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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS REÇUE
EMBOURGOISEMENT AND CLASS
STRATIFICATION

by

Graham Knight, B.A., M.A.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario

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ABSTRACT

The discussion contained in the pages which follow moves simultaneously on two levels. At the more general, abstract level the thesis addresses the subject of class stratification in modern, industrial capitalist society, and revolves around the 'debate on social class'--the forms, consequences, and prospects for this mode of social inequality. At the more specific level the discussion focuses directly on the thesis of embourgeoisement, and more indirectly on the companion perspectives of proletarianisation and class convergence. At this level the discussion consists primarily of an empirical examination of the evidence for and against the proposition that as working-class families and individuals have become more affluent, educated, and mobile during the post-war period, so they have become increasingly assimilated culturally into the ranks of the middle-class.

The empirical analysis itself has a double character: On the one hand we have reviewed the existing literature on economic, occupational, and socio-cultural differences and similarities between blue- and white-collar workers and their families. This review, in turn, has been used as a benchmark against which to compare the findings revealed by Canadian survey data from 1968. Both the review of existing literature and the Canadian data indicate that support for the thesis
of embourgeoisement is weak and uneven. At the same time, data on life-style patterns from the Canadian survey indicate considerable homogeneity in many respects between managers, foremen, skilled, and semi-skilled workers. This has been interpreted theoretically as indicative of partial class convergence. Both embourgeoisement and proletarianisation were ruled out on the grounds that they are too simplistic and one-sided. The data reveal that both the blue-collar and the white-collar respondents depart in a number of ways from the conventional images of working- and middle-class life.

The thesis is concluded with a brief discussion of the theoretical implications of the disjunction of class situation and life-style in light of the theory of post-industrial society.
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CHAPTER I

CLASS STRATIFICATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE:
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

It may by now have become something of a truism to characterise the post-war period in western society—the advanced industrialised capitalist societies of Western Europe, North America, and Japan— as an era of unprecedented growth and expansion. We are now only too well aware of what distinguishes our society from that of which Spencer and Marx wrote. Part of this change, and part of our increased awareness of it, stems from the growth of institutionalised education and the expansion of rational self-inquiry which has accompanied it. We do not need to be reminded that subjects like socioplogy did not, as such, inhabit the institutions of Victorian academia, yet form a prominent feature of the university curriculum today.

Such intellectual endeavours as sociology are more than a part of modern society in the merely historical sense. Sociology is a reflection of the wider society which contains and sustains it in the sense that it is differentiated and diversified. This extends beyond the level of subject matter to the level of theory and ideology. The ironic twist to sociology (and, for that matter, to political science,
economics, etc.) is that while it reflects part of the attempt to understand the nature of modern society and delimit its problems, the structural bases for agreement and consensus which characterised the early theologies have now been eroded. The paradox of rationalism is that it has stimulated the search for self-knowledge, yet eliminated the possibility of one single reality or truth. In consequence, we have not one, but many sociologies; not one theory of society but many diverse, inconsistent, contradictory theories. We inhabit a world of intellectual pluralism where even truth, it seems, cannot escape the bounds of its own social context.

As we must confront not theory, but theories, we must take precautions to avoid the temptations of intellectual greed. This can be accomplished most successfully, only when the reviewer makes clear to himself and to his reader the problems and issues which dictate the guidelines for selection. Only in this way can a review avoid appearing as a confused attempt to cover everything, or as a perfunctory exercise in academic gamesmanship. The first thing we must make clear, then, is that this thesis concerns the subject of social class. More specifically it is concerned with the changes and continuities in both the structure and culture of class stratification in post-war western society, and in Canada in particular. More specifically still, it is concerned primarily with what has come to be called the thesis of embourgeoisement, the hypothesis that as the
working-class are increasingly incorporated into middle-class society so far as their economic and occupational situation is concerned, so they will increasingly adopt more characteristically middle-class styles of life in the various 'arenas' of social life outside the labour market and the workplace.

To examine this hypothesis, which we shall do empirically in the latter part of the thesis, we need first to elaborate the historical, theoretical, and methodological contexts which such a research task necessitates. The first two of these--the history and theory behind the thesis of embourgeoisement--will be the subject of the remainder of this chapter. The methodological problems will be ironed out in the three chapters which follow.

**Historical Context: The Nature of Modernism**

For writers like Weber and Sombart, the distinctiveness of modern society derived from its rationality, from the unending search for better, more efficient, more productive ways to achieve our goals, and the perpetual process of change which follows from this. Purposive changes, however, inevitably beget unintended consequences, and the analysis of these has become an established part of sociological inquiry. Changes in technology, for example, have given rise to a wide range of 'unintended' consequences which have helped re-structure the labour force, the occupational
structure, and subsequently the structure of class stratification. For example: the growth of ostensibly white-collar labour, the acceleration of occupational mobility, the expansion of consumer credit and the institutionalisation of a "mass consumer" market for goods and services, the growth of class abatement policies in the form of greater state welfare benefits, and so on. All these changes, however, are themselves part of a broader system of change, which, to use a graphic metaphor, spirals upward and outward at the same time. These examples, then, are surface changes which emanate from deeper structural developments. In the matter of the stratification system, four such developments are especially significant: the differentiation of capital, the bureaucratisation of work organisation, the institutionalisation of science and its incorporation into the institutional order in the form of productive (and destructive) technology, and the expansion and formal democratisation of institutionalised education.

The major change in the nature of property institutions concerns what Ralph Dahrendorf (1959) has termed the "decomposition of capital": the differentiation of industrial and financial capitalism, and the much debated separation of ownership and control. The paradigmatic unit of economic organisation during the early, formative stages of industrial capitalism was the relatively small scale private firm or enterprise, owned and operated by the entrepreneur.
and his family, and directly responsible for accumulating its own investment capital through the maximisation of short-term profits. This usually operated in a market situation composed of other similar units, acting along lines approximating the ideal form of perfect competition: no single firm was sufficiently large and powerful to alter appreciably the market mechanisms of supply and demand by its own actions alone.

This situation of 'anarchic egalitarianism' has, however, proven to be far from static: a tendency has developed in the direction of increasing concentration, and centralisation of economic resources, resulting in the emergence of oligopolistic and monopolistic commodity and service markets frequently dominated by giant 'multi-national' corporate conglomerates. In these large corporations the functions of ownership and control have to some extent become differentiated, and the latter increasing subject to the bureaucratic mode of organisation. At the same time, there has also emerged a differentiation of industrial and financial structures with the establishment and development of a large scale banking, insurance, and credit network. This points, in turn, to the growth of a full scale credit market, initially concerned with investment credit, but in the post-war period also expanding into the field of
consumer credit. ¹

We should exercise caution, however, in celebrating what James Burnham christened the 'managerial revolution'. While it is undoubtedly true that property ownership has become more diffused through the institutionalisation of the 'joint stock company', it nevertheless remains the case that for the most part this process of diffusion has hardly reached the proportions of a 'people's capitalism'--a nation of small more or less equal shareholders. Indeed, one can make a strong argument in favour of the thesis that stock diffusion enables control to pass more easily into the hands of a minority, but well organised shareholder. As Clement has pointed out:

It would be mistaken to assume, however, that the separation of ownership and control means the separation of all ownership from control. What this means is minority ownership, as low as five per cent or even less, is able to control wealth many times its actual value if the remainder of stock is widely dispersed. (1975:15)

¹ The structure and functioning of the credit market has largely been ignored by sociologists, even those concerned with the analysis of the distributive system. The importance of consumer credit as a feature of that system has grown steadily since the war. For example, Mandel gives figures which indicate that the ratio of private household debts to total disposable household income in the U.S. has risen from 19.6% in 1946 to 93% by 1974. Cf. E. Mandel, "The Industrial Cycle in Late Capitalism", New Left Review, 90, 1975. Data on consumer credit in Canada can be found in D.A. Porter, Report of the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance, Ottawa, 1964. The Porter Commission found that those who used consumer credit most were those in lower income occupations--labourers, semi-skilled and skilled manual workers followed by those in clerical work--yet who were steadily employed. Clearly, from the point of view of "conspicuous consumption" and the 'status situation', consumer credit is an important device enabling the "apparent" homogenisation of working- and middle-class styles of life.
These reservations notwithstanding, it is clear that the decomposition of capital, in both senses, has had important ramifications for the class structure. These lie not so much in the redistribution of productive property as in the changes to the division of labour and the occupational structure, and in the nature of ideology and legitimation. In the second case, the bureaucratic giantism and complexity of the modern corporate mode of organisation can be seen to have rendered the exploitative and inequalitarian character of industrial capitalism less transparent. Gone are the conspicuous rich families, the robber barons and tycoons whose main if not sole motive was to accumulate wealth as much as possible, as quickly as possible—'I owe the public nothing' J. P. Morgan was once reputed to have declared—to be replaced by anonymous 'organisation men', the professionals, executives, technocrats, and managers, themselves often 'propertyless' (at least those lower in the hierarchy), their commitment to the organisation contingent upon the satisfaction of career aspirations and (theoretically) the vagaries of the labour market, and their ideology derived from an image of the corporation as 'socially responsible' and a self-image of dedication to the public welfare.

But clearly more significant than this are the effects the decomposition of capital has had on the second basis of class inequality, the occupational structure. Strictly speaking perhaps, the changes in the occupational
structure are not so much a direct function of the decomposition of capital as the subsequent process of bureaucratisation attendant upon it. Whatever the cause, the consequence is clear-cut: the creation of new non-manual professional, technical, managerial, and clerical occupations to staff what Siegfried has dubbed the "administrative age". This growth of white-collar, non-manual labour reflects the structural shift occurring in the western economies away from the secondary, goods producing sector to the tertiary, service producing one.

In addition to the decomposition of capital and increasing bureaucratisation of organisation and administration, the sectoral transformation most modern societies are undergoing (particularly the United States and Canada) is also the result of the expansion of institutionalised science and its incorporation into the established socio-economic order in the form of productive technology. As in the case of decomposition and bureaucratisation, the growth of science and its increasing significance to our system of mechanised production were developments Marx clearly anticipated, though whether he fully appreciated their far-reaching implications is a matter of some contention. Indeed, science has now become so critical to the maintenance of our civilisation that it has, as Habermas (1972) has pointed out, become self-rationalising, giving rise to an ideology of 'scientism' which has pervaded such areas of human endeavour as politics, social control, administration, introducing to
them the language, and promise, of certainty and control.

Science too has been diverse and far-reaching in its effects upon human institutions and cultural beliefs. It is at once evident that science has made a crucial contribution to the more or less continuous technological development experienced in all industrial societies, which has, in turn, allowed us to enjoy almost uninterrupted increases in our levels of economic productivity and standard of living, thus bringing a wider and wider range of consumer goods and services within the financial grasp of larger and larger sectors of the population. Though the size of the slices of the economic pie relative to each other has changed only negligibly over time, the overall size of the pie has unquestionably increased; the modern societies have experienced a more or less continuous growth of real income, and one which has been distributed over all social classes. The perennial fight for daily subsistence which confronted so much of the working-class when Engels wrote The Condition of

The Working-Class has now largely disappeared. At the same time, however, the direction which much technological change has taken has been to routinize work roles further, often, as in the case of semi- and unskilled manual work and low level clerical work, to the level of monotonous repetition in which the individual is reduced to the status of an appendage to the machine with little or no opportunity to exercise control over either the technical or social organisation of his/her work setting. The numerous studies of
auto assembly-line workers stand as adequate testimony to the dehumanising and alienating effects of rationalized technology. To couch it in more Marxist terms, while alleviating the contradiction of immiseration, industrial technology seems, at least for some sectors of the labour force, to have exacerbated that of alienation. Yet one large sector of the labour force which has traditionally been confronted with the deleterious effects of technological change—the semi-skilled, blue-collar machine operative—is now showing signs of demise. While the relative increase in so-called white-collar workers in the labour force has been, at least in the North American context, largely at the expense (statistically) of the decline of those in primary industries (agriculture, mining, forestry, fisheries, etc.), the grouping composed of crafts and production workers (blue-collarites) is now beginning to contract slightly. In Canada, this decline is actually a decline of female participation in these occupations, male participation having increased very marginally between 1951 and 1971.  

Nevertheless, these slight changes have been heralded by some as the incipient disappearance of the traditional

2. In 1951, 26.2% of the male labour force in Canada were employed in 'crafts and manufacturing' occupations as opposed to 15.9% of the female labour force. By 1971, these respective figures were 31% and 10.2%. See Statistics Canada, Perspectives Canada, Ottawa, 1974, p. 125.
working-class. This theory has been argued quite forcefully by Daniel Bell (1973) in his recent treatise on the post-industrialism; the implications are quite clear: even if the working-class is not disappearing because of affluence, mobility, or education, it is destined to wither away demographically!

But, again, we must exercise some caution in drawing hard and fast conclusions from the interpretation of present trends. Though it is true, as Bell asserts, that the fastest growing grouping in the occupational structure is that consisting of professional and technical workers, it is, however, quite another thing to argue that at the present rate of expansion that grouping will be the largest in the labour force by the turn of the century. On the basis of this kind of reasoning a perusal of labour force statistics for Great Britain between 1820 and 1850 would naturally lead us to conclude that the whole of the country would be factory workers by the year 1900! Secondly, the growth of the professional and technical labour force seems to be characteristic of the North American labour markets, and is not as evident a feature of labour force changes in western Europe. Thirdly, the categories used in official statistics

are often sociologically crude; in the professional/technical category are included school teachers and laboratory assistants as well as doctors, academics, and scientists. Fourthly, the growth of routine clerical and sales occupations is strongly related to the increasing participation of women in the labour force. In Canada these occupational groups have become increasingly feminised during the post-war period, to the point where, in 1971, women constituted over 70% of the clerical labour force. Many of these women are married (indeed the increased participation of women in the labour force is now among married women, the participation rate for single females having stabilised); and many of them are married to working-class, blue-collar husbands. Finally, the so-called white-collar revolution is partly the product of rather distorted classifications. As Levison (1974:22-23) has pointed out, many of the workers who are classified as white-collar are in fact in 'service' occupations. Most of these are in relatively low skilled, semi-skilled manual service jobs such as janitors, waiters and waitresses, short-order cooks, mailmen, bus and taxi drivers, maintenance men, and so on. While, no doubt, the work situations of many of these occupations is typically more favourable than those enjoyed by the traditional blue-collar

4. In Canada, for example, the participation rate for married women doubled between 1951 and 1971 from 17% to 34%. See Statistics Canada, Perspectives Canada, Ottawa, 1974, p. 120.
it nevertheless remains the case that the work is relatively routine, requires only moderate levels of skill, and is usually associated with a market situation comparable to, if not in fact inferior to that of the industrial manual worker. Bearing these reservations in mind, then it is clear that if we define the working-class/middle-class division in terms of the manual/non-manual distinction, rather than the more confusing blue-/white-collar one, the working-class is hardly threatened by demographic extinction. To repeat once more, the relative growth of the non-manual sector of the labour force has come in North America, and particularly in Canada in the last three decades, at the expense of the primary not the secondary sector.

The changes with which we must deal do not, however, concern only the structure of class stratification, but relate also to the process by means of which people are recruited to it, and mobile within it. In this regard, the most prominent change is of course the formal or legal democratisation of educational opportunity. Under the influence of the 'human capital' theories popular in the fifties, many of the modern societies undertook a more or less rapid expansion of educational facilities in the (mistaken) belief that this was the best and easiest (if not exactly the cheapest) way to ensure continued economic growth and prosperity. Although this expansion is probably more accurately viewed as a consumption rather than produc-
tion of wealth, one of the effects was to open up to some extent access to the higher reaches of the class structure for those from upper working-class and lower middle-class backgrounds. At the same time, it must also be borne in mind that strong, deep-rooted barriers to educational attainment still persist in western society, meritocratic ideologies notwithstanding; sex, ethnic and racial origin, and social class background—the social class of one's family of 'orientation'—still have a significant biasing effect on passage through the various stages of the educational system and entry into the labour force. Yet allowing for the persistence of these distorting influences, it does seem to be the case that the growth of the non-manual sector of the labour force has opened up the opportunity for upward mobility of those working-class background into some form of middle-class market and work situation; and the principal mechanism by which to accomplish this is through the acquisition of formal education. Although the bulk of such upward mobility is of a structural as opposed to an exchange kind, and typically covers only relatively short distances between contiguous strata, its existence nonetheless introduces the possibility that the manual/non-manual division may be weakening in the sense that the inter-generational inheritance of class position may be gradually undermined thus eroding one of the conditions necessary for the institutionalisation of class boundaries, and conducive to the continuity
of a relatively distinct, identifiable working-class culture.

Theoretical Framework: Interpretations of Modernism

The attempts to come to grips with these and other changes in the structure and culture of modern society have given rise to a number of diverse theoretical (and ideological) positions in support of which it is possible, predictably enough, to marshal evidence of one kind or another. This in itself is illustrative of the general sociological truism that it is not so much facts, but rather the interpretation of facts which counts, and that the identification of social trends and patterns is only the first step in a complex process of interpretation, contextualisation, argument, and debate. Nonetheless, in spite of the diversity of the theoretical approaches to modern society, I shall, at the risk of some oversimplification, classify them along lines suggested by Michael Mann (1973) into 'integrationist' and 'conflict' perspectives.

The integrationist perspective has traditionally been characteristic of a significant and persistent current in American social thought, though by no means exclusively so, associated in sociological theorising with the structural-functionalism of Talcott Parsons and his students and admirers. It clearly reflects the rather sanguine liberalism to which many American sociologists, and scholars generally, subscribed in the fifties and early sixties. Much of the
theory developed in this tradition appears to us now as a rather selective portrait and extension of that quiescent period C. Wright Mills once called the "Great American Celebration"—a portrait of the fifties writ large into a future image of continuing abundance, pluralism, self-confidence, and individuality; in short a rather panglossian image of the best of all possible worlds.

One of the most controversial of the theses which falls under this heading is that put forward by Daniel Bell, first in The End of Ideology (1960), and more recently in amended and updated form in The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society (1973). In Ideology... Bell argues for the demise of 'traditional' (read Marxist inspired), chiliastic political movements and ideas, and the growth of a realpolitik, pragmatic and instrumental approach to politics and the social uses of power. Regrettably, Bell has often been misread in his intentions, and to give him his due he does recognise and foresee the search for new political passions, though he is, to say the least, somewhat perfunctory in his treatment of this. The message of Ideology... is, nevertheless, quite clear: as far as the system of class stratification is concerned, the underlying theme of Bell's argument implies an end to the traditional, divisive class conflicts of the formative period of industrial capitalism through the incorporation of the working-class into the dominant institutional order by means of affluence, full employment, social
security and welfare, and expanded opportunities for education and mobility, all of which are, in turn, themselves the outcome of a protean economic structure which has successfully contained the contradictions spelled out for it by Marx.

The basic perspective which was nurtured in Ideology... has since been reworked and developed by Bell into a theory of post-industrialism. Here Bell argues that theoretically grounded knowledge has now replaced property as the primary productive force in modern society. Knowledge is now the 'axial' or central principle around which modern society—be it formally capitalist or state socialist—is organised, and those who control its production and distribution—the professionals, scientists, technocrats—have duly emerged as the new class of initiators replacing the entrepreneurs and industrialists of earlier periods. Accordingly, the locus of authority and control is shifting to a new complex 'axial' institutions—the universities, colleges, research and development laboratories—where knowledge is produced and disseminated.

As this suggests, Bell's analysis of the role of this new class of highly qualified manpower is an integrative one; the commercial/entrepreneurial mode of integration characteristic of 'industrial' society is being supplanted by a professional/technocratic one with the transition to 'post-industrialism', and the old ideology of profit maximisation being replaced by a new one of planning and
control of the future. This thesis is, of course, not at all unsimilar to earlier interpretations, going back through Galbraith's (1967) theory of the 'techno-structure', Burnham's 'managerial revolution (1941), Veblen's 'engineers' (1963), to the Comtean vision of a benevolent and beneficent rule of the 'experts'. Bell tends to dismiss out of hand the idea that this new class of professional, scientific, and technical labour might constitute an incipient 'new' working-class of educated proletarians whose relationship to the established order is one of tension and conflict over the distribution of decision-making and control. His treatment of the 'new' working-class/educated labour theorists is shallow and glib, and overlooks some of the more substantial efforts of that paradigm. In this respect, we should note the interesting, and rather amazing fact that at the time Bell wrote The Coming..., one of the existing major works which deals in both name and substance with the very same issues Bell is addressing was Alain Touraine's *The Post-Industrial Society* (see below) which does in fact advocate the 'new' working-class thesis to some extent; yet, in over four hundred pages of text, Bell makes but one single reference to Touraine's work!

At about the same time Bell published *Ideology*..., a number of authors were toying with the ideas of 'convergence' and the 'logic of industrialism'. These revolved around the notion that all industrialised and industrialising societies were in the process of converging to a more or
less common type of society, and that this movement was the function of an autonomous logic inherent in industrial technology, science, and bureaucratic organisation which was impervious to the play of political ideology. This theme can be found to varying extents in the works of Raymond Aron (1967), Clark Kerr and his associates (1960), Marion Levy (1966), and Wilbert E. Moore (1962). It represents an emphasis upon industrialism rather than capitalism or state socialism, as the distinctive feature of all modern societies; the difference between the western and the Soviet bloc countries is seen primarily as a matter of the nature of their respective political systems, and particularly on the extent to which political freedoms are enjoyed by the general populace. Indeed, in some of the more chauvinistic versions of convergence, the extension of political and social liberties is also seen as an inevitable tendency in the state socialist societies, implying to some extent the evolutionary superiority of the western model.

As far as the structure of class stratification is concerned, the implications of the convergence thesis can be summed up in two ways. The first consequence of convergence is what we might call the 'decomposition of labour' as the class structure becomes more differentiated and complex with the emergence of new occupations, which are seen, moreover, in terms not of differential wealth or power but rather of differential prestige. And secondly,
the class structure is seen as more open and fluid with expanded opportunities for mobility as the shift to a universalistic meritocratic ethic gradually erodes traditionalism and ascriptiveness. This, in turn, suggests the attenuation of divisive class conflict along with the ideologies which were its motive force. In its stead emerges an institutionalised system for mobility (via formal education) and conflict resolution (via collective bargaining, government mediation, etc.), as the logic of industrialism promotes, in the words of Ker et al. (1960), greater 'pluralism' and 'individuality'.

A similarly optimistic view of modern society is offered by Edward Shils (1960) in his theory of 'mass' society. As the social structure of modern society becomes more differentiated, he argues, so a compensatory process of cultural homogenisation takes place. The development of 'mass' education, of the 'mass' media, and the growth of the state into matters beyond the traditional realm of political affairs are all seen to be having a levelling effect on values, tastes, and life-styles, giving rise to a 'mass' culture in which the 'peripheries' of society (read the lower and working-classes) are drawn closer to the 'centre' (read middle- and upper-classes). The implication of this is that the inequities of wealth and power characteristic of earlier forms of industrial society are disappearing in the face of a more fluid and open society in which formerly deprived social groups are able to participate more fully and with
greater effect, as the channels for grievance expression become an institutionalised feature of the social fabric. The result is that individuals generally are provided with greater opportunities to fulfill their needs both economically and culturally.

The structure of sentiment which pervades these various theories is manifestly one underscored by an optimistic sense that modern society can not only solve the seemingly intractable problems inherited from earlier capitalism—poverty and squalour, extreme inequalities, political impotence, social injustice, and so on—but can also, in so doing, institutionalise the mechanisms to anticipate and thereby pre-empt new sources of structural division and strain. This can be accomplished because the solution to these problems would serve to incorporate socially, politically and economically those who had formerly been excluded from the established institutional order, and therewith establish the bases for the kind of consensus capable of mobilising support to iron out future kinks in the social order.

In contrast to these various 'integrative' theories of modern society, those writing in the general tradition of conflict theory have been concerned more to identify and elaborate upon new sources of social conflict and division. Again by way of contrast, much of the theory in this tradition has emanated from Europe where class divisions and conflicts have traditionally been more transparent, though
factual class inequalities not necessarily any greater. As is true for much of the integrationist theory, the intellec-
tual origins of conflict theory lie in some form of dialogue with a real or fabricated ghost of Marx.

One of the earliest post-war attempts at new theory in this perspective was Ralph Dahrendorf's (1959) discussion of the 'post-capitalist' class structure. Dahrendorf explicitly starts from Marx's rather fragmented discussions of class, and attempts to come to a re-conceptualisation of these by a process of eliminating those elements he no longer considers appropriate to 'post-capitalist' society. While retaining Marx's original emphasis on classes as primarily conflict groups rather than strata in the hierarchical distribution of social rewards, Dahrendorf goes on to reject the Marxian emphasis on property ownership as the basis of class differentiation in favour of the distribution of authority in what he calls 'imperatively co-ordinated associations'. In other words, Dahrendorf hinges his new model of class structure on the differentiation of ownership and control—the 'decomposition of capital'—selecting the latter rather than the former as the determining criterion of class position and interests, and, by extension, the source of class division and conflict.

This argument carries with it certain important implications and considerations. Firstly, and most generally, it follows from Dahrendorf's thesis that any society in
which political inequality (i.e. inequalities in the distribution of power and authority) exists, will necessarily be class stratified, at least analytically speaking. Secondly, the implication of this is that the distinction between the western and Soviet bloc societies becomes largely irrelevant from the point of view of macro stratification analysis since both types of society are characterised by political inequalities which are embedded in large scale bureaucratic administrations; hence the notion of 'post-capitalism' as a means of signifying the demise of property ownership and the primacy of property control as the distinctive feature of modern industrialised society, a point which brings Dahrendorf's analysis close, in sentiment at least, to that of earlier elite theorists like Burnham (1941) and Roberto Michels (1949). Thirdly, if the basis of class differentiation has shifted from ownership to control, then clearly, there has emerged a new class in the position of social domination; the entrepreneurs and landowners have been supplanted by the corporate executives, professionals, and managers in whose hands decision-making functions now reside. Finally, if class stratification is ubiquitous, then so too must be at least the potential for class conflict. Here again, the Marxian legacy rears its head; Dahrendorf is careful enough to realise that actual, overt conflict is sporadic and discontinuous, and to cope with this problem he distinguishes between 'latent' and 'manifest' interests, and between
'quasi-groups' and 'interest groups'. This parallels Marx's distinction between a 'class-in-itself' and a 'class-for-itself'; quasi-groups, just like classes-in-themselves, are a ubiquitous feature of modern society, yet conflict only erupts when interests become manifest, when the quasi-group becomes an interest group.

Writing in the context of the 1968 upheavals in France, and addressing himself more or less explicitly to the issues which those events raised, Alain Touraine (1971) has formulated a theory of 'post-industrial' society, which, like that of Bell's (1973), focuses upon the emergence and growth of the new professional, scientific and technical strata, together with the ideology and mentality they reflect and represent, as the point of departure for a theoretical analysis of the changing structure and culture of modern industrialised society. Here, however, the similarity with Bell comes to an abrupt end; rather than see these strata as the new source of social integration, he views their ascendency as a new form, or at least potential form, of conflict with the dominant institutional order, as a 'new' working-class of educated labour, not as a new elite of decision-makers. Like Dahrendorf, however, Touraine does not interpret the nature of this conflict in orthodox Marxian terms as one deriving fundamentally from the distribution of productive property, but rather as a predominantly political conflict arising from the distribution of authority and decision-making within work organisations.
As for Dahrendorf, then, the central issue in the dynamics of class stratification is the control not the ownership of property. The emerging professional, scientific, and technical class, Touraine argues, is the lynchpin in the organisation and functioning of modern systems of production by virtue of its control over the knowledge on which that system thrives. At the same time, the professionals, scientists, and technicians are effectively excluded from the major sources of decision-making in the system, and are expected to deliver their skills when called upon to do so, without reaping the rewards of genuine power. Here it is evident that Touraine is borrowing from the Marxian theory of alienation: these strata of educated labour are alienated by virtue of their powerlessness and lack of control over the uses to which their skills are put, a contradiction, in other words between what they put into the system and what they receive from it in return. It is the persistence of this disparity which subsequently assures the continuity of 'class' conflict and division in some form.

In somewhat different vein, writers influenced by the tradition of 'critical' theory emanating from the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, writers like John O'Neill (1972), Andrew Gorz (1967), Stanley Aronowitz (1973), and particularly Herbert Marcuse (1964), have offered something of a critical version of the mass society theory in their analysis of the state of modern society. Marcuse, for example, has
argued that a process of homogenisation is occurring in modern industrialised society, creating a uniform, or as he calls it, 'one-dimensional' reality in which individuals, and particularly what are referred to as the 'underlying population'—those bereft of effective political or economic power—lose all sense of critical awareness, and are subsequently incorporated into the dominant institutional order principally by means of mass consumption. They are being bought off, in other words, in a way which effectively precludes their being aware of it: consumerism, spectator sports, commercialised recreation, and mass media are seen as the new form, the 'soft machine' so to speak, of social control.

Looking at this in terms of stratification analysis, then the principal implication pertains to the position of the working-class (as one very large segment of the so-called 'underlying population'), most especially with regard to its once imputed role as an agent of social conflict and change. Here Marcuse and his associates tend to depart from the orthodox Marxist position which retains an image of the working-class as the fundamental agent or vehicle of the social, economic, and political changes in which capitalism is ultimately transcended. Rather, Marcuse and many other 'critical' theorists argue that the true nature of this new form of domination and control, by virtue of its oblique and complex character, is generally mystified by the underlying population who lack the opportunities to develop the
critical understanding necessary to overcome it and their own alienation. In this way, Marcuse came to light upon the student movement in the late sixties as the principal vehicle for the development of critical consciousness (via education), and as the agent of human liberation (via revolutionary praxis). In short, he and many of his associates seem to have given up on the working-class; it is too well incorporated into the dominant institutional order (even though 'really' dominated and exploited by it), and left to its own devices will passively acquiesce in its own alienation.

Clearly, when we look at these apparently diverse theoretical perspectives a little more closely, when we scratch the surface of rhetoric, it becomes evident that what is at issue is not so much the selection of the principal facts and trends, but rather their interpretation. Bell, Touraine, and Dahrendorf, for example, all attach a good deal of importance to changes which are occurring in the occupational structure in the direction of the growth of skilled white-collar labour. Their differences are not over this, but rather over what such a change means, what its implications are, and what it presages for our society. Similarly, if we look more closely at the self-styled 'critical' theorists, what we find is a rather elitist 'left-wing' functionalism, replete with the same problems, shortcomings, and inadequacies of the older Parsonian variety. Gone is the vocabulary of
'system needs', 'adaptation', 'boundary maintenance', and so on, only to be replaced with a new (and somehow superior?) emphasis on 'repression', 'domination', 'social control'.

Nonetheless, we should not assume that the differences between these theories are insignificant or merely terminological. Each perspective, in fact, can be seen to have nurtured a more specific theory concerning the nature of class stratification in modern society. On the one hand, clearly tied to the general integrationist perspective, there is the thesis of 'embourgeoisement'. Tied to the conflict perspective, on the other hand, is the thesis of proletarianisation. And as something of a synthesis between these we find the various theses of (more or less) limited class convergence, such as that proposed by Goldthorpe and Lockwood (1963), or the thesis of "middle-mass culture" expounded by Wilensky (1960, 1961, 1964). All are similar to the extent that they assert, or imply, that significant changes are occurring in the structure and culture of class stratification in modern society, changes which reflect the 'decomposition' of conventional class boundaries, particularly the main structural 'fault'--the division between manual, blue-collar occupations on the one hand, and non-manual, white-collar occupations on the other. As a result of this, all three theses suggest the homogenisation of both economic situation and life-style. The differences between these three perspectives, however, far outweigh the similarities.
These deal with the direction these changes are taking, their extent and scope, and the implications they carry for the wider institutional and cultural order.

Class and Change: Embourgeoisement, Proletarianisation, Convergence

The thesis of embourgeoisement, though not exactly laid down as such in any one systematic form, can be traced back, paradoxically enough, to some of the earlier Marxist literature. As early as his now famous ethnography on the living conditions of the working-class in England in the 1840's Engels (1968) noted the pervasive tendency among factory workers living and working in the most appalling, squalid conditions to identify with and aspire to the life-styles and habits of their social 'superiors', even though (or perhaps because?) these sentiments could usually be realised only in the attempt to emulate the latter in the most superficial of ways. These observations were later to be reflected in the equally famous remarks he made about 'false consciousness' and the lack of revolutionary spirit on the part of the proletariat. Similarly, the Leninist notion of 'labour aristocracies' connotes the impression of an upwardly striving (if not upwardly achieving) segment of the proletariat blind to the direction in which its 'true' interests supposedly lie, an idea which is amply demonstrated empirically by the elitist and exclusionist practices of the 'craft'
unions in Canada and the U.S. before the war.

Clearly, the structure of sentiment underlying these ideas is one confronting the perennial (for Marxists at least) problem of how to instill the working-class with a sense of its historic mission as the revolutionary agent of the transformation of bourgeois society, and as the vanguard of a new form of classless society in which man can realise rational control over nature and himself. When we turn to the more recent versions of embourgeoisement, and the ones with which we shall be primarily concerned in this thesis, then we immediately witness something of an inversion in that structure of sentiment. The problematic adopted by these modern versions is concerned to refute Marxist predictions and undermine the theoretical viability of Marxism rather than to salvage them from the events of an unsympathetic history; the new form of classlessness they envisage is not one which is accomplished in the revolutionary transformation of capitalism, but rather in its very maturation and development. The various proponents of this new position generally argue that a process of transition is occurring in the direction of the traditional working-class, or at least significantly large segments of it, moving towards 'middle-classness' not only in terms of immediate class or economic situation, but also in terms of general life-style: family and domestic life, patterns of social participation, consumption and leisure habits, and finally values, attitudes, and tastes.
The major claims for this new version of embourgeoisement can be found among a diverse assortment of writers, both European and North American, foremost among whom are Zweig (1961), Mayer, (1955, 1956), Barnard (1956), Geiger (1969), and Shelsky (Cf. Dahrendorf, 1959:97-109). These authors have variously argued that the working-class in western society is being progressively assimilated into middle-class society; expanded opportunities for social mobility and education, structural changes in the divisions of labour and property, the institutionalisation of industrial conflict and its differentiation and insulation from wider social issues, and most especially working-class affluence and prosperity are the principal factors to which this assimilation is attributed.

Probably the strongest and most unqualified statement of working-class embourgeoisement can be found in the works of Ferdinand Zweig. On the basis of his studies of the behaviour and attitudes of industrial manual workers in Britain after the war, Zweig discerned a general "move towards new middle-class values and middle-class existence" on the part of his subjects (1961:ix). This, he argues, is reflected in the adoption of a more positive yet instrumental attitude toward work and the employing organisation; in the modern firm developing, in turn, a more humanitarian posture toward the worker thus enabling him to feel a greater sense of commitment and security, and "loosen the sense of his identity with his class, to which he is bound no longer by
the links of common hardships, handicaps, and injustices, and the constant call to arms in class warfare"; and in the emulation of such characteristically middle-class habits as family planning and material consumerism (1961:69).

The American stratification literature, to a very great extent, abounds with diagnoses and forecasts of impending classlessness in the capitalist societies, particularly, of course, in the United States itself. One of the most consistent and specific in his claims is Kurt Mayer. Like Zweig, Mayer has proclaimed a move toward an essentially middle-class existence on the part of manual workers and their families, a fact which re-affirms, he argues, the fundamental openness and fluidity of American society, and the persistence of the 'American Dream' of success and achievement which serves to mitigate collectivism and class consciousness:

The style of life of many skilled and better paid semi-skilled workers resembles that of the lower middle-class much more closely than that of their poorer paid semi-skilled and unskilled manual labourers. The higher wages of recent years have enabled many working men to buy their own houses and furnish them much like those of white-collar people, whom they also resemble by stressing respectability, sobriety, church membership, and mobility aspirations. Away from the job they cannot be distinguished from the lower middle-class white-collar workers. (1955:47)

Mayer leaves little doubt, however, that this apparent homogenisation has an identifiable character and direction to it: "the 'proletarian' workers are becoming
homogeneous with white-collar workers and are joining the middle-class" (1956:78); nor is he uncertain as to its causes:

The high incidence of social mobility and its upward direction, the shifts in occupational and income distribution, and the changes in personal behaviour which tend to minimize class distinctions, taken together strongly suggest that the characteristic dynamism and fluidity of our class system continue with undiminished vigour. (1955:79)

The emphasis upon affluence, or rather 'abundance', as one of the crucial factors responsible for re-shaping the class structure of western society is also evident in the work of Jessie Barnard. Once again, the principal impact of postwar prosperity is seen to be upon the life-styles and life situations of manual worker families:

The 'proletariat' has not absorbed the middle-class but rather the other way around....In the sense that the class structure here described reflects modern technology, it vindicates the Marxist thesis that social organisation is 'determined' by technological forces. The precise manner in which these forces operate and the result they bring about, however, belies the Marxist dialectic. (1956: 30-31)

Here the polemic against a mythical Marxism once again rears its head. Nevertheless, the underlying message of Barnard's argument is unmistakable: "A mass oriented economy depends on a mass market....The very existence of families able to afford Cadillacs depends on the existence
of millions—able to buy Chevrolets." (1956:27)

The debate with Marxism is also evident in some of the postwar German literature, notably in the works by Theodor Geiger and Helmut Shelsky. Employing a metaphor which enjoyed a certain popularity at the time, Geiger put forward the thesis that the class structure of postwar western society was in the "melting pot"; that class boundaries and distinctions were undergoing a process of blurring and dissolution. This too, at first glance, conveys the impression of a rather amorphous, directionless leveling of former class inequalities and differences, but on closer inspection it becomes more apparent that Geiger does in fact have in mind something akin to embourgeoisement: "They [the working-class] have become, as one says, bourgeois (verbourgerlicht)." (1969:91) "Most workers have become petty bourgeois in their purchasing power and spending habits." And finally, "[one can] speak of a proximity of interest among capital and labour within urban industrial society..." (Dahrendorf, 1959:99). Thus, for Geiger, the working-class is now more or less fully integrated into capitalist industrial society, and firmly dedicated to its preservation, a situation he regards as having arisen from the institutionalisation of class conflict and the gradual erosion of the rights and powers of property ownership due to the separation of the latter from the functions of control.

Implicit in all these analyses, of course, is the...
simple yet crucial question Helmut Shelsky takes as his explicit point of departure, "Have we still got a class society today?" (Dahrendorf, 1959:103) Like the previous authors he answers that question with a more or less qualified no. In the Marxian sense of a dichotomous, polarised class structure then, Shelsky argues, certain structural tendencies have developed which have "leveled-in and mitigated that abyss of class tension", most significantly social mobility, the homogenisation of life-styles, and the redundancy of earlier 'ideologies' of capitalist society. (Dahrendorf, 1959:103) These changes have, in turn, brought about a degree of declassement, they have "diminished class conflict and leveled society into a very wide, comparatively uniform social stratum." (Dahrendorf, 1959:103). Once again, this reads initially as a process of convergence or massification rather than one of embourgeoisement, but this is a point on which Shelsky is, in fact, somewhat equivocal. At a later point in his discussion he does indeed speak in terms which echo the other embourgeoisement theorists of a "leveled middle-class society" in which the uniformity of life-styles and life situations could be described "...'petty bourgeois' or 'middle-class' if it were not for the fact that these terms lead to too many misunderstandings on account of their class character." (Dahrendorf, 1959:104). But regardless of these qualifications and equivocations, what Shelsky has in mind is a situation where the erstwhile working-class does the moving upward rather than the middle-
class engage in any significant movement down.

With the exception of Zweig, these authors have not exactly based their arguments and claims on systematic empirical research; the tone of their writings has been distinctly speculative and impressionistic. There are, however, several other, though less sweeping, statements of embourgeoisement to be found in the empirical literature. In a survey of literature on modern industrial workers, and about the only account we have come across which includes references to Canadian data, the Westleys (1971) talk of a new breed of proletarian whom they refer to, rather cryptically, as the "emerging worker". This refers to the industrial manual worker who has entered the labour force during the postwar period; according to the authors, he is more educated and therefore more confident and optimistic about his economic future, more militant though in an instrumental rather than class conscious sense, and more aspiring to a middle-class style of life for himself and for his children, particularly when it comes to the realm of material consumption: "It seems evident that consumption patterns in a mass consumption society tend toward uniformity for all age, income, and occupational groups." (1971:15-16)

The Westleys are cautious enough to realise that this change will also bring about new sources of conflict and contradiction—between workers being more highly educated yet work roles being more routinised for example—yet the overall
tone of their research is one which substantiates that of other embourgeoisement theorists:

The time honoured cleavage between manual and non-manual work, representing the class barrier between the working-class and the middle-class is disappearing. Perhaps a new one will be constructed, say between upper and lower middle-class, but at least the old one is coming down. (1971:96)

The argument for class decomposition put forward by the Westleys rests heavily on the homogenisation of consumption patterns among manual and non-manual families, and in this respect their argument depends to some extent on Veblen's notion of 'conspicuous consumption' as a means to 'usurp' status by means of conscious emulation. Though this has always been a rather dubious notion, similar conclusions are also suggested in some of the literature on family structure and work experiences. Gerald Handel and Lee Rainwater (1964), for example, have made the distinction between what they call 'traditional' and 'modern' working-class families on the basis of their research into social class and family life. The 'traditional' refers, in ideal type form at least, to the older, relatively homogeneous, sedentary, kin-centred working-class which arose out of the early stages of industrial capitalism, and is still found in older, more traditional industries in which there endures a strong sense of both occupational and residential community such as shipbuilding and mining. The 'modern', on the other hand,
denotes the newer, more geographically mobile working-class family which has emerged during the postwar period of affluence and the accompanying growth of lighter, high technology industries such as electronics, petrochemicals and aerospace. Though the two are contemporary, they are clearly not contemporaneous; the 'modern' working-class family is seen to be increasingly paradigmatic of modern society, and to entail a more middle-class style of life, notably with respect to the demise of sedentarism, rigid sex role differentiation within the family, and the segregation of husband's and wife's social networks.

The literature on urban sociology also contains reference to what amounts to embourgeoisement. One aspect of the optimistic, celebrationist sociology of the late fifties and early sixties was the heralding of the so-called 'suburban revolution', the advent of a new way of life embodying a kind of urbs in rure existence. At the same time, one of the main features, or at least imputed features, of this new way of life which received prominent attention was its homogeneity, middle-class style: a frenetic life of social participation and involvement. Though there is some degree of validity to some of the imputed characteristics of suburban living, much of the discussion was hyperbolic. In his Working-class Suburb, Bennett Berger (1960) admirably demonstrates the ways in which old class differences persist and new ones emerge within the suburban context.
Some of the literature on work experiences and the work situation also speaks to and supports the thesis of embourgeoisement. Mark Lefton (1967), for example, found some empirical support for the thesis that those blue-collar workers who have benefited most from the industrial system—the educated, the skilled, the affluent, those with little or no experience of unemployment, the upwardly mobile, and so on—were more likely to have internalised middle-class values and orientations. For example, he found that the more successful exhibited lower levels of anomia, were more likely to describe themselves as middle- rather than working-class, and were more likely to stress an individualistic approach on such matters as job hunting.

But the most significant study of the work situation which has implications for the embourgeoisement thesis is Robert Blauner's *Alienation and Freedom* (1964). In this work Blauner tries to substantiate the thesis that the social organisation of manual work (the division of labour) is primarily a function of its technical organisation (technology). He divides industrial technology up into a developmental sequence of four stages—craft technology in which the worker takes on the role of something of an artisan; machine technology in which the worker is a machine operator but still has some control over the pace if not the design of his work; assembly-line or mass production technology where not only production but also the transfer of materials from
one processing stage to the next is mechanised and the worker tied to the line, unable to exercise control over either work design, performance or pace; and finally continuous process automation technology in which the worker no longer intervenes in the production process as in the case of the artisan or operative, but now takes on the role of monitoring and supervising the process. Blauner then argues that work alienation and dissatisfaction are related to this schema of technological development in form of an inverted 'U' curve: as we move from craft to machine to assembly-line so alienation increases, then declines with automation.

The implication of this is that, assuming the future direction of technological development will lie in the expanded use of automation, then the alienation of the industrial worker—traditionally one of the features of the work and general class situation which has set manual workers off from their non-manual counterparts—can be expected to diminish progressively as his work situation becomes enriched and upgraded to a level comparable to that of the white-collar worker. Thus, Blauner predicts that once again, through the agency of automation, the manual worker will be able to find meaning, control, and overall fulfillment in his work. The theoretical ramification of this, then, is that automation will hammer the final nail in the coffin of Marxism; just as prosperity and affluence have attenuated the contradiction of immiseration, unemployment, and poverty, so
automation will attenuate that of alienation, incorporating the worker into middle-class society at work as well as play.

There are a number of assumptions underlying these various statements of embourgeoisement. The first and most obvious is that the principal changes which have occurred in the stratification systems of the western societies, such changes as the shifts in the occupational structure and the sectoral balance of the economy, increased rates of social mobility, the expansion of educational opportunities, and the advent of widespread affluence and "full" employment, have made their impact felt primarily on the traditional working-class rather than on other sectors of the class structure. In this respect, among others, the embourgeoisement theorists share a general affinity with the whole paradigm of structural-functionalism insofar as they are engaged in some more or less direct dialogue with Marxism and attempt to refute Marx's predictions for the fate of capitalist society. Indeed, ironically enough, for most of the embourgeoisement theorists capitalist society has been transcended, but not in the way Marx forecast; the transformation of capitalism has come about in an evolutionary not revolutionary manner.

The second assumption, or perhaps more accurately impression, which is conveyed in the general tone of their writings is that the trend toward embourgeoisement, together with the general structural developments which underpin it,
constitute a linear, irreversible restructuring of the stratification order. Once again, this linear evolutionism closely resembles one of the principal features of functionalism, namely the belief in a gradualist, progressive path of societal development. It is in this connection that we have purposely taken care to stress the social as well as sociological context of the embourgeoisement thesis, in an attempt to convey, in the general perspective of the sociology of knowledge, that ideas are the products of their times. The theoretical ambiance of gradualism, progress, and evolution which pervaded so much of academic sociology in the fifties and early sixties was subsequently thrown into question by the radical upheavals of the mid and late sixties--the 'rediscovery' of poverty, urban decay, racism, youth culture, the undermining of consensus politics, and the emergence of the Third World from the processes of decolonialisation and national liberation. Though many now argue that the seventies is experiencing the revival of quiescence, at least domestically in the west, the point we are making is precisely that processes of change often exhibit a cyclical rather than distinctly linear character. To assume, then, that any trends or developments will necessarily continue indefinitely or unabatedly is highly questionable.

The third assumption which is manifest in some shape or form in these various versions of embourgeoisement concerns
the use of a pseudo economic determinist argument. Most embourgeoisement theorists, though paradoxically arguing against Marxism, employ an economic determinist argument to the extent that they assume that the experience of a middle-class economic situation gives rise logically to the adoption of a middle-class style of life and values. As S. M. Lipset (1964) has put it: "history has validated a basic premise of Marxist sociology [namely that economic forces 'determine' social structure] at the expense of Marxist politics." (parenthesis added)

This, in turn, gives rise to a fourth, or rather four set of assumptions. In assuming that economic embourgeoisement results in social and cultural embourgeoisement, these theorists must be making one of two additional assumptions. The first is that the working-class has always aspired to middle-class life-styles and values, yet simply been hitherto deprived of the opportunity and requisite resources to realise their aspirations, a situation now remedied by middle-class affluence. This possible assumption smacks distinctly of the assumption of value consensus--shared beliefs and aspirations--which was one of the major elements of structural-functional theory, and which has been subjected to trenchant criticism. Moreover, as the cognitive dissonance theorists have consistently demonstrated, it is difficult to maintain views and aspirations over long periods of time which are sharply at odds with manifest...
reality, without at least experiencing some sense of deprivation. Yet, as W. G. Runciman (1966) has shown, there is little evidence to suggest that working-class individuals experience substantially greater levels of relative deprivation than those in the middle-class, precisely because aspirations are generally kept at a manageable and realisable level.

The second possible assumption is that there inheres in the experience of affluence and the enjoyment of an erstwhile middle-class economic situation an accompanying resocialisation into middle-class values and tastes, and the subsequent abandonment, partly at least, of former working-class ways. Though this possibility avoids the pitfalls of assuming value consensus across classes, it still leaves us distinctly in the dark as to how this resocialisation might take place, what agencies or mechanisms might be involved, and, for that matter, why it should occur empirically at all. In short, the whole relationship between economic and cultural embourgeoisement is left implicit and unexplored; we are simply left with the assumption that a middle-class economic situation does not somehow conduce to the continuity of a working-class life-style. Yet as we shall see, this relationship is indeed problematic, and warrants examination.

By way of contrast, the emergence and development of the thesis of proletarianisation can clearly be traced back to Marx's critique of capitalism. In this, Marx predicted
not only the increasing polarisation of classes under capitalism, but also that the proletariat would become increasingly homogeneous, particularly with respect to skill, training, and marketability, as well as general life-situation, due to what he thought would be the inevitable leveling effects of further mechanisation. He also believed that this would occur to mental as well as manual labour, thereby eroding gradually the distinctions of rank and wealth which traditionally separated the manual and non-manual worker. In this way, the two would be integrated together as 'abstract labour'.

The actual course of capitalist development has, however, cast many of Marx's predictions into serious doubt, and subsequently given rise to various attempts to revise and salvage Marxism as an intellectual system. In this respect, one of the principal empirical problems which Marxists, and socialist thinkers generally, have had to confront is the rapid and enormous growth of the various forms of so-called non-manual or white-collar labour—the clerical, sales, technical, scientific, managerial, and professional occupations. In strict, orthodox Marxist terms, of course, the incumbents of these occupations are typically propertyless wage and salary earners who appropriate

wealth largely through the sale of their skills on the labour market; they are theoretically non-manual proletarians. On the other hand, the market, work, and status situations they enjoy, particularly those in scientific, managerial, and professional employment, not to mention general life-styles and ideology, have tended to mark these strata off from the traditional proletarian population of industrial manual workers. In short, the predicted homogenisation of those who depend on the sale of their labour power has proven to be a highly problematic point.

The earliest post-Marxian attempts to come to grips with this problem centred around the intellectual circles of German social democracy and the debate over a revisionist Marxism. In this context, the first work to address specifically the position and role of non-manual labour was that of Emil Lederer and his sometime collaborator Jacob Marschak. Lederer's analysis, though formulated within the general context of social democratic theory, tended to depart, and in some respects quite radically, from orthodox Marxism in the sense that he saw these new strata as a "new middle-class" (neuer Mittelstand), or more accurately new "middle-estate", buffering the propertied capitalist class on the one hand, and the industrial working-class on the other. Although Lederer acknowledged that these strata were property-less employees and therefore did not strictly constitute a

new class, he took pains to emphasise their distinctiveness from the working-class not so much in terms of their economic situation but rather in terms of their ideology and social psychology, in short, in terms of their status situation. This in turn, was seen to be contingent largely upon their functional position within the division of labour, and the general work situation which this conferred upon them.

As is to be expected, Lederer's thesis sparked off a debate which has now gelled into the theory of proletarianisation—do the strata of non-manual, white-collar labour constitute a new middle-class (replacing the old petty bourgeoisie of independent commodity and service producers), or do they constitute a new working-class of more educated and prestigious proletarians? One of the earliest to affirm the latter interpretation, and by implication reject the Lederer-Marschak thesis, was Hans Speier (1939). Speier's analysis was first published in 1934, and it is worth quoting at length from it because he had already at that time identified what were to become the major elements in later models of proletarianisation:

The social level of the salaried employee sinks with the increasing extent of the group. This qualitative change, which has been termed "the proletarianisation of the white collar worker", shows itself in a number of ways. It is most evident, perhaps, in the especially great increase in the women salaried workers, who mostly perform subordinate work....It is the man who has the principal authority, the girl who is typically the subordinate....The great
increase in salaried employees is especially traceable to a demand for subordinates, not for fully qualified responsible persons. As a result, the average chance of advancing has declined. The majority of the subordinate employees in the large offices perform duties which are specialised and schematised down to the minutest detail. They no longer require general training; in part only a very limited and brief training is necessary, in part previous training has become quite unnecessary. The process in the course of which the body of salaried employees becomes a mass, group rests on the successful attempt to replace the personal experience of the individual by a rational scientific business administration, so that an increasing proportion of the workers can be changed without danger to the efficiency of the enterprise. One social result of this development is the rise of the unskilled and semi-skilled salaried workers, whose designation already indicates the assimilation of the processes of work in the office to that in the factory. In the case of the salaried workers who serve as subordinates on one of the many modern office machines, or, for example, who sell in a one-price store, the difference in the nature of the duties between such workers and manual workers is completely wiped out... especially revealing with regard to the sinking of the social level of the white-collar worker is, finally, the change in the social antecedents. The growing tendency to employ salaried workers of 'proletarian origin' indicates that the number of untrained and poorly paid positions is increasing faster than the number of middle and principal positions. In other words, the salaried employees as a whole are being subjected to a process of decreasing social esteem. (Cited in Braverman, 1974: 350-351)

In this passage Speier has identified the major issues around which the proletarianisation thesis revolves: the use of women as a source of cheap unskilled and semi-skilled labour, the progressive erosion of skilled work through the use of office mechanisation, the routinisation
and standardisation of office work procedures, in short the whole deterioration of the relative market, work, and even status situations of the non-manual worker.

In discussing the proletarianisation thesis proper, it must be acknowledged that Speier's work forms the point of departure. Nonetheless, there have been several attempts to elaborate upon and go beyond it. One of the first postwar attempts to do this, and one which is all the more interesting given its social and historical context, can be found in C. Wright Mills' *White Collar* (1951). Although Mills is generally acknowledged to have been left-leaning in his sentiments and critical in his approach to sociological analysis, he was no Marxist, and his analysis of the non-manual worker exhibits a generally cautious attitude toward proletarianisation, a fact which is evidenced by his use of both terms—'new middle-class' and 'new working-class' to designate the group. On the one hand, Mills recognised that these new non-manual strata were typically deprived of property, and therefore reduced to a situation of dependency on the market; that they were increasingly subjected to the rationalisation of their work situations resulting in progressive alienation and control; and that even such traditional privileges as tenure of office, and opportunities for promotion and advancement were continually diminishing:
Mechanised and standardized work, the decline of any chance for employees to see and understand the whole operation, the loss of any chance, save for a very few, for private contact with those in authority—these form the model of the future. (1951:212)

The alienating conditions of modern work now include the salaried employees as well as the wage-workers. There are few, if any, features of wage-work (except heavy toil—which is decreasingly a factor in wage-work) that do not characterise at least some white-collar work. For here, too, the human traits of the individual, from his physique to his psychic disposition, become units in the functionally rational calculation of managers. (1951:227)

On the other hand, while Mills acknowledged the forces at work which were stripping non-manual employment of its formerly distinctive character, he was also concerned to show that these white-collar strata did not constitute a homogeneous grouping sharing a similar market, work, and status situation, but were, in fact, an "occupational salad", a mixed and socially variegated aggregate with important lines of internal differentiation. And secondly, Mills argued that the status situation and the status concerns and pre-occupations of white-collar workers still set them apart to some extent from the traditional manual working-class.

The employees composing the new middle-class do not make up one single compact stratum. They have not emerged on a single horizontal level, but have been shuffled out simultaneously on several levels of modern society; they now form, as it were, a new pyramid within the old pyramid of society at large rather than a horizontal layer...Types of white-collar men and women range from almost the top to almost the bottom of modern society. (1951:64)
Only by keeping objective position and ideological consciousness separate in analysis can the problem be stated with precision and without unjustifiable assumptions about wage-workers, white-collar workers and the general psychology of social class. (1951:296)

This division between the less skilled, routine non-manual workers such as those in clerical, sales, and technical employment on the one hand, and those in more highly skilled, professional, managerial, and scientific occupations on the other, is an important point of debate among proletarianisation theorists. At the risk of some over-simplification, it seems that the emphasis upon the lower level white-collar workers has been more common in the North American literature, while the proletarianisation of the more skilled ranks of the non-manual labour force has captured the attention more of European scholars.

In the American literature, the most detailed recent argument on behalf of proletarianisation has come from the pen of Harry Braverman (1974), and to a lesser extent Andrew Levison (1974) and Stanley Aronowitz (1973). Braverman concerns himself primarily with the recent rapid growth of those performing routine clerical and sales tasks—the semi-skilled white-collar worker. His approach is distinctly historical: firstly, he examines the origins of clerical labour, demonstrating with the use of documentary evidence that clerical work originally possessed many of the attributes of skilled craft work—the skills necessary to perform the
requisite tasks were generally in scarce supply (due to widespread illiteracy); they were typically acquired through some process of apprenticeship; the work performed was in many respects semi-managerial in character and thus conferred on the incumbent some measure of authority as well as prestige; and finally, the work entailed a good deal of responsibility and provided the worker with opportunity for initiative and discretion. In short, in terms of market, work, and status situations, clerical work was clearly set apart from manual labour.

Seen in this light, Braverman continues, the recent expansion of sales and clerical labour represents not simply a growth, but rather a transformation of the occupational structure. The modern clerical worker, he argues, is different in kind not just degree from his Victorian counterpart; they have "little continuity with the small and privileged clerical stratum of the past." To account for this historical break he directs his attention to three interrelated developments, the relative deterioration of both the market and the work situation of clerical labour, and its increasing feminisation.

In support of the proletarianisation of the market situation Braverman relies largely upon statistics for the U.S. which show the progressive homogenisation of incomes for clerical and manual workers. Indeed, the latters' average income has now surpassed that of the clerical category by approximately 5% in the case of semi- and unskilled workers
and about 55-60% in the case of skilled craftsmen. In addition, he points out the erosion of other comparative market privileges such as fringe benefits, opportunities for promotion, and job tenure and market security. In some cases, clerical workers have actually lost these benefits, in others manual workers have enjoyed a faster growth of benefits, due partly at least to the successful use of collectivisation and collective bargaining.

But like the other proletarianisation theorists, Braverman's principal area of interest concerns the relative deterioration of the work situation of clerical labour. Again, the perspective is clearly historical, and Braverman points to three developments in this area. The first is the rationalisation of the social and technical division of clerical labour which began around the First World War, and which transformed clerical work "from something incidental to management to a labour process in its own right." (1974: 304) In this respect, he shows the pervasive influence which F. W. Taylor's principles of 'scientific management' had on office organisation as well as organisation of the shop floor:

- From the beginning, office managers held that all forms of clerical work...could be standardised and routinised. For this purpose they undertook elaborate studies of even those occupations which involved little routine....The essential feature of this effort was to make the clerical worker, of whatever sort, account for the entire working day. Its effect was to make the work of every office employee, no matter how experienced, the subject of management interference. In this way, management began to assert in the office its hitherto unused or sporadically exercised right of control over the work process (1974:309).
What this amounted to, Braverman argues, was a total re-organisation of the office division of labour, along lines first suggested by Adam Smith in *The Wealth of Nations*, without altering appreciably the work technology; a move comparable to that discussed by Marx from handicraft to manufacture production among manual workers.

Furthermore, just as manual labour underwent a subsequent transformation from manufacture to 'machino-facture' with the later implementation of greater mechanisation, so too has clerical work. The second phase of office rationalisation was the progressive mechanisation and routinisation of mental labour with the introduction of such items as typewriters, and mechanical calculators. Although earlier theorists have noted the same process, Braverman argues that the immediate ramification of this is not only that so-called clerical work becomes more routine and alienating, but also that the character of the work process becomes, so to speak, increasingly 'manualised', i.e. that this traditionally mental form of labour process takes on more and more the character of manual work:

The progressive elimination of thought from the work of the office worker thus takes the form, at first, of reducing mental labour to a repetitious performance of the same small set of functions. The work is still performed in the brain, but the brain is used as the equivalent of the hand of the detail worker in production, grasping and relaxing a single piece of "data" over and over again. The next step is the elimination of the thought process completely—"or at least in so far as it is ever
removed from human labour—and the increase of clerical categories in which nothing but manual labour is performed. (1974:319)

The third process of change which Braverman discusses, a change which only began in earnest during the mid fifties, is the accelerating use of automated electronic data processing equipment, in short, the computerisation of the office. Although, Braverman accedes, automated technology does serve to re-unify the work process and therefore reduce the division of labour to some extent, he rejects the position adopted by Blauner and others that automation will attenuate sufficiently the rationalisation and routinisation of work to diminish substantially the tendencies toward pervasive work alienation among manual and clerical workers:

...But, as in manufacturing, the office computer does not become, in the capitalist mode of production, the giant step that it could be toward dismantling and scaling down the technical division of labour. Instead, capitalism goes against the grain of the technological trend and stubbornly reproduces the outmoded division of labour in a new and more pernicious form. (1974:328)

Thus, although the early development of computer technology did create temporarily a new stratum of non-manual 'craft' labour, the long-run tendency has been for computerisation to create a small elite—a new aristocracy of white-collar labour perhaps?—of highly skilled technical and professional occupations, yet at the same time reduce the bulk of clerical skills to the level of semi-skilled, routine,
'neo-manual' tasks which are easily learnt and thus easily filled and replaced. Computerisation, moreover, has the added attraction for management insofar as it enables the latter to reduce its dependency on the clerical work force for the efficient processing and passage of information, the substance of which bureaucracies are made:

Just as Frederick Taylor diagnosed the problem of the management of a machine shop as one removing craft information from the workers, in the same way the office manager views with horror the possibility of dependence upon the historical knowledge of the office past, or of the rapid flow of information in the present, on the part of some of his or her clerical workers. The recording of everything in a mechanical form, and the movement of everything in a mechanical way, is thus the ideal of the office manager. (1974:347)

Both cause and consequence of these changes in the market and work situations of the clerical (and sales) worker is the increasing use of women as a relatively cheaper source of labour power. Although Braverman does not devote an extensive analysis to this aspect of the problem, it is nevertheless clear that he appreciates its importance: "The sex barrier that assigns most office jobs to women...has made it possible to lower wage rates in the clerical category, as we have seen, below those in any category of manual labour." (1974:353) The implication of this is that the two single largest groupings in the labour force, factory and office workers, will be increasingly composed of husband and wife teams, "the husband is an operative and the wife a clerk." (1974:354)
The cumulative effect of all these developments, Braverman argues, is the progressive homogenisation and proletarianisation of the work force:

The problem of the so-called employee or white-collar worker which so bothered earlier generations of Marxists, and which was hailed by anti-Marxists as proof of the falsity of the "proletarianisation" thesis, has thus become unambiguously clarified by the polarisation of office employment and the growth at one pole of an immense mass of wage-workers. The apparent trend to a large non-proletarian "middle-class" has resolved itself into the creation of a large proletariat in a new form. In its conditions of employment, this working population has lost all its former superiorities over workers in industry, and in its scales of pay it has sunk almost to the very bottom. (1974:355)

The emphasis upon clerical and sales workers in the American proletarianisation literature largely reflects the realities which scholars face in that context; as we saw earlier, the growth of white-collar work has generally been hailed as a 'progressive' sign in American sociology spelling at least the end of a Marxian class structure, if not an end to institutionalised inequality altogether. In European Marxist and socialist circles, on the other hand, the proletarianisation of the lower level white-collar worker is usually taken for granted; the problematic which is more commonly addressed concerns the proletarianisation of the higher level, educated worker—the salaried professionals, managers, scientists and highly qualified technical personnel— in the attempt to formulate a critical analysis of their
political and economic situation and incorporate them into the framework of a rejuvenated Marxism.

This task has received a good deal of attention from a wide circle of French socialist thinkers prominent among whom are Andre Gorz (1967) and the late Serge Mallet (1963). Adopting a fairly orthodox Marxist point of departure, both point out that even the high level educated non-manual workers are typically propertyless employees who depend upon the sale of their labour power in the market place. Indeed, they argue, there is a clear trend toward increasing proletarianisation in this sense: the old petty bourgeoisie of independent commodity and service producers such as farmers, shopkeepers, and particularly independent professionals are in a process of marked decline, being replaced by salaried farm managers, store managers, and salaried professionals. As such, they continue, although this stratum generally enjoys superior market benefits as compared to the less skilled, it too, in the last analysis, is now subject to the inexorable laws of capitalist development: the skills and creative capacities of educated workers are only rewarded insofar as, and to the extent that, they can be put to profitable use by those who purchase them. Thus the educated worker is increasingly confronted with alienation in his work situation; like the manual worker, the manager, professional, and scientist is increasingly separated from control over the uses to which his skills and abilities are put. As Gorz has put it:
And technicians, engineers, students, researchers discover that they are wage earners like others, paid for a piece of work which is "good" only to the degree that it is profitable in the short run. They discover that long-range research, creative work on original problems and the love of workmanship are incompatible with the criteria of capitalist profitability....They discover that they are ruled by the law of capital not only in their work but in all spheres of their life, because those who hold power over big industry also hold power over the State, the society, the region, the city, the university--over each individual's future (1967:104).

And Mallet:

The "new working-class" [skilled non-manual labour] is, in effect, tied to the most highly developed industrial capitalists and the standard of living which they have is due entirely to the high degree of productivity of these enterprises. It is, however, a situation which could change according to the economic situation and it is a superficial analysis which permits one to assimilate these modern industrial technicians to a "working-class aristocracy" (Cited in Bell, 1973:149).

Thus, the proletarianisation of 'educated labour'--in objective situational terms at least--derives not so much from its economic deprivation but from its increasing alienation, in short its growing political impoverishment.

Both Gorz and Mallet see the revolutionary potential of this stratum as one which is embodied in the contradiction between its trained capacity on the one hand and the reality of the work context in which that capacity and creativity are fettered by the demands of capital on the other. It is thus from the Marxist theory of alienation rather than that of immiseration that the proletarianisation of the educated
white-collar worker is drawn.

The last strand in the proletarianisation thesis which we need to discuss briefly is that relating to the topic of white-collar unionisation. By the fifties and early sixties, union growth had reached a point of temporary stagnation in North America. This was hailed by some as an indication of the obsolescence of such class-based institutions in what was widely thought, by academics at least, to be a middle-class or incipiently classless society. The principal reason for this stagnation, and why it so readily lent itself to an interpretation of incipient classlessness, was that the traditional population of unionists—the industrial manual worker—had reached a point of virtual saturation and offered no opportunity for substantial further expansion. Indeed, the actual rate of unionisation in the United States did undergo a slight decline during this period. At the same time, so it was claimed, unionism, with its lingering taint of class based interest politics and conflicts, had little appeal to the growing sector of the labour force, the white-collar worker, many of whom were women, and most of whom, we were told, preferred to identify themselves as solidly middle-class citizens firmly committed to the values of individualism and career success.

As Pat Marchak (1973) has demonstrated, however, many of these statements and impressions about the 'mentality' of the female worker—docile and uninterested in the enhancement
of occupational rewards—and the status obsessions of the
white-collar worker reveal themselves, on closer empirical
scrutiny, to be myths or stereotypes at best. Moreover, the
union movement has, in the last decade, and especially in
Canada, begun to resolve the crisis posed by the stagnation
of its traditional constituency of blue-collar workers, and
begun to take up more successfully the challenge of organising
the white-collar labour force. In Canada, for example, the
largest union (in terms of membership size) is now the
Canadian Union of Public Employees, a large proportion of
whose members can be classified, in conventional terms, as
non-manual white-collar workers. The third largest is now
the Public Service Alliance of Canada, the union of federal
government employees, the bulk of whose membership falls into
clerical, technical, and lower level managerial and semi-
professional occupations. And if we peruse the remainder of
the list of the largest fifteen unions in the country we will
also find the Quebec and Ontario teachers' and civil servants'
unions. Moreover, with the exception of C.U.P.E. (which
used to go under the name of the National Union of Public
Employees before amalgamation), all of these groups have only
acquired union status proper in the last decade or less.

The growth of white-collar unionism, particularly
among government employees, semi-professionals, and technical

7. Cf. Department of Labour, Labour Organisation in Canada
1974-75, Ottawa.
workers such as school teachers, nurses, and hospital technologists, has given a needed empirical boost to proletarianisation theorists, and helped substantiate the claims of the 'new working-class' thesis. Traditionally non-manual white-collar workers were generally assumed to be oriented toward "professionalism" rather than "unionism" as the model for occupational organisation and ideology, and as the means to enhance the market, work, and status rewards which accrued to them. The traditional image of professionalism, in turn, usually emphasised that it was antithetical to unionism in its focus upon status rather than material rewards, in its individualism, and in its ideology of public service as opposed to economic self-interest. In reality, of course, the distinction between the two models has now all but disappeared, except for the continued, and by no means unimportant, legitimacy conferred by professionalism. Even this, however, shows signs of increasing fragility, as is demonstrated by the enormous growth of malpractice suits being filed against established professionals.

However, the recent growth of white-collar unionisation has been seen by some as an abandonment of professionalism, and by implication of the striving for recognition of upper middle-class status, in favour of more direct, collective means for the protection and improvement of material rewards; in short it is seen as a sign of proletarianisation not only in the objective, but also in the subjective sense. Speaking
of the growing union militancy among nurses, teachers, and
government employees, Robert Laxer (1976) has written:

The mood of public employees in Canada has
changed rapidly. The old-style "professional-
ism" and "white-collar" superiority which led
many public workers to take conservative posi-
tions and to think of themselves as somehow
different from "blue-collar" workers and their
unions fell by the wayside. It was to be
replaced by a growing trade union conscious-
ness, followed by the transformation of public
employee staff associations into genuine
unions, engaging in collective bargaining and
using the strike weapon to press their demands

Clearly, white-collar unionisation is seen as both cause and
consequence of proletarianisation in other respects such as
the erosion of income differentials, the loss of opportunities
for promotion and advancement on the basis of personal merit,
and the increasing rationalisation of the work situation
resulting in routinisation and loss of control over the work
process, in short increased alienation. In the case of
semi-professionals like teachers, social workers, technolo-
gists, and nurses, 'career blockages' are an especially
important factor conducing to unionisation. These workers
now usually work in what Hall (1968) calls 'heteronomous'
professional organisations; although the professionals
themselves have a good deal of control over day-to-day
organisational decision-making, important policy is decided
upon by non-colleagues (usually government bureaucrats) who
are often not direct members of the organisation, e.g. school
and hospital policy. At the same time, heteronomous professional organisations generally have a relatively 'flat' pyramidal structure with few levels of hierarchy, and therefore little opportunity for career mobility within the profession.

The assumptions entailed in the various claims and arguments for proletarianisation quite obviously mirror to a large extent those associated with the thesis of embourgeoisement: the principal changes in the division of labour, the market allocation of economic and social rewards, and the changing structures of work organisation are seen to be having their effect primarily on the white-collar worker, particularly those in low level routine clerical and sales work, rather than on the manual worker. It is interesting to note, however, that the proletarianisation theorists do not usually extend their arguments beyond the class situation to the area of life-style. Unlike the embourgeoisement theorists there is no assumption that the changes in the market and work situations of the white-collar worker inevitably lead to similar developments in status situation, life-style, and general social perspective and psychology. On the one hand, this leaves the proletarianisation thesis less open to critique; on the other, it renders it a predictively less powerful theory.

The alternative to these two perspectives is that of a partial synthesis in which working-class and middle-class
are seen to be converging together to certain degrees and in various respects. There are two major versions of this argument. The first is that presented by Goldthorpe and Lockwood (1963) at the outset of their own research into the class and life-style situations of a group of affluent British auto workers. The kind of convergence they hypothesized entailed a move away from collectivism on the part of the new working-class, and away from individualism on the part of the new middle-class. The traditional working-class, they argued, subscribed to an ideology and practice of "solidaristic collectivism"—a shared sense of togetherness, stretching beyond the level of kinship to the community, the workplace, occupation, and class, and expressed through a sense of social exclusion and antagonism as represented in the "them vs. us" dichotomisation of the world. The traditional middle-class, on the other hand, subscribed to "radical individualism", a strong belief in accomplishing success and one's position in the world through individual merit and application, and a deep fear of collectivism as expressed through contempt for the "mob" or "mass". According to Goldthorpe and Lockwood, these polarised situations were obsolescent: a process of partial convergence was underway to a situation of "instrumental collectivism" at work and in the market place, and "privatised
family-centredness" at home. For the working-class this signified a transformation of ends; for the middle-class a transformation of means.

The second version of the convergence thesis has been elaborated by Harold Wilensky (1960, 1961, 1964), originating from his participation in a research project on labour and leisure in the early 1960's. Drawing upon some of the themes of the mass society theorists, Wilensky has argued that wholesale class cultures, that is, styles of life associated with and underpinned by a shared situation in the marketplace, are becoming eroded, and being replaced by a cultural "middle-mass" fostered by the homogenising influence of the new "mass" institutions--media, entertainment, education, consumerism, and so on. Wilensky does not deny

8. By instrumental collectivism, Goldthorpe and Lockwood mean the willingness by both blue- and white-collar workers to resort to collective action in order to pursue and realise their goals in the market- and work-places. These goals, however, are no longer, for the working-class, the traditional ideological expressive ones of creating broader economic, political, and cultural transformations; rather they are largely 'economistic' goals organised around a pre-occupation with 'bread-and-butter' concerns. As this implies, work is seen in a predominantly 'instrumental' manner, as the means to financial and pecuniary goals, as the means to enrichment in the realm of consumption, rather than as an end in itself.

This instrumental orientation to work is, they argue, accompanied by a more 'privatised', i.e. socially isolated and insulated, and more 'family-oriented' life outside work. The immediate nuclear family becomes the overwhelmingly predominant focus for emotional and recreational activity and gratification. As this, in turn, implies, orientation to other non-familial sources of social association--friendship networks, the neighbourhood, the workplace as a social arena, the union, formal groups and associations, etc.--becomes shallow, transient, and perfunctory. These alternative or supplementary loci are no longer regarded as significant catalysts for the establishment of deep-seated social bonds.
that behavioural and attitudinal differences will persist within the cultural middle-mass, but suggests that these will vary along other lines of differentiation than class position. In this respect he singles out the continuing importance of religion, ethnicity and community background as forces of cultural variation, together with the effects of differential occupational experience, particularly the "orderliness" of career or work biography, the experience of satisfaction or deprivation at work, and the relationship of career situation to the general family life-cycle. In this sense, then, class culture is likely to become obscured, first by the homogenising effects of the institutions of cultural 'massification', and secondly by the potentially competing and cross-cutting effects of alternative lines of differentiation.

Methodological Problematic: Class and "Classness"

Despite the obvious differences between these three theses, they do, as we alluded earlier, share in common certain basic assumptions, which do, in turn, give rise to certain methodological problems which have been largely overlooked in the earlier attempts to test their implications. Direction of change notwithstanding, all three perspectives assume, or at least contend, that some process of homogenisation is occurring between manual and non-manual workers and their families, be this in terms of the marketplace, the workplace, leisure patterns, home life, consumer behaviour,
voting habits, whatever. This, in turn, assumes that such homogeneity did not, in fact, exist at an earlier point, but has emerged over time. In other words, the notions of embourgeoisement, proletarianisation, and convergence all imply a process of historical change. Particularly in the case of the embourgeoisement theorists, the processual or historical nature of their central argument is largely taken for granted; seldom is any systematic evidence presented to substantiate the historical distinctiveness of class situations and life-styles.

This, in turn, introduces a further assumption: To speak of the working-class becoming more middle-class, or of the reverse, or of each becoming more like the other in some way presumes that one has a reasonably clear-cut idea as to what, in fact, constitutes 'working-classness' and 'middle-classness'. One must have, in other words, some more or less explicit model of what are characteristically working-class and middle-class patterns of behaviour, taste, experience, attitude, and outlook; one must have empirically grounded models of working- and middle-class culture and economic situation. And to have these, in turn, presumes further that one has a clear model of what class is, a clear model of class structure, of its foundations, and of how, to speak metaphorically, it operates. Both these models--of class structure and of class culture--have to be treated as empirically problematic, they cannot simply be taken for
granted and left implicit. In the first place, the theses of embourgeoisement and proletarianisation derive from distinct theoretical and ideological positions which adopt different conceptions of class structure and class formation. In the second place, we cannot assume our models of class culture in the context of constantly changing social conditions. To illustrate: how does one judge whether the appearance (or disappearance) of a certain pattern of behaviour or a certain attitude among working-class individuals which was characteristic of the middle-class a generation earlier genuinely constitutes an instance of cultural embourgeoisement? An example of this would be home ownership; does the spread of home ownership among the working-class in the post-war period signify their adoption of a middle-class value or simply the better opportunity to realise financially what has always been a working-class value and aspiration?

To put this another way, the problem is one of constructing models of 'classness' which capture the characteristic elements of different class situations and life-styles, yet allow at the same time for the probability of change. We can identify this problem quite easily in the case of the proletarianisation thesis. Generally, it is evident that the proletarianisation theorists tend to focus their attention on the plight of the lower level white-collar worker in the workplace rather than the marketplace. The reason is that it is easier to demonstrate not only a relative deterioration of
the work situation, but also an absolute one. It is not only the case that the rewards of the workplace tend to have become reduced vis à vis the manual worker, but it's also the case that these rewards are less vis à vis what they used to be for the white-collar worker a generation ago. It is easy to show, in other words, that lower level white-collar workers are now deprived not only in relation to manual workers, but also in relation to their own past situation. In the case of the marketplace, on the other hand, while it is true that many working-class incomes now equal if not surpass those of lower level white-collar workers (see Chapter III), it is also true that the real incomes of both groups have risen over time; the situation is that working-class incomes have risen faster. As such, there exists a relative but not absolute deterioration. The problem, however, is how to assess this change; do we speak of the working-class 'catching-up' or the lower middle-class 'falling-behind'? At this juncture, empirical models alone will not suffice; it becomes necessary to rely on one's theoretical imagination as well.

The overall implication of these problems is that it is necessary both theoretically and methodologically to have reasonably clear models of class structure and class culture in order to undertake any empirical examination of either of these three theses. The first is necessary in order to identify class position and class situation. The second is
necessary to provide an external benchmark against which to compare our own data on the association between class and various aspects of life-style. Construction of these models will be undertaken in the three chapters which follow. In Chapter II, we shall examine the literature on social class and use this to establish a model of class structure and class formation appropriate for modern society. In Chapter III we shall examine the evidence concerning class differences in the various aspects of class situation; and in Chapter IV we shall take a look at the literature on class culture and class life-styles in order to establish 'conventional images' of the nature of working- and middle-class life.

These models will, in fact, enable us to resolve, at least partially, three analytical problems. Firstly, we shall have a model of class culture which will serve as a point of reference and comparison with the Canadian data presented in the latter part of the thesis. As these data are only cross-sectional rather than longitudinal, comparison with the models established in Chapters III and IV will allow us to make oblique inferences about changes over time which would otherwise be impossible. And thirdly, by reviewing the evidence on differences and similarities in class situation and class culture we shall preview the evidence for and against the three perspectives, and therewith establish some initial conclusions against which to compare the Canadian data. This
will be especially useful as most of the existing literature on class culture and on certain aspects of class situation deals with American or British society. The models, then, will serve not only the purpose of historical comparison, but also that of cross-cultural comparison.

Summary

The purpose of this opening chapter has been to acquaint the reader with the historical and, more importantly, theoretical context in which the thesis is set. In this respect, it has attempted to contextualise the discussion both sociologically and socially by drawing out the specific theoretical problem, the thesis of embourgeoisement, from the context of the post-war attempts to establish a theory of modern society, and relating this to the social and historical climate of that period. This has meant adumbrating the major changes in the structure of post-war society which impinge most directly on the stratification order; examining the various major attempts to come to grips theoretically with these changes; and finally how these, in turn have given rise to three perspectives on the structure and culture of the class system—the theses of embourgeoisement, proletarianisation, and class convergence.

The following three chapters will be devoted to ironing out the methodological problems entailed in examining these perspectives. Chapter II will concern the theory of
class structure, and Chapters III and IV will focus upon the
literature addressing differences and similarities in class
situation and class culture respectively. These discussions
will then serve as points of reference and comparison with
the Canadian data analysed in Chapters VI and VII.
CHAPTER II

A MODEL OF CLASS STRUCTURE

Introduction

It is a frequent complaint from students that sociology seems obsessed with its own past, with re-reading and re-interpreting the theories of earlier scholars. Though this may be dismissed by the flippant as a sign of insecurity or narcissism, it derives largely from a recognition on our part that the fundamental problems and issues identified and discussed by those scholars are still with us, albeit, perhaps, in modified form. Foremost among these issues is the debate over social inequality, particularly over the form which it adopts in industrial capitalist society and the manner in which it ramifies upon the wider society. Inevitably, this brings us to the debate over social class and the nature of class, as opposed to status; estate, or caste, stratification. Despite the predilection of certain American sociologists to proclaim the fall or withering away of class stratification during the 1950's, it still remains very much with us as a conceptual tool for understanding modern society, whether we choose to identify as such, or by some other name such as 'socio-economic-status'.

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Words, however, are not concepts, and they are certainly not theories. Because we retain the use of certain words does not mean we endow them with the same meaning as those who used them before us. Nor does it mean we have a clear-cut model of assumptions and propositions about the nature of the real phenomenon we identify by use of the word. In this respect, social class may be said to stand out as a term which has been used to denote many concepts yet for which we have very few theories. The aim, therefore, of this chapter is to establish by means of a review of the major theoretical positions a concept and model of social class and class structure to use as a basis for the examination of the embourgeoisement thesis which follows in the subsequent chapters.

In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to return to the intellectual legacies of class theory, and attempt to reveal and elaborate major lines of theoretical synthesis. In doing this, the discussion will fall more heavily on the European tradition in class theory since it is this, rather than the American, which has confronted more directly and more successfully the conceptual and theoretical problems associated with the analysis of class stratification, particularly in the context of western society. These problems have been largely eschewed by American sociologists, who have generally preferred to reduce class (or 'socio-economic-status') to quantifiable operational definitions, and to treat it
apart from considerations of the wider social and historical context.

At first, this may appear strange as the subject of the research in an examination of the thesis of embourgeoisement in the context of a North American society, Canada. Nevertheless, as both Parkin (1972) and Giddens (1973) have made clear, class inequalities are an inherent feature of capitalism. Moreover, the magnitude of these inequalities is, for the most part, no less great in North America than it is in Western Europe. This is not to deny that important differences between them do exist, but these have to do more with the extent to which they are, to borrow Giddens' term, "structurated"—that is, the extent to which they are inter-generationally fixed and socially 'transparent'. In this respect, most observers acknowledge that the class system has been historically less structurated in North America than in Europe. This fact, however, does not preclude our applying European models to North American realities; it simply means that we have to bear in mind the differences, and be willing to change our theory when it becomes inappropriate.

Marx: Class and the Division of Property

In spite of the many different uses to which the term social class is put, and the many different concepts which are implied therewith, most owe some debt, however
small, to the legacy of Marx. While Marx was by no means the first to use class as an analytical device, sociologists generally consider his writings as the origin of class theory.

The initial problem which confronts any student wishing to interpret and understand Marx is that of inconsistency. It is inevitable that anyone who writes on the scale Marx did will tend to use terms inconsistently, and overlook the implications of formally stated definitions. In Marx's case it is ironic that he did not clearly articulate one single concept of class, although the term occupied a central position in his whole intellectual creation. Indeed, it appears that he used the term in a number of different ways and in different contexts, though the actual number remains a point of some contention among Marxian scholars. For example: In the most famous work, the polemical Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels speak of a dichotomous division of classes in capitalist society between the dominant bourgeoisie and the dominated proletariat. At other times, Marx seems to speak of a tripartite division, as in the final pages of the manuscript for the third volume of Capital, between a land owning aristocracy, a capital owning bourgeoisie, and a propertyless proletariat. And finally, at other times, most notably in the historical analyses such as the Eighteenth Brumaire, he speaks of several other classes such as the peasantry, the petty-bourgeoisie, the lumpenproletariat, and the various 'service' classes such as soldiers, government functionaries,
and the 'labour of superintendence' in addition to the two 'great' classes of bourgeoisie and proletariat.

To a large extent, however, these apparent confusions can be clarified if we consider the different literary contexts in which the different usages arise. In both the polemical and the more strictly sociological-analytical writings Marx employs a model of class structure which is essentially dichotomous, and in which class position is seen as a function of the distribution of productive property. In this way, the class structure of capitalism is divided into capital (bourgeoisie) and wage labour (proletariat), the former appropriating the wealth produced by the latter. On the other hand, in the journalistic and historical-analytical writings, Marx tends to make use of a multiple class model in which class position, though never clearly spelled out, is implied in terms of what appears to be a mixture of property ownership and the division of labour. The former, sociological model entails a nominal concept of class which can be viewed, in Weberian terms, as an ideal type. The latter, historical model, on the other hand, is based upon a real concept of class in which the relationship of bourgeoisie and proletariat is complicated by the presence of intermediary strata pursuing their economic interests separately on the basis of short-term considerations.

The disjunction between these two models of class is resolved for Marx by the theory of capitalist development.
From the Paris Manuscripts onwards, Marx argues that the imminent tendency of capitalist society is for the historically 'real' class structure to approximate more and more closely the 'pure' form of a dichotomous division between bourgeoisie and proletariat, a division which is founded on domination and contradiction: The bourgeoisie occupies a position of economic and political domination derived from the control of property (capital), having conquered and absorbed the remaining vestiges of the old dominant class of feudalism, the land-owning aristocracy. The proletariat, on the other hand, though numerically far superior, is condemned to a situation of subordination. This emanates from the absence of control over property and the subsequent need to sell labour power as the means to subsist which result in the individual's degradation to the status of a commodity and thing.

This situation occurs, Marx argues, because of the very nature of capitalist development: The incessant drive for capital accumulation gives rise inevitably to the concentration and centralisation of capital and other economic resources, resulting therewith in the absorption of the intermediary strata into the ranks of the two 'great' classes, particularly into the proletariat as the structural bases for economic autonomy are increasingly eroded. Thus, from a theoretical point of view, the intermediary strata are seen as transitional phenomena destined to disappear with the maturation of capitalism. As such, therefore, we might say
there exists for Marx an important distinction between the ideal and the actual, yet at the same time, an abiding belief that the distance between them is becoming increasingly narrowed.

Underlying this theory are certain basic features around which much of the subsequent debate with the 'ghost of Marx' has revolved. Most significant are the relationship between class structure and property, the assumption of an inherently antagonistic relationship between capital and labour, and the implication that classes are real, or potentially real, social groups capable of concerted political action in the pursuit of conscious collective goals.

Notwithstanding what appear to be occasional references to classes in occupational terms, it is clear that Marx views class structure as a derivative of the unequal distribution of productive property; the fundamental of class position, then, emanate from the individual's relationship to the ownership (and thereby control) of the means of production (land, capital, technology, etc.). In this respect, he unequivocally rejects the identification of class position with level of income or functional position in the division of labour. This does not mean that quantitative economic inequalities (a notion best approximated by the idea of 'exploitation') are unimportant to his analytical scheme, but rather that, by themselves, they are of secondary significance. What is of principal interest is the manner
in which wealth is generated and socially appropriated—
through private property and the market allocation of rents,
profits, and wages—and the way in which this, in turn,
determines the calculation of economic, and therefore class,
interests. Thus for example, two individuals may share the
same occupation and enjoy comparable levels of income, yet
if the former is self-employed then he is petty bourgeois
whereas the latter, if he is an employee, is a proletarian.

What this points to is, as Dahrendorf (1959) has
rightly noted, that Marx is not primarily interested in
classes as strata in a system of stratification in the sense
used by most modern sociologists, i.e. the differential
distribution of social rewards. What he is concerned with
is classes as the contending parties within a system of
social, economic, and political conflict; classes for Marx
are, above all else, conflict groups in a framework of
domination and subordination.

This brings us directly to the second point, namely
that Marx assumes class relations, especially in the 'pure'
dichotomous form engendered by capitalism, are inherently
antagonistic. This assumption stems from the observation he
made early in his intellectual career that capitalism, as
an economic system in which the private ownership of produc-
tive property is predominant, gives rise to its own internal
contradictions'. These, in turn, are seen as different
concrete forms of the basic paradox that the system generated
increasing material wealth, yet at the same time those who are responsible for its actual production, the proletariat, find themselves increasingly impoverished both materially and spiritually (through increasing alienation). In short, those who produce wealth neither enjoy nor control it.

This belief forms the basis for Marx's later discussions of surplus value and exploitation from which the assumption of inherent class antagonism is theoretically derived. Given a system of production and exchange in which private property is the basis for the appropriation of surplus value by a minority of property owners, themselves caught up inextricably in a system of profit maximisation and capital accumulation, then the economic interests of the mass of wage-earners who produce that surplus, yet do not share it, naturally lie in conflict with the interests of those who do not actively produce yet do appropriate. Thus the division between bourgeois and proletarian is a qualitative rather than simply quantitative one; it is in the very mechanisms of property and the market by means of which wealth is produced and thereby distributed that the antagonistic relations of the capitalist class structure are rooted.

The actual nature of this antagonism, the form that it adopts, is, however, problematic. The materialistic thesis provides, as has already been noted, for the development of certain 'contradictory' forces such as alienation, the tendency for the rate of profit to fall, the depression
of wages through the maintenance of an 'industrial reserve army' of underemployed proletarians, and the 'socialisation' of capitalism in the form of the joint stock company, but nowhere does Marx specifically predict the inevitability of one final ruinous crisis in which capitalism is ultimately transcended (though he does come very close to doing so at times, and later positivistic interpretations of Marxism certainly have). For this crisis to occur, it is necessary that the proletariat become the active agent of revolutionary transformation, that it unite theory with **Praxis** through the development of class consciousness, ideology, and political struggle. In this respect, the so-called inexorable decline of bourgeois society rests ultimately on the purposive actions of a united proletariat.

As this clearly implies, Marx envisions classes as at least potentially real social entities, as collective actors internally bound together by concerted effort. This conception is at the bottom of his distinction between a "class-in-itself" (Klasse-an-Sich), and a "class-for-itself" (Klasse-fur-Sich). The former denotes the analytical class construct of the observer; the latter, on the other hand, denotes the real class, the collective actor held together by consciousness of kind and political organisation. The

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distinction is necessary to the extent that it handles--conceptually at least--the problem that empirically capitalism does not automatically engender proletarian unity, and class struggle of an overt kind. Indeed, it is unlikely to do so, particularly in its early stages of development, given the ideological and general superstructural supports that are also fostered. It follows quite logically, then, that the transformation of the proletariat from a 'class-in-itself' into a 'class-for-itself' can come about only when the contradictory nature of bourgeois society becomes more and more manifest.

Though Marx's sociological predictions about class formation and conflict, and the transition to a more rational social order may have remained unsupported by the course of events, we should not succumb to haste in discarding the model completely. Marx may have overlooked or failed to anticipate a whole array of factors which have subsequently militated against the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, such things as the growth of new forms of skilled labour, the expansion of the tertiary sector to absorb those displaced from manufacturing by technological rationalisation, the success of labour unions in raising workers' living standards, the competing pull of community affiliation based not upon shared economic position and interest but religious or ethnic identity, and so on. At the same time, Marx made a lasting contribution to our understanding of social inequality by
placing so much emphasis on the principal basis on which the production and distribution of wealth (and for Marx, therefore, power also) rests: property ownership and control.

But this means more than simply recognising that property ownership remains a basic means whereby people appropriate wealth, prestige, and power. It means recognising that the production of these facilities, most especially wealth, and their distribution are not two separate social functions, but are processes which are inextricably inter-related and inter-dependent. What Marx reveals, in other words, is that the manner in which wealth is produced—the social organisation of production, the mode of production, etc.—determines, to a certain degree, who will appropriate it and, for that matter, the way in which it will be consumed. Recognition of this fundamental relationship between these three elements of economic activity, and therewith of its implications for the structure of the stratification order, have to a great extent been overlooked by modern sociologists. At best, property is seen as a source of economic appropriation alongside income, rent, dividends, etc., without consideration being made for the relationship between them.

10. For example, in refuting the assertion by J.S. Mill that the organisation of human production is natural whereas that of distribution is social, Marx states that, "The 'laws and conditions of the production of wealth and the laws of the 'distribution of wealth' are the same laws under different forms, and both change, undergo the same historic process; are as such only moments of a historic process", Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (rough draft), M. Nicolaus (ed.), Pelican Books, 1973, p. 832.
Indeed, this has resulted in the importance of property ownership to the class structure being de-emphasized on the grounds that the vast majority of individuals now acquire wealth through earned income, the amount of wealth accruing to property in the form of profits and rent having declined as a proportion of the total national wealth in the western societies. We have overlooked that our society is still capitalist in the sense that the 'mode of production' is grounded in the institutions of private property and wage labour, and that the distribution of economic assets and rewards will favour those who control the former.

Acknowledging this relationship, and the implication it carries for the dominance of property holders in the distributive system, does not necessarily commit us to accepting Marx's predictions about class formation and class relations in advanced capitalism. It is clear that the intermediary strata which Marx considered moribund have not so much disappeared as undergone transformation. The growth of professional, scientific, technical, managerial, clerical, and sales occupations has conduced to the perpetuation of economic inequalities founded not only on the division of property but also on the division of labour and differential market capacity for the sale of labour. The homogenisation of wage labour both in terms of skill level and in terms of level of material remuneration which Marx predicted has not taken place. Substantial inequalities persist among those
who sell their labour power as their means of livelihood, as we shall see in the following chapter. At the same time, these structural changes have not appreciably altered, let alone transformed, the relationship between production and distribution, property and labour, which characterised earlier capitalist societies.

Yet clearly, as it stands, the Marxist model is inadequate. While recognising the primacy of property on the class structure we need a model which will also enable us to account for inequalities deriving from the division of labour and the marketplace as well. To establish such a model, we must look to the critique of Marx, and most especially to Max Weber's attempt to outline a model of social class and class formation in terms of the division of both property and labour.

Weber: Class and the Division of Labour

The central features of Marx's model of class structure and formation have become, in T.B. Bottomore's (1965:21) words, "the object of unrelenting criticism" by professional sociologists, particularly in the 1950's and early 1960's when the prospects for a proletarian overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of rational communism seemed highly remote. Foremost among these critics were writers like Geiger (1969) for whom class society was now in the "melting pot"; Aron (1967) for whom all thought of capitalism as the distinguishing
characteristic of western society was now overwhelmed by a homogenising industrialism; and Robert Nisbet (1959) who celebrated the "decline and fall" of social class as a principal axis of social, economic, and political differentiation in modern society. What much of this criticism boiled down to was that while much of Marx's analysis—divested, needless to say, of its ideological contaminants!—was useful and insightful, particularly into the structure of Victorian capitalism, the overall predictions derived from the theory have proven false due to the countervailing tendencies mentioned earlier. Marxism, then, became rather like a scrapped automobile—useless as an integrated whole, but useful as a source of 'spare parts' for generating improved theory. Though some of this criticism has been recent, much of it, in fact, dates back to what Giddens (1973) has labelled the "first generation of Marx critics". Among these, the most prominent by far is Max Weber.

The problem confronting any scholar who wishes to understand Weber's discussions of stratification is that they are again rather fragmented and—at times unclear, resulting subsequently in their having been 'misinterpreted' and 'trivialised' to some extent by later generations of sociologists. Nevertheless, Weber does attempt to provide us with something Marx did not, namely a systematic conceptual analysis of class and the related concepts of 'status group' and 'party'. In fact, Weber's contribution to stratification
theory is twofold: firstly, the analytical differentiation of class from status group and party; and secondly, a complex typology of class in terms of the relationship between property, the market (itself differentiated into the commodity, credit, and labour markets), and the division of labour. These two contributions, however, have not been given equal prominence by later sociologists; it is the differentiation of class and status group which has been accorded greater attention, particularly by American sociologists, and for reasons which are not hard to discern.

The context in which Weber addresses most systematically the relationship between class and the other two concepts is in the short essay titled, appropriately enough, "Class, Status, and Party" (1958). Despite the typically formalistic style of presentation, "Class, Status, and Party" should be viewed to some extent as a polemic against Weber's Marxist contemporaries like the 'talented' Georg Lukacs. As such, Weber is concerned to demonstrate what he considers to be some of the main misconceptions of the Marxists' analyses, foremost among which is the assumption of class consciousness among the proletariat as an inevitable outcome of capitalist development. To handle these problems, Weber

11. There is some general contention surrounding the extent to which Weber's so-called 'dialogue with the ghost of Marx' is not in fact more of a dialogue (or should one say polemic?) with his own Marxist contemporaries like Lukacs and Rosa Luxembourg.
distinguishes analytically between classes, status groups, and political parties, all of which are seen as contending modes of organisation in the 'distribution of power'. As such, it is worthy of note that the three do not constitute separate 'dimensions' of stratification, as some later sociologists have interpreted them, but rather three separate forms for the pursuit of the same goal, namely power. Of the three, it is the relationship between class and status group which is the most problematic, and which has served as the basis for later misunderstandings.

In the schema outlined in "Class, Status, and Party" Weber devotes a considerable amount of time to discussion of status stratification and the ways in which it is distinct from class. The treatment, unfortunately (and uncharacteristically), is rather ambiguous. Status groups are defined primarily in terms of criteria other than those relating to property and market forces. In this respect, Weber is clearly influenced by his own studies of oriental society, and indeed most (though not all) of the illustrations of status stratification are taken from pre-capitalist society. Here, Weber takes some pain to show that the status order (that is, the differential allocation of honour and worth) is distinct from the class order and may in fact countervail it: "But status honour need not necessarily be linked with a 'class situation'. On the contrary, it normally stands in sharp opposition to the pretensions of sheer property" (1958:187).
Or again, "Therefore all groups having interests in the status order react with special sharpness precisely against the pretensions of purely economic acquisition" (1958:192). As examples of this, he points to ethnic segregation and community formation cross-cutting objective class lines such as that accomplished by European Jews.

This emphasis, together with the illustrations Weber uses, have led some later sociologists to interpret status groups as completely non-economic phenomena based upon such criteria as age, gender, ethnicity, race, and religion. This interpretation has enjoyed a certain degree of popularity among American sociologists faced with the persistence of religious and ethnic pluralism in the United States, a particularly notable phenomenon in light of the relative absence of strong class based institutions such as Communist and Social Democratic political parties.

This interpretation is misleading, however, to the extent that Weber also speaks of status groups in terms which are clearly economic:

With some oversimplification one might thus say that 'classes' are stratified according to their relations to the production and acquisition of goods; whereas 'status groups' are stratified according to the principles of their consumption of goods as represented by special 'styles of life'" (1958:193).

Thus one of the distinguishing characteristics of status groups is that the members typically share a common pattern
of consumption and a common life-style on which their claims to status honour are based, and in terms of which internal closure is to some extent accomplished.

So far it may seem that Weber paints a fairly clear picture of the lines of differentiation between the bases of class and status group formation. On closer scrutiny, however, this assessment begins to appear unwarranted. Weber seems generally confused as to the empirical (as opposed to analytical) relationship between class and status. For example, at one point he emphasises that status groups counter the "pretensions of sheer property", yet at another point, he states, "Property as such is not always recognised as a status qualification, but in the long run it is, and with extraordinary regularity" (1958:187). Or again, "And today, the class situation is by far the predominant factor, for of course the possibility of a style of life expected for members of a status group is usually conditioned economically" (1958:190). And finally, "Of course, material monopolies provide the most effective motives for the exclusiveness of a status group; although in themselves they are rarely sufficient, almost always they come into play to some extent" (1958:191). How do we make sense of these confusions?

The first point which must be re-iterated is that Weber's discussion is partly a polemic against what he feels is the Marxist obsession with class to the exclusion of other forms of inequality. As such, it is probable that at times
he purposely overstates the separation of class and status. Secondly, it is important to note that in spite of the copious illustrations, he is writing at an essentially analytical level of abstraction; the illustrations are themselves drawn largely from pre-capitalist society where the realm of consumption often enjoys a degree of autonomy from those of production and distribution because of the 'imperfect' operation of the market.

As for Marx, the development of capitalist society represents for Weber something of a transformation rather than mere modification of economic relations. This transformation is based upon the extension of the market and market principles of regulation from the local to the national and international levels, and from the distribution of credit and commodities to the distribution of labour as well. The obvious implication of this is that the relations of production, distribution, and consumption come to share a joint dependency on property and general market forces. Thus, in capitalist society, as Weber himself points out, the ability to pursue (consume) a particular style of life becomes increasingly dependent on one's position vis à vis the relations of production and distribution ("allocation", "acquisition"), that is, upon one's class position. Consequently, there is a tendency for the class and status orders to become superimposed upon one another as the market increasingly pervades all sectors of economic life. We may note,
moreover, that this tendency is further stimulated by the fact that relative to earlier forms of economic organisation capitalism is characterised by a high rate of economic and technological change which in turn tends to be conducive to the predominance of class stratification:

When the acquisition and distribution of goods are relatively stable, stratification by status is favoured. Every technological repercussion and economic transformation threatens stratification by status and pushes the class situation into the foreground. Epochs and countries in which the naked class situation is of predominant significance are regularly the periods of technical and economic transformation" (1958:193-4).

To the extent, then, that industrial capitalism can be said to institutionalise change, it can also be said to be a predominantly class stratified form of society.

Nevertheless, the relationship between class and status still remains problematic. The principal inadequacy Weber finds with the Marxist treatment of class pertains to the assumption that classes become 'communities', i.e. 'classes-for-themselyes', as part of the natural development of capitalism. Although Weber nowhere denies that classes can become communities, it is clear that he considers it unlikely: "To treat 'class' conceptually as having the same value as 'community' leads to distortion" (1958:184). In the passage from which this quotation is taken, Weber in fact goes on to castigate Lukacs for committing "that kind of pseudo-scientific operation" wherein the development of class consciousness is
seen to be inevitable. For Weber, on the other hand, it is status groups which are more likely to undergo development into communities, in which the membership shares a sense of belonging and an awareness of common interests. This seems to imply (and again, it is certainly how later sociologists have understood it) that Weber conceives of classes as the 'objective' aspect of stratification, and status as the 'subjective' one. This seems generally to fit with his methodological concern with the interpretive aspect of social action; class would refer to the factual inequalities while status would denote the way in which these are seen and acted upon by social actors. The message to the Marxists is unequivocal: what is important for understanding human action is not the factual distribution of rewards, but rather the perceived distribution.

Weber leaves us, however, with these two images of status, one referring to stratification in terms of life-style and consumption, the other referring to the subjective, interpretive aspect of stratification. The actual relationship between them remains unclarified and unexplored.

The treatment of class itself is likewise deceptive, to the extent that what begins as a systematic conceptual analysis reveals, on closer examination, certain internal ambiguities and confusions. Weber commences with a purely abstract model of class which is clearly economic: classes are seen as the 'objective' product of the interplay of
property and market forces. Class situation is equated with 'market situation', and class position is seen to denote shared 'life-chances' for the procurement of wealth and opportunities for mobility. Classes, in this sense, are seen as products of the relations of production and distribution.

On the basis of this general concept Weber goes on to specify further refinements in which class is divided into three subtypes: 'ownership' classes (Besitzkassen), 'acquisition' classes (Erwerbsklassen), and finally 'social' classes.

The distinction between ownership and acquisition classes is both important and useful, and enables us to make some valuable modifications to the Marxist model. The difference between them derives from the distinction between property and skills as the basis for one's "procuring goods, gaining a position in life and finding inner satisfactions". Ownership classes derive from "the kind of property that is usable for returns", while acquisition classes derive from the "kind of services that can be offered on the market" (1958: 102). What this amounts to is the addition of another variable to that of property ownership as the foundation of class structure, the ownership (itself also privatised in capitalist society) of marketable skills, talents, and knowledge. In this respect, Weber comes to regard the fusion of two orders—the division of property and the division of labour and skills (manifested concretely in the form of the occupational structure)—as the basis of the class
structure of capitalist society.

The principal implication of this change is that it enables us to make some differentiation among the mass of 'propertyless' wage and salary earners in terms of both the acquisition of economic rewards and the calculation of economic interests. This, of course, is important for the purposes of coming to grips with the class structure of advanced capitalist society in which the mass of wage and salary earners has not become the homogenised class Marx predicted it would. Following Weber, we can view differentiation within this group precisely in terms of the degree of monopolisation of marketable skills, epitomised in the form of the established 'professions' like law and medicine. This, in turn, enables us to distinguish degrees of 'middle-class' occupying an interstitial market position between the 'positively privileged' class of property owners on the one hand, and the 'negatively privileged' class of propertyless and unskilled labour on the other.

Despite the overall utility of this change, there remain a number of problematic points in Weber's analysis: what is the empirical relationship between the division of property and the division of labour? How many classes does Weber actually envisage, how does he specify, in other words, concrete class boundaries? And how is this model of class reconciled with the typology of markets? The answers to these queries are by and large left implicit and undeveloped;
they become a matter of inference on the part of the reader. This is because Weber is working at a largely analytic level in "Class, Status, and Party", and these are questions which require us to move to a more empirical one.

With respect to the first matter of the relationship between the property and occupational structures, then we can assume that Weber regards their relationship as symbiotic but unequal. The fact that acquisition classes are typically viewed as 'middle-classes', occupying a position in the class hierarchy under that of property classes, clearly implies that occupation and skills are dependent upon property rather than conversely so. As Weber himself phrased it, "Property and the lack of property...are the basic categories of all class situations" (1958:182). In this respect, if in no other, the difference from Marx is negligible.

The second and third points of issue are, however, more problematic. In his historical works Weber distinguishes between three spheres of the market: the commodity, credit, and labour markets, in which an individual can occupy a position of either domination or subordination. For example, in Antiquity relations in the credit market were predominant, and generated conflict between debtors and creditors which took on a societal significance. In feudal society, on the other hand, this arena of conflict was superceded by the commodity sphere in which conflict was based on the price of basic goods such as foodstuffs. With the ascendancy of
capitalism, finally, the market principle spreads to the area of labour supply and the predominant mode of conflict becomes that over the price of wage labour.

What remains unclear in this analysis is whether or not conflict in the first two cases—antiquity and feudalism—can be said to be class conflict. As classes are, strictly speaking, properties of the market, then we have a strong case for arguing that they only emerge with the development of a relatively free market for labour, in other words with the emergence of capitalism itself. Weber does indeed recognise this to the extent that he regards slaves, for example, as a status group rather than a class, notwithstanding the fact that they are an important grouping in the relations of both production and allocation in ancient society. On the other hand, Weber does regard these conflicts in ancient and feudal society as class conflicts. The reasoning behind this appears to rest on the assumption that the realms of credit and commodity distribution were to some extent at least mediated by market mechanisms even though labour distribution was not. Analytically this complicates matters considerably since it implies that we have to take account of three separate class positions corresponding to three separate market spheres.

The way out of this analytical morass is to move from the analytical to the concrete level. Like Marx, Weber recognises in capitalism a transformation of the bases of
economic life as the market mechanism increasingly pervades the organisation of productive, distributive, and consumption function as the national and international levels. This development, in turn, alters the bases of the stratification order in the sense that the importance and autonomy of traditional status groups wanes as they become increasingly superimposed upon the class structure through dependency upon the market. Thus, despite the analytical separation of classes and status groups, the former become predominant in capitalist society, and the status order largely contingent upon class. In this respect, for Weber also, capitalist society is class society.

This still leaves the problem of identifying empirically class boundaries. Obviously, the implication of Weber's discussion, particularly in light of the Marxist emphasis upon class dichotomisation and internal homogenisation, is that the class structure of capitalist society is more differentiated and diversified; the question is, how much so? If class position refers to any group of individuals who, speaking objectively, share the same amounts of either property and/or skills which they bring to the market, then as Giddens (1973) has pointed out, pushed to its logical extreme we can arrive at as many discrete class positions as there are individuals participating in the market, given that each one is likely to have a fractionally different combination of property and skills in relation to all the
rest. To a certain degree Weber does recognise this problem of infinite regression, and the concept of 'social' class can be regarded as a partial solution. This denotes an aggregate of objectively separate economic, class situations joined together in terms of shared mobility opportunities (both intra- and inter-generational), life-styles, and life-chances in the broad sense. In this respect the idea of social class can be seen to introduce some unification to an otherwise disparate mass of strictly economic class situations; it is a way of introducing order amidst potential chaos.

On the basis of this, Weber goes on to identify four broad social classes in capitalist society: propertyless manual or blue-collar workers, the petty bourgeoisie (small, independent commodity and service producers and distributors), propertyless non-manual or white-collar workers—"technicians, various kinds of white-collar employees, civil servants...", and finally an upper class of those "privileged through property and education" (Giddens, 1973). Like Marx, Weber believes (correctly) that the petty bourgeoisie were becoming increasingly insignificant; unlike Marx, on the other hand, he believes that propertyless white-collar workers were becoming increasingly important as a class sui generis.

To summarise: in Weber's discussions of stratification there are certain features which prove to be both important and useful for dealing with the inadequacies of the Marxist model, particularly its emphasis upon class dichotomi-
sation and homogenisation as an outcome of capitalist development. While he continues to view property as the principal axis of the stratification order, Weber introduces an additional variable in the form of 'marketable' skills as a means of differentiation among the mass of propertyless wage and salary earners. This, in turn, enables him to establish the idea of a 'middle-class' in its own right, without seeing it as a residue from some earlier stage of societal development destined to be swallowed up by other classes.

At the same time, Weber's penchant for analytical precision leads him into a maze of fine distinctions from which the only means of extrication is to resort to the concrete empirical level. This unavoidably entails certain confusions and ambiguities, the most important of which pertains to the nature of status and status groups, and the latter's relationship to class.

Notwithstanding these problems, Weber's stratification theory has been integrated into modern sociological thinking on the nature of inequality in two ways. The first has been an emphasis upon the differentiation of class and status stratification, and the importance of the former as a separate dimension of inequality which can cut across the 'normal' lines of class division. This approach has enjoyed a certain currency in American sociology, where it has figured most prominently in the widespread use of prestige scales. The second use to which Weber has been put is the
attempt to develop ideas about the relationship between class, property, the market, and the division of labour.

Weber Updated: Class Structure and Modern Society

It is the first avenue from Weber which has been the source of much of the 'trivialisation' and 'misinterpretation' to which we alluded above; the second avenue, on the other hand, has remained largely unexplored until recently. Though it may by now seem cant, it is nevertheless true that to a great extent stratification theory and research in American sociology have been deeply underpinned by conservative ideological assumptions, and have subsequently acquired a pervasive middle-class bias. As a result of this situation class and status have tended to be paraded as contenders for the stratification honours of American society, usually with victory to the latter. Examples of this, particularly in the conservative post-war period, are not difficult to find: "So far as the bulk of western society is concerned, and especially in the United States, the concept of class is largely obsolete" (Nisbet, 1959:16).

While this, and other, proclamations of classlessness may have peaked in the 1950's and early '60's, the sentiments underlying such conclusions can be traced back to the origins of an indigenous sociology in the U.S. In his documentation of the contributions to stratification theory of the "founding fathers" of American sociology, Charles Page (1969)
has revealed and examined the underlying themes and assumptions which characterised the work of such men as Cooley, Ross, Small, Ward, and Sumner. While these men did recognise the existence of economic and political inequality in American society, they did not come to regard it as an institutionalised phenomenon with generational persistence due to the obdurate structures of economic production and distribution. Poverty and powerlessness simply signified the absence of sufficient inclination on the part of the individual to strive assiduously for success. They depicted America as an essentially open society in which mobility of the talented, aided by education and appropriate socialisation, diminished the historical continuity of inequality, and thereby reduced its political and cultural impact on the wider society. Those who did not succeed in this open society, then, were the "weak and incompetent" whose plight was because "they or their parents [had] failed the tests of the competitive system" (E.A. Ross, 1924, as cited in J. Pease et al., 1970:127).

This legacy persisted, and found fertile soil in the development and intellectual hegemony of structural-functionalism in the post-war period. In certain respects, however, the functionalists went further in their claims than these early sociologists. Economic inequalities represented by class were replaced as the core of the stratification order by moral-symbolic inequality reflected in the attribution of
differential status and prestige in terms of society's "common value system." What this amounted to was grafting a rather selective reading of Weber onto the conservative and celebrationist sentiments of early American sociology. This was most evident in the works of Parsons (1940, 1953) and his students for whom stratification was defined a priori as a system of hierarchical ranking based upon a social judgment of people's worth. In the Davis-Moore (1945) theory of stratification this, in turn, was expressed in terms of differential "functional importance": those who were more functionally important, who made a greater contribution to the social system as judged on the basis of shared moral sentiments, were accorded greater social rewards, a system which served not only to reward the meritorious but also to encourage the talented to strive for the functionally most important positions. Thus, material inequalities were seen to be dependent upon, to be the consequence of prior evaluations of social and moral worth, and the structure of inequality to be a finely graded hierarchy with a multiplicity of cross-cutting divisions.

Methodologically, this emphasis upon prestige and status was well suited to the empiricist tendencies in social research among American sociologists, and in a way which reflected the dominant social values of that society. Differential status and prestige were conveniently measured by social survey techniques--"moral referenda" in Parkin's
(1972) terms—which could claim to have validity precisely because they were 'democratic' instruments for obtaining information, and therewith truly representative of the wider social consciousness. Like the voter in the political arena, or the consumer in the marketplace, the survey respondent, chosen randomly to avoid bias, casted his or her vote for a particular occupation, ethnic group, religious affiliation, or whatever, and thereby elected its members or adherents to a position of social honour and worth. The survey, like the ballot, represented the majority view. And while the population-at-large had little say or control over the distribution of wealth or power, their representatives did decide, on the basis of one-man-one-vote, upon those endowed with status and esteem.

The principal consequence of these theoretical and methodological assumptions has been generally to degrade the importance accorded to material and political inequalities in American society at the expense of those based upon some moral-symbolic evaluation. Even for non-functionalists material inequalities, while recognised, were generally subsumed under the heading of 'socio-economic status' which was not so much a concept as an operational measure composed of income level, years of formal schooling, and occupational
prestige. 12 As for the functionalists, the idea of social class was avoided; no attempt was made to elaborate and explore what form class inequalities take, why they are important, how and why they change. Just as the functionalists began by subordinating class to status, so the 'socio-economic-status' theorists began by taking for granted the very issues they should have sought to analyse and explain. The overall effect of this has been that the study of stratification in American sociology has furnished us either with theories of status stratification, or with a catalogue of ever expanding studies informing us how well 'socio-economic-status' predicts variance in an array of attitudes and activities as diverse as toilet training and political party affiliations (for a review of this literature, see Chapter IV below). Yet from all this frenetic endeavour, a systematic

12. The use of 'socio-economic-status' scales conducted nicely to the popularity of quantitative empiricism in American social research, and fitted easily with the advent of computer fetishism. All three components—income, education, occupational status/prestige—are conveniently quantified by ratio/interval measures, e.g. annual income level, years of formal schooling, and ranking score on either subjective or objective occupational prestige hierarchies. As such, 'S.E.S.' is amenable to the application of more complex parametric statistical-analytic techniques, though the assumptions behind the use of such methods are seldom explicated or questioned. In operating in this manner the social and sociological "meaning" of the variables is lost to a great extent; what is gained in its stead is the ability to "predict" with varying degrees of accuracy the range of variation observed in the 'dependent' variable under examination. In this respect, the use of S.E.S. measures is symptomatic of the supplanting of explanation with prediction, and therewith of the scientisation of social research and its incorporation as an instrument of social policy.
theory of class stratification is still to emerge.

Notwithstanding the importance of status stratification, it is clear that from the point of view of a sociological understanding of structured inequality, the most profitable avenue of development from Weber is the second one, namely his discussion of the relationship between property, the market, and the division of labour. This means that we must re-think Weber's ideas in a radically different manner from that typical of American sociology. It means that we must regard stratification not as an alternative or countervailing system of inequality to that based upon class, but rather one which is typically complementary, though may at times serve to undercut the impact of unequal material rewards. To arrive at this conception is merely to recognise that when Weber takes pains to emphasize the autonomy of the status order, the tone of his discussion is designed to establish the fact that status stratification is not necessarily wholly dependent on class, not that it is wholly independent of it.

If we accept this alternative interpretation, then we can see that the status order is, to a large degree, an integral and necessary component of the class structure which serves, in functional terms, to promote moral legitimation for the unequal distribution of material and political rewards. Its role is typically to shore up and reinforce the direction and magnitude of class inequalities rather than to
militate against them. As such, the status order is indeed a crucial element in the overall maintenance of social and political order. As Parkin (1972) has argued, any structure of inequality would be fragile without moral legitimacy insofar as its foundation would rest largely upon coercion. In this respect, the functionalists are correct in their views of the 'functions' of the status order, though for the wrong reasons. Status stratification—the ranking of individuals on the basis of a moral judgment of their social worth—provides stability and cohesion not by serving as an alternative and countervailing system of stratification to that based upon class, but by providing the latter with its ideological justification.

This still leaves unanswered, however, the very basic question concerning the form and composition of the class structure in modern society. To deal with this we have to turn now to the second avenue from Weber, namely his discussion of class, and to the recent attempts to develop this discussion into a theory of class structure found in the works of a group of British sociologists, the most prominent of whom are Lockwood (1958), Giddens (1973), Parkin (1972), and MacKenzie (1973).

In the distinction between Besitzklassen and Ewerbsklassen Weber, in effect, gives us two criteria in terms of which the class order is formed; the first, like Marx, is that of the possession and control of productive
property; the second, the possession and control of 'marketable' skills. As we have already seen, the relationship between these two is, for Weber, relatively unproblematic; the dominance of property over the relations of production (in a capitalist society) can be said to render it, in turn, dominant in the relations of distribution. For the sake of re-iteration: "Property and the lack of property are, therefore, the basic categories of all class situations" (1958:182).

This model, of course, fits well with a relatively competitive market system subject to its own internal dynamics of regulation, and not to the purposive interference of outside agencies such as government. To assume such a situation persists today, however, is questionable. There is an impressively strong body of evidence pointing to the development of oligopolistic and monopolistic tendencies in all three market sectors (commodity, credit, and labour), together with an unparalleled growth of the public sector and increasing involvement by the state into the interplay of market forces. These are the changes which underlie the whole array of theories of 'post-industrialism', 'post-capitalism', 'managerial capitalism', 'monopoly capitalism', and so on, some of which were discussed or alluded to briefly in the preceding chapter.

Notwithstanding these, and other significant, changes in the structures of the modern capitalist economies, it is still evident that the First World societies of North America,
Western Europe, and Japan are still 'capitalist', at least to the extent that the bulk of productive property is still concentrated in private hands, that the predominant social relations of production are still based upon 'wage labour', and that the principles which underpin their relationship are still primarily the quest for material profit and growth. As a result of this, we can add that the production, distribution and consumption of most goods and services are largely a function of market forces rather than purposive policy of any effective kind.\textsuperscript{13} Even in those cases (very small in number) where property ownership has become genuinely diversified—the much heard-of 'people's capitalism'—control has remained privatised, if not in fact become more so. In this respect, then, we can assume that the relationship between property and skills remains largely unchanged; it is the uses to which those who own and control property choose to put it which calls forth the demand for particular types of skill and therewith shapes the division of labour and distribution of rewards, rather than the reverse. As Anderson (1974\textsuperscript{122}) has aptly put it: "...occupational remuneration

\textsuperscript{13} There are some exceptions to this, and indeed the number seems to be generally increasing due to the expansion of 'welfare state' provisions. The principal commodities to be taken off the market are health care and to a lesser extent housing, though it has happened later and more slowly in North America than in Europe.
is largely shaped by the power of organised capital over salaries and wages, and over the very composition and makeup of the occupational structure itself." Thus, in a statement like that by Parkin (1972:18) to the effect that the occupational structure is the "backbone" of the class system, the analogy may be somewhat overdrawn.

On the other hand, it is undisputably the case that the acquisition of wealth through property ownership is characteristic of only a relatively small minority of individuals. In Canada, for example, less than 10% of the total population owns any corporate stock at all, and the vast bulk of this is concentrated in the hands of a mere one or two percent (Clement, 1975). In the U.S. likewise; figures from 1962 show that 83% of all corporate stock was owned by only 5% of the population, and that 60% was owned by just 1% (Parker, 1972)! For the majority of the population, in other words, the acquisition of wealth occurs almost solely in the form of earned income from employment, from their position in the societal division of labour and labour market. Now, it is in this respect that the class structure can be said to rest on the occupational order, at least to the extent that the latter can be taken as a concrete embodiment of the division of labour and differential market capacity. At the same time, recruitment to the occupational order (and mobility, if any at all, within it), and by implication access to the distribution of economic rewards and opportunities
derived from the possession of marketable skills, has come to depend less and less upon their direct inheritance from generation to generation, and more on the acquisition of formal education and vocational training. This difference now marks off access through property from access through skills: the former is still largely accomplished through direct inter-generational inheritance, whereas the latter is not. In that respect, we may say that access to the class structure has become more democratised to the extent that access to the attainment of marketable skills is now more open than previously. This should not be taken to mean, however, that inter-generational continuity of class position has now disappeared: one of the most consistent findings of empirical research in this field is that access to education is highly contingent upon family class background.

To specify this relationship more fully we can tentatively adopt the proto framework suggested by Giddens (1973). Though we may distinguish analytically between skills and property as the bases of class formation, we must recognise that there is, in reality, only one class structure, not two. Given the predominance of property over skills, then, we can for the moment identify three broad class strata: an upper class consisting of those whose economic situation derives from the ownership of substantial property assets; a middle-class composed of those whose situation is founded on the possession of marketable skills within the
division of labour; and finally, a lower class whose market situation is typically propertyless and skill-less.

From the point of view of this schema, the vast majority of individuals in modern society would fall into the middle and lower class categories since they either sell their labour as the means to attain material subsistence, or else are the dependents of those who do. Their class position, then, would be largely a function of their or their provider's position in the occupational order. It is in this sense that Parkin is right to equate class with occupation. This model is useful, however, only as a point of departure; as it stands its usefulness is limited in two ways. The first problem is that the class categories are conceived in too broad and crude a manner for the nature of the research being undertaken. Important differences in not only immediate economic situation but also life-chances and life-styles exist within as well as between these divisions. It is necessary, therefore, to specify lines of sub-class division where theoretically and empirically appropriate.

The second, more substantial problem derives from the fact that in the context of modern industrial capitalism there is a third factor, besides property and skills, which exerts some influence upon the determination of economic situation, a factor whose emergence reflects the increasingly significant role which agencies of the state now play in the mediation of market forces in the attempt to subordinate the
latter's anarchic and disruptive quality. As we have seen, for Weber the importance of skills as a determinant of reward distribution lay in their being a typical market commodity whose price was established according to the usual mechanisms of demand and supply. As with other commodities, control of the market, and therewith the ability to subordinate it to one's own interests comes mainly through the establishment of a monopoly. The interests of buyer and seller, however, are contradictory: for the former they reside in maintaining a diversified and competitive source of supply, for the latter, on the other hand, they reside in monopolising supply and thereby establishing a situation of scarcity. In this respect, the marketplace is the institutionalisation of contradiction and conflict. The clearest example of this in practice comes from the full or established professions like law and medicine. These are "autonomous" occupations in Weber's terms insofar as the practitioners themselves exercise a good deal of control over the various aspects of skill supply—recruitment, training, policing, deployment, and so on. In this way, they have been able to promote demand and maintain a situation of relative scarcity (why is it we never have enough doctors?!?) which has, in turn, resulted in high payment. Once monopoly and closure are realised, moreover, they become difficult to assail. 

There has, however, developed an additional mode of labour monopoly and closure based upon the ability of those
who supply certain skills which are not scarce to acquire successful legal recognition of the right to control supply to some extent and to bargain collectively with employers to establish wage and salary levels: unionisation and other forms of labour collectivisation. This third form of economic enhancement has been traditionally identified with those who lacked access to the other two (property and skills), and whose situation was therefore highly precarious and deprived—low-paid, unstable, low skilled workers, usually in blue-collar or manual service work. It has served, moreover, not only as a way to enhance direct economic remuneration for the exchange of labour, but also as a means to protect security of employment to some extent, though on this latter ground the track-record of organised labour is less noteworthy.

The relationship between these three modes of class formation is hierarchical. Just as we have seen that skills are subordinate to property as a means to appropriate wealth, so we find that collectivisation is likewise subordinate to both. Collective action by relatively propertyless, skillless workers can only be successful as a means to enhance economic position as long as there already exists a demand for the type of labour being sold. It should come as no surprise to us that unions are most successful in their bargaining and organising efforts when the wider economy is booming and expanding and the demand for labour generally
high. Similarly during periods of contraction and slow-down, unions have proven relatively restricted in their attempts to stave off increasing unemployment and the erosion of their members' living standards. Monopolies based upon skill control rather than the institution of collective bargaining alone—what we have now come to term 'professionalisation' as opposed to unionisation—tend to be economically more effective since the practitioners can manipulate supply more easily (doctors do not have problems with alternative 'scab' labour), and thereby manufacture scarcity regardless, more or less, of the level of demand. From this point of view, we can see in fact that attempts by labour to 'professionalise' are often more threatening to employers than attempts to unionise, and may explain why successful professionalisation is more difficult to accomplish since it entails acquiring control over a number of aspects of the work situation which employers are loathe to relinquish. Thus we can see, along the lines of Braverman's thesis, why the energies of employing capital are directed more toward "de-skilling" labour by means of rationalising work organisation technically and socially, than they are toward 'union-busting'.

When we establish these three modes of class formation into a hierarchical scheme it is evident that we have a four rather than three class model of the stratification system. At the apex are those who own and control productive
property—land, real estate, technology, capital, etc; beneath them are those who own and control marketable skills; beneath them those who are propertyless and relatively skillless but who are collectively organised and recognised; and at the base are those who have no source of protection or enhancement, those who have neither property, skills, nor collective organisation. As we go from the base to the apex, so we find that the distribution of rewards increases.

This model, however, must be treated as an ideal type, as a construct which accentuates certain theoretically significant features of reality, rather than an attempt to depict that reality in a descriptively accurate sense. What the model attempts to do is to outline the three bases of class formation and their relationship to each other. One assumption embodied in this model which is clearly at odds with reality to some extent is that the three modes are mutually exclusive of each other. We do not need to search far for examples of situations in which two or even three are combined as the basis of class formation. Owners of capital, for example, need increasingly to acquire professional financial training and skills in order to manage their investments profitably; semi-professionals like teachers and nurses are increasingly adopting the strategy first used by skilled craftsmen of combining limited skill control with unionisation as the means to further their economic interests; and even the formerly unprotected, often those whom the
market has abandoned to become state welfare clients, are adopting collectivisation as the best way to press their claims for more benefits.

These changes illustrate what are for the most part a number of recent developments which have, like those changes emphasized by the embourgeoisement and proletarianisation theorists, been adduced by some observers as evidence that our traditional models of class which take the divisions of property and labour as the bases of class formation are increasingly obsolete. These examples are part, therefore, of the very issue which forms the core problem of this thesis, and should not be incorporated a priori into the model. By examining empirically and theoretically the theses of embourgeoisement, proletarianisation and class convergence, we are concerned not only with the relatively straightforward issues of whether blue-collar workers who are more characteristically bourgeois in certain aspects of their class situation are also more like white-collar workers in the way they organise their lives outside the market- and work-place as well, but also in what effect such changes as these signify for the very structure of class stratification and for the relationship of its structural bases and supports. In the empirical analysis which follows, then, the model we adopt will also be subjected to scrutiny, and its appropriateness as an instrument for understanding the class system thereby assessed.
In more specific terms this means that we shall continue to abide by conventional wisdom as far as the identity of these class categories is concerned. To do this we shall adopt a modified version of the schema constructed by Parkin (1972:19) which is presented in Figure One. This model accepts that the major "fault" running throughout the class structure is based upon the division between manual, working-class occupations on the one hand, and non-manual, middle-class occupations on the other. Like the other components of the model, this distinction is adopted in the form of an assumption, not as an a priori fact; its appropriateness too will be the object of empirical scrutiny.

In this schema, the top of the pyramid is occupied by the dominant property holders whose economic situation is a function largely of their ownership assets, though these may be supplemented in the form of salaries and fees awarded for the performance of directorship functions. The 'upper middle-class' consists of those whose situation is based upon the ownership and disposition of skills for which a scarce source of supply and a permanent excess demand have become institutionalised. In real terms it consists of those in the independent established professions such as law, medicine, dentistry together with those in higher managerial and executive levels in government and industry, i.e. those whose skills are scarce because of the relatively lengthy (and costly) periods of training over which the
## FIGURE ONE

**A Model of Class Structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BASIS OF CLASS FORMATION</th>
<th>LABEL</th>
<th>COMPOSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Property</td>
<td>Upper-Class</td>
<td>Dominant property and capital holders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upper middle-class</td>
<td>Professional/executive/scientific personnel. Highly educated labour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills</td>
<td>Middle middle-class</td>
<td>Middle-managerial/semi-professional/skilled technical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower middle-class</td>
<td>Routine white-collar: clerical/sales/lower technical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectivisation</td>
<td>Upper working-class</td>
<td>Skilled manual labour: blue-collar, craftsmen, skilled service workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower working-class</td>
<td>Semi-skilled manual blue-collar and service workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unprotected</td>
<td>Lower-class</td>
<td>Chronically under- and unemployed, unorganised, state welfare clients.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
established practitioners themselves exercise some good deal of control. The 'middle middle-class' category denotes middle and lower level managerial personnel, salaried semi-professionals such as teachers and social workers and skilled technical workers such as draughtsmen, designers, and computer programmers. It is on the bottom reaches of this category that managerial workers who form part of the analysis in the second part of the thesis fit. The 'lower middle-class' consists largely of those in routine white-collar work: clerical workers, sales assistants, and lower level technical labour such as the numerous para-professional workers in such fields as education and health care. This sector of the labour force has become increasingly 'feminised' in the post-war period, a fact which is being interpreted by some as support for the idea of embourgeoisement insofar as working wives not only provide additional family income, but also, if they work in this type of occupation, provide a measure of white-collar prestige to the family's social standing.

The 'upper working-class' is composed of those in skilled manual work--craftsmen such as carpenters, skilled industrial blue-collar workers like tool-makers, and skilled manual service workers like electricians. It is evident from these examples that the distinction between these workers and many of those in the new technical occupations is a fine one. The skilled manual occupations have, however, traditionally been regarded as working-class--albeit by some as an
"aristocracy" of labour—because not only is their work clearly manual, but also the training necessary to attain a level of proficiency, though it may be long, has been acquired mainly 'on-the-job', and has been oriented toward the acquisition of purely practical skills. Neo-technical workers, on the other hand, typically acquire their training through institutions of formal education, and do so on the basis of theoretical as well as practical knowledge. Skilled manual workers are, however, increasingly serving as a kind of role model for semi-professional and technical workers whose attempts to professionalise fully have met with serious obstacles. One of the major findings of research into the causes of white-collar unionisation indicates that when skill levels and skill control are eroded by non-practitioners, then attempts to unionise become the most common response. It was in just this kind of situation, at the time of the industrial revolution and the beginnings of rapid work rationalisation, that craftsmen and tradesmen also began to collectivise as a way to protect their economic interests and preserve their levels of skill.

The 'lower working-class' consists of those who still, despite popular theories of 'post-industrialism', comprise the largest single sector of the labour force in North America: semi-skilled and relatively unskilled blue-collar and manual service workers such as machine operators, janitors, bus and taxi drivers, mailmen, warehousemen,
hospital orderlies, cleaners, and so on. Those whose work (it is hard to imagine it as occupation in the distinct sense) requires little training, most of which can usually be acquired on-the-job in a matter of hours at most. In North America, these are the workers who fought for the establishment of 'industrial' unions in the thirties to break the hegemony of the conservative 'craft' unions, and organise those who were formerly excluded from collective bargaining. As this implies, the history of relations between these two segments of the working-class has not been exactly one of harmony and solidarity. The notion of internal differentiation of the working-class along lines of skill has been a common theme among observers dating back to the industrial revolution.

The 'lower-class' finally refers to the unorganised and the unskilled, those who are chronically under- and unemployed, and those whose relationship to the market is marginal and intermittent. Often these individuals are forced out of the market arena altogether, and become state welfare clients dependent upon government transfer payments for their means of livelihood. In real terms it includes such groups as single mothers with small children, the dependent aged, the chronically sick and disabled, and, in Canada, large sections of the native peoples. In many respects, the position of this group is such that they do not constitute a class; they have, by definition, no basis of
class formation; they are associated together in a residual way, sharing only their marginality and general level of deprivation.

This schema is more than simply a means to identify class position in the notational sense; it is, more importantly, a representation of different 'class situations'. In the abstract the term denotes the range of rewards, opportunities, resources, and interests which accrue to those who share a similar position in the class structure and the market system generally. In this respect 'class situation' is primarily 'market situation', and Weber, for example, often equates the two. In a more concrete sense, market situation refers not only to direct forms of remuneration such as wages, salaries, dividends, interest, rents, fees, and commissions, but also to more oblique sources of gratification. Firstly, there are latent economic benefits in the form of 'fringe benefits' such as pensions, sickness and disability benefits, extra medical coverage, paid vacation time, commodity and service discounts, maternity and bereavement leave, and so on. All of these are additions to overall standard of living. Secondly, we must take account not only of the opportunity to acquire a certain level of rewards, but also of the opportunity or likelihood of continuing to do so in the future, and indeed of being able to improve one's market situation over time. We must take account, in other words, of the chances to enjoy market security and
opportunities for future promotion and advancement, either within the present employing situation (what we might call "local" or 'internal' mobility), or more generally within the wider market ('external' mobility).

The relative salience of these three dimensions of the market still not always occupy the same levels of priority vis-à-vis each other. For example, it seems clear, particularly in North America, that during periods of economic slow-down and impending recession the market for labour ceases to expand, may indeed begin to contract, and the issue of market security therewith begins to figure more prominently than it would during periods of growth and reflation. Again, there are cross-cultural differences here which distinguish the modern societies from each other. The commitment to full employment as a political goal in the post-war years has been much greater in Europe and particularly Japan than it has in North America. This has meant a willingness on the parts of governments and their electorates to suffer a slightly higher level of general inflation in order to keep employment levels reasonably high. At the level of the worker, this has meant that maintenance of income level has been of greater priority than job security.

It becomes evident, however, that by including these additional dimensions of reward, the line of demarcation between the marketplace and the workplace has broken down to some extent. Opportunities for 'internal' mobility, for example,
are, in the immediate sense, opportunities of the work rather than the market situation. Is this separation between workplace and marketplace, work situation and market situation a legitimate and useful one? The separation of the two lies in the separation of industrial sociology from the study of social stratification, which, in turn, owes more to the bureaucratic organisation of professional sociology than to any real intrinsic distinction between the realms of inquiry. We do not have to look too deeply to recognise that what takes place in the market is very closely connected to the social and technical organisation of the workplace; market rewards are, after all, the result of an exchange for labour time spent working. Capital, technology, skill level, division of labour, and level of remuneration form a chain which interlocks the market- and the workplace together.

When we acknowledge this inter-relationship, the justification for assigning the marketplace to the study of stratification and the workplace to the study of industrial sociology seems increasingly fragile; both are clearly important elements in the structure of class stratification. Working is the social activity from which class rewards eventually spring, and therefore the conditions an individual can enjoy or must endure in order to acquire those rewards and opportunities deserve serious consideration in any judgment of their overall magnitude. For this reason we
propose to broaden the concept of class situation to include
the rewards (and deprivations) of the work situation in
addition to those of the market. The term 'work situation'
will be used to refer to rewards and deprivations which
eemanate from the immediate work context: the performance
of the work itself, the experience of the work setting as a
physical, technological, and social environment, and the
opportunities to express creativity and exercise discretion,
the opportunities to "self-actualise" to borrow the term of
humanistic psychology. In conventional terms, this distinc-
tion between work situation and market situation is very
similar to that between the 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic'
rewards from work, the former denoting the rewards which
derive from the performance of the work itself, and the
latter to the material rewards of work. As we shall see in
Chapters III to VI, the distribution of these two sets of
rewards tends empirically to be parallel: as we ascend the
class hierarchy so the incidence of both typically increases.
The distribution of each, in other words, tends to shore up
and reinforce the other.

By looking at class situation in this manner, as
the rewards (and deprivations) which accrue to us from the
social activity of working, we can identify, in fact, a
third dimension or component: those rewards which are expressed
through their impact on self- and social identity, the rewards
of dignity, or self-respect, and the sense of others' respect
for us. This dimension refers to what we can call the 'status situation'—the subjective feelings of gratification and satisfaction we experience when we feel others consider us worthy, and bestow their respect and esteem on us. The status situation comprises those moral-symbolic rewards which confer legitimacy on the unequal distribution of wealth and satisfying work.

We have, then, a model of class situation which is a composition of three reward situations. This model is essentially the same as that adopted by David Lockwood (1958) in his study of clerical labour, *The Blackcoated Worker*. Its utility lies in broadening the conventional image of class situation to include other sources of reward which are related, and in some cases determinant of an individual's situation in the marketplace. Technological changes initiated to increase profits may radically alter skill structures in the workplace, and result in subsequent changes in the marketability of that labour, the price paid for it, and the social status accorded to it. At the same time, by clearly delimiting the nature and scope of these three dimensions, we can avoid reducing class situation to a 'grab-all' concept.

This model will form the organisational basis for the discussions of continuities and changes in class inequalities undertaken in the later chapters. Class, however, is more than simply a term we apply to structured differences
in social and economic rewards. When the term is used in everyday language, it usually refers not primarily to differences in class situation as we have defined them above, so much as to difference in life-styles and life-chances, to differences in outlook, habits, and prospects for the future. This, for Weber, was the distinctiveness of 'social class' as opposed to 'purely economic' class. The former are real in a sense in which the latter are not, in the sense that they denote groupings or clusters of individuals and their families who share not only a common class situation, but also a typical style of life and outlook associated with that
position. To speak in this sense of class as a social and cultural phenomenon as well as an economic one is part of the problem we are seeking to examine: under what circumstances does class situation give rise to class culture? And under what circumstances does the latter break free of the former?

Conclusion

In this chapter we have attempted to review the theory of class stratification with the intention in mind of establishing a theoretical model of class structure which could serve as the framework for an empirical examination of the embourgeoisement thesis. In doing so we have chosen to develop a neo-Weberian model rather than a neo-Marxist one, on the grounds that the former enables us to deal more adequately with the continuity of socio-economic inequalities founded on the division of labour as well as the division of property.

The model developed posits three bases or modes of class formation: property ownership, skill ownership, and collectivisation based upon political-legal recognition and sanction. These three form a hierarchy: property ownership and control is the basis of the upper-class, skill control the basis of the middle-class, and collectivisation the basis of the working-class. In addition, there is a
lower-class defined in residual terms, comprising those of unstable, marginal economic status. As we go from base to apex, so control over productive activity increases, and the acquisition of rewards therefore becomes greater. In this way, we can see how the production of wealth conditions its distribution, how those who control the former accordingly control the latter.

The nature of these rewards and opportunities, finally, has been represented by the concept of 'class situation'. This, in turn, has been reduced to three component dimensions of reward (and deprivation), the market situation, the work situation, and the status situation. Like the three bases of class formation, these three component situations are empirically interdependent, and mutually reinforcing.
CHAPTER III
CLASS SITUATION: AN EMPIRICAL REVIEW

Introduction

Using the model of class structure and class formation established in the preceding chapter, it is obvious that for the bulk of the population in modern society class differentiation means differentiation between middle-class and working-class. Apart from such minor sources of wealth such as interest from personal savings, the odd piece of investment, or occasional rent from real estate, most individuals appropriate wealth through the sale of their labour power, through income earned from employment. As such, the major form which class inequalities take is expressed through the differential rewards associated with the social activity of working. And this is most certainly true for those we have designated working-class and who are therefore the subject of the imputed process of embourgeoisement. For this reason, we shall not be concerned herein with inequalities which derive directly from the division of property; we shall be concerned rather with inequalities which stem from the division of labour, from the sale of labour in the marketplace, and from the employment of labour in the workplace.

The purpose of this particular chapter is to review
the evidence pertaining to class differences and similarities in 'class situation', i.e. in the market situation, work situation, and status situation. This, in turn, has a twofold purpose. Firstly, the review is designed to provide us with an overall or general image of the economic and occupational situations of the middle-class and working-class to serve as points of reference and comparison for the Canadian data analysed in Chapter VI below. As this implies, the literature on which this review is based is, of necessity, largely non-Canadian. This is most especially true of the literature dealing with class differences and trends in the distribution and production of work situation rewards where most of the empirical research is taken from British and American studies.

The second purpose is to enable us to draw certain preliminary conclusions about the validity of the thesis of embourgeoisement (and by implication that of proletarianisation and of class convergence also) from the existing empirical research. In this respect also, the review undertaken here will serve as a point of reference and comparison for the later discussion in Chapter VI.

The manner of presentation will be kept as direct and straightforward as possible. Using the three components of class situation as the basis for organisation, we shall begin with a review of the evidence on the market situation, followed in turn by the work situation and the status situation. The data available on class differences and similarities
in market situation rewards are derived largely from national statistics taken from official surveys and publications. The data dealing with the work and status situations, on the other hand, are taken largely from non-official studies, often based upon local rather than national populations. It is important for the reader to bear this difference in mind; the data on the work situation and the status situation tend to be open to more equivocal interpretation, and, as such, the conclusions drawn are more tentative and tendential.

The Market Situation

At the end of Chapter II we defined 'market situation' in terms of the direct and indirect economic rewards which accrue to individuals by virtue of their position in the social relations of production and distribution. In this way, market capacity comes to be reflected in one's position in the divisions of property and labour. Operationally, market situation can be reduced to four components: income and wealth, fringe benefits, opportunities for personal advancement and promotion, and market security. Let us now take a look at each of these in turn:

1. Income and Wealth:

Paradoxically perhaps, wealth is in some respects rather difficult to measure since it takes both direct and
indirect forms. If we take wealth in the form of property—land, corporate stocks and shares, capital—then it is clear from the works of Titmuss (1962), Westergaard and Resler (1975), Kolk1 (1962), Parker (1972), and Clement (1975) that there has not been any substantial redistribution of assets in Britain, the U.S., or Canada in the last fifty or sixty years. Property ownership has been and continues to be the preserve of a very small minority of the population. In this respect, the upper-class, in objective terms at least, is as much a reality now as it has ever been in capitalist society—it is neither sinking down into the ranks of lower classes, nor being invaded from below.

The upshot of this is that the appropriation of wealth for the vast majority of individuals and their dependants takes the form of earned income from the sale of their labour power in the marketplace; in other words, from occupational remuneration. Tables One to Four present national data on the relationship between income and occupation for the three countries.

There are a number of conclusions to be drawn from a comparison of these data. The first, and most general one is that there are strong patterns which hold cross-nationally. Though we do not wish to imply that some autonomous logic of industrialism or convergence is at work, it is perhaps surprising to find these patterns given the different structures of the three economies. To be sure, this is
### TABLE ONE

Income and Occupation by Sex, U.S., 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>MEDIAN INCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MALES</strong></td>
<td><strong>FEMALES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed professional, technical, and kindred workers</td>
<td>$20,279 p.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried professional, technical, and kindred workers</td>
<td>11,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers, proprietors, and officials</td>
<td>11,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical workers</td>
<td>7,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales workers</td>
<td>9,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen and foremen</td>
<td>8,741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operatives</td>
<td>7,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>6,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers</td>
<td>6,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and farm managers</td>
<td>4,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm labourers</td>
<td>3,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All occupations</td>
<td>8,455</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE TWO

Occupation and Income, Males 25-64 yrs.,
Canada, 1961-71

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional and technical workers</td>
<td>$7,224 p.a.</td>
<td>$12,104 p.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial workers</td>
<td>7,088</td>
<td>11,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical workers</td>
<td>4,030</td>
<td>7,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales workers</td>
<td>4,924</td>
<td>7,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen and production workers</td>
<td>3,974</td>
<td>8,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>2,668</td>
<td>6,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers</td>
<td>3,678</td>
<td>6,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary--mining</td>
<td>4,344</td>
<td>8,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary--non-mining</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>3,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(approx.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

TABLE THREE

Income of Clerical and Manual Workers, Males Only,
U.K., 1913/14-71

(Occupational group average is expressed as a % of the average for all male manual workers during the same period.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>1913/14</th>
<th>1922/24</th>
<th>1935/36</th>
<th>1955/56</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Manual</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled Manual</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled Manual</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Manual</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE FOUR

**Occupation and Income, Males Only,**

**U.K., 1913/14-60**

(Occupational group average is expressed as a % of the average income for all males during the same period.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>1913/14</th>
<th>1922/23</th>
<th>1935/36</th>
<th>1955/56</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher professions</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower professions</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>165.5</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical workers</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled manual</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled manual</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled manual</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All non-manual</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All manual</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


...evident in the inclusion in the North American figures of data on those in primary occupations. This reflects the continued importance of that sector of the economy in North American society, a sector which declined rapidly during the early stages of industrialism in Britain. Additional figures for Britain do show, nevertheless, that those in agricultural employment are likewise ranked lowest in terms of direct economic remuneration: in 1971 the median weekly earnings for agricultural workers were 25% lower than those of routine
clerical workers, 38% lower than those in semi-skilled manual work, and almost 50% lower than those of skilled manual workers (Westergaard and Resler, 1975:78).

If we now examine some of these cross-national patterns, then one of the most striking features of the American data, and on which is further substantiated by additional data for Canada and Britain, is the considerable differential between male and female incomes for the same occupational categories. The American data indicate that median female incomes range from a low of about 40% of their male counterparts in sales work to a high of about 65% for clerical and salaried professional, technical, and kindred workers. Figures for Britain for 1960 show a similar span, from a low of 50% of male incomes for those in skilled and unskilled manual occupations to a high of 72% for the 'lower professions' such as semi-professional and technical workers (Westergaard and Resler, 1975:100). Data from the 1961 census in Canada, finally, show that for those employed for the full year, median female incomes spread from a low of 45% of male incomes for sales workers to a high of 74% for clerical workers (Podoluk, 1968). Moreover, there has been no narrowing of this gap in the last 15 years; it remains the case that female incomes are still appreciably lower than those for males in the same occupational strata (Statistics Canada, 1974).

These figures are misleading, however, and particularly
in the Canadian case, to the extent that they convey the impression that the occupational categories used are internally homogeneous, which of course they are not. In the sales category are included those who sell highly priced consumer and capital goods on a commission basis as well as routine sales assistants, chainstore tellers, and supermarket bagpackers. The former tend to be more highly paid and disproportionately male; the latter low paid, semi-manual, and predominantly female. The same picture also holds for the professional/technical category of workers: this ranges from highly paid, predominantly male 'full' professionals such as doctors and lawyers down through salaried 'semi-professionals' such as schoolteachers and nurses to routine technical assistants who are often female and receive incomes comparable to those of manual and routine clerical workers.

In short, then, we must also bear in mind that some degree of stratification within official categories inevitably distorts the overall picture of inequality.

In this respect, one might argue that the apparent inequality between males and females in the class structure is in fact an inequality of opportunity rather than an inequality of condition; women, in other words, have simply been denied access to the more highly rewarded reaches of the occupational order and/or have lacked the motivation necessary to strive for and attain these positions. While there is more than a grain of truth to this argument, it
does not represent the complete picture by any means. Even when we use finer occupational categories gender inequalities are still evident; women consistently earn less than men, especially, as we have seen, in the lower reaches of the class structure. In this way, as Westergaard and Resler (1975) have pointed out, class and gender inequalities reinforce one another.

This pattern complicates matters, however, when we bear in mind that women are not evenly distributed throughout the labour force, but are heavily concentrated in certain areas of employment, particularly sales, clerical, and service work. In Canada in 1971, for example, 72% of all clerical and 60% of all service workers were women. The import of this is that we must compare income distributions separately for each sex if we are not to distort the overall view of things. If we did not do so, then it would appear that the median income for clerical work, for example, had fallen well below that for manual work. Such a conclusion would overlook the fact that over 70% (in Canada) of clerical workers are lower paid females, increasing proportions of whom are married, many to working-class husbands. Feminism notwithstanding, it is clearly the case that in the vast majority of cases the husband is the principal income earner, especially in lower middle- and working-class families, and that the family life-style is shaped largely by the husband's rather than the wife's class situation.
Bearing more directly on the present issue of embourgeoisement, however, the most striking feature of these data on income distribution is that there is now a broad pattern of homogenisation among those in manual and lower non-manual occupations. Though there are some national differences on this score, the overall picture tends to be one in which those in sales and skilled manual work rank first, followed by those in clerical and semi-skilled manual occupations, with service and unskilled manual workers in third position. Each of these groupings seems to be separated by an income gap of between 10% and 20%.

The longitudinal data for Britain and Canada indicate that this homogenisation has occurred over time, and that the relative positioning of the occupational categories involved has not remained constant. In Canada, for example, the median income for semi-skilled and skilled manual workers combined caught up with that of sales workers and surpassed that of clerical workers during the sixties. In 1961, the combined blue-collar income was very slightly below that of clerical workers; by 1971 it was about 10% higher. Even more substantial during the same period was the relationship of blue-collar to sales incomes: the median income of the former rose from being 20-25% lower than that of the latter in 1961 to being very slightly higher by 1971.

Likewise, the British data, while showing that the overall ratio of manual to non-manual income has not changed
appreciably over this century, show relative changes among 'lower professionals', clerical, skilled, and semi-skilled manual workers. Clerical incomes dropped from a position of virtual parity with those of skilled manual workers before the war to a position interstitial between the skilled and semi-skilled by 1960. Table Three indicates a further deterioration in their relative position to a point just below the semi-skilled by 1971. On this score, the British data show that a gap is opening up among non-manual workers between the 'higher professions' and clerical occupations at the bottom where they mingle with those in manual work. This gap is not as evident in the Canadian figures; although clerical incomes are slightly below those of blue-collar workers, they have shifted from being 57% of managerial income in 1961 to 73% by 1971. On the face of it, then, the Canadian data would seem to suggest more of a process of total homogenisation of manual and non-manual incomes, rather than simply the homogenisation of manual and lower non-manual ones.

While this conclusion is partly correct, it is clear that there is in Canada also a fairly distinct line of differentiation among non-manual workers between highly paid self-employed professionals and corporate executives on the one hand, and salaried semi-professionals, low level managers, sales, and clerical workers on the other. This becomes more evident when we look at the position of what
the British census refers to as 'lower professionals', salaried semi-professional and technical workers such as teachers, social workers, librarians, laboratory technicians, and so on. The British data show clearly that the relative position of this group deteriorated after the war to a level roughly equivalent to that of skilled manual workers, and only 15-20% higher than clerical workers as opposed to the 60-70% differential before the war. Although it is impossible to compare these data exactly with the North American figures, the Canadian and American censuses do allow us to distinguish between the incomes of salaried and self-employed managers and professionals. Though the pattern is now changing to some extent, it has traditionally been the case that full professionals such as physicians and lawyers were self-employed or "old" middle-class in C. Wright Mills' sense. Semi-professionals such as school-teachers, librarians, and social workers, and technical workers, on the other hand, were usually salaried, in other words they usually earned their livelihood by selling their labour power on the labour market.

Using this distinction between the self-employed and the salaried professional and technical workers as roughly equivalent to the British distinction between 'higher' and 'lower' professionals, then we see that a similar picture holds true for Canada and the United States as for the U.K. with respect to the relative positioning of the two groups.
Table one shows that in the U.S. in 1969, the median income for self-employed professional and technical workers was almost double that for their salaried 'counterparts'. Similarly in Canada in 1961 the average income for self-employed professional and technical workers was $12,286, that for the salaried only $5,794, less than half as much (Podduk, 1968). And in the U.K. in 1960 the average income of 'lower' professionals was likewise just under half (about 40% in fact) that of their 'higher' brethren. Looking at the ratio between clerical and semi-professional/technical incomes, then again we find a fairly stable cross-national pattern: in the U.S. in 1969 the incomes of male clerical workers were about 70% of those of salaried semi-professional and technical workers, with sales incomes being about 80%; in Canada in 1961 the incomes of male clerical and sales workers were 67% and 83% respectively of those for salaried professional and technical workers; and in Britain in 1960 clerical incomes (males only) were about 80% of those of 'lower' professionals.

The overall picture of the relationship between occupation and income presented by these data suggests a strong gap between self-employed professionals and higher level managerial and executive personnel at the top and a more closely graded aggregate of semi-professional, technical, lower managerial, sales, skilled manual, clerical, semi-skilled manual, service, and unskilled manual workers, followed
after a more substantial gap by those in agriculture below. Excluding the latter, however, the overall ratio of top to bottom for male workers at least appears to be narrowing over time to some extent. In Britain at the outbreak of World War I it was about 5:1; by 1960 it was 3.5:1. In Canada likewise: in 1931 those classified as managers earned average incomes five times larger than those of unskilled labourers; by 1971 it was about twice as much (Marchak, 1973: 2). These patterns, however, contradict the figures on overall income distribution which show that no appreciable redistribution has occurred at all over the last half century. The answer to this apparent paradox lies in the role and situation of female workers. As we can see from Table One, if we compute the ratio of the highest overall income to the lowest overall income we would have a ratio of 5:1 between self-employed male professionals on the one hand, and female service workers on the other. As both are equally members of the labour force and the class structure, any accurate and valid calculation must include them. And when we do, then it becomes clear that the ratio of top to bottom, from an overall point of view, has not changed. Just as women and children were mobilised to fill the new unskilled "cheap" jobs created by the industrial manufacturing revolution, so women and teenagers are now being mobilised as the cheap labour for the post-industrial, service revolution. Thus, what is happening to the occupational structure is a twofold
development: on the one hand the old manual/non-manual division is beginning to erode and is being replaced by one differentiating highly skilled non-manual from a melange of semi-professional, technical, lower managerial, skilled manual, sales, semi-skilled manual, and clerical labour. And secondly, the rapidly expanding sector of this melange—the service occupations requiring low skill and paying low wages—is becoming increasingly feminised, as male labour has become too expensive.

Inevitably, however, we do encounter certain problems when comparing income statistics across occupational categories. When using aggregate figures for annual income, we should, strictly speaking, only compare those who have actually worked the same amount of time during that period. It is all too easy to assume that the standard work week is now forty hours for everyone in the labour force, but on closer inspection this proves to be a falacious assumption. On the one hand we find that the actual number of hours regularly worked each week does vary quite significantly by occupation—those at the top and the bottom of the hierarchy tend to work longer hours (though for different reasons) than those in between. Thus we find that manual workers generally work longer for their annual incomes than non-manual workers; the upshot of this is that the annual income average for manual workers presented in official statistics are composed in part from earnings above those received for
the standard work week, earnings from overtime or shift work which are usually paid at a higher premium than the regular wage rate and which therefore help to inflate apparent income size.

In this connection, Westergaard and Resler (1975: 93-86) cite figures showing that the average working week for manual workers in the U.K. in 1971 was about 45 hours, or five more than the 'standard' week of forty hours, and that 20% of all manual workers who had been fully employed for the year had put in an average of over 50 hours work a week. Levison (1974:63) cites comparable figures for the United States which show that in 1966 20% of all semi-skilled manual workers worked more than 49 hours a week on average. And in Canada in 1971 16% of all so-called "non-office" workers worked over 40 hours per week as a normal routine, with only 8% working less than forty. For "office" workers, on the other hand, only 2% normally worked over forty hours a week, and 80% worked a normal average of 37½ hours or less (Canada, Department of Labour, 1972).

What these figures point to, then, is the fact that although manual incomes may equal or even exceed those of clerical and semi-professional/technical workers, these income figures are annual averages which overlook the fact that manual workers may have worked anywhere up to 20% longer to earn them, and at higher, premium overtime or shiftwork rates of pay. On the other hand, however, while it is clear
that manual workers do work longer hours than non-manual workers, it is also clear that they are more susceptible to lay-off and extended periods of unemployment (see below, page 174). To make fair comparisons therefore, we must not only compare those who worked the same number of hours per week, but also those who worked the same number of weeks per year.

In Canada in 1961, for those who worked a 'full' year, the median income for male clerical workers was $3,818, for sales workers $4,608, and for crafts and production workers $4,170 (Podoluk, 1968). In 1963, 25% of all 'non-office' employees worked normally more than forty hours a week as opposed to 4% of 'office' workers, a differential of 21% (Canada, Department of Labour, 1964). On this basis, if we assume that 20% of manual income at that time was composed of overtime payment--working about 12-13% longer than non-manual workers at 'time-and-a-half' rates of payment--then the median income for manual workers for a work week equivalent in length to that of non-manual or 'office' workers would have been just over $3,000--20% below that of clerical workers and a more substantial 35% lower than sales workers. While all this is purely hypothetical, it does serve to show the importance of overtime and shift work to the pay packet of the manual worker. Updated to the present, what this would mean is that for those working the full year with an average work week equivalent in time to that of 'office'
workers, the income of manual workers would be about equal to those of male clerical workers and about 15% less than those of sales workers.

A second problem we confront when comparing across occupations is that the statistics we employ do not usually differentiate in terms of age and stage in the life-cycle. This is an important consideration since it generally holds that those in non-manual work, particularly those in higher level professional, scientific, and executive positions, are more likely than manual workers to enjoy a work 'career' in which they pass through a series of stages of promotion reaching the point of maximum advancement around the age of late forties to mid-fifties. Manual workers, on the other hand, tend to reach the point of maximum personal advancement much earlier—usually in the mid-to late twenties—and any improvement which follows usually takes the form of collective, occupational mobility, usually through the efforts of collective bargaining.

One of the major ramifications of this pattern, as we can see clearly in Charts One and Two, is that income differentials between manual and lower non-manual on the one hand and higher non-manual on the other increase steadily until middle-age, a fact which is masked over if we simply compare the average distributions for all age groups combined. Thus in Britain in 1971 a professional aged 20-24 earned only about 5% more than an unskilled labourer and actually
about 5% less than a semi-skilled or skilled manual worker of the same age. By the age of 50-59, however, the professional earned about 120% more than the labourer, about 80% more than the operative, and about 65% more than the craftsman. In Canada (1961) likewise: at age 25 or less the professional earned about 15% more than the craftsman, by age 50, he earned twice as much.

**CHART ONE**

**Occupation and Income by Age,**

**Canada, Males Only, 1961**

Average income from employment by age groups for selected broad occupations, year ended May 31, 1961.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOLLARS</th>
<th>MALES IN CURRENT LABOUR FORCE</th>
<th>DOLLARS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Craftsmen</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under 25  25-34  35-44  45-54  55-64  Age  Group

CHART TWO

Occupation and Income by Age, U.K., Males Only, 1970


Key: M = Managers
     E = Professional engineers, Scientists, Technologists
     A = Academic staff and teachers
     P = Other professional and Technical
     T = Technicians
     O = Office and communications workers
     S = Sales workers
     SM = Skilled manual
     SSM = Semi-skilled manual
     UM = Unskilled manual
Regular salary and wage payments are not, however, the only source of direct occupational remuneration; some workers receive bonuses or participate in profit-sharing schemes which also act as a form of pecuniary reward. National statistics for Canada show that these are not extensive: in 1969 8% of non-office employees and 10% of office employees participated in profit-sharing schemes, while 17% of the former and 20% of the latter received bonuses of some kind (Canada, Department of Labour, 1970). On the basis of these figures, one might conclude that neither profit-sharing nor bonuses constitute a particularly significant factor in the overall distribution of wealth. Such a conclusion would overlook the fact, however, that bonuses for example are an important feature of higher managerial and executive incomes. Research conducted by H.V. Chapman and Associates in Canada in 1974 shows a substantial increase in bonus payments for executives, an increase of 26.4% for 1973, following an increase of about 34% during 1972 (Queen's University, Industrial Relations Centre, 1975). They found that senior executives (1974) received about 28% of their total earnings in the form of bonuses, a far from insignificant sum, and one which again helps to differentiate the upper middle-class from the other layers of non-manual and manual labour.
2. Fringe Benefits:

Fringe benefits now constitute an important source of indirect remuneration; in Canada, for example, research on fringe benefit costs by the Thorne Group Ltd. showed that for 1973-74 fiscal year large companies spent an average of $2,783 per worker on fringe benefits, or about 28% of the gross payroll, though fairly wide inter-industry disparities were noted (Queen's University, Industrial Relations Centre, 1975). It is interesting to note, moreover, that over half of this cost was due to paid absence of some kind such as vacations, holidays, sick periods, and so on.

The term 'fringe benefits' has become something of an umbrella term, encompassing a wide range of rewards from paid holiday to expense accounts to retirement pensions. For present purposes, we shall include these features together with others like paid vacation, life and accident insurance, disablement pensions, sickness benefits, and cost-of-living allowances. The central idea or theme tying these together is that they are all forms of indirect remuneration which individuals may receive, and which either protect against loss of income or provide some service which would otherwise be of cost to the individual.

One form of fringe benefit, and one enjoyed almost exclusively by those in the upper and upper middle-classes, is the so-called 'expense account'. At its most exotic, this term conjures up images of chauffeur driven limousines,
private yachts, executive jets, dining and vacationing in exclusive places, all at the company's, and therefore indirectly at the taxpayer's, expense. Though this image may be overdrawn to some extent—for one thing, corporate tax write-offs are always a favourite target for government belt-tightening—it is certainly true that tax-deductible expense accounts do provide a significant source of latent remuneration for those in executive and professional positions. Kolko (1962:17-20) cites data for the United States, for example, to the effect that unofficial government estimates put expense account outlays in 1957 at between five and ten billion dollars, a far from insignificant sum by any measure. Similarly, Westergaard and Resler (1975:87) report one estimate for the U.K. during the mid-sixties that tax free advantages rose from an addition of about 10% to the incomes of those in junior management earning about one thousand pounds per annum to an addition of over 30%, or almost one third, to the incomes of top executives making over seven thousand. Once again, this pattern of expense account remuneration shores up the division we noted earlier in the data on income distribution and bonuses, namely the sizeable gap between those in upper middle-class, executive and professional occupations on the one hand, and the lower middle-class and working-class composed of semi-professionals, technicians, lower managers, clerical, sales, manual, and service workers on the other.
Traditionally, many of the services provided by the company or organisation for its higher level managerial, professional and administrative personnel were such items as sickness insurance, pensions, and other benefits which are now, in some form or other, provided by the state. Indeed, one of the much vaunted features of the transition from the entrepreneurial capitalism of the early nineteenth century to modern postwar capitalism is the ability of the social system, particularly through its political apparatus, to abate the misery and suffering which were so much a part of everyday life even one hundred years ago. This has been accomplished largely through the state’s taking on a more significant role in the management of the economy, ironing out the cycle of boom and slump through fiscal policy, and introducing a greater measure of economic security to the general populace through the provision of social welfare in its multifarious forms: health care, unemployment insurance, accident and disability pensions, retirement pensions, subsidised housing, and so on. Generally speaking, the provision of these services has been slower in coming in North America than in Western Europe, though the vast bulk of social welfare on both sides of the Atlantic is a thing of the recent past. Yet in spite of the efforts of the state in the realm of social welfare, it remains the case that the provisions it makes often provide only minimal coverage, leaving ample room for supplements of various
kinds in the form of private schemes.

One area of private welfare which has witnessed substantial development in the postwar period is that of retirement pensions. Either through registered retirement savings plans or through employer sponsored schemes won through collective bargaining, it is evident that more individuals are enjoying private as well as state provided retirement income. Nevertheless, these developments are fairly recent, and this is an area where appearances are often belied by reality. For example, in the U.S. circa 1970 Levison (1974:90) has estimated that "about half of all blue-collar workers are employed in occupations or industries without any pension plan at all", and are subsequently dependent upon their savings (if any) and social security payments for retirement income. In 1971, these amounted to about $57.00 per week for a single worker retiring at age 65, and about $79.00 per week for a married couple. For those covered by works pension plans, however, the future is also far from secure; if the worker gets laid off, or the firm goes out of business, then he/she may lose all pension rights. Levison cites the example of the Studebaker bankruptcy in 1963, when over 4,000 workers between the ages of 40 and 65 received an average of 15% of what they were actually owed by the company. In this respect, government employees tend, of course, to be more secure, yet what this means on aggregate is that it is white-collar workers who
tend to benefit more since government employees are disproportionately non-manual workers. Blue-collar government employees, moreover, tend to be concentrated at the local, municipal level of government, where, as the recent saga of New York City reminds us, things are far from fully secure. Class differences in pension remuneration are further strengthened by the fact that worksponsored plans are seldom transferable to another employer should the worker decide to change jobs. Though this applies equally to manual and non-manual workers, the actual effect of this situation is one where, statistically, manual workers tend to lose out, particularly the less skilled, since they tend to be more mobile between places of employment.

This pattern is by no means confined to the United States. In the U.K. company sponsored and other private pension schemes grew throughout the fifties and sixties, reaching a peak in 1967 when 51% of the labour force was covered, a situation which dropped slightly to 49% by 1971. Breaking down this coverage along class lines, however, reveals substantial differences in the extent of coverage: in 1967 68% of all non-manual workers participated in some pension scheme, dropping slightly to 66% in 1971. Among manual workers, on the other hand, 46% participated in 1967, dropping to 42% by 1971. Moreover, per capita expenditure by employers was greater for non-manual than manual employees: in 1968 they were spending more than five times the amount
on pension coverage for non-manual than for manual workers in manufacturing, and in the economy as whole expenditure on non-manual pension schemes was about 300% that on pension coverage for the manual labour force (Westergaard and Resler, 1975:87-91).

Figures for Canada show a similar though not as strong situation. In 1963 72% of 'non-office' workers belonged to a works sponsored pension plan; for 54% this entailed joint contributions from employer and employee alike; by 1969, these figures had remained fairly stable at 71% and 54% respectively. Among 'office' workers on the other hand, 88% were covered by a works pension plan in 1963, rising slightly to 90% by 1969; in 1963, 75% belonged to a joint contributory plan, 76% in 1969 (Canada, Department of Labour, 1964, 1970). In this respect, then, there seems to be a stable yet moderate difference between 'office' and 'non-office' workers, a difference which favours the former.

A similar picture is also evident with regard to group life insurance plans sponsored through work. In 1963, 87% of non-office workers received group life insurance coverage as opposed to 95% of office workers. A more significant difference, however, is the fact that for nearly half of the non-office workers this coverage entailed a fixed amount payment regardless of income, whilst this was the case for only 20% of office workers, the vast bulk of whom were covered on the basis of earnings level. Moreover,
for 47% of the non-office workers the insurance plan terminated after retirement, while it did so for only 40% of the office workers (Canada Department of Labour, 1964, 1970). These categories—'office' and 'non-office' also tend to obscure the real amount of difference between class levels with respect to pension and insurance plans; they do not differentiate between the skilled and the unskilled, between the higher and the lower level employees. If they did so, then we would tend to find more substantial inequalities.

Traditionally one of the haunting spectres of working-class life was the threat of accident or ill health, the occurrence of which inevitably meant the loss of income and the advent of hard times for the unfortunate. As such, protection against income loss due to such misfortune became one of the principal crosses borne by the union movement and by social democratic political parties throughout the capitalist world. Yet the provision of insurance of some form against sickness and accident is again largely a recent phenomenon, particularly in North America where governments have long faced a strong and persistent lobby by the medical profession and employers' associations against socialised medical care and the rights of the employee to hold his employer responsible for accident or injury incurred on the job. In Canada, medical care is now more or less regarded as a human entitlement rather than a market commodity, and the institution of Workmen's Compensation
does provide some minimal protection against injury on the job, though only at the cost of the employee's relinquishing his right to sue his employer for negligence. Once again, however, and particularly in North America, state provisions in this regard provide only minimal protection, leaving room for additional, private forms of insurance coverage. Moreover, health care services are often partly funded, as is the case in the province of Ontario, by flat rate, ungraduated payment which is an inherently regressive form of taxation since all (or rather most) pay the same premium regardless of personal income.

In the U.S. state participation in the provision of health care services has developed even less rapidly than in Canada, with the result that it is still by and large a commodity which is distributed according to the market principles of demand, supply, and the ability to pay the going price. Nevertheless, most workers—blue-collar and white-collar—employed by large organisations now receive hospitalisation insurance, but extended benefits such as those provided by Major Medical were only enjoyed by 37% of manual workers (1971) as opposed to 45% of office workers (Levison, 1974:94). Though this is not a large differential between the two groups, a more significant one is the fact that on the commencement of sick leave only 21% of factory workers get full pay with no waiting period, as compared to 64% of office workers. For the U.K., Westergaard and Resler
(1975:87) report that in 1970 90% of male non-manual workers were covered by works sick pay schemes, with little difference in the extent of coverage in the ranks from top managerial and executive down to routine clerical. Among manual workers, on the other hand, only 65% received sick pay coverage, a difference of 25%.

For Canada in 1963, before extensive socialised health care had been introduced, 42% of non-office workers had wage loss insurance in case of on-the-job injury or accident, 28% had paid sick leave schemes, and 12% had both. Among office employees, 11% had wage loss insurance in case of occupational injury, reflecting more the conditions of office work and the unlikelihood of serious accident or injury rather than employers' unwillingness to protect their employees, 54% had paid sick leave, and 18% had both (Canada, Department of Labour, 1964). This illustrates clearly that at that time office employees were in a distinctly favourable position with respect to sickness benefits as compared to their non-office counterparts.

Furthermore, for those non-office workers with sick leave benefits just under half had no waiting period before benefits were paid, as compared to over 80% of the office workers. By 1971, most provinces were operating or beginning to institute socialised health care schemes, yet the opportunity still existed for supplementary private coverage schemes. At that time 51% of non-office workers received extended hospital
and medical coverage through works sponsored private plans, as compared to 66% of office workers. For 40% of the office workers receiving extended coverage, the necessary cost was footed by the employer alone, while for the non-office workers this figure was 36%. Interestingly enough, for only 17% of the office workers with extended coverage was thus due to contract negotiation at the bargaining table as opposed to over 60% of the non-office workers (Canada, Department of Labour, 1972). What these figures show, in other words, is that identifiable inequalities persist in the realm of health care provisions between manual and non-manual workers, and that extended health coverage for the bulk of manual workers has only come as part of the collective bargaining process and not as a "free gift" from benevolent employers.

When we turn to the area of paid holiday and vacation leave, then we again encounter class differentials, with non-manual workers enjoying superior privileges. In the U.S. in 1970, for example, 54% of 'plant' workers received two or more weeks of paid vacation after two years of service, as compared to 95% of 'office' workers; 66% of the former enjoyed three weeks vacation after ten years service as compared to 81% of the latter; and 50% of the former received four weeks or more after twenty years service as opposed to 62% of the latter (Levison, 1974:94). Though the gap between the two groups does narrow appreciably with increased length of service, it should be borne in mind that
on average manual workers tend to be more mobile between employers, and are more susceptible to lay-off and unemployment; in other words, they are less likely to enjoy lengthy service in the first place. This same pattern of differentials in vacation time also holds true for paid holidays: in 1970, manual workers received an average of 7.1 days of paid holiday as compared to an average of 8.4 days for non-manual workers (Levison, 1974:94).

In the U.K. we encounter the same pattern, manual workers enjoy less paid leisure time than non-manual workers. Though there has been what Westergaard and Resler refer to as a "genuine creation of leisure" in the provision of paid vacation time during the postwar period, significant class differentials in the extent of that time still persist. In 1970, for example, about 65% of all managerial and most grades of clerical workers received three weeks paid vacation time as compared to only 25% of all skilled manual workers; 12% of the semi-skilled, and 10% of all unskilled labourers (Westergaard and Resler, 1975:86).

For Canada likewise: there has been an increase in the extent of paid holiday and vacation time over the last decade and a half, but class differences persist to some extent, though not perhaps as greatly as in the U.K. In 1963, 28% of non-office workers received more than eight days paid holiday as compared to 44% of office workers. By 1971 the number of paid holidays had generally increased
though the differences remained: 42% of non-office workers received ten or more days, yet 55% of office workers did (Canada, Department of Labour, 1964, 1972). With respect to vacation time, then a general increase is quite evident, but again class differences have not disappeared as can be seen from Table Five. The principal change these data reveal is that substantially more non-office workers enjoyed at least two weeks vacation after one year's service in 1971 than did so in 1963, though disparity with office workers in this and the other time period categories is still evident.

The major overall conclusion to be drawn from these figures on the distribution of fringe benefits is that in spite of general improvements throughout the labour force, class inequalities still persist to some extent, and with some variations between the three countries surveyed. This is the picture conveyed even with the use of such crude distinctions as that between manual and non-manual or office and non-office workers, categories which tend if anything to obscure and underestimate the extent of differential. Furthermore, although these inequalities are in some cases small, their cumulative effect is clearly one which shores up rather than mitigates existing inequalities of income and wealth.
### TABLE FIVE

**Occupation and Vacation Time,**

**Canada, 1963, 1971.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD OF TIME</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-office</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two weeks vacation after one year's service or less</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three weeks vacation after ten years</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four weeks vacation after twenty-five years</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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3. **Promotion, Advancement, and Market Security:**

The final component of the market situation concerns the extent to which individuals not only enjoy certain benefits and rewards during the present, but also enjoy the opportunity of further improvements in those benefits as the result of either individual or collective efforts, or both. At the same time, the other side of this coin is the ability to be able to look at the future as a secure one in which one will not be submitted to sudden income and benefit loss because of lay-off, redundancy or some other form of unemployment.
The traditional pattern with regard to promotion and advancement has been one distinguishing manual and non-manual, especially higher level executive and professional worker, from each other. As Charts One and Two (see pp. 152, 153) clearly demonstrate, those in upper middle-class occupations enjoy a 'career' work history in which they experience a progression through a series of stages which, in turn, constitutes something of a system of advancement. The upshot of this is that they do not typically reach the point of maximum relative advancement until middle-age. Lower level white-collar workers and manual workers, on the other hand, reach maximum relative peak at about late twenties; any improvement in market position after that time usually comes on a collective rather than individual basis, or via mobility between rather than within occupations.

This conclusion is also borne out by additional research on work histories conducted by Harold Wilensky (1969). He claims that although the proportion of the total labour force experiencing 'careers' is increasing, it is still no more than a quarter to a third. Moreover, while there is more occupational mobility due to technological change and other sources of disruption such as wars and depressions, he argues that this mobility is, for the majority, largely disordered from the perspective of a 'career'. To illustrate these hypotheses, Wilensky draws from research based on 108 blue-collar and 39 lower level
white-collar males in Detroit in 1959. For both groups the median number of jobs held since full-time entry into the labour force was six, yet "One fifth of the white-collar workers and almost one third of the blue-collar workers have gone nowhere in an unordered way", with the conclusion that "By no stretch of the imagination could more than 45% of the total sample be said to have given evidence of an ordered progression in function or status" (1969:128). Thus, while the frequency of job mobility may be accelerating, it is clear that for the majority of individuals this does not necessarily entail the adoption of a career.

At the other end of the class hierarchy, on the other hand, those in professional and higher managerial and executive occupations do typically experience an ordered work history passing through a sequence of upward moves. Professional occupations, for example, have always been characterised by the idea of vocation and life-time commitment, and still have one of the lowest rates of turnover; once a professional, always a professional. Higher level managerial and executive personnel, on the other hand, still retain a public image of high mobility between employers. This image is part of the general impression of these individuals as highly career oriented, with the result that organisational loyalties are eschewed in favour of the highest bidder.

There is, however, more fiction than fact to this image of the aggressive executive seeking career rewards
wherever he can find them. Research recently published in *Fortune* magazine on the chief executive officers of the largest 500 industrial and 300 non-industrial corporations in the United States reveals that the chief executives of the largest one hundred industrial corporations have worked for fewer companies (an average of 1.8 forms) than the chief executives of the corporations ranked 401 to 500 (average of 2.8 firms). Moreover, the chief executives of the largest one hundred firms worked for their present employer almost twice as long (average of 21 years) before they got the top job; almost 30% worked their way up from the bottom of the company as compared to only 12% of the executives of the smaller firms (Burck, 1976:173). What these data suggest, then, is that the top corporate executives of the largest corporations are 'locals' rather than 'cosmopolitans', that their careers are based upon their being relatively immobile between employers, and making their work life within the corporation not between them.

For those in the middle of the class structure—the semi-professionals and technical workers—finally, work careers tend to be limited and blocked after a certain point. There are two reasons for this, one structural, one historical. Structurally, many technical and semi-professional occupations are organised in such a manner that the incumbents perform essentially para-professional functions. That is, they perform tasks delegated by physicians, technicians do
routine preparatory work for scientists. As such, they reach a point where to be further upwardly mobile means leaving their present occupation, undergoing further extensive formal training, and then entering the profession for which they now perform ancillary tasks. There is, in other words, no institutionalised mechanism by means of which nurses and technicians can become physicians and scientists as a matter of course within their occupational career systems; all they can become are head nurses and chief technicians.

This structural blockage to the career development of semi-professional and technical workers is further ramified by the historical tendency toward the bureaucratisation of these occupations. Though full professional and scientific workers are also increasingly subjected to bureaucratisation, it nevertheless remains the plight of semi-professionals and technicians to work in "heteronomous" rather than "autonomous" organisations (Hall, 1969:100–113). Autonomous professional organisations or bureaucracies are those such as medical clinics or law firms, in which the professional workers themselves exercise control over the administrative structure and functioning of the work activity. Heteronomous professional organisations, on the other hand, are those in which the professional or semi-professional workers are employees, and in which the major decisions about organisational structure and functioning are made by non-professionals who
do not belong directly to the organisation. An example of this would be a social work agency or school in which the social workers and schoolteachers are subjected to the organisational decisions of government bureaucrats or school board trustees. Characteristically, these organisations are structurally 'flat', having a small number of echelons, and therefore restricting opportunities for promotion, advancement, and the pursuit of a career. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, this fact has been frequently related to recent developments of unionisation among semi-professional and technical workers, culminating in a mixture of individual and collective channels of mobility.

Turning to the issue of market security, then what we find again serves to shore up the picture of inequality garnered from the data on income distribution, the distribution of fringe benefits, and the opportunities for promotion and advancement, namely that those who are more privileged in one respect tend to be more privileged in all the others. Full employment is a goal that successive governments in Britain, regardless of their political hue, have given strong priority to during the postwar period. As a result, overall levels of unemployment have been considerably lower there than in North America. Nevertheless, class differences persist; manual workers have higher unemployment rates than do non-manual workers. Although the British government does not tabulate unemployment by occupation,
this pattern is nevertheless evident from national data on dismissals and redundancy.

In the United States and Canada, on the other hand, much higher rates of unemployment have been tolerated in the postwar period, particularly in Canada where it has been part of the price paid for substantial economic growth. As Tables Six and Seven show, however, these higher unemployment rates have not been distributed evenly throughout the labour force: once again, those in manual occupations are more vulnerable than non-manual workers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional and technical</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers, officials, proprietors</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical workers</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales workers</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operatives</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction workers</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE SEVEN

Unemployment by Occupation,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office and professional</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service and recreation</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crafts and production workers</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary workers</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All occupations</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These tables are not strictly comparable with each other, as they measure different aspects of the unemployment picture. The Canadian data are taken from official estimates which depict the average number of unemployed workers per occupational category for the given year. The American data, on the other hand, represent the accumulated number of 'unemployments' per occupational category throughout a given year; since some individuals are unemployed more than once per years, then these data overestimate the number of separate unemployed persons throughout the given time period. Nevertheless, the central point here is that no matter how unemployment is measured, manual workers are clearly more vulnerable to it than non-manual workers—the rate in 1971...
for blue-collar workers in Canada was about three times higher than that for white-collar. In addition, as Levison points out, when manual workers become unemployed, they tend to stay unemployed for longer periods of time than non-manual workers; in 1970 in the U.S., for example, 30% of unemployed blue-collar workers were out of work for four months or more continuously (Levison, 1974:83).

The conclusions about the nature of the market situation to be drawn from these data on income distribution, fringe benefits, promotion, advancement, and market security depend, of course, on the type of categories used. In the case of the income distribution and promotion/career structure data, we were able to differentiate not only between manual and non-manual, but between degrees of the two. As a result of this, the principal point which emerged was that the main line of cleavage appears to have moved upwards, so to speak, and now separates the upper middle-class of professional, executive, and higher managerial labour from the remaining "mass" of white- and blue-collar workers. This "mass", however, is not undifferentiated; at the top is the semi-professional, technical, and lower managerial stratum, followed after an income gap of 10-20 percent by skilled manual and sales workers, followed in turn after a gap of 10-15 percent by the semi-skilled and clerical labour, followed after a similar gap by the unskilled and service workers.
The data on fringe benefits and unemployment, at least for Canada, only allow us to differentiate between manual and non-manual. In this respect, differences in fringe benefit distribution still persist between the two classes, though they seem to be undergoing some narrowing to an extent. Indeed, in some cases, the differences are small, less than ten percent. But more importantly, the differences consistently favour non-manual workers however marginally, and taken together in cumulative form, they serve to shore up traditional differentials between the two groups. The data on unemployment do likewise, though to a greater extent. One of the most persistent forms of inequality between manual and non-manual workers, it seems, is that the latter are up to five times (in the case of the unskilled) more likely to suffer unemployment, and to do so for longer periods of time, in spite of the fact that unemployment has become one of the politically most sensitive topics in the capitalist societies since the 1930's.

Inequalities of market situation are, however, only one aspect of overall class inequalities in modern society. We must now go on to take a look at the secondary aspects of the overall situation, the work and status situations, to see if inequalities here shore up or cut across those of the market situation, if, of course, they exist at all.
The Work Situation

Work situation was defined in Chapter I in terms of the work rewards accruing to an individual by virtue of his/her position in the division of labour. In other words, it refers primarily to an individual's chance to experience work satisfaction and intrinsic enjoyment from the performance of his occupational role. Understandably, the idea of work satisfaction is a rather vague and amorphous one, encompassing a range of concepts such as alienation, motivation, commitment, and involvement. Essentially, however, all these concepts deal in some way with the fundamental issue of the extent and manner in which individuals find their work activity rewarding.

The history of theory and research on work satisfaction is an extensive one dating back effectively to the famous Hawthorne experiments in the late 1920's and early 1930's (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1964; Whitehead, 1938). The Hawthorne studies were originally undertaken in an ideological climate coloured largely by the rationalist, individualist assumptions of F.W. Taylor's 'scientific management'. Though primarily concerned with problems of productivity and motivation, Hawthorne is clearly relevant to the subject of work satisfaction, if only because of the pervasive assumption (should one perhaps say presumption?) that one prerequisite for good productivity is a satisfied work force. After exhausting a string of ecological and
psychological variables (the stock in trade of industrial research at that time), the researchers finally set upon the informal work group as the principal source of work integration, motivation, and control. The major development to grow out of Hawthorne was the emergence of a rather nebulous theory-cum-ideology known as 'Human Relations', whose main focus was on the informal primary social relations of work organisation as the principal determinant of work attitudes and behaviour. The focus in much of the postwar research, on the other hand, turn away from the informal social organisation to the technical organisation of work activity as the prime mover behind attitudes and behaviour, particularly among the industrial blue-collar labour force. The thrust of research by analysts like William Form, Robert Blauner, and Joan Woodward was on the attempt to delineate the obdurate constraints imposed on the social worker's social life at work by the predominating form of technology (Form, 1972; Blauner, 1964; Woodward, 1958). For Blauner and Woodward this entailed the construction of evolutionary typologies of technological development, and examining the subsequent impact of different forms on the division of labour and authority. In the mid sixties something of a synthesis between these two perspectives emerged in the form of the "socio-technical systems" theory of Trist, Bamforth, Rice and their colleagues at the Tavistock Institute (Trist and Bamforth, 1969). In various pieces of
research this group of theorists has attempted to examine the variety of ways in which both the social and technical relations of the work process combine to form particular socio-technical systems which are, nonetheless, open to being restructured in various ways and to varying extents in order to enhance the sense of work community and participation and thereby improve morale, motivation, and (of course) productivity.

As even a cursory overview as this is enough to suggest, the bulk of the research on work satisfaction and alienation has concerned itself with factors closer to the actual performance of work operations--the work setting as a physical, technological, and social system--as the primary source of attitudes and behaviour, than on more abstract notions such as class position. Nevertheless, it is clear at a glance that the work setting is definitely related to occupational position, and that by implication work satisfaction is to some extent a function of social class.

In the literature on the relationship between occupation and work attitudes and behaviour, the conventional wisdom which has been built up over time is that the extent of satisfaction and the occupational/class hierarchy are directly related: as we move up from unskilled manual to professional/executive so the amount of work satisfaction generally increases. Gurin et al., for example, found that 42% of the professionals they questioned claimed to be
"very satisfied" with their work, as opposed to only 13% of the unskilled labourers (Gurin et al., 1960). And in an interesting cross-cultural survey of work satisfaction Inkeles found that although the overall level of satisfaction did vary from country to country, the association with occupation and skill level did not: those in middle-class occupations consistently reported greater work satisfaction than those in working-class ones (cited in Argyle, 1972).

Like much of the initial postwar research on work satisfaction, both of these studies rely upon direct questioning to ascertain levels of satisfaction; this is plausible enough as satisfaction is, after all, a subjective concept. However, the direct questioning approach has now been shown to have certain shortcomings. 'Given the centrality of one's occupational role as a general source of social and self-identity in modern society, it is psychologically self-effacing to admit to being dissatisfied with it in some respects; to do so almost equals being dissatisfied with one's essential self-concept. Consequently, there is a certain degree of pressure on the individual to make a public statement of satisfaction, regardless of his/her specific sentiments, a fact which helps to account in some part for the fact that, generally speaking, direct questioning tends to elicit overall high levels of reported satisfaction, usually in the region of 80% of those being questioned. As a result of this, more oblique measures of
work satisfaction were devised such as indirect questioning—"would you encourage your son to follow in your occupational footsteps," etc.—and the use of behavioural indicators like grievance and conflict activity. In this respect several studies have come up with a range of diverse findings which all tend to substantiate the conventional wisdom: Friedman and Havighurst (1954), for example, found that middle-class workers retire later or at least express the desire to do so; Wilensky (1963) found that professionals and executives work long hours, not for extra pecuniary rewards, but for the intrinsic satisfaction of the work they do and for the enhancement of their career potential; Kornhauser (1965) in his now famous study found that manual workers in low skill, repetitive work develop low "mental health" over time; Dubin (1956) and Orzack (1963) found that industrial blue-collar workers no longer regard their work and their jobs as a "central life interest" whereas semi-professionals like nurses do; and Coburn (1974), in a study of work life and health among a sample of Canadian workers, found that the manual workers questioned were more likely to choose a different line of work if they could start their work lives over again, and were less likely to recommend their own occupations or those like it to their offspring. Along a slightly different tack, Morse and Weiss, in a comparative study of work attitudes and values, found that middle-class individuals were more likely to respond
to their work and its setting in extreme form, both positive and negative, than those in working-class jobs. This, they concluded, suggested that for those in middle-class occupations, work constitutes more of a challenge, a source of both strong gratification and frustration. For those in manual occupations, on the other hand, they argued that work was more a matter of adjustment and resignation. Moreover, in line with this interpretation, they also found that their middle-class respondents seemed more committed to the job itself, whereas for the working-class respondents the commitment seemed to be more one to working in general (Morse and Weiss, 1955:191).

This last point underscores another important distinction which was often overlooked in the earlier studies of work satisfaction, namely that the latter varies not only in quantity but also quality. To say one is satisfied with one's "work" could mean one is satisfied with only certain of the many aspects of it, e.g. the content of the job, the place of employment, the system of authority and supervision, the physical work setting, the level and manner of payment, and so on. One of the earlier attempts to capitalise on this was Herzberg's famous "two factor" theory of motivation based on research into work satisfaction among engineers and accountants (Herzberg, 1959). Herzberg and his associates claimed that 'motivators' such as achievement and recognition from others were responsible for
feelings of satisfaction, whereas 'hygiene' factors like supervisory relations and work group relations were the major source of dissatisfaction and frustration. As parsimonious as this sounds, the theory was found not to hold up so well for other occupations and other working conditions; at best, Herzberg et al. had contributed something to an understanding of the work values of professional/technical workers, but whether the theory revealed very much about the work lives of the rest of the work force was doubtful indeed.

Of far more lasting durability in this regard has been the distinction between 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' sources of satisfaction and alienation. The accumulated conventional wisdom in this connection now holds that those in non-manual, white-collar jobs tend to emphasize intrinsic work factors such as job content, the opportunity to exercise initiative and discretion, while manual workers, on the other hand, pay more attention to extrinsic factors such as working conditions, job security, and income. The theoretical implication of this is that manual workers are more instrumental in attitude to their work, seeing it primarily as the means to other rewards and ends, than are non-manual workers. What this means in terms of the framework of class inequalities is that quantitative and qualitative inequalities compound one another: not only do manual workers not find their work as satisfying and rewarding as non-manual workers, but the rewards they do find are also predominantly extrinsic.
However, this image of the intrinsically satisfied white-collar worker, and the extrinsically striving blue-collar worker has recently come under scrutiny and revision from a number of quarters. As we have already seen, Robert Blauner has argued that automation will increasingly attenuate the objectively alienating features of industrial manual work by injecting it with more skill, responsibility, and initiative, by making the work semi-technical, and, above all, by reducing the extreme division of labour forced on the worker by mass production technology (Blauner, 1964). Harry Braverman, on the other hand, has argued that the increasing rationalisation of so-called non-manual work, especially in the form of office mechanisation and automation, results in the downgrading of skill levels, increasing routinisation and standardisation of work procedures, culminating in the progressive 'manualisation' of non-manual work (Braverman, 1974). And the conventional assumption that blue-collar instrumentalism represents simply a passive adaptation to the prevailing physical, social, and technical conditions encountered at work has also come under attack and reassessment with the work of Hulin and Blood in the U.S. and Goldthorpe, Lockwood et al. in the U.K. (Blood and Hulin, 1967; Hulin and Blood, 1968; Goldthorpe et al., 1968).

Automation became something of a glamorous topic of study during the fifties and early sixties when the
general social ambiance was celebrationist and the outlook for the future optimistic. In this respect, Blauner's was by no means the only sanguine projection for the salutary effects of automation on blue-collar work. Nevertheless, it is hard to draw any definite conclusions from the existing empirical literature; automation, much like anything else, turns out to be a Janus-headed creature.

On the 'positive' side, it is generally conceded that automation—in the strict sense of continuous process technology with built-in automatic feedback—does reduce the division of manual labour, and result in the subsequent enlargement of work tasks. In his study of the effects of automation in a pipe fitting factory, for example, Walker found that the overall number of job levels in the organisation were reduced from eighteen to seven, resulting not only in de-differentiation of work functions but also a flattening of the authority pyramid (Walker, 1957). At the same time, industrial automation generally makes the work cleaner, less noisy, less physically arduous, and less physically hazardous. The work itself takes on a less manual character and tends to confer a greater sense of occupational prestige on the individual.

On the 'negative' side, it has been found that industrial automation may simply replace work which was physically strenuous with work which is mentally strenuous. In a study of the effects of automation on auto workers,
William Faunce found that workers in the automated settings were less likely to report being physically tired, but more likely to complain of mental fatigue as a result of the tension caused by greater responsibility (Faunce, 1970). This, in turn, comes from monitoring very costly equipment in which mistakes can result in the loss of time and money. The expense of automated equipment also means that it usually has to be working twenty-four hours a day in order to be profitable. An inevitable consequence of this is the necessity of shift work which tends to disrupt normal family and leisure routines, and which is an almost universal source of discontent among industrial workers. The physical organisation of automated technology also tends to result in workers being spaced far apart, acting as a barrier to informal social interaction on the job and augmenting rather than reducing social isolation.

On the equivocal side of things, we find the issues of employment and skill level. Though there does not seem to be any overall, unquestionable evidence to suggest that automation is having an adverse effect on unemployment rates at the national level, it does seem to be the case that at the level of the individual plant or organisation automation does reduce, sometimes quite substantially, the need for manpower. Studies by Mann and Hoffman of an automated power plant, and Walker's study of an automated pipe mill both indicate that from management's point of view the big
attraction of automation is that productivity is increased with a reduced labour force (Mann and Hoffman, 1960; Walker, 1957). Though some new jobs are generally created by automation, typically maintenance work, the overall impact seems to be one of job loss.

The impact of automation on skill level seems to be dual: it both raises and downgrades existing skill requirements. This process is best explained by James Bright in his study, Automation and Management (Bright, 1958). Bright begins with a schema of technological development starting from the level of simple hand tools and progressing up to continuous process automation. As we move from stage to stage along this schema, so the level of human skill required in the process of production at first rises (reaching its epitome in the artisan or craftsman), and then gradually declines as more and more complex operations are stripped from the worker and built into the machine itself. As this takes place, so human participation in the actual production process becomes more minimal, simple, and routine. What this amounts to, then, is that the historical evolution of technology has rendered machine operation more simple and therefore in need of less skill; at the same time, it has rendered machine design, construction, and maintenance more complex, and therefore in need of more skill. Thus, the overall tendency of automation, just like most earlier forms of technological development, is to make production
work less skilled and maintenance work more so; hence automation both decreases and increases skill levels. As Bright himself has summarised it:

If we think carefully about the skill, education, and training required to become a suitable operator on the machinery around us, it becomes clearer that we tend to confuse the maintenance and design problems or exceptional operator jobs with the most common situation: namely that growing automaticity tends to simplify operator duties (1958:183; original emphasis).

As a result of this, as Bright himself discovered in the plants he studied, "...there is little evidence to show that large numbers of distinctly superior skills are required to man the automated plant" (1958:195). In other words, the creation of skilled maintenance work at best only offsets the skill loss due to automation.

The main conclusion from this brief review is hardly one which supports Blauner's endorsement of automation as the harbinger of good times for the blue-collar worker's work situation; if anything, its effects will be mixed. To be sure, the incidence of work alienation is already variable within the manual labour force—skilled craftsmen, for example, have conventionally enjoyed more intrinsically rewarding work situations, and there is no reason to assume this will not extend to the new forms of skilled/technical labour created by automation—but for the bulk of the manual category, the semi-skilled and the unskilled, the direction of technological change, over which they as yet exercise little
control, does not appear to offer prospects of a less objectively alienating future. Even if Blauner's thesis did receive unqualified support about the salutary effects of automation from other studies, it still remains problematic just how extendable this form of technology is. Georges Friedmann, for example, cites one study in the 1950's which estimated that only 8% of the American labour force was 'automatable' at that time (Friedman, 1961). In the early sixties Brozen estimated that to automate the manufacturing sector of the American economy as fully as possible would require capital investment of over two-and-a-half trillion dollars, which, at the rate of expenditure on plant and equipment at that time, would take two centuries to complete (Brozen, 1963)!

On the other hand, the evidence pertaining to the effects of rationalisation on the structure and content of white-collar work, both in the form of bureaucratisation and in the shape of office mechanisation and automation, does suggest a clearer picture, and one which generally supports the claims of the proletarianisation theorists. Studies of white-collar bureaucracies by Dale (1962), Aiken and Hage (1966), Morse (1953), Wall (1968), and Crozier (1964), to name a few, all substantiate the general proposition that the more a work setting is bureaucratised, that is, the more work procedures are standardised, formalised, impersonalised, and routinised, the more likely is the worker
to feel dissatisfied, frustrated, and generally alienated from his/her work. Though organisations do vary widely in the extent to which they are bureaucratised, there is an incentive on the part of management, at least in the context of a capitalist culture, to attempt further bureaucratisation for precisely the reasons which those subjected to it find it alienating: it removes control of the work out of the hands of the individual and thereby lessens management dependency on the worker, rendering him more replaceable and, by implication, a cheaper market commodity.

More recently, the main vehicle of office rationalisation has taken the form of mechanisation and automation. Strictly speaking, the mechanisation of the office began a century ago with the invention of the typewriter, but extensive office mechanisation only began in earnest after the war. The immediate ramification of mechanisation, as Braverman noted, is to transform mental into semi-manual labour. This, in turn, results in the transfer of more complex operations from the individual to the machine, thus reducing skill requirements, routinising work tasks, increasing the division of labour, all culminating in a reduction of the worker's market security. As for manual workers, these developments conduce to feelings of dissatisfaction and alienation. A study of clerical workers by Kirsch and Lengermann, for example, found that those working at more routine, low skill jobs experienced greater self-estrangement.
than those with more varied, challenging work (Kirsch and Lengerman, 1972).

Office automation, which usually takes the form of computerisation, seems to have the same general effects upon the division of white-collar labour as industrial automation has on the blue-collar occupational structure. It creates a small number of highly skilled/technical jobs concerned with design and maintenance, together with an array of relatively routine, semi-skilled ones devoted to operation. In this connection, Ida Hoos has argued that office automation amounts to a transformation of office work in which the "accounting, bookkeeping, filing, and ledger clerks, often called the 'backbone of the clerical force'" are eliminated, and their work incorporated into the computer. As a result of this, they are replaced by semi-manual forms of labour such as key-punching—"a dead-end job, with no promotional opportunities" in which the work activity is "simple, monotonous, and repetitive, but requires a high degree of accuracy and speed" (Hoos, 1960:105).

The ramifications of this for both the organisational structure and for the individual directly are fairly clear-cut and invariable. Due to changes in the division of labour, centralisation of decision-making tends to occur as management finds itself in a position of reduced dependency on its clerical work force. The ecology of the office setting is radically altered as the traditional, small-scale intimate
setting is replaced with large-scale "office-floors" with reduced privacy and less opportunity to interact frequently and on a personal basis with management. Furthermore, the cost of office automation, like that in the factory, introduces an incentive for continuous use; as such, we should expect shift work to become an increasingly prominent feature of office work. In short, with the introduction of automatic equipment into the office, the traditional organisational characteristics of white-collar work which differentiated life in the office from life on the factory floor began to erode.

At the level of the individual worker, these organisational and technical changes make themselves felt in the form of reduced skill level, reduced control over the design, composition, and pace of the work process, and a generally less satisfying work environment. Hoos, for example, found that the workers she studied who had been affected by computerisation complained of being "chained to the machine", with subsequent restrictions upon the opportunity for movement about the work setting (Hoos, 1960). In this respect, she found that automation conduced more to the sense of social isolation which has been identified by Blauner (1964), Seeman (1959) and others as a major component of alienation. It is an even more significant development if we bear in mind that opportunities for informal social interaction on-the-job have traditionally been considered one of the
Indeed, it seems to be the case that the effects of office automation are extending above and beyond the level of the routine clerical worker. In a study of the effects of automation on management, Burack found that an increasing emphasis was placed on technical expertise at the expense of personal experience (Burack, 1967). This clearly threatens the seniority system of promotion, and introduces to older, less formally qualified management personnel the spectre of their being passed by on the promotion ladder by younger 'experts'. As Richard Hall has intoned: "At the managerial level the possibility of a form of technological unemployment or underemployment is thus not remote" (Hall, 1968:361).

Quite possibly, these same effects may reach up into the upper middle-class, particularly into the full professions. An example of this is the introduction of computers into medical practice as diagnostic aids. What this will do, however, is to remove a central aspect of medical professionalism, namely diagnosis of the problem and requisite treatment, out of the hands of the individual professional, thus threatening to eliminate an important feature of his claim to expertise. Unchecked, the consequences of this would be to reduce progressively the physician to the level of a technician, and duly undermine the basis of his privileged market and work situations. Accordingly, we should
expect the professions to focus their energies and resources in the direction of maintaining close control over the manner and rate of automation.

The trend toward the ever-developing rationalisation of white-collar work introduces, as a matter of course, the question of how those affected will react and adapt to it. The conventional assumption on this score has been simply that when individuals are denied intrinsic rewards from the activities in which they engage, then their level of satisfaction generally drops, and their emphasis is switched, presuming they continue to participate, to the extrinsic benefits participation provides. Going back to Marx, it has commonly been assumed that individuals seek primarily intrinsic rewards from their work, and so instrumentalism on their part must be a sign of ensuing alienation. From this perspective, the white-collar worker, when faced with an increasingly rationalised work situation, will simply adapt after the manner of his blue-collar counterpart.

Recent research, however, throws this conventional wisdom into doubt to some extent, principally on the grounds that it is empirically questionable whether all individuals, regardless of social background, do seek the same intrinsic rewards from their work. Blood and Hulin, for example, have argued very persuasively that one feature of working-class family life is that children are socialised into a predominantly instrumental definition of work and the job
(Blood and Hulin, 1967). The corollary of this is that blue-collar instrumentalism is not just the result of adaptation to a work situation in which the individual is denied intrinsic rewards, but is in fact a prior orientation, learned throughout childhood and adolescence, and taken to work from the outside.

This account of working-class instrumentalism is substantiated to some extent and developed in the research undertaken by Goldthorpe, Lockwood, et al. (1968) in the U.K., and in later research by Cotgrove (1972) and Wedderburn and Crompton (1972). In their study of the work values and habits of a sample of "affluent" industrial workers in the automotive industry, Goldthorpe et al. found that many of the semi-skilled workers they interviewed predictably found their work dull and monotonous, and emphasised the pecuniary and security benefits of the work as its attractive feature. In this respect, they came up with findings much like those of a host of other industrial studies including Blauner's. On further inquiry, however, the researchers found that a substantial number of their sample had at some point previous to their present employment worked in white-collar or "intermediate" occupations, and that some had purposely left these presumably more prestigious jobs in order to become manual workers because the work was better paid.

At first sight, this may appear as something of a paradox to those sociologists who insist upon seeing the
stratification order as a prestige hierarchy: a group of individuals deliberately motivated to become "downwardly" mobile. This, however, is clearly not the case, since in their own estimation these men were upwardly mobile in their new jobs as they earned more money; their image of the stratification order was primarily an economic one. What this points to, of course, is the fact that actors themselves, as well as the professional sociologists who study them, have models of social reality in terms of which their actions are framed; and that conceptions like upward and downward mobility may well be defined differently by those involved.

More to the point, however, this study also questions our conventional assumptions about the alienated worker. Clearly, in the Goldthorpe study, many of the workers were importing into the work setting a definition of work, a set of expectations, aspirations, and orientations, derived outside work and in some sense prior to it. And so, although these men generally found their work dull and boring, can we speak of their being alienated if the rewards they sought from work--money and security--were generally fulfilled? Can we, in other words, speak of alienation if there is no disparity between rewards sought and rewards gained? We can illustrate this relationship by means of the following diagram:
Typology of Work Commitment\textsuperscript{14}

Rewards Gained  
(Fulfillment/Involvement)

\begin{tabular}{ccc}
  & Intrinsic & Extrinsic \\
Intrinsic Rewards & A & B \\
Sought (Expectations/orientations) & C & D \\
\end{tabular}

In terms of this typology, Goldthorpe's instrumental workers would fall into box D, and would be better labelled 'dissociated' from their work: they seek extrinsic rewards, and that is what they receive. The alienated worker, on the other hand, would fall into box B: he seeks intrinsic rewards but finds only extrinsic ones; hence there exists a disparity between rewards sought and those gained. If the findings of Goldthorpe are extendable to at least the semi-skilled manual work force, then alienation may no longer be problematic for them. Indeed, work alienation may

\textsuperscript{14}The author cannot claim originality for this typology. Though it does not exist, to the author's knowledge, in published form, it was introduced during a series of lectures on the sociology of work by Dr. S. Box at the University of Kent, Canterbury, U.K., 1966-67.
now become the lot of the white-collar worker. As we noted earlier, white-collar workers tend to express intrinsic orientations toward work. At the same time, as we also noted, they are increasingly finding themselves faced with rationalised work situations which do not provide fulfillment for these orientations. The upshot of this is that the white-collar worker may no longer find him/herself in box A—the traditional white-collar situation of work "association"—but in box B, work alienation. Thus one possible scenario, in the short-run, is not so much a homogenisation of the subjective aspects of blue- and white-collar work situations so much as an actual inversion: a dissociated manual worker willing to compromise boring work for tangible rewards in the paycheck and an alienated white-collar worker struggling to cope with expectations which are thwarted by prevailing reality.

This, however, is speculation, and it oversteps the bounds of the evidence at hand. On the whole, the weight of this does support the position of the proletarianisation theorists that, objectively speaking, the technical and social organisation of white-collar work is approaching more and more that of manual work. Nonetheless, we should exercise caution in endorsing this position unconditionally. Notwithstanding these growing similarities, there still remain some significant inequalities between blue- and white-collar work situations, particularly with respect to physical
working conditions. White-collar work, even in the rationa-
ised, "technicised" office floor, remains cleaner, safer,
and generally more pleasant than life in the factory, on
the construction site, or down the mine. Every year in the
United States, for example, about 12,000 workers are killed
on the job; add to these the thousands of others who are
maimed, injured, or contract debilitating diseases because
of the work they perform. Clearly, these are more likely to
be truck drivers, miners, or machine operatives than pro-
fessionals, managers, or clerical workers. Though manual
work may become safer with the introduction of automation,
the short-run prospects for a substantial reduction in the
toll of on-the-job accidents and deaths remains slim.

The Status Situation

In one of their first statements on the issue of
working-class embourgeoisement, Goldthorpe and Lockwood
referred to what they called the "relational aspect of class",
whether or not manual workers are being accepted by the
established middle-class "on terms of equality in both formal
and informal interaction" (Goldthorpe and Lockwood, 1963:136).
What this amounts to is that if one is to speak of the decom-
position of traditional class boundaries, one must do so in
the subjective as well as the objective sense. Put another
way, if manual workers are to be regarded as middle-class,
they must not only experience a middle-class economic
situation and follow a middle-class style of life, but also think of themselves as middle-class and be accepted as such by their new-found 'peers'; alternately, if white-collar workers are to be regarded as working-class, they too must think of themselves and be accepted as such by others. What we are talking about, then, is the status situation: the symbolic rewards of prestige and worth. For present purposes, we can measure this in two ways: firstly, by looking at the public images of occupational prestige; and secondly by looking at how individuals define themselves in terms of the class structure, in other words by looking at class consciousness and self-placement.

The most suitable way in which to examine the public images of occupational worth and value is by means of occupational prestige scales. The systematic study of occupational prestige rankings dates back effectively to the famous National Opinion Research Centre study of 1947 (North and Hatt, 1947). Though earlier studies had been undertaken, going back to Counts' pioneering work in 1925, the '47 N.O.R.G. study was the first to put the study of occupational prestige on a sound footing. Indeed, it sparked off a hive of activity for the next fifteen years as apprentice sociologists in pursuit of doctoral degrees combed the globe conducting studies of occupational prestige in places as far apart as Brazil and the Island of Guam (Inkeles and Rossi, 1956; Hodge et al., 1966). By and large, the
consensus of opinion to emerge from these studies was that, allowing for local peculiarities and sometimes rather dubious methodological practices, there was remarkable consistency both internationally and intranationally in the way people allocated status and prestige in the occupational structure, which fact gave a welcome boost to the functionalist preoccupation with common values as the cornerstone of social order.

From the point of view of our present interests, however, the most significant feature of these studies is that they reveal quite unambiguously the way in which the distribution of occupational prestige mirrors the inequalities of the market and work situations noted above. Once again, then, we find that the components of the class situation tend to compound and reinforce one another: those occupations which are more highly rewarded materially tend to enjoy greater work control and satisfaction, and tend to receive greater symbolic rewards in the form of status and prestige. Excluding the state socialist societies, the overall pattern of occupational prestige is consistent not only cross-culturally, but also historically: at the top are professional and executive workers, followed by semi-professionals and low-level managers, followed by sales, clerical, service, skilled blue-collar, semi-skilled blue-collar, with the unskilled at the bottom.

Methodologically, the two most reliable and extensive
studies are both replications of the '47 N.O.R.C. research. The first is an American follow-up study undertaken by N.O.R.C. in 1963, published by Hodge et al.; the second is a study conducted in Canada by Peter Pineo and John Porter in 1966-67 (Hodge et al., 1956; Pineo and Porter, 1967). As we can see from Table Eight, the second N.O.R.C. study found that between 1947 and 1963 there was an upward shift in the prestige 'score' attributed to all blue-collar occupations which was greater than the overall average.

**TABLE 8**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATIONAL GROUP</th>
<th>AVERAGE SCORE DIFFERENCE</th>
<th>AVERAGE CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White-collar</td>
<td>+0.3</td>
<td>+0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>+0.7</td>
<td>+0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and Sales</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-Collar</td>
<td>+1.8</td>
<td>+3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen</td>
<td>+1.6</td>
<td>+2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operatives</td>
<td>+0.9</td>
<td>+1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>+2.4</td>
<td>+4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>+2.2</td>
<td>+5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Occupations</td>
<td>+0.8</td>
<td>+1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the professions, there was a slight increase, whereas the prestige scores for managerial, clerical, and sales workers declined negligibly. Before rushing to any conclusions about incipient homogenisation, however, it should be emphasised that all the changes are small, less than 6%. On the basis of this comparison, together with other studies dating back to 1925, the authors conclude that "there have been no substantial changes in occupational prestige in the U.S. since 1925... That no substantial changes are observed over a span of approximately forty years is... surprising and is further evidence of constraints toward the stability of prestige hierarchies" (Hodge et al., 1966:329).

The Pineo-Porter study, as well as attempting to replicate the '47 and '63 N.O.R.C. studies for purposes of comparative analysis, was also concerned to measure the longitudinal trends in occupational prestige for Canada. For this purpose, the benchmark for comparison was Tuckman's 1947 study of occupational prestige ranking (Tuckman, 1947). Though this study had not been based on a sample drawn randomly from a representative cross-section of the general population, it had still correlated highly with the '63 N.O.R.C. study (r = .96). The Pineo-Porter study correlated highly with both the '63 N.O.R.C. study (r = .98), and with Tuckman's (r = .93). This demonstrates remarkable inconsistency between Canada and the U.S., and within Canada over time. When compared with the U.S. data, Pineo and Porter found that
the Canadian prestige scores were an average of two points higher on the scale of one hundred, ranging from four points higher for full and semi-professionals to 1.4 points higher for blue-collar occupations.

TABLE 9

Average Prestige Scores by Occupational Group, Canada, 1967.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATIONAL GROUP</th>
<th>MEAN SCORE</th>
<th>STANDARD DEVIATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers, proprietors, official large organisations</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-professional</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers, proprietors, official small organisations</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and Sales</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled manual</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled manual</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled manual</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There are two principal conclusions to be drawn from these data. The first is that, if we take the standard deviation scores as an indicator of consistency and therefore of the degree of certainty about an occupational group's ranking, then it appears that individuals are least consistent and by implication less certain about the ranking
of non-manual than manual occupations. This possibly reflects the fact that it is in the area of white-collar occupations that most recent change in the occupational structure has been occurring. Blue-collar occupations, on the other hand, have remained more fixed, and therefore perhaps more familiar to the public at large.

More significantly, however, these data on prestige ranking clearly reinforce the picture of market situation inequalities discussed earlier. Again, we can see that the traditional manual/non-manual line of differentiation has blurred and 'moved up', so to speak; with respect to both income and prestige allocation, the principal division is between the upper middle-class of professional and executive labour on the one hand, and the remainder of the white- and blue-collar work force on the other. The prestige data do tend to differentiate the position of semi-professionals more clearly than the data on income distribution, but the overall pattern is the same. Particularly notable is the bunching of the clerical, sales, skilled, and semi-skilled manual groups—the bulk of the labour force—within six points of each other, and fairly low down the points list; just as we saw that full professionals earn on average in the region of two to two and a half times as much as lower white-collar and blue-collar workers, so we find they receive twice as many points for "social standing". As we saw, these findings correlate highly with both of the
N.O.R.C. studies, which, in turn, exhibited high correlations with earlier American studies going back to 1925. If this is the case, then we can hardly conclude that the homogenisation of lower white-collar and blue-collar prestige is a recent phenomenon since it dates back, more or less intact, to the mid-twenties. Nor can we safely assume that it means that blue-collar workers are now accorded the same status as white-collar workers, since the generally low level of the scores for this block, together with the sizeable gap separating it from small managers and semi-professionals suggest that if anything we are witnessing the proletarianisation of lower white-collar status rather than the embourgeoisement of blue-collar status.

We can measure the status situation, however, not only by how individuals judge the prestige and symbolic worth of others, but also by how they see themselves. After all, one of the commonly noted features of prestige ranking studies is that individuals tend to "overvalue" their own occupation at the expense of others (Young and Willmott, 1956). In this respect, although we have not found any evidence to support the notion of an embourgeoisement of occupational prestige, we may well find evidence supporting the embourgeoisement of self-prestige, particularly in light of the assumption that people like to identify with and emulate their "betters".

The most direct manner in which to measure self-
identification in the stratification order is to examine how (if) individuals place themselves in terms of social class categories such as 'working-class', 'middle-class', and so on; in other words to see which class they put themselves in. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that in North America there is a strong body of professional sociological opinion which maintains that individuals do see themselves as predominantly middle-class; a view which is held by those who otherwise are concerned to demonstrate the obduracy of objective class inequalities. Porter, for example, in his The Vertical Mosaic, a book devoted to an analysis of the strength and continuity of class inequalities in Canadian society, introduces his discussion with a statement to the effect that Canadians overwhelmingly regard themselves and their society as a middle-class one, a statement which remains unsupported and simply taken for granted (Porter, 1965:3). To be sure, this kind of "whereas-the-common-man-believes..." approach is always common in a discipline attempting to establish its scientific credentials. In this particular case, however, the myths, as we shall see, are not propagated by the common man, but rather by the professional sociologist; it is more a case of "whereas-the-professional-sociologist-believes..." followed then by the corrective.

The study of class self-identification has generally fallen under the rather amorphous area of 'class conscious-
ness'. Although, in the Marxist sense, this means considerably more than simply defining oneself as a capitalist or a worker, it cannot really be disputed that this is a necessary condition for the kind of collective political action Marx had in mind. Among professional sociologists, on the other hand, the term 'class consciousness' is generally confined to the ways in which individuals define the class structure, if at all, and where they place themselves in it.

The empirical study of class consciousness in this sense dates back essentially to Richard Centers' pioneering study published in 1949. In The Psychology of Social Class, Centers attempted to blend together elements of the European concern with class and class consciousness with American concerns for systematic empirical study. The study, based on surveys conducted with white male only samples in 1945 and '46, deals with the whole subjective aspect of stratification, of which self-placement is one part. In the first survey (its results were substantiated by the later ones), Centers found that 3% identified as 'upper-class', 43% as 'middle-class', 51% as 'working-class', 1% as 'lower-class', with only 1% each in the 'don't know' and 'don't believe in social classes' categories. These figures show quite clearly and unequivocally that just over half those sampled identified themselves as working-class, or rather did not see themselves as middle-class. Moreover, not only do these data dispel the myth that Americans at that time saw
themselves as predominantly middle-class, but they also dispel the myth that they did not believe in classes and saw their society as a classless one.

When correlated with occupation, furthermore, Centers discovered a significant relationship with class self-placement: those in manual occupations were far more likely to see themselves as working-class, and non-manual workers as middle-class.

TABLE 10
Class Identification and Occupation,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>UPPER</th>
<th>MIDDLE</th>
<th>WORKING</th>
<th>LOWER</th>
<th>DON'T KNOW</th>
<th>DON'T BELIEVE IN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All non-manual</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager, large</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager, small</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-Collar (clerical, sales)</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All manual</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To be fair, however, this is an area of study in which methodological differences can have a significant impact on the overall findings. Centers' study was based on closed-ended questions in which respondents were given a choice of four class categories into which to allocate themselves. Other studies, using a three class model with upper, middle, and lower, have tended to find that individuals disproportionately choose the middle one. All this shows, however, is that people are loathe to put themselves at either the top or bottom of hierarchies. Another, and more pertinent objection which can be raised to drawing strong conclusions from studies like Centers', is that when faced with open-ended questions about class identification, it is evident that there tend to be considerably more 'don't know' and 'other' responses, a fact which, according to one team of researchers, indicates "that popular usage of self-placement expressions like "middle-class" and especially "working-class" is considerably less prevalent than a structured question alone would have us believe" (Lopreato and Hazelrigg, 1972:147). Nevertheless, the Centers study does demonstrate that public recognition of such terms is indeed high, and that the vast majority have little problem identifying the one to which they belong.

Much as the 1947 N.O.R.C. Study of occupational prestige rankings stimulated further research, so the Centers study of class consciousness established the bench-
mark for further research. In a review of later studies of class consciousness in the U.S. up to 1968 Schreiber and Nygreen have concluded that there has been no overall decline in the extent of working-class identification in the population (Schreiber and Nygreen, 1970). Unlike the prestige studies, however, studies of class consciousness have found significant variations both inter- and intra-nationally (see Appendix I). The American studies conducted in the fifties generally came up with findings close to those of Centers'. Two studies in the sixties, however, found lower levels of working-class identification at the expense of greater middle-class placement (Hodge and Treiman, 1968). These findings may reflect a number of things: changes in objective class structure (the growth of white-collar labour for example), changes in subjective perceptions, or simply methodological procedures. In the latter respect it should be noted that both studies differentiated upper middle and lower middle in the categories presented to the respondents. Moreover it should not be overlooked that although the proportion of working-class identifiers declined, it still remained significant at over 30% in both studies.

Canadian sociologists, however, have only recently turned to the topic of class consciousness; most observers have contented themselves with the assumption that Canadians saw themselves as middle-class and the matter could be left at that. A recently published study by Rinehart and Okraku
based on a sample in London, Ontario does indicate findings similar to those of the American research (Rinehart and Okraku, 1974). Out of a sample of 558, 0.4% identified themselves as upper-class, 43.7% as middle-class, 34.4% as working-class, 4.1% as lower-class, 6.8% uncertain, and 5.6% with no answer. Furthermore, as Table Eleven demonstrates, there was a strong relationship between class identification and occupation.

**TABLE ELEVEN**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>MIDDLE-CLASS</th>
<th>WORKING-CLASS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>67.9%</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager, large</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>90.9%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager, small</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>64.0%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-professional</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and Sales</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>53.4%</td>
<td>46.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>77.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>69.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>77.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>87.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Thus, although the data on class consciousness are not as invariant historically and cross-culturally as those on occupational prestige rankings, the overall conclusion is very much the same. First of all, it should be re-emphasised
that there is no evidence to support unequivocally the notion that North Americans see their society as either classless or as predominantly middle-class. Nor, secondly, is there any evidence to suggest any substantially increased tendency for manual workers to regard themselves as members of the middle-class or, on the other hand, for non-manual workers to see themselves as working-class. This latter point is significant: with respect to income distribution and occupational prestige, the overall picture conveyed by the data is one of homogeneity between lower level non-manual labour—thoe in clerical and sales work—and the various strata of manual work. However, with regard to class identification, it is clear that clerical and sales workers regard themselves predominantly middle-class, though less so than the other strata of non-manual labour. In this sense, if in no other, the traditional manual/non-manual division appears to persist.

The last point has some bearing too on what is possibly one of the cloudiest issues in the whole debate, namely the nature and meaning of white-collar unionism. This is a topic which seems to have attracted more speculation than serious research, which perhaps accounts for the over-abundance of analytical dichotomies which litter the literature. Several analysts have attempted to draw clear-cut lines of differentiation between blue- and white-collar unionism. Allen, for example, has distinguished
between the two on the basis of the strategies and means adopted to realise goals (Allen, 1964). White-collar unions, in his view, eschew "crude industrial action" and opt for legalistic channels through which to press their members' claims. Rawson, on the other hand, makes the distinction in terms of goals and aims rather than means. He argues that blue-collar unions are oriented to broad programmes for social and political reform, while white-collar unions concentrate their energies on the immediate issues which confront their members in their narrowly defined roles as employees (Rawson, 1956). Other writers have avoided the blue-/white-collar dichotomy, and made distinctions in terms of the degree of professionalism exhibited by occupational associations.

All of these are, however, open to detailed empirical criticism. The recent adoption of militant tactics by semi-professionals like nurses and teachers has made Allan's conceptualisation at best obsolete. Likewise, Rawson's typology is undermined by such things as white-collar endorsement of left-wing political parties and support for broader socio-political reforms, particularly in Europe. And the professional/non-professional dichotomy is becoming increasingly redundant as more and more so-called professional associations use collective means to further their interests (the Saskatchewan doctors' strike for example).

The problems with these attempts to differentiate
conceptually blue- and white-collar unionism have led others to reject the quest for differences as a futile one. C. W. Mills, for example, wrote that "The psychology of white-collar unionism...is not different from that of wage-workers" (1956:316), and Blackburn and Prandy have concluded that the "most fruitful" position is "to place emphasis on the basic similarity of white-collar to other unions" (1965:120). Yet, how do we reconcile conclusions like these with the fact that non-manual workers tend to regard themselves as middle- not working-class? Though, it is impossible to answer this question in the space of this chapter, there are certain points which are pertinent to it and to an understanding of the relationship between white-collar unionism and proletarianisation. Above all, we must bear in mind, as Bain and his associates have clearly shown through their review of the literature on the topic, that there is no simple, determinist relationship between unionism, of either blue- or white-collar variety, and the class structure (Bain et al., 1973). To reject classifications of the two types of unionism does not in any way imply that unionism can be understood as a homogeneous phenomenon.

To illustrate: while it is generally true that more and more non-manual workers are becoming unionised, it is nonetheless also true that there remain wide divergencies cross-culturally in the extent of white-collar
unionism. In the U.S. and Canada about 13% and 18% respectively of the white-collar labour force are unionised, as compared to about 70% in Sweden. Thus it remains problematic, and especially so in North America, whether the density of white-collar unionisation is increasing, or whether the increased number of white-collar unionists barely matches the overall increase in the white-collar labour force. Furthermore, if we take a look at the pattern of white-collar unionisation, then it is at once evident that it is heavily concentrated in the public rather than the private sector; in Canada in 1972, for example, about 84% of all white-collar unionists were public service employees (Marchak, 1973). In short, both the extent and distribution of white-collar unionism are restricted in some sense.

What this means, then, is that although we may not be able to draw any hard and fast distinctions between blue- and white-collar unionism, we cannot, on the other hand, endorse unconditionally the position that the latter is an objective and subjective indicator of proletarianisation. The structure, strategy, and ideology of any union must be treated as a complex interrelated system, which is subject to change, and which cannot be properly understood in terms of specious mono-causal theories.
Conclusion

The model of class structure constructed in the preceding chapter adopted the manual/non-manual division as the principal structural 'fault' running through the class system. In light of the empirical evidence presented in the foregoing analysis, however, this model stands in need of some qualification. On the one hand, if we adhere to conventional definitions of the manual/non-manual distinction, we are faced with a situation in which the lower middle-class is, in certain respects such as income level, in a position inferior to that of large sections of the working-class, both skilled and semi-skilled. On the other hand, if we adopt a more dynamic view of this division, there is considerable evidence concerning the rationalisation of white-collar office and sales work which suggests that many of those in ostensibly lower middle-class jobs—routine clerical, sales, and technical occupations—are performing what is increasingly 'manualised' work, supervising, operating, and tending increasingly automatic machinery. In this respect, the manual/non-manual division continues to be the major 'fault' of the class structure, but has (and continues to) moved up the class structure, so to speak, and now divides the upper middle-class of professional, scientific, and higher managerial workers from a more finely differentiated 'mass' composed of lower managerial, semi-professional, technical, clerical, sales,
blue-collar, and manual service labour.

Clearly, as Braverman has implied throughout his own analysis of these changes, the 'manualisation' of work activity and the steady deterioration of the typical market, work, and possibly status situations associated with it are inherently inter-related processes. At least as far as operation and execution (as opposed to maintenance) are concerned, the manualisation of work, usually by means of increased mechanisation, typically gives rise to 'de-skilling' as more complex processes and operations are transferred from person to machine. As such, the work situation usually deteriorates insofar as the work operations themselves become more repetitive and restrict opportunity for the worker to exercise discretion over design, sequencing, pacing, and so on, and the working conditions less agreeable as noise and heat levels rise and the opportunities for on-the-job interaction with others limited by the need for increased attention to the machine. At the same time, the market situation also suffers as the lower levels of skill and training required for the more routine work undermine wage potentials and market security.

From the point of view of sheer size, this mass of lower middle-class and working-class workers and their families constitutes the overwhelming bulk of the population, and it is here that the theses of embourgeoisement, proletarianisation, and convergence must stand the tests of
empirical scrutiny. Firstly, with respect to the market situation dimension, it is evident that in income terms at least, most blue-collar and some manual service workers have caught up with, and indeed may have surpassed, the lower middle-class and some sections of the middle class. Though some differences do persist in the matters of fringe benefits, career prospects, and market security, these too appear to be narrowing to some degree, though their cumulative impact is far from significant, and their direction serves to reinforce the traditional division between manual and non-manual work. There is, however, a problem in assessing theoretically the nature of these changes as the market situations of both working- and lower middle-class workers has undergone real improvement during the post-war period, though at a faster rate for the former. At the same time, we are tempted to interpret this as an embourgeoisement of market situation if only because the greatest impact of these changes has been felt by those in blue-collar and manual service work.

Changes in the work situation, on the other hand, are more easily diagnosed, and point generally in the direction claimed by the proletarianisation theorists. The progressive rationalisation of work activity, in the office, the store, the factory, the mine, etc., which occurs with the maturation of industrial capitalism has the general effect of introducing into white-collar work situations
conditions of work similar to those traditionally experienced by the manual worker: routinised, semi-skilled, manualised operative work. Historically, a relatively cheap and thus far relatively quiescent source of labour for this type of work has been provided by the rapid increase in female participation in the labour force. At the same time, we must make abundantly clear that these changes refer to the objective structures of white-collar work. When we examine subjective work attitudes, the patterns are far less clear-cut and consistent. While some researches have revealed greater boredom and deprivation on the part of rationalised white-collar workers, others have continued to find that these workers adhere to the middle-class norm, finding their work enjoyable and interesting.

The status situation, finally, presents something of a paradox insofar as there is little sign of any substantial change at all. In the case of occupational prestige ranking, we have observed a situation of virtual homogeneity between clerical, sales, and blue-collar workers. At the same time, however, we have also seen that this situation has in fact remained relatively unchanged over the last half century. If the occupational prestige of the lower middle-class has indeed undergone some process of proletarianisation, then it did so at least fifty years ago, way before the era of post-war affluence and abundance. In the case of social class identification and self-placement,
on the other hand, the traditional manual/non-manual division appears to have remained largely intact. In spite of increasing objective similarity to manual workers in their market and work situations, clerical and sales workers, together with lower managerial, semi-professional, and technical workers, continue to regard themselves as members of the middle-class. The manual groups, on the other hand, even in North American surveys, showed a marked propensity to regard themselves as working-class. Neither side, in short, has budged in the way it sees itself.

The overall picture, then, is one of a convergence mixed of partial embourgeoisement in the market situation, partial proletarianisation in the work situation, and relative stability in the status situation. The evidence does not support uniformly either the thesis of embourgeoisement or that of proletarianisation. The overall picture can be summed up diagramatically as follows:

```
+-------------------+          +-------------------+
| Traditional       |          | Traditional       |
| Working-class     |          | Middle-class      |
|                   |          |                   |
+-------------------+          +-------------------+
  
+-------------------+          +-------------------+
| 'Old' working-class |          | 'Old' middle-class |
|                   |          |                   |
+-------------------+          +-------------------+
  
+-------------------+          +-------------------+
| Market Situation  |          | Partial convergence|
|                   |          |                   |
+-------------------+          +-------------------+```
It must be re-emphasised that this convergence be regarded as only partial. If we use the term 'mass' to refer to this amalgam of lower middle-class and working-class, we should do so in a guarded sense. The idea of a social mass, as opposed to a social class, implies an aggregate of individuals who have no shared bases of social differentiation, who have no distinct roots in the social structure. In this respect, the label mass, as a way of designating this aggregate, is misleading. Social class is still an important line or axis of differentiation among this group. What the data suggest is not that it has disappeared, but rather that its importance has weakened in certain respects. Moreover, we have dealt here only with differences and similarities in immediate class situation; we have said nothing about class in the cultural sense. To complete this picture we need to look next to the issue of continuities and changes in class culture.
CHAPTER IV

CLASS CULTURE: AN EMPIRICAL REVIEW

And so the question of style enters into the definition of class; and style is what sociologists usually end up talking about when they speak of "stratification"...
(Hacker, 1976:15)

In their exhaustive review of the literature dealing with the multifarious aspects of 'class consciousness', Lopreato and Hazelrigg show that when people speak of 'class' in their everyday lives, as often as not, they are referring not to the list of objective economic indicators familiar to most professional sociologists, but to more amorphous things like tastes, beliefs, and habits; in short to the attitudinal and behavioural components of the mundane (Lopreato and Hazelrigg, 1972). In other words, as Andrew Hacker has pointed out, the 'question of style' must inevitably enter into the debate on class at some point sooner or later.

In the context of the present discussion, the question of style clearly figures more prominently for the thesis of embourgeoisement than that of proletarianisation. As we saw in Chapter I, one of the principal features of the embourgeoisement argument for the decomposition of the class structure was that the integration of the manual worker and his family into the world of middle-class existence was taking place not only in terms of objective class situation,
but also with respect to style of life--values, tastes, family life, patterns of recreation and sociability, consumption, and social participation--a claim which is distinctly absent from the arguments of the proletarianisation theorists. In the last chapter, we reviewed the state of the evidence pertaining to continuities and changes in the class situation of manual and non-manual workers; in this chapter, then, we shall be concerned to examine the continuities and changes in class culture and life-style by means of a review of the existing literature which bears on the matter.

Any review of this kind must, of necessity, be selective; and indeed the problem in this particular case is the overabundance of research and opinion from which to make that choice. In doing so, we have tried for the most part to follow the pattern established in the previous chapter: to select evidence dealing largely with the post-war period; to confine attention to materials dealing with Canada, the United States and Britain; and finally to base the review on studies which can be trusted for their methodological reliability and soundness. The first of these limitations is especially important: as we have just intimated, the theoretical base to which this review will be speaking is the thesis of embourgeoisement. This, in turn, relies heavily upon the spread of 'affluence', 'prosperity', and 'abundance' in its claims for the coming
of the middle-class society, and marks it unmistakably as a postwar thesis in its primary thrust and implications. At the same time, by confining our attention to this period, we still retain a reasonably long—three decade—time span from which to chart the signs of persistence and change.

Even when we impose these limitations, however, the task of selection is not as straightforward as it may seem; there are certain problems which do warrant some initial consideration and clarification. The first of these deals with the perennial problem of definition and measurement; the model of class established in Chapter I does not, needless to say, correspond necessarily with other models or conceptions. For example, income and education, used either singly or in the form of some composite index, have also been used in addition to occupation to denote class position in a concrete, operational sense. Yet status inconsistencies notwithstanding, there is a relatively strong empirical relationship between the various measures of class, and most of them do entail some reference to the blue-/white-collar or manual/non-manual distinction as a central feature of the class structure. More to the point, however, is the fact that, by implication, both the embourgeoisement and proletarianisation theses are questioning fundamentally the whole occupational perspective on class inequality: their claims amount to the argument that the distribution of market, work, and status situation rewards,
and by implication for the embourgeoisement theorists the 'distribution' of differential life-styles, is no longer contingent upon one's position in the division of labour. As such, therefore, it is essential that we retain an occupational model of class for the purposes of this review, since it is, in fact, what is being tested. And so, for this present chapter, I shall use the term 'working-class culture' to refer to the life-style patterns of manual workers and their families, and 'middle-class culture' to refer to the life-styles of non-manual workers.

By virtue of their general nature, however, these terms do contain certain dangers; for one thing, they imply homogeneous categories of individuals with no lines of internal diversity and variation. And it is common enough to find this assumption in the literature, particularly in those works which attempt to convey a holistic and integrated picture of the subject matter such as Brian Jackson's Working-Class Community (1968), or Arthur Shostak's Blue-Collar Life (1969). Although there is indeed an impressive body of evidence which points to a fairly commonly accepted image of both working- and middle-class life-styles (I shall refer to these henceforth as the 'conventional images' of working- and middle-class culture), we must, at the same time, be alert to the possibility of intra-class variations in values and behaviour as well as the possibility of inter-class similarities. This cautionary note is supported by a
small body of research and opinion which has recently begun to emerge, and which is increasingly critical of these 'conventional images' of class culture in a number of respects, and which suggests that they now be regarded as at best ideal types, and at worst as stereotypes and caricatures of the subject. To be sure, given the fact that class situations do vary within class boundaries, then we should expect that styles of life may also.

This point illustrates a general problem which is frequently encountered in social research, namely that if one is looking for variations one will usually find them; conversely, if one is looking for similarities then they too will usually be found. What this apparent paradox boils down to, of course, is that the nature of one's findings depend to a very large degree on the level of abstraction at which one is working. Good analysis must therefore strike that balance between using categories which are so broad and elastic as to encompass any and everything, and those, on the other hand, which are so narrow and restricted in scope as to serve as a procrustean bed for analysis in which facts and evidence are sacrificed for the sake of taxonomic elegance. In other words, we must be prepared to recognise distinctions within these class categories if the data so warrant.

The final problem which requires some preliminary discussion before beginning the review concerns the use of
the terms 'culture' and 'life-style'. I shall use the terms, co-terminously, and not make any systematic distinction between them unless otherwise specified. They are used to denote not only the usual referent of the term culture, namely values, tastes, attitudes, and beliefs, but also to what we might call the behavioural repertoire of everyday life, to the series of activities which constitute the mundane: family and domestic life, patterns of sociability and primary social participation, patterns of formal or secondary social participation, leisure, recreation and media use, and finally patterns of material consumption.

The term 'life-style' or 'style of life', though found often enough in commonsense and sociological vocabularies, is in fact a relatively unexplored one. As a sociological concept, its use dates back to Max Weber who, perhaps uncharacteristically, said very little about it save for some rather cryptic allusions to it as a basis for status group closure and invidiousness. It is clearly a term which refers to the world of everyday life, but inclusion of the idea of 'style' carries certain implications and is worthy of further mention. To talk of a life style would seem to suggest that one is referring not simply to an aggregate of discrete, compartmentalised activities and habits, but rather to a pattern of activities which are in some way integrated into an overall structure. This, in turn, implies some ideational theme or themes which provide
the infrastructure whereby the components or elements of daily life hang together and form a more or less coherent entity. In other words, the idea of life-style or style of life connotes a holistic view of everyday life as a structured and integrated phenomenon. This is an important consideration which seems to have been largely overlooked in the bulk of the literature which has concerned itself more with documenting what working- or middle-class people do or do not do, rather than with showing the underlying structure in which this repertoire of activities consists as a whole. What I shall try to do at the end of the following review, then, is to attempt to explicate and discuss what appears from the literature to be the 'style' of working- and middle-class life.

What follows below is by way of a summary, or rather a series of summaries, on uniformities and variations in class life-styles. The principal focus for this will be working-class life, though this will inevitably entail comparative reference to middle-class life-style as well. The reason for this is simply that we are speaking to the thesis of embourgeoisement rather than that of proletarianisation, which means that we are concerned with what, if anything, is happening to the working-class and its way of life.
Family, Kinship, and Domestic Life

Despite earlier theories concerning the effects of 'modernisation' and industrialisation on family structure, and heralding the era of the nuclear unit based on romantic love and the pursuit of happiness, it is now commonly accepted that some form of modified extended family, though not necessarily extended household, does persist among both working- and middle-class families. The difference between them, on this score, appears to be a functional one. In middle-class families, the role of extended kin tends to reflect the greater propensity for geographical and social mobility, acting as a source of financial aid and support in such matters (Litwak 1960; Sussman 1953, 1959). As this implies, extended family relations tend to assume a more pronounced instrumental nature, particularly among the male members. The conventional image of working-class kinship relations, on the other hand, has pictured extended kin as more a source of aid and support during times of financial hardship and deprivation, at times of unemployment for example, rather than as aids for career mobility (Young and Willmott 1957; Hoggart 1958). Added to this is the pervasive tendency among working-class families to use extended kin as a source of associates for purposes of recreation and sociability (Berger, 1960; Bonjean, 1966; Cohn and Hodges, 1963; Dotson 1951; Gans, 1962; Goldthorpe et al., 1969; Gordon and Anderson, 1964; Ineichen 1972;
Reissman 1954; Young and Willmott 1957). These patterns have, in turn, been associated with a more female-centred orientation within the working-class extended family, though in a study of skilled blue-collar craftsmen MacKenzie (1973) found no greater preference or tendency to associate with wives' at the expense of husbands' kin. Female-centredness does, however, seem to develop into female dominance among some lower-class families where adult male members are intermittently absent from the household (Miller 1964).

The nature of domestic role relationships has also been noted to vary by class position. Stricter, more stereotyped definitions of sex roles have often been identified as a central characteristic of working-class families, implying, in turn, a more strongly segregated division of labour within the household (Bott 1957; Gans 1962, Miller and Reissman 1964; Young and Willmott, 1957). Again, however, much of this difference is not attributable to class situation directly as to the greater propensity for middle-class families to be more socially and geographically mobile. Mobility does tend to erode, though by no means eliminate completely, the opportunity to make long-term or permanent affiliations outside the family-household unit. As a result, adult members especially find themselves seeking companionship and emotional support from within the family, thereby rendering sex roles more diffuse and fluid to some extent; adult relations, then, take on more the character of
a partnership of equals. Along similar lines, Handel and Rainwater (1964) have argued that as working-class families become more geographically mobile (which current statistics suggest is indeed the case), so they too will adopt a more characteristically middle-class pattern of more diffuse domestic role relationships. Available evidence does support this claim, but only partially: in a study of 'affluent', geographically mobile blue-collar families, Goldthorpe et al. (1969) found that the husband did take a more active domestic role, participating in such activities as child care, house cleaning, and shopping to a greater extent than the conventional image of the working-class male would suggest. Similar findings were also made by Ineichen (1972) among a sample of blue-collar families who had combined geographical and property mobility in the form of suburban home ownership. Yet in spite of these changes, it was clear in both studies that differences still persisted in the domestic structures of working- and middle-class homes.

The last area of family life in which significant class differences have been observed is that of child rearing and socialisation practices. According to the research summarised by Bronfenbrenner (1966), the postwar period has witnessed a reversal of class socialisation practices, at least in the United States. He shows that middle-class parents, who before the war were regarded as more authoritarian toward their children, have now become more permissive,
more willing to recognise their children as distinct individuals with needs and rights of their own, and more likely to employ tacit forms of social control such as love manipulation and guilt inducement. On the other hand, working-class parents, he asserts, are now seen as more authoritarian toward their offspring, regarding them as inherently mischievous and in need of frequent supervision and control (also McKinley 1964). The conventional image of working-class methods of sanctioning and control paints them as more direct, entailing more frequent resort to physical punishment. The implication of this is that the child is accorded a relatively low status in the family, and there is little recognition of or interest in him/her as an individual with autonomous needs or rights. These profiles have given rise to the characterisation of the working-class family as "adult-centred", in contrast to the "child-centred" family of the middle-class (Gans 1962, Miller and Reissman, 1964).

These two pictures of class socialisation practices are also borne out to some extent by data on educational and occupational aspirations. In this regard, the most common and persistent theme to be found in the vast body of literature is that working-class individuals have generally lower educational and occupational aspirations both for themselves and for their children, though it should be noted that "lower" is seldom interpreted in relation to the point of departure from which those aspirations are being made (Hyman
1966; Knupfer 1947; Parsler 1971; Porter 1968; Reissman 1954). Again, however, the research by MacKenzie (1973) does cast some doubt on this conventional image. Not only did he not discover evidence of conventional modes of working-class social control, such as the use of physical punishment for example, but he also found that aspirations for their children’s education among his blue-collar craftsmen were generally as high of those of the clerical and managerial workers he also interviewed. The principal difference of the craftsmen was that they did not emphasise the desirability of graduate training, the need for post-secondary education for females, nor had they been as realistic in their financial preparations to put their children through college as the managers and clerical workers had been. This latter point he interpreted not as an unwillingness or inability to save the required amounts, but rather as a function of inadequate information on their part about the necessary procedures for such a move. He does point out, however, that this apparent similarity in the level of reported aspirations may be misleading since the emphasis placed on post-secondary education by the craftsmen was defined in almost exclusively instrumental terms as primarily a vocational benefit. Among the clerical and managerial groups, on the other hand, education was also seen as an important end in itself, as a way of enabling the individual to understand better his/her life situation, and to develop self-confidence and self-discipline, both highly
valued as desirable personal qualities, particularly by the managers. In other words, though conventional quantitative differences in educational and occupational aspirations may be showing signs of erosion, qualitative class differences still persist.

Summary: The conventional image of working-class family life gives us a picture of a fairly sedentary, adult-centred world with a fairly high degree of sex role segregation and stereotyping; the home and children are regarded as the woman's domain, work and 'bread-winning' the man's (cf. also Rainwater et al. 1959; Fried 1973). Extended kin relations play an important role in everyday family life, but are predominantly female-centred. Children are generally accorded low family status, seen to be in need of continual control, and not motivated toward high levels of educational or occupational aspirations. The conventional image of middle-class family life, on the other hand, is one of more fluid sex role differentiation, less extensive and more male-centred extended kin relations, and less authoritarian, more oblique forms of child rearing and supervision together with a strong concern for educational and occupational success.

In something of a contrast to these, recent research on working-class life-styles by Goldthorpe et al. (1969) and McKenzie (1973) does suggest some weakening of sex role segregation, a less authoritarian attitude toward children,
and a more ambitious outlook for their future among affluent and skilled blue-collar families (cf. also Sennett and Cobb 1973). Yet although this may at first suggest a move in the direction of 'middle-classness', it is clear that important differences remain, particularly with respect to the social meaning of these behaviours and aspirations for the participants themselves. This is illustrative of an important consideration, namely that although individuals may appear to behave in similar ways or to similar extents, this does not necessarily mean that they endow their actions and aspirations with the same meanings and values, or that they pursue or hold them for the same reasons and intentions.

Patterns of Sociability (Primary Social Participation)

Sociability essentially refers to those associations, together with the social network patterns which they foster over time, which are undertaken on a voluntary or preferential basis; sociability, in short, connotes the ideas of 'friendship' and 'socialising' in the commonsense meaning of the terms. Sociological research into sociability and social network patterns has revealed two areas in which class differences are evident. The first pertains to the type and social status of persons chosen for friendship purposes; the second concerns the actual character of the associations which emerge.
On the first score, two themes recur in the literature. The first is that working-class individuals display a marked preference for friends of the same or similar class background and/or position as their own (Goldthorpe et al. 1969; Gordon and Anderson 1964; Lucas 1971; MacKenzie 1973; Nagata 1974; Salaman 1971; Sykes 1965). And secondly, it is usually the case that they are predominantly family-centred, preferring kin as associates with whom to spend free time outside work and domestic obligations, a pattern which appears to be especially marked among working-class women (Berger 1960; Bonjean 1966; Bott 1957; Cohen and Hodges 1963; Dotson 1951; Goldthorpe et al. 1969; Gordon and Anderson 1964; Gans 1962; Ineichen 1972; Lucas 1971; Reissman 1954; Young and Willmott 1957).

This conventional image of working-class sociability has not, however, gone unchallenged. Handel and Rainwater (1964; also Rainwater and Handel 1964) have argued that reliance on kin as the main source of free time companions will be attenuated as working-class families experience more geographical mobility, and the tie of proximity is duly severed. Evidence in this regard, nevertheless, is rather unsupportive. Goldthorpe et al. (1969) found that among a sample of affluent, mobile blue-collar families (both upper and lower working-class in the terms of Chapter I) the preference for kin as leisure associates remained strong, though the problem of proximity did impose some constraints on the
extent to which this could be realised. Ineichen (1972) also found the persistence of strong kinship ties among his sample of blue-collar suburban home-owners, in spite of the fact that home-ownership meant that they had experienced a degree of upward 'property' mobility from their social origins.

A second challenge to the conventional image of working-class sociability has come from the research by MacKenzie (1973). He found that although his sample of upper working-class families had retained extended kinship ties, these were not regarded as inordinately strong, nor predominantly matriarchal. Only 25% of reported leisure companions were kin, compared to 20% and 16% respectively for the clerical and managerial samples. As he concluded, "It is apparent, therefore, that kinship exerts only a minor influence on the patterns of friendship enjoyed by affluent manual and non-manual workers alike" (1973:157). Despite the allusion to affluence in this remark, the principal implication of MacKenzie's research is that it is not so much mobility or even affluence per se, but rather the enjoyment of a more generally strong and privileged market and work situation which now internally differentiates the working-class, setting off skilled craftsmen from their less skilled and less market-proof colleagues.

In addition to the family, two secondary sources of friends are commonly noted in the literature: the workplace and the neighbourhood. As early as Marx and Engels, the work-
place has been viewed-as an important arena facilitating communication and association, particularly among manual workers; the assumption behind this view was that the experience of a common work life would foster association and affiliation which would extend into the realm of private life, particularly as it was born of a shared antagonism and struggle. More recent empirical research suggests, however, that with the exception of those working in traditional heavy industrial occupations where there persists a strong sense of community, homogeneity, isolation, and conflict, there is now little integration of work and non-work life among manual workers, and that contact and affiliation with work colleagues outside the workplace is slight (Furstenburg 1968; Goldthorpe et al. 1969; Gordon and Anderson 1964; Lucas 1971; MacKenzie 1973). It would seem from this, then, that the image of the blue-collar worker spending his time and money drinking and carousing with his workmates is now destined to be dispatched into the realm of folklore.

The body of research on the role of the neighbourhood as a catalyst of sociability and friendship, on the other hand, is more equivocal in its conclusions. Studies by Bott (1957), Goldthorpe et al. (1969), Heberle (1960), and Young and Willmott (1957) suggest that neighbouring is a common activity among the working-class, especially for women. Furthermore, these studies indicate that it is a characteristically working-class activity which declines in
frequency as one ascends the class structure. On the other hand, MacKenzie (1973) found that contact with neighbours was rare among his sample of craft families, and likewise, Berger (1960) found little contact with or interest in neighbours among a sample of newly suburbanised auto workers and their families. Several explanations for these differences in findings suggest themselves, but the most plausible seems to be one of restricted opportunity: if neighbouring is indeed a predominantly female pastime, then it will in all likelihood decline if the wife holds full or part-time employment, as the amount of available free time will be curtailed. This is perhaps why it is predominantly female in the first place, which in turn suggests that its character is distinctly casual and spontaneous.

The conventional image of middle-class sociability, on the other hand, regards them as far less dependent on kin for friendship purposes. Friends proper (i.e. non-kin and non-neighbours) are seen as the principal source of free time companions, often made by the male through his experiences and contacts at work, during occupational or professional training, or through involvement in voluntary associations or recreational clubs (Salaman 1971). Moreover, this preference for friends proper does not appear to be a matter of substitution for absent kin, but does seem to be based upon preferred choice. Babchuk and Bates (1963), for example, found that the definition of "close friendship"
among a sample of middle-class couples did not depend to any great extent on close geographical proximity or frequent face-to-face contact. For the working-class, on the other hand, the very concept of 'making friends' has generally been considered to be an alien one: their friendship associations tend to emerge from other pre-structured arrangements and relationships, as in the case of kinship or residence, or in the case of extending childhood ties and friendships into adult life (Goldthorpe et al. 1969).

The literature dealing with the actual character of sociability and friendship patterns among the working-class reveals three conventional themes. First, the social networks of males and females are generally seen as more segregated than those of middle-class couples. This pattern of separate groups of friends for husband and wife has been noted as a particularly salient feature among those working in older, more homogeneous industrial communities characterised by a strong and pervasive sense of tradition and loyalty (Bott 1957; Cohen and Hodges 1963; Gans 1962; Young and Willmott 1957). More recent studies of affluent and skilled manual workers, however, indicate that social networks are now more conjugally structured than the conventional image portrays (Goldthorpe et al. 1969; MacKenzie 1973). In the Goldthorpe study, this fact was attributed to a more privatised life-style which the authors of the study regard as an increasingly characteristic feature of affluent, mobile
blue-collar families. MacKenzie, on the other hand, could find no evidence to support such a trend among his craftsmen: they appeared to be no more or less socially gregarious than their traditional brethren.

The second point of difference between the character of working- and middle-class sociability which recurs in the literature is that the former typically have smaller, more stable networks, and tend to be more home-centred in their use of territory for free time activity. At the same time, it has been noted that working-class individuals do not, in fact, indulge in extensive home entertainment, except for kin. This apparent paradox is easily resolved when we bear in mind that working-class families have usually been found to have lower levels of sociability, at least with those who do not form part of the immediate family-household unit (Bott 1957; Cohen and Hodges 1963; Gans 1962; Goldthorpe et al. 1969; Havighurst and Feigenbaum 1969; Ineichen 1972; Knupfer 1947; Nagata 1974; Parsler 1971; Reissman 1954). Once again, however, MacKenzie's (1973) research questions this image to some extent. Firstly, he found that although his sample of skilled working-class families were indeed home-centred in their sociability patterns, they were not necessarily more so at least beyond the bounds of the immediate household unit. Secondly, he found that these skilled workers and their families were no less able to name at least five friends proper with whom they associated.
frequently and regularly than were the clerical and managerial workers in his study. In short, the overall implication of this and other findings from the MacKenzie study is that some consideration be given to the thesis that skilled manual workers now constitute a stratum quite separate from the remainder of the working-class both economically and culturally.

The third and final characteristic of working-class sociability noted in the literature, and one on which there seems to be a good deal of agreement, is that in comparison to the professional and managerial strata of the middle-class, it tends to be far more casual, spontaneous, and less planned (Berger 1960; Bott 1957; Gans 1962; Goldthorpe et al. 1969; Ineichen 1972; MacKenzie 1973; Young and Willmott 1957). Perhaps the best example of planned sociability typical of the middle-class is the archetypal dinner party, organised as an event in and of itself. By contrast, as MacKenzie (1973) found, although it may no longer be the cast-iron rule that it once was that working-class families do not entertain non-kin to meals, when they do so, the meal itself is simply regarded as a natural extension of the evening's entertainment and relaxation. As he summarised it: "Dinner, in other words, will be part of an evening rather than the evening" (1973:88).

**Summary:** The conventional image of working-class sociability presents us with a picture of kin- and home-centredness.
Though wives may engage in neighbouring, it does not appear to be regarded as important as contact with kin. The workplace, it seems, is no longer an especially significant arena for making friends and friendships. The structure of working-class social networks are seen as sex segregated, smaller in size and more stable in duration, and more casual in operation. In all these respects, working-class sociability is seen to contrast with that of the middle-class.

Again dissenting opinion to this image comes from the recent studies by MacKenzie (1973) and to a lesser extent Goldthorpe et al. (1969). The MacKenzie research, particularly, suggests that the conventional distinctions between working- and middle-class styles are disappearing, especially for the upper working-class of skilled blue-collar families. Notwithstanding these signs of homogenisation, the MacKenzie research does reveal that some of the conventional differences still persist, notably with respect to the casual nature of working-class sociability.

Leisure Time and Use of the Mass Media

The distinction between sociability and leisure is purely one of organisational convenience; both concern the use of 'discretionary' time when the obligations of work and family have been met. And so, I am using the term 'sociability' here to refer to the type of person with whom that time is spent and the form which ensuing associations take,
and 'leisure' to denote the amount of discretionary time available, and the particular type of activities which are undertaken.

The view that the workweek has been steadily diminishing in size, and that forty hours now represents the maximum may well be firmly established in the social consciousness, but, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the reality of the matter is different. Much of the postwar 'affluence' enjoyed by the working-class has been bought at the price of working long and/or irregular hours; overtime work, shift work, moonlighting, and working wives are common features of working-class life (cf. Goldthorpe et al. 1969; Hamilton 1964; Lockwood 1960). One of the major ramifications of these is that they usually entail some disruption of conventional leisure time routines, as well as cut into the amount of discretionary-time at the individual's disposal. To be sure, overtime is often found among the middle-class, particularly among those in the professional-executive stratum (cf. Gerstl 1963). In this case, however, overtime is not so much the price paid for short-run affluence as for the realisation of career aspirations, or as an expression of the intrinsic satisfactions the work itself yields.

Various studies of the actual manner in which leisure time is consumed have pointed to several relatively minor lines of class difference. Clarke (1956), for example, found a slightly higher use of commercialised forms of leisure among those in working-class occupations, and that the
incidence of hobby and craftsmanship activities was inversely related to the occupational prestige hierarchy, and by implication class position. But above all else, the most salient characteristic of working-class leisure time use is that it is predominantly home-centred, much more so than among the middle-class (Berger 1960; Bonjean 1966; Gans 1962; Goldthorpe et al. 1969; Havighurst and Feigenbaum 1959; Ineichen 1972; MacKenzie 1973; Reissman 1954). This pattern, of course, reflects the home-centredness of sociability. Interestingly enough, this pattern of home-centredness seems to intensify among the affluent and geographically mobile; in their study of affluent blue-collar workers, the authors dubbed their sample 'privatised' (Goldthorpe et al. 1969).

This orientation to home-centredness is nowhere better illustrated than in the area of media tastes. One of the overwhelming features of the conventional image of working-class leisure time use is the amount spent watching television. Not only do working-class individuals watch more television than the middle-class, but they do so to the extent that it has become the single most important pastime, at least with respect to the amount of time consumed doing it. As we might expect, one of the ramifications of this is that television is evaluated more favourably among the working-class (Berger 1960; Clarke 1956; Gans 1962; Geiger and Sokol 1959; Goldthorpe et al. 1969; Gordon and Anderson 1964;
Graham 1954; MacKenzie 1973). This is understandable enough on economic grounds alone: television provides fairly cheap, stable entertainment and relaxation which is primarily what they seek from it, a fact which is evidenced in the popularity of westerns, detective movies, sports, and variety shows (Berger 1960; MacKenzie 1973).

The complementary image of middle-class media tastes points to a lower incidence of television viewing, and indeed a rather critical and sometimes contemptuous attitude toward it; especially among professionals (cf. Gerstl 1963). Their orientation to television, furthermore, is portrayed as a predominantly informational and educational one. MacKenzie (1973), for example, found that the managerial families in his study expressed a marked preference for news and documentary programmes. This lower interest in television does, however, seem to be compensated by a stronger orientation to the print media: books, magazines, and newspapers, a fact which reflects the probability of greater exposure to formalised education in which greater emphasis is placed upon the written as opposed to the spoken word (Hamilton 1964; Lazarsfeld cited in Bogart 1964). MacKenzie (1973), for example, found that his managers and their wives reported more book reading than was found among the blue-collar families, and were also more likely to hold and use regularly a library card.

In some respects, however, these conventional images
of the manual worker as a television addict and the white-collar worker as a book-worm are debatable. MacKenzie (1973), for example, found a high incidence of magazine readership among his craftsmen, and not overwhelmingly of the stereotype blue-collar variety such as Popular Mechanix. Indeed, he found that the media tastes of the craft and clerical groups in his sample were quite similar, and that the latter engaged in as much television viewing as the former. Similarly, Wilensky (1964) has argued that exposure to television and "mass" culture generally are growing among the middle-class, thereby permeating all social strata and gradually eroding the isolation and insulation of "high culture" bearing elites. Although he found that the middle-class in his sample remained more critical of television, the fact of the matter was that they continued to watch it. In view of these findings, Bogart's conclusion that, "contrary to stereotyped expectations, the mass media experience of blue-collar workers and their families hews remarkably close to the...main line" (1964:428) merits serious consideration.

Summary: The conventional image of working-class leisure and media use is one of home-centredness and orientation to television. The middle-class, on the other hand, are seen as socially more gregarious and oriented toward the print media. Though there seems to be strong agreement in the literature on the first score, the second has come in for
increasing criticism from Wilensky (1964) and his theory of massification, and from the empirical work of MacKenzie (1973). The former points to increasing television use by the middle-class; the latter to increasing print use by the upper working-class.

Secondary Social Participation

Implicit in the literature on sociability and leisure time use is the impression that working-class individuals do not participate to any great extent in formally organised activities, at least beyond the boundaries of the workplace. This antipathy towards formality and organisation also manifests itself quite clearly in the area of secondary social participation, particularly with regard to participation in formal voluntary associations. One of the most consistent, if not the most consistent, findings of the research on the structure and functioning of voluntary associations is that working-class individuals join less frequently and participate less actively than do those from the middle-class. This is a finding, furthermore, which has received an impressive body of both historical and cross-cultural substantiation (Berger 1960; Bonjean 1966; Dotson 1951; Axelrod 1956; Cohen and Hodges 1963; Frizzell 1973; Frizzell and Zurik 1973; Goldthorpe et al. 1969; Gordon and Anderson 1963; Havighurst and Feigenbaum 1959; Hamilton 1964; Hausknetch 1964; Ineichen 1972; Knupfer 1947; MacKenzie 1973; Parsler
1971; Reissman 1954). Moreover, this finding remains constant even when control is made for factors associated with embourgeoisement such as skill level, affluence, geographical mobility, and suburban residence.

The principal source of contention with this conventional image of manual workers as non-joiners comes from Wilensky (1961) who has argued that the extent of social participation is not so much a function of class position and situation per se, as of the "orderliness" of one's occupational biography. Though this may well account for intra-class variations in participation, Wilensky tends to disregard the fact that the "orderliness" of an individual's work history tends itself to be a function of his/her class situation to a very large extent. As we saw in the last chapter, the market and work situations of blue-collar and lower level white-collar workers tend to restrict the opportunity for an "orderly" or career-like work history; these are sectors of the occupational structure in which all kinds of insecurities continue to inhere.

Nonetheless, we should not be blind to the fact that working-class individuals do indeed join voluntary organisations, and that their lives are not necessarily as privatised as some accounts would seem to imply. On this matter, the conventional wisdom holds that when manual workers do join such organisations, they tend to choose ones which are relatively homogeneous in terms of their composition,
particularly with respect to the class origins of the members, such as sports, fraternal, and social clubs (Hausknetetch 1964). Among the middle-class, on the other hand, there seems to be a greater tendency to join civic and community associations (MacKenzie 1973). In cases where working-class individuals do join associations with more socially heterogeneous memberships, then they tend to participate in organisational activities to a lesser extent than the middle-class membership, and often allow the latter to exercise a virtual monopoly over the positions of office and authority. This, of course, easily develops the character of a self-fulfilling prophecy in which working-class members feel more and more excluded from the mainstream of events in the organisation, which, in turn, further reinforces the tendencies towards greater bureaucratisation (cf. Bottomore 1954).

The most common type of account offered to explain this pattern of working-class exclusion is interesting methodologically since it illustrates the kind of circular reasoning in which one can become entrapped by using values as explanatory variables. Hausknetetch (1964), for example, has argued that the type of voluntary organisation to which working-class individuals belong tends to be, in his words, "expressive" in nature, possessing a more egalitarian structure. In other words, the prime beneficiary of organisational activity is the membership itself; and the more egalitarian structure which accompanies this goal reduces the possibility
of rank-and-file alienation from the officialdom of the organisation. The combination of these characteristics, so the argument goes, conduces more to the "person-oriented" character of the working-class personality which is uncomfortable with formality and ceremony. Conversely, middle-class persons gravitate more towards "instrumental" organisations with hierarchical structures more suited to their "object-oriented" personality.

While all this sounds plausible, it is questionable on the grounds that one of the factors commonly adduced in support of the fact that the working-class is "person-oriented" and the middle-class "object-oriented" is the very type of organisations to which they typically belong. We end up, in other words, with an explanation which sounds very tautological: working-class individuals join "expressive" organisations because they join "expressive" organisations, etc.

This problem stems from a one-sided approach to phenomena in which they are expressed in almost exclusively motivational terms and explained in terms of preferences and choice without consideration for structural and situational constraints of a socially imposed nature. Even membership in 'voluntary' organisations cannot be accounted for in purely voluntaristic terms, but must be seen in terms of the interaction between choice and opportunity, values and interests.

Curiously enough, this need has been recognised in the case of one type of 'voluntary' association, namely
labour unions. Even when formally voluntary, unions are often discounted by sociologists as authentic examples of voluntary organisations because membership is often 'unofficially' mandatory in the sense that considerable pressure is placed on the individual by his work colleagues to join whether he wants to or not. In short, it is a matter of living up to socially defined (and socially enforced and sanctioned) expectations, though ones which are not necessarily encased in a legal-rational shell. Similarly, I would argue that middle-class membership in civic and community organisations is also partly a question of living up to socially defined expectations. Though it is doubtless true that to some extent middle-class individuals join and participate in these organisations as a way of meeting others with similar backgrounds and interests, at the same time, membership in these types of "instrumental" or altruistic organisations acts as an important source of legitimation, particularly in a society with democratic and egalitarian ideals, for those in a more privileged class situation. After all, the nature of organisational activities—the intended beneficiaries of these organisations are those other than the actual members—suggests a concern for the plight of those less fortunate, be they the sick, the poor, the disabled, the homeless, and so on. In short, I am suggesting that we take into account the fact that middle-class membership in civic and community groups may also serve middle-class
interests, at least insofar as it confers a degree of respectability.

**Summary:** The conventional images of working- and middle-class patterns of social participation suggest that the former do not participate as much, and confine their participation to self-interest, recreational organisations with relatively homogeneous memberships. This image, furthermore, recurs throughout the literature, showing little sign of change.

**Consumer Behaviour**

To most observers it now seems self-evident that the culture of modern capitalism is pervaded with an ideology of consumerism; this idea is no longer the exclusive preserve of Marcuse and other 'critical' theorists. What is unfortunate about such observations, however, is that they have given rise to a number of popular stereotypes, beginning with Veblen's "conspicuous consumption", which have often taken on a frightening degree of reality all their own. In fact, when we dig beneath the appearances down to the level of reality, then we do find often considerable similarities between working- and middle-class consumption patterns. Although it is generally true that lower income families spend proportionately more of their budgets on foodstuffs,
several studies have also shown that working-class consumption of durables is comparable in both quantity and quality to that of the middle-class (cf. Caplovitz 1964; Patterson 1964). This is made financially possible by overtime work, moonlighting, working wives, the extensive use of consumer credit facilities, and a proportionately lower expenditure on services (Handel and Rainwater 1964; Porter 1965).

The relatively high consumption of durables by working-class families has given rise to various versions of the conspicuous consumption theory in which it is interpreted as indicative of the desire and the attempt to emulate middle-class life-styles (or more correctly middle-class consumption styles), and thereby "usurp" middle-class status symbolically. Once again, this type of account is underlaid by the all too questionable assumption that when individuals behave in similar ways, then they must do so for the same reasons and with the same meaning. However, several studies have shown that there are class differences in the social meanings of money and its uses (cf. Rainwater 1974). Hamilton (1966), for example, found that middle-class are more secretive about financial matters, and more knowledgeable about such matters as taxation and investments.

As such, I think it can be argued that working-class consumption patterns are not so much an expression of symbolic upward mobility via conspicuous consumption, as a means of affirming to oneself that one is secure and respectable.
This line of argument is based on three points. Firstly, it is fairly clear from the literature on sociability, leisure use, and secondary social participation that working-class individuals have little desire to affiliate with those of middle-class background; why, then, should they wish to emulate them consciously in their buying habits? Secondly, we should not overlook that a good proportion of the postwar labour force grew up with first-hand experience of the Depression of the thirties. As several surveys have shown, working-class individuals tend to be more skeptical and pessimistic about the future, particularly their own economic future (cf. Knupfer 1947; Cohen and Hodges 1963). It is all too easy in an era of apparent abundance and affluence to dismiss these suspicions as irrational and atavistic, but when economic insecurity does come, it tends to hit the working-class sooner and harder in the form of both inflation and unemployment. In this respect, the issues of insecurity and alienation in its objective sense are still very much a part of the reality of everyday working-class life. And finally, as Lockwood has pointed out, these theories of conspicuous consumption ignore the fact that consumer purchases are limited to what producers supply and that many of these durable are of a very utilitarian nature. As he so adroitly put it, "a washing-machine is a washing-machine is a washing-machine" (1960:253).

Perhaps the best example of working-class attitudes towards material consumption and the ways in which it differs
from the middle-class is that of home-ownership. It has commonly been held that this form of property ownership is characteristically middle-class and a value to which the working-class has only recently begun to subscribe. Though this view is questionable, it is certainly undeniable that the opportunity to realise this goal has only been opened up substantially to the working- and lower middle-class in the postwar period when the financial constraints have been eased (cf. Hamilton 1964; Handel and Rainwater 1964; Ineichen 1972; MacKenzie 1973). Nevertheless, although the opportunity for home-ownership may have been equalised to some extent, class differences in its meaning and definition do not seem to have disappeared. Among the middle-class, home-ownership often entails certain cosically symbolic qualities in the sense that it is a partial reflection of status and prestige as well as serving as a form of capital investment and accumulation. For working-class families, on the other hand, the symbolic qualities of home-ownership are security and respectability, but besides this it is valued as a means to escape the subordination and potential tyranny of the landlord-tenant relationship (MacKenzie 1973; Handel and Rainwater 1965).

One of the ramifications of this difference is that upward social mobility among the middle-class is often accompanied by the move to a new residential area more commensurate with the new occupational status of the family. On the other hand, MacKenzie (1973), for example, found no indication of
the desire to move to more socially prestigious neighbourhoods or purchase more expensive homes among his sample of skilled craftsmen. What they valued in a neighbourhood were access to amenities (schools, churches, stores, etc.), "Pleasant", "respectable" neighbours, and freedom from noise and overcrowding. Once these had been satisfactorily achieved, there was no desire for residential mobility; in fact, quite the opposite, there was a strong emphasis upon stability. Interestingly, MacKenzie found much the same sentiments among the clerical workers in the sample, suggesting again that culturally at least they may no longer be an integrated part of the conventional non-manual middle-class.

When we examine the form of working-class consumption patterns, then once again home-centredness stands out as the most salient feature. This is understandable in the sense that it shores up a similar tendency noted in the reviews of sociability, leisure use, and social participation. Secondly, they appear to be more routine in the sense that working-class families stick to a narrower range of commodities and services, and are less willing (though not necessarily less able) to experiment with new ones (Patterson 1964). In practice, working-class families have been found to stick with brands which are nationally known and advertised even though these may not be the most economical buy (Patterson 1964; Caplovitz 1964). Paradoxically, these rather routine and rigid purchasing habits seem to intensify rather than
weaken under conditions of hardship. Caplovitz (1964) cites from the Jahoda et al. study of unemployment in prewar Austria where the researchers found what they termed a "reduction in effective scope" in buying patterns among the unemployed. What this meant was that they confined their buying to local retailers who were known and trusted on a personal basis. Caplovitz too found a similar pattern of behaviour in a low income neighbourhood, even though localising consumption usually entailed paying more for the items purchased.

Summary: It is clear from the literature dealing with consumer behaviour that there are strong class similarities in buying habits, particularly in the area of durable commodities. One of the traditional accounts borrows from the Veblenian notion of 'conspicuous consumption': the attempt by working-class families and individuals to usurp middle-class status through symbolic emulation. This idea has been criticised on the grounds that it does not square up with the other facts: in areas other than consumption there is little evidence to suggest that working-class families have any desire to emulate the styles of the middle-class. The idea of conspicuous consumption rests on the questionable assumption that similar patterns of behaviour imply similar social meanings and intentions; this has been shown to be erroneous in the example of home ownership. Though working-class
families aspire to home-ownership as does the middle-class, they do so for different reasons, and with a different frame of social definitions.

**Values and Beliefs: Themes of Class Culture**

This last area of review is perhaps the most difficult to confront; values, beliefs, tastes, attitudes, and so on are by their very nature abstract, amorphous phenomena—one dare not even say 'entities'—which are not easily captured and measured by the tools of conventional methodology. The most common form of measurement is through the use of attitude and opinion surveys in which individuals are asked questions which supposedly pertain to their principles and beliefs. While this is useful, it has its obvious shortcomings: are the answers reliable, are they truthful, what do they tell us about values, and so on. To deal with these problems of measurement and interpretation, however, we must first ask and try to answer the question of why we choose to study values, and what we consider their analytical and empirical importance is.

In the 1950's and early 1960's values gained a central role in sociological theory with the intellectual hegemony of Parsonian functionalism. In this upgraded, sociological version of idealism, values were seen as the principal constitutive element of the social system, responsible for motivating human action and thereby providing
the impetus for societal 'evolution' (cf. Parsons 1966).
Yet in spite of this ascribed importance the empirical and
analytical role of values still remained relatively unex-
plored; in short, they were taken for granted by most func-
tionalists as some kind of uncaused cause. While this
conception is clearly inadequate, it nevertheless remains
the case that values are a significant question for the
sociologist in the sense that and to the extent that they
provide us with a thematic and ideational representation of
the overarching structure and form of life-style. As such
they offer us a kind of shorthand device by means of which
we can summarise the underlying coherence of everyday life
insofar as they represent the ways in which the disparate
components of the mundane are tied together into a whole.
In this respect, it is not sufficient to rely solely on the
answers to attitudinal questions as our indices of values--
these simply represent one side of the dialectic between
thought and action--we must also look to the structure of
behaviour itself. Put in less abstract terms, it means that
the following review is based on data from attitude and
opinion surveys together with inferences drawn from the
observation and interpretation of concrete behaviour.

The structure of the review is organised into two
parts. In the first I shall outline and discuss five value
themes which are commonly found in the literature and which
can be said to constitute the conventional image of the
"social character" of the working-class. In the second part, we shall try to draw these five themes together into a single overarching theme, or meta-theme, which can be taken as a very general, tendency summary of the quality of working-class life. The point of doing this is to enable us partially to address and discuss the question of why different class situations should indeed give rise to different life-styles; why, to use Hacker's phrase, the "question of style" is associated with the social class at all.

The first value theme is one which has already been encountered in the review of the literature on social participation, namely that of person-versus object-orientation. One of the most common findings in the study of client-official relations in formal, bureaucratic organisations is that working- and lower-class clients often experience difficulty operating on a formalistic and impersonal basis, and subsequently, it is argued, they tend to personalise their encounters. If they experience difficulty, and this is often the case since individuals of these class positions generally come into disproportionate contact with social and economic welfare agencies of one kind or another in search of some form of benefit, then this means they will tend to interpret it in personalised terms: the official was out to get them particularly rather than applying the rules in the regular manner. To put this in Parsonian terms, working-
class orientations to others tend to be more affective, ascriptive, and particularistic. This is implicit in the idea of person-orientation, together with a preference for concrete as opposed to abstract reasoning. Another example of this is Bernstein's (1970) distinction between "public" and "formal" languages: whereas the middle-class generally has facility in both, the working-class is largely confined to the former, a form of language in which the spoken and written aspects differ very little from each other.

The person-oriented character of the working-class has been contrasted with an object-oriented disposition among the middle-class (cf. Gans 1962). On the whole, this is represented as the converse of person-orientation, as an ability and tendency to be universalistic, neutral, and performance oriented in those contexts which demand such a disposition as the appropriate one, such as formal bureaucracies for example. This, in turn, is seen to derive from a learned ability to reason in an abstract and categorical manner. In some respects, however, all this is rather obvious since the ability of middle-class persons to function appropriately in formalistic and impersonal settings can simply be construed as an ability to get along in situations which are populated and controlled by other middle-class persons. Furthermore, the actual extent to which middle-class persons are object- as opposed to person-oriented is a matter of contention. Herbert Gans
(1962), for example, has argued that middle-class individuals tend to be more object-oriented during the early stages of the career cycle when there is an emphasis on performance and the visible accomplishment of success. At this stage success, particularly in bureaucratic settings, usually entails living up to the ideal definition of the normative as much as possible. However, he continues, this object-orientation usually mellows in later life when career aspirations level off, and the promotion ceiling is reached. As this happens, a more person-oriented outlook emerges as the individual is to some extent freed from the constraint of having to perform to the level of the ideal.

These qualifications are not, however, intended to imply that no difference exists at all. Though they may well remain unrealised in practice for a variety of reasons, it is generally the case that middle-class persons do subscribe to those values which are implicit in the idea of object-orientation, such things as universalism, specificity, and performance. Among the working-class, on the other hand, an object-orientation is not only something which they find difficult to realise in everyday encounters, but is indeed something they simply do not value as an ideal to which to aspire. In this respect, the difficulties they commonly encounter when dealing with formal, bureaucratic settings derives not simply from 'inadequate socialisation' into the appropriate means to do so, but rather from the
absence of any desire to do so.

The second theme which emerges frequently in the literature, and one which has generated a good deal of controversy and debate, is that of authoritarianism and conformism. The usual evidence adduced in support of the notion of working-class authoritarianism is drawn largely from studies of child-rearing practices, political attitudes and opinions, and attitudes towards deviant or socially marginal groups of various kinds (cf. Bronfenbrenner 1966; McKinley 1964; Lipset 1959). It has also been related to such phenomena as "blue-collar" anger over student and racial unrest in the U.S. in the late sixties. The general idea behind these notions of authoritarianism is that working-class individuals place a strong value on uncritical acceptance of and conformity to established sources of institutionalised authority, implying, in turn, a degree of conservatism and traditionalism (cf. Kohn 1969). Theoretically, the best developed work in this area comes from Kohn (1969) and his sometime collaborator Carmi Schooler (Kohn and Schooler 1969). They argue essentially that those in higher class positions tend to value self-direction and feel a high degree of efficacy over their life-situations, whereas those in lower class positions, on the other hand, will value conformity to external sources of authority. Their explanation for this is generally sound and, although they do not use this terminology, invokes a
quasi-Marxist notion of alienation: the market and work situations of those in higher class positions allows the individual greater control over the events and occurrences which affect him/her. For those in lower class positions, however, their market and work situations do not permit such control, which, in turn, conduces to conformism with external sources of authority. Added to this situation of efficacy versus alienation (in its objective sense) are the effects of formal education which instill self-direction, self-confidence, and self-control into the middle- and upper-class child. Finally, this pattern, they argue, becomes reflexive in the sense that the values and character traits the child acquires through early socialisation ultimately affect his/her directions for occupational choice.

While agreeing substantially with this account, I think it is necessary to point out certain qualifications. First of all, the very term 'authoritarianism' (which Kohn and Schooler fortunately avoid using, though other writers, notably Lipset (1959) do not) is an unfortunate one insofar as it connotes an image of narrow-mindedness, bigotry, and prejudice. Indeed, what may be taken by professional middle-class observers as indicative of authoritarianism may simply be a pragmatic adaptation to the constraints of an obdurate reality over which, as Kohn and Schooler imply, the individual has little or no control or opportunity to modify. An example of this may be that 'authoritarian'
child-rearing practices are the most expedient solution to the organisational problems faced with large families. Secondly, the source of authoritarian attitudes may not be, as McKinley for example argues, in the work and market experiences of the individual, but be due rather to the variable of education (cf. Lipsit 1965). And finally, we should be careful to make some distinction between attitudes and actual behaviour, as well as between the various forms of behaviour in which authoritarianism is said to consist. On the first score, though working-class persons may respond in seemingly authoritarian terms to questions dealing with their attitudes about marginal social and political issues, the fact remains that during periods of relative economic stability these opinions are seldom translated into action in the form of support for radical and extremist social and political movements. Indeed, as Hamilton (1972) has clearly demonstrated there is little evidence to support the notion that working-class persons even subscribe disproportionately to extremist attitudes in times of relative social order. Furthermore, one of the principal sources of support for extremist right- and left-wing political movements has come from the ranks of the middle-class, small shopkeepers and big business in the case of the ascendancy of fascism, and disenchanted middle-class youth in the case of the 'new left'. On the other hand, the willingness of the working-class to use strikes as a weapon to further their
economic aims hardly smacks of "conformism" to external authority. Though one may well argue that the strike is now an institutionalised and legitimate part of the collective bargaining system and that workers go on strike at the behest of their leadership, both points are debatable. Though the strike may now be a legal if not exactly legitimate institution, it certainly has not always been so; furthermore the increasing incidence of wildcat strikes and rank-and-file refusal to ratify contract terms bargained for them by their leaders warrants serious consideration in the matter (cf. Levison 1974).

What this picture suggests, then, is that the notions of authoritarianism and conformism are not simple, cut-and-dried labels that can be pinned conveniently to the working-class. On the whole, what the evidence points to is that while working-class individuals may express more authoritarian and conformist attitudes, these may go unrealised in action. And secondly, what this authoritarianism and conformism consist of is more a matter of a rather uncritical acceptance of the established institutional order including those elements of it which were once a form of dissent but have now become incorporated and institutionalised also. At the same time, we must not overlook the fact that this uncritical acceptance of things is not immutable and permanent. Insofar as it derives from a situation of objective alienation, it is susceptible to change when that circumstance
itself changes. We should not overlook the fact that the working-class has been an important agent of fundamental change in capitalist society, though not necessarily in the direction that the Marxists would have it be. The future of this role, however, is questionable; it may become increasingly tempered and limited in what Lefebvre (1971) has dubbed the "bureaucratic society of controlled consumption" in which social change has become another commodity to be planned, designed, and produced to order.

The third theme concerns orientation to social space and territory. One of the most persistent features of working-class life to emerge from the review of literature concerning sociability, leisure time use, and social participation was home-centredness and relative exclusion from secondary forms of social association beyond the workplace and the home. This home-centredness has also been related to family-centredness, and to the sense of suspicion and distrust of the unknown as reflected in the "them/us" dichotomy characteristic of the traditional working-class (cf. Hoggart 1958; Young and Willmott 1957). The main idea, it seems, behind the notions of family- and home-centredness is by now becoming a familiar one. Family- and home-centredness imply confining oneself to groups and territories which are familiar ones and over which one can and does exercise control, and avoiding those which are not. This, of course, ties in clearly with other themes noted earlier.
person-orientation and the antipathy for formalistic, impersonal settings and encounters; adult-centredness in the operation of the family; and the ideas revolving around the themes of conformism, authoritarianism, traditionalism, and conservatism discussed above.

Once again, however, the actual, empirical extent of family- and home-centredness among the working-class appears to be variable. In their study of affluent, mobile blue-collar families, Goldthorpe et al. (1969) found that home-centredness was particularly accentuated, to the point where they labeled their sample 'privatised'; the social energy of the families they studied was directed almost exclusively to the nuclear unit itself, with little concern in extra-familial activities. The account the researchers provide for this pattern focuses on the erosion of extended kinship ties which accompany the geographical mobility necessitated by the pursuit of affluence. At the same time, these families had not adopted the middle-class pattern of associating in their leisure time with friends proper, again partly because the rate of geographical mobility also inhibited such alternative forms of sociability. However, it is noteworthy that similar conditions of high geographical mobility do not appear to impede middle-class friendship patterns to anything like the same extent. This would clearly imply, then, that working-class home-centredness derives not so much from an inability to be otherwise.
but from a marked preference for the home as the principal arena of social activity.

On the other hand, MacKenzie (1973) found no evidence to support the Goldthorpe et al. thesis that the price for economic enrichment is social privatisation; as we have already seen, he found his affluent craftsmen were just as socially active as the clerical and managerial workers in his sample. Moreover, he found that the type of persons admitted to the home for the purpose of sociability was wider than that suggested in the conventional image. These differences notwithstanding, however, his overall conclusion was still that they were predominantly home-centred, though less so than conventionally assumed.

Orientation to social space implies a complementary orientation to social time. Fully in line with the overall image of working-class character as one oriented to familiarity and certainty, the literature on time-orientation suggests that working-class individuals are more present-oriented, middle-class persons more future-oriented. This too has other implications, characteristics such as a preference for immediate as opposed to deferred sources of gratification; a fear and distrust of change or novelty, what Cohen and Hodges (1963) refer to as "neophobia"; and finally a general sense of uncertainty and pessimism about the future, especially one's own particular future.

Evidence in support of this image comes from a
variety of sources. One of the more consistent findings of opinion surveys on expectations and aspirations for the future, for example, has been that working- and lower-class respondents exhibit far less confidence and optimism, particularly when it comes to economic matters (cf. Knupfer 1947; Cohen and Hodges 1963; Miller and Reissman 1963). Predictably enough, these feelings are exacerbated among those who have experienced some firsthand degree of economic insecurity and uncertainty, and among those whose resources do not offer much protection against such events (cf. Lefton 1967). Present-orientation is likewise evident in the form of aspirations: on the whole, and particularly after the age of about 35, working-class individuals appear to be content with a future which will simply provide security and the continuing benefits of the present, in short a rather modest hope that serious disruptions will not undermine life's tranquility (Goldthorpe et al. 1969; Chinoy 1955). Goldthorpe et al., for example, found that most of their sample of affluent manual workers simply wanted the future to bring a steadily improving continuation of their present prosperity. This, moreover, was to be achieved not through individualistic career success but rather on a collective basis through the collective bargaining system.

The final theme is that of pragmatism and realism. This, again, is directly related to the previous themes, especially person-orientation and authoritarianism/conformism.
It implies a more pragmatic, concrete, non-abstract mode of thought and action, reflected in the common image of working-class people as a more straightforward, direct, and "down-to-earth" in their dealings with others. Empirically, it is illustrated in the instrumental orientation to education discussed by MacKenzie (1973) and by Sennett and Cobb (1974); in the "bread-and-butter" economism of the union movement in its relationship with organised capital (cf. Mann 1973); and by the instrumental attitude to work generally, regarding it primarily as the means to other ends rather than as an end in itself (cf. Cotgrove, 1972; Dubin 1963; Dufty 1960; Goldthorpe et al. 1969; Tausky 1969; Wedderburn and Crompton 1972).

Implicit in this pragmatism is also a kind of anti-intellectualism and contemptuousness towards abstractions and those who propound them. This is partly at the root of "blue-collar anger" towards the anti-war movement in the U.S. for example. But the focus of this reaction was not so much the cause itself as those who were regarded as typical of the dissenters, particularly middle-class, college educated youth. The nature of this reaction was partly a resentment at the fact that those who stood to gain most from the system were among its severest critics, and partly reflective of a pragmatic sense of social justice. I can perhaps best illustrate what I mean by this by citing an example from Sennett and Cobb's *The Hidden Injuries*
of Class (1973). One of their subjects was a young worker who had just returned from a stay of duty in Vietnam, and who was opposed to the war itself as were the middle-class liberals who had taken on the role of spokesmen for the anti-war cause. At the same time, he was also contemptuous of and hostile towards the latter precisely because he felt they had not earned the right to voice their criticisms. In other words, his conception of social justice was one in which only those who had experienced the situation first-hand were entitled to the right of criticism and rejection.

This sense of pragmatism and anti-intellectualism is again a function of both class situation and education, reflecting the situation of objective alienation both at work and outside to which working-class individuals are exposed. Quite clearly, one of the characteristics of manual work is that it neither requires the need for abstract thought or reasoning, nor does it often provide the opportunity for it. Very simply, it is work which enacts and concretises the abstractions of others. At the same time, this situation is reinforced by the fact that working-class individuals generally have lower levels of education. This is important in the sense that formal education typically conduces to the development of abstract reasoning and subsequently acquaints the student with abstract ideas and principles.

These five themes are unmistakably related to each
other, so much so that it is difficult to establish even rough conceptual boundaries separating them. The reason for this is that they express, represent and illuminate an underlying theme or structure of their own. This meta-theme consists in an overall general orientation toward security, routine, stability, and the familiar. To be sure, there is a very real risk in overgeneralising this characterisation, and it should therefore be treated as a tendency or ideal type. In this connection, Gans' (1962) distinction between "action-seeking" and "routine-seeking" working-class, and Kerr's (1958) distinction between the "rough" and the "respectable" working-class are instructive. Both conceptions are defined, at least implicitly, in terms of the extent to which there is an orientation to stability and the routine, and, as the terms themselves suggest, there are sections of the working-class in which such an orientation may not be particularly strong, and may even be a subject of derision. Among the "rough" and the "action-seekers" there exists, rather, an emphasis upon 'fun' and 'thrill' seeking which are occasionally accompanied by excursions into petty crime as a form of "event". As this suggests, there is something of an orientation to risk and uncertainty.

Though this distinction is a real and useful one, it nevertheless remains problematic just how pervasive 'action-seeking' is among the working-class. In the first
place, it is common to find this mode of orientation among working-class adolescents whose claims to adult status are not yet fully recognised nor its obligations fully realised. In this form, then, it is a typically transitory phenomenon, and is usually attenuated by the assumption of adult work and family roles. More importantly, where 'action-seeking' is found as a permanent feature of working-class life, it is usually found among those sections whose class situations are unstable and marginal—the unskilled, the under- and unemployed, and so on. (Indeed, this may account to some extent for the prevalence of 'action-seeking' among working-class youth insofar as their market, work, and status situations are typically transitory and marginal.) Gans, for example, found that 'action-seekers' tended to be found disproportionately among the unskilled whose employment experiences were highly unstable and erratic. A similar picture of marginality and instability is also conveyed in Kerr's (1958) discussion of the "rough" working-class. What this means is that their market and work situations are such that stability and security become unrealistic goals; moreover, they do not possess the resources necessary to make them otherwise. In this respect, action-seeking offers one way, however temporary, to alleviate the strains inherent in the situation, and provide at least the illusion of control over one's life.

There is also a second note of caution to the use
of this meta-theme as a representative characterisation of conventional working-class life. At the beginning of this discussion of values and themes we noted that one of the difficulties encountered in their study arose from their abstract, amorphous character. Part of this difficulty stems from the problematic relationship between values and behaviour, and part from the problematic relationship of one value to another. Empirically, and this was illustrated clearly in the discussion of authoritarianism, these relationships are not necessarily straightforward, consistent, or symmetrical; they frequently entail inconsistencies and contradictions. Individuals often behave in ways which belie the values and beliefs to which they verbally subscribe; they also believe things which are logically and empirically inconsistent and contradictory.

While this gap between values and between values and behaviour has not gone unnoticed, attempts to conceptualise and theorise the relationship are rare. Two attempts do come to mind: Rodman's (1966) idea of "value-stretch", and Mann's (1973) discussion of the "duality" of consciousness and action. The idea of "value-stretch" arose from Rodman's research into marriage and family patterns in the West Indies, where he found that although most of his respondents claimed to value legalised marriage as the ideal basis from which to establish a family and domestic arrangement, they in fact seldom realised this
goal, and tended to live on a commonlaw basis instead. He interpreted this situation as a process in which the closest possible alternative was chosen when situational constraints inhibited realisation of the ideal; in short, a 'stretching' of values to meet the prevailing circumstances. What this represents, of course, is the dialectic between values, interests, and opportunities, demonstrating the way in which actual behaviour constitutes something of a compromise between all three. Paradoxically, however, he found that this compromise did not entail rejecting the ideal in any way; it was simply redefined to accommodate and legitimate actual behaviour on a situational basis.

Mann's (1973) idea of the 'duality' of consciousness and action emerged from his analysis of the situation and role of the working-class in the advanced capitalist societies. He was concerned to understand why the union movements in France and Italy had traditionally been more politicised than those of other advanced capitalist countries, yet at the same time chose to pursue predominantly instrumental, economistic goals within the context of the immediate workplace and not press actively for political goals such as greater democratisation of decision-making within the enterprise. He interpreted this in terms of the idea of a ranking of goals in which the individual assigns priority to certain values according to the situation at hand. This ranking, in turn, allows for compartmentalisation by means of which
inconsistencies and contradictions can be contained. Once again, it clearly reflects the dialectical relationship between values, interests, opportunity, and action.

This problem of consistency and compatibility is by no means confined to the relationship between values and action, but extends to the relationship between the various values a person may hold. An example of this can be found in Wedderburn and Crompton's (1972) study of technology and work values. On the one hand, they found that many of the blue-collar workers they interviewed were highly critical of management and the way the enterprise was organised, and expressed an unqualified willingness to use strike activity as a means to accomplish their occupational goals. On the other hand, when asked by the interviewers to express the way they saw labour-management relations in the metaphor of a sports team, the predominant view was that both were on the same side, that the interests of both were mutually compatible and not conflicting. Again, this would seem to suggest some process of 'stretching' or compartmentalisation in which the two opinions are reconciled. It also points yet again to the situational nature of the actual working-out of the values/interests/behaviour dialectic; it is evident from all these examples that the functionalist assumption of the primacy and stability of values is at best an oversimplification.

In spite of these problems, values are an important
subject of study for two reasons. Firstly, they provide a way of observing and understanding individual's social perspectives or what Parkin (1971) refers to as "meaning-systems", the ways in which individuals define their life-situations and the various contexts in which they find themselves. Secondly, and as a result of this, they act as an approximate representation of the overarching framework in terms of which everyday life is structured and made plausible. Analytically, this means that value themes give us a way of understanding the 'style' of 'life-style'. What the 'stretching' and 'dualising' processes mean, however, is that we cannot assume that values give us a simple key for explaining and predicting behaviour. They have to be construed and treated as general guidelines within which and in interaction with which specific meanings are constructed and courses of action projected and carried out. Values, in other words, are a shorthand representation of life-style rather than its essence.

Why Class Culture?

There seems to be something quite logical and acceptable in assuming that social class will have a considerable effect on the way we organise and pursue our lives, the kind of habits we adopt, the kind of tastes we prefer. Yet this relationship between class and life-style should properly remain problematic for the professional sociologist.
a matter for empirical inquiry rather than a priori assumption. Taking the orientation to stability, security and familiarity as our meta-theme of working-class culture, then this means that we must explore what is the nature of class situation which conduces to the emergence and persistence of this characteristic; what is it about class, in other words, which leads to different patterns of lifestyle?

What has become by now the conventional wisdom on this matter revolves essentially, if not exactly terminologically, around the theory of alienation. In its objective sense, alienation denotes a loss of control over the forces and circumstances which impinge upon and shape our lives. In the case of worklife, for example, alienation consists in the relinquishment of control over what we produce and the manner and rate at which we produce it. As Marx, and Weber too for that matter, pointed out, the historical development of industrial capitalism has entailed a progressive alienation for many, who have surrendered, or been forced to surrender, control over their work to the machine, the bureaucracy, the professional, or the manager.

From this perspective, the realm of economic activity—the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth—has been subordinated to the principles of supply and demand and their institutional embodiment, the market. In the realm of work, human endeavour has been
subordinated to further rationalisation in the form of more bureaucracy, more professionalism, and more mechanisation. To be sure, in the case of the market situation, it can be argued that this alienation has been halted and even reversed to some extent by means of collective action in the shape of unionism. At the same time, however, and the evidence of the last chapter does point in this direction, partial control over the market may, for many, have been achieved only at the price of continuing, if not further, alienation in the work situation; a compromise, in short, between an enriched market situation and an impoverished work one. This compromise has arisen, moreover, partly from the choice of the union movement (or more correctly, its leaders) to pursue instrumental, economistic goals in the collective bargaining system rather than concern itself primarily or even equally with the quality of work life. In 1967, for example, a study by the federal Department of Labour of collective agreements revealed that less than twenty percent of all the contracts surveyed contained any clause relating to the provision of protection against the deleterious effects of technological change. Of those which did, the most common form of protection was income maintenance. Seen in this light, then the quantity of non-work life has been bought at the expense of the quality of work life (Canada, Department of Labour, 1967).

The economic and occupational alienation of the
worker is not seen to stop at the office door or factory gate, but to carry over and pervade the other spheres of everyday life. The economic (market situation) and occupational (work situation) experiences of the individual, in other words, are seen to predominate over the remainder of his life-situation, and foster there a situation similar to that originating in the market- and work-places. "Work", Robert Blauner (1964) has written, "remains the single most important life activity for most people, in terms of time and energy...the quality of one's worklife affects the quality of one's leisure, family relations, and basic self-feelings" (183-4). In this way, alienation at work and in the market become alienation in thought and deed at play. As Melvin Kohn has expressed it:

The essence of higher class position is the expectation that one's decisions and actions can be consequential; the essence of lower class position is the belief that one is at the mercy of forces and people beyond one's control, often, beyond one's understanding. Self-direction--acting on the basis of one's own judgment, attending to internal dynamics as well as to external consequences, being open-minded, being trustful of others, holding personally responsible moral standards--this is possible only if the actual conditions of life allow some freedom of action, some reason to feel in control of fate. Conformity--following the dictates of authority, focusing on external consequences to the exclusion of internal processes, being intolerant of nonconformity and dissent, being distrustful of others, having moral standards that strongly emphasize obedience to the letter of the law--this is the inevitable result of conditions of life that allow little freedom of action, little reason to feel in control of fate (1969:189)
As a result of this pervasive alienation, stability, routine, security, certainty, familiarity become the mechanisms to cope with a world over which one exercises little control or direction, a world in which change and the instability which ensues from it come from the decisions made by others.

As it stands, however, this theory remains incomplete precisely because it appears too complete. The generally one-sided perspective on the relationship between class and life-style gives too strong a quality of determinism to the subject. Any attempt to theorise this relationship must take account of the dialectical nature of social processes, of the way in which causes and effects interact with one another to form ongoing systems which cannot be unravelled easily using traditional causal thinking. The market and work situations not only influence and shape life-style experiences and meanings, but are, in turn, influenced and shaped by them, and are, to an extent, independent and autonomous. This is evident in the work situation studies by Goldthorpe et al. (1968) and by Cotgrove (1972). In both cases, the researchers found that work orientations were partially derived from non-work experiences, and were imported into work from outside, so to speak.

The importance of acknowledging this lies in the fact that it enables us to consider the possibility that although a particular clustering of values and behaviour
may have originated under the conditions of a certain class situation, the persistence of that clustering may not be contingent upon the persistence of the class situation which originally gave rise to it. We must recognise that class cultures can and do acquire a degree of autonomy from class situations. This idea is not new; it is evident in Engels' attempt to set the record straight concerning the theory of historical materialism after Marx's death by affirming that the "superstructure" does enjoy a degree of independence from the "substructure". It is also implicit in Ogburn's famous notion of "cultural lag"---the historical delay between structural and cultural changes. Recognising this dialectical character does not preclude the possibility of assigning a position of primacy to the role of the class situation; it simply rejects and qualifies the deterministic positivism characteristic of some of the one-sided alienation theories.

Conclusion: Embourgeoisement and Working-Class Culture

The overall conclusion of the last chapter was that a limited and partial process of convergence between manual and lower level non-manual market and work situations shows signs of taking place. This process of convergence, moreover, represented a mixture of embourgeoisement in some respects and proletarianisation in others. At the same time, a picture of relative stability was evident in the status
situation. The state of the evidence reviewed in this chapter would suggest a similar picture of limited, partial convergence or homogenisation, though this conclusion should perhaps be taken more tentatively than that of the previous chapter.

On the one hand, there is clearly an extensive body of postwar literature pointing to what we have referred to as the "conventional image" of working-class, and by implication middle-class, culture. This image pictures a working-class world which is home- and family-centred, with relatively strong ties of extended kinship, sedentary, rather hostile and suspicious of formal social participation, relatively ascriptive and particularistic in orientation, fairly conformist and uncritical of the institutional order, present-oriented, and pragmatic. In short, an image of everyday life oriented and organised largely in terms of stability, familiarity, and routine, a world in which change, usually emanating from external sources, is regarded as disruptive and threatening rather than as a challenge to one's adaptive resources. In these respects, this conventional image of the working-class world is seen to be distinct from, if not contradictory to, that of middle-class existence.

On the other hand, there are bodies of research and opinion which are critical of this conventional image. There are those like Gans (1962) and Kerr (1958), for
example, who distinguish the stability and routine oriented working-class from those who are motivated by 'fun' and 'thrill'-seeking, who reject stability and routine, and who are contemptuous of the quest for 'respectability'. This distinction, while perfectly valid and useful, is, nonetheless, related clearly to differences in class situation. While objective alienation seems to be a typical quality of working- and lower middle-class life, it is, nevertheless, variable in its extent and in its ramifications. Those segments of the working-class who reject stability and routine are typically those whose own market and work situations are highly unstable and incapable of personal control, those, in other words, whose objective situations in the marketplace and at work make even an orientation to stability an inappropriate and unrealisable form of coping. But more importantly, there are those studies which point to some manner of homogenisation and convergence of working- and lower middle-class life-styles, which, by implication, suggest that the conventional images are increasingly obsolete. Here, there are two studies which stand out as warranting further discussion, those by Goldthorpe et al. (1968, 1969) and by MacKenzie (1973).

The "Affluent Worker" project undertaken in the mid to late sixties in Luton, England by John Goldthorpe and his associates was designed as an explicit attempt to test the various claims of the embourgeoisement and their implications
for the dissolution and transformation of the class structure of advanced industrial capitalism. Focusing upon the effects of geographical mobility and affluence on the lifestyles of blue-collar families, they nevertheless found little empirical support for the conclusion that these had led to the adoption of, or even the desire to adopt, more characteristically middle-class styles of life either at work or outside. This is not to imply that they did not observe any change at all; they concluded that in the case of their own sample, affluence and mobility had given rise to a rather privatised life-style in which the nuclear family had been cut off to some extent from traditionally strong kinship ties, yet had adapted to this situation by further withdrawal into the confines of the nuclear unit, rather than compensating for the loss of kin by adopting more middle-class forms of sociability and social participation.

MacKenzie's study in Providence, Rhode Island, was also designed as an attempt to test the thesis of embourgeoisement. Although he did not find evidence to support any substantial conversion of working-class families to middle-class ways, he did conclude that the skilled manual stratum is becoming increasingly detached from the remainder of the working-class in terms of both immediate class situation and life-style. He attributes this not so much to affluence per se, but rather to the more generally superior market position they enjoy by virtue of their skills and the control
they exercise over the supply. These, he argues, render the more skilled worker more market-proof, and subsequently more resistant to the vagaries of the labour market. In other words, the skilled enjoy greater security in their market situations, which is reflected, in turn, in their work and life-style situations. At the same time, his findings also suggest a similar detachment of lower level, routine white-collar workers from the established middle-class, again in terms of both economic position and style of life, together with partial convergence with the skilled blue-collar stratum.

The principal conclusion of both studies, then, points in the direction of some form of limited convergence between segments of the affluent and/or skilled manual strata on the one hand and segments of the lower level, routine non-manual strata on the other. This idea is most fully developed in the Goldthorpe study, where it is expressed diagramatically as follows:

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  MEANS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRESENT ORIENTATION &amp; COMMUNAL SOCIABILITY</th>
<th>COLLECTIVISTIC</th>
<th>INDIVIDUALISTIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional working-class</td>
<td>Solidaristic collectivism (Convergence)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New working-class ← Traditional</td>
<td>New middle-class → middle-class</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental collectivism &amp; family-centredness</td>
<td>Radical individualism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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In conclusion then, the overall picture of class situation and life-style which has emerged throughout the course of this and the previous chapter does suggest that our conventional images of both the class structure and class culture are undergoing some change. This change, however, does not point clearly and unequivocally in the direction of either embourgeoisement or proletarianisation but tends rather in the direction of a limited convergence or homogenisation of segments of the working-class and the lower middle-class in terms of class situation and style of life. The limited and partial nature of this change must, however, be strongly emphasized; there is also ample evidence pointing to the persistence of some traditional class inequalities and some traditional differences in life-style patterns.

In broader theoretical terms, the idea of convergence which emerges from the Goldthorpe and MacKenzie studies is relevant to the perennial debate on social order, particularly as it relates to what Parkin (1971) has tagged the problem of "class inequality and political order". Insofar as it represents a synthesis (partially at least) of the embourgeoisement and proletarianisation theses, then at a more general theoretical level the idea of class convergence should tie into a synthesis of the integrationist and conflict perspectives discussed in Chapter II. Ideally, such a perspective would take account equally of conflict
and integration as the two sides of an ongoing, dialectical reality, and avoid the strictures of both the structural-functionalist and the orthodox Marxist positions.

Two recent attempts to develop such a perspective can be found in the works of Parkin (1971) and Mann (1970). In classifying and elaborating upon the varieties of "meaning-systems" to be found among the working-class, Parkin discusses what he calls an "accommodationist" value system somewhere in between the "deferential" and the "traditional". The accommodationist position represents a limited, contingent acceptance of the dominant institutional order as long as that order continues to fulfill what is expected of it. This is akin to Mann's idea of a "pragmatic acceptance" of the status quo by the working-class, an acceptance based upon the fulfilment of short-run interests rather than upon shared moral values.

What both of these conceptions imply is a situation of ceasefire or truce rather than one of either permanent peace or conflict. And as such, the continuity of order is contingent upon the continuity of a particular configuration of circumstances; the prevailing situation is not one of permanent integration, but one of a partial integration grounded primarily, as we have seen, in a predominantly instrumental and economistic commitment. To borrow from Etzioni's typology of organisational commitment, and extrapolate from it to the level of the whole society, the
synthetic/convergence perspective would fall into the 'calculative-remunerative' category rather than the 'alienative-coercive' or the 'moral-normative' (Etzioni, 1961). In this sense, writers like Marcuse (1964) and Gorz (1967) are correct when they complain that the working-class has been 'bought-off' by affluence and mass consumerism, and subsequently compromised the fragmentation and alienation of work for the material enrichment of their roles as consumers. They are wrong, however, and this is especially so in Marcuse's case, when they imply this compromise has a permanent and unconditional character. The instrumentalism and economism which seem to be increasingly characteristic of the manual and lower non-manual labour force is inherently fragile and volatile. As John Westergaard has rightly pointed out, this fragility derives precisely from the fact that continued commitment is contingent upon a steadily increasing flow of material benefits, and therefore on the ability of the economic machine to provide them (Westergaard, 1972). This, as Mann has noted in his analysis of economism, is based upon the assumption that material rewards are infinitely expandable, and that all the participants can gain without there ever having to be any losers. However, as the recent spate of 'stagflation' has made only too clear, such assumptions are highly contentious. In spite of the celebration of Keynesian fine-tuning, fluctuations and disruptions still inhere in the capitalist
economic form, and when incomes and security are threatened, individuals have shown themselves only too willing to adopt militant tactics to protect them, and the truce is abruptly yet temporarily ended.

This, however, properly belongs to the realm of theoretical speculation, and is not something on which we can draw definite conclusions with the state of the evidence at present. This is deficient in two respects. The first is that convergence, just like embourgeoisement and proletarianisation, implies a process of historical change, in which respect it requires longitudinal data which are not presently available. The second problem, and this stands out particularly for the data on class culture, is that the data deal overwhelmingly with Britain and the U.S. This, however, is a deficiency we are better able to correct. The remainder of the thesis will be devoted to an analysis of fairly recent Canadian data, particularly with respect to blue-collar life-styles, and what, if anything, happens to them under conditions of affluence, mobility, skill, education, in short under the conditions identified by both the embourgeoisement theorists and the Goldthorpe and MacKenzie studies as the catalysts of change.
CHAPTER V

RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

Introduction

The preliminary conclusions to be drawn from the reviews of existing literature undertaken in the two preceding chapters are twofold. Firstly, it is evident that while traditional class differences in market situation, work situation, status situation, and life-style do persist between working-class and middle-class, certain homogenising changes are also in evidence, though in the matter of life-style patterns especially, the data are more equivocal and contradictory. At the same time, it is also evident that any overall or blanket process of either embourgeoisement or proletarianisation should be ruled out; the data point to a mixed situation of limited class convergence, working-class becoming more 'bourgeois' in some respects, middle-class more 'proletarian' in other respects, and both more like each other in yet other respects. Empirically, at least, the notions of embourgeoisement and proletarianisation appear too simplified and selective. The second conclusion, and one which provides an important justification for undertaking this research, is the relative paucity of literature applying to Canadian experiences and situations. This is most obvious in the matter of the literature
dealing with the work situation and general life-style patterns. In the latter case particularly, what information there is is fragmentary and is more than likely founded upon inference from studies focusing ostensibly upon problems other than those falling within the domain of class analysis.

The need for analysis of Canadian situations means that the research undertaken here is, in the broad sense, replicative and comparative. The model for replication and comparison is provided by the two major existing studies of embourgeoisement conducted by Goldthorpe and his associates in the U.K. and by Gavin MacKenzie in the U.S. At the same time, any study which seeks to replicate existing research inevitably seeks also to amend the deficiencies and shortcomings which the researcher identifies in his model. Accordingly, the present research will depart methodologically in a number of ways from the Goldthorpe and MacKenzie studies.

These departures, however, will also entail sacrificing some of the benefits of the type of research design these previous two studies adopted. The latter were founded upon data collected through intensive interviewing of a relatively small number of sample respondents. This format allowed the researchers to follow up 'leads' from their respondents, to press for more elaborate answers where they thought appropriate, to witness non-verbal reactions to
the questions, and so on. This permitted a depth of finding which the present study cannot attain as it is limited to the use of data collected by means of a 'face-sheet' survey compiled from mailed questionnaires. The limitations of this technique are self-evident: a lack of researcher control over the situation in which responses were made, over the respondents' interpretations of the questions, over the seriousness with which they were answered, and so on. As a result of these limitations the richness of the data is impaired as the researchers themselves are not on hand to probe more deeply, to clarify misunderstandings, or to follow up intriguing responses. Ironically the very standardisation of the responses from survey questionnaires which enables easier codification and computer processing limits the range and richness of the data one can attain by their use.

On the other hand, the use of mailed survey questionnaires has its own benefits and advantages. Firstly, they permit the researcher to achieve larger samples which enhance the reliability of the findings, and allow for more confident generalisation. In sharp contrast to the Goldthorpe and MacKenzie studies, the present research is established on the basis of a data base of nearly three thousand respondents. Secondly, the advantages extend to the nature of the data analysis. In both the previous studies, conclusions were drawn on the basis of reference points which were essentially taken for granted and not
subjected to empirical scrutiny. For example, in the Goldthorpe study, although a small sub-sample of clerical workers was included in the interview schedule, the whole image of what constituted a middle-class style of work and life was left for the most part implicit. At the same time, the authors could conclude that their group of affluent blue-collar workers were not becoming more middle-class as a result of their material prosperity. In the light of a taken-for-granted image of middle-classness, however, the legitimacy of such a conclusion is seriously weakened. Similarly, in his American study of embourgeoisement, MacKenzie came to important conclusions about the skilled working-class and their detachment, both in terms of economic and occupational situation and in terms of lifestyle patterns, from the semi-skilled; yet he did so without examining empirically the class and life-style situations of the semi-skilled, his image of them was one derived from taken-for-granted assumptions which were not clearly spelled out.

To avoid this problem of drawing conclusions on the basis of inadequate data, we shall base the analysis upon a four-way comparison of semi-skilled industrial blue-collar workers, who fit into the lower working-class in terms of the model established in Chapter II; skilled industrial blue-collar workers working in maintenance and direct production, who fit into the upper working-class category; foremen who
are a marginal group bridging the divide between blue-collar and white-collar, factory and office, authority and execution; and finally a small group of lower level industrial managers, who fit into the bottom reaches of the middle-class. By including the latter, we have two benchmarks of 'middle-classness' against which to compare the data on the skilled and the semi-skilled, and at the same time we will be able to examine differences and similarities between the conventional image of middle-class work and life-styles and the managers in the sample and see thereby just how 'bourgeois' the latter are as well.

The third difference between this and the previous research, particularly the Goldthorpe study, concerns the nature of the sample and the manner in which respondents were selected. Goldthorpe and his colleagues established their research on the assumption that the most appropriate way in which to test the implications of the embourgeoisement thesis was to select deliberately a sample of skilled and semi-skilled blue-collar workers whose own social biographies and backgrounds rendered them most likely of anyone to conform to the predictions of the thesis. In this way, the sample was restricted to those who were well-paid, enjoyed seniority and relative job security, had been geographically mobile in search of well-paying work, were consumer orientated, worked in industries which employed 'advanced' technologies and were reknown for
'progressive' labour-management relations, and lived in new, socially heterogeneous neighbourhoods and communities which were pervaded by an atmosphere of optimism and prosperity. The apparent logic of this design is clearly compelling: if no traces of embourgeoisement are found among those whom the theory implies are the most likely candidates, then the idea of embourgeoisement as a broad, historical tendency can be ruled out tout court, and the validity of the thesis thereby seriously undermined.

Again, however, by limiting the composition of the sample in this way, the authors therewith limited their own points of reference and comparison, and restricted their potential for generalisation. The study may provide us with a wealth of information about affluent, mobile, consumer oriented, etc., etc. workers and their families, but it tells us little of how these compare with the less affluent, the less mobile, the less consumer oriented, etc., etc. The image of the latter, the more traditional working-class, just like the image of the typical middle-class, is taken-for-granted. This restriction, moreover, confines the authors either to accepting or to rejecting the embourgeoisement thesis as it stands, and prevents them from elaborating and modifying it. Perhaps, for example, the embourgeoisement theorists are correct about the direction of change, but incorrect about its causes; perhaps it occurs not among the affluent, the mobile, the secure,
etc., but among some other segment of the working-class. On the basis of the Goldthorpe research, we have no way, or even potential way, of knowing. By organising their research in this way, the authors overlooked the fact that the point of empirical research is not simply to falsify existing theories, but rather to discover ways to amend and improve them. And to do this, it is advisable to design one's research in such a way that it enables one to examine alternative hypotheses and ideas. The present research, then, will attempt to do this by allowing for comparison not only between semi-skilled, skilled, foremen, and managers, but also between the affluent and the non-affluent, the mobile and the non-mobile, those working with advanced technology and those working with more conventional technology, and so on. Only by doing this can we examine soundly the real effects of those factors to which the process of embourgeoisement is attributed.

**Data Base**

The data analysed in the following two chapters is taken from a mailed survey conducted in early summer 1968 by J. Louber and M. Pullan as part of a series of studies commissioned by the Parliamentary Task Force on Industrial Relations in Canada. Ostensibly, the survey was conducted in order to "examine the impact of industrial change on workers and their attitudes." As such, a large number of
questions included in the questionnaire were designed to elicit responses on a whole range of issues pertaining to technological change and its impact on the worker, the work group, the work setting, and so on. At the same time, the survey included questions about a whole range of biographical and background characteristics, together with questions about general life-style outside work. Included were questions about patterns of sociability and primary social participation, patterns of formal or secondary social participation, political participation and affiliations, mass media use and taste, and a large number of Likert-style questions from which inferences about social attitudes and values could be made. In the original author's report, these data remained unanalysed, and as such offer a valuable research resource for secondary analysis.

The questionnaire was sent to male employees in six major industrial settings—oil, chemicals, automobiles, steel, printing, and electrical products—covering a broad range of organisational and technological work settings. The majority of those who responded come from the Toronto-Hamilton region, with other pockets from the Windsor, Ontario region, northern Ontario, Winnipeg, and Edmonton. However, given the prevailing industrial ecology in Canada, the concentration of respondents from the southern Ontario region is only to be expected. While we should exercise caution, then, in regarding the sample as a
national one, we can regard it as an acceptable industrial one. In all, sixteen firms were represented in the final sample: one from steel, two each from autos, chemicals, and electrical products, and five each from oil and printing. The latter testify to the relatively small size of operation in those two industries, a fact which has both historical and technological roots. Sample size by plant varied from a low of just under sixty respondents for three of the oil firms, to a high of over three hundred and fifty in the case of the steel firm and one each of the auto and electrical products operations. From this basis a final sample of 2,832 respondents was established.

As the original sample was targeted with the idea in mind of studying the effects of technological change, it cannot be considered randomly chosen, and thus cannot serve as the basis for generalisation to the male labour force as a whole. The sample was drawn from those in mainstream urban-industrial employment, and therefore it must be considered unrepresentative in the general sense. However, the fact that it was chosen from industries which are, relatively speaking, more economically stable and technically advanced than the average fits well with our present concerns: it is precisely in those segments of the working-class which work under such conditions that the process of embourgeoisement is implied to be most evident. At the same time, the nature of the sample means that the analysis conducted in the following chapters must necessarily be regarded as exploratory.
The questionnaire was originally sent out to five thousand male workers engaged in either direct supervision, skilled maintenance, or immediate supervision. Selection of respondents did vary from industry to industry, and a more detailed discussion of these various procedures is presented in Appendix I. From the point of view of our present interests, nevertheless, these variations are minor, and their effect as far as the data are concerned can be treated as negligible. Of the target sample, the eventual response rate was 50.3%. This is slightly higher than is usual for mailed questionnaires, particularly given the approximate length of time—one hour and a half—which it took to complete. One possible reason for this is that the questionnaire was administered under the auspices of the Parliament of Canada, and thus its apparently 'official' nature may have encouraged a higher rate of response.

Each questionnaire was mailed out with a covering letter explaining its purpose. This letter reassured the potential respondent that the study had been discussed beforehand with management and, where appropriate, union representatives, and that the answers would be treated confidentially and the respondent's anonymity guaranteed. A copy of this covering letter is provided in Appendix II. If no reply was forthcoming after ten days, each questionnaire was followed up by a reminder postcard, and after
another ten days by a letter of final appeal. Copies of these too are provided in Appendix II. Finally, a follow-up letter was mailed to those who had not replied to elicit the reasons for their non-response. Although some stated that they thought the questions too personal and intrusive and unrelated to work and labour relations, others did not respond because they had ceased in effect to be potential respondents, e.g. they had moved, left the firm, could not read or write English sufficiently well, had passed away, and so on. Thus, if the non-potentials are excluded, the rate of return exceeds fifty percent.

The questionnaire, a copy of which is contained in Appendix II, involved a total of 157 question items. The form of the questionnaire underwent several revisions before reaching final form, and was pre-tested on a number of steel workers in a Toronto suburb to verify its suitability. The accuracy of the responses was attested by a question asking the respondents whether or not they found the questionnaire interesting or dull. Over four-fifths replied that they found it interesting, a fact which lends some support to the assumption that for the most part those who filled in the questionnaire did so seriously and accurately. Moreover, comments provided at the end of the questionnaire by the respondents concerning any feelings they had about the whole exercise proved to be "overwhelmingly positive".
Sample Composition

Although we have summarised above the criteria governing the selection of the sample respondents, it will be useful to sketch a brief profile of the same in terms of major social background characteristics, in order to acquaint the reader more fully with the type of sample involved.

1. Age: The age distribution of the sample shows a weighting toward workers over forty. Nearly sixty percent (59.3%) fall into this bracket, though there are variations by industry and occupation. Those in chemicals and oil are somewhat older than average, those in steel and printing somewhat younger. Variations by occupation indicate that the blue-collar groups are slightly younger than the managers or the foremen. 53% of the semi-skilled and about 60% of the skilled report they are over forty as compared to 69% and 72% respectively of the foremen and the managers, a fact which demonstrates the relationship between the authority and seniority systems within the typical factory setting.

2. Education: The bulk of the sample have at least some high school education—69.6%. The next most common are those with only grade school, 24.4%, followed finally by the few—6%—with some post-secondary schooling. By industry, there is negligible variation. By age, as we
would normally expect, the older respondents tend to have less schooling, though the difference is moderate. By occupation, again as we would expect, there is a fairly strong relationship: 30.6% of the managers have some post-secondary education as compared to about only 4% each of the skilled and semi-skilled.

3. Marital Status: The overwhelming majority of the respondents are married.

4. Birthplace Status: Just over two-thirds—68.6%—are native born Canadians. Of the remaining third 8.8% immigrated into Canada while they were still children or adolescents under the age of sixteen. The remaining 21.8% immigrated as adults, over the age of 16. There is little variation by occupation.

Of the immigrants, the largest single group are originally from the U.K., followed by those from Eastern Europe (about 15%). Of the remaining 35%, most are from the rest of Europe. Again, there is little occupational variation.

5. Family Background:

(a) Community: With respect to the type of community background in which the respondents grew up, the sample demonstrates the major change in Canadian society away from a predominantly rural to a predominantly urban society. Nearly one third of the total sample grew up either on farms
or in small towns with populations under 5,000. Only about 17% grew up in large cities with populations of more than half a million. Of all the four groups, the semi-skilled have the most rural-small town backgrounds: about 40% grew up in such an environment, with only 8% from large cities. This not only indicates the general pattern of migration from rural to urban, but also that those who make the transition often enter the industrial-urban labour force at its lowest ranks.

(b) Father's Education: Given the generally old nature of the sample as a whole, it is only reasonable to assume that their fathers would have received only elementary schooling. Fully two-thirds of the respondents have fathers who received only grade school education. When compared to the respondents' own levels of schooling, we can see that considerable educational mobility has taken place between the two generations.

(c) Father's Occupation: As we would expect, the bulk of the sample have fathers whose own occupation was blue-collar, about two-thirds, in fact. In addition to this, reflecting again the rural to urban transition, another 18% have fathers who were farmers. Predictably, the managers are more likely than any of the other groups to have had white-collar fathers, though this still only amounts to just under 25%. As such, we can see a considerable degree of occupational mobility on their part. On the whole, the
main kind of inter-generational mobility evident in the present sample is more lateral than vertical, more a matter of relocation from rural-small town employment to that of the large industrial city.

6. Social Biography:

(a) Geographical Mobility: Overall, the sample has experienced a moderate degree of geographical mobility. About half have moved residence three or more times, and just over a fifth five or more times. The relationship with occupation is only weak, though the managers exhibit slightly more mobility than the other groups.

(b) Job Mobility: As we would expect on the basis of the data encountered in Chapter III, most of the sample have been occupationally mobile; only 15% have never changed jobs at all, and almost two-fifths have changed three or more times. The frequency of mobility is slightly higher among the semi-skills and lower among the managers, though the overall relationship between occupation and mobility is weak.

(c) Career Origins: The bulk of the sample began their own worklives as manual workers of some kind. Predictably, this proportion is lower among the managers, though it still reaches nearly two-thirds. This suggests, then, that the mobility of the managers is intra-rather than inter-generational. Of the foremen, skilled, and semi-skilled, under ten percent began in white-collar work.
(d) Religious Affiliation: The majority, as we would expect for English-speaking Canada, state they are Protestant, nearly three-fifths overall. Predictably again, this is higher among the managers and lower among the semi-skilled of whom a third are Catholic. This reflects to some extent the differential ethnic composition of the two groups. Particularly in the post-war period, much low skill labour emigrated to Canada from the predominantly Catholic regions of southern Europe.

Analytical Framework

In order to understand why the mode of analysis adopted in the following two chapters has been chosen as the most appropriate, it will be useful first to restate the problem we are examining in propositional form. As we saw in the opening chapter, the process of embourgeoisement (and for that matter those of proletarianisation and massification) is not seen simply as a blanket process occurring indiscriminately to all sections of the working-class, but rather as a process contingent upon certain structural-historical changes in post-war western society.

Foremost among these is the spread of affluence and material prosperity among large sectors of the working-class, particularly those working in the 'new' industries utilising advanced, complex technologies, supposedly requiring intricate occupational training. The development,
it is argued, has given rise to an unprecedented rise in material living standards and therewith to a narrowing, if not an outright elimination, of class situation differences, and to the attenuation of divisive class-based social conflicts. To translate this into propositional form we may state that:

1. The greater the extent to which a blue-collar worker and his family can be said to be materially affluent, the more likely they are to adopt more characteristically middle-class patterns of behaviour and outlook both at work and at home.

In addition to affluence, however, we have seen that there are a number of secondary forces to which the embourgeoisement of the working-class family is attributed, and thus, by implication, the re-composition of the class structure as a whole. Firstly education and formal schooling: accompanying the rapid economic growth of the last thirty years, indeed, some argue, a very cause of that growth, has been the expansion of opportunities for formal education. In Canada, for males at least, the average age of entry into the labour force in the post-war period has steadily increased, a trend which is also evident in the other western societies. Not only has this meant that the working-class has been able to avail itself of a facility formerly reserved largely for the middle- and upper-classes, it has also meant that children from working-class backgrounds have been increasingly exposed to a predominantly middle-class institution, administered
according to middle-class precepts and by essentially lower and middle middle-class individuals. In this way, working-class children, it is argued, have become increasingly socialised into middle-class norms of individualism and competitiveness. In short, as both a launching pad for the labour force and as an agency of socialisation, the school system has come to be identified as a potentially 'bourgeoisifying' instrument for those from working-class families. Thus, we can state our second proposition as follows:

2. The greater the extent to which an individual has experienced formal schooling, the more likely he/she will be to adopt more characteristically middle-class patterns of behaviour and outlook.

The third factor to which working-class embourgeoisement has been attributed is mobility, both geographical and occupational. As we saw in Chapters I and IV, the connection between geographical mobility and embourgeoisement derives from the plausible argument that frequent changes of residence, and by implication of neighbourhood and community, inexorably erode the strong ties with community, workplace, and most particularly extended kin which have long been identified as a central feature of traditional working-class life. In this respect, the 'bourgeoisifying' effects of geographical mobility are seen to occur almost by default: mobility inhibits the retention of traditional life patterns thereby pushing gradually the working-class
family toward a more middle-class life-style organised 
around the nuclear family and assorted non-related friends 
as the principal sources of companionship and social 
attachment. Thus, the third proposition:

3. The greater the extent to which a working-class family 
is geographically mobile, the more likely it will be to 
adopt more characteristically middle-class patterns of 
behaviour and outlook.

It is (regretably) common to find that when socio-
logists make historical comparisons they do so on the basis 
of reference points which sometimes approximate caricatures 
rather than reasonably accurate descriptions of the past. 
One example of this is the common assumption that the 
traditional working-class were a sedentary lot, not only 
geographically but also occupationally--the idea of a 
'lifetime commitment' to community and job. While this 
may be true of those who were skilled and practised a clear-
cut trade, it is more questionable whether the same charac-
terisation applies to those who performed routine machine 
operative work, those today we refer to as the semi-skilled. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that recent changes in technology 
and occupational composition--away from conventional mechani-
sation towards greater automation, away from blue-collar 
manufacturing jobs to ostensibly white-collar service ones 
--have strengthened the likelihood of intra- and inter-
generational occupational mobility horizontally and
vertically, as we have seen above with the managers in the present sample.

What, then, are the consequences of intra-generational mobility across class lines, viz. from blue-collar to white-collar or the reverse? The general pattern depicted in the literature dealing with the social and personal consequences of vertical mobility suggests that the downwardly mobile, those who move from white-collar, non-manual to blue-collar, manual typically retain elements (habits, beliefs, tastes, etc.) from their point of departure, and import them, so to speak, into their destination. One important aspect of this retention-importation process is that the downwardly mobile continue to employ their former peers as their major reference group point. Theoretically, this introduces the possibility that the presence of apparently middle-class styles of life and outlook among working-class families may be due not to affluence or education but to the experience of downward mobility on the part of the family head from white-collar career origins. This, in turn, poses another question: if the presence of middle-class characteristics among working-class families is the result of downward mobility, then can this legitimately be interpreted as an incidence of embourgeoisement? Recent research on embourgeoisement in New Zealand by O'Malley and Collette suggests that it cannot since the changes are not due to the general structural developments said to be
occurring to the working-class without their having to change occupational status. On the other hand, as we have seen in Chapter I, the idea of increased mobility is seen by some as just such a development, and thus that any changes which result from individual mobility from white-collar to blue-collar fall legitimately within the scope of the concept of embourgeoisement. In either case, from a methodological and empirical point of view, it will be judicious to control for personal mobility and work biography to see to what extent the downwardly mobile do "contaminate" working-class culture. To put this in propositional form we may say that:

4. If the head of a working-class family has experienced personal mobility from a white-collar job, then he is likely to retain elements of a more characteristically middle-class life-style.

The last factor with which we will be concerned, at least from a theoretical point of view, is technological work environment. As we saw in the opening chapter, Blauner's thesis about technology and work alienation can be viewed as a statement for the 'bourgeoisifying' effects of automation, at least vis à vis the work situation and its rewards and deprivations. For Blauner automation would attenuate the alienating tendencies of earlier machine technology by reversing the trend to greater and greater job fragmentation, and thereby re-integrate differentiated work tasks into a smaller number of work roles and restore
meaning, challenge, and discretion into blue-collar work.
Thus, we may state that:

5. The greater the extent to which a worker works with or oversees automatic equipment, the greater the likelihood that he/she will adopt a more characteristically middle-class attitude to work, and experience a more characteristically middle-class work environment.

In addition to these specific factors, there runs throughout the various accounts of the thesis of embourgeoisement the sense that this process is due also to the general ambiance or tenor of the post-war period. Without entangling ourselves in Hegelian discussions of Geist, it is clear that the idea of embourgeoisement was part and parcel of the general post-war spirit of optimism and progress, a general feeling that the formerly intractable problems which had plagued industrial capitalism could now be solved, that increasing prosperity could now be institutionalised, and that class inequalities become a thing of the past. Though it is difficult to measure empirically such vague notions as these, we can translate them to mean that those entering the labour force in the post-war period, those who did not experience firsthand the problems of finding and keeping a job during the years of the Depression, will adopt a more optimistic, confident, ambitious, in short more middle-class perspective on life. To put this in propositional form we may state that:
6. If a worker entered the labour force for the first time in the post-war period, then both he and his family are more likely to adopt more characteristically middle-class patterns of behaviour and outlook.

The task now incumbent upon us is to spell out the variables and the way in which they are operationalised and measured. The principal 'independent variable', to use the conventional methodological vocabulary, is social class. Following the theoretical discussion in Chapter II, we shall measure social class in terms of occupation. The actual comparison is a fourfold one of managers, of whom there are 147, foremen, numbering 274, skilled production and maintenance workers, who number 1,628, and semi-skilled workers, of whom there are 774. Although the actual sub-sample size does not affect the use of proportional statistics, the number of managers, we feel, is too small to be able to draw firm and confident conclusions. For this reason, the main emphasis will be on the two blue-collar groups and the evidence for and against their embourgeoisement. This does not mean, however, that the managers will be ignored, but rather that the data dealing with them should be interpreted more carefully.

The 'dependent variables' fall into two main categories: class situation and life-style. The former will be examined in Chapter VI, the latter in Chapter VII. Class situation is broken down into its three components: market situation, work situation, and status situation. Market situation is used to denote those forms of economic
remuneration which accrue to an individual by virtue of his/her participation in the distributive system (or by the participation of those on whom they are dependent): wealth, fringe benefits, security, and advancement opportunities in the future. Wealth is measured here by means of annual income level. The scale used in the survey, however, is open-ended after $10,000 p.a. which prevents accurate estimation of the ratio of lowest to highest income between the four groups. In addition, we shall also examine the incidence of working wives, and the effect that wives' incomes make on the class distribution of earned wealth. In the matter of fringe benefits, regretably, we have no measure in the survey; the distribution of 'latent' rewards, then, will have to go unexamined. Security is measured in terms of unemployment experience, using a question asking the respondents how many times they had been unemployed for a month or longer during their working life. Advancement and promotion, finally, are examined by means of three related questions. Firstly, how each respondent evaluates his own prospects for future promotion. Secondly, how satisfied he is with this situation. And thirdly, whether or not he expects to remain in his present job for the rest of his working-life, and, if not, what type of job he expects to obtain. Although these questions do not permit us to measure objective advancement opportunities, they do enable us to tap subjective feelings and judgments.
Work situation refers to those rewards (and deprivations) which are experienced in the immediate work context, which emanate directly from the activity of working. In this context, we shall examine five features: job orientation, job interest, general job satisfaction, intrinsic job satisfaction, and extrinsic job satisfaction. Job orientation is measured by means of responses to a fixed-choice question asking the respondent to select which of seven factors he believes is the most important consideration when thinking of taking another job (cf. Chapter VI, pp. 366). The seven are then re-classified into intrinsic and extrinsic work features, those stressing the latter being viewed as instrumentally work oriented. Job interest and general job satisfaction are each measured by fixed-choice, direct questions. Intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction, on the other hand, are each measured by indices composed of satisfaction with three intrinsic and three extrinsic work aspects (cf. Chapter VI, p. 388).

Status situation is measured by means of social class identification and placement. There are, unfortunately, no questions dealing with occupational prestige, images and definitions of class and class structure, or the placement of different occupations in class categories. The only question in the survey which addresses this aspect is one asking the respondent to identify himself in terms of five class categories, upper-class, upper middle-class, lower
middle-class, working-class, and lower-class.

The second general category of dependent variable, life-style, is similarly broken up into a number of component categories. The first of these is primary social participation or patterns of sociability. Here we shall examine the size of friendship networks, the frequency of network interaction, the extent of network integration, the extent of kinship contact, and the social sources of network members. The first of these is measured by a question asking each respondent to identify the number of "close friends" he has; the second is measured by a question asking how often the respondent "does things" with his friends; the third by asking how many of the respondent's friends are friends with each other; the fourth by a question inquiring how many relatives the respondent visits "often"; and the last by three questions asking how many friends work for the same company as the respondent, live in the same neighbourhood, and grew up with the respondent.

The second aspect of life-style we shall examine is that of secondary social participation. This concerns membership and participation in formal social associations which usually extend beyond the realm of the nuclear family. We shall examine three aspects of secondary social participation: firstly, the number of "groups and associations" to which the respondent belongs; secondly, the number of times he has held office in the group he considers most
important to him; and thirdly, how many of the last three meetings of that same group he has attended.

A third aspect of life-style, one which in many respects could be subsumed under the preceding category though we have chosen to treat separately on the grounds that it is an area which was not reviewed in Chapter IV, is that of political affiliation and participation. Here we shall examine four aspects: firstly, the political party, if any, the respondent normally supports; secondly and thirdly, whether or not the respondent, if eligible, voted in the last federal and the last provincial elections; and fourthly, whether or not the respondent contributes financially to a political party and/or attends political party rallies.

The fourth area is use of the mass media, and the type of media content in which the respondent is most interested. This is broken down into five aspects: firstly, the number of newspapers the respondent reads regularly; secondly, the average amount of radio programming he listens to; thirdly, the amount of television he watches on average per day; fourthly, what section of the newspaper he is most interested in reading; and lastly what kind of television programming he prefers to watch—entertainment programmes such as sports shows, westerns, movies, comedies, variety shows, drama, or information oriented programmes such as documentaries, current affairs programmes,
cultural programmes, religious programmes.

The last area deals with general social value orientations. Here we shall examine six value themes which are commonly, and controversially, associated with class differences in ideological perspective: orientation to time, conformism, family orientation, pragmatism, general neophobia, and work neophobia. Each of these value themes is measured by means of a composite index constructed from either two or three Likert-style attitudinal questions the respondents were asked to answer. The index components were chosen first on the basis of face validity, and then reduced in number by means of a factor analysis. Details of the procedure used is provided in Appendix III.

The six propositions laid out on pages to specify six conditions on which the process of working-class bourgeoisation is said to be contingent: affluence, education, geographical mobility, occupational mobility, technological work environment, and the general social 'atmosphere' of the post-war period. These, then, are the principal control variables. Affluence, first of all, is measured in terms of annual income level. This has been dichotomised into affluent and non-affluent, the former referring to those whose income equalled or exceeded $8,000 p.a. at the time of the survey (1968), the latter referring to those making less than that amount. This
figure was chosen as the break-point on the grounds that the 1971 national census put the average blue-collar (both skilled and semi-skilled) income at $8,077 p.a. (cf. Chapter III, p. Table 2). Thus, given the modest though steady process of wage inflation prevalent in the late sixties, the figure of $8,000 p.a. would be slightly above the average blue-collar income in 1968. Indeed, as the present sample shows (cf. Chapter VI, p. 334), that figure is approximately the mean for skilled workers, and about $1,000 to $1,500 higher than the average for the semi-skilled. By using this sum as the dividing point between the affluent and the non-affluent, we may be accused of taking too modest a view of affluence. However, had we chosen a higher figure, even $9,000 p.a., than the number of semi-skilled respondents included in the affluent subsample would have become too small for meaningful and confident comparisons.

Education and geographical mobility are both divided into three categories. The former is measured by amount of formal schooling, and the sample is divided into those with grade school or elementary education only, those with at least some high school or secondary education, and finally those with some post-secondary schooling. This division is based on the fact that it parallels the organisation division in the school system itself, between elementary-primary, secondary, and post-secondary. The
three control categories for geographical mobility are firstly those who have never moved, secondly those who have moved once or twice, and finally those who have moved three or more times. This division enables us to examine separately the immobile, those with low mobility, and those with high mobility. The reasoning behind this is that if the importance of mobility derives from its disruptive effects on established social patterns, then conceivably one move alone may achieve that effect. Thus, it seems important, theoretically, to treat separately those who have never experienced geographical mobility from those who have, and among the latter those who have experienced a little from those who have experienced a good deal. Control for geographical mobility, furthermore, is only undertaken in Chapter VII where we examine life-style patterns. The reason for this is simply that those who regard geographical mobility as a bourgeoisifying agent do not extend its predicted influence into the realms of the workplace and marketplace; its effects, in other words, are confined to the social organisation of life-style outside the economic and technological realms.

Occupational mobility is not measured in terms of its frequency, but rather its direction. What is important here is not how many times the respondent has changed jobs, so much as what kind of job he has performed and what kind of behavioural and attitudinal 'baggage' he has
acquired therewithin, and, to continue the metaphor, transported with him during his subsequent work history. More specifically, we are concerned with the effects of white-collar work experience on the situation of those who are presently blue-collar. To evaluate this, we shall control for career origins, taking account of the respondent's first full-time job. This latter is divided into three categories: those who began their worklives as white-collar workers (the 'white-collar starters'), those who began either as foremen or as skilled manual workers (the 'foremen/skilled blue-collar starters'), and lastly those who began as either semi-skilled or as unskilled manual workers (the 'semi-/unskilled blue-collar starters'). Rather than distinguish simply between white-collar and blue-collar, we thought it more prudent, in light of the various theses of the "internal differentiation of the working-class" proffered by MacKenzie, Form, and others, to distinguish also between upper and lower working-class career origins.

Control for technological work environment is significant from the perspective of Blauner's thesis about the salutary, and by implication bourgeoisifying, effects of automatic technology on both the market and work situations of the factory worker. What is important, then, is not to examine the differential impact of the whole range of factory technologies, so much as to compare the effects of working with automation with those of working with more
conventional technology. Thus, although the survey classifications enable us to compare a variety of different technological environments, we shall concern ourselves simply with an automation/non-automation dichotomous comparison. Control for technology, moreover, will also be confined to the analysis in Chapter VI of the market, work, and status situation differences. As in the case of geographical mobility, the predicted effects of different technologies is confined theoretically to this domain; to extend control to the realm of general life-style is superfluous.

The final control factor—that for the general ambiance of post-war society—is the most difficult to measure. In proposition #6 we expressed its effects in terms of the time of entry into the labour force: either before or after the war. To operationalise this we shall control for age. This is dichotomised into those under and those over forty years of age at the time of the survey. This, however, introduces the problem of spurious interpretation. By controlling for respondent's age we mean to control for the projected effects of historical change—the emergence after the war of a more confident and optimistic society than that of the pre-war Depression days. If, however, age control does reveal significant changes there exists the possibility that they are due not to changing structural conditions so much as different position in the
general life-cycle, to the process of aging per se regardless of historical context. As the data with which we are working are synchronic we have no way to judge accurately between these alternative explanations. Thus, in instances where the effects of control for age do support the implications of the embourgeoisement thesis, we shall have to examine the literature on aging and life-cycle effects to see if it offers a more acceptable explanation.

The actual mode of data analysis has been kept at an elementary level. For the most part, we shall rely upon presenting the data in cross-tabular form. The tables are usually accompanied by the provision of the Cramer's V statistic as a means for summarizing the strength of the various relationships. Cramer's V is an elementary measure of association based upon the Chi square statistic; it is calculated by taking the square root of Chi square divided by sample/subsample size.

Given the general uncertainties involved in secondary data analysis, it was deemed wisest wherever possible to follow the analytic techniques used by Loubser and Fullan (1970) in their own analysis of the data. It is chiefly for this reason that Cramer's V has been adopted here as the measure of association.

The reasons for keeping the analysis at this level
are threefold. Firstly, tabular presentation of essentially
descriptive statistics allows us to compare more directly
our own findings with those of the Goldthorpe and MacKenzie
studies which also relied on this level of analysis as the
most appropriate for their needs. Secondly, and more
importantly, the data contained in the survey are, for the
most part, ordinal at best, and thus not strictly suitable
for the use of statistical techniques based upon interval
and ratio measurement. Although there is now a sizeable
body of opinion which considers that the use of statistics
strictly appropriate to interval and ratio data can be
profitably applied to ordinal data, particularly in an
exploratory context, we decided not to take this risk as
the analysis is secondary: we simply do not have the
kind of detailed knowledge of how the original raw data were
codified necessary to make such a judgment with confidence
that the analysis would not be seriously distorted and the
findings misleading.

Thirdly, and most importantly, even if the data were
suitable for the use of more complicated statistical-
analytic techniques, it would have still been inappropriate
to employ them given the nature of the problem at hand. Since
Durkheim's classic study of suicide, conventional empirical
research in sociology has assumed the form whereby the
researcher attempts to account statistically for as much
of the variation in his 'dependent variable(s)' given the
array of 'independent variables' informed by the original theoretical perspective. In this procedure the focus of the research and analysis efforts is clearly on the dependent variable and its explanation and prediction. In the present context, on the other hand, the problem derived from our theoretical framework implies an inversion of this conventional format. We are concerned not so much to explain or account statistically for variation in the dependent variables--namely class situation and life-style patterns--as to examine the impact of a particular independent variable--namely social class as measured by occupation--under specified control conditions--namely affluence, education, technological work environment, and so on. We are not concerned, in other words, with what variables or combination of variables best allows us to predict variation in, say, the number of close friends the respondent has or the amount of television he usually watches; rather, we are concerned with what effect class position has on these activities, and what effect affluence, etc. have on those relationships. In view of this, more complex multi-variate analytic techniques are inappropriate; to use them would be to engage in analytic overkill. We must not lose sight of the fact that research methods are technologies like any other technology. To use an unusual but not inappropriate metaphor, analysing data is akin to scrambling eggs: we can use a fork or we can use the latest multi-speed electric
mixer. We have chosen the former, without, we believe, impairing the quality of the finished product.
CHAPTER VI

AT WORK: MARKET, WORK AND STATUS

SITUATIONS

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter will be, in many ways, to replicate the analysis undertaken in Chapter III. The principal difference is that we shall be concerned here with analysis of Canadian data taken from the Loubser and Fullan survey described in the preceding chapter. This means, however, that we shall be concerned not merely to replicate as directly as possible the earlier analysis, but rather to examine the class situation differences and similarities of our sample in light of the conclusions drawn from that previous discussion.

The major conclusion established in Chapter III, it will be recalled, identified certain discernible trends in the direction of a general, though limited or partial, convergence of class situations between certain segments of the blue-collar and white-collar populations. In the matter of the market situation, we argued that the data concerning income levels, fringe benefits, and general occupational mobility point toward some degree of blue-collar embourgeoisement. In the work situation, on the other hand, a substantial
body of research and opinion pointed to the further rationalisation of manual, blue-collar work, though possibly not at such an intense pace as previously, and, increasingly more significant, the accelerating rationalisation of ostensibly non-manual, white-collar work not only through the traditional means of further bureaucratisation, but also now through mechanisation and the application of machine technology in a manner reminiscent of the blue-collar experience. Objectively, at least, this is seen to be promoting the proletarianisation of the work situation for large sectors of the lower middle- and even middle middle-class by introducing job fragmentation, hyper-specialisation, routinisation and, perhaps most importantly, 'manualisation', all of which have potentially deleterious 'spill-over' effects for the market situation in the long run. In the matter of the status situation, finally, we found a situation of remarkable stability. The data adduced from occupational prestige surveys and studies of social class self-placement indicate little change in the way individuals rank others and themselves over the last thirty, even fifty, years. These data, moreover, re-affirm that subjectively the manual/non-manual, blue-collar/white-collar distinction remains the most salient line of class differentiation, despite its questionable status as an objective line of class division and formation.

At the same time, these conclusions were presented as tentative rather than definitive. Notwithstanding the
changes revealed by the data, it was also clear that many traditional class inequalities have proven to be persistent and resilient to change. Job security, promotion and advancement opportunities within the work organisation, and some forms of fringe benefit remain unequally distributed, and in a fashion which profits those in white-collar work, particularly in its higher reaches. Similarly, despite the objective tendencies towards the proletarianisation of much white-collar work most white-collar workers continue to remain subjectively satisfied, to enjoy their work, find it challenging, and to consider advancement opportunities both available and accessible. The situation depicted by the data is Janus-headed; the evidence is equivocal and thus open to different, even contradictory, interpretations, some, needless to say, more persuasive than others.

In addition to these conclusions from Chapter III, the present discussion will address itself also to the Goldthorpe and MacKenzie studies upon which it is, more or less, modelled. Important in the former is the thesis of 'instrumentalism', the idea that affluence results from the adoption of a more instrumental, economistic orientation to work and the work setting which is, in turn, the result of considerations and calculations made by the worker outside the workplace, in his role as consumer rather than producer. Important in the latter study is the thesis, also expounded by William Form, of the 'internal differentiation of the
working-class', the idea that the skilled are becoming differentiated and detached from the semi-skilled in the marketplace, workplace, and quest for social status as the result of their possession of occupational training and skills.

The Market Situation: How Affluent, Secure, and Optimistic?

As we saw in the opening chapter, the cornerstone on which the thesis of embourgeoisement rests is the claim that large segments of the manual working-class have, at least in the post-war period, been elevated from the hand-to-mouth existence characteristic of earlier industrial capitalism, and now enjoy standards of affluence and material living comparable to those of much of the white-collar middle-class. The review of the national data conducted in Chapter III did tend to bear this out, at least to the extent that there is a clearly discernible trend towards the homogenisation of blue-collar, service, and lower level routine white-collar incomes. Indeed, it now seems to be the case that the latter two groups are quickly becoming the lowest paid forms of labour in the non-agricultural work force.

When we examine the income situation of the present sample, however, we can see that this homogenising trend is less in evidence between the blue-collar groups and the managers. The relationship between occupation and income
### TABLE 12
Income and Occupation with Controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% earning over $8,000 p.a.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 30 yrs. old</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>0.458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 30-45 yrs</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>1220</td>
<td>0.481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 45 yrs old</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>1173</td>
<td>0.523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>0.363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0.783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>0.438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>0.725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricals</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>0.602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>0.326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with automated technology N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>0.468</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with other technology N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>1772</td>
<td>0.379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-unionist</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>0.375</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A not applicable

is a very strong one: taking the annual income of $8,000 in 1968 as the breaking-point, differentiating the affluent from the non-affluent (in 1971 the median income in Canada for all blue-collar males, both skilled and semi-skilled, was $8,077, see Chapter III, Table Two), then we find over ninety-five percent of the managers made over that sum as compared to just eleven percent of the semi-skilled. In this respect, there appears to be some support for MacKenzie's thesis concerning the class situation detachment of the
skilled from the semi-skilled, as over fifty percent of the skilled workers and eighty percent of the foremen in the sample made over $8,000. It should be noted, on the other hand, that this trend is less apparent if we take $10,000 as the dividing point. In this case the managers are clearly differentiated from the rest, and the skilled and the semi-skilled become more closely lumped together. Although the manner in which the income data are categorised does not permit us to compare occupational means, an examination of the modal incomes for each group suggests that skilled incomes average $1,000 to $1,500 more than those of the semi-skilled and less than those of the foremen. As such, I think caution should be exercised in endorsing MacKenzie's argument.

One of the prominent features of the cross-national data on income distribution analysed in Chapter III was the complicating effect of uneven career, or more correctly work history cycles experienced by manual and non-manual workers. The former, it will be recalled, typically reach the point of maximum personal advancement by their late twenties or early thirties, whereas higher level white-collar workers commonly enjoy a more protracted 'career' of promotion which does not reach its pinnacle until early fifties. The data on age breakdowns above bear no surprises as far as this is concerned, though they do suggest that the semi-skilled and particularly the skilled reach their
maximum relative income level slightly later in life than was revealed by the national data. Furthermore, it seems that this peak point does not necessarily constitute a stable plateau; the data indicate that income level may drop off slightly in the later stages of working life.

Given the general relationship between amount of economic remuneration and the state of the labour market, we should naturally expect some fluctuation of earnings within each occupational grouping and skill level by industrial setting. This expectation is clearly borne out in the breakdowns by industry. Indeed, from the manner of presentation these variations appear highly conspicuous; these extremes, however, are not as apparent if we compare modal incomes by industry. The variations are least obvious in the case of the managers, though this is largely an artifact of the coding system which leaves income level unspecified above $10,000 p.a. The spread is moderate for the foremen and the semi-skilled, and widest for the skilled, with over eighty percent of those in oil making over $8,000 as compared to a mere ten percent of those in chemicals. Notwithstanding these variations, the rank order by industry is similar for all three groups, with those in oil being the best paid and those in chemicals the worst.

One prominent reason for this pattern is that different industries utilise different technologies some of which are more labour intensive than others, and there-
with more subject to pressures to restrain labour costs. In this connection the oil industry, for example, tends to be relatively highly automated, and, as Walker, Blauner and others have pointed out, more likely to pay higher wage rates as a result of a lower labour intensity (Walker, 1957; Blauner, 1964). This, in fact, is one of the very reasons why many of its proponents have argued that automation will attenuate the alienating tendencies of industrial work settings. As we can see from Table 12, those workers "minding and checking an automatic process" are more highly paid, especially in the case of the skilled, than those working in other technolgoical environments. The data for the semi-skilled, on the other hand, do not reveal quite as clearly the pecuniary benefits of working in an automated work setting; indeed the technological grouping with the highest modal income consists not of those in automation but in semi-automated jobs. As such, there is only very weak evidence to support Blauner's thesis about the upgrading effects of automation on semi-skilled work as far as income level is concerned.

More pertinent than this, however, is the fact that when we control for technological environment, then the income differential between the skilled and the semi-skilled increases among those working in automated jobs. In this respect, then, we do find support for MacKenzie's thesis (MacKenzie 1973). To extrapolate from this situation,
nevertheless, is problematic for the reasons outlined in Chapter III: the rate of growth of automation, its applicability, and its over-all cost are highly questionable matters. Any endorsement of the MacKenzie position, therefore, should be clearly accompanied by the appropriate caveats.

The theoretical model of class structure and class situation which was developed in Chapter II posited three criteria as the determining elements of an individual’s class position, namely property, skills, and collectivisation. We have seen thus far that skill level is strongly related empirically to income distribution; if we now take a look at the effects of union membership, then some interesting and unexpected patterns emerge. At first sight these figures suggest that far from being a way in which to enhance one’s market capacity, unionisation is associated with a lower level of income, particularly so far as the skilled are concerned. When we dig more deeply into the data, however, we find that this pattern can be attributed in part to the presence of a fairly large number of well-paid, un-unionised skilled workers in the oil subsample. If we omit these from consideration, then the relation between union membership and income level is reversed: 41.3% of the skilled unionists earned over $8,000 p.a. as compared to 32.1% of the non-unionists. Among the semi-skilled, the only industry in which there is a sufficiently large
group of non-unionists for meaningful comparison is printing. Here we find a similar pattern with fifteen percent of the unionists making over $8,000 p.a. as compared to just three percent of the non-unionists.

Still, these differences are not large, and although they generally support the proposition that collectivisation is a way to enhance monetary rewards, it is palpably clear that unionisation is distinctly secondary in its effects to the general market principles of demand, supply and scarcity. Furthermore, the general effect of unionisation on the market situation is contingent upon the particular industry, firm, and union involved; some unions, after all, are more adept at winning benefits for their members than others. This is apparent when we compare income levels for the unionists by industry. In the steel sample, for example, the presence of a strong international union together with a relatively high degree of overall unionisation combine to produce all-round high incomes: nearly sixty percent of the skilled and over twenty percent of the semi-skilled made over $8,000. In autos, on the other hand, similar conditions appear to have benefitted the skilled at the expense of the semi-skilled: over seventy percent of the former made over $8,000, while only five percent of the latter did. These data re-affirm the earlier conclusion that support for MacKenzie’s thesis concerning the detachment of the skilled from the semi-skilled must be qualified;
such detachment varies according to industrial and technological context. They also serve again to illustrate that the effects of collectivisation on market capacity are secondary to those of skill level; unionisation is only effective in enhancing remuneration when skill level and market capacity already conduce to its success.

While we may conclude on the basis of the data presented in Table 12 that there is little evidence to suggest an embourgeoisement, or indeed any form of homogenisation, of blue- and white-collar incomes, we must be careful not to overlook additional sources of monetary benefit. As noted earlier, one of the principal changes which has taken place in the labour forces of the western societies during the post-war period has been the increasing participation of women, and more recently a notable increase in the participation of married women. As Andrew Levison has pointed out, we are moving to a situation in which the 'typical' working-class family consists of a male adult working at a semi-skilled manual job, with a wife working full- or part-time as a cashier in a chain-store or clerk in an office or bank. Where it does exist, in other words, working-class affluence is usually derived from two household incomes, not one. In the present sample, of those who were married at the time of the survey (83% of the total sample), 17.6% had wives working full-time, 12.9% part-time, with the remaining 69.5% having non-working wives. As we
can see from Table 13, however, the relationship between husband's occupation and whether or not the wife worked is surprisingly weak.

**TABLE 13**

*Occupation, Working Wives, and Wives' Income*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mngr.</th>
<th>F/man</th>
<th>Sk.</th>
<th>Semi-sk.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% with wife working</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>full-time</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>2577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with wife working</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>part-time</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with wife earning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3,000+ p.a.</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with full-time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>working wife earning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4,000+ p.a.</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with part-time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>working wife earning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2,000+ p.a.</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nonetheless, it is also evident from these data that, as far as the present sample is concerned, working wives among the skilled and the semi-skilled do serve to compensate to some extent for income differentials between themselves and the managers. This is largely due to the fact that the majority of the managers' working wives work only on a part-time basis, thus lessening their income potential. If we control also for working-time status, then we see that the managers' working wives 'out-earn' their blue-collar counter-
parts. This fact does not obviate, however, the initial observation that the patterning of wives' incomes does help to reduce class differentials. Furthermore, if we examine these occupational groups more closely it is also evident that working wives serve to lessen to some degree intra-class differentials. Among the semi-skilled for example, we find some moderate relationship between respondent's income and wife's working status and income. Among the non-affluent the majority of those with working wives have wives who work full-time—17% of the subsample as compared to 12.2% with wives working part-time. Among the affluent, on the other hand, this situation is reversed: 16.9% have wives working part-time compared to 13.3% with wives working full-time. As a result of this, the non-affluent are slightly more likely to have wives earning, regardless of working-time status, over $3,000 p.a.—a total of 15.1%—than are the affluent—12.3%.

The magnitude of direct financial remuneration is not the only feature of the market situation; in addition we must examine market security and the individual's prospects for the future. As we saw in Chapter III, class differentials in market security (as measured by unemployment rates) remain one of the principal features of class inequality in the advanced societies. Table 14 gives similar data for our present sample, data which bear out the findings reported earlier. It is interesting to note,
nevertheless, that the unemployment experience of the skilled is not as high as we might have expected. The substantial differential between them and the semi-skilled does tend to validate the MacKenzie thesis, though there still remains a significant difference between the former and the managers. Insofar as unemployment experience is concerned, in other words, the skilled may be detached from the semi-skilled, but they are hardly embourgeoisé.

### TABLE 14

Occupation and Unemployment Experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mng.</th>
<th>F/man</th>
<th>Sk.</th>
<th>Semi-sk.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% NEVER unemployed for a month or longer</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>2794</td>
<td>0.237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999 p.a.</td>
<td>50.0*</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>1529</td>
<td>0.187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000 p.a.</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>1255</td>
<td>0.178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs old</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>1138</td>
<td>0.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs old</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>1634</td>
<td>0.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>75.0*</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>0.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>0.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>0.410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar start</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>0.418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/man or sk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>1048</td>
<td>0.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>1294</td>
<td>0.152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size less than 15 cases

Putting matters in propositional form, we should expect, on the basis of the validity of the embourgeoisement thesis, that market security would be greater among
the younger, more educated, more affluent blue-collar respondents, and among those with some experience of white-collar work in their work biography. The data presented in Table 14, however, give no unambiguous indication of such a pattern, either for the skilled or the semi-skilled. Education, it is true, does have some effect in the predicted direction for the skilled, but this is rather modest. In fact, the overall relationship between occupation and unemployment experience actually strengthens among those with some post-secondary schooling. It is manifest from these data that the effect of increased education on market security is mediated by occupation and skill level. Similarly, the effects of career origins on the unemployment experience of both the skilled and the semi-skilled disappear once we omit from consideration those who have not held any other job than their present one or one of similar title, and who, as a consequence, are less likely to have ever been unemployed at all.

Although these data do not offer much support for the idea of embourgeoisement in the matter of market security, we should not therefore conclude that they are uninteresting or unsurprising. The controls for age, particularly, reveal somewhat unexpected results. On the basis of simple probability we should expect older workers to have experienced more unemployment insofar as they have been exposed to the possibility for a longer period of time.
Furthermore, in the present sample those over the age of forty-five would have initially entered the labour force in the later pre-war period and thus been exposed to the vagaries of the labour market prevalent at that time. But these expectations are not borne out by the data: the younger blue-collar respondents are just as likely to have experienced some extended unemployment as the older ones.

What this points to is the effect of countervailing tendencies of which two come directly to mind. The first is that manual workers, particularly those performing lower skilled work, tend to engage in frequent occupational mobility during their early years in the labour force, partly out of choice, on an experimental basis in the search for a suitable line of work, and partly because the pressures of family life and the financial burden of juvenile dependants which usually serve to foster a more cautious and sedentary outlook on work have not yet developed. Mobility of this kind, in turn, is often accompanied by periodic unemployment insofar as it is undertaken not so much on the basis of a 'career' promotion, but as a more spontaneous rejection of dissatisfying work. This reasoning is supported by the present data: among the skilled nearly half (48.9%) of those under forty had changed jobs three or more times as compared to just over three-fifths (61%) of those over; among the semi-skilled the respective proportions are nearly sixty (58%) and sixty-five (65.4%) percent.
Thus, although the older workers have been more mobile, the difference is really negligible. The second reason is that as workers grow older so they usually begin to benefit from the seniority system common to most industrial enterprises. As such, their job tenure becomes greater as they are insulated from the threat of lay-off. In short, then, as workers grow older, so they become less willing to be job mobile, and less likely to be forced to be, with the result that their chances of experiencing further unemployment are diminished.

Past mobility and future prospects are themselves important considerations to be weighed when assessing the quality of an individual's market situation. It is no longer the case, if indeed it ever was beyond the pale of certain occupations, such as mining, which were characterised by a strong sense of occupational and residential community, that work biographies are fixed and stable with little or no likelihood of movement either upwards, downwards, or sideways. One of the distinguishing features of class stratification as compared to other, pre-industrial and pre-capitalist forms of structured inequality—and paradoxically one of the very reasons why the existence of social classes is commonly denied—is that class boundaries are often fluid and permeable. Unlike castes or estates, classes do not possess a legal status, and there are no formal prescriptions assigning one irrevocably to a social position
inherited from the previous generation. As evidence of this we might point to recent information from the United States indicating that the "average" labour force participant now changes jobs about seven times per working lifetime, and 'careers' about three times (cited in *Time*, late summer, 1976).

If we examine the work biographies of the present sample, we find a similar pattern of movement, and one which bears little relation to current occupational position. Nearly thirty percent of the managers, skilled, and semi-skilled have changed jobs at least five times, together with a quarter of the foremen. Only a fifth of the managers and the foremen and a tenth of the skilled and the semi-skilled have never changed jobs at all. Very definitely, we are dealing here with a mobile group of individuals as far as occupation is concerned.

When we examine the direction of this mobility, we find that not only do the majority of all four groups come from working-class backgrounds (as measured by father's occupation), but also the majority began their own work lives in some form of manual or intermediary/supervisory work. This is particularly striking among the managers of whom almost two-thirds first entered the labour force in such a capacity—about a third as foremen or skilled workers and another third as semi-skilled or unskilled workers. Moreover, this entry into the labour force via
manual or supervisory work cannot be interpreted evidentially as a temporary, stop-gap measure on their part: fully half of the managers who began as manual or supervisory workers stayed in their first job for at least three years; only ten percent quit before one year. This pattern of upward career mobility on the part of many of the managers cannot, however, be attributed so much to the successful play of meritocratic values and institutions, as to the changes in the division of labour which have occurred during the post-war period, notably the growth of new forms of white-collar (or ostensibly white-collar) labour and the relative stagnation of the blue-collar labour force. This becomes evident when we take account of age: almost seventy percent of the older (i.e. over forty) managers began their work lives as manual or supervisory workers as compared to just half of the younger ones. This would also indicate that passage from blue-collar to white-collar on an intra-generational basis, though still substantial, may be now less prevalent than it once was.

Looking at mobility from the opposite angle, we find that there has also been some downward mobility on the part of the blue-collar groups, though not on the kind of scale discovered by Goldthorpe et al. among their affluent auto workers. For the foremen, skilled, and semi-skilled about eleven percent each started their work lives as clerical workers, with an additional one percent in some other form of white-collar occupation (managerial, profes-
sional, etc.). When compared with the extent of upward mobility, nevertheless, the net mobility situation of the overall sample is clearly one of upward movement.

One of the restrictions imposed on the researcher by the use of survey questionnaires of the kind employed here is that they seldom enable us to apprehend 'objective' changes and opportunities taking place in the situation under study; they merely show respondents' subjective feelings about them. As such we are not in a position to measure accurately what kind of promotion and advancement opportunities are realistically open to the sample. We can, nonetheless, examine what the respondents feel their changes are, how satisfied they feel with this situation, and what their occupational aspirations and expectations are for the future. Tables 15, 16 and 17 present data on the respondents' perceived chances for promotion in the future, the amount of satisfaction they feel with these opportunities for advancement, and the occupational expectations of those who do not expect to remain in their present job.

As we can see from Table 15, the blue-collar groups have a largely realistic, if slightly pessimistic, appraisal of their future career prospects. The vast majority of the skilled and the semi-skilled see their chances for promotion as less than good; as such, there are no signs to suggest any embourgeoisement of attitudes or perspectives is taking place in this respect. Nor is there any evidence to support
the MacKenzie thesis; there are no differences at all between the skilled and the semi-skilled. This itself is rather interesting insofar as we might normally expect the skilled, by virtue of their training and superior market capacity, to entertain better prospects for future promotion than the semi-skilled. However, the fact that this expectation is not met by the data should not lead us to assume unquestioningly that this 'pessimism' among both the blue-collar groups derives automatically from the same source.

Among the semi-skilled, the chances for promotion are likely to be seen as poor because they possess no real skills on which upward mobility could be based. For the skilled, on the other hand, chances for future promotion are likely to be regarded unfavourably precisely because they have now reached the point of maximum advancement within their trade or craft. Skilled work is rather akin to professional work in the sense that both commonly entail the concept of lifetime commitment, and thus are frequently terminal occupational activities. As such, when the individual has reached the usual point of maximum advancement, there is nowhere else to go unless careers are transferred altogether. Unlike professionals, however, that point of maximum advancement for the skilled usually comes fairly early in the work biography, a fact which is evidenced in the data on the age structure of income distribution presented in Chapter III and again earlier in the present
one. One way of summarising this difference, then, is that whereas the semi-skilled have, and see themselves to have, low promotion prospects because of too little skill, the skilled may be said to occupy the same position because of too much skill.

The control variables—age, income, education, career origins, and technological work environment—do not have any significant effect on the perceptions of the skilled, though it is true that those working in automated settings are slightly more sanguine than those working in more conventional environments. Among the semi-skilled, on the other hand, the controls do have more effect, notably age, income, and technology, and in the direction we would expect from the embourgeoisement thesis: the younger, affluent workers, and those working with automation report higher perceptions of their prospects than their older, non-affluent colleagues working in other technical settings. Set against this interpretation, however, are the inescapable facts that the differences are at best modest, that the relationship between occupation and chances for promotion among the affluent and the young remains fairly strong, and that in fact the strength of the relationship actually increases among these groups due to a general heightening of perceptions experienced by all the occupational groups with the partial exception of the skilled. In light of this, then, any conclusions about incipient embourgeoisement must be taken as rather fanciful.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% seeing chances as good or very good</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>1138</td>
<td>0.307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>1636</td>
<td>0.275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>41.7*</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>0.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>0.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>0.435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999 p.a.</td>
<td>50.0*</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000 p.a.</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>1252</td>
<td>0.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar starter</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>0.429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/man or sk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>1047</td>
<td>0.297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>1295</td>
<td>0.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works with automated technology</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works with other technology</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>2037</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size less than 15 cases
N/A not applicable

Table 16 likewise reveals significant differences between the four groups in the matter of satisfaction with opportunities for advancement. The relationship remains fairly strong to strong throughout, and only weakens appreciably among the non-affluent where the small subsample of managers (only six cases) has rendered the distributions artificially close. This, at any rate, contrasts with what we would expect from the embourgeoisement thesis, namely
<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% satisfied or very</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>7.23</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>2803</td>
<td>0.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>satisfied with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opportunities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for advancement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>1137</td>
<td>0.247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.*</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>1644</td>
<td>0.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>100.0*</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>0.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>0.459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999pa</td>
<td>50.0*</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>1527</td>
<td>0.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt;$8,000pa</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>1257</td>
<td>0.265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar start.</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>0.405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/man or sk. blue-collar</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>1062</td>
<td>0.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>starter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-collar</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>1290</td>
<td>0.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>starter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works with automated</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>technology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works with other technology</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental work</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>1575</td>
<td>0.284</td>
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<tr>
<td>orientation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic work</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>1043</td>
<td>0.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>orientation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size less than 15 cases

N/A not applicable

that the relationship would be weaker among the affluent than the non-affluent. Similarly, again, we find no evidential support for the MacKenzie thesis; only among those who began their lives as white-collar workers is there any sizeable difference in attitudes between the skilled and the semi-skilled, and here this is largely a function of decreased satisfaction
among the semi-skilled rather than greater satisfaction among the skilled.

The effect of the control variables is mixed, yet on the whole quite moderate, implying therefore the same conclusions as previously. Education, on the one hand, operates in a manner contrary to what we would expect from the embourgeoissement thesis. Not only does the relationship between occupation and satisfaction strengthen with increasing education, but the extent of satisfaction among the foremen, skilled, and semi-skilled actually declines for those with some post-secondary schooling. Income and work setting, on the other hand, generally conform in their effects to the predictions of the embourgeoissement thesis: there is a moderate increase in satisfaction among the affluent blue-collar groups, particularly the semi-skilled, and among those working with automatic technology. At the same time, the overall relationship remains fairly strong among the affluent, indeed, as mentioned above, it actually increases when compared to that for the non-affluent. Similarly, if we compare the automated blue-collar workers to the foremen and the managers, it is clear that a substantial differential in satisfaction persists between them, with the result that the relationship remains fairly strong ($r = 0.225$). In other words, although income and automation are associated with increased satisfaction on the part of the skilled and the semi-skilled, the differential is by no means eliminated.
One of the major findings of the Goldthorpe research was that a considerable number of the workers in their sample had, at some point in their worklives, held white-collar jobs which they had subsequently left, becoming industrial manual workers in order to make more money (Goldthorpe et al. 1968). Though we have no way of telling the circumstances in which the 'downwardly' mobile semi-skilled workers in our present sample came to leave their original white-collar employment (voluntary or involuntary), the data in Table 5 reveal that some "retention effect" is present. These data confirm the conventional wisdom that the downwardly mobile retain elements—attitudes, aspirations, standards of judgment, habits, etc.—of their point of departure, and import these, as it were, to their social destination. As we can see, those semi-skilled who began their worklives as white-collar workers are unquestionably less satisfied with their promotion prospects than anyone else in the sample. This would suggest, in turn, that many of them retain their white-collar points of reference, which have fostered, in their turn, the kind of relative deprivation we would expect of their situation.

Among the semi-skilled, however, satisfaction with advancement opportunities reaches a trough for both those who began their worklives as white-collar workers and those who have some experience of post-secondary schooling. Given the general relationship between occupation and
education, this pattern raises the question of whether the drop in satisfaction is due primarily to white-collar career origins, to post-secondary education, or to a combination of the two. When we control simultaneously for the two we find that the latter holds true; regardless of career origins those with some post-secondary schooling have the lowest level of satisfaction, and regardless of education those who began their worklives as white-collar workers have the lowest satisfaction. The mutually compounding effect of these two variables is neatly illustrated when we examine those who are white-collar starters and have had some post-secondary education: none at all express satisfaction with their advancement opportunities.

The fact that so many of their sample had opted out of white-collar and into blue-collar employment was only one feature of what Goldthorpe et al. identified as a general life orientation of pecuniary "instrumentalism" on the part of their affluent workers and their families. In this view of the world, work and career were treated largely as the means to financial and material ends. Instrumentalism, however, was seen to embrace a whole range of attitudes and behaviours, another of which was the development of an orientation to the future of "instrumental collectivism", quite distinct in its composition from the so-called traditional working-class outlook of "solidaristic collectivism" and the middle-class one of "individualism". Instrumental
collectivism implies a view of the future as an ever continuing expansion of the material benefits of the present, a goal to be achieved via a collective upgrading based on an instrumental and pragmatic manipulation of the collective bargaining system and the traditional tools of dissent (strikes, slow-downs, etc.) available to the worker. As this implies, success and mobility by individualistic means were to be eschewed in favour of a collective improvement for all.

I do not think, however, that our present data support at all this putative eclipse of individualism. The fact that a clear majority of both blue-collar groups are not satisfied with their opportunities for advancement does not speak of a working-class reconciled to a future of collective improvement alone. Nor does it make any difference if we take account of work orientation; those with an instrumental or extrinsic orientation are no more likely to be satisfied than those with an intrinsic one. As such, the conclusion which emerges is that individualism is still an important mode of orientation to occupational success for our present workers. This conclusion is further supported by two additional sets of data. Firstly, when asked what they thought the most important consideration to be borne in mind when thinking of taking another job, better opportunities for advancement was the most common choice among the managers, foremen, and skilled workers, and second only to better pay.
TABLE 17

Occupation and Job Expectations
(Those who expect to be mobile only)

<table>
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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% expecting to be self-employed</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>0.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(small entrepreneur or farmer)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>0.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>0.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>50.0*</td>
<td>37.5*</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0.305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999 p.a.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>16.7*</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>0.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000 p.a.</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>0.193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar start:</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/man or sk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>9.1*</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>0.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>22.2*</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>0.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental work orientation</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>0.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic work orientation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>0.238</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size less than 15 cases

and benefits among the semi-skilled. The second additional source of support comes from the data presented in Table 17.

When asked whether they expect to remain in their present job, the vast majority of all four groups—three-quarters of the managers and the semi-skilled and four-fifths of the foremen and the skilled—reply that they do. This indicates two things. First, regardless of how satisfied or dissatisfied they feel about their opportunities
for advancement, most do not entertain the expectation (as opposed to the aspiration) that they will, in fact, move out of their present position. The second point is that the adjustment to work which these data imply is not necessarily class specific. It has become common to assume that adjustment and reconciliation to present occupational position are chiefly characteristic of manual workers faced with routine, monotonous jobs and little prospect of any alternative in the future. Yet we find here that the managers (and the foremen) are just as likely to expect to remain stationary. If this implies adjustment, then it also implies that it cuts across class lines.

When we examine those who do expect to be mobile, some interesting patterns emerge. While these tend to confirm the idea of blue-collar individualism, at the same time they do cast doubt on the assumption that this is akin to middle-class individualism, and must thereby signify an embourgeoisement of outlook. What the data reveal, rather, is that there are two kinds of individualism, similar in their substance, but distinct in their form, manner, and implications.

In his now classic essay, "Capitalism", written for the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Werner Sombart noted, in almost dialectical fashion, that the spirit or mentality on which capitalism had originated had, in the process of its own historical development, given rise to its
own contradiction. The transition from "full" to "late" capitalism, he argued, had witnessed the partial demise of the entrepreneurial mentality, the risk-taking individualism of Weber's early Protestants, and in its stead the growth of a more calculative, ponderous, cautious mentality, the kind of perspective embodied for Weber in the rise of modern bureaucracy. Thus capitalism was now permeated by this curious cultural and psychological tension. Sombart himself phrased the matter aptly:

> The capitalistic spirit at its prime was characterised by psychological strains of peculiar intensity born of the contradiction between irrationality and rationality, between the spirit of speculation and that of calculation, between the mentality of the daring entrepreneur and the hard-working sedate bourgeois (Sombart, 1930 as cited in Bell, 1973:65).

What this amounts to is the co-existence of two forms of individualism, what we may call entrepreneurial on the one hand, and institutional or bureaucratic on the other. Each is similar to the extent it establishes 'success' in individualistic rather than collectivistic terms; each is distinct, however, in the manner in which the accomplishment of success is conceived.

The data presented in Table 17 help to illustrate this distinction. For those managers who expect to be mobile, the majority--two-thirds--expect to continue in some form of managerial employment. They expect, in other words, to remain
within the same general career path and, presumably, the same institutional work setting. Of the semi-skilled workers who expect to be mobile, on the other hand, the largest single group, nearly two-fifths, expect to become self-employed, either as small 'entrepreneurs' (twenty-seven percent) or as farmers (nine percent). What is important about these choices on the part of the semi-skilled is that they illustrate what Ely Chinoy referred to as the "American Dream", the dream of being one's own boss, of owning and running a small business or enterprise, in short, of being self-employed (Chinoy, 1955). Whether or not these expectations will ever be realised or not is, of course, quite another matter, but the point is that they demonstrate an entrepreneurial individualism quite distinct from the institutional individualism of the managers. Quite distinct insofar as it implies that for a substantial number of the semi-skilled with expectations for a future different from the present, success consists of opting out of the dominant bureaucratic structure of work organisation, whereas for the managers success is to advance within it. As such, this blue-collar individualism signifies not so much an acceptance of and commitment to middle-class institutions and standards, as an escape from them to some alternative.

This distinction between entrepreneurial and institutional individualism, between commitment and escape is illustrated further when we examine the effects of controls.
Among the semi-skilled, the expectation of self-employment is highest precisely among those who have least resources to succeed within the bureaucratic setting, the older and less educated workers. Conversely it is lowest among those who do have such resources, the young and those with some post-secondary schooling. What this points to, in turn, is that these two modes of individualism are not simply different psychological reactions to the same reality, but rather reflect two different structures of mobility. The first is the bureaucratic/professional one in which possession of appropriate educational qualifications is the sine qua non of success; this structure is now by far the predominant one in the division of labour. The second avenue is to pursue success on one's own account by setting up a business and becoming self-employed. Historically this structure is now all but moribund as the opportunity to succeed occupationally on one's own account has contracted steadily during the post-war period. The chances of 'making it' this way are slim indeed. Yet notwithstanding this fact, the belief in the "American Dream" seems to have proven quite resilient, and particularly so among those with little skill or schooling and therewith little chance to succeed via the bureaucratic route.

By questioning the Goldthorpe et al. conclusions about instrumental collectivism I neither wish to endorse the implication that blue-collar individualism denotes an
embourgeoisement of career and work attitudes, nor imply that this individualism excludes collectivism, of either action or thought, altogether. On the latter count it is worth noting that when asked their opinion of labour unions, eighty percent of the skilled workers in the sample and nearly ninety percent of the semi-skilled thought they were doing a fine job or at least more good than harm. While these data may appear contradictory and inconsistent to the mind of the professional observer, they are sentiments which clearly co-exist in the minds of the respondents themselves. And as such, they cannot legitimately be interpreted as signs of impending embourgeoisement. Blue-collar individualism is part of an outlook which implies a desire to escape from the dominant institutional setting in which work is now organised rather than a commitment to that system. From a Marxist point of view such attitudes may appear reactionary, but from a sociological point of view, they can hardly be taken now as bourgeois.

Indeed, this must also be the overall conclusion with respect to the market situation of our sample. Significant occupational differences in income, unemployment experience, perceptions of promotion opportunities, satisfaction with those opportunities, and occupational expectations persist, and any indications of embourgeoisement are weak. When we compare separately the younger, affluent, more educated workers, those working with automated technology,
and those who have had some experience of white-collar work, we do not find that these differences are eliminated or even substantially reduced. If we do not find much support for the thesis of embourgeoisement, nor do we find any unequivocal verification of MacKenzie's thesis about the detachment of the skilled from the semi-skilled or Goldthorpe et al.'s notion of instrumental collectivism. Where it can be said to occur in the preceding evidence, the detachment of the skilled is only partial and conditional. At best the skilled occasionally occupy a position interstitial between the managers and the semi-skilled, but on the whole they are clearly more "blue-collar" in their situation and outlook. Similarly, although there is evidence to show the blue-collar groups are collectivistic (their opinion of labour unions for example), there is also a good deal of evidence to suggest they also adopt an individualistic, though implicitly escapist, orientation to work and career.

The Work Situation: How Instrumental, Satisfied, and Fulfilled?

One of the principal advantages with the concept of class situation is precisely that it enables us to see the rewards of the workplace as well as those of the marketplace as an integral part of the overall structure of class inequalities. And as we saw previously, the distribution of market and workplace rewards tends to be reinforcing rather
than cross-cutting, due primarily to the mediating effect of skill level. In the present section we shall examine five aspects of the work situation, measured through the attitudinal responses of the sample respondents: job orientation, job interest, general job satisfaction, intrinsic job satisfaction, and lastly extrinsic job satisfaction.

As we have already seen above, the principal theme is said to underpin the social perspectives of Goldthorpe et al.'s new working-class of affluent workers is that of instrumentalism. This was found to be most clearly manifest in the attitudes Goldthorpe's workers held toward their jobs: work was largely regarded as the means to financial ends. For the present sample, work orientation is measured by responses to a hypothetical question asking the sample to identify what consideration they thought most important to bear in mind when thinking of taking another job. Of the seven possible factors from which they could choose, three--higher pay and benefits, more security, and better opportunities for advancement--can be looked upon as extrinsic rewards and their choice as signifying an instrumental work orientation. The remaining four--more interesting work, more control over work pace and quality, better chance to use one's abilities, and a greater sense of accomplishment--all connote an intrinsic work orientation.

Table 18 presents the distributions for those who expressed an instrumental orientation by choosing one of the
### TABLE 18

**Occupation and Job Orientation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% instrumentally oriented</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>2635</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>1091</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>1524</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>80.0*</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>0.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>1843</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>0.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999 p.a.</td>
<td>100.0*</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>1427</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000 p.a.</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>1199</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works with automatic technology</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works with other technology</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar start.</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/man or sk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>1223</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar father</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman/blue collar father</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>1596</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finds job interesting</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>2097</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finds job dull</td>
<td>60.0*</td>
<td>18.2*</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finds job satisfying</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>1777</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finds job neutral or dissatisfying</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*subsample size < 15 cases

N/A not applicable

three extrinsic work values as the most important job consideration. These data are interesting since they neither confirm the embourgeoisement thesis, nor provide unequivocal
support for the Goldthorpe thesis. As we saw above, the literature on work attitudes generally suggests an image of white-collar workers as intrinsically involved in their work. That is to say, there is usually considered to be a congruence between an intrinsic orientation to work, on the one hand, and the fulfillment of those rewards sought in the work setting on the other. In short, a situation of work association prevails (see Chapter III, p. 197). However, not only do we not find evidence of an intrinsic orientation among the younger, affluent, automated workers and those who began their worklives in white-collar employment, we also do not find evidence of such an orientation among the managers (or the foremen) either! About three-fifths of all four groups express an instrumental orientation, and as a consequence the relationship with occupation is non-existent. On the face of it, then, we appear to have an instance of proletarianisation on our hands. But this too becomes arguable when we recognise that of the three factors denoting instrumentalism, better opportunities for advancement is the most common choice for all but the semi-skilled where it comes a close second to higher pay and benefits. As we have already noted above, this concern among the blue-collar groups with personal advancement is evident in a number of ways, yet it is, at the same time, the one instrumental work reward commonly identified as a characteristically middle-class value.
From the point of view of the embourgeoisement thesis, it is only among those with some post-secondary schooling that we discover any signs of verification, where, with the exception of the foremen, the instrumentally oriented become a (slim) minority. Yet here too the concern with promotion and advancement continues to predominate. The reason why instrumentalism as a whole recedes in importance among this group is that pay, benefits, and security are less common concerns, being replaced by such intrinsic values as greater sense of accomplishment, and better opportunity to use abilities. Indeed, better opportunities for advancement remains the single most important consideration throughout, with the exception of the non-affluent, older, grade schooled blue-collar groups and the older managers where, understandably, it takes second place to pay, benefits, and security.

Nonetheless, as I argued at the conclusion of the previous section on the market situation, this concern with advancement, and the underlying sense of individualism which it implies, should not be interpreted as an embourgeoisement of perspective. Sharing the goal of success does not necessarily mean sharing the same interpretation of what it constitutes or how it is to be accomplished.

When we examine the intrinsic factors, the single most important pattern to emerge, and one which is maintained consistently (under control conditions, is the thoroughly abysmal showing of control over work pace and quality as a
concern for the respondents, regardless of their occupation. For all four groups, this factor ranks as the last or penultimate choice. Even among the semi-skilled assembly-line workers, the cultural archetype of the powerless, alienated worker faced with boring, repetitive, strenuous work, control over work pace and quality rated joint last along with greater sense of accomplishment. This, of course, has important ramifications for the theory of alienation: in its original Marxian usage alienation connotes the idea of separation, of loss of control over the use and product of one's labour. Even in its more recent updated form, notably in the works of Blau and Seeman (1964) and Seeman (1959), the notion of "powerlessness" is taken as a central, if not the central, component of the whole conception. The present data, on the other hand, would seem to cast this imputed role into doubt. Subjectively, in the minds of the workers themselves, control over work pace and work quality do not figure prominently as a job consideration at all.

For Goldthorpe and his colleagues, job instrumentalism was seen as only one part of a more broad instrumental attitude toward the whole work setting—to the employing firm and its management, to the union, and to the workgroup in whose company the worker spent his daily worklife. On the first count, for example, they found their workers expressed an attitude of what could best be described as critical satisfaction: while generally satisfied with the firm they
worked for, they were nevertheless readily critical of how it was run, and of the intentions of its management. Toward the union they discovered an attitude of economism: the union was seen first and foremost as an agency to improve working conditions and material benefits, not to promote industrial democracy or political activism. And toward the workgroup there was a feeling of situational commitment, but not the kind of permanent solidarity typically identified with traditional working-class communities where work and leisure commonly overlap as workmates become leisure companions.

We generally find a similar array of sentiments in the present sample. For example, only 2% of the skilled and 7% of the semi-skilled rate their firm as worse than most others to work for; only 22% of the former and 25% of the latter consider that their firm is not managed well. At the same time, three-fifths of the skilled and over two-thirds of the semi-skilled state that the most important consideration in their relationship with their firm is the material benefits which employment provides. Moreover, while having a generally favourable if instrumental attitude, they are also critical and suspicious of management motives: 53% of the skilled and 67% of the semi-skilled believe that their firm is more interested in cutting costs than in its employees or equally in both. In their attitude to the union the present blue-collar sample appear overwhelmingly
instrumental. 90% of the skilled and 93% of the semi-skilled feel the most important task of a union consists of protecting workers' contractual rights and seeking improved working conditions, pay, and other benefits. Finally, although the vast majority of both blue-collar groups—82% of the skilled and 76% of the semi-skilled—feel they really belong to their workgroup, 57% of the former and 59% of the latter would not mind being separated from it, and only 16% and 12% respectively would mind so very much.

While these figures tend to substantiate those of the Goldthorpe research, and reinforce the findings on job orientation, there are, nevertheless, certain reservations to an endorsement of the Goldthorpe interpretation. In the first place, it should be pointed out that although we find the majority of all four groups expressing an instrumental orientation to their jobs, this majority is only a moderate one of three-fifths. Thus, there is no evidence to validate clearly the implications of Goldthorpe (1968), along with others such as Dubin (1956) and Cotgrove (1972), that industrial workers are now overwhelmingly instrumental in the way in which they regard work. Furthermore, for Goldthorpe et al. these various instances of instrumentalism were all viewed as components of the same conceptual order, namely work instrumentalism. As such, we should expect these various aspects to be inter-related in a mutually reinforcing manner. Yet when we examine these attitudes to the firm,
the union, and the workgroup and control at the same time for job orientation, we find no effect at all. The intrinsically oriented, in other words, respond to these questions in much the same way as the instrumentally oriented. Only in the case of the question pertaining to the most important consideration in the respondents' relationship with their firm does any significant and predicted change occur when the proportion of the skilled identifying material rewards declines from two-thirds among the instrumentally job oriented to just over half among the intrinsically oriented.

But it is not simply in its extent and composition that the idea of blue-collar instrumentalism is problematic; the present data also throw some question onto it in regard to its source and correlates. Firstly, however, it should be pointed out that we do find, in Table 18, some support for the proposition that job instrumentalism is stronger among affluent workers. At least among the semi-skilled the proportion of instrumentally oriented does increase moderately when we compare the affluent with the non-affluent. Indeed, it is among this group that the incidence of instrumentalism is highest (discounting the non-affluent and grade school managers where small subsamples render the figures unreliable), and exceeds two-thirds of the respondents. But for Goldthorpe and his associates affluence was not so much the cause of instrumentalism as its consequence. Instrumentalism, they argued, was not the product of an adaptive reaction to
boring, repetitive work devoid of any sources of intrinsic reward, it was, rather, an attitude acquired outside work, and imported into the work setting. It was, in other words, an attitude generated on the basis of considerations in the sphere of consumption rather than production. This, in turn, was found to be most pronounced among those who had themselves occupied some form of white-collar employment at an earlier point in their worklives and/or those who had relatively successful white-collar parents or siblings. Thus, pecuniary instrumentalism was seen to have been fostered by the relative deprivation of downward occupational mobility vis-à-vis self, parents and/or siblings. In this view of things affluence became the compensation for lost or unacquired prestige.

This argument has fundamental ramifications for the conventional sociological wisdom about work attitudes. This derives from the host of studies which propound or imply that work attitudes are principally a function of the structure of the work setting—its technology, patterns of authority, task structures, and so on—and the individual worker's subjective response to it. In some forms the argument is extended beyond this and work experiences and attitudes are seen to spill over, as it were, into non-work life and engender subsequent changes there. Goldthorpe and his colleagues, on the other hand, have reversed that sequence; the worker's attitude to his work, and the subsequent
effect this has on his experiences there, are seen as a function of non-work considerations.

Though we cannot test this proposition directly—to do so would require in-depth data of a longitudinal nature about the dialectics of attitude formation and change—we can test it indirectly by subjecting its implications to empirical scrutiny. This can be done in two ways. Firstly, we can test the argument of Goldthorpe et al. about the source of instrumentalism by controlling for the effects of the respondent's own first full-time occupation, his father's main occupation, and both simultaneously. In the second place, we can test the implication that if instrumentalism is the outcome of non-work considerations, then it will remain relatively impervious to the individual's work experience, and thus be largely independent of job satisfaction and job interest.

As far as first full-time job is concerned, there is no indication that either the skilled or the semi-skilled who began their worklives as white-collar workers are more likely to be instrumentally job oriented than those who began in blue-collar work. Indeed, first full-time job has no apparent effect on the job orientations of any of the four groups. Father's occupation does have some effect, but this is only very modest and is limited to the foremen and the semi-skilled. However, in the case of both groups, the direction of this effect is actually contrary to that
we would assume on the basis of the Goldthorpe thesis, as the proportion of instrumentally oriented is lower among those with white-collar fathers than those with blue-collar ones. Finally, when we control for both background factors together, for what Goldthorpe and his associates referred to as "compounded" downward mobility, we find no change among the skilled where 60% (12 cases) of those with white-collar fathers and a white-collar start in the work world express an instrumental orientation, and an opposite effect than we would expect among the semi-skilled where 36% (5 cases) of those with white-collar fathers and first job indicate that they are instrumentally oriented. In short, as far as the source of job instrumentalism is concerned, the present data do not validate the findings and interpretation of the Goldthorpe study.

"There is no evidence that within our sample any association exists between job satisfaction (or deprivation) in terms of workers' immediate shop-floor experience and their attachment to their present employment."

With this rather succinct, if not almost terse, statement Goldthorpe and his associates parted company rather abruptly and radically with the conventional wisdom on work attitudes. Is their departure substantiated by the present sample? The figures on the effects of job interest and job satisfaction presented in Table 18 suggest that it is not. In the case of the skilled low-job interest, in the case of the managers and
the semi-skilled low job satisfaction, and in the case of the foremen both low satisfaction and low interest are markedly associated with a greater intrinsic orientation to work. This pattern would indeed suggest that job orientation is related to the subjective evaluation of work experiences. At the same time, while these data do not exactly confirm the Goldthorpe thesis, they do not square with the conventional wisdom either. We find that low job interest and satisfaction are not associated with a reactionary and adaptive instrumentalism on the part of the blue-collar groups (or the managers or foremen either for that matter), so much as a greater concern with intrinsic work benefits. As further evidence of this we might point to the sample breakdowns by technological work environment. If we break down those working with non-automated technology into more specific categories, we find that with the exception of the skilled and semi-skilled working in inspection, it is among the semi-skilled assembly-line workers, among those performing robotised work tasks on a highly repetitive basis that the cumulative choice of intrinsic factors is greatest. In short, the present data simply do not point in the direction of the Goldthorpe findings: while we find extensive evidence of instrumentalism it is not confined to the blue-collar groups but appears in all four groups; at the same time its extent is limited and its composition problematic; finally, it does not appear to be associated, at least in
the predicted direction, with the relative deprivation of downward mobility, but is, on the other hand, clearly related to the experience of interesting and satisfying work.

It is to the issues of job interest and satisfaction that we must now turn our attention. Job interest is a fairly self-explanatory concept, and is measured here by a direct question offering the respondent a choice of four scaled answers: that he finds his job interesting nearly all the time; most of the time, though sometimes dull; mostly dull and monotonous, occasionally interesting; and completely dull and monotonous. The value of this question is that it provides for a more discriminating look at how the respondents feel about their job content than do the more general questions on work satisfaction. In view of this, there are strong grounds to argue that it provides a more opposite indicator of alienation.

As we can see from Table 19, there is a fairly strong relationship between occupation and job interest; there are no signs of incipient embourgeoisement, and the distributions paint a fairly conventional pattern of lower work interest among the blue-collar groups as compared to the managers. In fact, contrary to the embourgeoisement thesis, we find that job interest increases among the older workers, a fact which confirms the conventional view that workers adapt and adjust more to their jobs as they grow older, and decreases with greater amounts of schooling. In
### TABLE 19

**Occupation and Job Interest**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mng.</th>
<th>F/man</th>
<th>Sk.</th>
<th>Semi-sk.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% who find their job interesting nearly all the time</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>2802</td>
<td>0.281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>1136</td>
<td>0.234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>1644</td>
<td>0.281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>83.3*</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>0.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>0.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>0.398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999p.a.</td>
<td>50.0*</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>1529</td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000p.a.</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>1254</td>
<td>0.276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works with automatic technology</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works with other technology</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar start.</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>0.379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/man or sk. Blue-collar starter</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>1055</td>
<td>0.282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>1297</td>
<td>0.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental job orientation</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>1580</td>
<td>0.283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic job orientation</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>0.300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample < 15 cases

N/A not applicable

The case of age, however, the relationship between interest and occupation does not weaken as there is a general heightening of job interest among all four groups with increasing age. This pattern, then, would seem to suggest that far from being more accepting of their jobs, younger workers, regardless of occupational status, are more critical.
This picture is strengthened further by the data on educational controls. Rather than being associated with greater job interest, increased schooling has the opposite effect, particularly among the foremen, but also quite evident among the other three groups. In the case of the semi-skilled, at least, this parallels the same change in the case of satisfaction with opportunities for advancement where satisfaction declines among those with some post-secondary schooling. What these patterns, along with the data on job satisfaction as we shall see shortly, point to is the phenomenon of "over-education"—the situation where individuals acquire levels of educational qualification, and with them levels of occupational aspiration, which exceed those necessary for the jobs they subsequently occupy. The case of semi-skilled workers with some post-secondary schooling is a good case in point. It is a situation which some sociologists refer to as "status inconsistency", but more importantly it is a situation which commonly fosters feelings of relative deprivation as the expectations and aspirations acquired during schooling are thwarted by current status. More than this, however, is the fact that these data do indicate this phenomenon may not be confined to over-qualified manual workers, but may also extend to those in managerial and supervisory positions as well.

Income and career origins, on the other hand, have
some effect in the predicted manner, but it is limited to the semi-skilled. Among the affluent a higher proportion are likely to find their jobs interesting nearly all the time; and among those who began their worklives as white-collar workers a smaller proportion do. As far as upward mobility is concerned, there is no consistent effect among the managers. Though those who began as blue-collar workers are more likely to find their work interesting than those who began their worklives in white-collar work, the trend is not a linear one as it is among those who started as supervisory or skilled workers, not as semi- or unskilled ones, that the incidence of interest is highest. But in perspective, all these changes are very modest ones; they may edge the blue-collar groups closer to the managers, but they certainly do not eliminate entirely the substantial occupational differences in job interest.

We saw above that low job interest was associated with a more pronounced intrinsic orientation to the job, particularly among the skilled and, to a lesser degree, the semi-skilled. Once adopted, however, job orientation does not appear to have much of a reciprocal effect upon how the worker evaluates his job. There is no evidence, for example, to indicate that an instrumental job orientation serves to insulate the individual from feelings of monotony on the job. If it is adopted by the worker for such a purpose, then it is likely to have disappointing results.
The breakdowns by technology, finally, do not offer any support for the Blauner thesis. Neither the skilled nor the semi-skilled working with automatic equipment are more likely to find their work interesting than those working in other technical environments; they are clearly not as likely to as the managers and foremen. This is a crucial finding since it is on the basis of an improvement in the variety, challenge, and enjoyability of job content that Blauner pins his hopes for a broader enrichment of the blue-collar work situation with the introduction of automation. The present data simply do not bear out his optimism.

In summary, then, in this basic respect of how interesting the respondents find their jobs there is abundant evidence to show that significant occupational differences persist, and in the direction of traditional class patterns: the blue-collar groups are consistently less likely to find their work predominantly interesting than the managers. The differential between the skilled and the semi-skilled, when compared to their differences vis à vis the managers, appears small; there is really no evidence here of an aristocracy of labour detached from their semi-skilled cousins. As far as the semi-skilled are concerned, these figures offer no surprises; they generally confirm the findings of Blauner, Goldthorpe, and a whole host of other researchers that those performing routine, semi-skilled manual work find little of interest in what they do. As
far as the skilled are concerned, however, the present data, while not at odds with the conventional wisdom (only 15% find their jobs mostly dull as compared to 38% of the semi-skilled), do suggest that the skilled may not find as much interest in their work as we commonly imagine.

Table 20 presents data on the relationship between occupation and general job satisfaction. These data are open to interpretation from both points of view, from the thesis of embourgeoisement and its critique. From the former point of view, we should point to the fact that the majority of both blue-collar groups, along with the managers and the foremen, say they find their jobs satisfying to some extent. Moreover, for the semi-skilled at least, the proportion of satisfieds increases noticeably among those who work with automation and those who earn more than $8,000 p.a. In the latter case the relationship between occupation and satisfaction almost disappears, as the differential separating the semi-skilled and the managers declines to a mere ten percent. This would clearly suggest that money is an important source of overall job satisfaction, a fact which is further substantiated by the data on the effects of job orientation; those with an instrumental orientation are more likely to express satisfaction than those oriented to intrinsic job benefits. When we control separately for satisfaction with pay, then this pattern becomes even more apparent: only 36% of the semi-skilled and 53% of the
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% who are satisfied or fairly satisfied with their job</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>2808</td>
<td>0.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>1138</td>
<td>0.212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>1648</td>
<td>0.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>91.7*</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>0.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>0.243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>0.240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns under $7,999 p.a.</td>
<td>100.0*</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>1532</td>
<td>0.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns over $8,000 p.a.</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>12596</td>
<td>0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works with automation</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>0.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works with other technology</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>0.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar starter</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>0.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/man or sk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>1060</td>
<td>0.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>1296</td>
<td>0.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental work orientation</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>1579</td>
<td>0.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic work orientation</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>1047</td>
<td>0.193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size less than 15 cases

N/A not applicable
skilled who are not satisfied with their level of pay express overall satisfaction as compared to 60% and 76% respectively of those who are satisfied in that respect.

Set against this interpretation are other considerations which cast some doubt on the proposition of embourgeoisement. In the first place, while it is true that a majority of all four groups expresses satisfaction, this is only a slim majority in the case of the semi-skilled; some significant difference exists between the groups, and the relationship itself is moderate to fairly strong. Indeed, if we examine the clusterings of the four groups there is some support here for MacKenzie's thesis as the skilled fall closer to the managers and foremen than they do to the semi-skilled. As such, the distributions point to a dichotomous division between the four groups, with the semi-skilled as the odd-men-out.

Secondly, it is also clear that the predictions of the embourgeoisement thesis, though they may be substantiated in the case of income level, are in fact contradicted in the case of age and education, and are not supported in the matter of career origins. Again we find a decline in satisfaction with increased schooling, and, as in the matter of job interest, this decline is not confined to or even of the greatest magnitude among the "over-educated" blue-collar groups. Similarly, it is among the older rather than the younger respondents that satisfaction is more common, though
here the only appreciable change occurs in the case of the semi-skilled. Insofar as age and education are related to one another—older workers being more likely to have left school earlier than younger ones—these patterns raise the question of whether the change is a function predominantly of education or of aging. The answer is that both have an effect, but that of education is greater. For example, 29% of the younger semi-skilled who have some post-secondary schooling are satisfied as compared to 35% of their older counterparts.

Surprisingly the data on the effects of first full-time job show little or no change as far as either blue-collar group is concerned. From the perspective of reference group and relative deprivation theory we would expect that those who have been downwardly mobile from white-collar to blue-collar employment would have retained standards of reference from their departure point and used them to evaluate present circumstances. Thus we should expect the skilled and especially the semi-skilled who began their worklives as white-collar workers to be less satisfied than those who began as blue-collar workers. This does not, however, prove to be the case, and suggests that some other factor than occupational prestige is the principal ingredient in overall job satisfaction, and that workers make such judgments on the basis of current job and its rewards rather than on the basis of some external criterion.
Finally, it must be pointed out that while these figures seem to some extent to validate the idea of embourgeoisement, this conclusion is further qualified when we compare these data to other similar studies. As I noted in Chapter III, one of the principal deficiencies with direct questioning on the subject of job satisfaction is that it generally evokes an affirmative response. This is due to the strong psychological pressure to do so deriving from the centrality of occupation as a source of social resources—prestige, income etc.—as an orientational reference point when encountering others, and as a sheer consumer of time. To answer that one is not satisfied is to question in certain respects one's basic image of self. Furthermore, the many facets of the job and its setting are more than likely to provide the individual with something he does find satisfactory. Thus it is not surprising that most studies using this method find the incidence of satisfaction ranging upwards of eighty percent of those questioned. In light of this, however, the present figures are, we would argue, significant of a weaker attachment to work, particularly on the part of the semi-skilled, than we would assume at face value.

Combining these counter points together means that any conclusion to the effect of an embourgeoisement of job satisfaction must be seriously and explicitly qualified. As we have seen, the extent of satisfaction, particularly
among the semi-skilled is indeed questionable. Its nature, furthermore, has been shown to be dependent upon satisfaction with the level of direct remuneration received in exchange for labour. Exclude those who are satisfied in this latter respect and the incidence of overall satisfaction is attenuated. As we can see from Table 21, these feelings of work interest and work satisfaction are not isolated sentiments, but part of a broader outlook on all aspects, both specific and general, of the work setting. It is clear from the data presented there that an absence of job interest and satisfaction is associated, in some cases quite markedly, with critical attitudes towards the firm, and big companies generally, and with a conflict perspective on labour-management relations. In short, low job interest and low job satisfaction imply a rather fragile commitment to work.

At the same time, we should be distinctly wary about drawing any conclusions about revolutionary class consciousness from these data. They merely show a clustering or configuration of beliefs and sentiments which reflect a critical or indifferent attitude to work on the part of a sizable minority of the skilled and the semi-skilled. Whether or not these attitudes will be realised in collective action is contingent upon a complex intersecting of events and circumstances which we cannot examine with the present type of data. We should always remember, as Robin Blackburn has pointed out, that a short while after Goldthorpe et al.
# TABLE 21
Attitudes to Firm, Big Companies, and Labour-Management Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SKILLED (N)</th>
<th>SEMI-SKILLED (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% who think their firm is better to work for than most</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finds job interesting</td>
<td>50.5 (1366)</td>
<td>33.5 (472)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finds job dull</td>
<td>28.4 (236)</td>
<td>19.4 (294)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly/very satisfied</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with job</td>
<td>53.7 (1143)</td>
<td>36.3 (419)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/dissatisfied</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with job</td>
<td>30.5 (463)</td>
<td>18.2 (346)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% who think big companies are good</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly/very satisfied</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with job</td>
<td>48.6 (1367)</td>
<td>50.0 (474)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/dissatisfied</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with job</td>
<td>31.4 (236)</td>
<td>28.6 (294)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% who think labour-management relations are marked by conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finds job interesting</td>
<td>29.0 (1303)</td>
<td>40.3 (469)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finds job dull</td>
<td>47.1 (227)</td>
<td>64.2 (288)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly/very satisfied</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with job</td>
<td>26.6 (1087)</td>
<td>43.7 (416)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/dissatisfied</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with job</td>
<td>43.7 (449)</td>
<td>56.8 (340)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

concluded their 'Affluent Worker* research at the Luton Vaushall plant with the "finding" that traditional working-class solidarism was disappearing and privatised instrumentalism taking its place, the plant went out on strike, the workers raised the Red Flag, and occupied the factory.
At the same time, we should also remember, as Robin Blackburn and other Marxists conveniently did not, that the strike was only temporary, and that the workers soon went back to work once their pay demands were met. Vindication for Goldthorpe? Partly, perhaps; but more importantly, the whole episode illustrates quite clearly the caution which must accompany any conclusions based solely on attitudinal data.

While questions on general job satisfaction do offer some guideline to the extent of an individual's attachment to work, they do not provide more detailed information about its composition: which aspects of the work situation are a source of gratification and which a source of deprivation? To assess this, we can once again make use of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic rewards, the former referring to the rewards of performing the occupational task, the latter to the material and situational benefits. Two composite measures have been constructed using the "compute" sub-programme of the S.P.S.S. programme. Each measure is a composite of three separate variables. In the case of intrinsic satisfaction these consist of satisfaction with feelings of accomplishment, with the extent to which the respondent felt he could use his abilities on the job, and with the amount of decision-making and responsibility he had. For extrinsic satisfaction a composite index was formed from satisfaction with amount of pay, amount of job security, and working conditions. In the case of intrinsic satisfaction, these
three were chosen on the grounds that they best reflected the three most common intrinsic factors chosen in the question dealing with job orientation (see above, p. 369). In the case of extrinsic satisfaction, the survey only solicited the respondents' views on four aspects, these three together with satisfaction with opportunities for advancement and promotion. As the latter has already been analyzed separately (see above, pp. 352-4), there was in fact no actual choice to be made.

Tables 22 and 23 present the statistical breakdowns for these two composite variables. The distributions are largely similar to each other, and to those for general job satisfaction, though there is slightly less overall satisfaction in the case of the extrinsic index, and the relationship with occupation is therewith a little weaker. When we break each one down into its separate components we generally find that the incidence of satisfaction is highest for amount of decision-making and responsibility and amount of security, and lowest for ability to use skills and working conditions. In neither case, however, does the difference in overall satisfaction between the highest and lowest exceed twenty percent. In both cases, the semi-skilled, as we would normally expect, continue to stand out as the least satisfied. The skilled cluster together with the foremen, and fall generally in a position interstitial between the semi-skilled and the managers, thus suggesting some support for the MacKenzie thesis.
### TABLE 22

**Occupation and Intrinsic Satisfaction**

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<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% who are fairly/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>very satisfied</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>2489</td>
<td>0.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>0.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs:</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>1516</td>
<td>0.178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>83.3*</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>0.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>1705</td>
<td>0.227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>0.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999p.a.</td>
<td>83.3*</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>1332</td>
<td>0.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000p.a.</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>1137</td>
<td>0.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works with automated technology</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>0.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works with other technology</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>1804</td>
<td>0.176</td>
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<td>White-collar start.</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>0.397</td>
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<td>F/man or sk. blue-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collar starter</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>0.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>1164</td>
<td>0.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collar starter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental job orientation</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>1434</td>
<td>0.203</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intrinsic job</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>0.203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample < 15 cases

N/A not applicable

While this is the case, the data do not indicate any process of embourgeoisement. Given the tendency of respondents to "over-estimate" their levels of real satisfaction, the fact that only about half of the semi-skilled report that they are satisfied implies again a rather weak attachment to work. Income level, it is true, is associated with greater extrinsic satisfaction among the skilled and greater satisfaction on both counts among the semi-skilled. Yet
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% who are fairly/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>very satisfied</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>2474</td>
<td>0.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>0.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>1479</td>
<td>0.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83.3*</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>0.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>1706</td>
<td>0.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999 p.a.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83.3*</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>1294</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000 p.a.</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>1160</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works with automatic</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>technology</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>starter</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>46.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>F/man or sk. blue-collar</td>
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<tr>
<td>starter</td>
<td>88.9</td>
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<td>58.4</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>943</td>
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<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-collar</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>starter</td>
<td>70.2</td>
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<td>60.5</td>
<td>49.3</td>
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<td>0.149</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>orientation</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>1383</td>
<td>0.144</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intrinsic job</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>0.142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample < 15 cases

N/A not applicable

Some differential persists for both measures among the affluent: again we find that affluence may narrow the gap between the blue-collar groups and the managers, but it does not eliminate it. Age and education, on the other hand, have either no appreciable effect or one contrary to the predictions of embourgeoisement. The exception to this is the moderate increase in extrinsic satisfaction among the
semi-skilled with some post-secondary schooling. This is clearly contrary to the pattern established in the case of satisfaction with promotion opportunities, job interest, general job satisfaction, and repeated in the case of intrinsic job satisfaction. This can be attributed, in part at least, to the very high level of satisfaction among those earning over $8,000 p.a.

Technology, like income, has some effect, though this is restricted and operates in a manner which does not exactly validate the arguments of Blauner. In the case of extrinsic satisfaction, a greater incidence of satisfaction is associated with both the skilled and the semi-skilled who work with automatic technology. This is primarily a function of higher pay, and better working conditions which the automated workers enjoy over their non-automated fellows. But in the crucial matter of intrinsic satisfaction, there is no effect to speak of. Crucial because, for Blauner and the other advocates of automation as the harbinger of blue-collar work enjoyment, the principal benefit automation is alleged to confer is not on the upgrading of income levels or other material benefits but on the enrichment of performing the work tasks themselves, in short on the intrinsic aspects of the work situation. From the present data, however, there is no indication that the automated are more likely to find their work intrinsically satisfying than their counterparts elsewhere.
Surprisingly perhaps, the effects of job orientation and first full-time job are limited. The fact that intrinsic satisfaction, yet not extrinsic satisfaction, is higher among the instrumentally oriented semi-skilled reinforces the argument above that job orientation is associated with job experiences, and that an intrinsic job orientation is partly the result of intrinsic deprivation in the present job. The effects of first full-time job are again greater for the managers and the foremen than for the blue-collar groups. The only noticeable change for the latter is the unusually low proportion of satisfieds among the semi-skilled who began their worklives as white-collar workers. Though we would expect the 'downwardly' mobile to be less satisfied (due to relative deprivation and the retention effect), the difference in this case is unexpectedly large. But even when we discount those who are dissatisfied because of downward mobility from white-collar work, the proportion of semi-skilleds who are not satisfied remains pronounced.

Therefore, we really have little evidence to support the embourgeoisement thesis as far as these two aspects of job satisfaction are concerned. Moderate to fairly strong occupational differences persist, more clearly in the case of intrinsic satisfaction, yet also in extrinsic satisfaction. The differentiation of the skilled from the semi-skilled is apparent, but modest in size and variable in nature, suggesting that any conclusions about class detachment be qualified.
and cautious. All in all, in the preceding examination of job orientation, job interest, general job satisfaction, and intrinsic and extrinsic job satisfaction, the data point to a rather conventional image of class and occupational differences. There is some support for the Goldthorpe and MacKenzie theses, though this is partial and conditional. Only income level, and by implication affluence, works consistently in the manner we would expect from the thesis of embourgeoisement, yet its effect is one of reducing rather than eliminating the differences between the blue-collar groups and the managers. The other control variables either have no appreciable effect or, if they do, it is generally contrary to the propositions of embourgeoisement.

**The Status Situation: How Do They See Themselves?**

Of all three components of class situation, the status situation is probably the least well-defined; it tends to become something of a residual category in which all the remaining features of class inequality which do not fit into the other two categories are lumped. For present purposes, however, status situation is best regarded as the subjective aspect of stratification: how people see themselves and others in terms of the societal hierarchy of social, economic, and political rewards. The present data allow us to examine the first of these (though not the latter) by means of a closed-ended question requesting the
respondents to identify themselves in terms of five social class categories: upper class, upper middle-class, lower middle-class, working-class, and lower-class, the last one of which was barely chosen at all and can, for all intents and purposes, be disregarded.

While it is true, as several commentators have noted, that there are problems entailed with the interpretation of such questions, the results still give us some indication of how individuals do see themselves in the class structure (Lopreato and Hazelrigg, 1972). We should not throw out the baby with the bathwater: in the first place, many of the problems with fixed choice class identification questions are problems which pertain to fixed choice questions of any kind. Secondly, if as some have argued 'class' is an alien category and mode of social identification in modern Canadian society, and is an archaic remnant of feudalism and pre-industrialism, then we should not only expect a substantial number of non-responses, but also expect that class identification and occupation would be less clearly related among the native born respondents than among the immigrants. Yet neither expectation is actually borne out. The non-response rate amounted to a mere two percent of the total number of respondents who returned the questionnaire. The breakdowns by birthplace status show little difference between the native born and the immigrant respondents, indeed if anything the extent of working-class identification
TABLE 24

Occupation and Social Class Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>% who identify as working class</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>2775</td>
<td>0.276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>1126</td>
<td>0.243</td>
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<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>1627</td>
<td>0.304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>27.3*</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>0.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>0.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>0.439</td>
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<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999p.a.</td>
<td>-*</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>1518</td>
<td>0.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000p.a.</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>1237</td>
<td>0.280</td>
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<tr>
<td>Works with automatic technology</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Works with other technology</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>2023</td>
<td>0.148</td>
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<tr>
<td>White-collar start.</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>0.273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/man or sk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>1049</td>
<td>0.180</td>
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<tr>
<td>Semi-/unk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>1284</td>
<td>0.272</td>
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<td>Instrumental job orientation</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>1564</td>
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<td>Intrinsic job orientation</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>52.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fairly/very satisfied with job</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>1876</td>
<td>0.285</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neutral/dissatisfied with job</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>884</td>
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<td>47.3</td>
<td>60.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-unionist</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>0.282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample < 15 cases

N/A not applicable

among the blue-collar groups is stronger among the native born than the immigrants. In short, then, there is no reason to suppose that the responses to this question are meaningless as guides to the way in which the respondents see themselves in the class structure.
The principal conclusion to be drawn from these data is that although the extent of working-class self-identification is not as great among the two blue-collar groups as that revealed in the recent Canadian study by Rinehart and Okraku (1974), it is evident that a majority of the semi-skilled and the largest single (unrecorded) category of the skilled see themselves as such. This is particularly so if we exclude those with some middle-class background trait such as post-secondary schooling or white-collar career origins. For all four groups, in fact, the incidence of working-class identification is lowest, or nearly so, among the highly educated and the white-collar starters. When we control simultaneously, then we find that for the managers, the foremen, and the skilled education has the most effect. For the semi-skilled, on the other hand, the combined effect of education and career origins is more or less evenly balanced between them. In this respect, then, the implications of the embourgeoisement thesis vis-à-vis the effects of education and the experience of a white-collar job do receive some support.

When we control for the effects of income and age among the semi-skilled, then little happens: the proportion of working-class identifiers remains about the same among the younger and the affluent which is not what we would expect were embourgeoisement occurring as predicted. Furthermore, the proportion of working-class identifiers does increase slightly among the instrumentally oriented semi-skilled.
If, then, as Goldthorpe and others have implied, instrumentalism is becoming the norm among the 'new' post-war working-class, we should not, on the basis of the present data, expect that it will seriously erode the likelihood of a working-class self-image. Finally, as we should expect, the proportion of working-class identifiers is higher among those who belong to a union. This corroborates the conventional wisdom that unions are indeed a working-class institution and therewith serve to propagate some sense of working-class consciousness among their memberships. In all, then, I would maintain that, despite the lower level of working-class identification, these data do not point to an embourgeoisement of self-image among the semi-skilled: the latter are twice as likely to see themselves as working-class than lower middle-class, and more than four times more likely to than as upper middle-class.

The skilled, on the other hand, appear to be a different matter. While the single largest block—45%—of skilled see themselves as working-class, this offers a rather striking contrast with the nearly seventy percent found by Rinehart and Okraku, and does not constitute an overall majority. Furthermore, if we exclude those with more 'proletarian' backgrounds—the grade schooled, the non-affluent, and those who began their own worklives as semi-skilled or unskilled workers—then this proportion of working-class identifiers drops to around two-fifths. At the same
time, there remains a moderate to fairly strong differential separating the skilled from both the managers and the foremen; they are not clearly working-class or middle-class in their identification, whereas the managers see themselves largely as upper middle-class. Given the persistence of this differential, then, it would be more judicious to conclude that the skilled are not so embourgeoisé as we might tend to assume at face value. One of the major findings in studies of occupational prestige is that respondents tend to "over-value" their own occupations when compared to similar ones. If this tendency applies also in the case of social class identification, then the grounds for arguing that the skilled see themselves as middle-class is weakened. As such, then, I think the data on the skilled presented in Table 24 point not so much in the direction of the embourgeoisement thesis as MacKenzie's proposition about the differentiation and detachment of the skilled from the semi-skilled, though, to be sure, in neither case do the data provide unequivocal validation or refutation.

The magnitude of the effect of the controls is greatest, however, for the foremen. This we might expect insofar as the foremen occupy a marginal, 'halfway' position between manual and non-manual, between shop and office floor, between rank and file and managerial authority. This would tend to confuse the individual insofar as self-image and identity are concerned, with the result that background
characteristics rather than present position would exert the major influence on evaluations and assessments of self. This is borne out to the extent that those with 'proletarian' background features—the grade schooled, the non-affluent, the unionised, and those who began life as blue-collar workers—are more likely to see themselves as working-class. Yet, even under these circumstances, the clear majority of foremen see themselves as middle-class, a pattern which, as we have seen, is repeated in other subjective variables—job expectations, job interest, and job satisfaction.

With the exception of job orientation for the semi-skilled, it is interesting to note that the work situation controls—job orientation, job satisfaction and technological work environment—have little or no effect on how either the skilled or the semi-skilled place themselves in the class structure. It is the market situation variables—income, education, unionisation, and career origins—above all which affect the way the respondents see themselves and the relationship that has with occupation. Yet here too, with the exception of education, the effects are modest at best. The overall situation is one in which an absolute majority of the semi-skilled and a relative majority of the skilled see themselves as working-class; the size of these proportions, however, is not as great as that found in some earlier studies.
Conclusion

"It is evident that statements relating to the disappearance of economic differentials separating blue and white collar workers are as unrealistic as they are insufficiently precise" (MacKenzie, 1973:44). This statement by MacKenzie, opening the concluding paragraph to his discussion of the market and work situations of a sample of American workers and managers, might serve as equally apt in the present context, at least as a general statement on the data reviewed in the preceding pages. On the whole, we have found little to indicate the impending embourgeoisement of the class situation of our sample of Canadian workers. The picture adumbrated in the previous pages is a fairly conventional one of persistent class differences in the distribution of economic rewards, in the attitude toward the work situation, and in the self-image the respondents have of themselves in terms of the class structure.

But while there may be said to be little general indication of the disappearance of market, work, and status differentials between blue- and white-collar, we must, at the same time, recognise that this putative homogenisation is not regarded as unconditional, but is, rather, attributed to the play of certain identifiable factors—affluence, increased formal education, increased mobility, and the general, 'open' ambiance of post-war society in which the barriers to success, and the class 'traps' to which these
invariably give rise, have been largely eliminated through the triumph of meritocratic and democratic institutions and values. Thus we have examined, by means of statistical control, the possible effect of income, education, age, career origins, and technological work environment on the attitudes and situation of the blue-collar groups in the sample. Predictably, changes have become duly evident when this was done; but again there is no indication to suggest that these control variables are consistently and substantially associated with a more 'bourgeois' class situation among the skilled or the semi-skilled, or that they promote a more characteristically middle-class outlook on work and career.

Of all the factors examined in this way, only income level has any consistent effect in reducing differentials between the four groups, by bringing the blue-collar groups closer in outlook and situation to the managers and foremen. On this score, there is indeed some evidential support for the imputed bourgeoisifying effects of affluence and the possession of money. At the same time, it is also clear that affluence only reduces these differentials; it does not eliminate them entirely. The relationship between occupation and the various aspects of market, work, and status situation among those earning over $8,000 p.a. is usually statistically significant, and at least moderate in strength.

What of Blauner's thesis concerning the upgrading, and by implication bourgeoisifying, effects of automation on
the work environment of the blue-collar worker? While supportive, the evidence in this regard is generally weak: the automated workers may earn higher wages, entertain higher promotion prospects, and find their work more satisfying and interesting than their colleagues working under other technical conditions, but the differences are modest at best. There is no suggestion in the preceding evidence that automation is associated with any wholesale improvement or enrichment of the market or work situations of either the skilled or the semi-skilled; there is certainly no indication that the automated workers are indistinguishable in situation and perspective from the foremen and managers. Moreover, rather than have a homogenising effect between the skilled and the semi-skilled, automation is associated with the opposite, with a widening (though only slight) of the differences between the two blue-collar groups, a fact which tends to substantiate Bright's basic thesis that automation has a bifurcating effect on task structures: complicating maintenance while further routinising execution, complicating already skilled work while simplifying that of the semi-skilled.

While affluence and automation may have some moderate repercussions in the direction predicted by the embourgeoisement thesis, age and education, on the other hand, often have the contrary effect. To be sure, the general effects of age are weak, and can, for practical purposes, be largely
overlooked. Yet the pattern which seems to emerge time and again in the preceding analysis is that it is the older rather than the younger workers who tend to find their jobs more interesting, more satisfying, and who tend to be more intrinsically job oriented, in short who tend to be more middle-class in outlook and sentiment. Only in the matters of satisfaction with future promotion prospects and self-rated social class are the younger workers more characteristically 'bourgeois'. Of these, the latter is the more important from the viewpoint of the embourgeoisement thesis as it suggests that the tendency for manual workers to see themselves as working-class may be weakening historically. Alternately, the data may simply demonstrate that blue-collarites are more likely to see themselves as middle-class in their youth and early adulthood, and as working-class as they grow older.

With control for education, the contrary effects are more striking. Only in the matters of job orientation and self-rated social class does increased schooling foster a more typically middle-class perspective among the blue-collar groups. In all aspects of job satisfaction, save intrinsic, and in job interest, by contrast, the level declines noticeably with increased schooling, and especially among those workers who have had some post-secondary educational experience. To the extent that we normally associated high levels of job satisfaction and job interest as characteristically middle-
class work attitudes, then, increased education among manual workers has de-bourgeoisifying rather than embourgeoisifying ramifications. As noted above, what this situation amounts to is the relative deprivation fostered by 'over-education' as the aspirations and expectations for occupational success acquired during schooling are found to be relatively unfulfilled in the current occupation.

This process is similar, though less pronounced, in the effects of work origins, at least so far as the semi-skilled are concerned. As we would expect, there is some evidence of the 'retention effect' at work; however, this has both positive and negative forms from the viewpoint of embourgeoisement. On the one hand, such as unemployment experience for example, the retention can be said to have a bourgeoisifying effect to the extent that the semi-skilled who began as white-collar workers resemble the managers and foremen more closely than those who began as blue-collar workers. In the main, however, the retention effect serves to bring about the opposite situation, particularly with respect to work attitudes. This is most striking in the matters of intrinsic job satisfaction and job interest where those semi-skilled who have been mobile from white-collar first jobs are notably less likely to find their work satisfying and interesting than those who began in manual or intermediary supervisory roles. In other words, in these instances the retention effect serves to promote a sense of
relative deprivation on the part of the 'downwardly' mobile, with the result that the latter resemble the managers and foremen less than their less mobile colleagues.

If mobility from white-collar to blue-collar is associated with lower levels of satisfaction and interest for the semi-skilled, then we would logically expect that the opposite should occur with mobility from blue-collar to white-collar. To some extent this expectation is indeed borne out by the facts, though not perhaps as strongly or consistently as we might imagine. In the matters of job satisfaction and interest it is true that their incidence is lowest among those managers who began their worklives as white-collar workers of some kind. Yet at the same time it is not highest among those who have travelled, as it were, farthest, namely those who began as semi- or unskilled manual workers, but rather among those who began as either foremen or skilled workers. Indeed, those managers who began as semi- or unskilled workers are only very slightly more likely to find their work interesting and satisfying than those who started as white-collar workers. In other words, the effect of career mobility on the attitudes of the managers takes a curvilinear rather than linear pattern. In all of this, however, it is plain that regardless of career origins the vast majority of the managers do find their jobs satisfying and interesting; the effects of first full-time job are small and do not obscure the overall relationship.
If we find little support for the thesis of embourgeoisement, then what of the alternatives: the Goldthorpe and MacKenzie theses, and the hypothesis established at the conclusion of Chapter III to the effect of a class convergence founded on the embourgeoisement of blue-collar market situations and the proletarianisation of white-collar work ones? As we have seen, it is evident, on the one hand, that a majority of all four groups are instrumentally job oriented, at least as measured by means of what they feel to be the most important consideration to be made when taking another job. At the same time, it is also clear that this majority is only moderate (about sixty percent), and that no real difference exists between the four groups in the incidence of instrumentalism. Broken down into its individual components we find, furthermore, that opportunities for promotion and advancement figure prominently not only for the managers but also for the blue-collar groups, for a good number of whom it is expected to take the form of self-employment. These data, in other words, cast some doubt on the Goldthorpe notion of instrumental collectivism as the principal mode of work orientation among modern workers. The evidence points to the existence, to some degree, of instrumental individualism among the blue-collar groups, though one which carries with it the implications of escape from the dominant work order rather than commitment to it. In addition, we have also found, in contrast with Goldthorpe,
that job orientation is related to work experiences: those who find their work dissatisfying or uninteresting are more likely to adopt an intrinsic job orientation; they are also more likely to adopt a generally critical attitude to the management of their own firm and to big companies in general. Not only does this depart from the interpretation of Goldthorpe and his associates, it also does not square with the current conventional wisdom which regards instrumentalism as the response or adaptation to work which is found intrinsically unrewarding.

The MacKenzie thesis, similarly, receives some support in the preceding pages, though of a partial and qualified nature. While some differentiation of the skilled from the semi-skilled is discernible in most aspects of the market, work, and status situations discussed above, it is doubtful if these differences are strong enough to amount to a full-blown class detachment of the two occupational groups. At best it seems that the skilled occupy a position which is interstitial between the managers and the semi-skilled. This in itself, however, is hardly new; the idea of a working-class aristocracy of skilled manual workers has been a familiar enough theme at least since Lenin. The skilled, nonetheless do seem the most impervious of all the four groups we have examined to the play of the control variables. This 'stability' gives some credence to MacKenzie's notion that the possession of marketable skills insulates the worker
from the vagaries of the work- and marketplace, thus setting him/her apart from less skilled colleagues.

As for the last alternative, the thesis developed at the end of the reviews conducted in Chapter III, there seems to be little support at all. We have dismissed the notion of embourgeoisement as largely unwarranted on the basis of the present data. Likewise the idea of a proletarianisation of white-collar work situations, at least in the subjective sense, does not receive support in the case of the managers: there are no real signs of impending dissatisfaction or boredom with work, nor a critical attitude toward the employer. On the whole, it is clear that our four groups are a fairly conventional lot so far as class situation differences are concerned. We have seen little evidence to suggest that substantial changes are afoot.
CHAPTER VII

AT HOME: THE SOCIAL ORGANISATION OF LIFE-STYLE

Introduction

For the most part the conclusions of the last chapter confirm the view that significant class differences in market, work, and status situations persist in modern Canadian society. The purpose of the present chapter is to carry this analysis over into the realm of life outside work by examining the size and nature of class differences (and similarities) in five aspects of life-style, namely patterns of sociability (or primary social participation), formal associational affiliations (secondary social participation), political attitudes and activity, mass media use, and values. The primary focus will once again be on the skilled and semi-skilled workers in the sample, and the extent to which they show signs of assimilation to more characteristically middle-class habits and outlooks. At the same time, therefore, the discussion will necessarily have to make reference to the situation of the foremen and the managers.

Although the procedures for analysis will be substantially the same as those employed in the previous chapter, some changes will be made. The most salient of these is that the number of control variables will be extended to include
birthplace status (immigrant versus native born) and the extent of geographical mobility; control for technological work environment, on the other hand, will be dropped from consideration. The reasoning behind these changes is as follows. Canada is quite obviously a society which has relied, and continues to rely, often heavily on the importation of human labour. The most palpable result of this is that it has become an ethnically-plural society, and one which contains, at any given moment, a relatively high proportion of non-native born members, many of whom have emigrated not only from non-anglophone regions but also from non-industrial or semi-industrial settings in which the patterns of stratification, and the divisions of property, wealth, and labour are quite distinct. In light of this, control for immigrant status (regretably the survey does not allow us to control very effectively for ethnicity on a separate basis) is important insofar as it (ethnic origin) may cut across and distort the culturally differentiating effects of social class. Geographical mobility is an important factor to consider from a theoretical point of view. As we saw in Chapters I and IV, geographical mobility has been identified by some sociologists as a potentially 'bourgeoisifying' agent on the grounds that it tends to erode traditional patterns of working-class family and domestic life by severing the bonds of geographical proximity which supposedly conduce to the persistence and strength of extended familial ties and
social network stability. Technological work environment has been dropped, finally, since its predicted effects were confined to the areas of the market- and workplace; there is no theory, in other words, for us to test.

Sociability: Patterns of Primary Social Participation

In this opening section we shall examine variables which represent different aspects of kinship and sociability: the number of "close friends" the respondent has as a measure of social network size; how often he "does things" with his friends as a measure of the frequency of contact and interaction, and by implication as a measure of the extent to which he is socially 'gregarious' or 'privatised'; how many of those friends are friends with each other as a measure of how tightly-knit and integrated networks are; how many relatives the respondent visits 'often' as a measure of contact with kin; and finally how many friends work for the same company, live in the same neighbourhood, and are people the respondent grew up with as a measure of the social origins and social location of friendship networks.

Table 25 presents the data on the extent of sociability, covering the first four of these variables. The most striking feature of these figures is the fact that they do not reveal any substantial differences between the four groups; indeed in only three of the four is the relationship with occupation statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
In all four cases, the strength of the relationship can only be described as weak at best. The question which this situation introduces, then, is which of our three models of homogenisation—embourgeoisement, proletarianisation, of some form of 'middle-mass' convergence—provide the most appropriate interpretation.

This question, however, is problematic. In the preceding chapter on class situation differences, the theoretical reading of the data was largely straightforward insofar as the managers conformed for the most part to the conventional image of middle-classness established earlier in Chapter III: they were well-paid (comparatively), secure, optimistic about their prospects, satisfied and interested in their work, and saw themselves squarely as middle-class citizens. What this meant, in short, was that we had a consistent model of middle-class attitudes and attributes against which to compare the embourgeoisement of the two blue-collar groups.

In the present situation, on the other hand, this is by no means so apparent. For example, in the matter of network size the literature reviewed in Chapter IV indicated that larger friendship networks were a more characteristically middle-class trait; working-class families, by contrast, were shown to be more oriented to kin for their free time companions. In Table 25, however, there is little evidence to support this distinction; if anything, the pattern seems
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mng.</th>
<th>F/man</th>
<th>Sk.</th>
<th>Semi-sk.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% with 5 or more &quot;close friends&quot;</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>2803</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>1133</td>
<td>0.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>1648</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>0.178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999 p.a.</td>
<td>50.0*</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000 p.a.</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>1254</td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant &lt; 16 yrs</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>0.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant &gt; 16 yrs</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>0.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>0.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once or twice</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>1049</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three or more times</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>1435</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar starter</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/man or skilled blue-collar start</td>
<td>48.9*</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>1061</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>1291</td>
<td>0.111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*subsample size < 15 cases  * Immigrant </>/ 16 yrs refers to respondent's age in all tables.

to be reversed since it is the semi-skilled who are slightly more likely to report five or more 'close' friends than the managers. Not only do we find the pattern reversed, we also find that the majority--three-fifths--of the managers report small rather than large networks! While these findings deviate on both counts from the conventional images, they do resemble the findings of the MacKenzie study. He too found
## TABLE 26

**Occupation and Frequency of Network Contact**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% who &quot;do things&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with friends 2/3 time</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>2788</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a month or more</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>1132</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>1634</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>33.3*</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999p.a.</td>
<td>16.7*</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>1517</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000p.a.</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>1251</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant &lt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>0.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant &gt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>0.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once or twice</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>1045</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three or more</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>1425</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar starter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/man. or sk.</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blue clr. starter</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>1056</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unk. blue-coll.</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>1283</td>
<td>0.070</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size < 15 cases

Not only that the skilled workers in his sample were equally as able to name five or more close friends as the managers, but also that "frequent and informal interaction with related and non-related friends [was] not at a premium" as far as the latter group were concerned (MacKenzie, 1973).

A similar situation also holds in the matter of the frequency with which the respondents "do things" with their
TABLE 27

Occupation and Network Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% with most close</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>friends being</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>friends of each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>2766</td>
<td>0.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>1122</td>
<td>0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>1623</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>58.3*</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>0.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999p.a.</td>
<td>33.3*</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>1508</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000p.a.</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>1238</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant &lt; 16 yrs</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>0.192</td>
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<tr>
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<td>51.0</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>0.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>46.7</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>0.183</td>
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<td>59.1</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>1036</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>twice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three or</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>1415</td>
<td>0.069</td>
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<tr>
<td>more times</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>0.042</td>
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<tr>
<td>starter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/man or sk. blue-</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>1047</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collar starter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>1275</td>
<td>0.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collar starter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size < 15 cases

friends. Middle-class individuals and couples are usually pictured as more socially active and gregarious, interacting more frequently with their friends than working-class couples, and doing so more frequently outside the confines of the family household. This is not borne out, however, by our present data. Just under half of the managers say they "do things"
with their friends only once a month or less, as compared to just over half of the semi-skilled. The upshot of all this, then, is that we have no consistent benchmark by means of which to assess whether or not a process of embourgeoisement is taking place.

To be sure, the data pertaining to the extent of social network integration and contact with kin, presented in Tables 27 and 28 respectively, are patterned in a manner which conforms more closely to the conventional images established in Chapter IV. The semi-skilled are more likely to enjoy closed-knit networks and visit three or more relatives frequently than are the managers. At the same time, nevertheless, it is also clear that the differentials are only weak. We find that half the managers reveal closed-knit networks on the one hand, and that only half of the blue-collar respondents visit three or more kin regularly on the other. In the first place, the data again cast some doubt on the conventional image of middle-class gregariousness. And in the second place, the data suggest that extensive (though not necessarily intensive) kinship ties are not as pronounced among the present sample of manual workers as the conventional image would seem to imply.

One of the reasons closed, though sexually segregated, social networks have been attributed to working-class couples is that friendships are often derived from pre-structured and social arrangements such as kinship, childhood,
### Table 28

**Occupation and Contact with Kin**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% who visit three or more relatives &quot;often&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>2801</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>1132</td>
<td>0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>1647</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>66.7*</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999p.a.</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>0.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000p.a.</td>
<td>16.7*</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &lt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &gt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once or twice</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>1051</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three or more times</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>1430</td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar starter</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/man. or sk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>1058</td>
<td>0.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>1291</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample < 15 cases

Neighbourhood, and workplace. Tables 29 to 31 give the data for the last three of these; the number of friends who are people the respondent grew up with; the number of friends who live in the same neighbourhood; and the number of friends who work for the same company. Of the three, it is the workplace which figures most prominently as a network location; it is clear that both childhood and neighbourhood are not important
### TABLE 29

**Occupation and Childhood Friendships**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mng.</th>
<th>F/man</th>
<th>Sk.</th>
<th>Semi-sk.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% with most friends being those the respondent grew up with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>2781</td>
<td>0.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>1631</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>8.3*</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>0.326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999pa</td>
<td>-*</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>1519</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000pa</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>1242</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &lt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &gt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once or twice</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>1044</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three or more times</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>1417</td>
<td>0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar starter</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>0.188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/man or sk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>1052</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>1278</td>
<td>0.123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size < 15 cases

Friendship sources or locations for any of the four groups. Even in the case of workplace friendships, it is also apparent that the majority of each group, a majority of about two-thirds, do not derive a particularly large number of friends from that source. While the data on childhood and neighbourhood friendships may support the idea of embourgeoisement, it is interesting to note that the factors to which this process is attributed—mobility, education, age, and affluence—do not,
in fact, exert any appreciable effect on the distributions. Even among those who have never been geographically mobile, the vast majority of the skilled and the semi-skilled (as well as the managers and foremen) do not report significant numbers of childhood or neighbourhood friends.

When we examine the effects of the control variables on the relationship between occupation and these various aspects of primary social participation several conclusions can be drawn. Perhaps the most striking, at least from the point of view of our theoretical framework, is that income level has little effect on the extent of sociability or network integration for any of the occupational groups. Age too is limited in its effects; where noticeable changes do occur they are mixed if not contradictory. For both blue-collar groups, for example, network size increases with age, but the extent of contact, on the other hand, declines.

The impact of education on these data, however, is more extensive. Taking an overall view we can see that increased schooling tends to be associated with a decrease in the extent of sociability (viz. fewer close friends, less contact with them and kin) and of network closure, and in the incidence of workplace friendships. This pattern, however, applies to all four occupational groups, and in some cases the extent of the changes brought about by increased schooling is greater among the managers (and the foremen) than it is among either of the blue-collar groups. These changes, some
TABLE 30

Occupation and Workplace Friendships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% with 3 or more friends working for same firm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>2795</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>50.0*</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>0.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999pa</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>1526</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000pa</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>1249</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &lt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>0.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &gt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once/twice</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>1044</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three or more times</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>1432</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar starter</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>0.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/man or sk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unksk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>1055</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>1287</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size < 15 cases

of them admittedly modest do suggest, nonetheless, that the problems brought about by "over-education" which were so palpable in the matter of work attitudes (see last chapter) do spill over into the realms of life outside the factory, and for that matter, the office too. The status inconsistency which results when one socio-economic attribute, such as education is disparate with another, such as income or position in the division of labour and labour market, often fosters
TABLE 31
Occupation and Neighbourhood Friendships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% with most of their</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>2751</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>friends living in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>their neighbourhood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.*</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>1130</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>1621</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>8.3*</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>0.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>0.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999pa</td>
<td>-*</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>1518</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000pa</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &lt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>10.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &gt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once/twice</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>1043</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three or more</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>1425</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>times</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>starter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/man. or sk. blue-</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collar starter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/uns sk. blue-</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>1281</td>
<td>0.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collar starter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size < 15 cases

a sense of social marginality which may inhibit 'normal' patterns of social association, reduce the level of social participation, and therewith result in some degree of social isolation. While this pattern of reduced sociability and network closure is evident among both blue-collar groups, it is most obvious in the case of the skilled. Those with some experience of post secondary schooling are clearly less likely to have many close friends, to have friends who know
each other, to visit extensively and regularly with kin, to have retained friends from childhood, or to have many friends in the same place where they work. These are not, however, isolated characteristics; they are part of an overall pattern of reduced sociability which manifests the disparity between their education and occupation, between their situation in the culture, so to speak, and that in the market- and workplace.

A similar pattern of reduced sociability can also be identified in the case of the semi-skilled who have been mobile from white-collar career origins. As we can see from Table 25, those semi-skilled who began their worklives in some form of white-collar employment tend to have smaller friendship networks, less contact with their friends, and less likely to have closed networks and many workplace friends than those who began as blue-collar. This too reflects the problems fostered by social marginality, this time caused by the experience of "skidding" from white-collar, middle-class employment into the ranks of the blue-collar working-class. These problems will now be particularly poignant in the sense that 'downward' social mobility is ostensibly less common than upward as a result of the restructuring of the labour force and the sectoral balance of the economy toward white-collar service labour. In this respect, their downward movement is compounded in its implications by the absence of any substantial reference group with which to identify and justify
one's predicament. For the managers, on the other hand (as for the foremen and the skilled also), career origins do not seem to have much effect either way. Coming from blue-collar career origins neither inhibits nor stimulates sociability, network closure, and friendships derived from workplace, childhood, or neighbourhood.

The disruption and attenuation of these various aspects of primary social participation is commonly attributed to the severing effects of geographical mobility (cf. Handel and Rainwater, 1964; Rainwater and Handel, 1964). This argument is based on the plausible, yet often unstated assumption that in order for sociability to flourish and be stable, geographical proximity is indispensable. This assumption, however, is a contentious one: as we can see from Table 26 the vast majority of all four groups have most of their friends living beyond the bounds of their own neighbourhood. This is even more true in the case of kin: only about one percent of the managers and foremen, three percent of the skilled, and five percent of the semi-skilled live in the same neighbourhood as most of their relatives. The assumption about the necessity of geographical proximity is further undermined when we examine the effects of geographical mobility on sociability. While we do find some evidence of reduced sociability among the mobile respondents, we also find the opposite. Contact with kin, for example, is actually less common among the non-mobile managers, foremen, and semi-skilled
than it is among those who have moved residence. Moreover, the effects of geographical mobility are uneven from an occupational point of view: among the skilled and the semi-skilled, for example, network closure, as we would expect from this assumption about geographical proximity, is greater among the non-mobiles; among the foremen, on the other hand, it is lower. This lack of consistency, together with the contradictory findings, cast some considerable doubt on the putatively disruptive role of geographical mobility. The "nation of strangers" to which some have already consigned us appears, in the light of these findings, to be more the fanciful and sententious notions of which paperback best-sellers are made than an accurate and informative portrayal of prevailing realities (cf. Packard. 1972).

One of the more persistent themes to recur in the literature on the social organisation of life-styles, particularly in North American sociology, has been the 'debate' between class and ethnicity as the principal force of social differentiation and cultural division in modern industrial-capitalist society. Those like Robert Nisbet and Daniel Bell who assert the demise or withering away of social class have often relied on the argument that in ethnically plural societies such as Canada or the United States, ethnic origin has become a far more potent source of social and cultural identity and affiliation, and one which has served to cut across and attenuate, if not eliminate, the ramifications of class
distinctions. While we do find that important differences become apparent in the data on sociability when controls for birthplace and immigrant status are made—either or both of the immigrant groups generally exhibits less sociability—it is also evident that in some cases class differences among the non-native born become stronger. Thus, the argument of Bennett Berger, for example, that class differences will become more pronounced and conspicuous as the waves of immigration abate and existing ethnically diverse groups become culturally assimilated may indeed prove to be the reverse (Berger, 1960). Furthermore, when we also separate the immigrant groups into anglophone (those from the U.S. or the U.K.) and non-anglophone (from elsewhere), we find that with the exception of contact with kin, occupational differences are greater among the latter group. Class differences, it would seem, are not necessarily an anachronism imported by feudally-minded British immigrants!

The major problem, however, still remains, namely how to interpret these changes with regard to the theoretical framework of embourgeoisement. To do this requires a modèle of middle-class sociability against which to compare and evaluate the evidence. Yet, as we have seen, the model established by a review of existing literature in Chapter IV is unsubstantiated on a number of points by the present data on the managerial group in the sample. Which, then do we take as a benchmark? For example, if we use the model
established in Chapter IV we should conclude that increased education has a de-bourgeoisifying effect among the skilled as far as network size is concerned. If, on the other hand, we compare the educated skilled workers with the managers (and with the managers in MacKenzie's study), then we should conclude the reverse!

This theoretical maze can be simplified to some extent if we turn our attention back to the basic issues on which such comparisons are made and conclusions duly drawn. In the original Goldthorpe study of working-class embourgeoisement the traditional model of working-class life was taken, from the very outset, to be problematic; it was taken as the object of empirical scrutiny in order to assess the direction and extent of any changes which had occurred or were occurring (Goldthorpe et al., 1969). As we have seen, the methodology on which this scrutiny was founded was to see if, and under what conditions, individuals of working-class situation were becoming more characteristically middle-class. But in doing so, Goldthorpe and his colleagues continued to make the same presumptions as those who first advocated the process of embourgeoisement. The whole notion of "middle-classness", the benchmark against which judgments were to be made, was taken to be unproblematic. Together with this presumption went the additional one that those factors to which changes in working-class life-styles were attributed --affluence, education, mobility, etc.--would have no such effect on the organisation and experience of middle-class life.
In the first chapter of this thesis I argued that, theoretically, we could not assume the idea of middle-classness, and that therefore we could not address the issue of embourgeoisement without, at the same time, addressing its alternatives. The presumption of middle-classness, in other words, is theoretically unwarranted. What these data now show is that it is empirically unwarranted also; they show that, empirically, the notion of middle-classness, which is by definition fundamental to the thesis of embourgeoisement, is indeed problematic in certain respects, that there is no model or benchmark which is derived from a complete and unambiguous consensus of research and opinion.

As a result of this problem, the data, I would argue, militate against interpreting the absence of any appreciable class differences in sociability patterns in blanket terms of either embourgeoisement or proletarianisation. A conclusion to either effect would be too simplistic; it would overlook the problematic nature of the evidence, and, from a more theoretical point of view, would abandon a dialectical understanding of social reality in favour of a one-way deterministic view. What the data point to, rather, is some form of convergence or massification between the four groups, a partial merging of these aspects of life-style.

While adopting this interpretation as the most opposite model in this context, it should also be noted that the data do not substantiate the kind of convergence hypothesised
by Goldthorpe and his colleagues. Although it is true that both blue-collar groups depart clearly from the traditional view of working-class sociability so far as neighbourhood and childhood friendships are concerned, it does not hold that this is accompanied by a generally more "privatised" situation with regard to the other aspects of sociability examined above. Even the affluent and geographically mobile blue-collarites display an ability to sustain at least moderate levels of primary social participation. The withdrawal and isolation into the confines of the nuclear family intimated by Goldthorpe as the typical condition of the "new" working-class is a picture overdrawn by the standards of the present data.

At the same time, nonetheless, we must accept Goldthorpe's qualification that any convergence between blue-collar and white-collar be treated as partial and conditional. This caveat results from the limitation inherent in the data available to us. These data focus largely upon quantitative differences and similarities in sociability between the four occupations. Therewith, they virtually exclude consideration of qualitative differences: does each group have the same definition as to who constitutes a "close" friend? Do they all agree what "doing things" with friends means? And so on. These are questions which cannot be directly examined; their answers have to be largely assumed. Yet as we have seen previously in Chapter IV, quantitative-class similarities
often obscure important qualitative differences, differences in social meanings and definitions bestowed upon ostensibly similar patterns of behaviour. Indeed, as we shall see below in discussion of the data presented in Table 28, there is evidence in the present data to suggest that such qualitative differences are sustained in our sample.

Formal Association: Patterns of Secondary Social Participation

One of the most common themes running throughout the literature on class culture is the antipathy of working-class persons to most forms of formal social association, at least outside the bounds of the workplace. Manual workers and their families are generally seen in contrast to those of middle-class status, to prefer social relationships of a more spontaneous and unplanned character. The data in Tables 32, 33, and 34 confirm this view, though the number of associational memberships and the incidence of office holding in such associations is not as high among the managers as we might have expected on the basis of previous studies. Though all three relationships are statistically significant, their strength is only moderate to fairly strong. There is not much support here for the frenetic "joining" commonly portrayed in the literature of the fifties and early sixties as a fundamental characteristic of North American pluralism.
### TABLE 32

**Occupation and Associational Memberships**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% who belong to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 or more groups</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>-10.1</td>
<td>2802</td>
<td>0.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and associations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>1135</td>
<td>0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>1630</td>
<td>0.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>0.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>0.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999pa</td>
<td>33.3*</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>1525</td>
<td>0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000pa</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>1256</td>
<td>0.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &lt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &gt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once/twice</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>0.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three or</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more times</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>1434</td>
<td>0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar starter</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>0.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman/sk.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blue-c. starter</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>1060</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unksk.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blue-c. starter</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>1291</td>
<td>0.105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size less than 15 cases

The effects of the control variables on the skilled and the semi-skilled is limited; of the three aspects of secondary participation under consideration, only the incidence of office-holding is much affected. Here too, the changes which come about are modest at best: office-holding for example, increases marginally among the more mobile and educated skilled workers in the sample. While this is congruent with the implications of the bourgeoisie thesis, the


**TABLE 33**

**Occupation and Associational Office-Holding**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% who have never held office in the group/association most important to them</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>2511</td>
<td>0.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>1002</td>
<td>0.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>1473</td>
<td>0.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>45.5*</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>0.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>1729</td>
<td>0.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>0.239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999pa</td>
<td>40.0*</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>1345</td>
<td>0.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000pa</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>1149</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>1739</td>
<td>0.169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &lt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>0.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &gt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>0.195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>0.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once/twice</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>0.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three or more times</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>1273</td>
<td>0.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar start.</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>0.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman/sk. blue-c. starter</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>0.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>0.203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size less than 15 cases

The relationship between office-holding and occupation continues to remain statistically significant and moderate in strength. The conclusion which is most easily drawn from these data is that younger, more affluent, mobile, and educated workers are not especially more likely to become more 'bourgeois' in their patterns of formal social association than their less well-paid, older, less mobile and educated colleagues.
### TABLE 34

**Occupation and Meeting Attendance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% who have attended</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at least 1 of the</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>2555</td>
<td>0.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>last 3 meetings of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the group most</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>important to them</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>1020</td>
<td>0.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>1498</td>
<td>0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>45.5*</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>1754</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>0.294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999pa</td>
<td>80.0*</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>1374</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000pa</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>1163</td>
<td>0.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>1761</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &lt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &gt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>0.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>0.213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once/twice</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved 3 or more times</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>1298</td>
<td>0.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-c. starter</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>0.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman/sk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>964</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>1180</td>
<td>0.128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample less than 15 cases

In fact, it is upon the behaviour of the managers and the foremen that these control variables make their more conspicuous mark. Once again we find the presumption that affluence, education, mobility, etc. have their impact largely, if not solely, on the working-class is unbalanced and misleading. If we are to search for evidence of 'bourgeoisifying' effects from these factors, then it is to the managers
we must turn for support. While having little or no effect on either the skilled or the semi-skilled, increased education, white-collar career origins, and greater geographical mobility do seem to promote embourgeoisement among the managers. Those with some post-secondary schooling, for example, are more likely to belong to three or more groups and associations, more likely to have held office in one of these groups on one or more occasions, and more likely to have attended at least one of the last three meetings of the group or association most important to them. Similarly, those who began their worklives as white-collar workers of some kind are also more likely to belong to more associations, and to have attended meetings in the one most important to them.

While these relationships between occupation and secondary social participation are stronger to some extent than those examined in the preceding section on sociability, there are nevertheless some visible parallels. The first is that income level and age exert little impact on the relationship, particularly so far as the two blue-collar groups are concerned. This has important implications, since it is affluence, above all else, to which the embourgeoisement of working-class life is attributed; however, we have found no evidence to substantiate this claim either here or in the previous section. Similarly, we find that participation does tend to decline again among either or both of the immigrant groups in the sample, there is no sustained support
for the contention that immigration, and by implication ethnicity, cuts across class differences and eliminates them. The overall conclusion which suggests itself most readily in the light of these findings is that class differences remain in the matter of formal social associations. To be sure, they are not as strong as some previous studies have indicated, and there is evidence to show that the skilled are differentiated, if not fully detached, from the semi-skilled in contrast to the data on sociability. Yet notwithstanding these points, it is also clear that no appreciable narrowing of class differentials emerges when we take account of affluence, education, age, birth status, career origins, and geographical mobility. Indeed, the managers with working-class background traits such as lower education and blue-collar work origins are far more 'proletarian' in character than the skilled or the semi-skilled with some middle-class trait are 'bourgeois'. In other words, the bourgeoisifying effects of affluence etc. are far more pronounced on the managers than on the blue-collar samples.

The persistence of these class differences is further illustrated by the data presented in Table 35: These reveal a direct relationship between primary and secondary social participation: those who have more extensive primary relationships and are more active in them are also more likely to have more extensive and more active secondary relationships. However, when we examine this pattern more closely it becomes clear that this relationship is more pronounced
### TABLE 35

**Occupation and Primary and Secondary Social Participation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mngr.</th>
<th>F/man</th>
<th>Sk.</th>
<th>Semi-sk.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>v</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% who belong to 3 or more groups or associations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 5 close friends</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1402</td>
<td>0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 5 close friends</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>1382</td>
<td>0.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interacts with friends 2/3 times a month or more</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>1484</td>
<td>0.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interacts with friends once/month or less</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1288</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% who attended one or more of the last 3 meetings of the group/association most important to them</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 5 close friends</td>
<td>7.18</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>1251</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 5 close friends</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>1286</td>
<td>0.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interacts with friends 2/3 times a month or more</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>1369</td>
<td>0.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interacts with friends once a month or less</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>1158</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

among the managers, and to a lesser degree the foremen, than it is among either the skilled or the semi-skilled. Only the relationship between meeting attendance and network size reveals more change among the latter than the former; in the
other three cases the situation is reversed.

What the data show, then, is not only that class differences persist in the present sample, but also that they do exist as far as primary participation is concerned. In concluding the earlier discussion of sociability I made reference to the bias of the data in measuring only the quantitative and overlooking the qualitative aspects of the matter. The allusion to differences in the latter can now be elaborated. The greater effect of sociability on the extent of formal social association among the managers (and the foremen) suggests that the distinction between the two forms of social participation is not, in fact, as separable for them as it is for the skilled and the semi-skilled. The data, for example, suggest that "doing things" with friends and attending meetings of formal social groups are much more likely to be regarded as one and the same thing by the managers than they are by the blue-collarites. In other words, the patterns which emerge from these data do indeed imply that some qualitative difference in the nature of sociability exists for the four groups. For the managers, informal sociability and formal social association are blurred and overlapping; for the skilled and the semi-skilled this is less obviously the case. The analytical distinction we have made between the two forms, then, is more likely to be translated into a real distinction for the blue-collar workers than for the managers or foremen. As such, the data reinforce
the conclusion that significant class differences continue to exist in this fundamental aspect of life-style.

**Political Affiliations and Participation**

The subject of political affiliations and their relationship to social class are important elements, not only in the debate over embourgeoisement and proletarianisation, but also more generally in the broad discussion of the nature of modern industrial-capitalist society and the ways in which it is similar to and differs from the Victorian variety. Predictably, it has become a perennially troublesome and contentious issue. The Marxists, on the one hand, stress the continuity of class based politics and their significance *vis-à-vis* the development of a revolutionary class consciousness among the working-class. The liberal-pluralists, on the other, emphasize the relative unimportance of class cleavages in the political structures of "advanced" industrial democracies such as the United States and Canada where, supposedly, other lines of social distinction such as those based upon ethnicity, religion, and region have now superceded class as the principal sources of political differentiation. The message which is usually implied in these analyses for the other industrial societies is by now familiar and ironic enough: *de te fabula narratur!*

The relevance of political affiliations and preferences to the thesis of embourgeoisement derives largely
from their significance as an expression of commitment to the established institutional order or desire for its (more or less partial) change. As we have seen, the social context of the thesis of embourgeoisement was the relative quiescence and optimism of the 1950's. It was a period of post-war reconstruction, and was identified by many as a period of moral and cultural retrenchment which permeated a broad range of institutional realms. Sociology itself witnessed the hegemony of an ideologically conservative perspective in the form of structural-functionalism. In the realm of politics, this mood was reflected in the electoral success of relatively conservative political parties and the institutionalization of a consensus politics in which ideological differences were replaced by technical ones—the much vaunted "end of ideology". These were the Eisenhower years in the U.S., the thirteen years of uninterrupted Tory rule in the U.K., and in Canada the electoral success of the Conservative Party of Diefenbaker, only the third Tory prime minister this century and fourth since Confederation. The success of conservative politics was attributed by many observers to a substantial switch in the political preferences of many of the working-class away from traditional social democratic and liberal-centre parties to parties of the right, parties of the established middle-class, parties with the ideology and rhetoric of 'free enterprise (cf. Abrams, 1960). This was happening, so the argument went, because increasing
numbers of working-class voters now felt themselves firmly settled into the middle-class as a result of the spread of affluence, mobility, and so on—the whole litany of themes which are by now familiar to us.

While many of these claims were hastily made without much consideration for empirical evidence or much concern for historical perspective, Canadian society, of all the 'Anglo-American' democracies, seemed an especially appropriate context to support this thesis about the eclipse of class politics. In a now famous study of comparative voting patterns in the Anglo-American democracies undertaken in the early sixties, Robert Alford concluded that class-based political cleavages were least in evidence in Canada as compared to Britain, Australia, and even the United States. Indeed, in Canada, they were virtually non-existent. The reasons, at that time, seemed familiar and unmistakable: "In Canada regional and religious cleavages supercede class almost entirely as factors differentiating the support for national parties" (Alford, 1963:ix). Canadians, it seems, were simply not motivated in their political preferences by class factors.

Alford's thesis naturally stimulated a debate in which dissenting research and opinion were marshalled to contend the absence of class-based politics in Canada. Alford himself later amended his original interpretation of the data away from the motivational account toward a more
structural one in which the absence of strong class-consistent voting patterns were seen to reflect the lack of opportunity on the part of the electorate to express class sentiments at the polls. The spectrum of political ideology offered by the party system in Canada was seen as narrow and confined, offering little effective choice.

Using data collected earlier by John Meisel, Ogmundsen has recently attempted to test the implications of Alford's revised thesis (Ogmundsen, 1975). To do so he has examined the relationship between the various aspects of class, such as income, occupation, and education, controlling at the same time and in a variety of ways for voter perceptions of the policies and ideological character of the various national parties. On the whole, the results of Ogmundsen's research supported both the idea that class-consistent voting strengthens when account is taken of the voters' own perceptions of the parties, and the view that the "explanation of the classless nature of Canadian electoral politics has more to do with the Canadian political parties than with the Canadian voters" (Ogmundsen, 1975:511). The implication of this research, so far as our present interests are concerned, is that the apparent absence of straightforward patterns of class-based voting, together with the relative weakness of a national social democratic/labour party in Canada cannot be legitimately interpreted as an indication of the political embourgeoisement of the Canadian working-class.
Using a more conventional roster of control variables, McDonald undertook a study of voting intentions in Ontario at the time of the 1968 federal election (McDonald, 1971). The main hypothesis she set out to test was that of embourgeoisement, namely that the more a working-class individual displayed a middle-class characteristic or status, such as high income, greater education, etc., in short the more middle-class their situation, the less likely would they be to express an intention of voting for the New Democratic Party. The control variables were organised into three groups: "objective" status features such as income level, education, home ownership, unemployment experience; "social involvement" variables such as union membership and participation, size of residence community, and wife's occupation if she worked; and lastly "personality characteristic and subjective perception" variables such as feelings of alienation and anomie, and general life satisfaction. Somewhat surprisingly, however, she found that among the working-class respondents the class situation factors were generally weaker in their effects than the social involvement factors, most especially union membership. The attitudinal/subjective factors were least strong.

The data on the party preferences of the present sample are presented in Table 36. Given the wide range of factors to which variations in the pattern of class voting have been attributed, the list of control variables has been
### TABLE 36

**Occupation and Political Party Support**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% who support the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>2237</td>
<td>0.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>0.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>1318</td>
<td>0.228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>11.1*</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>0.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>1537</td>
<td>0.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>0.367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999pa</td>
<td>20.0*</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>1226</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000pa</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>0.251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>1564</td>
<td>0.220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &lt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>0.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &gt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>0.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>-*</td>
<td>23.1*</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>0.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once/twice</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>0.214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three or more times</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>1130</td>
<td>0.214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar start.</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>0.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman/sk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>0.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>1067</td>
<td>0.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>1559</td>
<td>0.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>0.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owns house</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>1808</td>
<td>0.217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rents accommodation</td>
<td>-*</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>0.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-unionist</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community background &lt; 5,000 pop.</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>0.195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-100,000 pop.</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>0.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 100,000 pop.</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>0.283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper/middle-class self rating</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>1201</td>
<td>0.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class self rating</td>
<td>-*</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>1006</td>
<td>0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workplace size:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 employees</td>
<td>16.7*</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>38.5*</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>0.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-1,000</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>0.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 1,000</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>1444</td>
<td>0.228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size < 15 cases

N/A not applicable
extended to include those which have figured in the debate more prominently. Included are religion, home ownership, union membership, the size of the respondent's background community, self-rated social class, and workplace size. Control for region was not possible as the number of respondents living outside Ontario was too small to make any meaningful comparison. The most immediate feature of these data is that there is indeed a fairly strong relationship between occupation and party support. The data account only for those who say they support one particular party; the number who do not does vary to some extent, from a quarter of the managers, to a fifth of the foremen and the skilled, to fifteen percent of the semi-skilled--political single-mindedness is not, it would seem a more bourgeois virtue. Yet even when we include those who express no fixed party support, the relationship remains significant and of moderate strength.

The effects of the standard control variables are, for the most part, limited, and unsupportive of the embourgeoisement thesis. Controls for income and age again reveal little change in the political affiliations of the four groups. There is no evidence to support the hypothesis that the younger blue-collar respondents are noticeably less inclined to favour the NDP, an expectation we should have were embourgeoisement taking place. Indeed, among the skilled the situation is the reverse; they tend to reinforce
the old adage that men are socialists in their youth and conservatives in their old age. Control for income has even less effect, except among the foremen where there is a decrease in NDP support for the more affluent. The skilled and the semi-skilled, however, remain unaffected, a fact which confirms Hamilton's conclusion that affluent workers are not more likely to abandon their support for parties of the left and centre as a result of pecuniary advancement alone (Hamilton, 1967).

The controls for geographical mobility and first full-time job are similarly disappointing for the advocate of embourgeoisement. The data do not confirm the implication that greater geographical mobility conduces to a more middle-class political perspective. In fact, for both the managers and the skilled support for the NDP increases moderately among the more mobile. Somewhat surprisingly we also find that little impact is made on the political affiliations of the two blue-collar groups by occupational mobility and career origins. The conventional theory of mobility effects would normally lead us to expect some retention of a more 'bourgeois' attitude among the blue-collar workers who had begun their worklives in white-collar employment and later moved into blue-collar work. Yet we do not find any evidence of less support for the NDP among either the skilled or the semi-skilled. Nor do we find any increase in NDP support among the managers who
began as blue-collar workers of some kind. Only for the foremen do career origins make much difference; here we do find that NDP support is less prevalent among those who began as white-collarites.

It is really only the effects of education which conform unambiguously to the implications of embourgeoisement, and this applies only to the semi-skilled, and to a lesser extent the foremen, where the extent of NDP support declines among those with some post-secondary schooling. Yet here too the differentials separating the four groups remain significant and strong. Increased schooling may eras some of the political difference between the managers and the semi-skilled, but it certainly does not eliminate it.

When we examine the effects of the remaining control variables on the relationship between occupation and party support, we find that they fall into roughly three groups of increasing influence. The first group, those variables with little or only moderate impact, consists of immigrant status, religion, home ownership, and size of workplace. The effect of the first of these, immigrant status, is varied and uneven. In the first place, it has little or no effect upon either the managers or the semi-skilled. Among the foremen we find that support for the NDP increases among both immigrant groups, yet among the skilled, on the other hand, it only does so among those who immigrated after they were sixteen years of age. Notwithstanding this variation,
the data do not support either the view that immigrant status attenuates class differences, nor the view that immigrants tend to be a force for political conservatism. Among both immigrant groups the relationship between party support and occupation remains moderate to fairly strong; and when immigrant status does have any effect it is to increase NDP support when compared to the native born.

As we saw above in the brief review of existing literature on class politics in Canada, religion has also been regarded as a factor which reduces, if not eliminates, class differences in political affiliations. This view, however, is not substantiated by the present data. To be sure, the incidence of NDP support among the Catholic semi-skilled is slightly lower than among the Protestants, but apart from this, there are no other noticeable changes in the distributions. Among the Catholic respondents the relationship between occupation and party support continues to remain statistically significant, and moderate in strength.

Immigrant status and religion are both factors which are conceptually and analytically unrelated to class situation; home ownership and workplace size, on the other hand, are not. In recent research on the size and nature of class differences, both economic and cultural, home ownership has been increasingly recognised as an important yet overlooked source of wealth, derived not from earned income but from the basic source of wealth, property ownership. Although
most homes are owner-occupied and therefore not used as a source of direct financial remuneration, home ownership can still be considered a form of property since, unlike most other material possessions, the historical tendency is for its value to appreciate rather than depreciate, a trend which results to some large extent from the tendency of the land-population ratio to rise. Until the post-war period, however, home ownership was still considered to be largely the preserve of the upper and middle classes, and looked upon, therefore, as just one more asset differentiating them from the working-class. During the last thirty years home ownership has indeed become more accessible to the latter, with the result that some now question the validity of regarding it as a typically and exclusively middle-class value. This is amply demonstrated by the present sample where nearly nine-tenths of the managers and foremen, four-fifths of the skilled, and three-quarters of the semi-skilled own or are buying their own homes. In view of this change, it is only to be expected that home-ownership by working-class families has been seen by some observers as an instrument of embourgeoisement. This is not, however, a hypothesis which is substantiated by the present sample. Indeed, among the semi-skilled, those who own their homes are actually very slightly more rather than less likely to support the NDP compared to those who rent their accommodation.
The effect of workplace size on attitudes and behaviour, both in and out of work, is by now well-documented (cf. Ingham, 1970). The principal theme to emerge on the matter is that smaller workplaces conduce to the development of a more socially, economically and politically conservative, and thus by implication more middle-class, outlook on life among the 'lower participants'. The reasoning behind this is that smaller workplaces permit a more close and intimate social environment in which the lower participants can associate and identify more freely with those in positions of authority and prestige. In short, the cultural and political gulf between working- and middle-class is reduced to some extent, enabling the former to develop attitudes and habits similar to those of the latter; a case of 'upward emulation' if you like. Conversely, as Marx himself pointed out, larger workplaces tend to have a more de-humanised and bureaucratic air, cutting the worker off from regular face-to-face contact with those in charge, thereby conducing to a more class conscious and antagonistic outlook. In the present sample, nonetheless, the 'bourgeoisifying' effects of workplace size are confined to the semi-skilled. Among the foremen and the skilled, on the other hand, small size has, if anything, the opposite effect as the incidence of NDP support among those in settings with fewer than 200 employees is slightly larger than among those working in larger enter-
prises. In fact, among the semi-skilled, the small number (thirteen cases) of respondents who do work in enterprises with fewer than 200 employees tends to throw some doubt onto the representativeness of the findings; when compared with those working in settings with less than 1,000 employees the increase in NDP support among those working in large enterprise is far less impressive.

The second group of controls, those which exert more influence, consists of self-rated social class and the size of the community in which the respondent grew up. As we would expect, the blue-collar respondents who rate themselves as working-class are more likely to vote for the NDP than those who see themselves as upper or middle-class. This tendency, however, is more pronounced among the skilled than among either the semi-skilled or the foremen. A substantial number of the semi-skilled who see themselves as upper or middle-class continue to support the NDP regardless of how they regard their own position in the wider society. As a result of this, the relationship between occupation and party choice continues to remain significant and fairly strong among the upper and middle-class self-raters.

The effects of community background size likewise comply with established expectations. Those from rural or small town backgrounds, it is argued, tend to be politically, socially, and economically more conservative
than the more urbanised. Accordingly, we find that support for the NDP is highest among those blue-collarites who grew up in large (over 100,000 pop.) cities, though only lowest among those from rural/small town backgrounds in the case of the skilled. It should also be noted that community background has no effect to speak of at all among the foremen and the managers. As a consequence of this, class differentials in party support become quite strong for those of large urban backgrounds. These figures also reflect the tension which seems to have plagued the social democratic movement in Canada during the post-war period. This tension is that between the rural/small town origins of the social democratic movement in the primary producing hinterlands of the Prairies and, more recently, Northern Ontario and its growing base of electoral and financial support in urban, industrial centres like Vancouver and Toronto-Hamilton.

This change is also illustrated when we turn to the last control variable, that which, above all the others, exerts the most substantial effect on the class/vote relationship, namely union membership. In this respect, the present data replicate the findings of the earlier McDonald study in which union membership was also found to be the single most important factor affecting class differences in party support. It is also evident, however, that the effects of union membership are uneven and
variable, having greater impact on the political choices of the foremen and the skilled than on the semi-skilled. This would suggest that NDP support among the latter is fairly well established and resilient, suggesting, in turn, that participation in class institutions on the part of the semi-skilled is less important for the formation of political opinions than it is for the skilled or the foremen. Notwithstanding this difference, the data show quite clearly that unionism is an important political institution which helps to shape the outlooks and behaviour of its members in spite of the fact that the respondents have, as we saw in the previous chapter, an overwhelmingly instrumental view of the role of the union in their lives. From the perspective of the embourgeoisement thesis, these data indicate, finally, that unionism is a significant bar to political embourgeoisement, especially among the skilled. Though we cannot examine the comparative effects union membership has upon the ranks of the white-collar labour force (there are only three unionised managers in the present sample!), its effects upon the blue-collar respondents indicate that it may be a source of political 'proletarianisation', particularly given the recent growth of unions in the white-collar and manual service workforces and the apparent spread of militancy among their ranks.

From an overall perspective, the most striking feature of these data dealing with political party support
is that the effects of the control variables differ from group to group. On the one hand are the semi-skilled and the managers, those whose class position is firmly established and on whom the controls have generally moderate impact at best. If we take the semi-skilled, for example, their support for the NDP never drops much below forty percent, as in the case of the un-unionised and those (few) working in small enterprises, nor does it rise much beyond sixty percent, as in the case of those who were brought up in large urban areas—in short a spread of about twenty percent. For the foremen and the skilled, on the other hand, the range of variation under control conditions is manifestly greater. Among the latter, for example, NDP support varies from a low of just under twenty percent among the un-unionised to a high of over fifty-five percent for those who are union members—a range of more than thirty-five percent. This variation between the skilled and the semi-skilled suggests two things. First, the implication of the data is that political attitudes are more firmly embedded, and therewith more resilient to the impact of status modifications, among the semi-skilled than among the skilled. Secondly, as a direct result of this, the data do provide some support for the position argued by MacKenzie, Form, and others that the working-class in the advanced industrial-capitalist societies is becoming increasingly differentiated internally along the lines of
skill. In our present sample the skilled have shown themselves more susceptible to the impact of age, birthplace status, geographical mobility, union membership, size of community background, and self-rated social class insofar as the nature of political commitment is concerned. Only education and (questionably) workplace size have shown themselves to have greater impact on the political affiliations of the semi-skilled than on the skilled. This difference implies that the skilled are clearly more marginal in their political situation, and more responsive to the influence of factors other than their immediate position in the societal division of labour.

This difference in responsiveness between the skilled and the semi-skilled does not reveal itself when we examine class differences and similarities in political participation. Indeed, from a more general point of view, the differences in political affiliation outlined above do not carry over into the realm of participation in the political process. As we can see from Tables 37 and 38, the vast majority of all four groups report that they voted in the previous provincial and federal elections; the differentials are weak at best, and only statistically significant in the case of voting at the federal level. At the same time, it is also clear that again for the vast bulk of all four groups participation in the political process does not extend much beyond this level to other
### TABLE 37

Occupation and Voting in Federal Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of eligible respondents who voted in the last federal election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>0.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>1591</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>100.0*</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>1795</td>
<td>0.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-sec.</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns less than $7,999pa</td>
<td>100.0*</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>1363</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns more than $8,000pa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>1875</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. before 16 yrs. old</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>0.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. after 16 yrs. old</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>85.7*</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once/twice</td>
<td>97.8</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three or more times</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>1342</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-c. starter</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>95.7</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman/sk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>97.8</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>1208</td>
<td>0.080</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size less than 15 cases

activities such as making financial contributions to political parties and/or attending party rallies. When we further exclude the foremen and blue-collar respondents who belong to a union and therewith may make financial contributions as part of their membership dues, then we find that the
### TABLE 38

**Occupation and Voting in Provincial Elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mgr</th>
<th>F/man</th>
<th>Sk</th>
<th>Semi-sk</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of eligibles who</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>2640</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>voted in the last</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provincial election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>1010</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>1593</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>100.0*</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>1825</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>0.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999pa</td>
<td>100.0*</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>1401</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000pa</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>1218</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &lt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>0.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &gt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once/twice</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>0.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three or</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>1369</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more times</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-c. starter</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman/sk. blue-coll</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collar starter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/usnk. blue-coll</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>1227</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size less than 15 cases

Proportion who do contribute and/or attend rallies declines to 13% among the skilled and a mere 2% among the semi-skilled (Table 39).

The relative absence of any difference between the four groups cannot, however, be interpreted legitimately as a sign of embourgeoisement among the two blue-collar groups. In the first place, the narrow differentials are not especially contingent upon the bourgeoisifying factors
of affluence, education, geographical mobility, immigrant status, or career origins. The only substantial change which comes about with controls is the greater likelihood of participation beyond the voting level which appears among the semi-skilled who began their worklives in white-collar employment. Insofar as more extensive participation in the political process is typically regarded as a more middle-class attribute in our society, then this change is indeed congruent with the implications of the embourgeoisement thesis. At the same time, it is by no means clear on the basis of the present sample that greater participation, or even substantial participation, is indeed such a bourgeois trait: the data concerning the managers show that at best only about one fifth of them do indeed contribute financially to political parties and/or attend party rallies. In view of this, the only appropriate conclusion which suggests itself is that the absence of any appreciable difference in the matter of political participation between the four groups signifies some degree of convergence in which there exists a high level of participation at the polls, but little beyond that.

In this respect, the data presented below do depart to some extent from the conventional images of working- and middle-class patterns of political participation. Traditionally we find the working-class to be portrayed as having low levels of participation in the
TABLE 39
Occupation and Other Political Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% who contribute money and/or attend political rallies</th>
<th>Mngr.</th>
<th>F/man</th>
<th>Sk.</th>
<th>Semi-sk.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>1135</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>1648</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>0.191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999pa</td>
<td>33.3*</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>1524</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000pa</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &lt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &gt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>0.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once/twice</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>1051</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three or more times</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>1438</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size < 15 cases

political process, e.g. they do not stand for office, join political parties, or even show up in great numbers at election times. The middle-class, on the other hand, are seen to have a much higher degree of political efficacy which is subsequently translated into a more active political outlook and involvement. The data on voting behaviour do not confirm the first of these views; the data on contributions and rally attendance do not confirm the second. As
in the case of primary social participation, then, we simply cannot speak of a clear-cut case of either embourgeoisement or proletarianisation. To do so would again oversimplify the findings and obscure the situation at hand.

Mass Media Use and Taste

As Max Weber never tired of telling us, one of the major features of modern western society is its rationality. We inhabit a world in which actions and thoughts are considered to be largely a matter of purposive choice on the part of the individual or group; the way we live is seen as the result of a deliberate, sometimes even contrived, pursuit of certain goals and principles. And in this fundamental respect we see ourselves as quite distinct from our pre-industrial forebears. This does not, of course, mean that individuals remain uninfluenced by outside forces and factors in making the decisions which shape their 'style' of life. Nor does it mean that the actions which emanate from these decisions are devoid of unintended or unanticipated consequences which may distort or even countervail the original purpose of action. But it does mean that we regard life-style as something people choose to affect, and in so doing we have developed institutions and technologies whose own rational purpose (though this may well be denied by those in control) is to influence and shape what we do, what we think, and how we feel: the
mass communications media—books, magazines, newspapers, television, radio.

In realising this task of persuasion, the media have also given rise to unintended consequences of their own, or so some have argued. One of the more prominent of these is the homogenisation of taste, style, and opinion. For Marxists, this homogenisation results largely from the fact that, especially in North America, the mass media are for the most part privately owned institutions which serve as a source of profit and capital accumulation for their owners. As such, it is argued, they naturally convey a message which is both politically and economically conservative, a buttress to the capitalist system in whose maintenance and expansion the owners and controllers have a vested interest. Liberal-pluralists, on the other hand, see the apparent homogenising effects of the mass media as a counter-weight to the structural differentiation which inevitably accompanies the process of societal modernisation. In this view of things, the role of the mass media is essentially a benign and salutary one; they serve as the glue to promote national integration and value consensus and thereby help the differentiated structures cohere.

But this is only one view. Simply because the media may convey what is, for all intents and purposes, the same message, does not necessarily mean that this message is interpreted in the same way, with the same impact, or
that it inspires the same behavioural response among all those who receive it. Simply because advertisements, for example, tend to portray a view of the world as a rather cloying place populated by respectable middle-class families --suburban home, station wagon, houseproud wife, industrious husband, and two children who are no longer cavity prone because they use the right toothpaste, etc.-- does not mean that all those who find themselves exposed to it will automatically appropriate this image as the model to emulate for their own lives.

As we saw in Chapter IV, there is indeed a sizable body of literature to support both views—that the media homogenise taste and style, on the one hand, and that traditional cultural differences remain relatively resistant to their effects, on the other. Against the homogenisation thesis we can draw upon the research which suggests that working- and middle-class persons use the media and are influenced by them in different ways. For example, a lot of research indicates that working-class individuals are more oriented to the electronic media, television and radio, than to print, and seek primarily entertainment value from them rather than use them for informational and educational value. The middle-class are seen as the reverse: more oriented to print and to information and education. On the other hand, writers like Wilensky (1961) and Bogart (1964) both argue that media use and tastes are now effectively
levelled, and that traditional class differences are all but eliminated at best, and were always largely fictitious at worst (for both views, see Chapter IV).

The data dealing with media use and taste among the present sample are presented in Tables 40 to 44 inclusive. On the whole, they tend to support the homogenisation thesis: in all cases except the extent of television viewing the relationship between occupation and media use and taste is weak. Even in the matter of television viewing, the relationship is barely moderate, though it does conform to expectations insofar as the managers say they watch less television than the blue-collar respondents. In the case of newspaper reading, we find that about half of each group reads two or more papers regularly. The single most popular section, and indeed the single most popular category of television programmes, among all the groups is sports news. Combining the categories together, however, we find that between a half and three-fifths of the respondents are most interested in the political, financial, and editorial sections of the paper. The majority also claim that they watch less than two hours of television per day on average, though this is more pronounced among the managers. An even greater majority listen to less

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This figure is somewhat less than national statistics suggest is the typical amount of viewing done in North America. One reason for this may hinge upon definition of the word "watch". The respondents may have interpreted this to mean a deliberate decision to tune in and follow certain programmes as opposed to being simply in the same room as the television when others are watching it; but having no attentive interest in what's on oneself.
TABLE 40
Occupation and Newspaper Use

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% who regularly read &gt; 2 or more newspapers</th>
<th>Mngr.</th>
<th>F/man</th>
<th>Sk.</th>
<th>Semi-sk.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 40</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>1116</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>1623</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>91.7*</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>0.213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>0.236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999pa</td>
<td>66.7*</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>1502</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000pa</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>1237</td>
<td>0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>1896</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &lt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &gt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>0.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>0.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once/twice</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>0.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three or more times</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>1412</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-c. starter</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman/sk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>1034</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unk. blue-collar/starter</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>1281</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size &lt; 15 cases

than two hours of radio programming per day. As for taste, finally, it would seem that the clear majority of all four groups uses television for its entertainment rather than its informational and educational value. Movies, variety shows, comedies, fiction serials, and especially sports and adventure shows are the favourites of all the groups, the managers included.

The absence of any substantial differentials between
### TABLE 41

#### Occupation and Radio Use

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% who listen to the</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>2785</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>radio 2 hours or</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less each day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>1132</td>
<td>0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>1631</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>91.7*</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999pa</td>
<td>100.0*</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>1517</td>
<td>0.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000pa</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>1248</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &lt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>0.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &gt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>85.7*</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once/twice</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>1045</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three or</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>1426</td>
<td>0.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more times</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-c. starter</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman/sk. blue-coll</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>1051</td>
<td>0.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi/-unsk. blue-coll</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>1286</td>
<td>0.097</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample < 15 cases

The four groups in the matters of media use and taste consequently raises the problem of theoretical interpretation: in what direction, or directions, does the homogeneity point? As I argued in the matter of primary social participation, the situation cannot be interpreted in blanket and unconditional terms either as embourgeoisement or proletarianisation. The situation is more mixed and complex. In the matter of media use, the patterns established
by the data suggest some form of convergence between the four groups; both the conventional image of working-class media use and that of middle-class media use remain unsupported by the data to some extent. For example, there is no solid evidence to confirm the conventional image that the middle-class are print oriented as barely more than half of the managers read more than one newspaper on a regular basis. Similarly the contrary view that working-class persons are heavily oriented to the electronic media also remains unconfirmed: fully three-fifths of the semi-skilled and two-thirds of the skilled state that they watch an average of less than two hours of television a day, hardly the kind of dose of which TV narcosis is made! An even greater proportion—about four fifths of each group—listen to less than two hours of radio.

In the matter of media taste, on the other hand, we would appear to have a case of proletarianisation, though deeper inspection casts some qualification on this. The proletarianisation of the managers' media tastes is most evident in the case of which television programmes they prefer to watch. Contrary to expectations, a clear majority choose programmes which have a predominantly entertainment value; their interest in informational programmes is, to say the least, rather weak. When it comes to the matter of print tastes, then the evidence is
TABLE 42

Occupation and Television Use

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mng.</th>
<th>F/man</th>
<th>Sk.</th>
<th>Semi-sk.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% who watch TV 2 hours/day or less</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>2806</td>
<td>0.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>1136</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>1648</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>83.3*</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999pa</td>
<td>100.0*</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>1531</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000pa</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>1255</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigr. &lt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>0.195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigr. &gt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>0.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once/twice</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>1055</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three or more times</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>1434</td>
<td>0.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-c. starter</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman/sk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>1060</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>1294</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size < 15 cases

more equivocal. As mentioned above, the single most popular section of the newspaper, for the managers as well as the foremen and the blue-collar groups, is sports news. At the same time, a majority of three-fifths of the managers prefer the political, financial, and editorial sections combined. A majority, in short, is more interested in serious news reporting than in sports or cultural events news. As this is also the case for the other groups as
**TABLE 43**

Occupation and Television Taste

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% who are information oriented toward TV</th>
<th>Mngr.</th>
<th>F/man</th>
<th>Sk.</th>
<th>Semi-sk.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 40</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>1117</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>1623</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>25.0*</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>0.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999 pa</td>
<td>50.0*</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>1499</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000 pa</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>1243</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &lt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &gt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>14.3*</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once/twice</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>1038</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three or more times</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-c. starter</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman/sk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>1044</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>1275</td>
<td>0.088</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size < 15 cases

well, the data can be read as indicating convergence again; the difference is one of scale, of whether we compare individual news categories or take a broader, more general view of the matter.

We must not overlook, however, the fact that although we find no overall indications of embourgeoisement, the thesis makes the process contingent upon affluence, education, mobility, and the tenor of the times. When we
examine the effects of the control variables on the relationship between occupation and media use and taste, it is at once evident that a good many changes take place. For the most part, however, these do not confirm the implications of the embourgeoisement thesis. What support there is is fragmentary and uneven. Of all the controls, career origins and education appear to have the most supportive impact. We find, for example, that radio listening and television viewing are lower respectively among the semi-skilled and the skilled who began their own worklives in white-collar employment. At the same time, we do not find that this lessened interest in the electronic media is compensated by greater interest in reading newspapers, a fact which would suggest that the two forms of medium are not necessarily competitive and exclusive.

The effect of education is broader, but again leaves some room for doubt. Among the semi-skilled with some post-secondary schooling we do find a decrease in radio and television use which is accompanied, at the same time, by an increase in newspaper use. The skilled, on the other hand, prove to be more resistant to the effects of education, as only television viewing decreases noticeably among those with advanced schooling. So here too, we find that the bourgeoisifying impact of one of the controls is restricted in its scope. Control for immigrant status, finally, does not reveal much support for the
TABLE 44
Occupation and Newspaper Taste

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% who are most interested in political, financial, editorial sections of newspaper</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>2585</td>
<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>1062</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>1522</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>30.0*</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>1810</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999pa</td>
<td>50.0*</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>1406</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000pa</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>1179</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>1804</td>
<td>0.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &lt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &gt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>0.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once/twice</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>984</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three or more times</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>1333</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-c. starter</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman/sk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>989</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size < 15 cases

argument that ethnic pluralism cuts across and attenuates class differences. Although changes in media use are evident among the immigrant groups when we compare them to
the native born, we do not find any substantial change in the magnitude of the occupational differentials among these sub-
samples. As such, the absence of any substantial class differences in media use in the overall sample cannot be
attributed to the presence of a fairly large number of immigrants in the sample.

The impact of the control variables on media taste paints a similar picture; what support there is for the implications of the embourgeoisement thesis is rather fragmentary and uneven. Income and geographical mobility have little effect at all. With control for age we find a generally increased interest in informational programmes on television and in the financial, political and editorial sections of the paper. In the former case, nonetheless, it is still clear that even among the older respondents television is looked to primarily for its entertainment rather than its informational content. Moreover, in both cases, the changes which occur to the distributions when we take account of age apply to all four groups to a similar extent, and thus have little effect at all on the magnitude of the differentials between them.

The effects of career origins and education are erratic, and even to some extent contradictory to the thesis of embourgeoisement. This is most apparent in the matter of television taste: among the skilled respondents who have experienced some post-secondary schooling we find, as we would expect, some increase in the proportion who are interested in television primarily for its informational value. Among the managers, on the other hand, we find quite the reverse! A similar paradox applies also in the
effect of career origins on television taste: interest in television for its informational value is actually highest among those who began their worklives as semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers and lowest among those who began their worklives in white-collar employment. In short, we find that the managers with the most 'bourgeois' backgrounds have the most 'proletarian' taste in television! For the skilled and the semi-skilled career origins have no appreciable effect on their tastes in television. These patterns, then, seriously question our conventional views about both working- and middle-class media taste; they tend to support Wilensky's thesis that television, and the mass media generally, have now penetrated the ranks of the middle-class, subsequently diluting traditional bourgeois taste and replacing them with preferences of a more mass, less class-specific nature (Wilensky, 1960, 1964). Indeed, under all control conditions, the majority of all four groups remains firmly oriented to television as a source of entertainment rather than information or education.

In the matter of newspaper tastes, the effects of education fall more in line with expectations: among both the foremen and the skilled, interest in the financial, political, and editorial sections of the paper is greatest among those with most education, though among the managers and the semi-skilled education seems to make little difference thereby qualifying the overall impact of education.
The effect of career origins is similarly negligible for the managers, and the skilled also, and among the foremen and the semi-skilled the changes it induces do not meet fully with expectations. Among the foremen, for example, interest in serious news coverage is indeed highest among the white-collar starters, however it is lowest not among the semi- or unskilled starters but among those who began their work-lives as foremen or skilled workers. Likewise, for the semi-skilled, although interest in serious news coverage is lowest among those who started as semi- or unskilled workers, it is highest, not among the white-collar starters, but among those who entered the labour force as foremen or skilled workers. The pattern of effects, in other words, is erratic and inconsistent. Yet notwithstanding this, it is also evident that the effect of the controls is only modest at best; for the most part, a moderate majority of the respondents looks to the newspaper as a source of serious coverage of events in the wider political and economic realms.

When we compare together the two aspects of media taste, it becomes evident that they are in some respect opposite to each other: television is looked to for its entertainment value, the newspaper for its informational value. This raises the question of whether these two forms of medium, both in the extent and in the purpose of their use, are competitive and exclusive, or whether they are
complementary, each performing a different communications function. As we can see from Table 45, when we compare the use of the two media by the sample respondents, we find no significant differences. Those who watch more than two hours of television daily, regardless of occupation, are only very slightly less likely to read regularly two or more newspapers. As far as their use is concerned, then, there is no evidence to suggest that the print and electronic media are competitive to any great extent. When we compare the two in terms of taste, however, a more significant pattern emerges; those who watch television primarily for its informational and educational value are also more likely, especially in the case of the two blue-collar groups, to be most interested in the serious news sections of the paper. This suggests some overlap of taste, and throws some doubt on the hypothesis that each form is used for a different purpose.

These patterns should not, however, overshadow the general findings on the subject of class and media use and taste. Firstly, it is clear from the foregoing that class differences are weak or moderate at best in the five aspects of media use and taste we have examined. As the most opposite statement on this we might well re-echo Bogart's remark to the effect that "contrary to stereo-typed expectations, the mass media experience of blue-collar workers and their families news remarkably close to the...main line"
TABLE 45

Occupation and Comparative Media Use and Taste

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% who read 2 or more newspapers</th>
<th>Mngr.</th>
<th>F/man</th>
<th>Sk.</th>
<th>Semi-sk.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>watch &lt; 2 hrs. TV/day</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>1816</td>
<td>0.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>watch &gt; 2 hrs. TV/day</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>0.089</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% most interested in the political, financial, editorial sections of newspaper</th>
<th>Mngr.</th>
<th>F/man</th>
<th>Sk.</th>
<th>Semi-sk.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entertainment orientation to TV</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information oriented to TV</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Bogart, 1964:428). At the same time, we must bear in mind that this conclusion applies also to the "manager" and his family.

As this qualification implies, the absence of any substantial class differences in the data, with the possible exception of the amount of television viewing, cannot be interpreted legitimately as either an embourgeoisement or proletarianisation of media use and taste; the situation at hand points rather to some convergence between the managers and the blue-collar groups. Even when we take account of the various factors to which the process of embourgeoisement has been attributed, we find no consistent, unequivocal, or substantial evidence that any such trend is afoot. Indeed, we find that in some cases the 'bourgeoisifying'
agents exert a more conspicuous influence on the behaviour of the managers than on either the skilled or the semi-skilled. In the case of newspaper reading, for example, we find that education, income (possibly at least—the sub-sample of non-affluent managers is really too small for reliable judgment), birthplace status, geographical mobility, and career origins all have some identifiable, if modest, effect on the managers. By contrast, only education, birthplace status, and career origins leave any comparable mark on the semi-skilled. What this again illustrates and reaffirms is that "middle-classness" cannot be presumed to be unproblematic, to be a stable, homogeneous state which can be used as a sure benchmark against which to evaluate the habits and outlooks of others. Like "working-classness", it is a loose amalgam of attitudes and behaviours which are subject to the play of outside circumstance. Like those of the working-class, the life-styles of the middle-class must be seen to be subject to the process of dialectical change, interacting with and changing with the environment of which they form a part. To presume otherwise is simplistic and misleading.

Values

In Chapter IV we examined five value themes commonly associated in the literature on class culture with differences in working- and middle-class orientations to the world, with
different social class personalities. The portrait of working-class beliefs which emerged from this discussion took on the following contours. Firstly, working-class persons were seen to be more person- as opposed to object-oriented. This theme represented the general antipathy observed among working-class individuals to rules of social formality and impersonality, such as those which predominate in and are responsible for structuring bureaucratic environments. Person-orientedness comes close in meaning to the more common idea of ascriptiveness: an orientation to others on the basis of who they are rather than how well they perform according to some extraneous rules or standards. Related to this was the theme of pragmatism, a practical as opposed to idealistic and intellectual orientation, particularly to problem-solving. Like person-orientedness, pragmatism implies a 'here-and-now', situational orientation rather than one grounded in the application of general or abstract principles. One of the most contentious themes to recur in the literature on value orientations is that of working-class authoritarianism, or to use a less dubious term, conformism. Working-class persons are often portrayed as authoritarian or conformist insofar as they tend to be more accepting of established sources of authority and instruction, using these rather than self-judgment as the cues for action. This general notion has been applied to phenomena as diverse as working-class child-rearing practices.
and the putative attraction of the working-class to extremist social and political movements. The last two themes concern orientations to time and space. Working-class individuals are pictured as suspicious of the future, and pessimistic about what it holds in store. As a result of this, it is argued, they are oriented primarily to the present, to the 'here-and-now' situation which is visible and knowable.

A common version of this present-orientatedness was the idea of a widespread inability among the working-class to "defer gratification" prevalent in the educational sociology of the fifties and early sixties as an explanation of why they did not avail themselves as fully of the opportunities for further education as did the progeny of the middle-class.

Working-class orientations to space, finally, is represented by the related ideas of home- and family-centredness: a preference for social arenas which are familiar and narrowly circumscribed thus reducing the uncertainties associated with social interaction.

These five themes were then combined into one general or meta-theme represented by the concept of neophobia—the fear and dislike of things new, uncertain, unpredictable, unknown. Running as a common thread throughout the five specific themes are the ideas of familiarity and routine. These were seen to be largely the result of the situational powerlessness of the working-class in the wider social, political and economic order, a general inability to exercise
influence and control over the forces which ultimately shape the various facets of daily life. These value themes were seen, in other words, as a reaction to and compensation for the powerlessness and inefficacy resulting from their position in the societal division of labour.

The present data enable us to re-examine four of these specific themes together with the overarching idea of neophobia which has been divided into two types—work neophobia and general neophobia. The one theme which has had to be omitted from consideration due to the inadequacy of the data is that of person-versus object-orientedness. It is interesting to note, nonetheless, that two attitudinal questions included in the survey polled the respondents on what they believed to be the most important factors to take into account when considering someone for employment or promotion. The distributions for these questions indicate that the overwhelming majority of all four groups—over ninety percent—stated that performance and accomplishments were far more important than such things as family background.

The remaining themes were measured by means of Likert-style attitudinal questions which were included in the original questionnaire. An index was constructed for each value theme by collapsing two, and in some cases three, of these questions together. The choice of variables for each index was made on the basis of a two-step procedure.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% with a moderate-high present orientation</th>
<th>Mngn.</th>
<th>F/man</th>
<th>Sk.</th>
<th>Semi-sk.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 40</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>1141</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>1659</td>
<td>0.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>0.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &lt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>0.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &gt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>8.3*</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>0.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once/twice</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>1057</td>
<td>0.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three-or more times</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>1445</td>
<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size < 15 cases

The first was to classify several variables together on the basis of face value validity. Each category of variables was then factor analysed using the "factor" subprogramme of the S.P.S.S. programme. The results of this were then used as the basis for selecting the variables from which each of the final indices was compiled, a task which was accomplished by means of the S.P.S.S. "compute" subprogramme. Each index was then recoded dichotomously into a moderate-to-high value
orientation on the one hand, and a neutral-to-low orientation on the other. Further details of this procedure together with specification of the Likert measures from which each index was constructed are provided in Appendix C.

The data concerning the relationship between occupation and time orientation, conformism, family orientation, pragmatism, general neophobia, and work neophobia are presented in Tables 46 through to 51 respectively. As in the matters of primary sociability, political participation, mass media use, and media taste, the most striking feature about these figures is the absence of any substantial relationship between occupation and value orientation in all but the case of work neophobia (Table 51). In all of the remaining five cases, the size of the differentials separating the four occupational groups is either weak or very weak, and in some cases—notably family orientation and pragmatism—the relationship does not even achieve statistical significance at the 0.05 level.

Conforming to the pattern established in the previous cases where the relationship between the dependent variable and occupation was weak, we similarly find that the effect of the control variables on the relationship between occupation and these five value themes is generally limited, though in some cases partial support for the implications of the embourgeoisement thesis is revealed. Among both the
TABLE 47

Occupation and Conformism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% with moderate-high conformist orientation</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>2823</td>
<td>0.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>1141</td>
<td>0.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>1660</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>0.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &lt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &gt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>33.3*</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>0.248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once/twice</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>1057</td>
<td>0.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three or more times</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>1445</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999pa</td>
<td>33.3*</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>1539</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000pa</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>1263</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar starter</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman/sk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>1066</td>
<td>0.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>1302</td>
<td>0.104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size < 15 cases

skilled and the semi-skilled groups, for example, the extent of present-orientedness (Table 46) declines somewhat with increasing geographical mobility. Among the semi-skilled, likewise, the incidence of general neophobia (Table 50), pragmatism (Table 49), and conformism (Table 47) is lowest for those who began their worklives as white-collar workers of some kind. Of all the control variables, the effect of education is most supportive of the thesis. This applies
### TABLE 48

*Occupation and Family Orientation*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% with moderate-to-high family orient.</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>2821</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 yrs.</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 yrs.</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>1659</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. before 16</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. after 16</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>0.169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>91.7*</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once/twice</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>1056</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved 3+ times</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>1445</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns under $7,999</td>
<td>100.0*</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>1537</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns over $8,000</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>1263</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar starter</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/man or sk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>1064</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>95.7</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>1302</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size less than 15 cases
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% with moderate-high pragmatic orientation</th>
<th>Mng.</th>
<th>F/man</th>
<th>Sk.</th>
<th>Semi-sk.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 40</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>1141</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>1660</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &lt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &gt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
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<td>91.3</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>687</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
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<td>81.3</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>72.1</td>
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<td>0.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once/twice</td>
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<td>83.7</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>1057</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three or more times</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>1445</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999pa</td>
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<td>83.0</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>1539</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000pa</td>
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<td>80.7</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>84.1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman/sk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>1066</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>1302</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size < 15 cases

most clearly insofar as the skilled workers are concerned, for whom present-orientedness, conformism, and pragmatism are least in extent among those with some post-secondary schooling. On the whole, nevertheless, the changes which these controls bring about are limited in size, uneven in impact, and fragmentary in scope. As such, the absence of any substantial relationship between occupation cannot be attributed to their intervention.
**TABLE 50**

*Occupation and General Neophobia*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% with moderate-high general neophobia</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>2823</td>
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<td>Under 40</td>
<td>13.2</td>
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<td>9.7</td>
<td>1141</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>1660</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &lt; 16 yrs.</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>20.0</td>
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<td>14.9</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>0.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>8.3*</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never moved</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved once/twice</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>1057</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved three or more times</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>1445</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &lt;$7,999pa</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>1539</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000pa</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>1263</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar starter</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>0.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman/sk. blue-collar starter</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>1066</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-collar starter</td>
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<td>4.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>1302</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size < 15 cases

Despite the consistent pattern of weak or very weak relationships, the situation which these data depict cannot be assumed to be simple and straightforward. As in the previous instances of weak or insubstantial class differences, the data introduce the thorny problem of theoretical interpretation. Which of the three perspectives—embourgeoisement, proletarianisation, or class convergence—does this relative homogeneity between the
four occupational groups point to most readily?

Following the pattern established in those earlier cases, the data again point least ambiguously to the latter situation, that of convergence. The reasoning behind this conclusion is that in various respects the distributions fail to confirm not only the conventional image of working-class values, but also that of middle-class values, thereby casting doubt onto the appropriateness of both the thesis of proletarianisation and that of embourgeoisement. To illustrate: on the one hand, we find that the incidence of both present-orientatedness and general neophobia is low among all four groups. This situation, then, does not live up to expectations about working-class attitudes to time and social change derived from the overall image established in Chapter IV. On the other hand, we also find that the incidence of pragmatism and family-orientatedness is very high among all four groups. This, in turn, departs to some extent from the view that the middle-class are more individualistic and intellectualistic, more oriented to career and more concerned with ideals and abstract principle. And in the matter of conformism, finally, we find that there is no clear overall pattern. There exists a more or less even split in orientations among all four groups, with about a half to three-fifths rating moderate-to-highly conformist. In this respect neither conventional image receives much support: the
incidence of conformism among the blue-collar groups is too low, and among the managers too high.

Thus we have only partial support for either the thesis of embourgeoisement or that of proletarianisation. From an overall point of view, neither provides an adequate interpretation of the situation reflected by the data. What the latter do suggest, rather, is a mixed situation, one of convergence to a more or less common point. As far as the blue-collar groups are concerned, moreover, the data do cast some doubt about three of the more ideologically contentious characterisations of working-class life, namely that they are conformist, and by implication authoritarian, narrow-minded, incapable of independent thought and action, that they are oriented predominantly to the present and thus incapable of the future vision necessary to succeed economically and socially, and that they are afraid of change and by implication incapable of the risk-taking and adventurousness likewise necessary for mobility and success. The implication of these data, then, is that the situation of the working-class cannot be attributed to the lack of appropriate motivation, but rather has more to do with the availability of opportunity.

This situation of weak class differences does not apply in the matter of the sixth variable, work neophobia. As we can see from Table 51, the relationship between
occupation and work neophobia is fairly strong, and remains at least moderate under all control conditions. This, however, is only what we would expect in light of the literature on the work situation reviewed in Chapter III and the analysis of the present sample in Chapter VI, namely that the semi-skilled express most concern over change in the workplace, and the managers the least. The skilled, in turn, occupy a position interstitial between the managers and the semi-skilled, a fact which does offer some support for the internal differentiation of the working-class hypothesis. But as in those other aspects of class situation where the skilled are differentiated from the semi-skilled, it remains the case that they continue to be clearly differentiated from the managers as well. The differentiation of the skilled from the semi-skilled, in other words, should not be equated with an embourgeoisement of the former.

The effect of the control variables on this relationship is varied, but generally follows the pattern established in the case of the other work situation variables. Income, immigrant status, and career origins have a limited impact, though generally in the direction we would expect. Of the three, this is most evident in the case of the latter. Among the foremen particularly, work neophobia is least in evidence for those who began their worklives in white-collar work. The same is true,
### TABLE 51

**Occupation and Work Neophobia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mng.</th>
<th>F/man</th>
<th>Sk.</th>
<th>Semi-sk.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% with moderate-high</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>work neophobia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>2822</td>
<td>0.211</td>
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<tr>
<td>Over 40</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>1141</td>
<td>0.188</td>
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<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>26.1</td>
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<td>1936</td>
<td>0.206</td>
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<td>25.9</td>
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<td>249</td>
<td>0.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. &gt; 16 yrs.</td>
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<td>36.4</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>0.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade-school</td>
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<td>37.0</td>
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<td>67.7</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>0.226</td>
</tr>
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<td>34.5</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>0.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some post-second.</td>
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<td>14.8</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>0.373</td>
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<td>26.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>52.1</td>
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<td>0.234</td>
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<td>Moved once or twice</td>
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<td>29.3</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>1057</td>
<td>0.222</td>
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<td>15.5</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
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<td>1445</td>
<td>0.191</td>
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<tr>
<td>Earns &lt; $7,999pa</td>
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<td>55.9</td>
<td>1538</td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earns &gt; $8,000pa</td>
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<td>26.9</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>1263</td>
<td>0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar starter</td>
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<td>29.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>0.329</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreman/sk. blue-coll</td>
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<td>36.7</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>1065</td>
<td>0.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-/unsk. blue-coll</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>1302</td>
<td>0.201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* subsample size < 15 cases

Though less obviously, for the managers and the skilled as well. For the semi-skilled, on the other hand, work origins has no effect at all. For the latter, income level has the most effect of the three controls, and, as we would expect, the extent of neophobia declines very modestly among the affluent. None of these changes, however, is particularly substantial; in all cases the relationship between occupation and work neophobia remains at least
moderate in strength.

The controls for age, education and geographical mobility provide slightly more support for the implications of the embourgeoisement thesis. In the case of age, for example, we find that the younger blue-collar and foremen respondents express less fear of change at work than do their older colleagues. Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess precisely whether this can be put down to historical changes in the social ambiance of post-war capitalism—to a more optimistic and change-oriented culture—or whether it simply is due to the effects of passage through the age structure, of aging per se. As we have seen in Chapter III, and again in the preceding chapter, there is a good deal of evidence to indicate that older members of society are generally more conservative and suspicious of change regardless of cultural and historical context. This is nowhere more evident than in the area of occupational and industrial sociology: as one ages so, one's investment in the established order of things becomes greater, and therewith change tends to be regarded increasingly as a threat insofar as it may disrupt that investment—the steady job, a quiet retirement, a secure pension, and so on. Although we cannot test these two hypotheses with our present data—to do so would require time-series data which we simply do not have—the weight of the evidence from other research falls squarely on the side of the latter interpretation, that increased neophobia among the older respondents results from
the aging process rather than historical change. In any event, it must also be borne in mind that among both the old and the young respondents, the relationship between occupation and work neophobia continues to remain statistically significant and moderate-to-fairly strong.

With increased geographical mobility we also find a decrease in the incidence of work neophobia among all four groups, though most especially among the skilled. Although this meets with expectations, the possibility arises that this change is a spurious one, and that the decrease in neophobia is really the result of increased occupational rather than residential mobility; the two forms clearly are related, and we would expect occupational mobility to have a greater effect on work attitudes than would mobility of a residential and geographical kind. However, when we control simultaneously for both forms of mobility we find that the decline in neophobia is due more to the effects of geographical than occupational mobility. For example, even among those who have changed jobs three or more times but never changed residence nearly seventy percent of the semi-skilled and sixty percent of the skilled score moderate-to-high on the work neophobia index. Compared to this, of those who have never changed jobs but moved their residence three or more times, only fifty percent of the semi-skilled and thirty-five percent of the skilled score moderate-to-high. These findings would suggest, then, that geographical
mobility does prepare one for dealing with the exigencies of change, even at the place of work. But again it should be noted that even among the highly geographically mobile, the differentials remain significant and fairly strong.

Of all the control variables, however, it is education which has the most visible effect on the occupation/neophobic relationship. Here too, though, this effect applies most evidently in the case of the foremen and the skilled, the two more 'marginal' groups in the sample. For both of these groups work neophobia declines steadily in incidence with increased education. This could be due to either or both of two reasons. Firstly, decreased neophobia among the more educated skilled and foremen may be due to the fact that they feel, because of their education, that they have good job prospects and could move into another position easily if change had deleterious consequences for them. However, if this were the case, then why does neophobia not decrease steadily with increased schooling among the semi-skilled also? Moreover, if we recall the discussion of job prospects conducted in the preceding chapter, it is evident that the majority of the foremen and the skilled do not regard their prospects as particularly good, and that this proportion remains constant among those with some post-secondary schooling (see Chapter VI, p.349). The second explanation is that the experience of education in some way equips the individual to anticipate change more
easily and accept it without apprehension. Even this account falls down, however, when applied to the semi-skilled among whom the incidence of neophobia is lowest not among those with some post-secondary education but among those with high school. In any event, as in the case of the other control variables, the effects of education do not disrupt the overall relationship to any great extent: among all the education categories, the differentials remain statistically significant and at least moderate in strength.

With the exception of work neophobia, then, the dominant pattern revealed by these data does not suggest any substantial class differences in value orientations. On the surface, at least, there appears to be a situation of homogeneity, though not one which is predominantly either 'proletarian' or 'bourgeois' in the conventional sense. While it is clear that the data point in this direction, we should, nonetheless, exercise caution before concluding that they therefore substantiate the idea of a value consensus. The measures used here reflect responses to abstract questions, sometimes concerning hypothetical situations. They do not tell us how the values reflected in the responses are 'interpreted' and 'enacted' in everyday life, in the context of real 'here-and-now' circumstances. Furthermore, these measures deal only with five themes which have been prevalent in the existing literature on class cultural differences and similarities. Similarities in these five should not be
taken to signify similarities in others. Finally the responses themselves do not tell us how the attitudes they depict were established and fostered. To show that individuals agree in their evaluations does not show that they do so for the same reasons, or that their sentiments were established in the same manner or by the same process. What the data dealing with these five value themes do depict is a surface consensus of opinion. To extrapolate further would entail assumptions whose validity is open to serious question.

Conclusion: The End of Class Culture?

...the 'social location' of the individual (his social class or other position) no longer determines his life-style and his values (Bell, 1971:30, original parenthesis).

In rather distinct-contrast to the previous chapter concerning class situation differences in the sample, the principal pattern which has run throughout the preceding discussion of the relationship between class and life-style is that, with some notable exceptions, substantial, or for that matter even moderate, class differences have not emerged from the data; the promise of clear-cut, identifiable class cultures has not been realised. Most especially in the matters of primary social participation, political participation, most aspects of media use and taste, and
value orientations, we have found a persistent homogeneity among the managers, foremen, skilled, and semi-skilled. Furthermore, it has been clear that although the primary control variables--income level, education, age, immigrant status, geographical mobility, and career origins--have exerted some effect on the relationship between occupation and life-style, the absence of any substantial class differences cannot be attributed to their intervening effects to any great extent. The changes which have occurred have not appreciably altered the overall shape of things.

The task of sociology, however, is to go beyond the identification and measurement of empirical similarities and differences, to the level of theoretical interpretation and account. In this respect, the point of this analysis is to examine the evidence for and against the thesis of working-class embourgeoisement, and thus by implication the alternatives of proletarianisation and class convergence. This, in turn, entails comparing the data against our models of working- and middle-classness and assessing the extent to which changes in either can be attributed to the effects of affluence, education, mobility, and so on. On both of these counts, the data are largely unsupportive. The evidence of embourgeoisement is fragmentary and uneven. Rather, the patterns to emerge from the data point less ambiguously to a situation of partial class convergence; theoretically, the model which the data approximate most
closely is Wilensky's idea of "middle-mass" culture in which the traditional positional statuses associated with class, occupation, and division of labour no longer exert such a close influence upon patterns of life-style as they once did (Wilensky, 1960, 1964).

This conclusion has been reached on two grounds. Firstly, empirically, the data we have adduced in the preceding analysis do not, as just stated, offer any consistent, unambiguous support for either the thesis of embourgeoisement or that of proletarianisation. In many cases, we have not only failed to find confirmation of conventionally accepted working-class life-styles, but have also failed to reaffirm those of the middle-class. Moreover, on some occasions, the data have indicated that those factors to which the embourgeoisement of working-class life has been attributed--affluence, mobility, education, etc.--may in fact exercise a greater influence on the habits and thoughts of white-collar workers than on those in manual work. In these fundamental respects, the impact of the data cuts two ways, casting some doubt on both conventional images of 'classness' and the assumptions which underpin them.

This fact takes us directly to the second, theoretical reason for this conclusion. The theses of embourgeoisement and proletarianisation both make certain presumptions about the nature of social processes which are theoretically as well as empirically contentious. As we have seen
throughout, the embourgeoisement theorists assume that the spread of affluence, mobility, and education, since they are identified a priori as already typically middle-class attributes, will exert their effect only on the working-class, and will leave the middle-class intact; likewise, the converse assumptions are made by the proletarianisation theorists when they discuss such things as the rationalisation of work and market situations. Such assumptions, however, depart radically from one of the basic assumptions of sociological theorising—be it functionalist 'systems' theory or dialectical Marxism—namely that structures and processes are inter-related, inter-connected. This assumption, nevertheless, is effectively abandoned by these two versions of the homogenisation thesis insofar as they imply that changes such as the spread of affluence or the rationalisation of work organisation exercise their impact only on certain sectors of the class structure and leave the others untouched. They abandon, in other words, the assumption of inter-relatedness. The thesis of convergence, on the other hand, does respect this assumption to the extent that it recognises that such structural changes as those given in the example above will ramify, in different ways and to differing extents, throughout the class structure. It recognises, for example, that the spread of affluence, mobility, and education can have implications, both direct and indirect, on the middle-class as well as the
working-class. While this may detract from its theoretical and predictive impact, and render it a less "dramatic" perspective, it does enable us to reconcile theory with reality in a more profitable way than the alternative.

At the same time, we should exercise some circumspection before endorsing unconditionally the opening statement by Daniel Bell. Firstly, it is clear that some traditional class differences in life-style patterns have been confirmed in the present data, most notably patterns of secondary social participation, political affiliation, television consumption, and work neophobia. For all these aspects we should re-echo the conclusion to the preceding chapter that class differences persist, and remain resilient, especially to the impact of affluence. Secondly, it should be re-emphasized that the data employed here only provide us with a view of certain aspects of life-style; data on family and domestic life and material consumption are notable omissions, and we cannot rule out tout court the possibility that important class differences persist in these matters. The data are partial in another sense: for the most part we have looked for quantitative class differences in life-style patterns. As such, our findings do not legitimately enable us to generalise about the persistence or erosion of qualitative differences, differences in social meanings and social significance. Finally, it must be borne in mind that the data used in this and the preceding chapter
have permitted us to examine and compare only the four occupational strata which make up the contiguous 'territory' embracing the working- and lower-to-middle middle-class. We have been unable to include samples from lower-, upper middle-, and upper-class background. Yet if we are to celebrate the eclipse of class culture, data on the life-style patterns of these segments of the class structure are indispensable. At best, our data show us that substantial life-style differences among the stable, employed "middle-mass" are limited. But in this respect, it should be noted, the findings on life-style patterns correspond clearly with the findings in Chapter III in which the review of the national data on the various aspects of the market situation indicated that the main structural cleavage no longer falls between what we conventionally regard as manual and non-manual, but now falls between the upper- and upper middle-class on the one hand and a more finely graded melange of working- and lower middle-class on the other. Insofar as we assume that the complexion of life-style reflects the class structure, in other words, there is reason to believe that the patterns we have found do mirror wider structural changes in the distributive system.

One final caveat is in order. Comparing the present data with the review of the literature on class life-styles undertaken in Chapter IV entails not only an analytical comparison, but also a cross-cultural one. As we noted
earlier, the bulk of the literature dealing with this topic applies either to the U.S. or the U.K.; the paucity of Canadian data is one of the principal justifications for the present undertaking. As such, the 'conventional images' of working- and middle-class culture assembled from this literature are, strictly speaking, portraits of class culture in those two societies and nowhere else. Their applicability, as points of reference, to Canadian society is therefore questionable to some extent. The possibility exists that the differences between the present findings and the conventional images derived from the American and British literature reside not so much in the structural and cultural changes common to all modern industrial capitalist societies so much as in the historical and cultural uniqueness of Canadian society. To some extent, it is highly probable that some of these differences are a product of national tradition. However, although we have no way to test this due to the absence of any sizeable body of research on class culture in Canada with which to compare the present findings, we are tempted to disregard this alternative explanation as a general one on the grounds that despite the cultural and historical differences between the U.S. and the U.K. the literature indicated strong cross-cultural similarities in the patterns of class life-styles. That cross-cultural similarities in class life-styles can transcend national peculiarities suggests that they are contingent
upon structural arrangements and developments which are more or less common to all modern societies.

Notwithstanding these reservations and qualifications, it is clear that the data do raise some fundamental questions, not only about the nature of the relationship between class structure and class culture, but also more generally about the whole relationship between occupation and life-style, work and leisure, economy and culture. Further examination of these questions will, however, be better deferred until the following, and final, chapter.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION: CLASS, MASS AND THE DIALECTICS OF AFFLUENCE

The world goeth fast from bad to worse, when shepherd and cowherd for their part demand more for their labour than the master-bailiff was wont to take in days gone by. Labour is now at so high a price that he who will order his business aright, must pay five or six shillings now for what cost two in former times....Ha! age of ours...the poor and the small folk...demand to be better fed than their masters. Moreover they bedeck themselves in fine colours and fine attire, whereas (were it not for their pride and their privy conspiracies) they would be clad in sack cloth as of old....Ha! age of ours...I see the poor folk more haughty than their lords; each draweth whither he pleaseth.

John Gower, England, ca. 1375

The issues, problems, and ideas we have addressed or touched upon more casually during the course of this discussion—embourgeoisement, social levelling, status emulation, class decomposition, etc.—are not new to us, as the words of John Gower well testify. And so this should be our first conclusion, namely to recognise and appreciate that our concepts, ideas, and theories are seldom, if ever, erased at one stroke. Rather, as Thomas Kuhn has pointed out, the activity of scientific inquiry is like other fields

Cited in Gimpel, 1977:214-217

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of human social endeavour, it has both its 'normal' and its 'special' sides. Ideas, therefore, are replaced usually in a gradual manner, as the weight of accumulated evidence points to better ways to see and understand the world. Indeed, intellectual fashionability is somewhat akin to sartorial fashionability: ideas, like clothes, which emerge and are accepted into the social consciousness slowly, tend to linger, and disappear slowly. Conversely, those which ascend overnight tend to be relatively short-lived, and disappear as quickly. The ideas with which we have been dealing clearly fall into the former, and so we must not accept any sudden fall from grace.

Bearing these observations in mind should not, however, deter us from the task of drawing conclusions from our analyses, nor from the attempt to replace outmoded conceptions, however tenacious they might be, with better ones. In order to carry out this task, we shall organise our concluding remarks into three sections: first a summary of the empirical findings as they relate directly to the thesis of embourgeoisement; secondly a discussion of class convergence and massification; thirdly a discussion of the relationship between class structure and class culture with, finally, some concluding remarks on the dialectics of affluence.
The Thesis of Embourgeoisement

As we stated at the outset, the specific problem which has formed the focus for our discussion and inquiry has been the thesis of embourgeoisement, the thesis that as manual workers and their families become more middle-class in their economic and occupational situations, so they will tend to adopt more characteristically middle-class styles of life outside the market- and work-places. We have attempted to examine this hypothesis in two ways, firstly by reviewing the existing literature on manual and non-manual class situations and life-styles; and secondly by re-examining the differences and similarities we found in these reviews using Canadian survey data. On the whole, the evidence supportive of the implications of the embourgeoisement has been scant, uneven, and inconsistent.

1. The Market Situation: The first, and perhaps most important, point on which the data have proven to be equivocal concerns the actual extent of affluence itself. While it is clear that relative to other societies the modern industrial capitalist ones are affluent in the aggregate or overall sense, the distribution of affluence within those societies is open to differing interpretation. On the one hand, it is clear from the cross-national data presented at the opening of Chapter III that manual,
blue-collar incomes now equal or exceed those of clerical, sales, technical, and even some semi-professional and lower managerial workers. Thus, while we have taken this as an indication of embourgeoisement, its extent is clearly circumscribed. The Canadian data in Chapter VI, indeed, did not reveal any sign of income levelling between the managers and the semi-skilled or, for that matter, the skilled. What this points to is a further differentiation in the labour market between those working in public service, which applies to many in semi-professional and technical employment, and those in the private sector. Despite the signs of growing unionisation and militancy among many public service workers, it remains the case that they are less well-paid than their private sector equivalents. It is the incomes of these white-collar groups which the blue-collar working-class now approximates rather than the managerial middle-class of the private sector.

In the matter of the other, indirect aspects of the market situation—fringe benefits, market security, and general career and economic prospects—the evidence points to some narrowing of traditional class differentials during the post-war period, though certainly not to the extent that they have been, or are becoming, eliminated. Indeed, in the first two of these aspects, the narrowing of class differentials owes more to the growth and inter-
vention of the state in the regulation of market forces—
the social control of market capitalism—than it does to
any forces or processes inherent in the economy itself.
The political goal of "full" employment, the state appro-
priation of health care and economic protection for disa-
bility, and the state provision of retirement pensions have
been the most important developments in the extension of
indirect economic rewards. Furthermore, as the state
provides these benefits and pursues these goals, so private
employers feel less and less the need to do so themselves.
Even in Japan the system of industrial paternalism and
feudalism shows signs of erosion (cf. Cole, 1971). Indeed,
in some cases, such as Workmen's Compensation in Canada,
the worker has had to relinquish the right to sue his employer
for accident due to poor working conditions, as a condition
for receiving economic compensation from the state.
These provisions, especially those concerning health care
and disability, have made their greatest mark on those in
manual industrial and service work, since these types of
job have, due to the nature of the work itself and the
working conditions typically experienced, been exposed
more to the possibilities of serious accident or even
death. While professionalised help and care may now be
more readily available to the working-class, the chances of
needing it are probably as great. Manual work, in other
words, continues to be physically arduous and hazardous, a
fact which continues to distinguish the factory, the warehouse, and the mine from the office or the salesroom or the classroom.

In the matter of economic and occupational prospects, then the data presented in Chapter III show that one of the traditional distinctions between manual and non-manual jobs, namely the experience (or not) of a work 'career', i.e. a work history extending in an-orderly manner through a series of promotion steps or stages to a point of maximum advancement reached somewhere between late forties or early fifties, continues to remain pertinent. In contrast to those in higher white-collar work, those in manual or routine white-collar jobs can look forward to reaching their maximum personal advancement peak somewhere during late twenties. Any improvement after that point comes usually on a collective basis. Indeed, signs of incipient collectivisation among even established professionals like salaried doctors and academics may serve not only to preserve this difference, but actually to augment it if collective advancement can be achieved as a supplement to personal advancement, rather than as a substitute for it.

The restriction of promotion and advancement opportunities for those in manual work is something which is clearly appreciated in a realistic manner by those who perform this type of labour. Less than one fifth of the
skilled or semi-skilled workers in our Canadian sample saw their future promotion prospects as good. This, it may be argued, does not matter particularly, as manual workers neither expect nor aspire to such individualistic forms of mobility and success. This view, however specious and common, we have found to be seriously misleading, and one which too easily gives rise to convenient 'class-centric' visions of the worker as an essentially contented, unambitious, accommodationist creature who has resigned himself to his lot. In the Canadian data again, we found that only two-fifths of the blue-collar respondents stated they were satisfied with their promotion chances. Moreover, when asked which consideration they thought most important when thinking of taking another job, better opportunities for promotion and advancement ranked first choice for the managers, foremen, and the skilled, and second only to better pay and benefits for the semi-skilled.

The data clearly do not depict the kind of quiescent, unaspiring worker much of the literature would have us believe is common of the working-class (either from the 'class-centric' elitist perspective or from the ostensibly more sympathetic 'culture of poverty' perspective). One of the most striking findings of Chapter VI concerned the nature of job expectations among the semi-skilled in particular. Although the majority of all four occupational groups (the managers no less than the blue-collar respon-
dents) expected (as opposed to aspired) to remain occupa-
tionally stationary, the largest single groups of the semi-
skilled who expected to be occupationally mobile stated 
that they expected to become self-employed, either as 
farmers or as 'small entrepreneurs'. The 'American Dream',
in other words, though less prevalent than in Chinoy's 
study, was far from dormant or moribund. Moreover, the 
proportion expecting to become self-employed, at least 
among the semi-skilled respondents, reached its peak among 
those excluded from succeeding via the bureaucratic-
organisational route—the older workers and those with only 
elementary schooling. Although this speaks of a form of 
individualism, we have argued that it does not signify an 
embourgeoisement of career attitudes among those who 
expect to become self-employed. Rather, it implies a desire 
to escape from the dominant institutional order of work 
organisation to a work world of (ideally) self-control.

At the same time, it should be made clear that 
these expectations are likely to go unrealised. Opportunities 
for self-employment have contracted steadily during the 
post-war period in North America, notwithstanding the 
persistence of work ideologies emphasising the merits of 
individual enterprise, industriousness, and 'small business'. 
Within the work organisation, this fact means that most 
blue-collar and lower level white-collar employees have to 
rely upon unionism and the collective bargaining system as
the principal means to protect and enhance their economic and occupational interests. This is reflected in the overwhelmingly 'instrumental' and 'economistic' orientation toward the role of unions found in our own analysis and that of other studies such as the Goldthorpe one. For the modern manual worker, unions exist to fulfill narrowly circumscribed goals, directed to 'bread-and-butter' issues like pay, benefits, and working conditions.

The effect of the control variables on these various aspects of the market situation has proven to be restricted. As far as pay level is concerned, the Canadian data confirmed the general view that automated workers are better paid than their colleagues in other technological settings. This was most especially so among the skilled, with the result that among the automated workers the income gap between the skilled and the semi-skilled increased substantially. Income level influenced perceptions of promotion chances and satisfaction with those chances in a way which similarly gave some support to the implications of embourgeoisement: among the semi-skilled especially, those making over $8,000 p.a. were more likely to be more optimistic about their prospects, and more satisfied on that account. Apart from these incidences, however, support for the embourgeoisement of the market situation has been conspicuous by its absence.
2. The Work Situation: At the end of Chapter III we concluded that the review of the literature dealing with the work situation presaged some degree of proletarianisation for those employed in white-collar work, most particularly those in low level, routine, semi-skilled, semi-manual work subject to the rationalising effects of differentiation, mechanisation, and hyper-bureaucratisation. In the data analysed in Chapter VI dealing with subjective work attitudes and orientations, on the other hand, we found no evidence of white-collar work blues. The managers appeared in a conventionally middle-class light, finding interest and satisfaction in their work, and, although predominantly instrumentally oriented to work, considering work from the point of view of career success and advancement. This picture points to two theoretical implications. Firstly, it re-affirms the idea implicit in the data on income distribution of an 'internal differentiation' of the middle-class, along both skill and sectoral lines, separating those in relatively low skilled, routine, manualised occupations on the one hand, from those in positions requiring more training and certification and commanding more authority within the work organisation, thus enabling the practitioners more scope to manipulate their situations to avoid or deflect the deleterious consequences of rationalisation, on the other. And secondly, these patterns again demonstrate the
potentially contradictory nature of objective structures and subjective responses to them; the rationalisation of white-collar job structures, in other words, does not guarantee any automatic and reactive response in the direction of intensified dissatisfaction.

Indeed, from an overall perspective, the data on the work situation of our Canadian sample reveal an array of fairly conventional class differences in attitudes to and about work; the blue-collar groups, the semi-skilled more so than the skilled, generally found their jobs less interesting, less generally satisfying, less intrinsically satisfying, and less extrinsically satisfying than did the managers or the foremen. Only in the matter of work orientation did the data reveal some unexpected patterns. Here we found that a slim majority (about three-fifths) of all four groups expressed a predominantly 'instrumental' orientation to work. In one respect, this can be taken as a proletarianisation of attitudes on the part of the managers, as we conventionally regard the middle-class as intrinsically work oriented. On the other hand, the single factor to which the respondents were most oriented, more or less regardless of occupation, was better opportunities for advancement and promotion as the most important consideration when thinking of taking another job. Only among the semi-skilled did this not rank as top priority, and in this case it ranked second only to better
pay and benefits.

When we juxtapose these data on work orientations with those on job expectations, it becomes clear that the blue-collar workers in our Canadian sample, while they are instrumentally oriented, do not conform to Goldthorpe et al.'s image of "instrumental collectivism", since it is also clear that a good many of them have not abandoned individualism as an idealised means to economic and occupational success. What these two sets of data suggest is that involvement in work entails something of a tension, or dialectic between the need to adjust and adapt to the present work situation as a short-run goal, and the need to escape and make it on one's own account as the long-run goal. In the first respect, they look to the means of collectivism as the way to protect and enhance their situation. In the second respect, for those who entertain the idea of promotion and advancement as a goal, the means are often classically 'individualistic'—setting up a business of one's own. For most, it is true, the latter will remain a world of fantasy, but its very existence as an idea helps to accomplish some accommodation to the status quo.

This duality or dialectic of work involvement and work orientation is, we believe, a fundamental feature of most work situations which has been overlooked and underestimated by previous research and theory, which have
tended to regard work attitudes as fixed and immutable 'things' rather than as subjective states subject to a more or less continual process of production and reproduction in interaction with the individual's encounters with the social and technical worlds of working. Goldthorpe et al., for example, depict the work situation in terms which imply that the participants have arrived at a judgment of what they seek from work, have imported this assessment into work, have striven to attain these goals, and duly accommodated themselves to the institutional order of things. They depict the work situation of their affluent workers as a closed-ended place, in which choices and outcomes are fixed and objectified. As the strike which occurred at the Luton plant soon after the completion of their research signified, this vision was too rigid and reified. They had underestimated the extent to which participation in the world of working is a dialectical process in which there inheres a tension between acceptance and rejection, commitment and escape: they had overlooked the open-endedness of their subject-matter.

The effects of the controls on the relationship between occupation and these various aspects of the work situation again proved to be restricted. Income level appeared to be the most consistently supportive of the implications of embourgeoisement: among both blue-collar groups, though most clearly among the semi-skilled, the
affluent found their work more interesting and more satisfying. The affluent, interestingly enough, also had more optimistic views about their own promotion and advancement prospects, suggesting that income level does serve to inflate optimism about one's economic and occupational situations. At the same time, it was also clear that although income level served to reduce to some extent the differential separating the blue-collar groups from the managers, it did not by any means eliminate those differences. Affluence may encourage a more 'bourgeois' view of work, but it does not guarantee the disappearance of traditional class inequalities in the experience and enjoyment of work's intrinsic rewards.

Unlike income level, the effects of career origin and education on the work situation attitudes ran generally counter to the implications of the embourgeoisement thesis. Among the blue-collar respondents the earlier career experience of white-collar work (first full-time job) contributed to greater deprivation and dissatisfaction at work. This was most evident among the semi-skilled, whose 'downward' mobility from white-collar origins had covered a greater 'distance' than that of the skilled. What this suggests is that movement from white-collar to blue-collar, in work situation terms at least, is indeed downward mobility, and that it fosters the kind of relative deprivation associated with downward economic
mobility. The white-collar starters among the skilled and the semi-skilled seem to have retained essentially white-collar images and expectations of what constitutes interesting and satisfying work, in comparison with which their current jobs scored decidedly low.

A similar process of relative deprivations was evident with the controls for schooling. Again, we found that the skilled and especially the semi-skilled who had experienced some post-secondary schooling were clearly less likely to find their present work rewarding, either in its interest for them or in its level of satisfaction. What this situation suggests is the effect of "over-education", or from the other side of the coin, "under-employment": as a result of their educational experiences and training these workers are likely to have assumed levels of work aspiration and expectation which are unrealised by their present level of employment. Again, we can see that the "distance" effect between attitudes and sense of fulfillment is greatest for the semi-skilled who are furthest removed from the level of work for which they have been trained and to which they have come to aspire.

Of these two sources of potential work deprivation --i.e. downward mobility and over-education/under-employment--it is the latter which is likely to have the most important aggregate, or structural effect. With the expansion of ostensibly white-collar forms of labour, the
incidence of downward mobility from white-collar to blue-collar is likely to remain fairly restricted. The most probable form of work deprivation will not come so much from downward occupational mobility, as from downward work situation mobility due to the effects of further work rationalisation. The over-education/under-employment contradiction, on the other hand, is likely to have greater and broader disruptive effects insofar as there is a historical trend toward the further rationalisation and simplification of many jobs on the one hand, and a general increase in the overall, societal level of schooling on the other. Mass education also upgrades the educational level, and therewith the occupational aspirations, of those who eventually become assembly-line workers as well as those who become professionals and scientists.

Finally, the impact of technological work environment on work attitudes seems to be generally restricted; we have found no consistent evidence of any weight to support Blau\u0142er's thesis about the salutary work effects of automated technology. To be sure, the automated blue-collar respondents are generally more interested in and satisfied with their work, but the difference from those working in more conventional settings is only slight, and certainly not of the magnitude to suggest that automation can be treated as the harbinger of good work times.
3. The Status Situation: In this third aspect of the class situation, the data from our Canadian sample revealed a situation of conventional class differences similar to that of the work situation. In both the review of existing studies undertaken in Chapter III and in the analysis of the Canadian data in Chapter VI, we found fairly strong to strong relationships between occupation and self-rated social class position. These patterns suggest two conclusions. Firstly, it is clear from the data that the idea of identifying themselves as 'working-class' is not alien to those who perform manual work, especially the semi-skilled and those with more 'proletarian' biographies—those with only elementary schooling, those who began their own worklives in semi-skilled manual work, those working in conventional technological settings, and those earning less than $7,999 p.a. at the time of the survey. Though we normally consider the language of class to be more fully integrated into everyday, common sense perspectives in European society than in North America, it is evident from the low non-response rate and from the fairly strong relationship between self-rated social class and occupation that class categories are socially meaningful, and that individuals locate themselves more or less 'accurately' vis à vis objective observer definitions.

For the two blue-collar groups in the Canadian
sample, the factor which most affected this relationship between occupation and self-rated social class was education. This operated in a manner supportive of the embourgeoisement thesis to the extent that the incidence of working-class identification dropped clearly for those with some post-secondary schooling as compared to those with only grade school. At the same time, even among those with post-secondary schooling, about a quarter of the skilled and two-fifths of the semi-skilled continued to regard themselves as working-class, as compared to none at all of the managers and foremen.

Age, career origins, and union membership all had minor effects on the relationship, in ways supportive of embourgeoisement, viz. the older workers were more likely to identify as working-class than the younger ones; those with white-collar first jobs were less likely to identify as working-class than those who began as semi-skilled or unskilled blue-collar; and unionists were more likely to identify as working-class than non-unionists. While all of these effects are in the direction we would expect, their impact is quite modest. Indeed, the puzzle is not that they had any effect, but that it was not greater. This applies even more so to the effects of income: the affluent were really no less likely to identify themselves as working-class than the non-affluent. This is important, since if affluence is expected to be the principal catalyst
of embourgeoisement, we should expect it to have some perceptible effect on the way people see themselves in the stratification order, and should expect this to be apparent at an early stage of the process.

4. **The Life-Style Situation:** The overall view depicted by the Canadian data pointed to a mixed situation of continuity and change. In the areas of secondary social participation and political affiliation we found fairly conventional class difference: the blue-collar groups were less active, and more likely to support the NDP. Indeed, in the latter case, the data suggested stronger class differences than suggested in the literature on class and Canadian politics. On the other hand, in the matters of primary social participation, political participation, most aspects of media use and taste, and finally five out of the six value themes commonly associated with class differences, we found a situation of relative homogeneity between the four occupational groups. On balance, then, the expected differences in patterns of class culture did not emerge.

This situation introduced the problem of theoretical interpretation; did this situation of relative cultural homogeneity signify embourgeoisement, proletarianisation, or some form of class convergence. On empirical grounds alone, the first two accounts were ruled out as too
simplistic and inadequate. Rather, what the data suggested was some form of class convergence between the four groups; the blue-collar groups more like the 'conventional image' of the middle-class in some respects, the managers more like the 'conventional image' of the working-class in other respects, and no clear pattern at all in yet other respects.

The effect of the control variables on these patterns has again proven to be restricted; the absence of any relationship between occupation and primary social participation, political participation, media use and taste, and social values cannot be attributed to the intervening effects of the control variables. Though, in some cases, the controls did operate in a manner congruent with the implications of the embourgeoisement thesis, e.g. the restriction of sociability among the blue-collar groups with increasing geographical mobility, the magnitude of the effect was small, indeed smaller than anticipated. On the whole, the data do not suggest convincingly that geographical mobility restricts sociability, or that the presence of large numbers of non-anglophone and non-francophone immigrants serves to cut across cultural differentiation along class lines. If anything, in fact, class differences were more manifest among the immigrant than among the native born. And, finally, the data clearly do not support the idea that affluence exerts a transforming impact upon the social organisation of life-styles. Of all the controls,
that for income level proved the least revealing. In short, the patterns to emerge from much of the analysis throw serious doubt on the 'conventional images' not only of working-class life but also of middle-class life, for which reason, the most appropriate interpretation the evidence points to is that of convergence.

As this implies, the data, particularly the lifestyle data, do not provide any substantial or overwhelming support for the thesis of the internal differentiation of the working-class. The evidence which does support the idea of such a differentiation of the skilled and the semi-skilled is confined to the market, work, and status situations. Here we have seen, moreover, that when differentiation is evident, its extent is such that at most the skilled come to occupy a position and situation interstitial between the managers and the semi-skilled. The differentiation of the skilled, then, does not mean that they have become fully embourgeoisé, nor is its extent sufficient to speak of a class detachment.

Indeed, if anything, the data we have adduced in the preceding analysis suggest more an internal differentiation of the middle-class. The national data on income distribution, for example, indicate that the main structural fault now separates the upper middle-class from an amalgam of lower middle- and working-class. Moreover, although we have only been able to examine a relatively
small sample of first level managers in the Canadian data, one of the more consistent findings has been that income, education, and mobility have exerted a greater effect on the beliefs and habits of the managers than upon the two blue-collar groups. This introduces the idea of the embourgeoisement of the middle-class as a theoretical possibility, some additional support for which is provided in a recent Canadian life-style study by Schreiber who concluded that:

"While the summary cultural scores showed modest differences by occupation, the largest cleavages separated professionals from nonprofessionals" (Schreiber, 1976:16).

The Limitations of Class Convergence

Throughout the preceding analysis the underlying argument has been that the most useful interpretation of the evidence signifying the homogenisation of class culture is the thesis of partial class convergence. On both theoretical and empirical grounds this perspective has offered the most suitable account of the situation at hand. This judgment cannot, however, stand unqualified; the thesis of class convergence entails problems and limitations which are particular to the present case.

Firstly, it must be emphasized in the strongest terms that as the Canadian data we have analysed are synchronic, we cannot phrase our conclusions in historical form.
In the strictest sense, they should be framed in a negative rather than positive manner: the data do not substantiate in a consistently convincing fashion the implications of either the embourgeoisement or the proletarianisation thesis (at least to the extent that the relatively small subsample of managers has allowed us to examine the life-style situation of the lower middle-class). When compared to the conventional images of class culture outlined in Chapters 3 and 4, we have not encountered any overwhelming evidence to indicate that the skilled or the semi-skilled were characteristically more middle-class, or the managers more characteristically working-class.

Although the extent to which we can extrapolate from these findings is necessarily limited to the time at which the survey was conducted, we are entitled to argue that some degree of convergence existed in so far as the absence of any substantial differences in-life-style patterns cannot be attributed to the alternative perspectives. At the same time we must acknowledge that it is beyond the scope of the present study to ascertain whether or not this forms part of a process of historical change.

The interpretive limitations which beset the conclusion of partial class convergence are not the only problems with which this perspective confronts us. As we saw in the opening chapter, there are two main versions of this thesis. The first derives from the hypothesis by Goldthorpe and Lockwood
that the traditional working- and middle-classes are abandoning aspects of their traditional cultural forms, and converging, partially, to a situation of "instrumental collectivism" at work and "privatised" "family-centredness" outside. Our Canadian data, however, only substantiate half of these two postures. Firstly, while it is the case that the blue-collar groups have demonstrated a largely, though by no means overwhelmingly, instrumental attitude to work and the job, it is also clear that collectivism is too simplified a description of the means they favour to achieve their occupational and economic goals. In contrast to Goldthorpe's affluent workers, our Canadian workers do value individual promotion and advancement, and, some at least, continue to subscribe to the traditional channel of escape from the bureaucratic work world by means of self-employment and a business of their own. In other words, we cannot discount an important residue of an old-fashioned "petty-bourgeois" sentiment among the blue-collar strata. As this implies, involvement in work is more complex than a simple, permanent resolution of expectations and fulfillment. Work involvement is better seen in terms of an ongoing tension between acceptance and rejection, commitment and escape, collectivism and individualism.

Similarly, the present data indicate support for only half of Goldthorpe and Lockwood's characterisation of non-work convergence. It is clear from the measure of
family orientation that all four groups consider it (the family) a primary focus in their lives; the overwhelming majority scored high on the index. Furthermore, the data on kinship contact patterns indicate that this concern is, again for all four groups, focused largely upon the nuclear household unit; contact with extended kin, especially among the blue-collar respondents, was generally low. At the same time, we found no evidence that the respondents were especially privatised in the way they organised their lives, either generally so, or under the conditions of affluence and mobility to which this aspect of convergence was attributed by Goldthorpe et al. In short, the data adduced here are only half supportive of the Goldthorpe thesis; our workers appear instrumental and family-oriented, but the extent of their collectivism and privatisation remain questionable.

The alternative to the Goldthorpe thesis is the version of convergence implicit in Wilensky’s thesis of cultural massification and the rise of the “middle-mass”. The implications of Wilensky’s thesis are more radical than those of Goldthorpe’s in the sense that by replacing class with mass, he seriously questions the whole assumption that life-style is underpinned by economic situation. For Wilensky, class culture denoted those patterns of belief and activity which arise from one’s situation in the marketplace. This he separates from what we would call
'occupational culture'—those patterns of behaviour and belief which are derived from one's situation in the workplace. At the same time this distinction is made, Wilensky introduces by means of the idea of "career orderliness" the hypothesis that occupational culture may actually cut across, and reduce the extent of class culture, at least to the extent that the experience of shared work situations may now cut across traditional class boundaries. Thus, he implies, what we normally think of as class culture may 'in reality' be better understood as instances of occupational culture. The overall implication of these changes is to deflate the theoretical and empirical significance of social class as a major axis of cultural differentiation, and to place it on a level with other axes—ethnicity, religion, life-cycle, career orderliness, etc.—in which no one is treated a priori as analytically more important than the others, and in which each is seen to criss-cross with the others in a myriad of ways and combinations.

Though it is beyond the scope and resources of the present thesis to test directly the implications of Wilensky's thesis (we have, for example, no suitable way of measuring the important concept of career orderliness), we are in a position to be able to make certain preliminary judgments about its applicability to our findings. The evidence which supports the idea of massification pertains largely to the metaphorical connections of the term. Mass
implies size; more specifically it implies big size. And as we saw at the opening of Chapter III, cross-national data on income distribution do suggest that traditional class boundaries are being decomposed and replaced by a large aggregate of finely graded strata composed of lower managerial, semi-professional, technical, skilled manual, sales, semi-skilled manual, clerical, and sundry 'service' workers, which, if added up, constitute clearly the overwhelming bulk or 'mass' of the labour force and general population. Furthermore, the Canadian data on primary social participation, political participation, mass media use, and social values suggest a similar dissolving of traditional class differences and boundaries into an emerging cultural 'mass'. In both these senses, the idea of massification as the amalgamation of society into large-scale, finely differentiated aggregates or groupings is a persuasive one.

At the same time, these judgments must be accompanied with appropriate qualifications. Firstly, it is clear that we have not encountered any massification of work and status situations or of patterns of secondary, or formal, social participation; the Canadian data have revealed conventional class differences. Secondly, with the exception of the data concerning overall national income distribution, we have not encountered any separation of market and work situations. For the most part, we have found that the inequalities and differences of the market,
work, and status situations parallel each other, that they serve to reinforce and augment each other rather than cut across and diminish each other. The implication of this is that there is little, if any, separation of class, in Wilensky's narrow sense, from occupation. Finally, although we cannot measure directly the effects of career orderliness and disorderliness, we have found no evidence that occupational mobility of the vertical kind contributes substantially to the experience of different lives both in and out of work. The implication of this is that the effects of career orderliness may be no greater empirically than those of the more conventional factors for which we have controlled in the present analysis.

As in the case of the Goldthorpe model, then, the data are partially supportive of Wilensky's thesis. At the same time, reservations need to be made explicit; the full implications of the Wilensky model remain either untested or open to question to some extent.

Class, Culture, and the Dialectics of Affluence

Whether we speak of the data in terms of massification and convergence or not, it is clear that some severing of class situation and life-style is apparent. And this situation, in turn, throws into question the whole set of assumptions underlying the way in which we
think about the relationships between the various institutional orders of which society, as a whole, is composed. The conventional wisdom on the matter of class and lifestyle, as we saw toward the end of Chapter IV, posits their association in terms of the theory of alienation. The subordination of the worker in the market- and workplaces, it is argued, conduces to the emergence of an orientation to stability and security on the one hand, and a fear and distrust of novelty and change--'neophobia'--on the other. In light of this, the 'meta-theme' in terms of which working-class life was characterised was hinged upon the avoidance of relationships and situations which might disrupt familiarised and habitualised patterns of outlook and habit.

Support for this characterisation from our present data, however, is flimsy to say the least. Not only is the correspondence between neophobia and class situation absent, the overall incidence of neophobia, as measured by the index presented in Table 50 of the previous chapter, is decidedly low among all four occupational groups. Only in the workplace does change appear to create uncertainty and apprehension among the skilled and the semi-skilled, and thus set them off from the managers.

How do we account for this apparent disjunction of class situation and life-style, economy and culture?

For Daniel Bell, modern society consists in the
relationship between three institutional realms—not unlike Engels' formulations of base and superstructure—each of which is governed by its own separate 'axial' principle, each with different 'rhythms of change' (Bell, 1976). The 'techno-economic' structure is governed by the principle of 'functional rationality', the search for maximised efficiency and productivity. The 'polity' is guided by the principle of legitimacy, and this, in western democratic society, is translated, in turn, into the principle of participation. The 'culture', finally, refers to the realm of meanings and 'expressive symbolism', and in modern society this is governed by the principle of modernism and hedonism—"doing one's own thing". As this brief description implies, the relationship between these realms is not orderly and harmonious as the functionalists assert, nor is it hierarchical and determinist as the Marxists assert, rather for Bell this association of realms is loose, flexible, changeable and riddled with contradiction.

This idea of the relative autonomy of the institutional realms, and the contradictory nature of their guiding principles or logics, is not a new one; it can be traced back in part to the conservative critique of modernism and 'mass' society where the upheavals wrought by capitalism, industrialism and urbanism had uprooted people from their traditional anchors in the social structure, had cut them loose from the constraints and certainties of traditional
moral beliefs, and turned society into a loosely amalgamated mass of atomised individuals. Strains of this argument can be identified in Durkheim's treatment of the malaise of anomie, for example, in the sense that it derived from the disjunction of the division of labour from appropriate forms of moral regulation. Running throughout Durkheim's analysis is the thin line between individualism and egoism, a distinction others were not careful to make. For Durkheim individualism could become a new source of solidarity as long as it were prevented from degenerating into egoism, that state where individuals exalt material self-interest to the exclusion of moral principle.

We do not need to dig deeply into Bell to uncover the strong thread in his analysis which is inherited from this legacy and critique.

Western society lacks both civitas, the spontaneous willingness to make sacrifices for some public good, and a political philosophy that justifies the normative rules of priorities and allocations in the society (Bell 1976:25).

Bell, however, goes a step further in his analysis: the disjunction of realms is not an aberration or temporary pathology, rather it is now a permanent, institutionalised feature of the social order. As for the dialectical philosophers, contradiction and disjunction are the essence of reality, not something alien or marginal to it.

The implications of this analysis are quite radical
in that they abandon the traditional sociological assumptions about the inter-connectedness of parts, and therewith throw open the whole relationship between structure and culture:

As a discipline sociology is based on the assumptions that variations in the behaviour of persons or groups in the society are attributable to their class or other strategic position in the social structure; and that individuals so differentially placed will vary systematically in their interests, attitudes, and conduct on the basis of distinct social attributes...

For the majority of society, and for many aspects of social life (e.g. voting), this general proposition may hold true. But it is increasingly evident that for a significant proportion of the population the relation of social position to cultural style—particularly if one thinks in such gross dimensions as working class, middle class, and upper class—no longer holds (Bell, 1976:37-38; emphasis added).

For Bell, this situation has arisen partly from the effects of those changes like affluence, increased education, and mobility, to which we have earlier seen the process of embourgeoisement attributed. For the embourgeoisement theorists, however, these factors exert their effects as personal or familial experiences, i.e. those who actually experience affluence etc. will be the ones whose styles of life will change. For Bell, on the other hand, these factors work their effects as aggregate social conditions, as "structural effects" in Peter Blau's sense.
(Blau, 1960). This distinguishes Bell from the embourgeoisement theorists; whereas the latter attribute the transformation of class life-styles to the impact of affluence, education, and mobility, Bell, on the other hand, attributes the whole disjunction of class and life-style to their effects. The effect of these factors has been to cut life-style loose from class situation, not simply reconstruct the association in another form. Culture is now emancipated from structurally derived tradition; it now floats free in the realm of personal choice. Affluence etc. have not simply reshaped the traditional class structure, they have "dissolved" it, and rendered it culturally void. In Bell's own words, 'discretionary' income has given rise to 'discretionary social behaviour'. The paradox of affluence etc. is to have rendered superfluous the dependency of life-style upon economic situation.

As Bell himself points out, this vision is tendential and somewhat overdrawn as an accurate description of prevailing reality at present; its value lies in the identification of trends and their implications for future developments and re-arrangements in the social order. Its specific benefit in the present context is that it does express, in one way, a theoretical account for the patterns revealed by our data on the class/life-style relationship. But it clearly leaves unresolved certain important questions, particularly the mechanisms by means of
which change takes place. By setting aside traditional assumptions about inter-relatedness Bell comes close to denying the validity of causal thinking, and therewith comes close to pulling out the rug of legitimacy from sociology's, and his own, intellectual feet.

The answer, at least incipient answer, to the dilemma of class culture in modern society lies in a companion essay to the discussion of the "cultural contradictions of capitalism". In a work entitled "The Public Household", Bell examines some aspects of the relationship of the state and the economy in post-industrial society, by means of the perspective of 'fiscal sociology'--the analysis of state revenues and expenditures (Bell, 1976). In similar fashion to Marxists like O'Connor (1973) and Gough (1975), Bell recognises the fiscal contradictions which have arisen with the expansion of state expenditures, particularly those directed toward the allocation of social welfare goods and services. Unlike the Marxists, Bell focuses his attention not upon the demands made of the state by organised capital, but upon the population at large, particularly upon the role of what he designates the "revolution of rising entitlements" as the motive force behind this expansion.

The general demand for equality characteristic of modern society, Bell argues, has conjoined with the spiral of rising expectations set in motion by the uninterrupted
rise in general living standards of the last thirty years, and given rise to a situation of rising entitlements. Entitlement implies a demand for goods or services as a simple right of existence; the important difference between entitlements and expectations is that the latter do not imply any other conditions of performance as a necessary condition for receipt. This transformation of expectations into entitlements has occurred in such areas as housing, minimum income, employment, health care, and education, and has therewith given a tremendous boost to both spending and employment in the service sector, especially to those services now organised and allocated by the state.

This expansion of public services, however, creates serious "overload" problems for both the polity and the economy. In the former the modern state is confronted with an increasingly large number of issues and problems for which it is expected to provide solutions. This politicisation of problem-solving concentrates decision-making and renders the consequences of solving activity more publicly visible in contrast to the market whose virtue for Bell was to disperse and diversify decision-making and consequences. As Jacques Ellul has observed, this spiraling of politicisation creates a "political illusion" in which the state is looked upon to provide solutions which it cannot realistically do (Ellul, 1967). At the same time, the pressures of accountability force the
state apparatus to "go through the motions" by extending programmes, expanding programmes, increasing expenditures, and therewith creating more problems to be solved. For the economy, the overload problem consists in the tendency for service production to be inherently inflationary, more so than either resource extraction or manufacturing. This is so for two reasons: first, service industries are more labour intensive than manufacturing or resources; thus labour costs account for a bigger proportion of overall expenditures. Second, it is more difficult to increase productivity in service industries to offset the effects of increased labour costs. Indeed in some aspects of public service such as education and health care attempts to increase productivity are actively resisted on the grounds that the quality of the service will be seriously impaired. In this way the service economy begins to institutionalise increased state expenditures and permanent price inflation.

If the effects of affluence have been to give rise to this revolution of rising entitlements and therewith the overload crises of the state and the economy, then, in the long run, they may turn out to be contradictory. If individuals demand more from the system on the basis of right, i.e. without the sense of any moral or even instrumental need to put more back in, then the strain on the system will ultimately take its toll; it will become overburdened to the point of exhaustion. This will be particularly
so if the increased demand is for services rather than goods, since the production of the former, as we have seen, is more labour intensive and less easily performed by machines. Yet increased demand for these services sets in motion a fiscal-inflationary spiral, resulting in higher costs and reduced service. It is no accident that as the costs go up so the quality of the service goes down. In other words, affluence can be seen to be giving rise to its own contradiction; as the experience of affluence as a structural or aggregate condition gives rise to accelerating expectations and their transformation into entitlements so the failure to redistribute wealth to ensure the experience of affluence as a personal condition frustrates those expectations, yet heightens them further.

The long-term implications of this are twofold. The first is that affluence may undermine itself by overloading the system with demands it cannot make. Secondly, as a result of this the conditions which enabled the disjunction of economy, polity, and culture may be transformed. Bell does not emphasize sufficiently the historically contingent nature of the disjunction of institutional realms. If affluence has contributed to this situation, then perhaps the undermining of affluence will contribute to its alteration. If this is so, then perhaps the dialectics of affluence will join economy and culture, albeit in a different manner from that characteristic of early modern society.
Although this is only speculation (a legitimate enough exercise if spelled out as such), the point is that it does serve to remind us that conditions and relationships do not endure intact in perpetuity, and that the conditions which have helped give rise to the separation of class and life-style may yet work themselves out in such a manner that the two are rejoined.
APPENDIX A


Method of Sampling

The standard procedure for selecting respondents was to sample male hourly rated workers on direct production, skilled maintenance workers, and immediate supervisors in each firm. All others were excluded at the outset. In addition, in the unionized companies, we sampled union executives and stewards separately. The production workers in the sample are almost exclusively skilled and semi-skilled, since unskilled workers usually do not relate directly to the production process in these companies and our questionnaire was not quite appropriate for them. Thus the skill level in the sample is undoubtedly higher than that for the average Canadian industrial worker.

In all but the three larger firms, we included all the employees in each of the three categories of occupations, namely, immediate supervision, skilled maintenance, and direct production. In these three cases, we sampled randomly using a table of random numbers. In the automobile firm we sampled 50% of skilled maintenance and 20%
of direct production in both plants and 50% of immediate supervisors in the smaller firm (but all immediate supervisors in the larger firm).

In the largest electrical products and printing firms (E1 and P5) we sampled 50% of direct production, and all individuals in the other two categories. In the steel firm we sampled 40% of supervision and 20% of the other two categories.

A few further comments should be made on the sampling procedure. In the automobile firms the sample proportion was not uniform for all production workers. It was 20% for all production occupations with the exception of assembly line workers, only 10% of whom were selected because of the very large number in that category. Furthermore, in A2, workers who started after September 1965 were not included in the sample frame because they were not involved in the change event for that company. Finally, in the steel industry, we were unable to obtain job titles for the sampling of individuals. We did have information on job class, a numerical ranking common to the steel industry, ranging from approximately 01 to 35. 2/

We excluded all those below job class 07 (i.e., the relatively unskilled). From the remainder we drew a 20% sample. Although we were less likely to get indirect production workers this way, we did end up with some individuals who were not direct production workers. The final sample
## Total Size of Firm, Size of Target Sample, and Number and Percent Returns by Industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Target Sample</th>
<th>Achieved Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automobile</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>6558</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>374 (41.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A2</td>
<td>1540</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>129 (41.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Automobile Total</td>
<td>1202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>C1</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>134 (42.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C2</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>156 (35.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chemical Total</td>
<td>749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical</td>
<td>E1</td>
<td>4934</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>378 (51.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E2</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>77 (35.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Electrical Total</td>
<td>956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>O1</td>
<td>1570</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>317 (67.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>O2</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>100 (46.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>O3</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>21 (38.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>O4</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>55 (69.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>O5</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>45 (63.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oil Total</td>
<td>888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>61 (78.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>71 (52.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P3</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>65 (43.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>264 (75.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P5</td>
<td>1020</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>208 (60.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Printing Total</td>
<td>1055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>8405</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>377 (48.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Steel Total</td>
<td>783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>5633</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
reported in the table on page 540 and used in the analysis was cleaned up by omitting the small number of indirect production workers whom we had inadvertently sampled.

We discovered very soon after data collection commenced that it would be impossible to distribute questionnaires at the plants or to administer the questionnaire to groups of workers. As a result of different shifts, the reluctance of companies to interfere with production, and the possible bias that might be introduced by this method, we decided to mail the questionnaire directly to the workers' homes. They were mailed to all people in the sample, except for the 79 employees of the first firm included (P1).
APPENDIX B

1. Copy of final questionnaire.
2. Copy of the accompanying and follow-up letters.
APPENDIX B - THE QUESTIONNAIRE

TASK FORCE ON LABOUR RELATIONS
A STUDY OF WORKERS' ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS

This study is part of the research program of the Prime Minister's Task Force on Labour Relations. The Task Force believes that it is a very important aspect of their task to find out how workers feel and think about their place in industry.

You are one of the people in this company who have been selected by a random sampling technique. It will be a tremendous help to us if you agree to fill in the questionnaire. Your answers to the questions will not be identified with you as an individual and in the analysis of the responses of all workers we will not know which responses are yours or any other individual's. No one but the researcher will see your questionnaire. You can be assured that your responses will be treated as strictly confidential.

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Most of the questions can be answered by drawing a circle around the number which best describes your response to the question. As a rule you should always circle one number only for each question.

For example, if you have worked for your company for 4 years you would circle number 2 as in the question below:

How long have you worked for this company? 0 - 5 years . 6 - 10 years . More than 10 years .

2. A few questions require you to write in your response. In these cases please be as specific and as accurate as you possibly can.

3. Answer the questions in the order in which they appear in the questionnaire. Please make sure you answer all the questions. The meaning and value of the study depend on the accuracy of the information on your questionnaire.

4. We do not want to take too much of your time and one way of avoiding this depends on you. We urge you to work as rapidly as you can through the questionnaire. Consider each question carefully but always give your first response as quickly as you can.

5. It is very important for this study that you give us your personal responses to the questions. There are not right or wrong answers and people usually have different views and answers on all of these matters. Please do not discuss questions and your answers with anybody at work or at home until you have filled in and returned the questionnaire.

6. We urge you to fill in the questionnaire in one session and return it as soon as you can, if possible the next day after you have received it.

We greatly appreciate your willingness to participate in this study, and to contribute your time and effort.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

Jan J. Laubser
Research Director
Department of Sociology
University of Toronto

Michael Fullan
Research Associate
1. My sex is: Male: 1 (5) Female: 2


4. Did you come to Canada from another country? No, I was born in Canada: 1 (8) Yes, I came to Canada at or before age 16: 2 Yes, I came to Canada after age 16: 3 [Write in]

5. Do you consider yourself a Canadian? Yes: 1 (10) If no, what do you consider yourself? [Write in]

6. In which town or city do you live now? [Write in]


8. If it didn't matter for your work, where would you prefer to live in a big city: 1 (13) in a medium sized city: 2 in a small town: 3 in a rural area: 4

9. How much schooling have you completed? Some grade school: 1 (14) Grade school: 2 Some high school (general): 3 Some high school (technical or business): 4 Graduated high school (technical or business): 5 Some college: 6 Completed college: 7 Graduate or professional training: 8


11. What is the size of the community in which you grew up? Rural district town: 1 (16) Less than 5,000 population: 2 to under 20,000: 3 20,000 to under 50,000: 4 50,000 to under 100,000: 5 100,000 to under 200,000: 6 200,000 to under 500,000: 7 500,000 to under one million: 8 One million and over: 9

12. How long has it been since you have last moved? Less than 6 months: 1 (17) More than 6 months but less than 1 year: 2 More than 1 year but less than 3 years: 3 More than 3 years but less than 5 years: 4 More than 5 years but less than 10 years: 5 10 years or over: 6

13. How often have you moved since you have started working full time? Never: 1 (18) Once: 2 Twice: 3 More than twice: 4

14. Did you go to Expo '67? Yes: 1 (19) No: 2
15. When you were a child, how strict were your parents? (In insisting that you obey and respect them)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strictness</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very strict</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite strict</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite lenient</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very lenient</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither strict nor lenient</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not grow up with parents</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. When you were a child, how close would you say you were to your parents? (Close here means a warm, loving relationship with them)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Closeness</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very close</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite close</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly close</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very close</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not grow up with parents</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. If you had to choose, to which one of the following social classes would you say you belong?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper class</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper middle class</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower middle class</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working class</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower class</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. How many close friends do you have?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Friends</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight or more</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please answer the following questions about your closest friends. If you have answered NO in question 16, answer these questions for your friends or acquaintances, even though you do not consider them close.

19. How much schooling do most of your friends have?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More than I have</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The same as I have</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than I have</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20. How often do you do things together with your friends (for example, visit, go to the movies, to the pub, shopping, social activities)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOW OFTEN</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Once a week or more</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 or 3 times a month</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 or 2 times a month</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twice or three times a year</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a year</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than once a year</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. How many of your friends work in the same career as you do?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four or more</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. How many relatives do you often visit or do things together with?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELATIVES</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four or more</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. There are relatives and friends that...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the same neighborhood as I do</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the same part of the city</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the same city</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the same county</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the same country</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the United States</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsewhere</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24. Please indicate whether the following statements apply to you by circling one number for each.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almost all my friends are people I grew up with</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half of my close friends are also friends with each other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of my close friends have the same religion as I do</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. How many of your friends are men?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four or more</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26. How many of your friends are women?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four or more</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27. How many of your friends are children?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four or more</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28. How many of your friends are adults?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four or more</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29. How many of your friends are younger than you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four or more</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30. How many of your friends are older than you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four or more</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. How would you like to ask a few questions about your social activities and interests in radio and television? Please circle one number only for each question:

25. To how many organized groups, associations, clubs, teams, etc., do you belong?
   None .......................................................... 1
   One ............................................................ 2
   Two ............................................................. 3
   Three .......................................................... 4
   Four or more .................................................. 5

The following three questions are about the group that is most important to you.

26. How many of the last three meetings or events of this group have you attended?
   None .......................................................... 1
   One ............................................................ 2
   Two ............................................................. 3
   Three .......................................................... 4

27. Have you been an officer in this group?
   Yes, I've held one office .................................. 1
   Yes, I've held two offices .................................. 2
   Yes, I've held more than two offices ................. 3
   No, I've not held any offices ............................ 4

28. Which one of the following reasons do you think comes closest to your reasons for being a member of this group?
   (a) I belong to the group because I enjoy the things the group does. It's a lot of fun to do things for others with a purpose in mind .... 1
   (b) I belong to the group because it does worthwhile things that are important, whether it is fun to do them or not .......... 2

29. What is your religious preference? Please write down the exact name of the religious faith to which you belong or subscribe (for example, "Anglican," not just Protestant, or "Orthodox-Jewish," not just Jewish. Write down "none" if you have no preference.

   [Write in] ..................................................... (31-A)

30. How often do you go to church, synagogue or temple?
   More than once a week ...................................... 1
   Once a week .................................................. 2
   A few times a month ...................................... 3
   About once a month ...................................... 4
   About once every three months ...................... 5
   Mainly on important holidays ....................... 6
   Seldom ......................................................... 7
   Never .......................................................... 8

31. Do you take part in other religious activities? (For example, social clubs, youth groups, choirs)
   Yes ............................................................ 1
   No ............................................................... 2

32. How often do you pray?
   Never .......................................................... 1
   Now and then ................................................ 2
   About once a week ........................................ 3
   Two or three times a week .............................. 4
   Once a day .................................................... 5
   Twice a day .................................................. 6
   Three times a day or more ............................. 7

33. How religious do you consider yourself?
   Very religious .................................................. 1
   Moderately religious ........................................ 2
   Slightly religious ........................................... 3
   Not religious at all ........................................ 4

34. Do you consider yourself more of a supporter of
   The Liberal Party ............................................. 1
   The Progressive Conservative Party ................ 1
   The New Democratic Party .............................. 2
   Green Party ................................................... 3
   I do not support a political party ................. 4

35. Generally speaking, do your friends support the same political party as you do?
   Yes ............................................................ 1
   No ............................................................... 2

36. Have you voted in elections in Canada? For each of the two types of elections we want to know whether you voted in the last election that was held:
   (a) The federal election
   Yes, I voted .................................................. 1
   No, I did not vote, but would have ......... 2
   No, I was not eligible to vote ..................... 3

   (b) The provincial election
   Yes, I voted .................................................. 1
   No, I did not vote, but would have ......... 2
   No, I was not eligible to vote ..................... 3

37. Do you contribute to a political party or take part in party activities?
   Yes, I contribute only .................................... 1
   Yes, I do not contribute and do not take part in party activities ...... 2
   Yes, I do both ................................................. 3
   No, I do neither .............................................. 4

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36. Name the newspaper(s) you read most regularly.

37. Which of the following sections are you most interested in reading?

- Sports
- Financial
- Political News
- Editorial Page
- Reviews of cultural events, plans, etc.
- Advice columns
- Horoscope

38. Do you have a radio?
- Yes
- No

39. Do you have a television set?
- Yes
- No

40. How often do you listen to or watch news and weather reports? (Circle one number only for each of news and weather)
- Several times a day
- Once a day
- 2 or 3 times a week
- Once a week
- Less often
- Never

41. How many hours a day, on the average, do you watch television?
- An hour or less
- 1 - 2 hrs
- 3 - 4 hrs
- 5 - 6 hrs
- More than 6 hrs
- I do not watch TV

42. Which television programs do you like best? Please write in.

43. Which programs do you watch most often and regularly? Please write in.

44. How many hours a day, on the average, do you listen to the radio?
- 1 - 2 hrs
- 3 - 4 hrs
- 5 - 6 hrs
- More than 6 hrs
- I do not listen to the radio

45. Which of the following views do you think should be allowed on television or radio? (Check as many as you wish)
- Views of homosexuals
- Views on diet
- Views critical of the war
- Views of means of birth control
- Views of ancient religions
- Views of communism
- Views on any education for children
- Views of anti-communists
- Views of Nazis
- Views of birth control
- Views of transvestites
- Views of society
- Views of the arts
- Views of all of the above

46. In the following situations, which do you think is (Circle one number only)
- (a) A person who is treated by others
- (b) A person who is approved by others
- (c) A person who is trusted by others
- (d) A person who is criticized by others

47. I prefer a friend of my own sex who (Circle one number only)
- (a) is efficient, industrious, and practical
- (b) is warm and faithful - has friendship
- (c) is a natural leader
- (d) is actively concerned with justice and/or charity

48. On the whole, I prefer to associate with (Circle one number only)
- (a) People who are cooperative and ready to compromise their stand on issues
- (b) People who are reliable and can be trusted
- (c) People who are logical and make the best decisions possible
- (d) People who are friendly and easy to get along with
51. One should guide one's behavior according to the standards of: (Circle one number only)
(a) what is wanted or expected by others ........................................ 1 (8)
(b) what is permitted by the laws and norms of society .................... 3
(c) what is practical or possible ..................................................... 2
(d) what is desirable or ideal ....................................................... 4

52. If one is the type of person who: (Circle one number only)
(a) is confident that he can do everything reasonably well ................. 1 (9)
(b) is concerned with the moral quality of his life and tries to live a
   respectable life ........................................................................... 2
(c) is determined to take full responsibility for the decisions he 
   makes in life ............................................................................. 3
(d) is living at peace with himself and finds happiness in himself ......... 4

53. If I had to choose what I would most like to be, I would choose: (Circle one number only)
(a) to be loyal to the best .............................................................. 1 (10)
(b) to be a responsible leader ....................................................... 2
(c) to be a faithful companion (buddy) ........................................... 3
(d) to be an efficient worker .......................................................... 4

54. I believe the most important task of a union is to: (Circle one number only)
(a) protect the contractual rights and interests of workers ............... 1 (11)
(b) secure better working conditions and other facilities for workers . 2
(c) make a strong political stand and stand for responsibility 
   among workers ........................................................................ 3
(d) ensure workers to take better care of the welfare of their 
   families, in terms of take-home pay, security, etc. ...................... 4

55. Of all the good things a man can be, I believe it is most important that he be: 
(Circle one number only)
(a) a responsible member of the community, contributing to the attain- 
    ment of its goals ................................................................... 2 (12)
(b) a law-abiding member of the community, respected for his moral 
    life by others ........................................................................ 3
(c) a conscientious and good worker on his job ................................ 4
(d) a good husband, father, friend and friendly to others ............... 5

56. If I could influence the educational policies of the schools of my city or town, I would... (Circle one number only)
(a) improve practical and technical training .................................. 1 (13)
(b) improve teaching of basic civic duties and ideals ...................... 2
(c) stress the study of political problems and ideals ...................... 3
(d) promote the study and participation in cultural activities .......... 4

57. How would you like to ask you to tell us a little more about yourself by choosing the adjectives below which seem to describe you best.

You will notice that there are two columns. Each word in the left-hand column has a word in the right-hand column which is its exact opposite. If one word describes you well, the other won't. For example, you wouldn't choose both "nervous" and "calm." This can be enjoyable if you relax and let yourself go. Please put a check (x) on the line which describes you best for each pair of words.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Between</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Very</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Flexible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Inflexible (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Bad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Good* (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Passive (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Strong</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Weak (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Independent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dependent (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Liking change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Distilling change (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Warm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cold (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Pessimistic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Optimistic (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Submissive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dominant (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Interested in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Interested in getting along (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-conforming (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Powerless</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Powerful (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Idealistic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Practical (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Organized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Organized (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Dishbelieving</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Believing (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Hateful</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Call (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Trusting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Distrusting (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Dissatisfied</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Satisfied (31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. High in self-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low in self-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Unimportant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Important (33)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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C. This section contains a number of statements about which there is no general agreement. People differ widely in the way they feel about each item. There are no right answers. The purpose of the survey is to see how different groups feel about each item. We should like your honest opinion on each of these statements.

For each statement there are five alternative responses from which you are asked to choose the one coming closest to your own views:

1. STRONGLY AGREE
2. AGREE
3. UNDECIDED
4. DISAGREE
5. STRONGLY DISAGREE

These statements are set up so that immediately to the right of each one you will find the series of numbers, 1 2 3 4 5. All you have to do is circle the number of the response that comes closest to your own view.

Please use response number 3, "undecided" only when you find it completely impossible to decide right away whether you tend to agree or disagree with the statement. It is important that you indicate whether you agree (number 2) or disagree (number 4) even in cases where you are uncertain or where you have some reservations.

SAMPLE ITEMS:

1. I am less happy and contented than most people are.
   1 2 3 4 5
   One should strive to do one's best.
   1 2 3 4 5

START HERE. READ EACH ITEM CAREFULLY. DO NOT SPEND MUCH TIME ON ANY ITEM. WORK RAPIDLY. BE SURE TO ANSWER EVERY ITEM.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Too many things are planned these days; one should let things develop more naturally.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>(240) 3</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>I could just as easily live in another society, past or present.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>A child should be expected to obey his parents without any explanation of why he should do what he is asked to do.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Short term goals should always be given priority over long term goals.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Even though technical change and automation is bound to happen, it doesn't mean that it is usually a good thing.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>For most questions, there is just one right answer, once a person is able to get all the facts.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. There are so many laws and regulations that the average man seldom knows what to do.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. The welfare of the whole society should be promoted even at the cost of the interests of the individual.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. The kind of job I would most prefer would be a job where I am the final authority on my work.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. The purpose of prayer is to solve difficult problems.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. All religions should have the same rights before the law.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. One should try to get along without help from other people.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. The world is a pretty good place. We really don't need all this concern about change.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. The trouble with most jobs is that you just get used to doing things in one way and then want you to do them differently.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued on the next page)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I would let my friendship slip in a community stand in the way of moving on to a better job</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The interests of the family is the highest goal that all men should set for themselves.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Organized religion determines the fate of civilization.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The world would be a much better place if each man took care of his own back yard.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I prefer to come to conclusions about things pretty much on my own.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. A man can be truly good without any religion at all.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. People will be honest with you as long as you are honest with them.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. The average citizen can have a real influence on most government decisions.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. I react to new ideas which I hear or read by analyzing them to see what they mean in general.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Permanence and stability, not change, are what we should aim for in society.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. I'm very happy with most aspects of myself.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. It is only natural to desire about the way things are going in this society</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. The government should base its policies on achieving long-term goals of the society even if it means making some immediate sacrifices.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. As a country we should be more concerned about improving our own standard of living than about improving conditions in the new countries of Asia and Africa.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. These days it is almost impossible to know what to expect of other people.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. It's hardly fair to bring children into the world, the way things look for the future.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. In spite of what many people say, technical change and automation is really a very good thing.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Man should adapt to circumstances and not actively try to master them</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Religion is extremely important to me because it answers many questions about the true meaning of life.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. I feel I am able to get along well with people.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. If you start trying to change things very much you usually make them worse.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. People who give priority to satisfaction of their own desires tend to be a danger to the unity of the nation.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. I am often worried and anxious.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. There is a God, creator of the universe, who knows God's will.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. I often feel that I am doing alone in life with no particular role to play.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. If we think about war often, we will have fewer problems.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. In the time in which we live, traditional ties between nations and races are outdated.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. In spite of the age and down of family life, we usually have the happiest times at home.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. If you want to get anywhere, it's the policy of the system to make people who need to be cleansed, not just the behavior of individuals.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Under certain circumstances, disobedience to the government is justified.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. The interests of the group ought to come before those of the individual.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. The only meaning to existence is the one which one gives to oneself.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. I'm always going to say, if I were a millionaire, I'd do it myself.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. As you grow older, the people who are self-conscious and exploited are the happiest.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Most people can be trusted.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. If you know a person well enough in a person at work, then it must be true that the person must be living the calm life.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
97. I feel confident that I can have a personal influence on what is done in this society.

98. It is better for a society to have a large number of different religious denominations than to have just one large one and a few small sects.

99. The greatest goal one can strive for is to understand fully the general laws of the universe and those governing his own behaviour in society.

100. If a change in society will benefit most people in the long run, it should be made even if it hurts many in the short run.

101. One can never feel at ease on a job where the ways of doing things are always being changed.

102. If one thinks a little, one must think that it can be proven that there is no God.

103. I set a high standard for myself, and I feel others should do the same.

104. I am able to do things as well as most other people.

105. Technological change and automation are happening too rapidly these days.

106. One should concentrate on the present: the future remains uncertain.

107. These days a person doesn't really know what he can count.

108. Nothing in life is worth the sacrifice of losing contact with your family.

109. A person should obey only those rules and regulations which seem reasonable.

110. The greatest degree of self-expression and gratification to members of a group can be achieved through discipline and self-control in the group.

111. It seems to me that other people find it easier than I do to decide what is right.

112. Change in itself is always a good thing for nothing can be worse than stagnation.

113. I sometimes find it hard to be myself in this day and age.

114. A lasting world peace can be achieved by those of us who work toward it.

115. I analyze the motives of others to see how well I can understand them in terms of general ideas about why people behave the way they do.

116. One should be guided by ideas of justice and charity in one's daily behaviour and not be too much concerned about one's own personal interests and security.

117. Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.

118. A man should obey the laws no matter how much they interfere with his personal ambitions.

119. A person should be undivided in his loyalty to his family.

120. If I had to go to a doctor or lawyer, I would prefer someone who is not a close personal friend of mine.

121. Most of the ideas which are printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.

122. Church membership and attendance offer an opportunity to formulate good social relationships and to establish oneself in the community.

123. One of my greatest concerns is to be my own boss in as many aspects of life as possible.

124. Technical change and automation is a good thing, even though it often interferes with the interests of the workers.

125. With everything in such a state of disorder it's hard for a person to know what are the right rules to follow.

126. I often do whatever rules we feel cheerful here and now, even at the cost of some distant goal.

127. To compromise with political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of your own side.

128. The best standard to apply to any goal or ideal is: Is it practical? Will it work?

129. I enjoy thinking of metaphors to illustrate moral rules and principles.

130. Nowadays it is difficult to distinguish between good and bad conduct.
131. I've never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings.
   
132. It is very important to me to get ahead in life.
   
133. Religion provides answers to problems of meaning which science will never be able to solve.
   
134. Sometimes I feel that I am about to go to pieces.
   
135. There is a power greater than man, which some people call God and some people call nature.
   
136. Anyone can rise above circumstances if he tries hard enough.
   
137. I prefer letting things happen without worrying about too much, rather than planning everything carefully.
   
138. Quite often I have been keenly aware of the presence of God or of the Divine Being.
   
139. When I get used to doing things in one way, it is disturbing to have to change to a new method.
   
140. There's very little we can do to bring about a permanent world peace.
   
141. That which is distinctive of a people should be safeguarded at all cost - even if it means breaking off relations with other people.
   
142. It is not enough to believe that time will take care of things; one must actively intervene to get things done.
   
143. I would prefer a job where I could plan my work in advance.
   
144. Unquestioning obedience is not a virtue.
   
145. The greatest disadvantage of discipline is that it inhibits the expression of a person's full personality.
   
146. No one understands you as well as do members of your own family.
   
147. A trade union should never ask its members to strike in support of other trades, but should call strikes only for causes that will benefit its own trade.
   
148. I wish I could have more respect for myself.
   
149. In making decisions, I prefer to determine my position myself.
   
150. I'm sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.

58. What is your present job? Please write in the exact title (and grade, if any).
   
59. How many years have you held this job?
   
60. What was the last job you had before you took your present job? (Please answer all sections)
   
(a) Exact title
   (Write in)
   
(b) What was the type of business or firm in which previous job was held?
   (Write in)
   
(c) In what city or town was it located? (Write in)
   
(d) How many years were you in this job? (Write in)

61. How many times have you changed jobs since you left school?
   
   Never
   
   Once
   
   Twice
   
   More than Twice
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>122. I've never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings.</td>
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<td>125. There is a power greater than us, which some people call God and some people call nature.</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>132. It is not enough to believe that time will take care of things; one must actively intervene to get things done.</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140. I'm sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

58. What is your present job? Please write in the exact title (and grade, if any). (195,197)

59. How many years have you held this job? (Write in) (197)

60. What was the last job you had before you took your present job? (Please answer all sections)

(a) Exact title (Write in) (198)

(b) What was the type of business or firm in which previous job was held? (Write in) (199)

(c) In what city or town was it located? (Write in) (200)

(d) How many years were you in this job? (Write in) (201)

61. What was the first full time job you ever held?

(a) My first job was my first full time job. Check if this applies to you. (Judge)

(b) The exact title of the first full time job was... (Write in) (202)

(c) What was the type of business or firm? (Write in) (203)

(d) In what city or town was it located? (Write in) (204)

(e) How many years were you in this job? (Write in) (205)

62. How many times have you changed jobs since you left school?

(Choose one)

- Never
- Once
- Twice
- Three times
- Four times
- Five or more times
62. What was your father’s main job or type of work during most of his lifetime?  (Please write in as specifically as you can.)

(21,22)  

63. Do you expect to remain in your present type of job all your working career?
(a) Yes  
(b) No  

(23)  

64. If NO what type of job do you expect to get? Please write in this job title and the kind of work it involves.

(24,25)  

65. When you think about taking a job in another plant or company, what do you think is the most important consideration?

Higher pay and benefits...  
More interesting work...  
More security...  
Better chance to use your abilities...  
Better opportunities for advancement...  
A greater sense of accomplishment...

(26)  

66. How many times have you been unemployed for more than a month since you first started to work full time?

Once  
Twice  
Three times  
Four times  
Five times or more  
Never  

(27)  

67. What is your yearly income from your present job, before deductions? Remember that this information will be strictly confidential and you as an individual cannot be identified with it.

Under $5,000  
$5,000 - $9,000  
$9,000 - $13,000  
$13,000 - $17,000  
$17,000 - $21,000  
$21,000 - $25,000  
$25,000 - $29,000  
$29,000 - $33,000  
$33,000 - $37,000  
$37,000 - $41,000  
$41,000 or more  

(28)  

68. How many persons (other than yourself) depend on you for more than half of their support?

None  
One  
Two  
Three  
Four  
Five or more  

(30)  

69. If your wife or husband works, please indicate what her or his yearly income is.

Under $5,000  
$5,000 - $9,000  
$9,000 - $13,000  
$13,000 - $17,000  
$17,000 - $21,000  
$21,000 - $25,000  
$25,000 - $29,000  
$29,000 - $33,000  
$33,000 - $37,000  
$37,000 - $41,000  
$41,000 or more  

(31)  

70. Taking into consideration all the things about your job (work), how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with it?

Very dissatisfied  
Fairly dissatisfied  
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied  
Fairly satisfied  
Very satisfied  

(32)  

71. About how long have you been with the company?

Less than one year  
1 - 3 years  
3 - 6 years  
6 - 9 years  
More than 9 but less than 12 years  
12 - 15 years  
Over 15 years  

(33)  

72. For how many years have you been working in the line of industry you’re working in now? (For example, you may have worked for more than one company all producing the same product or related products).

Less than one year  
1 - 3 years  
3 - 6 years  
6 - 9 years  
More than 9 but less than 12 years  
12 - 15 years  
Over 15 years  

(34)  

73. What are your chances for promotion in your job?

Very good  
Good  
Fair  
Poor  
Very poor  

(35)
74. How satisfied are you with the following aspects of your job? Please circle one number only for each aspect depending on how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Very satisfied</th>
<th>Fairly satisfied</th>
<th>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</th>
<th>Fairly dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The conditions under which you have to work (lighting, ventilation, etc.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5 (36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The opportunities for advancement in your job.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5 (37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The recognition you get from your job.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5 (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The amount of pay you get on your job.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5 (39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The amount of security you have on your job.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5 (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Your control over the pace and quality of your work.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5 (41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The amount of decision-making and responsibility demanded by your job.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5 (42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. The extent to which you can use your skills.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5 (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The feeling of accomplishment from the work you are doing.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5 (44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. The amount of contact you have with other workers on the job.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5 (45)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

75. How satisfied are you with their jobs do you think the most of the workers in this firm/company are?

- Very satisfied: 1 (46)
- Fairly satisfied: 2
- Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied: 3
- Fairly dissatisfied: 4
- Very dissatisfied: 5

76. If you were asked to advise a young boy just graduating from high school with good marks, which one of the following would you advise?

- Take the best job available. 1 (47)
- To continue education through university. 2
- To train for a specialized occupation by apprenticeship, trade school or business school. 3

77. Which one of the following comes closest to describing what you do on your job?

- Mining and checking a continuous automatic process. 1 (48)
- Using tools to produce something that requires a lot of skill. 2
- Using and controlling a machine to do a job that requires a lot of decisions and skill on your part. 3
- Using or operating a machine that does not require much skill. 4
- Always doing the same part of the job on an assembly line while other workers do other parts of the whole job. 5
- Not a production worker. 6

78. How do you feel you are on the technical side of your job?

- Quite a bit above average. 1 (49)
- A little above average. 2
- About average. 3
- A little below average. 4
- Quite a bit below average. 5

79. Which of the following kinds of jobs would you consider ideal for yourself?

- A job where the way you do your work: Is always the same. 1 (50)
- Changes very little. 2
- Changes somewhat. 3
- Changes quite a bit. 4
- Changes a great deal. 5

80. What do the members of your family think about your job?

- My family thinks that this is: An excellent job. 1 (51)
- A good job. 2
- A fair job. 3
- A poor job. 4
- A very poor job. 5

81. How does your family feel about your working hours?

- I do not work shifts. 1 (52)
- They like to have no working shifts. 2
- They don't mind whether I work shifts or not. 3
- They don't like to have me working shifts. 4
- They dislike very much the working shifts. 5

82. What do your friends outside of the company think about your job?

- My friends think this is: An excellent job. 1 (53)
- A good job. 2
- A fair job. 3
- A poor job. 4
- A very poor job. 5
83. Every person does some things better than he does others. Some are able to work better with machinery than with people - others are able to work better with people than machinery. How does it work out for you?
   I am much better at working with machinery than I am at working with people. 1 (54)
   I am a little better at working with machinery than I am with people. 2
   I am a little better at working with people than I am with machinery. 3
   I am much better at working with people than I am at working with machinery. 4

84. Do you think that business for your company will be better or worse in the next few years than it is now?
   Business will be a lot better. 1 (55)
   Somewhat better. 2
   About the same as now. 3
   Somewhat worse. 4
   Business will be a lot worse. 5

85. Which of the following situations best describe the amount of contact you have with other workers on your job?
   (a) I work in a team or gang with lots of contacts with other workers. 1 (56)
   (b) I work with one other person in frequent contact. 2
   (c) I work alone, but in easy talking distance from other workers. 3
   (d) I work alone, but can talk with other workers if I shout. 4
   (e) I work alone and cannot talk to others without leaving my job. 5

86. Do you and some of the other workers consider yourself a work group?
   Yes. 1 (57)
   No. 2

   If YES, PLEASE ANSWER THE NEXT 5 QUESTIONS.
   If NO, TURN TO QUESTION 97.

87. How many people are there in your work group?
   2 - 4 people. 1 (58)
   5 - 9 people. 2
   10 - 14 people. 3
   15 - 19 people. 4
   20 or more people. 5

88. How long have you been working with this group?
   Less than 1 year. 1 (59)
   1 - 2 years. 2
   More than 2 years, but less than 5. 3
   3 - 4 years. 4
   More than 5 years, but less than 10. 5
   5 years or longer. 6

89. Do you feel that you are a part of your work group?
   Yes, I feel really a part of it. 6 (60)
   Yes, I feel included in most ways but not in all. 2
   Yes, but I feel I am included in only a few ways and not in others. 2
   No, I don't feel I really belong. 4

90. Would you mind being separated from your present work group?
   Yes, very much. 1 (61)
   Yes, a little. 2
   No, not really. 3
   No, not at all. 4

91. Which of the following statements best describes your work group?
   (a) My work group is a cheerful bunch who have a lot of fun together. 1 (62)
   (b) My work group is a close-knit group of friends who can rely on each other's help even outside the job. 2
   (c) My work group works together very well and all try to do the best they can to reach their common production goals every day. 3
   (d) My work group is very competitive, each one wants his own business. 4

92. How much time do you have during working hours to talk to other men?
   I have no time at all. 1 (63)
   I have too little time. 2
   I have enough time. 3
   I have too much time. 4

93. Can you do the work on the job and keep your mind on other things most of the time or not?
   Often. 1 (64)
   Sometimes. 2
   Seldom. 3
   Never. 4

94. Is yours the kind of job in which someone would have to take your place if you had to leave your job for half an hour or so, or could you let your work go for half an hour and catch up on it later?
   Can leave without relief. 1 (65)
   Cannot leave without relief. 2

95. Which one of the following statements comes closest to describing how you feel about your present job?
   My job is interesting nearly all the time. 1 (66)
   While my job is interesting most of the time, there are some dull stretches now and then. 2
   There are a few times when my job is interesting, but most of it's pretty dull and monotonous. 3
   My job is completely dull and monotonous. 4
96. On an ordinary workday, do you have to make decisions on your own when you are carrying out your tasks, or not?  
- Often ........................................ 1  
- Sometimes .................................. 2  
- Seldom ....................................... 3  
- Never ........................................ 4

97. How do you think your firm or company compares with others as a place to work?  
- It is a better place to work than most ........................................ 1  
- It is about as good as most ........................................ 2  
- It is a worse place to work than most ........................................ 3  

98. As compared to other firms in the industry, do you think your firm is:  
- One of the most modern firms in this industry ........................................ 1  
- More modern than most ........................................ 2  
- Less modern than most ........................................ 3  
- One of the most backward firms in the industry ........................................ 4

99. Do you feel your firm is more interested in cutting costs than it is in the people who work for the company?  
- The company is much more interested in cutting costs than in its people ........................................ 1  
- Somewhat more interested in cutting costs than in its people ........................................ 2  
- Equally interested in both ........................................ 3  
- Somewhat more interested in its people than it is in cutting costs ........................................ 4

100. Do employees usually have to fight for what they get in your company?  
- Usually ........................................ 1  
- Sometimes ........................................ 2  
- Seldom ........................................ 3  
- Never ........................................ 4

101. How do you feel about big companies in general?  
- Big companies are bad ........................................ 1  
- Big companies are good ........................................ 2  
- Big companies are neither bad nor good ........................................ 3  

102. How well do you feel your firm is managed?  
- Not managed well at all ........................................ 1  
- Not managed very well ........................................ 2  
- Fairly well managed ........................................ 3  
- Very well managed ........................................ 4

103. Which one of the following factors would you say is most important to you in your relationship to your company?  
- The material benefits I get from my job (such as pay, security, etc.) ........................................ 1  
- My relationships and loyalty to the man who works with me and the company itself ........................................ 2  
- The sense of fulfillment and accomplishment I get from my job itself ........................................ 3  
- The feeling of being a part of a concern that is trying to achieve certain goals and that I am contributing to reaching these goals ........................................ 4

104. How much influence do you and workers in general have on the way the plant or firm is run?  
- A lot ........................................ 1  
- Some ........................................ 2  
- Very little ........................................ 3  
- None ........................................ 4

105. How much do you know about the internal overall technical operation of this plant?  
- A great deal ........................................ 1  
- Quite a bit ........................................ 2  
- Little ........................................ 3  
- Not much at all ........................................ 4

106. How often would you say your company introduces changes in the way things are done?  
- Very often ........................................ 1  
- Quite often ........................................ 2  
- Seldom ........................................ 3  
- Never ........................................ 4

107. How long have you worked under your present foreman?  
- Less than 1 year ........................................ 1  
- 1 - 2 years ........................................ 2  
- More than 2 but less than 3 years ........................................ 3  
- 3 - 4 years ........................................ 4  
- More than 4 but less than 5 years ........................................ 5  
- 5 years or longer ........................................ 6

108. When your foreman wants you to do something, how does he usually let you know what is wanted?  
- Simply tells me ........................................ 1  
- Asks me if I will ........................................ 2  
- "Explains to me why he wants it" ........................................ 3

109. Do you feel that your foreman is a part of your work group?  
- Yes, he really is a part of my work group ........................................ 1  
- Yes, he is included in most ways but not all ........................................ 2  
- Yes, he is included in some ways but not in others ........................................ 3  
- No, he is not really a part of our work group ........................................ 4
110. Does your foreman tell you clearly or does he leave you much on your own?

He supervises very little; I do it definitely on my own. .............................................. 1
A little supervision; I am pretty much on my own .......................................................... 2
A moderate amount of supervision .................................................................................. 3
Fairly close supervision ....................................................................................................... 4
He supervises very closely; he doesn't leave me on my own ............................................ 5

111. How good is your foreman at getting people to work well together, getting individuals to do the best they can, giving recognition for good work done, letting people know where they stand, etc.?

Very good .......................................................................................................................... 1
Good ...................................................................................................................................... 2
Average ................................................................................................................................... 3
Poor ......................................................................................................................................... 4
Very poor ............................................................................................................................... 5

112. How good is your foreman at planning and scheduling the work?

Very good .......................................................................................................................... 1
Good ...................................................................................................................................... 2
Average ................................................................................................................................... 3
Poor ......................................................................................................................................... 4
Very poor ............................................................................................................................... 5

113. Do you feel foremen in this firm are just doing what they are told and do not have much say in what should be done?

They have a great deal of say ............................................................................................. 1
They have quite a bit of say .................................................................................................. 2
They have some say ............................................................................................................. 3
They have a little say ............................................................................................................ 4
They have very little or no say at all .................................................................................. 5

114. From where do you get information about what is going on in your firm? (Check as many as apply to you)

From a separate information department (newsletters, bulletins, etc.) ................................ (12, 13)
Through the local union officers .......................................................................................... 
From the superintendent .........................................................................................................
Directly from management ...................................................................................................
From the men with whom you work ....................................................................................
I do not get any information ................................................................................................

115. How satisfied are you with the amount of information you get about what is going on in your company?

Not very satisfied ................................................................................................................ 1
Somewhat satisfied .............................................................................................................. 2
Fairly satisfied ..................................................................................................................... 3
Very satisfied ....................................................................................................................... 4

116. Do you receive information and/or news about any changes that affect you or your work?

Always ................................................................................................................................... 1
Usually .................................................................................................................................... 2
Sometimes ............................................................................................................................. 3
Never ....................................................................................................................................... 4

117. Which one of the following four statements comes closest to your opinion of labour unions?

(a) Labour unions in this country are doing a fine job ...................................................... 1
(b) While they do make some mistakes, on the whole they are doing more good than harm ................................................................. 2
(c) Although we need labour unions in this country, they do more harm than good the way they are run now .................................................. 3
(d) This country would be better off without any labour unions at all .............................. 4

118. Is your firm unionized?

Yes ........................................................................................................................................ 1
No .......................................................................................................................................... 2

119. Are you a member of a union?

Yes ........................................................................................................................................ 1
No .......................................................................................................................................... 2

120. Which of the following statements comes closest to your view on responsibility for decisions about changes?

Management alone has the responsibility to make those decisions ................................... 1
Management alone has the responsibility to make those decisions but it should consult with the unions or workers ................................. 2
Management does not have the responsibility to make those decisions alone; the unions have an equal responsibility and decisions should be made together .......................................................... 3
Management and the unions cannot decide these matters alone; the workers affected by the change should have a say ........................................................................................................... 4

121. How many of the last three meetings of your union's local did you attend?

I attended none of them ..................................................................................................... 1
I attended one ...................................................................................................................... 2
I attended two ..................................................................................................................... 3
I attended all three ............................................................................................................. 4

122. How much do local union officers care about workers in your firm?

My firm is not unionized ...................................................................................................... 1
They care very much ........................................................................................................... 2
Quite a bit ................................................................................................................................ 3
A little ....................................................................................................................................... 4
Very little ............................................................................................................................... 5
Not at all ................................................................................................................................... 6

123. Have you ever been a steward in a union?

Yes, once ............................................................................................................................. 1
Yes, but not now ................................................................................................................... 2
Yes, many times ................................................................................................................... 3
No .......................................................................................................................................... 4
I have never been in a Union .............................................................................................. 5
124. How much say does the union have in how this firm is run?

Very much: 1
Quite a bit: 2
Some: 3
Very little: 4
None at all: 5
My firm is not unionized: 6

125. In your opinion, how are local union officers in fighting for the interests of workers?

Very good: 1
Good: 2
Fair: 3
Poor: 4
Very poor: 5
My firm is not unionized: 6

126. (a) Would you say labour-management relations in your firm are mainly marked by:

Conflict: 1
Co-operation: 2

(b) How do you feel about that?

I think it is a good thing: 1
I think it is a bad thing: 2
I think it is neither good nor bad: 3

127. When the Company introduced the change, were the workers given any explanation of the reasons for the new set up?

We were given full explanation of its reasons: 1
Some explanation: 2
No explanation: 3
We were given very little or no explanation of its reasons: 4

128. In your opinion, how drastic or important is the change as it affects the jobs of most of the workers in the firm?

It was a very basic change that greatly affected the jobs of many of the workers in the firm: 1
It was a medium change that affected the jobs of the workers somewhat, but not drastically: 2
It was a very small change that only slightly affected the jobs of most workers: 3

129. Would you say that from your point of view the change on the whole has been:

A good thing: 1
A bad thing: 2
Neither one way nor the other: 3

130. Do you think the change was necessary to make the Company more efficient?

Yes: 1
No: 2

131. Has the change made any difference in your work?

It has made no difference in my work: 1
A little difference in my work: 2
Some difference in my work: 3
Quite a lot of difference in my work: 4
It has made a great deal of difference in my work: 5

132. Do you think you have better or worse chances for promotion as a result of the change?

Better: 1
Not affected or about the same: 2
Worse: 3

133. Do you have fewer or more contacts with other workers on the job as a result of the change?

Fewer contacts: 1
Not affected or about the same: 2
More contacts: 3

134. Do you have more or less responsibility in your job as a result of the change?

More responsibility: 1
Not affected or about the same: 2
Less responsibility: 3

135. Are you in general more or less satisfied with your job than you were before as a result of the change?

More satisfied: 1
Not affected or about the same: 2
Less satisfied: 3

136. Are you more or less satisfied with the change?

More satisfied: 1
Not affected or about the same: 2
Less satisfied: 3

137. Are you more or less satisfied with the way your firm is run as a result of the change?

More satisfied: 1
Not affected or about the same: 2
Less satisfied: 3
126. Do you think you have more or less security in your job as a result of the change?
   More secure ........................................... 1 (30)
   Not affected or about the same .................. 2
   Less secure ........................................... 3

127. Are you more or less satisfied with your pay as a result of the change?
   More satisfied ........................................ 1 (30)
   Not affected or about the same .................. 2
   Less satisfied ........................................ 3

128. Do you have to pay more attention to the work you are doing as a result of the change? 
   Have to pay more attention to my work .............. 1 (40)
   Not affected or about the same .................. 2
   Can pay less attention to my work ................ 3

129. How did you feel about the advance notice of the change? 
   We were given no advance notice .................. 1 (41)
   The notice was short enough ........................ 2
   The notice was too long ............................. 3

130. How did you feel about the information given to you about the change before its introduction? 
   We received much information ..................... 1 (42)
   We received enough information .................. 2
   We did not receive enough information ............. 3

131. Did the workers affected by the change participate at all or have an influence in making the decisions about the adoption of this change? 
   Yes ...................................................... 1 (43)
   No ........................................................ 2

132. If it would not make any difference to the pay or security of your job, would you like to see your job become more highly automated?
   I would like it very much ................................ 1 (44)
   It doesn't matter much one way or the other ........ 2
   I would dislike it very much .......................... 3

133. If some change in your work required you to learn new skills through retraining, which one of the following would you do?
   Take a course at night at your own expense learning the new skills 1 (45)
   Take a course only if management would pay part or all of the cost 2
   Prefer not to 3

134. If some change in your work meant that you would lose your job, which one of the following would you do?
   Accept this as a fact of life and look for another job .................. 1 (46)
   Complain to management and the union .................. 2
   Participate in a strike against the Company ............ 3
   Quit the job for another ................................ 4

135. If some change in your work meant that you would have much less security in your job, which one of the following would you do?
   Transfer to another plant ................................ 1 (47)
   Complain to management but probably accept the transfer ............ 2
   Complain to the union and, if necessary, participate in a strike against the Company ........... 3
   Not transfer even if it meant I would lose my job .................. 4

136. If some change in your work meant that you would have much less security in your job, which one of the following would you do?
   Stay on the job, but adjust as well as you can .................. 1 (48)
   Stay on the job, but complain to management and union ............ 2
   Stay on the job, but start looking for another job ............... 3
   Take part in a strike against the Company ............... 4
   Quit the job for another ................................ 5

137. If some change in your work meant that you would have much less security in your job, which one of the following would you do?
   Stay on the job, but adjust as well as you can .................. 1 (49)
   Stay on the job, but complain to management and the union ............ 2
   Stay on the job, but start looking for another job .............. 3
   Take part in a strike against the Company ............... 4
   Quit the job for another ................................ 5

138. If some change in your work meant that you would have much less security in your job, which one of the following would you do?
   Stay on the job, but adjust as well as you can .................. 1 (50)
   Stay on the job, but complain to management and the union ............ 2
   Stay on the job, but start looking for another job .............. 3
   Take part in a strike against the Company ............... 4
   Quit the job for another ................................ 5

139. If some change in your work meant that you would have much less security in your job, which one of the following would you do?
   Stay on the job, but adjust as well as you can .................. 1 (51)
   Stay on the job, but complain to management and the union ............ 2
   Stay on the job, but start looking for another job .............. 3
   Take part in a strike against the Company ............... 4
   Quit the job for another ................................ 5

140. If some change in your work meant that you would have much less security in your job, which one of the following would you do?
   Stay on the job, but adjust as well as you can .................. 1 (52)
   Stay on the job, but complain to management and the union ............ 2
   Stay on the job, but start looking for another job .............. 3
   Take part in a strike against the Company ............... 4
   Quit the job for another ................................ 5
153. If some change in your work meant that you would have much less responsibility in your job, which one of the following would you do?

Stay on the job, and adjust as well as you can. 1
Stay on the job, but complain to management and the union 2
Stay on the job, but start looking for another job 3
Take part in a strike against the company 4
Quit the job for another 5

154. If some change in your work made you much less satisfied, on the whole, with your job, which one of the following would you do?

Stay on the job, and adjust as well as you can. 1
Stay on the job, but complain to management and the union 2
Stay on the job, but start looking for another job 3
Take part in a strike against the company 4
Quit the job for another 5

155. On the whole, did you find the questionnaire interesting?

Very interesting 1
Fairly interesting 2
Fairly dull 3
Very dull 4

156. How long did it take you to fill in the questionnaire?

One hour or less 1
More than 1 hour, less than 1-1/2 hours 2
More than 1-1/2 hours, less than 2 hours 3
More than 2 hours 4

157. If you have any comments, please write them below:

Thank you very much again for your time and co-operation.

5. Letter Accompanying Questionnaire.

University of Toronto
Department of Sociology
363 Spadina Avenue
Toronto 5

May 24, 1968

Dear Sirs,

The enclosed questionnaire is being mailed to 5,000 Canadian industrial workers in six different industries. ALL 5 is one of the firms selected to represent the oil industry. We have discussed this study with Mr. , President of Local 368, the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, as well as with Mr. , Manager at the Refinery. Both have given their approval and co-operation to the survey.

We should like to make an appeal for your personal co-operation. We feel that this is an important opportunity for workers in various industries to express their opinions and attitudes towards their place in industry. We urge you to use this opportunity. Remember that your views will not be identified with you as an individual, but will be kept strictly confidential. The number on the front of the questionnaire is necessary for the distribution and collection of questionnaires given to workers in the different industries. By checking all the numbers of returned questionnaires we are able to send control only to those people who have not returned theirs. After the information has been transferred to IBM cards, the questionnaires are destroyed to ensure anonymity.

We ask you kindly to fill in the questionnaire completely and return it to us in the enclosed stamped envelope as soon as possible. So far most people in whom we have visited the questionnaires have co-operated by completing and returning it promptly.

Thank you very much.

Sincerely yours,

Jan T. Floodt
Associate Professor.
Dear Sirs:

We have not yet received back your Task Force on Labour Relations questionnaire which we mailed to you two weeks ago.

We once more appeal to you for your cooperation on this important study. Recent events in the field of labour-management relations show again how important it is that we try to understand the problems involved as best we can. You can make a contribution to this understanding by filling out the questionnaire. By finding out how the people most directly affected by these problems feel and think about them we might be able to solve some of them eventually.

We think you will find the questionnaire interesting and we will waste the time it takes to fill it out. However, if you are unable to complete it, would you please be so kind as to mail it back to us in the stamped and addressed envelope provided? But please make an effort to complete it.

We assure you of our sincere appreciation of your contribution.

Sincerely,

Jan J. Laubert
Associate Professor

June 15, 1964

Department of Sociology
University of Toronto
50 St. George Street
Toronto 1, Ontario

Associate Professor

Project Director
June 30, 1968.

Dear Sirs,

It is now about 6 months since we mailed to you a questionnaire for a study we are doing for the Prime Minister's Task Force on Labour Relations. In the meantime we also have sent a post card and a letter asking again for your participation in the return of the blank questionnaire.

Since we have now received the questionnaire back, blank or completed, we are wondering whether you ever received it. We are most anxious to have your participation and would be willing to send you another questionnaire if you have misplaced the one we previously sent to you. If you still have the questionnaire we would like to make a final courteous appeal for your participation. We now do tell you that the number on the questionnaire is no longer necessary since we have the other questionnaires in and will not be writing to you again. You could therefore remove the number and send us the questionnaire if that was the reason you were reluctant to complete it. Similarly, we will remove the number on the new questionnaire we send you if you wish to do so. In this way you could be sure that the questionnaire could not be identified as yours.

If you wish another questionnaire to be sent please check here. ______

If you do not wish to participate in this study, we would be very much interested in learning your reasons since it might help us interpret our results and evaluate our methods. If so, would you please comment freely and fully on your reasons? We would appreciate your frankness on the matter.

Comments:

______________________________________________________

(Use the back of this sheet, if you need more space)

We should like to know your age and education if you don't mind. Please write the numbers in the box to the right.

Age ______

No. of years of education ______

We enclose a stamped self-addressed envelope for your convenience. We would be most obliged if you would return this letter to us with your comments and, if you are asking for a questionnaire to be sent, we want to thank you warmly for your participation.

Yours very truly,
APPENDIX C

Index Construction for Value Themes

For each of the six value themes a composite index was constructed by means of amalgamating two or three Likert-style questions. Likert-style questions present the respondent with a statement, to which he is then required to respond in terms of a fixed-choice scale ranging from 'strongly agree' through 'agree', 'undecided', 'disagree', to 'strongly disagree'.

Although these variables are strictly only ordinal, it was considered acceptable to conduct a factor analysis for two reasons. Firstly, all the variables used are scaled in an identical manner. Secondly, the factor analysis was not intended as an instrument of data exploration and analysis from which conclusions were to be drawn; rather its use here was simply intended as a way to help select variables for the construction of an index to be analysed by means of more orthodox procedures.

The construction of each index was broken down into three steps:

1. An assortment of questions was chosen for each value theme on the basis of face validity.
2. Each group of variables was then submitted to a factor analysis.
3. On the basis of this analysis, two or three variables from each grouping was chosen and the index thereby constructed using the 'compute' subprogramme of S.P.S.S.

Time-Orient: The variables chosen on face validity were: VAR061, VAR088, VAR094, VAR112, VAR122, VAR 129, VAR133, VAR139, VAR146.

Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix

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<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
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The index of time orientation was finally constructed from:

VAR133: "One should concentrate on the present, the future remains uncertain."

and

VAR139: "Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself."

Conformism: The variables chosen on face validity were: VAR054, VAR060, VAR077, VAR085, VAR095, VAR097, VAR124, VAR126, VAR136, VAR140, VAR153, VAR154.
Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VAR054</td>
<td>0.21569</td>
<td>0.25456</td>
<td>-0.03597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR060</td>
<td>0.26245</td>
<td>0.09996</td>
<td>0.02463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR077</td>
<td>0.26647</td>
<td>0.10193</td>
<td>0.13905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR085</td>
<td>0.55666</td>
<td>0.32471</td>
<td>0.10260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR095</td>
<td>0.38131</td>
<td>0.01473</td>
<td>0.17597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR097</td>
<td>0.25957</td>
<td>-0.04369</td>
<td>0.14198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR124</td>
<td>0.19374</td>
<td>0.37915</td>
<td>0.02741</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAR126</td>
<td>0.08555</td>
<td>-0.02288</td>
<td>0.44593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR136</td>
<td>0.17072</td>
<td>0.10656</td>
<td>0.47654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR140</td>
<td>0.23627</td>
<td>0.22975</td>
<td>0.08821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR153</td>
<td>0.12513</td>
<td>0.36305</td>
<td>0.00357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR154</td>
<td>-0.16588</td>
<td>0.38846</td>
<td>0.05197</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final index of conformism was constructed from:
VAR060: "A child should be expected to obey his parents without any explanation of why he should do what he is asked to do."

and

VAR095: "One of the most important things children should learn is when to obey authorities."

and

VAR097: "In order to be happy one must behave in ways that other people desire even if one has to suppress one's own ideas sometimes."

Family Orientation: The variables initially chosen were:
VAR048, VAR106, VAR123, VAR135, VAR141, VAR155.
The factor analysis only revealed one factor, thus the index was constructed from those with the highest loading on this factor. These were:
VAR106: "The integrity and preservation of the family is the highest goal that all men should set for themselves."

and

VAR135: "Nothing in life is worth the sacrifice of losing contact with your family."

and

VAR141: "A person should be undivided in his loyalty to his family."

Pragmatism: The initial variables selected were: VAR049, VAR056, VAR064, VAR070, VAR091, VAR101, VAR102, VAR090, VAR147.

Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VAR049</td>
<td>0.07017</td>
<td>0.24373</td>
<td>0.07797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR056</td>
<td>-0.01106</td>
<td>0.43412</td>
<td>0.05751</td>
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<td>VAR064</td>
<td>-0.10202</td>
<td>0.19525</td>
<td>0.44851</td>
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<td>VAR070</td>
<td>0.02817</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAR091</td>
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<td>0.00641</td>
<td>0.31620</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAR101</td>
<td>0.68004</td>
<td>0.16079</td>
<td>-0.21513</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAR102</td>
<td>-0.20458</td>
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<td>0.02084</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAR090</td>
<td>0.50286</td>
<td>0.21785</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR147</td>
<td>-0.12396</td>
<td>0.34878</td>
<td>0.21008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final variables from which the index was constructed were:

VAR056: The respondent's own judgment of whether he was 'very idealistic' through 'slightly idealistic', 'in-between', 'slightly practical', to 'very practical'.
and

VAR070: "I am more realistic than idealistic, that is, more occupied with things as they are than with things as they should be."

and

VAR147: "The best standard to apply to any goal or ideal: is it practical? Will it work?"

General Neophobia and Work Neophobia: One set of initial variables was factor analysed and the two indices were taken from this single set. The variables were: VAR052, VAR068, VAR073, VAR083, VAR086, VAR099, VAR100, VAR110, VAR130, VAR130, VAR137, VAR150.

**Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VAR052</td>
<td>0.13042</td>
<td>0.13555</td>
<td>0.34330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR068</td>
<td>0.27681</td>
<td>0.22830</td>
<td>0.44270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR073</td>
<td>0.12551</td>
<td>0.41832</td>
<td>0.10278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR083</td>
<td>0.32183</td>
<td>0.22744</td>
<td>0.45444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR086</td>
<td>0.47880</td>
<td>0.00304</td>
<td>-0.04883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR099</td>
<td>0.01409</td>
<td>0.65763</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAR100</td>
<td>0.52497</td>
<td>0.16168</td>
<td>0.10883</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAR110</td>
<td>0.28210</td>
<td>0.39634</td>
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<td>VAR130</td>
<td>0.46183</td>
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<td>VAR132</td>
<td>0.53507</td>
<td>0.14778</td>
<td>0.07310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR137</td>
<td>-0.08671</td>
<td>-0.02452</td>
<td>0.22275</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAR150</td>
<td>0.45284</td>
<td>0.09541</td>
<td>0.39275</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The index for general neophobia was constructed from:

VAR073: "As it is this society is in pretty good shape;
efforts to change it will just make things worse."

and.

VAR110: "Permanence and stability, not change, are what we should aim for in society."

Work neophobia was constructed from:

VAR100: "The trouble with most jobs is that you just get used to doing things in one way and then they want you to do them differently."

and

VAR130: "One can never feel at ease on a job where the ways of doing things are always being changed."

and

VAR132: "Technical change and automation are happening too rapidly these days."
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ADDENDA


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