A GENEALOGY OF THE UNEFENDED BORDER

Denaturalizing current conceptions of the Canada-U.S. border through the use of Foucault's concepts of genealogy and governmentality

by

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ABSTRACT

Using a methodology informed by Foucault's techniques of *genealogy* and *governmentality*, this thesis will locate historically the various rationalities that have established how Canada's border with the United States has been understood, especially in relation to the concepts of sovereignty and territoriality. Three specific moments in Canadian history will be examined: the Alaskan boundary dispute at the turn on the 1900s, the 1911 General Election, and the current post-September 11 context. In examining these specific moments, the thesis will attempt to denaturalize current understandings of the role of the border. It will be shown that our assumed understanding of the inherent role and function of the border is in fact a historically contingent concept. Such a discovery is important because, by showing that the border was not always as it is now, the possibility that the border can become something different in the future is opened.
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# Table of Contents

1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1
  1.1 SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................... 5
  1.2 DISCOURSE THEORY VS. REALISM .............................................................................. 6

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................ 10
  2.1 GENEALOGY .................................................................................................................. 10
  2.2 ARCHAEOLOGY ............................................................................................................. 15
  2.3 GOVERNMENTALITY .................................................................................................... 20
  2.4 APPLICABILITY OF THE METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK ........................................... 23
  2.5 SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIALITY AND BORDERS .......................................................... 25

3. ALASKAN BOUNDARY DISPUTE – THE ‘CUSTOMS’ FRONTIER ........................................... 31
  3.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................................... 31
  3.2 THE BORDER AS A ‘CUSTOMS FRONTIER’ ................................................................. 33
  3.3 THE REGULATION OF COMMERCE ............................................................................ 39
  3.4 THE COLONIAL/LIBERAL BORDER ............................................................................ 42
  3.5 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 49

4. RECIPROCITY DEBATE OF 1911 – THE ‘MISSING’ BORDER ............................................. 50
  4.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................................... 50
  4.2 THE ‘MISSING’ BORDER ............................................................................................. 52
  4.3 BORDERS AND GEOPOLITICS ................................................................................... 57
  4.4 THE IMPORTANCE OF GEOPOLITICAL REPRESENTATIONS ........................................ 59
  4.5 THE DENATURALIZATION OF THE COLONIAL BORDER ............................................... 64
  4.6 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 66

5. AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 – THE ‘SMART’ AND ‘SECURE’ BORDER ..................................... 68
  5.1 POST-SEPTEMBER 11 CONTEXT .................................................................................. 68
  5.2 THE BORDER AS DEFENDER OF SOVEREIGNTY ......................................................... 69
  5.3 THE BORDER AND THE SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION ......................................... 70
  5.4 THE BORDER AND ECONOMIC/PUBLIC SECURITY .................................................... 72
  5.5 THE SECURITIZATION OF THE BORDER IN MEXICO AND EUROPE ............................. 76
  5.6 ‘FORTRESS NORTH AMERICA’ .................................................................................. 77
  5.7 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 80

6. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 81

REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................... 85
1. INTRODUCTION

On September 11, the border became in some ways invisible, but in many other respects ever the more prominent. The shock and sorrow felt by Canadians as they watched the attacks in the United States – and the values they acted upon in the days that followed, extending their generosity, compassion and sincerity to friends and to strangers in trouble – these became the most important yardstick of the Canada-U.S. relationship, not the line that serves as a customs and immigration management point between us.

~ Deputy Prime Minister John Manley¹

The above statement should, at first glance, appear relatively innocuous. One could make a convincing argument that the Deputy Prime Minister was making a simple statement on the reality of the Canada-U.S. border in the post-September 11 context. Indeed, little fault can be found in the Deputy Prime Minister’s analysis of the situation; even as traffic backed up behind a border that was essentially closed, Canadians seemed to ignore the national separation implied by the border to find common sorrow with their neighbours to the south. This statement and others like it, however, will be treated in a critical manner in this thesis. This is not to suggest that the Deputy Prime Minister was being duplicitous in his comments. It is, rather, the recognition that statements such as this can help provide fundamental insights into the nature of the border in Canadian society.

The word ‘nature’ is presented in a problematic manner because it is not the traditional understanding of naturalness that is being

¹ Manley, 2002a.
investigated in this work. No single, comprehensive definition of the role of the border in Canadian society will be laid out in this thesis. Indeed, despite using a historical approach, no coherent evolution of the border will be presented. This thesis is not a history of the Canada-U.S. border. Instead, it is an examination of the various historically specific rationalities (systems of thought in which some statements are rendered legitimate and others illegitimate) that have established how Canada’s border with the United States has been understood. It attempts to answer questions such as what function does the border play? what problems are associated with the border? how has this understanding of the border been propagated? Through an examination of the bordering discourses present during the Alaskan boundary dispute at the start of the 20th century and during the 1911 General Election, this thesis will *denaturalize* the current assumed relationship between the notions of sovereignty, territoriality and the border.

This thesis will use a methodology informed by Michel Foucault’s concepts of *genealogy* and *governmentality* to make the present problematic by bringing forth a discontinuous series of historically specific border rationalities. Genealogy deconstructs commonly held assumptions – those things that are thought to be ‘without history’ – and shows that these assumptions do not represent ahistorical truths, but are rather historical constructs. Deconstruction is accomplished by removing any overarching themes to one’s historical inquiry. Every
historical moment operates within its own discursive framework where only certain statements can be accepted as rational. Thus, the very nature of the border – what the border is, what its purpose is – is itself historically specific. Governmentality is concerned with the ‘art of government’. It calls for an analysis of governments not in terms of their ideology, but in their actual practices. It investigates the ways that various parts of society are judged to be ‘governable’ (i.e. how a geographic area can be defined as a security problem and how it can therefore seem only logical for this area to come under the control of governmental practices).

Returning to the statement by the Deputy Prime Minister presented earlier with the concepts of genealogy and governmentality in mind, it is possible to gain a better understanding of what it means to denaturalize the current conceptions of the border. While the insight that can be gleaned from this statement is by no means exhaustive, it does provide a useful example. As is outlined in greater detail in Chapter 2, the basic notion of genealogy is that all statements exist within a discursive framework that is ordered by a specific rationality. A discursive framework can be understood as:

an ensemble of heterogeneous discursive and non-discursive practices, and regimes of truth and conduct, which possesses an overall coherence without answering to any determinative principle or underlying logic.²

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To partake in a genealogical examination is to seek out this rationality, the 'overall coherence' that orders what statements can be made within the discourse. In the Deputy Prime Minister’s statement, the overarching rationality, the meta-narrative to which all statements must conform, is found in the definition of the border as ‘a line that serves as a customs and immigration management point between’ Canada and the United States.

In the current discourse, the border is conceived first and foremost as a governmental apparatus for controlling and regulating the movement of goods and people in and out of a delimited territory.\(^3\) The border thus becomes "ever the more prominent" as the regulations concerning the movement of goods and people become more intense. It is also seen in non-technical terms as a societal barrier between Canada and the United States, with the border becoming "in some ways invisible" as Canadians begin to relate with Americans on a personal level. This definition does not constitute an ahistorical rationality of the border, but rather represents what James Anderson describes as a "historically unique form of spatial organization."\(^4\) It is through the discovery of the uniqueness of this definition that current conceptions are denaturalized; if there is a multitude of historically contingent border rationalities, the

\(^3\) The word territory itself denotes a specific way that space is organized as, for example, a site for governmental action, or as a space possessing sovereignty. Cf. chapter 2.

current rationality cannot be understood as being any more natural than any other rationality.\textsuperscript{5}

1.1 Summary

An analysis of the Deputy Prime Minister's statement is obviously of limited use given its brevity. This thesis therefore includes in-depth examinations of two historical moments in Canadian history to provide more robust historical illustrations. Chapter 3 concentrates on the Alaskan boundary crisis. Through an examination primarily of government correspondence in the 1890s and 1900s, the role of the border during negotiations over the delimitation of the Alaskan border will be investigated. It will be found that the border at this time was conceived primarily as a 'customs frontier': a governmental tool designed exclusively for the collection of revenue. Such a border is a specific creation of the liberal/colonial governmental rationalism that was prevalent at the start of the twentieth century. Chapter 4 is an investigation of the role of the border in the debate over reciprocity surrounding the 1911 General Election. This debate is notable because, despite being concerned primarily with issues of commerce and trade, the border was not central to the discourse. This is especially interesting given the geopolitical imagery that was common at the time; despite the

\textsuperscript{5} The main sources of alternative border rationalities in academic literature are Medieval Europe and the postmodern, 'globalized' world. Cf. J. Anderson, 1996, Caporaso, 1996.
apparently strong tendencies for borders to be involved in the social spatialisation of a polity, in this case the border remained silent.

While the historical examples provided in chapters 3 and 4 are an important part of this thesis, their main purpose is to be contrasted against the present. Thus, chapter 5 is an analysis of the border discourse in Canada after September 11. The contemporary border rationality will be posited as a discourse concerned primarily with public/economic security. Comparisons will be drawn between the Canadian example and discourses of securitization at play in the European Union and at the U.S.-Mexico border. When taken together, the three historical moments examined in this thesis will denaturalize the current border discourse by showing that our assumed understanding of the inherent role and function of the border is in fact a historically contingent concept.

1.2 Discourse theory vs. realism

The theoretical framework employed in this thesis can be placed under the broad heading of discourse theory, loosely defined as the rejection of "an epistemic realism whereby the world comprises material objects whose existence is independent of ideas or beliefs about them...." Such a label, from the very beginning, opens this work to criticism. Given that discourse theory represents a rejection of material realism, it should not

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6 David Campbell, quoted in Milliken, 1999: 225.
be surprising that the inclusion of discourse theory into the study of political science has sparked a heated theoretical debate, a debate that questions the empirical basis on which political science operates.\textsuperscript{7} While this thesis is not the appropriate forum to settle this argument, due to the central importance of discourse theory to this thesis, it would be remiss not to examine some of its perceived shortcomings.

Modern political scientists use theories based on the concept of realism inherited from the scientific method of the Enlightenment. Using these theories, the world is seen as a laboratory from which empirical knowledge can be gathered and applied to a methodological framework to arrive at an ultimate truth, to "set the record straight by appealing directly to concrete historical evidence of what individuals and groups thought, said, and did at a time."\textsuperscript{8} Since there is a real world that can be known, it is possible to make rational decisions. The use of realist theories in political science, therefore, presumes that actors can make rational decisions based on real empirical evidence. This emphasis on empirical evidence leads some political scientists to dismiss discourse theory as "bad science because of its lack of testable theories or empirical analyses...."\textsuperscript{9} From a realist perspective this argument has merit: discourse theory does not in any way meet the empirical standards laid down by rational theory. The argument does not cripple discourse theory

\textsuperscript{7} This debate has been especially prevalent in the study of European integration. Cf. Jachtenfuchs, et al., 1998: 409-411.
\textsuperscript{8} Moravcsik, 1999: 389.
\textsuperscript{9} Milliken, 1999: 227.
as an investigative tool, however, because the usefulness of discourse theory is not based on its ability to seek out empirically verifiable truths. From the perspective of discourse theory, realism is a hegemonic discourse that has been able to label itself as 'non-political': it is able “to present itself as homeless and timeless; or better, to present itself as at home everywhere, and at all times.”

Discourse theory, therefore, attempts to operate outside of the hegemonic discourse presented by realism. Proponents of realism present their theory as an unproblematic, ahistorical methodological tool uncomplicated by the taint of normative theory. In discourse theory the opposite stance is taken, with realism understood as a historically specific construct of modernity. As a discursive framework, there are limits to what can be known under realism: what room, for example, is there for the consideration of normative values in a methodological framework based solely on nation-states operating as economically motivated rational actors? Discourse theory strives to be “critically self-aware of the closures imposed by research programs and the modes of analysis which scholars routinely use in their work and treat as unproblematic.”

Discourse theory, unlike realism, does not strive for a totalizing picture of reality, nor does it claim

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10 Hansen and Williams, 1999: 239.
11 Moravcsik argues that discourse theorists who criticize his rationalist work seem *not to grasp fully that the economic interests I ascribe to governments are not simply arbitrary, inductive observations: they are the preferences predicted by standard political economy models of foreign economic policy* 1999: 377.
12 Diez, 1999b: 357.
13 *ibid.*: 359.
to have a monopoly on intelligibility.\textsuperscript{15} Instead, discourse theory allows
the political scientist to seek out a multiplicity of understandings, to
consider alternative conceptions, to highlight neglected knowledges.
Thus, in this thesis, it is found that the current way of thinking about
the border represents just one possible assemblage of discursive and
non-discursive practices, the most recent example in a discontinuous
series of historical assemblages. Such a discovery is important because,
by showing that the border was not always as it is now, the possibility
that the border can become something different in the future is opened;
it is the realisation that the current rigidity of our policy options in
regards to the border is an artificial constraint that can be bypassed.
This is especially true given the relative scarcity of discourse theory in
the analysis of the Canada-U.S. border. The implications of this
discovery on public policy formation and academic study will be
discussed in chapter 6.

\textsuperscript{15} Walters, 2002: 562.
2. Theoretical Framework

This thesis provides a unique perspective on the Canadian border primarily because it would rely on a methodological framework informed by Foucault’s concepts of genealogy and governmentality. Given the great stock that has been placed in the potential effectiveness of this framework, it is essential for it to first be mapped out in some detail before proceeding to the major substance of the thesis. Even more than that, its applicability must be underlined given the relative absence of the use of such a framework by others studying the Canadian border.

2.1 Genealogy

In his essay ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, Foucault writes that a genealogical study “must record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality; it must seek them in the most unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without history....”\textsuperscript{16} To accomplish such a task, the genealogist must “dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that’s to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework.”\textsuperscript{17} While the above two quotations concisely summarize what is entailed in a genealogical study, their meaning is perhaps not entirely clear to one who has not had the opportunity to immerse themselves in

\textsuperscript{16} Foucault, 1984a: 76.
\textsuperscript{17} ibid.: 59.
the work of Foucault. Instead of attempting to explain the meaning of the above quotations through a meticulous analysis, the quotations will be approached from the opposite direction; indeed, the best way to explain genealogy is to first outline what it is not. While a genealogical study does in practice deal with historical matters, it does not involve the creation of a ‘traditional history’. Genealogy is specifically designed to avoid the debilitating traps found in traditional history, what Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow identify as the presentist fallacy and finalism (both of which, admittedly, traditional historians do their best to avoid). In the presentist fallacy, the historian “takes a model or a concept, an institution, a feeling, or a symbol from his present, and attempts – almost by definition unwittingly – to find that it had a parallel meaning in the past.”18 With finalism, on the other hand, the historian approaches his or her study in a deterministic manner that attempts to “find the kernel of the present at some distant point in the past and then shows the finalized necessity of the development from that point to the present.”19 In Foucault’s opinion, practitioners of traditional history are at fault because they assume that:

words had kept their meaning, that desires still pointed in a single direction, and that ideas retained their logic; and [they] ignore the fact that the world of speech and desires has known invasions, struggles, plundering, disguises, ploys.20

18 Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 118.
19 ibid.: 118.
20 Foucault, 1984a: 76.
Essentially, historians cannot objectively view the past because they are too consumed with the present, and nothing in the present can be used as an effective referent to the past: "Nothing in man – not even his body – is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men."\(^{21}\) This is a quite radical statement, for Foucault is arguing that even something as basic as how one knows or views oneself is a historically rooted concept that in a fundamental way removes the possibility of the comprehension of others. By fitting history into a grand, coherent schema that "takes as its model a kind of great continuous and homogenous evolution, a sort of great mythic life"\(^{22}\) – as in the Hegelian/ Marxist tradition\(^{23}\) – the historian is not creating an account of things as they actually were, but rather an account of things as if they were at all times irrevocably moving towards the historian situated in the present.

In contrast to traditional history, genealogy strives to write an "effective history".\(^{24}\) In Discipline and Punish, Foucault asks himself if he had undertaken his study, "Simply because I am interested in the past?

No, if one means by that writing a history of the past in terms of the

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\(^{21}\) *ibid.*: 87.

\(^{22}\) Foucault, 1989c: 59.

\(^{23}\) "Marx makes explicit what was somewhat less evident in Hegel and even less so in Rousseau: human nature is social and self-changing: *labour is the activity in which man makes himself.* Human society and its individual members must be understood, then, as the product of a course of historical development which must, in turn be understood in distinct terms and which cannot be reduced to the terms that may be appropriate to understanding the behaviour of matter in motion" Horowitz and Horowitz, 1988: 247 (emphasis added).

\(^{24}\) Foucault, 1984a: 87.
present. Yes, if one means writing the history of the present.” Foucault realized that he could not escape the present when looking at the past. Foucault thus gave up all claims to writing an objective history. All historians, because they lack objectivity, are political; they necessarily (if unintentionally) produce partisan histories. Genealogy is ‘effective’ because it is aware of its own political character. Genealogy does not attempt to provide a comprehensive picture of the past. What genealogy does is make the present problematic. The genealogist deconstructs commonly held assumptions – those things that are thought to be ‘without history’ – and shows that at their base is “not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.” This deconstruction is accomplished by banishing the constituent subject from the historical study.

In the second volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault writes that what he is trying to undertake is “a history of the experience of sexuality.” To do so, however, he has to “break with a conception that

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26 Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 120. Indeed, Foucault once declared that he “had never written anything but fictions”, a claim that has been supported by historians eager to point out the factual shortcomings of Foucault’s major historical works. Cf. Windschuttle, 1998.
27 Bartelson, 1995: 73.
28 Foucault, 1984a: 78. While genealogy is inherently political, the goal of the genealogist is not to produce a polemic. “The polemicist... proceeds encased in privileges that he possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a just undertaking....” Foucault, 1984c: 382.
was rather common. Sexuality was conceived of as a constant.”

Sexuality has meant different things and appeared in different forms throughout history (i.e. to the Greeks, Victorians, contemporary society); it cannot be referred to as a historically stable subject. Thus, a genealogy of sexuality is not a history of the evolution of sexuality and its causal effects (what is sexuality and how it has shaped history) but rather a history of how sexuality has been known and the institutions and practices that have made such knowledge legible. This is the genius of Foucault’s genealogy: the ability to “analyze human seriousness and meaning without resort to theory or deep hidden significance.”

To understand the above fully, Foucault’s concept of discourse needs to be introduced. In methodological terms, genealogy is an attempt to answer the question: “How does it happen that at a given period one could say this and that something else has never been said?” Those structures that limit what can be said/known are discourses. Jens Bartelson defines a discourse as a network of statements that “organize knowledge systematically, so that some things become intelligible, and others not.” Nothing (sexuality, rationality, evil, etc.) exists outside of a discourse. There are no metaphysical constants,

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30 Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 183.
31 Foucault never set out to create a complete methodology and certainly never wrote a coherent set of methodological rules. For this reason, some prefer to think of Foucault as not “making primarily a methodological contribution to the social sciences,” but as radically transforming some very traditional philosophical questions—of truth, power, and subjectivity.” Manhon, 1992: ix.
32 Foucault, 1989c: 58.
no “vast phantoms acting out their shadow-play on the backdrop of history.”\textsuperscript{34} There are instead only statements defined solely by their historically contingent relations to other discursive statements. What makes one discourse distinguishable from another – for there will always be a plurality of discourses throughout history\textsuperscript{35} – is not a “particular object, nor a style, nor a play of permanent concepts, nor... the persistence of a thematic,”\textsuperscript{36} but the “certain implicit knowledge (savoir) special to that” discourse.\textsuperscript{37}

2.2 Archaeology

In order to discover how a statement is perpetuated within a discourse, the genealogist must rely on ‘archaeology’ to re-construct the ‘rules of formation’ of a specific discourse that makes “the formulation of certain individual utterances possible” and ensures that it is “these utterances (and not others) that are effectively produced.”\textsuperscript{38} Foucault has identified within the discursive rules of formation five facets that make up a specific archaeology; the “limits and forms of the sayable” (What can or cannot be said within a discourse?); the “limits and forms of conservation” (Which utterances will disappear from human memory and which will be retained?); the “limits and forms of memory” (“Which utterances does everyone recognize as valid, or debatable, or definitely

\textsuperscript{34} Foucault, 1991a: 55.
\textsuperscript{35} ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Foucault, 1980b: 63.
\textsuperscript{37} Foucault, 1989a: 2.
\textsuperscript{38} Gordon, 1991: 244.
invalid?”); the “limits and forms of reactivation” (Which previous discourses have been given a renewed place within the current discourse?); and the “limits and forms of appropriation” (“What individuals, what groups or classes have access to [the] discourse? How is this relationship institutionalized between the discourse, speakers and its destined audience?”).\(^\text{39}\)

It should be understood by now that Foucault uses a very different conception of power than is normally used in modernist political theory. According to Dreyfus and Rabinow, Foucault defines power as “a general matrix of force relations at a given time, in a given society.”\(^\text{40}\) Foucault’s conception of power is in contrast to what he describes as the economic analysis of power contained in liberal theory. In an economic analysis of power, everyone is thought to hold a certain amount of power that can be exchanged or given away, in return for something such as security (a conception of power most notably evident in Hobbes’s formulation of the relationship between the sovereign and the people\(^\text{41}\)). Instead of the personal power inherent in an economic analysis, Foucault sees power as

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\(^\text{40}\) Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 186.
\(^\text{41}\) “The final cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love liberty and dominion over others) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves in which we see them live in commonwealths is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shown) to the natural passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants and observation of those laws of nature...” Hobbes, 1994: 106.
an impersonal force that only exists in action.\textsuperscript{42} When looking at power, therefore, Foucault is not trying to discover who has power over what, and how they gained that power, but rather how "entire networks of power were able to establish themselves at a given moment."\textsuperscript{43} Discourses are essentially networks of power relations because they limit what can be known by labelling certain statements as true, and competing statements as irrational and false.\textsuperscript{44} This is the source of Foucault's belief in the sameness of power and knowledge, because if there can never be an objective 'truth',\textsuperscript{45} society is constantly engaged in a "battle for truth."\textsuperscript{46} The dominant discourse, what Foucault terms the "regime' of truth," sustains its position by linking truth "in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extends it."\textsuperscript{47} There are always conflicting discourses, each vying for supremacy against (and being suppressed by) the dominant discourse. Thus, to speak of a certain 'truth' – to operate within one form of knowledge – is to favour one discourse over another.\textsuperscript{48} It is this battle over truth that produces different discourses throughout history. These paradigmatic changes in knowledge do not resemble the smooth progress depicted in traditional historical accounts, however, where every age takes up the knowledge of

\textsuperscript{42} Foucault, 1980: 89.
\textsuperscript{43} Foucault, 1989e: 186.
\textsuperscript{44} Foucault, 1984b: 60.
\textsuperscript{45} Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 116.
\textsuperscript{46} Foucault, 1984b: 74.
\textsuperscript{47} \textit{ibid}.
\textsuperscript{48} Diez, 1999a: 604.
the previous age and carries on. Rather, genealogy tells a history of sudden shifts and junctures, a history where “the veneration of monuments becomes parody, the respect for ancient continuities becomes systematic dissociation....”

Dreyfus and Rabinow describe archaeology as the creation by the effective historian of a grid of intelligibility in order to link discursive and non-discursive practices (for the rules of formation are not only propagated through language, but in “technical ensembles, in institutions, in behavioural schemes, in types of transmission and dissemination”). The creation of a grid of intelligibility is important because it allows the genealogist to “locate and understand a set of coherent practices which organize social reality” without relying on an organizing subject. Instead of building structures around a historical constant, a historical reality is organized by examining the power relations that arise in the grid. These specific historical realities brought to light by archaeological methods can then be used by the genealogist to “emancipate historical knowledges from that subjection, to render them, that is capable of opposition and of struggle against the coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse.” In sum, the genealogist can use the specific historical discourses found in

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49 Foucault, 1984a: 97.
50 Foucault, 1997a: 12.
51 Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 121.
52 Foucault, 1980: 85.
archaeology to question the apparent timelessness of a current discourse.

It is important to note, however, that the historical moments highlighted through a genealogical study are not being presented as alternative solutions to the present discourse. While this genealogy is a critique of the present through an examination of the past, it makes no claims to finding a solution in the past; genealogy, after all, in not concerned with solutions, but with problems.\textsuperscript{53} How problems have been framed is far more interesting to the genealogist than any solution could be, since the act of framing a question limits the number of acceptable answers (in effect, categorizing the possible answers as rational or irrational in relation to the dominant discourse). Nonetheless, despite its inability to fabricate real solutions, a critical analysis of the present can be used to show that things were not always thought of as they are now, that the range of solutions currently available is not the result of any fundamental truth but rather of societal forces.\textsuperscript{54} Dreyfus and Rabinow put this succinctly:

In this discovery of groundlessness the inherent arbitrariness of interpretation is revealed. For if there is nothing to interpret then everything is open to interpretation; the only limits are those arbitrarily imposed.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{53} Foucault, 1983b: 231.  
\textsuperscript{54} Foucault, 1984c: 389.  
\textsuperscript{55} Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 107.
2.3 GOVERNMENTALITY

Since borders are most readily identifiable as state institutions, it will be useful to adopt in some manner Foucault's concept of governmentality, in addition to the genealogical methods presented above. Governmentality does not work in opposition to the above methods, but rather compliments them in forcing a revision in the way one thinks about and studies government. Mitchell Dean identifies two main definitions given to governmentality in academic literature: a historically specific definition as used by Foucault and a general definition, informed primarily, but not exclusively, by Foucault's work.⁵⁶ Although the specific definition will be examined, it is the general definition that will be explored in more depth as a methodological tool.

Governmentality as a research agenda is "a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), capable of making some form of the activity thinkable;"⁵⁷ it seeks out the discursive formations that rationalize government action on those parts of society that are judged to be 'governable'. It entails the study of government not by its ideology (who is in control and how is power distributed among the various players? what ultimate end or value that the government is trying to achieve?), but by the way power is practiced in a discursive

⁵⁶ Dean, 1999.
manner.\textsuperscript{58} Liberalism, for example, is analyzed as "a method of rationalizing the exercise of government, a rationalization that obeys... the internal rule of maximum economy,"\textsuperscript{59} and not as an ideology or a political theory that holds individual rights in the highest regard. With governmentality, the 'real' reasons behind a government's action – i.e. its ideological motivation – are banished in much the same way that genealogy does away with the utilisation of meta-historical themes. The supposed motives behind a government's action are not as important as what actually takes place in the formation and propagation of the dominant discourse; "To put the matter clearly: [the] problem is to see how men govern (themselves and others) by the production of" a 'regime' of truth.\textsuperscript{60} The discursive construction where the production of truth is most readily seen is in problematization.\textsuperscript{61} A problematization is the way that discursive or non-discursive practices identify something as being a valid site for thought and thus can be labelled as either true or false in relation to the discourse.\textsuperscript{62} An example of such a problematization can be seen clearly in Foucault's historically specific use of the term governmentality. For Foucault, governmentality means the rise, since the eighteenth century, of "biopower": the rationalization of the "problems presented to governmental practice by the phenomena characteristic of a

\textsuperscript{58} Walters, 2000: 3.
\textsuperscript{59} Foucault, 1997c: 73-74.
\textsuperscript{60} Foucault, 1991c: 79.
\textsuperscript{61} Dean, 1999.
\textsuperscript{62} Foucault, 1989: 296.
group of living human beings constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race...."\(^{63}\) With the rise of the social sciences and the creation of the ‘population’ as a legible subject, government rationality became more and more involved with the regulation and control of individuals.\(^{64}\) It saw the elevation of the state with its own form of rationality in which the aims of the state were its ultimate end (\textit{e.g. raison d'État}, national economies).\(^{65}\) The individual and the population were now constructed as objects of knowledge “through discursive practices which, in giving it intelligible form, render this object at least partially susceptible to rational management.”\(^{66}\) The role of the individual in society and the government was also radically transformed. An individual’s livelihood (or lack thereof), health, movement, etc., could all now be posited as problems for the government to solve and objects for the government to regulate.

Of particular interest for the topic at hand is the crucial connection between biopower and territoriality. In the opinion of Matthew Hannah, governmentality is “\textit{inherently and fundamentally spatial}.”\(^{67}\) Territory, according to Foucault, “is no doubt a geographical notion, but it’s first of all a juridico-political one: the area controlled by a certain kind of power.”\(^{68}\) It is not the natural demarcation of space, but the strategic

\(^{63}\) Foucault, 1997c: 73.
\(^{64}\) Foucault, 1997b: 68.
\(^{66}\) Hannah, 2000: 24-25.
\(^{67}\) \textit{Ibid.}: 2. Emphasis in original.
\(^{68}\) Foucault, 1980b: 67.
ordering of space to meet presubscribed ends. In a sense, territoriality can be thought of as the problematization of geography, the way that geographic space is reconstituted as an object of governmental knowledge and activity. While this thesis is not directly an attempt to find evidence in support of Foucault's notion of biopower – even though some parallels can and will be made – it will use the general notion of governmentality in examining the Canada-U.S. border.

2.4 Applicability of the methodological framework

What, then, is the applicability of the above methodological framework to the study of the Canadian border, and what is entailed in such an undertaking? Since genealogy is a history of the present, that which is currently felt to be without history must be at the centre of the project. In this thesis, the central problematic is the current assumed relationship between sovereignty and territoriality at the Canadian border. This assumed relationship can be described as a 'sovereign calculus' in which the level of Canada's sovereignty can be predicted to rise or fall in a direct relationship with the level of Canada's control of its border. Under the current conception, Canada's sovereignty is inherently connected to its territory. This means that Canada's inability to control its own sovereign territory through border controls would naturally result in the loss of sovereignty. To denaturalize this assumed relationship, I

will attempt to locate different historically contingent rationalities that have established how Canada’s border with the United States has been known (what function does the border play? what problems are associated with the border? how has this understanding of the border been propagated? etc.). The inclusion of the governmentality perspective widens this archaeological examination to encompass an analysis of how the government in a variety of ways has problematized the border.

This paper will apply the methodological framework outlined above to three separate moments in Canada’s history: the Alaskan boundary dispute on the 1890s and 1900s, the reciprocity debate surrounding the General Election of 1911, and the role of the border at the start of the 21st century, especially in relation to the post-September 11 context. An examination of these moments will help to show the ways that the border has been constructed historically to deal with problems of sovereignty and territoriality. In the end, the application of this methodological framework – relatively untried in relation to the Canadian border – will, in the words of Colin Gordon, “help political thought to grasp certain present realities, thus perhaps providing a more informed basis for practical choice and imagination.”

\[70\] Gordon, 1991: 46.
2.5 Sovereignty, territoriality and borders

Before specific historical moments are examined, it would be helpful to look in greater detail at the concepts of sovereignty and territoriality, and how they relate to international borders. This, however, will not entail the setting-down of a number of definitions of terms that will be used throughout this thesis. As Cynthia Weber states in her study of state sovereignty: "rather than redefining state sovereignty, this analysis 'un'-defines (and therefore radically deconstructs) state sovereignty by questioning the historical foundations of sovereign authority."71 Indeed, the marshalling of sovereignty, territoriality and borders into stable definitions would be the very antithesis of genealogy. This study will instead look to the discursive struggles that have attempted to locate the meaning of these concepts; it will denaturalize the search for stable definitions and natural origins by bringing forth a discontinuous series of historically referenced definitions. Why, then, must sovereignty and territoriality be discussed from the outset at the risk of creating uncritical subjects? Why not just delve into the genealogical study and see what discursive relationships arise? By looking at how others have denaturalized the concepts of sovereignty and territoriality and related them to borders, this study will be opened up to new possibilities, new connections, and will be forewarned of possible pitfalls.

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In the influential work of Thomas Wilson and Hastings Donnan, borders are described as serving "as both locuses and symbols of a state's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and power...."\textsuperscript{72} The most important implication of this statement is that Wilson and Donnan are treating borders as significant units of analysis in and of themselves. Initially, it may not seem like this represents a radical methodological shift. To appreciate this shift, the treatment of borders in modern (rational) theories of international relations must be examined.

At the risk of oversimplification, realist theories of international relations try to understand events through the study of the relations between states within an anarchical world environment. The state, therefore, is imbued with agency as the main actor at the international level. While theories of the formulation of a state's position differ, international relations theory is still primarily concerned with the relationship between states as the sole legitimate holders of power. The role of borders in realist theories is in outlining the limits of a state's sovereign competency in economics and culture. Borders embody the strict territorial demarcations that are the defining feature of the modern state-system. They mark where one nation-state ends and where another begins. They are essentially, "containers of statehood, nationhood, citizenship, and citizenry proper, ...a centrepiece of the modernist vision

\textsuperscript{72} Donnan and Wilson, 1999: 156.
of territoriality. Theoretically, then, borders are not significant in and of themselves. Rather, they are significant because they are a tangible holder of a state’s agency, a reflection of the power of the centre at the periphery. Borders can therefore never be considered as anything more than a facet of state agency. This represents, to say the least, an unproblematic conception of the role of borders in relation to the state, one that a growing body of literature has started to question. As argued by Wilson and Donnan, the traditional study of borders is being challenged by “the proliferation of identities in a post-industrial and globalizing world,” identities that are not tied to “territoriality and sovereignty.” While much of the end-of-geography discourse that has risen in tandem with globalization – ‘the death of the nation-state’ and ‘the creation of a borderless world’ – is hindered by a deterministic vision and a penchant for hyperbole, it has been useful in reconceptualizing the methodological place of borders. In the study of globalization, the border (a territorially defined line between two sovereign states) has been supplanted by the border-region (a space, both territorial and non-territorial, emanating out from the border proper). A focus on border-regions represents the realisation that events are taking place at international borders that cannot be fully accounted for through an

73 Medvedev, 1998: 49.
74 Anderson and O’Dowd, 1999: 598.
75 Donnan and Wilson, 1999: 58.
76 "end-of-geography discourse fails to demonstrate how deterritorialisation is in actuality also a reterritorialisation. Geography is not so much disappearing as being restructured, rearranged and rewired." Ó Tuathail, 1999: 147.
analysis of state relations. Borders, while technically dependent on the state, have an existence outside of their constitutive states. In a sense, borders are no longer seen as a clean delimiters but rather as bleeding edges; they are "areas of cultural contest and integration in which national identity and citizenship are often not the same thing...."\textsuperscript{77} The most prevalent example of such academic research is in work on the Mexican-American border-region, seen as a "type site for the study of political ecology and emergent globalization."\textsuperscript{78} In this literature, the American Southwest is represented as a place of contested identities where two separate nation-state projects vie for allegiance and loyalty in an environment that is dominated by transnational flows of capital and people (legal and illegal). It is a region where neither American nor Mexican nationalism has been fully adopted by the Mexican American community (a trans-border community). Instead, according to David Gutiérrez, the Mexican American community exists within a "Third Place" between the United States and Mexico, a situation that draws attention to the ambiguities of citizenship and the nation-state....\textsuperscript{79}

While this thesis does not follow the academic trend by focusing on transborder regionalisms, some important points can be garnered from such studies. Most important among these is the freeing of borders from the domain of international relations. Thus, the Canadian border cannot

\textsuperscript{77} Wilson and Donnan, 1998: 200.
\textsuperscript{78} Hackenberg and Alvarez, 2001: 98.
\textsuperscript{79} Gutiérrez, 1995: xviii.
be fully studied merely in relation to Canadian foreign policy, nor can it be seen as the natural container of the Canadian state. Also notable is the role given to borders in the formation of national identities, and, indeed, the creation of border-specific identities and attachments (the periphery acting on the centre);\(^80\) in effect, highlighting both the territorial and non-territorial aspects of borders. While the general attitude in border studies is that the state must somehow be transcended in order to properly study the border/borderland, it is the state with which the political scientist must be concerned. After all, however 'subjective' borders are, they have a quite real 'objective' reality;\(^81\) they are physical institutions that play an important role in the governing of society. International borders are not disappearing, and to claim any such utopian vision would be academically suspect. While territory may in some respects be going through a debordering process, it is also involved in a complex process of rebordering: a "reassertion or rearticulation of socially constructed boundaries, both territorial and nonterritorial."\(^82\) This process is, not surprisingly, nothing new. As Malcolm Anderson has shown, borders have had many historically specific meanings and purposes.\(^83\) By questioning the role of the state in the study of borders, by always considering the state in a critical manner, studies in transborder regionalism speak to the essential

\(^{80}\) Donnan and Wilson, 1999: 34.
\(^{81}\) ibid.: 26.
\(^{82}\) Spener and Staudt, 1998: 236.
relationship in modern governmentality between borders and notions of territoriality and sovereignty.
3. Alaskan Boundary Dispute – The ‘Customs’ Frontier

3.1 Historical Background

The first demarcation between the British possessions in North America and Alaska was the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825. This treaty established that the border north of latitude 54°40 would follow the summit of the mountains situated parallel to the coast, with the exception that if the mountains were found to be more than 10 marine leagues (approximately 30 miles) from the coast the border would parallel the coast. Knowledge as to the exact geography of the area at the time of the signing of the treaty and for many years afterwards, however, was quite lacking and set the stage for future disputes.

In 1867 the United States purchased Alaska from Russia for US$7 200 000. This ensured that any future disputes surrounding the border described in 1825 would now become a matter between the United States, Great Britain and, with the ascension of British Columbia as a province in 1871, Canada. At the time of B.C.’s entry into Confederation, the Alaskan border remained unmarked; in a very real sense the official border only existed on paper. In such an environment, the intricacies of the border delineated on paper in 1825 had given way to the practicalities of an easily understood and functional border. To complicate matters further, the border outlined on British maps was different from the border that was represented on official maps given to
the United States by Russia. According to the B.C. government, the Alaskan Panhandle was a “30-mile belt of American territory running along a part of the seaboard,” a description that was clearly at odds with the 1825 delineation. In 1872 the B.C. government first called for an official survey of the border. The provincial government’s proposals, however, and all subsequent ones from Canada and the United States, were dismissed as being prohibitively expensive. When an 1898 Joint Commission finally convened to work out a common understanding of the border, they were ultimately unsuccessful. A similar fate met an official tribunal established by Britain and the United States later the same year. Progress towards a resolution to the dispute was ultimately set in motion in 1903 with the Hay-Herbert Treaty. This treaty called for the creation of an impartial tribunal to decide the matter, with the tribunal consisting of two Canadian members, one British member, and three American members. Unfortunately for Canada, the tribunal was far from impartial, ultimately deciding in favour of the United States when Lord Alverstone, the British representative, sided with the three American members.

The Alaskan boundary dispute is commonly viewed in academic literature as a watershed moment in the evolution of Canada’s growing independence from Great Britain. According to John Munro, the dispute was part of “a pattern of historical development [that] set Canada on an

84 H. George Classen, 1965: 302.
independence course, ...it was only a matter of time before Canada would become a nation-state independent of the Empire.\textsuperscript{85} Indeed, the general impression in the Canadian press at the time was that Canada’s interests had been sacrificed on the altar of Imperial demands, its rightful claim to its sovereign territory dismissed.\textsuperscript{86} In the opinion of Donald Creighton, it was the Alaskan boundary dispute that convinced Prime Minister Laurier that Canada needed to un hinge itself from any imperial policy and strike out on its own. It is certainly quite clear that it was primarily the Alaskan boundary dispute that convinced Laurier that Canada need to have the power to make its own treaties independent of the Empire.\textsuperscript{87} As Creighton rhetorically asks, “Would the final goal of Liberal nationalism be an independent Canada?”\textsuperscript{88}

3.2. The Border as a ‘Customs Frontier’

Given the often volatile mixture of territory and sovereignty at play in the Alaskan boundary dispute, it would be worthwhile to examine the discursive space occupied by the border. One could reasonably expect that the actions of Britain in the resolution of the dispute would be seen as being particularly traitorous because it pertained to something as fundamental to the sovereignty of Canada as the delineation of its territory. A careful analysis of contemporary government correspondence.

\textsuperscript{85} John A. Munro, 1970: 85.
\textsuperscript{86} cf. \textit{ibid}.
\textsuperscript{87} Norman Hillmer & J.L. Granatstein, 1994: 28.
\textsuperscript{88} Donald Creighton, 1970: 102.
however, belies this assumption. Contemporary texts reveal a rather dry discourse in which the border is removed from passionate considerations of ‘Queen and Country’. In all the discussions surrounding the dispute, the border was primarily concerned with matters of revenue and the implementation of state agency. While the overall discussion surrounding the Alaskan boundary dispute did indeed enflame passions in Canada and rouse questions of sovereignty, this concept of sovereignty did not utilize the border as a discursive element. In the discourse surrounding the Alaskan boundary dispute the border is presented as a ‘customs frontier’, and disconnected from any great symbolic notions of being involved in a ‘national purpose’.

A report produced by the Executive Council of British Columbia in 1885 stated that there were “many reasons, apart from the national object of avoiding grounds of dispute between Canada and the United States,” why it was “desirable, as affecting British Columbia particularly and the Dominion incidentally, that the boundary line referred to should be settled as soon as possible.”\textsuperscript{89} Foremost amongst the reasons set out in the document was the probable presence of large gold deposits in the Yukon area. The Klondike Gold Rush was a central concern in the deliberations over the border. While the Yukon was long thought to contain gold, the drive did not start in earnest until the summer of 1896, propelled by large discoveries on a tributary of the Klondike River. Over

\textsuperscript{89} British Columbia, Executive Council, 1885: 3.
the next few years as many as 100 000 gold seekers – mainly American amateurs – flooded into the region. The effect on the area was immense. By 1898, the city of Dawson, that had only been staked as a town site in 1896 in anticipation of the gold rush, had swelled to a population of 16 000. This made it the largest city on the continent west of Winnipeg and north of Seattle. At the height of the gold rush the Yukon boasted a population of over 30 000.

At one level it seems evident that a gold rush in the Yukon would result in an increased desire to clearly demarcate the border. There was gold in the area, so Britain and Canada would logically want to claim it as their own by reaffirming their sovereign right to the territory in question. What exactly was the role of the border as a solution to questions concerning the Yukon gold fields? Was the border presented merely as a means for staking out the government’s claim? Government correspondence, while plainly pointing to a fundamental link between the border and the presence of gold in the region, suggests a role for the border other than the ‘traditional' role of borders as containers of national territory. As can be seen below in an excerpt from a letter sent by British officials to the U.S. government, the border is not so much presented as a solution to the problem of how to secure the gold or to physically take possession of a territory, but rather as a means with

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90 Traditional as defined by modern theories of international relations. Cf. theoretical framework.
which to place an area under the administrative control of the
government for the purpose of collecting revenue:

The recent development of the mineral resources
of the country drained by the Yukon River, and
the growing importance of the administration of
that region, have rendered it highly desirable
that the precise limits of the jurisdiction of the
United States and the Dominion respectively
should be more exactly determined than has
hitherto been the case.\textsuperscript{91}

More to the point is a series of instructions sent to Imperial negotiators
written by the British Prime Minister (the Marquis of Salisbury):

In the first place, owing to the discovery of
Klondike gold-fields, there has already been a
large influx of miners and others into the
territory to which access lies mainly through the
strip. The necessity of establishing a Customs
frontier on the inlets of the coast is therefore
obvious.\textsuperscript{92}

These texts each include an important phrase. The first text talks of the
“growing importance of administration” in the Yukon, while the second
speaks of the ‘obvious’ “necessity of establishing a Customs frontier....”
What these texts indicate is that the fundamental problem put forward
by government officials in the discourse surrounding the Alaskan
boundary dispute was not ‘how are we to gain control of a specific
territory’ but ‘how are we to place a specific territory under our
administrative control’. While these two problems of government may
seem similar, each problem requires a different conception of the border

\textsuperscript{91} Great Britain. Foreign Office. 1896: 9.
\textsuperscript{92} Great Britain, Foreign Office, 1899b?: 28.
to be presented as a ‘solution’. This framing of the question, and the consequential shaping of the solution can be seen clearly in the minutes of a meeting of the Canadian Cabinet in 1896, quoted at length below:

The Minister considers that the facts recited clearly establish, first, that the time has arrived when it becomes the duty of the Government of Canada to make more efficient provision for the maintenance of orders, the enforcement of the laws, and the administration of justice in the Yukon country, especially in that section of it in which place mining for gold is being prosecuted upon such an extensive scale, situated near to the boundary separating the North-West Territories from the possessions of the United States in Alaska; and, second, that while such measures as are necessary to that end are called for in the interests of humanity, and particularly for the security and safety of the lives and property of the Canadian subjects of Her Majesty resident in that country who are engaged in legitimate business pursuits, it is evident that, under existing circumstances, a large revenue which is justly due to the Government of Canada, under its Customs Excise, and Land Laws, and which would go a long way to pay the expenses of government, is being lost for want of adequate machinery for its collection.93

The above texts outline two self-evident concepts that act as a framework for the Alaskan boundary dispute discourse: (1) that there is a necessity for greater administrative control of the Yukon (it is the ‘duty of the Government of Canada to make more efficient provision for the maintenance of orders’); and (2) that the administrative control should take the form of a customs regime (‘it is evident that, under existing circumstances, a large revenue... is being lost for want of adequate

machinery for its collection). All the problems associated with the Yukon are filtered through these considerations; i.e. the lack of a clear border is hindering the collection of revenue. Thus the Executive Council of British Columbia, while noting that existing trade in the area is "upward of $300,000, yielding to the Dominion Revenue per annum $35,000 or $40,000", warns that this "trade is seriously jeopardized by the unsettled nature" of a boundary that "has not been laid down territorially, and locally defined between two countries." Such talk was by no means limited to official government circles. An excerpt from an editorial published in the *Edmonton Bulletin* shows a similar concern for the collection of revenue:

The reports from the Yukon country of the enormous richness of the placer gold deposits in the Klondyke district have moved the government to consider what steps should be taken to protect the interests of Canada. Whatever dispute there may be as to the exact boundary line between Canada and Alaska, there is no question about the rich Klondyke gold fields being altogether and clearly in Canada. This being the case the question arises whether Americans or others foreigners should be allowed to come in there and take away millions of dollars without leaving anything in the country, or contributing anything to the public revenue.\(^5\)

Clearly, this discourse is primarily concerned with matters of revenue collection and administration. It should therefore not be surprising that the conception of a border that develops within this framework is

\(^5\) British Columbia, Executive Council, 1885?: 3.

\(^5\) *Edmonton Bulletin*, June 26, 1897: 1.
essentially conceived of as a 'customs frontier', a site for government agency involved in the administration of trade and the collection of revenue.

3.3 THE REGULATION OF COMMERCE

Taking into account this paper's genealogical framework, it should be clear that the act of situating the border within a 'customs frontier' discourse at once legitimizes and delegitimizes any potential governmental use of the border. At a fairly obvious level, the border could be used as a tool for the collection of revenue. The use of the word 'tool' might be misleading, however. It should not be taken to mean that the border existed as some malleable object that could be transformed at the whim of the government. Far from it, by being situated within a specific discourse, the border becomes a historically specific tool. In the Alaskan boundary dispute, when one spoke of the 'border' one meant a system for the collection of revenue. This meant that many roles commonly associated with the border today were not associated with the border in that discourse. The most evident differentiation between current border discourse and the discourse under examination is the lack of concern for the movement of people over the border. According to Malcolm Anderson, in the modern world, "the ability to control frontier crossings is universally regarded as an essential attribute of sovereignty and the right
to refuse entry to aliens is a stable principle of international law.\textsuperscript{96} This assumed function of borders is a fairly recent concept. There were certainly no systematic administrative barriers to migration in 19\textsuperscript{th} century Europe.\textsuperscript{97} During the Alaskan border dispute it would seem that even military units were allowed to cross the border and move through foreign territory as a matter of course:

At the same time as any Canadian force for the mining district on the Klondike and Yukon must pass through United States’s territory, and permission for such passage has hitherto been freely given, it is necessary to avoid any action which would afford the United States’s Government a pretext for refusing passage to further Canadian forces....\textsuperscript{98}

This is not to say, of course, that any movement of people over the border would go unchecked – that would counter the functioning of a customs frontier. It is simply that there was no real consideration given to using the border to control access to the territory. People crossing the border would be stopped, not to check their movement over the border or to keep out undesirables, but for the purpose of collecting duties on the goods the people carried with them. This can be better understood in the discussion surrounding a petition from the Chilkat nation. The Chilkat, fearing that their traditional land base would be split in two by any demarcation of the border, petitioned the British government for the right to hunt, fish, and trade freely in the Yukon interior. The British

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{M. Anderson, 1996: 129.}
\footnote{Walters, 2002: 571.}
\footnote{Great Britain, Foreign Office, 1889a: 2.}
\end{footnotes}
government, however, because they concluded that the Chilkat were established as U.S. subjects, were unable to give "those Indians an unrestricted right of free passage across the boundary-line". The act of restricting passage across the border should not be taken to mean the restriction of personal movement across the border. Rather, by restricting the passage of the Chilkat over the border the government was reaffirming its right to submit the goods carried by the Chilkat to searches by customs officials for the purposes of collecting revenue. While the customs officials would be instructed to "pass free the canoes used by Indians, their peltries and other usual effects," this would only be done so far as "the necessity of preventing frauds upon the revenue will permit." The Canadian government would allow the Chilkat to move across the border unhindered with their personal effects, but they could not allow dutiable goods to flow across the border without collecting the requisite revenue:

[The Canadian government feels it] unsafe, as regards the prevention of the importation of dutiable goods, to allow the Indians, on excursions ostensibly for the purpose of hunting and fishing, to cross the line without inspection of their goods by the officers of the Customs. They, however, offered to waive their right to collect duties upon the canoes and the usual effects of the Indians temporarily, but not as a matter of right.

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100 ibid.
101 ibid.: 51.
To allow such a privilege to the Chilkat would be, in the context of the customs frontier, an abrogation of the very reason for the existence of the border.

The specific example of the Chilkat shows that the Alaskan boundary was constructed in a similar manner to other borders working within the discourse of 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century colonialism\textsuperscript{102}. In an examination of the formation of borders in colonial Africa, Anderson notes that the “political and social organization of pre-colonial Africa had little effect on the politics of colonial boundary-making.” In addition, “African topography (rivers and relief features) sometimes led European colonial powers to draw political boundaries cutting across ethnic boundaries.”\textsuperscript{103} This is certainly the case with the Alaskan boundary; the traditional territory of the Chilkat\textsuperscript{104} had been split in two by negotiators in Washington and London.

3.4 The Colonial/Liberal Border

The question of what ‘territory’ meant to non-European nations\textsuperscript{105} (i.e. through what geopolitical image did they view their society), especially pre-European contact, must be touched on briefly, if only to contrast and

\textsuperscript{102} While Canada had retained some degree of independence by this point, in the area of international relations there was very much a colonial relation with Britain at play – it was, after all, Britain that was directly negotiating with the United States on this matter. For an examination of the role of the periphery (including frontiers) in ‘pre-modern’ colonialism, cf. Daniels and Kennedy, 2002.

\textsuperscript{103} M. Anderson, 1996: 79.

\textsuperscript{104} \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{105} The term ‘nation’ not being used here to refer to a nation-state as one would imagine today, but rather as a semantic shorthand for any social-political grouping.
highlight some of the defining characteristics of the European bordering discourse. One common facet of non-European nations was the lack of any clear demarcation or even signification of the limits of a nation’s territory. In Africa, Malcolm Anderson writes that the “boundaries of tribes were rarely demarcated and the power of pre-colonial African empires and kingdoms simply faded the greater the distance from the centre.”¹⁰⁶ A similar situation was present in China, where the Chinese empire adopted a form of ‘universalism’ (they were the centre of the universe, all other nations were rightfully vassals) that negated the need for any concrete borders. Since China’s influence was to be present, and dominant everywhere, there was no conceptual place for a border, understood as a meeting place between two sovereign bodies.¹⁰⁷ In his discussion of the spatialisation of Siam, Benedict Anderson¹⁰⁸ notes that before European contact, borders were “understood horizontally, at eye level, as extension points of royal power; not ‘from the air.’” This was reflected in the demarcation of the border, where there was no attempt to stake out a clear limit to Thai sovereignty. While there were boundary-stones and other markers, they were placed along the frontier in a discontinuous fashion, and often at a distance from the markers of bordering states. This horizontal perspective was also evident in the Thai

¹⁰⁷ M. Anderson states that this ‘universalism’ is actually quite similar to the concept of ‘Christendom’ that was prevalent during medieval Europe, 1996: 88.
¹⁰⁸ B. Anderson’s account of this process relies heavily on the doctoral work of Thongchai Winichakul, 1988.
cartography, where the 'bird's-eye' view utilized in modern maps was completely unknown. The advent of a western school system with mandatory classes in 'geography' altered the way that Thai territory was conceived. Through the introduction of a dominant 'geographic' discourse, Thai leaders began to think of borders as "segments of a continuous map-line corresponding to nothing visible on the ground, but demarcating an exclusive sovereignty wedged between other sovereignties." 109 Likewise, in a study of North American aboriginal maps by Mark Warhus it is noted that:

Unlike western cartography, where the 'map' becomes one's picture of the landscape, Native American maps are always secondary to the oral 'picture' or experience of the landscape. Routes, landmarks, sacred sites, and historical events formed a 'mental map' that wove together geography, history, and mythology. 110

While aboriginal societies certainly did posses the idea that their society inhabited a certain territory to the exclusion of other societies, they had vastly different conceptions concerning the ownership of land, the delimitation of territory, and the geopolitical nature of sovereignty.

What the above examples have attempted to do, despite their cursory nature, is to make obvious the historically specific nature of the border discourse that was at play during the Alaskan boundary dispute. The delineation of the Alaskan border is presented by those involved as a problem to be solved through judicial and scientific means through the

use of "legal and scientific experts."\footnote{Great Britain, Foreign Office: 1899b?: 212.} Since the 'real' border exists in the treaties between the negotiating parties, its true location could be discovered using the "incontestable principle of international law."\footnote{ibid.: 92.} As defined by international law, however, the border also had to correspond 'logically' with the physical geography of its location. It was thus possible to have a "geographically unsound"\footnote{Great Britain, Foreign Office: 1887: 20.} border, one that, "if laid down in literal accordance with the language of the Convention," would "afford a frontier grotesque in its intricacies and irregularities."\footnote{ibid.: 22.} These judicial and scientific discourses were completely foreign to the aboriginal societies that inhabited the area in pre-colonial North America. Instead of the geography being socially spatialised through reference to the society's oral tradition, the land was placed under the rubric of European jurisprudence and scientific knowledge.

To return to the African example, George Joffé argues that the legacy of colonialism was the implantation of the "European concept of the state as an area of unique and sovereign power over which political authority is exercised, rather than relating sovereignty primarily to populations."\footnote{Joffé, 1987: 30.} The colonial states saw their sovereignty as inhabiting a delimited territorial space. This was in contrast to the concept that a nation's sovereignty was accorded to populations based on ethnicity or
religious vocation, such as is the case in Islamic law.\textsuperscript{116} This should not be taken to mean that in the process of territorializing their colonial possessions, European states were not concerned with 'populations' as sites for government regulation. The difference was that populations, understood governmentally as individuals in aggregate, would now be defined solely by their territorial status (\textit{i.e.} is the individual inside or outside of the state's boundaries?). By basing sovereignty on a rigid territorial basis, colonialism supplants indigenous geopolitical representations with:

\begin{quote}
a totaling classificatory grid, which could be applied with endless flexibility to anything under the state's real or contemplated control: peoples, regions, religions, languages, products, monuments, and so forth. The effect of the grid was always to be able to say of anything that it was this, not that; it belonged here, not there. It was bounded, determinate, and therefore – in principle – countable.\textsuperscript{117}
\end{quote}

Thus, one comes to the second characteristic of the Alaskan border: not only was it created through a colonial discourse, but it also represented a specifically liberal form of governance.

The colonial bordering discourse outlined above was an attempt to create in North America the necessary conditions for a liberal form of government as contained in Foucault's historically specific definition of

\textsuperscript{116} In Islamic law, citizenship is based on the individual's religion. The combination of the traditional understanding of religious-based citizenship with the Western concept of territorially-based citizenship has contributed to the instability of the modern state system in the Middle East. For more discussion on this matter, cf. Korany, 1987.

\textsuperscript{117} B. Anderson, 1992: 184.
governmentality. In liberal government, the "population comes to appear above all else as the ultimate end of government." As opposed to the Middle Ages, where the purpose of governance was the continuation of governance, in liberal government the main concern is the "welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc." In the opinion of Colin Gordon, liberal government postulates "an intimate symbiosis between the cares of government and the travails of a society exposed to the conflicts and crises of the liberal economy," where the problems of society take "the form of a catalogue of problems of government." In order to have the population as the ultimate recipient of government action, however, it is necessary to "identify problems specific to the population." This means bringing the full force of social science onto the state's territory; in other words, the population within the state's territory must be made 'countable'.

Viewing the Alaskan border through the lens of governmentality helps to explain why the border was not connected discursively to any metaphysical conceptions of national progress and destiny. The border

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118 Cf. chapter 2.
119 Foucault, 1991b: 100.
120 The example used by Foucault is Machiavelli's The Prince. The sole goal for the prince, as presented by Machiavelli, is not the welfare of his subjects, but the continuation of his power: "The link that binds [the prince] to his principality may have been established through violence, through family heritage or by treaty, with the complicity or the alliance of other princes; this makes no difference, the link in any event remains a purely synthetic one and there is no fundamental, essential, natural and juridical connection between the prince and his principality" 1991b: 90.
121 Foucault, 1991b: 100.
negotiations surrounding the Alaskan boundary dispute were not an attempt to make concrete a border that existed within a national consciousness (i.e. to identify and defend the natural/rightful limits of a nation-state), but to discover a border that existed in mutually agreed upon texts. There was no theme in the discourse implying that Canada has any 'natural' right to a certain border. That is not to say, of course, that the various negotiators did not fervently advocate the adoption of their position as to the actual location of the border. The border the parties for which the parties were negotiating was an administrative tool designed to meet the needs of a liberal government concerned with matters of economy. The border was not an attempt to order a realm in all of its details, but to regulate it in a specifically liberal manner that had as its primary goal the "recasting of the interface between state and society in the form of something like a second-order market of governmental goods and services."124 The Alaskan boundary as a customs frontier was economic in that it was primarily seen as a means of putting in place an administrative structure that would regulate the movement and activities of individuals as economic actors as well as supporting the business of the state through the collection of revenue.

3.5 Conclusion

The most prominent discovery made when examining the discursive role of the border during the Alaskan boundary dispute is that the border was not important. This is not to deny the undisputable fact that the border was central to, and indeed the reason for, the dispute and subsequent negotiations. In the discourse, however, the border never acted as an end in and of itself, but rather as a means to an end. Within the dominant discourse at the time, the establishment of the border was also the establishment of an administrative regime in the Yukon and an attempt by a colonial/liberal government to bring economic order to the periphery of the empire.
4. Reciprocity debate of 1911 - the 'missing' border

4.1 Historical background

The reciprocity debate has long been a thorny issue in Canada. Indeed, the question of whether to enter into a free trade agreement with the United States pre-dates Confederation itself. In 1854 the United States first entered into a reciprocity agreement to allow for common fishing rights and free trade in natural products with Britain's North American possessions. This treaty was short lived, however, as it was abrogated by the United States Congress in 1866, victim to an up-swell in domestic support in the United States for protectionist policies. Since Confederation in 1867, reciprocity has played a pivotal role in three federal elections (all of which resulted in electoral loses for the Liberal party). Twice the voters rejected a proposed reciprocity treaty, in 1891 and 1911. It was not until 1988 that a reciprocity treaty was embraced by the electorate, with the re-election of the Conservative party under Brian Mulroney. This electoral victory ushered in first the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), later expanded in 1993 with the addition of Mexico as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

This thesis will focus on the reciprocity debate surrounding the 1911 federal election. Before the election occurred, the Liberals, lead by Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier, surprised the Canadian public by announcing that the government had agreed to a reciprocity treaty with
the United States. The agreed-upon treaty was limited in scope, and certainly not on the same scale as the current agreement in place between Canada and the United States; tariffs on fish, livestock and farm products were eliminated, but tariffs in support of Canada’s burgeoning manufacturing sector were left intact. Nonetheless, having President Taft of the United States agree to the treaty was a notable achievement, one that the Liberal party had been trying to secure since Confederation. Domestic opposition to the treaty soon emerged, however, from Canada’s business class. Foremost in opposing the proposed treaty was the ‘Toronto Eighteen’, a group of 18 prominent Liberal businessmen from Toronto, counting in their membership the heads of five banks, two railroads, three manufacturers and two life insurance companies. The Toronto Eighteen publicly broke rank with their party to oppose the treaty, becoming the genesis for the very active Canadian National League. This opposition was only bolstered by Taft’s attempts in Washington, D.C. to have the treaty ratified by Congress. In support of reciprocity, Taft made the argument that the treaty was tantamount to the annexation of Canada. In a letter to former President Roosevelt, Taft wrote that the treaty would turn Canada into “only an adjunct of the United States.... I see this argument made against Reciprocity in Canada, and I think it is a good one.” In the House of Representatives, Champ Clark, a member of the Democratic party leadership declared: ‘I hope to see the day when the American flag will float over every square foot of the
British-North American possessions clear to the North Pole."\textsuperscript{125} On September 21, 1911 the Conservatives won 134 seats to the Liberals' 87. Unable to counter the nationalism aroused by such comments, the Liberal party went down in electoral defeat.

4.2 The 'Missing' Border

The debate over the reciprocity treaty was, at its most basic level, a discussion concerning the movement of commerce across the border. Yet the debate, given the rather vocal threat of American annexation, was also fundamentally bound to nationalist rhetoric. Representatives from both sides of the debate professed that they were proceeding in their arguments from "a national point of view."\textsuperscript{126} Given this, what makes the discourse surrounding the reciprocity treaty interesting is that the border itself was not given a significant discursive role to play. Much as in the Alaskan boundary dispute, the border was not identified within the discourse as the holder or protector of Canadian sovereignty, nor was the border discursively involved in the social spatialisation of Canada. This is not to say, however, that there was no unifying force in the discourse. As will be seen below, there was a strong predilection to concepts of cross-country unity in the discourse, making the near absence of the border only more notable.

\textsuperscript{125} Hillmer and Granatstein, 1994: 40.
\textsuperscript{126} Tupper, 1911?. 
The idea that there was a geographic force holding Canada together was very much at play in the reciprocity debates. As can be seen in the following excerpt by Clifford Sifton, there was a fairly evident preoccupation with the unity of Canada:

What is the commonest phrase in the mouths of the people of Canada? We hear it in the speeches of public men, we read it in their editorials of newspapers; we even see it in the compositions of our school boys – what is it? "Binding the scattered provinces of Canada together." I would like to know if this treaty is intended to bind the scattered provinces of Canada together.¹²⁷

This 'binding' most often found discursive voice in a geographic/geopolitical image of an east-west axis. This east-west axis was used almost exclusively to define what Canada was and what Canada's highest ambition should be. The maintenance of the east-west axis was presented as a national project: "This was Canada's task. It is still her task. She has accomplished it, so far, because reciprocity with the United States has not existed."¹²⁸ Commentators warned that the reciprocity treaty would "smash Canadian interests which to-day live by East-and-West trading",¹²⁹ that it would "destroy the artery through which East and West live a common, national life."¹³⁰ Indeed, the most consistent criticism that was leveled against the reciprocity agreement

¹²⁷ Sifton, 1911?.
¹²⁸ Canadian National League, 1911?.
¹²⁹ *By Canadians, for Canadians, about Canadians*, 1911?.
¹³⁰ Hawkes, 1911?.
was that it would irrevocably shift Canada’s east-west axis to a north-south axis with the United States:

I would like to know if this treaty is intended to bind the scattered provinces of Canada together. It binds, but it binds the other way; it binds the provinces of the North West to the states immediately to the south of them; it binds Ontario and Quebec to the states south of us; and it binds the maritime provinces to the states of New England.131

The idea of Canada – which is seen primarily through the east-west motif – existed discursively as a human creation, fighting for its survival against the more natural north-south axis. During the reciprocity debates, all of Canada’s young history was cast as a struggle that “forced our trade against the laws, of nature and geography.”132 The reciprocity treaty was delegitimized within the discourse by being cast as a threat to the east-west link, effectively reversing the “great and successful policy” that allowed Canadians, "fighting against poverty, against natural obstacles, against geographic conditions," to make Canada “one of the most enviable [countries] of the world.”133 Whereas the east-west axis was seen as a virtuous link, the north-south axis embodied a future in which Canada gave in to its base, natural urges: "These tremendous influences pulling the countries together, had to be resisted, ...and east and west trade promoted and maintained."134

131 Sifton, 1911?.
132 Tupper, 1911?.
133 Sifton, 1911?.
134 Canadian National League, 1911?. 
Proceeding from the above logic, if Canada "were to follow the laws of nature and geography between Canada and the United States, the whole trade would flow from south to north, and from north to south." In other words, trade "would be diverted South as surely as water runs down hill." A sense of scientific certainty was given to the predicted results of the reciprocity treaty, a scienticism sometimes made explicit: "The result can be estimated almost in as precise terms as an astronomer can express the weight of figures of, and the force of gravitation between, two celestial bodies."

It should be noted that this east-west notion of national unity was not just tied to the confines of what is now considered Canada, but had an extra-continental aspect to it. The east-west axis was often stretched across the north Atlantic to accommodate a Canadian nationality that saw itself as an integral part of the British Empire: "bear in mind that there is but one alternative for you, ...Canada's position geographically is such that she must be either hostage or a link between Britain and the United States." Although the British Empire was still present in almost every corner of the world at this time, it was firmly situated to the east in the minds of Canadians. The British Empire was incorporated as an extension of the dominant east-west discourse, an axis that would be thrown off-kilter by the north-south tendencies of the reciprocity.

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135 Tupper, 1911?.
136 Gosnell, 1911?.
137 *ibid*
138 Cartwright, 1911?.
agreement. One read that the reciprocity agreement would thus "weaken the ties which bind Canada to the Empire," and the north-south trade that "would naturally flow would still weaken those ties and make it more difficult to avert political union with the United States."\textsuperscript{139}

The above should not be taken to mean that the border was completely ignored in the deliberations over the reciprocity treaty. As it was a discussion of the movement of commerce over the border, the border did occupy a place within the discourse, as can be seen in the following example:

[it is] idle to say that reciprocal north and south trade will not lessen our interprovincial trade, and our trade with Great Britain. ...Look at a map of Canada and see what reciprocity would mean. Our country would be trapped all along the southern boundary.\textsuperscript{140}

Elsewhere, the reciprocity agreement was described as an attempt to "remove the tariff line between" the two countries.\textsuperscript{141} In neither of these cases, however, was the border involved in the dominant east-west imagery, but was instead used in a cursory fashion as a barrier to the 'natural' north-south flow of trade. Instead of the border acting as an east-west link, it was transportation infrastructure – particularly the railway – that became the means of 'binding' the nation. Thus, government policy was seen as doing "everything possible by building canals and subsidizing railways to bring the trade from west to east... so

\textsuperscript{139} Liberal promises..., 1911?.
\textsuperscript{140} Canadian National League, 1911?.
\textsuperscript{141} Gosnell, 1911?.
as to bring this trade into British channels."\textsuperscript{142} As Sifton rhetorically asked: "What have been the main features of our transportation policy? We have spent scores of millions of dollars [on the Canadian Pacific Railway] for what purpose?"\textsuperscript{143} Within a discourse where the east-west axis of the country was supported by the imagery of trans-national transportation infrastructure, the reciprocity agreement was seen as the abandonment of the national institutions that solidified the east-west axis.

4.3 Borders and Geopolitics

The 1911 federal election offers an interesting look at the connection between borders and geopolitics. "In certain circumstances," writes Malcolm Anderson, "the frontier acquired a mythic significance in building nations and political identities, becoming the \textit{mythomoteur} of a whole society."\textsuperscript{144} As will be seen in an analysis of texts opposed to the reciprocity treaty during the 1911 federal election, however, the border's role in creating/perpetuating the state's geopolitical identity is neither constant nor predictable. Despite the discourse being organized around a pronounced geopolitical representation of Canada, the border did not play a significant role in that spatial image.

As outlined above, the geopolitical representation present in the reciprocity debates was that Canada existed in a very fundamental way

\textsuperscript{142} Tupper, 1911?.
\textsuperscript{143} Sifton, 1911?.
\textsuperscript{144} M. Anderson, 1996: 4.
along an east-west axis. Before examining the role of the border in relation to this representation, however, it would be useful to first clarify some of the terms used above. In describing this representation of Canada as 'geopolitical', a conscious effort is being made to place the representation within the methodological purview of governmentality. Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby argue that geopolitical imagery is not merely a benign representation of the 'real' world, but rather a practical rationality in the Foucauldian sense: "we begin from the premise that geopolitics is itself a form of geography and politics, ...and that it is implicated in the ongoing social reproduction of power and political economy."\(^{145}\) Geopolitics has a central role in the construction and perpetuation of a governmental discourse because it identifies the space in which the government can act by "establishing a boundary with an outside and converting diverse places into a unitary internal space."\(^{146}\) Rob Shields uses the term 'social spatialisation' to describe the process by which space is grouped into an identifiable formation:

Spatialisation... is a means to express ideas – an intellectual shorthand whereby spatial metaphors and place images can convey a complex set of associations without the speaker having to think deeply and to specify exactly which associations or images he or she intends.\(^{147}\)

\(^{145}\) Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 1998: 2.
\(^{146}\) ibid.: 3.
\(^{147}\) Shields, 1991: 46.
Shields goes on to define social spatialisation as a ‘discourse of space’, once again relying on Foucault’s concept of discursive formation.\textsuperscript{148} Social spatialisation, however, is not just the labeling of geographic space into easily identifiable silos. It is the spatialisation of “social divisions and cultural classifications... using spatial metaphors or descriptive divisions.”\textsuperscript{149} Dreyfus and Rabinow contend that understanding how society is marshaled into a spatial context is critical to Foucault’s description of the rise of liberal governmentality and biopower: “Discipline proceeds by the organization of individuals in space, and it therefore requires a specific enclosure of space.”\textsuperscript{150} Foucault himself was well aware of the importance of geography in the formation of discourses, arguing that it was essential to investigate the “tactics and strategies [of power] deployed through implantations, distributions, demarcations, control of territories and organizations of domains....”\textsuperscript{151}

4.4 The Importance of Geopolitical Representations

The consideration of geopolitical representations as discursive regimes is valuable because it allows the study of geopolitics to be thought of as a discursive struggle between competing spatial images. The perpetuation of a geopolitical representation is a political act because it involves the construction or reaffirmation of a discourse that allows governments to

\textsuperscript{148} ibid.: 47.
\textsuperscript{149} ibid.: 29.
\textsuperscript{151} Foucault, 1980b: 77.
“organize, occupy, and administer space”\textsuperscript{152} in a specific way to the exclusion of others. Thus certain policies or historical understandings can be dismissed as illegitimate while others can be held as central ‘truths’ – truths that are reliant on the hegemonic discourse for their substance and would be deligitimized under competing discourses.

Viewed under the aegis of competing discourses, the dominant east-west geopolitical representation at play during the reciprocity debate can be thought of as engaged in a struggle with an alternative north-south ‘continental’ discourse. It is interesting that in this case, the competing discourse is actually in some part a creation of the dominant discourse. Proponents of reciprocity, for the most part, were not seeking the annexation of Canada into a continental/American regime: Clark’s vision of a United States running all the way north to the North Pole was greeted warily by Canadian politicians on both sides of the debate. Given the persistence of the east-west discourse, it is not surprising that any competing discourse would be deligitimized as a north-south proposal; there was simply not enough rhetorical room to maneuver within the dominant geopolitical representation to allow for any continental imagining of Canada to take root. In this debate, to associate something with a north-south geopolitical image was to dismiss it as incompatible with Canada’s future. At the risk of creating a stable historical subject, it should be noted that the east-west discourse has had a certain resilience

\textsuperscript{152} Ó Tuathail, 1996: 1.
in the academic study of Canada. One of the more influential organizing concepts in Canadian history is the 'Laurentian Thesis', formulated in the 1930s by Donald Creighton.¹⁵³ Based in part on earlier work by Harold Innis,¹⁵⁴ this thesis contends that Canada’s historical development as a transatlantic and transcontinental market economy was an outgrowth of the east-west axis of the St. Lawrence River. All of Canadian history, from the fur trade on, is cast at once as an economic practice and as a natural response to the westward flow of the St. Lawrence.

In the United States the equivalent to the 'Laurentian Thesis' is the 'Frontier Thesis', first presented by Frederick Turner in 1893.¹⁵⁵ Turner argued that the American national identity was forged on the Western frontier; it was in the rugged colonial experience that Americans gained the individualism and wariness of authority that would differentiate the United States culturally and socially from Europe. Following this thesis, the American Southwest, specifically the U.S.-Mexico border created by the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo in 1848, represents the final resting place of a dynamic line of Americanization that swept westward across the continent. The American Southwest is positioned in this geopolitical representation at the periphery of the United States. While many historians have criticized this thesis since its inception, there is little

¹⁵³ Creighton, 1956.
¹⁵⁴ Innis, 1930.
¹⁵⁵ Turner, 1893.
doubt that as a central organizing theme it has had a tremendous influence on the production of American history.\textsuperscript{156} In recent years, an alternative geopolitical representation has emerged to challenge the ‘Frontier thesis’. This discourse does not locate the U.S.-Mexico border on the periphery but at the center of a unique social and political space – a Mexican-American community whose identity is not reliant on a delineated international border.\textsuperscript{157} The future development of the region is very much dependent on the discursive struggle between the border’s geopolitical representation as either the center or the periphery.

A particularly vivid example of competing discourses is found in the debate over the future of European integration. Referring to some of the various theories on European integration that have been put forward, Thomas Diez states that there is much debate over whether the EU is a ‘postmodern’ or ‘regulatory state’, a ‘confederatio’, ‘consortio’ or ‘condominio’, a system of ‘multi-level governance’ or a ‘multiperspectival polity’,\textsuperscript{158} each presenting a different geopolitical representation of ‘Europe’.\textsuperscript{159} All of these theories position themselves as an accurate description of reality, an attempt to give a name to and categorize the true nature of Europe. Diez argues, however, that even though the theories present themselves “as mirrors of reality, the discrepancy

\textsuperscript{156} For a look at the continued relevance of Turner's work in the practice of American history, cf. McClintock, 1986. 
\textsuperscript{157} Albert and Brock, 1998: 228. 
\textsuperscript{158} Diez, 1999a: 598. 
\textsuperscript{159} ‘Europe’ is understood here to be the geopolitical representation of the EU.
between the existence of [a new Europe] and our knowledge of it suggests that reality is not so readily observable as it may seem."\textsuperscript{160} Instead of viewing these competing geopolitical representations as apolitical descriptions of Europe, they need to be considered as political texts that participate in the construction of a new Europe. Political scientists who adhere to theories of intergovernmental institutionalism contend that international institutions "are created by states as purposeful and utility-maximizing actors."\textsuperscript{161} Thus, when considering the EU through theories of intergovernmental institutionalism, it is found that the "rational pursuit of commercial interest, not a European cultural ideal... provides the only empirically robust explanation for the long-term evolution of the EU."\textsuperscript{162} In this construction of Europe as a geopolitical space ordered by the rationality of national economic maximization, normative constructions of Europe – such as those that conceive of Europe as a geopolitical space ordered on the basis of common liberal values – are deligitimized.

The American and European examples show the importance of geopolitical representations in the construction of polity they describe. In examining the propagation of these constructions, it is necessary to look at both the discursive and non-discursive tactics and strategies of power in the formulation of a geopolitical representation; the analysis of the

\textsuperscript{160} Diez, 1999a: 598-599.
\textsuperscript{161} Jachtenfuchs et al., 1998: 411.
\textsuperscript{162} Moravcsik, 1999: 373.
reciprocity debate thus becomes an exercise in exploring the relationship between the discursive elements of the reciprocity debates (the 'east-west axis' representation) and the non-discursive elements (the border). Some clarification is needed when declaring the border to be a non-discursive object. As is argued elsewhere in this paper, the 'idea' of the border certainly has a strong discursive role to play. In the present context, however, the border is understood as being non-discursive because, unlike the wholly "imaginary geography"\textsuperscript{163} of the geopolitical representation, the border exists in a very tangible manner in the bricks and mortar of the customs house and survey markers and through cartographical representations.

4.5 The Denaturalization of the Colonial Border

From the outset, there would seem to be a clear connection between borders and any geopolitical representation. Even in critical theory, borders are commonly understood to act in nation-states as "instruments of state policy."\textsuperscript{164} Borders provide for the "political domination over a spatial extension,"\textsuperscript{165} acting as the lynchpin for any geopolitical understanding of the nation. In the reciprocity debate, however, the border did not play a central role in the organization of the dominant geopolitical image. It did have a secondary role within the discourse as a stop gate to the 'natural' flow of north-south trade;

\textsuperscript{163} Shields, 1991: 29.
\textsuperscript{164} M. Anderson, 1996: 2.
\textsuperscript{165} Ackleson, 1999: 159.
although the border did not have a role in the construction of the discourse, it did have a role in the reification of the discourse. The border, as a government tool, is used in this discourse to help conquer nature. This geopolitical use of the border is out of step with the dominant bordering discourse in Europe during the 19th and early 20th century. The 19th century witnessed the creation of the ‘nation’ as a site for historical and geographical study. Central to this study of nations was an investigation of environmental influences to explain the process by which ethnic groups were transformed into individual nation-states. This reliance on environmental factors made “these processes appear natural and necessary.... In terms of the relations between nations this situation led to an emphasis on ‘natural frontiers’.”166 Since nation-states were natural creations, it was logical that they would have natural boundaries. In such a situation, geopolitics became a game in which nation-states sought to defend their natural space, to default to their natural borders or to surge past them into another nation-state’s natural space. In practice, therefore, a natural border meant a defensible border.167 Conflict arose when different delineations of natural borders overlapped, such as along the Rhine. While French geographers saw the Rhine as the natural eastern limit of the French nation, German geographers viewed the Rhine as a ‘German’ river, negating any French

166 Black, 1997: 82-83.
167 van Dijk, 1999: 25.
claims to its western bank.\textsuperscript{168} Any advance in territory or control of the Rhine by one nation was thus seen by the other nation as an aberration of nature, an unnatural situation that it was imperative for the nation to remedy. The colonial basis of Canada's borders can explain the absence of this naturalizing discourse in Canada. As discussed in chapter 3, the bordering discourse in Canada was seen as the implantation of European order into a virgin wilderness. While borders often followed natural features, this was done for the sake of convenience or other strategic reasons without any consideration of ethnographic issues. The same combination of geometric lines and natural features found in the colonial delineation of Africa\textsuperscript{169} can be found in Canada, from the rigidity of the 49\textsuperscript{th} parallel to the meandering course of the border through the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River. Canada as a geopolitical space was seen as a governmental project that attempted to overcome the 'natural' continental urges through the implantation of order and civilization. Even though the border did not play a significant role in the construction of the east-west axis during the reciprocity debate, it did have a significant role in supporting this image as a tactile technology of power.

4.6 CONCLUSION

What is important about the reciprocity debate in 1911 in the context of this thesis is that during a debate where, given the current border

\textsuperscript{168} Walters, 2002: 566.

\textsuperscript{169} M. Anderson, 1996: 80.
discourse, one would expect the border to play a prominent role, the border was silent. Despite the charged issues of commerce, geography, and sovereignty at play in the 1911 election, the border did not emerge in the discourse as a significant nodal point for these concepts. The border's involvement in the geopolitical imagining of the nation should not be taken as a natural state of affairs.
5. After September 11 – the ‘Smart’ and ‘Secure’ Border

5.1 Post-September 11 Context

Just weeks before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the ruling Liberal Party’s pollster, Michael Marzolini, had advised the government to “steer clear of the terms ‘harmonization and integration’ while tightening ties with the U.S.” Furthermore, any new proposals dealing with the border should be positioned as a “customer service” – a far cry from anything to do with Canadian sovereignty or independence.” As noted by Juliet O’Neill: “A couple of weeks later, Marzolini’s advice was blown out of the water.” In the aftermath of September 11, the Canada-U.S. border was thrust to the forefront of the public’s attention. As public policy discussion and speculation increased concerning what will tentatively be called a ‘North American’ agenda, the major governmental questions of the day – the issues of sovereignty and (economic/national) security – became inextricably linked discursively to the border.

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171 For the purposes of this thesis, ‘North America’ will be taken to mean the conceptualized space occupied by Canada and the United States. This is, obviously, a problematic definition that delegitimizes wider conceptions of North America to include Mexico, or non-state definitions. For the most part, however, the phrase ‘North America’ in Canada is taken to mean Canada and the United States as two nation-states.
172 Of course, nothing is ever really ‘inextricably linked’ within a discourse. If that were the case, there would never be any room for discursive change – a premise that is at the heart of any genealogical examination. The phrase, ‘inextricably linked’ is used here purposefully, however, to point to the apparent fixedness of the discourse to those operating within it.
5.2 The Border as Defender of Sovereignty

The border is clearly identified in contemporary discourse as being intrinsically related to Canada’s sovereignty: “The border is, to some, a symbol of our sovereignty; it is where we stand on guard.”\(^{173}\) The issue of Canada’s sovereignty is a constant refrain in the border discourse, acting as a filter through which all policy proposals – especially those calling for closer integration with the United States – must pass. Two primary positions have thus developed within the discourse. The first position sees the loss of sovereignty that would flow from any integrationist border policy as being simply unacceptable. Those who hold this belief “are worried that [any integration] would impinge on Canadian independence, while others worry that without a border Canada will inexorably creep into political union with the U.S.”\(^ {174}\)

Additionally, it is reported that:

> some politicians and analysts are worried about how far the federal Liberals have gone to appease the United States and get trade flowing again, abdicating a measure of control over tools that are vital to a nation’s sense of identity and authority: policing the border, and standards for visas, immigration and refugees.\(^ {175}\)

The above quotation is useful because it includes a handy checklist of those policy areas over which it is believed that Canada must retain control for the sake of its own sovereignty. This, in turn, provides for a

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\(^{173}\) Manley, 2002a.  
definition of sovereignty: at the root of the current discourse in the conception that a sovereign state must have the ability to decide, "who gets in and out of our country".\textsuperscript{176}

5.3 THE BORDER AND THE SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION

It is not especially surprising that sovereignty is conceptualized as being primarily concerned with the movement of people in and out of the state's territorial limits. Indeed, Malcolm Anderson contends that "the ability to control frontier crossings is universally regarded as an essential attribute of sovereignty and the right to refuse entry to aliens is a stable principle of international law."\textsuperscript{177} What is noteworthy, however, is that, despite editorial comment to the effect that "the most important feature of a state is sovereignty" over a "clearly defined territory,"\textsuperscript{178} that in the end, sovereignty does not hold an overly privileged position in the policy making process. Instead of arguing that border integration will not affect Canada's sovereignty, the second position, mentioned above, contends that while any border integration will result in the loss of sovereignty, Canada would still benefit from such a policy:

\begin{quote}
The loss of sovereignty should be, of course, weighed against what both countries will gain if a customs union were to be signed in the future. Those benefits include a reduction in paperwork at the border, lower costs for businesses, greater market access without much friction at the
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{176} ibid.,
\textsuperscript{177} M. Anderson, 1996: 129.
\textsuperscript{178} The Vancouver Sun, 2002.
\end{flushright}
border and lower prices and more choice for consumers in Canada and the U.S.\textsuperscript{179}

The role of sovereignty in the current discourse is striking because it represents a drastic change in the position of sovereignty within a governmental discourse. Instead of being an end in itself – the modern conception that (territorial) sovereignty is something that nations must possess – it is considered as a means to an end. When sovereignty is seen as just a governmental tool that can be used in the attainment of the ‘true’ goals of state – economic and public security – it thus becomes easier to dismiss considerations of sovereignty when they are incompatible with government action that is thought necessary to secure the greater economic good. Since sovereignty is seen as being protected by a ‘hard’ border that closely regulates the movement of goods and people, the diminution of sovereignty can be translated in functional terms with a loosening of modern conceptions of the relation between the border and the state.

An important caveat is that this new security discourse has not completely overtaken the modern nation-state discourse. As discussed in chapter two, the movement from one hegemonic discourse to another is in fact a battle between two competing regimes of truth. There is no sudden transition, therefore, from one discourse to another even though the rationalities represented by the two discourses may be radically different. Vestiges of former hegemonic discourses remain – indeed, one

\textsuperscript{179} \textit{ibid.}.
of the goals of the genealogist is to see how this former knowledge is retained or forgotten within the current discourse. While the discursive power of territorial/sovereign conceptions such as a 'national economy' or a 'national culture' has been greatly diminished, they have not been extinguished. The border is still seen as affording Canada some form of protection from American culture, despite the porous character of the border in regards to the technological transmission of culture. Likewise, the allure of a 'national economy' remains, but it has been discursively linked with the removal of barriers between it and the world economy.

5.4 The Border and Economic/Public Security

In the current border discourse, the primacy of economic security (which equals public security) has trumped the central importance of sovereignty in the life of the nation-state. By arguing that the loss of control of the border will necessarily result in the loss of sovereignty, both sides of the debate find themselves basing their arguments on the same question: will the benefits procured from the proposed border policy be enough to outweigh the policy's negative impact on Canada's sovereignty? Or, from a different perspective, does the value of maintaining Canada's sovereignty outweigh the lost benefits that would accompany any proposed border policy? Public opinion polls after
September 11 suggest, "Canadians are willing to sacrifice sovereignty for security."\textsuperscript{180}

The most significant border agreement put into place since September 11 is the 'Smart Border Declaration', signed in Ottawa on December 12, 2001 between Canada and the United States. The preamble to the declaration states:

The terrorist actions of September 11 were an attack on our common commitment to democracy, the rule of law and a free and open economy. They highlighted a threat to our public and economic security. They require our governments to develop new approaches to meet these challenges. This declaration commits our governments to work together to address these threats to our people, our institutions and our prosperity.

Public security and economic security are mutually reinforcing. By working together to develop a zone of confidence against terrorist activity, we create a unique opportunity to build a smart border for the 21st century; a border that securely facilitates the free flow of people and commerce; a border that reflects the largest trading relationship in the world.

Our countries have a long history of cooperative border management. This tradition facilitated both countries’ immediate responses to the attacks of September 11. It is the foundation on which we continue to base our cooperation, recognizing that our current and future prosperity and security depend on a border that operates efficiently and effectively under all circumstances.\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{180} O'Neill, 2001.
\textsuperscript{181} The Smart Border Declaration, 2001.
The above quotation, while lengthy, is useful in clarifying the current conception of sovereignty, as well as outlining the role of the border as an object of government policy.

The primary concern expressed in the declaration, and, therefore, the main object of governmental regulation and activity, is the maintenance of North America's "public and economic security" for the sake of "our current and future prosperity and security." What is most interesting about this professed goal is what it means for the articulation of 'the other' that is so essential in the formation and perpetuation of the modern border discourse.\textsuperscript{182} The foreign identity from which the border separates Canada is not the United States, a nation located on the other side of the dividing line. 'Otherness' is instead assigned to a transnational class of individuals — "terrorists and criminals of all kinds," according to Prime Minister Chrétien\textsuperscript{183} — that is seen as posing a common threat to both Canada and the United States. Individuals can therefore be delegitimized as valid actors within this discourse by being declared incompatible with the North American "commitment to democracy, the rule of law and a free and open economy." Far from being seen as a point of divergence and confrontation with the United States, the border is positioned as the type-site for North American cooperation; "The Canada-U.S. border is a potent symbol of our interdependence and the enduring partnership between our two countries. It symbolizes the

\textsuperscript{182} Boswell, 2000: 538.
\textsuperscript{183} Chrétien, 2001.
many ties that link our citizens and our economies,"\textsuperscript{184} and "the Canada-U.S. border is also the channel for the world's most successful, active, comprehensive and productive bilateral relationship."\textsuperscript{185}

The threat to Canada has been deterritorialized and denationalized at the border because the very thing that the border is designed to protect, a liberal market system, is not fundamentally tied to a territorial conception of Canada: "This is the 21\textsuperscript{st} century – not the Congress of Vienna. Walled nation-states have melted into a global village."\textsuperscript{186} Thus, the Canadian Ambassador in Washington, Michael Kergin, declares that:

\begin{quote}
[in order to reinforce] our mutual security... we should continue to pursue the goal of improving the movement of legitimate people and goods across our border. Not to do so would be to hand the terrorists their victory, a restricted society and a weakened economy.\textsuperscript{187}
\end{quote}

With the border positioned as the main location for both the security and economic defence of North America, the mobility of individuals becomes problematized as a security concern for the border to address. The securitization of mobility in part refers to the "social construction of migration as a security question" that places migration inside a discourse where it is conceptualized primarily "as a force which endangers the good life" in Western society.\textsuperscript{188} It is, after all, the presence

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{184} Cauchon, 2001.
\item \textsuperscript{185} Manley, 2002a.
\item \textsuperscript{186} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{187} Kergin, 2001a.
\item \textsuperscript{188} Huysmans, 2000: 752.
\end{itemize}
of a "tiny percentage of traffic which is high risk"\textsuperscript{189} that imperils the legitimate "business and tourism" economy.\textsuperscript{190}

5.5 The securitization of the border in Mexico and Europe

The securitization of migration, in a comparative context, is particularly evident at the Mexico-United States border. The opening of the border to the free movement of goods and services under NAFTA was accompanied by 'Operation Blockade', a large-scale military operation undertaken by the United States to close the border to the free movement of people.\textsuperscript{191} This is a clear example of the debordering and rebordering processes at play in the globalization discourse. In Europe, the adoption of the Schengen \textit{acquis} by the majority of the European Union at the 1999 European Council in Tampere is an example of the securitization of migration policy at a supra-national level. The adoption of the Schengen \textit{acquis} has been posited as the "abolition of internal border controls as part of both the completion of the internal market" as well as the "creation of 'Europe of the citizens' in which citizens would experience the existence of Europe by traveling freely across borders."\textsuperscript{192} In practice, the creation of the EU's external borders has been dominated by a 'Fortress Europe' discourse. In the words of EU Commissioner António Vitorino, "Reinforced external border controls remain necessary in order

\textsuperscript{189} Manley, 2002b.
\textsuperscript{190} Chrétien, 2001.
\textsuperscript{191} Spener and Staudt, 1998: 234.
\textsuperscript{192} Monar, 2001: 758.
to compensate for the abolition of internal border controls.”¹⁹³ Ralph Rotte, in a study of post-reunification German immigration policy, argues that the creation of a common European migration policy is “an example of basically effective immigration control by government action adapting to the new challenges in the field.”¹⁹⁴ EU member states Europeanized migration policy not to create a coherent European position centered on any sort of common European value system, but rather to bolster their weakened national control of migration in the face of globalization.¹⁹⁵

5.6 ‘FORTRESS NORTH AMERICA’

An apparent contradiction can be found within the border discourse; an international border, a state construct designed to delimit a specific territorial sovereign competency, is being used to protect an extra-national territory (North America), from a post-territorial threat.¹⁹⁶ This is a common contradiction faced by the modernist state-centric discourse in a globalizing world. Pirjo Jukarainen argues that modern notions of territoriality are “being challenged by the multiplicity of overlapping spatial formations, the modern state-centric system is confronted by a change in the fixedness of spatial formations.”¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁴ Rotte, 2000: 357.
¹⁹⁶ The threat is post-territorial in that it is not based on the modernist conception of identifiable nation-states. It is post-territorial rather than non-territorial, however, because many of the perceived threats are identified by strong geopolitical images (i.e. Middle Eastern terrorism, Mexican immigration).
Despite being placed within a post-territorial context, the Canada-U.S. border is not disappearing through a process of deterritorialization. As Sergei Medvedev points out, "rather than becoming extinct, borders transform, taking on dynamic, moving, zonal forms...."\textsuperscript{198} Faced with a post-territorial ‘threat’, a rebordering process had been initiated. This rebordering process has taken the form of a ‘Fortress North America’ discourse: “Our line of defence has been expanded to encompass the idea that protecting our security begins far away from Canada – at the points of passenger embarkation and transit overseas...."\textsuperscript{199} Thus, the Smart Border declaration promises to “identify security threats before they arrive in North America through collaborative approaches to reviewing crew and passenger manifests, managing refugees, and visa policy coordination.” It also states that the two countries will “identify security threats arriving from abroad by developing common standards for screening cargo before it arrives in North America.” At the same time as stopping security threats before they reach North America, the declaration will attempt to decrease limits to the flow of goods and services across the “internal” border: “We will establish a secure system to allow low risk frequent travelers between our countries to move efficiently across the border.” By pushing out Canada’s border – not just as a geopolitical perimeter around North America, but through a multiplicity of border sites all around the world – the government is

\textsuperscript{198} Medvedev, 1998: 54.
\textsuperscript{199} Coderre, 2003.
attempting to create a North American "zone of confidence"\textsuperscript{200} where legitimate travelers, goods, and services can pass freely between Canada and the United States.

The internal border region between Canada and the United States that is being constructed by the above process is not an example of a post-territorial, post-national border, "a fuzzy zone of interchange with no clear limits."\textsuperscript{201} While the European Union example is not directly comparable (there are, for example, discursive notions of common citizenship and history at play in Europe that are not evident in North America), a case can be made that, just as the Schengen \textit{acquis} has caused the upward shift of national policies instead of the transformation of national policies into a coherent European policy (and, at the same time, the internalization of formerly international security issues\textsuperscript{202}), there will be very little discursive room for alternative imaginings of a North American community. As long as the movement of people is conceived of primarily as a security issue, those who would view the creation of a North American immigration policy not as a chance to create harder, more secure borders, but as a policy concerned foremost with fundamental human rights through the establishment of a liberal humanitarian migration regime, will be delegitimized within the discourse.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Kergin, 2001b.
\item Jukarainen, 1998: 58.
\item Passi, 1998: 15.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
5.7 Conclusion

Gearóid Ó Tuathail writes that "the concept of territory is contextually dependent upon the development of state bureaucratic powers..., military institutions and technology capabilities...." As seen in the example of the Canada-U.S. border after September 11, however, the relationship between territoriality, sovereignty and liberal government is a very flexible one. While territoriality may be contextually dependent on the modern state system, it can change and be changed by discursive movements in governmentality. Despite the apparent deterritorialization of the Canada-U.S. border, Canada – as a governmental actor – has produced a multitude of borders in various forms (rarely with a firm spatial component) throughout North America and the rest of the world. While under the current discourse it is apparent that Canada is forfeiting its sovereignty through this rebordering process, the government is by no means inhibiting its ability as a liberal government to regulate and legislate the actions of individuals. If anything, the expansion of border sites has increased the government's ability to advance a liberal governmental discourse.

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203 Ó Tuathail, 1999: 139.
6. Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis was to denaturalize the assumed role of the Canada-U.S border through a historical examination of the way that the border has been conceived in relation to territoriality and sovereignty. It was shown that the Canada-U.S. border has taken on different discursive shapes. The border existed as a 'customs frontier' during the Alaskan boundary crisis. During the reciprocity debate, the border was found to have surprisingly weak ties to the dominant geopolitical imagery. In the post-September 11 context, it was shown that the border was going through a reformation as a site for economic and public security. Contrasting these moments against one another is an attempt to show that because the border was not always as it is now, there is the possibility that the border can become something different in the future. By injecting methodology based on Foucault's concepts of genealogy and governmentality into the study of the Canada-U.S. border – a theoretical move that is not generally used in this area – and by highlighting some of the current issues at play in Europe and on the Mexico-U.S. border, this thesis tried to broaden the methodological toolbox that scholars of the Canada-U.S. border have to work with. Through the use of this methodological framework comes the realization that the current rigidity in the understanding of the border is an artificial constraint that can be bypassed. Genealogy is, in the end, a political act; it is hoped that other researchers will take up the methodology outlined in this thesis to
critically examine issues of territoriality and sovereignty in Canada and North America. It is especially important that this take place given the current construction of North America as a new geopolitical space.

Current academic investigations of 'North America' are primarily the domain of modern political science theories. The recent rise of interest in North America as a site for institutional structures (such as NAFTA or common defence mechanisms) and as a place for shared values and a common culture is treated unproblematically as the predictable culmination of a long historical progress of continental integration. North America needs to be investigated genealogically to find instances where it was presented as a problem to be solved, a means to a solution, an ultimate end, and, just as importantly, the instances when the concept of North America was absent from society.

The current geopolitical representation of North America in academic literature is firmly rooted in the economic/security discourse outlined in chapter 5. Dominated by modernism, this literature is overly concerned with quasi-supranational institutions and agreements such as NAFTA, and the process by which the continent's internal borders are being shifted outwards to become both a common security (and immigration) perimeter and a common external border "designed to attract foreign capital."204 In these theories, the emergence of a new North America can be found in the creation of sub-continental regional

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204 Albert and Brock, 1998: 227.
economies that reach across the existing international boundaries. Modernist theories view these trans-border trading regions as being more effective than traditional nation-based economies because they substitute artificial and inefficient trading relationships with more efficient and 'natural' trade linkages. It is predicted that the seed of a new North American identity is planted in these 'natural' regional economies. In much the same way, North America is presented as a 'natural' basis on which to plan for national/continental defence.

Modernism does not present any clear conception of how a transnational 'community' will develop from these 'natural' regional economies/security zones. The neofunctionalism/neoliberalism that is often relied upon to predict the creation of a North American community argues that "subnational and transfrontier changes will [provide] the innovations, necessities, and identities that will spur the development of functional interconnections between locations in North America." The idea that increased economic ties or militaristic ties will necessarily lead to increased societal ties is faulty, as is any deterministic theory. Modernist theory transforms the world into a marketplace "that is no longer steered by political ideas and interests but by the desire of customers to secure their needs." Earle and Wirth see the "well-springs of community in an era when sovereign states, though still important, no

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206 Katzenstein, 1996.
207 Earle and Wirth, 1995: 221.
longer dominate the realm of collective action.\textsuperscript{208} Their theory of integration, however, does not account for anything other than a functional economic space.

The current view of North America should be understood not as a 'natural' progression in the relationship between Canada and the United States in a globalizing world, but as one specific geopolitical representation. A proliferation of representations of what 'North America' is needs to be developed to provide alternatives to the current economic/security discourse. If North America is only defined as a 'space of security' or as a site for the maximization of national economies, what ramifications will that have for those living within that geopolitical space? This question must be addressed through an examination of the rebordering process taking place around North America, since the construction of any common border has a potentially dramatic effect on the construction of identity within the polity it contains.

\textsuperscript{208} ibid.: 219.
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