provide something of an agrarian counterpart to this common historiographical tendency. How has the production and supply of food functioned as an important pivot of political power? Through what strategies and practices has agro-food power shaped the lives and labor of populations?
Agriculture and the Governmentalization of European Space

As previously discussed, the production, supply and circulation of food has been an important vector through which both the state and Europe have been ‘governmentalized’ Outside of a few illuminating studies, the importance of the food supply in histories of state formation, national economic development, and the governing of populations has generally been marginalized. Likewise, the constitutive relationship between agriculture and the emergence of postwar European government has also not been fully explored in any single study. Let us review what we have learned on these relations.

For the Absolutist State, controlling agrarian wealth and the circulation of food was a precondition for centralizing authority. But we also saw this meant different thing when governing the city compared to the countryside. In the countryside, the peasantry comprised the bodies and resources from which sovereign wealth was ‘extracted’, and from which its soldiers and functionaries were fed. The urban crowd, on the other hand, was not an object to be harnessed and controlled, but one that required pacification and appeasement. If the countryside was a place for exploiting agricultural production in order to aggrandize sovereignty, the city was a space wherein the consumption and circulation of food would need to be policed in the name of ‘good order’. Because bread riots were the surest route to political subversion and rebellion, the ‘happiness’ of the crowd, notably their sustenance needs, was the first concern of political authorities.

Chapter Two detailed how the creation of national ‘agricultural policies’ take agro-food power in a new direction, completely displacing this sovereign diagram. As a public policy based on ‘strategies of security’, agriculture policies are put to work on
problems including stabilizing the national food supply and promoting the ‘balanced’ development of national economies. As a set of practical mechanisms for governing food, farming and rurality, agricultural policies were defined by their use of techniques of economic government and the extension of social infrastructure across the countryside. Compared to the configurations of peasants and police in preindustrial Europe, agricultural policies would be based on the need to integrate a number of problems, and govern these through a unified policy apparatus.

Chapter Two concludes with a discussion on the penultimate expression of national agricultural policies in wartime Europe. With the intensification of agricultural governance in the Second World War, ‘food security’ will come to include a multitude of strategies including the nationalization of agricultural production, the rationing of foodstuffs, and mobilization of agro-imperial networks. To conclude, Chapters One and Two canvassed the important relays between agro-food power and the state, demonstrating how the two embodied a dynamic and eventful history. At the same time, the bulk of empirical work within this dissertation was not focused on state configurations, but ‘assemblages’ of European government.

Reviewing the Strategic Imbrications of European, Government and Agriculture

Chapter Three located the role of agricultural governance in transforming Europe from a space of geopolitical antagonisms to one of ‘functional’ cooperation. With the OEEC, we saw how problems around nutritional health and deficient agricultural productivity were rendered intelligible as a collective problems with international solutions. This early regional agricultural assemblage had a twofold significance for our genealogy. First, it
was a crucial site in which the geopolitical and geoeconomic logics that had previously conjoined state power with the food supply were displaced by forms of functional and technocratic regional cooperation. Second, the OEEC and FAC was a repository of unique knowledges, practices and visibilities that would constitute it as an agrarian ‘learning machine’ for postwar Europe.

Chapter Four explored how the original CAP ‘Europeanized’ agrarian political economy and extended the welfare state across rural Europe. The chapter explored how the CAP, and its forms of economic government, were created to ensure prosperity for millions of rural Europeans. As a unique configuration of social liberalism and ‘managerial political economy’, Mansholt and other CAP planners tried to realize ‘income parity’ between farmers and industrial workers, and make this an explicit political goal of Europeanization itself. Moreover, the ‘family farm’ was the object targeted in this new political economy. Imagined as both a production unit and cultural form, the family farm comprised a totalizing image of rural society in the discourse of the European Commission through the 1950s, 60s and 70s.

Chapter Five explored CAP Policy Reform in terms of how it introduced strategies of reflexivity and ordoliberalism into the CAP. This assemblage reconsidered the relationship between farmers, markets and the (post-SEA) EU. In the new CAP political economy, farmers are imagined as ‘business managers’, as economic agents that must produce for, and prosper within, competitive markets. This presented a clear departure from the previous assemblage in which farmers (and their incomes) were governed through systemic market intervention and political planning. To borrow a phrase from Foucault, agrarian political economy would no longer work ‘on the
commodity’ as it had since the 1930s. The new strategy of welfare (or *vitalpolitik*) was to provide farmers an income floor – in the form of a standardized single annual payment – while simultaneously pushing them to become ‘entrepreneurs’ who no longer required commodity supports.

In order to understand the political context that provided the conditions for CAP Reform, this chapter also explored the narrative construction of the CAP as a policy ‘in-crisis’. Over the 1980s and 1990s, CAP was discursively normalized as policy of waste, inequity, and corruption. Mine was the first study to track the emergence and tactical iterations of the ‘crisis’ discursive formation that takes root in European agricultural governance. Moreover, this discursive formation becomes so pervasive and intense that it eventually renders the CAP an ‘ungovernable’ policy which threatens the economic and political foundations of the entire European project.

Chapter Six explored the creation of an EU rural policy. This strategy not only comprised a new dimension of governing practices and programs in agricultural governance, but also put forth new ways of imagining rurality as socioeconomic space. The conflation of rural society and farming will become dislodged beginning in the 1980s. In its place, a more complex understanding of rurality as heterogenous economic space, hybridity and potentiality is offered. This new imaginary also presents a new role for the Commission *vis-a-vis* rural society. The EU would now directly target rural communities themselves, not indirectly govern them through universal commodity support schemes. The CAP would now be an instrument to facilitate rural regions and communities in their quest to craft unique solutions to decidedly local economic
problems. To conclude, agricultural governance in Europe had become increasingly resposnibilized, localized and market-oriented.

_Governing the Food Supply as Political Practice_

Another contribution of this project was to elucidate how agricultural governance has been assembled through an array of administrative, infrastructural, economic and organizational mechanisms. It is only through practices and materials that agro-food strategies are ultimately be translated into concrete modalities of political rule. This emphasis on the _how_ agro-food power operates was doggedly pursued from the first chapter onward, beginning with the discussion of bread and order that provided a historical pivot for the dissertation.

Within the Absolutist State, the countryside was governed through extractive mechanisms which allowed sovereign authorities to pull wealth and sustenance from the countryside, from the peasantry. The practices for governing the peasantry had a diverse character. Some utilized outright violence, such as when requisitioning food for a military grain magazine. Others yet operated in the zone of administrative liminality and extra-legality, such as country buying. Some other practices resembled formalized inequalities in which all financial burdens were simply circulated downward to the peasantry. The ‘hide tax’ and _taille_ both fit this category.

Urban crowds, in contrast to peasants, were governed through practices that sought to keep them happy and satiated. Through an intricate organization and disciplining of the marketplace, the bread police imposed a calculative supervision over all the economic transactions that occurred within the marketplace and concerned the sale
and purchase of flour and bread. This included regulating the amounts being sold to certain classes of individual, and the order in which these sales were conducted (Which was in addition to regulating the weights, measures and compositions of different breads)
Policing also included the governing of particular relationships – such as those between consumers and bakers, or merchants and millers – seen as integral to the general sustenance, and thus political order.

National agricultural policies were distinctive in the sense of breaking from the above configurations and introducing mechanisms that worked towards the security of the entire population. Technologies of ‘national political economy’ – such as tariffs, sanitary regulations and import certificates – were used to govern the realities of agrarian production, trade, supply and income, as well as to develop the ‘rural economy’ as one half of the ‘national economy’. Agricultural policies also involved extending a wide range of ‘social infrastructures’ – such as schools in the countryside, new road networks, farmer co-operatives, and rural banks. The logic behind this infrastructural expansion was to incorporate the peasantry within the social and economic life of the nation. Lastly, we also explored how national agricultural policies were intensified as a result of the World Wars. Particular attention was given to the practices of ‘agricultural imperialism’ and the modalities (and knowledges) of rationing.

In the case of the OEEC assemblage, we were drawn to how technologies such as the ‘food balance sheet’ and ‘country report’ made visible new problems and relations that conjoined the needs of the population with the realities of the food supply. When considering the significance of OEEC’s work, we are drawn to how its statistics, maps, studies and reports allowed it to represent and inscribe the food supply as European.
Moreover, practices such as tracking the caloric intake of postwar populations also demonstrated the tangibility of agricultural government as a space from which European government could be built, and European populations imagined as totalities.

The important mechanism explored in Chapter Four were the CMO regimes. As a form of ‘managerial’ political economy, CMOs involved the annual fixing of prices for all major commodities produced in the EC (especially cereals, dairy, meat and sugar). Of course, setting the initial price was only the beginning of a CMO. A number of additional techniques were then required to insulate the European price from the depressing effects of lower global prices (protecting the internal CMO price). These techniques included commodity support payments, variable import levies, export refunds, and ‘green rate’ conversions. As a regime of economic government, the CMO came to be derided and mocked for its labyrinth complexity. While there is a certain ideological truth in this story, the CMOs, in a more fundamental way, must also be seen as the technical underpinnings of the rural welfare state in postwar Europe.

Chapter Five explored two sites of practice through which this managerial economy is first eroded, and then later dismantled. The first included a set of disciplinary technologies which attempted to chisel away at the production surpluses and egregious budget overruns which had become commonplace in the CAP by the early-1980s. While not very effective in in bringing down CAP costs, these technologies were successful in making intelligible and governable the link between CAP spending and the EU budget – a priority of Delors during his transformative tenure at the head of the Commission.
The second regime, and the more consequential of the two, involved a set of practices for ‘ordoliberalizing’ Europe’s agrarian economy. What began as a series of direct payments to compensate farmers for commodity price-cuts eventually morphs into a comprehensive and standardized system of income support that is completely divorced from production levels. This is the SPS payment. This new subsidy mechanism will govern farmers in the image of an ‘entrepreneur’, and the farming sector as a ‘competitive order’.

Chapter Six elaborated on the mechanisms that made it possible to govern a new ‘rurality’ in the CAP. In fact, the new ‘second pillar’ of the CAP would put into operation a new governing architecture based on subsidiary rather than hierarchy. Furthermore, through the use of ‘national envelopes’, member-states could now work directly with rural regions to create programs that addressed whatever unique problems they had related to competitiveness or achieving greater economic growth. But it is ultimately with the LEADER program that we encounter the clearest example of practices oriented toward the mobilization of ‘indigenous’ rural networks and other solutions to the realities of ‘economic heterogeneity’ in the countryside. LEADER thus becomes a pivotal subset of EU rural policy that encourages micro-developmental practices and locally derived strategies to promote rural economic dynamism and employment.

To conclude, my study has investigated the mechanisms and materials of agro-food power in Western Europe. As Veyne (1997) reminds us, it is in practice where the transformations of political life are best discerned.
For this project, a genealogical style of inquiry was used to make intelligible different mutations of agro-food power up to the present. But does the approach also allow us to assess political futures? I believe it does, and even encourages us to do so in the sense it places significance on contingency, appropriation and hybridity (Foucault 1977; Brown 2001; Walters 2012). In other words, while the genealogical style rejects forms of teleological and developmental reasoning, it does encourage us to trace the lines of ‘becoming’ etched in the utterances and practices of the present (Deleuze 1988). While maintaining a certain dose of modesty and circumspection, I now attempt to prognosticate on where the future(s) of agricultural governance may be headed.

My first assumption is that there will be a continued intensification of the ordoliberal and rurality strategies covered in Chapters Five and Six. Moreover, these two strategies are likely to become increasingly intertwined through the logics of competitiveness, economic heterogeneity, and market-making in the countryside. This common trajectory is evident in the recently published Partnership Between Europe and Farmers, (Commission 2012). In setting the tenor for the next reform, Partnership suggests that the Commission’s ultimate dream would be to govern farmers and rural communities through a single policy instrument predicated on manufacturing internal and external ‘competitiveness’.

In terms of pushing these ordoliberal logics further, Partnership provides new proposals for optimizing agricultural markets so new entrants and less-well capitalized farmers can also compete. In the first place, the market framework must be improved in
order to help ‘young people to get started in farming with funds to buy land, machinery, and equipment’ (6). For young farming families particularly, better public services are needed in the areas of health care and education (11). Improvements in this type of social infrastructure will keep young families living, working and contributing to economic development in rural areas. Furthermore, the Commission singles out the ‘economic dynamism’ of smaller farmers as a target for future programs. There is a particular need to ‘strengthen their bargaining position vis-à-vis other players in the food chain’ (13). To this end, the Commission provides a list of potential solutions including co-operative producer arrangements, specialized organic production, and mutual insurance schemes to protect farmers who grew a specific commodity from ‘market instability or fast-falling prices’ in those markets (13).

In Partnership, the Commission is imagining new strategies for how to proliferate marketization and competition across the farming and rural economies. The role of the CAP is to construct and uphold such a framework, devising new programs and cooperative endeavors that will help this economic order function better, and in a ‘fairer’ way for all stakeholders. What is not evident in this policy imaginary is any legitimacy to the idea the CAP should return to fully regulated commodity markets and extensive production support.

Due to page limitations, I was unable to explore all of the contemporary assemblages of agricultural governance. One important one I was unable to explore concerns the governing of ecological health through agricultural policy. Beginning in the 1980s, the consequences of high modern farming began to constitute a central risk discourse in CAP policymaking (Lynggaard 2006). From these concerns – and due to the
BSE and dioxin scandals that came to public attention in the 1980s – a new dimension of ‘agri-environmentalism’ has opened up within the CAP.¹

This strategy was first articulated in the 1985 Green Paper that connected intensive agricultural practice to the degradation of wetland ecosystems and the extinction of valuable flora and fauna (50). Agenda 2000 was even harsher in assessing the ecological consequences of European agricultural policy, arguing the CAP was a policy that ‘pollutes’, ‘fails in the protection of the environment’ and is ‘complicit in the spread of animal diseases’ (Commission 1998b: 3). In the MTR (2002) a commitment is made to cross-pollinate agricultural policy with the sustainable development agenda agreed to at the Göteborg Council of 2001 (5).² This meant that all CAP policies would have to evaluated according to their sustainability criteria.

The EU has also been intent on accumulating ‘eco-knowledge’ for the purposes of better regulating farming ecologies. One mechanism for doing this has been IRENA, a mandate of the Vienna European Council (1998). IRENA has been in full operation for about a decade.³ Its job has been to collect, aggregate and analyze data on a range of ‘indicators’ that denote particular relations between ecology and agriculture. The indicators measure things such as ‘nutrients in rivers’, ‘agricultural intensity’, and ‘agricultural eco-efficiency’. Digital maps are used to shade in various degrees of pollution, desertification and land degradation across geographies the European countryside. What emerges from the collection of maps, reports, indicators and

¹ The nifty neologism comes from Commission itself (Commission 2005c).
² The Health Check further insists that more must be done ‘head off the risks to environmental degradation’ (Commission 2007: 2).
assessments is a dense regime of intelligibility that establishes quantitative relations farming practice and agricultural ecology.

Since 2003, the relations between agriculture and ecological health have been primarily governed through modalities of ‘regulatory politics’. This is a style of political-administrative governance based on the making and enforcing of rules (Caporaso 1996). As a transnational polity whose primary task is to enforce a market-order, the EU has become very dependent on utilizing the regulatory style (Barry 1993; Majone 1996).

There is a specific technique of ‘horizontal regulation’ that is now used to govern Europeans farmers in relation to the environment. Horizontal regulation essentially involves using rules developed in one policy domain and making these obligatory in another policy domain. In our case, horizontal regulation has materialized in the form of ‘cross-compliance’; that is, taking existing environmental law and making it applicable on farmers and the agricultural sector.

The ‘stick’ of cross-compliance is a suspension of SPS payments when farmers fail to respect the statutory environmental requirements. After 2003, Bianchi (2007) notes that: ‘The new regulation stipulates that any farmer receiving direct payments shall respect some statutory management requirements, according to a timetable for their introduction and the good agricultural and environment conditions established’. In effect, cross-compliance presents a form of regulatory power through which the ‘ecological

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4 The history of environmental measures in the CAP began with the use of ‘accompanying measures’ that came as part of the MacSharry Reform package (regulation 20782). At this point, environmentally friendly farming practices were not mandated, but were eligible for compensation through EU co-funding schemes (Buller 2000).
Towards ‘Polyfunctionality’?

We can now circle back and address the question formulated at the beginning of the section: As an apparatus of security, what is the future of agricultural policy? One illuminating answer can be found in the words of Commissioner Fischler. In a talk he gave to the IPC ⁵, Fischler used the opportunity to defend his CAP reforms, as well as point to a future direction for agricultural governance. His overriding claim was that agricultural policy must pursue a proper ‘balance’ of elements and goals. This will also involve pushing the CAP framework into new areas, some of which do not involve economic government at all:

What has changed? Firstly – the balance. Previously a policy that tipped the scales heavily in favour of pure economic objectives, today’s CAP is one in which the economic, environmental, and social impact all way weigh in equally important…Support has been decoupled from production levels and tied, instead, to maintaining mandatory environmental, food safety, and animal welfare requirements (Fischler 2005: 4).

In his Security, Territory, Population lectures, Foucault (2007) uses the example of a ‘good street’ to explore the essential logic of security. What is a good street? The answer is that a good street must be designed and organized to do many things (19-20). It must be constructed to minimize the spread of disease, while intensifying commerce and the circulation of goods. At the same time, the mobility of thieves and rioters will need to be blocked, or at least corralled, through the design of the street. In short, a ‘good street’ needs to govern a multitude of problems, and all the solutions all must be built ‘into the

⁵ Stands for International Food and Agricultural Policy Trade Council
plan’ (20). Foucault labels this condition ‘poly-functionality’ and argues that it underpins regimes of security (19-20).

I want to suggest that agricultural governance has become increasingly defined by its poly-functionality. A ‘good agricultural policy’ needs to do many things. It must guarantee the food security of populations and the welfare of farmers. But moreover, it must also govern markets, budgets, rural communities, and agro-ecologies in ways that would have been unimaginable in the 1950s. The politics of agriculture is certain to remain ‘burningly political’ (to quote again Commissioner Hallstein). But what this politics will involve, as we move into the future, still remains an open question.
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