Autonomous agents require trust and reputation concepts in order to identify communities of agents with which to interact reliably in ways analogous to humans. Agent societies are invariably heterogeneous, with multiple decision making policies and actions governing their behaviour. Through the introduction of naive agents, this paper shows empirically that while learning agents can identify malicious agents through direct interaction, naive agents compromise utility through their inability to discern malicious agents. Moreover, the impact of the proportion of naive agents on the society is analyzed. The paper demonstrates that there is a need for witness interaction trust to detect naive agents in addition to the need for direct interaction trust to detect malicious agents. By proposing a set of policies, the paper demonstrates how learning agents can isolate themselves from naive and malicious agents.
A set of sensors establishes barrier coverage of a given line segment if every point of the segment is within the sensing range of a sensor. Given a line segment I, n mobile sensors in arbitrary initial positions on the line (not necessarily inside I) and the sensing ranges of the sensors, we are interested in finding final positions of sensors which establish a barrier coverage of I so that the sum of the distances traveled by all sensors from initial to final positions is minimized. It is shown that the problem is NP complete even to approximate up to constant factor when the sensors may have different sensing ranges. When the sensors have an identical sensing range we give several efficient algorithms to calculate the final destinations so that the sensors either establish a barrier coverage or maximize the coverage of the segment if complete coverage is not feasible while at the same time the sum of the distances traveled by all sensors is minimized. Some open problems are also mentioned.
The design and implementation of security threat mitigation mechanisms in RFID systems, specially in low-cost RFID tags, are gaining great attention in both industry and academia. One main focus of research interests is the authentication and privacy techniques to prevent attacks targeting the insecure wireless channel of these systems. Cryptography is a key tool to address these threats. Nevertheless, strong hardware constraints, such as production costs, power consumption, time of response, and regulations compliance, makes the use of traditional cryptography in these systems a very challenging problem. The use of low-overhead procedures becomes the main approach to solve these challenging problems where traditional cryptography cannot fit. Recent results and trends, with an emphasis on lightweight techniques for addressing critical threats against low-cost RFID systems, are surveyed.